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Is it legal to produce GI tagged products without using the tag outside the tagged region

A Geographic Indication (GI) tag gives exclusive rights to use a particular name/tag to certain people/region regarding a product. Does this mean it is still legal for other people/regions to produce these products without using the mentioned tag? And do all countries allow this?

Yes You can legally make a a product with the same method. For example, sparkling wine using the same method as champagne. But it it is not made in the right region, it can not be sold under that region label. Champagne needs also the correct grapes from the Champagne, so the sparkling wine after the champagne method should never to be called champagne. Similarly, a tea may be processed just the same as Darjeeling Tea, but it can't be called Darjeeling in trade if it is not from the right region. Most countries that have marks for geographic origin respect them globally.

Can a German employer force employees to submit personal data to a contractor?

A German higher-education institution recently introduced a new measure to facilitate Covid-19 contact tracing: next to each door (i.e. entrances to the building, the lecture rooms, the labs and some other places), there is a QR code that must be scanned using an app by a company. The goal is to track who was in a specific room at a specific time. The rule applies to employees, students and visitors. People who don't have a smartphone, should visit a specific URL on the contractor's website and enter their data manually. People who do not wish to provide these data should not enter the building at all. The higher-education institution claims that this is all perfectly legal because it conforms to the local Corona Law (i.e. Baden-Wüttemberg's Corona law, in force since 30 September 2020 , which is also available in English) and because the contractor's treatment of the data conforms to the GDPR. However, I am not totally convinced that the reference to these two pieces of legislation is sufficient: §6 of Baden-Wüttemberg's Corona law allows organisations to collect certain data about attendees, participants etc. but does not state that these persons can be forced to submit their data to a third party (i.e. a contractor to the organisation they are visiting). The GDPR is relevant when people willingly submit their data but does not seem to be a legal basis for forcing people to submit data to a third party. Note that this contractor is not mentioned in employee contracts as a company with which the higher-education institution might share data. So my question is whether an employer can force employees and students to submit data to a contractor without violating the principle of informational self-determination .

The university has a legal obligation to collect certain data from attendees, including employees an visitors. It has decided to keep these records in digital form, and offers a smartphone app as a convenience. The university has outsourced the data processing activity to a third party. This is perfectly legal under the GDPR, if that third party is contractually bound to only process the data as instructed, and not for their own purposes. Whereas the university acts as a data controller (Verantwortlicher), the third party would be a data processor (Auftragsverarbeiter). I have some doubts though whether an app or a website is indeed the solution that offers the best data protection, especially taking into account the GDPR's data minimization principle. Requiring updates when entering or leaving any room is potentially excessive. Given the sensitivity of the data, the university should have performed a data protection impact assessment to weigh the consequences of this measure. At least for employees, the measure would likely have to be approved by the union (Personalrat) as well.

Is it unethical for a prosecutor not to try his hardest to get an indictment?

A Grand Jury failed to indict Darren Wilson, the police officer who shot Michael Brown, which led to riots in Ferguson, MO. This my have been due in part to the fact that the prosecutor presented the Grand Jury with all the evidence rather than just presenting the evidence that bolsters his case for indictment. In this article , Megan Mcardle argues that the prosecutor was in a no-win situation, since he was under political pressure to convene a grand jury, and yet he didn't think that a conviction would be likely. So he intentionally tried not to get an indictment in order to avoid the case going to trial. But my question is, is it unethical for a prosecutor not to try his hardest to get an indictment after he's convened a Grand Jury? Could a prosecutor be disbarred if it's found that he presented evidence which he knew would undermine his case for an indictment? Would such behavior run afoul of government rules of conduct for prosecutors?

On the contrary, it is unethical for a prosecutor to bring a case where there is no reasonable prospect of conviction. The prosecutor is an officer of the court and as a representative of the state, their primary concern is the guilty are convicted and the not guilty are not.

Can a business' more specific form contract show that a previous contract's terms were ambiguous or that there was no meeting of the minds?

A Hypothetical Situation: An individual lives in an assisted living / nursing facility and dies on January 4. The monthly fee has already been paid, as it is due by that day. The individual's family wishes to get a refund, pro-rated, for the remaining three weeks of January. The individual's family signed a contract at the beginning of the individual's stay there that is called "Refund Policy" and states that no refund will be given unless 30 days notice is given to the facility when that individual is "leaving." Other words used in the same sentence included The facility also now has a separate form that speaks specifically to what would happen in the event of the death of an individual staying in the facility. This form is called "No Refund Policy in Case of Death." It states there is no refund in the event of death, no matter what day of the month / no matter how much is paid for but will obviously not be used by that individual due to that individual's death. This form was never signed nor was the information it contains ever discussed with the individual or family. Question: Can the family get a pro-rated amount of money back for the time that the individual did not stay in the facility? Note: I understand that in contract situations, the contract governs. That said, is there a way to use the second form and its specific mention of "death" to show that the first form did not sufficiently explain its terms and/or was ambiguous at the time it was signed? If not, it sounds like "one party relied on a statement of the other about a material fact that the second party knew or should have known was mistaken by the first party." And the existence of the second form would show that the second party knew or should have known that a form simply referencing "leaving" was insufficient for these purposes. Thoughts?

Under the terms of the contract you (or whoever) signed, there is no basis for demanding a refund. It explicitly says there will be no refund in the case of a client "leaving", and says nothing that would imply that a refund is owed in case of death. Of course, without seeing the actual wording of the contract, we can only guess, but the burden would be on you to show that there is a refund provision that is applicable in case of death. It is reasonable to presume that this issue has come up before and others have attempted to get a refund, which resulted in a more explicit denial that a refund is owed in case of death. In case there is an actual ambiguity in the wording, an argument might be made that the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the client. If the matter hinges on the word "leave", for example "if the client leaves without giving 30 days prior notice", you would have to argue that "leave" means something like "walks out under their own power". But looking at the ordinary meaning of words, if a person is removed (dead or incapacitated), they have left – "leave" doesn't mean "go under your own power". It is immaterial that we ordinarily circumlocute when talking about bodies. There is a unilateral mistake here, on the part of the client, which is that they are entitled to a refund. Without the full contract, it is hard to see how they might believe that they were entitled to a refund. The facility could have said "in case a client is removed dead or incapacitated, they shall be entitled to a refund for the unused portion of that month". But they didn't, so it is not reasonable to think that that was what they meant. The reason for the amplified refund statement is to expressly deny that a refund is owed, for public relations reasons -- to avoid or at least reduce such claims in the future.

Can a state suspend my license and not tell me about it?

A Iowa-registered driver was on the highway in Indiana, US, going 26 mph over the speed limit. The driver was pulled over and was fined. The driver went and payed the fine in person and resolved the ticket. A few months later, when the driver went to the Ohio BMV to attempt to transfer his license to his new home state, he was informed (for the first time), that his license was suspended for the next 3 months. According to a phone call the driver had with the Iowa DOT , in Iowa, if a driver gets cited for going more than 20 mph over the speed limit, they must complete a defensive driving course within a number of days. If they don’t, they risk a 6 month suspension of their license. I wasn’t able to find this information in the Iowa’s Driver Manual . The Iowa DOT had sent a letter to the driver, which was returned to the sender. The Iowa DOT had a record of the letter being returned. They had not attempted to contact the driver further. Thus, the driver had no way of knowing of the requirements needed to keep his license valid. This seems like a problem in the Iowa DOT, and shouldn’t have afflicted the driver with the consequences it did. Is there any way to challenge this decision? What steps could be taken?

It seems that the Iowa authorities did attempt to notify the driver. If the letter of notification was returned because the driver changed his or her address, that is not the DOT's fault -- drivers are supposed to notify the authorities of changes of address -- indeed driving with a license with an out-of-date address is itself a violation in some US states. If the error was made by the postal service, that is still not the DOT's fault but they might be more willing to accept an appeal from the driver. In general, authorities must make a reasonable attempt to notify people of court or administrative actions, but if those notifications fail, the authorities can go ahead in many cases. Try explaining that one doesn't owe taxes because an IRS notice was misdelivered. It would be too easy to avoid unwanted governmental actions if nondelivery of mail were a valid excuse. It may well be that there is a procedure to get the suspension waived or ended early, perhaps involving taking the class that should have been taken, and perhaps paying an additional fine. Details of such procedures vary. A local lawyer who deals with traffic issues frequently would probably know what steps might be taken. It may well be that the original ticket mentioned a possible suspension, but it may not have. That also varies by state.

A Judge Has Blocked The 'Anti-Riot' Law Passed In Florida

A Judge Has Blocked The 'Anti-Riot' Law Passed In Florida The constitution prevent Congress from abridging the right to peaceably assemble: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Florida has enacted an "anti-riot" act and is described as: A public gathering of three or more people can be classified as a “riot” under the law, and anyone who “willingly” participates in such a gathering can be charged with a third-degree felony. Plus, participants in rallies that turn violent can be also be charged with a third-degree felony even if they had no involvement with the violence. Most jarring of all, the law grants civil immunity to drivers who ram into protesting crowds and even injure or kill participants, if they claim the protests made them concerned for their own well-being in the moment. Source: https://slate.com/business/2021/04/drivers-hit-protesters-laws-florida-oklahoma-republicans.html If the right to assembly may not be abridged by congress, does that imply states may not craft anti-assembly legislation?

The restrictions of the First Amendment have been made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. For the right to assemble, this was recognized in De Jonge v. Oregon , 299 U.S. 353 (1937) . But note that the right only protects peaceable assembly. When it is alleged that improper violence or other properly unlawful action has occurred, the state may make that criminal, and indeed laws against rioting have existed throughout the history of the US. Whether a law is criminalizing peaceful assembly or prohibiting unlawful violence is a question that depends on th wording of the law, and the way it is applied In the De Jonge opinion the Court wrote: The broad reach of the statute as thus applied is plain. While defendant was a member of the Communist Party, that membership was not necessary to conviction on such a charge. A like fate might have attended any speaker, although not a member, who "assisted in the conduct" of the meeting. However innocuous the object of the meeting, however lawful the subjects and tenor of the addresses, however reasonable and timely the discussion, all those assisting in the conduct of the meeting would be subject to imprisonment as felons if the meeting were held by the Communist Party. ... While the States are entitled to protect themselves from the abuse of the privileges of our institutions through an attempted substitution of force and violence in the place of peaceful political action in order to effect revolutionary changes in government, none of our decisions goes to the length of sustaining such a curtailment of the right of free speech and assembly as the Oregon statute demands in its present application. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, under the New York statute defining criminal anarchy, the defendant was found to be responsible for a "manifesto" advocating the overthrow of the government by violence and unlawful means. Id. pp. 268 U. S. 656, 268 U. S. 662, 268 U. S. 663. In Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, under the California statute relating to criminal syndicalism, the defendant was found guilty of willfully and deliberately assisting in the forming of an organization for the purpose of carrying on a revolutionary class struggle by criminal methods ... Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Gitlow v. New York , supra, p. 268 U. S. 666; Stromberg v. California , supra, p. 283 U. S. 368; Near v. Minnesota , 283 U. S. 697, 283 U. S. 707; Grosjean v. American Press Co ., 297 U. S. 233, 297 U. S. 243, 297 U. S. 244. The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press, and is equally fundamental. As this Court said in United States v. Cruikshan k, 92 U. S. 542, 92 U. S. 552: implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. The First Amendment of the Federal Constitution expressly guarantees that right against abridgment by Congress. But explicit mention there does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions -- principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause. Hebert v. Louisiana , 272 U. S. 312, 272 U. S. 316; Powell v. Alabama , 287 U. S. 45, 287 U. S. 67; Grosjean v. American Press Co ., supra.

Verbal Agreement vs Written Agreement

A Landlord and Tenant negotiated a lease agreement of a store premise in a commercial property. The agreement underwent several iterations with massive changes in between each iteration. These earlier drafts of the lease agreement no longer exist. Prior to signing the final draft of the lease agreement, the Tenant specifically asked the Landlord representative who would be responsible for the removal of fixtures attached to the premise (e.g. wall shelves, etc.). The Landlord representative said that the Tenant would not be responsible for those. This was witnessed by the Tenant's real estate agent. The lease has now expired. As it turns out, buried deep in the lease agreement, is a clause that specifically states that the Tenant is responsible for the removal of those fixtures (even if the Tenant was not the one who installed those fixtures). The Tenant and the Tenant's real estate agent do not recall this clause in the earlier drafts of the lease agreement. Nonetheless, the Tenant did sign the agreement not knowing that the clause obligating the Tenant to remove the fixtures existed. Generally speaking, without factoring the country of jurisdiction, what legal arguments does the Tenant have? Assume that both verbal and written agreements are equally enforceable.

In general, the express terms of the lease signed supersede all prior negotiations of the parties, except to the extent that the particular language in question in the lease is ambiguous. This is called the parol evidence rule (which is the law in all U.S. jurisdictions although it has been expressly rejected in Israel). The parol evidence rule expressly makes a written agreement supersede a verbal agreement, rather than making them equally valid. Also, even if both agreements had been written, generally speaking, the last and final version of the agreement will supersede earlier versions of the agreement. The best defense would be along the lines of fraud-in-factum or fraudulent inducement, i.e. that this term was slipped into the final draft in a manner expressly intended to mislead the signing party about what was being signed. I've won one case where this happened (where there was extensive email correspondence between business lawyers regarding the changes that would be made in each draft and there the version signed did not correspond to the last version signed electronically in a very long document on paper and there were other indicia of fraud), but by far the more common outcome is to bind the party signing the document (especially in a commercial context) and to consider failing to carefully read all terms of the final draft to be negligent on the part of the party signing the contract. Arguably, there might also be a malpractice claim against the lawyer for the tenant for missing this change in a material term before the contract was signed.

Expired Rental Lease & Addendum Determination

A Landlord had a tenant in her Florida condo with a lease expiring on 2/28/22. The Landlord was 88 and in her final stage of life. Death occured on 3/17/22. Landlord was not able or willing to sign lease renewal--even under pressure by agent. Tenant had an addendum A--stating: Owner and tenant agree that the tenant will have the option to renew the lease for an additional year with the rental amount to increase no more than $100.00 per month. Trustees of landlords estate gave tenant a "Notice to vacate." It was mailed on 4/4/22, and received 4/11/22 certified mail. We offered 60-90 days to vacate so as to accommodate tenant adequate time to vacate. The condo is in a trust with Co-Trustees. The Trustees are Certified. Tenant has obtained legal counsel to enforce addendum. She believes addendum guarantees lease renewal, thought the intent was to lock-in a minimal rent increase, due to the fact the comparable condos rent for $5,000.00/mo, not $3,000.00. Tenant had option to renew, and rent increase was not negotiable, but capped at an, "increase of no more than $100.00 per month". Landlord did not renew lease. Trustees need to sell asset to settle estate taxes due 1/17/23. Does Addendum A legally force & bind the estate trust to sign a lease against the better judgment of Trustees?

That is going to depend on the full lease, but from the quoted provision it would seem that the tenant does indeed have the option to renew, and the trustees probably are obliged to grant a renewal on request. I will update this answer after lookign at the specific Florida law.

How does a flow-through LLC own assets?

A Limited Liability Company (LLC) is a business under US law with the following characteristics: Establishes a "corporate veil" of limited liability, such that creditors or lawsuits can only go after the company's assets, and not personal assets of the owner(s). Requires much less in the way of formalities than a corporation. Treated as a flow-through entity by default, meaning that the income of the company is treated directly as the income of the owner(s), rather than being held by the company and paid out as salary or dividends. (Not all LLCs operate as flow-through entities, but this question is only about those that do.) At first glance, it appears that the first and third points above are in conflict with one another: if all revenue generated by the company flows directly to the owner(s) rather than being retained by the company itself, then the company has no money of its own with which to purchase company assets! Obviously this has to be an overly simplistic understanding, but I'm having trouble finding a plain-English description of how it really works. So my question is, what are the principles by which a flow-through LLC segregates company money and assets from flow-through payments to the owner(s)?

My understanding is that the "flow-through" treatment is specifically a tax law concept. The LLC has its own income, which it can use to pay expenses or acquire assets or for whatever other purpose, and such assets become the property of the LLC. It's just that when it comes time to pay taxes, the LLC's net income is taxed as income to the owner. But that does not mean that the LLC's income is treated the same as the owner's income in all other legal contexts.

How do war survivors claim damages?

A Modern Example: Numerous Ukrainians survivors have had their homes destroyed by Russian missiles. If the Russian prevail in this conflict, then I would think that said survivors can not claim damages against the victor. On the other hand for the purposes of the question, let us assume that the Ukrainians prevail in this conflict. How & in what forum would a Ukrainian survivor claim / recover damages from Russia for the destruction of his / her home?

Currently, there is no recourse The Russian state is sovereign. This means the Russian government has to tell the Russian courts that they allow people to sue Russia for specific, enumerated things. If the Kremlin has not done so, then Russia has total, sovereign immunity from such claims. In the united-states , the FTCA regulates how and when you can sue the USA or federal institutions for torts, while FSIA regulates how or when you can sue other countries in the USA. In russia , the Federal Law No. 297-FZ of November 3, 2015 "On Jurisdictional Immunities of a Foreign State and Property of a Foreign State in the Russian Federation" seems to be a very similar law to FSIA. I could not determine if an equivalent to the FTCA exists. Reparations would be handled by a peace treaty with Ukraine Besides a law that allows claims against Russia, a Ukrainian-Russian peace treaty might contain a passus about reparations. There are three very traditional ways how such handle reparations: In one case, such a treaty could establish that Russia pays the reparations to Ukraine, and then claims against Russia are paid out by Ukraine. In the other case, the treaty provides a framework to sue Russia for compensation. And in the last variant, no compensation for civilians is agreed upon at all.

Assignment of Inventions to employer - exclusion of Inventions assigned or licensed to me?

A NY law employment contract states in a section entitled All Inventions are Exclusively the Property of the Firm: Employee assigns to the Firm... without any additional consideration, all of Employee's right, title, and interest in any and all inventions that Employee invents, conceives of, creates, develops, or reduces to practice while employed by the Firm or for a period of one year... Specifically, as pertains to Copyright: I should have added this clause Employee also agrees that...all inventions made by Employee (solely or jointly with others)...which are protectable by copyright are "works made for hire" as ... defined by US Copyright Act (17 USC Sec 101) and are deemed specifically ordered by the Firm under US Copyright Law. In the event .. not to be a 'work made for hire', this Agreement shall operate as an irrevocable assignment ... of the copyright ... including all right, title and interest therein. At the same time, the contract states under Excluded Information: The restrictions contained in this Agreement shall not apply to any Prior Work....means discoveries, creations, developments, improvements, ..., ideas, reports and other creative work...Employee made or conceived such works prior to commencement of employment.... including but not limited to those described in Exhibit A Clearly, all copyrighted ideas / code done before employment are of course Prior Work . This is stronger if the copyright is put in Exhibit A, but can still be established even if the IP is not listed. (e.g., timestamped code/papers in external repos, email trail, etc). What if a Third Party licenses a copyright to the Employee or assigns a copyright to the Employee subsequent to his employment? Can the firm claim these licenses/copyrights as its own Property? Is there any distinction between the two: licensing or assignment from the point of view of the Employee protecting his IP from the new firm? My (mostly ignorant) belief is that a license granted to the Employee, even if it is exclusive and perpetual cannot be claimed by the Firm, while an assignment is more questionable. Am I correct in saying that in neither case can the Firm established that the Employee invented these licensed/assigned inventions, since that claim can only be made by the (Third Party, original) copyright-holder.

all inventions that Employee invents, conceives of, creates, develops, or reduces to practice Things that the employee acquires but doesn’t create themselves are not covered. Also, this clause appears to only apply to inventions, that is, things that are patentable. Other IP (e.g. copyright) is not captured.

Judges barring defendants from using social media

A New York Times article recently mentioned that a US immigration judge has prohibited a non-US-citizen from speaking on social media, apparently as a condition of release from detention. But the federal immigration judge Charles R. Conroy ruled this week that Ms. Sorokin was no longer such a threat — provided she wears an ankle bracelet. She will also be barred from using social media, including the accounts she already has. How is this ability to ban people from publishing in a particular place or kind of place to be squared with free speech rights? Is it: US law does not actually recognize or protect a right to free speech by non-citizens, so while this would be illegal to do to a citizen it is not illegal here. US law does not prevent the government from cutting deals with people where they "voluntarily" restrict their speech and it "voluntarily" stops locking them up when it might otherwise be allowed to. Or from then locking them up again if they go back on the deal. There's something in the judge's ruling that justifies this particular restriction on free speech in this particular case, such as it being reasonably necessary to protect against the person committing a crime. (This would make a lot more sense in, say, a libel case than an immigration case.) Or is it something else?

The NYT article implies that she has used social media in the past to get her victims to believe her fake back story. She is being released from detention, and the restriction on her using social media is not tied to her expressing a particular viewpoint. Courts have repeatedly held that the Government can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest ( U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 US 367 - Supreme Court 1968). One such compelling interest is the effective administration of criminal justice (U.S. v. Spilotro, 786 F. 2d 808 - Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit 1986). For instance, speech restrictions can be tied to the purpose of preventing a defendant from committing further crimes while released.

Does Florida bankruptcy law apply to second homes?

A New York couple filed for bankruptcy. In New York state, they have to surrender all their assets to the bankruptcy court except for $150,000 each of "exempt" assets. They own a "second" home in Florida worth about $250,000. If that was their primary residence, Florida law would cover their home to that amount (or more). But given that they lived in and filed for bankruptcy in New York, would the Florida home be part of the New York bankruptcy estate?

Yes, the second home will be part of the New York bankruptcy estate. Congress broadly defined property within the bankruptcy estate as all property, "wherever located and by whomever held," subject to limited exemptions. Florida's homestead exemption is among the broadest in the Unite dStates; the value of the property that can be protected is unlimited. See Florida Constitution, Article X, Section 5 . As such, I have broken down your question into two parts: May the debtors use the Florida homestead exemption for their Florida home even if they are domiciled in New York? If not, may the debtors use either the Federal or New York state homestead exemptions to protect their Florida home? Exemption Eligibility The debtors can choose between either the federal exemptions of section 522(d) or the exemptions available under New York state and nonbankruptcy federal law; the debtors may not choose the exemptions available under Florida state law. Section 552 of the Bankruptcy Code is the operative statute. To take advantage of a state's exemption scheme, the debtor must either: Be domiciled in the state for the 730 days immediately prior to filing its petition; or If the debtor has not been domiciled in a single state for such period, the state in which the debtor was domiciled for the 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day period (or for the longer portion of that 180 day period). 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)(A) : . . . any property that is exempt under Federal law . . . or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition to the place in which the debtor’s domicile has been located for the 730 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition or if the debtor’s domicile has not been located in a single State for such 730-day period, the place in which the debtor’s domicile was located for 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day period or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place; As a result, the debtor may only utilize either the Federal or New York homestead exemptions. Federal Homestead Exemption Section 522(d)(1) provides a homestead exemption in the amount of $22,975 in value for the debtor's residence. (1) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $ 22,975 in value, in real property or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, in a cooperative that owns property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, or in a burial plot for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor. (The linked statute says that the federal homestead exemption is capped at $15,000. But pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 104, the amount is adjusted every three years to account for changes in the cost of living. Effective April 1, 2013, the cap is $22,975). Essential to the right to a homestead exemption is designation and occupancy of the property as a residence. Residence and domicile are not necessarily the same thing. Courts seem to be split as to whether a debtor may hold multiple "residences" at the same time. For example, the court in In re Lawrence , 469 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) held: By choosing not to limit the residence qualified for exemption under § 522(d) to a principal or primary residence, Congress presumably intended to encompass a broader category than principal residences, namely any residence . . . . To sum up, on the date of their bankruptcy petition the [debtors] owned two residences, one in Massachusetts and one in Maine. They used them both. They were entitled to exempt either one, but only one, under § 522(d)(1). See also In re Demeter , 478 B.R. 281 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2012); In re Gandy , 327 B.R. 807 (Bankr. S.D.Tex. 2005). But the New Jersey Bankruptcy Court in In re Stoner , 487 B.R. 410 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2013) read the term "residence" in a manner "requiring some measure of permanence." I couldn't find any cases from New York discussing this issue, making it difficult to determine whether a New York bankruptcy court would allow the debtors to apply the federal homestead exemption to their Florida home. But given that the exemption is capped at only $22,975, it is unlikely to have a significant impact on the bankruptcy. New York Homestead Exemption The New York homestead exemption is more generous than the federal exemption. It provides exemptions capped between $75,000 to $150,000. However, it is limited to property located within New York and used as a primary residence. As such, the Florida property is not subject to the exemption. New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5206 : Property of one of the following types, not exceeding one hundred fifty thousand dollars for the counties of Kings, Queens, New York, Bronx, Richmond, Nassau, Suffolk, Rockland, Westchester and Putnam; one hundred twenty-five thousand dollars for the counties of Dutchess, Albany, Columbia, Orange, Saratoga and Ulster; and seventy-five thousand dollars for the remaining counties of the state in value above liens and encumbrances, owned and occupied as a principal residence, is exempt from application to the satisfaction of a money judgment, unless the judgment was recovered wholly for the purchase price thereof: a lot of land with a dwelling thereon, shares of stock in a cooperative apartment corporation, units of a condominium apartment, or a mobile home.

What does case law say about nonprofit Members' rights to campaign/free speech?

A Nonprofit organization (corporation) is formed on a Membership basis . That means Members elect a Board of Directors . The Members, naturally, need to be able to freely discuss the affairs of the organization (corporation) so they can discuss amongst themselves which directors to elect. The seated Board of Directors might have feelings about this, and might want to interfere . In support of this, the State (MI) has statute obliging the organization to give Members the tools to campaign. They "shall provide a reasonable way for Members to communicate regarding the affairs of the corporation". The organization has provided the member list. Instead the Board of Directors place absurd limitations on speech: "You can't talk about money, can't name individuals, can't disparage anyone or make implications, can't say X, Y, Z". These effectively gag the Members from having any meaningful communication. This defeats the purpose of the State law which guarantees right to communicate. The statute seems silent on whether Member speech is free. I need to find case law (any state will do) where the Board of Directors or managers tried to block free speech or access to the Member list, it went to verdict, and the judge made some sort of ruling on the question of either list access or speech limitations. I have seen several, but can no longer find them. Out-of-state cases are fine, since my state gives credence to out-of-state cases when local case law is thin. Would anyone have some leads?

Section 450.2304 paragraph (7) of the Michigan code provides that: A corporation may adopt rules of qualification and government of its members, including rules of admission to, retention of, and expulsion from membership, under its articles of incorporation or bylaws, if those rules are reasonable, germane to the purposes of the corporation, and equally enforced as to all members. That means that a membership organization may adopt reasonable rules and expel members for violating those rules. No definition of "reasonable" is given. Section 450.2487 provides that: Any shareholder or member of record of a corporation that is organized on a stock or membership basis, in person or by attorney or other agent, may during regular business hours inspect for any proper purpose the corporation's stock ledger, a list of its shareholders or members, and its other books and records, if the shareholder or member gives the corporation written demand describing with reasonable particularity the purpose of the inspection and the records the shareholder or member desires to inspect, and the records sought are directly connected with the purpose. As used in this subsection, "proper purpose" means a purpose that is reasonably related to a person's interest as a shareholder or member. A shareholder or member must deliver a demand under this subsection to the corporation at its registered office in this state or at its principal place of business. If an attorney or other agent is the person seeking to inspect the records, the demand must include a power of attorney or other writing that authorizes the attorney or other agent to act on behalf of the shareholder or member. If this demand is refused, it may be enforced by court action as described in later paragraphs of the section. If a member obtains contact information for the other members, then that member may communicate to them under the freedom of speech provided by the First amendment of the US Constitution, although in some cases an membership organization might make violations of its internal rules on such communication grounds for expulsion from membership. However, paragraph (2) is limited by paragraphs (7) and (8) which provide that: (7) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this act, the articles of incorporation, the bylaws, or a resolution of the board of directors may provide that the shareholders or members and attorneys or agents for shareholders or members do not have the right to inspect the corporation's stock ledger, lists of shareholder or members, lists of donors or donations, or its other books and records, if the incorporators, shareholders, members, or directors that approve a limitation under this subsection make a good faith determination that 1 or more of the following apply: (7) (a) Opening the stock ledger, lists of shareholder or members, lists of donors or donations, or its other books and records for inspection would impair the rights of privacy or free association of the shareholders or members. (7) (b) Opening the stock ledger, lists of shareholder or members, lists of donors or donations, or its other books and records for inspection would impair the lawful purposes of the corporation. (7) (c) Opening lists of donors or donations for inspection is not in the best interests of the corporation or its donors. (8) A corporation that limits inspection of lists of its shareholders or members under subsection (7) shall provide a reasonable way for shareholders or members to communicate with all other shareholders or members concerning the election of directors and other affairs of the corporation. A corporation described in this subsection may require a shareholder or member that wishes to communicate with other shareholders or members under this subsection to pay the reasonable costs to cover the cost of labor and materials and third-party charges incurred by the corporation in doing so. Paragraph 8 appears to contemplate an organization that is organized as a membership corporation requiring a member to send communications to other members through the organization It neither authorized not forbids the organization to place limits on what may be included in such communications. I find an unpublisahed case No. 257155 Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 2002-044667-CZ, in which BILTMORE PROPERTIES, INC. and Toll Brothers Inc were required to turn over balance sheets to condominium association members under Section 450.2487 A 2017 blog post from a law firm: "Responding To A Members Request To Review And Inspect Your Associations" says that there is no caselaw yet on how to apply the restrictions permitted under section 450.2487 and future court decisions may be need to construe the law and its interactions with the law governing condo associations. This post advises restricting access to "privileged" information such as an individual member's financial accounts, minutes of executive sessions, and advice from the association's attorneys, but makes no mention of simple membership lists. In the unpublished and unsigned case Vidolich v. Saline Northview Condominium Association , Court of Appeals of Michigan. No. 334579. The Court of Appeals wrote: "our courts have recognized a stockholder's common-law right to inspect corporate records for a proper purpose," noting that a proper purpose might include "raising doubts whether corporate affairs had been properly conducted by the directors or management" but would not include "requests to satisfy idle curiosity or aid a blackmailer" or "mere speculation of mismanagement." North Oakland Co Bd of Realtors v Realcomp, Inc , 226 Mich.App. 54, 58-59; 572 N.W.2d 240 (1997) (emphasis added). At its heart, the development of legal rights such as this one has always been for the purpose of providing people with tools to maintain order and decorum, not to provide people with swords with which to create chaos and harm. The N. OAK BD. OF REALTORS case, linked above, was brought under the very similar M.C.L. § 450.1487, which deals with stock corporations, but has much language identical to Section 450.2487. In that case, the court upheld access and wrote: Thus, a "proper purpose" is one that is reasonably related to the person's interest as a shareholder. Although no appellate court in Michigan has been called upon to interpret § 487 of the Business Corporation Act, M.C.L. § 450.1101 et seq.; M.S.A. § 21.200(101) et seq., our courts have recognized a stockholder's common-law right to inspect corporate records for a proper purpose. Woodworth v. Old Second Nat'l Bank , 154 Mich. 459, 465-466, 117 N.W. 893, 118 N.W. 581 (1908); People ex rel. Bishop v. Walker , 9 Mich. 328, 330 (1861); see also Guthrie v. Harkness , 199 U.S. 148, 26 S.Ct. 4, 50 L.Ed. 130 (1905). Under the common law, a shareholder stated a proper purpose for an inspection by raising doubts whether corporate affairs had been properly conducted by the directors or management, Woodworth , supra at 466, 117 N.W. 893, or by seeking election to the corporate board of directors, George v. Int'l Breweries, Inc. , 1 Mich.App. 129, 133, 134 N.W.2d 381 (1965). On the other hand, inspection requests to satisfy idle curiosity or aid a blackmailer were held not to be proper. Slay v. Polonia Publishing Co. , 249 Mich. 609, 613, 229 N.W. 434 (1930). Consistent with the common law in this state and the holdings of courts in other jurisdictions with similar statutes, we hold that a proper purpose for inspection of corporate records under § 487 is one that is in good faith, seeks information bearing upon protection of the shareholder's interest and that of other shareholders in the corporation, and is not contrary to the corporation's interests. ... Other citations of section 450.2487 that I have been able to find all deal with financial records, not membership lists, and add little to the above. None deal with what limits a corporation may place on member communication under paragraphs (7)and (8) of the section. Nor have I found cases on similar limitations under the laws of other states, but not having specific laws to search for citations of, i may well have missed relevant cases. But it seems not unlikely that this issue has not been directly dealt with by any appellate court in a published case which would be precedent or of persuasive authority in Michigan.

Police officer killed by a rooster, during an illegal cock fight

A Philippine police lieutenant was killed by a rooster, when he tried breaking up an illegal cock fight that is linked to the spread of Covid-19. Would the owner of the rooster be criminally liable for murder, even though he didn't do it himself, or would he only face criminal liability for the cock fighting? Siegel and Johnson's comments below mention intent, which, to me, seems a bit tricky: While the rooster did not intend to kill the police officer, it was armed with a blade, with the intent to kill the other rooster in the cock fight. So, it's an egregious attack, much more than just an accident, given that deadly weapons were involved.

The crimes of murder and homicide are defined under Philippine law in Art. 248 and Art. 249 of the Penal code , both of which reduce the act to the case where "Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another". Murder is distinguished by having certain attending circumstances, such as "with treachery; for money; by drowning; with evident premediation", none of which are applicable here. In the case of homicide, it is necessary that the accused killed the person without any justifying circumstance. The rooster killed the officer, no person did. For comparison, here are the homicide states of Washington State. Second degree homicide is defined as: A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when, with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of another person. A noticeable difference in the laws is that in Washington, "causing death" is the defining act, consistent with the definition of homicide as the killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or omission of another In the Philippines it is "killing another", not "causing the death of another". This document from the Dep't of Justice (the Criminal Code of the Philippines) states that as a general principle of Philippine law that Only intentional conduct is punishable. Negligent conduct is punishable only when specifically provided under this Code or other laws. Intent is therefore an implicit element of the crime, and because negligence is not included for homicide, a negligent killing is not a homicide. Given all of this, the law would not classify this as homicide, given the facts as reported and the improbability that anyone intended to cause a death. However: The offender shall be responsible for all the effects arising from the commission of illegal acts. The cock-fighting event appears to be presently illegal, there being a covid-related ban on cock-fighting (which is not generally illegal). I will assume that the event was in fact illegal, in the legal sense, though that is not guaranteed. Crimes that could be charged are (Art. 365) punishes the crime of imprudence and negligence: Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period or, with a lesser penalty (up to 6 months) for "simple imprudence". Since The Philippines is a civil law jurisdiction with a US case law veneer, it is hard to be certain, but it is likely that this is at least "simple imprudence".

Can Congress declare someone guilty of insurrection and bar them from standing for elections, without that being considered a bill of attainder?

A Q&A to a related question on Politics SE quoted the 14th Amendment of the Constitution that: No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. [...] The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. While that is true, it's also true that Congress cannot pass bills of attainder , declaring someone guilty of something and then punishing them. So can Congress itself just declare someone guilty of insurrection and bar them from standing in elections, without that being considered a bill of attainder? Or do they have to delegate the finding of fact (in re insurrection) to another body, e.g. to the judiciary? N.B. I'm aware that following a successful impeachment, Congress has declared some persons ineligible for office, e.g. judge Archbald in 1913 . So maybe Congress can actually issue that kind of finding of fact outside an impeachment... because barring someone from standing for office might not be considered a punishment. (I vaguely recall reading that whether a measure is or isn't considered a punishment is fairly central to whether something is or isn't a bill of attainder.)

So can Congress itself just declare someone guilty of insurrection and bar them from standing in elections, without that being considered a bill of attainder? No. Even if it isn't a bill of attainder, the Congress can't do that. Or do they have to delegate the finding of fact (in re insurrection) to another body, e.g. to the judiciary? The issue would be presented when someone ran for public office and their qualifications were challenged, and would be resolved by state and local election officials, subject to judicial review. If that was not done, Congress could nonetheless refuse to recognize a state certification of someone's election on these grounds.

On what grounds can Instagram contest the use of the domain name slutsofinstagram.com?

A Reddit user registered the domain name slutsofinstagram.com , and has created a kind of parody cover story ( Reddit ; Imgur ): Welcome to Slütsof In Stagrâm an online fantasy series about a Princess duck named Slütsof and her adventurous journey across the mystical lands of Stâgram. Instagram allegedly sent this user a letter ( image ) asking them to which alludes to the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). As a lay person, I cannot determine how the ACPA would apply in this specific case (if at all), and in particular it seems to fail the condition: ... has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark ... 15 U.S. Code § 1125 - False designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution forbidden Question : On what grounds can Instagram contest the use of the domain name slutsofinstagram.com? I found Trademarked name in domain name , but the answer there seems practical: they can just bully to get their way with expensive lawsuits. I'm interested in the theoretical here: if they have actual grounds.

The theoretical is that the domain slutsofinstagram.com does dilute or harm Instagram's mark because of the use of "Instagram" in the domain and because of the unwanted association of the parody story; that's the theory and "grounds" that Instagram would use in their lawsuit. Instagram would have to prove their theory of dilution or harm to the jury or judge, and convince either that the harm is not theoretical but real and financially damaging in order to win their case. The owners of slutsofinstagram.com would have to defend themselves and argue that they are not damaging Instagram's mark and their parody is a parody and is protected as such. Any actual court outcome is also theoretical. If Instagram won their case, one of the legal remedies could be the court ordering the owner of slutsofinstagram.com to transfer ownership of the domain to Instagram so they could simply park the domain and effectively take down the parody story. Or, the owner of slutsofinstagram.com could prevail because they argued the fact - and the court agreed - that the domain name and creative contents of the site is a parody and is protected speech and doesn't dilute Instagram's mark because any reasonable person could see that the site is a parody and not related to Instagram. In the US, a possible example of a parody not diluting a mark is L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987) , where Imitation may be the highest form of flattery, but plaintiff-appellee L.L. Bean, Inc., was neither flattered nor amused when High Society magazine published a prurient parody of Bean's famous catalog. The reality is that Instagram can contest the use of slutsofinstagram.com because they can; they have deep pockets and can take the owner of slutsofinstagram.com to court, like any other trademark holder can contest another's trademark. The owner of slutsofinstagram.com would have to defend themselves in court, or settle - possibly for monetary damages or the ownership of the domain or use of slutsofinstagram - and not go to court. It's possible that the SLAPP (Strategic lawsuit against public participation - Wikipedia) California law could help the plaintiff defend themselves against a deep pocket lawsuit designed to kill the parody site - as the suit would be "intended to censor, intimidate, and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defense until they abandon their criticism or opposition" - which could happen because Instagram is part of Facebook and is incorporated in California. But basically, in the legal world, one man's litigation bully is another man's trademark protection hero. This concerns the US. As always, your mileage may vary due to jurisdiction and national/international laws and agreements concerning trademarks.

Shoud a company send to customers of its clients notice when getting data about them under GDPR Article 14?

A SaaS company ( A ) provides services, (e.g. web hosting) for its clients, (e.g. web agency B ). The clients can create websites for their customers ( C ) and host them using the web hosting. Web agencies can also create child accounts for their clients in the hosting dashboard (user management). Child user accounts or hosted websites may contain personal data. According to GDPR Article 14, should A send notice about private data to C when B creates child account for C or hosts site of C ?

No, The SaaS company should strive to be a Data Processor for the web agency, and the web agency will likely want to be a Data Processor for its customers in turn. A Data Processor processes the personal data only as instructed by the Controller. The SaaS company should not be a Data Controller itself. Being a Data Processor requires a contract that fulfils the condition in Art 28 GDPR. It is the Data Controller's responsibility to provide transparent information to Data Subjects. However, some of the involved tasks can be outsourced to a Data Processor. If the SaaS company deals with customers directly, the company might be a Controller for some and a Processor for others, or possibly both but for different processing activities. This depends on whether the customer is a Data Controller, Data Subject, or both in this context. If the SaaS company receives data from third parties in its capacity as a Controller, then yes, it must inform the data subjects as required per Art 14. But the mere creation of an account would likely not mean that personal data was obtained from a third party. This ultimately depends on the details of the account creation process, though.

Should the client be informed every time when more personal data is requested under GDPR Article 13?

A SaaS company offers some services, which require registration. Its clients are notified about Terms of Service and Privacy Policy during the registration process. Should the company send to the client an email according to GDPR Article 13 after the registration? If later the client adds some new personal data to her account info (e.g. profile image), should the company again inform the client about obtained new personal data according to GDPR Article 13?

Art 13 GDPR is about information to be provided when data is collected directly from the data subject. This information can be provided directly during/before collection. It is not generally necessary or useful to send the data subject an email with this information. Usually, a SaaS website will provide the information under Art 13 as part of their privacy policy, and link it in easy to find places. Also consider the EDPB guidelines on transparency , which suggests a layered approach: in addition to a detailed privacy policy, summarize key information directly when the data is collected, e.g. next to an input form.

What is the legal significance of explicitly designating an ingredient as a fruit oil?

A South African food item lists an ingredient as olive (fruit) oil. Another South African food item lists an ingredient as non-hydrogenated palm (fruit) oil. I’ve never seen such designations on ingredient listings and assume that it has some legal significance to specify that it is a fruit oil (as in an oil of the olive fruit, rather than the seed) in South African law.

This may be historical with a quasi-legal underpinning. Apparently, regulations that might have banned palm kernel oil were repealed, but they would not have banned palm fruit oil. It is most likely there to inform consumers that these are the fruit oils, and not palm kernel or olive seed oil (the latter would not be generally used in food, the former is almost universally what people outside Africa mean when they speak of "palm oil"). Palm kernel oil is regulated in the US in a way that palm fruit oil is not, and I can't find any evidence that olive seed oil is legal in food, in the US.

Intellectual property and storage medium

A State owned hard drive contains intellectual property belonging to an individual. Can the State remove that hard drive from the premises of the individual without his consent? EDIT : The property was proprietary data given to the researcher in the course of his research There may be other copies around, but I believe that is more or less immaterial to the question The individual was not given the opportunity to remove the IP from the drive, and even if he was, forensic tools are available to recover that material. Followup Question : Does this mean that the owner of the hard drive can walk off with the intellectual property of the user of that drive? Does hardware ownership 'trump' the ownership of material on the hard drive? Followup Question : Does the State have the right to move an author's intellectual property from one medium to a different, possibly less secure, medium without the consent of the Author? Or, to put it another way, does the author have any rights with regard to the disposition of his intellectual property?

Assuming that the owner of the hard drive (irrespective of if that owner is a government or private person) is legally entitled to take possession of the hard drive then they can do so subject to the fact that they generally cannot commit a crime to do so (e.g. trespass or damage to property). If the person in possession of the hard drive refuses to hand it over, the owner can seek a court order to seize it - this may allow trespass etc. Any IP on the hard drive that doesn't belong to the owner of the drive is still protected by all relevant IP laws. For example, the owner of the drive cannot copy copyright material without permission unless it is in accordance with fair use/fair dealing rules.

Can you be convicted of both first- and second-degree murder?

A TV show reported a case where a man killed two teenagers and was convicted of both two counts of first degree murder and two counts of second degree murder. Is this possible? I know that you can be accused of both first degree and second degree murder for killing the same person, but I thought the jury would have to pick the strongest accusation that they believe is proven beyond reasonable doubt (or declare the accused not guilty), so for each killing the outcome would be exactly one of "first degree murder", "second degree murder", and "not guilty" – not a double conviction for the same crime.

Ordinarily, you can be convicted of more than one crime for the same actions, but the sentences are served concurrently, rather than consecutively. So, for example, if the first degree murder but not the second degree murder charges were reversed on appeal (e.g. because the first degree murder charges were for "felony murder" and the appellate court found that the evidence showing the related felony should have been suppressed at trial due to an unlawful search), the second degree murder charges would remain in place.

Is a written promise relating to the “workmanship” of software and hardware components create an express warranty under Magnusson-Moss or U.C.C.?

A U.S. auto manufacturer promises in writing that its vehicles will, for the life of their vehicles, receive free hydrogen at its charging stations. Bob buys such a vehicle. Turns out the vehicle communicates with the hydrogen wells, and commands them wirelessly or otherwise that it is entitled to initiate charging without a payment method setup associated with the VIN number or other ID of the vehicle. Turns out the vehicle, once coupled with a hydrogen well, runs computer executable instructions stored on the vehicle which will block the vehicle to open its tank for hydrogen to enter unless a payment method is added and then authenticated with the manufacturer wirelessly. The promise, although undisclosed in such detail, related to computer executable instructions which coupled with the vehicle which coupled with a hydrogen well, causes the tank of the vehicle to open and allow the pooring/blowing of hydrogen inside the vehicle. (It also communicates with the well to open ordinarily) The written promise was related to the workmanship of the vehicle in connection with its software and hardware components. Was a warranty created? Was a warranty created even if the manufacturer failed to clearly and in readily understood language disclose what it was going to do in case of malfunction or defect with the vehicle relating to its ability to cause a hydrogen well to open and start filling up? Is this a warranty?

A U.S. auto manufacturer promises in writing that its vehicles will, for the life of their vehicles, receive free hydrogen at its charging stations. . . . The written promise was related to the workmanship of the vehicle in connection with its software and hardware components. Was a warranty created? It sounds like there were two separate promises. A promise to provide free hydrogen (which is a contractual obligation, although not a warranty) which amounts to prepayment of hydrogen, and a warranty that the vehicle had adequate workmanship in software and hardware components. Was a warranty created even if the manufacturer failed to clearly and in readily understood language disclose what it was going to do in case of malfunction or defect with the vehicle relating to its ability to cause a hydrogen well to open and start filling up? Whether this is a breach of the agreement to provide free hydrogen, or a breach of the warranty agreement that the vehicle's recharging feature would work properly, or both, taken together it is a breach of contract by the automobile manufacturer. There were agreements, and taken as a whole, those agreements as reasonably interpreted in light of the intent of the parties and construing against the drafter of the agreements, were breached. Therefore, you should be entitled to the damages for breach of contract as measured by the benefit of the bargain test applicable to contracts. Most likely, repair of the defeat at the cost of the manufacturer and reimbursement of money you had to spend on hydrogen due to the defect.

Tax Implication of COVID-19 Induced Remote Employment

A U.S. company has instructed it's employees to work from home for a period extending 4 weeks following city and state guidelines as a necessary precaution in response to COVID-19. Subsequently company workers have set up makeshift offices at home in. What if anything at all about the "makeshift office" is tax deductible for the 2020 tax season ( -next year).

You will probably not be able to take a tax deduction for this. The IRS requires that the space that you use for your home office is that the portion of your house is exclusively and regularly used for business purposes. It also must be the principle place of your business. Some employees can use the home-office deduction, but there are tests there too: Your business use must be for the convenience of your employer You cannot rent any portion of your home to your employer You have to meet the above (exclusivity/regularly) criteria It's unlikely that you will be able to deduct a home office expense as a tax deduction for the 2020 tax year (2019 tax year has already passed) due to quarantine measures unless you continue to be quarantined for the remainder of the year (or a significant portion of it).

In which United States District Court should a permanent resident file a lawsuit against the USCIS?

A US permanent resident has recently moved to western VA. VA has two United States District Courts : Western and Eastern . The permanent resident would like to file a lawsuit against the USCIS. One of the defendants is the head of the USCIS Field Office at Norfolk, VA , which is now responsible for the permanent resident's case, based on his zip code. So, the permanent resident resides in one district (the Western district), but his rights were violated by the USCIS field office which is in another district (the Eastern district). The permanent resident wants to file a lawsuit according to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) : (b) Request for hearing before district court If there is a failure to make a determination under section 1446 of this title before the end of the 120-day period after the date on which the examination is conducted under such section, the applicant may apply to the United States district court for the district in which the applicant resides for a hearing on the matter. Such court has jurisdiction over the matter and may either determine the matter or remand the matter, with appropriate instructions, to the Service to determine the matter. So, the law specifies that the permanent resident should file his lawsuit in the United States district court for the district in which the applicant resides, i.e. the Western District . However, it would be reasonable to say that the actions or inactions that violated the permanent resident's rights occurred in the USCIS Norfolk Field Office , which is in the Eastern District. A quote from the US District Court for the Western District of Virginia's PRO SE HANDBOOK : 3. VENUE: Is the Western District of Virginia the appropriate federal court in which to file my lawsuit? If you decide that there is jurisdiction to bring your claim in a federal court, you must then determine in which federal court to file. In order to decide a case, a court must have some logical relationship either to the litigants or to the subject matter of the dispute; this is called venue. There are two United States District Courts in Virginia: the Eastern District and the Western District. Generally, you may only file an action in the Western District of Virginia if the actions or inactions that you believe violated your rights occurred within the boundaries of this District. According to the above resource, the permanent resident should file his lawsuit in the United States district court for the district in which his rights were violated, i.e. the Eastern District . In which district should the permanent resident file his lawsuit then?

Generally, you may only file an action in the Western District of Virginia if the actions or inactions that you believe violated your rights occurred within the boundaries of this District. When a lawyer uses the word "generally," it typically signals the existence of exceptions. The specific statutory provision of 8 USC 1447(b) supersedes the general rule expressed in the handbook. I am not a lawyer, so I hope that the lawyers on this site will correct me if I am wrong, but I believe that this provision establishes "subject matter jurisdiction," and the statute explicitly grants that jurisdiction to the court for the district in which the permanent resident resides. The "application for a hearing" should be submitted to the court for the western district. If I were you, I would try to find out whether "applying for a hearing" is in fact the same as filling a suit; it sounds to me like they may be different. In the latter case, you submit a "complaint," which makes you a "plaintiff." The use of "apply" and "hearing" suggests that different procedural rules may be relevant. If that is the case, it supports the conclusion that the general rule expressed in the handbook does not apply, since the talk of rights violation also implies a complaint and a potential trial rather than an application and a hearing. After writing the previous paragraph, I found a few discussions online that make it clear that "apply for a hearing" does mean "file a suit," but it's still not clear to me who the defendant would be. Another open question is when the 120-day period begins. It seems that different courts have different opinions on the matter.

Are slogans protected under trademark?

A US-based wine company created a slogan. Later it found a Canadian wine company had already been using the same slogan. Could the U.S. company's used violate copyright or trademark?

Slogans, titles, and other short phrases are generally not subject to copyright protection. They can be subject to trademark protection. Trademark protection is limited in several ways. It is limited by industry. In this case, according to the question, the two companies are marketing the same sort of product, so the industry limitation would not apply. (A wine slogan might not be protected against use to promote a soda, and surely would not be protected against use to promote a computer brand.) In addition, trademark protection is limited to the geographic market area in which it is used. A slogan or trademark used to promote a grocery chain in upstate New York would not be protected against the use of the same slogan in northern California, for example. Separate countries are usually separate market areas, and in addition, have different trademark laws and trademark registration procedures. (Some countries require registration for any trademark protection to apply. The US does not, although it gives stronger protections to registered trademarks.) (Trademark protection is also limited to use in trade or commerce, but here both companies seem to be using the slogan in trade.) If the US company used its slogan to sell wine in Canada, it might be subject to a lawsuit in Canada under Canadian law for infringing the Canadian company's mark. If the Canadian company had been selling wine using the slogan in the US, then it might have grounds for a US suit, under US law, for trademark infringement against the US company. If the US company was the fist to use the slogan in the US and the Canadian company later started using the slogan in the US, then the US company might have grounds for a suit, as it would have the US rights to that slogan in the wine business. However, if the earlier Canadian use had included advertising that went across the border into the US, that might well reduce the US company's rights, especially if it was relying on use in trade alone, rather than relying on having registered the mark. If the US company sold and advertised only in the US, and the Canadian company sold and advertised only in Canada, then neither would seem to have valid grounds for a trademark suit against the other.

Virginia employer terminated employee and wants signing bonus returned

A Virginia employee was terminated within 1 year of hiring because the on-site customer felt he was "too negative". Offer Letter: Along with this offer, you are receiving a $10,000.00 signing bonus, which includes $3,000.00 to be paid directly to you in your first company paycheck and the remaining $7,000.00 to be paid to you at 30 days of employment with xxxxx. A 1−year commitment required or the bonus will be repaid in full to xxxxx. Can the employer legally keep the employee's last check and send the employee a bill for the remainder ?

Virginia employer terminated employee and wants signing bonus returned Can the employer legally keep his last check and send the employee a bill for the remainder ? No, unless (1) the employee resigned and (2) his resignation does not amount to constructive termination . The employer may withhold the remaining $7,000 only if the employee did not meet the condition of " 30 days of employment with xxxxx ". Absent any language to the contrary, the requirement of " 1-year commitment " is to be construed as the consideration expected from the employee (namely, " not to quit ") in exchange for the bonus. Termination by the employer is self-defeating in the sense the employer himself made it impossible for the employee to fulfill the consideration that was expected from the employee. Therefore, the employer forfeits his entitlement to reimbursement. In the event that the employee met the condition of " 30 days of employment with xxxxx ", he would be entitled to the remaining $7,000 as well. Virginia labor law has no provision for treble damages (this is in response to one of the comments , per the OP's suggestion). The statutory provisions are only a civil penalty no greater than $1,000 for each violation, a portion of attorney's fees, and "all wages due, plus interest at an annual rate of eight percent". See Code of Virginia at § 40.1-29 A.2, F, and G . Item E of that statute determines which violations are misdemeanors and which are felonies. This statute would be applicable only if (1) the employer disavows the employee's entitlement to the remaining $7,000, and/or (2) the employer withholds a portion of the employee's earned compensation in an attempt to recover the initial payment of $3,000.

What standard of evidence is used for a subpoena of documents in a criminal case? How does it compare to probable cause?

A Website I use received subpoenas from the US Department of Justice for data related to certain specified usernames. What standard of evidence must that subpoena have met and how does it compare to the probable cause required for a search warrant?

Probable cause is not required to issue a subpoena. But, a recipient of a subpoena (or a party to a case in which a subpoena is issued, or a person whose records a subpoenaed), may file a motion to quash the subpoena in the court that issued it, before the information is disclosed pursuant to the subpoena. A claim that the subpoenaed material is privileged is always a legitimate reason to quash a subpoena. A subpoena can also be quashed on the grounds that the materials sought are unrelated to the matter for which it is issued, or that it is unduly burdensome in a manner unrelated to a legitimate interest in obtaining the information sought (this list of objections is not exhaustive). You can see an example of a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum from a federal grand jury, together with the subpoena itself attached to the motion at the end of the linked file as an exhibit, at this link . The federal court rule governing subpoenas in federal criminal cases is Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 . In federal court civil cases, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 applies. Short of actually quashing the subpoena, the court issuing it could also modify the obligation by imposing a protective order on the materials to be disclosed (e.g. trade secrets or private financial information). This would prevent the materials disclosed from being shared with people other than the recipient. Incidentally, the penalty for failing to respond to a subpoena is for the person to whom it is directed to hold the person in contempt of court, punishable by incarceration or a fine (often a fixed amount per day). Often, if testimony is part of what is required, a warrant for the arrest of the person who fails to appear is summarily issued by the court. Footnote regarding terminology Strictly speaking, the word "subpoena" unmodified, refers to a subpoena directing the person to whom it is addressed to testify under oath at a certain place and time, sometimes a grand jury, sometimes a trial in a court, sometimes a deposition, sometimes an arbitration, and sometimes an interview with a government official. When a subpoena is asking for the turnover of records or things or data it is strictly speaking called a "subpoena duces tecum" (from the Latin duces tecum , meaning "you shall bring with you"). Historically, in response to the subpoena duces tecum, the custodian of the records would appear personally at a deposition or grand jury proceeding or trial with the records or things and would testify under oath briefly at that time to authenticate them. These days, the federal rules of evidence and most state rules of evidence provide that the custodian of records can sign an affidavit, or a declaration (i.e. a statement made under penalty of perjury which is not notarized), regarding the authenticity of the records (and their status as "business records" or "public records" where appropriate). Then, this affidavit or declaration is delivered along with the records by a courier or mail, in lieu of actually providing live testimony regarding the authenticity and business records status of the records. Delivery of documents by courier or mail or electronically, accompanied by an affidavit or declaration is what is usually done these days, except in exceptional cases where the authenticity and/or business records status of the records is genuinely in dispute and complicated in some way. For example, in person testimony of the custodian of records might be required in a case where there are allegations of forgery of documents or that digital files were hacked.

Partial Payment: ramifications under English & Welsh law?

A and B enter into a contract. They agree that A has to effect payment by bank transfer to B's account. A transfers only a part of the agreed sum. According to Cutter v Powell , which establishes the entire obligation rule , A is not discharged (in part) from his obligation under the contract. What can B do, if he wants to have the whole sum, but wants to avoid any disadvantages - of contractual or procedural nature - of keeping the partial payment (a bird in the hand is better than two in the bush)?

B can sue A for the balance, in the meantime B can keep the money that A has already paid.

What are the legal implications of a common-law marriage followed by a formal marriage?

A and B have been in a common law marriage for many years. A and C then apply for and receive a marriage license. When A and C marry, what is the legal status of each marriage?

A and B have been in a common law marriage for many years. A and C then apply for and receive a marriage license. When A and C marry, what is the legal status of each marriage? I assume in answering all of these questions that C did not know that A was in a valid common law marriage to B at the time of C's marriage to A, although the answers below may implicitly shed some light on how the questions would be resolved if C was aware of this fact. The Marriage Of A and C Is Invalid, The Marriage Of A and B Is In Force The only way to end a common law marriage that is valid in the recognizing state (i.e. either the same one where it is entered into or another way as the case may be; see below for when a common law marriage or foreign marriage must be recognized as valid) apart from a Utah common law marriage, is by the same death or divorce that would terminate a valid marriage entered into with a marriage license. A valid marriage is not established between A and C. No marriage is established between A and C, even if A and C are married in a state that does not recognize common law marriage, and even if both A and C were not aware that a common law marriage was formed between A and B because A and C did not know that the state where A and B were living at the time that the common law marriage was formed recognized common law marriage. This rule is subject to an important burden of proof rule. If there is a facially valid marriage certificate in evidence, the burden of proof is on the person seeking to show that this marriage is void to show that any prior marriage did not terminate by death or divorce prior to the new marriage certificate being issued. This rule flows from the fact that there is no comprehensive index of divorces entered in the United States and the fact that a valid divorce can be entered by consent of the parties in a jurisdiction other than the place where the parties were domiciled at the time of the purported divorce. In practice, this can be used to circumvent the general rule even when the general rule actually applies, especially when a putative marriage existed for many years and the common law marriage was long ago and the couple was separated shortly after it formed (often with the former common law spouse or both spouses being dead at the time of the litigation). But, this is only a burden of proof rule and can be overcome with affirmative proof of a lack of divorce (e.g. by the testimony of A and/or B in this question). The question of when a foreign divorce is recognized by a U.S. state as valid is a complicated one and beyond the scope of this question. It is particularly complicated in countries with non-Western legal systems such as Islamic law, in which some divorces are effected non-judicially. Where Are Common Law Marriages Valid Most states recognized common law marriage at some point in their history, or prior to becoming states when they were territories or parts of other countries. The states that currently recognize common law marriage or recently did so, if the marriage was formed in the first place in that state are as follows : Alabama (if created before January 1, 2017) Colorado (subject to restrictions for minors but allowing same sex marriages even if common law marriage between them was not legally recognized at the time of the common law marriage) District of Columbia Georgia (if created before January 1, 1997) Idaho (if created before January 1, 1996) Iowa Kansas Montana New Hampshire recognizes domestic common law marriage for purposes of probate only (there is a three year cohabitation requirement) although it recognizes valid common law marriages entered into outside the state. Ohio (if created before October 10, 1991) Oklahoma Pennsylvania (if created before January 1, 2005) Rhode Island South Carolina Texas Utah recognizes only common law marriages that have been validated in a judicial proceeding. A common law marriage may be validated by a court of law up to one year after the alleged marriage has been terminated (effectively allowing for "common law divorce" in Utah only). Prior to statehood, Utah allowed polygamous marriage (at least de facto ) and this issue greatly delayed its admission as a U.S. state, but it does not now recognize such marriages as valid and all people who entered into those marriages are now dead. The exact test for a common law marriage formation varies by state. The most common test for formation of a common law marriage is an understanding of the couple between each other that they are married, the couple holding themselves out to the public that they are married (especially in joint tax returns and in health insurance applications), and in some states, either cohabitation or consummation of the marriage. There is a body of law governing what connect a couple must have to a state in order for their relationship to be subject to that state's common law marriage rules. If the couple has a shared domicile in the state that is generally sufficient, but this is not always the bare minimum level of connection necessary to establish that a state's common law marriage laws will apply to a couple that is physically present in that state. For example, it is customary in many U.S. subcultures, for example, to hold a wedding in the state of the bride's parents' domicile even if neither the bride nor the groom are domiciled in that state. But, a ceremonial wedding held in a state that recognizes common law marriage without the benefit of a marriage license would almost always be valid in all U.S. states (if otherwise valid), even if neither member of the couple resided there. I am not aware of any U.S. state except New Hampshire where mere cohabitation and/or coparenting for a certain number of years establishes a common law marriage, even though law enforcement and journalists often describe couples in those circumstances as being common law married couples. Functionally, common law marriage usually comes up in one of two fact patterns. First, it validates ceremonial marriages conducted with most formalities of a fully valid legal marriage license marriage with a formal wedding that have some technical defect in formalities; these are easy cases. Second, it establishes marital rights between cohabiting couples (often with shared children) who live together and act more or less like marriage couples who never have a decisive moment that is a wedding or marriage ceremony but end up considering themselves to be a married couple and deal with the administrative state and in their social lives accordingly. In both cases, common law marriage is usually a doctrine invoked generally avoid harsh consequences for wives who have sacrificed economically in reliance on a domestic couple relationship who lack meaningful legal rights do to a lack of marriage formalities. N.B. Australia has a concept called de facto relationships that provide certain legal rights after more than two years of cohabitation for a limited period of time after the relationship ceases to exist in fact. These are not common law marriages in the senes of American law. When Must A State Recognize A Marriage Valid Where Entered Into At The Time Entered Into There is really only one exception to the rule that a common law marriage (or any other form of marriage) which was valid where entered into (even outside the United States) at the time it was entered into (even if that state no longer recognizes common law marriage) is valid in every state. The exception is that a state does not have to recognize marriages which are barred by public policy in the state where the second marriage takes place (for reasons other than a lack of a marriage license), but not in the original state. Basically, the marriages which a state does not have to recognize are: (1) marriages valid where entered into that were polygamous when entered into (generally outside the U.S.), (2) marriages where a spouse was a minor too young to marry at the time of the marriage by the recognizing state's standards if the common law marriage was not reaffirmed by conduct after both spouses were of age (Colorado recognizes common law marriages only when both spouses were at least eighteen years old at the time of the marriage or at some time afterwards in the continued common law marriage, and the validity of this unique limitation has not been legally tested), (3) a marriage entered into without the voluntary consent of both spouses that was valid where entered into (generally outside the U.S.), or (4) a marriage where the spouses were too closely related (although many states will recognize first cousin marriage that was valid where entered into even when first cousin marriage is not recognized in that state). This public policy exception also previously applied to (5) same sex marriages valid where entered into but not in the recognizing state, and (6) to interracial marriages valid where entered into but void in the recognizing state. But, these two public policy reasons to deny recognition of a marriage entered into elsewhere have now been held to be unconstitutional in the United States. Paternity Implications The father of a child born while A and B were married, prior to the purported marriage of A and C would be presumed to be the father among A and B, even if this paternity was not noted on the birth certificate of the child because vital statistics bureau officials were not alerted to the existence of the common law marriage. But, the rule in a majority of jurisdictions is that contrary to the general rule, the presumption that the father of a child born while A and C were purportedly married and at least one of them believed themselves to be married, was the person among A and C who did not give birth to the child, without other proof of paternity, would remain effective even after C learns that A and C are not married. Thus, a child of A and C would be legitimate, even though the marriage between A and C was void. Tenancy By Entirety Implications States with tenancy by the entirety are: Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. In those states, title to a residency owned by a husband and wife that would otherwise be a joint tenancy with right of survivorship would instead be a tenancy by entirety. A tenancy by entirety property is only subject to being used to satisfy judgments against both a husband and wife, rather than only against one of them individually and functions a bit like an unlimited homestead exemption as to money judgments against one spouse only. Any property purported held in tenancy by entirety between A and C would actually be held in joint tenancy with right of survivorship by operation of law and the claims of a creditor against A or C but not both of them could be enforced against that residence in the one half interest of the person against whom the creditor had a claim. Criminal Law Implications A would guilty of the crimes of bigamy in most states (or under the Uniform Code of Military Justice if A is in the U.S. armed services which might also prosecute A for adultery), although a minority of them might recognize an intent requirement that would absolve A of criminal liability if A didn't realize that A and B were living in a common law marriage state. A may or may not be guilty of the crime of perjury in connection with the marriage application depending upon whether A was aware that A and B were in a common law marriage. Restitution might be awarded in a criminal proceeding resulting in A's conviction, in favor of B or C but probably limited to the legal fees incurred to establish the invalidity of the marriage to C. The odds of a prosecutor pursuing a criminal case under these facts if B complained are probably about 50-50, given that the facts are quite blatant. Often both B and C would ask the prosecutor not to bring charges because both of them have an economic interest in A being able to make money while not in prison so their economic rights can be respected, and often, but not always, a prosecutor would respect those requests. Of course, depending upon the state where the marriage license was issued and the time that the common law marriage of A and B was discovered by a complaining witness to the police or prosecutor's office, the statute of limitations for one or more of these criminal offenses may have run by the time the prosecutor is considering bringing criminal charges. Statutes of limitation for state criminal charges vary greatly from state to state. Rights Of B Against A As A Spouse B has the full rights of a spouse to support during the marriage, and, if either A or B seeks a divorce, to a property division and alimony and if there are joint children to child support and parental rights, with respect to A. While every state has no fault divorce, in some states, fault is considered in property division and alimony and spousal support other than support for children during marriage, and this would work to the disadvantage of A. Rights Of C In States Without A Putative Spouse Doctrine Against A In states without a putative spouse doctrine, C has only the rights of an unmarried person with respect to A (e.g. rights arising from co-ownership and rights to child support and parental rights with respect to their joint children). This said, it is conceivable in these circumstances that C might have a right to recover prejudice in C's economic position as a result of a purported marriage to A under a restitution doctrine, or under a common law fraud theory. Rights Of B In States With An Alienation Of Affections Tort Against C In a few states (including South Dakota, Mississippi, and North Carolina) B would have a right to sue C if C continued to carry on the purported marriage after C learned of the common law marriage of A to B, in an alienation of affections tort. The alienation of affections tort also exists in Hawaii, Illinois and Utah, but subject to greater limitations: Illinois only permits actual economic damages to be recovered in alienation of affection actions. Thus, it prohibits non-economic damages like pain and suffering, and punitive damages, in these suits. Hawaii would only allow B to sue C if C persistently overcame A's free will to establish the relationship with A (e.g. in a relationship that would constitute illegal sexual harassment in employment or an abuse of a fiduciary relationship by C) and B was without marital fault at the time. In Utah, B could sue C only if "full responsibility for the breakdown of a marriage can be attributed solely to the conduct" of C (with the typical case being one where C was a priest or psychotherapist for A). No states have both an alienation of affections tort and a formally recognized putative spouse doctrine. Rights Of C Against A In States With A Putative Spouse Doctrine And For Social Security Benefit Purposes In Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Texas, and Washington state and for purposes of Social Security benefits, C has the legal rights of a putative spouse from A for the period from the date of the putative marriage to C until C learns that A was in a common law marriage to B. The rights of a putative spouse are essentially the rights that a legal spouse would have had for a marriage of that duration reduced, to the extent necessary to respect the rights of B as a true spouse. The relative rights of B and C would be balanced by the Court in an equitable manner in the Court's discretion, likely, in part, by imposing greater burdens on A than a single spouse alone would be entitled to in a divorce. Note also that Colorado, Montana and Texas are the only U.S. states to have both common law marriage and to formally recognize putative spouse status. Bankruptcy Priority Consideration If the claims from B and C against A render A insolvent, and A files for bankruptcy, the marital claims of B will generally have priority as bankruptcy claims over the tort and putative spouse and contractual claims (if any) of C. But, child support claims of both B and C will have equal priority to the marital claims for alimony of B and will be superior to the property division claims of B. Probate Considerations If the common law marriage of A to B is discovered by C only after the death of A, then B has all of the rights of a surviving spouse (some of which are higher priority than creditors claims and some of which are lower priority than creditors claims) while C will have no spousal rights in the probate estate. Any putative spouse rights or tort or contract claim or property ownership claim that C has against A at that time can be asserted in the probate case as a creditor or co-owner of probate property. If A left a Will leaving A's estate in whole or in part to C, C will have rights an unrelated will devisee in the estate to the extent that there is anything left over after B's minimum marital rights and the claims of all creditors have been paid. The rights of a surviving spouse at death differ considerable from state to state. If A left assets by virtue of non-probate transfers to C (e.g. joint tenancy and/or beneficiary designations attached to particular assets), generally C will be entitled to those assets, but the assets that C receives at A's death from A may be invaded by B to the extent that the probate estate assets of A's estate are insufficient to meet A's obligations to B at death as A's surviving spouse. Joint Tax Return Considerations If A and C filed as married filing jointly on their taxes, their tax returns would have to be amended for all such tax years for which the statute of limitations had not yet run (usually three year from the due date of that return) as single or head of household taxpayers with separate returns for each of them. Usually, this would result in additional income tax being due from A and C combined. The application of prior tax payments made and prior tax refunds received would be allocated equitably by an appropriate court if necessary because the parties could not agree. Gift and Estate Tax Considerations For estate tax purposes, B will receive any unused gift and estate exemption of A at A's death. B will receive any assets received from A free of gift, estate and income taxes. Transfers at death to C from A will potentially be subject to estate taxation, and gifts made during life to C from A will potentially be subject to gift taxation. But, unless the sum of A's gifts and inheritances given to all people other than B during A's lifetime exceeded about $11.5 million, no gift or estate tax will actually be due at A's death. Retirement Account Taxation If A died with C as a beneficiary of a retirement account of A, or if C died with A as a beneficiary of a retirement account of C, the surviving person of A and C would not be able to roll over the proceeds tax free into a retirement account of the survivor. Instead, the survivor of A or C who was the beneficiary of the retirement account of the decedent among A or C would have to take taxable distributions either over the life expectancy of the surviving person, or over five years, as the survivor elected. Note On Authority I am writing from memory and my summary notes from when I was a professor of estate planning and later a continuing education teacher for lawyers. I could find all of the statutory or case law authority to back it up, but it would take another two or three hours that I don't have to devote to this answer.

Does a tenancy swap reset the start of tenancy date

A and B rented a house from private landlord L, on a 3 year term with an option to break with 2 months notice after 12 months. After 16 months, B moved out. A agreed with the landlord on a swap to add C on all the original terms including the same (now 20 months away) end date. The new tenancy agreement also notes that the tenants accept the inventory from A's original start date. Circumstances changed such that both need to move city, timed such that A and C will both want to leave 10 months after the swap. They gave 3 months notice to this effect. The landlord's agents responded with the claim that because a new tenancy agreement was signed between A, C and L after the swap, they cannot break the tenancy until 12 months after the swap. This surprised C and astonished A, who will have been in the house for 26 months by that point. Both had understood a swap to imply that C would have effectively the same set of rights and obligations as B, had B continued in the tenancy and A would also continue as before. Does such a change of tenant generally entail restarting the clock on contractual or statuatory obligations in an AST, and do A and C have any recourse other than paying off the last 2 months or negotiating fresh exit terms from a position of relative weakness?

Maybe It really depends on what you agreed to. As you describe it, either: The original lease remained in place with the rights and obligations of B being transferred to C. If so, then there is no new no break period. The original lease with A & B was terminated by agreement and a new lease with A & C was created. If so, then there will be a new no break period. From the info you provided it's impossible to tell which. Also, please don't provide additional info because it's likely that the exact situation is ambiguous and picking that apart is legal advice for which you need to hire a lawyer.

Is it legal for a bank to discriminate against someone by the services they offer based upon their marital status?

A bank is charging me this kind of fee: The fee is $0 if you have over a certain amount, or if you have $500 going in through a direct deposit each month. I don't meet these requirements, so I don't qualify for the $0 fee. (Paraphrased from clarifying comment ) Is this discrimination based on marital status? If so, is that legal?

Your bank is not discriminating against you. Your reasons for not having the required amount of funds pass thru your account has nothing to do with your marital status. In general, it's problematic to make a chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination. For example. Your argument is analogous to the following. My boss fired me for being late to work. But I was late to work because my child woke up late and missed the school bus; so I had to drive her to school. Therefore, my boss fired me for having children. That type of chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination just doesn't hold water. It is non sequitur and a requires a leap of logic .

What references are available for the GDPR legitimate interests balancing test?

A basis for the processing of personally identifiable data (PII) is legitimate interest. According to the UK ICO data controllers who rely on this basis should conduct a legitimate interests assessment. A part of this is the balancing test, which involves: You need to weigh up all the factors identified during your LIA for and against the processing, and decide whether you still think your interests should take priority over any risk to individuals. This is not a mathematical exercise and there is an element of subjectivity involved, but you should be as objective as possible. In many cases this balance test will involve comparing things that appear inherently incomparable. For example many websites, including all major UK newspapers, this includes processing data for targeted advertisements. The Daily Mail has 467 vendors that rely on legitimate interest to technically deliver ads or content, including Huawei. Presumably they have performed a legitimate interests assessment that balanced a users desire to not have their browsing behaviour monitored, analysed and monentised against the desire of Huawei to monitor and analyse their browsing behaviour and the Mail Group to monetise it. These seem inherently incomparable, but I have no doubt that Viscount Rothermere thinks his interests should take priority over any risk to the sites users. What can one refer to when conducting a legitimate interests assessment? The legislation does not seem to provide any objective measure that can be applied to this balancing of desires and the ICO guidance above appears to leave it to which interests the data controller thinks should take priority. As I understand it there is no requirement for data controllers to make this assessment public so we cannot base it on what others do. Have there been any court cases where the assessment was considered and perhaps made public? Is there any more detailed guidance from other countries that could guide this decision?

The guidance on this subject is somewhat slim. Ultimately, disagreement about a legitimate interest balancing test will have to be decided by a court. The GDPR allows processing activities if processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. (Art 6(1)(f) GDPR) Details are given in Recital 47, which suggests that the balancing test must consider “the reasonable expectations of data subjects based on their relationship with the controller”: 1 The legitimate interests of a controller, including those of a controller to which the personal data may be disclosed, or of a third party, may provide a legal basis for processing, provided that the interests or the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject are not overriding, taking into consideration the reasonable expectations of data subjects based on their relationship with the controller. 2 Such legitimate interest could exist for example where there is a relevant and appropriate relationship between the data subject and the controller in situations such as where the data subject is a client or in the service of the controller. 3 At any rate the existence of a legitimate interest would need careful assessment including whether a data subject can reasonably expect at the time and in the context of the collection of the personal data that processing for that purpose may take place. 4 The interests and fundamental rights of the data subject could in particular override the interest of the data controller where personal data are processed in circumstances where data subjects do not reasonably expect further processing. 5 […]. 6 The processing of personal data strictly necessary for the purposes of preventing fraud also constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. 7 The processing of personal data for direct marketing purposes may be regarded as carried out for a legitimate interest. The EDPB's predecessor WP29 issued an opinion on legitimate interests in 2014 (document WP-217, PDF link ). While this relates to the old Data Protection Directive rather than to the GDPR, the general concepts should be transferable. For the UK, the ICO has issued the guidance linked in the question. It contains an explanation of a three-part test developed from case law (purpose – necessity – balancing), provides various examples, and suggests a number of questions that can be used to start a legitimate interest balancing test. For example, to assess the reasonable expectations of the data subject, the following prompts are given : You need to consider whether people will reasonably expect you to use their data in this way in the particular circumstances. You should consider all relevant factors, including: Do you have an existing relationship with the individual? If so, what is the nature of that relationship? How have you used their data in the past? Did you collect data directly from the individual? What did you tell individuals at the time? If you obtained the data from a third party, what did they tell individuals about reuse of the data by third parties for other purposes? How long ago was the data collected? Are there any changes in technology or other context since that time that would affect current expectations? Is your intended purpose and method obvious or widely understood? Are you intending to do anything new or innovative? Do you have any actual evidence about expectations, eg from market research, focus groups or other forms of consultation? Are there any other factors in the particular circumstances that mean they would or would not expect the processing? This is an objective test. You do not have to show that every individual does in fact expect you to use their data in this way. Instead, you have to show that a reasonable person would expect the processing in light of the particular circumstances. The ICO guidance is, to my knowledge, the best and most up to date publicly available resource on this matter. You are right to be frustrated about the current use of legitimate interests in typical consent management frameworks for tracking or advertising purposes. There is the perverse but technically correct argument that since advertising and tracking is so common, that a data subject must reasonably expect it on typical websites. On the other hand, there is no “relevant and appropriate relationship between the data subject and the controller” where the data controllers are hundreds of third parties in the depths of the advertising, tracking, and data brokering industries. My assumption is that the current state of internet advertising through the use of large advertising networks is not GDPR compliant. The legitimate interests claimed in consent management tools are often extremely spurious. To be clear, direct marketing and showing ads is probably perfectly fine, but sharing the information with an indeterminate number of third parties is probably not. While such sharing is necessary given the current state of advertising networks, the sharing is not fundamentally necessary for advertising. The individual publishers are not necessarily to blame. Sure, they are data controllers and are at least jointly responsible for whatever happens on their websites. But the abuse of legitimate interests for internet advertising purposes is more of a systemic problem. I would lay a lot of the blame on the Internet Advertising Bureau (IAB) which standardizes data models and vendor lists for consent management tools. These lists are sometimes copied by publishers in a false sense of security. The GDPR has no explicit right to demand access to internal compliance documents such as a legitimate interest analysis. Supervisory authorities are clearly authorized to access such documents during an investigations. Data subject could instead invoke the Art 5(2) accountability principle: The controller shall be responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance with, paragraph 1 (‘accountability’). The paragraph 1 of Art 5 contains, among other principles, the lawfulness principle. Relying on a legitimate interest per Art 6(1)(f) can be lawful, so that demonstrating compliance could require disclosure of the legitimate interest analysis. This interpretation seems to be commonly shared by supervisory authorities and is occasionally implied by EDPB guidelines, but there has yet to be official guidance or a clear court judgement on this matter.

Who is responsible for getting the tree removed?

A big storm passed through our area and a bunch of trees fell. This one tree is kind of in a weird situation. The tree is technically on my neighbors property and it fell towards our house. However, the tree didn't completely fall and is being held up by another tree. If the other tree fails to hold it up, the main tree will hit our house. Who is responsible for removing the tree and would the removal be covered under insurance?

I've gone through this enough times in Pennsylvania to paraphrase the law in this state: If a tree falls it's nobody's fault, unless the tree's owner was given credible advance notice that the tree posed an exceptional risk of failure, in which case the owner is liable for damage it causes if it fails. (For purposes of liability, a tree is "owned" by the owner of the ground where the trunk of the tree enters earth.) In the scenario you describe: A tree owned by your neighbor has not yet caused significant damage, but has been so structurally compromised that it poses an exceptional risk to your property. The standard course of action in such a circumstance is to promptly and formally notify the owner of that fact, and for the owner to remedy the risk. (In this case, it sounds like the only practical remedy is removal of the tree.) As a practical matter, the owner might be able to get an insurer to cover the cost of removal before it does more damage. But that's their problem. As a matter of expedience, you might also notify your insurer, since if the tree does end up causing significant damage to your property, you could subrogate your claim through your insurer. As a further matter of expedience: The township may have codes requiring landowners to address hazardous trees. Thus, if the owner does not promptly remedy the peril you could also notify the township.

What does "cause" mean in this law?

A bill was introduced in the Iowa legislature which gives an instruction to the Board of Regents (which governs seven specific institutions ). Relevant background information is that people registered to vote in Iowa can register "no party", or else Democrat / Republican (Libertarian and Green are apparently "non-party political affiliations"); this registration is a public record. The intent of the law is to regulate hiring or professors and instructors in said institutions so that the number of Democrats and the number of Republicans in faculty positions cannot diverge by more than 10%. Specifically, it says A person shall not be hired as a professor or instructor member of the faculty at such an institution if the person’s political party affiliation on the date of hire would cause the percentage of the faculty belonging to one political party to exceed by ten percent the percentage of the faculty belonging to the other political party, on the date established by the board for determining the political party composition of the faculty. (There is a provision to the effect that the the commissioner of elections shall turn over registration records annually so that the count can be done, though the mechanism of counting is unspecified. Given the reality of parties, only registered Democrats and Republicans are considered so independent and 3rd party voters aren't counted: it strictly compares the number of Democrats vs. Republicans, thus the number of D faculty cannot exceed the number of R faculty by more than 10%, or vice versa). I am interested in how the courts could interpret the language "would cause" in this law. For the sake of argument (which means, I'm not saying it's true, I'm saying we have to make some factual assumptions in order to interpret the language), I will assume that across the seven institutions, jointly and severally, the number of registered Democrats holding faculty positions in such institutions currently exceeds the number of registered Republicans by more than 10%. The ordinary meaning of "would cause X" is that a state of affairs X does not exist but if Y happens (and it's not just a coincidence – I'm avoiding 3K years of philosophical debate on "cause"), then X will be the case. The question is then whether, because that threshold is already exceeded (by assumption), no hiring causes the threshold to be exceeded, and therefore there would be no legal impediment to hiring an Iowa-registered Democrat to a faculty position. To be clear: this is a bill, not a law; I do not claim it has any chance of being passed; I am not asking if it would be held to be unconstitutional on other grounds. This is just about case law and how courts interpret "would cause" or other language describing a change of state.

On proper English construction "would cause" means that the state after the event is different from the state before the event as a result of that event. This is a really, really badly drafted clause. First 10% of what? The number of people in the faculty, the number of people in the larger party or the number of people in the smaller party. A faculty 20 democrats, 23 republicans and 0 independents can hire a republican if we go by the first 2 criteria but not if we go with the third. It is likely that a court would go with the first interpretation but both of the others are arguable. Consider a small faculty of 6 people, even split between democrats and republicans - it can hire as many independents as it likes but it can't hire either a democrat or a republican because that would shift the balance from 50:50 to 57:43: a 14% difference. Now consider a large faculty with 62 republicans and 38 democrats (i.e. currently exceeding 10%) - it can hire whoever it likes because hiring either a republican or a democrat would not "cause" the amount to be exceeded because it already is. Now, a court would probably look beyond the badly written language of the statute to the legislatures intent so that hiring a democrat would be OK as it moved towards the balance being sought but hiring a republican is not. Also, the ability of the faculty to count or not count independent's at their discretion is open to abuse. Counting independents makes it easier to hire a person of either affiliation since it dilutes the percentage. Not counting them makes it easier to exclude a member of the larger party.

Is it legal to put a billboard on residential property?

A billboard is put on top of a person's roof or on his vacant land. It is zoned residential. This person lives on a main road and the billboard is visible to cars travelling on it. He hasn't received permits or licenses to do so. Is this legal on a federal level according to U.S. laws? Is this legal in all states or do some states prohibit this? What about county and local laws? Do some counties and cities have ordinances that prohibit residential billboards? Or is a person allowed to construct signs on their own personal property as it is their right to do so with their land as they please? If this is unlawful, what are some of the potential consequences that the landowner could face? Would they just be fines and how large might those fines be? Should this person be researching all local county and city ordinances to see if this is legal in his area, or should this be considered fine anywhere within the USA? Does it matter what size the billboard is? For instance, does a 7'x7' billboard carry less lawful risk than a 30'x30' billboard?

Laws regarding billboards and advertising are very local in nature and are typically handled under city/county zoning ordinances. Start with calling your local county zoning office. They will tell you the city/county laws regarding your particular residential zoning overlay, if city or state laws supersede county laws, and recent changes in law that might matter and if the sign might be grandfathered. There can be different types of "residential" zoning and the city/county will tell you this; some allow limited commercial use and signage, and some don't. The housing subdivision you are in may also have covenants; you'll know if there are covenants if you received information when you bought property in that subdivision. 1,2,3,4,8: These depend on local laws. 5: Very generally speaking, land owners typically do not have absolute rights to land usage; that is the rationale behind zoning laws (among others, like health and public safety, building codes, national defense, etc.), because some types of land usage impact adjacent users and the general public. 6, 7: Potential consequences include fines and requirements to take the billboard down, but again, those possibilities are very localized. The size of the billboard could come into play; again, this will be very localized. Some signage may be grandfathered, too. In order for the city/county to look at the situation and possibly take action, you may have to file a written protest with the zoning office; they would help with the process. You may have to present your case at a public city council or county commission meeting, but that basically involves saying such and such is happening and you want the city/county attorney to look into relevant laws. It would help your case if you had a list of names of others in the area who are also unhappy about the billboard. I doubt you will need legal representation to lodge a protest, but if it comes to that, Google for free legal aid in your area. If the city/county attorney won't take action (which is possible, as this involves prosecutorial discretion as to if the city/county wants to press the issue with the landowner), you can look for free legal aid in your area and consider your options.

Maiden name for an unmarried adopted woman

A birth certificate document (legal) asks for mom's maiden name; mom was adopted and never married, and her last name has changed. Which last name is her maiden name? The name before or after the change?

I would simply write "N/A". Maiden name is the name a married woman had before she got married so it is not applicable to her.

When sharing posts on social media (i.e. copying a post made by someone else) do you need the permission of the author?

A bit of a follow up to Is it legal to copy pictures found on social media and upload them again? When a person takes a picture or writes some text, they are by default the copyright owner. Many social media platforms (such as Facebook) have the option to share content created by other people. Would you need the permission of the owner before sharing or is there something in the TOS that allows for this without their permission?

Would you need the permission of the owner before sharing or is there something in the TOS that allows for this without their permission? Yes, you need permission and there is something in the TOS whereby the poster gives that permission under a licence, the terms of which are detailed in the TOS.

Abuse of power / official capacity / misuse of authority etc financial damage minimum?

A bit of context: Recently the Romanian Justice Ministry signed a executive order to change the penal code decriminalizing "abuse of power" if the damage is less than 200000 RON (Aprox: 50.000 USD / 45000 EURO) everything less than that is subject of labor law. Is it normal to have minimum financial damage value for such an act to become felony ? Only thing I could find is Texas code where it becomes a state felony above 2.500 USD (and I'm not sure about that even, because it says "value of thing misused" which for me doesn't equate with damage) I'm not sure if abuse of power is the correct term (it's a literal translation from Romanian) so here is the definition: The act of civil servant, who, in the exercise of his duties, knowingly, does not act or acts incorrectly and thereby causing harm legal interests of a person Some examples: Policeman giving you I fine without real cause because he doesn't like you, your race or gender City council member preferentially selecting streets to be repaired based on his own house location Mayor hiring his own nephew and allowing him not work at all for the job he was hired to do Taking or giving bribe is another infraction, different from this one, at least in Romanian Penal Code. I appreciate any references to similar articles in any penal code, or even suggestions for google keywords.

Colorado has what is called a " gift ban " which is a prohibition against giving anything of value to any state or local public official as a gift, whether or not there is any attempt to influence the official in his official capacity (subject to certain exceptions, for example, for family members giving normal family gifts). The threshold for a gift to qualify under the gift ban is $50 (which makes $49.99 a popular price at expensive restaurants near the capital). This was adjusted for inflation in 2011 and in 2015, but inflation has been very low in the last ten years, so it would only be slightly more than $50 now.

In what circumstances are police able to stop the traffic for a convoy?

A bit of context: Yesterday I was near Oxford Street, London, near to a T junction that has traffic lights. A few police officers on motorbikes, using whistles (not sirens), stopped oncoming traffic and allowed two Range Rovers through even though the traffic lights were red. Therefore, what circumstances are police able to use there powers to stop traffic for a convoy?

The power stop the traffic is at s.163 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 : (1) A person driving a mechanically propelled vehicle on a road must stop the vehicle on being required to do so by a constable in uniform or a traffic officer . (These riders were probably from the Metropolitan Police Special Escort Group )

What can be done regarding gathering possessions from a rented student house where someone is unable to visit due to bullying?

A bit of strange circumstance: I have already looked online on various Housing charities and legal forums, but I haven't been able to get an approach that meets the specific circumstances as this issue is quite sensitive. During the past academic year a friend has not been able to stay in the house they are paying rent on due to the consistent breaking of covid rules by other tenants and bullying. My friend stayed with another friend for a while but has now returned home to complete the academic year. They have a typical student type agreement with the landlord which is coming to an end by the end of the academic year. As it stands my friend has all their belongings still in the house and is mentally not able to face going to get them due to the other tenants, or able to communicate with the other tenants for the same reasons. My friend has approached the letting agent, explained the above in greater detail, and asked them to speak to the other tenants to arrange a time where the house would be vacant to gather the belongings (possibly over the Easter break), so far the letting agent has simply replied that it hasn't been possible. What we are trying to find out is: What are the lettings agent's (or landlord's) responsibilities to a situation like this? Can my friend ask for additional time at the end of the agreement to empty their things? If the letting agent refuses to help what options does my friend have? Given they are not the lead tenant how do they go about getting any deposit remaining back? For clarity my friend is a British citizen living in the UK, in case of any regional variations to possible laws.

The agent/landlord responsibility is to ensure that the residents have "quiet enjoyment" of the property during the period it is let. As long as your friend has access to the flat he has that. He can ask, but the agent/landlord have no obligation to provide it. Could your friend appoint someone else to go and get their property? There is no reason why he has to do it in person. He should provide this person with a signed letter of authority (just "I, Joseph Bloggs, hereby authorise John Doe to collect my belongings from 123 Cherry Tree Crescent on my behalf", signed and dated) and also send a copy to the agent. Your friend must have a contract with somebody. If he paid a deposit then it should have been kept in a proper deposit protection scheme , and he should have paperwork to that effect. If that wasn't done, then he can sue the person he has the contract with for (in effect) punitive damages in addition to getting his deposit back. You say your friend was "not the lead tenant", so it sounds like one of the tenants was sub-letting, but its not clear; it may be that this "lead tenant" was just acting as a point of contact for stuff like rent collection. Your friend should have some kind of written tenancy agreement; he can sue the person or company named named on that. If the tenancy was a verbal contract then he can sue the person he handed the deposit to.

What is Justice?

A blindfolded woman holding out an equal-arm scale commonly illustrates Lady Justice. However, this is merely a characterization Justice. In Book I of Plato’s Republic, Thrasymachus claims that “the just [justice] is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger.” Socratic dialogue exposes Thrasymachus' ignorance as he finally cedes that he does not know what the just is, nor whether it is a virtue or whether a just man is happy or unhappy. Many jurisdictions actually mandate that their prosecutors are not to seek prosecution, rather they are to seek Justice. Art. 2.01. DUTIES OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS of the TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, CHAPTER 2. GENERAL DUTIES OF OFFICERS states: It shall be the primary duty of all prosecuting attorneys, including any special prosecutors, not to convict, but to see that justice is done. So, can you Law experts point me to an actual definition of Justice? What is Justice? Surely, this should be easy but I simply can't find the documentation. What is Justice? Please reference/cite the Statutes/Code (of any jurisdiction).

No From https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Justice "justice" is the systematized administration of punishment and reward. Further to this, one can say that justice excludes randomness. Justice is whatever society decides is the correct way to reward or punish its members for their actions. For example, in a society without slavery, justice includes the payment of wages for work. However, in a society with slavery justice involves the obligation on slaves to work without pay. Your example of "an eye for an eye" was justice in ancient Judea. In Anglo-Saxon England taking an eye required payment of a wergild to the victim. In modern Western democracies it usually involves the concept of damages - returning the person as far as possible to the position they were in before they lost their eye; this would involve the cost of medical treatment and compensation. If the loss was as the result of a crime then justice also requires punishment by the state. Fairness or equity are not necessarily parts of justice except to the extent that they eliminate arbitrariness.

What is the “prayer” in a claim?

A blog refers to certain things not having been pleaded/specified in the “prayer”. What does this refer to?

the Legal Dictionary includes this definition: the specific request for judgment, relief and/or damages at the conclusion of a complaint or petition.

What provision of the CPR requires any parties who might possibly be claimants to an action to be made defendants if they are not?

A blog site mentions a provision requiring all parties who might be a party to a claim to be listed as defendants if they are not participating as claimants, but I cannot find it again now that I want to. What provision of the civil procedure rules is this, what is the logic of it, and how does it actually work in practice?

Civil Procedure Rule 19.3 provides Provisions applicable where two or more persons are jointly entitled to a remedy : (1) Where a claimant claims a remedy to which some other person is jointly entitled with him, all persons jointly entitled to the remedy must be parties unless the court orders otherwise. (2) If any person does not agree to be a claimant, he must be made a defendant, unless the court orders otherwise. (3) This rule does not apply in probate proceedings. My reading is that it is a technical device to deal with circumstances where a number of people are severally jointly entitled to a remedy or redress but not all wish to make a claim for some reason or another. Imagine the simplistic scenario (but hopefully not too simplistic that it loses its meaning) where Dave the defendant destroys an asset jointly and severally owned by Alice, Bob and Carol thus causing a loss to all three. Carol does not wish to be a party to the claim so she becomes a co-defendant next to Dave, but she remains a joint and several owner - for now anyway. If Alice's and Bob's claim is successful one potential outcome is that an order is made to award Carol's "share" ownership of the asset jointly and severally over to Alice and Bob - in effect removing Carol from the equation. Dave is then ordered to pay Alice and Bob damages. One example of joint ownership is joint tenants who... ...have equal rights to the whole property – neither one [of you] has a specific “share” in the property

Can content from others be monetised?

A book author, who normally writes his or her content through many experimentations. Can I produce a content (video/webinar or others) based on the book and claim money for that content ? What does law normally say about it?

Can I produce a content ... based on the book and claim money for that content ? That depends on what exactly is meant by "based on" You could create your own content discussing the book, or the ideas in the book. That would not infringe the copyright on the source book in any country that I know of. That is, copyright would not make this unlawful or requiem the source author's permission. You could post such content anywhere what will let you, and "monetize" it -- that is, allow ads placed alongside it for which you get money. Doing all that would be legal in any country. However, if you convert the book, or part of it, to some mother format such as a video or webinar, using the words of the book author for much of the content, that would probably be an infringement of copyright. Such a new work "based on " a per-existing work is called a derivative work To make a derivative work requires the permission of the copyright owner (often the author) of the original work. If one does not get permission, simply making the derivative work is copyright infringement. Posting it (or distributing it in another way) would be a further infringement. That is true in every country that I know of. Profiting by such distribution (such as by monetizing it) will increase the seriousness of that infringement, and quite likely increase the damages that the owner could get in a suit. In addition, YouTube and similar platforms have rules against monetization in such cases, and could take action based on a complaint from the copyright owner even without a lawsuit being filed. The only way that such a thing might be permissable is if it fit an exception to copyright . These are different in different countries. In the US the key exception is fair use . In the UK and several other Commonwealth Countries, it is fair dealing . In other countries different exceptions apply. Basing a video or the like on a book, while using extensive passages from the book is not likely to be fair use under US law, although the details will matter. It is also not likely to fit under fair dealing, although again details will matter. I am not aware of any exception in any country that would cover the situation described in the question, but I do not know the copyright laws of all countries. Also, note that the owner could potentially sue in any country where the derivative work was distributed, in which case that country's law would apply. I repeat, creating a video or other work which presents the ideas from the book, giving proper credit, without using the words of the book, or closely paraphrasing the book (that is mere superficial sentence by sentence rewriting) will not cause a copyright problem, and could be monetized. Otherwise this probably cannot be done lawfully. By the way, that the book is created "through many experimentations" will not matter. Each version of the book is protected by copyright. It does not matter if the author wrote the book all at once or through many revisions.

What are the responsabilities about cited text after original licensor confesses illegal license?

A book is published containing cited text from an article licensed under some free license like CC-BY-SA. With all requirements of such license fulfilled. Later on the "author" of the article confesses that it was not original work and did not in fact have the right to grant licenses for the article. What are the responsabilities of the book's author and publisher? Is it a copyright infringement to continue publishing it unmodified claiming that any damage is caused by the author of the article and not the book's author whom acted in good faith? Otherwise, is it a copyright infringement to reject acting on such revelation until proof is provided about the illegality of the cited article? If the author choses to keep the cited text, is there any obligation to actively investigate the license status? Note that there is no doubt that the identities of the article's author and the one claiming it was a false license are the same. There is doubt about the veracity of his words though since he must have lied at least once, when he falsely granted a license or when he falsely confessed.

The author of the book has no right to use the text from the article unless permisison has been granted by to holder of the copyright in that article. Since it was taken from a source now known to be infringing, and the original source is not known, it may not legitimately be used until the true author comes forward and grants permission, unless the use would fall under fair use (in the US) or some simialr fair dealing concept (in those countries where that applies). Of course, the author of the book will suffer no legal penalty unless and until after the true author does come forward and files suit. But the book author could hardly claim 'innocent infringement". The book author is on notice that text has been used with no valid license or grant of permission. It is the book author's responsibility not to use other people's work unless it is in the public domain or permission has been granted in some way. Also, a book publisher would be jointly liable in such a case, and might choose to withdraw the book from publication unless some suitable correction is made.

Can a Contract supersede public domain/copyright

A book published in 1875 is in the public domain. A scan of it possibly being copyrightable in certain jurisdictions by "sweat of the brow" logic is not copyrightable in every jurisdiction. But if there was a simple contract written and agreed to, that stated that the person being given a PDF or JPEG copy of the 1875 book was being given these files to do with what they wished, with the caveat being they couldn't reproduce them in whole or substantial part, or otherwise proliferate the scans to others (whether for free or profit, whether citing the scanning source or otherwise)... Would that contract be able to stand up in a court of law (namely US), that while the images are of a book in the public domain, and not copyrightable by "sweat of the brow" and thus outside of copyright entirely, and in theory one could do with them whatever one wanted...if there was a contract whereby one person agreed NOT to exercise the right of public domain protection, is that valid?

Sort of A copyright suit would fail because, as you say, there is no copyright. However, a suit for breach of contract would likely succeed. You promised not to do something and then you did it. That is a clear breach of the contract you entered and would entitle the other party to sue for damages. Admittedly, such damages are likely to be nominal at best because no real loss has been suffered but the suit would probably succeed.

When an author sells the underlying copyright to a third party, where does the publisher now send the royalties?

A book publishing contract typically starts with an author who owns a copyright and licenses it to a publisher for the term of the copyright. The publisher (or the literary agent) sends royalty checks to the author. (I'm using royalties as a stand-in here for all the various obligations the publisher typically owes under a contract.) Here's the wrinkle: Suppose the author, while alive, transfers the underlying copyright to a third party. Where does the publisher send the royalty check? To the author, or to the new copyright owner? Another way of asking the question: Does the publisher's contractual obligation flow to the individual person (the author) who signed the publishing contract, or does it flow to the owner of the copyright, whoever that may be? If the first is true, then a separate transfer of contractual obligations would presumably be needed to vest the third party with all rights. But if the second is true, then the shift of royalties (obligations) would be automatic. (A related question: In the normal case, the author still owns the copyright when he dies, at which point the heirs succeed to the author's rights under the publishing contract. No problem. But if the copyright ownership has been transferred to a third party during author's lifetime, does that third party have any claim to the royalties going forward?) Geographically, this question pertains to the U.S. (but it would be interesting to hear if other jurisdictions have different approaches).

Any obligation to pay royalties comes from the agreement between the publisher and the copyright holder. In a particular agreement, "the Author" is defined as the specific person, and the royalties clause says that "During the legal period of copyright Publisher shall pay to the Author...". Whether or not Author retains copyright (merely grants a non-exclusive license) or transfers copyright to Publisher is specified in the agreement. If (per the hypothetical) Author has the right to transfer copyright i.e. has not transferred copyright to the Publisher, this does not extinguish the Publisher's original obligation to pay royalties – unless that is what the copyright agreement says (I've never seen such a clause, but who knows). Change the Royalties clause to read "shall pay the owner of the copyright", then you get a different result.

Theft of a winning lottery ticket

A bought a lottery ticket for $1, and then B stole it from him. Later, it turns out to be a winning ticket for $100 million dollars. If it is beyond reasonable doubt that B stole the ticket (e.g. B admits to stealing it), did B steal $1 or $100 million dollars from A — or some other amount?

I am just a foreign patent attorney who is studying common law to pass the California Bar Exam, but I will present my personal view. (I cannot guarantee the validity of my theory) There is an equitable theory called Constructive Trust. If it is established, the victim is entitled to benefit of any increase in value of defendant's (thief) property, meaning in this example victim (plaintiff) can recover $100 million. In order to assert CT, the following must be met: Wrongful appropriation; Here, D stole lottery ticket. Met. D has title; Here, D has title to $100 million. Met. P can trace his property to D's property; P can trace from P's $1 lottery ticket to its possession by D and collection by D of $100 million. Met. Unjust enrichment by D; D was enriched by stealing P's property (the lottery ticket). Met. Thus, it is highly possible that a court will order D to hold the property ($100 million) in constructive trust for P. This means, in plain language, that P will recover $100 million.

Is it proper for a venue to refuse entry to “single gentlemen” after a certain time of day as a matter of policy?

A bouncer to a bar in an English urban centre claims that it is the establishment’s standing policy not to allow entry for lone male visitors who are not with another person after a certain hour in the evening due to “past issues that have happened” with men who are visiting alone. After being asked for clarification another bouncer wandered over and chimed into the conversation claiming that it in fact had something to do with the council’s liquor licensing policy based on their venue’s traffic and size. They were unmistakably clear that the same rule did not apply to single women, as they had not had the same types of issues with single ladies visiting the venue alone previously as they had with single male visitors in the evenings. My question is, how is this not textbook sex discrimination that would fall afoul of anti discrimination rules? Or is it? And if it is, how do they ever get away with maintaining this type of rule as a business?

This is unlawful sex discrimination In fact, its incredibly close to the example given on this website: A nightclub allows women in for free but you have to pay because you’re a man. This is unlawful discrimination because of your sex. How do they get away with it? Did you complain or report them? No? That’s how.

Must one accept an offer to fix a defect before suing for damages

A building contractor was hired to do certain work. The contract stipulated that the contractor would be paid in full once the work is successfully inspected by the city building compliance inspector. The work was inspected, the contractor got paid. Shortly thereafter a defect was found (non-compliance to building code that the city inspector should have noticed, but did not). The contractor acknowledges existence of the defect, and the fact that they intentionally created it, but disputes the seriousness of the defect, deferring to successful inspection. The contractor offers to fix the defect. However, based on the fact that contractor intentionally hid the defect in the first place, and based on other interactions with the contractor, the client believes it unlikely that the defect will be fixed right. Question: The client prefers not to expose their property to the risk of shoddy work, and instead wants to hire another contractor to fix the problem. It is expected that the original contractor will refuse to pay the client for the cost of the repair done by a third party. In that case, is building owner likely to be successful if they sue the original contractor for the cost of repair, even though they declined that contractor's offer to fix the defect? The jurisdiction is Pennsylvania.

Must one accept an offer to fix a defect before suing for damages Not in the circumstances you describe. However, the client is entitled to recover only the damages caused by the contractor. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts speaks of relief " [on] terms as justice requires ", or " to the extent that justice requires ". The contractor's "intentional" defect and concealment thereof indicates that he violated the [contract law] covenant of good faith and fair dealing . Accordingly, contract law recognizes client's right not to further trust the contractor despite the latter's offer of repair. The unspecified interactions you mention might reinforce this aspect of the client's legal position. That being said, the contractor will most likely allege or try to prove that reimbursing you for work done by a third-party subjects him to excessive expenses (that is, greater expenses than "justice requires"). Therefore, the client should ponder which option is less of a hassle in and/or outside a court.

Misleading sign on a bus claiming it is zero emissions when it is 100% diesel powered, what law?

A bus company in my town are misleadingly labelling their new hybrid buses as zero emission and electric when they are in fact 100% diesel powered and have normal levels of emissions. As an asthmatic who suffers serious negative health effects from exposure to air pollution I feel the bus company has a duty to label them correctly. I would like to force the bus company to change the signs, what law does this come under? Also, I am not a customer of the bus company but someone who is affected negatively by the emissions. (I contacted Advertising Standards but it is not relevent as the advertising is on the product itself)

Here is a web page detailing some guidance from the UK Government regarding making green claims on products. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/make-a-green-claim 6.1 Trading Standards Use Trading Standards for advice on how to deal with complaints. Enforces consumer protection legislation and can advise you on how to deal with complaints. Phone the Citizens Advice consumer helpline on 03454 040506 or find your local Trading Standards office. In Northern Ireland the enforcement body is the Trading Standards Service of the Department for the Economy. Relevant legislation Before making green claims, you should check if the law requires you to state or publish environmental information about your product. You should check the following legislation: EU Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD) The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (CPRs) The Business Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008 (BPRs) The Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002

What legal actions can we take for website that doesn't remove PII upon requests?

A business directory listing website scraped old data for their listings. They use random contact information, personally identifiable information (PII), logos/banners to falsely represent those business listings and individuals. That directory listing website presents itself as a self submission service but those listings are listed without owners permissions and valid contact information. Simply, that directory listing website is just to generate impressions for ads revenue. The contact info stated on their website is invalid. What legal actions can an individual take to have the listing that contains PII to be removed from such directory website? Does the use of random banners/logos to misrepresent those listings have any copyright infringement issues? -- Added Info --- Based on a search, the directory website should be hosted at Deutschland. It scraped data from all over the world. It has a very huge database of domains(active and expired) but most of the information is invalid. It looks more like a bogus directory website than anything. The last edit of privacy policy was in early 2018 in which the operation is different from what it claims. The listed contact information is invalid too. Are there anything to be done in this scenario?

england-and-wales What legal actions can an individual take to have the listing that contains PII to be removed from such directory website? You can take action under the UK GDPR . Assumptions: The processing falls within the territorial scope in Article 3 . The data falls within the definition of "personal data" under Article 4(1) . The controller doesn't have any of the six lawful bases for processing the personal data under Article 6(1) . In that case you have the right to require the controller to erase the data under Article 17 . Article 12 contains details of how controllers must handle such requests. The request would most likely be made under Article 17(1)(d) i.e. that the controller never had a lawful basis to process the data in the first place. Alternatives include Article 17(1)(a) (the controller had a lawful basis but the processing is no longer necessary under that basis) or Article 17(1)(b) (the only lawful basis was consent and you are withdrawing your consent). Under Article 12(3) the following deadlines apply for the controller to action your request: The controller must always action it without undue delay . Even if the controller can justify a delay, there is an upper time limit of 1 month. That can be extended to 2 months for complex requests provided that you are notified within 1 month. The clock can be paused under Article 12(6) if the controller has reasonable doubts about your identity and requests further information from you. After the applicable deadline has passed, you have two options: Complain to the regulator under Article 77 . In the UK the regulator is the ICO and you can make a complaint here . Under Article 58 , the ICO can, among other powers, order the controller to erase the data. It can also impose a fine of up to £17,500,000 or 4% of annual turnover under Article 83(5) . Complaining to the ICO is often preferred as it is free and without risk to the complainant. Seek an injunction in the courts under Article 79 . That is done by applying to the County Court for a compliance order under Sections 167 and 180(1)(a) of the Data Protection Act 2018. If you go down this route you will have to pay court fees which you may not recover if you lose. You may also risk paying the other party's costs. Very similar rules apply to the EU. The main difference is that you need to look at the EU GDPR instead of the UK GDPR.

Can you retroactively pierce the corporate veil?

A business injures a customer. The customer sues and seeks to pierce the corporate veil and hold the business owner personally liable. The customer is able to present evidence of misconduct satsifying the state's test for piercing the corporate veil, but only based on actions that occured after the injury. In other words, the business was being operated up to the time of the injury, but the owner began mismanaging it some time later. Can the customer still hold the owner personally liable? I'm looking for cases addressing this question.

There are several concepts that are very closely related: piercing the corporate veil, the alter ego doctrine, and fraudulent transfer laws. Lots of conduct that does not qualify for piercing the corporate veil, or the alter ego doctrine, can still be used to hold the owner liable for a fraudulent transfer. Usually, if the owner transfers an asset from the company (even something intangible, like business prospects) without substantially equivalent value being paid in exchange, or if the owner takes actions calculated to make the entity debtor affirmatively hinder a creditor or conceal assets, there is a fraudulent transfer and the transferred asset can be recovered by the entity's creditors. Paying bona fide valid insider debts before paying third-party creditors can also constitute a fraudulent transfer that can be recovered. The remedies available against the business owner personally would also depend upon the precise nature of the misconduct. Keep in mind that in an action for a tort, like negligence causing personal injury or professional malpractice, anyone who participated in the negligence that caused the personal injury has personal liability, notwithstanding the fact that this person was acting in their official capacity for the company while doing so. So, the details of who was involved in causing the injury to the customer matter. In a small closely held limited liability company, the owners is often personally involved in tortious conduct. For example, suppose that a small closely held company makes a defective product and sells it to a customer who is injured by the defective product. Certainly, the company that sold the product would be exposed to product liability claims from the injured customer. But, if the small company only has one or two people who design and manufacture the product, and one can prove that they were involved in designing and manufacturing this particular product (e.g. a custom item), then the individuals involved in designing and manufacturing the defective product have personal liability in tort in a product liability suit, not just the company. On the other hand, if the liability is purely for a breach of contract, or the company is liable vicariously for conduct of someone other than the owners or managers or officers, and if the company made no fraudulent transfers, and was operating with proper formalities at the time of the incident, piercing the corporate veil, or applying the alter ego doctrine could be much more challenging (although, of course, the law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and this is largely a matter of state law).

In the United States is doing business in only some states considered discrimination?

A business would like to only operate in states except for California to avoid the $7500-per-person fine CCPA demands. Is it legal or would the business have to leave out the whole of USA? For information on the CCPA, see: https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa

I have a really good pizza place near my home but the bastards won't deliver when I go interstate! Now, that's discrimination! Yes, it's discrimination. However, it's not unlawful discrimination. Discrimination is not unlawful unless it is on the basis of a protected class . Geography isn't a protected class of itself. It can be if it's used as a proxy for a protected class, such as excluding certain neighbourhoods which correspond with racial or religious groups, but that's not the case here.

Must I honour a (non auction) sale on ebay

A buyer bought an item (buy it now) but were so rude to me I cancelled the sale. The buyer is threatening to sue for damages. Is this even possible? I should add there were a number of other factors involved here, including the fact that the buyer was based abroad (and I have my account limited to preventing sales outside the UK), they got around this by providing a UK address to ebay (which may or may not be real - see edit - almost certainly fake), but they wanted it sent abroad. It listed as a "collection in person" item, and the buyer insisted on sending their own courier. In short, I was TOLD to package it up, which I refused to do as it was not a small item and would have taken considerable time to pack properly, but it was very low value -in short - not worth my time. Edit: I note now the buyer has changed their ebay address from UK to US, although ebay believes they are based in a 3rd country. I suspect they buy or attempt to buy from different countries, changing their ebay address each time to get around the sellers' rules.

Yes From clause 7 of the Ebay agreement : When you enter into a transaction you create a legally binding contract with another user, unless the item is listed in a category under the Non-binding bid policy. You have a contract, if you don't fulfil your obligations under it you can be sued. You can only terminate a contract a) if the contract provides for termination and the relevant circumstances have happened, or b) due to a breach of a condition (but not a warranty) of the contract by the other party or c) some very limited and highly technical circumstances at law. The fact that the other party is rude doesn't fit within b) or c) and, barring some very unusual contract terms, won't fit in a) either. Make good on your legally enforcable promise.

What rights and remedies does the buyer have under the following circumstances of a failed contract?

A buyer offered X for a building, which was accepted by the seller. The building had a mortgage, Y, which was greater than X. The terms of the purchase contract called for the building to be delivered "free and clear of all mortgages, liens, and other encumbrances," and the understanding was that the seller was supposed to pay off the mortgage by making up the remaining mortgage balance, Y-X. Seller used only X to pay down the mortgage, which had a remaining balance of Y-X. Buyer doesn't want the building with the Y-X mortgage remaining on it, wants to cancel the deal, and get his X back. What is the name of the tort that the seller has committed? What rights and remedies does the buyer have?

No tort has been committed This is a straight up breach of contract. I also don’t understand how this happened - settlement on land usually involves the mortgage holder to taking payment in full and discharging the mortgage.

Would Ukraine humanitarian scammers be commiting war crimes?

A cambridge article has an abstract reading as Impeding humanitarian access and the starving of civilians is prohibited under international humanitarian law in times of both international and non-international armed conflicts. Such conduct is criminalised under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) when committed during an international armed conflict. However, without good reason, it is not a war crime when committed during a non-international armed conflict. Contemporary conflicts, such as that in Syria, show that this is a problematic omission. This article addresses the challenges in prosecuting the denial of humanitarian access during international armed conflicts and examines the options to prosecute before the International Criminal Court such denial in times of non-international armed conflict as other war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The author concludes that these options would not suffice and proposes to add to the ICC Statute the starvation of the civilian population, including through impeding humanitarian access, as a war crime for non-international armed conflicts. The Ukraine conflict has also led to scammers making humanitarian help scam sites. But the thing is, they are techinally blocking aid from reaching Ukraine (by making the site a scam) Could they be procesuted as a war criminal?

As unlikely as snowfall in the Sahara at noon To be a war criminal, you need to violate the rules of war. These are for example the Hague conventions (aka Haager Landkriegsordnung) - which bans the use of certain munitions or destroying cultural heritage - or the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of civilians , prisoners of war , use of Gas , and other items. There is literally no way in which you can violate the Geneva Convention without being in the location of the conflict or the command structure, and to violate Hague, you would need to either supply such munitions to a side or again, be in the command structure. Even if scamming funds into non-existing "help funds" is super unethical and illegal in itself as fraud, it would need someone in a very specific position to take the money to actually commit a war crime to make this part of a war crime.

As a student, do I have a right to see my incident report as filed by campus security?

A campus peace officer made a report against me for public intoxication, but no fine or ticket was issued. Do I have rights to access that report? By asking for the report, could that make them decide to issue a ticket where they previously had not? I asked directly but was told I needed to contact a lawyer. They also placed a comment in the report stating that I disobeyed them which violated my school contract and I received a warning with no information. Without any ticket information, I am not sure how I disobeyed them. They called the police and they drove me home. I was not charged. I realize that I'm probably making this worse for myself as I understand I got off with just a warning but the information seems falsified, as I complied with both police and peace officers. I'm gonna take it as my consequence as I understand my responsibilities but I just need some more information. My question is, can I have a copy of the report they filed at the time, and if so, how do I go about getting it?

As a student, you are bound by the school contract you entered into as a student, and that will determine if you have a right to see a copy of the incident report filed by campus security. You need to read that contract - more commonly known as a student conduct manual or other similar title - to find out what your rights are and any actions you can take with campus security and getting your incident report, as well as any administration and student conduct committee contacts that may be helpful, possibly starting a grievance process that can lead to a resolution, any penalties you may be subject to, etc. Example: http://www.uvic.ca/services/judicial/ If it's a public school, the school's website should have a full copy of a student conduct manual; if a private school, you may need to get a copy from the administration. Campus security is also bound by the school contract; they may or may not be correct in not releasing your incident report. That's what the school administration can tell you; ask them, rather than the security department. Look in the student conduct manual for administration and student conduct committee contacts. If campus security told you to talk to a lawyer, they've probably dealt with such situations before and are correct in that you need a lawyer to be the go-between. You can look around for a legal aid group in your city and see if they can help you with options. (You shouldn't ask for legal advice here.) By asking for the report, could that make them decide to issue a ticket where they previously had not? It's possible, but campus security would need to be sure they have clear justification to ticket you, because they are obviously aware of repercussions (re: telling you to get a lawyer) and have lots of experience working through the processes. The big picture is that you need to do research into your situation with the school contract you are under and any administrative, student and legal aid contacts that can help explain your options to you.

Possible legal repercussions for ignoring reasonable accommodation requests

A candidate requests certain accommodations for the job interview, for instance to perform interaction with the interviewer in written. (Speaking is not an essential requirement for the job in question; the candidate can hear and speak, but it's a significant extra effort for them and thus constitutes an undue disadvantage). What are possible legal repercussions for the company if one of the interviewers ignores these requests and keeps on speaking to the candidate?

Note that while a person can request a specific accommodation, an employer or potential employer is not required to grant the specific accommodation requested. Some other accommodation which (the employer claims) will meet the expressed need can be offered instead. Also no accommodation need be offered if it would impose an "undue burden" on the employer. The normal expectation is that there will be a back-and forth until the employee (or applicant) and the employer agree on an appropriate accommodation. Where there is agreement but the agreement is then violated, the normal first response is to make such adjustments as will restore the agreed accommodation. Only if that fails will a legal complaint be heard. There is no automatic penalty for violation of an accommodation agreement, it will depend on the facts ass assessed by the Commission and perhaps later by a court. Possible penalties can include an order to employ or reinstate a complainant, back pay, costs and legal fees, and money damages, which can be up to $75,000 per violation, as the court deems just. The relevant law is 42 U.S. Code § 12112 . This provides (in relevant part): No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. The section goes on to define “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” as including any of several acts, including: (b) (5) (A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity; ... (7) failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in the most effective manner to ensure that, when such test is administered to a job applicant or employee who has a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, such test results accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor of such applicant or employee that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such skills are the factors that the test purports to measure). 42 U.S. Code § 12111 defines "Reasonable accommodation" and undue hardship” as follows: (9) Reasonable accommodation The term “reasonable accommodation” may include— (9) (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (9) (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. (10) Undue hardship (10) (A) In general The term “undue hardship” means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B). (10) (B) Factors to be considered In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include— (10) (B) (i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter; (10) (B) (ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility; (10) (B) (iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (10) (B) (iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity. Under 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–5 and subsequent sections informal measures are normally first attempted to remedy any violation. If those fail, remadies can include injunctions against continued discrimination, awards of back pay (not relevant when the person was never an employee) orders to employ a person, awards of costs and legal fees, and other damages. No specific remedy is automatic, there is wide discretion.

What is the charge for minor hit and run?

A car scratches one parking and one standing car slightly (with less then 5mph speed) and drives off. Afterwards the police come and inspect the vehicle and take samples of the scratches. The person has had no prior issues with police or with driving. What is the likely charge for such a minor hit and run in Germany?

The hitting by itself would not be too bad (though the police would likely take a close look because of the two scratched cars – was the driver drunk or something?), but the subsequent running constitutes a crime under § 142 StGB ( official but non-authoritative translation ). The maximum sentence for this is imprisonment for three years, but a first-time offender would most likely be sentenced to a fine corresponding to a few months’ income, if there are no aggravating circumstances.

Who has right of way between a legal u-turn vs car driving out of a parking lot as per Texas rules?

A car stopped in a left-only lane (not a traffic signal/intersection) on a main street and was making a u-turn (it is not prohibited) and no-through traffic from the opposite side. The car turns and has reached half-way at an angle into the third-lane (4-lane each way). At same time, a driver coming out of a parking lot takes a right and tried to move to the same lane and not the right-most(closest to curb) and meets this above car in an accident. Since the car in the left-turn lane is on a main road, do they have right-of-way over the parking lot car. The first car turned into the lanes even before the other car drove out of the parking lot. Is there a law about who takes precedence in this case?

No party is granted the right of way, instead, some party is required to yield the right of way. Sec. 545.155 of the Texas Transportation Code says An operator about to enter or cross a highway from an alley, building, or private road or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to a vehicle approaching on the highway to be entered. Sec. 545.256 likewise requires that An operator emerging from an alley, driveway, or building in a business or residence district shall: (1) stop the vehicle before moving on a sidewalk or the sidewalk area extending across an alley or driveway; (2) yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian to avoid collision; and (3) on entering the roadway, yield the right-of-way to an approaching vehicle. The law against wide right turns says "To make a right turn at an intersection, an operator shall make both the approach and the turn as closely as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway"; intersection "means the common area at the junction of two highways, other than the junction of an alley and a highway", and highway or street "means the width between the boundary lines of a publicly maintained way any part of which is open to the public for vehicular travel", i.e. the part where the parking lot empties into the main road.

Can someone who owns property on the border prevent/delay government related construction?

A card game company has reportedly bought acres of land on the Us/Mexico border, and also hired eminent domain lawyers to defend it. Could this actually prevent the construction of something (i.e a wall) from being built, or perhaps delay the process?

Could this actually prevent the construction of something (i.e a wall) from being built, or perhaps delay the process? It could not prevent the construction of a wall from being built. It could slightly delay the process, but government eminent domain lawyers are very efficient and the immediate possession phase of eminent domain cases is very fast, so the delay would be on the order of a few weeks to a few months, not a long delay. Also, good project managers figure in the time necessary to handle the eminent domain process into their project timing by working on land the government already owns first. The determination of the amount of compensation to which the owner is entitled would take longer than that, but would happen after construction was commenced.

Multiple claimants for a single act of deceit in UK law

A case caught my attention recently: In it, person A commits both breach of contract and also the tort of deceit in lying about an asset they fraudulently sold for about 6 figures. In the civil case, the ostensible claimant is B who eventually reaches a pre-trial settlement of some amount over £30k in "full and final settlement of all claims between A and B from the transaction". However there is also a 2nd potential claimant C (and perhaps others as yet unknown) who suffered loss due to the transaction being fraudulent. A knew that C would also suffer loss, but no exposure to a claim by C was contemplated by A at the time they settled with B. C and B kniw each other but C has mental health issues which meant they were unable to discuss their own harm suffered with B or combine the claims, and mentally also couldn't deal with their own case at that time. C's claim isn't as large (probably £5-10k), is well evidenced, and is not ruled out by the agreement of A and B. But the immediate rebuttal if C claims will probably be that the cases should have been brought together and is not able to be brought because of failure to follow court rules or combine the cases. I'm not sure how strong a barrier this would be in UK law, and I'm curious. Can C bring a case, or is C pre-emptorily barred by the fact that any case should have been brought a the same time and settled with A? Or is there just a penalty in costs? Was C under a duty to combine or just desirable in law to do so? What other arguments would strengthen C's position if the question comes up of failing to combine cases?

A wrongful act may cause damage to any number of people. Each of those people has the right to seek compensation independent of the others. For example, consider an electrician who incorrectly wires a main switchboard in a communally owned building under contract from the owner's corporation causing a fire which burns the building to the ground. The owner's corporation can sue for breach of contract and the tort of negligence, each individual owner can sue for negligence against the electrician and breach of contract and negligence against the corporation as can each tenant (plus the landlord) and each visitor. Even if the facts are the same and uncontested, each has a different basis in law and potentially different defendants.

Can a court decision be appealed by a sheriff?

A case recently came up in my area of Kentucky in a district court where a man had been convicted of growing and selling marijuana. The sheriff had drove by his residence on a hot day and smelled marijuana emanating from the man's property. The sheriff was able to narrow the location down to a mobile home which was on the man's property. The sheriff then obtained a search warrant to search the mobile home for marijuana, with the smell of marijuana being probable cause. Upon conducting the search, the sheriff found 154 marijuana plants and several firearms in the man's possession. The man is a convicted felon, so they were also seized. When the case went to court, the case was dismissed. The judge said that the smell of marijuana was not probable cause to have issued a search warrant. If the prosecutor will not ask for an appeal of the court's decision, can the sheriff ask for an appeal himself?

Generally, no. The party to the action will be the State (commonwealth). The prosecutor acts as the agent of the state. The sheriff is not a party and cannot appeal.

What counts as a medical facility?

A certain POA for medical document gives an adult son the right to move his parent to medical facility. Would a assisted living place count as a medical facility? Is there a precise legal definition of a medical facility?

This is a logical thing to ask but somewhat misses the point as described below, because a POA doesn't really give the adult son " the right to move his parent to medical facility" in the ordinary sense of that word. Is there a precise legal definition of a medical facility? Not usually, in the context of interpreting a power of attorney, unless the document itself defines it. Would a assisted living place count as a medical facility? This could go either way but often it doesn't matter much because it is mitigated by the next point, and because there is usually also a non-medical durable power of attorney put in place at the same time that would give the agent or a different agent the authority to take steps necessary to move the principal (the parent in this case) to a non-medical facility like a new apartment or home. A certain POA for medical document gives an adult son the right to move his parent to medical facility. This somewhat overstates what a POA does. A POA gives an agent under the POA (the adult son in this case) the authority to take action to make something happen. But a POA does not give the agent the authority for make the parent do anything if the principal (the parent in this case) is conscious and capable of expressing a contrary opinion and a POA also does not give the agent the power to prohibit the principal from doing anything. Only a guardian of the person who is suffering from some condition has the authority to act over the objections of that person. Action with a POA requires the non-objection of the principal because the principal is silent or incapable of communicating any objections. Normally, someone well enough to be placed in an assisted living facility has enough capacity to object to the placement and override the agent if that person is unhappy with a decision that the agent is making under the POA. This can be done on a case by case basis, or by revoking the POA entirely.

Waiver of liability: can I be required to waive an institution from liability from its negligence?

A certain University in New Jersey is holding a conference and organising an afternoon of excursions and leisure activities. It requires that participants sign a waiver containing the clause (emphasis mine): In exchange for {UNIVERSITY}’s grant of permission for Participant to participate as a registered Conference Participant in an excursion or activity, for himself or herself, his or her parents, guardians, heirs, assigns, agents, and all those in privity with Participant, do hereby release, waive, discharge, and covenant not to sue {UNIVERSITY}, its trustees, officers, employees, and agents from liability from any and all claims, including negligence , personal injury, accidents, assaults, kidnappings, or illnesses (including death) and property or economic loss related to or arising from, but not limited to, participation in the Seminar[sic]. and also: I have read this waiver of liability and assumption of risk agreement, fully understand its terms, and understand that I am giving up substantial rights, including releasing the University from all liability related to or arising out of the Conference excursion or activity. I acknowledge that I was provided this document with sufficient time to consider its provisions, ask questions and to seek review of it counsel[sic]. I am signing the agreement fully and voluntarily, and intend by my signature to be a complete and unconditional release of all liability to the greatest extent allowed by law. It isn't realistic for me to seek professional legal advice on a waiver for an afternoon's excursion. To what extent does NJ law allow an institution to demand a waiver from the negligence of itself or its agents?

The University is probably entitled to put a term like this in its contract. In general, one can waive in advance, liability for negligence, but not gross negligence, willful and wanton misconduct, reckless conduct, or intentional conduct, from the person seeking the waiver. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the validity of these clauses in the case of Gina Stelluti v. Casapenn Enterprises LLC (August 5, 2010), which involved a negligence waiver in a contract with a private gym. Also, since this is conditions on an afternoon of fun activities, rather than something mandatory or necessary, this waiver does not appear to be conditioned on giving up a substantial thing to which you are otherwise entitled. If the waiver were conditions upon something which you had an unconditional right to (e.g. a public high school education), it might not be valid because it would not be supported by valid consideration. In contrast, here, you get the right to participate in something fun, which you did not have an unconditional right to have, in exchange for the liability waiver.

Could any repercussion from a libel suit prevent or limit someone from perpetuating other attacks on others?

A certain evil man has previously waged a vicious campaign of cyber-bullying and libel against me, and appears to be revving up for a whole new round in the near future. His claims include accusing me of being a different individual, multiple claims of mental illness of various types, pretending to be a women I supposedly harassed to upset a third party, and accusing me of being a pedophile because I'm a male that volunteers with children (which everyone knows is synonymous with pedophile!); amongst other actions. I've always ignored these attacks, others then posting requests to have them removed from any third party site he made them on. They were quite upsetting, but the difficulty of doing anything about them is quite high. However, he is actually doing far worse to others then what he is doing to me. His cyber-bullying is quite common, but the least of his actions. He has had multiple rape allegations made against him; I can't get either of the ones I know personally to press charges. He is involved in many other bad actions, using anonymity of the internet, threat of vicious attacks on any that oppose him, a sociopathic (and I mean that literally here) ability to manipulate others, and a talent for knowing exactly how much he can break rules and laws without every pushing enough to make it worth anyone prosecuting him. My own ability to prove libel is difficult at best, due to the indirect nature of most of the attacks and difficulty of tying his real name (known to me) to his aliases to a degree required to be legally admissible. It is simply not worth the significant expense, time, emotional investment, and increased harassment that would inevitable come from any lawsuit just to try to prove libel myself. However, I would like to stop him from the far more massive harm he is doing to others. Assuming I could even generate a sufficient case for libel is there any way that the results of winning a case proving libel/slander/cyber-bullying etc could lead to repercussions other then his being forced to pay me money, something that may in some way slow down or limit the harm he is doing to other parties? Or is the only possible repercussion financial penalty, which I would value far less then the harm of the case and I doubt would stop him from continuing his activities. I live in Maryland, the individual harassing me is in West Virginia, with all the harassment being done over the internet; to make things even harder.

You are seeking criminal penalties through the civil law system, which does not happen (and for good reason). If you want criminal penalties, You need to pursue harassment, rape, or other criminal law penalties through the criminal law system. People can also be "scared straight" just by an encounter with a police officer for their activities, although some people increase their attacks.

Republishing public domain material from an edition that is not public domain

A certain famous philosopher from the 19th century made an arrangement of a few hundred of his notebook writings that was intended to be the outline for a book. He didn't live long enough to actually write the book, but some scholars are interested in working out what form it might have taken. This is because the arrangement is incomplete: it lists a bunch of texts and numbers them, and assigns about 2/3 to one of the four main divisions in an accompanying table of contents, but it doesn't specify which subdivisions they belong in, or how they should be ordered. Hence the scholarly speculation. I'm working on a web app that would allow scholars to work on arrangements of these texts: basically assign them to sections, order them, etc. All of the texts I'm using are taken from an online scholarly edition of the author's works. Now these texts were written almost 150 years ago, and I'm using them in the original language, not in English translation, so I'm not infringing on the copyright of a more recent translation. However, the online edition I took the texts from is basically a digitized version of the standard scholarly print edition, funded by a few major organizations. Because the author's originals were notebook material, the editors of this standard edition had to distill them into printable texts, which were never set in print that way by the original author. My question is: does the publisher of the standard edition hold the copyright for their print renditions of these texts, or are their renditions public domain because the texts themselves were written so long ago? The author has been dead for well over 100 years.

If only such content as is in fact in the public domain is reprinted, it will not matter that a later edition that is protected also includes the public domain content. No later edition can confer copyright protection on a work already in the public domain. However, if the older content is so rewritten in the new edition as to be a new, if derivative, work, that would be protected by a new copyright. Also, if creativity were used in the selection and arrangement of texts from a public domain source, copying that selection and arrangement could be an infringement.

Does a resume qualify as personally identifiable information relative to a privacy policy/tos?

A certain freelancer marketplace website based in Pennsylvania has allowed Google to index over 1000 user resumes. As we all know, resumes contain personally identifiable information. Their privacy policy states the following: [site] does not rent or sell your personally identifiable information to third parties. [site] does not share your contact information with other users or third parties without your consent. Any personally identifiable information that you provide to [site] will be secured with industry standard protocols and technology. In speaking with their staff, I have been informed that their terms of service contains language that makes users "solely responsible for information posted on our Website" and that users "hereby assign to [site] your rights in any Non-Multimedia Content." They believe that those statements in the terms of service override the quoted privacy statements. It seems to me that an uploaded resume is "personally identifiable information" and that it should be "secured with industry standard protocols and technology." If the resume is publicly downloadable on the Internet, that's the definition of unsecured. Would their position stand up to the California CCPA, or Europe's GDPR rules? The resumes appear to belong to users from around the globe. [EDIT] For clarity, this website is treating users' uploaded resumes as miscellaneous image files and allowing them to be indexed in Google. Resumes contain names, addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers, social media handles and a lot of other private information that most privacy conscious people would not want published openly on the Internet. Since Guru.com is a jobs/employment oriented website it's completely reasonable that people upload their resumes there for the purpose of sharing with employers/clients who are logged-in to their own accounts for hiring purposes, and there is no reason to think that these resumes would not be treated as PII or contact information as defined in the privacy policy.

[site] does not rent or sell your personally identifiable information to third parties. [site] does not share your contact information with other users or third parties without your consent. Look, they do not rent or sell your PII, but what is it that they do not share ? Not PII but contact information . Is contact information PII? Sure. Is PII contact information? Not necessarily. Conclusion: they will not share your PII that is contact information, but will share (though not rent or sell) all other PII, such as resume without contact information. it should be "secured with industry standard protocols and technology." If the resume is publicly downloadable on the Internet, that's the definition of unsecured. "Secured" in this context means "protected from unauthorised access". Your resume is "secure" in the sense that noone can access it if the company does not want anyone to (but it turns out they actually want, haha).

Car Debt and the IRS

A certain tax payer is on a payment plan to the IRS. The tax payer owes $10,000. The tax payer has missed several payments and now the IRS is going to take away the tax payer's car. The car is worth about $11,000 however there is an outstanding loan on the car of about $4,000. Assuming the IRS takes the car for non-payment of taxes, who pays off the car loan? Does the lender get stuck? Note: Assume the person is in the United States.

australia The lender is paid first Assuming the lender has properly registered a lien under the Personal Property Securities Act then they have first right to the proceeds of the disposal of the vehicle. Assuming it realises $11,000 (i.e. after the costs of seizure and sale), the lender gets $4,000, the Australian Tax Office (ATO) gets $7,000 and the taxpayer still owes $3,000 to the ATO. If the lender has (foolishly) not registered their interest then the ATO gets $10,000, the taxpayer gets $1,000 and still owes the lender $4,000.

Can I use my drawing of a photo someone took for commercial purpose

A certain wildlife photographer puts up photos of bears online. To use those for any purpose you are supposed to ask for permission and most likely to pay for it. The question is, what if I copy the photo by drawing it (it'd be accurate, but looking obviously like a drawing, not a photo.) Can I use it for my purposes then? Or does it depend on how good of a drawing it'd be?

This is a derivative work and the right to make derivative works rests solely with the holder of the copyright in the photo. If you make a drawing of the photo without permission then you must only use it in ways that meet the fair use doctrine if you are in the USA or the similar but more restrictive fair dealing doctrine in Commonwealth countries (do your own research if you are somewhere else). Making the drawing to improve your skill and hang it on your wall is fair use - selling it commercially is not.

Can a store accuse me of something and ban me without proof?

A chain store that I frequent has banned me from their store, citing that I was seen stealing merchandise. I've NEVER stolen anything from their store (or any other store of this chain) before, and the store manager claims that their store has video surveillance. He can't admit that they have video evidence of ME personally stealing anything (which, if they have surveillance, they should have proof of, no?), but apparently, one of their employees has (mistakenly) identified me as a thief, resulting in my being permanently banned from their store. On top of that, the store manager claims that one of his employees (who he's named personally) is the one of who says that he saw me stealing merchandise. Yet, I've talked to this same employee before, and HE claims that another Asst. Manager of the store is the one who claims they saw me stealing something. So right there, they already have an inconsistency in their story. There are other stores of this chain around me that I could can and do go to, but I don't like the idea of being labeled & treated unfairly for something that I didn't do, and on top of that, I feel like--and I know this sounds...fantastical--they're intentionally lying just to have a reason to ban me from their store. Is this right? And is there anything legally that I can do about this? Thank any and all who answer in advance, and I look forward to hearing you all's thoughts on the situation.

In theory, a store can ban you or anyone else for any reason except those protected by law against discrimination. As a practical matter, you potentially have various forms of recourse. The first thing to do is to write the the CEO of the chain, with a long detailed letter describing the incidents, and naming names. Most CEO's don't want to deal with this kind of bad publicity, and will at least order an investigation, and make amends, if the internal investigation is in your favor. This would apply even to the late Sam Walton, if the chain is WalMart, or whoever the current CEO is. If you are a member of a protected minority, or even have dark skin, you can sue the chain on those grounds. There will be a presumption that they barred you on grounds of race or color. Then the burden of proof will be on them to show that they didn't bar you for those causes. As a form of "entrapment," you should take a witness, basically the most influential person you can get hold of that's not a family member, to the store with you to ask them why you were barred. The mayor of your town would be ideal, more llkely it would be a boss, teacher, or clergyman, but in any event, someone who knows you well. If you can get them to accuse you of stealing in front of this third party, you have the makings of a defamation case. And even if you aren't a minority, you can sue them anyway. You can demand "discovery" of all internal documents, videos, etc. relating to your case. Your lawyer will also the right to "depose" (cross examine) all offending managers.There's a good chance that something embarrassing will turn up in the process. (Many defendants settle in connection with discovery.) You might want to hire a second (libel) lawyer to teach you how to publicize the case without running into libel laws. If all this fails, the store can probably bar you, but you want to make it prohibitively expensive for them to do so, meaning that most rational people wouldn't bar you after the above. If they do, they're not rational and you're better off not using the store.

Large YouTuber: Copyright Lawsuit vs Fair Use

A channel with close to 1.5-million subscribers on YouTube, H3H3Productions , is being sued on the grounds that their video infringes another author's copyright . Their channel essentially reviews other YouTube videos in the form of satire, mockery, and comedy. I've been watching them for over 6-months, so first-and-foremost I'm a fan. But after having thought about this situation for a few days, I'm not entirely sure if the lawsuit is unfair. In H3H3 videos, they don't just show small clips or images from videos that they make fun of; they show almost the entire work of the targeted author's video but in the form of small clips. The format is essentially: Show a clip/segment of the other person's video Pause said clip Change scene from the reviewed video to H3H3 making commnetary on that particular clip/segment Pick up where you left off on the video and show the next 5-10 seconds Rinse and repeat From watching their videos, I'd estimate that H3H3 shows at least half of the other author's video more than 95% of the time. To be honest, when I watch the original work (which is rare) or have happened to see it before hand, I'd say that H3H3 uses more than 75% of the video they review within their own video. H3H3 is claiming in their defense that the grounds of Fair Use is in their defense and thus does not breach any copyright. Does it?

Only a court can decide if use is fair. As Dale stated, we will know whether it was or was not legally fair when a court decides, and it ceased to be appealed. Unfortunately, there is no formula. Remember that fair use is an exception to rules that make copyright infringement illegal, so it occupies a narrow space practically by definition. Fortunately this was already decided (yes, I recognize that this is an old question) Judge Katherine B. Forrest decided in favor of your favorite YouTuber : The Court has held that the Klein video constitutes fair use, and further that the Klein video does not infringe plaintiff’s copyrights. and further that: But even if this Court held the Klein video is not fair use, the Court would still dismiss Claim II because defendants clearly had a subjective “good faith belief” that their video did not infringe plaintiff’s copyrights. Cf. Lenz, 815 F.3d at 1153. It is undisputed that defendants understand the concept of fair use and have an established practice for ensuring their videos make fair use of copyrighted material. But that answer isn't entirely satisfying, is it? Let's get specific. Fair use seems to be something that should be clear to both parties: the copyright holders and the user of copyrighted content. While it is true that the percentage of original content may be of concern, there is no specific percentage nominated in Title 17 Chapter 1 Section 107 of the US Code. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. It takes vigilance on the part of both parties to cohabit this narrow law. Fortunately, YouTube has recently taken measures to ensure that use that should (presumably in their view) be judged as fair will remain live on their site while a dispute process is pursued. This procedure resolves cases outside of formal legal battles, which can be costly for both parties. However, YouTube has pledged to pay legal fees of content providers that are sued for copyright infringement, in special circumstances (esp. when the use was fair, and when a claimant is abusing, again presumably as determined by some legal counsel at YouTube). They discuss similar matters in their FAQ page . Why did YouTube let an abusive claimant remove my video? YouTube takes action to address cases of abuse and misuse in our copyright takedown processes. While we cannot comment on specific cases or our processes, we do look into abuse of our copyright tools and processes, and have a zero-tolerance policy for claimants we've deemed abusive. Misuse of the copyright process (for both takedowns and counter notifications) can result in termination of an account. And remember that courts love precedent Future cases will likely leverage the decisions made in the case you mention . And while the following does not have any real legal value, you may find comfort in knowing: there are many YouTubers out there that heavily leverage others' content, and their videos are still up. Again this is not strictly speaking a precedent, but you can safely assume that in cases where a high-profile YouTuber (say CinemaSins, for instance) uses content from many content owners, and uses a great deal of it, they will likely have come up against claims of unfair use, and have emerged with an intact channel. The aforementioned avenues that YouTube provides should be utilized wherever possible to stay out of court.

Interesting hypothetical: Is it legal to deny service to a customer in a children's dentistry if he is scaring other kids based on his appearance?

A child has gone to a children's dentistry since he was 5. He is now 18, 6'9", 300 pounds, and bearded, resembling Andre the Giant. During each weekly orthodontics visit, the other children in the waiting room are clearly shaken and parents report that their 5 year olds are becoming scared to go to their dentist. They ask if the owner of the practice could kindly talk to the parents of the 18 year old and ask if he could attend an adult dentistry. The owner obliges, not wanting to upset and possibly lose customers. The owner explains the situation to the "giant's" parents and offers an alternative practice, one run by the owner's friend from dentistry school who happens to have worked with children for 20 years before opening a general practice, i.e. whose service is equal with that of the current dentists. The parents refuse. Would the owner of the practice be able to deny service to this individual without losing a discrimination lawsuit? I think this is a pretty interesting question. One, we are dealing with children, who can't expected to be rational actors (e.g. observe that the giant is peacefully going about his business and is perfectly innocuous by the determination of any sane adult), but are also in a sense "customers". In addition, there are perfectly viable alternatives available that would only enhance the experiences all involved parties if exercised. This feels like discrimination; if we replaced the giant with a black child, or anyone else with "abnormal" but immutable features, it seems the answer would be clear. We would say that the children need to learn how to live with others in their society that don't look like themselves. But this is maybe a bit more acute, considering it would seem much easier to convince a 4 year old who hasn't been exposed to Nazi propaganda or "Birth of a Nation" that a random African American is harmless than it would given the real-world manifestation of the cartoon antagonist of the latest Disney flick. After all, on top of the desired for specialized care, part of the ethos of the children's dentistry is the desire to create a sort of dental "safe space", a friendly environment that assuages the anxiety of this otherwise possibly frightening experience. Should we really expect children to learn life lessons while dealing with the immediate fear of the dentist? TL;DR: Kids at a children's dentist are scared because an 18yo who has been going there since he was 5 looks like Andre the Giant. The dentist denies service to the 18 year old and his family, saying that of course it would be discriminatory if everyone involved were rational, but that little children can't be expected to be rational actors, and that if the 18yo keeps coming, it will hurt the business of the dentist. Is there any sort of precedent that firmly classifies discrimination against an individual based on immutable characteristics as illegal, or can this take place under certain circumstances?

Discrimination is not illegal per se Some discrimination is illegal, details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin Some of these apply only in particular circumstances (e.g. employment) and not in others (e.g. consumer rights). Physical appearance is not one of the illegal ones , unless it is as a result of a physical disability. Age discrimination is illegal but not universally. For example, you are allowed to treat children different to adults. If the practice was a genuine paediatric one then moving adults onto an adult practice would be fine.

Is the recording of an audience singing in public copyrighted?

A church records their service on audio . The service, open to the public but behind the closed doors of their building, is performed before a live audience who voluntarily attend. The church then sends out a copy of the recording to paying subscribers around the world. The recording includes announcements, speeches, prayers, musical and theatrical entertainment, and a sermon all of which I would assume are copyrighted by the church entity since it is their employees and volunteers who made and produced it. Likely everyone who contributed gave consent to record their work, except perhaps members of the audience who were distinctly asked to pray out loud for the group's benefit. Also included is the singing of gospel songs by the audience . The audience is prompted and led by a song leader who is possibly accompanied by a piano player on some or all of the songs. Assume the piano player is a paid employee. My question is: Is the singing by the audience copyrighted as part of the larger or complete work? Probably in the same category: Are the prayers solicited from the audience also copyrighted? The question seems unclear in this regard: It is highly unlikely that the church asked any member of the audience for their permission to record their singing much less to distribute it. Assume they did not. No audience member signed a waiver granting the church copyright permission over their vocals, foot-stomping, or hand-clapping. To further muddy the waters, some of the songs sung by the audience may be copyrighted while others are in the public domain. I assume the audience's singing is about common for a diverse group - so not necessarily "original" or "creative".

There is copyright in the recording (probably) The person who first fixed the material in a tangible form owns the copyright. Presumably, whatever legal entity the church is, as it was made by a volunteer as a work-for-hire. That is because they were the ones who fixed it in tangible form. This is why journalists own the copyright in interviews they make with subjects. The copyright in the performance is a separate copyright from any that might exist in the composition. If the recording violates the composer’s copyright (e.g. the church did not pay the required statutory royalties to perform the songs), then there is no copyright in the recording, and the composer can sue the church for making it. There is no copyright in works that violate another's copyright. Making an audio recording without permission is a crime This is totally unrelated to copyright, but in most jurisdictions, you need the speaker’s permission before recording their voice. If the recording is obvious (e.g. a microphone in your face or a big sign saying services will be recorded), then permission can be implied - by knowingly speaking while you are aware you are being recorded, you have consented to the recording.

What elements are considered when deciding order of trials and sentences for a multi-region, multi-year, multi-severity criminal?

A citizen of the USA has a number of individuals, cities, counties, states and the federal government after them for a wide variety of crimes with a wide variety of themes over a period of several years and with a wide variety in severity. What are the considerations when deciding the particulars of trial-order and sentence-order, and how are they weighed? I'm guessing timing of charges being filed probably has a lot of weight, the location of defendant residence might be a factor in trial order/priority, and age/infirmity is probably a consideration for some defendants in even bringing some charges to trial, but what else?

england-and-wales The timing of charges being laid is a factor to take in to account, as is whether a charge is appropriate after taking in to account the suspect's circumstances described in the OP, but setting those aside - more often than not it's a negotiation between the various prosecuting agencies and the investigation teams' supervisors resulting with the more serious offences taking precedence. The lesser offences are either dealt with at a later trial or left to "lie on file", meaning there is enough evidence for a case to be made, but that it is not in the public interest for prosecution to proceed, usually because the defendant has acknowledged other, often more serious, charges. No admission to the charge is made by the defendant, and no verdict is recorded against them. Wikipedia

GDPR: Can a city request deletion of all personal data that uses a certain domain for logins?

A city in Finland asked me to delete all data for everyone whose login uses a certain domain. The domain contains "edu" in it and "oppilas" (which translates to "student"), and my website doesn't have data that anyone is going to mind losing, so I have already deleted that data, however, I have some concerns about what to do in the future if the decision is less easy: I'm a little worried that I shouldn't allow certain domains to be used as logins in the first place, especially ones that might be school related I'd like to have some idea for future reference if there's any case where the GDPR would require me to comply with such a request I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one Is deleting the data actually more of a legal liability than not deleting it in some cases? (People shouldn't be able to delete other people's accounts.) I searched quite a bit but couldn't find anyone discussing the possibility of any of these things: an organization asking for the deletion of personal data requests to delete data for more than one person the GDPR saying anything about school-related domain names What makes this request seem wrong is probably pretty obvious, judging from the very straightforward wording of the GDPR: an individual can ask for deletion of their own data, and a guardian acting on a specific child's behalf can ask for data deletion, but there is no mention of any other situation you can (should?) ask for a reasonable amount of identification for the individuals, but in a case like this, it would require the city to identify all logins and prove that they are acting on behalf of all these people, which would, itself seem like a breach of privacy (unless they have a specific list for the ones visiting my website) This seems like a pretty blatant misuse of the GDPR even if it is well-intentioned, and I'm wondering if I should notify some authority about it. I wouldn't bother if it were a teacher or some other small group, but it's the government of a city with a population of tens of thousands of people, and it seems like they're just blasting this request out to every website that has been visited by their users, without even providing a way for anyone to verify that they are, in fact, government officials. I should note that I'm a US citizen living in the US and I'm the sole proprietor of the website, and the website doesn't pertain to the EU specifically in any way, which, as far as I understand it, means the GDPR doesn't require me to do anything about deleting private data, even by their own standards. However, I'd still prefer to comply with it even if I don't really have to.

Can a city request deletion of all personal data that uses a certain domain for logins? Well, they can , but they have no legal backing to make it happen. Their chances of succeeding are about as good as me requesting a Ferrari, a Yacht and a Mansion. I can make that request. People will laugh. I will not get it. I'm a little worried that I shouldn't allow certain domains to be used as logins in the first place, especially ones that might be school related You have no way to know who owns what email address. And it's none of your business. Your only interest should be in whether the address is owned by the person that is creating the account. You probably already do that by sending a confirmation link to the email address when people sign up. I'd like to have some idea for future reference if there's any case where the GDPR would require me to comply with such a request The only way you have to comply with such a request is if the owner can prove their identity. As far as I understood, the "Finnish city" was three degrees away from that. They could not provide any proof they are who they said they are, they could not provide a finite list of accounts they claimed to own and they could not even provide proof they own those accounts. They literally just wrote an email with zero legal meaning. I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one The correct way to handle this is have a feature on your website where the account owner can delete their own account. GDPR compliant. Then you make a text template explaining how to use that feature and reply with that template to every request, no matter how stupid (like this case) they are. If they cannot identify themselves to you by proving they have access to their "own" email, they have no business wasting your time. Legally, they could provide you with a different method of identification. In case of a Finnish school, that would probably need to be power of attorney from all children's legal guardians and a specific way to identify the accounts that is consistent with the data given (for example if they entered their full name and address on your website). You would probably in your rights to demand a certified translation if it's all in Finnish. Apart from the fact that you as a private US citizen have no real means to check the validity of all that paperwork, personally, if I saw hundreds of pages of certified translated paperwork, I would probably just comply. Not sure it it were actually enough, but it certainly gets an A+ for effort to delete data from a private website. But a real lawyer might give better advice with a real case on their hands. Is deleting the data actually more of a legal liability than not deleting it in some cases? (People shouldn't be able to delete other people's accounts.) Indeed. You should not delete people's data because a random punk on the internet sent you an email. You need to identify who the request is from and if they are allowed to make such a request. Whether you have a legal duty to actually keep data, is up to you or your lawyer to find out. It depends on your data and laws. It is perfectly legal to make a website with a textfield that deletes any data you enter after a second. Destruction of data you own is only a problem if you break other laws with it. For example the IRS might not be amused if you destroyed invoices and other proof of taxable income. "Some dude claimed I must in an email" is not going to fly with them. That said, again, please, identify who you deal with, find out if their claim is valid . Don't do stuff because random internet punks write you an email. Because the next mail you get, will be from a Nigerian Prince. Please wisen up before opening that one. People on the internet, through stupidity or malice, might not have your best interests at heart. Don't believe random emails.

Where should a foreign interested party in a civil case seek a lawyer?

A civil case is in progress in the UK. Someone involved in the case as an interested party wants to make a motion about it, but is a US citizen living in the US. Should they get a lawyer at home in the US, or should they get one in the UK jurisdiction where the case is being handled?

They should get a lawyer in the UK jurisdiction where the case is being handled. To file a motion in a case pending before a tribunal one needs to be admitted to the practice of law before that tribunal.

Where can one file complaint re bribing witness and false evidence in NYC (Manhattan)? District Attorney?

A civil court case in New York City (Manhattan) is still being decided and a attorney brought these issues to the judge. During the proceedings of the trial, one side allegedly bribed witnesses and falsified evidence. These actions are not the subject of the case but occurred during the proceedings. As these are criminal offenses, a separate criminal complaint is sought by the party who was the victim of the opposing party's criminal deeds of bribery and falsifying evidence. I looked at the Manhattan District Attorney's website but didn't see any department categories which cover bribing a witness or falsifying evidence. I've also done many searches on the web and though info was found about the laws, no information was found re how to file such a complaint which leads me to believe that this is basically not done by ordinary citizens. If anyone has any guidance, experience or knowledge as to how the process to seek to have criminal charges filed for these actions (separate from a civil action), it would be greatly appreciated. Also if anyone knows if, despite being against the law, that this type of crime is rarely prosecuted, kindly also share your experience. In case it's not clear, I seek to have criminal charges filed not a civil action filed. Would this type of complaint be filed with the NYC police dept, the Manhattan DA or some other entity?

The complaints about the alleged criminal conduct could be lodged with the NYPD or with the DA. In practice, the chances of those charges being brought criminally (even in the face of unequivocal evidence), are almost nil. This conduct happens not infrequently, and is almost never criminally prosecuted. Police and the NYPD generally treat it is a "civil matter" except in the most rare cases, despite the fact that the conduct may violate criminal law. Usually, there are only prosecutions if there is a pattern of conduct by a repeat litigant that exploits someone who does not have access to counsel to represent them (e.g. widows, orphans, and undocumented immigrants). The number of cases brought criminally in this fact pattern in the entire State of New York is unlikely to be more than half a dozen a year in the entire state out of many thousands of instances of this happening every year, and quite possibly only one or two a year. It would be unwise to pursue this course of action and would pose a greater risk that your own attorneys would be sanctioned (for violating the ethical rule against using criminal proceedings to gain advantage in a civil matter) than it would of providing a positive benefit to the victim of this conduct. The most effective means of obtaining relief would be to file a motion with the judge in the underlying case seeking sanctions against the offending party (or parties), or seeking to hold the offending party (or parties) in contempt of court in the underlying action. If an attorney was involved in the misconduct, a complaint to the attorney discipline officials in the State of New York could result in sanctions against the attorney, although this would not result in benefit to the aggrieved party (nor would criminal charges).

Serving summons on a defendant who is a U.S. Federal Government official: original or copy?

A civil lawsuit against federal government officials is served by certified mail. This is in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (i) : (i) Serving the United States and Its Agencies, Corporations, Officers, or Employees. (2) Agency; Corporation; Officer or Employee Sued in an Official Capacity. To serve a United States agency or corporation, or a United States officer or employee sued only in an official capacity, a party must serve the United States and also send a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to the agency, corporation, officer, or employee. The above law requires to mail the defendant a copy of the summons. However the following Western District of VA Pro Se handbook says (page 16): Generally, if you are suing the United States Government, you must serve an original SUMMONS and a copy of the COMPLAINT on three separate parties: (1) the head of the federal agency you are suing; (2) the United States Attorney for the district; and (3) the United States Attorney General in Washington, D.C. Question: So which one is it? Should the defendant be served with a copy or the original summons?

The court should give you two originals: one to be served, the other to be returned with proof of service attached. If the court gives you only one original then just ask them whether they need the original or copy to be returned with proof of service, from which you will deduct what to serve.

What happens when a federal government Defendant who is sued in his official capacity is being replaced shortly after the civil complaint was filed?

A civil lawsuit is filed against several federal government officials. The officials are specified in the complaint by their names as defendants, however they are sued in their official capacity. What happens with the lawsuit if shortly after the summonses are mailed to each defendant, one of the defendants is replaced? Does the plaintiff need to mail the summons again to the new official? Does the replacing of the official reset the 60-day period the defendants have to file an answer? And what happens if the soon-to-be-replaced official was served with his summons, but shortly after that (but before the defendant replied, and before the expiration of the 60-day period the defendant has to file and answer), the defendant is replaced with the new official?

The named official capacity defendant is substituted as a matter of course, by unopposed motion or with the stipulation of the Justice Department. This is typically done in dozens or even hundred or thousands of cases, when there is a change in the official holding the post. This happens frequently, so the Department of Justice has forms on their computer that allow it to be done en mass by paralegals with only the slightest intervention from DOJ lawyers. They have the process down to a science. It has no practical impact on the course of the litigation. It does not require a new summons to be served and does not reset any deadlines. If the change happens before the summons is served, the summons should be amended by the Plaintiff through the same sort of process.

Does the statute of limitations apply if the company to be sued wasn't operating in the U.S.?

A civil statute of limitations applies to a non-criminal legal action, including a tort or contract case.[5] If the statute of limitations expires before a lawsuit is filed, the defendant may raise the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense to seek dismissal of the charge. The exact time period depends on both the state and the type of claim (contract claim, personal injury, fraud etc.). Most fall in the range of one to ten years, with two to three years being most common. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statute_of_limitations Does the statute of limitations apply if the company to be sued wasn't operating in the U.S.? Let's say that a company in China wasn't located in the U.S. for 12 years and 12 years before it created a headquarters in the U.S., the plaintiff was victim of a contract breach from that company, can the the plaintiff still sue the company because the company could not be sued before that even if the statute of limitation would suggest the company cannot be sued anymore? Assume the plaintiff is in the United States in California.

Does the statute of limitations apply if the company to be sued wasn't operating in the U.S.? If the company is not operating in the USA then, of course, US law does not apply to it. There may be statutes of limitations where it is operating but the US ones are irrelevant. However, the company you describe which is entering into a contract with a California resident to provide goods or services in California is most definitely operating in California. The fact that it doesn't have a physical presence in California doesn't mean it's not operating there. If you wish to bring an action in California, the Californian statute of limitations will most definitely apply and time will run from when the breach of contract occurred. You are suffering under the misapprehension that you can't sue a foreign company in a US court You can. It's technically more complicated and there can be disputes over jurisdiction, the appropriate venue and which law applies but assuming all of that can be managed and a Californian court has jurisdiction and considers itself the most appropriate venue (it may be that a Chinese court is more appropriate) then there's no reason why you can't sue a foreign company with no physical presence in California.

SAR before claim: tactical and legal considerations

A claimant C intends to sue a business B, which is also a data controller. Independently of the prospect of any civil action, C is entitled to make a SAR (Subject Access Request) to B under the Data Protection Act 2018, and may be tempted to do so in order to have all available information at his disposal for maximum perspective and advantage in proceedings. Is there any way in which a SAR to a data controller with whom one has had no dealings for some years could disadvantage C in subsequent proceedings? For example, could either B or a judge draw any inference from C’s decision to submit a SAR?

I can't comment on tactical considerations, but legally there is nothing preventing submitting a Subject Access Request to support litigation. The case law has developed (and been somewhat inconsistent) over the years, culminating with the "no other purpose" rule being clarified by the Court of Appeal in Dawson-Damer v. Taylor Wessing LLP, [2017] EWCA Civ 74 by saying that... ... a SAR would not be invalid if it had been made with the collateral purpose of assisting with litigation. Delivering the leading judgment, Arden LJ noted (at paragraph 107) that the EC Data Protection Directive “makes it clear that the rights given by the Directive are to protect fundamental rights conferred by EU law. We have been shown nothing in the DPA or the Directive which limits the purpose for which a data subject may request his data, or provides data controllers with the option of not providing data based solely on the requester’s purpose”. Source and further reading

Will a clause giving jurisdiction to the contract maker hold up in court?

A clause states "If the contract is breached you accept that you must pay for damages. We shall determine the amount." Will this hold up in court?

A clause states "If the contract is breached you accept that you must pay for damages. We shall determine the amount." Will this hold up in court? A court is going to want to look for context and an interpretation that would make this provision make sense before invalidating it (which it might). For example, if there was a schedule of the amount of damages for various violations attached to the contract, a court might interpret this language to mean that the drafting, non-breaching party will invoice you for damages in amount that it determines in good faith to be the correct amount with reference to the schedule or some formula set forth in the contract (e.g. an interest rate on an open account loan), in much the same way that a landlord might dock your security deposit and send you a letter telling you what was deducted in what amounts and why, or that a credit card company might charge you interest and late fees on a monthly basis. A court would, of course, be unlikely to interpret the clause as affording final and binding legal authority to decide what is owed. In the face of a clause like this one, the other party could bring a lawsuit to dispute the amount determined to be owed by the drafting, non-breaching party (unless the contract is a third-party arbitration clause and simply doesn't read like one because it is out of context).

Voicemail recordings and transcription email fall under GDPR

A client calls, leaves a voicemail with his name and number. A vendor calls, leaves account information and address information. This call is also transcribed and sent via email. The above are common communications left to individual employees' voicemail. Do these fall under GDPR protection laws, and how are they to be handled? I understand when a consumer calls, they are informed that call may be recorded, but with the above type of communication is this implicitly assumed?

The scenario you describe is entirely expected. Leaving contact details on voicemail is one of the chief functions of voicemail, and such data definitely falls under the GDPR. Now, under the GDPR this is not a problem. The customer left that data intentionally for you in order to be contacted. That is sufficient reason for you to have that data. However, all other GDPR policies should still apply. You shouldn't keep that voicemail for an unreasonable amount of time. That's not bad business practice either: erase the voicemail once you called back, so you know that call is handled. The customer may request that you share that voicemail, per the GDPR, and you'll need to make sure that the request comes from the person who made the call. But that's luckily something you only need to do if anyone ever asks.

licence contract between a freelancer and a client

A client found a graphical artist freelancer online, which is located on the other side of the globe. The freelancer finished the work and his end product is an Adobe Photoshop file, which is sent to the client. The client than incorporates this file, (possibly with other files), to create his end product -> image. The client does not resell the original item freelancer sent, nor does the client own it. If there is ever a DMCA complaint by the freelancer, how can the client prove, that he/she indeed made a deal with the freelancer? What kind of licence must the freelancer transfer to the client? How do you transfer it? This seems such a common scenario and one would expect there is a template for such licences. Yet, google is kinda vague on the topic.

The client will have to rely on their evidence that they have a contractual arrangement with the freelancer to create the thing, if they don't have a license for the product. Permission to use the freelancer's stuff is required, which could be in the form of an explicit license, or an implicit license arising from the fact that the client paid the freelancer to create the thing (which implies "and let us use it", though this would have to be sorted out in court). Suppose for example you have an exchange of emails where you say "We'd like an X", and he says "I can do that for $N", you agree, and you pay him. That is sufficient to establish his permission for you to use the thing. Signatures for such agreements are really not required: what's needed is evidence that there was an agreement in the first place. As for DMCA takedown, freelancer files a notice and asserts the item was used without permission, then client can file a counter-notice. At that point, freelancer has to either file suit, or else the allegedly infringing material gets put back up. Client only has to prove something in court, when being sued by freelancer. Emails, for example, showing that there was an agreement would be useful – if you have no proof whatsoever that you even had such an arrangement, that would be a bit of a problem. In general, if a person wants to make use of and distribute stuff created by another person (where the other person would hold the copyright), it is in the client's interest to protect themselves from lawsuit by getting a license to use the material. However, client probably needs to hire an attorney to draft a generic license agreement. Licenses like the CC licenses generally say "Anybody can use this, with certain conditions", which freelancer presumably would not agree to (and could be contrary to the interest of client). There are very many possible approaches: assign copyright to client; grant client a permanent exclusive license to us in any way they want; grant client a nonexclusive license to use in a very specific way for a couple of years, etc. Essentially, there is not and cannot be a one size fits all approach to restrictive licenses.

Do I need to verify the licensing of an image to be used on a clients website?

A client has sent me an image to use on her home page. If this image is stolen, am I (or my company) held liable? Side/follow up question: In my personal work contracts, I add a clause stating that I assume all images sent by the client are OK to use and I am not responsible if not. Does this protect me sufficiently?

Assume that the image is protected by copyright, and there is no license to copy it. I assume you are a programmer who would be assembling a web page for the client, and you have a copy of the image, let's say on a thumb drive. What you would do is make a copy from the thumb drive, to a server. Without authorization of the copyright owner this act would infringe the copyright. The client might also be liable for contributory infringement. It is legally pointless to say that you assume that all material is "okay": you cannot disclaim liability for copyright infringement that way. It may be possible to disclaim liability for damage to the client, but it is impossible to disclaim liability that you have to a third part in this manner. Instead, contracts typically have an indemnity clause, which states that the client must protect you by covering your legal costs and whatever damages you are assessed, if their wrongful act lands you in trouble. Of course verifying that the client has the right to use the image is also the simplest way to avoid lawsuits.

Employer Won't Release 401k

A client of mine came today with a scenario that I had never seen. She had worked for a company for three years, held about $60K in a 401K, but four months after being laid off she hasn't been able to rollover her funds to an IRA. Since she's had trouble finding a job in software (cutbacks), she doesn't want to sue or cause legal trouble for her former employer, as it would cause a loss of money and look bad for future companies. However, $60K isn't nothing and the company's plan is expensive (no index funds; every mutual fund has a minimum of a 1.5% fee) Is it legal for a company to hold 401k money after a layoff for over four months? The administrator cannot let her transfer because they have not received any lay off notice. In her case, she doesn't want to sue for obvious reasons even though I feel she's being bullied; are there any other options she has - such as a form to submit to the administrator requesting the funds that can override the lack of a notice?

This sounds like a really bad communication issue. I would contact the company to find out what is up and inform them politely that they have been given more than a "reasonable" time to release the 401k. I would also inform them that they need to expedite the notice and offer to stay on the phone while they contact the plan administrator. If they give you any resistance or if the issue persist, I would inform them that they may be in violation of the Department of Labor ERISA guidelines and may be subject to fines by the Department of Labor. If you get any attitude, file a complaint with the Department of Labor (Federal). I would also call the plan administrator and ask them to verify employment since she has not been employed. That may go a bit further. Just as a personal comment, I have noticed with companies that are not doing the right thing because you are the little guy, is that filing complaints is easier than lawsuits. No company wants the Department of Labor on there back looking at their records or books. And normally, the governing agencies will motivate the company to do the right thing. One time I sent an email to the CEO of the company and within 48hrs my issue was solved.

Lawyer forgot to file the paperwork and now has no case: what to do?

A close friend of mine had a legitimate suit against a large business. He was directly harmed, the business was caught and punished (for harming him and many other clients), and my friend joined a group lawsuit against this business. The lawyer running the lawsuit met with my friend and told him, "Sorry but I forgot to file your case in time. There's nothing I can do. The statute of limitations is up for you." It's a little more involved in that but I don't understand legalese. That is the gist. The lawyer was nice and apologized but this seems like a real bad deal for my friend. Everyone else in the case still moves forward, only my friend is out. Is my friend completely out of luck?

This is a fairly general answer, as much of the nature of what could happen depends on what the first lawyer did or didn't do, state of Missouri laws, and rules of the Missouri State Bar. The friend could find another lawyer so they both can determine exactly what happened with the forgotten filing by the first lawyer. Your friend will need to find a lawyer who has no conflicts of interest with the first lawyer, which could be difficult. The first lawyer will realize they need to be truthful about what happened. The new lawyer could advise your friend if the forgotten filing was negligence, an "honest mistake" according to the lawyer, or somewhere in between, and if it might be possible to recover damages for not being part of the original suit, or for breach of contract, etc. With that evidence, your friend, with the advice and/or help of the new lawyer, could either 1) file a ethics or disciplinary complaint with the Missouri office that disciplines lawyers for ethics and other violations Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel . 2) sue the first lawyer for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty or for breach of contract. Your friend could file an ethics complaint with the OCDC - and without the aid of a lawyer - with whatever information he/she already has from their work with the first forgetful lawyer. The OCDC complaint process is geared towards non-lawyers. But if your friend gets help from others (non-lawyers) with filing a complaint, check with the OCDC first as to if that is allowed and to what degree.

Who owns a video recording of a sporting event?

A colleague of mine recorded an sporting event on his mobile phone. He then forwarded the video to me. I entered the video in a competition on a television program. The video won and the prize is $1000 Australian dollars. I notified the colleague of the award and suggested that we will split the prize money. However he wants the full $1000 prize, claiming he is the rightful owner of the video. Is he the owner of the video? And is he entitled to the prize?

Pay him the $1,000: it's his video so it his money. If you're lucky he won't sue you for copyright infringement. If you're very lucky he won't sue the TV station for copyright infringement (because they would immediately sue you under the indemnity clause you undoubtedly signed when you submitted a video you said you owned but didn't). If you're extremely lucky he might buy you a beer.

Can non-consentually recorded conversations be used as evidence?

A collection company calls a client. When the client is connected to the collection company agent. The agent informs the client that the call will be recorded. If the client states, "I do not consent to being recorded" but continues the conversation. Can that recording be used as evidence later on during a court case regarding collections?

It depends on the country/state. Non-consensually recorded conversations cannot be used as evidence if both these conditions are met: Exclusionary rule applies (which means illegally obtained evidence cannot be used in court); AND "Two-party consent" law applies (which means consent from both parties is required for the conversation recording to be legal). If either of those conditions is not met, then recording can be used as evidence. Furthermore, if condition 1 (exclusionary rule) is not met, then recording can be used as evidence regardless how it was obtained — even if intercepted by a third party.

What torts can a person not yet admitted to the bar represent before a California state or federal court?

A comment on a recent question stuck with me: "[L]ay people can't prosecute [torts] in California". Is this correct? And if so, to what extent? What torts can and cannot be prosecuted by a layman. I am hoping to receive one or two case laws too so that I could research the topic further.

A non-lawyer can bring torts committed against them in their own name as pro se parties in their own name. They cannot sue for torts committed against others including entities in which they are officers, or persons for whom they are guardians, nor can they represent someone else in their efforts to do so. A handbook written for California judges does not anywhere suggest a greater limitation than that. Neither does a guide for pro se parties in federal courts in California (see also here ). Labor law and civil rights claims are routinely filed pro se in California's federal courts . California's state courts have standard court forms for pro se parties to use in state court to sue for torts like personal injury and fraud. The comment that: "[L]ay people can't prosecute [torts] in California", appears to be not literally true. Either the implied meaning was that they cannot prosecute torts committed against someone other than themselves, or the comment was mistaken. It is also possible that the person making the comment meant that it was not as a practical matter possible to be successful in doing so because it is so difficult. There may be a limited exception for law students in a legal clinic working under the supervision of a law school professor.

In what language(s) are laws written in Puerto Rico?

A comment on the recent question about the possibility of U.S. laws in Spanish mentioned an assumption that Puerto Rican law would be mostly in Spanish. Not being familiar with Puerto Rican law, this comment just made me curious whether or not that assumption is correct. Are Puerto Rican laws indeed written primarily (or entirely) in Spanish? Or are they written primarily or entirely in English? Or are they written in both in parallel? It seems that having them written in Spanish only would be problematic for federal court cases arising from them, since the federal courts ( including the one in Puerto Rico ) would be conducting any proceedings in the English language - and comparing the Puerto Rican laws with U.S. federal law and existing case law, which are also in English. On the other hand, having laws that much of the local populace couldn't read would also be problematic. (As background for those who may not be familiar with Puerto Rico, it is a territory of the United States, but Spanish is by far the primary local language there .)

It depends on the language used to pass the statutes, but if in doubt then Spanish prevails. See section 13 of the Civil Code: In case of discrepancy between the English and Spanish texts of a statute passed by the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico, the text in which the same originated in either house, shall prevail in the construction of said statute, except in the following cases: (a) If the statute is a translation or adaptation of a statute of the United States or of any State or Territory thereof, the English text shall be given preference over the Spanish. (b) If the statute is of Spanish origin, the Spanish text shall be preferred to the English. (c) If the matter of preference cannot be decided under the foregoing rules, the Spanish text shall prevail.

How to effectively search laws?

A common answer to problems and situations includes researching your state/country's law to check what are the consequences of a particular action. As a layman, it is difficult to do this research effectively, since it's hard to find a comprehensive resource/channel of this information, and Legislative Language is complex and very structured. Is there a method I can consistently apply for most political regions (Country or State) in order to do this research, and efficiently find what I'm looking for?

This really depends on what you're looking for . For example, if you want the details of a specific regulation or the statutory definition of some term, the internet is pretty good! If you can't follow legal language, or if you want to know whether something is legal , you probably have to hire a lawyer. In general you can't effectively determine the legality or legal consequences of an action: As noted in this answer , even the enumeration of laws is an unsolved problem. But you can look for "safe harbors" ... if you know in which statutes or case law you are likely to find them. This is one reason we can't just kill all the lawyers ;)

Removal of branding constituting trademark infringement

A common brand of commercial refrigerators used in stores in my country all have the following sticker on them (emphasis mine): Trademark Infringement The [Brand Name] trademark on this product is infringed if the owner, for the time being, does any of the following: Applies the trade mark to the product after its state, condition, get-up or packaging has been altered in any manner Alters, removes (including part removal) or obliterates (including part obliteration) the trade mark on the product Applies any other trade mark to the product Adds to the product any written material that is likely to damage the reputation of the trade mark Notice of the above contractual obligations passes to: Successors or assignees of the buyer Future owners of the product So they're claiming that removing their branding form one of their products would constitute trademark infringement. Is there any legal basis for this claim (or any of the others)? How could buying one of their units and removing all of their branding from it infringe their trademark?

It’s mostly crap Trademarks in new-zealand do what they do everywhere else: prevent other people from using your trademark to identify their goods or services. Applies the trade mark to the product after its state, condition, get-up or packaging has been altered in any manner It’s still their product so using their trademark to identify it is legal. Even if the change is substantial - consider the Intel Inside trademark for chips inside computers. Alters, removes (including part removal) or obliterates (including part obliteration) the trade mark on the product Nope - your fridge, do what you like with it. Applies any other trade mark to the product This one depends. If you do it in such a way that it could confuse a reasonable person that the fridge is the product of the other trademark, that’s a violation. But if you stick AC/DC stickers to your fridge, it isn’t. Adds to the product any written material that is likely to damage the reputation of the trade mark. Like writing “sux” or “produces crap fridges” after their brand name? Nope, that’s just freedom of speech - or criminal damage if you don’t own the fridge. Now, any or all of these obligations could be made terms of the contract when you buy the product but breaching them would be a contract law matter, not a trademark law matter. In any event, terms on a sticker inside a box are not part of the contract unless it can be proved that you were made aware of and agreed to them. Even if you agreed, it would only apply to successors, assignees, or future owners if they agreed. As written, you have no obligation to ask them to agree when the fridge moves on.

Are U.S. mailboxes federal property?

A common claim seems to be that mailboxes in the United States are federal property ( example , example , example ). (To be clear, some mailboxes are owned and maintained by the USPS, typically cluster boxes, but this is referring to mailboxes purchased and installed by property owners.) The justification for this statement is typically that U.S. code makes mailbox vandalism or use for non-USPS materials a federal crime; thus, USPS has total control over your mailbox. This seems questionable. Obviously, if you go smashing other people's mailboxes or go box to box inserting pamphlets, you are liable to get in trouble with the postal inspector, but that seems unrelated to who owns the mailbox. In fact, the USPS website seems to acknowledge that some mailboxes are privately owned. What is the real story here? Are U.S. mailboxes property of the USPS? To what extent do property owners have control over their own mailbox? Can they deface or place non-mail in their own mailbox? Can they tear it down with no intent to replace it?

The real story is that the articles you link to are logically fallacious. The first hedges its assertions by saying a mailbox is "effectively considered" to be federal property. It cites 18 USC 1705 , which it correctly notes "puts your mailbox under Federal jurisdiction." But that's not the same as assuming ownership of it. The piece also says that you "effectively lease" your mailbox to the federal government, which is a somewhat exaggerated way of putting it, but even if we accept it at face value it falls far short of a claim that the mailbox is federal property. The second concludes that mailbox tampering is a federal offense because "the mailbox belongs to and is controlled by the USPS." There is no evidence offered to support the assertion of ownership, and there is of course an alternative explanation for the fact that mailbox tampering is a federal offense, which is that there are laws such as the aforementioned 18 USC 1705 that prohibit it. These laws, however, say nothing about ownership. The third is ultimately based on the assertion of a letter carrier who said, "Listen, lady, your friends don’t own these mailboxes. We do." The claim was made in explanation of the prohibition against private individuals putting items into a mailbox. As far as I can see, the article is off the mark in another way: that prohibition has nothing to do with safety and security, but rather with protecting the postal service's revenue: it arises from 18 USC 1725 , which explicitly is about avoiding the payment of postage. In any event, it does not establish ownership. In short, the idea that all mailboxes are federal property is a myth, as implied by the USPS page you link to. To what extent do property owners have control over their own mailbox? To a fairly high extent, but they do need to comply with the relevant law. They can't, for example, hang a plastic bottle by the roadside for the purpose of receiving their mail. Can they deface or place non-mail in their own mailbox? 18 USC 1705 actually prohibits willful or malicious injury, tearing down, or destruction of a mailbox, not defacing. So technically, they could, but a prosecution seems highly unlikely. Under section 1725, placing non-mail in the box is only prohibited to the extent that there is intent to avoid paying postage. That would be difficult to establish for someone putting something in their own mailbox. Can they tear it down with no intent to replace it? If they're willing to forego mail delivery, yes. They may be able to arrange to have the mail held for retrieval at the post office. If they do not, their mail will be returned to the sender as undeliverable. This arises from the Domestic Mail Manual, which says (in general) that "customers must provide authorized mail receptacles or door slots" as a condition of city delivery (I could not find a corresponding requirement for rural delivery, but it must exist somewhere). The manual also describes requirements for customer mail receptacles .

What happens if governing law clause specifies a state but not country?

A common clause is "this contract is made in accordance and to be construed by the laws of the state of California". What if something in the the contract applies to federal regulation and law but not state level law? For example laws pertaining to television requirements (such as audio levels) are federal, so would the clause that the contract is to use California law be invalidated since in a sense it should say "US law" (since the law comes from the federal level?)

A choice of law clause stating that the laws of the state of California apply includes all laws, state and federal, that apply if one is located in the state of California, not just state law.

What does it mean for international law to be binding? What is the nature of obligation at international law?

A common critique of international law is expressed in propositions like: "international law is just a gentlemen's agreement," or "no one can enforce international law." What does it mean for international law to be binding? What is the nature of obligation at international law?

Austin's view: the command theory of law—rules of a superior sovereign backed by force The idea that law exists only if the rules are those of a superior sovereign and backed by force is an outdated conception whose most prominant proponent was John Austin . This is known as the "command" theory of law. This clearly cannot explain obligation at international law. But nor can it explain many of the rules in domestic legal systems that we have no problem conceiving of as law (e.g. the law-making process itself, the system of adjudication, rules that confer power, etc.). Modern views: internal sense of obligation The command theory of law has largely been supplanted by other theories of obligation such as that of H.L.A. Hart . In this view, law does not require rules to be backed by threats of force, or to be imposed by a superior sovereign. Law can exist and sustain itself purely through a group's internal point of view: do the participants (states, in the case of international law) " use the rules as standards for the appraisal of their own and others' behaviour" and do they see them as imposing obligations? This focus on the internal viewpoint is actually part of the test for recognizing a norm as customary international law. For something to be customary international law, it must be accomanied by opinio juris . This is a "'psychological' element'" (John H. Currie, Public International Law , p. 195). States need to behave as if a rule has legal obligation. International judicial bodies will look to evidence about how states explain their motives, including how they explain deviations from the rule. H.L.A. Hart explicitly noted the common question, "How can international law be binding?" ( The Concept of Law , "Chapter X: International Law"). His answer: there is something very confusing in this favourite form of question; and before we can deal with it we must face a prior question to which the answer is by no means clear. This prior question is: what is meant by saying of a whole system of law that it is 'binding'? The statement that a particular rule of a system is binding on a particular person is one familiar to lawyers and tolerably clear in meaning. We may paraphrase it by the assertion that the rule in question is a valid rule, and under it the person in question has some obligation or duty . He recognizes that "one source of doubt on this point is simply the absense from the system of centrally organized sanctions." But for all the reasons that this is not the criteria of what makes law law or creates the internal view of obligation, even in domestic systems, this fact does not undercut international law's status as law. He describes nation states' expressed attitude towards the rules of international law: Yet what these rules require is thought and spoken of as obligatory; there is general pressure for conformity to the rules; claims and admissions are based on them and their breach is held to justify not only insistent demands for compensation, but reprisals and counter-measures. When the rules are disregarded, it is not on the footing that they are not binding; instead efforts are made to conceal the facts . In what sense is international law binding? When one makes the assertion that a rule is binding at international law, they are simply describing or predicting that the participants view the rule as generating obligation and duty, likely due to the rule's basis in treaty or customary international law.

Does fleeing across the county line actually work for the Dukes of Hazzard?

A common feature on that old Dukes of Hazzard show was the idea that once them good old Duke boys crossed the county line, they'd be safe from the mean old sheriff and his deputy. Under what circumstances, if any, would that actually work? Answers focusing on 1970s America are welcome, but so are insights into other times and places.

It would not work. There is apparently a common misconception in Georgia that this would be the case, based on Article IX, Section II, Paragraph III (b)(1) of the Georgia constitution, which says: No county may exercise any of the powers listed in subparagraph (a) of this Paragraph [including police protection] or provide any service listed therein inside the boundaries of any municipality or any other county except by contract with the municipality or county affected. What many people miss is the clause right before that: "Unless otherwise provided by law." Georgia courts have held that the law does provide otherwise when pursuing someone for a traffic offense: The plaintiff contends that when the collision occurred, the policeman-deputy sheriff had no authority to be pursuing the Mitchell car because he was outside the county in which he had a power of arrest. While ordinarily a peace officer has power of arrest only in the territory of the governmental unit by which he was appointed, there are two exceptions to the rule present in this case. Code Ann. s 92A-509, which deals with arrests for traffic offenses, provides by implication that certain officers (including deputy sheriffs) have arrest powers for these offenses outside their appointed territories. City of Winterville v. Strickland , 127 Ga. App. 716, 718, 194 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1972) . What that case decided in 1972, the principle was in place well before the boys began their hijinks. I don't know of any state where the law is different, though the answer would be different if the boys crossed into another state.