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As they discussed their options, cavalry commander J.E.B.
Stuart arrived with an intelligence report from his subordinate, Brig.
Howard's XI Corps was camped on the Orange Turnpike, extending past Wilderness Church, and was vulnerable to a flanking attack.
Investigations of a route to be used to reach the flank identified the proprietor of Catharine Furnace, Charles C. Wellford, who showed Jackson's cartographer, Jedediah Hotchkiss, a recently constructed road through the forest that would shield marchers from the observation of Union pickets.
He decided to summon the I Corps of Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds to reinforce his lines at Chancellorsville.
His intent was that Reynolds would form up to the right of the XI Corps and anchor the Union right flank on the Rapidan River.
In fact, both Reynolds and Sedgwick were still west of the Rappahannock, south of the town.
Hooker sent his orders at 1:55 a.m., expecting that Reynolds would be able to start marching before daylight, but problems with his telegraph communications delayed the order to Fredericksburg until just before sunrise.
Reynolds was forced to make a risky daylight march.
By the afternoon of May 2, when Hooker expected him to be digging in on the Union right at Chancellorsville, Reynolds was still marching to the Rappahannock.
Meanwhile, for the second time, Lee was dividing his army.
Jackson would lead his Second Corps of 28,000 men around to attack the Union right flank while Lee exercised personal command of the remaining two divisions, about 13,000 men and 24 guns facing the 70,000 Union troops at Chancellorsville.
For the plan to work, several things had to happen.
First, Jackson had to make a 12-mile (19 km) march via roundabout roads to reach the Union right, and he had to do it undetected.
Second, Hooker had to stay tamely on the defensive.
Third, Early would have to keep Sedgwick bottled up at Fredericksburg, despite the four-to-one Union advantage there.
And when Jackson launched his attack, he had to hope that the Union forces were unprepared.
Confederate cavalry under Stuart kept most Union forces from spotting Jackson on his long flank march, which started between 7 and 8 a.m. and lasted until midafternoon.
Several Confederate soldiers saw the Union observation balloon Eagle soaring overhead and assumed that they could likewise be seen, but no such report was sent to headquarters.
When men of the III Corps spotted a Confederate column moving through the woods, their division commander, Brig.
Gen. David B. Birney, ordered his artillery to open fire, but this proved little more than harassment.
The corps commander, Sickles, rode to Hazel Grove to see for himself and he reported after the battle that his men observed the Confederates passing for over three hours.
Sedgwick did not take action from the discretionary orders.
Sickles, however, was enthusiastic when he received the order at noon.
Jackson had ordered the 23rd Georgia Infantry to guard the rear of the column and they resisted the advance of Birney and Berdan at Catherine Furnace.
The Georgians were driven south and made a stand at the same unfinished railroad bed used by Wright's Brigade the day before.
Hill's division turned back from the flanking march and prevented any further damage to Jackson's column, which by now had left the area.
Most of Jackson's men were unaware of the small action at the rear of their column.
As they marched north on Brock Road, Jackson was prepared to turn right on the Orange Plank Road, from which his men would attack the Union lines at around Wilderness Church.
However, it became apparent that this direction would lead to essentially a frontal assault against Howard's line.
Fitzhugh Lee met Jackson and they ascended a hill with a sweeping view of the Union position.
Jackson was delighted to see that Howard's men were resting, unaware of the impending Confederate threat.
Although by now it was 3 p.m., Jackson decided to march his men two miles farther and turn right on the Turnpike instead, allowing him to strike the unprotected flank directly.
The attack formation consisted of two lines—the divisions of Brig.
Significant contributions to the impending Union disaster were the nature of the Union XI Corps and the incompetent performance of its commander, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard.
Howard failed to make any provision for defending against a surprise attack, even though Hooker had ordered him to do so.
The Union right flank was not anchored on any natural obstacle, and the only defenses against a flank attack consisted of two cannons pointing out into the Wilderness.
Also, the XI Corps was not well respected – an outfit with poor morale and no history of battlefield success.
Many of its officers and enlisted men were immigrants from Germany and other parts of Central Europe, including a number of political refugees from the 1848 revolutions.
The corps had been formed in the spring of 1862 by merging Brig.
Gen Louis Blenker's division with Maj. Gen John C. Frémont's Mountain Department in West Virginia.
After a miserable trek across Virginia in which Blenker's troops were provisioned inadequately and suffered from widespread hunger, disease, and desertion, they joined with Fremont in a campaign that resulted in them being soundly defeated by Stonewall Jackson.
Fremont's army became part of Maj. Gen John Pope's Army of Virginia in the summer.
Fremont had refused to serve under Pope and was replaced by Maj. Gen Franz Sigel, an inept political general who, however, was much beloved by his German troops.
Louis Blenker fell from a horse during the Northern Virginia campaign and suffered injuries that would claim his life later in 1863.
The corps suffered heavy casualties at Second Bull Run and was left behind in Washington D.C. during the Maryland campaign.
During the Fredericksburg campaign, it did not join the rest of the army until after the battle was over.
After Hooker took command, Sigel was the ranking general behind him.
Gen Francis Barlow, who had a reputation of being aggressive martinets.
Eight of the 27 regiments in the corps had never been in battle before, while the remaining 21 had never been on the winning side of a battle.
As far as Hooker knew, the only possible route for a Confederate attack was along the turnpike, which would cause them to run right into the II and XII Corps, both elite outfits and well-entrenched.
Further north, the Union line was held by the V Corps, also first-rate troops occupying an almost impregnable position.
As the day wore on, the men of the XI Corps became increasingly aware that something was going on in the woods to the west of them, but were unable to get any higher-ups to pay attention.
Col. John C. Lee of the 55th Ohio received numerous reports of a Confederate presence out there, and Col. William Richardson of the 25th Ohio reported that huge numbers of Confederates were massing to the west.
Col. Leopold von Gilsa, who commanded one of two brigades in Brig.
Gen Charles Devens' division, went to Howard's headquarters warning him that an all-out enemy assault was imminent, but Howard insisted that it was impossible for the Confederates to get through the dense woods.
Dilger next went to Howard's headquarters, but was merely told that the Confederate army was retreating and that it was not acceptable to make scouting expeditions without permission of higher-ups.
As the sun started to go down, all remained quiet on the XI Corps's front, the noises of the III and XII Corps engaging Lee's rear guard coming from off in the distance.
Most of the men of the XI Corps were encamped and sitting down for supper and had their rifles unloaded and stacked.
Their first clue to the impending onslaught was the observation of numerous animals, such as rabbits and foxes, fleeing in their direction out of the western woods.
This was followed by the crackle of musket fire, and then the unmistakable scream of the "Rebel Yell".
Two of von Gilsa's regiments, the 153rd Pennsylvania and 54th New York, had been placed up as a heavy skirmish line and the massive Confederate assault rolled completely over them.
A few men managed to get off a shot or two before fleeing.
The pair of artillery pieces at the very end of the XI Corps line were captured by the Confederates and promptly turned on their former owners.
Devens's division collapsed in a matter of minutes, slammed on three sides by almost 30,000 Confederates.
Col. Robert Reily and his 75th Ohio managed to resist for about ten minutes before the regiment disintegrated with 150 casualties, including Reily himself, and joined the rest of the fleeing mob.
Some men tried to stand and resist, but they were knocked over by their fleeing comrades and a hail of Confederate bullets.
Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz ordered his division to shift from an east-west alignment to north-south, which they did with amazing precision and speed.
They resisted for about 20 minutes and "Leatherbreeches" Dilger managed to drive the Confederates off the turnpike for a bit with his guns, but the sheer weight of Jackson's assault overwhelmed them, too, and they soon had to flee.
Dilger for a time stood alone with a gun firing double-shotted canister at the attackers, then limbered up to flee as the Confederates closed in on him.
Three of his artillery horses were shot dead, and when he realized that the gun could not be moved, he had to abandon it.
General Howard partially redeemed his inadequate performance prior to the battle by his personal bravery in attempting to rally the troops.
He stood shouting and waving a flag held under the stump of his amputated arm lost at the Battle of Seven Pines in 1862, ignoring the danger of the heavy rifle fire, but he could only gather small pockets of soldiers to resist before his corps disintegrated.
Col. Adolf Buschbeck's brigade put up a last-ditch stand along with Dilger's guns.
They too had to retreat, but maintained good order as they went.
The chaos unfurling on the Union right had gone unnoticed at Hooker's headquarters until at last the sound of gunfire could be heard in the distance, followed by a panic-stricken mob of men and horses pouring into the Chancellorsville clearing.
Artillerymen around the clearing began moving guns into position around Fairview Cemetery.
Meanwhile, down at Hazel Grove, the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry were relaxing and awaiting orders to chase after Confederate wagon trains, also oblivious to the collapse of the XI Corps.
The regiment's commander, Maj. Pennock Huey, received a notice that General Howard was requesting some cavalry.
Huey saddled up his men and headed west along the turnpike, where they ran straight into Robert Rodes's division.
After a confused fight, the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry retreated to the safety of the Chancellorsville clearing with the loss of 30 men and three officers.
By nightfall, the Confederate Second Corps had advanced more than 1.25 miles, to within sight of Chancellorsville, but darkness and confusion were taking their toll.
The attackers were almost as disorganized as the routed defenders.
Although the XI Corps had been defeated, it had retained some coherence as a unit.
The corps suffered nearly 2,500 casualties (259 killed, 1,173 wounded, and 994 missing or captured), about one quarter of its strength, including 12 of 23 regimental commanders, which suggests that they fought fiercely during their retreat.
Jackson's force was now separated from Lee's men only by Sickles's corps, which had been separated from the main body of the army after its foray attacking Jackson's column earlier in the afternoon.
Like everyone else in the Union army, the III Corps had been unaware of Jackson's attack.
When he first heard the news, Sickles was skeptical, but finally believed it and decided to pull back to Hazel Grove.
Sickles became increasingly nervous, knowing that his troops were facing an unknown number of Confederates to the west.
A patrol of Jackson's troops was driven back by Union gunners, a minor incident that would come to be exaggerated into a heroic repulse of Jackson's entire command.
Between 11 p.m. and midnight, Sickles organized an assault north from Hazel Grove toward the Plank Road, but called it off when his men began suffering artillery and rifle friendly fire from the Union XII Corps.
Stonewall Jackson wanted to press his advantage before Hooker and his army could regain their bearings and plan a counterattack, which might still succeed because of the sheer disparity in numbers.
He rode out onto the Plank Road that night to determine the feasibility of a night attack by the light of the full moon, traveling beyond the farthest advance of his men.
When one of his staff officers warned him about the dangerous position, Jackson replied, "The danger is all over.
As he and his staff started to return, they were incorrectly identified as Union cavalry by men of the 18th North Carolina Infantry, who hit Jackson with friendly fire.
Jackson's three bullet wounds were not in themselves life-threatening, but his left arm was broken and had to be amputated.
While recovering, he contracted pneumonia and died on May 10.
His death was a devastating loss for the Confederacy.
Some historians and participants—particularly those of the postbellum Lost Cause movement—attribute the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg two months later to Jackson's absence.
The Union gunners at Fairview Cemetery were alert and nervous; they were a few hundred yards behind Berry's division and still-intact elements of the XI Corps and they found it quite impossible to fire their guns without the shells going over the heads of the infantrymen in front of them.
Howard's XI Corps had been defeated, but the Army of the Potomac remained a potent force and Reynolds's I Corps had arrived overnight, which replaced Howard's losses.
About 76,000 Union men faced 43,000 Confederate at the Chancellorsville front.
The two halves of Lee's army at Chancellorsville were separated by Sickles's III Corps, which occupied a strong position on high ground at Hazel Grove.
Unless Lee could devise a plan to eject Sickles from Hazel Grove and combine the two halves of his army, he would have little chance of success in assaulting the formidable Union earthworks around Chancellorsville.
Fortunately for Lee, Joseph Hooker inadvertently cooperated.
Early on May 3, Hooker ordered Sickles to move from Hazel Grove to a new position on the Plank Road.
As they were withdrawing, the trailing elements of Sickles's corps were attacked by the Confederate brigade of Brig.
Gen. James J. Archer, which captured about 100 prisoners and four cannons.
Hazel Grove was soon turned into a powerful artillery platform with 30 guns under Col. Porter Alexander.
After Jackson was wounded on May 2, command of the Second Corps fell to his senior division commander, Maj. Gen. A.P.
Gen. Robert E. Rodes, the next most senior general in the corps, and Rodes acquiesced in Hill's decision to summon Maj. Gen. J.E.B.
Stuart to take command, notifying Lee after the fact.
Although Stuart was a cavalryman who had never commanded infantry before, he was to deliver a creditable performance at Chancellorsville.
By the morning of May 3, the Union line resembled a horseshoe.
On the left were the remnants of the XI Corps, and the right was held by the V and I Corps.
On the western side of the Chancellorsville salient, Stuart organized his three divisions to straddle the Plank Road: Heth's in the advance, Colston's 300–500 yards behind, and Rodes's, whose men had done the hardest fighting on May 2, near the Wilderness Church.
The attack began about 5:30 a.m. supported by the newly installed artillery at Hazel Grove, and by simultaneous attacks by the divisions of Anderson and McLaws from the south and southeast.
The Confederates were resisted fiercely by the Union troops behind strong earthworks, and the fighting on May 3 was the heaviest of the campaign.
The initial waves of assaults by Heth and Colston gained a little ground, but were beaten back by Union counterattacks.
Rodes sent his men in last and this final push, along with the excellent performance of the Confederate artillery, carried the morning battle.
Chancellorsville was the only occasion in the war in Virginia in which Confederate gunners held a decided advantage over their Federal counterparts.
Confederate guns on Hazel Grove were joined by 20 more on the Plank Road to duel effectively with the Union guns on neighboring Fairview Hill, causing the Federals to withdraw as ammunition ran low and Confederate infantrymen picked off the gun crews.
Fairview was evacuated at 9:30 a.m., briefly recaptured in a counterattack, but by 10 a.m. Hooker ordered it abandoned for good.
The loss of this artillery platform doomed the Union position at the Chancellorsville crossroads as well, and the Army of the Potomac began a fighting retreat to positions circling United States Ford.
The soldiers of the two halves of Lee's army reunited shortly after 10 a.m. before the Chancellor mansion, wildly triumphant as Lee arrived on Traveller to survey the scene of his victory.
At the height of the fighting on May 3, Hooker suffered an injury when at 9:15 a.m. a Confederate cannonball hit a wooden pillar he was leaning against at his headquarters.
If he was attacked in "overwhelming numbers," Early was to retreat to Richmond, but if Sedgwick withdrew from his front, he was to join with Lee at Chancellorsville.
On the morning of May 2, Early received a garbled message from Lee's staff that caused him to start marching most of his men toward Chancellorsville, but he quickly returned after a warning from Brig.
Gen. William Barksdale of a Union advance against Fredericksburg.
At 7 a.m. on May 3, Early was confronted with four Union divisions: Brig.
Albion P. Howe and William T. H. Brooks—were arrayed in line from the front of the town to Deep Run.
Most of Early's combat strength was deployed to the south of town, where Federal troops had achieved their most significant successes during the December battle.
Marye's Heights was defended by Barksdale's Mississippi brigade and Early ordered the Louisiana brigade of Brig.
Gen. Harry T. Hays from the far right to Barksdale's left.
By midmorning, two Union attacks against the infamous stone wall on Marye's Heights were repulsed with numerous casualties.
A Union party under flag of truce was allowed to approach ostensibly to collect the wounded, but while close to the stone wall, they were able to observe how sparsely the Confederate line was manned.
A third Union attack was successful in overrunning the Confederate position.
Early was able to organize an effective fighting retreat.
John Sedgwick's road to Chancellorsville was open, but he wasted time in gathering his troops and forming a marching column.
His men, led by Brooks's division, followed by Newton and Howe, were delayed for several hours by successive actions against the Alabama brigade of Brig.
His final delaying line was a ridge at Salem church, where he was joined by three brigades from McLaws's division and one from Anderson's, bringing the total Confederate strength to about 10,000 men.
Artillery fire was exchanged by both sides in the afternoon and at 5:30 p.m., two brigades of Brooks's division attacked on both sides of the Plank Road.
The advance south of the road reached as far as the churchyard, but was driven back.
The attack north of the road could not break the Confederate line.
The fighting on May 3, 1863, was some of the most furious anywhere in the civil war.
The loss of 21,357 men that day in the three battles, divided equally between the two armies, ranks the fighting only behind the Battle of Antietam as the bloodiest day of war in American history.
Lee observed that Hooker was threatening no offensive action, so felt comfortable ordering Anderson's division to join the battle against Sedgwick.
He sent orders to Early and McLaws to cooperate in a joint attack, but the orders reached his subordinates after dark, so the attack was planned for May 4.
By this time Sedgwick had placed his divisions into a strong defensive position with its flanks anchored on the Rappahannock, three sides of a rectangle extending south of the Plank Road.
Early's plan was to drive the Union troops off Marye's Heights and the other high ground west of Fredericksburg.
Before noon, Lee arrived with Anderson's division, giving him a total of 21,000 men, slightly outnumbering Sedgwick.
Despite Lee's presence, McLaws continued his passive role and Anderson's men took a few hours to get into position, a situation that frustrated and angered both Early and Lee, who had been planning on a concentrated assault from three directions.
Harry T. Hays and Robert F. Hoke) pushed back Sedgwick's left-center across the Plank Road, but Anderson's effort was a slight one and McLaws once again contributed nothing.
Throughout the day on May 4, Hooker provided no assistance or useful guidance to Sedgwick, and Sedgwick thought about little else than protecting his line of retreat.
Sedgwick withdrew across the Rappahannock at Banks's Ford during the pre-dawn hours of May 5.
When he learned that Sedgwick had retreated back over the river, Hooker felt he was out of options to save the campaign.
He called a council of war and asked his corps commanders to vote about whether to stay and fight or to withdraw.
Although a majority voted to fight, Hooker had had enough, and on the night of May 5–6, he withdrew back across the river at U.S. Ford.
Rains caused the river to rise and threatened to break the pontoon bridges.
Couch was in command on the south bank after Hooker departed, but he was left with explicit orders not to continue the battle, which he had been tempted to do.
The surprise withdrawal frustrated Lee's plan for one final attack against Chancellorsville.
He had issued orders for his artillery to bombard the Union line in preparation for another assault, but by the time they were ready Hooker and his men were gone.
But he paid a terrible price for it, taking more casualties than he had lost in any previous battle, including the Confederate defeat at the Battle of Antietam.
With only 60,000 men engaged, he suffered 13,303 casualties (1,665 killed, 9,081 wounded, 2,018 missing), losing some 22% of his force in the campaign—men that the Confederacy, with its limited manpower, could not replace.
Gen. Elisha F. Paxton was the other Confederate general killed during the battle.
After Longstreet rejoined the main army, he was highly critical of Lee's strategy, saying that battles like Chancellorsville cost the Confederacy more men than it could afford to lose.
Of the 133,000 Union men engaged, 17,197 were casualties (1,606 killed, 9,672 wounded, 5,919 missing), a percentage much lower than Lee's, particularly considering that it includes 4,000 men of the XI Corps who were captured on May 2.
When comparing only the killed and wounded, there were almost no differences between the Confederate and Federal losses at Chancellorsville.
Hooker's errors included abandoning his offensive push on May 1 and ordering Sickles to give up Hazel Grove and pull back on May 2.
He also erred in his disposition of forces; despite Abraham Lincoln's exhortation, "this time put in all your men," some 40,000 men of the Army of the Potomac scarcely fired a shot.
There is no evidence that Hooker and Doubleday ever met during the Gettysburg campaign, and they could not have done so since they were dozens of miles apart.
Finally, Doubleday made no mention of such a confession from Hooker in his history of the Chancellorsville campaign, published in 1882.
Couch was so disgusted by Hooker's conduct of the battle (and his incessant political maneuvering) that he resigned and was placed in charge of the Department of the Susquehanna, commanding only Pennsylvania militia.
President Lincoln chose to retain Hooker in command of the army, but the friction between Lincoln, general in chief Henry W. Halleck, and Hooker became intolerable in the early days of the Gettysburg campaign and Lincoln relieved Hooker of command on June 28, just before the Battle of Gettysburg.
The new assignments for the latter two generals caused some command difficulties in the upcoming Gettysburg campaign, which began in June.
Of more consequence for Gettysburg, however, was the supreme confidence that Lee gained from his great victory at Chancellorsville, that his army was virtually invincible and would succeed at anything he asked them to do.
The Chancellor family, whose house was destroyed during the battle, placed the entire 854-acre property for sale four months after the battle.
A smaller version of the house was rebuilt using some of the original materials, which served as a landmark for many of the veteran reunions of the late 19th century.
In May 2002, a regional developer announced a plan to build 2,300 houses and 2,000,000 square feet of commercial space on the 790-acre Mullins Farm, site of the first day of fighting at the Battle of Chancellorsville.
Soon thereafter, the American Battlefield Trust, then known as The Civil War Trust, formed the Coalition to Save Chancellorsville, a network of national and local preservation groups that waged a vocal campaign against the development.
For nearly a year, the Coalition mobilized local citizens, held candlelight vigils and hearings, and encouraged residents to become more involved in preservation.
Public opinion polling conducted by the Coalition found that more than two-thirds of local residents opposed the development.
The survey also found that 90 percent of local residents believed their county has a responsibility to protect Chancellorsville and other historic resources.
As a result of these efforts, in March 2003 the Spotsylvania County Board of Supervisors denied the rezoning application that would have allowed for the development of the site.
Immediately following the vote, the Civil War Trust and other Coalition members began working to acquire the battlefield.
By working with county officials and developers, the Trust acquired 140 acres in 2004 and another 74 acres in 2006.
The Battle of Chancellorsville was depicted in the 2003 film Gods and Generals, based on the novel of the same name.
The treatment of the battle in both the novel and the movie focuses on Jackson's assault on the Union right flank, his wounding, and his subsequent death.
The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website.
Fishel, Edwin C. The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War.
Conshohocken, PA: U.S. National Park Service and Eastern National, 1995. .
Goolrick, William K., and the Editors of Time-Life Books.
Krick, Robert K. Chancellorsville—Lee's Greatest Victory.
New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1990. .
Livermore, Thomas L. Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America 1861–65.
Reprinted with errata, Dayton, OH: Morninside House, 1986. .
U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1880–1901.
It is a derived form of Johannes Kepler's laws of planetary motion (which Kepler had first obtained empirically).
The is considered one of the most important works in the history of science.