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Have open-source hardware licenses ever been enforced when distributing a physical product?

As I have found out , there are "open-source hardware" licenses which are written in the spirit of "open-source software" licenses and require the user to publish a modified design if they distribute a physical product based on that design. Examples are TAPR and Arduino license. However, unlike software which is subject to copyright in any form, circuit boards are not subject to copyright as they are not works of art. This makes me wonder whether open-source hardware licenses can actually provide the protection that they advertise. Are such licenses deemed legally enforceable? Have they ever been enforced?

Circuit boards are not subject to copyright but circuit board designs are This case from Taiwan neatly explains the difference. The licence presumably attaches to the design of the circuit board - the circuit diagram, circuit board layout, or integrated circuit layout. In order to use the design, one would almost surely need to make a copy of it or modify it. It is this step that requires adherence to the licence, not the actual manufacture of the circuit.

Uploading images of music notation: Do we violate copyright laws?

As I have noticed, it is rather common on music.SE to post a photo of a few bars and ask for help how to play it, e.g. fingering, how to play ornaments, etc. Is that according to copyright laws? My assumption is that posting 1 or two bars could be ok and within fair use posting the whole piece is not ok. Is that correct? And if so, is there a strict borderline ( e.g. a number of bars or a fraction(%) of the piece)? This came up with this question , where a user was asking about an 8 bar piece. Since one comment mentioned that copyright laws vary between different jurisdictions: I was assuming that the US laws apply here, since StackExchange is located in the US. However, it would be nice if you could confirm this as well, since other options could be that the jurisdiction of the poster or the publisher would apply. PS: The only related post I could find so far is about copyright violation when transcribing notes, but that is not exactly the same.

All I know of "Fair use" is from reading Wikipedia: see Fair use . My assumption is that: 1) posting 1 or two bars could be ok and within fair use; 2) posting the whole piece is not ok. Is that correct? That's my assumption too. Similarly (on other SE sites) I'll upload a paragraph of an article, a screenshot of a page of a book of text, if I want to ask about it or reference it in an answer. And if so, is there a strict borderline (e.g. a number of bars or a fraction(%) of the piece)? I don't think so. Per Wikipedia, "Amount and substantiality" is important (less is better), and "Effect upon work's value" is also important. IMO my uploading just a couple of staves (for critical or academic reasons) won't reduce the market's demand for the complete work from the copyright owner, so my doing that should be considered fair, not "infringing". In the case in question it's an extract from a book -- i.e. it's not the whole book. Also the music is from the 18th or 19th century (therefore out of copyright, I assume), although I don't know whether the book can copyright its representation of the music. Also the book and its author are attributed (referenced, mentioned in the question). People on Stack Exchange like that: they'll ask you to reference (with a citation or hyperlink) what you quote. Doing that is mentioned in Wikipedia as one of the Additional factors : As explained by Judge Leval, courts are permitted to include additional factors in their analysis. One such factor is acknowledgement of the copyrighted source. Giving the name of the photographer or author may help, but it does not automatically make a use fair. I'd guess that, if anything, that would tend to help rather than hurt the copyright holder commercially (and would therefore please them, and make them disinclined to ask you to remove your posted extract) -- because a referenced quote of a snippet acts as kind of advertisement for the whole work. Note there's a specific help centre topic about to reference work written by others: How to reference material written by others -- it says things including ... Provide a link to the original page or answer Quote only the relevant portion Provide the name of the original author Do not copy the complete text of external sources; instead, use their words and ideas to support your own. And always give proper credit to the author and site where you found the text, including a direct link to it. ... which are compatible with what I wrote in the answer above.

Does usage of a title/salutation like doctor/professor have legal ramifications?

As I identify as a male adult, my understanding is that I should select "Mr." when asked for my title when filling out forms. I noticed a feature in my online bank portal which allowed me to change the title pre-pended to my name in communications. Changing this to Doctor (for which I am not recognised) worked instantly. Could asking to be referred to as Doctor or Professor when you do not hold either rank, illegal in any way? This is without any intent to claim one has studied in either field, simply asking that a company refers to them by that title.

australia It's dishonest. Dishonesty is not, in general, illegal. Dishonesty is illegal when it is used to obtain someone else's property or financial advantage through fraud . It's also illegal if it's part of a statement made when applying for an authorisation or benefit . It's potentially misleading. Misleading people is not, in general, illegal. Misleading is illegal when it takes place in trade or commerce . It gives you a title you don't hold. Claiming a title you don't hold is not, in general, illegal Claiming a title you don't hold is illegal if it is a protected title under Australian law. For example, there are protected titles under the National Health Practionioners Registration Scheme : "medical practitioner" is a protected title; "doctor" isn't. Further, holding yourself out to be able to practice in certain professions when you are not (e.g. law, engineering in some states etc.) is illegal. Context matters Putting on a white gown, wearing a stethoscope and calling yourself "doctor" when attending a fancy dress party is not illegal. Doing it to angle for a free upgrade on your airline ticket is.

Right of way on new construction when easement was never established?

As I know real estate law tends to be very local, this is occurring in the state of Georgia (in the US), and I'm not certain if the county is relevant (and not something I'd like to give out). I am running into an issue on sewer line access. Originally (1932) the plots of me and my neighbor were not divided as they are now. Apparently both existing hookups to the sewer are in between my front yard and the street. My house was built in 2006, after acquiring one plot from the neighbor's estate and combining it with another plot. At the time, a new sewer-line was put in for the house and no easement was written up. The house that was on neighbor's plot was from 1941, extremely dilapidated, and occasionally abandoned for up to 8 months at a time. The property was sold at the end 2013 and the house was demolished. Then a new house was erected on the site, where the building permit makes no mention of sewer access. Does the previous sewer attachment running through my property likely grant the current owner/construction the right to dig through my property to reconnect the new house on the old connection? I've been reading through much of O.C.G.A. TITLE 44 Chapter 9 and wasn't able to find much that might seemed immediately relevant. Is there a better place to look? Perhaps I need to try to find more county regulations (which I had a hard time finding digital copies of). I was a little interested in O.C.G.A. § 44-9-6 because there were several occasions where the property was vacant for 6+ months, including a 7-month pause in demolition construction due to funding, but after trying to find some case law I don't think that's long enough (as 44-9-6 doesn't specify a time, it seemed vague to me). Hopefully you will forgive if I'm not even asking this question correctly, but I'm trying to read up on relevant Georgia code so I can understand the situation from a legal perspective.

O.C.G.A. § 44-9-6 is a statute that deals with abandoned properties, typically meaning without ownership, upkeep, failure to observe their obligations related to loans/taxes....it's not just someone not living there for a few months or during construction. If the pipes are the municipality's or they are granted an easement in their deed they have the legal right to access them. There is really nothing that can stop them from accessing it, because if they applied for and seemingly obtained a building permit, then they would've not issued that permit without access to water and sewer (even if your county or town uses well and septic). The means necessary for obtaining that would've likely meant getting a sewer permit, too. But yes, these are all locally controlled issues.If you think the deed or the municipality does not grant the access, you can go to the registry of deeds and the county clerks office, and find out. That said, abandonment takes much much longer than you've described, and it's a legal determination not just a physical absence from the property from a neighbor's perspective if other things are in place.

On what grounds can a government delegalise the use of specific software and is that compliant with international laws?

As I read in the "Government use" section in the VPN blocking article on Wikipedia. It seems that Iran and China (used to) block access to use VPN software. I'd like to widen the scope of the question and apply it on any type of software, not specifically VPN or encryption software. On what grounds can a government delegalise the use of specific software? And is delegalization of (specific) software compliant with international laws (human rights)?

Governments have power to do whatever their constitutions (written or unwritten) allow them to do. For example, the constitution of Australia provides : The federal Parliament can make laws only on certain matters. These include: ... post and telecommunications; ... The telecommunications power covers VPN and any software that uses the Internet for delivery or communication (i.e. virtually all modern software). In addition the federal government has power over inter-state and international trade (any software that crosses state or international borders) and corporations (any software made, sold or used by companies). If they want to ban a piece of software they have pretty strong constitutional power to do so.

How can a F-2 visa holder establish a company but can't work inside the US?

As I searched about, I found that establishing a new company inside the US is allowed for everyone, but working inside the US is not allowed for certain type of visas like F-2 visa that is a student's(F-1) dependent visa. How can a F-2 visa holder have a company in the US but he/she can not work for his/her company? Does it mean he/she can work for his/her company in real but he/she can not write a wage/salary check for his/herself? I mean the police won't come to the office and say "Wow! you are a F-2 visa holder and you don't have a right to work inside the US. You must leave your office and go home(or maybe court :) )?

You don’t have to work for a company you own I’m an owner of 3 private companies and part owner of dozens of public companies. I only work for one. Other people are employed to do the work. So, you can start a company you are not allowed to work for and that company (at your direction) can employ other people who are allowed to work. See Are directors employees of the company?

In general, to who do you report *house* (not apartment) owners who make a ton of noise?

As I took a bicycle trip from the horrible, noisy ghetto where I live, back to the fancy neighbourhood where I grew up, I was shocked by how many loudmouths there were. For instance, one of the neighbours to the house where I grew up had a bunch of teenagers listening to loud music outdoors, screaming and shouting in a very obnoxious manner. Is that generally "allowed"? I mean, in the West. If people live in an apartment and play loud music, bang hammers into the floor or otherwise make a horrible noise (something I know all too well...), it is at least theoretically possible to report it to the landlord/company that owns the building, and in theory, they will make them shut up. (Whether that's actually done in practice is a whole other matter. They appear to have ignored me for years.) But if somebody has a stand-alone house and there is no obvious "community area", and they make a bunch of noise which affects me (assuming I live there in another house), who are you supposed to call then? The cops? I wouldn't want to involve the police, for multiple reasons. (Not wanting to make bitter enemies and face retaliation, social awkwardness, not wanting to generally telephone, not sure it's a "crime", etc.) Is this some sort of terrible freedom that house owners have? Can they basically make as much noise as they want on their property? If so, the whole concept of "peace and quiet" that I always have associated with owning your own house goes straight out the window.

In the US, many municipalities have ordinances outlawing loud noises during some night hours. It may start as early as 10pm or as late as 11pm, and end as early as 6am or as late as 7am. Unfortunately, you have to deal with it in the way which you indicated you would rather not. The people to call to deal with this are the police. You don't have to be present when the police arrives. Nor will they tell the neighbors who called them. But if the noise ordinance is violated, it is their job to deal with it. During the day-time hours, it is generally legal to make loud noises unless they exceed some very extreme levels. But those extreme levels are probably more than anything casual teenagers can do. If the walls of the house are not visibly shaking, that's probably not it.

Making profit of copyrighted material - when exactly does it become illegal

As I understand copyright is something that is inherent in creative work, as in, if you painted a picture you automatically "own" the copyright to it without having to do anything extra. Say I have a bunch of pictures that I know are painted by someone else. I want to make copies of them and sell them without telling the painter. Let's also say that the person who owns the pictures doesn't care about how they are used and whether someone's profiting from them, and hence doesn't do anything about it. Is the act of making profit still automatically illegal in this case, or does it become illegal when the copyright owner tries to sue me? In other words, can I get arrested for the fact itself without anyone making an explicit claim? Can someone else make a complaint ("I know a guy who really painted that pictures!") that could get me arrested? For context, there is an exhibition of Banksy works in Moscow, which apparently was organised without Banksy's consent. Trying to understand the law behind such exhibitions. Thanks.

Making a profit does not make the act illegal: it is illegal without there being any profit. The act of copying without permission is what makes the act illegal. Profit might maybe enter into the matter if you are talking about the " fair use " defense, since certain kinds of works can be partially copied for certain purposes. You could quote a few lines from a novel in a review, for instance. The judgment of whether a given act of copying without permission is allowed under fair use is complex and involves a balancing act. Profit becomes relevant in that a non-profit use favors fair use and a for-profit use disfavors it. Wholesale copying of works of art as you describe is illegal (is infringement). However... "illegal" is a pretty broad concept. If you infringe on my intellectual property, you almost certainly will not suffer any consequences unless I sue you. Taking "illegal" to mean "in violation of the law", infringing copyright is illegal because it violates the law, but I have to make a federal case out of your infringement – I have to sue you. As it happens, it can also be a crime to infringe copyright, and in that case, the government and not the copyright holder pursues the matter. If a person knowingly infringes copyright, he might be prosecuted, thus the Megaupload case which in the US is realized in the indictment US v. Dotcom . Moreover, profit motive is a required element for criminal infringement. (Also note that you don't have to actually make a profit for the profit element to be present). You cannot sue a person unless they have harmed you, so if you know that Smith copied Jones' work you can't sue Smith for harming Jones. (This is what they call "standing"). You might sue Smith, but not for infringement itself. If they sold you an illegal infringing copy, then you could sue. Or, their infringement could diminish the value of your legal copy. This website gives a multi-nation overview of criminal copyright infringement laws.

Where can I get a list of driving "primary offenses?"

As I understand it (and please correct me if I am wrong), (the law in many if not all U.S. states) classifies (non-moving) driving offenses into at least two categories. Primary offenses are non-moving violations which authorize the police to stop and ticket a driver. All other offenses require the officer to cite a moving violation or a primary offense during the same stop in order to issue a ticket. For example, some non-moving violations that might or might not be primary offenses include: Not wearing a seatbelt No proof of insurance Broken headlamp or brake light Expired tabs Cracked windshield etc... Question Where can I get a list of primary driving offenses in any (not all) jurisdiction in the U.S.?

Most states have a title (i.e. volume) of their codified statutes that contains the traffic code. In Colorado, for example, that is Title 42 (Vehicles and Traffic). This statute would usually contain a comprehensive list of traffic offenses, although sometimes traffic offenses also appear in the criminal code, and there are sometimes stray offenses (e.g. related to hazardous materials) that might be codified somewhere else. Many statutes are not terribly clear over what is and is not a primary offense, and unless a statute specifically says that it is not a primary offense, you should assume that it is one. Many jurisdictions do not have any convenient reference source for this information although most traffic cops learn the most notably cases in their training and most criminal defense lawyers who do traffic cases would know the status of the most common offenses. Usually, there are only a handful of traffic offenses that are not primary offenses in any given jurisdiction, and some jurisdictions would have none. In a related point, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that it is constitutional to arrest and incarcerate someone briefly pending legal processing, even if the underlying offense does not authorize incarceration as a punishment. (I don't have the citation to the case immediately at hand).

Is there a general duty to avoid creating unsafe situations when driving (Belgium)?

As I understand it (and please correct me if I'm wrong), in aviation and in maritime traffic, there is an overriding obligation to operate safely and avoid accidents/damage. E.g.: Alice and Bob are both cargo ship captains. Alice is bringing her ship into port, in perfect accordance with all relevant laws and guidelines. Bob's ship, close by, starts behaving erratically (either due to technical problems or human error on Bob's part). There is a risk of collision. Alice's ship has ample opportunity to change course and eliminate the risk, but Alice refuses to do so because "Hey, I followed all the rules - this isn't my problem." A collision ends up occurring, resulting in material damage, huge delays & opportunity costs, and perhaps even loss of life. My understanding (again, please correct me if I'm mistaken) is that in the above situation, Alice would have been expected to take action to avoid the collision, and bears some degree of (criminal or civil) liability for failing to do so, even though all she did was 'follow the rules'. My question is whether any similar principle exists for road users. An example: Carol and Dave are driving their cars across a level crossing, with Carol ahead and Dave following. Just after clearing the crossing, Carol's car halts (or slows down to a crawl), leaving Dave with insufficient space and trapping him on the tracks. The bells ring and the barriers begin to descend, indicating that a train is on the way. Of course, Dave should have known better than to cross a level crossing when there isn't already sufficient space on the other side. But now that the situation has occurred, and Carol is able to easily resolve it, is she under any legal obligation to do so? If she does not, is she civilly liable to Dave (or possibly to the engineer & passengers on the train)? Has she committed a criminal offence? Does it matter whether Carol has a generally valid reason for stopping (e.g. she's letting a passenger disembark onto the sidewalk, perhaps completely unaware of Dave's predicament) or not (e.g. she's a bully who spontaneously decides she'd find it hilarious to terrify the driver behind her, maybe kill him, and possibly derail a train - and is later caught admitting as much in a brag to friends)? Say Dave, after a fruitless ten seconds of frantic klaxoning with the train barreling down, decides to floor it and physically push Carol's car with his own so that he can get off the tracks. Is Dave then liable for the damage he's caused to Carol's car? Has Dave committed a criminal offence by driving into her car? Is Carol possibly on the hook for the damage this maneuver caused to Dave 's car? I live in Belgium so that's the answer I'm most interested in, but I also welcome insights from other jurisdictions. I imagine this is an area of law that could easily vary quite a bit.

There are multiple questions on different areas of law, but I will answer purely on any criminal liability arising by the drivers concerned and leave the question(s) on civil liability to others. The general rule to avoid creating unsafe situations appears to be in the Royal Decree of 1 December 1975, at Article 7 , which states (via English translation): 7.2 Users must behave on public roads in such a way that they do not cause any inconvenience or danger to other users, including the staff working for the maintenance of the road and the equipment bordering it, the surveillance services and priority vehicles. Here are some specific regulations/offences relating to the railway crossing incident: Under Article 4 of the 30 September 2005 Decree: It is forbidden to stop or park a vehicle on level crossings. Carol may have committed an offence under Chapter 2, Article 2 of the 1975 Decree: It is forbidden to stop a vehicle or park it in any place where it is obviously likely to constitute a danger for other road users or to obstruct them unnecessarily... Dave may have committed an offence under Article 20 of the 1975 Decree: 20.2. The user approaching a level crossing must be extra careful to avoid any accident: when the level crossing is not equipped with barriers or traffic light signals or when these signals do not work, the user can only enter it after making sure that no vehicle on rails is approaching. ... 20.4. The driver cannot enter a level crossing if the traffic congestion is such that he would in all likelihood be immobilized on this crossing.

Does copyright on a resume prevent you from sharing it?

As I understand it a resume is automatically considered the intellectual property of its author, and the author has a right to determine how it will be copied ie. distributed. Does this actually hold any practical significance? Does this mean that when someone sends you their resume, it is unlawful to pass it on to others unless the author gives permission? Can you get sued if the resume finds its way to someone the author did not intend to see it, and the author suffers some harm as a result? Is distributing a resume in the context of professional networking considered as implicit consent to allow sharing with anyone under the US legal system?

You need permission to copy unless fair use applies Does this mean that when someone sends you their resume, it is unlawful to pass it on to others unless the author gives permission? First note that copyright law only applies to copying . If someone were to give you a physical copy of their resume (assuming such a thing would happen in this day and age) then giving this to someone else without copying it is not copyright violation. There may be privacy issues involved but that’s another issue. Further, in the United States, there is a fair use doctrine which allows limited copying without permission in certain circumstances. This is likely to apply in a lot of situations around copying resumes. Finally, permission does not have to be explicit. For example, if you receive a resume in the course of a job application then permission to make copies for that purpose can be assumed to have been implicitly given. Can you get sued if the resume finds its way to someone the author did not intend to see it, and the author suffers some harm as a result? Under privacy law, possibly. Under copyright law, no. What you can be sued for is making a copy . It doesn’t matter where this ends up. Is distributing a resume in the context of professional networking considered as implicit consent to allow sharing with anyone under the US legal system? No. It’s explicit consent because those networking sites have Terms and Conditions that explicitly deal with copyright. For example, if you post your resume on LinkedIn, you agree to this .

How can civilian security personnel do their jobs without risk of committing assault or related crimes?

As I understand it assault can include the implied threat of using physical force against an individual, such as looming over someone, to compel them to do something. I believe many US states also have related laws about harassment, menacing, etc. However, the job of security personnel seems to be primarily to discourage activities by being present as deterrent against such crimes. Their mere presence is not a threat or assault of course, but if they are attempting to deter someone from acting in negative manner the security personnel would likely have to get close to the person and make demands that they leave or stop whatever activity their engaged in in a manner that could be considered a threat of force if they don't comply. To go with a particular difficult example think of a bouncer at a bar. More then most security personnel a bouncers job is practically defined by their ability to loom. My father owned a bar, and as he described it to me a good bouncer should be identifying someone who's likely to cause an incident and basically pre-emptively start looming nearby them to remind the inebriated fellow that the bouncer is ready to use physical force if necessary in hopes of preventing a situation from occurring. Likewise breaking up a minor fight often involves a good amount of getting between the two fighting and looking menacing enough that no one want's to try to go around you. Basically you want your bouncer to be able to menace people when a situation is escalating because it's a far safer way of preventing the escalation then allowing it to degreed to violence. Is a bouncer, or other security individual, guilty of assault or related crime when they do something like this? Does the fact that they are employed by a business with the explicit task of keeping the peace give them any extra leeway with such actions? Is the fact that they are trying to prevent/discourage other crimes give them more leeway?

The above is not quite accurate. First, assault. The correct definition is "a threat or physical act that creates a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact." Therefore, no attempt at a battery is necessary. Rather, simply making someone subjectively believe that you are about to commit a battery against them is enough for an assault charge. Please note the following two points . One, that apprehension does not mean fear. Apprehension means that the victim has to believe that the actor's conduct will result in imminent harmful or offensive contact. Two, it's not necessary that the victim believes such conduct will actually be effective - rather, he only has to believe the conduct is "capable" of making the contact. I can't tell if by "other security personnel" you mean, in addition to bouncers, say, security at concerts or if you mean private security guards, such as ones who guard warehouses or other businesses. Nonetheless, for the warehouse/business "guards," they do not have a special privilege above or beyond what any random person may do. That is, you may use force to the extent you reasonably believe necessary to prevent a felony, riot, or serious breach of the peace. You may use deadly force only if it appears reasonably necessary to prevent a "dangerous felony" involving risk to human life, including, for example, robbery, arson, burglary. However, if the private security personnel are operating under authority vested to them by local ordinance or the state legislature, then their rights (and also any attendant restrictions, such as those provided to citizens under the Fourth Amendment) would apply instead. So where's the difference ? It comes about at the standard a situation must meet to allow use of deadly force. A police officer can use deadly force to effectuate an arrest based on a reasonable belief that a suspect has committed a felony involving the risk of physical harm or death to others (murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape or burglary) or if there is substantial risk that the suspect was dangerous to the point that he may cause serious physical harm or death to someone if the arrest were delayed. On the other hand, as a private citizen, you may only use deadly force when attempting to effectuate an arrest if the suspect did indeed commit such a felony. Police can base their action on a reasonable belief and even if that belief is wrong, they will be safe from prosecution. A private citizen actually must be right about the suspect having committed the requisite crime. No matter how reasonable the belief was of a private citizen regarding a suspect, if that suspect did not actually commit the crime, the private citizen who used such force will be subject to prosecution. Bouncers are afforded no more rights than private citizens. They can issue verbal warnings, ask a patron to leave the establishment, check identification, refuse entry, call the cops, protect bystanders from violence, break up fights, and respond with equal force if necessary. They may not strike an individual with a punch or kick, push or physically toss someone out of the establishment, restrain them using chokeholds or other submission techniques, or use weapons or pepper spray.

Could Alex Jones' lawyer have claimed back the data he should have produced in discovery?

As I understand it from the news and some blogs: Alex Jones and his lawyers were asked during discovery to provide any message from his cellphone that did mention the Sandy Hook massacre. He claimed he did not have any and he did not produce any. Then his lawyer provided the plaintiffs' lawyer with some electronic documents. But it seems that he botched it and gave way more information than he intended to. The plaintiffs' lawyer warned Jones' lawyer about that. Jones' lawyer had ten days to formally acknowledge the transfer was a mistake, and to ask the plaintiffs' lawyer to ignore and delete the data. Jones' lawyer failed to do anything. Ten days after the error was notified to Jones' lawyer, and due to the lack of answer, the plaintiffs' lawyer was entitled to use all that was provided to him. That data included the record from Jones' phone, showing that he had messages related to the Sandy Hook massacre that he had failed to disclose. My question is: if the plaintiffs' lawyer had noticed those messages (that should have been delivered to him more than a year ago), could he have kept them and used them in trial even if Jones' lawyer had requested him to delete the data transferred to him? Or would a request from Jones' lawyer have prevented him from doing that?

This is a civil case in Texas. See Texas Rules of Civil Procedure , Rule 193.3(d) and guidance. In the current PDF May 1 2022 those are on pages 199 and 121 respectively and I reproduce them below. My understanding is that defense counsel (D) could have asserted privilege when Plaintiffs' counsel (P) originally told him about the link. In doing so, D would have identified the inadvertently produced material and the privilege asserted. Then P would be obliged to promptly return (or delete as it's digital) that material and any copies. Inevitably in this case P would object to the claim of privilege over any material potentially or apparently 'responsive' to discovery (e.g. a folder called "digital copy of defendant's phone" or texts mentioning keywords). The judge would hear from both parties and make a ruling on the material. In reality, D did not do that. Also, D made no contemporaneous objections to P's request to admit particular material in court (note P did not request the admission of the entire trove, only particular pieces of it). Instead, the day after the "Perry Mason moment", D filed an ' emergency motion of protection ' and a request for a mistrial. The judge denied both. D asked for another ten days to review the material. The judge said no to ten days but said D could have a D a day to make a start and then they could discuss whether more were needed. She said she would not make a blanket protection order over the entire trove without knowledge of what was in it. hearing here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dKbAmNwbiMk Incidentally, P claimed there was an earlier inadvertent production of some other material and in relation to that material rule 193.3(d) was followed by both parties. (from 7mins in that clip.) Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 193.3(d) Privilege not waived by production. A party who produces material or information without intending to waive a claim of privilege does not waive that claim under these rules or the Rules of Evidence if - within ten days or a shorter time ordered by the court, after the producing party actually discovers that such production was made - the producing party amends the response, identifying the material or information produced and stating the privilege asserted. If the producing party thus amends the response to assert a privilege, any party who has obtained the specific material or information must promptly return the specified material or information and any copies pending any ruling by the court denying the privilege. (guidance) Rule 193.3(d) is a new provision that allows a party to assert a claim of privilege to material or information produced inadvertently without intending to waive the privilege. The provision is commonly used in complex cases to reduce costs and risks in large document Page 122 productions. The focus is on the intent to waive the privilege, not the intent to produce the material or information. A party who fails to diligently screen documents before producing them does not waive a claim of privilege. This rule is thus broader than Tex. R. Evid. 511 and overturns Granada Corp. v. First Court of Appeals, 844 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1992), to the extent the two conflict. The ten-day period (which may be shortened by the court) allowed for an amended response does not run from the production of the material or information but from the party’s first awareness of the mistake. To avoid complications at trial, a party may identify prior to trial the documents intended to be offered, thereby triggering the obligation to assert any overlooked privilege under this rule. A trial court may also order this procedure. This rule imposes no duty to supplement or amend deposition testimony. The only duty to supplement deposition testimony is provided in Rule 195.6. Any party can request a hearing in which the court will resolve issues brought up in objections or withholding statements. The party seeking to avoid discovery has the burden of proving the objection or privilege.

What is the limit to my entering an unlocked home of a stranger to render aid without explicit permission

As I understand it in the USA if I, a normal citizen, walking by a stranger's home and witness them suddenly get electrocuted or otherwise seriously harmed I'm allowed to enter their home to try to render aid, even uninvited, since I have a reasonable belief they would prefer me to come into their home under those circumstances. I'm wondering where the line is drawn for that. I presumably can't barge into a stranger's home because it looks like they are having a bad hair job and I need to give them a perm this instant. How serious would the need have to be before I could justify entering their home? If I see someone appearing to be about to commit suicide can I reasonably barge in to try to stop them for example, even though presumably at that moment they did want privacy to continue following through with their suicide? On a related note when, if ever, would I be authorized to break into a home that was otherwise locked to render aid?

What you are describing seems to raise the defense of necessity . I cannot pinpoint the line for you or tell you whether any particular action would lie on one side or the other, but I can describe the test. In Maryland, there are "five elements necessary to consider before applying the defense of necessity" ( Marquardt v. State , 164 Md. App. 95, 135-36 (2005), citing Sigma Reproductive Health Center v. State , 297 Md. 660, 677-79 (1983)): The harm avoided — this need not be physical harm but also may be harm to property as, for instance, where a firefighter destroys some property to prevent the spread of fire which threatens to consume other property of greater value. The harm done — this is not limited to any particular type of harm but includes intentional homicide as well as intentional battery or property damage. An illustration is supplied: `[A]s where A, driving a car, suddenly finds himself in a predicament where he must either run down B or hit C's house and he reasonably chooses the latter, unfortunately killing two people in the house who by bad luck happened to be just at that place inside the house where A's car struck — it is the harm-reasonably-expected, rather than the harm-actually-caused, which governs.' Intention to avoid harm — to have the defense of necessity, the defendant must have acted with the intention of avoiding the greater harm. Actual necessity, without the intention, is not enough. However, an honest and reasonable belief in the necessity of his action is all that is required. The relative value of the harm avoided and the harm done. The defendant's belief as to the relative harmfulness of the harm avoided and the harm done does not control. It is for the court, not the defendant, to weigh the relative harmfulness of the two alternatives. To allow the defense the court must conclude that the harm done by the defendant in choosing the one alternative was less than the harm which would have been done if he had chosen the other. Optional courses of action; imminence of disaster. The defense of necessity applies when the defendant is faced with this choice of two evils: he may either do something which violates the literal terms of the criminal law and thus produce some harm, or not do it and so produce a greater harm. If, however, there is open to him a third alternative, which will cause less harm than will be caused by violating the law, he is not justified in violating the law. For example, "[a] prisoner subjected to inhuman treatment by his jailors is not justified in breaking prison if he can bring about an improvement in conditions by other means." Marquardt at 137: in order for the defense of necessity to have been warranted in this case, appellant must have presented "some evidence" that there was a choice between two evils, that no legal alternatives existed, that the harm appellant caused was not disproportionate to the harm avoided, and that the emergency was imminent.

How do states sue each other?

As I understand it one of Scotus jobs is to mediate inter-state litigation. Did this happen with equal regularity over the years or was this something that happened mainly when the union was new? Is it therefore at least in theory possible for two states to have contrary laws and scotus be forced to make a value judgment contrary to state law to resolve some dispute? Can scotus decide not to hear inter-state litigation in the same way it often does with constitutional matters or are they forced to mediate because there is no other way to settle such matters?

As I understand it one of Scotus jobs is to mediate inter-state litigation. Did this happen with equal regularity over the years or was this something that happened mainly when the union was new? You are right the Supreme Court of the United States is the venue for state vs. state disputes. Though I would be careful to differentiate "inter-state" litigation from "stave vs. state" litigation. These disputes did happen regularly over the years yes, but with differing success as the strength of the Federal Government and Supreme Court increased*. In general state v. state cases are not too common, and generally deal with issues such as land and border disputes or questions. *(See as a partial reference this video where when NJ sued NY over a land dispute, NY effectively ignored the Court/ the Court didn't hear the case in 1832. Whereas in the 1990s NY did not ignore it https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgZ1f4ACZBQ ) For background the relevant provisions of the Constitution and statute are as follow: U.S. Const. Article III: Sec 2: In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party , the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleiii 28 USC Sec. 1251 (a)The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States. (b)The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of: (1)All actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public ministers, > consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties; (2)All controversies between the United States and a State; (3)All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another State or against aliens. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1251 For a recent/ current state v. state case see Mississippi v. Tennessee: https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22o143.html concerning territorial matters/ water rights. Is it therefore at least in theory possible for two states to have contrary laws and scotus be forced to make a value judgment contrary to state law to resolve some dispute? Generally no, unless the state law is impermissible under the United States Constitution or otherwise preempted by federal law for example. But the Supreme Court wouldn't really rule on "contrary" state laws, most cases are concerning federal laws or land matters. Also, unless there is a matter of Federal Law ("federal question") or the state v state controversy under Article III the Supreme Court doesn't have jurisdiction to rule on state matters (again unless a "federal question" is involved). Can scotus decide not to hear inter-state litigation in the same way it often does with constitutional matters or are they forced to mediate because there is no other way to settle such matters? Yes, they can choose not to hear state vs. state cases. Rule 17 of the Supreme Court Rules regards "Procedure in Original Action" https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/supct/rule_17 in which the Court "Court thereafter may grant or deny the motion, set it for oral argument, direct that additional documents be filed, or require that other proceedings be conducted." Though, and I will note for completeness in answering your question, some current Justices believe it is not discretionary. See below: 155, ORIG. TEXAS V. PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL. The State of Texas’s motion for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied for lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. Texas has not demonstrated a judicially cognizable interest in the manner in which another State conducts its elections. All other pending motions are dismissed as moot. Statement of Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas joins: In my view, we do not have discretion to deny the filing of a bill of complaint in a case that falls within our original jurisdiction . See Arizona v. California , 589 U. S. ___ (Feb. 24, 2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting). I would therefore grant the motion to file the bill of complaint but would not grant other relief, and I express no view on any other issue. https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/121120zr_p860.pdf

Recusal: can someone recuse someone else?

As I understand it people recuse themselves from making decisions in a role (judge, lawyer, board member) in situations where there is a conflict of interest. That being said, can a non-judicial party (for example a community association manager of an HOA) recuse a board member from voting or participating in a decision? or is the decision to recuse always a self-recusal?

The definition of "Recuse" is : To remove (oneself) from participation to avoid a conflict of interest The word "recuse" is from the Latin word "recusare", which means "to refuse." You can recuse plurally, but if you are plurally recusing a group you are doing it on behalf of the group (meaning you are also recusing yourself). In the situation given I believe the word "barred" would work better to describe the action taken. The community association manager of the HOA barred the board member from voting or participating in a decision.

Patent law: What is the litmus test for 'inventive step' \'non obvious'?

As I understand it the EPC (Europe) requires 'inventive step' and the USPTO require claims to be 'non obvious'. An electronic measurement was designed and tested. What are the questions that one should ask when determining: How to identify the 'inventive step' of my invention? How do I determine if the invention is 'obvious' (litmus test) I have read the section below: said invention requires skills from electrical engineering, system engineering, computer science and industrial engineering. 35 U.S.C. 103 Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

In a rejection for obviousness, a USPTO examiner can't just say "it seems obvious to me". Assume the invention has three subcomponents interconnected and related in a certain way to accomplish a particular action. The examiner needs to find one or more references that call out each of those three elements. The "base" reference needs to be in a very closely related area but other references may not be as directly relevant. Then the examiner needs to argue that a person of ordinary skill in the area, given those three subcomponents and other teaching in the cited references, would come up with the invention. An analogy with a litmus test is instructive; there is no litmus test , patent law is not remotely like science.

Could a person be indefinitely detained without trial by being briefly released every 24 hours?

As I understand it the police must charge someone with a crime within 24 hours of arresting them. Suppose the police wanted someone put away but didn't want to go through the trouble of convicting them. Could they arrest them, set a 24-hour timer, then when that timer expires let the person outside the jail for 5 seconds before arresting them again? Is there any jurisdiction with rules to prevent this tactic?

Rules on such things vary significantly by jurisdiction. To get a specific and accurate answer, please specify the jurisdiction of interest. Some jurisdictions have rules or laws forbidding the sort of maneuver described in the question, others do not.

Provisional Patent Scope Strategy

As I understand it the rigor required of a provisional patenta is less than that of a non provisional patent. A US provisional patent is to be filed this month for a device and I would like to understand if there is a disadvantage / penalty if the claims / description is too: 1) Narrow: the concern here is that if the device description is very detailed, then any required evolutions to the device between provisional and the non provisional utility patent may be invalidated when opened. 2) Broad: the concern is that non provisional patent is invalidated because claims are too broad (not specific enough) and jeopardize the foundation and filing of the non provisional patent. If it is possible that either of these scenarios can jeopardize the non provisional patent, how does one go about honing one's judgement of whether the scope (claims) are in the 'Goldilocks' zone: not too broad, not too narrow? Any examples are appreciated: Thank you

As I understand it the rigor required of a provisional patent [application] is less than that of a non provisional patent. While this is true in a sense, there is a lack of nuance here. Provisional patent applications are not examined for formalities. Generally, this is interpreted as being able to omit claims. However, if you're really wild, you can even use a different page size. However, a provisional still needs to be treated during the drafting stage as if it were a non-provisional. This is because the provisional needs to be able to support the non-provisional. Notably, while you do not need to file claims with the provisional, you should still have claims drafted for use in the non-provisional. This is because the description of the provisional needs to be able to support the claims of the non-provisional. If you insufficiently describe your invention in the provisional, it will be as if you never filed the provisional: it will be useless and you'll have lost a year of priority. For this reason, it is not entirely accurate to say that the rigour of a provisional is less than that of a non-provisional patent application. Merely, the filing formalities and fees are lower. What is the risk if the provisional is too narrow? You will not have an earlier priority date for anything not described in the provisional. If you provide in your provisional that your invention must have features X and Y, then you would likely not have support in the non-provisional for your invention just having X alone. So be careful with what you describe as essential (as indeed you would with a non-provisional). That said, if you avoid suggestions that features are essential, and take care to describe broader embodiments as potentially standalone, more detail is always better. What is the risk if the provisional is too broad? The risk is that the provisional will inadequately describe your invention. Claims in the non-provisional will therefore not be entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the provisional. Intervening prior art will therefore deprive your claims of novelty. How do I get in the Goldilocks zone? Dale M's suggestion of hiring a patent attorney, while flippant, is certainly the right answer. But in general, more detail is better. As long as you describe your invention in its broadest embodiment without optional features, then describe each further embodiment while noting that the added features are beneficial but optional, you should be fine. Although this makes for a dull drafting experience, it makes for a strong provisional.

Ch 13 Bankruptcy: What happens if you owe too much to repay in 5 years

As I understand it, Ch 13 bankruptcy protects a person by letting them repay their debts over a period of some 5 years. What if a person has more debt than they can repay in 5 years? (In the state of Georgia, in the USA.) (Assume the person has filed for Ch 7 less than 8 yers ago, so the only bankruptcy available to them is ch 13.)

According to the US Courts website , not all debts need to be paid in full in Chapter 13 proceedings: The plan need not pay unsecured claims in full as long it provides that the debtor will pay all projected "disposable income" over an "applicable commitment period," and as long as unsecured creditors receive at least as much under the plan as they would receive if the debtor's assets were liquidated under chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 1325. If they can't pay even this reduced amount, then they probably don't belong in Chapter 13. If the court declines to confirm the plan, the debtor may file a modified plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1323. The debtor may also convert the case to a liquidation case under chapter 7.

Must German job postings include "(m/f)" even in English?

As I understand it, German law requires companies posting job openings to address the gendered nature of the German language by including both the masculine and feminine forms of the job title (e.g., by writing " Programmierer(in) " for both maculine " Programmierer " and feminine " Programmiererin "). When these job postings are then translated into English, this distinction is kept by including "(m/f)" or "(m/f/d)" in the job title, despite the fact that (the vast majority of) job titles are ungendered in English, so it makes the company look like they don't understand how English works. Is keeping this distinction in English a legal requirement, or are companies just doing it to be safe against any hypothetical legal challenges? Has a German company ever gotten in trouble for not including all genders in a job posting in a language that doesn't gender nouns?

Adding m/w/d in a job posting is not explicitly required by any German law. It is however the established way to implement the requirements of the AGG (~ general equal treatment act) which in turn implements various EU directives. Protected classes under the AGG are race, ethnic origin, gender, religion or belief system, disability, age, and sexual identity. Of these, only gender manifests itself in the German language, making workarounds necessary that indicate that no gender is preferred. Within certain bounds, the German language can use gender-neutral terms, for example a job called “Lehrer/-in” or “Lehrer*in” could also be called “Lehrkraft”. If you are able to use gender-neutral language in English but are still subject to German law, adding “m/f/d” is probably not necessary but still a very sensible idea as it corresponds to German best practices. If you fail to add some explicit note that applicants of all genders are welcome, nothing bad will happen automatically. However, a person with a not-explicitly listed gender may apply for the job, get denied, and then sue with the argument that they were denied because of their gender. The employer would have the obligation to prove that their job postings are non-discriminatory.

How does [arbitrary attorney] have standing?

As I understand it, Judge Sullivan has a conflict with the executive branch and appointed an attorney to plead his case. But how can one delegate power one doesn’t have? Either the power is delegated and this is a member of the judicial branch challenging the executive branch’s use of its authority or it is not a delegation, in which case it is a random attorney with a general grievance. If a random attorney at the direction of a judge has standing to challenge actions within executive branch jurisdiction, why didn’t a judge prosecute the banks guilty of criminal fraud leading to the 2008 financial crisis when Obama ordered the DOJ to not prosecute? Edit: Just realized a third option, that there exists, as in Superman comics, an unelected bizarro executive branch that can be summoned by the judiciary to battle the elected executive branch for supremacy and the one who determines the winner is... the judicial branch. Edit 2: (In response to people claiming that this is just how things work) Frank v. Gaos affirmed that standing is required at all stages of a case. Courts do not give advisory opinions. Courts do not entertain oral argument between one side that has standing and some arbitrarily selected neutral observer. Maybe answerers are confused and think that a traditional appeal, where a judge sends it to a higher court has a case and controversy due to a judge wanting the opinion of the higher court rather than the parties themselves having real injury in fact. That is not the reasoning applied by the Supreme Court when it comes to determining standing. So, I would like someone to reconcile (if possible) the traditional requirements for standing with the facts in the Flynn case before I select an answer.

If a random attorney at the direction of a judge has standing to challenge actions within executive branch jurisdiction, why didn’t a judge prosecute the banks guilty of criminal fraud leading to the 2008 financial crisis when Obama ordered the DOJ to not prosecute? This is a misunderstanding of the issue. Judge Sullivan is not "prosecuting" Mr. Flynn. Judges do not have the power to prosecute people. Instead, Sullivan (argues that he) is trying to decide whether or not to grant the government's motion to dismiss. Normally, this is a very open and shut question: If the government doesn't want to prosecute someone, then it would make no sense to try and keep the case in court, so it's typical for these dismissals to be rubber stamped. The complication in this particular case is that Mr. Flynn has already pleaded guilty. Because he was in federal court, on a federal charge, pleading guilty is a rather involved process. His plea included very explicit statements under oath about the specific conduct he allegedly committed, and that conduct directly matches up with specific required elements of the alleged crime. After Mr. Flynn had already made those statements under oath, the government told Judge Sullivan that it did not believe it had enough evidence to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Judge Sullivan now wants to hold a hearing to determine whether he can or should believe the government, and if not, what if anything he can or should do about it. Finally, the DC Circuit issued a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Sullivan to immediately grant the dismissal. Sullivan is now appealing that order. In this sense, then, the dispute is not directly about Mr. Flynn's case, but rather about the level of discretion to which Judge Sullivan is entitled in performing his official duties. By issuing the writ, the DC Circuit necessarily determined that Judge Sullivan was not legally entitled to hold the hearing which he wanted to hold. That is what the en banc re-hearing is about.

How does Judge Sullivan have standing?

As I understand it, Judge Sullivan is appealing a writ of mandamus in the Flynn case. As the Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Constitution as having a case or controversy requirement that embodies a requirement of injury in fact and party seeking review must have suffered an injury, what is the injury here? Either Judge Sullivan is standing in for the American people and acting on behalf (but in opposition to) the executive branch (which would create a precedent that the judicial branch can step in and perform the executive branch function), or he has some some other injury. But as the judicial branch is expected to just be impartially interpreting law, it does not seem as though he would have any real injury in fact here, even if he is unhappy with the outcome of a particular case.

The Court of Appeals made Judge Sullivan the respondent. Flynn petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus to order the inferior court to dismiss the criminal proceedings against Flynn. Normally the adversary in the 'parent' proceedings would oppose such a petition but in this case the adversary, the Department of Justice, supported Flynn's petition. The Court of Appeals made Judge Sullivan the respondent and did not appoint an amicus curiae . That allowed Judge Sullivan to seek a review en banc of the Court of Appeals' 24 July 2020 decision. The Court of Appeals has since vacated the 24 July 2020 decision and will re-hear the petition for the writ of mandamus en banc . It has asked parties to consider whether there are "no other adequate means [than mandamus] to attain the relief" desired. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 21. Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition, and Other Extraordinary Writs : The court of appeals ordinarily will be adequately informed not only by the opinions or statements made by the trial court judge contemporaneously with the entry of the challenged order but also by the arguments made on behalf of the party opposing the relief. The latter does not create an attorney-client relationship between the party's attorney and the judge whose action is challenged, nor does it give rise to any right to compensation from the judge. If the court of appeals desires to hear from the trial court judge, however, the court may invite or order the judge to respond. In some instances, especially those involving court administration or the failure of a judge to act, it may be that no one other than the judge can provide a thorough explanation of the matters at issue. Because it is ordinarily undesirable to place the trial court judge, even temporarily, in an adversarial posture with a litigant, the rule permits a court of appeals to invite an amicus curiae to provide a response to the petition. In those instances in which the respondent does not oppose issuance of the writ or does not have sufficient perspective on the issue to provide an adequate response, participation of an amicus may avoid the need for the trial judge to participate. Interesting point made at 41:00 in episode 175 of The National Security Law Podcast by Bobby Chesney and Steve Vladeck : the Court of Appeals didn't address the question of 'standing' or whether Sullivan was a proper party to make a petition. The Court announced that "Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing en banc, the responses thereto, and the vote in favor of rehearing en banc by a majority of the judges eligible to participate" they ordered the re-hearing of Flynn's petition en banc .

What are the implications of the new executive order regarding social media?

As I understand it, Trump is planning to issue an executive order that claims some social media platforms are violating the Communication Decency Act Section 230 by not acting in good faith, and as a result, wants new FCC guidelines on the behavior of the platforms. If a platform violates these guidelines, then they are open to litigation, which they have previously been protected from. Here is a link to a draft of the order: https://kateklonick.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/DRAFT-EO-Preventing-Online-Censorship.pdf Some questions I have... Is my summary an accurate description? A common part of the debate has been "free speech", which isn't relevant to a private company. However, are there other times the FCC has set guidelines that effectively influence free speech?

Addressing only the document that you link to without assumption of accuracy or finality, it says that "It is the policy of the United States to foster clear, nondiscriminatory ground rules promoting free and open debate on the Internet. Prominent among those rules is the immunity from liability", referring to 47 USC 230 , and specifically "the scope of that immunity should be clarified". It is clear that the law say nothing about what counts as "good faith", nor does it say anything about what constitutes "otherwise objectionable". The document correctly say that the law "does not extend to deceptive or pretextual actions restricting online content", at leas as long as we understand "extend to" as meaning "explicitly mention". Similarly, the law does not explicitly say anything about whether a provider violating its own TOS nullifies the "good faith restriction" clause. The order then directs the Dept. of Commerce to petition the FCC for regulations clarifying the interpretation of this law (I assume you meant FCC and not FTC). It specifically proposes explicitly interpreting "taken in good faith" to exclude actions that are deceptive, pretextual or inconsistent with a provider's TOS, or "the result of inadequate notice, the product of unreasoned explanation, or having been undertaking [sic] without a meaningful opportunity to be heard". Everybody is presently open to litigation for defamation (for example), because you can allege that pretextual or "unreasonable" restrictions on speech are in bad faith, then the courts have to evaluate that question. What the regulations would do is provide a default answer ("yes, it is"), which the courts would follow unless the regulation is overturned in court or is rescinded. There are vast numbers of restrictions on free speech by the FCC: the whole purpose of the FCC is to restrict the freedom to speak as one may please. The initial premise was that the government didn't want broadcaster A to functionally obliterate broadcaster B due to the strength of his signal on a particular frequency, so you are not free to speak in certain ways. There are numerous other restrictions on what you may say within the sphere regulated by the FCC, e.g. you can't broadcast live sex acts on network TV during Saturday morning cartoon time. The Fairness Doctrine and the equal time rule are / were other examples of restrictions on free speech (via compelled speech). "Free speech" is an open-enough concept that it is reasonable to consider anything with a governmentally-mandated "non-level playing field" to be a restriction on free speech (for example, statutory immunizations of a certain class of individuals against legal consequences of their acts). The problem with saying what acts of the FCC "restrict free speech" is that there isn't a clear definition of "free speech" that is consistent with laws against threatening, fraud, perjury and defamation. As for the accuracy of your summary, there are also provisions regarding deceptive practices . There is more to it than you summarized (obviously: that's what a summary is), but apart from misspelling FCC I'd say that the summary is brief and not as informative (or verbose) as the original, but it is not deceptive. If you want a well-intentioned criticism, I think it is important to be specific about the fact that there is been some statutory immunization against liability which is the core of the order, but you didn't clarify that point. Governments litigate against companies (mostly) all the time, but governments do not litigate against companies or individuals for defamation or violating a TOS, and nothing in the order suggests that the government could start to sue social media companies for defamation or breach of contract, that is, the scope of the potential litigation is limited in an important way. I would (did) include that information, and don't assume "bad faith" in your omission. You have a First Amendment right to omit any details that you want.

Florida Self Storage Default

As I understand it, a payment default triggers a process in which the storage facility locks the unit and auctions the storage unit contents. Is there any mechanism that: prevents the defaulter from bidding? prevent a straw-man bidder from bidding on behalf of the defaulter? UPDATE: The concern is that in a scenario where the defaulter is the only bidder, he could conceivably recover his / her assets without paying the bill for $1 or other unreasonable figure.

According to Florida section 83.806 (6) (which the link in the question amends) Before any sale or other disposition of personal property pursuant to this section, the tenant may pay the amount necessary to satisfy the lien and the reasonable expenses incurred under this section and thereby redeem the personal property. Upon receipt of such payment, the owner shall return the property to the tenant and thereafter shall have no liability to any person with respect to such personal property. If the tenant fails to redeem the personal property or satisfy the lien, including reasonable expenses, he or she will be deemed to have unjustifiably abandoned the self-service storage facility or self-contained storage unit, and the owner may resume possession of the premises for himself or herself. Thus the owner may pay-up and stop the sale at any time before the sale occurs. There is nothing in the law preventing the former owner from bidding in person or via an agent, at such a sale. But it is hard for me to see why this route would be taken rather than simply paying the back rent due.

What is the nature of a quorum?

As I understand it, a quorum is the minimum necessary for business to get done in a meeting. My understanding is that a quorum merely prevents business from taking place without meeting the required number of members present. It is not an grant of authority for things to take place when you do happen to meet the minimum threshold. For example, the quorum may be set at a majority of members. But without a rule stipulating that a majority vote wins, a quorum is not sufficient to tell you whether or not a majority can carry a motion. To go further, the quorum certainly does not override any requirement that a supermajority carry any motion. In sum, my understanding is that a quorum shouldn't be read to explain what number is necessary to carry a motion. My understanding is that a quorum merely denotes the number required for any business to take place at all.

Quorum defines the minimum number of members present in order to conduct business. Once quorum is met, members may make motions and the assembly may conduct business. Now your question concerns the minimum required for passing a motion, and you are correct some motions require more than majority, such as 2/3 vote. The problem in your analysis is that rules of procedure assume that the majority or supermajority is met from the members present and voting, not from the total number of members. Let me show you some examples so you can fully understand. Let's say there's an assembly with 21 members, with the standard quorum requirements of majority of the members. The minimum number of people required for quorum show up, which is 11 (more than half is majority). In order to pass a motion, you only need majority of the members present and voting. That typically means 6 people. However, let's say 2 members abstain from the vote or are present at the meeting but don't record their vote. Then a vote can pass 5-4. Quorum is met and a majority of the members present and voting, voted for the the motion. Similarly 2/3 votes are counted from members present and voting. There is an exception to this. If the organizations bylaws say that it takes a majority of the members to pass a certain motion, then the motion must pass by the majority of the total number of members in the organization, which is 11 in this case. Thus all 11 people present in the room would have to vote for it.

How does copyright apply to rules, eg ISO standards?

As I understand it, copyright applies to creative expression and not for examples rules of games. Does this also apply to the ISO standards ( example, costs CHF 158 )? For example, could one re-write the standards in one's own words and sell them in competition with ISO? Or is there something that would prevent this, perhaps something like Copyright in compilation ?

Expression vs Idea As I understand it, copyright applies to creative expression and not for examples rules of games. That is not correct as stated. Game rule, or more exactly the fixed expression of a set of game rule (what one finds in the package of a commercial game, or in a book such as Hoyle's Rules of Games , can be and usually are protected by copyright. What is not protected is the ideas expressed in a set of rules. These are sometimes called "game mechanics". For example it is a rule of bridge that 13 cards are dealt to each of 4 players. That is a fact, and so is not protected by copyright. But the exact wording of the official Laws of Duplicate Bridge is protected. "creativity" vs "originality" Many things that might not be considered very creative are protected. US Copyright law calls not for creativity, but for an original work . The concepts of "creativity" and "originality" have a significant overlap, but are not at all the same. For example, a person might watch a baseball game and write down play-by-play account of it. That might not be very creative, but it would still be protected by copyright. But the event of the game are facts, and not protected. Someone else might describe the same game in different words, covering the same facts, and that would not be copyright infringement. Another example. A person writes a scientific paper describing in detail a series of chemical experiments and the results obtained. That is not very creative (although the design of the experiments might be). It would, however, be protected by copyright. But the facts and ideas would not be protected. Another person could desacribe the same experiments in different words, and that would not be an infringement of copyright. Merger Doctrine In extreme cases, such as a basic recipe, there is no expression temperate from the facts. In such a case the "merger doctrine" applies, and there is no copyright protection at all. Standards Standards, such as ISO standards, are normally protected by copyright. But the ideas expressed in them are not. And since standards are highly factual, the protection afforded to them is particularly narrow. But when one is testing compliance with a standard, the exact words of the standard may be important. A compliance officer is not likely to accept a paraphrase as a valid substitute. Standards in Laws The actual text of laws (and regulations), however (Federal, state, or local) is never protected by copyright. All are in the public domain. So when a law incorporated and reprints a standard, as is often done with fire and building codes, anyone may freely reproduce the codes as set down as part of law, even through the code has been copyrighted and indeed registered, as long as the source is the text of an enacted law or regulation.

Opinion Estoppel

As I understand it, estoppel is the notion that once a position is taken (i.e. all swans are white) that another contrary position may not be taken (some swans are black). That being said, counsel was hired by a board member to provide an opinion on a corporate procedural matter. The attorney replied with the position that person A is not a 'black swan' and then issues a follow-on opinion two years later to opine the same person A is a 'black swan'. The paper opines a procedure to address the black swan issue, however, the board never implemented the procedure. The standard boilerplate is provided at the end of the opining indicating that ABC lawfirm does not have an obligation to update the client as the law changes and that the opinion is not legally binding. If the two opinions were presented in a court, does the notion of estoppel apply (in the sense that the opinion has flip-flopped and is not solid)? Is the latter opinion weakened (from the viewpoint of a judge or arbitrator) by the notion of estoppel? The opinion's procedure was not implemented for several years, does the inaction create precedent to support continuation of the current process?

The question somewhat misstates the concept of estoppel in a legal sense. Estoppel does not mean that one is prevented from changing one's opinion. Estoppel means that when one gives a third party cause to rely on one's position, by word or conduct, one cannot then adopt an altered position and use it to legally attack that third party. For example, if one has invited a person onto one's land, one cannot turn around and sue them for trespass. In the case in the question, the Board hired counsel to give them an opinion, which was given. Two years later, a contrary opinion was offered, along with a recommendation for action, which was not followed. No third party was induced to rely on either opinion to its detriment. No estoppel seems relevant. And by the way estoppel is an equitable defense that would be raised by the third party, not unlike the defense of "clean hands". If the board acted on the first advice to its detriment, and thinks that their counsel was negligent in not having gotten the advice correct the first time, they might possibly have a case for legal malpractice, but only if they can get experts (other lawyers) to say that their counsel was in fact negligent , and also prove that this did in fact harm them. If they didn't act on the advice, harms seems less likely, although the details would matter a lot.

First-to-use vs First-to-file trademarks

As I understand it, first-to-use ownership of a mark trumps first-to-file. If that is true, why spend money on getting a trademark for your business name?

Because a Registered trade mark give statutory rights while an unregistered one only gives common law rights For example, for australia , a summary of the differences can be found here : Enforcing an Unregistered Trade Mark An unregistered trade mark has limitations in the level of protection it can provide to its owner. For an unregistered trade mark, any right to ownership of the trade mark needs to be proven. It is easier to confirm your enforceable rights to exclusively use a registered trade mark. This is because your rights immediately arise once it is registered. According to the common law, a substantial level of evidence will be needed to demonstrate an unregistered trade mark’s use. The owner of an unregistered trade mark often needs to prove that a reputation has been established, and their level of protection will only correspond to the area where they have established that reputation. A registered trade mark, on the other hand, provides protection Australia-wide. For example, in my business I would have no trouble proving a reputation for my goods and services is Sydney. I would have no chance of proving it in Melbourne or Brisbane or even in Wollongong or Newcastle so anyone can use my common law trade marks for the same goods and services outside Sydney and I couldn't stop them.

Can you designate someone to sign a contract for a company with certain restrictions?

As I understand it, for companies to sign contracts, some individual must sign their signature or else the contract is void. I have read that non-officers in a company must be given the capacity to sign contracts on behalf of that company. My question is: as the owner of a company, can I give someone else in the company the capacity to sign contracts for that company with certain restrictions . For example, they can only sign a contract if the board authorizes them or if the contract pertains to a certain thing. Additionally, the Board would usually be willing to go what I say in this matter.

Have you ever bought groceries? If you have, I’m pretty sure you never signed a contract nor asked the person on the till if they had the authority to enter a contract on behalf of the company. Notwithstanding, a contract is what you had with the grocery company; one that is legally binding on both you and that company. (Most) contracts don’t need to be signed Or, for that matter, be in writing There are exceptions, most notably around real estate or finance, but the overwhelming majority of contracts don’t need a signature or even to be in writing. Many contracts are in writing even when that isn’t legally necessary for all sorts of good reasons but most B2C and even many B2B contracts are verbal or even simply performed - like you buying groceries. Apparent or ostensible authority An agent of a company (including employees) that reasonably appears to have the authority to bind a company to a particular course of action, including agreeing to a contract, has that authority even if they don’t . For example, when you buy your groceries, you can reasonably assume that the cashier has the authority to sell them to you. Unless you know that someone is exceeding their actual authority or it is unreasonable for you to assume the agent is (for example if the cashier tried to sell you the grocery store ), then the company cannot avoid their obligations to you. They can, of course, take action against an agent that exceeded authority but that doesn’t let them off the hook for what that agent did. What authority a company gives its agents is up to it A company can only act through its agents. At the top of the tree are the directors and other officers, they have authority only limited by the law and the company’s rules. However, since outsiders don’t know the company’s rules (unless they have been explicitly told), their apparent authority is only limited by law. The directors and officers can delegate authority to employees and other agents however and with whatever restrictions they wish. Such delegation may be explicit or implicit, for example, it’s implicit in a purchasing officer’s role that they can purchase things. However, an outsider is entitled to presume that an employee who acts like they have the company’s authority to do whatever they are doing, does have it.

Can tribal nations initiate gambling between states or are they subject to the same rules as everyone else?

As I understand it, gambling in the U.S. is only illegal if it takes place between states. However, the large, Native American owned casinos permitted by states through due to the 1987 ruling of California v. the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians draw in people from many different states at a time. I am wondering if this is permitted because these casinos are constructed within the sovereign territory of tribal nations within states, or, if it is because that ruling itself loosened regulations for all gaming institutions, Native or not.

The two general federal restrictions on gambling are in 18 USC ch. 50 , against off-shore gambling ships, and wire communication for transmitting information that assists interstate / international gambling on sporting events and competitions. Interstate lotteries are legal and internet sales of lottery tickets is legal (until Congress or SCOTUS says otherwise). These laws have the usual commerce clause justificational language. In addition, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act says that you can't use the internet to engage in otherwise-illegal gambling, so if your state prohibits lotteries or bingo, you can't use the internet to gamble (in-state or across state/tribal lines). The definitions section ( 31 USC 5362(10)(C) ) narrows the term "unlawful Internet gambling" so that an online wager is legal if made exclusively within or between the land of one or more tribes, and follows applicable Indian gaming regulations, see below. Gambling on tribal land is covered by 25 USC ch. 29 which was passed in response to California v. the Cabazon, and there are three classes of gambling. Traditional and social games with minimal reward are unrestricted; bingo, cards (not games where you play against "the house") and other stuff is class II which requires tribal approval etc. The broader 3rd class requires a compact to be negotiated between the state in which the venue is located and the tribe. Section 2710(d) address the most stringent (and most generally-relevant) restrictions. The federal "take" on these matters is mediated via the Indian Gaming Commission under Interior (and not, for example, the DOJ), and 2 of the 3 commisioners must be registered tribe members. The law is framed in terms of location on tribal land which is "within the reservation" or "on tribal trust land", thus an operation owned by a tribe but located on other land is not covered by this act (and would be covered by the relevant state law). No specific law is required to permit anything pertaining to gambling, instead a specific law would be necessary to prohibit it. The federal government prohibits very little, leaving that to the states. A state has authority to regulate gambling, but it has no authority to regulate gambling on tribal land, unless Congress gives it such authority (and Congress has not). The Indian Gaming Commission has (apparently) not issued any general regulations to the effect that a casino must disallow out-of-state gamblers or anything to that effect, although it might technically have the authority to do so. If home-to-casino internet gambling is legal in your state, then home-to-tribal-casino internet gambling is legal.

Can An Unregulated Firm Without Any Solicitors Send Pre Action Protocol Letters?

As I understand it, in the UK: (a) The provision of legal advice or assistance in connection with the application of the law or with any form of resolution of legal disputes; (b) The provision of representation in connection with any matter concerning the application of the law or any form of resolution of legal disputes. are unreserved legal activities. My understanding is that writing a letter before action on behalf of one of a person would fall under (b) above and thus no formal qualifications or regulation are required. Is that assumption correct? For the avoidance of all doubt, as a hypothetical scenario, if a company was to write and send a letter before action on their own letterhead stating that we are representing "Alice" and explaining why Alice intends to take legal action would this be legal without being a registered solicitor? Thanks

You can't legally represent someone without being authorised or exempt under sections 18 and 19 of the Legal Services Act 2007: This is because both the "right of audience" and the "conduct of litigation" is a reserved legal activity under section 12 of the Act: (1) In this Act “reserved legal activity” means— (a) the exercise of a right of audience; (b) the conduct of litigation; (c) reserved instrument activities; (d) probate activities; (e) notarial activities; (f) the administration of oaths. It is an offence under section 14 of the Act to carry out any of the above, as well as being an offence under section 17 to pretend to be entitled. Furthermore, anyone professing to be entitled to conduct litigation when not so entitled would also be in contempt of court. However, you may provide the following services without qualification: (i) the provision of legal advice or assistance in connection with the application of the law or with any form of resolution of legal disputes; (ii) the provision of representation in connection with any matter concerning the application of the law or any form of resolution of legal disputes. as these are not reserved legal activities and are not regulated by the Act. So, you could provide a template letter for the person to write and send off their own letter before action, but you wouldn't be allowed to send it on their behalf. This is because, arguably, letters before action are part of the expected pre-action protocol under the Civil Procedure Rules and therefore constitute part of the conduct of litigation as they are issued as an ancillary function and indeed clause c of Schedule 2, part 4 of the Act covers such ancillary functions: The “conduct of litigation” means— (a) the issuing of proceedings before any court in England and Wales, (b) the commencement, prosecution and defence of such proceedings, and (c) the performance of any ancillary functions in relation to such proceedings (such as entering appearances to actions). Therefore, you cannot send the letter on behalf of Alice and you cannot represent to be a solicitor, barrister, lawyer, etc. at any point on your website or in your communications with anybody.

What identification must police officers provide to compel someone to follow their orders?

As I understand it, in the USA it is the law that if a police office gives one a lawful order it is a crime to not comply with that order. What does the police officer need to do to identify them as a police officer for this law to apply? Is any statement that they are police sufficient, and people are required to believe anyone who says they are police? Is there a specific form of words they must use, perhap similar to the UK arrest requirements ? Is it a question of the state of mind of the subject of the order, perhaps similar to the legal standards of preponderance of evidence or beyond reasonable doubt? The case that made me think of this was the case of a child who was shot by a police office who was in the back seat of the car . In this case it would be impossible for the subject to see the officer, so would have no way of knowing if the speaker was police. I am also reminded of the federal police in portland who drove around in unmarked cars wearing camouflage pattern clothing that makes me think of the proud boys more than police officers. There are also many movies in which the undercover police protagonists will wave a gun and a badge around and expect people to do what they say. In all these cases it would appear to be legitimate doubt as to the identity of the police officer. What are the requirements of a member of the public in such a situation? At which point does it become a crime to not comply with orders given by someone who is not obviously a police officer but claims to be? The United States is the most prominent country with such a law, and the one I am most interested in. The situation in other countries with similar laws would also be interesting, especially if they contrast with the USA. This is different from this question as that is about how do I tell if an order given is a legal order. This is different from this question as it is about a requirement for undercover officers to identify themselves, not about the threshold for the requirement for the public to follow orders.

Identification is require only in Alaska , California , Oregon and also , and Pennsylvania . In these states, if a person is uniformed (AK,CA,PA) or wearing a badge (AK,OR), or if the defendant "knows" that the person is an officer, they are penalized if they do not obey the order. In other states, you are simply penalized if the person giving the order is a police officer. In those states where there is no statutory limit on police power to give commands, it depends on what the courts have ruled. In North Carolina, following Glenn Robinson v. Acker there is a burden on off-duty officers to establish their authority, and an officer may not assume that others will know he is a police officer where he simply states as much and flashes "something," while wearing civilian clothing, working off-duty, and acting "out of control." But in Alabama, following Sly v. State , 387 So. 2d 913 referring to the statutes, Neither section makes any reference to whether the peace officer was on or off duty so there is no requirement to prove that you are an officer. The majority of states give this power to officers with traffic control powers. Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas and Utah grant that power with no restriction, and Alaska, California, Florida, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina and Vermont limit police command power to specific circumstances (traffic or emergencies). This article lists various cases in states that bear on the question – there is no clear and uniform law on the matter in the US. Some courts have limited the power to traffic related matters, others (where it is not part of the statutory law) have extended the power to outside of traffic stops. For example, in Ohio which is in the majority "can issue traffic tickets" set of states, State v. Thigpen , 62 N.E.3d 1019 ruled that nothing in the plain language of R.C. 2921.331(A) limits it solely to orders or signals of police officers actively engaging in traffic direction, control, or regulation. It is more likely that if the statute refers to willfully failing to comply, that creates some obligation for the officer to identify themselves. To simplify this, here are a few ordered generalizations. In 4 states, there is some requirement to be identifiable as a police officer via a uniform or badge, as noted above. In some states, it is a crime to willfully fail to comply – not complying with an officer whom you have reason to believe to be a LEO (e.g. he is wearing his uniform). Otherwise, if the person is in fact an officer, it is a crime to not comply.

Why Offer Arbitration Opt-Out

As I understand it, in the United States there is no legal obligation for a company to offer its customers the opportunity to opt-out of their arbitration agreement . So why do some companies offer their customer a very short window in which they can opt-out of the arbitration agreement? Does offering the limited opt-out option give the company some added legal protection? (It doesn’t seem to be for the customer's benefit or it wouldn’t have a time limit, so I assume it must offer some legal or strategic benefit for the company to include it?)

Companies that operate worldwide have to comply with the law everywhere they operate. Some jurisdictions consider mandatory arbitration in standard-form consumer contracts to be unenforceable - providing the out may overcome this.

How was SCOTUS established as the ultimate arbiter of federal constitutional matters?

As I understand it, in the early days of the US, it was held that the president had veto rights over laws that were unconstitutional. It was not entirely clear how these matters were to be dealt with in the early days of the US democracy. How exactly then was SCOTUS made the ultimate judge? Was there amendments to the constitution involved? What exactly was the process?

This came in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison (1803). At the last moments of his term, President Adams and Congress appointed a bunch of new judges to the courts. One of those was Marbury, but his new commission was not delivered by the outgoing Secretary of State John Marshall. The incoming President Jefferson had the undelivered commissions thrown out and ignored by his own Secretary of State (Madison). So Marbury sued to have his commission instated. There were some peculiar subtleties to the case. One is that Marbury sued directly in the Supreme Court, rather than an inferior court. A law passed by Congress had granted SCOTUS authority to be the trier of certain cases; said law was repealed before the case went before the court. Another oddity is that the Chief Justice was the very same John Marshall that had originally failed to deliver the commission; he did not recuse himself. The case was very contentious. Congress and the President were both very combative and eager to claim control of "constitutionality" for themselves. Congress would not much appreciate its laws being thrown out, and Jefferson was of the (combative) mind that it was in fact the President who decided the constitutionality of laws (the constitution can be said to explicitly charge him with enforcement of the laws and protection of the constitution), etc. The court risked getting neutered by both sides with just the slightest misstep. The President was sure to ignore any attempt to make him do anything, and Congress would retaliate if anyone but them threw out their laws. And simply declaring themselves impotent was the same set of problems. That the ruling effectively avoided all such problems makes it one of the great examples in SCOTUS opinions to this day, though not all hold it up in a positive way (it arguably intentionally handled the case backwards, so as to yield a ruling rather than a dismissal; some even argue the case may have been manufactured as a way to formally let SCOTUS claim this power). The ruling basically said the following: (1) Does Marbury have a right to this commission? Yes, the commission was validly created and the deliverance of it is just a non-discretionary formality, failure of which is an injury that can be fixed (give him the commission). (2) Do we have the power to force the Executive branch to do something like this? Yes, for non-discretionary duties that are non-political and owed to a particular person, the courts may order the lower ranks of the Executive branch to do things. (3) Do we even have the authority to hear this case? No. It is held that the law in question would grant us original jurisdiction over this issue, but that is unconstitutional: our original jurisdiction is completely enumerated by the Constitution, and cannot be expanded by legislation. (4) So what do we do? Nothing, we just dismiss it. Madison can be ordered to do this thing, but won't actually be so ordered since the law required to let us do so is invalid. And we can invalidate that law, but don't actually do so since Congress has already repealed it. In this way both Congress and the President were left with no real angles to hold a beef over the court, as neither one of them had effectively had their authority directly neutered or compelled. The ruling did nothing but what was already done, and simply asserted the Judiciary had certain powers it could flex later: it could rule on the constitutionality of laws, and it could order the Executive branch to do things. For what it's worth, the Marshall court never really invoked these powers again, seemingly still mindful of a contentious battle for power between the branches of government that could render the courts impotent, but one way or another the ruling successfully claimed the power to decide the constitutionality of things for the courts.

What is the legal basis for unilateral share dilution?

As I understand it, many corporations have provisions in their articles of incorporation that allow them to issue new shares (or options) by board vote and give those shares to themselves or their friends and thereby dilute the value of shares held by other existing shareholders. So, for example, a minority shareholder could essentially have their stake in a company reduced to zero. This just seems like theft to me. What is the legal basis for it?

Corporations are creatures of statute. In the U.S., the vast majority of corporations (99.9999%) are organized under state or territorial, rather than federal law. Those statutes generally authorize the issuance of new shares for new consideration, although the process by which this is authorized differs from state to state. These statutes or case law also usually impose fiduciary duties, or at least some sort of duties, on the board and majority shareholders to minority shareholders. Sometimes this is also called the law of "majority oppression." Some corporate statutes also allow minority to cash out if dilution is alleged. Issuance of new shares only dilutes existing shareholders when the price of the new shares is less that the per share market capitalization of the old shares. If the price is the same, the value of the existing shares doesn't change. If the price is lower, the new shares dilute existing shares. If the price is higher, the new shares increase the value of existing shares. A bright line rule is difficult because the value of shares is not self-evident and is to some extent a matter of opinion upon which informed people can differ to some extent. So, a blanket prohibition makes no sense and it isn't a good fit for "theft". "Theft" usually involves an actual taking of property (like a share) not merely a change in its value, which can happen for all sorts of legitimate reasons as well as illegitimate ones. Since shareholders are usually similarly situated, in an arms-length transaction, corporations will not knowingly issue new shares that dilute existing shareholders. Instead, this only happens when there is collusion between controlling shareholders/board members and new share purchasers, something that mostly happens in closely held companies and is where the case law on the duties of boards and majority shareholders arises.

Alternative systems without the Right to Remain Silent

As I understand it, the "Right to Remain Silent" errs on the side of innocence in the USA justice system. Jurors are usually supposed to rule as if the defendant testified in the manner voiced by his attorney (in opening and closing arguments) even if the defendant does not really testify. What would be the harm in removing this right when questions are asked through his attorney with a long allowed response time? For example, suppose the judicial system (and even the police in the executive system) allowed questions like "Were you inside your house at any time on March 30, 2021?" and required an answer of either "Yes", "No", or "I don't recall" (with allowance for further supplemental information if the defendant wants to clarify further). There might be a limit of only a few such forced questions, but answers to these forced questions are all admissible in court. It's important to realize that the attorney fields these questions for the defendant, so direct police interviews still would be refused. Of course, some defendant accused of murdering his wife on March 30 would rather not answer this question if he was truly at home with her. But, jurors would know that this incriminating evidence was forced out. So, jurors get more information in the end and can stay open to circumstances which allow the defendant to still be innocent. I'm ultimately looking for alternative justice systems which drop the "Right to Remain Silent". There are many cases in the current system where defendants don't even try to give an alibi and this often puts a wasteful burden on investigators. Are there any such candidate justice systems in other countries? or am I missing something that makes such a system impossible?

Overview The "right to remain silent " is a feature of US law, inherited, like much of the basic structure of US law, from the British law of the late 1700s. The right is also retained in modern UK law, in a somewhat different form. The laws of many countries that do not inherit their legal system from the English/British source do not include the right. For example, the legal system of France does not. Such a system is clearly possible and need not be an arrant tyranny. Whether such a right improves the justice and fairness of the system could be debated, but it is not essential. Note that it is not the case that a jury must pretend that a defendant would have testified in accord with a defense lawyer's opening statement. Indeed the jury is routinely told that opening statements are not evidence and should not be regarded as such. But a US jury is instructed that it should not draw any inference or conclusion of guilt because a defendant remains silent. A defendant is entitled, by remaining silent to in effect say to the state "Prove it!" and need not offer a competing version of the events of the alleged crime. In UK law, an accused person's failure to deny the crime may be considered at the trial. Historical origin The right arose as a reaction against certain specific practices considered to be abusive and unfair. In several English courts, particularly the Court of the Star Chamber , the practice arose of compelling suspected persons to attend and asking them under oath if they had commuted various illegal acts. If such a suspect had in fact committed the act asked about, then the suspect had the choice of confessing to a criminal act that carried a severe penalty (often death), or committing perjury, which was both a criminal act and was widely believed to be a grave sin, possibly condemning a person's soul to hell. Or if the accused remained silent, a serious punishment for contempt of court could be imposed, and that might be treated as evidence of guilt. These practices contributed to the abolition of the Star Chamber court in 1641. The right to silence seems to have been established in English law after the Restoration of Charles II in 1660, as described in the Wikipedia article , although it was not fully established until well into the 18th century. Current US Practice The right in the US not only applies during a trial for the protection of the accused. The right permits a person being questioned by the police to refuse to answer questions, with the assurance that such refusal may not later be used in court to help convict the suspect. Many lawyers advise anyone questioned by the police who are or might be under suspicion to refuse to answer any questions at all. The right also means that a witness who is not a defendant may not, in a criminal or civil trial, be required to answer a question if the answer might later be used to help convict that person of a crime. There are other implications of the right, and the details are too long to go into in this answer – whole books have been written about the right and what it does and does not cover, and the reasons behind it. The general principle may be taken to be that when the government accuses a person of crime, it must undertake to prove the crime by its own resources, not compel the accused to assist in the process. A system in which an accused is required to respond to specific questions can be imagined. To some extent it has existed at various times and places. It need not involve torture or coerced confession, but could require an accused, during a trial, to respond to specific questions. It would violate the principle that the state must make its case without help from the accused. The value of that principle can be debated. Other Legal systems In the article "French Criminal Procedures—Surprising Features of a French Trial from Bloomberg, it is said that: The “right to silence” is limited. During a trial, the judges usually turn to the defendant and ask for the defendant’s response to the evidence in the record. A refusal to respond will lead to a strong inference of guilt. A defendant is not, however, put under oath.

In this hypothetical, can the courts disapply primary legislation?

As I understand it, the 2019 general election in the UK was held because of the Early Parliamentary General Election Act 2019. In this hypothetical, Parliament has passed a statute that imposes a requirement on any future legislation written to trigger a general election: it can only pass the Commons with a 3/5 majority of a quorum. We'll call this Act A. A few years down the line, a bill to initiate a general election is proposed in the Commons which includes a provision that it can pass the Commons with a simple majority vote while a quorum is present, contrary to Act A. Nevertheless, the bill passes both chambers of Parliament with a simple majority, in accordance with the wording of the aforementioned provision (which does not expressly repeal Act A or make any explicit reference to it, but does state that it only applies to this bill), and it receives Royal Assent to become Act B. Act B is challenged in court on the basis that it is an unconstitutional act of Parliament, because the requirement of Act A was not met, and the provision that allowed Act B to come into law with a simple majority vote was not law at the time Act B received Royal Assent. Therefore, it should be nullified. But if any court were to strike down Act B, wouldn't that go against parliamentary sovereignty? Do the dicta in R. (Jackson) v. Attorney General come into the discussion at all? Or would this bill never even be able to get to the stage of Royal Assent?

Bill B is not an Act until it proceeds through Parliament and receives Royal Assent. Therefore it doesn't matter what its provisions say; it must follow the rules described in Act A. If it doesn't, there is no Act B. It's not a matter of constitutionality, as that has limited meaning when we're talking about Acts of Parliament. It's more that Parliament itself can determine its own processes through Acts, which apply to future Bills before they can become Acts. There is precedent for this. The Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 allow the Commons to pass a Bill without the agreement of the Lords, subject to certain conditions and delays. A number of Acts have been passed in this way (including the Parliament Act 1949, which amended the 1911 Act), and their validity has been challenged in court . So far, all the relevant Acts have been found to be valid. If a court can find that an Act of Parliament is valid, it implies that it could find one invalid. While this could be seen as a court "striking down" an Act, the argument would (I imagine) be made that there was no Act in the first place.

Is it legal to sell food or supplement products online in unlabeled packaging?

As I understand it, the FDA requires labeling with specific information for food and supplement products in most cases, and steep potential penalties for "misbranding" if required information is missing from the label. When food is sold in bulk in grocery stores, the required information is (in my experience) posted on or near the bin. However, I have seen cases in which bulk food or supplement products are sold online and arrive in simple ziploc bags or other unlabeled packaging. Provided that required label information is given in the online product listing, is this legal? Or are these vendors skirting FDA regulations? In other words, what counts as a "label" for the purpose of FDA labeling requirements? Could it be e.g. the product page on an e-commerce platform?

The FDA has an FAQ with citations to legal authority regarding its labeling requirements. Generally speaking, food sold to the general public in packages must be labeled. There are exceptions for some farmer's market scale face to face dealings and for bulk food sales, but none that would obviously apply to internet sales of food, which is almost by definition, packaged food for sale which is subject to the labelling requirement. The main exemptions are set forth in 21 CFR § 1.24 . Most of the regulatory detail applies to the content of the labels rather than the requirement that products have a label.

Does gdpr.eu violate GDPR compliancy?

As I understand it, the GDPR does not permit sending of personal information (which includes the IP address) without prior consent by the user. If that's true, it's basically impossible to fetch any external resources on a website without asking for consent first, so not even style sheets or JavaScript libraries from CDNs. Recently, a German court even fined a website owner for using Google webfonts (German source: golem.de) . People at my workplace where advised to host Google fonts locally because of that decision. That being said, while I was reading about this regulation on https://gdpr.eu/ , I noticed that the site itself uses Google webfonts without asking for user consent (see screenshot). What I would like to know is basically: could gdpr.eu be in violation of the GDPR? Or am I misunderstanding the regulation? I am honestly confused. The consent form on the site also implicitly assumes consent, which I thought was also a violation . I've read some questions about the GDPR on here and information from gdpr.eu and other websites, but it's still very unclear to me what is legal and what is not. I know that a EU regulation can be implemented and interpreted differently from country to country, and that a single court ruling in Germany doesn't even mean that the national law was correctly applied. From what I've read, I get the impression that this particular ruling was not unlikely to be overturned by a higher instance, if it came down to it. So my question probably both pertains to German law specifically and the EU regulation itself.

As I understand it, the GDPR does not permit sending of personal information (which includes the IP address) without prior consent by the user. That's not exactly true, consent is merely one of six possible legal basis for processing (article 6). For example, processing of personal data can also be lawful if it necessary to perform a contract, legally mandatory, or in the public interest. The court decision acknowledges that but rules out another basis in this case because it considers that it is possible to serve fonts without relying on a third-party ( […] der Einsatz der Schriftarten auch möglich ist, ohne dass eine Verbindung von Besuchern zu externen Servern hergestellt werden muss ). Confusingly, it only refers to article 6(1)(f) when it seems to me that (b) would also be plausible but maybe this wasn't raised during the proceedings? If the data controller cannot invoke any other basis for the lawfulness of the processing then yes, the only thing left is asking for consent, i.e. invoking article 6(1)(a). But that doesn't mean that you should expect to be asked for consent each and every time your personal information is being used. The consent form on the site also implicitly assumes consent, which I thought was also a violation. Yes, implying consent doesn't really make sense under the GDPR definition (article 4, see also article 7): ‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action European data protection authorities have issued guidelines that detail what that means and clearly reject “bundling” different data processing. The regulation also makes it clear that data subjects should be able to withdraw consent at any time, which does not seem possible with the fonts on golem.de My reading of all this is that assuming consent because you are using a service (or even created an account or checked a box at some point) simply isn't valid consent. Either you don't need consent at all in the first place or what you need is freely given, specific consent and “implying” consent or bundling it with a registration process achieves exactly nothing. But this is still extremely common and it might take some time before enforcement and case law definitively settle this question. Smart data controllers trying to avoid collecting consent (like Meta) have abandoned any claim that signing up to the their services would constitute consent (because that's transparently not the case) and try to bypass the issue entirely using another basis like contractual necessity. This is also being litigated. I know that a EU regulation can be implemented and interpreted differently from country to country, and that a single court ruling in Germany doesn't even mean that the national law was correctly applied. From what I've read, I get the impression that this particular ruling was not unlikely to be overturned by a higher instance, if it came down to it. So my question probably both pertains to German law specifically and the EU regulation itself. That sounds more like the way EU directives work. Regulations are supposed to be immediately applicable (no implementation in national law necessary) with minimal differences between countries (except when they explicitely provide for that). Of course, enforcement would still mostly be in the hands of national court systems and (in Germany) provincial data protection authorities but there are mechanisms to ensure consistency (the European Data Protection Board, prejudicial questions to the CJEU, infringement proceedings from the European Commission…).

Can the Governor of Maine remove Maine's Attorney General?

As I understand it, the President of the United States has an Attorney General (AG) that serves at the pleasure of the President. That means the President can fire the AG at any time. Can you take a look at Maine? Its legislature elects the AG and as I understand it, the AG has a special common law status as a constitutional officer. The Governor of Maine is supposed to ensure that the laws are executed faithfully. Does he have power to do so when it comes to the department of the AG? I'm not only interested in the AG, but I am also interested in the assistant AGs who serve at the AG's pleasure. I assume that if the Governor can't fire the AG, then the Governor also can't fire any AAGs. I'm trying to understand who is in charge. Can the Governor of Maine fire the Attorney General? Otherwise the department of the AG seems like a 4th or 5th branch of government.

Article IX, Section 5 of the constitution says: Removal by impeachment or address . Every person holding any civil office under this State, may be removed by impeachment, for misdemeanor in office; and every person holding any office, may be removed by the Governor on the address of both branches of the Legislature. But before such address shall pass either House, the causes of removal shall be stated and entered on the journal of the House in which it originated, and a copy thereof served on the person in office, that the person may be admitted to a hearing in that person's own defense. This provides at least some mechanism for removing an AG. A subcomittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Maine Legislature reports here on the broader question of tenure of office. p. 5 opines that "Many members of the executive branch of Maine government hold their offices at the pleasure of the Governor and may be removed from office by the Governor's direction to vacate". p. 6 then holds that "For civil officers whose tenure is set by the Constitution, removal from office may only occur through impeachment or address," and the Attorney General is enumerated as one of those Constitutional Officers (referencing Article IX Section 11). The State of Maine web page says that there are three branches of government plus three constitutional officers (state, treasurer, AG) and one statutory officer, thus the AG is not part of the executive branch (and thus the AG does not serve at the pleasure of the Governor).

Do (any) US State Governors have legal authority to preemptively pardon persons of a state crime?

As I understand it, the President of the United States is empowered to pardon a person prior to being charged with a federal crime. I further understand that State Governors have the power (under their specific state Constitution) to grant pardons. However, what I don't know is if any states have empowered their governors to grant pardons to persons prior to being charged or convicted. For clarification, I am defining "preemptively" as anytime prior to actual conviction (whether charged or during the prosecution process) BTW, I was told by Politics.SE that is was a question that should be posted with Law SE rather than Politics. I looked at other Law SE questions and they did not seem to answer this question about preemptively pardoning

Twenty States Allow Pre-Conviction Pardons The default rule is that states follows the federal rule that a crime can be pardoned any time after it is committed, but cannot be pardoned before it is committed. It appears that this is the rule in 20 U.S. states (a compilation of state clemency laws and procedures can be found at this website and a compact chart for all 50 states is here ). Admittedly, this evaluation relies on a third party summary that may not capture every fine nuance of the process or exception to the general rule. Four States Where Pre-Conviction Pardons Are Allowed Don't Actually Grant Them Under A Policy Which Is Actually Followed This list of 20 states include states where the Governor or Board or both working together, have the power to grant clemency in a very broad array of circumstances, but have adopted policies for how the current Governor or Board will handle applications that are more restrictive than the legal authority that the person issuing pardons has to grant them. In Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota and Nebraska, the pardon power is legally very broad but recent Governors, as a matter of personal pardon power policy, have refused to consider applications for pardons by people who have not completed their sentences many years earlier (5 years in IN; 7 years in MN; 10-15 years depending upon the offense in MA; 3-10 years depending upon the offense in NE). In addition to these four states, North Carolina's Governor has an informal five year from completion of sentence waiting period. But, North Carolina is not included because in practice, the Governors of North Carolina have granted almost all pardons awarded in cases where the Governor is commuting sentences due to a likelihood of actual innocence of a crime, notwithstanding this policy. Commutation Of Sentences And Pre-Conviction Pardons Are Very Rare In practice, however, commutation of a sentence for crimes, or pardons of people who have not completed sentences for their crimes of conviction are very rare in every state, although the frequency with which pardons are granted varies wildly from state to state. For example, in Alaska, the pardon power is legally very broad, but has been exercised only three times since 1995, while in Pennsylvania the hybrid Governor-Board pardon power is theoretically more narrow but about 150 pardons are granted per year (a rate about 1000 times greater before adjusting for population, and more than 30 times greater after adjusting for population). The vast majority of pardons are issued to people who have been convicted of a crime and served their sentences and shown good behavior after their release in order to relieve the applicants of the collateral consequences of having a criminal record, such as ineligibility for occupational licenses and loss of gun ownership rights. Pardons for people who have not been convicted of a crime and commutations of the sentences of people who have been convicted of crimes and are still serving their sentences are extremely rare in every state, and pardons for people who have not been convicted of a crime at the state level are less common than commutations of people who are currently serving sentences for crimes they have been convicted of by courts. There are probably fewer than twenty such pardons or commutations per year in the United States on average (excluding several cases in which a Governor has commuted the sentence of everyone sentenced to death to life in prison). The number of pardons of people who have not been convicted of a crime at the state level is probably less than five per year on average in the entire United States - although there are occasional spikes (e.g. in the case of pending prosecutions where serious doubt has been cast on a common source of evidence like a state informant or a crime lab). Most of the notable instances of pardons of people who have not been convicted of crimes (e.g. President Carter's pardon of Vietnam era draft dodgers ) involve categorial pardons of a class of people rather than case by case evaluations of individuals, and resemble a legislative amnesty process to serve a political goal, rather than an individualized quasi-judicial consideration of a particular individual's case in the interests of justice tempered by mercy. Immunity From Prosecution On the other hand, even when a state limits the pardon power to persons who have been convicted of a crime in a court of law (which many appear to), there is something almost equivalent to the pardon power for people who have not been convicted of crimes that is routinely used by executive branch DAs (i.e. a grant of immunity from prosecution for a crime, for example, in exchange for testimony or cooperation with an investigation). This practice is quite common, although so far as I know, there are no comprehensive statistics available regarding immunity from prosecution grants, although there may be some estimates of how many are made in the academic literature. Governors v. Pardon Boards v. Hybrid Systems While it doesn't go to the thrust of your question, it is true, however, that while every state has a pardon power, not every state vests that power in the Governor of the state on the federal model. Many states (e.g. Georgia, Texas and Oklahoma) require the involvement of a Board of Pardons and Paroles (or an equivalent body) to be involved any time that a pardon is sought, sometimes independently of the Governor, and sometimes in coordination with the Governor. Wikipedia states that nine states have Boards of Pardon and Parole or the equivalent with exclusive power over pardons. In the other forty-one U.S. states the pardon power is vested either in both the Governor and a Board, or is vested entirely in a Governor. The pardon power of the President extends only to offenses recognizable under federal law. However, the governors of most of the 50 states have the power to grant pardons or reprieves for offenses under state criminal law. In other states, that power is committed to an appointed agency or board, or to a board and the governor in some hybrid arrangement (in some states the agency is merged with that of the parole board, as in the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board). Nine states in the United States have Boards of Pardons and Paroles that exclusively grant all state pardons. These states are: Alabama (Board of Pardons and Paroles), Connecticut (Board of Pardons and Paroles), Georgia (Board of Pardons and Paroles), Idaho (Commission of Pardons and Paroles), Minnesota (Board of Pardons), Nebraska (Board of Pardons), Nevada (Board of Pardon Commissioners), South Carolina (Board of Probation, Parole and Pardon), and Utah (Board of Pardons and Parole). In states that vest the pardon power in part or in full to a Board of Pardons and Paroles, as opposed making it a plenary power of the Governor personally which is not subject to review or limitation as in the federal model, as a practical matter, it is much harder to fit into the Board's bureaucratic process for processing pardon applications when there is not a conviction that has been entered, than it is in the less bureaucratic case when that power is vested solely and personally in the Governor on a plenary basis. The pardon board process in many states, at least as a practical matter, makes it impossible to obtain a pardon until there has been a conviction and in most cases, also a sentence imposed and sometimes a waiting period after a sentence has been fully served. For example, many states prohibit applications to the pardon board from being made until a sentence has been completed or until a certain number of years after a sentence has been completed (effectively limiting the power to restoration of civil rights rather than commutation of a sentence, or relief for someone who has not been convicted).

What effect does Brexit have on Britons' Right to be Forgotten?

As I understand it, the Right to be Forgotten was promulgated solely as an EU regulation 1 . Assuming that the UK follows through and leaves the EU, would search engines no longer have to remove results related to British subjects?

The 'right to be forgotten', as currently being applied throughout the European Union (EU), does not come from the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which will come into force 25 May 2018. Rather, the current basis exists in the Data Protection Directive, 95/46/EC, article 12(b): Right of access Member States shall guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from the controller: [...] (b) as appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data; This was one of the main points upon which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided Google Spain v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González , the judgement which allowed for individuals to ask for search engines to remove results containing personal data. The CJEU explained that the 'right to be forgotten' was not absolute and should take into account economic considerations as well as other rights (paragraphs 85 - 88). The GDPR, article 17, for purposes of contrast, has a more robust and explicit right of erasure than currently in force: Article 17 Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies: [...] Shortened for clarity GDPR, article 17 fleshes out much of the lack of specifics that the Directive's article 12(b). It should be noted that the UK's Data Protection Act 1998 is a transposition of the Data Protection Directive. This means that the full effect of the rights and obligations in the Directive are contained within the Data Protection Act 1998. Furthermore, the interpretation of the rights and obligations of the Data Protection Directive by the CJEU are highly influential on interpretation of the Data Protection Act 1998. This is due to the European Communities Act 1972, s 3(2) which states: Judicial notice shall be taken of the Treaties, of the Official Journal of the Communities and of any decision of, or expression of opinion by, the European Court on any such question as aforesaid; and the Official Journal shall be admissible as evidence of any instrument or other act thereby communicated of any of the Communities or of any Community institution Even without the above provision, it would be extremely likely that British courts would take into account Google Spain , given that the foundation of the Data Protection Act 1998 is the Data Protection Directive. The most likely outcome is for British courts to uphold the interpretation in Google Spain and allow for data subjects to request removal from search engines. Of course, it is not entirely possible to know without a test case, but it is doubtful any major search engine would attempt to deviate from the current situation as there is currently legal certainty. The Data Protection Act 1998 will still be in force after the future Brexit agreement and is certainly not contingent on continued EU membership. Update The current DPA will be repealed when Brexit comes in to play and will be replaced by a new one. Read more about the new data protection bill on the ICOs web site , which is based on the GDPR with certain derogations and additions.

Have any recent US court decisions cited English common law?

As I understand it, the common law system in the United States inherited the body of caselaw developed by English courts up until the US declared independence, at which point we started developing our own additions to common law. So, for example, Scrope v. Grosvenor (1389) should still be binding law in the US, in the vanishingly unlikely event that it should ever come up in a court case, unless it has been overridden by subsequent judgments. I'm curious to know if there are any US court cases within the past few decades that have cited pre-1776 English common law as binding precedent.

Infamously, the Supreme Court majority in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization , No. 19-1392 (2022) cited English law from as long ago as the 13th century in order to inform their analysis of abortion. While this opinion has been widely criticized, it still represents a prominent recent use of pre-independence English common law. A quoted statement from Henry de Bracton 's De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae , probably written in the 1230s, must surely count as the oldest piece of common law heritage to be used by the Supreme Court in recent years: [If one has] struck a pregnant woman, or has given her poison, whereby he has caused abortion, if the foetus be already formed and animated, and particularly if it be animated, he commits homicide. (trans. T. Twiss, 1879, as cited in the case) Si sit aliquis qui mulierem prægnantem percusserit vel ei venenum dederit, per quod fecerit abortivum, si puerperium iam formatum vel animatum fuerit, et maxime si animatum, facit homicidium. (Original Latin text, from the edition by G. E. Woodbine, 1923) Justice Alito's opinion also cites case law, such as R v. Webb (Q.B. 1602). He did not consider himself to be bound by such cases, or by Bracton, but he did use them as part of an argument that there was no historical common-law right to an abortion. If there were one, then it would be potentially capable of Constitutional protection and any U.S. domestic law would have to give way. But the historical common law, on its own, could not override a federal or state statute in that manner: it is just being studied in order to understand the scope of what the Constitution requires. Less controversially, certain English cases relating to civil liberties continue to be cited in recent U.S. decisions, although again not as "binding precedent". They are used to help illuminate the historical context behind provisions of the U.S. Constitution - which is the supreme law of the United States - rather than because they themselves are authoritative in that way. For example, in the case of United States v. Jones , 565 U.S. 400 (2012) , the Supreme Court had to consider whether installation of a GPS tracker on Jones's car was done in violation of the Fourth Amendment. That provision of the Constitution, enacted long before the invention of GPS or cars, says The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The majority opinion by Justice Scalia begins by calling back to a famous English case of 1765, known to have been influential for the drafting of this amendment: We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C. P. 1765), is a “case we have described as a ‘monument of English freedom’ ‘undoubtedly familiar’ to ‘every American statesman’ at the time the Constitution was adopted, and considered to be ‘the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law’ ” with regard to search and seizure. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 596 (1989) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626 (1886) ). In that case, Lord Camden expressed in plain terms the significance of property rights in search-and-seizure analysis: “[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his neighbour’s ground, he must justify it by law.” Entick, supra, at 817. Note that Justice Scalia is careful about his language here. He is not treating Lord Camden's opinion in Entick as binding precedent, to be applied to the facts in the Jones case. What he is doing is affirming a line of Supreme Court authority, in particular the 1886 case of Boyd in which Justice Bradley used pre-Revolution cases from England to characterize the Fourth Amendment's relation to personal property. It is the Fourth Amendment which provides the standard by which the police's conduct could be judged. The English case is important for understanding what the Amendment really means, but is cited here mainly for rhetorical effect. In the same way, lower courts in the U.S. are not bound by Entick directly, but they are bound by the Supreme Court's analysis of the Fourth Amendment in its various cases. That analysis is informed by Entick and so other courts may also consider it to be persuasive or useful, although they would very rarely have to reach back to "first principles" rather than more recent applicable precedent. Similar cases on search and seizure can be decided without reference to English authority. For example, the majority opinion in Carpenter v. United States , 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) contains a few passing references to the general history and scope of the Fourth Amendment, including a citation of Boyd , but doesn't delve into any deep exegesis using historical English law. Some of the dissenting opinions do - between Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch, we see citations of Entick , of cases of comparable vintage such as Wilkes v. Wood 19 How. St. Tr. 1153 (K. B. 1763), and of learned treatises by Locke, Blackstone, and Coke.

Are police allowed to be ignorant of the law?

As I understand it, the limited liability that police enjoy requires that people bringing civil cases against police must prove that the police officer should have had a reasonable knowledge of the civil rights that they accuse him of breaking, for the civil case to be successful. If we excuse the rhetorical gymnastics of not expecting law enforcement to be knowledgeable of the law, how does this excuse of ignorance fit into the adage that "ignorance of the law is no excuse for breaking it"? If a police officer is allowed to be ignorant of laws in defense of a civil claim, how can it then be said that another law adage, "everyone is equal under the law," is true?

As I understand, the limited liability that police enjoy, requires that people bringing civil cases against police must prove that the police person should have had a reasonable knowledge of the civil rights that you accuse him of breaking, for the civil case to be successful. This isn't quite right. The test you are referencing is the one for qualified immunity from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which imposes liability on government officials only for violating a "well-established" constitutional right. A rule of law is "well-established" when there is controlling case law in that jurisdiction when a factually similar binding precedent exists in that jurisdiction to show that the alleged conduct is unconstitutional. This test is employing the legal fiction that police officers are familiar with all of the binding precedents in the jurisdiction regarding what constitutes a violation of a constitutional right, which is held against officers. Of course, in reality, almost no police officers have that exhaustive a level of understanding of the law. What the test does, however, is to prevent police officers from being held civilly liable for money damages when they take action which, in fact, violates a constitutional right, but which no case law in a factually similar case that was binding precedent established before the incident took place. Thus, police officers are relieved of liability for incidents that they would have to predict that a future court would find violated a constitutional right. This is sometimes phrased as being justified because a reasonable police officer could not have foreseen a new rule of constitutional law or a novel application of an existing rule of constitutional law to a new situation. One of the reasons that the qualified immunity rule is controversial, however, is that courts have the discretion to decide a case on qualified immunity grounds without determining if the underlying action indeed did violate a constitutional right, and this prevents constitutional law from evolving normally over time to applications in new factually novel situations. The key point, however, is that this requirement that a constitutional right be well-established to be enforceable in a civil action is an "objective" test in that it is decided without any reference to what the particular individual being sued actually knew about the law in the particular circumstances presented. A police officer who acts without actually knowing the law does so at his or her peril.

Why is there a 'statute of limitation' for sex crimes?

As I understand it, there is no statute of limitations for murder: in contrast sex crimes (rape) have time limits to prosecute . Is there a line of reasoning to decide which classes of crime have a limited window for prosecution?

There are great jurisdiction by jurisdiction differences in the statutes of limitations that apply to crimes. Some jurisdictions have no statute of limitations for any serious crime (e.g. Canada and if I recall correctly Virginia). Others have statutes of limitations for almost all serious crimes other than murder (e.g. Colorado). Where there is a statute of limitations, the primary issue is that the ability of the prosecution and defense to secure reliable evidence that will allow a jury to enter an accurate verdict. This potential to conduct a fair trial can be compromised by a delay in pressing charges. Alibi witnesses can die or disappear to someplace that they can't be located, the location of the alleged crime can change in ways pertinent to proof, memories of witnesses in general can fade. Records or correspondence that could show intent can be destroyed. This is particularly a burden for an innocent criminal defendant who did not know that he or she needed to prepare a defense and gather evidence to respond to criminal charges. Some states toll statutes of limitations during a period of a victims minority or incapacity when brining charges may not be feasible. Other states have a long statute of limitations in rape cases where there is DNA evidence available that can conclusively tie a defendant to the scene of the crime (lack of consent would still have to be established), but a shorter statute of limitations in other rape cases. Murder and fraud are the most common offenses to lack a statute of limitations, in the first case, because it is considered the most serious crime and because the victim is unable to report the crime, and in the latter case, because fraud, by its nature and by the perpetrator's design, may go undiscovered for very long periods of time. Is there a line of reasoning to decide which classes of crime have a limited window for prosecution? While I've given some examples of the considerations that apply, ultimately, this is a legislative and political decision and not a legal one. You can't determine by reason alone which classes of crimes will have a limited window for prosecution. Different legislative bodies make different decisions on the same issues at different times and in different places.

Can the accused change their mind about testifying mid-trial? USA criminal law

As I understand it, under US criminal law, a defendant may decline to testify in their own trial. Suppose a defendant elects to testify in their own trial but decides that it is no longer in their best interest to continue. Can they leave the witness box at a whim. For example mid-question by either defence or prosecution. Could they perhaps say to the judge, "I no longer wish to testify, may I step down?" and the judge allow this? Conversely, if the trial is going badly and, at the last moment, they decide that they do want to testify in order to bolster their position, can they request this and it be granted, even at the last minute? Are there any precedents for these actions by a defendant?

Normally, the prosecution case will not rely upon the testimony of the defendant. Instead, the prosecution will call all of its witnesses until its evidentiary case is complete. Then, the defense case opens and it may call witnesses. The defense is not obligated to call all of the witnesses that it stated that it anticipated that it would call prior to trial and the jury doesn't know which witnesses the parties said that they anticipated that they were going to call and didn't call. Until the defense case is closed, the defendant can call himself or herself as a witness if he or she wishes to do so, but is not obligated to do so. Once a defendant starts testifying (generally in his or her own case) he or she has generally waived the Fifth Amendment right not to testify. So, the prosecution may cross-examine the defendant in this situation. But since the prosecution's case is usually already closed at this point, the prosecution's cross-examination is limited to the scope of the defendant's testimony under questions from his or her own lawyer (there are some nuances of how this is done when the defendant is self-represented and has no lawyer). The prosecution cannot expand the scope of questioning of the defendant to new topic areas. I can imagine deviations from this pattern in odd circumstances, but they would be very rare.

When a lawyer is paid by an insurance company and representing an individual to whom do they have a duty to act in best interests of?

As I understand it, with regards to civil claims handled through insurance there are two duties involved: An insurance company has a duty to defend their client, in the US this seems to be inherent in insurance law, in the UK it seems to depend on the insurance covering legal fees (but most do, assume that it is so here) A lawyer has a duty to act in their client's best interests If a lawyer is acting in such a case where the defendant is an individual, they are likely to be paid by the insurance company and representing the individual. In whose best interest are they required to act? The specific case in question is the result of an car accident, where the insurance company has not made an offer than it is possible for the claimant to accept, has not even acknowledged any offers made by the claimant and I THINK has advised the defendant that they are not required to provide their address to the claimant, even though it is a legal requirement for them to do so . I think that if the claimant initiates legal action they shall be required to declare this lack of provision of address, which I suspect will be very much not in the interests of the defendant, possibly even involving criminal charges.

Generally the insurer appoints a solicitor from its panel and instructs the solicitor to defend the claim in the name of the insured on the basis of the insurance policy . In the circumstances the solicitor has two clients, the insured and the insurer - a 'joint retainer'. The solicitor must not behave as if there is a 'primary client' or preferred client. A conflict of interest may arise. The solicitor has a duty not to act in the matter if there is a conflict of interest or a significant risk of one. The solicitor should ensure the insurer is aware of its duty to have regard to its own interests and the insured's interests. If the solicitor gets this wrong the insured may have a cause of action against the solicitor for breach of contract; the solicitor may face disciplinary proceedings for breaching the solicitor's Code of Conduct; a complaint could be addressed to the Legal Ombudsman (which may award compensation).

USA: Do 911/PD phone operators have a 'duty to rescue'?

As I understand it: 'duty to rescue' does not generally exist for regular citizens in the USA. (Some exceptions apply!) Let's say I'm in Europe and I call the general inquiry phone number of a local (city) police department in the United States to report a suicidal individual local to them. Do any of the following entities have a 'duty to rescue' in the following situations?: Police officers answering the phone. Non-police officer employees answering phones at a (local?) PD. The dispatch operators that #1 and #2 connect me to. The dispatch operators I get when I dial 911 while being in the USA myself. The legal entities of either the police department or the emergency services dispatch (or other involved party?) Note: I have tried to keep this question as narrow/focused as possible. Let me know if there's any issues with the question. I'm not familiar with law all that much.

No More generally, government agencies have no duty to protect . In the cases DeShaney vs. Winnebago and Town of Castle Rock vs. Gonzales , the supreme court has ruled that police agencies are not obligated to provide protection of citizens. In other words, police are well within their rights to pick and choose when to intervene to protect the lives and property of others — even when a threat is apparent. In the united-kingdom , the situation is the same with the relevant case being Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire , a precedent followed in australia . However, the police, fire fighters, ambulance officers etc. do owe the same common law duty of care as everyone else where such a duty exists if and when they do choose to act, unless specifically exempted by law. For example, they owe a duty to people in custody or innocent bystanders.

Pressing Battery Charges

As I understand it: Battery is the act of intentionally touching or applying force to another person such that the person suffers harm or offense. Q1: What is the correct verbiage to communicate to an enforcement office that you want to press assault charges against a suspect that has physically struck a victim? Assume you witnessed the battery. Q2: What obligation do officers have once a victim has indicated they have been assaulted and the victim seeks to press charges? Q3: Under what, if any, circumstances are officers required to arrest a battery suspect? Does an arrest require that the victim suffer visible physical injury? Assume a Juris Diction of Florida / New York City

As I understand it: Battery is the act of intentionally touching or applying force to another person such that the person suffers harm or offense. More or less. Q1: What is the correct verbiage to communicate to an enforcement office that you want to press assault charges against a suspect that has physically struck a victim? Assume you witnessed the battery. Normally called making a complaint or report. Q2: What obligation do officers have once a victim has indicated they have been assaulted and the victim seeks to press charges? They are required to record the complaint and use their discretion to decide if and how they will investigate. Q3: Under what, if any, circumstances are officers required to arrest a battery suspect? In general, they aren’t. Police have wide discretion in which complaints to investigate and how to do so. In some jurisdictions there are some crimes which must be investigated by law - child abuse and domestic violence are the typical ones. Otherwise it is a matter of administrative policy, capability and resources as well as individual discretion. Similar discretion exists around prosecution. Does an arrest require that the victim suffer visible physical injury? No

Are unreasonable late fees prosecuted as usury?

As I understand the term usury: it is the action or practice of lending money at unreasonably high rates of interest. Are unreasonable late fees prosecuted as usury? Is there mother term? If a concrete example is needed for an answer: assume a Florida commercial lease / rent with a late fee of 1% per day.

england-and-wales This is covered by the Tenant Fees Act 2019. This act caps any late fees for a tenancy to 3% above the Bank of England rate.

Plaintiff / Defendant terminology in demand letter

As I understand the terms are used to described opposing parties in court. When referring to opposing parties in a demand letter, they are not in court (yet) so I am not sure that this pair is the right label set. That being said, what is the right label when referring to the parties in a demand letter?

There isn't really an equivalent naming convention at the demand stage. You could call them demandor/demandee, but it would sound ridiculous. If you need generic terms, you would probably use names that describe the nature of the relationship: husband/wife, landlord/tenant, debtor/creditor, buyer/seller, etc. In my experience, though, good demand letters, like any good legal writing, refer to everyone by name. People frequently identify parties by their role in the case, but mostly just because that's how everyone has done it for a long time, and lawyers are terrified of doing anything new, especially in writing. Courts and law schools are generally pushing people away from this convention, but many people are still hanging on.

Under California law, where are all the unmarked crosswalks located?

As I understand, "unmarked crosswalk" refers to any area implicitly defined by the law as a crosswalk. For example, an unmarked crosswalk usually exists where one road meets another. CVC 21949-21971 provides the pedestrian rules, but does not define "unmarked crosswalk "

CVC section 275 defines "crosswalk": http://codes.findlaw.com/ca/vehicle-code/veh-sect-275.html An unmarked crosswalk is simply a crosswalk that isn't marked.

How to shoot a movie based on Harry Potter fan fiction?

As I understand, J.K.Rowling owns right for characters, story, special words (like "muggle"), and so on. Warner Bros. has exclusive right to make movies based on the original books/stories. Here is a discussion on acquiring a license to produce Harry-Potter-related products. But what about movies, based on alternative stories in the same universe with the same characters? I imagine that one can just ask J.K.Rawling for her permission to make a movie based on a fanfic. Since it is not an original book/story, which can be filmed only by Warner Bros, it means that one can make a deal to produce a movie based on fanfic, and pay, say, 80% of revenue to the author, if author is agreed :) But I suppose this only possible in the ideal world.

If Rowling chose to permit the creation and distribution of such a film, it would be legal, unless that violated her contract with Warner. (I have no idea how that might be written.) If based on a previous work of fan fiction, such a movie would need permission from the author of that work also. Otherwise such a fan fiction move would be a derivative work and would infringe Rowling's copyright. Creating such a work of fan fiction and distributing it "for free" does not "get around the legal issue." The copyright holder has the right to control the making of derivative works, whether for profit or not, unless they count as "fair use" (under US law). If they harm or might harm the market for the original they are not likely to be held to be fair use.

Who is supposed to teach the law to the citizens?

As I understand, in general, not knowing the law does not excuse violating it . That should apply to most if not all jurisdictions in most cases with very few exceptions . From personal experience, never in my life has school, family or anyone ever actually taught me any laws or showed me where I could consult them myself, and I have already reached legal age a couple of years ago. So my question is, who, by law or morality, is supposed to teach citizens the law so that they can be aware and abide by it? Answers can be generalized to include most jurisdictions or be specific.

The answer from @user6726 is a good one. But, I'd like to add to it by pointing out that the body of law applicable to an individual is usually much, much smaller than the entire body of law. I'm a lawyer who has been in private practice for almost 25 years with an extremely diverse practice compared to the average lawyer, and I've never even looked at perhaps 80% of the laws on the books in the states where I practice, and even less elsewhere. By statutory and regulatory volume, the vast majority of statutory and regulatory law is applicable to either the internal operations of government, or to the way in which regulated industries and business transactions are conducted. And, it is customary for people in situations in all of those situations to have professional intermediaries such as lawyers, realtors, brokers, architects, general contractors, accountants, tax preparers, and consultants to assist them in complying. Some of the more technical areas encountered by average people (e.g. traffic laws) are areas in which training is mandated before you can get a driver's license. Many other areas of occupational and industry regulations are similarly distinguished by having a licensing requirement to make sure that everyone involved knows that a new body of law applies to them. You only need to know about nuclear power plant regulations, for example, if you build a nuclear power plant and will soon learn if you try to do so that you need a license to do that. Even within areas of law that have broad applicability like tax law and criminal law, a lot of the law has only narrow application. For example, most people don't need to know the rules for determining the taxable income of a life insurance company, or the criminal laws pertaining to people who have security clearances to review top secret national security information. The body of "private law" governing the rights of individuals vis-a-vis other private individuals, and of criminal law that an ordinary person is in a position to violate, is very modest. And much of the law in this area is devoted to determining how serious an offense is and what the penalty should be, and what law enforcement is allowed to do in order to investigate these violations, and not to what is legal and illegal in some regard. For example, intentionally, recklessly or negligently offensively touching or causing injury to someone else's property or person, is almost always either a crime and/or a civil wrong called a tort for which you can be sued. Some versions of this conduct are more serious (e.g. rape or murder), some are less serious (e.g. pinching someone on Saint Patrick's Day for not wearing green). But the overriding concept, once you strip away the details, is pretty simple. Likewise, damaging or taking property that isn't yours, intentionally, recklessly or negligently, is almost always either a crime and/or a civil wrong called a tort for which you can be sued. Add the notion that you have to honor your promises in most circumstances and shouldn't lie or deceive in most circumstances, you have to follow authoritative signs and directions from legal authorities, and you have to figure out if you owe income taxes or not each year with professional help, if necessary, and you are well on your way to knowing what you need to know to obey the law. Even within "private law" there are lots of areas like patent law, product liability law, and oil and gas property rights, that the average person doesn't need to know. Knowing that if you are injured by someone else you should think about talking to a lawyer is usually good enough. These bare bones may prevent you from doing things that are legal close to the boundaries of what is allowed sometimes, but having standards higher than the bare legal minimum is rarely a deep impediment to living a decent life. It should also be enough to let you have some intuition that you are in a gray area and need to confer if you aren't sure if something is illegal or not. There are more complicated areas that many average individuals do have to deal with to some extent. The law governing privacy, copyright and speech comes to mind, for example. But, you can go a very long way on some very basic principles. Most law that applies to ordinary people flows from simple moral intuition.

Why is no language in the world defined by one single official entity?

As I understand, languages are mutable and shaped by their usage and the need for newer terms. The definitions of single words and expressions aren't always clearly defined by dictionaries. There are different definitions for each term, some more vague than others and some embracing more meanings. In my opinion there is the need to exist one official place that defines a language instead of different respected entities not only for common learning but also for legal purposes such as: Absent some definition or example in the document itself, one must fall back on the “ordinary and plain meaning” of the term, which, as with all terms, is subject to interpretation and dispute. My question is if there have been attempts of a country or such to officialize a language so that it leaves less doubt and controversy in legal cases of any meanings in for example written contracts.

Here is a list of language-regulating bodies . There is none for English, but they exist for Spanish (Real Academia Española), French (Académie française) and Swahil (Baraza la Kiswahili la Taifa for Tanzania, Chama cha Kiswahili cha Taifa for Kenya). No language regulator addresses the issues which arise in the interaction between natural language and the needs of legal interpretation. Instead, these bodies generally strive to maintain the historical "purity" of the language. Rather than "define" a word like "sandwich", they decide whether to outlaw (or disparage) the word because it comes from English. The vast majority of language-related problems in law which arise in common-law countries pertains to characteristics of common law and the practice of establishing precedent. There are philosophical conflicts, for example between those to adhere to the text versus those who try to discern original intent. If we had an official agency that precisely defined what a "weapon" is, we would still have the struggle over interpretive philosophies which renders moot any rulings from the national language regulator. In the US, part of the problem of word-definition is the widespread practice of localized redefinition in statutes – the laws that say "In this subsection, 'weapon' has the meaning defined in 18 U.S. Code §920" (fictitious: §921 defines "firearm" undefined "weapon"). Tracking the scope of definition and range of variation of a word within a body of codified law is very difficult. The rule in common law is that words that are not statutorily defined are given their "ordinary" meaning. There is no authoritative resource for "ordinary meaning" in English (there is no such thing as "the" dictionary). In the US, it would require a constitutional amendment to immutably impose a particular dictionary standard for deriving word meaning (e.g. Webster's Fourth New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged , forthcoming) and there would be ensuing political protests. A legally precise definition of "repair" would be very difficult to understand, and would require hiring a lawyer in order to engage in the activity of "repairing broken windows", from a legally-safe perspective. And that is just word meaning. Ambiguity in sentence-meaning cannot be resolved by listing the sentences.

Legality regarding Medals of Honor in motion pictures/television series

As I understand, per 18 U.S. Code § 704 - Military medals or decorations, it is illegal to produce replicas of Medals of Honor, or any United States military decorations. However, as I have seen in a multitude of American motion pictures and television series, Medals of Honor along with other medals appear frequently. I would like to know how it is legal for the production to either produce or own such replicas.

18 U.S. Code § 704 is a statute called the Stolen Valor Act. The earlier version enacted in 2006 , which simply made it illegal to produce replicas of Medals of Honor, or any United States military decorations was declared unconstitutional in the case of United States v. Alvarez as a violation of free speech rights. The statute was amended in 2013 with an intent to make it constitutional , and as currently in force, it is limited "to fraudulent claims about military service to subject to a fine, imprisonment for not more than one year, or both for an individual who, with intent to obtain money, property, or other tangible benefit, fraudulently holds himself or herself out to be a recipient of:" various military honors. An actor in a movie or television series is not fraudulently holding himself or herself out to be a recipient of military honors. Everybody knows that it is a fictional story and that the person who plays the character in the movie or on TV isn't the actual person whom they depict on TV or in a movie. Therefore, this is outside the scope of the statute. The core provisions of the current version of the statute read as follows (the remainder sets enhanced punishment for certain kinds of really special honors and provides some definitions of certain kinds of honors) (emphasis added): (a)In General.— Whoever knowingly purchases, attempts to purchase, solicits for purchase, mails, ships, imports, exports, produces blank certificates of receipt for, manufactures, sells, attempts to sell, advertises for sale, trades, barters, or exchanges for anything of value any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the armed forces of the United States, or any of the service medals or badges awarded to the members of such forces, or the ribbon, button, or rosette of any such badge, decoration or medal, or any colorable imitation thereof, except when authorized under regulations made pursuant to law, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. (b)Fraudulent Representations About Receipt of Military Decorations or Medals.— Whoever, with intent to obtain money, property, or other tangible benefit, fraudulently holds oneself out to be a recipient of a decoration or medal described in subsection (c)(2) or (d) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than one year, or both. There is a split of authority on the validity of 18 USC 704(a). The Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Hamilton , 699 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2012), that the law was constitutional because there was an implied element of deception included that was not part of the express language of the statute, in some lengthy and tortured analysis (some citations omitted without indication): Hamilton argues that his convictions for wearing a military uniform without authorization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 702 (Section 702), and for wearing military medals without authorization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (Section 704(a)),[6] violate his First Amendment rights. . . . Before we address the level of scrutiny applicable to our analysis of the insignia statutes, we first must consider the range of conduct covered by the statutes. We undertake this preliminary analysis because " it is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute covers." Section 702 addresses the unauthorized wearing of military uniforms. This statute provides that " [w]hoever, ... without authority, wears the uniform or a distinctive part thereof or anything similar to a distinctive part of the uniform of any of the armed forces of the United States" is subject to a monetary fine or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months. 18 U.S.C. § 702. Section 704(a) addresses the display of military medals, encompassing various forms of conduct including the wearing, purchasing, solicitation, importation, exportation, sale, trading, or advertising of such military medals. In relevant part, Section 704(a) provides that " [w]hoever knowingly wears ... any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the armed forces of the United States, or any of the service medals or badges awarded to the members of such forces ... or any colorable imitation thereof, except when authorized under regulations made pursuant to law," is subject to a monetary fine or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months.18 U.S.C. § 704(a). The government acknowledges that a broad reading of the insignia statutes could " raise serious constitutional concerns," because such a reading would prohibit anyone from wearing a military medal who did not validly receive it, or anyone from wearing a military uniform without express authority, under any circumstances. Under that view, for example, it would be unlawful for grandchildren to wear their grandparents' medals during a Veterans Day parade, for persons to wear a military uniform to a Halloween party, or for actors, including children participating in a school play, to wear a military uniform or imitation military medals. See United States v. Perelman, 658 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (9th Cir.2011) (listing these and other examples of conduct potentially prohibited by a literal interpretation of Section 704(a)), amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, 695 F.3d 866, (9th Cir.2012). As a " cardinal principle" of statutory interpretation, we may avoid such serious constitutional concerns if we are able to " ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." Thus, when " an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, [courts] will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." see also Legend Night Club v. Miller, 637 F.3d 291, 300 (4th Cir.2011) (holding that this Court will not strike down a statute as facially overbroad if the statute's constitutionality may be preserved through a " limiting construction" or " partial invalidation" ). We observe that the Ninth Circuit applied such a limiting construction to Section 704(a) in United States v. Perelman, holding that the statute created a criminal offense prohibiting the unauthorized wearing of military medals only when the wearer " has an intent to deceive." 658 F.3d at 1137-38. In our view, the imposition of a limiting construction requiring an " intent to deceive" is appropriate with respect to both Sections 702 and 704(a).[9] In fact, Section 704(a) already contains certain limitations restricting its application. A violation of that statute occurs only when a person " knowingly wears" a military medal, " or any colorable imitation thereof." Thus, in drafting this statute, Congress manifested its intent that application of the statute be restricted to avoid absurd results. See Perelman, 658 F.3d at 1137 (" By prohibiting the wearing of a colorable imitation and by including a scienter requirement, Congress made clear that deception was its targeted harm." ). The application of a limiting construction to the insignia statutes requiring an " intent to deceive" is not " plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." Indeed, the rejection of such a limiting construction could lead to absurd results, as discussed above and in Perelman. Accordingly, we hold that persons violate the insignia statutes if they wear a military uniform without authorization, or wear military medals or imitations of such medals, respectively, only when they do so with the intent to deceive. We turn now to consider the level of scrutiny that should be applied in our determination whether the insignia statutes violate the First Amendment. Initially, we observe that in its recent decision in United States v. Alvarez, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012), the Supreme Court considered a First Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 704(b), which established as a criminal offense any false spoken or written claims concerning the receipt of military decorations or medals. Because Section 704(b) proscribed pure speech, a plurality of the Supreme Court applied " exacting scrutiny" to its consideration of the constitutionality of that statute. [10] Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2548-50 (plurality opinion); id. at 2555-56 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (concluding Section 704(b) violated the First Amendment because the government could achieve its objective in less burdensome ways). In contrast to Section 704(b), the insignia statutes do not regulate pure speech but instead proscribe certain forms of expressive conduct. In framing our analysis, we rely on the Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson and O'Brien, which set forth the level of scrutiny applicable in constitutional challenges to statutes regulating conduct rather than speech. In its decision in O'Brien, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected " the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘ speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." 391 U.S. at 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673. Further, in Johnson, the Court explained that although expressive conduct often includes both communicative and non-communicative elements, this mode of expression may be regulated by the government with a " freer hand" than the written or spoken word. 491 U.S. at 406, 109 S.Ct. 2533. Thus, as a general principle, expressive conduct is not entitled to the same degree of protection under the First Amendment as is pure speech. In O'Brien, the Supreme Court analyzed a defendant's First Amendment challenge to his conviction for burning his selective service registration certificate (draft card).[11] The defendant testified during his trial that he burned the draft card in a public place to persuade other people to adopt his antiwar beliefs. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 370, 88 S.Ct. 1673. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the statute at issue violated the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated O'Brien's conviction. Id. at 371-72, 88 S.Ct. 1673. In concluding that the statute under which the defendant was convicted was constitutional, the Supreme Court announced that a government regulation infringing on expressive conduct is permissible: " 1 if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; 2 if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; 3 if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and 4 if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673. The Court later stated that the fourth element of the O'Brien test is not a " least restrictive means" test. Explaining this distinction, the Court stated that " an incidental burden on speech is no greater than is essential, and therefore is permissible under O'Brien, so long as the neutral regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 67, 126 S.Ct. 1297. In Johnson, however, the Supreme Court declined to apply the O'Brien test in considering the constitutionality of a Texas statute that prohibited the desecration of certain " venerated objects." 491 U.S. at 400, 407-10, 109 S.Ct. 2533. The defendant in Johnson was prosecuted under Texas law for burning a flag, which he did in a public place as a means of political protest. Id. at 399, 109 S.Ct. 2533. In assessing the defendant's First Amendment challenge in Johnson, the Court held that the O'Brien standard was inapplicable because that " relatively lenient standard" applied in cases in which the governmental interest is " unrelated to the suppression of free expression." 491 U.S. at 407, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (citation omitted). The Court further explained that " [i]n order to decide whether O'Brien 's test applies here, therefore, we must decide whether Texas has asserted an interest in support of Johnson's conviction that is unrelated to the suppression of expression." Id. The Court held that Texas' only proffered interest implicated by the facts of the case was its interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity, an interest that the Court determined was related to the suppression of free expression. Id. at 407-10, 109 S.Ct. 2533. Concluding that " [w]e are thus outside of O'Brien 's test altogether," the Court held that the Texas statute was subject to " the most exacting scrutiny." [12] Id. at 410, 412, 109 S.Ct. 2533. As the Supreme Court's decisions in O'Brien and Johnson illustrate, the key factor that determines whether we apply the " relatively lenient" test employed in O'Brien, or the " most exacting scrutiny" standard set forth in Johnson, is whether the statute being reviewed is related to the suppression of free expression. This issue presents a close question, at least with respect to the " wearing" component of the insignia statutes under which Hamilton was convicted. On their face, the insignia statutes are not related to the suppression of free expression. Neither of these statutes " prevent[s] the expression of any particular message or viewpoint." See Perelman, 658 F.3d at 1140 (applying O'Brien test in affirming defendant's conviction under Section 704(a)). The insignia statutes do not restrict expression or debate concerning military policy, the meaning of military uniforms or military medals, the values that they represent, or any other topics of public concern relating to the military.[13] Our application of the " intent to deceive" limiting construction, however, complicates the matter. For instance, a defendant charged with violating the insignia statutes may have " intended to deceive" by communicating the false message that he actually earned the adorned uniform or military medals. [14] The insignia statutes' prohibition of this conduct arguably falls within the realm of the Johnson " most exacting scrutiny" test because the prosecution of that defendant would necessarily be related to the suppression of free expression. Thus, in applying the insignia statutes only to intentionally deceptive conduct based on the limiting construction discussed in this opinion, these statutes could reach conduct that solely involves free expression, within the holding of Johnson. In the present case, however, we need not resolve the issue whether the more lenient O'Brien standard or the more demanding Johnson standard applies in evaluating Hamilton's constitutional challenge because we conclude that the insignia statutes withstand a facial challenge under even " the most exacting scrutiny." Accordingly, we will assume, without deciding, that the more demanding standard discussed in Johnson applies in this case.[15] The " most exacting scrutiny" standard requires the government to establish that the " regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-22, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988) (cited in Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412, 109 S.Ct. 2533).[16] The first prong of this analysis requires us to determine whether the government's interests underlying the insignia statutes are " compelling." The statutes, as construed in conformance with the limiting construction requiring an intent to deceive, prevent the intentionally deceptive wearing of military uniforms and military medals. Military uniforms are a recognized symbol of our armed forces, and the uniforms themselves convey information about the rank and accomplishments of the wearer, as well as about the particular branch of the armed forces being represented. Military medals are institutional symbols of honor and prestige, which enhance military morale and recognize the accomplishment of difficult missions by members of the armed services. Additionally, military uniforms and military medals publicly promote the integrity of the military system by honoring members of our military for their service and their sacrifices. The intentionally deceptive wearing of military uniforms and military medals threatens to weaken this tradition because such deceptive practices, if left unchecked, could diminish the symbolic value of these items. Deceptive actions of this nature also frustrate the government's efforts to ensure that members of the military and the general public perceive military honors as being awarded only to a limited number of deserving recipients. Accordingly, we hold that the government's interest in preserving the integrity of the system honoring military members for their achievements and sacrifices is compelling. See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1216 (9th Cir.2010), aff'd, 132 S.Ct. 2537; Perelman, 658 F.3d at 1140; id., 695 F.3d at 872-73; see also Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2549 (plurality opinion) (observing that the government's interest in " protecting the integrity of the Medal of Honor is beyond question" and characterizing that interest as " compelling" ); id. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (characterizing the government's interest in preserving the integrity of the military honors system as " substantial" ). We also note that the importance of the uniform, which conveys a particular military rank, is not limited to the general public's perception of that rank. Rather, military uniforms are directly and inextricably linked to the effective operation of the military chain of command, because the unauthorized wearing of military uniforms may convey misleading information to other members of the military about the rank, if any, of the wearer. Thus, because the display of a military rank could have actual consequences, particularly when a uniform is worn on or near a military base,[17] we conclude that the government's interest in maintaining the orderly administration of the chain of military command is compelling. Having concluded that the government's interests underlying the insignia statutes are " compelling," we must examine whether the statutes are " narrowly drawn to achieve" those interests. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321-22, 108 S.Ct. 1157. In analyzing the " fit" between the insignia statutes' prohibitions and the governmental interests involved, we observe that the primary concerns targeted by the insignia statutes include: 1) the potential debasement of military awards and uniforms; 2) the avoidance of an implication that military honors are awarded on a frequent and routine basis; and 3) avoiding obstructions to the orderly administration of the chain of military command. We conclude that the insignia statutes are drawn sufficiently narrowly to satisfy the " most exacting scrutiny" standard. By preventing the unauthorized wearing of military uniforms and honors, the insignia statutes seek to ensure that the individuals displaying these honors to the general public are those who actually have received such honors. Moreover, we observe that the insignia statutes, which address the wearing of military uniforms and medals, unquestionably further the government's interest in preventing the appearance that military honors are given more often than actually is true, as well as furthering the government's interest in maintaining the orderly administration of military command. Additionally, by preventing those who have not earned such honors from displaying them, the " unauthorized wearing" component of the insignia statutes helps limit the demand in a " secondary market" for these symbols of high military achievement, providing additional support to the other prohibitions contained in Section 704(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (also prohibiting, among other forms of conduct, the purchase, sale, or manufacturing of military honors). Because the insignia statutes prohibit the wearing of symbols of military honor that have not been earned, individuals will be less likely to purchase such items to wear. Thus, absent the protections afforded by the insignia statutes, the number of individuals wearing military medals and uniforms without authorization, and their ability to purchase those symbols of honor, likely would pose a greater problem. Hamilton argues, nevertheless, that Congress could have furthered its interests by less restrictive means, such as by publicizing the names of the legitimate recipients of military honors or the names of those who have falsely claimed to receive such honors. These alternatives were identified by the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit in their respective decisions in Alvarez . 132 S.Ct. at 2551 (plurality opinion); id. at 2556 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment); 617 F.3d at 1210. In our view, these alternatives are less applicable to the interests underlying the conduct-based prohibitions of the insignia statutes than the speech-based prohibition of 18 U.S.C. § 704(b). As an initial matter, the actual appearance of the military uniform and military medals more strongly conveys the impression that the wearer has earned the honors displayed than when a person merely states that he has earned such honors. In our view, the wearing of an unearned medal or uniform of an unearned rank is more convincing evidence of such actual attainment than words alone, by constituting ostensible, visual " confirmation" that the wearer earned such honors. As expressed by a familiar adage, " seeing is believing." Thus, we agree with the Ninth Circuit's statement in its amended opinion in Perelman that " [t]he use of a physical object goes beyond mere speech and suggests that the wearer has proof of the lie, or government endorsement of it." 695 F.3d at 871 (explaining why Supreme Court's decision in Alvarez does not require conclusion that 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) is unconstitutional). Accordingly, we conclude that the government's interests are more greatly affected in this case than in the statute at issue in Alvarez . The plurality in Alvarez concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) was not sufficiently tailored to the government's interests because " [t]he Government has not shown, and cannot show, why counterspeech would not suffice to achieve its interest.... [T]he dynamics of free speech, of counterspeech, of refutation, can overcome the lie.... The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true." 132 S.Ct. at 2549-50. Notably, however, the remedy of " counterspeech" discussed in Alvarez would be much less effective in the present context, which involves the false display of military honors, rather than false words concerning military honors. Although speech may effectively counter other matters that a person hears, speech may not effectively counter that which a person sees. We also observe that the plurality and concurrence in Alvarez concluded that the government in that case could have achieved its interests underlying 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) in a less restrictive way, by creating and maintaining a database listing all individuals who have been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. However, Hamilton does not suggest, nor do we have reason to conclude, that the government could create and maintain such a database for all honors ever awarded to military personnel,[18] much less one listing the rank of every individual who has served in our armed forces. Even if such a database were technically feasible, concerns about privacy and identity fraud could render such a database unwise.[19] Additionally, we observe that the other government interests underlying the insignia statutes discussed in this opinion, namely, the effective operation of the military chain of command and the diminution of a " secondary market" for military honors, would not be protected by the less-restrictive alternative suggested by Hamilton and discussed by the Supreme Court in Alvarez . Thus, such an alternative would be a less workable and less effective protection for the interests underlying the conduct at issue in this case. Accordingly, we conclude that the insignia statutes promote the government's " compelling" interests in a manner that is " narrowly drawn" to achieving those interests. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 321-22, 108 S.Ct. 1157. Therefore, even under " the most exacting scrutiny" standard discussed in Johnson that we consider here, we hold that the insignia statutes on their face, as construed in accordance with an " intent to deceive" limiting construction, do not violate the First Amendment.[20] The 9th Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in United States v. Swisher , 811 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 2016)(Reversing the denial of a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the en banc court held that the reasoning in United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012), invalidating on First Amendment grounds a statute prohibiting lying about being awarded military medals, also applied to 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2002 ed.), a provision of the Stolen Valor Act that previously criminalized the unauthorized wearing of such medals.) People often ignore laws that remain on the books but that are likely to be unconstitutional, and as U.S. v. Hamilton illustrates, an implied element of deception, which would legalize TV and movie use, would have been in place even if it was constitutional. But, 18 USC 704(b), as amended, is constitutional and enforceable. The invalidity of 18 USC 704(a) if read literally, was clear at least as early as 1989, when flag burning laws were ruled unconstitutional. As noted here : Criminal penalties for certain acts of desecration to the flag were contained in Title 18 of the United States Code prior to 1989. The Supreme Court decision in Texas v. Johnson ; June 21, 1989, held the statute unconstitutional. This statute was amended when the Flag Protection Act of 1989 (Oct. 28, 1989) imposed a fine and/or up to I year in prison for knowingly mutilating, defacing, physically defiling, maintaining on the floor or trampling upon any flag of the United States. The Flag Protection Act of 1989 was struck down by the Supreme Court decision, United States vs. Eichman , decided on June 11, 1990. The outcome in these cases was predictable under U.S. free speech jurisprudence, which was pointing in that direction pretty clearly since at least the 1970s. Also, I suspect that uses in movies and television constitute uses "when authorized under regulations made pursuant to law" long before that in any case. Even if those regulations did not authorize that use, I suspect that a court asked to enforce the law would have interpreted it to include an implied scienter requirement which would have required showing an intent to defraud even though that is not expressly stated in the state. It is entirely possible that there were some prosecutions under the law, although even in the period from 1948 to 1989 when it wasn't clear from the case law that this law was unconstitutional as read literally, but, I don't suspect that it was ever an enforcement priority.

Copyright regulations and piping

As I understand, the copyright regulations help non-proliferation of duplication and repetition but nothing to do with profiteering. But can they do justice about "piping" at speeds beyond average human capabilities? "Piping" is just transferring input field entries at a mobile touch screen or terminal to unknown terminals or devices, through unknown browser or device, in the normal internet context. If the 'fair use' involves unfair third party financial transactions, does the copyright holder has any legal right to claim a share of the profit? My concern is about deliberate human interference while creation of a material in the present electronic storage, publication and distribution media. I hope my question is clear.

If copyrighted material is copied without a license, that's copyright infringement (with some exceptions for fair use in the USA). Whether anyone reads the copied material is irrelevant. You can be sued for it. Back in the day there were people making illegal copies of video games that fell into the category "hunters and gatherers". They never played any of these games, their entertainment was finding the games and making copies. Some had hundreds of games, never paid for any, never played any, just stored away. That was copyright infringement.

How novel does a Stack Overflow answer need to be from a copyright perspective?

As I understand, when I post something on Stack Overflow (or other Stack Exchange sites), I have copyright on the contents of the post and I've licensed significant redistribution and re-licensing rights to Stack Overflow. Sometimes, answering a Stack Overflow question is as simple as quoting/paraphrasing a section from documentation or some other resource. If I post an answer that contains nothing except paraphrased or lightly edited information directly from another source (and link to that source), am I in the wrong by granting redistribution rights on this content to Stack Overflow?

Not very novel What you are talking about is a derivative work . This is arguably the most famous example: It's an interesting example because Leonardo da Vinci did not have copyright in the original but Marcel Duchamp and Francis Picabia do have copyright in the derivative. Even though the changes are physically small, they are enough. A crucial factor in current legal analysis of derivative works is transformativeness, largely as a result of the Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. The Court's opinion emphasized the importance of transformativeness in its fair use analysis of the parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman" involved in the Campbell case. In parody, as the Court explained, the transformativeness is the new insight that readers, listeners, or viewers gain from the parodic treatment of the original work. As the Court pointed out, the words of the parody "derisively demonstrat[e] how bland and banal the Orbison [Pretty Woman] song" is. For an author to have copyright in the derivative they must: Meet the (low) threshold of originality for copyright to exist. Make their derivative lawfully - either because they have permission or because their use falls under an exception to copyright like fair use or fair dealing. However, they do not have copyright in the original elements. For example, I could take the Mona Lisa and give her different clothes, a different background or a hat I will not be infringing their copyright. If I give her a different style of moustache? However, there is an issue with "I have copyright on the contents of the post" when you don't. Even if your work is derivative, you do not have copyright in the original parts and do not have the right to licence them. So, for example, this post is a derivative work of the Wikipedia page linked to above and I have copyright in my original contributions because: They meet the threshold of originality I have permission to make the derivative either through the Wikipedia licence or because my use is fair use. I can give Stack Exchange a licence for my work but I cannot give them a licence for the original work including, for example, the image and quote above. So, someone could quote my entire answer subject to the licence or fair work, but they couldn't copy just the image or quote.

Can I use my Stack Overflow profile to release the contents of my questions and answers under a secondary license?

As I understand, when I post something on Stack Overflow (or other Stack Exchange sites), I have copyright on the contents of the post and I've licensed significant redistribution and re-licensing rights to Stack Overflow. Stack Overflow then releases that content to other netizens under an open license , but requires attribution in the form of a link to the original answer . I have occasionally seen users on Stack Overflow who update the 'bio' section of their profile page to say something like 'I hereby release all of my contributions to Stack Overflow, past, present, and future, into the public domain.'. Since those users do hold copyright, it seems to me this is valid. I.e., anyone using the content can choose to use it under the license offered by Stack Overflow (with attribution required) or as public domain content as offered by the user themself (without attribution required). Is it valid to use the 'bio' section of your Stack Overflow profile to release your Stack Overflow contributions under a secondary license? Does the answer differ if releasing to the public domain rather than under a secondary license?

You can licence your copyright under as many licences as you like to as many people as you like It's your copyright - you can do what you want with it. What you can't do is give someone an exclusive licence and then give licences to others - that would be a breach of contract with the exclusive licensee. How you let people know about the available licences is also up to you - your bio on Stack Exchange is fine.

Can Netherlands enforce the car import tax legally?

As I understood I am free to import goods from other countries within Europe tax free. I have been living in The Netherlands for 3 years now, but I want to bring my car from home country, Latvia. Yet, the rules state that " Permits are granted to those who have lived in another EU state for at least twelve months and who have owned the car or motorcycle for at least six months . " And " These restrictions are in place to stop Dutch residents buying much less expensive cars in Germany and bringing them back across the border to Holland. " Now, how is this legal? They are basically obstructing my rights to import goods freely, by adding additional rules. Is this legal to do, and can they enforce it? Source: https://www.angloinfo.com/how-to/netherlands/transport/vehicle-ownership/importing-a-car

I can't find a link proving it, but car registration taxes are not covered by the rules on free movement of goods. Thus the answer is "Yes, the Netherlands can legally enforce the car import tax." This page from the EU commission talks about removing the different levels of registration taxes, but doesn't actually say they are allowed. This page talks about the VAT rules. (You shouldn't have to pay VAT on bringing in a car that is at least six months old and has travelled 6000 km.)

Is there any legal mechanism in any country, that prevents a state to apply laws discriminatorily?

As I was explained in another question in this SE community, prosecutors dont have the resources to prosecute every single crime Does a prosecutor have any legal resource.. Then, what does it prevent a state to prosecute people discriminatorily as it might and it indeed happens in certain countries (based in race, sex, political affiliation, etc)? Is there any legal mechanism in any country, that prevents a state to apply laws discriminatorily?

Yes. In the United States, the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment provides that a state cannot "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." When the amendment was being introduced, Senator Howard said, "It prohibits the hanging of a black man for a crime for which the white man is not to be hanged."

Can you sue minors only in America?

As I was reading the story below, I thought I must be reading The Onion , only to later see that it's The Guardian instead. http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/13/woman-nephew-broken-wrist-hug-lawsuit-no-damages A woman who sued her 12-year-old nephew over a birthday hug that left her with a broken wrist has been awarded zero damages by a Connecticut jury. ... “I remember him shouting, ‘Auntie Jen, I love you!’ and there he was flying at me,” Connell is quoted as saying in court. The aunt, who was seeking $127,000 in damages, told the court that she had found it “difficult to hold my hors d’oeuvre plate” at a recent party. Several questions come to mind: Is this possible only in America, or can you sue minors for these sort of things in any other country, too? Can the 12-year-old nephew file a counter action for emotional distress, especially now that he was declared not liable?

Suing relatives or friends to trigger an insurance policy is sometimes necessary, particularly if the insurer is being recalcitrant. Apart from that it is pointless to sue someone who has no money! In common law jurisdictions you can of course sue anyone for negligence. One of the things that you have to prove to be successful is that the defendant owed a duty of care. It may be difficult to prove that a child had such a duty.

How is downloading a movie from the internet different from using home recording equipment?

As I was watching Despicable Me on free-to-air TV, I was thinking that maybe the next time it runs and Frozen I should set my PVR set top Box to record them. But then that got me thinking: if I recorded a movie from TV to my PVR (which records as .avi) and transferred that from the PVR to my PC, I would have done the exact same as downloading from the internet, except I would have gained 2 extra things: I would have skipped the first step in recording it The download wouldn't be subject to unexplained signal screw-ups causing things such as graphic artifacts, unexplained drop outs of the station or drops in image quality. So I am wondering how is downloading movies from the Internet different from using PVRs or similar equipment? If there isn't, then why are PVRs allowed to be bought from retail stores?

From Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. , 464 U.S. 417 (1984). The sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes, or, indeed, is merely capable of substantial noninfringing uses. [...] there is a significant likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright holders who license their works for broadcast on free television would not object to having their broadcast time-shifted by private viewers (i.e., recorded at a time when the VTR owner cannot view the broadcast so that it can be watched at a later time); and (2) that there is no likelihood that time-shifting would cause nonminimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, respondents' copyrighted works. The VTR's are therefore capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Private, noncommercial time-shifting in the home satisfies this standard of noninfringing uses both because respondents have no right to prevent other copyright holders from authorizing such time-shifting for their programs and because the District Court's findings reveal that even the unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents' programs is legitimate fair use. [...] we must conclude that this record amply supports the District Court's conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use. This is distinguishable from downloading movies because in the case of videotape or PVR recording, the copyright owner authorized the broadcast, and private, non-commercial time-shifting at home has been held to be fair use. When downloading a movie, the copyright owner did not authorize the communication, and copying movies by downloading them from an unauthorized source is not generally considered fair use. One policy reason why this difference might make sense is that when time-shifting, you are usually paying for the channels, and they are in turn paying the copyright owner for the permission to transmit their work. However, this is only a guess, and not really relevant to your legal question.

Am I liable to my employer if I keep my notebooks past the term of employment?

As I work, I keep a notebook. At a high level, it is a list of things I need to accomplish on a given day, or within the next few weeks. Sometimes I also use it as scratch paper, which means that I write down names of things (I am a programmer, so that might mean potentially sensitive information for a malicious agent). When I work with scratch paper in the office, it is sufficient to deposit it in the recycling bin in the office, my managers see no need for it to be specifically destroyed. The employee handbook makes the general statements about not bringing home company documents, but does not mention personal notebooks specifically. I am in an employment structure that sees me in a series of different short term positions (roughly 4 months each) at a series of different companies. At the end of each engagement I take my notebook home (as I do every evening), and place it on a shelf, where it stays. Are there specific laws or precedents that cover this? Specifically for Canada and the US, but I am also interested in general. Or would this entirely be governed by company policy?

If an employee takes home information that his or her employer considers confidential, that would be a matter of company policy. The employer could discipline or fire the employee if it learned of the incident, and chose to act. If the information is considered to be a trade secret, or part of one, disclosing it or mishandling it so as to risk disclosure could be a crime under US law. However, only in unusual cases is criminal action taken on such matters, normally it is left to civil lawsuits or internal company action. I do not know if Canada has a similar law.

Blackmail is illegal, but how is that enforced in practice?

As I'm sure you are aware, blackmail is illegal. However, I am curious about how this would be enforced in a real-world scenario. Could any lawyers provide some insight on this? For example, if I killed someone or my company is committing significant fraud or tax evasion, and someone threatens to reveal this information unless I help them with something, this would be considered blackmail. However, if you were in this situation, what could you even do? Report the person to the police and potentially face consequences yourself? What are the practical implications of blackmail being illegal?

Canadian law defines a crime of extortion, but not blackmail. An alternative theory of "blackmail" is that it is coercion . This is the law against extortion in Canada. We start with the definition of extortion, §346 (1) Every one commits extortion who, without reasonable justification or excuse and with intent to obtain anything, by threats, accusations, menaces or violence induces or attempts to induce any person, whether or not he is the person threatened, accused or menaced or to whom violence is shown, to do anything or cause anything to be done. To simplify, one person makes another person do something using threats, accusations or violence and doesn't have a good reason to do so. A parent can altruistically threaten to write a child out of their will if the child doesn't stop taking heroin: that's a good reason, so that is not extortion. If you threaten to turn a murderer in to the police unless they give to $1,000, that is extortion. However, the law also provides that "A threat to institute civil proceedings is not a threat for the purposes of this section". It is legal to threaten to sue the pants off of a person if they don't settle for some cash reward. The wording of the law is very broad and it's not obvious from the wording of the statute where the line is drawn. These guys give a number of examples of acts leading to convictions: A teenager who said he would bring an AK-47 to school and shooting people unless he was compensated for his damaged vape; A man who was found to have implied violence by asking for money and stating that ‘things will get a lot worse’, and ‘if you can’t pay with money you’ll have to pay with something else’ if he didn’t receive it; Three men who were accused of threatening, harassing, intimidating, and extorting a man who tried to start a new chapter of a Montreal-based Motorcycle club; A man who allegedly committed acts including arson, telephone threats, molotov cocktails, and paintball-gun shootings against his former business associates; A man who threatened to post nude pictures of people on social media unless paid; A man who pretended to be a photographer and threatened to send nude pictures to family or pornorgraphic magazines unless sexual favours were granted; A person who threatened to sell a story to a newspaper unless the victim paid a sum of money (the story regarded the victim’s recent conviction); A woman who threatened to send a letter to another woman’s employer unless the other woman repaid a debt she owed As they say, "the threat must go beyond what a reasonable person in the accused’s situation would view as a legitimate means": the issue is dealt with on a case-by-case basis. In case you murder someone or commit tax fraud, and another person threatens to turn you in if you don't {pay them / mow their lawn}, the law takes the position that you should turn yourself in, provide the evidence to the police, and the police will prosecute the other person for extortion. There is no "I was blackmailed" get out of jail defense. One practical implication of the law is that you can't extort a person because they committed a crime: instead, you are expected to just turn them (and the evidence) in to the police – that's your civic duty. You can also hold your tongue: what you can't do is extort the other criminal.

What can people do to be legally protected while licensing digital products over the internet?

As I've developed develop digital products and teach at an educational organization, I've become increasingly interested in studying the details of the law that effect the modern generations of new business. One of the defining characteristics of modern business is selling digital products online, but obviously there are problems with legal protection on that front as it is newer legal territory. Now, don't get me wrong, I'm not looking to hire a lawyer or get some kind of formal legal advice, but rather to find the right direction and a proper precedent for people facing this situation. Specifically, what is the best license agreement that allows any random person off the street to be legally protected when licensing purely digital content over the internet? What I mean is, say a business owner or sole proprietor wants to license a digital file, like a picture or audio file so that the buyer can use it to make and sell their own games, videos, commercials and freelance work, educational purposes, presentations, or really anything else that uses multimedia. But, the creator of the original digital product obviously doesn't want a buyer to simply start selling or distributing the individual files themselves or as a collection of files, they original creator or organization wants to retain their rights while preventing the buyers from selling specifically the files or modified versions of the files while allowing the buyers the utility to make commercial end-products with it. What kind of terms of use, in a simple text document, can be provided to ensure this with a product download? And does such a text document actually create any binding agreement in the first place? I would hope someone who has studied this or has experience with this matter could point me in the right direction so that I can convey it to designers and students alike. You can use microsoft word, but you can't sell microsoft word or any of its components or reverse engineer it. What kind of agreement is the equivalent of that but for digital media files?

The problem is stating exactly what you want to license versus forbid. You indicate that you want to prohibit resale of unchanged copies of the work, so you could include a license condition that forbids the sale of the unmodified work, but allows the sale of a derivative work. That would mean that the person can't just re-sell copies of the original image file, but that can package it with other works and sell a derivative work, or change the formal from GIF to JPG, or add a border around the file, and sell the derivative work. But that doesn't seem to be strong enough. It's not clear what distinction you are drawing between forbidding the sale of "the files or modified versions of the files", but allowing "the utility to make commercial end-products with it". In order to "use" the material, you are copying it and transforming it in some way. You might be able to craft language in a specific license to use a high-resolution digital representation of a unicorn, which allows a certain free use of copies with a certain level of degradation, such as 5% of the original resolution and limited to 8 bit color. There is no general license that covers all such cases, because we don't know what cases are in versus out. The rights-holder needs to figure out what they want protected, and then hire a competent attorney to draft the license.

I want to quote some of a book but publisher is defunct?

As I've stated, I want to quote some of a book in one that I am writing, from the 1800's. The publisher is defunct now. So do I still need permission or can I just add it? Don't want to get in trouble for using it but I can't find a way to get permission? I want to add from Jane Eyre by Charlotte Bronte Mr. Rochester had given me but one weeks leave of absence: yet a month elapsed before I quitted Gateshead. I wished to leave immediately after the funeral; but Georgiana entreated me to stay till she could get off to London: wither she was now at last invited now by her uncle, Mr. Gibson; who had come down to direct his sister’s interment, and settle the family affairs. Georgiana said she dreaded being left alone with Eliza; from her she got neither sympathy in her dejection, support in her fears, nor aid in her preparations; so I bore with her feeble-minded quailings, and selfish lamentations, as well as I could, and did my best in sewing for her and packing her dresses. The publisher was Smith, Elder & Co.

A book (or any other creative work) published in the 1800s is now in the public domain everywhere in the world (excepting odd cases like Peter Pan where a special rule applies in some jurisdictions.) Anyone may legally quote from such a work at any length with no legal requirement for permission. In fact there is no legal requirement to attribute the quote to the author (although there is an ethical requirement). In fact one may publish a new edition of such a work, unchanged or modified in any way one chooses, with no legal need to obtain permission from anyone or to pay any royalties or fees. If the work were recent enough to still be protected by copyright, a limited quote could be used under fair use, fair dealing or another exception to copyright under the laws of most countries. The exact rules vary by country, and are often highly fact-dependent, so the exact details will matter. If one wanted to quote enough from a recent work that permission is required, the copyright holder, who is often not the publisher, would need to grant permission. That is often the author or the author's heir, but it can be a person or firm to which the author transferred the rights. Sometimes the rights-holder can be hard to identify. Update: it would be possible for a work published in, say, 1890 by an author then young who lived to a fairly old age, dying in, say 1960, to still be protected in some countries, although not in the US. (Anything published before 1925 is now PD in the US.) But Charlotte Bronte died in 1855, and all of her work has long been in the public domain

Why did US law go with inadmissibility, and not reactionary punitive action, to prevent illegal evidence collection?

As I've understood it, the exclusionary rule is a prophylactic rule aimed to prevent the cultivation of illegal evidence collection by removing the utility of illegally-collected evidence through inadmissibility in court. Another way to prevent illegal evidence collection would be through strong and fear-inducing punitive action. The problem with the inadmissibility route (1) is that in certain cases, good evidence is thrown out. The limitations to the law that I've seen do not include any "if the evidence shows a grave crime, it must be admissible, despite illegal collection". It seems problematic that there can be blatant, undeniable evidence for heinous crimes, yet just because it was illegally attained, a blind eye must be turned and the criminal goes free. One problem with the punitive route (2) is that it, to me, seems to go against the values of the US legal system. The way I see it, one can morally look at illegal actions done by a government official in two ways: (a) they are so important and have a hard job (esp. officers), so they should get more lenient punishments. (b) they are supposed to set an example and they have sworn an oath, when they break the law, it sends a message of hypocrisy and insecurity that breeds government hate and distrust. Going with the (b) view, government officials should at least be given equally strong punishments, or stronger. It seems however, to my foreign and non-lawyer eyes, that the US is more in the (a) camp, meaning government officials should be given more lenient punishments. Given this assumption, route (2) would run contrary to at least one moral notion of the US legal system. Another problem with route (2) is that it might wind up incarcerating or firing a lot of officers and agents, though some may say that is a good thing due to the nature of those officers and agents. The last problem that I can think of is that this system may be easy to exploit. If strong punitive action was taken against illegal evidence collection, yet it is still admissible, that leaves motivation to do it. So, officers may congregate and create a kind of group immunity to punitive action, with everyone swearing to each other to never testify against one another on matters of illegal evidence collection. This could then propel illegal evidence collection, due to there being no practical danger in doing it, since the majority of officers have each others backs. Investigaton would be done by officers or agents, and if they're in on it, then there's no chance. This would then propel illegal evidence collection, and it could maybe lead to graver violations of privacy during the collection, as the informal rules of "no testifying" would probably not include a bunch of clauses for when the privacy/legal violations were too serious to be allowed. To me, the reasons I've given does make route (1) more favorable. However, I don't think I have figured out every reason that went behind the choice of (1) instead of (2). I am also not sure whether the reasons I've given are correct. One of my reasons was also based on an assumption that the US legal system holds the view contained in (b). So, what reasons did I get right/wrong, and what reasons did I miss? EDIT: After reading @Dale M's answer, I realize I forgot to specify I was talking about US jurisdiction, as I've only heard of this law in relation to the US. However, this led to a pretty good answer about whether or not countries in the West generally have an exclusionary rule or not. Interesting to see that, in the West at least, it seems to be pretty limited to the US.

The problem with Solution 2 is that government officials in the United States enjoy qualified immunity with respect to actions that they did while acting under color of law. It's not total immunity, but if they do things by the book, they cannot be prosecuted even if something goes wrong (even when doing things by the book, Police deal in very volatile situations and things can still go wrong because of an X factor to specific for the training manual to cover.). In other cases, it may be because multiple officers are working the scene and Office A lied to Officer B about the situation. Consider Officer A pulls over a suspect and realizes it was someone who was suspected of a crime, but couldn't prove it. He calls for back up and Officer B arrives. Upon arriving on scene, Officer A tells B to search the trunk of the car despite the fact that A had not received consent from the suspect nor has a warrant, nor cause to make a search of a trunk of a vehicle. B makes the search and finds [the bloody knife/the stash of drugs/the smoking gun/the match to a child's shoe that was missing from the kidnapping scene/ insert other incriminating evidence]. Under system (2), since it was Officer B who made the illegal search, B would be liable for it, even though Officer A lied about having legal reason for a search of the trunk space. But what's more... if the evidence is gonna be used anyway, what's to stop the cops doing it again? After all, there is very little recourse for those who are illegally searched to contest this in court (If I'm illegally searched and don't have anything on me, I have to take this to civil court, which is a different animal than Criminal Court and exposes me to broader Discovery... aka gives the cops free reign to search my property for a hell of a lot more illegal things.) or just sit back and count my 4th amendment rights (the section of the constitution protecting against unwarranted search and seizures) as worth less than the paper they're printed on. Oh, and by the way... that second word seizure... that means that they will be taking my property (or myself if they arrest me) and will not be giving it back for some time while they process it... if it's a legal to hold item (like my laptop that I do work on) that's going to make it harder for me to do my job which injures me further in lost business and income. In other cases, it could be they have a warrant for a large item (a stolen big screen tv) and while searching for it, open my sugar bowel and find evidence of a crime unrelated to theft of the television (i.e. opening a baggie of weed). This is actually an illegal search because, unless I am a wizard, a Time Lord, or Mary Poppins, there is no reason why a container smaller than a big screen TV should ever be searched when looking for a Big Screen TV and the cops should logically see this as out of bounds of the search warrant. The nature of this is damaging before the legality of the search can be determined, and because the search may have been out of scope of the warrant that was otherwise justified, the rule of making the evidence of a crime inadmissible was held in order to prevent LEOs from doing this because they could. This rule also started to take formation prior to the Revolutionary War. British Law had ruled against compelled confessions being inadmissible as evidence in 1769, a full six years before the Revolutionary war started (1775) and seven years before the publication of the Declaration of Independence (1776). Now there are some exceptions that can get the evidence brought back in, such as plain view ("The suspect's vehicle is a pick up truck with an open bed, the murder weapon was lying in the bed covered in blood"), inevitable discovery ("We have developed evidence by other means that would have lead us to this evidence legally") and Exigent Circumstances ("We believed someone inside the property was in grave danger if we did not enter the property immediately and that's when we found a cache of stolen Big Screen TVs!) and Good Faith (the Warrant was authorized for the wrong street address of the target but we found the evidence of an unrelated crime in a place the warrant authorized us to search. Everything but the goofed up address was done by the book.).

Are NDAs enforceable if they require violating copyright?

As NDAs and copyright violation usually do not go together, I'll provide some background: Suppose that a company, we'll call them Olio, created a smartwatch that uses publicly available computer code from the Linux project. Under the terms of the GNU General Public License, Linux's copyright license, it is fine for Olio to use Linux in their smartwatch, under the condition that, if Olio makes any changes to Linux's code before putting it on their watch, they make their edited code publicly available. Well, Olio uses Linux, with changes to its code, in their watch, but they never released this edited code. A few years later, Olio goes bankrupt and is bought by another company, we'll call this company Flex. As part of the acquisition, Flex requires that all of Olio's employees sign NDAs barring them from disclosing just about any information about the Olio watch, including the edited Linux code, which, under Linux's copyright license, has to be publicly available until 2020 (three years after Olio's last official use of their modified Linux code). If one of Olio's former employees with a copy of this edited Linux code were to release it, as required by Linux's copyright license, would they be punishable for violating the NDA?

The requirement to make the code publicly available is binding on Olio, and on Olio's successor, Flex. Olio, by accepting the code under the GPL, had contracted with the original author of that code, one of the contract provisions being to make any modified code available publicly. If Olio fails to abide by that agreement, it is in violation of the license, and the original author could sue Olio for copyright infringement, or sue Flex as having bought the assets and liabilities. But the individual employees of Olio are not under any obligation to publish such modified code, as they were presumably not parties to the license deal -- Olio was. Therefore the NDA does not require them to violate any law or contract to which they might be parties. The NDA could probably not be used to prevent the employees from testifying if called in such a copyright suit. If the NDA did require an illegal action, it would be void. If it merely required a person to violate a civil agreement that could be settled for money, it might or might not be enforceable, depending on the exact provisions, its reasonableness under the exact circumstances, and the local law.

Do UK citizens have a right to legal advice?

As a British citizen: If I can't afford to pay a solicitor to get legal advice, am I entitled to free legal advice from the government?

It depends on the circumstances, see here . You’ll usually need to show that: your case is eligible for legal aid the problem is serious you can’t afford to pay for legal costs

Are the USA the only country with multiple, "competing" penal codes (Dual sovereignty doctrine)?

As a German, I was surprised to learn that in the United States, there are penal codes (and prosecution) at two levels of government, namely at the state level, and at the federal level ("federal crime") - under the so-called Dual sovereignty doctrine . This produces interesting problems, such as how to treat acts that are crimes under more than one of the US penal codes. In Germany, there is only one criminal code (the Strafgesetzbuch ), which is enacted by federal parliament, and I believe the situation is similar in other European countries. So, are there other countries with "competing" penal codes, like the United states?

Federal countries usually define the separation (and sometimes sharing) of legislative competencies in their constitutions. There will also usually be a "default" case for if the competency is not explicitly defined in the constitution. For example, in the United States, the default is to give legislative power to the individual states via the Tenth Amendment . If criminal law is left to the sub-national entities, then the nation can usually still enact a penal code with respect to its competencies (again, the U.S. is a good example). So, I decided to make this a mini-research project by checking the countries Wikipedia lists as federations . I wasn't able to find an explicit statement as to whether there were competing penal codes in most cases, but was able to find in which level of government the constitution placed criminal law. In some cases where there are "competing" penal codes, the constitution specified which level has supremacy, making for less "competition". Without further ado, here's what I've been able to find. Links are either to an appropriate Wikipedia page, or the part of the applicable constitution dividing the legislative competencies. Take these with a grain of salt. Competing penal codes Australia Bosnia and Herzegovina Ethiopia India Iraq Mexico Nigeria Pakistan Sudan United States Single national penal code Austria Brazil Canada Comoros Germany Malaysia Nepal Russia Switzerland Venezuela Unclear Argentina Belgium Micronesia St. Kitts and Nevis Somalia South Sudan United Arab Emirates

Is a company liable if an employee illegally works across the border?

As a US based company, if an employee illegally works from a foreign country in violation of company policy, will the company be held liable for taxes and fines for this action? If the company is held liable, what is the extent of the damage, and can the company sue the employee to collect damages?

You are responsible if you break the law An employer is vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of your employees in the course of their employment. So, if you or your employee are breaking the law then you can be held to account and punished in whatever way the law provides. At common law, the employer can seek redress from the employee but such lawsuits are rare and even more rarely successful and are outlawed in soMe jurisdictions. You are not liable for the acts and omissions of independent contractors. However, many so called “independent contracts” are employment contracts under the hood. If the “contractor” is doing things employees normally do, then they are likely to be considered an employee.

Do non-EU international speeding offences count lawfully for UK insurance declarations?

As a US citizen, my wife received and paid a speeding ticket in Texas in 2013. After moving to the UK in 2015 (she's also a EU citizen), she began working towards her UK driver's license in early 2016 and sought to find an insurer, declaring this offence on each application as she went. When she confirmed an agreement with an insurance provider, they assured her that an international conviction did not count in the UK, and so they gave her a policy based on zero offences. After passing her test, she moved to a second insurer who was willing to give her a better rate, whom she has now been with for the past ~9 months. We did not declare any offences to this second insurer, because we had been told by the first insurer that the US speeding offence did not count in the UK. Yesterday, we received a letter from the second insurer's data verification team, who are claiming a discrepancy between her policy and 'another quote or policy from elsewhere within their group', have added an SP40 Exceeding passenger vehicle speed limit offence against her current insurance policy, and are back-charging her £750 for the last year's worth of insurance. Do non-EU international speeding offences count lawfully in the UK for insurance declarations? Have we unwittingly committed some kind of fraud or not?

It doesn't matter whether such offences "count lawfully". The insurance company doesn't punish you for speeding, that's none of their business. But they calculate the risk and the premium based on your driving history. Being caught speeding in the USA poses the same added risk as being caught speeding in the UK or in the EU, so each will increase your premium.

Client asks me to re-brand supplied media

As a backend web developer in UK, I do some frontend work on a side. A client of mine sent me a brochure of another company and more or less asked me to place his logos over that company's logos, or to replace the logos wholly, on said brochure. That triggered all the proper alarms in my head. In my understanding: I have no copyright information on the brochure, or about it I have my client's wish to "replace their logos with his" I fear I'd help him to steal a presumably copyrighted media I am potentially liable Questions : Do I need my client to state he has the permission to modify that piece of media, and to ask me openly to do so? Or, do I need him to produce the evidence that he has such permissions? To keep myself liability-free, what piece of information must I receive in writing, in such or similar case? EDIT: I don't know who made them originally so I don't even know who to ask. The brochures allegedly rotate around and get rebranded like that, and I don't know where they originated from. All I know about them comes from my client directly. The only party is my client, and IP lawyers assured me I can get him to indemnify me and when at risk of getting sued I can produce the signed indemnification and shift the blame to the client, without getting sued myself, which especially can be enforced when allegedly copyrighted work had no noticed on it whatsoever.

Since it is the brochure of another company: You can always ask that company "My client, so-and-so, asked me to create a brochure by taking yours and replacing your company logo with his own. Do you have any problems with that?" What answer do you expect? What do you think your client will say about it? You know it's copyright infringement. You know who has the copyright, or at least knows who has the copyright. If you go to a printshop and ask them to make copies of the brochure, they will throw you out. Don't do it. Tell your client "I'm sorry, but this brochure is copyrighted material, so I will not do what you ask me to do and commit copyright infringement, and you shouldn't even ask me to do this". If you think your client is clueless about copyright, you might put this in a more friendly way to educate him. PS. Your client indemnifying you doesn't work if the client goes bankrupt. It also doesn't work if you commit copyright infringement for commercial purposes, which you would be doing, which then makes it not only illegal but also criminal. You know or should have known that this material is copyrighted by someone other than your client. And of course the client isn't going to indemnify you. Since the company distributing the original brochure (and you know who that is) has no obligation to care about any indemnification, of course they can sue you. The indemnifying company can promise to pay your lawyers and pay any fines or damages you are ordered to pay, they cannot stop you from being sued. And since no court will believe you that you seriously thought this brochure was created by someone who died before 1948, and you are doing this for money, there might be criminal charges. You know who the copyright holder is, and you can verify it with one single phone call. If you say you don't have any copyright information, that's called "willfully blind".

Tax year for spending when bank transfer begins and ends in separate years

As a business expense, Alice initiates a bank transfer to a company on 30 Dec 2022 and the money reaches the company some business days later, in 2023. For U.S. tax purposes - assuming Alice files using the cash basis - can Alice claim the deduction on her 2022 tax return?

Since Alice uses "CASH ACCOUNTING" expenses are accounted for when they are paid by her, not when someone else receives it. So in your hypothetical, when she initiated the transfer would be the date that the payment is considered to be made. On the other hand, "ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING" means that Alice would account for the expense when it was made. Generally this would be earlier than the CASH date. But either way, she would account for it in 2022 based on what you said above.

Can you refuse services to businesses you deem unethical?

As a business owner, is it within my rights to refuse to sell products to other businesses that I personally view as unethical, such as Facebook, due to their alleged questionable or harmful practices? Is it possible that this decision could result in any negative consequences for my business, such as legal issues? Are there any laws or regulations that may prohibit me from making this type of decision based on my personal beliefs about the ethics of a particular company? Edit: As a follow up question, how would one go about doing this, would it be to include such information in terms and conditions, or perhaps a statement outlining policies on ethical business practices?

If you are the CEO of a public company, this might be a problem if it causes less profits for the shareholders. They could fire you if your actions cost them money. If you are the owner of a business, then the CEO of your company (you) can do anything legal that all your shareholders (you) agree with. Nobody can force your company to deal with anyone, especially with no business, except for existing contracts or if there is illegal discrimination. Now all this is not “your personal opinion” but “the ceo running the company according to the wishes of the shareholders”. You are allowed legally to discriminate against a company whose business practices you don’t like. You have to do nothing, just don’t deal with them. If Facebook sends you a million dollar order, just don’t accept it. Make sure that no sales contract is created. It is remotely possible that you have problems if such a decision causes you to go bankrupt and you can’t pay your taxes or debt, like a debtor could claim you could have paid your debt and want your personal money instead of your broke company’s money.

Can one of my citizenships cause problems with investing?

As a citizen and resident of Mexico, American and European brokers are happy to take my business. But I'm also a citizen of Syria, which is sanctioned. While filling out account creation forms, I don't see any options to add multiple citizenship information. So it seems I should be good but just checking. Can my Syrian citizenship cause any problems while opening or maintaining my financial accounts?

To narrow this down to a specific country, you can read about the Syria sanctions here . Sanctions under US law are against a country, and against named individuals : there are no sanctions against "Syrians". A person cannot engage in transactions in (certain) goods of Syrian origin, and you cannot invest in (businesses in) Syria. A Syrian citizen who is resident of a non-sanctioned country is not subject the the limitations that exist on Syrian citizens who are resident in Syria. However, this legal fact is not universally know, so your question does reflect an existing belief. It is entirely possible that a person who believes that there is a law of attainder against Syrian people might cause problems, but if they get advice from their legal department, they will find that also being a Syrian citizen is not an impediment to legally investing.

How are Indian laws classified and how many types of law are there?

As a common man, with a limited to no knowledge about the Indian legal system... How are Indian laws classified? (Covering every law in India.) If I were to search and know about a law in India, which is the best layman-friendly website to search and learn about it?

It's complicated, to say the least. A good starting point is the Wikipedia page on the Law of India ... India maintains a hybrid legal system with a mixture of civil, common law and customary, Islamic ethics, or religious law within the legal framework inherited from the colonial era and various legislation first introduced by the British are still in effect in modified forms today. Since the drafting of the Indian Constitution, Indian laws also adhere to the United Nations guidelines on human rights law and the environmental law. ...and identifies: Constitutional and administrative law (with the Constitution, in various languages, found here ) Criminal law Contract law Labour law Company law Tort law Property law Tax law Trust law Family law and personal law Nationality law For researching specific legislation, the India Code site is a comprehensive " Digital Repository of All Central and State Acts " and contains searchable legislation for all the above areas. And then there's the Indian Kanoon with a large amount of caselaw from court and tribunal decisions.

Reproducing pieces of a copyrighted standard, is it fair use?

As a company, we are looking to comply with a specific set of standards that are protected under copyright law (think ISO). Because of transparency requirements, we have to publish our final reports on this publicly on our website. The report reproduces some pieces of text from the copyrighted standard, as it is necessary to put the information in context. An example could be like: C.4.7. General Provide optical measurements of the number of particles suspended in the air per each physical location sample. We report the obtained measurements in the following table: The first two lines are an extract from the copyrighted standard, followed by what would be our typical response to that particular field of data. We worked through all the standard in such way and this led us to have large swaths of text from the standard in our final report. Would this be an issue regarding copyright law? Or could it be considered fair use?

It is unlikely to be fair use Primary because this is a commercial operation and it does not quote the minimum amount of the standard required. Why are you quoting such large amounts from the standard rather than just quoting the clause numbers and clause titles and letting the reader refer to their copy of the standard if they want more information. That’s likely to be fair use/dealing.

Does a Creative Commons license on sheet music affect what performers can do with their audio recordings of that piece?

As a composer, I only produce sheet music and I license all of it using the Creative Commons “Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International” license. This should allow a performer to perform and record the work and even sell it without having to pay me anything. But does the license require the performer to make the audio freely available for other people to copy, use, mix, etc, as if the performance were also licensed under the same CC license?

Probably, Yes Releasing a composition (say in the form of sheet music) under CC-BY-SA 4.0 should oblige anyone who makes a recording of that work to release it, if at all, under the same license. (Note that nothing requires that it be released at all.) CC License terms The creative commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license provides, in section 3 (b) "ShareAlike": In addition to the conditions in Section 3 (a), if You Share Adapted Material You produce, the following conditions also apply. 3(b) 1. The Adapter's License You apply must be a Creative Commons license with the same License Elements, this version or later, or a BY-SA Compatible License. This raises the question of whether a performance or a phonogram (recording of a performance) of a composition constitutes "Adapted Material". Section 1(a) of the license provides this definition: Adapted Material means material subject to Copyright and Similar Rights that is derived from or based upon the Licensed Material and in which the Licensed Material is translated, altered, arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor. For purposes of this Public License, where the Licensed Material is a musical work, performance, or sound recording, Adapted Material is always produced where the Licensed Material is synched in timed relation with a moving image. The CC Wiki page "Rights other than copyright" says: Can I use CC licenses to license rights other than copyright? CC licenses are copyright licenses, but the latest version of CC licenses also cover certain other rights similar to copyright, including performance, broadcast, and sound recording rights, as well as sui generis database rights. You may apply a 4.0 license to material subject to any of those rights, whether or not the material is also subject to copyright. US Law In [17 USC 101]) https://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html#101 ) the definition of "derivative work" is given as: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording , art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. ( emphasis added ) However, in 17 USC 106 the right to prepare derivative works is covered under subsection (2), while the right to perform works is under subsection (4) Conclusion Since the definition of "Adapted Materiel" in the CC-BY-SA 4.0 license does not include the words "perform" nor "sound recording", it is less than clear if making a sound recording (phonogram) is considered an adapted work subject to the SA clause or not. However, since the license covers actions "requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights" which includes making a sound recording (at least under US law), so a sound recording is probably "Adapted Materiel" which must be released under the same or a compatible license. Moreover, if a sound recording is not adapted materiel, then it must be a form of the original content, and so may not be redistributed except under the same license in any case. Thus under either theory, a recording of a work whose composition copyright has been released under a CC-BY-0SA 4.0 license must be released, if at all, under the same license to comply with the original license.

Too restrictive IP transfer

As a consultant I was asked to sign an IP transfer agreement that differs a bit from what I was signing in the past. There is a particular bit that throws me off: Intellectual Property Rights: (i) inventions, innovations and discoveries (whether patentable or unpatentable and whether or not reduced to practice), all improvements thereto; (ii) know-how, ideas, concepts, creations, layouts, designs, drawings, patterns, models, compositions, architectures, protocols, formulas, algorithms, processes, programs, methods, computer software (including object code and source code and related documentation), and research and development; (iii) Patents; (iv) Trademarks; (v) Copyrights; So just how restrictive is this? Does it mean I can't in any way re-write or re-use any of the concepts I use in this software I'm building? I am used to not blatantly copying source code and if there are specific parts of the code to protect I should discuss and go ahead with that. But this part sounds like a catch-all that's gonna come and haunt me sooner than later.

The first rule of contracts is this: If you aren't comfortable signing something, DON'T SIGN IT. The second rule of contracts is this: If you aren't comfortable signing something without running it past your attorney first, RUN IT PAST YOUR ATTORNEY FIRST. The third rule of contracts is this: If your attorney is not an expert on the things you need to run past him, GET A REFERRAL TO ONE WHO IS. The fourth rule of contracts is this: If your attorney knows what he's talking about and he tells you not to sign something, DON'T SIGN IT. You're paying him for his expertise. Why would you want to waste your money on him, if you're going to ignore him? The fifth rule of contracts is this: If your attorney knows what he's talking about and he tells you it is OK to sign something, and you still aren't comfortable signing it, DON'T SIGN IT. He won't be offended, and you aren't wasting your money in this case. There's something else: If an attorney who is NOT your attorney tells you it is OK to sign something, IGNORE HIM. You don't know who is paying him, you don't know whose interests he is representing, you don't know whether he is being paid to look out for your interests or screw you to the wall, and you don't want to find out. Offer to retain him and THEN ask the question. If he declines your retainer, RUN AWAY!

How to handle CVs / resumes with GDPR rules?

As a consultant my resume is personal information which is handed out to prospective clients frequently. How personal should it be? Should some data be anonymized? Should the resume be returned from prospective clients? Is there any way to enforce a client to treat it confidential?

In answer to your questions, always get potential clients to sign a contract which covers the GDPR personal data processing requirements at a minimum, prior to giving them a copy of a consultant resume to retain. If you were sat in a meeting with them it is much simpler to record in your logs that the client had sight of the resume but was not left a copy of it in any format, than it is to keep track of which clients have a copy of which data and chasing up to ensure it is erased/destroyed when appropriate. To ensure clients treat the resumes as confidential, make sure they are labelled in the header and footer as confidential. They could also be kept in an envelope clearly marked confidential. There could also be a footnote in small print that informs anyone with a copy, who the data controller is, and that processing is strictly subject to the terms of the 'client contract' or whatever you call it, and that it should be returned or shredded within X days of receipt for example. If you have a computer system generate these it could even specify the client's name and the specific date it should be shredded by. Your notice could include a reminder that the personal data is protected under the E.U. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2016 and that (client name) as a data processor could be held liable in the event of unauthorised disclosure or processing, if they act outside or contrary to lawful instructions of the data controller. Whilst this won't enforce responsible processing at least it will ensure that your business has done its best to ensure any recipients are fully aware of their responsibilities to protect the information and it would be very difficult for a client to claim they weren't aware the information was confidential or that they had legally binding responsibilities to protect it. It's also worth noting that simply sending CV's/resumes (or other personal data) out via email (unless suitably encrypted) would not meet the requirement in GDPR recital 39 for personal data to be "processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security and confidentiality of the personal data, including for preventing unauthorised access to or use of personal data and the equipment used for the processing." Email technology whilst convenient does not offer any guarantees regarding privacy and confidentiality, therefore instead of sending resumes as email attachments it might be better to use a web-based extranet system which authenticates users before granting access to view resumes. Emails could just let clients know there is a new resume or X number of resumes waiting for them to review and give them a link/button to login. The records of processing activities are in GDPR Article 30 on page 50, and it does not specify a retention period nor that we can choose the retention period, but simply states that data controllers make the records available to the supervisory authority when requested to do so - this may imply indefinite retention of processing records even beyond the life of the processing system (e.g. discontinued products/services), however we may need to await further clarification on this issue from supervisory authorities to be sure.

The Consumer's Right To Challenge A Company's Claims

As a consumer, do you have any legal ground to challenge a company’s statement and demand evidence to support any claims made about a product or service they provided? A few hypothetical examples would be a company claiming its products are designed using a statistical formula to guarantee performance or a competitive pay to play mobile gaming app guaranteeing fairness. Are they required to provide proof to substantiate those claims, such as the mathematical equation used or disclose how fairness is actually determined, or are they allowed to make frivolous guarantees without ever needing to back up their claims? Jurisdiction: United States, New Mexico Clarification: A mobile gaming app that guarantees players are match based on skill, which is determined by a statistical algorithm to ensure fairness. Are they required to disclose the algorithm so players know if they are actually matched based on skill as claimed, oppose to more nefarious motivates?

Such claims might well constitute False Advertising . In the US state of New Mexico, False Advertising is prohibited by NM Code section 57-15-1 which says that: False advertising in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state is hereby declared unlawful. Section 57-15-2 defines false advertising as: ... advertising, including labeling, which is misleading in any material respect; and in determining whether any advertising is misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other things) not only representations made by statement, word, design, device, sound or any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the advertising fails to reveal facts material in the light of such representations with respect to the commodity to which the advertising relates under the conditions prescribed in said advertisement, or under such conditions as are customary or usual. If a company makes claims about its products or services, and those claims are false or misleading, and they are significant to the decision of reasonable person whether or not to buy the product or service, then they would seem to be false advertising under 57-15-2. Under section 57-15-4 a business can be subject to a civil penalty for false advertising. But a suit to impose such a penalty can only be brought by ... the attorney general or, with his consent, the district attorney of the district where the act is committed. Thus, an ordinary consumer may not bring such a suit. However, under section 57-15-5 an action for an injunction may be brought: A. The attorney general of the state of New Mexico or the district attorney of the district in which the violation occurs or a private citizen may bring an action in the name of the state against any person to restrain and prevent any violation of this act [57-15-1 to 57-15-5, 57-15-9, 57-15-10 NMSA 1978]. Any proceeding initiated under this section by a private citizen shall be initiated on his behalf and all others similarly situated. (Emphasis added) A private citizen does not obtain any damages from such a suit, but under 57-15-5 (B) in "exceptional cases" such a citizen may be awarded "reasonable attorneys' fees" if s/he wins the suit, and the court finds that the false advertising was "willful". None of these provisions allows a citizen to simply demand that a company prove its claims, or reveal its business processes. However, in a suit filed under 57-15-5, discovery might reach internal company documents which would help to show the truth or falsity of the advertising. This page from truthinadvertising.org says that a person may sue in Magistrate's Court (the NM version of Small Claims court) for recovery of the purchase price of something bought because of false advertising. I haven't found a specific law authorizing such a suit. In any case. most small claims courts in the US have no or very limited discovery procedures. According to this page from lawyers.com, the limit of small claims awards in NM is $10,000, and a lawyer is permitted, but not required.

How does GPL affect a Makefile-only modification?

As a continuation of this question , does a Makefile modification when building GPL source mean my own program becomes GPL also ? For example, if some third-party GPL'd source contains exit(), and I add to the Makefile -Derror_handling=exit and link an error_handling() function that performs error handling and returns without exiting, does that count as a GPL modification ? I could also change link order and supply my own exit() function to achieve the same result, would that count as a GPL modification ?

Your program doesn’t “become GPL” at all. That’s not how GPL works. The GPL license gives you two permissions without any obligation: You are allowed to use the software, and you are allowed to modify the software and use the modified software. If the software is a combination of GPL licensed and your own software, then your own software is not GPL licensed. The GPL license only comes into play when you distribute it (hand a copy to someone else), with or without your software added. You then have the choice: Either you ship the complete software under the GPL license and everything is legally fine, or you ship it without the GPL license which makes it copyright infringement. It’s your choice. Changing the make file does nothing to the license, you have to do that yourself. Of course when I say “choice” is like leaving a store with goods, you have the choice to pay or become a thief. It doesn’t mean it’s legal, it isn’t.

Getting one company to delete my personal information

As a customer of Resumeble.com's resume-writing service, I uploaded a copy of my MA diploma. Later, when I wrote to them and told them to delete all of my data containing information from documents I provided, a support specialist replied to convince me of the safety of my personal information. But according to their Privacy Policy they can use my data, can't they? "Transfer of Data Your information, including Personal Data, may be transferred to — and maintained on — computers located outside of your state, province, country or other governmental jurisdiction where the data protection laws may differ from those of your jurisdiction. If you are located outside Hong Kong and choose to provide information to us, please note that we transfer the data, including Personal Data, to Hong Kong and process it there. Your consent to this Privacy Policy followed by your submission of such information represents your agreement to that transfer. TrendSpotting Ventures LTD d/b/a/ Resumeble will take all the steps reasonably necessary to ensure that your data is treated securely and in accordance with this Privacy Policy and no transfer of your Personal Data will take place to an organisation or a country unless there are adequate controls in place including the security of your data and other personal information."

The quoted section of the policy says that they will store the information in Hong Kong. It also says that they will keep the data secure. It doesn't say anything about how they will use the data. I followed the link and read the rest of the policy. That does describe how the data may be used. It says that they can use your data to contact you, to market other products and series to you, to provide the services you request on the site, to do marketing analysis, to comply with local law and legal obligations, and similar purposes. It says that data will be retained as long as needed for the purpose it was collected for, and as long as needed to fulfill legal obligations. It looks very standard for a site of the kind you describe, and seems to comply with the GDPR. Nowhere does it say that they can use your data for other general purposes, or retain it forever. Of course, a policy is just words. Some firms adhere strictly to such policies, some do not. I don't know why you wanted the site to delete your info, or what your concerns are. Under the GDPR if you are in Europe, they should delete your info on request. They should only use the info for the purposes listed in the privacy policy.

What consequences does a business face if money taken and also misapplied?

As a customer, I made a payment with my debit card for a monthly bill I have each month. The amount sometimes changes so I asked for a amortization of payments. After reviewing I noticed 2 big errors. The first being,on one of these payments the total paid was not all applied. I have proof of what was taken out of bank and with a receipt. The missing funds are not applied or listed or shown on the amortization anywhere. I'm The second error is, they took my normal monthly payment and applied it to the intrest portion only, so it looks like I did not make a regular monthly payment. They did not tell me they where going to do this,had no idea until I received the amortization. They now expect me to make another payment in same month for the same amount I just paid to catch up. Unfortunately, this is a title loan business. What they say to pay I do as the company favorite saying is "You don't want your car repossessed?" Does anyone know the consequences of taking money and also applying incorrectly without telling me?

Unfortunately, this is a title loan business.... Unfortunately, when you signed on the dotted line for the loan, you agreed to a contract and that payment structure. They are not doing anything without telling you; the way the loan and payments are outlined in the contract you signed. Best thing to do is Google for free legal help in your area and see if they can help; it's possible that the title loan company is doing something illegal, but it's doubtful, as they want to remain in business. What they are doing could be seen as unethical, but unethical actions are not necessarily illegal.

Legality of using data obtained by hacking to make a blog post

As a data scientist, based in the UK, I am thinking about downloading the recently leaked Ashley Madison data, producing some interesting statistics (none of them incriminating), and using them to write a data blog post or making a dashboard about them. I would make all text completely impartial towards Ashley Madison or the users, since I only care about the statistical insights that could be drawn from the data. What possible legal problems could I face? I'm guessing that the data is "owned" in the IP sense by Avid Life Media, but it's also very public. Many thanks.

These are some thoughts about the state of affairs in the US, I do not know how it works in the UK. In the US it seems to be a legal gray area. Gray enough that I do not think any lawyer could say for certain that the use of the data is legal. The data is stolen. If possessing stolen property is illegal then possessing this data is also likely illegal. Of course experts disagree, Stuart Karle, an adjunct media professor at Columbia University and former general counsel for the Wall Street Journal says: ... the documents have been published by the hackers, they are now public by virtue of being put on the Internet . But Barrett Brown was charged with trafficking in stolen authentication when he forwarded a link to some stolen emails. He signed a plea for acting as an accessory after the fact. He spent more than a year in jail while they sorted it out. In the US there is no law banning the download of hacked documents. In fact Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) stands for the rule that journalists can report on illegally obtained information. But contrast that with the Barret Brown prosecution! And decide where a data scientist fits. Also there is the question of whether an illegally recorded conversation is of the same "illegal" nature as hacked personal information.

Do software developers typically retain ownership of work done OUTSIDE of work?

As a developer at a large software company, am I entitled to the right to work on my own projects, independent of my employer? I am referring to work completed on unpaid time, using only my own resources, not competing with the employer, and using no software or intellectual property from the employer. Is there a typical answer to this question?

At common law, your employer owns everything produced in the course of your employment. Your contract may give them more or less than this. To protect yourself you need to be rigorous in documenting what you do for them vs what you do for you: how, when, what and where.

What counts as personal data under GDPR?

As a developer of software intended for use by EU citizens, I am committed to complying with the personal data requirements of the forthcoming legislation ( EU Regulation 2016/679 ). There is a definiton in Article 4 (1): ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; In my opinion, the above definition is pretty wide and the directive texts are quite heavy. I would like to see a definition/list of examples of relevant personal data that software engineers and developers would find usable when developing software intended for use in the EU. I hope this question is not regarded too wide. I consider it to be a practical problem and hope for great answers.

The answer is right there in the quote: any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person So if the data can in any way be tied to a specific individual then it is personal data. Note that you have to consider the data collection as a whole - even if there are no names in your data, if there is enough info in it that you can work out who the individual is (or probably is) its personal data. Obvious things include names, dates of birth, physical addresses, electronic addresses, social media profiles etc. Less obvious things include job or profession, memberships of organisations, friends and associates, town/suburb etc. i.e. things that in combination can reduce the set of people it could be to a small number of individuals. Basically, if you collect and store information about individuals in any way you are caught by this regulation. Even an email address used for login is personal data in that it identifies an individual and tells a hacker that they use your software. Examples of what is not personal data includes information about judicial persons (companies and other organisations that are sufficiently large that individual information cannot be inferred) or properly anonomized data where the data set is sufficiently large that identifying any particular individual is highly improbable (several dozen people at least depending on how revealing the data is).

Could the Senate abolish the Supreme Court?

As a follow up from this question , suppose the Senate got tired of the "pesky" Court overturning its laws. Or, suppose that additional elections produced Senate majorities of a different party than the President, such as a continuation of the 2016 arrangement. Could the Senate simply decide to stop confirming Presidential nominees to be judges on the Supreme Court, even after there are no judges left on the Supreme Court? If not, why not? If unclear, absent a Supreme Court to authoritatively interpret the constitution, who would decide the answer? While we would hope the "no judges remaining" would take a while, a disaster or major attack could cause such a situation to arise within a short period. If so, this would be an interesting twist in constitutional law, that the Founding Fathers may not have considered. Article II, Section 2, of the US Constitution states: [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law[.] A separate question about if the President could do something similar is here ; they seem separate because of the stronger duty to nominate ("shall") imposed on the President. Could is intended to refer to legally could; political feasibility considerations would be at Politics , not Law.

If the Senate took the extreme measure of attempting to abolish the Supreme Court, there's nothing in the Constitution that requires them to confirm any of the President's nominees. However, attempting to dismantle one of the three branches would be nothing short of a coup d'etat. The president has some options here: He [the President] may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses [of Congress], or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper. -- Article 2, Sec. 3 Basically, this means that, in an extraordinary circumstance (total defiance of the entire Senate would easily qualify), the President can lock the Senate in their chamber until they straighten their heads out. And when I say "lock them in", I don't mean that figuratively. The Constitution requires that a majority of each house be present to constitute a quorum to do business. The President could order up to 51 Senators to convene, and if they refused, could order the FBI or whoever to physically arrest them and drag them to the capitol building. This was actually done in Wisconsin by Gov. Scott Walker in 2011 when 14 Democrat Senators fled the state to avoid the quorum needed to vote on a controversial bill that they couldn't block. It would be messy for sure, and as far as I know, has never been done with the U.S. Senate. But there is precedent for it. Additionally, the President could use his vacancy power and just appoint a justice. Legally, he would have to wait for the Senate to be in recess, and the Senate would likely arrange things so that never happens. However, if there were no justices left, he could just appoint a Chief Justice (the Constitution provides that there be at least one justice). Even if he did this in the most "in-your-face" illegal way, with both middle fingers extended, the only judge that can tell him he did wrong is the guy he just seated. Of course, the Senate would move to impeach that judge, and probably the President too for having appointed him illegally, but you need a supermajority of both houses to remove them from office. If you had such a supermajority, then the game is over at this point; there's no way the President would step down in such a situation (who would force him?) and we're in a civil war because we don't have a functional government anymore. In reality, this isn't an "interesting twist in constitutional law that the Founding Fathers may not have considered." It's that if Congress ever went totally off the rails like that, the President, or the people would have to step up and hope they could end the standoff peacefully without resorting to violence, because this is the kind of thing that revolutions are fought over.

What is considered personal information according to the US law?

As a follow up question from this question a person's name, age, address, parties affiliation are considered public data. I'd like to ask then what is considered personal information? So if there is a website breach of data i.e. on Facebook and the hackers get the information mentioned above, Facebook doesn't need to worry because this data is not considered personal information? Note: Since this is state specific then what most of states agree on what is personal information.

Federal and state laws do protect a variety of different types of personal information in particular contexts, but there isn't really any information that is necessarily personal and protected from disclosure in all contexts. For instance, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act generally protects a person's health records from unnecessary disclosure, and the Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act generally protects a student's educational records from unneccessary disclosure. But that doesn't mean that all of an American's health information is protected, or that all of the information that a hospital holds about an American is protected. The hospital can typically disclose the fact that it is treating a specific person, and if that person provides his health records to a government employer, that employer may be required to produce them in response to a request under the Ohio Public Records Act. But Facebook isn't a health-care provider, so it isn't required to protect medical records, and it isn't a school, so it isn't required to protect educational records. At the federal level, I don't know of any privacy laws that require it to maintain the privacy of its users' information, though it may be required to do so under state laws, or as a contractual matter because of its privacy policy. But that doesn't mean it has nothing to worry about. Like any business in the United States, it is prohibited from engaging in deceptive trade practices, so it can't make broad promises to protect users' privacy when it has no intention of honoring them. That's why it ended up paying $5 billion for privacy violations in the past and remains under court orders requiring it to better protect users' data. Further, Facebook has users all over the world, so it is required to comply with the international privacy regulations like GDPR that can be far more stringent.

Copyright of a children's song with no author or date information

As a follow-up on Copyright of children's folklore songs , artist A wants to use the melody of "Five little ducks". The song is not on the list of public domain songs . A sound recording of the melody and the score are on Wikipedia ; the lyrics and an animated video are on a US government website . Even so, Artist A cannot find author or date information. How can artist A assess whether a melody such as this one is copyrighted or in the public domain?

In the US, the artist can get the US Copyright office to search its records for any indication of the copyright holder. An hourly fee is changed by the office for this. A search of newspaper archives for mentions of the song might be helpful. A stretch through old music books, sch as those held by Google Books, might reveal a copyright notice. Project Gutenberg publishes copies of the US renewal registrations but not, (as far as I know), the original registrations. If a work was published in the US prior to 1964, and was not renewed, it is now in the public domain. (The 1976 Copyright act made renewal automatic for works published in 1964 and later.)

Copyright Ownership of a Translated Article Appearing in a Book in Which an Online Translator was Used

As a follow-up to Attributing the Assistance of an Online Translator for a Book's Chapter---Is It Necessary? , and at the suggestion of @DaleM: QUESTION: Would an author of a book who incorporates an English translation of an article which was first published in the 19th century (and presumably, in the public domain worldwide) by relying heavily on an online translator (such as DeepL Translate free version or Google Translate)---own also---a copyright, specifically, on the translated article which appears in that book?

Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole . The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist . That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it.

When does failure to pay become a material breach of contract?

As a follow-up to Work for hire as a contractor without payment, can you withhold IP? , when does failure to pay become a material breach of contract?

Materiality I actually don't think you mean "material" in this context but I'll deal with it anyway. Something is material when it has a non-insignificant impact on the performance of the contract. A breach that is not material would not support a claim in court for the breach. For example, a breach from which no damages flowed would be immaterial. In that sense, because the failure to pay when required always incurs a cost on the recipient - either the cost of borrowing the money they haven't got or the interest lost on money they could have invested its immediately material. Conditions (essential terms) and warranties (inessential terms) This is what I think you are asking. A condition is a major term which is essential to the contract. Breach of a condition entitles the injured party to terminate the contract and to treat its obligations as at an end, and/or sue for damages for loss suffered as a result. The injured party has to exercise one of two choices: Affirm (confirm) the contract, or Treat itself as no longer under an obligation to perform the contract - but rights which had accrued up to that time continue. In either case, the injured party can, but is not obliged to, sue for damages. A warranty is a minor term of the contract which is not essential to the main purpose of the contract. If a warranty is breached, the contract does not come to an end. Whether a term is a condition or a warranty depends on whether it is essential or non-essential to the contract. For example, a term is essential if it is so important that the promissee would not have entered the contract unless what was promised was definitely going to happen. A term can be expressly made a condition by express provision ( Gumland Property Holdings Pty Limited v Duffy Bros Fruit Market (Campbelltown) Pty Ltd [2008] HCA 10) - this is what the term "time is of the essence" actually does with respect to time. Is payment a condition or a warranty? In most contracts, that the principal will pay the contractor is a condition. However, when they will pay is usually a warranty. That is, the contractor can terminate if the principal doesn't pay but can't terminate if the principal is late paying. Of course, if the principal has a bona fide reason for not paying, e.g. that the contractor's entitlement to payment or the amount of the payment is in dispute (and providing the principal pays the undisputed amount) then the principal is arguably not in breach for not paying because it is not known if there is a payment that should be made. It may emerge that when the dispute is ultimately resolved that the principal was in breach, however, it would be a brave contractor that purported to terminate a contract because the principal might be in breach of what might be a condition. Assuming that there is no dispute, then the term becomes a condition when the payment is so late that "the promissee would not have entered the contract unless what was promised was definitely going to happen." How late is too late depends on the individual circumstances of the case - industry norms around late payment, prior dealing between the principal and the contractor, previous waiver of payment terms within the contract, the amount etc. In some cases (e.g. settlement of share purchases) 1 microsecond may be too long; in others (e.g. construction contracts), 3 months might not be long enough.

Transcribing Ancient Manuscripts from Around the World

As a follow-up/clarification to this question , I would like to ask with a little bit more detail. There are several groups of "ancient" manuscripts and inscriptions which I would like for this to take into account. Here is a list of some of them: Ancient Egyptian Hieroglyphs (>3000 years old) Ancient Olmec Inscriptions (>3000 years old) Ancient Mayan Glyphs Ancient Aztec Glyphs Old English Manuscripts (>1000 years old) Old Runic Inscriptions (>1000 years old) Old Irish Manuscripts (>1000 years old) Ancient Chinese Manuscripts (>1000 years old) Ancient Chinese Inscriptions (>3000 years old, like the oracle bone ) Ancient Latin Manuscripts (>1000 years old) Ancient Greek Manuscripts (>1000 years old) Etc. There are many other cultures such as Finnish, Tibetan, etc. Some of these are owned by places like the Catholic Church, others by places like the British Library, or other Libraries or Museums, even others are held by Universities, and still others are held by private individuals who may post an image online of the artifact for a variety of reasons, like this person did . Also, some artifacts may have been created in one place (like in China), but hosted in another place (like at the British museum). So the question is about looking at an online image of one of these artifacts, which is provided by one of the owners, and then either drawing a picture to replicate the object (like the image below), or copying it into text form, such as this , which was transcribed from an image of a manuscript , into electronic text . Specifically, all of the things I am talking about are pre-copyright era, the actual objects themselves. So then someone finds/discovers the item (either they found it pre-copyright era, like 1000+ years ago finding something and putting it in the king's library), or it was discovered post-copyright-starting era. So somebody owns it. I am not concerned with that part. But then they take a picture of it and put it online. Some of the pictures (like the reddit image) are just quickly shot with an iPhone. Others require significant cost, care, and tooling, such as taking a picture of a fragile ancient manuscript, while others require that much cost/care/tooling to startup, but then can be automated for thousands or millions of artifacts (like the Google books project). But in the end, an image of a natural, copyright-free artifact (since it was created pre-copyright era) is online and publicly available. What you see in this situation often is "this image is copyrighted". To me that means that you can't directly sell the image, or host it on your site/product for commercial gain. But given the content of the image is in the public domain (again, the content from all those cultural resources listed at the beginning) because it was created thousands of years ago, I wonder what you are allowed to do with the image. I wonder if you are allowed to: Make a drawing of it (like the sketch below). Transcribe the text contained in the original document (which you could see because of the copyrighted image). Obviously the drawing wouldn't be a straight copy of the photograph . It would draw the essence of the content instead. So the content is public domain, but the image is copyrighted and the artifact is owned. I wonder if you are allowed to essentially write down in electronic form what is in the manuscript artifact, or in the case of glyphs, to write down the glyphs. What this would mean is that one could go to a museum website and view their manuscripts, and transcribe them, and then do what you want with the transcription. If that's not allowed, I would be interested to know the reason.

What you're describing is generally permissible in the United States. The photographer has copyright in the photograph itself, not in the items photographed. This means that they have copyright in the way that they composed the photograph -- what background they placed it against, lighting, camera placement, etc. -- but not in the ancient manuscript. If you are strictly transcribing the text of the script, you're not infringing on anything that's copyrighted. If you make a sketch, there's more potential for infringement, but I suspect that you would not be working to faithfully copy the angles of the shadows as much as you would working to faithfully copy the image and condition of the artifact. Even if you were, calling that a copyright infringement would require that the image truly be copyrighted, and I'm not 100 percent convinced that they would be. Copyright is only available to original works of authorship, and that means that the author has to make some meaningful efforts to create something new out of the copyrighted elements discussed above. But what has the photographer done in that picture of the Coronation Oath? It appears that they've photographed the book head-on, as it's displayed by the museum, with lighting as provided by the museum, in an effort to recreate the display one would see while visiting the museum. Is that really sufficiently "original" to merit copyright protection that could be invoked to prevent someone from drawing a duplicate? I doubt it. But that picture of the Ge'ez book may be different. Someone appears to have grabbed the book, opened it up under weird lighting, kept their hands in the photograph, and otherwise actually composed a photograph that may not be particularly artistic, but is nonetheless difficult enough to duplicate that it can be considered original. So let's be generous to the copyright trolls and assume that the sketch you're imagining is protected. Even then, that only raises the question of whether the copy is a fair use. You haven't said anything about how the hypothetical copier would be using these materials, but I have a hunch that the idea isn't to launch a multimillion dollar merchandising enterprise. If the idea is more academic or cultural, you'd have a better claim to fair use. Again, you can review this fair-use explainer to get a better idea.

What exactly makes encryption a weapon?

As a followup from Is the right to keep and bear crypto protected by the Second Amendment? , for export control purposes, United States has been classifying crypto as munition . In the old days, maybe late 1990s and very early 2000s, it was not uncommon for there to be two version of Netscape Navigator -- one with and one without "strong crypto". Bernstein v. United States. http://export.cr.yp.to/ On what exact legal basis is crypto considered munition? I mean, has anyone ever been killed with crypto? Is that even possible?

Encryption is not a weapon. Encryption, or rather cryptographic technology and systems, is a munition. What makes it a munition is the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) managed by the U.S. Department of State. Weapons are a subset of munitions. Many U.S. laws grant authority to the executive branch to promulgate regulations for enforcement of the law. ITAR is a set of regulations managed by the U.S. Department of State to implement 22 U.S.C 2778 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) . As part of the implementation, ITAR must define those items that are regulated by the AECA. Part 121 of those regulations defines " The United States Munitions List ." There are many items on that list that are not weapons, yet they are regulated under the authority of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution granting power to the U.S. government to regulate international commerce. The extent of the definition of cryptography as a munition, for purposes of this discussion, is limited to the meaning created in the AECA and ITAR. There has been a somewhat successful challenge to the ITAR definition as it relates to cryptography mounted by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.

Stalking & Harassment

As a followup to stalking / harassement , after a police report is filed, it is my understanding that the remedy for such a matter is a restraining order . Is there any reason that the aggressor would not be considered for a restraining order? Is there "best practice" for filing a restraining order? Are there alternative remedies to restraining order? UPDATE / CLARIFICATION Victims indicates feeling threatened by the stalker as the suspect is unmasked, does not maintain distance, and seeks to step in the path of the walking victim, forcing the victim to alter direction to maintain distance. In my opinion, the intentional invasion of personal space during the COVID pandemic is no different than brandishing a firearm as more people will be felled by the pandemic in 2020 & 2021 than firearms. REQUEST Please consider adding a clarifying question before downvoting or voting to close the question. Editing the question is also an alternative.

You should probably look for a local lawyer and ask for a consultation. You do not have to hire the attorney, just discuss the situation and see what is advised. Alternatively, ask an officer handling your case as to next possible steps to take. Whether or not you can get a restraining order, you should definitely look into options for personal self-defense. While I would never advise someone who is uncomfortable with handling fire arms to get one, if you decide to go this route, Florida is not a difficult state to procure one and if you do so, do take a fire arms safety and shooting course (As a former FL citizen, I had a co-work tell me the story about the time was filling out paperwork for his first gun he bought at the Sheriff's office, the deputy processing the form read it over and said, "Okay, I see you're getting the gun for home defense. Just so you know, if you are ever in a situation where you do have to defend yourself with a gun, ALWAYS shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us." I found it a surprising tell of where the law sits on the matter of use of deadly force. You also have Stand your ground self-defense). Otherwise I would recomend looking into martial arts or self-defense courses so you can get yourself out of a physical altercation. Remember, a restraining order makes it a crime for your ex to approach you within a certain distance. It does not put a force field around you should he try to hurt you. And you can't be certain a cop or another person will get there in time to help you.

Working more than the yearly limit as a foreign student in Germany

As a foreign student in Germany, one has a 120-full-days or 240-part-days work limit during the year. From my personal experience so far, I have also noticed (thought might be wrong) that some laws about foreigners not only depend on one's city but are moreover even open to interpretation by the foreigner's office. In other words, one can observe different behaviors for equal/similar cases. After an inquiry I was told that the main point behind this law was for the student to focus on his studies and the important bit was that the student made progress in his studies. My question now is, assuming the study process doesn't get harmed, would there be any consequences if one exceeded this limit? For instance if you surpass it to 130-full-days, what could happen?

The DAAD has published a summary of the legal constraints when working as a foreign student in Germany. While the document is only available in German, it is complete and rather authoritative. I summarize the main points here. On a student visa, you are eligible for 120 full days or 240 half days in accordance with §16b (3) AufenthG. This is a legal constraint. It is not up to interpretation. Only mandatory internships constitute a right to further work. In individual cases, the Ausländerbehörde (foreign registration office) can grant authorization for additional work. The authorization will only be granted if the extra work will not jeopardize the purpose of your stay in Germany, which is studying full-time. In particular, work in a study-related job such as a student assistant will generally be eligible for an extension. This is up to the judgement of the office. Thus, there can be differences between different cities. If you intend to surpass the 120/240 day limit, you must get prior authorization. You are otherwise violating the conditions of your visa, which can result in fines and deportation. Additionally, no upstanding employer wants to provide illegal work as they would be subject to penalties themselves. Links: DAAD guidance on working in Germany (German): https://static.daad.de/media/daad_de/pdfs_nicht_barrierefrei/in-deutschland-studieren-forschen-lehren/daad-infoblatt_erwerbstaetigkeit.pdf §16b AufenthG (English): https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_aufenthg/englisch_aufenthg.html#p0275

Throwing tomatoes at a poster of a politician

As a form of protest, imagine: Printing a poster of a politician's face Placing it on a wall (with permission of the wall's owner) in a generally public space Handing out tomatoes to be thrown at the poster. What legal troubles can arise? EDIT: The jurisdiction is Canada, particularly Ontario. My apologies for not thinking of this detail.

If you contain and clean up the mess and don’t create a public nuisance, you’re good to go.