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19. Defendant regularly collects or attempts to collect debts asserted to be owed to others. 20. Defendant is regularly engaged, for profit, in the collection of debts allegedly owed by consumers. 21. The principal purpose of Defendant's business is the collection of such debts. 4 22. Defendant uses the mails in its debt collection business. 23. Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 24. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (the “alleged Debt”). 25. The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 26. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. 27. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 28. At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 29. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. 30. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by calls to Plaintiff's telephone. 31. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff in writing, including by letter dated February 13, 2021 (the “Letter”). (A true and accurate copy of the Letter is annexed hereto as Exhibit 1). 32. The Letter was the initial written communication Plaintiff received from Defendant concerning the alleged Debt. 33. The Letter conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt. 34. The Letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 35. The Letter was received and read by Plaintiff. 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g protects Plaintiff's concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest and right to receive a clear, accurate and unambiguous validation notice, which allows a consumer to confirm that he or she owes the debt sought to be collected by the debt collector. As set forth herein, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of this right. 37. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e protects Plaintiff's concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest and right to be free from deceptive and/or misleading communications from Defendant. As set forth herein, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of this right. 38. Plaintiff's injury is “particularized” and “actual” in that the letter that caused the injury was addressed and sent to Plaintiff specifically. 5 39. Plaintiff's injury is directly traceable to Defendant's conduct, because Defendant sent the Letter. 40. A favorable judicial resolution of Plaintiff's case would redress Plaintiff's injury with damages. 41. The deprivation of Plaintiff's rights will be redressed by a favorable decision herein. 42. Plaintiff has been misled by Defendant's actions. 43. Plaintiff justifiably fears that, absent this Court's intervention, Defendant will continue to use abusive, deceptive, unfair and unlawful means in its attempts to collect the Debt. 44. Plaintiff justifiably fears that, absent this Court's intervention, Defendant will ultimately cause him unwarranted economic harm. 45. As a result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff was forced to hire counsel and therefore has incurred damages including reasonable attorneys' fees in reviewing Plaintiff's rights under the law and prosecuting this claim. 46. As a result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff's counsel was forced to expend time and money to investigate the enforceability of the Debt. 47. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff can prove that all actions taken by Defendant as described in this Complaint were taken willfully, with either the desire to harm Plaintiff with knowledge that its actions would very likely harm Plaintiff, and/or with knowledge that its actions were taken in violation of the law. 48. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 49. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 50. As relevant here, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) requires the written notice provide the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 51. To comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2), a statement of the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed must clearly, accurately and without ambiguity convey, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the actual name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 6 52. Even if a debt collector conveys the required information, the debt collector nonetheless violates the 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) if it conveys that information in a confusing or contradictory fashion so as to cloud the required message with uncertainty in the eyes of the least sophisticated consumer. 53. Merely naming an entity without specifically identifying the entity as the creditor to whom the debt is owed is not sufficient to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 54. The Letter fails to clearly identify the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 55. The Letter states “Please allow this letter to intrudce Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC as the owner and current creditor of your referenced account. 56. The Letter lists “Cellco Pasrtnership DBA Verizon Wireless” as the “Original Creditor.” 57. The Letter then lists “Verizon” as the “Current Creditor.” 58. The Letter fails to indicate the name of Plaintiff's creditor to whom the alleged Debt is owed in a manner that is clear and unambiguous. 59. The least sophisticated consumer could read the Letter and be led to believe that Cellco Pasrtnership DBA Verizon Wireless is his creditor. 60. The least sophisticated consumer could read the Letter and be led to believe that Verizon is his creditor. 61. The least sophisticated consumer could read the Letter and be led to believe that Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC is his creditor. 62. The Letter fails to indicate the owner of the alleged Debt clearly and without ambiguity. 63. The Letter fails to indicate who referred the account to Defendant. 64. The Letter fails to indicate who Defendant represents. 65. The Letter fails to indicate the name of any entity to which payment should be made. 66. As a result of such failures, Defendant did not clearly convey, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the owner of the alleged Debt as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 67. As a result of such failures, the least sophisticated consumer would likely be 7 confused and uncertain as to the owner of the alleged Debt. 68. As a result of such failures, Defendant did not clearly, accurately and without ambiguity convey, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the creditor to whom the alleged Debt is owed as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 69. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 70. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 71. A debt collection practice can be a “false, deceptive, or misleading” practice in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e even if it does not fall within any of the subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 72. A collection letter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if, in the eyes of the least sophisticated consumer, it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. 73. A collection letter also violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if it is reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading by the least sophisticated consumer. 74. For purposes of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, the failure to clearly and accurately identify the owner of a debt is unfair and deceptive to the least sophisticated consumer. 75. The owner of a debt must be clearly, accurately, accurately and without ambiguity conveyed from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer. 76. The identity of the owner of a debt is a material piece of information to a consumer. 77. Knowing the identity of the owner of a debt affects how a consumer responds to a debt collector's attempts to collect the debt. 78. Defendant failed to explicitly state the owner of the alleged Debt. 79. Defendant failed to clearly state the owner of the alleged Debt. 80. The least sophisticated consumer would likely be confused as to the owner of the alleged Debt. 81. The least sophisticated consumer would likely be uncertain as to owner of the alleged Debt. 8 82. Because the Letter can reasonably be read by the least sophisticated consumer to have two or more meanings concerning the owner of the alleged Debt, one of which is inaccurate as described, it is deceptive within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 83. Because the Letter is reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading by the least sophisticated consumer concerning the owner of the alleged Debt as described, it is deceptive within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 84. The least sophisticated consumer would likely be deceived by the Letter. 85. The least sophisticated consumer would likely be deceived in a material way by the Letter. 86. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a)(2), 1692e and 1692e(10) and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 87. Plaintiff brings claims, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”) Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the following consumer classes (the “Class”) consisting of: a. All consumers who have an address the State of New York. b. who were sent a collection letter from the Defendant c. attempting to collect a consumer debt d. which states “Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC as the owner and current creditor” that lists more than one “Current Creditor.” e. That lists “Cellco Partnership DBA Verizon Wireless” as Original Creditor. f. That purports Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC to be the owner and current creditor but lists “Verizon” as Current Creditor. g. which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date 21 days after the filing of this action. 88. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 89. Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendants and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 9 90. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Classes, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit 1, violates the FDCPA for the reasons set forth herein. 91. The Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 92. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Classes defined in this complaint. 93. The Plaintiffs have retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiffs nor their attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 94. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that the Plaintiff Classes defined above are so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Classes and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit 1, violates the FDCPA. c. Typicality: The Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiffs and all members of the Plaintiff Classes have claims arising out of the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiffs have no interests that are averse to the absent class members. The Plaintiffs are committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiffs have also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiffs nor their counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. 10 e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 95. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Classes predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 96. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiffs may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 97. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 98. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant's conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws.

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(Violation of the Georgia Minimum Wage Statute) 11. Plaintiffs worked as employees hired by Defendants to provide services to medically home-bound clients of Defendants, at the residences of those clients. While their hourly rates of pay varied, all were subject to the same pay policies and practices as all other persons working in this or a similar capacity for Defendants. As such, Plaintiffs represent all similarly situated persons employed by Defendants for purposes of a class action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23 and performed the same work as the rest of the Class Members. 12. Defendants paid Class Members for some, but not all of their hours worked. 19. Named Plaintiffs bring this case pursuant to O.C.G.A § 9-11-23, against Defendants for violation of Georgia's minimum wage law. The case is brought on behalf of all Class Members, as defined in Paragraph 10 of this Complaint. 20. Because the proposed class has thousands of persons, joinder of all members is impracticable. 27. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 as if fully set forth herein. 31. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 31 as if fully set forth herein. 32. Plaintiffs and the Class Members were not compensated for time worked, thereby unjustly enriching Defendants and depriving Plaintiffs and the Class members of the fair value of the work performed on behalf of Defendants. 34. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 33 as if fully set forth herein. 7. Defendant Res-Care, Inc. is a Kentucky corporation licensed to do business in Georgia. Res-Care's registered agent for service of process in Georgia is CT CORPORATION SYS'T'EM, 8. Each Defendant is an "employer" within the meaning of the Georgia Minimum Wage Law and each Plaintiff is a "covered employee" within the meaning the Georgia Minimum Wage Law, and has standing to maintain this action on behalf of themselves and other employees similarly situated, as well as standing to bring the cause of action for violation of Georgia Minimum Wage Law and standing under O.C.G.A § 9-11-23 to maintain this case as a class action for violation of Georgia Minimum Wage Law and for other claims described in this Complaint Attorney Fees and Expenses of Litigation, O.C.G.A. § ,13-6-11 Equitable Claims - Quantum Meruit and Unjust Enrichment GA 30361. STATE OF GEORGIA MARGARET ANDERSON, � )

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a bicycle retailer that owns and operates www.ridedelsol.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in October of 2019, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.ridedelsol.com. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, the user is redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader fails to communicate that the link is broken. As a result, a visually impaired user is not able to return to or continue his original search. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly, to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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10. On or about November 15, 2019, Defendant sent an unsolicited facsimile to Plaintiff using a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device. See Exhibit A. Plaintiff received the Fax on a traditional stand-alone fax machine. 12. The Fax advertises the commercial availability or quality of Defendant’s new healthy lifestyle program, Mutually Well by Mutual of Omaha. 13. Defendant created or made Exhibit A, or directed a third party to do so, and Exhibit A was sent by or on behalf of Defendant with Defendant’s full knowledge and authorization. 14. Defendant receives some or all of the revenues from the sale of the services advertised on Exhibit A, and Defendant profits and benefits from the sale of said services advertised on Exhibit A. 15. Plaintiff did not give Defendant “prior express invitation or permission” to send the fax. 16. On information and belief, Defendant faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimile advertisements without the required opt-out language to Plaintiff and at least 40 other recipients or sent the same and other advertisements by fax with the required opt-out language but without first receiving the recipients’ express invitation or permission and without having an established business relationship as defined by the TCPA and its regulations. 18. Defendant’s facsimile attached as Exhibit A does not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 C.F.R. § 227(b)(1)(C) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4). 19. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the TCPA, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendant, (3) from whom Defendant did not obtain “prior express invitation or permission” to send fax advertisements, or (4) with whom Defendant did not have an established business relationship, or (5) where the fax advertisements did not include an opt-out notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii). Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its employees, agents and members of the Judiciary. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class which includes, but is not limited to, the fax advertisement sent to Plaintiff. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class certification discovery. 20. Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 23. Fair and Adequate Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)): Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts, and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 25. The TCPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 26. The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 29. The Fax. Defendant sent the Fax on or about November 15, 2019, via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class. The Fax constituted an advertisement under the Act and the regulations implementing the Act. Defendant failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Fax. The Fax was transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission and/or Defendant is precluded from asserting any prior express invitation or permission or that Defendant had an established business relationship with Plaintiff and other members of the class, because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, Defendant violated the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Fax via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class which includes this Fax and all others sent during the four years prior to the filing of this case through the present. 31. The TCPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendant’s violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 32. The TCPA is a strict liability statute, so Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the other class members even if its actions were only negligent. 33. Defendant knew or should have known that (a) Plaintiff and the other class members had not given prior express invitation or permission for Defendant or anybody else to send faxes advertising the commercial availability or quality of Defendant’s new healthy lifestyle program; (b) Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship; (c) Defendant transmitted advertisements; (d) the Fax did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice; and (e) Defendant’s transmission of advertisements that did not contain the required opt-out notice or were sent without prior express invitation or permission was unlawful.

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15. Plaintiff never provided her cellular telephone number to RCI and never provided her consent – written or otherwise – to RCI to be contacted on her cellular telephone. 16. Nonetheless, within the last four years RCI began calling Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, number 614-xxx-0632, from numerous different telephone number. 17. Plaintiff was physically located in this District when she received some of RCI’s calls. 18. When Plaintiff answered the calls from RCI, she heard an identical prerecorded and/or artificial female robotic-sounding voice stating the message was from “Marriott Hotels” and telling her that she had purportedly been chosen for a complimentary vacation. 19. The recording further advised Plaintiff that she could press 0 or 1 for more information or could “press 2” to be placed on a “do-not-call list.” 20. Plaintiff has repeatedly listened to the above recordings and then pressed ‘2’ to be placed on a do-not-call list and to ask RCI to cease calling her. 21. Nonetheless, RCI’s calls persisted. 22. Following her receipt of several calls from RCI after asking RCI to stop the calls, Plaintiff pressed ‘0’ in order to speak to a live representative and determine the identity of the caller. After waiting on the line for an extended period of time, Plaintiff was eventually transferred to a live RCI representative who disclosed that RCI was the caller placing the above calls. 23. RCI’s calls directly interfered with Plaintiff’s right to peacefully enjoy a service that Plaintiff paid for and caused Plaintiff a significant amount of anxiety, frustration, annoyance, and anger. 24. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 25. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the following classes (the “Classes”): Prior Express Written Consent Class: All persons within the United States to whom (1) RCI placed one or more prerecorded or artificial voice telemarketing calls, (2) to said person’s cellular telephone, (3) without prior express written consent, (4) within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. Do-Not-Call Class: All persons within the United States to whom (1) RCI placed one or more prerecorded or artificial voice telemarketing calls, (2) to said person’s cellular telephone, (3) after advising RCI to place them on a ‘do-not-call list,’ (4) within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. 26. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Classes but believes the class members number in the several thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. B. Numerosity 27. Upon information and belief, Defendant placed prerecorded and artificial voice calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to thousands of persons throughout the United States where it lacked prior express written consent to place such calls and/or such persons had previously requested to be placed on RCI’s ‘do-not-call’ list. The members of the Classes, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 28. The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s records. C. Common Questions of Law and Fact 29. There are questions of law and fact common to the Classes that predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. These questions include: a. Whether RCI’s calls to members of the Classes were placed for telemarketing purposes; b. Whether RCI placed prerecorded and artificial voice calls to persons’ cellular telephones after said persons requested to put on RCI’s ‘do-not-call’ list; c. Whether RCI can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior express written consent to place each telemarketing call; d. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and/or willful; e. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and f. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 30. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely places prerecorded and artificial voice calls to cellular telephone numbers without prior express consent, and over requests to stop the calls is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. D. Typicality 31. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all based on the same factual and legal theories. E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members 32. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. F. Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable 33. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecutions of separate claims against Defendant is small because it is not economically feasible for Class members to bring individual actions. 34. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 35. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of herself and the Classes. 36. Defendant placed telemarketing calls using a prerecorded and/or an artificial voice to cellular telephones belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes without their prior express written consent and not for any emergency purpose. 37. Moreover, Defendant placed telemarketing calls using a prerecorded and/or an artificial voice to cellular telephones belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes after they asked to be put on RCI’s ‘do-not-call’ list. 38. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a violation of the 42. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 43. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of herself and the Classes. 44. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed telemarketing calls using a prerecorded and/or an artificial voice to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express written consent and not for any emergency purposes. 45. Moreover, Defendant knowing and/or willfully placed telemarketing calls using a prerecorded and/or an artificial voice to cellular telephones belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes after they asked to be put on RCI’s ‘do-not-call’ list. 46. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a knowing and willful violation of the TCPA. 47. Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to an award of up to $1,500.00 in statutory damages for each message sent in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 48. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. 49. Further, Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to and seek a declaration from Defendant that:  Defendant knowingly and/or willfully violated the TCPA;  Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed prerecorded and/or artificial voices to calls to Plaintiff and the Classes who had previously asked to be placed on RCI’s ‘do-not-call’ list;  Defendant willfully placed calls to Plaintiff and the Classes without prior express consent; and  It is Defendant’s practice and history to place prerecorded and artificial voice telemarketing calls to persons without their prior express consent. A. The Classes VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ. WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ.

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15. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“The Class”). 16. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class defined as follows: “All persons in California whose inbound and outbound telephone conversations were monitored, recorded, eavesdropped upon and/or wiretapped without their consent by Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of the original Complaint in this action.” 26. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 27. Californians have a constitutional right to privacy. Moreover, the California Supreme Court has definitively linked the constitutionally protected right to privacy within the purpose, intent and specific protections of the Privacy Act, including specifically, Penal Code § 632. “In addition, California’s explicit constitutional privacy provision (Cal. Const., 1 § 1) was enacted in part specifically to protect California from overly intrusive business practices that were seen to pose a significant and increasing threat to personal privacy. (Citations omitted). Thus, we believe that California must be viewed as having a strong and continuing interest in the full and vigorous application of the provisions of section 632 prohibiting the recording of telephone conversations without the knowledge or consent of all parties to the conversation. Kearney v. Salmon Smith Barney, Inc., (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 95, 125. 28. California Penal Code § 632 prohibits one party to a telephone call from intentionally recording the conversation without the knowledge or consent of the other party. Penal Code § 632 is violated the moment the recording is made without the consent of all parties thereto, regardless of whether it is subsequently disclosed that the telephone call was recorded. The only intent required by Penal Code § 632 is that the act of recording itself be done intentionally. There is no requisite intent on behalf of the party doing the surreptitious recording to break California law or any other law, or to invade the privacy right of any other person. 36. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 37. Defendant invaded Plaintiff the members of The Class’ right to privacy by intentionally allowing the unauthorized eavesdropping, wiretapping, recording, and listening of the telephone conversation with Plaintiff and the members of The Class and negligently maintaining the confidentiality of the information of Plaintiff and the members of The Class, as set for above. 38. The intrusion through the unauthorized eavesdropping, wiretapping, recording, and listening of the telephone conversations with Plaintiff and the members of The Class and the negligently maintaining of the confidentiality of the information of Plaintiff and The Class, was offensive and objectionable to Plaintiff, the Class, and to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. 39. The intrusion was into a place or thing which was private and which is entitled to be private, in that Plaintiff and The Class’ personal conversations and information provided to Defendant were made privately, were intended not to be recorded, and were intended to be kept confidential and protected from unauthorized disclosure. 40. As a proximate result of Defendant’s above acts, Plaintiff and The Class’ personal conversations and information were intentionally wire-tapped, eavesdropped, recorded, and listened to, and then distributed and used by persons without prior written authorization, and Plaintiff and The Class suffered general damages in an amount to be determined at trial according to proof. 43. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 44. Defendant, as aforesaid herein, has various statutory and common law duties not to engage in the aforementioned wire-tapping, eavesdropping, recording, and listening conduct such that Plaintiff and The Class’ rights to privacy were invaded and breached. 45. Defendant negligently and recklessly engages in the aforementioned eavesdropping, wiretapping, recording, and listening conduct of Plaintiff and The Class. 46. These activities of Defendant as aforesaid in this cause of action and in this Complaint, legally caused actual, statutorily-imposed and/or demonstrable damages to Plaintiff and The Class. 47. As a result of Defendant’s activities as aforesaid in this cause of action and Complaint, Plaintiff and The Class suffered damage as a result of the conduct of Defendant. Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to their damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial. 8. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was an individual residing within the State of California. 9. On or about February 23, 2012 Plaintiff had a telephone communication with certain employees, officers and/or agents of Defendant that were initiated by Defendant. This conversation with Plaintiff was, without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent, recorded, monitored, and/or eavesdropped upon by Defendant, causing harm and damage to Plaintiff. Only at the end of the conversation, when Plaintiff asked defendant’s representative, “Justin”, whether the call was being recorded, did Defendant, via its representative, informed Plaintiff that some calls were recorded. At no time during these calls did Plaintiff give his consent for the telephone calls to be monitored, recorded and/or eavesdropped upon. Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): Brief description of cause: VII. REQUESTED IN INVASION OF PRIVACY: COMMON LAW INVASION OF PRIVACY: VIOLATION OF PENAL CODE § 630 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENCE UNLAWFUL, FRAUDULENT AND UNFAIR BUSINESS ACTS AND PRACTICES IN VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200, ET SEQ.

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17. Specifically, Plaintiff made a cash withdrawal from Defendant’s ATM at the following locations: (a) On or about September 1, 2012, Plaintiff made an electronic fund transfer at Defendant’s ATM located at 2306 Alcoa Highway, Alcoa, Tennessee 37701. Defendant charged Plaintiff a fee of $2.00 in connection with the above-described transaction. 18. At the time of the above-described electronic transaction, Plaintiff did not maintain any accounts with Defendant. 19. At the time of the above-described transaction, Defendant was acting as an “automated teller machine operator” that operated the automated teller machine at which Plaintiff initiated an electronic fund transfer or a balance inquiry. 20. However, at the time of the above-described transaction, there was no notice posted “on or at” the ATM operated by Defendant apprising consumers that a fee would be charged for use of the ATM. 21. Because Defendant did not post the required notice, it was not permitted to charge a usage fee to Plaintiff and other class members. 22. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 23. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of persons to be defined as follows: All persons who during the year preceding the filing of Plaintiff’s complaint: 1) where charged a “terminal fee” at Defendant’s ATM located at 2306 Alcoa Highway, Alcoa, Tennessee 37701, which was operated by Defendant when such persons made an electronic fund transfer and/or balance inquiry where, 2) no notice indicating that such fee was to be charged was posted on or at the outside of the ATM machine. 24. Congress expressly intended that the EFTA would be enforced, in part, through private class actions. 15 U.S.C. § 1693m(a). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff Don Anderson’s Class Action Complaint - 6 - 25. The EFTA’s class action enforcement provisions are identical, in relevant part, to the class action enforcement provisions of other consumer protection statutes and housed within the Consumer Credit Protection Act. (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.) There is abundant authority interpreting and applying these statutory class action provisions, throughout the federal judiciary. Federal courts have routinely certified classes relating to consumer claims for statutory damages, generally, and for violation of the EFTA’s ATM fee disclosure provisions, specifically. See, e.g., Hammer v. JP’s Southwestern Foods, LLC, No. 08-cv-0339 (W.D. Mo.)(Gaitan, J.); Flores, supra 2008 WL 4861511 at 3-5; Burns, supra., 2006 WL 3754820 at *11-12; Jackman v. Global Cash Access Holdings, 09-cv-897 (W.D. Pa.)(McVerry, J.)(class certified and final settlement approval granted); Nolf v. Allegheny Bank of Pittsburgh, 09-cv-645 (W.D.Pa.)(Bissoon, J.)(class certified and final settlement approval granted); Dragotta v. Northwest Bancorp, Inc. d/b/a Northwest Savings Bank, 09-cv-632 (W.D. Pa.)(Fischer, J.) .)(class certified and final settlement approval granted); Parker v. First-Citizen Bank & Trust Company, 09-cv-0588 (M.D. Tenn.)(Campbell, J.) .)(class certified and final settlement approval granted); Polevoy v. Devon Bank, 08-cv-4822 (N.D. Ill.)(Kennelly, J.) (class certified and final settlement approval granted);Ochart v. Broadway Bank, 08-cv-4893, (N.D. Ill.)(Castillo, J.)(class certified and final settlement approval granted);Anthony v. Fifth Third Bank (Chicago), 08-cv-4359, (N.D. Ill)(Schenkier, J.)(class certified and final settlement approval granted); Zintel v. Financial Partners Credit Union, (C.D. CA), SACV 09-0868. (class certified and final settlement approval granted). 26. Numerosity: The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 27. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that there are at minimum, thousands of members of the class described above. 28. The exact size of the class and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff Don Anderson’s Class Action Complaint - 7 - 29. Members of the class may be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in class actions, such as by published notice, e-mail notice, website notices, first class mail, or combinations thereof, or by other methods suitable to this class and deemed necessary and/or appropriate by this Court. 30. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful and willful conduct. 31. Plaintiff and members of the class were each consumers who used an ATM machine operated by Defendant to make an electronic fund transfer or balance inquiry and were charged a terminal owner fee, notwithstanding that the posting providing notice of the fee required by EFTA “on or at” Defendant’s terminals was not present. 32. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class. 33. The questions of fact and law common to the class predominate over questions which may affect individual members and include the following: a. Whether, under 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(A) and 12 C.F.R. 205.16, Defendant was, at all relevant times, an automated teller machine operator that imposed a fee on consumers for providing host electronic fund transfer services to those consumers; b. Whether Defendant complied with the notice requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1693(d)(3)(B) and 12 C.F.R. 205.16; and, c. Whether Plaintiff and members of the class are entitled to statutory damages, costs and/or attorneys’ fees for Defendant’s acts and conduct. 34. Adequacy of Representations: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who is competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff Don Anderson’s Class Action Complaint - 8 - 35. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of the class. While the aggregate damages which may be awarded to the members of the class are likely to be substantial, the damages suffered by the individual members of the class are relatively small. As a result, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it economically infeasible and procedurally impracticable for each member of the class to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. Plaintiff does not know of any other litigation concerning this controversy already commenced by or against any member of the class. The likelihood of the individual members of the class prosecuting separate claims is remote. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent, or contradictory judgments, and would increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same factual issues. In contrast, the conduct of this matter as a class action presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and would protect the rights of each member of the class. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action.

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28. Weyerhaeuser’s TJI Joists with Flak Jacket Protection are part of its Trus Joist floor system, which, according to Weyerhaeuser, is a result of “[m]ore than 50 years of wood research and technology.” Weyerhaeuser has represented that “a survey of builders” determined that “TJI joists were the number one brand in quality, familiarity and usage.” 29. Flak Jacket is a Weyerhaeuser “proprietary, factory-applied coating” that purportedly “enhances the joist’s fire resistance.” 31. Since at least December 1, 2016, Weyerhaeuser has coated the Joists with a Flak Jacket coating that includes a formaldehyde-based resin. 32. Weyerhaeuser has sold or distributed the Joists throughout Colorado and the United States for installation in homes and other structures, including homes that reside families, senior citizens and children. 33. Marketing materials obtained from Weyerhaeuser’s own website represent that its Joists “offer the high-performance flooring [consumers] rely on with the fire-resistance that new regulations require,” “do[] not require special handling,” and are “backed by Weyerhaeuser support.” 34. Weyerhaeuser’s sales brochures and marketing literature, that were widely distributed to building professionals who installed the Joists, and that were available to Plaintiffs and the Class at the time of sale, similarly tout the superior characteristics of the Joists. 35. Plaintiffs and the Class, and their builders, relied on Weyerhaeuser’s representations and advertising concerning the Joists when they purchased the Joists. 36. Weyerhaeuser widely advertises that its Joists carry a lifetime warranty. Building professionals and consumers appropriately and reasonably interpret Weyerhaeuser’s warranty and representations to mean that the product should not need to be replaced during the lifetime of a home or other structure in which the Joists are installed. 38. Given that the Joists need to be immediately repaired, removed and/or replaced, the Joists have not lived up to Weyerhaeuser’s representations and warranties. II. Weyerhaeuser’s Joists Are Defective 39. Because of a defect in the design, formulation, and manufacture of the Joists, the Joists emit excessive levels of noxious and toxic gases. These dangerous gases render the homes and other structures in which the Joists are installed uninhabitable, and pose a serious safety risk to those who enter these home and other structures. 40. These defects have manifested themselves uniformly in the Joists installed in the homes and other structures of Plaintiffs and the Class. 41. At present, there are thousands of Class members, including Plaintiffs, whose homes and other structures incorporate Weyerhaeuser’s defective Joists and who have observed or otherwise experienced the uniform defects described herein. 42. Some of the homes and structures at issue have already been subject to testing by builders and customers, that evidences the defect with the Joists, as described herein. 43. As a direct result of the readily observable and uniform defects inherent in the Joists, Weyerhaeuser has halted all production, sales and shipments of the Joists and now refers to the Joists as “temporarily discontinued.” 55. This action has been brought and may be properly maintained as a nationwide class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of the following class: All persons and entities who own or who have signed contracts to purchase homes or other structures located in the United States in which Weyerhaeuser TJI Joists with Flak Jacket Protection are or were installed (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class is Defendant and Defendant’s legal representatives, assigns and successors. 56. This action has also been brought and may be properly maintained as a Colorado class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of the Colorado Class defined as follows: All persons and entities who own or who have signed contracts to purchase homes or other structures located in the State of Colorado in which Weyerhaeuser TJI Joists with Flak Jacket Protection are or were installed (the “Colorado Class”). Excluded from the Class is Defendant and Defendant’s legal representatives, assigns and successors. 57. The Class and Colorado Class are collectively referred to below as the “Classes.” Plaintiffs reserve the right to redefine the Classes prior to class certification. 60. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes. As a result of the uniform defects inherent in the Joists’ formulation, the defective Joists have caused Plaintiffs and all members of the Classes to suffer damages. 62. Plaintiffs and the members of the Classes have all suffered and will continue to suffer harm and damages as a result of Weyerhaeuser’s conduct as described herein. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Absent a class action, the vast majority of Class members likely would not be in a position to litigate their claims individually and would have no effective remedy at law through which to vindicate their claims against Weyerhaeuser and be made whole. Class treatment of predominating common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions, in that class treatment would conserve the resources of the courts and the litigants, and will further the efficient adjudication of Class members’ claims. 63. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 64. Weyerhaeuser marketed and sold its Joists into the stream of commerce with the intent that the Joists would be purchased by contractors, subcontractors and end-users for installation in homes and other structures owned and purchased by Plaintiffs and the Classes. 65. Prior to filing this lawsuit, Plaintiffs provided written notice to Weyerhaeuser of the breach of warranty. 67. Pursuant to Weyerhaeuser’s express warranty, Weyerhaeuser is to pay costs for repair or replacement of the defective Joists. In exchange for these duties and obligations, Weyerhaeuser received payment of the purchase price for the Joists from Plaintiffs and the Classes. 68. Weyerhaeuser created additional express warranties for the Joists through its sales brochures, catalogs, website and marketing materials. These warranties have full force and effect, notwithstanding any limitations in the “limited warranties” from Weyerhaeuser. 69. Weyerhaeuser made the express warranties to the ultimate consumers, including Plaintiffs and the Classes. 70. The limitations and exclusions in Weyerhaeuser’s warranties are unconscionable and unenforceable. 71. The consequential or incidental losses sustained by Plaintiffs and the Classes are within the contemplation of the parties, and therefore should not be prohibited when such bargained for remedy fails of its essential purpose. 72. Weyerhaeuser’s purported “limited warranty” fails of its essential purpose in that it limits recovery to a multiple of the purchase price of the Joists themselves when adequate repair, replacement and/or removal of the Joists will cost far in excess of the limited amount. 73. Because Weyerhaeuser’s warranty fails in its essential purpose, Plaintiffs and the Classes are entitled to recover available damages. 75. Weyerhaeuser failed to perform as required under its purported warranties and breached said contracts and agreements by providing Plaintiffs and the Classes with Joists that were defective and unfit for their intended use and did not perform as promised, and failed to appropriately replace the Joists or otherwise provide relief. 76. The Joists fall well short of the lifetime guarantee as their defective nature is evident immediately upon installation of the Joists or occupation of the structure. 77. Weyerhaeuser breached its express warranties to Plaintiffs and the Classes by designing, manufacturing, marketing and selling Joists that were defective and not fit for their intended use as durable and long-term home building products. As detailed herein, the Joists did not perform as expressly promised and were fraught with uniform defects. 78. Weyerhaeuser knew that its Joists were defective, yet continued to represent that they were free of defects. Plaintiffs and members of the Classes had no ability to detect the defect nor received notice thereof, and did not receive notice on a timely basis. Based on facts within its control, Weyerhaeuser knew or should have known of the defective nature of the Joists long before its July 18, 2017 press release. 79. Plaintiffs and the Classes have relied on Weyerhaeuser’s express warranties to their detriment. 81. Weyerhaeuser is on actual notice of its breaches, as Weyerhaeuser noted in its own press release that the Joists are defective. In addition, builders and consumers across the United States have put Weyerhaeuser on notice of its breaches. Furthermore, Plaintiffs provided notice to Weyerhaeuser of its breaches prior to filing this lawsuit. 82. As a result of Weyerhaeuser’s breach of its express warranties, Plaintiffs and the Classes have suffered actual damages, in that they have purchased and installed in their homes and other structures Joists that are defective and not at all suitable for their intended purpose. These defects have caused and will continue to cause Plaintiffs and the Classes to expend substantial resources repairing and/or replacing their Joists and to address any collateral damages to their underlying homes and structures proximately caused by the defective Joists. 83. Plaintiffs and the Classes reserve their right to seek all damages available by statute or law. 84. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 85. Weyerhaeuser designed, manufactured, and sold the Joists knowing that they would be used in constructing consumers’ homes. 86. Weyerhaeuser was a merchant of the Joists and marketed, promoted, and sold the Joists to the consuming public. 88. Weyerhaeuser warranted to the Plaintiffs that the Joists were of a quality that would pass without objection in the trade and were at least fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods were used, and in all other respects were of merchantable quality. 89. Plaintiffs relied on that warranty. 90. Weyerhaeuser breached its implied warranty of merchantability because the Joists were not of merchantable quality and were unfit for the ordinary purposes for which they were designed and were used. 91. Prior to filing suit, Plaintiffs notified Weyerhaeuser of the defective nature of its Joists and of its breach of the implied warranty of merchantability within a reasonable time of its discovery. 92. Given the significance of the Joists to the structure of Plaintiffs’ home and the homes of Class members – supporting the floors – any limitation of remedies claimed by Weyerhaeuser must fail of its essential purpose in that significant damage to property will occur and the replacement of the Joists cannot be accomplished without considerable consequential cost and expense. 93. As a result of Weyerhaeuser’s breach of its implied warranties, Plaintiffs and the Classes have suffered actual damages, in that they have purchased and installed in their homes and other structures joists that are defective and not at all suitable for their intended purpose. These defects have caused and will continue to cause Plaintiffs and the Classes to expend substantial resources repairing, removing and/or replacing their Joists and addressing any collateral damages to their underlying homes and structures proximately caused by the defective Joists. 95. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 96. Defendant sold and impliedly warranted the Joists to be fit for the purpose of constructing a home to serve as a residence. 97. The Joists were not suitable for the purpose because they emitted noxious and toxic gases into Plaintiffs and Class members' homes. 98. Plaintiffs home used the product in the manner in which it was intended to be used, namely as a floor joist. This use was reasonably expected by and foreseeable to Defendant. BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY I. Weyerhaeuser Misrepresented The Joists’ Characteristics And Breached Its Warranties To The Class

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18. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone call from Defendant or Defendant’s agent/s and/or employee/s to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint wherein said person had not previously consented to receive any such call/s 19. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of All persons within the United States who received any telephone call from Defendant or Defendant’s agent/s and/or employee/s to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint wherein said person had not previously consented to receive any such call/s. 20. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class members number in the hundreds, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 21. The Class is so numerous that the individual joinder of all of its members is impractical. While the exact number and identities of The Class members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that The Class includes hundreds if not thousands of members. Plaintiff alleges that The Class members may be ascertained by the records maintained by Defendant. 6. Beginning in or around January 2017, Defendant began placing autodialed telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 9293, which Plaintiff has possessed exclusively since approximately 2011. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Injunctive relief.  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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11. Neither the scripted nor the pre-recorded message identifies the name of the debt collection company, that the call was an attempt to collect a debt, that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, or that the communication was from a debt collector. 12. PLAINTIFF is informed and believes and therefore alleges that PLAINTIFF and the class members are entitled to statutory damages and may have also suffered damages in other ways and to other extents not presently known to PLAINTIFF, and not specified herein. PLAINTIFF reserves the right to assert additional facts and damages not referenced herein, and/or to present evidence of the same at the time of trial. 13. PLAINTIFF repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, paragraphs 1 through 12 inclusive, above. 15. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims as Congress specifically envisioned class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C.§ 1692k. The members of the class are generally unsophisticated consumers, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would also create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards and would not be in the best interest of judicial economy. 16. If facts are discovered to be appropriate, PLAINTIFF will seek to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 17. PLAINTIFF repeats, re-alleges and incorporates by reference, paragraphs 1 through 16 inclusive, above. 19. Further, a debt collector is prohibited from placing “telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity”. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6). 20. In July of 2014, DEFENDANT began placing calls to PLAINTIFF’S phone number in connection with the collection of a consumer debt. DEFENDANT left the following scripted and pre-recorded messages, respectively, on PLAINTIFF’S cell phone: This message is intended for Rochelle Beaulieu, claim number 501- 5975. If this is not Rochelle disregard this message or contact us so we can update our records. This is Mike Carol calling in regards to a file that was submitted into my office. I need to verify information so you have the opportunity to address the claim and or claims against you. At this point you're required to contact our firm to discuss a voluntary resolution to this matter. We can be reached at 855-893-7266. Claim number on your file is 501-5975. This message. This message is solely intended for <Rochelle Beaulieu>. If you are not <Rochelle Beaulieu>, please hang up now and disregard this message. We are handling a claim in our office. We are making every effort to reach you in order to resolve this matter voluntarily and at this time we are waiting to hear from you. Press 0 to speak with your representative or call us now at 855-847-8504. The file number is <501- 5975>. Please contact our firm immediately to prevent a default status on this claim. Again press 0 now or you may be subjected to a default status within our firm. 21. DEFENDANT’s scripted and pre-recorded messages fail to identify the name of the debt collector in an attempt to trick the consumer into calling DEFENDANT back. 22. Further, DEFENDANT’s scripted and pre-recorded messages fail to identify that the call was an attempt to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, or that the communication was from a debt collector. 24. It has been necessary for PLAINTIFF to obtain the services of an attorney to pursue this claim, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated, and is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees therefor. 9. PLAINTIFF repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, paragraphs 1 through 8 inclusive, above. VIOLATIONS OF THE FDCPA 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(6) and e(2), e(11) BROUGHT BY PLAINTIFF INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS

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18. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and those similarly situated were employees of Defendants, DOES 1 to 10, and each of them, and were engaged in the occupation of computer analyst, computer programmer, computer technician, network technician, or other information technology role not properly classified as an exempt/salaried position. 19. Prior to approximately August 16, 2012, Plaintiff and those similarly situated were treated as exempt and were paid on a salary basis. Thereafter, Plaintiff and those similarly situated were made hourly employees. 20. Defendants, DOES 1 to 10, and each of them changed Plaintiff and those similarly situated from salaried exempt employees to hourly employees as alleged above due to an allegation that Defendants, DOES 1 to 10, and each of them had misclassified employees as exempt. The allegation was meritorious. 37. All prior paragraphs are incorporated by reference as though stated fully here. 38. Plaintiff and class members were at all relevant times non-exempt employees of Defendants. Each was entitled to payment of overtime wages for any overtime worked, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 USC 207). Plaintiff’s work duties during the time period of 2012-2015 consisted of executing computer operations such as batch processing, along with operations support of pre-installed software. Plaintiff was not a computer systems analyst, programmer, or software engineer. Plaintiff’s duties did not involve selection, creation, modification, documentation, design or similarly skilled work with computers; he was an operator. 39. Payment of overtime wages was due on the regular pay date or at the latest by the next regular pay date following performance of overtime work. (29 CFR 778.106.) 40. The regular rate of pay is not determined by agreement of the employer and employee, but is as a matter of law set as an actual fact based upon the amounts typically paid for the work performed. This renders the rate set by Defendants, DOES 1 to 10, and each of them irrelevant for the purposes of overtime determinations. (29 CFR 778.108.) 41. It is unlawful and void for an employer and employee to agree to set rates of pay in a manner designed to avoid overtime laws and regulation. (29 CFR 778.316, 778.317, 778.500 [“Since the term regular rate is defined to include all remuneration for employment … the overtime provisions of the act cannot be avoided by setting an artificially low hourly rate upon which overtime pay is to be based and making up the additional compensation due to employees by other means.”]) 55. All prior paragraphs are incorporated by reference as though stated fully here. 56. Eight hours of labor constitutes a day’s work, and any work in excess of 8 hours in 1 workday and any work in excess of 40 hours in any one workweek and any work on the seventh consecutive day shall be compensated at the rate of no less than one and one half times the regular rate of pay for an employee. Any work in excess of 12 hours in one day, or in excess of 8 hours on the seventh consecutive day shall be compensated at the rate of no less than twice the regular rate of pay for an employee. (Labor Code § 510 and IWC Wage Order No. 4-2001 (“Wage Order”) § 3(A).) 57. Plaintiff and class members are not exempt from California overtime rules of IWC Wage Order No. 4-2001 because, among other things, they do not earn income in excess of the amount required for exemption of employees in the computer software field. (IWC Wage Order 4-2001 § 1(A)(3)(h)(iv) [$41 per hour in 2001, subject to annual increase as specified in the regulation].) Additionally, Plaintiff was not a systems analyst or similarly skilled professional, as pled above. 58. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that during all times relevant to this action, many of Defendants' employees working as on site resident apartment managers, including Plaintiff, worked more than 8 hours per workday on some occasions, and/or more than 40 hours per workweek, and/or performed work on the seventh consecutive day of working in an amount to be proven at trial, but did not receive any overtime wages for overtime hours suffered or permitted to work. 65. All prior paragraphs are incorporated by reference as though stated fully here. 66. Defendants did not provide any accurate paystubs to Plaintiff or those similarly situated at any time during the relevant statute of limitations because: (1) they did not disclose the total hours worked; (2) they did not properly state gross or net income earned; (3) they did not state the actual identity and address of the employer; (4) they did not correctly state the hourly rates of regular or overtime pay. As a result, each and every paystub within the applicable statute of limitations was in violation of Labor Code § 226(a), which sets forth the specific requirements for paystubs in California. 70. All prior paragraphs are incorporated by reference as though stated fully here. 71. The conduct by Defendants, DOES 1 to 10, and each of them, alleged herein was unlawful, including failing pay overtime, willfully using True Up payments as an artifice to lower or avoid overtime obligations, and failing to provide accurate paystubs. 72. Because of the scale of operations in California by Defendants, DOES 1 to 10, and each of them, this wrongful behavior affects a meaningful group of Californians. Specifically, this wrongful behavior affected Plaintiff and class members by causing injury in fact including to nonpayment of wages, denial of labor code rights, and nondisclosure of hours worked and wages due. Given that many or all of the class members, including Plaintiff, are immigrants on an H1B visa, the behavior is repugnant in that it: (a) targets a vulnerable population, and (b) violates the spirit of H1B visa rules by using manipulation of immigrants’ labor rights to lower wages for that vulnerable group while also depressing wages and job opportunity for U.S. Citizens by negatively impacting the employment marketplace. 75. All prior paragraphs are incorporated by reference as though stated fully here. 76. The conduct by Defendants, DOES 1 to 10, and each of them, alleged herein was unfair in a manner tethered to regulatory and statutory obligations under FLSA, Cal. Labor Code, and IWC Wage Orders, including failing pay overtime, willfully using True Up payments as an artifice to lower or avoid overtime obligations, and failing to provide accurate paystubs. 80. All prior paragraphs are incorporated by reference as though stated fully here. 81. Plaintiff and class members had a right to all of the wages they earned in the course and scope of their employment with Defendants, DOES 1 to 10, and each of them. This included but was not limited to their right to overtime wages. 82. Defendants, DOES 1 to 10, and each of them substantially interfered with Plaintiff’s and the class members’ property by knowingly and intentionally taking possession of it after it was earned, preventing Plaintiff and the class members from having access to their money, and refusing to turn over the money owed to Plaintiff and the class members. 83. Plaintiff and the class members did not consent to the foregoing. 84. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff and the class members sustained harm and attendant damages, including loss of income and loss of the use of such income (interest). BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE 17200 (UNLAWFUL PRONG) BY ALL PLAINTIFF AND CALIFORNIA CLASS AGAINST DEFENDANTS, DOES 1 TO 10, AND EACH OF THEM BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE 17200 (UNFAIR PRONG) BY PLAINTIFF AND CALIFORNIA CLASS AGAINST DEFENDANTS, DOES 1 TO 10, AND EACH OF THEM BY PLAINTIFF AND NATIONAL COMMON LAW CLASS AGAINST DEFENDANTS, DOES 1 TO 10, AND EACH OF THEM BY PLAINTIFF AND THE NATIONAL CLASS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS, DOES 1 TO 10 AND EACH OF THEM OVERTIME BY PLAINTIFF AND THE CALIFORNIA CLASS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS, DOES 1 TO 10 AND EACH OF THEM STUBS IN VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE § 226 AND RELATED STATUTES BY PLAINTIFF AND THE CALIFORNIA CLASS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS, DOES 1 TO 10, AND EACH OF THEM VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE § 204, 8 CCR §11040, AND RELATED STATUTES BY PLAINTIFF AND THE CALIFORNIA CLASS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS,

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24. Defendants are an oil and natural gas exploration and production company operating throughout the United States, including Ohio and Pennsylvania. 25. The proposed Putative Class Members worked for Defendants as Solids Control Technicians. Defendant paid all its Solids Control Technicians like Plaintiff a salary and no with overtime pay for hours that they worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 26. As Solids Control Technicians, Plaintiff and the proposed Putative Class Members spent their shifts separating drilling fluid from the solids crushed by the drill bit and carried up to the surface in the drilling fluid. These individuals removed the solids at the surface using screens, centrifuges, dryers, and shakers. The clean mud is recycled back down the hole to the drill bit and the rock, sand, and other particles that were removed from the mud are discarded to prevent damage to expensive equipment. 1 27. The primary job duties of the Solids Control Technicians included setting up, servicing, and operating mud cleaning equipment, including screens, centrifuges, dryers, and shakers. The Solids Control Plaintiffs worked in excess of 40 hours each week while employed by Defendants, often for weeks at time 29. Moreover, the job functions of the Putative Class Members were primarily manual labor/technical in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college education or other advanced degree. 30. The Putative Class Members did not have any supervisory or management duties. 31. All of the Putative Class Members perform the same or similar job duties and are subjected to the same or similar policies and procedures which dictate the day-to-day activities performed by each person. 32. The Putative Class Members also worked similar hours and were denied overtime as a result of the same illegal pay practice. 33. Defendants’ policy of failing to pay their Solids Control Technicians, including Plaintiff, overtime violates the FLSA, Ohio Wage Acts, and PMWA because these workers are, for all purposes, employees performing non-exempt job duties. VI. 53. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs and alleges that the illegal pay practices Defendants imposed on Plaintiff were likewise imposed on the Putative Class Members. 54. Numerous individuals were victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which is in willful violation of the FLSA, Ohio Wage Acts, and PMWA. 55. Numerous other individuals who worked with Plaintiffs indicated they were improperly classified as exempt, paid in the same manner, performed similar work, and were not properly compensated for all hours worked as required by state and federal wage laws. 56. Based on his experiences and tenure with Defendants, Plaintiff is aware that Defendants’ illegal practices were imposed on the Putative Class Members. 57. The Putative Class Members were all improperly classified as exempt and not paid overtime compensation when they worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 58. Defendants failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by state and/or federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Putative Class Members. 59. Plaintiff’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Putative Class Members. 60. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the Putative Class Members do not prevent class or collective treatment. 61. Plaintiff has no interest contrary to, or in conflict with, the Putative Class Members. Like each Putative Class Member, Plaintiff has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages owed to them under state and/or federal law. 63. Absent this action, many Putative Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Defendants will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA and applicable state labor laws. 64. Furthermore, even if some of the Putative Class Members could afford individual litigation against Defendants, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. 65. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 67. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Putative Class Members. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ illegal and uniform employment policy. 68. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its ability to go forward as a collective or class action. 69. Although the issue of damages may be somewhat individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Therefore, this issue does not preclude collective and class action treatment. X.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a cryptocurrency management company, and owns and operates the website, www.blockfi.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.blockfi.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse cryptocurrency accounts for purchase, view a blog, obtain defendant’s contact information, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in April 2021, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website. 26. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: 28. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen- reader users; 29. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and 30. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those various cryptocurrency accounts for purchase, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 34. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 36. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 40. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 41. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 43. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 49. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 51. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 55. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 57. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 58. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 61. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 62. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 63. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 64. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 65. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 67. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 68. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 70. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 71. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 75. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 79. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 80. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 81. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 83. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 85. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 86. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 88. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 89. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 90. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 93. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 95. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 96. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. DECLARATORY RELIEF 100. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 101. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 102. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

win

(Class Action Alleging Violations of Texas Common Law) A. VIOLATIONS OF TEXAS COMMON LAW (Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations) 24. Defendants are a global customer engagement and contact center with fifteen contact centers, that provide customer services, technical support services, and sales and marketing support to their business clients.3 25. On information and belief, Everise is a global customer contact corporation based out of Singapore.4 27. On information and belief, C3 was a customer contact center that has been wholly acquired by Everise and is now operated and controlled by Everise.6 28. To assist its clients, Defendants employ thousands of hourly call-center employees–– Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members––who assist Defendants’ customers and clients. The Plaintiff and Putative Class Members work for Defendants either in call centers owned and operated by Defendants or remotely from home. 29. Defendants are joint employers pursuant to 229 C.F.R. § 791.2. 30. Specifically, Defendant Everise holds itself out as the overall employer of the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members. Hourly Call-Center Employees were told they worked for Everise, applied for the jobs through Everise’s website, and followed Everise’s corporate policies and procedures. 31. Defendant Everise manages key internal relationships to Defendants Truesource and C3—that is, it directs the financials of Defendants Truesource and C3 and controls the pay of Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members. 32. Defendants directly or indirectly hired Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members, controlled their work schedules and conditions of employment, and determined the rate and method of the payment of wages. 34. Defendants maintained control, oversight, and direction over Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members, including the promulgation and enforcement of policies affecting the payment of wages for overtime compensation. 35. Specifically, Defendants created and enforced the enterprise-wide policies and procedures, including the policies that caused the FLSA violations, that the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members had to follow. 36. Defendants did not act entirely independently of each other and have not been completely disassociated with respect to the work of Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members. 37. Specifically, Defendants dictated the practice goals and what pressing or tactical items needed to be done in order to meet the goals of the respective Defendants and/or their clients. 38. Moreover, all Defendants have (or had) the power to hire and fire Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members; supervise and control Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ work schedules and conditions of their employment; determine their rate and method of payment; and, maintain their employment records. 39. As a result, all Defendants are responsible, both individually and jointly, for compliance with all of the applicable provisions of the FLSA and Texas common-law with respect to the entire employment for the workweeks at issue in this case. 40. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ job duties consisted of answering phone calls made by Defendants’ customers, answering customer/client inquiries, fulfilling orders, accepting payments, selling business products, and generally assisting customers/clients. 41. Plaintiff Rodriguez was employed by Defendants in customer service in Corpus Christi, Texas from approximately February 2019 to August 2019. 43. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members typically worked approximately forty (40) “on-the-clock” hours per week. 44. In addition to their forty (40) “on-the-clock” hours, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members regularly worked at least twenty (20) minutes, and on occasion up to four (4) hours, “off- the-clock” per week and have not been compensated for that time. Unpaid Start-Up Time 45. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members have not been compensated for all the hours they worked for Defendants as a result of Defendants’ corporate policy and practice of requiring their hourly call-center employees to clock-in only when ready to take their first call. 46. Specifically, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are required to start and log-in to their computer, read company emails/alerts, open multiple different computer programs, log in to each program, and ensure that each program is running correctly—all of which can take up to twenty minutes—before they are allowed to clock in on the time keeping software application and then take their first phone call. 47. If Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are not ready and on the phone at shift start, they can be (and often are) subject to discipline. 48. If Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members clock in prior to their shift start time, they are also subject to discipline. 49. Therefore, the only way to be ready on time, and avoid discipline, is to prepare the computer “off-the-clock” and without pay. 51. Defendants provide Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members with one unpaid meal break each day. 52. However, Defendants require Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to perform “off-the-clock” work during their unpaid meal breaks. 53. Plaintiff and the Putative Class were required to stay on the clock and on call until the minute their lunch break begins, they then must clock out, then perform a lengthy shut down process, then log out of the phone system or otherwise go into an aux mode, and then log off of their computer prior to leaving their desk for their meal break. 54. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were required to log back into their computer, perform a restart process, log back into the phone system, then clock in, and be back on the phone before their meal break ends. 55. The log off process used prior to taking a meal break can take anywhere from one to three minutes. 56. The log in process used after returning from a meal break can take anywhere from another one to three minutes. 57. This lengthy log off and log in procedure had to be performed during Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ meal break as, per Defendants’ policy. Unpaid Technical Downtime 59. According to Defendants’ policy, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were to clock out and continue troubleshooting until they could bring their system back online and begin making phone calls, at which point they could clock back in. 60. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were not compensated for the time they worked for Defendants rebooting and/or troubleshooting Defendants’ computers after they crashed or experienced other technical difficulties. 61. As a result of Defendants’ corporate policy and practice of requiring Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to perform their computer start up tasks before the beginning of their shifts, perform log-in log out processes during their unpaid lunch break, and requiring Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to clock out while they troubleshoot system issues, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were not compensated for all hours worked, including all worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek at the rates required by the FLSA. 62. Defendants have employed other individuals who perform(ed) the same or similar job duties under the same pay provisions as Plaintiff. 63. Defendants are aware of their obligation to pay overtime for all hours worked and the proper amount of overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) each week, but have failed to do so. 64. Because Defendants did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for all hours worked and time and a half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, Defendants’ pay policies and practices violate the FLSA and Texas state law. V. 85. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 86. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this collective claim is made on behalf of all of Defendants employees who have been similarly situated to Plaintiff with regard to the work they performed and the manner in which they have not been paid. 87. Other similarly situated employees of Defendants have been victimized by Defendants’ patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. 89. Defendants’ failure to pay for all hours worked and overtime compensation at the rates required by the FLSA, results from generally applicable policies and practices of Defendants, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of the Plaintiff or the FLSA Collective Members. 90. Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective Members. 91. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective Members does not prevent collective treatment. 92. All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be properly compensated for all hours worked and the proper amount of overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 93. Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 94. Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Defendants will retain the proceeds of its rampant violations. 95. Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 96. Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as defined as in Paragraph 66 and notice should be promptly sent. 98. Plaintiff Rodriguez further brings this action pursuant to the equitable theory of quantum meruit. See Artemis Seafood, Inc. v. Butcher’s Choice, Inc. No. CIV. A. 3:98-0282, 1999 WL 608853, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 1999) (citing Schuchart & Assocs. V. Solo Serve Corp., 1983 WL 1147, at *23 (W.D. Tex. June 29, 1983)). 99. The Texas Class is defined as:

win

1. An award of the maximum statutory damages for Jerry K. Wong and the Plaintiff Class pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k; 11. As more particularly set forth infra at Paragraphs 12-13, within the one year immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, GT placed telephone calls to the Plaintiff and left telephonic voice messages on his cellular voicemail system (“Messages”). 12. On June 28, 2013, being within one year immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, the Plaintiff received the following message on his cellular voicemail system which could only be left by dialing his cellular telephone number, the voice message was 15 seconds in duration, and is transcribed as follows: “This message is for Jerry Wong, Jerry this is Daniel from Greentree, sir I need a call back from you today, my number is 877-808-0048 my direct extension is 86428 give me a call back at your earliest convenience sir I will be in the office until 8, thank you, have a good one.” 13. On December 4, 2013, being within one year immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, the Plaintiff received the following message on his cellular voicemail system which could only be left by dialing his cellular telephone number, the voice message was 10 seconds in duration and is transcribed as follows: “This message is for Jerry Wong, my name is Calandra I’m calling from Greentree please give me a call at 855-892-8914” 14. In leaving the voice messages, GT sought to collect a debt incurred for personal, family or household purposes, namely fees emanating from a personal mortgage loan. 16. Each of the voice messages transcribed in Paragraphs 12-13 qualifies as a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 17. The mortgage loan went into default in November 2012. (Annexed and attached hereto as “Exhibit A” is a monthly billing statement from Bank of America dated November 29, 2012 and received by the Plaintiff which states in bold letters, “Our records indicate that your loan is in default”) 18. Bank of America transferred servicing rights on the mortgage loan to GT on April 1, 2013 (Annexed and attached hereto as “Exhibit B” is a letter dated March 9, 2013 from Bank of America. stating that Bank of America. was transferring servicing rights on the mortgage loan to GT effective April 1, 2013) 19. GT formally took over serving of the loan on April 1, 2013. 2. Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k; and 20. At the time GT made the phone calls and left the Messages, GT was a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA as it pertains to its relationship with the Plaintiff because GT began servicing the mortgage loan after the debt was already in default. 21. The telephone numbers “877-808-0048” and “855-892-8914” which were the number left on the voicemails transcribed in Paragraphs 12-13 are answered by employees of GT. When returning phone calls to GT there is no precursor or automated message played informing anyone who calls that GT is a debt collector before being allowed to speak to a representative from GT. 3. Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 33. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a class, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 34. The class consists a) of all individuals with a New Jersey address for whom GT left a message on the person’s telephone answering device in connection with the collection of a mortgage loan that was in default when GT took over servicing of the mortgage loan, which message failed disclose that the communication was from a debt collector b) on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date 20 days after the filing of this action. 35. Upon information and belief the identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of GT. 36. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of GT and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 37. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. Those principal issues are whether the Defendants’ telephonic voice messages, such as the Messages transcribed in Paragraphs 12-13 of this Complaint, violate 15 U.S.C. §1692e(11). 38. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 41. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

lose

(APPLICABLE TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF) A. Related Case (Trauth) and Defendants’ Prior Wage Scheme: 1. Spearmint Rhino Exerts Control as Employers of the Plaintiff and Putative Class and Collective Action Members. 2. Working as an Exotic Dancer Employee of Spearmint Rhino Does Not Require Special Skill or Initiative. 3. Spearmint Rhino’s Relative Investment in Defendants’ Operations Vastly Exceeds that of Plaintiff and Putative Class and Collective Action Members. 4. Plaintiff and Putative Class and Collective Action Members Did Not Have the Ability to Alter their Opportunity for Profit and Loss Per the Economic Reality Test. 42. Like most (if not all) gentlemen’s clubs throughout the country, Defendants’ prior business practice was to classify all of their exotic dancer employees as independent contractors. 43. Defendants’ prior misclassification of their exotic dancers as independent contractors was not due to any unique factor related to their employment or relationship with Defendants. Rather, as is common business practice amongst gentlemen’s clubs, Defendants simply misclassified all of their exotic dancers as independent contractors instead of employees. As a result of this uniform misclassification, exotic dancers of Spearmint Rhino were not paid minimum wages or overtime wages as required by relevant federal and state law. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 - 10 - Case No. 5:17-cv-00527 Original Complaint 44. On July 13, 2009, a group of exotic dancers filed a wage lawsuit (“the Trauth case”) against Spearmint Rhino for wage violations under federal and state laws.1 The exotic dancers in that lawsuit alleged that they were misclassified as independent contractors and were entitled to their wages for all hours worked. Eventually, the Trauth cases settled, and came before the Court for final approval. See Trauth v. Spearmint Rhino Cos. Worldwide, Inc., Case No. EDCV 09-01316- VAP (DTBx), 2012 WL 12893448 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2012) (Phillips, C.J.). In the order approving the settlement, Chief Judge Virginia A. Phillips ordered Spearmint Rhino as follows: Within six months, the Clubs will no longer treat Dancers as independent contractors or lessees; instead the Clubs will treat Dancers “as either employees or owners (e.g. shareholder, limited partner, partner, member or other type of ownership stake)” of any Clubs in existence at the time of settlement. (Doc. No. 318-1 ¶ 4.2.) In California, Dancers will no longer be charged stage fees (i.e., fees a Dancer pays for the privilege of performing at a Club). (Id. ¶ 4.1.) Id. at *1. 45. Thereafter, Defendants no longer classified their exotic dancers as independent contractors. Instead they are now, facially, “members” of a newly formed limited liability company – Santa Barbara Hospitality Services, LLC. 46. Apart from this solitary measure, every single aspect of the employment relationship between the exotic dancers and their employer, Spearmint Rhino, remains wholly unchanged. In fact, in direct contravention of 1 Tracy Dawn Trauth, et al v. Spearmint Rhino Companies Worldwide, Inc., et al, Civ. A. No. 5:09-cv-01316-VAP-DTB, in the Central District of California Eastern Division – Riverside, Before United States District Chief Judge Virginia A. Phillips. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 - 11 - Case No. 5:17-cv-00527 Original Complaint Chief Judge Phillips order, Defendants continue to require their exotic dancer employees to pay fees for the privilege of performing at Spearmint Rhino locations. It is clear that Chief Judge Phillips intended Spearmint Rhino to reclassify their exotic dancers as employees or actual owners (or members) of Spearmint Rhino. It goes without saying, Chief Judge Phillips did not intend for the Club to continue its illegal pay practice of labeling its exotic dancers something other than employees (now “members” rather than “independent contractors”) for the purpose of avoiding its federal and state wage obligations. 47. Defendants’ actions instead leave their exotic dancer employees with no real ownership interest in the newly formed LLC. The exotic dancers still work as employees for Spearmint Rhino, economically dependent on Spearmint Rhino in all respects relevant to the “economic realities” test described further below, and regularly making below minimum wage compensation. B. Defendants’ New Scheme to Avoid FLSA Compliance 48. Defendants now embroil their exotic dancer employees in a series of illusory contractual engagements to give the appearance that the exotic dancers are “members” of the limited liability company formed subsequent to Chief Judge Phillips’s order – Defendant Santa Barbara Hospitality Services, LLC. However, all of the agreements exotic dancers are forced to sign upon being hired with Spearmint Rhino cannot mask the reality that nothing has really changed in Spearmint Rhino’s operations. In fact, Defendants use many (if not most) of the same kinds of documents, policies, and procedures found to create an employer/employee relationship in other exotic dancer cases with respect to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 - 12 - Case No. 5:17-cv-00527 Original Complaint Plaintiff and Spearmint Rhino’s other exotic dancers. Exotic dancers do not have any real decision-making authority, do not share equitably in the profitability of Spearmint Rhino, and do not have the right to control Spearmint Rhino management. In short, they are not owners of Spearmint Rhino in any demonstrable sense. 49. The exotic dancers remain economically dependent and under the complete control and direction of Defendants, but are paid no wages in connection with that work. They are still clearly integral to Defendants’ business, since without the exotic dancers there would be no gentlemen’s clubs. And finally, they still generate revenue for Spearmint Rhino, as they are still required to share the tips that they earn with Spearmint Rhino, and are otherwise treated as employees of Spearmint Rhino in all relevant respects as before. 5. Plaintiff and Putative Collective Action Members Worked Exclusively for Spearmint Rhino for Indefinite Periods of Time. 50. The totality of the circumstances surrounding the relationship between Defendants and their exotic dancer employees establishes economic dependence by the exotic dancers on Defendants, and thus employee status. As a matter of economic reality, Plaintiff and the putative Collective Action Members are not in business for themselves, nor truly independent, but rather are economically dependent upon finding employment through Spearmint Rhino. Plaintiff and the putative Collective Action Members are not engaged in occupations or business distinct from that of Defendants, in fact, their work is the basis of Defendants’ business. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 - 13 - Case No. 5:17-cv-00527 Original Complaint 51. Defendants’ business operation is to obtain the customers who desire the exotic dance entertainment and provide the workers who conduct the dance services on behalf of Defendants. 52. Indeed, a cursory review of the Santa Barbara Hospitality Services, LLC’s operating agreement shows that Defendants retain pervasive control over Spearmint Rhino’s operations as a whole and that the exotic dancer’s duties are integral to those operations. 53. Plaintiff and Putative Class and Collective Action Members do not exert control over a meaningful part of Spearmint Rhino’s business and do not stand as separate economic entities from Defendants. Defendants exercise control over all aspects of the working relationship with their exotic dancer employees. 54. Plaintiff and Putative Class and Collective Action Members’ economic status is inextricably linked to conditions over which Defendants have complete control. Exotic dancer employees of Defendants are completely dependent on Defendants for their income. Spearmint Rhino controls all of the advertising and promotion without which Plaintiff and Putative Class and Collective Action Members could not survive economically. Moreover, Defendants create and control the atmosphere and surroundings at Spearmint Rhino locations, the existence of which dictates the flow of customers into Spearmint Rhino clubs. The exotic dancers have no control over the customer volume or atmosphere at Spearmint Rhino clubs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 - 14 - Case No. 5:17-cv-00527 Original Complaint 55. Defendants continue to employ guidelines and rules dictating the way in which their exotic dancer employees, including Plaintiff and Putative Class and Collective Action Members, must conduct themselves. Defendants set the hours of operations, the lengths of shifts their exotic dancer employees must work, the show time during which an exotic dancer may perform, and sets minimum dance tips. Defendants also determine the sequence in which a dancer may perform on stage during her stage rotation; the themes of dancers’ performances, including their costuming and appearances; their conduct at work (e.g., that they should be on the floor as much as possible when not on stage to mingle with club patrons); tip splits; and all other terms and conditions of employment. 56. Defendants require that their dancers work a minimum number of shifts each week, each shift comprising a set number of hours. Exotic dancer employees are required to report in and report out at the beginning and end of every shift. If an exotic dancer employee arrives late, leaves early, or misses a shift, she is subject to a fine, penalty, or reprimand by Defendants. 57. Defendants routinely schedule their exotic dancer employees to work in excess of 40 hours per week and knowingly permit dancers to work in excess of 40 hours per week regularly. Defendants also routinely schedule their exotic dancer employees to work in excess of eight hours in a day and knowingly permit dancers to work in excess of eight hours in a day with frequency. 58. Defendants, not exotic dancers, set the minimum tip amount that exotic dancer employees must collect from patrons when performing dances. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 - 15 - Case No. 5:17-cv-00527 Original Complaint Defendants announce the minimum tip amount to patrons in the club wishing to receive the dance entertainment. 59. The entire sum a dancer receives from a patron for a dance is not given to defendants and taken into its gross receipts. Instead, the dancers keep their share of the payment under the tip share policy and pay over to Defendants the portion they demand as their share which they now term “rent and/or overhead.” Defendants’ aforementioned portion bears no actual relation to expenses associated with rent and/or overhead. For example, for a table dance, Plaintiff would be required to pay the club a portion of the minimum tip set by Defendants once collected from a patron of the club. 6. Exotic Dancers Provide Services at Spearmint Rhino Locations that Are Integral to the Financial Success of Defendants’ Enterprise. 60. Defendants establish the split or percentage which each exotic dancer employee is required to pay to Spearmint Rhino for each type of dance they may perform during their shift. In addition, amounts must be shared with disc jockeys, door staff, and other employees as part of Defendants’ tip sharing policy. Further, exotic dancer employees are expected to assist Defendants in selling drinks during their shift. The foregoing non-exhaustively demonstrates that Defendants set the terms and conditions for the work of each exotic dancer employee. 61. Plaintiff and Putative Class and Collective Action Members do not exercise the skill and initiative of those in business for themselves. 62. Plaintiff and Putative Class and Collective Action Members are not required to have any specialized or unusual skills to work at Defendants’ club. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 - 16 - Case No. 5:17-cv-00527 Original Complaint Prior dance experience is not required as a prerequisite to employment. Dancers are not required to attain a certain level of skill in order to dance at Defendants’ club. There are no certification standards for dancers. There are no dance seminars, no specialized training, no instructional booklets, and no choreography provided or required in order to work at Defendants’ club. The dance skills utilized are commensurate with those exercised by ordinary people dancing at a typical nightclub or a wedding. 63. Plaintiff, like the putative Class and Collective Action Members, did not have the opportunity to exercise business skills and initiative necessary to elevate her status to that of an owner of Spearmint Rhino. Dancers exercise no business management skills. They maintain no separate business structures or facilities. Exotic dancer employees do not actively participate in any effort to increase a club’s client base, enhance goodwill, or establish contracting possibilities. The scope of a dancer’s initiative is restricted to decisions involving what clothing to wear (within Defendants’ guidelines) or how provocatively to dance. 64. Plaintiff and Putative Class and Collective Action Members are not permitted to hire or contract other qualified individuals to provide dances to patrons and increase the club’s revenue as an owner of the club would. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 - 17 - Case No. 5:17-cv-00527 Original Complaint 65. Plaintiff’s investment in the exotic dancing business is minute when compared with that of Defendants. 66. Plaintiff, like all other exotic dancer employees of Spearmint Rhino, has made no capital investment in the facilities, advertising, maintenance, sound systems, lights, food, beverage, inventory, or staffing at Defendants’ club. A dancer’s investment is limited to expenditures on costumes or makeup. But for Defendants’ provision of the lavish club work environment, the dancers would earn nothing. 67. Defendants, not the exotic dancer employees such as Plaintiff, manage all aspects of the business operation including attracting investors, establishing working hours and hours of operations, setting the atmosphere, coordinating advertising, hiring, selling a club’s real and personal property, and controlling the staff. Defendants alone took the true business risks related to Spearmint Rhino clubs. 68. Exotic dancer employees, such as Plaintiff and Putative Class and Collective Action Members, do not control the key determinations for profit and loss of the Spearmint Rhino enterprise. Specifically, Plaintiff was not responsible for any aspect of the enterprise’s ongoing business risk. For example, Defendants are responsible for all financing, for the acquisition and/or lease of physical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 - 18 - Case No. 5:17-cv-00527 Original Complaint facilities and equipment, for inventory, for the payment of wages of individuals such as managers and bartenders (but not exotic dancer employees), and for obtaining appropriate business insurance, permits, and licenses. 69. Defendants, not exotic dancer employees, establish the minimum dance tip amounts that should be collected from patrons when dancing. Exotic dancer employees are not charged with the authority to accept a lower rate. 70. The tips received by exotic dancer employees are not a return on a capital investment. They are a gratuity for services rendered. From this perspective, it is clear that a dancer’s supposed “return on investment” is no different than that of a waiter who serves food during a customer’s meal at a restaurant. 71. Plaintiff worked exclusively for Defendants while employed as an exotic dancer at a Spearmint Rhino club. Plaintiff was not employed for a set term, but rather anticipated that her employment with Spearmint Rhino would be on an ongoing basis. 72. On information and belief, many exotic dancer employees work exclusively for Defendants for protracted periods of time, often for years at a time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 - 19 - Case No. 5:17-cv-00527 Original Complaint 73. Plaintiff and putative Class and Collective Action Members are essential to the success of Defendants’ clubs. The continued success of clubs such as Defendants’ turns upon the provision of dances by exotic dancers for the club’s patrons. In fact, the sole reason establishments like the Spearmint Rhino exist is to showcase dancers’ physical attributes for customers of the business. 74. Moreover, Defendants are able to charge higher admission prices and a much higher price for their drinks than a comparable establishment without dancers because exotic dancers are the main attraction of such clubs. As a result, the dancers are an integral part of Defendants’ business. 75. The foregoing demonstrates that dancers like Plaintiff and Putative Class and Collective Action Members are economically dependent on Defendants and subject to significant control by Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff and Putative Class and Collective Action Members are employees, not business owners, and should have been paid minimum wage at all times that they worked at Defendants’ clubs. Similarly, they should have been afforded all rights and benefits of an employee pursuant to relevant state and federal law, including the payment of overtime wages whenever they worked over forty hours in a given workweek or over 8 hours in a given day in the state of California. 76. All actions described above are willful, intentional, and the result of design rather than mistake or inadvertence. Defendants were aware that the FLSA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 - 20 - Case No. 5:17-cv-00527 Original Complaint applied to the operation of their clubs at all relevant times and were aware of the economic realities test under which its exotic dancers are clearly employees. V.

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10. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 11. Defendant’s calls were placed to telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incur a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 13. Plaintiff bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 14. Plaintiff represent, and are members of, The Class, consisting of All persons within the United States who received any telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously not provided their cellular telephone number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 15. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff do not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 8. Beginning in or around August of 2018, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on his cellular telephone, number ending in -3074, in an effort to sell or solicit its services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its daily calls to Plaintiff seeking to sell or solicit its business services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C); and  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Respectfully Submitted this 7th Day of May, 2019.

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(Collective Action Claim for Violation of the FLSA) (Individual Claim for Violation of the FLSA) 1.5x their regular wages for all hours worked over 40 in a week, unless an employee meets certain exemption requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 213 and all accompanying Department of Labor regulations. 10. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 11. Penick is a principal, director, officer, and/or owner of Acorn. 13. Penick, in his role as an operating employer of Acorn, had the power to hire and fire Plaintiff, often supervised Plaintiff’s work and determined his work schedule, and made decisions regarding Plaintiff’s pay, or lack thereof. 14. Penick, at relevant times, exercised supervisory authority over Plaintiff in relation to his work schedules, pay policy and the day-to-day job duties that Plaintiff’s jobs entailed. 15. Within the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendants have continuously employed at least four employees. 16. Defendants employ two or more individuals who engage in interstate commerce or business transactions, or who produce goods to be transported or sold in interstate commerce, or who handle, sell, or otherwise work with goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for interstate commerce, such as bulldozers and other machinery. 17. Defendants’ annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $500,000.00 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level that are separately stated) in each of the three years preceding the filing of the Original Complaint. 18. Defendants are employers within the meaning of the FLSA and have been, at all times relevant herein, Plaintiff’s employer. 19. Acorn is a full-service forestry company that provides services such as heavy mechanical site prep, site prep burning, and other services. 21. Defendants employed Plaintiff as a heavy mechanical operator from June of 2020 until November of 2020. 22. Defendants classified Plaintiff as an hourly employee, non-exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA. 23. Defendants employ heavy mechanical operators and other hourly employees, such as mechanics, bulldozer hands, and burn crew hands (hereinafter collectively “Forestry Workers”) in order to perform the forestry services that they offer. 24. Defendants also classified other Forestry Workers as hourly employees, non-exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA. 25. Defendants directly hired Plaintiff and other Forestry Workers, controlled their work schedules, duties, protocols, applications, assignments and employment conditions, and kept at least some records regarding their employment. 26. Plaintiff and other Forestry Workers regularly worked in excess of forty hours per week throughout their tenure with Defendants. 27. Defendants paid Plaintiff and other Forestry Workers 1.25x their base hourly rate for the hours they worked over 40 hours and up to 60 hours in a workweek. 28. Defendants paid Plaintiff and other Forestry Workers 1.5x their base hourly rate for the hours they worked over 60 hours in a workweek. 29. As a result, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and other Forestry Workers 30. Additionally, Defendants imposed paycheck fines on Plaintiff and other Forestry Workers for tardiness, absences, and failure to properly record information in the time-keeping app which Defendants required Plaintiff and other Forestry Workers to use. 31. Defendants deducted set amounts ranging from approximately from Plaintiff and other Forestry Workers’ pay for these infractions. 32. Defendants’ deductions for Forestry Workers’ tardiness ranged from approximately $50.00 to $100.00, deductions for Forestry Workers’ absences ranged from approximately $100.00 to $400.00 and deductions for misusing the app started at around $5.00. 33. These pay deductions resulted in additional violations of the overtime provisions of the FLSA. 34. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ pay practices were the same for all Forestry Workers. 35. Defendants knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, the way it paid Plaintiff and other Forestry Workers violated the FLSA. 36. At all relevant times herein, Defendants have deprived Plaintiff and other Forestry Workers of proper overtime compensation for all of the hours worked over forty per week. 37. Defendants knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, the way it paid Plaintiff and other Forestry Workers violated the FLSA. V. 39. Plaintiff brings this claim for relief for violation of the FLSA as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all persons similarly situated who were, are, or will be employed by Defendants within the applicable statute of limitations period, who are entitled to payment of the following types of damages: A. Overtime premiums for all hours worked over forty hours in any week; B. Liquidated damages; and C. Attorney’s fees and costs. 40. Plaintiff proposes the following class under the FLSA: All Forestry Workers within the past three years. 41. In conformity with the requirements of FLSA Section 16(b), Plaintiff has filed or will soon file a written Consent to Join this lawsuit. 42. The relevant time period dates back three years from the date on which Plaintiff’s Original Complaint—Collective Action was filed herein and continues forward through the date of judgment pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), except as set forth herein below. 44. Plaintiff is unable to state the exact number of the collective but believes that the collective exceeds fifty persons. 45. Defendants can readily identify the members of the collective, who are a certain portion of the current and former employees of Defendants. 46. The names and physical and mailing addresses of the probable FLSA collective action plaintiffs are available from Defendants. 47. The email addresses of many of the probable FLSA collective action plaintiffs are available from Defendants. VI. 48. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 49. Plaintiff asserts this claim for damages and declaratory relief pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 50. At all relevant times, Defendants have been, and continue to be, an enterprise engaged in commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. 51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207 require any enterprise engaged in commerce to pay a minimum wage for all hours worked up to 40 each week and to pay 1.5x their regular wages for all hours worked over 40, unless an employee meets certain exemption requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 213 and all accompanying DOL regulations. 52. Defendants classified Plaintiff as non-exempt from the requirements of the 59. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 61. At all relevant times, Defendants have been, and continue to be, an enterprise engaged in commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. 62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207 require any enterprise engaged in commerce to pay all employees a minimum wage for all hours worked up to 40 each week and to pay 63. Defendants classified Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees as non-exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. 64. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and similarly situated employees 1.5x their regular rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week. 65. Defendants knew or should have known that its actions violated the FLSA. 66. Defendants’ conduct and practices, as described above, were willful. 67. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged herein, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees for monetary damages, liquidated damages and costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees provided by the FLSA for all violations which occurred beginning at least three years preceding the filing of Plaintiff’s initial complaint, plus periods of equitable tolling. 69. Alternatively, should the Court find that Defendants acted in good faith in failing to pay Plaintiff and the collective members as provided by the FLSA, they are entitled to an award of prejudgment interest at the applicable legal rate.

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10. The section of Pipeline that ruptured was 30 inches in diameter and was buried approximately six feet underground prior to the incident forming the basis of this suit. 11. Upon information and belief, the Pipeline was constructed in 1966 and its interior and exterior walls had corroded to such an extent that a rupture was certain to occur under normal operating pressures if the Pipeline was not repaired and/or replaced. 12. When the Pipeline ruptured, a 75-foot-long section of 30 inch diameter pipe was ejected from underground and natural gas was literally pumped into the air and into the environment surrounding the location of the rupture. The exact amount of natural gas that escaped from the Pipeline into the atmosphere is currently unknown. 13. Natural gas that escaped and that was being pumped through the Pipeline ignited, causing an explosion and fire that burned nearby timberlands and forest, as well as Plaintiff, Janie Thigpen’s home. 15. Florida Gas failed to adequately inform the various federal, state, and local agencies that responded to the incident of the magnitude of the potential danger posed by the Pipeline before the explosion and fire were brought under control, which necessitated a second evacuation from the original “safety zone.” 16. The heat from the explosion and fire was so intense at the site of the rupture that clay and sand under the surface of the ground was baked and turned into a substance that resembled porcelain glass. 17. The intense heat at the site of the explosion caused Plaintiff, Janie Thigpen’s, house to catch fire which resulted in substantial physical damage to her home. 18. Plaintiff, Janie Thigpen, owns the land at the site of the Pipeline rupture and fire, subject to a servitude in favor of Florida Gas for maintenance and operation of the Pipeline. 20. The rupture, explosion, and fire, at issue has caused a substantial decrease in the fair market value of Plaintiff, Janie Thigpen’s, property, to her direct economic detriment. 21. In addition to the property damage and economic loss referenced hereinabove, as a result of the Pipeline rupture, explosion and fire, Plaintiff, Janie Thigpen, sustained bodily injuries, as well as shock to her nervous system and psyche, the final sequella of which is currently unknown. 22. At all times relevant hereto, the Pipeline was owned and/or maintained and/or manned and/or possessed and/or managed and/or controlled and/or chartered and/or operated by Florida Gas. 23. The rupture, fire and explosion of the Pipeline and the damage resulting therefrom was caused by the negligence of Defendant, Florida Gas, which renders Florida Gas liable jointly, severally, and in solido to the Plaintiffs and Class Members for all their damages sustained as a result of the incident forming the basis of this suit. 25. Continued use of the Pipeline following the February 13, 2012, rupture constituted an unreasonable risk of harm to the public, as Defendant, Florida Gas, had actual and/or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition that existed, namely corrosion of the Pipeline, and failed to take any remedial and/or corrective action to remedy the situation, as is evidenced by the fact that the incident complained of herein is the second occurrence of a failure of the Line 200 natural gas transmission pipeline within a sixteen month period, and Plaintiff and the Members of the Class sustained damages as a result of the rupture, explosion, and fire that occurred on June 18, 2013. 26. The injuries and damages suffered by Plaintiffs and Class Members were caused by Defendant’s violations of numerous statutes and regulations, including, but not limited to, the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 2006 (49 U.S.C. 601, et seq.); the Gas Integrity Management Rule (49 CFR §192(O)), including the federally mandated requirements to take corrosion resistance measures and properly test natural gas transmission pipelines at regular intervals. 28. The Pipeline’s rupture, explosion, and fire have caused and will continue to cause loss of revenue and equity value to persons and businesses, including but not limited to Plaintiff and the Class Members, who have sustained a loss in their property values as a result of this incident, as continued operation of the Pipeline poses an unreasonable risk of harm to any individual(s) located within a two mile radius of the Pipeline. 29. There are many other potential effects from the Pipeline rupture, fire, and explosion that have not yet become known, and Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this Class Action Complaint once additional information becomes available. 30. 33. B. Predominance of Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and the questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members and include, but are not limited to, the following: i. Whether Florida Gas caused and/or contributed to the rupture, explosion and fire; ii. Whether the actions of Florida Gas were negligent; iii. Whether the rupture, explosion, and fire have caused environmental or other damage; and iv. The amount of damages Plaintiffs and the Class Members should receive in compensation. 35. D. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Members of the Class because Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class Members they seek to represent. Plaintiff does not have any claims antagonistic to those of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex litigation, class actions, environmental litigation, and mass tort cases. 37. The various claims asserted in this action are also certifiable under Rules 23(b)(1) and/or 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because: A. The prosecution of separate actions by hundreds of individual Class Members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual Class Members, thus entitling incompatible standards of conduct for defendants; B. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class Members would also create the risk of adjudication with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other Class Members who are not parties to such adjudication and would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; and C. The questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual Members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 38. 40. The rupture, explosion, and fire, and resulting damages were caused by defective equipment, including but not limited to the Pipeline, gauges, testing equipment, and inspection equipment, which were in the care, custody, and control of Defendant, Florida Gas, and over which Defendant had garde. Florida Gas knew or should have known of these defects and Florida Gas is therefore liable for all damages sustained by Plaintiff, Janie Thigpen, and the Class Members, as alleged herein. 41. The injuries and damages to Plaintiffs and the Class Members were also caused and/or aggravated by the fact that Defendant, Florida Gas, failed to take necessary actions to mitigate the danger associated with their operations. 42. 44. 45. Plaintiff, Janie Thigpen, and the Members of the Class, expressly plead the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in connection with all claims set forth herein, as the injuries and damages sustained by Plaintiff and the Class Members would not have occurred but for the acts and/or omissions of Defendant, Florida Gas Transmission Company, L.L.C. 46. Plaintiffs and the Class Members are entitled to a judgment holding the Defendants liable to Plaintiffs and the Class Members for damages suffered as a result of Defendants’ negligence and awarding Plaintiffs and the Class Members adequate compensation therefore in an amount determined by the trier of fact. 47. 49. Defendant, Florida Gas, is vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of its employees, representatives and/or licensed dealer and thus, the law of vicarious liability is applied herein as if set forth in extenso. 50. Defendant, Florida Gas, is therefore liable jointly, severally and in solido unto Plaintiff, Janie Thigpen, and the Class Members, for the damages and losses sustained as a result of the incident complained of herein, which are itemized and non-exclusively set out hereafter. 51. 9. The Pipeline ruptured on June 18, 2013, at approximately 5:25 a.m. CST, near the town of Enon, Louisiana. A. Numerosity of the Class: The proposed class is so numerous that joinder is impractical. The disposition of the claims asserted herein through this class action will be more efficient and will benefit the parties and the Court. Florida Gas Transmission Company, L.L.C., is the owner and/or operator of the “Line 200” natural gas transmission pipeline (periodically referred to hereinafter as the “Pipeline.”) Plaintiff, Janie Thigpen, Individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, repeats, reiterates, and re-alleges each and every allegation set forth hereinabove as if pled in extenso. Plaintiff, Janie Thigpen, Individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, repeats, reiterates, and re-alleges each and every allegation set forth hereinabove as if pled in extenso. Plaintiff, Janie Thigpen, Individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, repeats, reiterates, and re-alleges each and every allegation set forth hereinabove as if pled in extenso. Plaintiff, Janie Thigpen, Individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, repeats, reiterates, and re-alleges each and every allegation set forth hereinabove as if pled in extenso.

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30. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through twenty nine (29) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 31. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 32. The class consists of all persons whom Defendant’s records reflect resided in New York who received telephonic messages from Defendant within one year prior to the date of the within complaint up to the date of the filing of the complaint; (a) the telephone call was placed to a the consumer's home or similar party seeking payment of a consumer debt by leaving a message for the Plaintiff; and (b) the Plaintiff asserts that the telephone message was in violation 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e, 1692e(10), 1692e(11), and 1692f. 3 See. Leyse v. Corporate Collection Servs., (2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67719 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006) ("The FDCPA requires debt collectors identify themselves as such in all messages to prevent consumers from being tricked into communicating with debt collectors regarding a debt. Anonymous telephone messages mislead consumers in to thinking that the message could reasonably pertain to a host of issues - including family or medical matters - which may be viewed by consumers as much more pressing, than a debt owed. The apparent purpose of these messages is to be vague enough to provoke the recipient to return the calls in haste. Leaving a message that deceptively entices a consumer to communicate with a debt collector when he is caught off guard is precisely the kind of abuse the FDCPA intended to prevent.") -8- 33. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: A. Based on the fact that form telephonic messages are at the heart of this litigation, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. B. There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendant violated the FDCPA. C. The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who received such telephonic messages, (i.e. the class members), a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of the Defendant. D. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. E. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members’ interests. The Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and collection-abuse claims. The Plaintiff's interests are consistent with those of the members of the class. 34. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would -9- create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties and would not be in the interest of judicial economy. 35. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, the Plaintiff will seek to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 36. Collection attempts, such as those made by the Defendant are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 37. The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

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1. Plaintiff Able Home Health, LLC brings this action to secure redress for the actions of defendants Care One Home Health Services, Inc., and Oasis Answers, Inc., in sending or causing the sending of unsolicited advertisements to telephone facsimile machines in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §227 (“TCPA”), the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/2 (“ICFA”), and the common law. 10. On September 12, 2017, Able Home Health, LLC received the unsolicited fax advertisement attached as Exhibit A on its facsimile machine. 11. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well. 12. Defendants Care One Home Health Services, Inc., and Oasis Answers, Inc., are responsible for sending or causing the sending of the faxes. 13. Defendants Care One Home Health Services, Inc., and Oasis Answers, Inc., as the entities whose products or services were advertised in the faxes, derived economic benefit from the sending of the faxes. 14. Defendants Care One Home Health Services, Inc., and Oasis Answers, Inc., either negligently or wilfully violated the rights of plaintiff and other recipients in sending the faxes. 15. Exhibit A refers to a website used by defendant Oasis Answers, Inc. 16. Plaintiff had no prior relationship with defendants and had not authorized the sending of fax advertisements to plaintiff. 17. The fax does not contain an “opt out” notice that complies with 47 U.S.C. §227. 18. The TCPA provides for affirmative defenses of consent or an established business relationship. Both defenses are conditioned on the provision of an opt out notice that complies with the TCPA. Holtzman v. Turza, 728 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2013); Nack v. Walburg, 715 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 2013). 3 19. On information and belief, the fax attached hereto was sent as part of a mass broadcasting of faxes. 2. The TCPA expressly prohibits unsolicited fax advertising. Unsolicited fax advertising damages the recipients. The recipient is deprived of its paper and ink or toner and the use of its fax machine. The recipient also wastes valuable time it would have spent on something else. Unsolicited faxes prevent fax machines from receiving and sending authorized faxes, cause wear and tear on fax machines, and require labor to attempt to identify the source and purpose of 1 the unsolicited faxes. 20. On information and belief, defendants have transmitted similar unsolicited fax advertisements to at least 40 other persons in Illinois. 21. There is no reasonable means for plaintiff or other recipients of defendants’ unsolicited advertising faxes to avoid receiving illegal faxes. Fax machines must be left on and ready to receive the urgent communications authorized by their owners. 22. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-21. 23. The TCPA makes unlawful the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ...” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). 24. The TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3), provides: Private right of action. A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State– (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the Court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal 4 to not more than 3 times the amount available under the subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. 25. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. Furthermore, plaintiff’s statutory right of privacy was invaded. 26. Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages. 27. Defendants violated the TCPA even if its actions were only negligent. 28. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 37. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-21. 38. Defendants engaged in unfair acts and practices, in violation of ICFA § 2, 815 ILCS 505/2, by sending unsolicited fax advertising to plaintiff and others. 39. Unsolicited fax advertising is contrary to the TCPA and also Illinois law. 720 ILCS 5/26-3(b) makes it a petty offense to transmit unsolicited fax advertisements to Illinois residents. 40. Defendants engaged in an unfair practice and an unfair method of competition by engaging in conduct that is contrary to public policy, unscrupulous, and caused injury to recipients of their advertising. 41. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. 42. Defendants engaged in such conduct in the course of trade and commerce. 43. Defendants’ conduct caused recipients of their advertising to bear the cost thereof. This gave defendants an unfair competitive advantage over businesses that advertise lawfully, such as by direct mail. For example, an advertising campaign targeting one million recipients would cost $500,000 if sent by U.S. mail but only $20,000 if done by fax broadcasting. The reason is that instead of spending $480,000 on printing and mailing his ad, the fax broadcaster misappropriates the recipients’ paper and ink. “Receiving a junk fax is like getting junk mail with the postage due”. Remarks of Cong. Edward Markey, 135 Cong Rec E 2549, Tuesday, July 8 18, 1989, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. 44. Defendants’ shifting of advertising costs to plaintiff and the class members in this manner makes such practice unfair. In addition, defendant’s conduct was contrary to public policy, as established by the TCPA and Illinois statutory and common law. 45. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 53. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-21. 54. By sending plaintiff and the class members unsolicited faxes, defendants 10 converted to its own use ink or toner and paper belonging to plaintiff and the class members. 55. Immediately prior to the sending of the unsolicited faxes, plaintiff and the class members owned and had an unqualified and immediate right to the possession of the paper and ink or toner used to print the faxes. 56. By sending the unsolicited faxes, defendants appropriated to their own use the paper and ink or toner used to print the faxes and used them in such manner as to make them unusable. Such appropriation was wrongful and without authorization. 57. Defendants knew or should have known that such appropriation of the paper and ink or toner was wrongful and without authorization. 58. Plaintiff and the class members were deprived of the paper and ink or toner, which could no longer be used for any other purpose. Plaintiff and each class member thereby suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes. 59. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 67. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-21. 68. Plaintiff and the class members were entitled to possession of the equipment they used to receive faxes. 69. Defendants’ sending plaintiff and the class members unsolicited faxes interfered with their use of the receiving equipment and constitutes a trespass to such equipment. Chair King v. Houston Cellular, 95cv1066, 1995 WL 1693093 at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 1995) (denying a motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiff's trespass to chattels claim for unsolicited faxes), vacated on jurisdictional grounds 131 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 1997). 70. Defendants acted either intentionally or negligently in engaging in such conduct. 71. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes. 72. Defendants should be enjoined from continuing trespasses. 73. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(3), plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons with Illinois fax numbers (b) who, on or after a date five years prior to the filing of this action, (c) were sent faxes by or on behalf of defendants Care One Home Health Services, Inc., and Oasis Answers, Inc., promoting their goods or services for sale 13 (d) with respect to which defendants Care One Home Health Services, Inc., and Oasis Answers, Inc., do not have evidence of consent or an established business relationship prior to sending the fax. 74. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that there are more than 40 members of the class. 75. There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The predominant common questions include: a. Whether defendants engaged in a pattern of sending unsolicited fax advertisements; and b. Whether defendants thereby committed a trespass to chattels. 76. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither plaintiff nor plaintiff’s counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 77. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 78. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against defendant is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions. 79. Management of this class action is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties 14 that those presented in many class actions, e.g. for securities fraud. WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and the class and against defendants for: a. Appropriate damages; b. An injunction against the further transmission of unsolicited fax advertising; c. Costs of suit; d. Such other or further relief as the Court deems just and proper. s/ Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Cathleen M. Combs James O. Latturner Heather Kolbus INTRODUCTION

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10. At all times relevant, BERKS regularly collected or attempted to collect debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another, which debts were incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 11. At all times relevant, BERKS used the mail, telephone or other instruments of interstate commerce in its attempts to collect debts due or alleged to be due another. 12. At all times relevant, BERKS used the mail, telephone or other instruments of interstate commerce in its attempts to collect consumer debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. 13. At all times relevant, the principal business engaged in by BERKS was the collection of debts, which debts were incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 14. BERKS is a “debt collector” within the scope of the definition contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) and interpretations thereof. 15. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) of the FDCPA. 16. Plaintiff and others similarly situated are consumers as they are natural persons allegedly obligated to pay a debt, in which the money, property, insurance, or services, which was the subject of the transaction, was primarily for personal, family and/or household purposes. 17. BERKS sent Plaintiff a letter dated October 24, 2016, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A, except that the undersigned attorney has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 redacted the financial account numbers and/or personal identifiers in an effort to protect Plaintiff’s privacy. 18. Upon receipt, Plaintiff read the October 24, 2016 letter. 19. BERKS' October 24, 2016 letter was an attempt to collect an amount allegedly due as set forth in the letter. 20. Plaintiff brings this action as a state wide class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”), on behalf of herself and all New York City consumers and their successors in interest (the “Class”), who were sent debt collection letters and/or notices from the Defendants which are in violation of the FDCPA, as described in this Complaint. 21. This Action is properly maintained as a class action. The Class is initially defined as follows: All New York City consumers who were sent letters and/or notices from BERKS, concerning a debt owed to another, which contained at least one of the alleged violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. herein. The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action.  The class may be subsequently refined.  Specifically excluded from this class is any Judge presiding over this Action and members of their immediate families. 22. Plaintiff seeks to recover statutory damages, attorneys' fees and costs on behalf of all class members under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 23. The Class for whose benefit this action is brought is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 24. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class that predominate over questions affecting only individuals. These common questions include, but are not limited to: Whether BERKS has violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e et seq., and 1692g et seq. 25. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. While the economic damages suffered by the individual class members are significant, the amount may be modest compared to the expense and burden of individual litigation. Additionally, the FDCPA statutory scheme provides for statutory damages payable to each class member. A class action will cause an orderly and expeditious administration of the claims of the Class and will foster economies of time, effort and expense. 26. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. 27. The questions of law and/or fact common to the members of the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. 28. Plaintiff does not have interests antagonistic to those of the Class. 29. The Class, of which Plaintiff is a member, is readily identifiable. 30. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class, and has retained competent counsel experienced in the prosecution of consumer litigation. Proposed Class Counsel has investigated and identified potential claims in the action; has a great deal of experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and claims of the type asserted in this action. 31. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would run the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for BERKS in this action or the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create the risk that adjudications with respect to individual members of the class would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Prosecution as a class action will eliminate the possibility of repetitious litigation. 32. BERKS has acted or refuse to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. 33. Plaintiff does not anticipate any difficulty in the management of this litigation. 34. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, repeats and realleges all prior allegations as if set forth at length herein. 35. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 36. One such requirement is that the debt collector provide “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 37. A debt collector has the obligation not just to convey the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed, but also to convey such clearly. 38. A debt collector has the obligation not just to convey the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed, but also to state such explicitly. 39. Merely naming the creditor without specifically identifying the entity as the current creditor to whom the debt is owed is not sufficient to comply with 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(2). 40. Even if a debt collector conveys the required information, the debt collector nonetheless violates the FDCPA if it conveys that information in a confusing or contradictory fashion so as to cloud the required message with uncertainty. 41. When determining whether the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed has been conveyed clearly, an objective standard, measured by how the “least sophisticated consumer” would interpret the notice, is applied. 42. BERKS' letter of October 24, 2016, fails to explicitly identify the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 43. BERKS' letter of October 24, 2016, letter to Plaintiff fails to identify any creditor to whom the debt is owed. 44. BERKS' letter of October 24, 2016 fails to identify any entity or individual as a “creditor.” 45. BERKS' letter of October 24, 2016, merely states: 7. At all times relevant, the principal purpose of BERKS was the collection of debts using the mails and telephone. 8. At all times relevant, BERKS regularly attempted to collect debts alleged to be due to another. 9. At all times relevant, BERKS regularly collected or attempted to collect debts due or alleged to be due another. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Violations

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10. At no time did Plaintiff ever enter into a business relationship with Defendant. 11. At no time did Plaintiff provide his current cellular telephone number to Defendant through any medium. 12. Plaintiff had never heard of One Planet or its subsidiary “HomeGain” prior to receiving the calls from them. 13. On or about November 7, 2019, at approximately 3:49 PM Defendant’s subsidiary “HomeGain” contacted Plaintiff on his cellular telephone ending in “0059” from the telephone number (925) 476-1983. 14. One Planet, through its subsidiary “HomeGain” called Mr. Hildre’s cellular telephone in an effort to convince Plaintiff to market, purchase, or sell real property thought its site & services. 15. Each time Defendant called there was a long pause on each of the calls after Plaintiff answered. 16. Upon information and belief, the calls were placed via an “automatic telephone dialing system,” (“ATDS”) as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a)(1), as prohibited by 47 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 31. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of and Class Members of the proposed Class pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) and/or (b)(2). 32. Plaintiff proposes to represent the following Class consisting of and defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone call(s) from Defendant or its agent(s) and/or employee(s), not for an emergency purpose, on said person’s cellular telephone, made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or artificial or prerecorded voice without their consent in the four years prior the filing of this Complaint. 43. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 44. One Planet repeated calls in a span of several months to Plaintiff’s cellular phone without any prior express consent—and even after Plaintiff revoked any consent that may have existed—constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 45. As a result of One Planet, and One Planet’s agents, negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 46. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 47. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 9. At all times relevant, One Planet conducted business in the State of California and in the County and City of San Diego, within this judicial district. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of One Planet and one planet’s agent’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Costs of suit. • Attorneys’ fees pursuant to, inter alia, the common fund doctrine. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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13. Plaintiff brings claims, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”) Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the following nationwide consumer class (the “Class”): • The class consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letters sent to the Plaintiff on or about November 21, 2017 and January 10, 2018 ; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt purportedly owed to the NEW YORK METHODIST HOSPITAL (“Creditor”); and (b) the collection letters was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; (c) and Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of the FDCPA. • The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. 14. The Class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23 of the FRCP for maintaining a class action: • Upon information and belief, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable because there are hundreds and/or thousands of persons who have received debt collection letters and/or notices from Defendant that violate specific provisions of the FDCPA. Plaintiff is complaining of a standard form letter and/or notice that was sent to hundreds of persons (See Exhibit A, except that the undersigned attorney has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 partially redacted the financial account numbers in an effort to protect Plaintiff’s privacy); • There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: a. Whether Defendant violated various provisions of the FDCPA; b. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Defendant’s conduct; c. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are entitled to restitution as a result of Defendant’s wrongdoing and if so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutory formula to be applied in determining such damages and restitution; and d. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief. • Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theories. • Plaintiff has no interest adverse or antagonistic to the interest of the other members of the Class. • Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the Class and have retained experienced and competent attorneys to represent the Class. • A Class Action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted. Plaintiff anticipates that no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action. • A Class Action will permit large numbers of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Absent a Class Action, class members will continue to suffer losses of statutory protected rights as well as monetary damages. If Defendant’s conduct is allowed proceed to without remedy they will continue to reap and retain the proceeds of their ill-gotten gains. • Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 15. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the debt”). 16. The debt was primarily for personal, family or household purposes and is therefore a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 17. The debt was incurred on a credit card. 18. The debt was incurred on a credit card issued by Creditor. 19. Sometime after the incurrence of the debt Plaintiff allegedly fell behind on payments owed. 20. Thereafter, at an exact time known only to Defendant, the debt was then assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 21. In its efforts to collect the debt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by letter dated November 21, 2017 (“Exhibit A.”)(Hereinafter referred to as “letter”). 22. The letters states “This debt may be covered entirely or in part by your insurance carrier (e.g. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Medicare/Medicaid, your union or other) – provided you are qualified. If you feel that you may qualify, please complete the back portion of this letter and return it in the enclosed return envelope. If you do not qualify please enclose your payment.” 23. The letter then immediately goes on to provide the consumer dispute notice. 24. The letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). Count I & II Violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g, 1692e 25. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “24” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 26. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 27. One such request is that the debt collector provides Notice, which includes “a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4). 28. This Notice is an important statutory right which must be effectively and clearly conveyed to the consumer. 29. The Notice must be sufficiently prominent to be readily noticed. It cannot be overshadowed by its placement, nor by other language or notices in the letter. 30. Even if a debt collector conveys the required information, the debt collector nonetheless violates the FDCPA if it conveys that information in a confusing or contradictory fashion so as to cloud the required message with uncertainty. 31. The question of whether a collection letter is deceptive is determined from the perspective of the “least sophisticated consumer.” 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 33. A collection letter is deceptive under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if it can reasonably be read by the least sophisticated consumer to have two or more meanings, one of which is inaccurate. 34. The letter states “This debt may be covered entirely or in part by your insurance carrier (e.g. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Medicare/Medicaid, your union or other) – provided you are qualified. If you feel that you may qualify, please complete the back portion of this letter and return it in the enclosed return envelope. If you do not qualify please enclose your payment.” 35. Immediately after stating the language quoted in paragraph 34 of this Complaint, the letter states “Unless you notify this office within 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of the debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume the debt is valid. If you notify this office in writing within 30 days from receiving this notice that the debt, or any portion thereof is disputed this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you such judgment or verification.” 36. Based upon the foregoing, the least sophisticated consumer could believe that they did not have the right to dispute the debt without providing a reason. 37. Based on the foregoing, the least sophisticated consumer can read this statement and reasonably deduce that if they don’t believe they qualify for insurance, then they must pay. 38. Based upon the foregoing, the least sophisticated consumer could believe that they only had the options of filling out the form on the back portion of the letter or enclosing payment. 39. Based upon the foregoing, the least sophisticated consumer would believe that the 30 day validation language meant that the consumer only had 30 days to respond by filling out the form or enclosing payments. 40. Based upon the foregoing, the least sophisticated consumer could believe that the 30 day language did not relate to the time in which they could dispute the debt. 41. Based upon the foregoing, the least sophisticated consumer could believe that the validation rights are affected by the language about having to enclose payment or fill out the insurance forms. 42. Based upon the foregoing, the least sophisticated consumer could believe that the validation rights language is not separate from the language about enclosing payment or filling out the insurance form. 43. Based upon the foregoing, the least sophisticated consumer could believe that the validation rights language is not separate from the language about enclosing payment or filling out the insurance form, but rather the dispute language refers to disputing based on insurance coverage and nothing more. 44. Defendant failed to express in any way that the options in no way affected the consumer’s validation rights. 45. Because of this failure, Defendant overshadowed the validation rights. 46. Defendant also used deceptive practices in the Assignment and Release Authorization section on the back of the letter within the insurance form. 47. Said section states in small font: “I hereby assign any and all benefits that I may be entitled, to the creditor indicated, on the reverse side of this page, and authorize said benefits to be paid directly to said creditor or to its agency or representative who will be acting on their behalf. I understand further that I am financially responsible to said creditor for all charges not covered by this assignment. I further authorize the release of any and all medical information requested by my insurance company to process this claim.” 48. Within the above paragraph there is a very key term to signing the Authorization. Specifically, that the consumer is agreeing to be financially responsible to said creditor for all charges not covered by this assignment. 49. The false pretenses to pursue medical coverage is just a ploy to have the debtor sign an agreement making them immediately liable for the debt. 50. The least sophisticated consumer would fill out the form expecting coverage from their insurance company, but in reality, the consumer would be losing their right to dispute the debt. 51. This is deceptive and misleading because it leads the least sophisticated consumer to be unaware of what they are agreeing to. 52. The Authorizations also overshadows the consumer’s validation rights by taking away their right to dispute the debt within the 30 days. 53. By filling out the form and signing the Assignment and Release Authorization Section the consumer would be losing said right. 54. A collection letter is deceptive under §1692e if it is reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading by the least sophisticated consumer. 55. Defendant’s letter is in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a) and 1692e(10) for overshadowing the Plaintiff validation rights within the thirty day period, and for engaging in deceptive and false practice

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13. Defendants operate a drop-off and do-it-yourself Laundromat in New York, New York. 14. Ms. Gonzalez was employed by Defendants from in or about February 2010 through July 2015 as a laundry worker. 15. When Ms. Gonzalez began her employment with Defendants, she was required to work 7 days per week and usually worked 9 to 10 hours each day. This went on for about three months. 16. Subsequently, Defendants required Ms. Gonzalez to generally work 6 days per week and she worked between 9 and 10 hours per day. 18. Defendants paid Ms. Gonzalez on an hourly basis but at times, less than the minimum wage. For example, when she began working for Defendants, Ms. Gonzalez was earning $7.00 per hour although the minimum wage was $7.25 per hour. 19. Ms. Gonzalez routinely worked more than forty (40) hours in a work week throughout her employment. Ms. Gonzalez was not paid any overtime premium pay at all and was paid her regular hourly rate for all hours worked. 20. Defendants failed to pay Ms. Gonzalez the required “spread of hours” pay when she worked a spread of hours longer than 10 in a single work day. 21. Defendants failed to provide Ms. Gonzalez with the required notice of wage rate. 22. Plaintiff Gonzalez repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in paragraphs 1 through 19 of this Complaint. 23. At all relevant times, Defendants were Plaintiff’s employers within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203(d). 24. At all relevant times, Defendants were engaged in commerce or in an industry or activity affecting commerce. 25. Defendants constitute an enterprise within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(r). 26. Defendants failed to pay the applicable minimum hourly rate in willful violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) and §255(a) for all work time. 28. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in paragraphs 1 through 27 of this Complaint. 29. At all relevant times, Defendants were Plaintiff’s employers within the meaning of the NYLL §§ 2 and 651. 30. Defendants willfully failed to pay Plaintiff at the applicable minimum hourly rate in violation of the NYLL for all time worked. 31. Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. 32. Plaintiff Gonzalez repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in paragraphs 1 through 31 of this Complaint. 33. Defendants failed to pay Ms. Gonzalez overtime compensation at rates of at least one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek, in willful violation of the FLSA. 34. Ms. Gonzalez has been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. 39. Ms. Gonzalez repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in paragraphs 1 through 38 of this Complaint. 40. Defendants failed to pay an additional hour of wages at the minimum wage rate on days where Ms. Gonzalez worked a spread of hours longer than ten. 41. Ms. Gonzalez has been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. 42. Ms. Gonzalez repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in paragraphs 1 through 41 of this Complaint. 43. Defendants failed to provide wage notices and accurate wage statements as required by NYLL § 195. 44. Ms. Gonzalez has been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. Failure to Pay Spread of Hours Pay (12 NYCRR §142-2.4) Failure to Provide Wage Notice (NYLL § 195) Violation of the Minimum Wage Provisions of the FLSA Violation of the Overtime Provisions of the FLSA Violation of the New York Minimum Wage Act/New York Labor Law

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26. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs by reference as if set forth fully in this section. 27. Defendant employs/employed numerous oilfield workers in connection with its drilling operations throughout locations in the United States. Those workers work/worked on and/or in support of Defendant’s drilling rigs which drill/drilled for oil and or natural gas in locations such as the Bakken Shale, Marcellus Shale, Permian Basin, Eagle Ford Shale and others. 28. Defendant’s drilling rigs operate/operated from numerous yards/sites of employment around the United States, including yards/sites of employment in or around San Antonio, Texas and Springtown, Texas. Oilfield workers worked at/from/through those yards/sites of employment. 29. Plaintiff was an hourly employee who worked on Defendant’s drilling rigs. Plaintiff routinely worked in excess of 40 hours in a seven day workweek when working hitches that were typically two weeks on and two weeks off. 31. In addition to receiving hourly pay, Plaintiff also received additional remuneration, including oil base mud pay, safety incentive bonuses, and so-called per diem pay. 32. Although Defendant paid Plaintiff overtime premium compensation for on-the- clock work at one and one-half times his hourly rate of pay, Defendant failed to include all remuneration required by the FLSA in calculating Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay. This resulted in Plaintiff not being paid all overtime compensation owed by Defendant. 33. Plaintiff worked with numerous other hourly oilfield worker employees of Defendant. Like Plaintiff, those employees, before, during and after Plaintiff’s dates of employment, routinely work/worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek, are/were entitled to overtime premium compensation at one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all overtime hours worked, are/were paid additional remuneration, such as oil base mud pay, safety incentive bonuses, and so-called per diem pay, in addition to their hourly pay, and did not/do not receive all overtime compensation owed by Defendant due to Defendant not including all remuneration required by the FLSA in their respective regular rates of pay. 35. Although Defendant has recently terminated many employees, on information and belief, it continues to employ hourly oilfield workers that are subject to the aforementioned practice/policy to not include all remuneration required by the FLSA in their respective regular rate of pay when calculating the overtime wages owed. IV.

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1.0 to 2.0 kcal/g less than sucrose or other carbohydrates, and since tolerance for sugar alcohol intake is limited, their impact on overall energy balance is likely to be, at most, approximately 20 to 40 kcal/day. Thomas Wolever, M.D. Ph.D., “Sugar Alcohol and Diabetes: A Review,” Canadian Journal of Diabetes 2002; 26(4): 356-362. 10. Defendant knowingly misleads consumers. As a leading low-carbohydrate lifestyle company, Atkins prominently touts the supposedly low (or zero) carb benefits of its products. But the company touts “net” carbs, a misleading term that subtracts sugar alcohols. Sugar alcohols have a carbohydrate impact that should be included in any carbohydrate calculation. 11. Atkins made these false, misleading statements to deceive consumers into purchasing its products under the belief that they are extremely low in carbohydrates, when, in fact, they are not. 12. Defendant Atkins is the eponymous company formed by the late Dr. Robert Atkins (hereinafter “Dr. Atkins”) to promote the sale of books and food items related to the “Atkins Diet,” a low- to zero-carbohydrate diet. 13. To follow the Atkins Diet, users must forsake carbs which are present in most processed foods in the average American’s diet. In 1999, at the time the Atkins Diet was gaining sweeping popularity, the late Dr. Atkins informed adherents that the most popular artificial sweeteners that American manufacturers use to replace conventional sugars were not approved for use in the Atkins Diet. 4 14. Dr. Atkins wrote, “Sweeteners such as sorbitol, mannitol, and other hexitols [i.e., sugar alcohols] are not allowed.” See Robert C. Atkins, M.D., Dr. Atkins’ New Diet Revolution (Rev.) at p. 100 (1999). 15. In 2002, Dr. Atkins revised this prohibition. He stated, “certain sugar alcohols such as maltitol do not affect blood sugar and are acceptable.” Robert C. Atkins, M.D., Dr. Atkins’ New Diet Revolution (3rd ed.) at p. 112 (2002). 16. What changed? Between 1999 and 2002, Atkins had established a growing line of food products that included sugar alcohols, including the products at issue in this case. B. Atkins’ Specific Claims Regarding “Net Carbs” 17. Atkins’ website at www.atkins.com explains its definition of “net carbs” as “the total carbohydrate content of the food minus the fiber content and sugar alcohols.” It further claims, “The Net Carbs number reflects the grams of carbohydrate the significantly impact your blood sugar level and therefore are the only carbs you need to count when you do Atkins.” 18. Atkins claims its “Net Carb” calculation is based on “science.” 19. Atkins further claims: Net Carbs are the carbohydrates that significantly impact the blood-sugar level; they’re the only carbs that count when following Atkins. The good news is that the grams of carbohydrate in fiber, glycerine, and sugar alcohols don’t break down and convert to blood sugar and need not be counted by people on the ANA. … So Net Carbs represent the number of grams of total carbohydrate minus those that do not impact blood sugar.1 1 See http://www.atkins.com/Science/Articles---Library/Carbohydrates/The-Blood-Sugar- Roller-Coaster--Excess-Carbs,-Exce.aspx 5 20. Atkins manufactures, distributes, markets, advertises, and sells products containing sugar alcohols as replacements for ordinary carbohydrates that it claims do not impact blood sugar or have any carbohydrate impact. 21. Maltitol is the sugar alcohol of Atkins’ choice. For example, it is a leading ingredient in the following Atkins’ products: (a) Blueberry Greek Yogurt Bar; (b) Chocolate Peanut Butter Pretzel Bar; (c) Strawberry Almond Bar; (d) Cinnamon Bun Bar; (e) Chocolate Chip Granola Bar; (f) Chocolate Peanut Butter Bar; (g) Cookies n’ Crème Bar; (h) Mudslide Bar; (i) Chocolate Chip Cookie Dough Bar; (j) Triple Chocolate Bar; (k) Caramel Chocolate Peanut Nougat Bar; (l) Caramel Double Chocolate Crunch Bar; (m) Cashew Trail Mix Bar; (n) Coconut Almond Delight Bar; (o) Dark Chocolate Almond Coconut Crunch Bar; (p) Caramel Chocolate Nut Roll; (q) Dark Chocolate Decadence Bar; (r) Chocolate Chip Crisp Bar; (s) Chocolate Hazelnut Bar; (t) Chocolate Oatmeal Fiber Bar; (u) Cranberry Almond Bar; (v) Chocolate Covered Almonds; (w) Chocolate Candies; (x) Chocolate Peanut Candies; (y) Caramel Nut Chew Bar; (z) Chocolate Caramel Mousse Bar; (aa) Chocolate Coconut Bar; (bb) Nutty Fudge Brownie; (cc) Peanut Butter Cups, and (dd) Peanut Caramel Cluster Bar. 22. The Atkins “net carb” formula subtracts all grams of sugar alcohol from carbohydrates. For example, its “Chocolate Candies” product claims to have just “1g Net Carb.” 6 23. The ingredients panel for Atkins’ Chocolate Candies reveals the following: 7 24. Thus, Atkins’ starts with 19g of total carbs then subtracts 4g of Dietary Fiber and 14g of Sugar Alcohols to arrive at a Net Carbs claim of just 1 gram. The ingredient list reveals “maltitol” is the largest content of the product. 25. By this calculation, Atkins assigns a carbohydrate value of zero to maltitol and any other sugar alcohols for this product. 26. But this method of calculation conflicts with the method originally espoused by Dr. Atkins in his books. Indeed, Dr. Atkins stated that to arrive at net carbs, an individual should subtract only carbohydrates associated with fiber. He stated: “Basically, you can deduct the grams of fiber from the food’s total carb count. I call the net number of grams, ‘The carbs that count when you do Atkins.’” Robert C. Atkins, M.D., Dr. Atkins’ New Diet Revolution (3rd ed.) at p. 68 8 (2002). He further elaborated, “And determining which carbs count is simple: Check the total fiber grams listed on the food label and subtract that number from the total grams of carbohydrate listed.” Id. at p. 69. Thus, even Dr. Atkins uses a different carbohydrate calculation than that used by Atkins in its labeling. 27. Atkins does not disclose the conflict between Dr. Atkins’ espoused method of calculating “net carbs” and the method used by the company. C. Sugar Alcohols Retain Significant Energy Value 28. Contrary to Atkins’ claims, the authoritative scientific research on sugar alcohols, particularly maltitol, shows that they continue to have a significant impact on blood sugar levels. 29. The Diabetes Teaching Center at the University of California, San Francisco puts it best, “[D]on’t be fooled – sugar alcohols are still a form of carbohydrate, and they still affect your blood sugar levels, if not as dramatically.”2 30. Similarly, Dr. Regina Castro of the Mayo Clinic warns consumers should “be cautious with sugar alcohols” because they “can increase your blood sugar level.”3 31. To Plaintiffs’ knowledge, no independent scientist, doctor, or researcher agrees with Atkins’ assertion that maltitol and other sugar alcohols have a net energy value of zero. Atkins conceals this fact from consumers, and does not disclose this fact in its labeling or representations to consumers. 2 See http://dtc.ucsf.edu/living-with-diabetes/diet-and-nutrition/understanding- carbohydrates/counting-carbohydrates/learning-to-read-labels/counting-sugar-alcohols/. 3 See http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/diabetes/expert-answers/artificial- sweeteners/faq-20058038. 9 32. In the study “Sugar Alcohols and Diabetes: A Review,”4 Dr. Thomas Wolever explained: Some people may believe that products sweetened with sugar alcohols allow for more variety in food choices, and, hence, increased quality of life for people with diabetes. However, there is no evidence that sugar alcohol-sweetened products have any benefit on long-term glycemic control in people with diabetes. … The rationale behind the use of sugar-alcohol sweetened products for weight management is that they reduce both the energy and sugar contents of confectionary. However, the reduction in energy content is not large[.] … Most sugar alcohols have an energy content 33. Ordinary carbs have an energy value of approximately four calories per gram. 34. Maltitol has an energy value of approximately three calories per gram, 25 percent less than the energy value of an ordinary carb.5 35. Dr. Wolever found that 50 to 75 percent of maltitol is absorbed into the body. 36. By multiplying the energy value by the percent of the sugar alcohol absorbed by the body, one can arrive at the carb value of a sugar alcohol relative to an ordinary carbohydrate. Thus, total carbohydrate energy consumed per gram of maltitol is actually between 38 to 56 percent of the carbohydrate value of table sugar or ordinary carbohydrates. 4 See http://archive.diabetes.ca/files/SugarAlcohols--Wolever--CJDDecember2002.pdf. 5 See http://www.inspection.gc.ca/food/labelling/food-labelling-for-industry/nutrition- labelling/elements-within-the-nutrition-facts-table/eng/1389206763218/1389206811747?chap=1. 10 37. Thus, according to Dr. Wolever’s more scientifically sound calculation, the true “net carbs” in Atkins “Chocolate Candies” product would be between 6.32 and 8.84 grams instead of the 1 gram fraudulently claimed by Atkins. Accordingly, just as one example, the “Chocolate Candies” product has a “net carb” value of between 632 to 884 percent times as high as that claimed by Atkins. 38. According to the Diabetes Teaching Center at the University of California, San Francisco, “When counting carbohydrates for products made with sugar alcohols, [one should] subtract half of the grams of sugar alcohol listed on the food label from the total grams of carbohydrate.”6 39. Thus, experts agree: carbohydrates derived from sugar alcohols (1) impact blood sugar, and (2) should be included in any net carbohydrate count for products. 40. Atkins conceals the fact that sugar alcohols impact blood sugar from consumers. 41. Atkins conceals the fact that sugar alcohols should be included in the net carb count for products. D. The Term “Net Carbs” Is Grossly Misleading 42. The FDA has not regulated the phrase “net carb” but has affirmatively stated that it “ha[s] concerns that [the] term may be misleading to consumers.”7 43. The FDA admonished a different company for failing to include maltitol in its carbohydrate count on its label. In a June 20, 2001 letter concerning the product Carbolite, the FDA stated: 6 See http://www.diabetes.org/food-and-fitness/food/what-can-i-eat/understanding- carbohydrates/sugar-alcohols.html. 7 See http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2014/ucm407036.htm. 11 The product is further misbranded because the label bears the claim “Zero Carbohydrate” and the statement “Maltitol . . . . has been omitted from the total carbohydrate content . . . .” Maltitol is a carbohydrate and must be included in the value declared for “Total Carbohydrate” . . . See Food and Drug Administration Warning Letter ONPLDS 20-01 (June 20, 2001). 44. Though the FDA does not formally regulate use of the phrase “net carb,” its Canadian counterpart has found that the phrase is “not acceptable due to lack of scientific consensus on … definition and [its] potential to mislead consumers.”8 45. In another study, Dr. Wolever articulated the same concerns. He wrote, “Food labels of products containing sugar alcohols can be confusing.” Thomas Wolever, M.D. Ph.D., “Sugar Alcohol and Diabetes: A Review,” Canadian Journal of Diabetes 2002; 26(4): 356-362 at 360 (2002). He elaborated that “individuals who use product labels to count carbohydrates could potentially overestimate the amount of insulin to use for a carbohydrate load. Complicating this issue is a lack of consistent labelling, both nationally and internationally, for products containing sugar alcohols.” Id. at 361. 46. In 2004, Dr. Wolever told the New York Times, “It’s a big misconception to say maltitol does not raise blood sugar.” Instead, he explained, “Sugar alcohols have come on the market quite aggressively and it’s very confusing. The science is not good.”9 47. In 2004, Atkins appeared to agree with the consensus that food labels concerning sugar alcohols were misleading. The company announced in 2004 that it would discontinue using the term “net carbs” on its food labels because the term is “imprecise.” Sarah Ellison, Atkins Labels 8 See http://www.inspection.gc.ca/food/labelling/food-labelling-for-industry/nutrition- labelling/carbohydrate-claims/eng/1409844949900/1409845010355. 9 See Burros, Marian, “New ‘Low-Carb’ Foods Aren’t All-You-Can-Eat, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/learning/students/pop/20040415snapthursday.html 12 Will Drop Term ‘Net Carbs’, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 6, 2004 (available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB109700319191636814). According to the article: As low-carb products have proliferated, the food industry has faced increasing skepticism about their nutrient content and labeling. For example, many companies, including Atkins at one time, calculate a products “net carbs” by subtracting grams of fiber and sugar alcohols from the total carbohydrate grams. That calculation allows food makers to cook up starchy, sweet products like brownies, pastries and candy, and call them “low carb.” But one thing the calculation doesn’t take into account is that sugar alcohols raise blood-sugar levels, just as “net carbs” do. Id. (emphasis added). 48. Nonetheless, despite acknowledging that the term “net carbs” is “imprecise” – particularly when it subtracts sugar alcohols from its consideration – Atkins continues to use the term in its labeling and continues to use the formulation that it publicly rejected in 2004. 49. Atkins’ “net carb” claims are false, misleading, and likely to deceive consumers, such as Plaintiff and members of the Class, in that Atkins’ products have multiple times the level of carbohydrates as labeled by Atkins’ net carb claim because sugar alcohol continues to have an effect on blood sugar and calories in direct contradiction to Atkins’ claims. E. The Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Experiences 50. Plaintiff is domiciled in Queens County, New York. 51. Plaintiff has purchased Atkins meal bars and snack bars at multiple locations in the State of New York, specifically in this District. 52. Plaintiff would not have purchased the products if he had known that the Atkins products misleadingly defined “net carbs” to exclude sugar alcohols, which were up to eight times higher than the amount claimed by Atkins. 13 53. Furthermore, ordinary and reasonable consumers would not purchase Atkins’ products containing the “net carbs” designation if they knew the facts and information that Atkins concealed from consumers. 54. Plaintiff and members of the Class have been economically damaged by their purchase of Atkins’ products because they have significantly more carbohydrates that affect the blood sugar and weight gain than the “net carb” amount claimed by Atkins. In this respect, Plaintiff and members of the Class have overpaid for Atkins products containing the “net carbs” calculation that omits sugar alcohols from its calculation. 55. At a minimum, Plaintiff contends that Defendant should cease labeling its products with a “net carb” calculation that assigns a value of zero to sugar alcohols. 56. Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and the following proposed Class: Citizens of New York who have purchased Atkins’ products labeled and marketed with the “net carbs” calculation that contained sugar alcohols in the State of New York. 57. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, any affiliate, parent, employee or subsidiary of Defendant; any officer, director, or employee of Defendant; anyone employed by counsel for Plaintiff in this action; and any Judge to whom this case is assigned as well as his or her immediate family. 58. This action has been brought and may be properly maintained as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 59. Numerosity of the Class – Rule 23(a)(1). Class members are so numerous that their individual joinder is impracticable. 14 60. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact – Rule 23(a)(2), 23(b)(3). Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. These common legal and factual questions, each of which may also be certified under Rule 23(c)(4), include the following: a. Whether Atkins misrepresented / concealed the sugar alcohol content on the label of its products identified with the “net carbs” designation; b. Whether Atkins was aware of its deception and/or omissions; c. Whether Atkins’s deception is material; d. Whether Atkins concealed the true nature of its product; e. Whether Atkins profited from its concealment; f. Whether Atkins had a duty to disclose the correct sugar alcohol content and/or true identity of its products with the “net carbs” label; g. Whether Atkins’s conduct harmed Plaintiff and the Class; h. Whether Atkins has engaged in unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices in violation of New York law; i. Whether Plaintiffs and the other Class members are entitled to equitable relief, including declaratory relief, restitution, and/or rescission. 61. Typicality – Rule 23(a)(3). Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class because, among other things, Plaintiff purchased Atkins products bearing the “net carbs” label that contained sugar alcohols. 62. Adequacy of Representation – Rule 23(a)(4). Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced 15 in complex class action litigation, and Plaintiff will prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff has no interests adverse or antagonistic to those of the Classes. 63. Superiority - Rule 23(b)(3). A class action is superior to all other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The damages or other financial detriment suffered by individual Class members are small compared with the burden and expense that would be entailed by individual litigation of their claims against Defendant. It would thus be virtually impossible for the Class members, on an individual basis, to obtain effective redress for the wrongs done them. Furthermore, even if Class members could afford such individualized litigation, the court system could not. Individualized litigation would create the danger of inconsistent or contradictory judgments arising from the same set of facts. Individualized litigation would also increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system from the issues raised by this action. By contrast, the class action device provides the benefits of adjudication of these issues in a single proceeding, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court, and presents no unusual management difficulties under the circumstances here. 64. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges all paragraphs previously alleged herein. 65. Plaintiff asserts this cause of action on behalf of himself and the proposed Class against Defendant under New York Gen. Bus. Law § 349, which protects consumers against deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business. 16 66. Throughout the class period, Atkins engaged in deceptive business acts and/or practices by: a. Marketing, advertising, and selling products with the “net carbs” label without disclosing and omitting the true carbohydrate count of those products; and b. Affirmatively asserting that sugar alcohols had effectively zero impact on blood sugar, by subtracting all sugar alcohols from its “net carb” calculation; c. Marketing, advertising, and selling products using the “Atkins” name without disclosing and omitting that the products were not consistent with the philosophy of the diet and company’s eponymous founder. 67. Defendant’s acts and omissions described herein misled Plaintiff and class members about facts of the product that could not reasonably be known by them. 68. Defendant’s deceptive acts and omissions described herein were made knowingly with the intent to cause Plaintiff and class members to underestimate the carbohydrate impact of Defendant’s products. 69. Defendant’s deceptive acts and omissions were directed at consumers. 70. As a direct result of Atkins’s deceptive business acts and/or practices, Plaintiff and members of the Class suffered injury in fact and lost money or property. 71. Defendant’s conduct in employing these deceptive business acts and/or practices was malicious, willful, wanton, and outrageous such as to shock the conscious of the community and therefore warrants imposition of punitive damages in an amount to be determined by a jury. 72. Defendant’s deceptive business acts and practices impact the public interest because Plaintiff and class members were injured in exactly the same way as thousands of others purchasing the products. 17 73. Defendant’s deceptive business acts and/or practices are likely to mislead reasonable consumers in the future. Had Plaintiff and class members known the true facts about the products, they would not have purchased them at their inflated price. 74. Accordingly, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class, seeks the greater of $50 per class member or actual damages, whichever is greater, plus attorney’s fees. 75. Plaintiff also seeks an injunction to enjoin the deceptive practices alleged herein. 76. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges all paragraphs previously alleged herein. 77. Plaintiff asserts this cause of action on behalf of himself and the Class against Defendant under GBL § 350, which declares unlawful “[f]alse advertising in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce.” As defined in the Act, false advertising includes “advertising, including labeling of a commodity … if such advertising is misleading in a material respect” taking into account “the extent to which the advertising fails to reveal facts material in light of … representations [made] with respect to the commodity. …” GBL § 350-a(1). 78. Defendant has been and continues to be engaged in the “conduct of … business, trade, or commerce” under GBL § 350. 79. Throughout the class period, Defendant caused to be made and disseminated throughout New York statements that were untrue and misleading. These statements were made on the Defendant’s product labels, its website, and in general advertising. 80. Defendant’s conduct in employing these deceptive business acts and/or practices was malicious, willful, wanton, and outrageous such as to shock the conscious of the community and therefore warrants imposition of punitive damages in an amount to be determined by a jury. 80. Defendant knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that its statements were untrue and misleading to Plaintiff and class members. 18 81. Defendant’s untrue and misleading statements were material and substantially uniform in their content, presentations, and impact upon Plaintiff and class members. 81. Accordingly, Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the Class, seek relief against Atkins in the form of an order prohibiting Atkins from engaging in the alleged misconduct described herein, and other relief as specifically prayed for herein. 82. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges all paragraphs previously alleged herein. 82. Defendant’s untrue and misleading statements were material and likely to deceive a reasonable consumer. As a direct result of Atkins’s false advertising, Plaintiff and members of the Class suffered injury in fact and lost money or property. 83. Plaintiff asserts this cause of action on behalf of himself and the proposed Class against Defendant for breach of express warranty. 84. Defendant provided Plaintiff and class members with written express warranties that its products contained minimal “net carbs” and that any sugar alcohols contained therein had minimal and effectively no impact on blood sugar. These “Net Carb” claims are affirmations of fact that were a basis of the bargain between Plaintiff (and class members) and Defendant. 85. Defendant’s Net Carb claims created an express warranty that the goods would conform to Defendant’s stated promises. 19 86. Defendant’s Net Carb claims were material to Plaintiff and class members in the decision to purchase Defendant’s products. 87. Defendant breached its express warranty by not providing goods with the qualities promised. 88. As a direct result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiff and members of the Class suffered injury in fact and lost money or property. 89. Defendant’s conduct in employing these deceptive business acts and/or practices was malicious, willful, wanton, and outrageous such as to shock the conscious of the community and therefore warrants imposition of punitive damages in an amount to be determined by a jury. 90. Accordingly, Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the Class, seek relief against Atkins in the form of an order prohibiting Atkins from engaging in the alleged misconduct described herein, and other relief as specifically prayed for herein. A. Background Breach of Express Warranty Violation of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 (Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices) Violation of New York Gen. Bus. Law § 350 (False Advertising)

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(Violation of TILA and Regulation Z) 26. On or about September 23, 2005, Plaintiff took out a mortgage, secured by her residential property, located at 4382 Dongounery Cove, in Memphis, Tennessee (“the Property”), for the principal amount of $156,370.00 (“the Mortgage”). The footer of the Mortgage’s Deed of Trust states it is an “FHA TENNESSEE DEED OF TRUST—MERS,” which indicates that it conforms to the servicing requirements established by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). 27. Section Four of the Mortgage’s Deed of Trust, entitled “Fire, Flood and Other Hazard Insurance,” requires the Borrower to maintain property insurance, and provides that the insurance policies “shall be held by Lender and shall include loss payable clauses in favor of, and in a form acceptable to, Lender.” 46. Plaintiff brings this suit as a class action on behalf of herself and on behalf of others similarly situated pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 23(a), 23(b)(2), and/or 23(b)(3) (the “Class”). The proposed Class consists of: all borrowers that have or had mortgages serviced by Defendant, on property located within the United States, (i) who may receive or are entitled to receive payoff statements; or (ii) who have received mortgage payoff statements from Defendant, which failed to disclose the amount of insurance proceeds held by Defendant. 47. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Defendant is one of the largest mortgage servicers in the country. According to a news release dated April 14, 2015, Defendant reported a residential mortgage servicing portfolio of $1.7 trillion, and $1.5 billion in mortgage banking noninterest income in its last quarter. There are over eighteen Wells Fargo branches in Tennessee alone. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the entire Class because Defendant failed to account for insurance proceeds in its payoff statement to Plaintiff. Defendant has a common course of conduct of failing to account for such funds in payoff statements regarding other Class members. 55. Plaintiff repeats the allegations in the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. Defendant’s Rights Under the Mortgage to Administer Insurance Proceeds

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11. In or around October 2012 through November 2012, Plaintiff Amanda Sumpter was housed as an inmate at the Wayne County Jail. 12. During her incarceration at the Wayne County Jail, Plaintiff Sumpter was subjected to unreasonable, unlawful, and unconstitutional strip searches conducted by agents and/or employees of the Wayne County Sheriff. 13. Specifically, the Wayne County Sheriff has allowed an unconstitutional policy, custom and practice to flourish within the Wayne County Jail whereby female inmates are forcibly exposed in a state of undress to male guards, officers, employees, and other male 5:14-cv-14769-JCO-RSW Doc # 1 Filed 12/17/14 Pg 2 of 8 Pg ID 2 3 inmates. 14. During strip searches, Plaintiff, and hundreds of other female inmates were made to strip down naked in common areas of the Wayne County Jail and in view of male officers as well as other inmates. 15. During such strip searches, Plaintiff, and hundreds of other female inmates, were forced to bend over and spread their vaginal parts and anus under the pretense of searching for contraband. 16. Defendants conducted these unreasonable and unconstitutional strip searches even if the female inmates were experiencing menstrual cycles which would often result in menstrual discharges in the common areas of the jail during these en masse strip searches. 17. During these unconstitutional strip searches, Plaintiff and hundreds of other female inmates would see and hear the male officers laughing and otherwise mocking them while standing naked and being forced to expose themselves. 18. These strip searches, which were often conducted in groups, were conducted without reasonable suspicion that any particular inmates were in the possession of contraband. 19. Often times these unreasonable and unconstitutional strip searches occurred before and after the female inmates were taken to court proceedings and/or medical examinations during which the female inmates were always in the presence of correctional officers. 20. Plaintiff was subjected to several unreasonable and unconstitutional strip searches between October and November 2012. 21. Upon information and belief, Defendant Graham routinely conducted the types of strip 5:14-cv-14769-JCO-RSW Doc # 1 Filed 12/17/14 Pg 3 of 8 Pg ID 3 4 searches described herein. 22. Plaintiff was also forcibly exposed to male deputies who often worked in the stations adjacent to the female inmates’ housing unit. 23. The male deputies who were assigned to the female housing unit had direct view into the cells of several female inmates including views of the inmate toilets. 24. The male deputies who were assigned to the female housing unit had direct view into the shower areas of the female inmates. 25. Furthermore, on the midnight shift when the female inmates were asleep, male officers would often perform rounds and check on the inmates in their cells when the female inmates were often in a state of undress. 26. During such rounding of the cells throughout the night, the male officers did not announce their presence. 27. Plaintiff and other female inmates were often degraded, humiliated, and subjected to inhumane and cruel treatment as described herein for no legitimate penological interest but rather to embarrass, humiliate, and degrade them. 28. Plaintiff suffered extreme emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, and damage as a result of Defendants’ degrading, humiliating, and cruel actions. 29. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in the above Paragraphs of the complaint. 30. The acts of Defendants as ratified, endorsed, and cultivated by Wayne County and its Sheriff as described herein violated Plaintiff’s privacy rights as guaranteed by the Fourth 5:14-cv-14769-JCO-RSW Doc # 1 Filed 12/17/14 Pg 4 of 8 Pg ID 4 5 Amendment to the United States Constitution. 31. Defendants’ actions as described herein were undertaken without regard to any legitimate penological interest. 32. Defendants’ acts of forcibly exposing Plaintiff to be seen naked by male deputies and male inmates constituted an unreasonable invasion of privacy in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 33. Defendants’ actions were not taken spontaneously in response to an emergency, but rather in conformity with the County and Sheriff’s Department’s deliberate policies, customs, and practices. 34. The constitutional rights that Defendants violated were clearly established at all times when Defendants violated such rights and a reasonable person in Defendants’ position would have understood that their conduct was in violation of those rights. 35. Defendants are therefore not entitled to qualified immunity. 36. By virtue of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages. 37. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in the above Paragraphs of the complaint. 38. Defendants County of Wayne and Wayne County Sheriff employed the use of unconstitutional policies, practices, and customs relating to strip searches that resulted in the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. 5:14-cv-14769-JCO-RSW Doc # 1 Filed 12/17/14 Pg 5 of 8 Pg ID 5 6 39. Specifically, Defendants County and its Sheriff allowed the following unconstitutional policies, practices, and customs to flourish in the Wayne County Jail: a. subjecting female inmates to strip searches in en masse without regard to the inmates’ privacy rights. b. subjecting female inmates to strip searches in the presence of or within view of members of the opposite sex; and c. forcibly exposing female inmates to spread and expose their vaginal areas without regard to the inmates’ privacy rights and in the presence of members of the opposite sex and other inmates. 40. Defendants’ unconstitutional polices, practices, and customs as described herein served no legitimate penological interest. 41. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference herein the allegations contained in the above Paragraphs of the complaint. 42. Defendants County of Wayne and its Sheriff had an obligation to train its employees and/or agents regarding the constitutional rights of citizens under the Fourth Amendment including the right to privacy. 43. Defendants County of Wayne and its Sheriff had an obligation to supervise its agents and employees, including the individual Defendants named herein, to insure that the constitutional rights of Plaintiff and similarly situated female inmates were not violated. 44. Defendants County of Wayne and its Sheriff failed to comply with its duty to train and/or 5:14-cv-14769-JCO-RSW Doc # 1 Filed 12/17/14 Pg 6 of 8 Pg ID 6 7 supervise its employees and/or agents and had a custom or policy of acting with deliberate indifference to violations of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff and other similarly situated female inmates. 45. By inadequately training and/or supervising its employees and agents and having a custom or policy of deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiff, Defendants encouraged and cultivated the conduct that resulted in the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 46. Defendants’ policies, practices, and customs were the moving force in causing Plaintiff her injuries as described herein. 47. By virtue of the actions of Defendant County of Wayne and its Sheriff, Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages. COUNTY SHERIFF FOR ITS UNCONSTITUTIONAL POLICES, CUSTOMS, AND PRACTICES COUNTY SHERIFF FOR INADEQUATE TRAINING AND/OR SUPERVISION OF ITS AGENTS AND EMPLOYEES REGARDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CITIZENS

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14. On or about July 2, 2014, First Step mailed a debt collection letter to Plaintiff regarding an alleged debt. A copy of this letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit A. 15. Upon information and belief, the alleged debt referred to in Exhibit A was alleged personal, “CareCredit” branded credit card account, originally with GE Capital Retail Bank, N.A. (GE Capital) and only used for personal, family or household purposes. 16. Upon information and belief, Exhibit A was the first letter that First Step sent to Plaintiff regarding the alleged debt referenced in the letter. 17. Upon information and belief, Exhibit A is a form letter, generated by computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiff inserted by computer. 18. Exhibit A identifies the creditor as “CACH, LLC.” 19. CACH, LLC acquired the account identified in Exhibit A after it was in default. 20. Exhibit A tells the consumer that the “Original Creditor” is “SYNCHRONY 41. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 42. Exhibit A identifies the original creditor as “SYNCHRONY LENDING, INC.” 43. “SYNCHRONY LENDING, INC.” is not the name of any past or present creditor. 44. Exhibit B identifies the original creditor as “SYNCHRONY BANK.” 45. The language in First Step’s letters is false, misleading and confusing to the unsophisticated consumer, in that one of the letters (Exhibit A) incorrectly states the name of the original creditor, the other uses a name that was never used during the pendency of the Plaintiff’s credit relationship, and both together are confusing as to the identity of the original creditor. 47. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a Class, consisting of (a) all natural persons in the State of Wisconsin (b) to whom First Step Group, LLC sent a collection letter seeking to collect a debt allegedly owed to CACH, LLC (c) which letter stated that the original creditor is “SYNCHRONY LENDING, INC.” or “SYNCHRONY BANK”, (d) seeking to collect a debt for personal, family or household purposes, (e) between the dates of July 2, 2014, and September 30, 2014 (f) that was not returned by the postal service. 48. The Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, there are more than 50 members of the Class. 49. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class, which common questions predominate over any questions that affect only individual class members. The predominant common question is whether the Defendants complied with 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 50. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 51. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in consumer credit and debt collection abuse cases. 52. A class action is superior to other alternative methods of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible. Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No.: 14-cv-1425

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55. Despite these risks, Plaintiff Badger plans to return to Defendants’ facilities, as she travels frequently throughout the Pittsburgh region visiting friends and family for shopping and dining, including to the Subject Properties. Furthermore, Plaintiff Badger intends to return to Defendants’ facilities to ascertain whether those facilities remain in violation of the ADA. 56. Plaintiff Gellatly plans to return to Defendants’ facilities, as she attends university in Western Pennsylvania and regularly travels throughout the area visiting friends and family for shopping and dining, including to the Subject Properties. Furthermore, Plaintiff Gellatly intends to return to Defendants’ facilities to ascertain whether those facilities remain in violation of the 69. Plaintiffs bring this class action, pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of themselves and the following nationwide class: all wheelchair users who have attempted, or will attempt, to utilize the parking facilities at all locations within the United States for which Defendants own and/or control the parking facilities. 71. Typicality: Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of Plaintiffs and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 72. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class in that they all have been and/or are being denied their civil rights to full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment of, Defendants’ facilities and/or services due to Defendants’ failure to make their facilities fully accessible and independently usable as above described. 73. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiffs are an adequate representative of the class because their interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class. Plaintiffs will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the class and have no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Plaintiffs have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation, generally, and who possess specific expertise in the context of class litigation under the ADA. 74. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiffs and the Class as a whole. I. Plaintiffs Have Been Denied Full and Equal Access to Defendants’ Facilities.

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40. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 41. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of: “all persons within the United States who received a text message substantially similar or identical to the text messages described above in this Complaint from Defendant, which message by Defendant or its agents was not made for emergency purposes, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint.” 42. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the tens of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 43. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using an unsolicited and impersonal form SPAM text messages, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 51. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 52. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 55. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 56. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 57. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 58. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 62. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 63. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 64. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 65. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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(Breach of Fiduciary Duty) (Declaratory Judgment) (Gross Negligence) (Negligence) (Uniust Enrichment) 1.220(b)(2), which states: "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to all the members of the class, thereby making final injunctive relief or declaratory relief concerning the class as a whole appropriate." Here, Defendant's consistent business practice affects all Class Members, including Buyers who may use Defendant as their Closing Agent at the selection of Sellers in the future. Therefore, Defendant's wrongful business practice is continuing and on-going. 10. A copy of the Contract is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 11. Paragraph 9 of the Contract states in relevant part: 2.? , � Broker or statutory obligetions undor Cheater giTS, F S., eS amended. Far purpoaes of this Perayrkriph 14. Broker will be troatud as a party to this Contract. This Paragraph 14 shalt survive Closing or terreinalion of this Contract. 24. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, as if fully set forth verbatim herein. 25. Plaintiff brings this class action under Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.220(b)(1) and/or 1.220(b)(2), and in the alternative, 1.220(b)(3) on behalf of himself and on behalf of a I similarly situated "Class" or "Class Members." 27. Plaintiff brings this class action individually, and on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated Buyers, and seeks class certification of the claims and issues pleaded in this Complaint, on behalf of the Class defined as follows: All Buyers in all cash real estate sale transactions in Florida, that used an "AS IS" Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase form approved by the Florida Bar and Florida Association of Realtors, that selected sub-paragraph (i) of section 9(c), but who were charged and paid a Closing Agent Closing Services Fee, during the four years precedent to the date of filing this Complaint, through and until the date Notice is provided to the Class. 28. Excluded from the Class are governmental entities, Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, and Defendant's officers, directors, affiliates, legal representatives, employees, co-conspirators, successors, subsidiaries, and assigns. Also excluded from the Class is any judge, justice, or judicial officer presiding over this matter and the members of their immediate families and judicial staff. 29. All Class Members were and are similarly affected by Defendant's conduct and business practice because they all were cash Buyers who agreed to be charged consistent with section 9(c)(i) of the uniform and standardized FARBAR Contract, but who were all nonetheless charged and paid Closing Services Fees. 31. A class action is also appropriate pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 33. Based on the estimated number of all cash land sale transactions throughout Florida and investigation of counsel, it is readily apparent that the number of Buyers is so large as to make joinder impractical. Based on information and belief, the size of the Class is likely in the thousands and easily includes more than forty (40) class members. Nevertheless, despite the estimated size of the Class, Class Members may be notified of the class certification and pendency of this action by recognized, Court-approved notice dissemination methods, which may include U.S. Mail, electronic mail, Internet postings, and/or published notice through the assistance of a Class Action Administrator. 35. The claims asserted by Plaintiff in this action are typical of the claims of Class Members as the claims arise from the same course of conduct by Defendant, and the relief sought within the Class is common to each of the Class Members. 36. Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in both consumer protection and class action litigation. Plaintiffs counsel has represented consumers in a wide variety of class actions where they were approved as class counsel. 37. A class action is a fair and appropriate method for the adjudication of the controversy, in that it will permit a large number of claims to be resolved in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary hardship that would result from the prosecution of numerous individual actions and the duplication of discovery, effort, expense and burden on the courts that individual actions would engender. 38. The benefits of proceeding as a class action, including providing a method for obtaining redress for claims that would not be practical to pursue individually, outweigh any difficulties that might be argued regarding the management of this class action. 39. Absent a class action, it would be highly unlikely that the representative Plaintiff or any other Class member would be able to protect their own interests because the cost of litigation through individual lawsuits might exceed expected recovery. 40. The questions of law or fact common to the respective Class Members predominate over questions of law or fact affecting only individual members. 42. Plaintiff adopts and realleges paragraphs 1 through 41 as if fully set forth herein. 43. Defendant was the Closing Agent for Plaintiffs cash purchase of real property pursuant to the Contract. 44. Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiff and Class Members to act competently and diligently with regards to closing the sale between Buyers and Seller. 45. In performing Closing Services for the transaction, Defendant breached its duty of care to the Plaintiff in the process of closing the sale and acted with gross negligence, as Defendant either wholly failed to review Paragraph 9(c) of the Contract or recklessly disregarded the terms of Paragraph 9(c) of the Contract. 46. Consequently, Plaintiff and Class Members were charged a Closing Services Fee, despite the Contract stating that the Closing Services Fee would be charged to the Seller. 47. Defendant's conduct evidences a reckless indifference to the rights of Plaintiff and a failure to exercise even the slightest degree of care. 48. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's gross negligence, Plaintiff and Class Members have been damaged. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment for damages in the amount of the total Closing Services Fees paid by and charged to Plaintiff and Class Members, together with interest and costs and an award of attorney's fees as permitted pursuant to applicable common benefit law. 49. Plaintiff adopts and realleges paragraphs 1 through 41 as if fully set forth herein. 51. Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiff and Class Members to act competently and diligently with regards to closing the sale between Buyers and Seller. 52. In performing Closing Services for the transaction, Defendant breached its duty of care to the Plaintiff in the process of closing the sale and acted with negligence, as Defendant failed to supervise and carry out the closing in a reasonable matter, in that Defendant either neglected to review Paragraph 9(c) of the Contract or disregarded the terms of Paragraph 9(c) of the Contract. 53. Consequently, Plaintiff was charged a Closing Services Fee, despite the Contract stating that the Closing Services Fee would be charged to the Seller. 54. Defendant's conduct evidences a failure to exercise reasonable care. 55. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligence, Plaintiff and Class Members have been damaged. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment for damages in the amount of the total Closing Services Fees paid by and charged to Plaintiff and Class Members, together with interest and costs and an award of attorney's fees as permitted pursuant to applicable common benefit law. 56. Plaintiff adopts and realleges paragraphs 1 through 41 as if fully set forth herein. 57. By virtue of its status as the closing or escrow agent in its relationship with the Plaintiff and Class Members, Defendant owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff and Class Members to deal in the utmost good faith and in the interest of the Buyers. 58. As Closing Agent, Defendant's fiduciary duty included the duty to conduct and supervise the closing in a non-negligent manner, and with honesty and in good faith. 60. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach and dereliction of fiduciary duty, Plaintiff and Class Members have been damaged. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment for damages in the amount of the total Closing Services Fees paid by and charged to Plaintiff and Class Members, together with interest and costs and an award of attorney's fees as permitted pursuant to applicable common benefit law. 61. Plaintiff adopts and realleges paragraphs 1 through 41 as if fully set forth herein. 62. This Court has jurisdiction over this action for Declaratory Relief pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 86.011. 63. As a Buyer in the real estate transaction that is the subject of this action, Plaintiff has a legal interest in, and there is doubt, as to whether Defendant was entitled under the Contract to charge Plaintiff a Closing Services Fee in connection with Plaintiff's purchase of the Property referenced in the Contract. 64. There is bona fide, justiciable controversy between the parties as to Defendant's entitlement to charge Plaintiff and Class Members a Closing Services Fee, and an actual, practical, and present need for a declaration. 65. Plaintiffs entitlement to a return of the Closing Services Fee improperly charged to Plaintiff is dependent on a declaration of facts, or the law applied to the facts of this dispute. 66. Plaintiff and Defendant have an actual, present adverse interest in the subject matter of the declaration requested, either in fact or law. 68. Plaintiff adopts and realleges paragraphs 1 through 41 as if fully set forth herein. 69. This cause of action is pleaded as an alternative to Plaintiffs legal remedies alleged in this Complaint. 70. Plaintiff and Class Members conferred a benefit on Defendant, in that Defendant collected an improper and wrongful Closing Services Fee from Plaintiff and Class Members. 71. Defendant knew and appreciated that it charged and collected a Closing Services Fee from Plaintiff and Class Members, as Defendant prepared the Closing Statement and conducted and supervised the closing. 72. Defendant voluntarily accepted and retained the Closing Services Fees paid Plaintiff and Class Members. 73. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff has been damaged. 74. The circumstances render Defendant's retention of the Closing Services Fees paid by Plaintiff and Class Members inequitable and unfair unless Defendant returns the money that was improper collected from Plaintiff and Class Members. 9. The Contract is a standardized form known as the "'AS IS' Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase" approved by the Florida Bar and Florida Association of Realtors. (hereinafter "FARBAR Contract"). 9. � CASE No.: JOHN P. HAINES, individually and on � CLASS REPRESENTATION behalf of all others similarly situated, Ii) FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN REAL PROPERTY TAX ACT ("FIRPTA"): Seiler shot! inform Buyer in wilting if • ,: �Seller Is a 'foreign person'. as defined by the Foreign Investment in Real Properly Tax Ac! ("FIRPTA'). Buyer and Seller shall comply with FIRPTA, which may require Seller to provide additional cash at Closing. If Selter is not a 'foreign person', Seller can provide Buyer. at or prior to Closing, a certification of non-foreign status: :.4 �under eanallies of perjury, to inform Buyer and Closing Agent that no withholding is required. See STANDARD . g' � V for further Information pertatning to FIRPTA. Buyer and Seiler are advised to seek legal counsel and tax - tzt �advice regarding their respedve rights. obligations, reloading and 1,..t..ho.- vi h IA ing requirements pursuant to WRITTEN OR OTHERWISE) .OF BROKER. Buyer arid Seller endividuelia. the "indemnifying Party) each indhadually indemnifies holds harmless, and releases Broker and Brokers officers, directore, egenle and • employees from all !lability. for toss or damage, induding ire costs and expenses, and reasonable attorney's fees at • all levels, suffered or incurred by Broker and arelter,e officers, directors, agents and employees in conpection with • n � or arising from claims. -demands or causes of action Instituted by Boyar or Seller based on; ti/ inaccuracy of ae � information provided by The Indemnifying Party or from public records; (ii) Indemnifying Party's neest.etement(s) or o � failure tri perform contractual Obligations; (iii) BrokeeS preformence at indemnifying Party's request, of any task beyond atG scope of services regulated by Chapter 475. F S.. .as .amended; including Broker's referral, _17 recommendation or retention of any vendor for, or on behalf of. Indemnifying Perty; (iv) products or Servicaa r 1 � Pi tiVig) ed by any such vendor for, or an behalf of, Indempifying Party and tv) expenses incurred by any earth Venikit. .o.: � Buyer and Seller each assume" full responsibility for salectieg and compensating their respective vendors not ret;acvned e � paying their other costs Under this,Contract whether et northie transoclion closes. This Paragraph 4 w

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7.   From December 29, 2014, through August 1, 2017, Helix employed Plaintiff as a Tool Pusher. In that role, his primary duty was to supervise and coordinate the activities of workers engaged in drilling on an oil rig. 9.   Helix’s payment of a day rate without overtime to Plaintiff and similarly situated individuals violates the FLSA. See Mumby v. Pure Energy Servs. (USA), Inc., 636 F.3d 1266, 1268 (10th Cir. 2011) (observing that “day rate” scheme clearly violated the FLSA and entitled the plaintiffs to overtime pay and liquidated damages under the law). A.   Helix Paid Plaintiff And Similarly Situated Employees On A Day Rate Plan With No Overtime

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a cooler, drinkware and apparel company that owns and operates www.bisoncoolers.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in January of 2020, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.bisoncoolers.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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(Collective Action Claim for Violation of FLSA) (Individual Claims for Violation of FLSA) (Individual Claims for Violation of the AMWA) 26. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all the preceding paragraphs of this Original Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 27. During part of the three (3) years prior to the filing of this lawsuit, Plaintiffs worked for Defendant as Hourly Grocery Store Employees. 28. Plaintiffs and other Hourly Grocery Store Employees regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week throughout their tenure with Defendant. 30. Plaintiff and other Hourly Grocery Store Employees were also paid non- discretionary cash awards and bonuses on a regular basis when certain objective and measurable revenue criteria were met. 31. In addition, Defendant paid Plaintiff and other Grocery Store Employees one-and-one-half (1.5) times their base hourly rate for some hours they worked over forty (40) in a workweek. 32. However, Defendant did not include the bonuses and cash awards paid to Plaintiffs and other Hourly Grocery Store Employees in their regular rates when calculating their overtime pay. 33. Section 778.208 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations requires that non-discretionary bonuses, such as shift and hour-based premiums, "must be totaled in with other earnings to determine the regular rate on which overtime pay must be based." 34. Defendant violated the FLSA and AMWA by not including the non- discretionary bonuses of Plaintiffs and other Hourly Grocery Store Employees in their regular rate when calculating their overtime pay. 35. Furthermore, Plaintiffs sometimes were required to work without clocking- in, and were not paid for these "off-the-clock" hours, which were beyond forty (40) in a given workweek. 37. Plaintiffs also sometimes stayed late after clocking out to complete tasks at the request of management. 38. As a result of this "off-the-clock" work, Plaintiffs were not paid a proper overtime premium for all of the hours they worked over forty (40) in a given workweek. 39. The pay practices that violate the FLSA and AMWA alleged herein were the same at all of Defendant's locations because the policy was a centralized human resources policy implemented uniformly from the corporate headquarters in Tuckerman. 40. Defendant knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, the way it paid Plaintiff and other Hourly Grocery Store Employees violated the FLSA and AMWA. 41. Defendant's Hourly Grocery Store Employees were classic manual laborers, working to stock and maintain food products and assist customers in a grocery store setting. V. 42. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all the preceding paragraphs of this Original Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 43. Plaintiffs bring this claim for relief for violation of the FLSA as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 45. The relevant time period dates back three years from the date on which Plaintiffs' Original Complaint-Collective Action was filed and continues forward through the date of judgment pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 46. The members of the proposed FLSA Collective are similarly situated in that they share these traits: A. They were classified by Defendant as non-exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA; B. They were paid hourly rates; C. They recorded their time in the same manner; D. They were required to work "off the clock;" and E. They were subject to Defendant's common policy of improperly calculating overtime pay for hours worked over forty (40) per work week. 47. Plaintiffs are unable to state the exact number of the potential members of the FLSA Collective but believe that the group exceeds 350 persons. 56. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all the preceding paragraphs of this Original Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 57. 29 U.S.C. § 207 requires employers to pay employees one and one-half (1.5) times the employee's regular rate for all hours that the employee works in excess of forty (40) per week. 29 U.S.C.S. § 207. 58. Defendant violated Section 778.208 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations by not including non-discretionary bonuses paid to Plaintiffs in their regular rate when calculating their overtime pay. 59. Defendant further violated the FLSA by requiring Plaintiffs to work "off the clock" and, thus, not paying them an overtime premium for all hours worked beyond forty (40) in a given workweek. 60. Defendant's conduct and practice, as described above, has been and is willful, intentional, unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith. 61. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged in this Complaint, Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs for, and Plaintiffs seek, unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees as provided by the FLSA. 63. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all the preceding paragraphs of this Original Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 64. Plaintiffs bring this collective action on behalf of all Hourly Grocery Store Employees employed by Defendant to recover monetary damages owed by Defendant to Plaintiffs and members of the putative collective for all the overtime compensation for all the hours worked in excess of forty (40) each week. 65. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves individually and all other similarly situated employees, former and present, who were and/or are affected by Defendant's willful and intentional violation of the FLSA. 66. 29 U.S.C. § 207 requires employers to pay employees one and one-half (1.5) times the employee's regular rate for all hours that the employee works in excess of forty (40) per week. 29 U.S.C.S. § 207. 67. Defendant violated Section 778.208 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations by not including non-discretionary bonuses paid to Plaintiffs and those similarly situated in their regular rate when calculating their overtime pay. 68. In the past three years, Defendant has employed hundreds of Hourly Grocery Store Employees. 69. Like Plaintiffs, these Hourly Grocery Store Employees regularly worked more than forty (40) hours in a week. 70. Defendant failed to pay these workers at the proper overtime rate. 72. Defendant's conduct and practice, as described above, has been and is willful, intentional, unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith. 73. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged in this Complaint, Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs and all those similarly situated for, and Plaintiffs and all those similarly situated seek, unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees as provided by the FLSA. 74. Alternatively, should the Court find that Defendant acted in good faith in failing to pay Plaintiffs and all those similarly situated as provided by the FLSA, Plaintiffs and all those similarly situated are entitled to an award of prejudgment interest at the applicable legal rate. 75. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully incorporated in this section. 76. Plaintiffs assert this claim for damages and declaratory relief pursuant to the AMWA, Arkansas Code Annotated§§ 11-4-201, et seq. 77. At all relevant times, Defendant was Plaintiffs' "employer" within the meaning of the AMWA, Ark. Code Ann.§ 11-4-203(4). 79. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs all overtime wages owed, as required under the AMWA. 80. Defendant's failure to include non-discretionary bonuses in Plaintiffs' overtime pay resulted in a failure to pay Plaintiffs full and complete overtime during weeks in which Plaintiffs worked more than forty (40) hours. 81. Defendant's conduct and practices, as described above, were willful, intentional, unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith. 82. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged in this Complaint, Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs for monetary damages, liquidated damages, costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee provided by the AMWA for all violations which occurred beginning at least three (3) years preceding the filing of Plaintiffs' initial complaint, plus periods of equitable tolling. 83. Alternatively, should the Court find that Defendant acted in good faith in failing to pay Plaintiffs as provided by the AMWA, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of prejudgment interest at the applicable legal rate. IX.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems and require that any third party vendors who participate on its Website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with WCAG 2.0 criteria. 28. Defendant offers the commercial website, WWW.SCAD.EDU, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. 30. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 31. Plaintiff, Jason Camacho, attended the NACAC college fair at Javits on Nov. 5, 2018 in order to obtain information from the college exhibitors presenting and marketing at the fair including the Defendant’s school. 32. Soon after attending the Javits fair, Mr. Camacho attempted to access the Defendant’s website in order to obtain additional information about the Defendant’s school but was thwarted in his efforts to do so due to the inaccessibility of the Defendant’s website as set forth herein. 35. The stated principles of NACAC members include “They strive to eliminate bias within the educational system based on …disability.”1 36. By its failure to provide a website that is accessible to the blind or vision impaired, Defendant, that is a member of NACAC, intentionally violated NACAC’s basic principles to eliminate bias toward the disabled as well as federal, state and city statutes and regulations designed to protect those members of society who are in need of protection by those various laws. 37. NACAC maintains a business relationship with the New York Daily News newspaper which publishes full page advertisements for the NACAC college fairs at Javits and an onsite guide to the exhibitors which is distributed free of charge to attendees at the college fairs. Exhibitors, such as the Defendant, may participate in the New York Daily News advertisements and/or advertise in the onsite guide. 39. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 40. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s school and enjoying the services offered by the Defendant equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant's school in the near future if he could access their website. 41. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 42. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 44. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 45. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 47. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s school, shop for and otherwise research related services available via the Website such as curriculum, financial aids, campus tours and other vital information. 48. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 50. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 53. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 55. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, RA, NYSHRL and NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 56. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 58. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 59. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 61. Defendant’s school and it’s exhibits at Javits are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s school. The Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 63. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 64. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 66. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 67. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 68. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 69. Defendant’s physical exhibit locations are located in the State of New York and constitutes a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 70. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 73. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 75. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the State Sub-class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the State Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 78. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 84. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 85. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 87. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 90. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 92. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 93. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 94. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 95. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) provides “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States … shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance….” 96. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) defines “program or activity” as “all operations of…(2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of education; or (B) a local educational agency…, system of career and technical education, or other school system.” 97. Defendant receives Federal financial assistance. 98. Defendant’s operations, including its website, is a program or activity within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 794. DECLARATORY RELIEF 116. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 117. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. and The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 118. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE REHABILITATION ACT of 1973, §504

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(On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 46. Defendant made unsolicited text message calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class en masse without their prior express consent. 48. Defendant utilized equipment that made, or had made on their behalf, the text message calls to Plaintiff and other members of the Class simultaneously and without human intervention. 49. By making, or having made on their behalf, the unsolicited text message calls to Plaintiff and the Class, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5). As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Class suffered actual damages in the form of money they paid to receive the unsolicited text message calls on their cellular phones and are entitled to statutory damages under section 227(b)(3)(B) and 227(c)(5) at a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 50. Should the Court determine that Defendants’ conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to section 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class.

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(Violations of the FDCPA) 21. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “20” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 22. Upon information and belief, Defendant, on behalf of itself or a third-party, began efforts to collect an alleged consumer debt from the Plaintiff. 23. Upon information and belief, and better known to the Defendant, Defendant commenced its campaign of communications with Plaintiff by sending Plaintiff two (2) mass-produced form letters in the mail both dated December 11, 2013. 24. One letter was a collection letter (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant’s Collection Letter”) which bore Defendant’s letterhead with company name identifying Defendant as “Law Office” (attached hereto as Exhibit “A”). 25. Defendant’s Collection Letter began: “The above creditor has turned over to us for collection your account in the sum of $____. Beneath this was a heading in large type, upper case letters centered on the page: “VALIDATION NOTICE.” 26. Said “validation notice” consisted of: “The amount shown is the amount owed to the Creditor.” Immediately after this sentence begins Defendant’s required 30- day dispute language regarding consumer rights. 27. Thereafter, with no space to separate it from the preceding text, Defendant stated: “At this time no attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the particular circumstances of your account.” 28. Thereafter, with no space to separate it from the preceding text, Defendant provided required FDCPA disclosures in all uppercase letters. Thereafter Defendant informed the consumer that if they did not dispute the alleged debt or require further information offered in the 30-day disclosure language and “wish to pay this claim,” that they should contact Defendant’s office. 29. Defendant’s Collection Letter was signed: BY:___[Script initials “JS”]___ [Defendant’s company name] 34. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “33” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 35. 15 USC §1692e – preface prohibits a debt collector from using any false, misleading or deceptive representations in connection with the collection of a debt. 36. The Defendant violated 15 USC §1692e – preface by creating a mass- produced form letter for dissemination to consumers as exemplified by Defendant’s Collection Letter (Plaintiff’s Exhibit “A”) which uses deception throughout. Defendant’s letter states that “The above creditor has turned over to us for collection your account,” with no indication of whether “us” means attorneys but implying that it does by the inclusion of “Law Office” above the company name in the masthead. Equally deceptive is Defendant including a heading above the body of its letter in large, bold, upper case type centered on the page: “VALIDATION NOTICE,” after which Defendant states “The amount shown is the amount owed to the Creditor,” and then immediately continues, “Unless you notify us with thirty days,” etc. stating the required 30-day disclosure language in the same paragraph as the so-called “Validation Notice.” Defendant has deliberately designed the aforementioned letter so that all of the text following the heading, in fact the entire letter, can be easily misconstrued as “validation” of the consumer’s debt, which is clearly not the case. Further down, Defendant deceptively squeezes the statement, “At this time no attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the particular circumstances of your account,” with no space to separate the paragraph from the preceding or following text. In clear contradiction of this statement, Defendant’s Collection Letter was signed by John J. Sheerin, an attorney with Defendant’s firm, who deceptively did not identify himself as an attorney, but beneath his signature printed the name of his firm and a direction to “refer to” a “J. Kennedy” and a telephone number. Evidence that Attorney Sheerin signed said letter is provided by Defendant’s Legal Letter (Plaintiff’s Exhibit “B”) where Attorney Sheerin includes his name beneath his signature. A comparison of Attorney Sheerin’s signatures in Plaintiff’s Exhibits “A” and “B” evidence that they are identical. Defendant dates two letters on the same day, falsely informing the Plaintiff that they are debt collectors and no attorney has personally reviewed particular circumstances of his account and at the same time that they have been retained as attorneys for the creditor and enclose an executed Consent to Change Attorneys which they claim has been sent to “the Court” for filing. Defendant’s Collection Letter deliberately and deceptively prints, “Refer to: J. Kennedy” directly beneath Mr. Sheerin’s signature and firm name, with no indication of “J. Kennedy’s” title. In Defendant’s Legal Letter, J. Kennedy is identified as “Collection Manager” and Mr. Sheerin is not identified as an attorney. Both letters conclude by asking the consumer to contact Defendant to make a settlement. Taken together, Defendant letters clearly illustrate Defendant’s deceitful and reprehensible attempts to imply legal action is imminent as a means to compel Plaintiff and the consumer to cooperate with Defendant’s debt collection objectives. 37. 15 USC §1692 f –preface prohibits a debt collector from using any unfair or unconscionable actions in connection with the collection of a debt. 38. The Defendant violated 15 USC §1692 f – preface by unfairly and unconscionably mass-producing and sending letters, exemplified by Defendant’s Collection Letter sent to Plaintiff, designed to convince consumer recipients that they are being contacted regarding a debt with all the implications associated with a pending legal procedure. Defendant prints a letter on letterhead indicating “Law Office” above the company name, states that “The above creditor has turned over to us for collection your account” without stating who “us” entails in order to encourage the belief that “us” means attorneys. Moreover, by centering the large upper case, bold typed heading, “VALIDATION NOTICE,” above the body of its letter, Defendant unfairly attempts to give the impression that what follows is a validation of the consumer’s debt when said “validation” consists of the words: “The amount shown is the amount owed to the Creditor.” Further, Defendant deliberately squeezes the language that no attorney has reviewed the particular circumstances of the consumer’s account between required dispute notification language and above the all upper case disclosure language that “THIS COMMUNICATION IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT,” etc. Further Defendant unfairly includes a signature of two initials, difficult to decipher, with no identity of the individual who sent the letter so as to encourage the consumer to assume it is from an attorney. By Defendant’s use of stationery with a legal masthead designated “Law Office,” it’s illusive signature and failure to identify the signatory or the individual, “J. Kennedy” whom the consumer is directed to “refer to,” and it’s misleading design and placement of information, Defendant intends to unfairly intimidate and unsettle consumers and convince them that legal action against them is imminent, thereby provoking the consumer into contacting Defendant in furtherance of Defendant’s debt collection objectives. 39. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA, Plaintiff has been damaged and is entitled to damages in accordance with the FDCPA. 8. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 23, on behalf of himself and all persons/consumers, along with their successors-in-interest, who have received similar debt collection notices and/or letters/communications from Defendant which, as alleged herein, are in violation of the FDCPA, as of the date of Plaintiff’s Complaint (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class is Defendant herein, and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with the defendant, including, without limitation, persons who are officers, directors, employees, associates or partners of Defendant is impracticable. Upon information and belief, hundreds of persons have received debt collection notices and/or letters/communications from Defendant, which violate various provisions of the

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6. Beginning in or around October 2019, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -7919, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s s services. 7. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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13. On or about August 4, 2012, Plaintiff withdrew funds from the ATM inside Lynnway Mart, located at 800-810 Lynnway, Lynn, Massachusetts (the “Lynnway ATM”). 14. At the time Plaintiff used the Lynnway ATM, it was owned and operated by Defendant. 15. At the time Plaintiff used the Lynnway ATM, a fee notice was inconspicuously posted near the bottom of the machine, below the currency dispensing slot. A true and correct copy of a photograph of the Lynnway ATM is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 16. As shown in Exhibit A, the “Fee Notice” is placed in an inconspicuous location, at or below knee level and out of eyesight of any person accessing the Lynnway ATM. 17. At the time Plaintiff used the Lynnway ATM, he was charged a service fee in the amount of $3.00. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s receipt from the Lynnway ATM is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 18. Defendant is aware of its obligations under the EFTA. On its website, www.atmpartner.com, Defendant states: 20. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 21. The Class of consumers that Plaintiff seeks to protect is defined as: All persons who within the one year period preceding the initiation of this action were charged a transaction fee for use of the Lynnway ATM. B. Numerosity 22. Upon information and belief, Defendant has assessed thousands of illegal transaction fees through use of the Lynnway ATM. 23. Upon information and belief, since the date of Plaintiff’s transaction at the Lynnway ATM, Defendant has not posted a conspicuous notice disclosing the service fee on the outside of the Lynnway ATM. 24. The members of the Class are therefore believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. 25. Although the exact numbers and identities of class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes that there are thousands of individuals throughout Massachusetts who have claims identical to Plaintiff’s. Therefore, bringing the action as a class will fairly ensure the adequate representation of all who may sue. C. Common Questions of Law and Fact 27. Defendant’s conduct in failing to post the required fee notice in a prominent and conspicuous location was intended and had the effect of causing damage to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. D. Typicality 28. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members since each of the claims arises from the use of an ATM owned and operated by Defendant in their regular course of business. E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members 29. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class members, all of whom are victims of Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. 30. All of the Class members’ claims arise from substantially the same course of conduct and specific activities complained of herein and require application of identical legal principles. 32. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 33. Absent a class action, most members of the Class would find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitive, and therefore would have no effective remedy at law. 34. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the court and the litigants and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 35. Prosecution of separate actions could result in inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. Conversely, adjudications with respect to individual Class members would be dispositive of the interest of all other Class members. 36. The amount of money at issue is such that proceeding by way of a class action is the only economical and sensible manner in which to vindicate Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 37. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 39. The notice required by 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(A) must “be posted in a prominent and conspicuous location on or at the automated teller machine at which the electronic fund transfer is initiated by the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(B)(i). 40. In addition, 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(c) provides: No fee may be imposed by any automated teller machine operator in connection with any electronic fund transfer initiated by a consumer for which a notice is required under subparagraph (A), unless: (i) The consumer receives such notice in accordance with subparagraph (B); and (ii) The consumer elects to continue in the manner necessary to effect the transaction after receiving such notice. 41. To enable enforcement of the EFTA, 12 C.F.R. 205.16(b) provides: An automated teller machine operator that imposes a fee on a consumer for initiating an electronic fund transfer or a balance inquiry shall: (1) Provide notice that a fee will be imposed for providing electronic fund transfer services or a balance inquiry; and (2) Disclose the amount of the fee. 42. 12 C.F.R. 205.16(c) further provides: An automated teller machine operator must comply with the following: (1) Post the notice required by paragraph (b)(1) of this section in a prominent and conspicuous location on or at the automated teller machine 44. Defendant is an automated teller machine operator who provided host transfer services at all times relevant to this action. 45. Defendant failed to comply with the EFTA in connection with providing such services to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class as the notice on the Lynnway ATM was in neither a prominent nor conspicuous location. 46. Pursuant to the EFTA, Defendant was prohibited from imposing any fee for host transfer services because Defendant failed to provide conspicuous notice that a fee would be charged. 47. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have suffered damages as a result of Defendant’s violations of the EFTA in that they were charged a fee that was not properly disclosed. 48. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693m, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class for the amount of actual damages incurred, as well as for statutory damages, reasonable attorney’s fees and the costs of this action. A. The Class Violation of the EFTA, 15 U.S.C. § 1693, et seq., (On Behalf of All Class Members)

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103. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated (the “Class”) in accordance with Rule 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and seeks certification of the following Class against Defendant: All persons who purchased, on or after April 4, 2010 Defendant’s Senna Products (in Case3:14-cv-01570-MMC Document1 Filed04/04/14 Page20 of 41 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 20 Johnson v. Triple Leaf Tea Inc. 11. This is a consumer protection class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of Triple Leaf brand products marketed by Defendant as “Dieter’s Green Herbal Tea,” “Ultra Slim Herbal Tea,” and “Super Slimming Herbal Tea” (together, “Senna Diet Products” or Case3:14-cv-01570-MMC Document1 Filed04/04/14 Page3 of 41 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 Johnson v. Triple Leaf Tea Inc. 36. Defendant Triple Leaf has used and continues to use labeling, advertising, and the Internet, to market Dieter’s Green Herbal Tea, Ultra Slim Herbal Tea and Super Slimming Herbal Tea (“Senna Diet Products” or “Products”), which Defendant claims, inter Case3:14-cv-01570-MMC Document1 Filed04/04/14 Page7 of 41 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 Johnson v. Triple Leaf Tea Inc. Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability Cal. Com. Code §§ 2314(1), 2314(2)(f) [On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class and Against the Defendant] 152. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 153. Defendant, in its sale, marketing and promotion of its Products, and the acts and omissions as set forth herein, made representations to Plaintiff and the Class in the form of statements and representations on the Products’ labels. See Exhibits 1 - 4. Specifically, Defendant asserted the Product was a “Dieter’s Green Tea,” “Ultra Slim Herbal Tea,” and “Super Slimming Herbal Tea” each of which would “Offer . . . Herbal Support While Dieting,” which constituted express warranties. 154. Plaintiff and the Class purchased the Products manufactured, advertised and sold by Defendant. 155. Defendant is a merchant with respect to the goods of this kind which were sold to Plaintiff and the Class, and there was in the sale to Plaintiff and other consumers an implied warranty that those goods were merchantable. 156. However, Defendant breached that warranty implied in the sale of goods, in that the Products did not provide the purported benefits, as set forth in detail herein. 157. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the Class did not receive goods as impliedly warranted by Defendant to be merchantable in that they did not conform to the promises and affirmations made on the container or label of the goods. 158. Plaintiff and Class have sustained damages as a proximate result of the foregoing breach of implied warranty in an amount to be determined at trial. Breach of Express Warranty [On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class and Against the Defendant] 148. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 149. On the Products’ labels (see Exhibits 1 - 4), Defendant expressly warranted that the Products were effective, proper, and safe for their intended use. Defendant made affirmations of fact or promises, or description of goods, which were “part of the basis of the bargain,” in that Plaintiff and the Class purchased the Products in reasonable reliance on the Products’ labeling statements. Cal. Com. Code §2313(1); see also Zwart v. Hewlett- Packard Co., 2011 WL 3740805 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 23, 2011) (holding that online assertions can create warranties). Specifically, Defendant asserted the Product was a “Dieter’s Green Tea,” “Ultra Slim Herbal Tea,” and “Super Slimming Herbal Tea” each of which would “Offer . . . Herbal Support While Dieting,” which constituted express warranties. 150. Defendant breached the express warranties with Plaintiff and the Class by not selling the Products that provided the benefits described above, and that breach actually and proximately caused injury in the form of the lost purchase price for the Products. 151. As a result of Defendant’s breach of their warranties, Plaintiff and the Class Case3:14-cv-01570-MMC Document1 Filed04/04/14 Page29 of 41 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Johnson v. Triple Leaf Tea Inc. For Violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act Civil Code §§ 17500, et seq. [On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class and Against the Defendant] 116. Plaintiff repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 117. At all times relevant herein, there was in full force and effect the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §§ 1750, et seq. (the “Consumers Legal Remedies Act”) and similar deceptive practice acts in other states. Plaintiff are consumers as defined by Civil Code § 1761(d). The Products are goods within the meaning of Civil Code § 1761(a). 118. Defendant violated and continues to violate the Consumers Legal Remedies Act by engaging in the following practices proscribed by § 1770(a), in transactions with Plaintiff and the Class which were intended to result in, and did result in, the sale of the Products: (a) Advertising that the Products are effective for weight loss when they are not; (b) Representing that the Products have characteristics, uses or benefits which they do not have; (c) Representing that the Products are of a particular standard, quality or grade when Case3:14-cv-01570-MMC Document1 Filed04/04/14 Page23 of 41 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 23 Johnson v. Triple Leaf Tea Inc. Violations of California Business and Professions Code Section 17500 et seq. (False Advertising Law) [On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class and Against the Defendant] 141. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 142. Plaintiff has standing to pursue this claim as Plaintiff suffered injury in fact as a result of Defendant’s actions as set forth herein. Specifically, prior to the filing of this action, Plaintiff purchased the Product in reliance upon Defendant’s marketing claims. Plaintiff used the Product as directed, but the Product did not work as advertised, nor provide any of the promised benefits. 143. Defendant’s business practices as alleged herein constitute unfair, deceptive, untrue, and misleading advertising pursuant to California Business and Professions Code section 17500, et seq. because Defendant has advertised their Products in a manner that is untrue and misleading, or that Defendant knew was untrue or misleading, or omitted material information from their advertising which Defendant had a duty to disclose. 144. Defendant’s wrongful business practices have caused injury to Plaintiff and the Class, in the form of the lost purchase price of the Products. Plaintiff and the Class purchased the Products after being exposed to Defendant’s false or deceptive advertising claims, as described herein. 145. Defendant’s conduct caused and continues to cause substantial injury to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the Class continue to be exposed to Defendant’s false and/or misleading advertising every time they shop for dietary Case3:14-cv-01570-MMC Document1 Filed04/04/14 Page28 of 41 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 Johnson v. Triple Leaf Tea Inc. Violation of California Business & Professions Code Section 17200 et seq. (Unfair Competition Law) [On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class and Against the Defendant] 127. Plaintiff repeat, re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 128. Business & Professions Code Section 17200 prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” For the reasons discussed above, Defendant has engaged in “unlawful” business acts or practices by, among other things, making misrepresentations and omissions of material facts, as set forth more fully above, and violating, among other statutes, Civil Code §§ 1572, 1573, 1709, 1710, 1711, 1770, Business & Professions Code § 17500, et seq., Health & Safety Code § 109875, et seq., and the common law. 129. The acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices, and non-disclosures of Defendant as alleged herein constitute “unlawful” business acts and practices in that Defendant’s conduct violates the False Advertising Law, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and the Sherman Law. Defendant’s deceptive statements with regards to their Products described herein violate 21 U.S.C. § 343(a), which deems food (including nutritional supplements) misbranded when the label contains a statement that is “false or misleading in Case3:14-cv-01570-MMC Document1 Filed04/04/14 Page25 of 41 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 25 Johnson v. Triple Leaf Tea Inc.

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27. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny the plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and are heavily integrated with Defendant’s locations. 28. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, the plaintiff and other visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s locations and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the website. 29. The plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. The plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. The plaintiff has visited the website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 30. During the plaintiff’s visits to the website, the last occurring in August 2018, the plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied the plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied the plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s locations in New York by being unable to learn more information about location addresses and hours, and Products available for purchase and delivery, among other things readily available to sighted individuals. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as the plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services the defendant offers to the public on its website. The access barriers the plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of the plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter the plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the website. 34. If the website was equally accessible to all, the plaintiff could independently navigate the website and complete a desired transaction, as sighted individuals do. 35. The plaintiff, through the plaintiff’s attempts to use the website, has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 36. Because simple compliance with WCAG 2.0 would provide the plaintiff and other visually- impaired consumers with equal access to the website, the plaintiff alleges that the Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually- impaired individuals, including the plaintiff; failing to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including the plaintiff; and failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as the plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 37. The Defendant therefore use standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination against others, as alleged herein. 39. Because Defendant’s website has never been equally accessible, and because the Defendant lack a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause Defendant’s website to become and remain accessible, the plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring the Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to the plaintiff to assist the Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s website. The website must be accessible for individuals with disabilities who use desktop computers, laptops, tablets, and smartphones. The plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction require the Defendant to cooperate with the agreed-upon consultant to: train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; regularly check the accessibility of the website under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s website, with contact information for users to report accessibility- related problems and require that any third-party vendors who participate on Defendant’s website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with WCAG 2.0. 40. If Defendant’s website were accessible, the plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently access information about location addresses and hours, the Products and services offered, and Products available for purchase and delivery. 42. The Defendant have, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining Defendant’s website and the Defendant have generated significant revenue from Defendant’s website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making Defendant’s website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 43. Without injunctive relief, the plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use Defendant’s website, violating their rights. 44. The plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 45. The plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 47. Common questions of law and fact exist among the class, including: whether Defendant’s website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; whether the defendant’s website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; whether Defendant’s website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and whether Defendant’s website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 48. The plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class. The class, similarly to the plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that the Defendant violated the ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on Defendant’s website so it can be independently accessible to the class. 49. The plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class because the plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because the plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because the Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the plaintiff and the class as a whole. 51. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 52. The plaintiff, on behalf of the plaintiff and the class, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Defendant’s locations are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s locations. Defendant’s website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 56. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 57. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, the plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 60. The plaintiff, on behalf of the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 61. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof. 62. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s website is a service, privilege or advantage of the Defendant. Defendant’s website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 64. The Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its website, causing its website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that the Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 65. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden. 66. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 68. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2), in that the Defendant has: constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 69. The Defendant have failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 70. The Defendant discriminate and will continue to discriminate against the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s website and its physical locations under § 296(2), et seq., and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins the Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 71. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of NYSHRL and therefore the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class invoke their right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. The plaintiff and the New York State sub-class are also entitled to compensatory damages, and civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c), et seq., for each and every offense. 74. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class pray for judgment as set forth below. 75. The plaintiff, on behalf of the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 76. The plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof …. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that no person because of … disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision. 80. The Defendant is subject to NYSCRL because it owns and operates Defendant’s physical locations and website. The Defendant is persons within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 81. The Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Defendant’s website, causing Defendant’s website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that the Defendant make available to the non-disabled public. 82. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two … shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby. 83. Under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside. 85. The Defendant discriminated, and will continue to discriminate, against the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class on the basis of disability and the plaintiff and the New York State sub-class are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40, et seq., and/or its implementing regulations. 86. The plaintiff and the New York State sub-class are entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40, et seq., for each and every offense. 87. The plaintiff, on behalf of the plaintiff and the New York City sub-class, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 88. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that, It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of … disability … directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof. 89. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9), and their website is a service that is heavily integrated with its establishments and is a gateway thereto. 91. The Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to website, causing its website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that the Defendant make available to the non-disabled public. 92. The Defendant is required to make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities … any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107, et seq.,] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to … enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 93. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the New York sub- class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that the Defendant have: constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 94. The Defendant have failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 96. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore the plaintiff and the New York City subclass invokes their right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 97. The plaintiff and the New York City subclass are also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 98. The plaintiff and the New York City subclass are also entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. 99. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein the plaintiff and the New York City subclass pray for judgment as set forth below. ADA Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website NYCHRL NYSHRL NYSCRL

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(Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act) 10. Defendant has been the “employer” of Plaintiff and similarly situated hourly-paid employees within the meaning of 29 U.S.C, § 203(d) and § 203(r) at all times material to this action. 11. At all times material to this action, Plaintiff and those similarly situated have been Defendant’s “employees” as defined by Section 203(e)(1) of the FLSA, and worked for Defendant within the territory of the United States within three (3) years preceding the filing of this collective action. 12. At all times material to this action, Defendant has been an enterprise engaged in commerce and production of goods for commerce as defined by Section 203(s)(1) of the FLSA. 13. Plaintiff and similarly situated hourly-paid employees also have engaged in commerce during the applicable statutory period. 14. At all times material to this action, Defendant has been an enterprise engaged in 4 commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as defined by Section 203 (s)(1) of the FLSA, with annual revenues in excess of $500,000.00. 15. Defendant has been responsible for the implementation and administration of its pay practices, including the decision not to pay Plaintiff and those similarly situated one-and one-half times their regular hourly rates of pay for all hours over forty (40) within weekly pay periods during all times material to this action. 16. Defendant has had a time keeping system in which Plaintiff and those similarly situated were required to “clock-in” and “clock-out” for the purpose of recording their compensable time during the three (3) year period preceding the filing of this Complaint. 17. Plaintiff and those similarly situated have been subject to Defendant’s aforementioned timekeeping and compensation plans, policies, and practice during all times relevant to this action. 18. Defendant has had a common policy, plan, and practice of not paying the FLSA mandated rate of overtime pay for all hours worked over forty (40) per week. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and those similarly situated one-and one-half times their regular hourly rates of pay for all overtime hours within weekly pay periods during all times material to this collective action. 19. Plaintiff and similarly situated hourly-paid employees have not received one and one-half times their regular hourly rates of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) within weekly pay periods during the three (3) year period preceding the filing of this collective action. 5 20. Specifically, Defendant’s policy and practice was to only pay Plaintiff and other hourly-paid employees overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) on “weekday” shifts (Monday through Friday). When Plaintiff and putative class members worked on a Saturday or Sunday, they were paid ten (10) dollars per hour, regardless of their base rate of pay or hours already worked. 21. Plaintiff and putative class members regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours each Monday through Friday. 22. Plaintiff and putative class members also routinely worked on Saturdays and/or Sundays. When they did, they were only compensated at a rate of ten (10) dollars per hour, despite all the “weekend” hours worked being in excess of forty (40) in a given workweek. 23. Plaintiff and those similarly situated have complained to Defendant that they were not receiving one and one-half times their regular hourly rates of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) within weekly pay periods during all times material to this lawsuit. 24. Defendant was aware Plaintiff and similarly situated hourly-paid employees were not receiving one and one-half times their regular hourly rates of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) within weekly pay periods during the three-year period preceding the filing of this action as it was Defendant’s policy to only pay them a “straight time” rate of pay for “weekend” hours worked in excess forty (40) per week within weekly pay periods. 25. The aforementioned unpaid overtime claims of Plaintiff and those similarly 6 situated are unified by a common theory of Defendant’s FLSA violations. 26. Defendant willfully and, with reckless disregard to the FLSA’s overtime compensation requirements, failed to compensate Plaintiff and similarly situated hourly-paid employees at one and one-half times their regular hourly rates of pay for all hour worked over forty (40) within weekly pay periods during all times material to this Complaint. 27. Defendant knew it was not compensating Plaintiff and those similarly situated at one and one-half times their regular hourly rates of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) within weekly pay periods during all times material to this Complaint, without a good faith basis for its failure. 28. Defendant’s common policies and practices of not compensating Plaintiff those similarly situated for all their compensable overtime hours at the applicable FLSA overtime rates of pay violated 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 29. As a result of Defendant’s lack of good faith and willful failure to pay Plaintiff and those similarly situated in compliance with the overtime requirements of the FLSA, Plaintiff and class members have suffered lost wages in terms of lost overtime compensation as well as other damages. 30. The net effect of Defendant’s common plan, policy, and practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and similarly situated hourly-paid employees one-and one-half times their regular hourly rates of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) within weekly pay periods, during all times material to this collective action, is that it unjustly enriched itself and enjoyed ill-gained profits at the expense of Plaintiff and class 7 members. V. 31. Plaintiff brings this case as a collective action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated individuals pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to recover unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, statutory penalties, attorneys’ fees and costs, and other damages owed. 32. The proposed collective class of similarly situated persons is defined as: All current and former hourly-paid individuals employed by Defendant who were not paid one and-one half times their regular hourly rates of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hour per week, occurring anywhere in the United States within weekly pay periods during the three (3) years preceding the filing of this action (“Class Members”). 1 33. Plaintiff seeks to pursue his unpaid overtime wage claims against Defendant on behalf of himself, individually, and on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated hourly-paid employees as a class. 34. Plaintiff and class members are “similarly situated” for purposes of 29 U.S.C. §216(b) because, inter alia, Defendant employed a common pay system that resulted in a failure to pay Plaintiff and class members for all hours worked over forty (40) per week at one and one-half times their regular hourly rates of pay, as required by the FLSA. 35. This action is properly maintained as a collective action because Plaintiff is similarly situated to the members of the collective class with respect to 1 Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class Description upon the discovery of additional facts. 8 Defendant’s pay and compensation policies and practices. 36. The collective action mechanism is superior to other available methods for a fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to class members. The prosecution of separate actions could create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the courts and/or substantially impair the ability of class members to protect their interests. 37. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class as his interests are in complete alignment with those of class members, i.e. to pursue their aforementioned unpaid overtime compensation claims. 38. Counsel for Plaintiff will adequately protect his interests as well as the interests of all putative class members. 39. Defendant knew Plaintiff and class members performed work in excess of forty (40) hours per week within weekly pay periods that required overtime compensation to be paid. Nonetheless, they operated under a common policy and practice to deprive Plaintiff and class members of such overtime compensation. 40. Defendant’s conduct, as alleged herein, was willful and has caused significant damage to Plaintiff and the collective class. 41. Defendant did not have a good faith basis for its failure to compensate Plaintiff and class members for all their compensable overtime hours at the FLSA applicable overtime rates of pay within weekly pay periods during all times material to this action. 9 42. Therefore, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and class members under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate them for their aforementioned unpaid overtime hours within weekly pay periods during all times material. 43. Plaintiff requests this Court to authorize notice to the members of the collective class to inform them of the pendency of this action and their right to “opt-in” to this lawsuit pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of seeking unpaid overtime compensation, as well as liquidated damages, under the FLSA, and the other relief requested herein. 44. Plaintiff estimates there are more than two hundred (200) members in the collective class. The precise number of collective class members can be easily ascertained by examining Defendant’s payroll, scheduling, timekeeping, personnel and other work-related records and documents. Given the composition and size of the class, members of the collective class may be informed of the pendency of this action directly via U.S. mail, e-mail, and by posting notice at Defendant’s work place. 45. Plaintiff and class members’ unpaid overtime compensation claims may be determined partially by an examination of Defendant’s payroll, scheduling, time keeping, personnel and other such work-related records and documents. 46. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as fully as if written herein. 10 47. At all relative times, Plaintiff and class members have been entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 48. Defendant has been an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce consistent with 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) and 207(a). Plaintiff and class members also have engaged in interstate commerce during all times material to this action. 49. Defendant employed Plaintiff and each of the class members under the coverage of the FLSA, during all times relevant to this complaint. 50. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and class members were “employees” of Defendant within the meaning of the FLSA’s overtime wage requirements. 51. Plaintiff and other class members have been similarly situated individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) at all relevant times, as previously described. 52. Defendant’s common policy and practice of working Plaintiff and class members over forty (40) hours per week within weekly pay periods without compensating them for all such overtime hours at one and one-half times their regular rates of pay during such weeks violated the FLSA. 53. Section 207(a)(1) of the FLSA states that an employee must be paid overtime, equal to at least one and one-half (1.5) times the employee's regular rate of pay, for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 778.315, compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week may not be considered paid to an employee unless that employee is compensated for all such overtime hours worked. 11 54. Through its actions, policies, practices, and plans, Defendant violated the FLSA by regularly and repeatedly failing to compensate Plaintiff and class members for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week at one and-one half times their regular hourly rates of pay within weekly pay periods during all times material to this Complaint, as required by the FLSA. 55. Defendant’s actions were willful with reckless disregard to clearly applicable FLSA provisions. 56. Defendant’s actions were not in good faith. 57. The unpaid overtime claims of Plaintiff and the class are unified by a common theory of Defendant’s FLSA violations. 58. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and similarly situated employees have suffered and will continue to suffer a loss of income and other damages. Therefore, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and other members of the class for actual damages, liquidated damages and equitable relief, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), as well as reasonable attorney’s fees, costs and expenses. 6. Defendant Knoxville Pallet Recyclers, Inc. is located in Knoxville, Tennessee and buys, builds, rebuilds and sells pallets to customers in the region. 7. Plaintiff Steven Lumpkin and those similarly situated were employed by 3 Defendant as hourly-paid employees during the three (3) year period preceding the filing of this action. 8. Plaintiff and other hourly-paid employees performed various tasks for Defendant such as, but not limited to, cutting boards for builders to build pallets, removing nails out of boards that are later used to build pallets, and operating the “trim saw.” Plaintiff and other hourly-paid employees did not build pallets. 9. Plaintiff and those similarly situated typically worked forty (40) or more hours per week for Defendant during all times material to this action.

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17. Nokia is a network and technology company that provides hardware, software, and services for telecommunications operators and enterprises and provides fixed networking solutions. 18. In November 2016, Nokia closed its acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent, a company that offers fixed, IP, optical applications and analytics technologies. Nokia and Alcatel-Lucent have been operating as a combined company since January 2016. Materially False and Misleading Statements Issued During the Class Period 24. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class, consisting of all persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Nokia securities between October 25, 2018 and March 21, 2019, inclusive, and who were damaged thereby (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 35. As alleged herein, Defendants acted with scienter since Defendants knew that the public documents and statements issued or disseminated in the name of the Company were materially false and/or misleading; knew that such statements or documents would be issued or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and substantially participated or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of such statements or documents as primary violations of the federal securities laws. As set forth elsewhere herein in detail, the Individual Defendants, by virtue of their receipt of information reflecting the true facts regarding Nokia, their control over, and/or receipt and/or modification of Nokia’s allegedly materially misleading misstatements and/or their associations with the Company which made them privy to confidential proprietary information concerning Nokia, participated in the fraudulent scheme alleged herein. 42. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 53. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 54. Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Nokia within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their high-level positions and their ownership and contractual rights, participation in, and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and intimate knowledge of the false financial statements filed by the Company with the SEC and disseminated to the investing public, Individual Defendants had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision-making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements which Plaintiff contends are false and misleading. Individual Defendants were provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Company’s reports, press releases, public filings, and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. Background Violation of Section 20(a) of The Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants Violation of Section 10(b) of The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants

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12. Beginning in or around December of 2016, Defendants contacted Plaintiff on his telephone facsimile numbers ending in -6535 in an effort to sell or solicit their services. 13. Defendants contacted Plaintiff via facsimile from telephone numbers confirmed to belong to Defendants, including without limitation (571) 335-4248 and (910) 339-8252. 14. Defendants contacted Plaintiff between on or around December of 2016 and April of 2017 in an effort to solicit their business. 21. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone facsimile messages from Defendants to said person’s telephone facsimile number made through the use of any telephone facsimile machine and such person had not previously consented to receiving such messages and such messages did not contain any opt-out notice within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.  As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B); and  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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12. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3): 13. The Class consists of (a) all individuals with addresses in the State of California (b) to whom Defendant (c) sent an initial collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt (d) without clearly identifying the name of the current creditor to whom the debt is owed (e) which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date 21 days after the filing of this action. 14. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 15. Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendants and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 16. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Classes, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants’ written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibits A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g. 22. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 23. Some time prior to March 14, 2017, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Mercury Casualty Insurance. 44. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 45. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 46. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692g, a debt collector is required in the initial communication with a consumer, to identify the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 47. The Defendant violated section 1692g(a)(2) by failing to clearly and concisely identify the current creditor. 48. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 49. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE ROSENTHAL FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT Cal. Civ. Code § 1788 et seq.

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10. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 11. The Class consists of: a. all individual consumers; b. to whom Defendant sent a collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. for which the debt had already become a judgement; d. that failed to include any information regarding the accrual of interest, fees and/or costs associated with a judgment; e. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. 12. A sub-class consists of: a. all individual consumers; b. to whom Defendant sent a collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. for which the debt had already become a judgement; d. that failed to include any identifying information such as an Index number associated with the case to which the judgment relates; e. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. 4 13. The identities of all class members and sub-class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 14. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class and sub-class are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 15. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class and sub-class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. § l692e and § l692g. 16. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members and sub-class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class and sub-class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 17. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff Class and sub-class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. 5 b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Class and sub-class and those questions’ predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A violate 15 U.S.C. § l692e and § l692g. c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members and sub-class members. The Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Class sub- class have claims arising out of the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members and sub-class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 6 18. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class and sub-class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 19. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 20. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 21. Some time prior to January 6, 2021, an obligation was allegedly incurred to a creditor, American Express. 22. Upon information and belief, American Express received a judgment related to the underlying debt. 23. Upon information and belief, American Express retained Defendant Zwicker & Associates, a Law Firm, to act as their agent in collecting the subject debt from the Plaintiff. 24. The subject debt arose out of a credit card debt. The subject debt was incurred by Plaintiff solely for personal, household or family purposes. 25. The Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (3). 26. The subject obligation is consumer-related, and therefore a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (5). 7 27. Defendant was contracted for the purpose of collecting the subject debt on behalf of American Express. Therefore, Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (6). Violations – January 6, 2021 Collection Letter 28. On or about January 6, 2021, Defendant sent the Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed to American Express. (See Letter at Exhibit A.) 29. Towards the top of the letter, it states (Exhibit A): 37. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 38. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 39. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 40. Defendant violated §1692e: a. As the letter falsely represents the true amount of the debt in violation of §1692e (2); and b. As the letter falsely represents the character and legal status of the debt in violation of §1692e(2)(A); and c. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). 41. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment in that Defendant conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 9 42. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 43. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 44. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a), a debt collector must provide notice of a debt, including the amount of the debt. 45. Defendant violated §1692g(a): a. As the letter falsely represents the true amount and identity of the debt in violation of §1692g(a)(1) 46. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment in that Defendant conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq.

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27. Named Plaintiff and Collective Plaintiffs worked for Defendants in the Southern District of Florida at some point in the three years preceding the date the instant action was filed. 28. Named Plaintiff and Collective Plaintiffs are similarly situated, have substantially similar job duties, have substantially similar pay provisions, and are all subject to Defendants’ unlawful policies and practices as discussed herein. 29. There are numerous similarly situated current and former employees of Defendants who worked overtime hours during the relevant period without receiving overtime compensation, and who would benefit from the issuance of a Court Supervised Notice of the instant lawsuit and the opportunity to join in the present lawsuit. 30. Similarly situated current and former employees are known to Defendants, are readily identifiable by Defendants, and can be located through Defendants’ records. 31. Therefore, Named Plaintiff should be permitted to bring this action as a collective action for and on behalf of himself and those similarly situated employees, pursuant to the “opt- in” provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 32. Named Plaintiff began working for Defendants at their grocery store and butcher shop in June of 2007 and remained employed until Defendants terminated his employment on April 6, 2020. 34. Named Plaintiff and Collective Plaintiffs regularly work/worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 35. Although Named Plaintiff’s hours varied, he generally worked 60 to 67 hours per workweek. 36. Upon information and belief, Collective Plaintiffs also work/worked approximately the same number of hours per workweek. 37. Throughout Named Plaintiff’s employment, Defendants had knowledge of Named Plaintiff’s overtime hours, but purposefully failed to provide him complete and adequate overtime pay in violation of the FLSA. 38. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ pattern and practice of depriving overtime compensation extended to other individuals at Sunrise Meats, including other similarly situated employees who work/worked overtime hours without being appropriately compensated. 39. Defendants are/were required to keep accurate time records for all hours worked by Named Plaintiff and Collective Plaintiffs. Upon information and belief, Defendants fail/failed to keep the required records. 40. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and Collective Plaintiffs based on the actual number of hours worked and at the proper rate. 41. Defendants’ FLSA violations are/were willful and intentional. 43. On or about April 6, 2020, Plaintiff complained about and/or objected to an actual violation of law, or what he reasonably believed to be a violation of law, and was terminated as a direct result of same, which constitutes a violation of the FWA. 44. Specifically, Plaintiff complained about and/or objected to Defendants’ failure to comply with safety guidelines in light of the COVID-19 pandemic by allowing an excessive number of customers in the store. 45. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (“OSHA”) General Duty Clause requires an employer to provide its employees with a safe workplace free of recognizable hazards. This includes providing employees with a safe work environment by complying with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) guidelines, which include social distancing. See 29 U.S.C. § 654(5)(a)(1). 46. Plaintiff’s complaints about and/or objections to the unsafe work practices in violation of OSHA regulations constitute protected activity pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 448.102(3). 47. As soon as Plaintiff complained about Sunrise Meats’ failure to provide a safe work environment for its employees, Defendant Alonso immediately instructed Plaintiff to go home, effectively terminating his employment. 48. Named Plaintiff and Collective Plaintiffs re-adopt each and every factual allegation as stated in paragraphs 1 through 42 above as though fully recited herein. 49. Named Plaintiff and Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to be paid time and one-half for all hours worked in excess of 40 in each workweek. 55. Named Plaintiff and Collective Plaintiffs re-adopt each and every factual allegation as stated in paragraphs 1 through 42 above as though fully recited herein. 56. During the relevant period, Alfonso was an Executive Officer and owner of the corporate Defendant, Sunrise Meats. 57. During the relevant period, Alfonso operated, oversaw, and controlled the day-to- day activities of Sunrise Meats, had supervisory authority over Named Plaintiff and Collective Plaintiffs, had knowledge of the hours worked by Named Plaintiff and Collective Plaintiffs, and was partially or totally responsible for paying Named Plaintiff’s and Collective Plaintiffs’ wages for the hours he/they worked. 58. Alfonso was Named Plaintiff’s and Collective Plaintiffs’ employer, joint employer, or co-employer during the relevant period for purposes of the FLSA, as the term employer is defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203. 60. Named Plaintiff and Collective Plaintiffs’ are owed unpaid overtime compensation pursuant to the FLSA for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 61. Alfonso is also jointly and severally liable for double the overtime amounts owed as liquidated damages under the FLSA as a result of intentional and willful violations of the FLSA. WHEREFORE, Named Plaintiff and Collective Plaintiffs respectfully pray for the following relief against Alfonso: A. Adjudge and decree that Alfonso violated the FLSA and did so willfully, intentionally, and with reckless disregard; B. Award Named Plaintiff and Collective Plaintiffs actual damages for unpaid overtime compensation; C. Award Named Plaintiff and Collective Plaintiffs liquidated damages; D. Award Named Plaintiff and Collective Plaintiffs the costs of this action, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees; E. Award Named Plaintiff and Collective Plaintiffs all recoverable interest; F. Grant Named Plaintiff and Collective Plaintiffs such additional relief as the Court deems just and proper under the circumstances. 62. Plaintiff re-adopts each and every factual allegation as stated in paragraphs 1 through 47 above as though fully recited herein. 64. Sunrise Meats’ termination of Plaintiff’s nearly 13-year employment was a direct result of his complaints about, or objections to, Sunrise Meats’ activities, policies or practices which were in violation of laws, rules or regulations, such as OSHA’s General Duty Clause. See 29 U.S.C. § 654(5)(a)(1). 65. As a direct and proximate result of Sunrise Meats’ intentional conduct, Plaintiff suffered serious economic losses as well as mental pain and suffering, anxiety, distress, and other mental conditions. 66. Any alleged justification by Sunrise Meats for terminating Plaintiff’s employment is a mere pretext for the actual reason, which was Plaintiff’s complaints about, or objections to, the aforementioned activities, policies, and/or practices of Sunrise Meats which were violations of laws, rules, and/or regulations. 67. Sunrise Meats’ actions were malicious and recklessly indifferent to Plaintiff’s rights under the FWA. OVERTIME VIOLATIONS AGAINST SUNRISE MEATS UNDER THE FLSA AS TO NAMED PLAINTIFF AND COLLECTIVE PLAINTIFFS OVERTIME VIOLATIONS AGAINST ALFONSO UNDER THE FLSA AS TO NAMED PLAINTIFF AND COLLECTIVE PLAINTIFFS RETALIATION UNDER THE FWA AGAINST SUNRISE MEATS

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12. An SMS message is a text message call directed to a wireless device through the use of the telephone number assigned to the device. When an SMS message call is made, the recipient’s cell phone rings or vibrates, alerting him or her that a call is being received. 13 Unlike other forms of advertising, text message calls cost recipients money and/or data, because cell phone users frequently pay their wireless service providers either for each text message call received or for a text message plan that includes a number of messages, regardless of whether or not the message is authorized. Likewise, cellphone owners pay for their data, which may suffer a reduction in available memory by virtue of unauthorized text messages. Additionally, unsolicited text messages like those at issue in this Complaint are annoying, harassing, and violate the consumer’s right to privacy. 15. For example, on December 18, 2014 at 8:04 a.m., Plaintiff’s cell phone (registered with the phone number ending in the last four digits 8209) rang, indicating that a text call was received. 16. The body of the text message, received from the number 801-590-3279, stated: Happy Holidays from Big City Burrito! New Holiday Gift Cards are Here! Buy $25 or more before 12/31 & receive a FREE Burrito Coupon for your next visit 17. Five minutes later, at 8:09 a.m. on December 18, 2014, Plaintiff Scott wrote back: Please stop spamming me with these silly texts. I will never patronize your business because of them. 18. Almost instantaneously, Plaintiff’s cell phone rang again, indicating that a text call was received. It was another message from Big City Burrito, this time thanking him for the message. The message read: Thanks for the message! We hope you enjoy our new loyalty program powered by FavoriteEats. Text STOP to unsubscribe. 19. It did not stop there—Plaintiff received at least one text message call in January 2015 despite the fact that he unambiguously told Big City Burrito on December 18, 2014 that he did not wish to receive any more messages. On January 27, 2015, Plaintiff received a text message call from the number 801-396-9629 (a different number than the December text message calls) that read: Big City Burrito! Get ANY Reg Burrito & 21oz Drink for ONLY $6! Breakfast Burritos Served ALL Day! Valid 1/27 Only w/Text @ 136th/I- 21. At no time did Plaintiff consent to the receipt of the above-referenced wireless spam text messages from Big City Burrito. Moreover, Plaintiff clearly revoked consent to receiving additional text calls on December 18, 2014 when he responded to Big City Burrito’s wireless spam by telling them to stop sending him the texts. 22. On January 13, 2015, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter via electronic mail and U.S. mail to Big City Burrito regarding the text message calls Plaintiff had received, specifically asking Big City Burrito to explain how it had obtained Plaintiff’s phone number or consent to send him text messages. (See January 13, 2015 Letter, attached as Exhibit A.) Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel received any response. V. 24. Members of the Class and Subclass are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of Class and Subclass members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Big City Burrito sent unsolicited text calls to hundreds if not thousands of persons. Members of the Class and Subclass can readily be identified from Big City Burrito’s records, and all Class members can be notified of the pendency of this action by mail and publication, using forms of notice similar to those customarily used in consumer class action lawsuits. 26. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the Class members all received unauthorized text message calls to their cell phones. As such, Plaintiff and the Class members have suffered similar harm as a result of substantially similar conduct. 27. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and consumer litigation and intends to vigorously prosecute this action. The interests of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and his counsel. Plaintiff is a member of the proposed class and has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those of the Class that Plaintiff seeks to represent. 28. Big City Burrito has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole making declaratory and injunctive relief appropriate. Specifically, Big City Burrito has placed text calls to cellphones in the same way, using the same equipment, and failed to first obtain prior express consent in the same way. 30. Given the limited resources of Class members, the complexity of the issues involved in this action, and the size of individual Class members’ claims, few, if any, Class members could afford to seek legal redress individually for Big City Burrito’s actions. When Big City Burrito’s liability has been adjudicated, claims of all members of the Class can readily be determined by the Court. The class action will cause an orderly and expeditious administration of the Class claims, economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered, and uniformity of decisions will be ensured. Without a class action, the Class and Subclass members will continue to suffer damages and Defendants’ wrongful conduct will continue without a real remedy or a deterrent. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. Much of the information needed for administrative purposes relative to the identity of the Class and calculation of damages are available from Defendant through its computerized records and databases. 31. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 33. These text calls were made en masse and without the prior express consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Class to receive such wireless spam. 34. Big City Burrito has therefore violated the TCPA. As a result of Big City Burrito’s conduct, the members of the Class suffered actual damages by having to pay their respective wireless carriers for the text messages and lost data and, under section 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 for each violation of such act plus costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 35. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 37. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 38. Big City Burrito contacted Plaintiff after Plaintiff had sent a message telling Big City Burrito to stop sending him text messages. 39. Big City Burrito failed to program its text messaging platform to accept customer responses containing instructions to stop. By doing so, Big City Burrito violated the TCPA with respect to the Plaintiff and the Opt Out Subclass members, which requires businesses to honor opt out requests. 40. As a result of Big City Burrito’s conduct, the members of the Opt Out Subclass suffered actual damages by having to pay their respective wireless carriers for the text messages and lost data and, under section 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 for each violation of such act plus costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Opt Out Subclass) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Willful Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

lose

(Breach of Implied and Written Warranties Under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.) (Breach of Implied Warranty pursuant to Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, California Civil Code §§ 1792 and 1791.1 et seq., and Cal. Comm. Code §2314) (Breach of Express Warranty, Cal. Com. Code § 2313) (Violation of Unfair Competition Law, California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq. (“UCL”)) (Violation of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code § 1750 et seq. (“CLRA”)) 18. For years, Subaru has designed, manufactured, distributed, sold, and leased the Class Vehicles. Upon information and belief, it has sold, directly or indirectly through dealers and other retail outlets, many thousands of Class Vehicles in California and nationwide. 19. The Windshield Defect causes the Class Vehicles’ front windshield to crack, chip and/or fracture for no reason at all and/or under circumstances that would not cause non- defective windshields to similarly fail. The Windshield Defect presents a safety hazard that renders the Class Vehicles unreasonably dangerous to consumers due to, inter alia, the impact of the Defect on visibility as well as the Class Vehicles’ structural integrity, and the potential for injury. 20. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that, as early as 2014, if not before, Subaru became aware of the Windshield Defect through sources not available to Plaintiff and Class Members, including, but not limited to, pre-production testing, pre-production design failure mode and analysis data, production design failure mode and analysis data, early consumer complaints made exclusively to Subaru’s network of dealers and directly to Subaru, aggregate warranty data compiled from Subaru’s network of dealers, testing conducted by Subaru in response to consumer complaints, and repair order and parts data received by Subaru from Subaru’s network of dealers. 21. In about the Fall of 2015, Subaru purported to extend the original New Car Limited Warranty of three (3) years/36,000 miles to five (5) years/unlimited miles for front windshield failure, for one replacement windshield to be provided under certain very limited circumstances. 4. The Windshield Defect poses an extreme safety hazard to drivers, passengers and pedestrians. A spontaneously shattering or cracking windshield can impair the driver’s view and cause driver distraction. It may also result in dislodged glass that can cause cuts, eye damage and other injuries. In addition, the windshield is a vital component of a vehicle’s safety restraint system, which also includes airbags and seatbelts. These safety features, including the windshield, are all part of a safety network. Each individual component of this network is dependent on the others functioning properly. If there is a compromise or weakness in just one aspect of the network, the likelihood of other parts not working properly is increased. All components of a vehicle’s safety restraint system are designed to work together to keep vehicle occupants within the relative safety of the passenger compartment during collision or roll over. 45. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 46. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and on behalf of the members of the Nationwide Class, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the members of the California Sub-Class. 47. Subaru is a “person” as defined by California Civil Code § 1761(c). 5. In addition to these obvious safety hazards, the cost to repair the Windshield Defect can be exorbitant, requiring consumers to pay significant sums over the life of their Class Vehicles. 6. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that Defendant knew the Class Vehicles were defective and not fit for their intended purpose of providing consumers with safe and reliable transportation at the time of the sale and thereafter. Defendant has actively concealed the true nature and extent of the Windshield Defect from Plaintiff and the other Class Members, and failed to disclose it to them, at the time of purchase or lease and thereafter. Had Plaintiff and prospective Class Members known about the Windshield Defect, they would not have purchased the Class Vehicles or would have paid less for them. 60. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 61. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and on behalf of the members of the Nationwide Class, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the members of the California Sub-Class. 62. California Business & Professions Code Section 17200 prohibits acts of “unfair competition,” including any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice” and “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” 63. Defendant knew that the Class Vehicles’ front windshields suffered from an inherent defect, were defectively designed and/or manufactured, would fail prematurely, and were not suitable for their intended use. 64. In failing to disclose the Windshield Defect, Defendant knowingly and intentionally concealed material facts and breached its duty not to do so, thereby engaging in a fraudulent business act or practice within the meaning of the UCL. 74. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 75. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and on behalf of the members of the Nationwide Class, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the members of the California Sub-Class. 76. Defendant was at all relevant times the manufacturer, distributor, warrantor, and/or seller of the Class Vehicles. Defendant knew or had reason to know of the specific use for which the Class Vehicles were purchased. 77. Defendant provided Plaintiff and Class Members with an implied warranty that the Class Vehicles and any parts thereof were merchantable and fit for the ordinary purposes for which they were sold. However, the Class Vehicles were and are not fit for their ordinary purpose of providing reasonably reliable and safe transportation because the Class Vehicles suffer from a Windshield Defect that can make driving unreasonably dangerous. 78. Defendant impliedly warranted that the Class Vehicles were of merchantable quality and fit for such use. This implied warranty included, among other things: (i) a warranty that the Class Vehicles’ front windshields designed, manufactured, supplied, distributed, and/or sold by Defendant were safe and reliable for providing transportation; and (ii) a warranty that the Class Vehicles’ front windshields would be fit for their intended use while the Class Vehicles were being operated. 79. Contrary to the applicable implied warranties, the Class Vehicles’ front windshields, at the time of sale and thereafter, were not fit for their ordinary and intended purpose of providing Plaintiff and the other Class Members with reliable, durable, and safe transportation. Instead, the Class Vehicles are defective, as described more fully above. 81. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 82. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and on behalf of the members of the Nationwide Class, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the members of the California Sub-Class. 83. As a result of Defendant’s breach of the applicable express warranties, owners and/or lessees of the Class Vehicles suffered, and continue to suffer, an ascertainable loss of money, property, and/or value of their Class Vehicles. Additionally, as a result of the Windshield Defect, Plaintiff and Class Members were harmed and suffered actual damages in that the Class Vehicles’ windshields are substantially certain to fail before their expected useful life has run. 84. Defendant provided all purchasers and lessees of the Class Vehicles with the express warranty described herein, which became a material part of the bargain. Accordingly, Defendant’s express warranty is an express warranty under California law. 85. Defendant manufactured and/or installed the front windshield in the Class Vehicles, and it is covered by the express warranty. 86. Subaru provided all purchasers and lessees of the Class Vehicles with New Car Limited Warranty. In this New Car Limited Warranty, Subaru expressly warranted that it covered “any repairs needed to correct defects in material or workmanship reported during the applicable warranty period which occur under normal use.” Subaru promised Basic Coverage under the New Car Limited Warranty of “3 years or 36,000 miles, whichever comes first.” 90. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 91. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and on behalf of the members of the Nationwide Class, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the members of the California Sub-Class. 92. Plaintiff and Class Members are “consumers” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3). 93. Defendant is a “supplier” and “warrantor” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301(4)-(5). 94. The Class Vehicles are “consumer products” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1). 95. Defendant’s implied warranty is an “implied warranty” within the meaning of ACROSS THE WINDSHIELD FROM DRIVERS SIDE TO THE MID POINT OF THE WINDSHIELD. CRACK IS IN DRIVERS LINE OF SIGHT, AND A SAFETY HAZARD. TOOK IT TO DEALER, WHO AND AGAIN BECAUSE NO ONE CAN PROVIDE AN ETA WE WOULDN'T KNOW HOW LONG WE'D NEED ONE ASSUMING WE COULD GET ONE. BASED ON WHAT I READ HERE THIS COULD AND I HAVE TO GET IT REPAIRED USING MY INSURANCE .  NHTSA Complaint: WINDSHIELD CRACK ON A 2016 SUBARU OUTBACK LIMITED WITH EYESIGHT, PURCHASED NEW IN AND SEAL IN UPPER RIGHT IS BROKEN, AND CAN'T TAKE IT OUT OF THE GARAGE BECAUSE THERE'S A DELUGE OF RAIN OUT THERE. MUST WAIT FOR FACTORY REPLACEMENT ANY DEBRIS HITTING THE WINDSHIELD . I RESEARCHED ON THE INTERNET AND FOUND NUMEROUS SIMILAR INCIDENTS WITH SUBARU OUTBACKS. I BELIEVE THIS IS A MAJOR AROUND WINDSHIELD ESPECIALLY AT THE BOTTOM AND A BIT TOWARDS THE DRIVER SIDE AND GOING UP THEN CURVING TOWARDS THE RIGHT, IN AN L SHAPE. BY THE NEXT MORNING THE HORIZONTAL PART OF BACK-ORDER; THIS GLASS IS CLEARLY DEFECTIVE.  NHTSA Complaint: WENT OUTSIDE TO WASH THE CAR AND BEFORE I EVEN GOT STARTED I NOTICED A CRACK IN THE BEING TOLD 10/28. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF AN EXTERNAL IMPACT AND AS THE CAR IS SITTING IN THE DRIVEWAY IT SEEMS IT IS BEING PUSHED OUT FROM THE INSIDE.  NHTSA Complaint: TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2015 SUBARU CRACK SEEMS TO BE GETTING LARGER. THE SUBARU DEALER WILL NOT DECEMBER 1, 2014, WINDSHIELD REPLACED WITH IDENTICAL MODEL BY CARLEX (MINUS THE SUBARU OEM STICKER). THE REPLACEMENT WINDSHIELD HAS EXHIBITED THE SAME DESIGN OF THE OUTBACK. DESTINATION. LOCAL AUTO DEVELOPED. CRACK STARTED AT AROUND 14 INCHES, AND CONTINUES TO GROW LONGER. CAR WAS BEING DRIVEN AT HIGHWAY SPEEDS WHEN CRACK FIRST APPEARED, AT DIFFICULTY GETTING THE PART. WHEN THE WINDSHIELD IS FINALLY REPLACED, WILL HAVE THAT AREA CAREFULLY INSPECTED FOR POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS.  NHTSA Complaint: WINDSHIELD CRACKED WHILE DRIVING ON DOUBLED IN SIZE. A WINDSHIELD WHICH FAILS UNDER TYPICAL DAY-TO-DAY CONDITIONS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.  NHTSA Complaint: I BOUGHT A 2016 SUBARU OUTBACK ON EYESIGHT. THERE IS A DEFECT.  NHTSA Complaint: WINDSHIELD CRACKED FROM DRIVERS SIDE BOTTOM CORNER ACROSS THE MID LINE ABOVE THE FAILURE. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 12,000.  NHTSA Complaint: OUR 2015 SUBURU OUTBACK WAS PURCHASED IN APRIL 2015. IN JULY, THE WINDSHIELD FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 3,400...UPDATED 06/09/15*BF  NHTSA Complaint: WINDSHIELD CRACKED FROM PASSENGER SIDE WIPER AREA UP AND ACROSS WINDSHIELD WHILE CAR FROM THE FIRST BUT A WHOLE NEW CRACK. IM TAKING IT TO MY DEALER TOMORROW.  NHTSA Complaint: TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2016 SUBARU GREW QUICKLY. THERE IS A TINY CHIP, LESS THAN A PIN HEAD IN SIZE NEAR THE BEGINNING OF THE CRACK. NO STAR, AND NOT THE SIZE I WOULD TAKE TO GET FIXED. I DIDN'T IMPACT TO THE GLASS, WHICH HAD BEEN REPLACED LESS THAN 10 JUNE AND TWO DAYS LATER ANOTHER CRACK-INSTANT AND BIGGER. SAW THE ROCK THIS TIME. CLAIMED ON THE INSURANCE, AGAIN, BUT SAFELIGHT HAD TO CANCEL THE MANY CUSTOMERS, BOTH OLD AND NEW.  NHTSA Complaint: WITHIN 9 DAYS OF RECEIVING A REPLACEMENT WINDSHIELD FOR MY SUBARU OUTBACK, MY MONTHS OF VEHICLE USE. *TR  NHTSA Complaint: PURCHASED CAR NEW FROM DEALER. CAR HAD BEEN SITTING IN DRIVEWAY FOR 4-5 DAYS. I WENT MORE MINUTES OF DRIVING I HEARD A LOUD POP. A 8 INCH VERTICAL CRACK STARTED ON THE WINDSHIELD. IT STARTED LOW, BY THE WIPERS, AROUND THE MID-LINE OF THE MOST DEALERS AND GLASS REPLACEMENT COMPANIES. GIVEN THE OVERALL NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS ABOUT WINDSHIELD CRACKING (BOTH HERE AND AVAILABLE NOT COVER THE FAILURE. THE APPROXIMATE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 6,000.  NHTSA Complaint: TL* THE CONTACT OWNS A 2016 SUBARU OCCURRED BEGINNING OF ON THE DRIVERS SIDE, RAISED THE DRIVERS SIDE WIPER, WENT AROUND THE FRONT OF THE CAR AND RAISED THE PASSENGER SIDE WIPER. I THEN WASHED AROUND THE CAR. PEBBLE HIT THE WINDSHIELD, BUT UPON LATER INSPECTION I COULD NOT FIND A DISTINCT STARTING POINT FOR THE CRACK IN THE WINDSHIELD CRACK (NO DENTS OR PLACES SMALL STAR SHAPE MARK THAT I THOUGHT COULD BE FIXED. HOWEVER IT SPREAD QUICKLY. I WENT TO AMERICAN AUTO GLASS AND WAS TOLD THAT HE HAD MANY OF THESE START THE CRACK. SUBARU NEEDS TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THIS -MAYBE THICKER GLASS? MAYBE A RECALL? WE'VE DRIVEN SUBARU'S FOR MANY YEARS AND HAVE NOT STILL SAFE TO DRIVE THE VEHICLE AS I DO NOT HAVE THE $500.00+ TO REPLACE THE WINDSHIELD AT THIS TIME.?  NHTSA Complaint: I PURCHASED THE VEHICLE NEW IN SUBARU AND POSSIBLY LAST IF THE PROBLEMS PERSIST. ALL OF THE INCIDENTS HAPPENED WHILE DRIVING BUT WHEN I DISCOVERED THE CRACK IT WAS PARKED IN THE GARAGE. SUBARU AND HAD IT INSPECTED BY SUBARU AND THEY SAID I NEEDED A NEW WINDSHIELD AND THAT IT WAS NOT COVERED UNDER WARRANTY. I THAN BROUGHT IT TO THAT RESULTS IN THE THESE ARE EXPENSIVE TO KEEP REPLACING AND I AM CONCERNED WITH SAFETY OF THESE WINDSHIELDS.  NHTSA Complaint: A SMALL OBJECT HIT THE PASSENGER SIDE THIS PAST WEEK WE THIS CAR IN FOUR MONTHS. *TR  NHTSA Complaint: AFTER OWNING CAR ROUGHLY 1.5 MONTHS, FRONT WINDSHIELD DEVELOPED A ROUGHLY 15 - 20 INCH THIS YEAR ON THEIR 2015 OUTBACKS. THIS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE! I EMAILED SUBARU AND DID GET A REPLY SUGGESTING I TAKE THE CAR TO THE DEALER AND LET THEM THOUGHT WAS DEFECT IN THE WAS A MANUFACTURING DEFECTS ON THE DEICER AREA AND CRACKS ON THIS AREA IS COVERED. MY CRACK IS LITTLE ABOVE THIS AREA AND THEY SAY IT IS NOT COVERED. I DO WHEN IT IS A FEW INCHES APART. SUBARU IS TRYING TO LIMIT LIABILITY FOR A DESIGN OR MANUFACTURING FLAW. WE BELIEVE THAT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED.  NHTSA Complaint: MY WINDSHIELD CRACKED WHILE ON THE WINDSHIELD PROBLEM I'VE HAD THAT'S HAD A PROGRESSIVE CRACK, AND THIS IS A BRAND NEW CAR! I'M READING THAT I'M NOT THE ONLY ONE WITH THIS PROBLEM!  NHTSA Complaint: OUR WINDSHIELD DEVELOPED A CRACK WINDSHIELD FAILURES ON 2015 SUBARU OUTBACKS THAT SUGGEST SUBPAR GLASS OR A DEFECT IN THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE CHASSIS THAT IS CAUSING THE GLASS TO WINDSHIELD CRACKED FROM THE CENTER BOTTOM UP AND TOWARD THE DRIVERS SIDE. CRACK CURRENTLY EXTENDS UP ABOUT 8 INCHES. AS BEFORE, THERE WAS NO STRIKE YEAR'S OWNERSHIP OF THIS CAR. THE FIRST ONE WAS CRACKED WHEN I PARKED MY CAR IN THE PARKING LOT OF A COSTCO WAREHOUSE. LOOKING AT THE COMPLAINS FILED  NHTSA Complaint: IN THE COURSE OF DRIVING AROUND OUR AREA, MY WIFE & I PARKED OUR NEW 2015 SUBARU LEGACY FOR AN HOUR TO DO SOME SHOPPING. WHEN WE GOT BACK  NHTSA Complaint: THIS WILL BE THE SECOND WINDSHILED REPLACED SINCE I BOUGHT MY OUTBACK IN MARCH 2015. FIRST TIME IT CRACKED, FOR NO APPARENT REASON, 2  NHTSA Complaint: I BOUGHT THE CAR AS A DEALER CAR (THEY TOLD ME IT WAS REGISTERED TO A MANAGER AS A TEST CAR). IT HAD 4,810 MILES WHEN I BOUGHT IT. I HAVE DRIVEN

win

34. Plaintiff brings the First Cause of Action, pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of himself and all similarly situated persons who have worked as TLs at Sykes nationwide on or after February 17, 2013, who elect to opt-in to this action (the “FLSA Collective”). 35. Sykes is liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and other similarly situated TLs. 36. Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective perform or performed the same primary duties. 37. As part of its regular business practice, Sykes has intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA with respect to Plaintiff and the members of FLSA Collective. This policy and pattern or practice includes, but is not limited to: (a) willfully failing to pay its employees, including Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective, premium overtime wages for hours that they worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek; and (b) willfully misclassifying Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective as exempt from the protections of the FLSA. 38. Sykes is aware or should have been aware that federal law required it to pay Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective overtime premiums for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. 40. Sykes’s unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent. 41. There are many similarly situated current and former TLs who have been underpaid in violation of the FLSA who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it. 42. Those similarly situated employees are known to Sykes, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Sykes’s records. 43. Notice of this action should be sent to the FLSA Collective pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 44. Plaintiff brings the Second Cause of Action, a Colorado claim, under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of himself and all others who have worked for Sykes in Colorado on or after February 17, 2013, and the date of final judgment in this matter (the “Colorado Rule 23 Class”). 45. Excluded from the Colorado Rule 23 Class are Sykes, Sykes’s legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors, or any individual who has, or who at any time during the class period has had, a controlling interest in Sykes; the Judge(s) to whom this case is assigned and any member of the Judges’ immediate family; and all persons who will submit timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion from the Colorado Rule 23 Class. 46. The members of the Colorado Rule 23 Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 48. Sykes has acted or has refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Colorado Rule 23 Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Colorado Rule 23 Class as a whole. 49. Common questions of law and fact exist as to the Colorado Rule 23 Class that predominate over any questions only affecting them individually and include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) whether Sykes violated the Colorado Wage Laws; (b) whether Sykes failed to compensate Plaintiff and the Colorado Rule 23 Class for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek; (c) whether Sykes misclassified Plaintiff and the Colorado Rule 23 Class; and (d) the nature and extent of class-wide injury and the measure of damages for those injuries. 50. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Colorado Rule 23 Class which he seeks to represent. 51. Plaintiff and all the Colorado Rule 23 Class members work, or have worked, for Sykes as TLs. 52. Plaintiff and the Colorado Rule 23 Class members enjoy the same statutory rights under the Colorado Wage Laws, including to be paid for all hours worked and to be paid overtime wages. Plaintiff and the Colorado Rule 23 Class members have all sustained similar types of damages as a result of Sykes’s failure to comply with the Colorado Wage Laws. Plaintiff and the Colorado Rule 23 Class members have all been injured in that they have been under-compensated due to Sykes’s common policies, practices, and patterns of conduct. 54. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. The members of the Colorado Rule 23 Class have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a result of Sykes’s violations of the Colorado Wage Laws, as well as their common policies, practices, and procedures. Although the relative damages suffered by individual Colorado Rule 23 Class members are not de minimis, such damages are small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution of this litigation. The individual plaintiffs lack the financial resources to conduct a thorough examination of Sykes’s compensation practices and to prosecute vigorously a lawsuit against Sykes to recover such damages. In addition, class litigation is superior because it will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments about Sykes’s practices. 56. Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective and the Colorado Rule 23 Class (collectively, “Class Members”) regularly worked more than 40 hours per week. 57. Sykes failed to pay Plaintiff and Class Members overtime compensation for hours worked over 40 in a workweek. 58. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ primary duties were routine, non-exempt tasks, including routine inspections of agents’ calls to track quality-control metrics using standardized forms provided by Sykes; running routine reports regarding call data; and completing forms relating to computer-generated metrics. 59. Plaintiff and Class Members’ duties did not differ substantially from the duties of non-exempt ATLs. 60. Plaintiff and Class Members did/do not have the authority to hire, fire, promote, or set employees’ rate of pay or hours of work. 61. Plaintiff and Class Members do not exercise independent judgment or discretion about matters of significance. Rather, Plaintiff and Class Members primarily complete routine inspections using detailed forms and applying well-established techniques, procedures, and specific standards. 63. Sykes did not keep accurate records of hours worked by Plaintiff or Class Members. 64. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 65. Sykes has engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the FLSA, as described in this Collective Action Complaint. 66. Plaintiff has consented in writing to be a party to this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 67. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 68. The overtime wage provisions set forth in §§ 201 et seq. of the FLSA apply to Sykes. 69. At all relevant times, Sykes has been an employer engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 70. At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were employees within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e) and 207(a). 72. Sykes has failed to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective the overtime wages to which they are entitled under the FLSA. 73. Sykes’s violations of the FLSA, as described in this Collective Action Complaint, have been willful and intentional. 74. Sykes has not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to its compensation of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. 75. Because Sykes’s violations of the FLSA has been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 76. As a result of Sykes’s willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have suffered damages by being denied overtime wages in accordance with 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 77. As a result of Sykes’s unlawful acts, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have been deprived of overtime compensation and other wages in amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recover of such amounts, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, costs and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 78. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 79. Plaintiff brings this count as a Rule 23 class action on behalf of himself and the Colorado Rule 23 Class. 81. At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the Colorado Rule 23 Class members have been “employees” as that term is defined by the CWCA because they performed labor or services for the benefit of Sykes in which Sykes commanded when, where and how much labor or services would be performed. C.R.S. § 8-4-101(5). 82. Sykes has been Plaintiff and the Colorado Rule 23 Class members’ “employer” within the meaning of the CWCA because it employed Plaintiff and the members of the Colorado Rule 23 Class in Colorado. C.R.S. § 8-4-101(6). 83. Sykes engaged in a widespread policy, pattern or practice of violating the Colorado Wage Laws, as described in this Collective and Class Action Complaint. 84. Sykes violated Colorado law, in relevant part, by failing to pay overtime to Plaintiff and similarly situated employees as required by the Colorado Wage Laws. 85. The overtime premiums and wages that Sykes denied Plaintiff and the Colorado Rule 23 Class members constitute earned wages or other compensation owed to Plaintiff and the Colorado Rule 23 Class. C.R.S. § 8-4-109. 86. Sykes failed to keep, make, preserve, maintain, and furnish accurate records of time worked by Plaintiff and the Colorado Rule 23 Class members, and failed to furnish to each of them their wage and hour records showing all wages earned and due for all work performed for labor or services rendered. 87. Sykes’s violations of the Colorado Wage Laws, as described in this Collective and Class Action Complaint, have been willful and intentional. 89. Plaintiff and the Colorado Rule 23 Class members are entitled to recover unpaid wages, penalties, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, as provided by law. COLORADO WAGE LAWS – UNPAID OVERTIME (Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the Colorado Rule 23 Class) Fair Labor Standards Act – Overtime Wages (Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective)

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11. On information and belief, it is possible to replicate a card number using the last four digits of the card number and the expiration date. 12. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a Class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a) and (b)(3). 13. The Class is defined as: All persons to whom Defendant provided an electronically printed receipt at the point of sale or transaction, in a transaction occurring at the Nicolet Restaurant after June 3, 2008, which receipt displays the expiration date of the person’s credit card or debit card. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, and its respective officers, employees, and attorneys. 14. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. For several years, Defendant has been open and serving customers seven days each week, and Defendant describes its restaurant as a “local favorite.”1 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that there are more than 50 alleged FACTA violations at issue. 15. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members. All are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful, negligent, reckless and/or willful conduct. 17. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class members. Plaintiff has no interests that conflict with the interests of the Class members. Plaintiff has retained experienced counsel. 18. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of the Class members. Individual actions are not economically feasible. 25. On information and belief, Defendant knew of the requirement concerning the truncation of credit and debit card numbers and prohibition on printing of expiration dates, but continued to print the expiration dates anyway. 26. On information and belief, VISA, MasterCard, American Express, the PCI Security Standards Council – a consortium founded by VISA, MasterCard, Discover, American Express and JCB – companies that sell cash registers and other devices for the processing of credit or debit card payments, and other entities informed Defendant about FACTA, including its specific requirements concerning the truncation of credit card and debit card numbers and prohibition on the printing of expiration dates, and Defendant’s need to comply with the same. 27. The truncation requirement was widely publicized among retailers. 28. In May 2007, the Federal Trade Commission issued a business alert informing businesses that they, “must delete the [credit and debit] card’s expiration date” and for example, a receipt that truncates the credit card number and deletes the expiration date could look like this: 37. The document further advises merchants to: Disguise or suppress all but the last four digits of the PAN, and suppress the full expiration date, on the cardholder’s copy of a transaction receipt created at a point of sale (POS) terminal or an ATM (already required for merchants in the U.S., Europe, and CEMEA; Visa will apply this rule across all regions in the near future to provide global consistency). Example: XXXXXXXXXXXX1234 for the PAN and XXXX for the expiration date. 39. MasterCard’s Security Rules and Procedures contain a section entitled “Primary Account Number Truncation and Expiration Date Omission.” As of July, 2008, that section states that expiration dates must be omitted from cardholder receipts effective October 1, 2008. 40. MasterCard’s Cirrus Worldwide Operating Rules contained a section entitled “Requirements for Transaction Receipts.” Beginning in June, 2008, that section contained a subsection that states that expiration dates must be omitted from cardholder receipts effective October 1, 2008. 41. Discover’s Merchant Operating Regulations, beginning in at least October, 2007, stated: Each party shall be responsible for performing its obligations hereunder in compliance with all Requirements of Law applicable to the subject matter of your Agreement and these Operating Regulations, Card Transactions, and each of the parties to your Agreement shall be responsible for ensuring that each of its respective Agents comply with all such applicable Requirements of Law in addition to any Requirements of Law directly applicable to the Agent. You are solely responsible for compliance with all Requirements of Law in connection with all activities conducted by you pursuant to your Agreement and these Operating Regulations. 42. Importantly, Discover’s Merchant Operating Regulations define “Requirements of Law” to include “the Fair Credit Reporting Act as amended by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act.” 44. Upon information and belief, in or about October, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, American Express provided notice to Nicolet Restaurant pertaining to the FACTA truncation requirements by mailing a copy of “American Express Merchant Regulations – U.S” to the Defendant. These regulations require Nicolet Restaurant to: Provide a copy of the Charge Record to the Cardmember. Pursuant to applicable law, truncate the Card Number and do not print the Card’s Expiration Date on copies of Charge Records delivered to Cardmembers. These regulations also contain a picture of an exemplar credit card receipt that is properly truncated, as follows: “XXXX XXXXXXX 2001”. 46. Defendant accepts Visa, MasterCard, Discover, and American Express cards, and is required to comply with the foregoing merchant rules and regulations by virtue of its acceptance of these credit and debit cards. 47. Defendant, as a merchant in the payment card system from the time it began accepting credit and debit cards, is aware of the importance of the card operating regulations of Visa, MasterCard, Discover, and American Express, and is aware that it is bound by them. By participating in the payment card system, Defendant necessarily represents to all other participants that it understands the importance of the card operating regulations of Visa, MasterCard, Discover and American Express, and that it will be complying with them. For the payment card system to function properly as a whole, it was essential for Defendant to comply with the card operating regulations of Visa, MasterCard, Discover and American Express. 48. Defendant knew of the card operating regulations of Visa, MasterCard, Discover and American Express, and Defendant knew that it had to comply with them. All of these regulations specifically informed Defendant of FACTA’s truncation requirements. 49. Most of Defendant’s business peers and competitors readily brought their credit card and debit card receipt printing process into compliance with FACTA by, for example, programming their card machines and devices to prevent them from printing the expiration date of the card upon the receipts provided to the cardholders. Defendant could have readily done the same. debit cards up to three years to comply with its requirements, requiring compliance for all machines no later than December 4, 2006.

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13. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the County of Alameda, State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 14. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 15. At all times relevant Defendant conducted business in the State of California and in the County of Alameda, within this judicial district. 16. In or about June 10, 2020, Plaintiff received an unsolicited text message from Defendant on his cellular telephone, number ending in -6544. 23. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 24. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any unsolicited text messages from Defendant which text message was not made for emergency purposes or with the recipient’s prior express consent within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 25. Defendant and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the hundreds of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 26. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through their agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using marketing and text messages, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 27. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class, and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 35. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 36. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 37. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 38. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).  Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future.  Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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1. The employer is required or empowered to do so by state or federal law. 2. The employer has prior written authorization from the employee. An employer shall not withhold wages under a written authorization from the employee past the date specified by the employee in a written revocation of the authorization, unless the withholding is to resolve a debt or obligation to the employer or a court orders otherwise. 27. Counts I and II asserted below are properly maintainable as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 28. Counts III through VIII asserted below are properly maintainable as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 3. There is a reasonable good faith dispute as to the amount of wages due, including the amount of any counterclaim or any claim of debt, reimbursement, recoupment or set-off asserted by the employer against the employee. 175. By the acts and omissions set forth above, including by failing to pay all wages due to Plaintiffs and Class Members, including minimum wages and overtime wages and by improperly deducting portions of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ wages without authorization, Defendants violated Arizona’s Wage Act. 176. As a result of Defendants’ violations of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-351, Plaintiffs and Class Members have been harmed, have suffered substantial losses and have been deprived of compensation to which they were entitled are entitled to an award of the unpaid wages, with prejudgment interest thereon, and treble the amount of such wages, together with attorneys= fees and costs pursuant to A.R.S. '23-355. 30. Excluded from any class or collective action are Defendants’ legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors, or any individual who at any time during the class period has a controlling interest in any Defendants. 31. The proposed Class Members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief there are several hundred members of the proposed Class of each subclass. 33. The claims of Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class they seek to represent. Plaintiffs and Class Members work or have worked for Defendants and have been subjected to common policies and practices of failing to pay all wages and overtime owed, making unlawful and excessive deductions from their wages. 34. Defendants acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class Members as a whole by engaging in the same violations of law with respect to the Classes, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the Classes as a whole. 35. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and each subclass. 36. Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action employment litigation. 37. The Class Members have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a result of Defendants’ common and uniform policies, practices, and procedures. 39. Defendants control the majority, if not all, of the Drivers’ work for IntelliQuick. 40. Drivers do not and may not exercise independent judgment regarding their work for IntelliQuick. 41. Defendants IntelliQuick independently or jointly with the other Defendants controls the Drivers’ work. 42. Defendants control the method, manner and time that Plaintiffs deliver packages. 43. Defendants control virtually every aspect of Plaintiffs’ performance of IntelliQuick’s work and the equipment that Plaintiffs use for that work. 44. IntelliQuick instructs Drivers when to be at the office, when they can leave, what deliveries and pickups to make, when to make the deliveries and pickups and how to make the deliveries and pickups. 45. By way of example, IntelliQuick has gone so far as to order a Driver not to wait for police to arrive at the scene of an accident when the Driver observed the accident. 46. If Drivers fail to follow IntelliQuick’s directions, instructions, rules, policies or procedures they are penalized and have money deducted from their weekly compensation under what is called “chargebacks.” 47. Drivers cannot delegate their work to assistants, associates or others without first obtaining approval from IntelliQuick. 48. Drivers cannot hire other assistants or associates to assist with their routes or deliveries. 49. All Drivers report to IntelliQuick Supervisors, including Defendants Mittendorf, Leiber, and Tavison (“IntelliQuick Supervisors”). 51. IntelliQuick Supervisors assign all routes, deliveries, and pick-ups to the Drivers. A. Drivers’ Daily Work Assignments. 52. Drivers are given a “manifest” each day from IntelliQuick which tells them what deliveries or pick-ups to make and when to make each delivery or pick-up. 53. The manifest is obtained from and printed from an IntelliQuick computer and can only be obtained at IntelliQuick’s offices. 54. Drivers cannot reject or negotiate the routes or deliveries that they have been assigned. 55. Drivers are required to keep IntelliQuick scanners with them at all times so that they can, among other things, receive instructions and messages throughout their workday from IntelliQuick. Drivers often receive messages sent directly to the IntelliQuick scanners, which will modify their daily routes and schedules, and/or direct them to make extra pick-ups or deliveries. Drivers do not receive any extra payment for these extra deliveries or pick-ups. 56. Drivers cannot deviate from instructions given to them by IntelliQuick on their manifests or as modified by messages throughout the day. If the Drivers fail to follow the directions from IntelliQuick they are given a “chargeback” or deduction from their compensation. 57. IntelliQuick Supervisors regularly tell Drivers that “we [IntelliQuick] have you [the Driver] from 7:00 am until 5:00 pm” and “you [the Driver] work for us [IntelliQuick].” 58. Defendants instruct the Drivers to report to work no later than 7:00 am. Drivers report to work at IntelliQuick’s offices and/or warehouses. For example, Drivers in the Phoenix, Arizona area are told to report to IntelliQuick’s headquarters at 4022 S. 20th Street, Phoenix, AZ 85040. 60. Before leaving on their morning routes, deliveries, or pick-ups, Drivers must first load their vehicles or vehicles owned or leased by Defendants that are used for deliveries and pick-ups. 61. Drivers are often instructed by Defendants to perform extra work in the IntelliQuick warehouses or offices, before leaving on their routes including sorting, logging packages, checking in drivers, loading vehicles and other administrative tasks. Drivers regularly spend between 30 minutes and two hours performing this extra work. Drivers are not paid for performing any of this extra work. 62. Defendants instruct Drivers to report back from their morning routes, deliveries, or pick-ups to IntelliQuick’s warehouses or offices by 1:00 pm. 63. Drivers are then given any new or additional routes, pick-ups or deliveries. Drivers are also often given additional work, including sorting, logging packages, checking in drivers, loading vehicles and other administrative tasks, which they must complete before leaving on their afternoon routes, deliveries, or pick-ups. Drivers regularly spend between 30 minutes and two hours performing this extra work. Drivers are not paid for performing any of this extra work. 64. Defendants instruct Drivers to report back from their afternoon routes, deliveries, or pick-ups to by 5:00 pm. 65. Because of the extra work that Defendants assign to the Drivers in IntelliQuick’s warehouses and offices, Drivers are forced to leave on their routes later and accordingly are expected to complete their routes in less time or work later to complete their routes. B. Defendants’ Treat Drivers Like Employees. 66. Although Defendants tell the Drivers they are “Independent Contractors” or “ICs,” Defendants treat Drivers like employees. 67. Drivers make deliveries to and pick-ups from businesses or individuals that are clients of IntelliQuick; not customers or clients of the Drivers. 69. As previously noted, IntelliQuick Supervisors tell the Drivers when they have to arrive at work and when they can leave work. IntelliQuick Supervisors regularly assign Drivers to do work in the IntelliQuick warehouse or office that is outside the Drivers’ normal routes, deliveries, and pick-ups. 70. Defendants are aware that Drivers regularly perform work in the IntelliQuick warehouse without any extra compensation. 71. Upon information and belief, Drivers currently are being assigned to do the same work while classified as independent contractors that was formerly performed by regular, non-exempt fulltime IntelliQuick employees without any additional wages. 72. On IntelliQuick’s website, Defendants refer to the Drivers as “our drivers,” “our legal couriers,” “IntelliQuick Medical Courier Specialists,” “our medical delivery specialists,” “IntelliQuick’s financial couriers,” and “IntelliQuick delivery drivers.” 73. IntelliQuick’s website asserts, “IntelliQuick has more than 250 uniformed and credentialed local couriers for pick-up and local delivery.” 74. IntelliQuick’s website states, “Our delivery drivers are sharp, seasoned professionals who understand that they are making an impression on your customers and business associates every time they make a delivery for you.” 75. IntelliQuick’s website also states, “All IntelliQuick delivery drivers are insured for cargo damage, reconstruction and criminal liability. Since most bonds don’t cover independent delivery drivers, our clients are assured proper coverage in the event of a loss.” 76. IntelliQuick includes pictures of the Drivers, wearing IntelliQuick uniforms, on their website. 77. Drivers are required to wear IntelliQuick uniforms and meet specific grooming requirements, established by IntelliQuick. Drivers cannot wear their own uniforms. 79. Drivers are given IntelliQuick Identification Badges (IDs). Drivers are required to wear the IDs somewhere that is in sight when they make deliveries or pick- ups. The IDs include the Driver’s name, the IntelliQuick logo and company name, and an IntelliQuick identification number. 80. Job openings for Drivers are posted on the IntelliQuick website and are advertised as positions with IntelliQuick. Drivers apply for the positions at IntelliQuick’s headquarters or other offices. 81. Drivers are interviewed and hired by IntelliQuick supervisors, including but not limited to Defendants Spizzirri, Mittendorf, Lieber, and Tavison. 82. Drivers are terminated by IntelliQuick supervisors, including but not limited to Defendants Spizzirri, Mittendorf, Lieber, and Tavison. 83. Drivers are required to use equipment provided by IntelliQuick, including scanners and computers. 84. Drivers cannot purchase or use their own scanners. C. Payment of Wages. 85. Drivers are paid each week. The pay statements can be viewed through IntelliQuick’s website or internal server. 86. Defendants provide Drivers with IntelliQuick identification numbers that Drivers can use to access their pay statements or “settlements” online through IntelliQuick’s website or internal server. These ID numbers are also used by Drivers to log into IntelliQuick computers. 87. Drivers are paid by Defendants either per route, delivery, or pick-up. Route and Freight Drivers are told that they will be paid a set amount per route (or per day). On-Demand Drivers are told that they will be paid a set amount per delivery or pick-up. 88. Drivers cannot negotiate with Defendants regarding the amount paid for a particular delivery or pick-up. 90. Defendants often refer to or explain the Drivers’ wages or compensation in terms of their hourly rate. For example, Defendants explain to Drivers that a route will pay the Driver “$10 an hour,” and refer to routes as “$10 an hour routes,” “$15 an hour routes,” “8 hour route,” “10 hour route,” or “13 hour route.” 91. Defendants often fail or refuse to pay the Drivers the amount they originally quoted for a particular route, delivery or pick-up, after the Driver completes the assignment. For example, a Driver was quoted $140 to make a late night delivery from Phoenix to Lake Havasu, Arizona, but only received $90 for the delivery. 92. The Drivers’ paychecks are generally issued by a third-party service, including TA. However, there have been occasions when the checks were issued directly from IntelliQuick and signed by Defendant Spizzirri. 93. Although IntelliQuick clients or customers are regularly charged an extra “fuel surcharge,” Defendants do not pay anything to the Route Drivers or On-Demand Drivers for fuel in their own vehicles. 94. Defendants have decreased the compensation paid to Drivers while increasing the costs and fees to the IntelliQuick clients and customers for delivery and pick-up services. 95. Although Route Drivers and On-Demand Drivers are expected and required to use their own vehicles for the benefit of Defendants, Route Drivers and On-Demand Drivers do not receive any additional compensation for gas or maintenance of their vehicles. D. Trainings and Meetings 96. IntelliQuick regularly provides training for and trains the Drivers. 98. Defendants require Drivers to complete HIPAA training at IntelliQuick’s offices. After the completion of the training, the Drivers receive certificates stating, “IntelliQuick Delivery completed HCSI Compliance Training for Employees, In Employee DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 183. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 184. The Membership Application and Agreement and Vehicle Lease Agreement that some Drivers are requested to sign are unconscionable. 185. Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to declaratory judgment that Defendants’ lease and Vehicle Rental Agreement are unconscionable. I. Defendants’ Control over Drivers’ Daily Activities

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13. Defendant LAS does more than $500,000.00 per year in business. 27. During the relevant time period, Defendants violated and continue to violate the provisions of sections 6 and 7 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C §§ 206-7, and 215(a)(2), by employing employees in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA for weeks longer than 40 hours without compensating for work in excess of 40 hours per week at rates no less than one-and-a-half times their regular rates of pay. Defendants have acted willfully in failing to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members in accordance with the law. 7. At all material times, Defendants have acted, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer or joint employer with respect to Plaintiff and the Class Members. 8. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendants have been an employer or joint employer within the meaning of the Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 9. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendants have been an enterprise within the meaning of Section 3(r) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(r). ACCORDANCE WITH THE FAIR LABOR STANDARS ACT

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(Fair Labor Standards Act – Unpaid Overtime) (New Jersey Wage and Hour Law – Unpaid Overtime) 48. Plaintiff brings the First Claim against defendants as a collective action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of himself and other similarly situated individuals, which include all other non-tipped, non-exempt restaurant employees, including Chefs, Cooks, Salad Preparers, Food Preparers, Pizza Makers and Dishwashers employed by defendants at Mangiamo at any time three years prior to the filing of this action through the entry of judgment in this action (the “FLSA Collective”). 50. The identities of the FLSA Collective members are known to the defendants and are contained in the employment records that the defendants are required to create and maintain pursuant to the FLSA and NJWHL. 51. As part of their regular business practice, defendants have intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly harmed the FLSA Collective by engaging in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA. 52. This policy, pattern, or practice includes, inter alia, failing to pay overtime at the rate of one and one-half times the FLSA Collective’s regular hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 53. Defendants’ unlawful conduct has been intentional, willful, and in bad faith and has caused significant damage to the FLSA Collective. 54. Defendants did not keep complete records, as required by law, of hours worked and wages earned by plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. 55. The FLSA Collective would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join the present lawsuit. Those similarly situated employees are known to defendants and are readily identifiable and can be located through defendants’ records, which they are required to maintain pursuant to the FLSA and NJWHL. Those similarly situated employees should be notified of and allowed to opt into this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 57. Plaintiff is a member of a class of employees of similarly situated individuals which includes current and former non-tipped, non-exempt restaurant employees, including Chefs, Cooks, Salad Preparers, Food Preparers, Pizza Makers and Dishwashers employed by defendants at Mangiamo at any time, during the period permitted by N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25.1 prior to the filing of the action through entry of judgment in this action (the “New Jersey Class”). 58. The persons in the New Jersey Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Further, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25 statutorily provides for a class action, without regard to the number of members, to enforce rights protected by the NJWHL. The exact number of the New Jersey Class members is unknown to plaintiff at this time, but there are believed to be at least 20 such persons. 59. The identities of the New Jersey Class members are known to the defendants and are contained in the employment records that the defendants are required to create and maintain pursuant to the FLSA and NJWHL. 60. Plaintiff is similarly situated to the New Jersey Class because plaintiff and the New Jersey Class performed similar work under similar terms and conditions of employment, and sustained similar damages arising out of defendants’ policies and conduct in violation of the 70. At all relevant times, Hani operated and managed Mangiamo. 71. At all relevant times, Sameh operated and managed Mangiamo. 72. Throughout his employment, plaintiff’s primary duties were to prepare salads and food. His duties included slicing tomatoes, cutting lettuce, preparing other toppings for salads, and making salads. 73. At all relevant times, defendants recorded plaintiff’s and other restaurant workers’ hours of work first by having the workers orally notifying the managers when they arrived at the restaurant and when they were leaving the restaurant, which the managers recorded. Thereafter, in or about 2018, a Point of Sale (POS) electronic system was installed at Mangiamo, which recorded hours of work for each restaurant worker. 74. At all relevant times, plaintiff and other restaurant workers typically worked at least 74 hours per workweek. 76. Plaintiff and other restaurant workers did not receive any uninterrupted meal or rest breaks during the workday. Any food eaten was done so while working. 77. Plaintiff and other restaurant workers were paid on a weekly basis in cash and/or check. 78. The pay period at Mangiamo went from Monday to Sunday. Non-tipped restaurant workers were generally paid once a week on Tuesdays. 79. All of the restaurant workers, except for the pizza makers, were paid on a flat salary basis, regardless of the number of hours they worked in a week. Pizza makers were paid on an hourly basis the same hourly rate, regardless of the number of hours they worked in a work week. 80. Defendants failed to pay plaintiff and other restaurant workers overtime pay at one and one half (1 ½) times their hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. 81. Examples of such weekly pay periods in 2018 include pay periods ending on March 5, May 21, June 18, August 27, and October 1, 2018. 82. Examples of such weekly pay periods in 2017 include pay periods ending on January 9, April 24, July 10, and October 16, 2017. 83. Examples of such weekly pay periods in 2016 include pay periods ending on January 11, April 25, July 11, and October 17, 2016. 84. In each of the identified pay periods above, plaintiff worked at least 74 hours. 86. Defendants have violated the recordkeeping requirements of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §211(c), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a20 and N.J.A.C. 12:56-4.1 and 4.2 87. Defendants failed to post, in a conspicuous, unobstructed place, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a21, the “New Jersey State Wage and Hour Law Abstract,” prescribed by the NJDOL, setting forth the state minimum wage and overtime requirements in English and Spanish. 88. Defendants failed to post in a conspicuous, unobstructed place, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §516.4, a poster prescribed by the U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, setting forth federal minimum wage and overtime requirements in English and Spanish. 89. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective repeat and reallege all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 90. Defendants are required to pay plaintiff and the FLSA Collective one and one-half (1½) times the regular rate of pay for all hours they worked in excess of 40 in a workweek pursuant to the overtime wage provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, et seq. 91. Defendants have failed to pay plaintiff and the FLSA Collective the overtime wages to which they are entitled under the FLSA, even though plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have regularly worked more than 40 hours per workweek. 92. For example, plaintiff worked as a salad preparer at least 74 hours each and every workweek from on or about January 1, 2015 to on or about December 31, 2018. 94. Defendants were aware or should have been aware that the practices described in this Claim were unlawful and have not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to the compensation of plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. 95. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA have been willful and, therefore, a three-year statute of limitations applies pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 96. As a result of defendants’ willful violations of the FLSA, plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have suffered damages by being denied overtime pay in accordance with the FLSA and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 97. Plaintiff and the New Jersey Class repeat and reallege all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 98. Under the NJWHL, defendants are required to pay plaintiff and the New Jersey Class one and one half (1 ½) times the regular rate of pay for all hours they worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek.

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21. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully against the Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class. 22. Pursuant to NYCRR Part 146-2.2 and 29 USC § 203(m), an employer cannot take credit towards the basic minimum wage if a service employee or food service worker has not received notification of the tip credit. 23. At all relevant times, Defendants knowingly and willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and similarly situated employees at least the New York minimum wage for each hour worked. 24. At all relevant times, Defendants knowingly and willfully failed to pay Plaintiff his lawful overtime compensation of one and one-half times (1.5x) their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) in a given workweek. 25. While employed by Defendants, Plaintiff was not exempt under federal and 6 of 18 state laws requiring employers to pay employees overtime. 26. Defendants failed to keep full and accurate records of Plaintiff's hours and wages. 27. Upon information and belief, Defendants failed to keep full and accurate records in order to mitigate liability for their wage violations. Defendants never furnished any notice of their use of tip credit. 28. At all relevant times, Defendants knowingly and willfully failed to provide Plaintiff and similarly situated employees with Time of Hire Notice reflecting true rates of pay and payday as well as paystub that lists employee’s name, employer’s name, employer’s address and telephone number, employee’s rate or rates of pay, any deductions made from employee’s wages, any allowances claimed as part of the minimum wage, and the employee’s gross and net wages for each pay day. 29. Defendants knew that the nonpayment of overtime pay and New York’s “spread of hours” premium for every day in which Plaintiff worked over ten (10) hours would financially injure Plaintiff and similarly situated employees and violate state and federal laws. 30. Defendants did not post the required New York State Department of Labor posters regarding minimum wage pay rates, overtime pay, tip credit, and pay day. Plaintiff XING LONG LIN 31. From on or about March 08, 2016 to January 05, 2018 Plaintiff XING LONG LIN was employed by Defendants to work as a deliveryman at 7009 Grand Avenue, Maspeth, 45. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as class representative individually and on behalf of all other and former non-exempt employees who have been or were employed by the Defendants for up to the last three (3) years, through entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”) and whom were not compensated at their promised hourly rate for all hours worked and at one and one half times their promised work for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week (the “Collective Action Members”).

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(Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.500, et seq.) 12. Plaintiff was hourly, non-exempt employee. 13. Plaintiff and other hourly, non-exempt employees were required to perform work in excess of forty (40) hours per week as an integral and indispensable part of the principle activities of performing their jobs. 14. Plaintiff and other hourly, non-exempt employees were frequently interrupted from their bona fide meal periods, and in many instances, were unable to have a meal period at all. Defendant failed to, and continues to fail to, compensate employees for this time. 15. Further, Defendant has at all relevant times, maintained a practice of rounding employees time to the nearest 15 minute interval, while at the same time, maintaining a discipline policy that allows it to discipline employees for tardiness. 16. Defendant’s unlawful policy causes Plaintiff to work in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 17. Plaintiff was not properly compensated for this work at the applicable rate of pay. 18. The Defendant employs/employed other employees, who, like the Plaintiff, are/were required to perform the same or similar work in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 20. These “similarly situated” employees were not properly compensated for their work at the legal and proper rate of pay. 21. The FLSA requires each covered employer, such as Defendant, to compensate all non-exempt employees for all hours worked and to compensate them at a rate of not less than one and one-half the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours in a work week. 22. All similarly situated employees working for Defendant are similarly situated in that they all are subject to Defendant’s same compensation and timekeeping policies that deny Plaintiffs compensation for all hours worked in a workweek, including overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 23. The quantum meruit claims are brought against Defendant under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a class action consisting of all current and former hourly employees who were required to perform work without proper compensation and who have worked for Defendant at any time during the last five years. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated employees, seeks relief on a class basis challenging Defendant’s failure to pay the class for all hours worked and overtime wages. 25. The Missouri Wage and Hour claims (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.500, et seq.) are brought against Defendant under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Missouri state-wide class action consisting of all current and former hourly employees who were required to perform work without compensation and who have worked for Defendant as a Missouri employee at any time during the last three years. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated employees, seeks relief on a class basis challenging Defendant’s failure to pay the class for all hours worked and overtime wages. 26. Plaintiff brings Count I (FLSA) as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated employees, seeks relief on a collective basis challenging Defendant’s practices of requiring unrecorded work without pay, as well as failing to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees for all overtime hours worked. The class for the FLSA claims is defined as: All current and former hourly, non-exempt personnel of Defendant who performed work without proper compensation at any time during the last three years. 27. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), FLSA claims may be pursued by those who opt-in to this case. 28. Plaintiff’s consent to join form is attached as Exhibit A. 30. Count III (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.500, et seq.) is a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against Defendant. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated employees, seeks relief on a class basis challenging Defendant’s practice of requiring unrecorded and unpaid work and failing to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees for overtime hours worked. The Missouri Wage Rule 23 class is defined as: All current and former personnel who performed work without proper compensation during the past five years. 32. Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendant satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, and superiority requirements of a class action. 33. The class satisfies the numerosity standards as it is believed to number over one- hundred. As a result, joinder of all class members in a single action is impracticable. Class members may be informed of the pendency of this class action through direct mail. 35. The aforementioned common questions predominate over any questions affecting individual persons, and a class action is proper as it relates to consistency, economy, efficiency, fairness, and equity. 36. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class in that class members have been employed in the same or similar positions as the Class Representative and were subject to the same or similar unlawful practices as the Class Representative. 37. A class action is the appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class. The presentation of separate actions by individual class members could create a risk of inconsistent and varying results, establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant, and/or substantially impair or impede the ability of class members to protect their interests. 38. The Class Representative is an adequate representative of the class because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class he seeks to represent. The interests of the members of the class will be fairly and adequately protected by the Class Representatives and their undersigned counsel, who has experience in employment and class action lawsuits. 40. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 41. Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant at the Defendant's hospital in North Kansas City, Missouri. 42. At this site, Plaintiff performed work both before and after her work shift as an integral and indispensable part of the principle activities of performing her job, and/or was clocked out for meal periods, notwithstanding the fact that she was unable to have an uninterrupted meal period. 43. Said work often caused Plaintiff to work in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 44. Plaintiff was not properly compensated for this work at the applicable rate of pay. 45. Plaintiff was treated as a non-exempt employee by the Defendant under the 59. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each and every averment of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 60. Defendant has been enriched through making deficient payments for work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees. Defendant was enriched at the expense of Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees because Plaintiff and others were not properly compensated for their work. 61. Defendant intentionally refused to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees at the proper rate for all hours worked and for time worked in excess of forty hours per week. Defendant knows or should know the proper rate of pay for Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees. Such wrongful conduct demonstrates bad faith on the part of Defendant. 62. It is unjust for Defendant to retain the benefits from the unpaid work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant on Count II of the Complaint; for notice to be sent to a class of similarly situated employees; for an award of restitution; pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as provided by law; and for such other orders and further relief, including an award of costs and attorney’s fees, as this Court deems just and equitable. 64. At all times material herein, Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees have been entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.500, et seq. 65. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.502 regulates the payment of minimum wages and Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.505 regulates the payment of overtime compensation by Missouri employers. 66. Defendant is subject to the minimum wage requirements of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.502 and the overtime pay requirements of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.505 because it is an employer in the state of Missouri under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.500(4) and Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees of Defendant are employees under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.500(3). 67. Defendant violated Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 290.502 and 290.505 by failing to properly pay employees for all hours worked and failing to pay employees for overtime. In the course of perpetrating these unlawful practices, Defendant willfully failed to keep accurate records of all hours worked by employees as required by Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.520. 68. Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees are victims of an unlawful and entity-wide compensation policy. Defendant continues to apply and enforce this policy and thereby continues to violate Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 290.502 and 290.505. 70. Defendant acted in bad faith and without reasonable grounds to believe its actions and omissions were compliant with Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 290.502 and 290.505. As a result thereof, Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees are entitled to recover an award of liquidated damages in an amount equal to the amount of unpaid overtime pay described above, pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.505. 71. As a result of these willful violations of the wage and overtime provisions under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.505, wages and overtime compensation have been unlawfully withheld by Defendant from Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees for which Defendant is liable pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 290.505; 290.527, together with an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of this action. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, and all similarly situated employees, demand judgment against Defendant and pray for: for notice to be sent to a class of similarly situated employees; compensatory damages; liquidated damages; attorneys’ fees and costs as allowed by Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.527; for prejudgment and post-judgment interest as provided by law; and (5) for such other relief the Court deems fair and equitable. 73. At Defendant's request, Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees provided services in the form of work for Defendant. These services had reasonable value and were performed at an hourly rate. 74. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees regularly would work off the clock before work and after work without being compensated for this time. 75. Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees the reasonable value of these services performed on Defendant's behalf. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant on Count IV of the Complaint; for notice to be sent to a class of similarly situated employees; for an award of restitution and for such other orders and further relief, including an award of costs and attorney’s fees, as this Court deems just and equitable. Respectfully submitted,

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(Violation of FLSA Overtime/Unlawful Deduction/Recordkeeping Provisions) 113. Plaintiffs repeats and realleges all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 114. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants were Plaintiffs’ employers (and employers of the putative FLSA Class members) within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). Defendants had the power to hire and fire Plaintiffs (and the FLSA class members), control the terms and conditions of employment, and determine the rate and method of any compensation in exchange for their employment. 115. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants were engaged in commerce or in an industry or activity affecting commerce. 116. Defendants constitute an enterprise within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (r-s). 21 117. Defendants, in violation of the FLSA, failed to pay Plaintiffs (and the FLSA Class members) overtime compensation at rates of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207 (a)(1). 118. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs (and the FLSA Class members) overtime compensation was willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 119. Defendants took unlawful deductions from Plaintiffs’ earned wages and the FLSA Collective’s earned wages. 120. Defendants, in violated of the FLSA, failed to pay Plaintiffs agreed-upon wages by virtue of their withholding policies, time-clock policies and chargeback policies as described herein. 121. Defendants failed to satisfy the FLSA’s recordkeeping requirements. 122. Defendants acted willfully in their violations of the FLSA’s requirements. 123. Plaintiffs (and the FLSA Collective) was damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. (Violation of the Overtime/Unpaid Wages/Unlawful Deductions/Spread-of-Hours- Pay/Recordkeeping/Wage Statement Provisions of NYLL/Frequency of Payment) 124. Plaintiffs repeats and realleges all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 125. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants were Plaintiffs’ employers within the meaning of the N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 2 and 651. Defendants had the power to hire and fire Plaintiffs, control terms and conditions of employment, and determine the rates and methods of any compensation in exchange for employment. 126. Defendants, in violation of the NYLL and associated rules and regulations, failed to pay Plaintiffs overtime compensation at rates of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek, in violation of N.Y. Lab. Law § 190 et seq. and supporting regulations of the New York State Department of Labor. 127. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs (and the Class members) in a timely fashion, as require by Article 6 of the New York Labor Law. 128. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs (and the Class members) with a paycheck every week. Rather, they paid him every two (2) weeks, in violation of violation of Labor Law § 191(1)(a) which requires weekly payment of manual workers. 129. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs (and the Class members) overtime compensation was willful within the meaning of N.Y. Lab. Law § 663. 130. Defendants, in violation of the NYLL, failed to pay Plaintiffs agreed-upon wages by virtue of their withholding policies, time-clock policies and chargeback policies as described herein. 131. Plaintiffs (and the Class Members) was damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. 132. Plaintiffs repeats and realleges all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 133. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs (and the Class) one additional hour’s pay at the basic minimum wage rate before allowances for each day Plaintiffs’ spread of hours exceeded 23 ten hours in violation of New York Lab. Law §§ 190 et seq. and 650 et seq. and the wage order of the New York Commissioner of Labor codified at N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Tit. 12, § 137-1.7 and 137-3.11. 134. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs (and the Class) an additional hour’s pay for each day Plaintiffs’ (and the Class) spread of hours exceeded ten hours was willful within the meaning of New York Lab. Law § 663. 135. Plaintiffs (and the Class members) was damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. 136. Plaintiffs repeats and realleges all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 137. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs with a written notice, in English and in Spanish (Plaintiffs’ primary language), of his rate of pay, regular pay day, and such other information as require by NYLL §195(1). 138. Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs in the amount of $5,000 together with costs and attorney’s fees. 139. Plaintiffs repeats and realleges all paragraphs above as though set forth fully herein. 140. Defendants did not provide Plaintiffs with wage statements upon each payment of wages, as required by NYLL 195(3). 141. Defendants acted willfully in his violation of the above-described NYLL requirements. 17. Plaintiffs bring his FLSA claims on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated persons who work or have worked for Defendants on or after December 8, 2013, who elect to opt-in to this action (the “FLSA Collective”). 18. All of the work that Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have performed has been assigned by Defendants and/or Defendants have been aware of all of the work that Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have performed. 19. As part of his regular business practice, Defendants have intentionally, willfully and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice and/or policy of violating the FLSA with respect to Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective. This policy and pattern or practice includes, but is not limited to: 5 a. Willfully failing to pay overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week; b. Willfully failing to keep records that satisfy statutory requirements. 20. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and other members of the FLSA Class who are and/or have been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and have been subject to Defendants’ common practices, policies, programs, procedures, protocols and plans of willfully failing and refusing to pay them the require overtime pay at a one and one-half his regular rates for work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek under the FLSA, willfully taking improper wage deductions and other improper credits against Plaintiffs’ wages for which Defendants did not qualify under the FLSA, and willfully failing to keep records require by the FLSA. 21. The claims of Plaintiffs stated herein are similar to those of the other employees and Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective all perform or performed the same primary duties. 22. Defendants are aware that FLSA required them to pay employees performing non-exempt duties, including Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective overtime premium for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 23. Defendants’ unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated and consistent. 24. Plaintiffs bring certain NYLL claims pursuant to FRCP 23 on behalf of all of Defendants’ employees who work or have worked for Defendants from December 8, 2013 and the date of final judgment in this matter (“the Class”). 25. Excluded from the Class are, inter alia, Defendants’ employees who will submit timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion from the Class. 26. On information and belief, the size of the Class is roughly 10 individuals. Although the precise number is unknown, the facts on which the calculation of that number depends are presently within the sole control of Defendants. 27. Common questions of law and fact exist as to the Class that predominate over any questions only affecting them individually and include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether Defendants violated Article 6 of the NYLL and the supporting NYS Department of Labor regulations; b. Whether Defendants failed to compensate the Class for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek; c. Whether Defendants misclassified Plaintiffs and members of the Class as exempt; d. Whether Defendants failed to keep true and accurate time and pay records for all hours worked by Plaintiffs and the Class, and other records required by the NYLL; e. Whether Defendants’ policy of failing to pay workers was instituted willfully or with reckless disregard of the law; and f. The nature and extent of class-wide injury and the measure of damages for those injuries. 28. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the Class’s claims that they seek to represent. Defendants employed Plaintiffs and the Class in New York State. Plaintiffs and the Class enjoy 7 the same NYLL rights to receive overtime; to be protected from unlawful deductions; to have legally sufficient record-keeping. Plaintiffs and the Class have all sustained similar type of damages as a result of Defendants’ non-compliance with the NYLL. Plaintiffs and the Class have all been injured by virtue of Defendants’ under compensation of them or Defendants’ failure to compensate them due to Defendants’ common policies, practices and patterns of conduct. 29. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class’s members. Plaintiffs understand that as class representatives they assume a fiduciary responsibility to the class to represent its interests fairly and adequately. Plaintiffs recognize that as class representatives, they must represent and consider the interests of the class just as they would represent and consider their own interests. Plaintiffs understand that in decisions regarding the conduct of the litigation and its possible settlement, they must not favor his own interests over the Class’s interests. Plaintiffs recognize that any resolution of a class action must be in the best interest of the Class. Plaintiffs understand that in order to provide adequate representation, they must be informed of developments in litigation, cooperate with class counsel, and testify at deposition/trial. Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions and employment litigation. There is no conflict between Plaintiffs and the Class. 30. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. The members of the Class have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a result of Defendants’ violation of the NYLL as well as its common and uniform policies, practices and procedures. Although the relative damages suffered by individual members of the Class are not de minimis, such damages are small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution of this litigation. For example, Class members lack the financial resources to conduct a thorough examination of Defendants’ timekeeping and compensation practices and to prosecute vigorously a lawsuit against Defendants to recover such damages. In addition, class litigation is superior because it will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments about Defendants’ practices. 31. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under FRCP 23(b)(3). 41. Defendants operate a construction contracting company where the Plaintiffs worked. At all relevant times, Individual Defendants Serge Pisman possess or possessed operational control over Defendant Corporations; possess or possessed an ownership interest in Defendant Corporations, and control or controlled significant functions of Defendant Corporations. 42. Corporate Defendants purport to be separate corporate entities. On information and belief, this is not true and Defendants have manipulated the corporate forms in order to deprive Plaintiffs and other employee members of the Proposed Class of FLSA, NYLL and other state law protections. 43. Corporate Defendants and Individual Defendants are associated and joint employers, act in the interest of each other with respect to employees, pay employees by the same method, and share control over the employees. 44. At relevant times, each Corporate Defendant possessed substantial control over Plaintiffs’ and other similarly situated employees’ working conditions, and over the policies and practices with respect to the employment and compensation of Plaintiffs, and all similarly situated individuals, referred to herein. 45. Corporate Defendants jointly employed Plaintiffs, and all similarly situated individuals, and are Plaintiffs’ and all similarly situated individuals employers within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. and the NYLL. 11 46. In the alternative, Corporate Defendants constitute a single employer of Plaintiffs and/or similarly situated individuals, as the corporate divisions between them are fictional. 47. Upon information and belief, Individual Defendants Serge Pisman, Operate each Defendant Corporation as the alter ego of the other one, and/or fail to operate Defendant Corporation as legal entities separate and apart from themselves by, among other things: (a) failing to adhere to the corporate formalities necessary to operate Defendant Corporation as separate and legally distinct entities; (b) defectively forming or maintaining Defendant Corporation by, among other things, failing to hold annual meetings or maintaining appropriate corporate records; (c) transferring assets and debts freely as between all Defendants; (d) operating Defendant Corporation for Individual Defendants’ own benefit as the sole or majority shareholder(s) even as the Defendant Corporation operated collectively in the execution of his moving business; (e) operating Defendant Corporation for each Individual Defendants’ own benefit and maintaining control over it as a closed corporation or closely controlled entity; (f) intermingling assets and debts of Defendants Corporations; (g) diminishing and/or transferring assets of Defendant Corporation to protect his own interests; and (h) other actions evincing a failure to adhere to the corporate form. 48. At all relevant times, Individual Defendants were Plaintiffs’ employers within the meaning of the FLSA, NYLL and other law. 49. Individual Defendants had the power to hire and fire Plaintiffs, control the terms and conditions of employment, and determine the rate and method of any compensation in exchange for Plaintiffs’ services. 50. Individual Defendants supervised Plaintiffs’ work schedules and conditions of his employment. 51. Individual Defendants also determined the rate and method of payment for Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees. 52. Individual Defendants also controlled and guided what limited recordkeeping that took place which Plaintiffs contends is deficient pursuant to FLSA and NYLL requirements. Individual Plaintiff Jonathan Arriaga 53. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendants, primarily employed in performing the duties of a plumber’s assistant. 54. Plaintiff did not work at his own convenience, having to report to work according to a schedule devised by Defendants. Furthermore, once scheduled for a shift, Plaintiff did not come and go at his pleasure, but rather was controlled by Defendant. 55. Plaintiff worked (6) or (7) six days per week for 10 hours per day and was paid a $12 per hour. Many times, Plaintiffs had to stay past his regularly scheduled departure time to complete his job duties. Defendants never paid him for that extra time. 56. Plaintiff is non-exempt under FLSA and the NYLL. Among other things, Plaintiff did not occupy what law would characterize as “professional,” “executive” or even “administrative” positions, as Plaintiffs’ employment for Defendants was physical labor. Plaintiffs did not receive salary and their primary duties 13 57. Plaintiff commences this action as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and as a putative class action under FRCP 23 with respect to the New York state law claims. 58. Plaintiffs Arriaga was employed by Defendants from approximately June 2016 until August 25, 2017. 59. Plaintiffs Arriaga regularly handled goods in interstate commerce, such pipes, cement and hardware that were necessary to perform their work and that were produced outside of the State of New York. 60. Plaintiffs Arriaga’s work duties required neither discretion nor independent judgment. 61. Throughout his employment with Defendants, Plaintiffs Arriaga regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 62. From approximately 2016 until his departure in August 2017 Plaintiff Arriaga worked about (6) six or (7) days per week. Typically, 7:30am to 5:30pm. 63. Plaintiffs Arriaga worked (60) sixty to (70) seventy hours per week with a half hour break per day. 64. From 2016 until his departure in August 2017, Plaintiff Jonathan Arriaga was paid $12 per hour at straight time, and not at the premium time and a half required by law. 65. Defendants did not provide Plaintiffs Arriaga with each payment of wages an accurate statement of wages, as require by NYLL 195(3). 66. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff Arriaga with a paycheck every week. Rather, they paid him every two (2) weeks, in violation of violation of Labor Law § 191(1)(a) which requires weekly payment of manual workers. 67. Defendants never provided Plaintiffs Arriaga with a written notice, in English and in Spanish (Plaintiffs Arriaga’s primary language), of his rate of pay, employer’s regular pay day, and such other information as require by NYLL §195(1). Individual Plaintiff Maldonado 68. Plaintiff Maldonado is a former employee of Defendants, primarily employed in performing the duties of welder and plumber. 69. Plaintiff did not work at his own convenience, having to report to work according to a schedule devised by Defendants. Furthermore, once scheduled for a shift, Plaintiff did not come and go at his pleasure, but rather was controlled by Defendants. 70. Plaintiffs worked a schedule for Defendants from 7:30am to 5:30pm. Many times, Plaintiff had to stay past midnight to complete his work at the different buildings that he serviced through his employer, Marcon Contracting. 71. Plaintiff is non-exempt under FLSA and the NYLL. Among other things, Plaintiff did not occupy what law would characterize as “professional,” “executive” or even “administrative” positions, as Plaintiffs’ employment for Defendants was physical labor. Plaintiff did not receive salary but an hourly wage that changed throughout the years and sometimes varied per project. 72. Plaintiff commences this action as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and as a putative class action under FRCP 23 with respect to the New York state law claims. 73. Plaintiff Maldonado was employed by Defendants from approximately June 2013 until November 11th, 2018. 15 74. Plaintiff Maldonado regularly handled goods in interstate commerce, such hardware and plumbing materials that were necessary to perform his work and that were produced outside of the State of New York. 75. Plaintiff Maldonado’s work duties required neither discretion nor independent judgment. 76. Throughout his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Maldonado regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 77. From approximately December 2013 until his departure in November 2018 Plaintiff Maldonado worked from 7:30am until on or about 5:30pm. 78. For approximately six (6) months in 2014, Plaintiff Maldonado worked on a city contract where he was supposed to be paid $90 per hour. Instead, Serge Pisman asked him to lie and tell the City Inspectors if they came, that he was earning this amount. 79. Individual Defendant paid him a certain amount of money conforming to the City contract and after Plaintiff Maldonado deposited the check, he had to give back Individual Defendant Pisman money back. 80. Plaintiffs Maldonado worked (60) sixty to (70) seventy hours per week with a half hour break per day. 81. From June 2013, he received a payment of $10 per hour. This amount increased to $11 per hour after 4 months or October 2013, then increased to $12 in December of 2013. 82. In January 2014, Plaintiff Maldonado was promoted to “Mechanic and Plumber” and was earning $14 per hour. 83. In April of 2016, Plaintiff Maldonado’s salary was raised to $17 per hour. 84. In August of 2017, Plaintiff Maldonado’s salary was raised to $20 per hour. He warned $20 per hour until his departure in November 12th, 2019. 85. Plaintiff was paid his wages by check, every two (2) weeks, in violation of violation of Labor Law § 191(1)(a) which requires weekly payment of manual workers. 86. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff Maldonado with each payment of wages an accurate statement of wages, as required by NYLL 195(3). 87. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff Maldonado with a paycheck every week. Rather, they paid him every two (2) weeks, in violation of violation of Labor Law § 191(1)(a) which requires weekly payment of manual workers. 88. Defendants never provided Plaintiffs Maldonado with a written notice, in English and in Spanish (Plaintiffs Maldonado’s primary language), of his rate of pay, employer’s regular pay day, and such other information as require by NYLL §195(1). Individual Plaintiff Raul Simbana 89. Plaintiff Simbana is a former employee of Defendants, primarily employed in performing the duties of an assistant to the plumber and mechanic. 90. Plaintiff Simbana did not work at his own convenience, having to report to work according to a schedule devised by Defendants. Furthermore, once scheduled for a shift, Plaintiff did not come and go at his pleasure, but rather was controlled by Defendants. 91. Plaintiff Simbana worked a schedule of 7:30am to 5:30 PM. Many times, Plaintiff had to go to Home Depot to buy supplies at 6:00 am and was not compensated for this extra time. 17 92. Plaintiff Simbana is non-exempt under FLSA and the NYLL. Among other things, Plaintiff did not occupy what law would characterize as “professional,” “executive” or even “administrative” positions, as Plaintiffs’ employment for Defendants was physical labor. Plaintiffs did not receive salary and their primary duties 93. Plaintiff Simbana commences this action as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and as a putative class action under FRCP 23 with respect to the New York state law claims. 94. Plaintiff Simbana was employed by Defendants from approximately August 28, 2017 until October 20th, 2018 95. Plaintiff Simbana regularly handled goods in interstate commerce, such as food and products sold at the restaurant that were necessary to perform their work and that were produced outside of the State of New York. 96. Plaintiffs Simbana’s work duties required neither discretion nor independent judgment. 97. Throughout his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Simbana regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 98. From approximately August 28, 2017 until his departure in October 20th, 2019 Plaintiff Simbana worked from (6) six to (7) seven days per week. 99. Plaintiff Simbana worked (60) sixty to (70) hours per week with a half hour break per day. 100. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff Simbana with each payment of wages an accurate statement of wages, as require by NYLL 195(3). 101. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff Maldonado with a paycheck every week. Rather, they paid him every two (2) or (3) weeks, in violation of violation of Labor Law § 191(1)(a) which requires weekly payment of manual workers. 102. Defendants never provided Plaintiff Simbaba with a written notice, in English and in Spanish (Plaintiffs Arriaga’s primary language), of his rate of pay, employer’s regular pay day, and such other information as require by NYLL §195(1). Defendants’ General Employment Practices 103. Defendants regularly require Plaintiffs to work in excess of forty (40) hours per week without paying him the proper overtime wages or spread of hours compensation. 104. At all times relevant to this complaint, Defendants maintained a policy and practice of requiring Plaintiffs and all similarly situated employees to work in excess of forty (40) hours per week without paying them appropriate overtime compensation or spread of hours compensation, as require by federal and state laws. 105. Defendants willfully disregarded and purposefully evaded record keeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law by failing to maintain accurate and complete timesheets and payroll records. 106. By employing this practice, Defendants avoided paying Plaintiffs at the overtime rate of time and a half for most or all of their hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 107. Defendants failed to post require wage and hour posters and did not provide Plaintiffs with statutorily require wage and hour records or statements of their pay received, in 19 part so as to hide Defendants’ violations of the wage and hour laws, and to take advantage of Plaintiffs’ relative lack of sophistication in wage and hour laws. 108. Upon information and belief, these practices by Defendants were done willfully to disguise the actual number of hours Plaintiffs (and similarly situated individuals) worked, and to avoid paying Plaintiffs properly for (1) their full hours worked, (2) for overtime due, and (3) for spread of hours pay. 109. Defendants did not provide Plaintiffs, and similarly situated employees, with the wage statements and annual pay notices require by NYLL §§195(1) and 195(3). 110. Defendants did not provide Plaintiffs and similarly situated emploees with a paycheck every week. Rather, they paid him every two (2) weeks, in violation of violation of Labor Law § 191(1)(a) which requires weekly payment of manual workers. 111. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs and other employees with wage statements at the time of payment of wages, containing: the dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; deductions; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage; net wages; the regular hourly rate or rates of pay; the overtime rate or rates of pay; the number of regular hours worked, and the number of overtime hours worked, as require by NYLL §195(3). 112. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs and other employees, at the time of hiring and on or before February 1 of each subsequent year, a statement in English and the employees’ primary language, containing: the rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging allowances; the regular pay day designated by the employer; the name of the employer; any "doing business as" names used by the employer; the physical address of the employer's main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; and the telephone number of the employer, as require by New York Labor Law §195(1). Defendants Constitute Joint Employers

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1. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 13. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 15. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 16. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 17. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants’ written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e & 1692f. 2. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 20. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 21. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 22. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 24. The Sprint Nextel obligation arose out of a transaction in which involved the transaction of money, property, insurance or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 25. The alleged Sprint Nextel obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 26. Sprint Nextel is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 27. Defendant LVNV, a debt collector and subsequent owner of the Sprint Nextel debt, contracted with Defendant TrueAccord to collect the alleged debt. 28. Defendants collects and attempt to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation – February 10, 2021 Collection Letter 29. On or about February 17, 2021, Defendant TrueAccord sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed. A true and accurate copy of the Letter is attached as Exhibit A. 3. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 30. The letter states a balance of $770.75. 31. The letter states: “We are TrueAccord, a third party debt collection agency. We are working on behalf of LVNV Funding LLC (current creditor of your original Sprint Nextel Corporation account) to collect on your balance of $770.75. 33. Upon information and belief, the statute of limitations to file a lawsuit on this debt has long passed. 34. The letter fails to clearly and adequately inform the consumer as to the true legal status of the debt and potential ramifications of making a payment with a written acknowledgement of the debt and thereby restarting the statute of limitations. 35. Therefore, the letter puts the Plaintiff at material risk of making a partial payment and thereby unknowingly recommencing the lapsed statute of limitations. 36. Plaintiff sustained an informational injury in that he was deceptively misled about the true legal nature of the alleged debt and was not advised that making payment on the debt would restart the statute of limitations. 37. As a result of Defendants’ deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 38. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 39. Defendants debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 4. Defendant violated this section by omitting material information that gave Plaintiff a false understanding of the rights provided him under the FDCPA. 40. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.

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(Against All Defendants For Violations of Section 10(b) And Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder) (Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against The Individual Defendants) 21. Juniper designs, develops, and sells products and services that together provide its customers with a high-performance network infrastructure built on simplicity, security, openness, and scale. The Company serves the high-performance networking requirements of global service providers, enterprises, governments, and research and public sector organizations. The Company’s core competencies are in hardware systems, silicon design, network architecture. Materially False and Misleading Statements Issued During the Class Period 22. On April 24, 2012, the Company issued a press release announcing its financial results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2012. For the quarter, the Company reported net income of $16.3 million, or $0.03 diluted earnings per share (“EPS”) and total net revenues of $1 billion, compared to net income of $129.8 million or $0.24 diluted EPS and total net revenues of $1.1 billion for the same period a year ago. 23. On May 9, 2012, the Company filed a quarterly report for the period ended March 31, 2012 on a Form 10-Q with the SEC signed by Defendants Denholm and Zamiska, which reiterated the Company’s previously reported financial results and financial position. In addition, the Form 10-Q contained signed certifications pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) by Defendants Johnson and Denholm stating that the financial information contained in the Form 10-Q was accurate, and disclosed any material changes to the Company’s internal control over financial reporting. 24. On July 24, 2012, the Company issued a press release announcing its financial results for the second quarter ended June 30, 2012. For the quarter, the Company reported net income of $57.7 million, or $0.11 diluted EPS and total net revenues of $1.1 billion, compared to net income of $115.6 million or $0.21 diluted EPS and total net revenues of $1.1 billion for the same period a year ago. Case3:13-cv-03733-WHO Document1 Filed08/12/13 Page5 of 20 36. The statements referenced in ¶¶ 21 - 34 above were materially false and/or misleading because they misrepresented and failed to disclose the following adverse facts, which were known to defendants or recklessly disregarded by them, including that: (1) the Company was violation of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”); (2) the Company’s reported revenues were derived in part from violations of the FCPA; (3) the Company lacked effective internal controls over financial Case3:13-cv-03733-WHO Document1 Filed08/12/13 Page9 of 20 39. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a Class, consisting of all those who purchased or otherwise acquired Juniper securities during the Class Period (the “Class”); and were damaged thereby. Excluded from the Class are defendants herein, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which defendants have or had a controlling interest. 40. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, Juniper securities were actively traded on the NYSE. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are hundreds or thousands of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by Juniper or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. Case3:13-cv-03733-WHO Document1 Filed08/12/13 Page10 of 20 47. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 48. This Count is asserted against defendants and is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. 49. During the Class Period, defendants engaged in a plan, scheme, conspiracy and course of conduct, pursuant to which they knowingly or recklessly engaged in acts, transactions, practices and courses of business which operated as a fraud and deceit upon Plaintiff and the other members of the Class; made various untrue statements of material facts and omitted to state material facts necessary in Case3:13-cv-03733-WHO Document1 Filed08/12/13 Page12 of 20 57. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants participated in the operation and management of Juniper, and conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of Juniper’s business affairs. Because of their senior positions, they knew the adverse non-public information regarding Juniper’s FCPA violations. 59. As officers and/or directors of a publicly owned company, the Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to Juniper’s financial condition and results of operations, and to correct promptly any public statements issued by Juniper which had become materially false or misleading. 60. Because of their positions of control and authority as senior officers, the Individual Defendants were able to, and did, control the contents of the various reports, press releases and public filings which Juniper disseminated in the marketplace during the Class Period concerning Juniper’s results of operations. Throughout the Class Period, the Individual Defendants exercised their power and authority to cause Juniper to engage in the wrongful acts complained of herein. The Individual Defendants therefore, were “controlling persons” of Juniper within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Case3:13-cv-03733-WHO Document1 Filed08/12/13 Page15 of 20 AFFILIATES MUST SUBMITTED FOR PROPER APPROVAL. Background

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20. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the two proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). 21. The class concerning the ATDS claim for no prior express consent (hereafter “The ATDS Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 22. The class concerning the National Do-Not-Call violation (hereafter “The DNC Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States registered on the National Do-Not-Call Registry for at least 30 days, who had not granted Defendant prior express consent nor had a prior established business relationship, who received more than one call made by or on behalf of Defendant that promoted Defendant’s products or services, within any twelve-month period, within four years prior to the filing of the complaint. 8. Beginning in or around August 2017, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers, including but not limited to, ending in - 3803, -7210, -5903, -7511, -6147, -1636, and -1080 in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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10. Upon information and belief, was an Amazon.com-branded credit card account, and the alleged debt was incurred for personal, family or household purposes, including purchases of household goods on Amazon’s website. Exhibit A 11. is a form letter, generated by computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiff inserted by computer. Exhibit A 12. was the first letter EGS sent to Plaintiff regarding this alleged debt. Exhibit A 13. EGS’s letter as a whole is confusing and misleading to the unsophisticated consumer. includes the FDCPA debt validation notice. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 14. Exhibit A states: 15. Exhibit A also states: 17. The bottom of Exhibit A is a “payment coupon.” It states: 18. Exhibit A is confusing to the unsophisticated consumer. It is unclear whether EGS is collecting the entire $2,032.00 balance or just the $234.00 that was represented to be the “Amount Now Due.” 19. EGS compounds the confusion by stating that Synchrony “has placed the above account with our office for collection,” (emphasis added) and including both amounts on the payment coupon at the bottom of Exhibit A 20. It is not unusual for banks to hire a debt collector to collect only the “past due” amount, i.e. missed payments and fees, of a credit card balance rather than the whole balance. The Seventh Circuit held in Barnes v. Advanced Call Ctr. Techs., LLC, 493 F.3d 838, 840 (7th Cir. 2007), that “ . 21. The different amounts on only the past due amount, the amount owed [to the debt collector], can be the ‘amount of the debt’ under § 809(a)(1).” Whichever number EGS is truly collecting, it need only state that amount in the letter. Exhibit A render Exhibit A 22. The alleged debt or debts here is an unsecured credit card account. confusing to the unsophisticated consumer, who would not be able to determine, or would be confused as to, which amount EGS was actually attempting to collect. 24. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e generally prohibits “ 25. any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(a) specifically prohibits the “false representation of 26. the character, amount, or legal status” of an alleged debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) specifically prohibits the “ 27. use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f generally prohibits “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 28. Plaintiff was confused by Exhibit A 29. The unsophisticated consumer would be confused by . Exhibit A 30. Plaintiff had to spend time and money investigating . Exhibit A, and the consequences of any potential responses to Exhibit A 31. Plaintiff had to take time to obtain and meet with counsel, including traveling to counsel’s office by car and its related expenses, including but not limited to the cost of gasoline and mileage, to advise Plaintiff on the consequences of . Exhibit A 34. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 35. EGS represented the amount of the debt that EGS was attempting to collect in a confusing manner by stating multiple amounts that EGS was attempting to collect. Exhibit A. 36. The unsophisticated consumer would be confused as to whether EGS was attempting to collect only the “Amount Now Due” or the total balance. 37. EGS’s conduct violates 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(a), 1692e(10), 1692(f) and 1692g(a)(1). 38. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a Class consisting of (a) all natural persons in the State of Wisconsin, (b) who were sent an initial collection letter in the form represented by Exhibit A to the complaint in this action, (c) seeking to collect a debt, incurred for personal, family or household purposes (d) between July 31, 2016 and July 31, 2017, inclusive, (e) that was not returned by the postal service. 39. The Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are more than 50 members of the Class. 40. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class, which common questions predominate over any questions that affect only individual class members. The predominant common question is whether Exhibit A violates the FDCPA. 42. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in consumer credit and debt collection abuse cases. 43. A class action is superior to other alternative methods of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible. 44. Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury. 9. The alleged debt referenced in . Exhibit A Exhibit A

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10. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendant has been an enterprise within the meaning of Section 3(r) of the FLSA 29 U.S.C. § 203(r). 11. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendant has been an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Section 3(s)(1) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1), in that the enterprise has had employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person and in that the enterprise has had and has an annual gross volume of sales made or business done of not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level which are separately stated). 12. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Plaintiff has been an employee within the meaning of Section 3(e) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). 13. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Plaintiff was an individual employee who was engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as required by 29 U.S.C. § 207. 14. CHS is a company that provides and manages student housing at learning institutions throughout the United States. 4 15. Dearman’s primary job duty as an inspector was inspecting student housing to ensure compliance with CHS rules and regulations. 16. Dearman spent the majority of his working hours conducting inspections. 17. CHS paid Dearman on a salary basis until approximately November 2016. Thereafter, CHS paid Dearman on an hourly basis. 18. Dearman regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week during his tenure with CHS. 19. Prior to changing Dearman’s pay from salary to hourly, CHS did not pay Dearman an overtime premium for hours he worked in excess of forty (40) each workweek. 20. Prior to changing Dearman’s pay from salary to hourly, CHS did not record or track the hours worked by Dearman. 21. Subsequent to changing Dearman’s pay from salary to hourly, CHS implemented a “no overtime” rule for its inspectors. CHS did not, however, reduce or change the job duties and responsibilities for its inspectors. 22. At all relevant times, CHS had knowledge that Dearman regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek and in fact regularly required him to do so by scheduling him for a 40-plus hour workweek and requiring him to be on-call to answer telephone calls and respond to emergencies during evenings and 5 weekends and requiring him to attend open houses during non- scheduled work hours. 23. Dearman regularly performed compensable work for CHS during the evenings and weekends, without pay, both before and after CHS changed his pay from salary to hourly. 24. Dearman regularly worked through his scheduled meal periods or experienced significant interruptions to his meal periods because of the work expectations placed on him by CHS. CHS did not have a system in place whereby Dearman could notify CHS of missed meal periods and thereby receive compensation for missed or interrupted meal periods. 25. Prior to changing Dearman’s pay from salary to hourly, CHS misclassified Dearman as “exempt” from the overtime requirements of the FLSA. 26. This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), as to claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. 27. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Plaintiff brings his FLSA claim on behalf of himself and similarly situated employees who have worked as inspectors (and/or individuals in any other 6 similarly titled position) and who elect to opt-in to this action (“Opt-in Plaintiffs). 28. The FLSA § 216(b) collective action class is properly defined as: All current and former employees of CHS who were employed as inspectors (and/or individuals in any other similarly titled position), anytime during the three-year period preceding the filing of the Complaint in this action. 29. Consistent with Defendant’s policy and pattern or practice, Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs have not been paid overtime compensation for all hours worked beyond 40 per workweek. 30. All of the work that Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs have performed has been assigned by Defendant and Defendant has been aware of all of the work that Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs have performed. 31. As part of its regular business practice, Defendant has intentionally, willfully and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA with respect to Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs. This policy, pattern and practice includes, but is not limited to, willfully failing to pay Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs premium overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 7 32. Defendant is aware or should have been aware that federal law required it to pay Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs overtime premiums for all hour worked in excess of 40 per workweek. 33. Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs perform or performed the same basic job duties, were paid pursuant to the same compensation scheme, were subject to the same employment policies, practices and procedures, and have been subject to the same unlawful practices alleged herein. 34. Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs have each worked more than forty (40) hours in one or more workweeks within the applicable statutory period. 35. Defendant’s unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent. 36. There are other similarly situated current and former employees who have been denied overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it. This notice should be sent to the Opt-in Plaintiffs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 37. Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendant, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendant’s records. 8 38. The foregoing conduct, as alleged herein, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Defendant’s conduct was willful in that it knew that it’s payroll policies, practices and/or procedures were in violation of the FLSA or it showed reckless disregard to whether it’s payroll policies, practices and/or procedures were in violation of the FLSA. 39. Plaintiff Greg Dearman requests that he be permitted to serve as a representative of those who consent to participate in this action and that this action be granted collective action status pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). (Violation of FLSA – Overtime Collective Action) 40. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-39 of his Complaint. 41. Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs an overtime premium rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek. 42. Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to keep, make and preserve accurate records of all time worked by Plaintiff and Opt-in Plaintiffs. 43. Defendant’s violation of the FLSA was willful. 9 9. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendant has been an employer within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 3

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1.6050P-1(d)(3), forgiveness of Interest is not a reportable event and would not require a copy of 1099C to be filed with the IRS. The least sophisticated consumer test is an objective inquiry directed toward "ensuring that the FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd." Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318. The FDCPA does not place considerable – or dispositive – weight on the facts and circumstances surrounding a debtor's background. By its very nature, however, the least sophisticated consumer test pays no attention to the circumstances of the particular debtor in question. See Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318. 10. The Class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23 of the FRCP for maintaining a class action: • Upon information and belief, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable because there are hundreds and/or thousands of persons who have received debt collection letters and/or notices from Defendant that violate specific provisions of the FDCPA. Plaintiff is complaining of a standard form letter and/or notice that was sent to hundreds of persons (See Exhibit A, except that the undersigned attorney has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 partially redacted the financial account numbers in an effort to protect Plaintiff’s privacy); • There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: a. Whether Defendant violated various provisions of the FDCPA; b. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Defendant’s conduct; c. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are entitled to restitution as a result of Defendant’s wrongdoing and if so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutory formula to be applied in determining such damages and restitution; and d. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and/or 4 injunctive relief. • Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theories. • Plaintiff has no interest adverse or antagonistic to the interest of the other members of the Class. • Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the Class and has retained experienced and competent attorneys to represent the Class. • A Class Action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted. Plaintiff anticipates that no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action. • A Class Action will permit large numbers of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Absent a Class Action, class members will continue to suffer losses of statutory protected rights as well as monetary damages. If Defendant’s conduct is allowed proceed to without remedy they will continue to reap and retain the proceeds of their ill-gotten gains. • Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 5 11. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “10” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 12. Some time prior to January 2, 2015, an obligation was allegedly incurred by Plaintiff to Defendant. 13. The aforesaid obligation arose out of a transaction in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 14. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) of the FDCPA. 15. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. 16. CITIBANK, N.A., directly or through an intermediary, contracted Defendant to collect CITIBANK, N.A.’s debt. 17. Defendant is a "debt collector" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) of the FDCPA. 18. In its effort to collect on the CITIBANK, N.A. obligation, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by written correspondence on January 2, 2015. (“Exhibit A”). 19. Defendant’s written correspondence to Plaintiff is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 20. Said communication states as follows: “Whenever $600 or more is forgiven as a result of settling a debt for less than the balance owed, the creditor may be required to report the amount forgiven to the Internal Revenue Service on a 1099C form after which a copy 6 would be mailed to you by the creditor. If you are uncertain of the legal or tax consequences we encourage you to consult your legal or tax adviser.” 21. Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from making false, deceptive, and misleading statements in connection with the collection of a debt. 22. Section 1692e(10) of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using false representations or deceptive means to collect a debt alleged due. 23. Advising Plaintiff that Capital Management Services, L.P.'s client, CITIBANK, N.A., “may be required to report the amount forgiven to the Internal Revenue Service on a 1099C form after which a copy would be mailed to you” is deceptive and misleading in violation of the FDCPA. 24. Internal Revenue Code 26 U.S.C. § 6050P, as further defined and clarified by the Treasury Regulation 1.6050P-1 (a)(1), states “a discharge of indebtedness is deemed to have occurred…if and only if there has occurred an identifiable event described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.” Paragraph (b)(2)(F) of that section defines an “identifiable event” as “[a] discharge of indebtedness pursuant to an agreement between an applicable entity and a debtor to discharge indebtedness at less than full consideration.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.650P-1(b)(2)(F). 25. However, Treasury Regulation 1.6050P-1, outlines certain exceptions to the § 1.650P reporting requirements. 26 C.F.R. § 1.650P-1(d). The most pertinent of these eight exceptions to the present case are §§ 1.650P-1(d)(2) and (3), which read, respectively: (2) Interest. The discharge of an amount of indebtedness that is interest is not required to be reported under this section. (3) Non-principal amounts in lending transactions. In the case of a lending transaction, the discharge of an amount other than stated principal is not required to be reported under this section. For this purpose, a lending transaction is any 7 transaction in which a lender loans money to, or makes advances on behalf of, a borrower (including revolving credits and lines of credit). 26. It is therefore entirely possible to forgive $600 or more of the debt and yet not be required to even file a Form 1099C. 27. Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from making false, deceptive, and misleading statements in connection with the collection of a debt. Advising Plaintiff that the Internal Revenue Service requires that they be notified with information about amounts of $600 or more, the statement “Whenever $600 or more is forgiven as a result of settling a debt for less than the balance owed, the creditor may be required to report the amount forgiven to the Internal Revenue Service on a 1099C form after which a copy would be mailed to you” is deceptive and misleading in violation of the FDCPA. 28. Furthermore, a consumer who has had difficulty paying his debts is unlikely to have income as a result of the settlement of a debt, in that such a person is more likely to be insolvent (in the sense that his liabilities exceed his assets), and the discharge of indebtedness by someone who is insolvent is not income. 29. Defendant gives erroneous and/or incomplete tax advice to consumers. 30. The purpose and effect of the statement is to suggest to the unsophisticated consumer that failure to pay may get the consumer into trouble with the IRS. Good v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., No 14-4295, 2014 WL 5422103 (E.D.Pa., Oct. 27, 2014); Wagner v. Client Services, Inc., No. 08-5546, 2009 WL 839073, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26604 (E.D.Pa., March 26, 2009); Sledge v. Sands, 182 F.R.D. 255 (N.D.Ill. 1998); Kaff v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 13-cv-05413-SLT-WP. 31. The false statements mislead the consumer as to the impact of attempting to settle the matter for less than what Capital Management Services, L.P. claims is owed. 8 32. Section 6050P of the Internal Revenue Code requires that an "applicable entity" report any cancellation or discharge of indebtedness in excess of $600.00 if, and only if, there has occurred an identifiable event described in paragraph (b)(2) of that section. 33. Here, there is no basis to conclude that a triggering event has or will occur requiring Defendant or CITIBANK, N.A. to report such forgiveness on a 1099c. 34. The gratuitous reference in a collection letter that a collector's client will report forgiveness equal or greater than $600 on an IRS Form 1099C, is a collection ploy which suggests to the least sophisticated consumer that he or she could get in trouble with the IRS for refusal to pay the debt. 35. Said letter violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, and 1692e(10), by falsely representing that “Whenever $600 or more is forgiven as a result of settling a debt for less than the balance owed, the creditor may be required to report the amount forgiven to the Internal Revenue Service on a 1099C form after which a copy would be mailed to you.” Such a statement is objectively false. The law prohibits the Defendant from reporting information about the consumer on a 1099C form unless certain "identifiable events" occur, none of which are applicable to the Plaintiff herein. 36. Said letter is false and deceptive in that it does not explain that it is only under certain limited circumstances that a 1099C form may be reported to the IRS. 37. Said letter language is false and deceptive in that it does not explain that the Defendant's client is prohibited from reporting forgiveness on a 1099C form unless and until both Plaintiff and Defendant have reached an "agreement" on the amount of the debt and the amount that is being discharged. 9 38. Said letter is false and deceptive in that it falsely implies to the least sophisticated consumer that the consumer will have to pay taxes on the difference between what the Defendant claims is owed and what the consumer agrees to pay. 39. Said letter is false and deceptive in that it falsely implies to the least sophisticated consumer that the consumer will have to pay taxes on any forgiven amount of $600 or more without disclosing that 1099C forms are only issued for principal forgiveness not interest forgiveness. 40. Said letter does not indicate how much of the current debt is interest and how much of it is principal. 41. Said letter fails to disclose to consumers that there is a distinction between principal and interest. 42. The false statements mislead the consumer as to the impact of attempting to settle the matter for less than what the Defendant claims is owed. 43. Said letter violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(5) and 1692e(10) by threatening to engage in an act which is legally prohibited. Defendant's statement that its client “may be required to report the amount forgiven to the Internal Revenue Service on a 1099C form” as contained within the said letter, could be read by the least sophisticated consumer, as a threat to engage in an act legally prohibited. The language falsely indicates that unless the consumer paid the full amount that the Defendant alleges is owed, the Defendant is going to unilaterally engage in conduct that is prohibited by law. 44. Defendant's actions as described herein also violate § 1692e(8), in that the language contained within the said letter is a threat to report information that the Defendant knows, or should have known to be false. Defendant is not permitted to report any forgiveness on 10 a 1099C tax form relating to a consumer unless certain "identifiable events" occur. The threat to report any forgiveness on a 1099C tax form without regard for said "identifiable events" is a violation of § 1692e(8). 45. The least sophisticated consumer could read this letter to mean that the Defendant is going to report to the IRS that the entire difference between what the Defendant say is owed, and what the Plaintiff pays, is taxable. The Defendant's letter fails to disclose to consumers that there is a distinction between principal and interest. 46. Defendant's actions as described herein are also unfair and unconscionable in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f; as well as harassing and abusive in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. 47. Defendant's letter gives consumers objectively false and deceptive tax advice. 48. Defendant's letter could mislead the least sophisticated consumer that unless the consumer pays the entire amount that Defendant alleges is owed on the alleged debt, the consumer is going to be reported to the IRS. 49. Defendant's letter could mislead the least sophisticated consumer into believing that unless the consumer pays the entire amount Defendant alleges is owed for the debt, the consumer is going to have to pay taxes on the entire unpaid balance. 50. Defendant voluntarily chooses to give the tax advice found in Defendant's letter. 51. No tax law or regulation obligates Defendant to include the notice regarding tax form 1099C in their collection letters. 52. Defendant's letter fails to disclose to consumers that there is a distinction between principal and interest. 11 53. Misrepresentation of a debtor’s rights or liabilities under the Internal Revenue Code in connection with the collection of a debt is an FDCPA violation. 1 54. The letter violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, by falsely representing that “Whenever $600 or more is forgiven as a result of settling a debt for less than the balance owed, the creditor may be required to report the amount forgiven to the Internal Revenue Service on a 1099C for after which a copy would be mailed to you.” Such a statement is objectively false. If $600 or more is forgiven it may not be reported to the IRS. Said letter is false and deceptive in that it does not explain that it is only under certain limited circumstances that a 1099C Form may be reported to the IRS. 55. Just like the Second Circuit held in Easterling v. Collecto, Inc., The operative inquiry in this case is whether the hypothetical least sophisticated consumer could reasonably interpret Capital Management Services, L.P.'s letter's statement: “Whenever $600 or more is forgiven as a result of settling a debt for less than the balance owed, the creditor may be required to report the amount forgiven to the Internal Revenue Service on a 1099C for after which a copy would be mailed to you” as representing, incorrectly, that the debtor is completely foreclosed from obtaining a settlement that includes forgiveness of $600.00 or more without the IRS sending the debtor a 1099 (which would create a tax liability) for the debt in question. 1 Wagner v. Client Services, Inc., 08-5546, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26604 (E.D.Pa., March 26, 2009). (Court refused to dismiss claim that 1099C warning was literally false, where defendant failed to show that plaintiff was not within one of the exceptions to the reporting requirement.); Good v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., No. 14-4295, 2014 BL 302150 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2014) (finding that the statement "American Express is required to file a form 1099C with the Internal Revenue Service for any cancelled debt of $600 or more. Please consult your tax advisor concerning any tax questions" is not true and does not accurately reflect the relevant law the court also found that the statement's invocation of the IRS was deceptive and materially misleading in violation of the FDCPA.); Kaff v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 13-cv-05413-SLT-WP. (1099 language in violation because it failed to apprise debtors that exceptions could apply to the creditor's mandatory reporting requirement, such as the exceptions for interest and other non-principal debts.) Many classes have been certified. See Sledge v. Sands, 1998 WL 525433(class certified), Follansbee v. Discover Fin. Servs., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8724 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2000). (Granting final approval of the proposed class action settlement and application for attorney fees and incentive award for confusing debt collection letter about canceled debt tax liability.) 12 56. The wording used in this letter is false and misleading because according to 26 C.F.R. § 57. Moreover, not only is the Defendant's representation in this regard literally false, it is also fundamentally misleading in that it suggests that the debtor has no possible means of obtaining a settlement which includes a discharge of $600.00 or more without creating a tax liability. 58. This is because the least sophisticated consumer could be led to believe: That unless the consumer pays the entire amount that the letter alleges is owed on the debt, the consumer is likely to be reported to the IRS. That unless the consumer pays the entire amount the letter alleges is owed for the debt, the consumer is likely to have to pay taxes on the entire unpaid balance. 59. In addition, the 2nd Circuit has found that Collection notices are deceptive if they are open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. 2 2 Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1989). (Because the collection notice was reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading, it was deceptive within the meaning of the Act.); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314,1319 (2d Cir. 1993). (Collection notices are deceptive if they are open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate.); Russell v. Equifax A.R.S. 74 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1996) (A collection notice is deceptive when it can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate. The fact that the notice's terminology was vague or uncertain will not prevent it from being held deceptive under § 1692e(10) of the Act.) 13 60. Defendant's collection letter’s capacity to discourage debtors from accepting any 61. settlement that includes forgiveness of $600.00 or more - without the IRS sending the debtor a 1099C- renders its misrepresentation exactly the kind of "abusive debt collection practice" that the FDCPA was designed to target. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). 62. Therefore, the statement in the said January 2, 2015 communication concerning tax consequences is false and misleading, and omits to state material facts, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692(e)(2), and 1692(e)(10). 63. Plaintiff seeks to end these violations of the FDCPA. Plaintiff and putative class members are entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, including, declaratory relief, and damages. 64. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “63” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 65. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 66. While § 1692e specifically prohibits certain practices, the list is non-exhaustive, and does not preclude a claim of falsity or deception based on any non-enumerated practice. 67. Collection notices are deceptive if they can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate. 68. The question of whether a collection letter is deceptive is determined from the perspective of the “least sophisticated consumer.” 14 69. For purposes of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, the failure to clearly and accurately provide the consumer with complete and accurate information notifying them of their rights and obligations is unfair and deceptive to the least sophisticated consumer. 70. Because the collection letter in the instant case omits important information and may lead the consumer to act in a way contrary to his best interests, it is deceptive within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 71. The least sophisticated consumer would likely be deceived by Defendant's conduct. 72. The least sophisticated consumer would likely be deceived in a material way by Defendant's conduct. 73. Defendant has violated § 1692e by using a false, deceptive and misleading representation in its attempt to collect a debt. 74. Defendant could have taken the steps necessary to bring its actions within compliance with the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to ensure compliance with the law. 75. Defendant sent a written communication, in the form annexed hereto as Exhibit A to at least 50 natural persons in the State of New York within one year of the date of this Complaint. Plaintiff brings claims, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”) Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the following nationwide consumer class (the “Class”): • All New York consumers who were sent collection letters and/or notices from Defendant attempting to collect an obligation owed to or allegedly owed to CITIBANK, N.A., in which Defendant improperly attempted to collect same, in 3 violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq. • The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. False or Misleading Representations as to the Rights of the Consumer

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18. During their employment with Defendant, Named Plaintiffs and Defendant’s other mobile experts and store leads worked as hourly, non-exempt employees. 19. Defendant automatically deducted 0.5 hours from Named Plaintiffs’ and Defendant’s other mobile experts’ and store leads’ compensable hours on each shift for a meal break regardless of whether they actually took an uninterrupted 0.5-hour meal break. 20. Named Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ other mobile experts and store leads are regularly unable to take a meal break; however, Defendant still deducted 30 minutes from their daily pay. 22. Defendant knew or had reason to know it was not compensating Plaintiffs and Defendant’s other mobile experts and store leads for working during their meal breaks. 23. Plaintiffs and Defendant’s other mobile experts and store leads informed Defendant that they were unable to take meal breaks. 24. Despite Defendant having a meal deduction override, Defendant did not use the meal deduction override even after Plaintiffs and Defendant’s other mobile experts and store leads informed Defendant they were unable to take meal breaks. 25. Defendant either did not have a policy or practice in place to compensate employees for missed or interrupted meal breaks, or if Defendant did have a policy or practice in place, Defendant did not actually follow the policy and compensate employees for missed or interrupted meal breaks. b. Allegations regarding uncompensated travel time 27. For example, Plaintiff Settles spent approximately 45 minutes traveling from CM- Oxford to CM-Fairfield each day she worked at both locations; however, Plaintiff Settles was not paid for this time. c. Allegations regarding time punch edits 28. During Plaintiffs’ employment, Defendant’s managers routinely edited employees’ time punches to reduce the amount of overtime being paid to hourly, non-exempt employees despite the time punches reflecting the time the employees were working. 29. By modifying employees’ time punches, Plaintiffs and other mobile experts and store leads were not fully compensated for all of the work that they performed. 30. Named Plaintiffs and Defendant’s other mobile experts and store leads regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but they were not paid one and one-half times their regular rate for all of hours worked over 40 as a result of Defendant’s: (1) automatic meal deduction policy or practice regardless of whether they were able to take an uninterrupted 30-minute meal break; (2) its practice and policy of not compensating “part-time” employees for time spent working traveling from one of Defendant’s stores to another; and/or (3) practice of editing employees’ time punches to reduce compensable time worked 31. Defendant’s failure to compensate Plaintiffs and other mobile experts and store leads as set forth above resulted in unpaid overtime. 32. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiffs and Defendant’s other hourly non-exempt mobile experts and store leads were employees as defined in the FLSA, the Ohio Acts, and Ohio Constitution Art. 2 §34a. 34. During relevant times, Defendant maintained control, oversight, and direction over Named Plaintiffs and other similarly situated mobile experts and store leads, including the promulgation and enforcement of policies affecting the payment of wages, including overtime compensation. 35. During relevant times, Defendant suffered or permitted the Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated to work more than forty (40) hours per workweek, while not compensating them for all such hours worked over forty (40) at a rate of at least one and one-half times their regular rate as a result of Defendant’s company-wide policies or practices described above that affect Named Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated employees. 36. Upon information and belief, Defendant, at all times relevant hereto, was fully aware of the fact that it was legally required to comply with the wage and overtime payment laws of the United States and of the State of Ohio as well as recordkeeping laws of the State of Ohio. 37. During relevant times, Defendant had knowledge of and acted willfully in regards to its conduct described herein. 38. Defendant is in possession and control of necessary documents and information from which Plaintiffs would be able to precisely calculate damages. IV. 40. Named Plaintiffs and putative FLSA Collective Members were all subject to the same policies or practices described above which resulted in unpaid overtime. 41. During some or all of the last three years, Defendant did not compensate Named Plaintiffs and the putative collective members for any time spent performing substantial duties for Defendant’s benefit because employees: (i) were unable to take uninterrupted meal breaks; (ii) were not compensated for travel time between stores; and/or (iii) had their time punches improperly modified to reduce compensable time worked. V. 42. The Named Plaintiff brings her Ohio Wage Act claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 as a class action on behalf of herself and all other members of the following class: All Ohio current and former hourly, non-exempt employees of Defendant who worked over 40 hours in any workweek but were not properly compensated for all of their overtime hours worked under the FLSA because of: (1) Defendant’s meal deduction; (2) Defendant’s failure to pay for travel time; and/or (3) Defendant’s improper time edits, during the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint and continuing through the final disposition of this case (“Ohio Rule 23 Class” or “Ohio Rule 23 Class Members”). 43. The Ohio Rule 23 Class includes all current or former hourly, non-exempt employees employed by Defendant throughout the State of Ohio as defined above. 44. The Ohio Rule 23 Class, as defined above, is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 46. The Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the Rule 23 Class and the interests of all members of the Rule 23 Class. 47. The Named Plaintiffs have no interests that are antagonistic to or in conflict with those interests of the Rule 23 Class that they have undertaken to represent. 48. The Named Plaintiffs have retained competent and experienced class action counsel who can ably represent the interests of the entire Ohio Rule 23 Class. 49. Questions of law and fact are common to the Ohio Rule 23 Class. 50. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because individual actions would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant with respect to their non-exempt employees. 51. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) as Defendant acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Ohio Rule 23 Class, making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Rule 23 Class as a whole. 52. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) as the questions of law and facts common to the Ohio Rule 23 Class predominate over questions affecting individual members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 54. A class action is superior to individual actions for the fair and efficient adjudication of Named Plaintiffs’ claims and will prevent undue financial, administrative and procedural burdens on the parties and the Court. The Named Plaintiffs and counsel are not aware of any pending Ohio litigation on behalf of the Ohio Rule 23 Class, as defined herein, or on behalf of any individual alleging a similar claim. Because the damages sustained by individual members are modest compared to the costs of individual litigation, it would be impractical for class members to pursue individual litigation against the Defendant to vindicate its rights. Certification of this case as a class action will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. VI. 55. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 56. This claim is brought as part of a collective action by the Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the FLSA Collective. 58. During the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendant employed the Named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Members. 59. The Named Plaintiffs and the 216(b) Class Members were paid on an hourly basis and worked in non-exempt positions. 60. The Named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Members regularly worked in excess of 40 hours in workweeks. 61. Defendant violated the FLSA with respect to Named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective by, inter alia, failing to compensate them at time-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek because of Defendant’s meal deduction, failure to pay for travel time, and/or improper time punch edits. 62. The Named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Members were not exempt from receiving FLSA overtime benefits. 63. Defendant knew or should have known of the overtime payment requirements of the FLSA. Despite such knowledge, Defendant willfully withheld and failed to pay the overtime compensation to which Named Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members are entitled. 64. The exact total amount of compensation, including overtime compensation, that Defendant has failed to pay the Named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Members is unknown at this time, as many of the records necessary to make such precise calculations are in the possession of Defendant or were not kept by Defendant. 66. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 67. This claim is brought under Ohio Law. 68. The Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have been employed by Defendant, and Defendant is an employer covered by the overtime requirements under Ohio Law. 69. Ohio Law requires that employees receive overtime compensation “not less than one and one-half times” (1.5) the employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) in one workweek, “in the manner and methods provided in and subject to the exemptions of section 7 and section 13 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937.” See O.R.C. § 4111.03(A); see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 70. The Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members worked in excess of the maximum weekly hours permitted under O.R.C. § 4111.03, but were not paid overtime wages for all of such time spent working. 71. Defendant’s company-wide policies or practices, including their meal deduction, failure to pay travel time, and improper time punch edits, reduced the Named Plaintiffs’ and Rule 23 Class Members' compensable hours worked, resulting in unpaid overtime. 72. The Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members were not exempt from the wage protections of Ohio Law. 74. For Defendant’s violations of R.C. §4111.03, by which the Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have suffered and continue to suffer damages. The Named Plaintiffs seek unpaid overtime and other compensation, liquidated damages, interest and attorneys’ fees, and all other remedies available, on behalf of themselves and the Rule 23 Class Members. 75. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 76. The Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members were employed by Defendant. 77. During all relevant times, Defendant was an entity covered by the OPPA and the Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have been employed by Defendant within the meaning of the OPPA. 78. The OPPA requires Defendant to pay Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members all wages, including unpaid overtime, on or before the first day of each month, for wages earned by them during the first half of the preceding month ending with the fifteenth day thereof, and on or before the fifteenth day of each month, for wages earned by them during the last half of the preceding calendar month. See O.R.C. § 4113.15(A). 80. The Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members unpaid wages remain unpaid for more than thirty (30) days beyond their regularly scheduled payday. 81. In violating the OPPA, Defendant acted willfully, without a good faith basis, and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable Ohio law. 82. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 83. The Ohio Wage Act requires employers to maintain and preserve payroll or other records containing, among other things, the hours worked each workday and the total hours worked each workweek. See O.R.C. § 4111.08. See also, 29 C.F.R. §§ 516.2 et seq. 84. During times material to this complaint, Defendant was a covered employer, and required to comply with the Ohio Wage Act’s mandates. 85. Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members were covered employees entitled to the protection of the Ohio Wage Act. 86. During times material to this complaint, Defendant violated the Ohio Wage Act with respect to Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members by failing to properly maintain accurate records of all hours Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members worked each workday and within each workweek. 87. In violating the Ohio Wage Act, Defendant acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable Ohio Wage Act provisions. 89. The FLSA prohibits, among other things, any person from discharging or in any other manner discriminating against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to the FLSA, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). 90. Complaints may be verbal complaints about hours worked or wages paid. 91. Defendant is an employer covered by anti-retaliation provisions set forth in the FLSA, which aim to prevent employers from punishing individuals engaging in protected activity. 92. Plaintiff Settles was subject to the protection of the anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA and was not exempt from those protections. 93. On or about December 6, 2019, Plaintiff Settles engaged in a protected activity when she contacted Defendant’s Director of Sales, Kristy, to report Defendant’s unlawful policies and procedures set forth above that resulted in unpaid overtime. 94. Specifically, Plaintiff Settles informed Kristy that her hours were being altered by her Store Manager, Josh, in the system to reduce the number of overtime hours she was working, including during lunches, resulting in unpaid overtime. 95. Kristy informed Plaintiff Settles that she would speak with Josh on December 9, 2019. 96. Plaintiff Settles replied to Kristy that she was concerned about Josh’s and Assistant Store Manager’s reaction to her complaint when they found out. 97. Kristy told Plaintiff Settles that there will be no retaliation. 99. Although Defendant maintained a progressive discipline policy, Defendant never disciplined Plaintiff Settles prior to her termination. 100. Defendant’s reason for terminating Plaintiff Settles was merely pretext. 101. Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff Settles because she complained about Defendant’s wage, overtime, and recordkeeping violations. 102. By the conduct described above, Defendant has violated and are in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). 103. In violating the FLSA, Defendant acted willfully, without a good faith basis and in reckless disregard of clearly applicable FLSA provisions. 104. Plaintiff Settles has been harmed by Defendant’s acts or omissions described herein. 105. Plaintiff Settles has been damaged by Defendant’s willful violation of the FLSA such that she is entitled to compensation therefore, including liquidated damages and attorney’s fees. A. Allegations regarding Defendant’s meal deduction FLSA – COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME R.C. 4113.15 — RULE 23 CLASS ACTION FOR OPPA VIOLATION R.C. 4111.03 — RULE 23 CLASS ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME RECORDKEEPING VIOLATIONS OF THE OHIO WAGE ACT RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF FLSA – PLAINTIFF SETTLES

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13. Defendants sent advertisements by facsimile to Plaintiff and a class of similarly-situated persons. Whether Defendants did so directly or with the assistance of a third party (yet unknown to Plaintiff), Defendants are directly liable for violating the TCPA. 14. Plaintiff has received at least one of Defendants’ advertisements by facsimile. A true and correct copy of the fax received in or around June 2016 is attached as Exhibit A. Plaintiff intends to discover the number of other Defendants’ advertisements sent to Plaintiff by fax. 4 15. Exhibit A is a one-page document Defendants sent by facsimile, advertising a DexCom Continuous Glucose Monitoring system. 16. The fax advertises the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services. The fax provides information about the availability and features of the Continuous Glucose Monitoring system offered for sale by DexCom, and website for contacting DexCom to purchase the glycemic management system. 17. Exhibit A includes DexCom’s name and website address. 18. LDM Group sends faxes to pharmacies nationwide under PharmacistCARE. LDM promotes PharmacistCARE as a way to drive revenue for healthcare marketing. 19. Exhibit A does not include a compliant mandatory opt-out notice required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 20. Plaintiff did not expressly invite or give permission to anyone to send Exhibit A or any other advertisement from DexCom to Plaintiff’s fax machine. 21. On information and belief, Defendants sent advertisements by facsimile to Plaintiff and more than 39 other persons in violation of the TCPA. 22. Plaintiff and the other class members owe no obligation to protect their fax machines from Defendants. Their fax machines are ready to send and receive their urgent communications, or private communications about patients’ medical needs, not to receive Defendants’ unlawful advertisements. 23. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action on behalf of itself and all 5 others similarly situated as members of a class, initially defined as follows: Each person that was sent one or more telephone facsimile messages labeled PharmacistCARE promoting the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services offered by “DexCom,” but not stating that the fax recipient may make a request to the sender not to send any future ads and that failure to comply, within 30 days, with such a request is unlawful, or a cost-free fax number, or other cost-free mechanism to contact “DexCom.” Plaintiff expressly reserves the right to modify the proposed class definition or propose subclasses. 24. Excluded from the class are Defendants, any entity in which Defendants have a controlling interest, each of Defendants’ officers, directors, legal representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns, and any Judge assigned to this action, including his or her immediate family. 25. On information and belief, Defendants’ fax advertising campaigns involved other, substantially-similar advertisements also sent without a compliant opt-out notice required by the TCPA. Plaintiff intends to locate those advertisements in discovery. 26. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. This action satisfies Rule 23 (a)’s numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements. Additionally, prosecution of Plaintiff’s claims separately from the putative class’s claims would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications under Rule 23 (b) (1) (A). Furthermore, the questions of law or fact that are common in this action predominate over any individual questions of law or fact making class representation the superior method to adjudicate this controversy under Rule 23 (b) (3). 6 27. Numerosity/impracticality of joinder. On information and belief, the class consists of more than 39 persons and, thus, is so numerous that individual joinder of each member is impracticable. The precise number of class members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff, but will be obtained from Defendants’ records or the records of third parties. 28. Commonality and predominance. There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of law and fact that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the class. These common legal and factual questions, which do not vary from one class member to another, and which may be determined without reference to the individual circumstances of any class member, include, but are not limited to the following: a. Whether Defendants sent advertisements by facsimile promoting the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services; b. Whether Exhibit A and other yet-to-be-discovered facsimiles sent by or on behalf of Defendants advertised the commercial availability or quality of property, goods or services; c. The manner and method Defendants used to compile or obtain the list(s) of fax numbers to which they sent the faxes contained in Exhibit A and other fax advertisements; d. Whether Defendants’ fax advertisements contained opt-out notices compliant with the TCPA; 7 e. Whether Plaintiff and the other class members should be awarded statutory damages; f. If the Court finds that Defendant(s) willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA, whether the Court should exercise its discretion to increase the amount of the statutory damages award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount; g. Whether the Court should enjoin Defendants from faxing advertisements in the future; and h. Whether Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein constituted conversion. 29. Typicality of claims. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other class members, because Plaintiff and all class members were injured by the same wrongful practices. Plaintiff and the members of the class received Defendants’ advertisements by facsimile and those advertisements did not contain the opt-out notice required by the TCPA. Under the facts of this case, because the focus is upon Defendants’ conduct, if Plaintiff prevails on its claims, then the other putative class members will prevail as well. 3. Private right of action. A person may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a state, bring in an appropriate court of that state: (A) An action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) An action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) Both such actions. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 30. Adequacy of representation. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because its interests do not conflict with the interests of the class it seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and TCPA litigation in particular, and Plaintiff intends to vigorously prosecute this action. Plaintiff and its counsel will fairly and adequately 8 protect the interest of members of the class. 31. Prosecution of separate claims would yield inconsistent results. Even though the questions of fact and law in this action are predominantly common to Plaintiff and the putative class members, separate adjudication of each class member’s claims would yield inconsistent and varying adjudications. Such inconsistent rulings would create incompatible standards for Defendants to operate under if/when class members bring additional lawsuits concerning the same unsolicited fax advertisements of if Defendants choose to advertise by fax again in the future. 32. A class action is the superior method of adjudicating the common questions of law or fact that predominate over individual questions. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the claims of all class members is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. The likelihood of individual class members prosecuting separate claims is remote, and even if every class member could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. Relief concerning Plaintiff’s rights under the laws herein alleged and with respect to the class would be proper. Plaintiff envisions no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 33. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 34. Plaintiff brings Count I on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated persons against Defendants. 35. The TCPA prohibits the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine….” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1). 36. The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s express invitation or permission.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (4). 37. The TCPA provides a private right of action as follows: 38. The Court, in its discretion, may treble the statutory damages if it 10 determines that a violation was knowing or willful. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 39. Here, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1) (C) by sending an advertisement by facsimile (Exhibit A) to Plaintiff and the other class members without their prior express invitation or permission. 40. The TCPA requires that every advertisement sent by facsimile must include an opt-out notice clearly and conspicuously displayed on the bottom of its first page. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 41. Defendants failed to include a clear and conspicuous opt-out notice on Exhibit A. 42. Defendants’ purported opt-out notice is in a very small font and buried below Defendants’ other voluminous disclosures. 43. Exhibit A does not provide all of the information the TCPA requires for a compliant opt-out notice. 44. Defendants violated the TCPA by failing to state on the first page of each fax advertisement that their failure to comply with an opt-out request within 30 days would be unlawful. Exhibit A. 45. Defendants failed to provide a domestic telephone number and a fax number as required by 47 U.S.C. § (b) (2) (D) (iv) and it is not clear from the purported opt-out notice that the mechanism provided is available 24/7 as required by 47 U.S.C § 227 (b) (2) (D) (v). 46. On information and belief, the opt-out phone number belongs to or is regularly used by LDM. 11 47. Facsimile advertising imposes burdens on recipients that are distinct from the burdens imposed by other types of advertising. The required opt-out notice provides recipients the necessary information to opt-out of future fax transmissions, including a notice that the sender’s failure to comply with the opt-out request will be unlawful. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 48. Defendants’ failure to include a compliant opt-out notice on their fax advertisements makes irrelevant any express consent or established business relationship (“EBR”) that otherwise might have justified Defendants’ fax advertising campaigns. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 49. The TCPA is a strict liability statute and Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were negligent. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 50. Even if Defendants did not intend to injure Plaintiff and the other class members, did not intend to violate their privacy, and did not intend to waste their valuable time with Defendants’ advertisements, those facts are irrelevant because the TCPA is a strict liability statute. 51. If Defendants’ actions were knowing or purposeful, then the Court has the discretion to increase the statutory damages up to three times the amount. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 52. DexCom is liable for the fax advertisements at issue because it sent the faxes; caused the faxes to be sent; participated in the activity giving rise to or constituting the violation; or the faxes were sent on its behalf or under general 12 principles of vicarious liability, including actual authority, apparent authority and ratification. DexCom is liable because the fax advertisement promotes DexCom’s goods or services. 53. LDM is liable for the fax advertisements at issue because it sent the faxes; caused the faxes to be sent; participated in the activity giving rise to or constituting the violation and the faxes were sent on its behalf or under general principles of vicarious liability, including actual authority, apparent authority and ratification. LDM is liable because the faxes were sent as part of LDM’s PharmacistCARE fax scheme. 54. On information and belief, both DexCom and LDM benefit financially from the sending of Defendants’ fax advertisements as DexCom’s goods, products, or services are advertised with the intent to drive revenue and LDM either shares in that revenue or is paid for its advertising or promotion services. 55. Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for Defendants or anybody else to fax advertisements about Defendants’ goods, products, or services, that Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship with Defendants, that Exhibit A is an advertisement, and that Exhibit A did not display a compliant opt-out notices as required by the TCPA. 56. Defendants’ actions damaged Plaintiff and the other class members. Receiving Defendants’ junk faxes caused the recipients to lose paper and toner consumed in the printing of Defendants’ faxes. Moreover, the subject faxes used the 13 fax machines of Plaintiff and the other class members. The subject faxes cost Plaintiff time, as Plaintiff and its employees wasted their time receiving, reviewing and routing Defendants’ illegal faxes. That time otherwise would have been spent on Plaintiff’s business activities. Defendants’ faxes unlawfully interrupted Plaintiff and the other class members’ privacy interests in being left alone. Finally, the injury and property damage sustained by Plaintiff and the other class members from the sending of unlawful fax advertisements occurred outside Defendants’ premises. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, demands judgment in its favor and against Defendants, jointly and severally as follows: A. That the Court adjudge and decree that the present case may be properly maintained as a class action, appoint Plaintiff as the representative of the class, and appoint Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the class; B. That the Court award $500.00 in statutory damages for each violation of the TCPA; C. That, if it finds Defendant(s) willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA’s faxing prohibitions, the Court exercise its discretion to increase the amount of the statutory damages award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount (Plaintiff requests trebling); D. That the Court enter an injunction prohibiting Defendants from violating the TCPA; and 14 E. That the Court award costs and such further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 57. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 58. Plaintiff brings Count II on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated persons and against Defendants. 59. By sending advertisements to their fax machines, Defendants improperly and unlawfully converted the class’s fax machines to Defendants’ own use. Where printed (as in Plaintiff’s case), Defendants also improperly and unlawfully converted the class members’ paper and toner to Defendants’ own use. Defendants also converted Plaintiff’s time to Defendants’ own use, as they did with the valuable time of the other class members. 60. Immediately prior to the sending of the unsolicited faxes, Plaintiff and the other class members each owned an unqualified and immediate right to possession of their fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time. 61. By sending them unsolicited faxes, Defendants permanently misappropriated the class members’ fax machines, toner, paper, and employee time to their own use. Such misappropriation was wrongful and without authorization. 62. Defendants knew or should have known that their misappropriation of paper, toner, and employee time was wrongful and without authorization. 63. Plaintiff and the other class members were deprived of the use of the 15 fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time, which could no longer be used for any other purpose. Plaintiff and each class member thereby suffered damages as a result of their receipt of unsolicited fax advertisements from Defendants. 64. Defendants’ unsolicited faxes effectively stole Plaintiff’s employees’ time because persons employed by Plaintiff were involved in receiving, routing, and reviewing Defendants’ illegal faxes. Defendants knew or should have known employees’ time is valuable to Plaintiff. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, demands judgment in its favor and against Defendants, jointly and severally as follows: A. That the Court adjudge and decree that the present case may be properly maintained as a class action, appoint Plaintiff as the representative of the class, and appoint Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the class; B. That the Court award appropriate damages; C. That the Court award punitive damages; D. That the Court award attorney’s fees; E. That the Court award costs of suit; and F. That the Court award such further relief as it may deem just and proper under the circumstances. 16 Respectfully submitted, CONVERSION TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 9

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20. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action on behalf of himself and the other public stockholders of Keryx (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any defendant. 21. This action is properly maintainable as a class action. 22. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of June 22, 2018, there were approximately 120,378,658 shares of Keryx common stock outstanding, held by hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals and entities scattered throughout the country. 24. Plaintiff is committed to prosecuting this action and has retained competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class and plaintiff has the same interests as the other members of the Class. Accordingly, plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 25. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for defendants, or adjudications that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of individual members of the Class who are not parties to the adjudications or would substantially impair or impede those non-party Class members’ ability to protect their interests. 26. Defendants have acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, and are causing injury to the entire Class. Therefore, final injunctive relief on behalf of the Class is appropriate. 27. Keryx is focused on the development and commercialization of innovative medicines that provide unique and meaningful advantages to people with kidney disease. 28. There are two U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)-approved indications for Keryx’s first medicine, Auryxia (ferric citrate) tablets. 30. On June 28, 2018, Keryx’s Board caused the Company to enter into the Merger Agreement. 31. Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Keryx’s stockholders will receive 0.37433 shares of Parent common stock for each share of Keryx they own. 52. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein. 53. The Individual Defendants disseminated the false and misleading Registration Statement, which contained statements that, in violation of Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-9, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements therein not materially false or misleading. Keryx is liable as the issuer of these statements. 54. The Registration Statement was prepared, reviewed, and/or disseminated by the Individual Defendants. By virtue of their positions within the Company, the Individual Defendants were aware of this information and their duty to disclose this information in the Registration Statement. 55. The Individual Defendants were at least negligent in filing the Registration Statement with these materially false and misleading statements. 57. The Registration Statement is an essential link in causing plaintiff and the Company’s stockholders to approve the Proposed Transaction. 58. By reason of the foregoing, defendants violated Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder. 59. Because of the false and misleading statements in the Registration Statement, plaintiff and the Class are threatened with irreparable harm. 60. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein. 61. The Individual Defendants and Akebia acted as controlling persons of Keryx within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as officers and/or directors of Keryx and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the false statements contained in the Registration Statement, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that plaintiff contends are false and misleading. 62. Each of the Individual Defendants and Akebia was provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Registration Statement alleged by plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause them to be corrected. 64. Akebia also had direct supervisory control over the composition of the Registration Statement and the information disclosed therein, as well as the information that was omitted and/or misrepresented in the Registration Statement. 65. By virtue of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants and Akebia violated Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act. 66. As set forth above, the Individual Defendants and Akebia had the ability to exercise control over and did control a person or persons who have each violated Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-9, by their acts and omissions as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as controlling persons, these defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ conduct, plaintiff and the Class are threatened with irreparable harm. Background of the Company and the Proposed Transaction Claim for Violation of Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-9 Promulgated Thereunder Against the Individual Defendants and Keryx Claim for Violation of Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act Against the Individual Defendants and Akebia

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(Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) 25. Defendant, R & E, Inc., controls and operates Mygrandma.com. in New York State and throughout the United States and the world. 26. Mygrandma.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale. The online store allows the user to view cake and coffee products, customize to their own preference, make purchases, and perform a variety of other functions. 27. Among the features offered by Mygrandma.com are the following: (a) Consumers may use the website to connect with R&E on social media, using such sites as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest; (b) an online store, allowing customers to view cakes, customize them, and make purchases; and (c) learning about answers to frequently asked questions, learning where to find the products, learning about shipping information, and about the company. 28. This case arises out of R&E’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to the goods and services offered by Mygrandma.com. Due to R&E’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Mygrandma.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to R&E, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Mygrandma.com. 29. R&E denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Mygrandma.com by preventing them from freely navigating Mygrandma.com. 31. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Mygrandma.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Mygrandma.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate and/or make purchases. 32. Mygrandma.com also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to allow blind shoppers who use screen-readers to locate and accurately fill-out online forms. On a shopping site such as Mygrandma.com, these forms include search fields to enter personal preferences about the cakes and fields used to fill-out personal information, including address and credit card information. Due to lack of adequate labeling, Plaintiff and blind customers cannot make a selection or inquiries as to Defendant’s products, nor can they enter their personal identification and financial information with confidence and security. 35. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Defendant’s website makes attempting to navigate through Mygrandma.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 36. Mygrandma.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Mygrandma.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Mygrandma.com. 38. Mygrandma.com thus contains access barriers which deny the full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Mygrandma.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Mygrandma.com in New York State and throughout the United States. 39. Plaintiff, Linda Slade, has made numerous attempts to complete a purchase on Mygrandma.com, most recently on February 22, 2020, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Mygrandma.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually- impaired persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to purchase the New England Blueberry Coffee Cake. 40. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Mygrandma.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 41. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Mygrandma.com. 43. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 44. Because of Defendant’s denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Mygrandma.com, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an injury-in-fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of defendant’s conduct. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Mygrandma.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Mygrandma.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 46. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Mygrandma.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Mygrandma.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 48. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of Mygrandma.com. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on Mygrandma.com. 49. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Mygrandma.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; (b) Whether Mygrandma.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Mygrandma.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Mygrandma.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 50. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims R&E has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Mygrandma.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 52. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 53. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 54. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 55. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 54 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 57. Mygrandma.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7). 58. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates Mygrandma.com. 59. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 60. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 61. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 63. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 64. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of R&E who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Mygrandma.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes her statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 70 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 72. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 73. Mygrandma.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 74. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates Mygrandma.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 76. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 77. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 78. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all R&Es can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Mygrandma.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 82. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 84. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 85. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 86. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 85 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 87. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 88. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 90. Mygrandma.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 92. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Mygrandma.com, causing Mygrandma.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 93. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all R&Es can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 94. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 95. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 97. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 98. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense.

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18. On February 27, 2015, LendingClub filed its annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2014 (“2014 10-K”) with the SEC which provided the Company’s annual financial results and position. The 2014 10-K was signed by Defendants Laplanche and Dolan. The 2014 10-K contained signed certifications pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) by Defendants Laplanche and Dolan attesting to the accuracy of financial reporting, the disclosure of any material changes to the Company’s internal control over financial reporting and the disclosure of all fraud. 20. The 2014 10-K stated that the Company had a detailed privacy policy which complied with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, stating in relevant part: Privacy and Data Security Laws. The federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) includes limitations on financial institutions’ disclosure of nonpublic personal information about a consumer to nonaffiliated third parties, in certain circumstances requires financial institutions to limit the use and further disclosure of nonpublic personal information by nonaffiliated third parties to whom they disclose such information and requires financial institutions to disclose certain privacy policies and practices with respect to information sharing with affiliated and nonaffiliated entities as well as to safeguard personal customer information. We have a detailed privacy policy, which complies with GLBA and is accessible from every page of our website. We maintain consumers’ personal information securely, and we do not sell, rent or share such information with third parties for marketing purposes unless previously agreed to by the consumer. In addition, we take measures to safeguard the personal information of our borrowers and investors and protect against unauthorized access to this information. (Emphasis added.) 22. The 2015 10-K stated the Company believed that all installment loans offered through its marketplace featured a fixed rate that was “clearly” disclosed to the borrower and which contained “no hidden fees,” stating in relevant part: We believe that our marketplace provides the following benefits to borrowers: • Access to Affordable Credit. Our innovative marketplace model, online delivery and process automation enable us to offer borrowers interest rates that are generally lower on average than the rates charged by traditional banks, credit cards or installment loans. • Superior Borrower Experience. We offer a fast and easy-to-use online application process and provide borrowers with access to live support and online tools throughout the process and over the life of the loan. • Transparency and Fairness. The installment loans offered through our marketplace feature a fixed rate that is clearly disclosed to the borrower during the application process, with fixed monthly payments, no hidden fees and the ability to prepay the balance at any time without penalty. Small business lines of credit have rates based upon the prime rate and allow borrowers to draw in increments, reducing their interest cost. Our platform utilizes an automated, rules-based engine for credit decisioning, which removes the human bias associated with reviewing applications. (Emphasis added.) 24. On February 28, 2017, LendingClub filed its annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2016 (“2016 10-K”) with the SEC which provided the Company’s annual financial results and position. The 2016 10-K was signed by Defendants Sanborn and Casey. The 2016 10-K contained signed SOX certifications by Defendants Sanborn and Casey attesting to the accuracy of financial reporting, the disclosure of any material changes to the Company’s internal control over financial reporting and the disclosure of all fraud. 26. The 2016 10-K stated that the Company had a detailed privacy policy which complied with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, stating in relevant part: Privacy and Data Security Laws. The federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) includes limitations on financial institutions’ disclosure of nonpublic personal information about a consumer to nonaffiliated third parties, in certain circumstances requires financial institutions to limit the use and further disclosure of nonpublic personal information by nonaffiliated third parties to whom they disclose such information, and requires financial institutions to disclose certain privacy policies and practices with respect to information sharing with affiliated and nonaffiliated entities as well as to safeguard personal customer information. We have a detailed privacy policy, which complies with GLBA and is accessible from every page of our website. We maintain consumers’ personal information securely, and only share such information with third parties for marketing purposes in accordance with our privacy policy and with the consent of the consumer. In addition, we take measures to safeguard the personal information of our borrowers and investors and protect against unauthorized access to this information. (Emphasis added.) 27. On February 22, 2018, LendingClub filed its annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2017 (“2017 10-K”) with the SEC which provided the Company’s annual financial results and position. The 2017 10-K was signed by Defendants Sanborn and Casey. The 2017 10-K contained signed SOX certifications by Defendants Sanborn and Casey attesting to the accuracy of financial reporting, the disclosure of any material changes to the Company’s internal control over financial reporting and the disclosure of all fraud. 29. The statements referenced in ¶¶18-28 above were materially false and/or misleading because they misrepresented and failed to disclose the following adverse facts pertaining to the Company’s business, operational and financial results, which were known to Defendants or recklessly disregarded by them. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) LendingClub falsely promised consumers they would receive a loan with “no hidden fees”; (2) LendingClub’s privacy policy did not comply with the Gramm- Leach-Bliley Act; (3) consequently, the foregoing conduct would subject LendingClub’s business practices to heightened regulatory scrutiny by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”); and (4) as a result, Defendants’ public statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times. The Truth Emerges 35. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, LendingClub securities were actively traded on the NYSE. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are hundreds or thousands of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by the Company or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. 36. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by Defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. 37. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class. 39. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 40. Plaintiff will rely, in part, upon the presumption of reliance established by the fraud- on-the-market doctrine in that: • Defendants made public misrepresentations or failed to disclose material facts during the Class Period; • the omissions and misrepresentations were material; • LendingClub securities are traded in efficient markets; • the Company’s securities were liquid and traded with moderate to heavy volume during the Class Period; • the Company traded on the NYSE, and was covered by multiple analysts; • the misrepresentations and omissions alleged would tend to induce a reasonable investor to misjudge the value of the Company’s securities; and • Plaintiff and members of the Class purchased and/or sold LendingClub securities between the time the Defendants failed to disclose or misrepresented material facts and the time the true facts were disclosed, without knowledge of the omitted or misrepresented facts. 42. Alternatively, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to the presumption of reliance established by the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 92 S. Ct. 2430 (1972), as Defendants omitted material information in their Class Period statements in violation of a duty to disclose such information, as detailed above. 43. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 44. This Count is asserted against the Company and the Individual Defendants and is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. 45. During the Class Period, the Company and the Individual Defendants, individually and in concert, directly or indirectly, disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or deliberately disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 46. The Company and the Individual Defendants violated §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 in that they:  employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud;  made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or  engaged in acts, practices and a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon plaintiff and others similarly situated in connection with their purchases of LendingClub securities during the Class Period. 47. The Privacy Rule, which implements Sections 501-503 of the [Gramm-Leach-Bliley] Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6803, was promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission on May 24, 2000, and became effective on July 1, 2001. 16 C.F.R. Part 313. Since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act on July 21, 2010, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) became responsible for implementing the Privacy Rule, and promulgated the Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, Regulation P, 12 C.F.R. Part 1016 (“Reg. P”), which became effective on October 28, 2014. Defendant’s conduct is governed by the Privacy Rule prior to October 28, 2014, and by Reg. P after that date. The GLB Act authorizes both the CFPB and the Federal Trade Commission to enforce Reg. P. 15 48. Individual Defendants, who are the senior officers and/or directors of the Company, had actual knowledge of the material omissions and/or the falsity of the material statements set forth above, and intended to deceive Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, or, in the alternative, acted with reckless disregard for the truth when they failed to ascertain and disclose the true facts in the statements made by them or other personnel of the Company to members of the investing public, including Plaintiff and the Class. 49. As a result of the foregoing, the market price of LendingClub securities was artificially inflated during the Class Period. In ignorance of the falsity of the Company’s and the Individual Defendants’ statements, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class relied on the statements described above and/or the integrity of the market price of LendingClub securities during the Class Period in purchasing LendingClub securities at prices that were artificially inflated as a result of the Company’s and the Individual Defendants’ false and misleading statements. 50. Had Plaintiff and the other members of the Class been aware that the market price of LendingClub securities had been artificially and falsely inflated by the Company’s and the Individual Defendants’ misleading statements and by the material adverse information which the Company’s and the Individual Defendants did not disclose, they would not have purchased LendingClub securities at the artificially inflated prices that they did, or at all. 51. As a result of the wrongful conduct alleged herein, Plaintiff and other members of the Class have suffered damages in an amount to be established at trial. 53. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 54. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants participated in the operation and management of the Company, and conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the Company’s business affairs. Because of their senior positions, they knew the adverse non-public information regarding the Company’s business practices. 55. As officers and/or directors of a publicly owned company, the Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to the Company’s financial condition and results of operations, and to correct promptly any public statements issued by the Company which had become materially false or misleading. 56. Because of their positions of control and authority as senior officers, the Individual Defendants were able to, and did, control the contents of the various reports, press releases and public filings which the Company disseminated in the marketplace during the Class Period. Throughout the Class Period, the Individual Defendants exercised their power and authority to cause the Company to engage in the wrongful acts complained of herein. The Individual Defendants therefore, were “controlling persons” of the Company within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. In this capacity, they participated in the unlawful conduct alleged which artificially inflated the market price of LendingClub securities. 58. By reason of the above conduct, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for the violations committed by the Company. Materially False and Misleading Statements Violation of Section 10(b) of The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants Violation of Section 20(a) of The Exchange Act Against The Individual Defendants

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16. Plaintiffs seek to bring this suit to recover from Defendants unpaid minimum wage and overtime compensation and liquidated damages pursuant to the applicable provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), individually, on their own behalf, as well as on behalf of those in the following collective: Current and former non-managerial employees, who during the applicable FLSA limitations period, performed any work for Defendants at the Hotel, and who consent to file a claim to recover damages for minimum wage and overtime compensation that is legally due to them (“FLSA Plaintiffs”). 17. Defendants treated Plaintiffs and all FLSA Plaintiffs similarly in that Plaintiffs and all FLSA Plaintiffs: (1) performed similar tasks, as described in the “Background Facts” section below; (2) were subject to the same laws and regulations; (3) were paid in the same or similar manner; (4) were required to work in excess of forty hours in a workweek; (5) were not paid at least the minimum wage for all hours worked; and (6) were not paid the required one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked per workweek in excess of forty. 18. At all relevant times, Defendants are and have been aware of the requirements to pay Plaintiffs and all FLSA Plaintiffs at an amount equal to the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked each workweek above forty, and to pay Plaintiffs and FLSA Plaintiff at the minimum wage rate for all hours worked, yet they purposefully and willfully chose and choose not to do so. 7 19. Thus, all FLSA Plaintiffs are victims of Defendants’ pervasive practice of willfully refusing to pay their employees overtime compensation for all hours worked per workweek above forty, or at the minimum wage for all hours worked, in violation of the FLSA. 20. In addition, Plaintiffs seek to maintain this action as a class action pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(3), individually, on their own behalf, as well as on behalf of those who are similarly situated who, during the applicable limitations period, Defendants subjected to violations of the NYLL and the NYCRR. 21. Under FRCP 23(b)(3), Plaintiffs must plead that: a. The class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable; b. There are questions of law or fact common to the class that predominate over any individual questions of law or fact; c. Claims or defenses of the representative are typical of the class; d. The representative will fairly and adequately protect the class; and e. A class action is superior to other methods of adjudication. 22. Plaintiffs seek certification of the following FRCP 23 class: Current and former non-managerial employees, who worked for Defendants during the statutory period within the State of New York at the Hotel, who: (1) did not receive compensation from Defendants at the legally-required overtime rate of pay for each hour worked over forty hours; and/or (2) did not receive compensation from Defendants at the legally-required minimum wage rate of pay for each hour worked; and/or (3) did not receive compensation from Defendants at the agreed upon straight wage rate of pay for each hour worked; and/or (4) did not receive spread of hours pay for each workday exceeding ten hours; and/or (5) were not provided with accurate wage statements on each payday pursuant to NYLL § 195(3) (“Rule 23 Plaintiffs”). 8 Numerosity 23. During the previous six years, Defendants have, in total, employed at least forty employees that are putative members of this class. Common Questions of Law and/or Fact 24. There are questions of law and fact common to each and every Rule 23 Plaintiff that predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the FRCP 23 class, including but not limited to the following: (1) the duties that Defendants required and require each Rule 23 Plaintiff to perform; (2) the manner of compensating each Rule 23 Plaintiff; (3) whether Rule 23 Plaintiffs worked and work in excess of forty hours per week; (4) whether Defendants failed and fail to pay Rule 23 Plaintiffs proper overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a week; (5) whether Defendants failed and fail to pay Rule 23 Plaintiffs at least the proper minimum wage for all hours worked; (6) whether Defendants failed and fail to pay Rule 23 Plaintiffs the agreed upon straight wage for all hours worked; (7) whether Defendants failed and fail to pay Rule 23 Plaintiffs spread of hours premiums; (8) whether Defendants furnished and furnish Rule 23 Plaintiffs with accurate wage statements on each payday containing the information that NYLL § 195(3) requires; (9) whether Defendants kept and maintained accurate records of hours that the Rule 23 Plaintiffs worked; (10) whether Defendants kept and maintained records with respect to the compensation that they paid to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs for each hour worked; (11) whether Defendants have any affirmative defenses to any of the Rule 23 Plaintiffs’ claims; (12) whether the Defendants’ actions with respect to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs were in violation of the NYLL and supporting regulations; and (13) if so, what constitutes the proper measure of damages. 9 Typicality of Claims and/or Defenses 25. As described in the “Background Facts” section below, Defendants employed and/or employ Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Plaintiffs within the meaning of the NYLL. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Rule 23 Plaintiffs whom they seek to represent, as the Rule 23 Plaintiffs work and/or have worked for Defendants as non-managerial employees, and Defendants failed to pay them overtime pay for all hours worked in a week over forty, the minimum wage for all hours worked, and/or the agreed upon straight rate for all hours worked, or to provide them with spread of hours premiums when appropriate or proper wage statements on each payday. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs enjoy the same statutory rights under the NYLL to receive overtime wages for all hours worked over forty hours, at least the minimum wage and/or the agreed upon straight wage for all hours worked, a spread of hours premium when their workday exceeded ten hours, and to be furnished with accurate wage statements on each payday. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs have all sustained similar types of damages as a result of Defendants’ failure to comply with the NYLL and supporting regulations. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs all have suffered injury including lack of compensation or under- compensation due to Defendants’ common policies, practices, and patterns of conduct. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims and/or Defendants’ defenses to those claims are typical of the Rule 23 Plaintiffs’ claims and/or Defendants’ defenses to those claims. Adequacy 26. Plaintiffs, as described below, worked and work the same or similar hours as the Rule 23 Plaintiffs throughout their employment with Defendants. Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs overtime for all hours worked over forty hours in a week, did not pay Plaintiffs at least the proper minimum wage and/or the agreed upon straight wage for all hours worked, did not 10 pay Plaintiffs spread of hours premium when their workday exceeded ten hours, and did not furnish Plaintiffs with accurate wage statements on each payday, which is substantially similar to how Defendants paid and treated the Rule 23 Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs fully anticipate providing discovery responses and testifying under oath as to all of the matters raised in this Complaint and that will be raised in Defendants’ Answer. Thus, Plaintiffs would properly and adequately represent the current and former employees whom Defendants have subjected to the treatment alleged herein. Superiority 27. Plaintiffs have no, or very few, material facts relating to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs’ claims that are atypical of those of the putative class. Indeed, at all relevant times herein, Defendants treated Plaintiffs identically, or at the very least, substantially similarly, to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs. 28. Any lawsuit brought by an employee of Defendants would be identical to a suit brought by any other employee for the same violations. Thus, separate litigation would risk inconsistent results. 29. Accordingly, this means of protecting Rule 23 Plaintiffs’ rights is superior to any other method, and this action is properly maintainable as a class action under FRCP 23(b)(3). 30. Additionally, Plaintiffs’ counsel has substantial experience in this field of law. 31. Defendant SSN owns, operates, and/or manages at least sixteen hospitality establishments throughout the United States, including the Hotel located at 38-05 Hunters Point Avenue, Long Island City, New York. 11 32. Defendant Shri owns, operates, and/or manages hospitality establishments, including that same Hotel jointly with SSN. 33. At all relevant times, Defendant SSN was and is listed as the employer on materials that Defendants issued to their employees working at the Hotel, such as employment manuals and employee health insurance policies. 34. At all relevant times, Defendant Shri was and is listed as the employer on all paychecks and the inaccurate wage statements that Defendants issued and issue to their employees working at the Hotel. 35. At all relevant times, Defendant Bhai operates and manages the Hotel, overseeing its operations on a daily basis, and is ultimately responsible for all matters with respect to hiring, firing, and disciplining Hotel employees, as well as for determining employees’ rates and methods of pay and hours worked. Remi Yazer 36. In 2010, Defendant Bhai, on behalf of all Defendants, approved the hiring of Plaintiff Yazer to work as a front desk agent and night auditor in the Hotel. Plaintiff Yazer is still employed in that capacity as of the date of commencement of this action. 37. As a front desk agent, Plaintiff Yazer’s primary duties consisted and consist of taking reservations, assisting guests, accepting and processing credit card payments for Defendants’ customers, and registering room assignments and checkouts. 38. As night auditor, Plaintiff Yazer’s primary duties consisted and consist of duties similar to that of a front desk agent, with the addition of compiling daily occupancy, credit card transactions, and financial reports. 12 39. In 2011 Plaintiff Yazer’s duties as a front desk agent and night auditor were expanded to include that of a houseman. Plaintiff Yazer performed and performs his houseman duties concurrently with his duties as a front desk agent and/or night auditor. 40. As a houseman, Plaintiff Yazer’s primary duties consisted and consist of making deliveries to rooms, retrieving items for guests, and performing other maintenance duties. 41. Throughout his employment, Defendants usually required Plaintiff Yazer to work between sixty-and-110 hours per week. 42. From the start of his employment in 2010 to approximately November 2013, Defendants agreed to pay Plaintiff Yazer a wage of $11.00 per hour and an overtime rate of $16.50 per hour. Sometime in November 2013, Defendants agreed to increase Plaintiff Yazer’s hourly wage to his current rate of $11.45 and his overtime rate to $17.18. Defendants paid and pay Plaintiff Yazer every two weeks by check. 43. Despite that agreement as to his straight and overtime hourly rates, Defendants paid and continue to pay Plaintiff Yazer for only some of his hours worked over forty at the statutorily-required overtime rate, and more often than not, failed and fail to pay Yazer for the vast majority of his hours worked over forty at any rate. Usually, Defendants pay Yazer for eighty hours at his straight hourly rate (although sometimes less) and for a maximum of ten hours at his overtime premium (although many times they pay him for fewer than ten hours of overtime), while failing to pay Plaintiff Yazer for any remaining hours worked at any rate. 44. By way of example only, during the week of Saturday, January 23, 2016 through Friday, January 29, 2016, Defendants required Plaintiff Yazer to work, and Yazer did work, the following schedule, without permitting him to take a scheduled or uninterrupted break: 13 Saturday, January 23, 2016: 9:45 p.m. until 4:00 p.m. the following day; Sunday, January 24, 2016: 9:00 p.m. until 3:30 p.m. the following day; Monday, January 25, 2016: 8:45 p.m. until 3:00 p.m. the following day; Tuesday, January 26, 2016: 8:30 p.m. until noon the following day; Wednesday, January 27, 2016: 3:30 p.m. until midnight; Thursday, January 28, 2016: 4:45 p.m. until midnight; Friday, January 29, 2016: 7:00 p.m. until 11:00 a.m. the following day. Thus, adding up the hours for this one workweek, Yazer worked 102.5 hours. Pursuant to his agreed upon rate, the Defendants should have paid Yazer for forty hours at his straight time rate of $11.45, or $458, and for 62.5 hours at his overtime rate of $17.18, or $1,073.75, for a total of $1,531.75 just for this week. Yet, instead, for the entire two-week pay period, Defendants paid Yazer for eighty hours at his straight hourly wage and seven hours at his overtime hourly rate, or a total of $1,036.23, which is $495.52 less than Yazer should have received for just the one week during which he worked 102.5 hours. 45. By way of second example, for the workweeks of March 22, 2014 to March 28, 2014 and March 29, 2014 to April 4, 2014, Plaintiff Yazer worked seventy hours each week for a total of 140 hours during the pay cycle. Accordingly, Defendants should have paid Yazer for eighty hours at his straight time rate of $11.45, or $916, and for sixty hours at his overtime rate of $17.18, or $1,030.80, for a total of $1,946.80. However, for the entire pay period from March 22, 2014 to April 4, 2014, Defendants paid Plaintiff Yazer only $926.25, consisting of 77.22 hours at his straight hourly wage of $11.45 and 2.45 hours at his overtime hourly rate of $17.18. 14 46. Additionally, Defendants regularly required and require Plaintiff Yazer to attend staff meetings that last from two to four hours. These meetings regularly take place outside of Plaintiff Yazer’s work hours but Defendants do not compensate Yazer for his time. 47. By way of example only, Defendants required Plaintiff Yazer to attend and Plaintiff Yazer did attend staff meetings on February 3, 2016 and February 4, 2016. These meetings each lasted four hours and took place outside of Plaintiff’s scheduled work hours. Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff for his time at these meetings at any rate of pay. 48. Additionally, on those occasions when Defendants required Plaintiff Yazer to work and Plaintiff Yazer did work over ten hours in a shift, which was nearly every work day, the Defendants did not compensate Yazer with an additional one hour’s pay at the minimum wage rate. 49. By way of example only, for the week of Saturday, January 23, 2016 through Friday, January 29, 2016, Defendants required Plaintiff Yazer to work, and Yazer did work, a spread of over ten hours on five separate dates as detailed above. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff Yazer an additional hour of pay at the minimum wage for each of those days. 50. On each occasion when they paid Plaintiff Yazer, Defendants intentionally failed to provide Yazer with a wage statement that accurately listed, inter alia, his actual hours worked for that week, or his straight and overtime rates of pay for all hours worked. Luis R. Gonzalez 51. In 2010, Defendant Bhai, on behalf of all Defendants, approved the hiring of Plaintiff Gonzalez to work as a night auditor and front desk “supervisor” in the Hotel, where Plaintiff Gonzalez remained employed until January 14, 2015. 15 52. Plaintiff Gonzalez’s night auditing duties were the same as Plaintiff Yazer’s as detailed above. 53. As front desk “supervisor,” Plaintiff Gonzalez’s primary duties consisted of duties similar to that of a front desk agent, with the addition of answering questions from other front desk agents. In this role, Plaintiff Gonzalez did not possess any authority to hire or fire employees, recommend the hiring or firing of employees, set or adjust any employees’ rates of pay and hours of work, or otherwise affect the terms and conditions of employment of front desk agents. 54. Throughout his employment, Defendants required Plaintiff Gonzalez to work between sixty and ninety hours per week, over the course of either five or six days per week. 55. From the start of his employment in 2010 to approximately January 2014, Defendants agreed to pay Plaintiff Gonzalez a wage of $14.00 per hour and an overtime rate of $21.00 per hour. Sometime in January 2014, Defendants agreed to increase Plaintiff Gonzalez’s hourly wage to $14.57 and his overtime hourly rate to $21.86. Defendants paid Plaintiff Gonzalez every two weeks by check. 56. Despite that agreement as to his straight and overtime hourly rates, Defendants paid Plaintiff Gonzalez for only some of his hours worked over forty at the statutorily-required overtime rate, and more often than not, failed to pay Gonzalez for the vast majority of his hours worked over forty at any rate. Usually, Defendants paid Gonzalez for eighty hours at his straight hourly rate (although sometimes less) and for a maximum of four hours at his overtime premium (although many times they pay him for fewer than four hours of overtime), while failing to pay Plaintiff Gonzalez for any remaining hours worked at any rate. 16 57. By way of example only, during the week of Saturday, December 20, 2014 through Friday, December 26, 2014, Defendants required Plaintiff Gonzalez to work, and Gonzalez did work, the following schedule, without permitting him to take a scheduled or uninterrupted break: Saturday, December 20, 2014: 3:00 p.m. until 3:00 a.m. the following day; Sunday, December 21, 2014: 3:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m. the following day; Monday, December 22, 2014: 3:00 p.m. until 3:00 a.m. the following day; Tuesday, December 23, 2014: off; Wednesday, December 24, 2014: 11:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m. the following day; Thursday, December 25, 2014: 7:00 p.m. until 11:00 a.m. the following day; Friday, December 26, 2014: 3:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m. the following day. Thus, adding up the hours for this one workweek, Plaintiff Gonzalez worked eighty hours. Pursuant to his agreed upon rate, the Defendants should have paid Gonzalez for forty hours at his straight time rate of $14.57, or $582.80, and for forty hours at his overtime rate of $21.86, or $874.40, for a total of $1,457.20 just for this week. Yet, instead, for the entire two-week pay period, Defendants paid Gonzalez for eighty hours at his straight hourly wage and approximately four hours at his overtime hourly rate, or a total of $1,253.04, which is $204.16 less than Gonzalez should have received for just the one week during which he worked eighty hours. 58. Additionally, Defendants regularly required Plaintiff Gonzalez to attend staff meetings that lasted from two to four hours. These meetings regularly took place outside of Plaintiff Gonzalez’s work hours, but Defendants did not compensate Gonzalez for his time. 59. By way of example only, Defendants required Plaintiff Gonzalez to attend and Plaintiff Gonzalez did attend a staff meeting on or about December 27, 2014. The meeting lasted 17 four hours and took place outside of his scheduled work hours. Defendants failed to compensate Gonzalez for his time at these meetings at any rate of pay. 60. Additionally, on those occasions when Defendants required Plaintiff Gonzalez to work and Plaintiff Gonzalez did work over ten hours in a shift, the Defendants did not compensate Gonzalez with an additional one hour’s pay at the minimum wage rate. 61. By way of example only, for the week of Saturday, December 20, 2014 through Friday, December 26, 2014, Defendants required Plaintiff Gonzalez to work, and Gonzalez did work, a spread of over ten hours on five separate dates as detailed above. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff Gonzalez an additional hour of pay at the minimum wage for each of those days. 62. On each occasion when they paid Plaintiff Gonzalez, Defendants intentionally failed to provide Gonzalez with a wage statement that accurately listed, inter alia, his actual hours worked for that week, or his straight and overtime rates of pay for all hours worked. 63. Defendants treated Plaintiffs, FLSA Plaintiffs, and Rule 23 Plaintiffs in the manner described above. 64. Defendants acted in the manner described herein so as to maximize their profits while minimizing their labor costs and overhead. 65. Each hour that Plaintiffs worked was for Defendants’ benefit. 66. Plaintiffs and FLSA Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 67. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) requires employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek. 18 68. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the FLSA while Plaintiffs and FLSA Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the FLSA. 69. Plaintiffs and FLSA Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty hours per week, yet Defendants failed to compensate them in accordance with the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 70. Defendants willfully violated the FLSA. 71. Plaintiffs and FLSA Plaintiffs are entitled to overtime pay for all hours worked per week in excess of forty at the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay. 72. Plaintiffs and FLSA Plaintiffs are also entitled to liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees for Defendants’ violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 73. Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 74. NYLL § 160 and 12 NYCRR § 146-1.4 require employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for any hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek. 75. Defendants are employers within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCRR, while Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the NYLL and the 79. Plaintiffs and FLSA Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 80. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) requires employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than the legally prescribed minimum wage for every hour worked. 81. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the FLSA while Plaintiffs and FLSA Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the FLSA. 82. Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiffs and FLSA Plaintiffs in accordance with the FLSA’s minimum wage provisions. 83. Defendants willfully violated the FLSA. 84. At the least, Plaintiffs and FLSA Plaintiffs are entitled to pay at the minimum wage for all hours worked per week. 85. Plaintiffs and FLSA Plaintiffs are also entitled to liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees for Defendants’ violation of the FLSA’s minimum wage provisions. 20 Unpaid Overtime Under the NYLL and the NYCRR Unpaid Overtime Under the FLSA Unpaid Minimum Wages Under the FLSA

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I. Glyphosate and the Enzyme It Targets 22. Glyphosate, the active ingredient in Roundup, is a non-selective biocide, meaning that it will kill most plants and many simple organisms. Unlike selective biocides, glyphosate cannot be used on most conventional lawns, as it would kill grass that has not been genetically modified. 46. All of the foregoing paragraphs are re-alleged as if fully set forth herein. 47. This action is maintainable as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 48. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of a Class defined as follows: Class: All consumers who purchased Roundup Products containing the statement “Glyphosate targets an enzyme found in plants but not in people or pets” on the labeling in the United States within the applicable statute of limitations. 60. All of the foregoing paragraphs are re-alleged as if fully set forth herein. 61. Plaintiff Jones brings this cause of action on behalf of members of the Missouri Sub-Class. 62. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.010 et seq. (“MMPA”). 63. The MMPA provides that: “The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise in trade or commerce . . . in or from the state of Missouri, is declared to be an unlawful practice.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.020(1). 64. Pursuant to 15 C.S.R. § 60-7.020, “A seller shall not make a representation or statement of fact in an advertisement that is false or has the capacity to mislead prospective purchasers.” 76. All of the foregoing paragraphs are re-alleged as if fully set forth herein. 77. Plaintiff Bonilla brings this cause of action on behalf of members of the New York Sub-Class. 78. This cause of action is brought pursuant to New York General Business Law § 349. 79. Defendants, in selling Roundup Products in the State of New York, have engaged in a consumer-oriented business practice or act. 80. Defendants’ labeling and advertising of Roundup Products with the statement that “Glyphosate targets an enzyme found in plants but not in people or pets” misrepresents, tends to mislead, and omits material facts regarding the nature of Roundup. Unjust Enrichment (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class) 135. All of the foregoing paragraphs are re-alleged as if fully set forth herein. 136. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the Class and the State Sub-Classes set forth herein. 137. This cause of action is pleaded in the alternative to Plaintiffs’ contract-based claims. 138. As the intended, direct, and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Defendants have been unjustly enriched through sales of Roundup Products at the expense of Plaintiffs and the Class Members. 139. Under the circumstances, it would be against equity and good conscience to permit Defendants to retain the ill-gotten benefits that they received from Plaintiffs and the Class Members, in light of the fact that the Roundup Products they purchased were not what Defendants purported them to be. Violation of New York General Business Law § 349 (On Behalf of Plaintiff Bonilla and the New York Sub-Class) Violations of New York’ General Business Law § 350 (On Behalf of Plaintiff Bonilla and the New York Sub-Class) Violation of Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (On Behalf of Plaintiff Jones and the Missouri Sub-Class) Violations of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (On Behalf of Plaintiff Yee and the California Sub-Class)

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from multiple telephone numbers. 15. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the proposed class (hereafter, jointly, “The Class”). 16. The class concerning the ATDS claim for no prior express consent (hereafter “The ATDS Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 8. Beginning in or around March 2019, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -6443, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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18. The United States Government, through the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), has passed and enforced laws and regulations designed to protect United States citizens and the environment of the United States from pollutants, chemicals, and agents known to cause disease and/or death in humans and that are known to harm the environment. Vehicle manufacturers, including Mercedes and Daimler, must abide by these United States laws and must adhere to EPA rules and regulations. 19. In order to meet the rigorous United States governmental emission standards and produce a desirable vehicle with torque and power characteristics and good fuel economy, Mercedes developed the BlueTEC™ (“BlueTEC”) diesel engine. BlueTEC is Daimler’s marketing name for Mercedes engines that are designed to effectively reduce fuel consumption and emissions in Mercedes diesel vehicles. 21. To combat this problem vehicle manufacturers illegally install certain mechanisms designed to evade emissions standards with the help of certain software or devices that manipulate emissions controls, known as “defeat devices” or “cheat devices”. 22. The EPA defines a defeat device as “an auxiliary emission control device (AECD) that reduces the effectiveness of the emission control system under conditions which may reasonably be expected to be encountered in normal vehicle operation and use.” 40 C.F.R. 86.004-2. 23. The EPA prohibits the equipment of defeat devices in vehicles in the United States. 40 C.F.R. 86.004-16. 24. A recent and prominent example of vehicle manufacturers’ use of defeat devices is the major scandal involving Volkswagen AGs, Audi AG and Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. and Porsche AG and Porsche Cars North America (collectively, “Volkswagen”). 25. On September 18, 2015, the EPA issued a Notice of Violation of the Clean Air Act to Volkswagen AG, Audi AG, and Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. alleging that model year 2009 – 2015 Volkswagen and Audi diesel cars equipped with 2.0 liter engines included software that circumvents EPA emissions standards for nitrogen oxides. The EPA labeled the software a “defeat device” as defined by the Clean Air Act, 40 C.F.R. 86.004-2. 26. On November 2, 2015, the EPA issued a second Notice of Violation to Volkswagen. The Notice of Violation alleged that Volkswagen developed and installed a defeat device in certain light duty diesel vehicles equipped with 3.0 liter engines for model years 2014 through 2016 that increased emissions of nitrogen oxide up to nine times the EPA’s standard. 28. The Volkswagen vehicles contained defeat devices that detected when the vehicle was undergoing official emissions testing in order to trigger the vehicle’s full emissions controls on only during official emissions testing, but not during normal operation of the vehicle. 29. This resulted in vehicles that met emissions standards in the laboratory or state testing stations, but not during normal operation of the vehicle. 30. The U.S. Clean Air Act has strict emissions standards for vehicles and it requires vehicle manufacturers to certify to the EPA that the vehicles sold in the United States meet applicable federal emissions standards to control air pollution. Every vehicle sold in the United States must be covered by an EPA issued certificate of conformity. Accordingly, Mercedes has certified to the EPA that the Mercedes BlueTEC vehicles sold in the United States meet applicable federal emissions standards. 31. Nevertheless, by manufacturing and selling BlueTEC cars that emit far more pollutants than permitted under EPA standards, Daimler violated the Clean Air Act, defrauded its customers, engaged in unfair competition under state and federal law, without ever disclosing any of the aforementioned to Daimler investors. 67. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class consisting of all persons other than Defendants who acquired Daimler securities during the Class Period and who were damaged thereby (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants, the officers and directors of Daimler, members of the Individual Defendants’ and Director Defendants’ immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which Officer or Director Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 68. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, Daimler securities were actively traded on the OTC. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are hundreds, if not thousands of members in the proposed Class. 70. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class. 71. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are:  whether the Exchange Act were violated by Defendants’ acts as alleged herein;  whether statements made by Defendants to the investing public during the Class Period misrepresented material facts about the financial condition, operations, and business Daimler;  whether Defendants’ public statements to the investing public during the Class Period omitted material facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading;  whether the prices of Daimler’s securities during the Class Period were artificially inflated because of the Defendants’ conduct complained of herein; and  whether the members of the Class have sustained damages and, if so, what is the proper measure of damages. 73. Plaintiff will rely, in part, upon the presumption of reliance established by the fraud-on-the-market doctrine in that:  Daimler shares met the requirements for listing, and were listed and actively traded on the OTC, a highly efficient and automated market;  Daimler regularly communicated with public investors via established market communication mechanisms, including through the regular dissemination of press releases via major newswire services and through other wide-ranging public disclosures, such as communications with the financial press and other similar reporting services; and  Daimler was followed by a number of securities analysts employed by major brokerage firms who wrote reports that were widely distributed and publicly available. 74. Based on the foregoing, the market for Daimler securities promptly digested current information regarding Daimler from all publicly available sources and reflected such information in the prices of the shares, and Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to a presumption of reliance upon the integrity of the market. 76. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 77. This Count is asserted against Daimler and the Individual Defendants and is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. 78. During the Class Period, Daimler and the Individual Defendants, individually and in concert, directly or indirectly, disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or deliberately disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 79. Daimler and the Individual Defendants violated §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 in that they:  employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud;  made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or  engaged in acts, practices and a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon plaintiff and others similarly situated in connection with their purchases of Daimler securities during the Class Period. 81. Individual Defendants, who are the senior officers and/or directors of the Company, had actual knowledge of the material omissions and/or the falsity of the material statements set forth above, and intended to deceive Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, or, in the alternative, acted with reckless disregard for the truth when they failed to ascertain and disclose the true facts in the statements made by them or other Daimler personnel to members of the investing public, including Plaintiff and the Class. 82. As a result of the foregoing, the market price of Daimler securities was artificially inflated during the Class Period. In ignorance of the falsity of Daimler’s and the Individual Defendants’ statements, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class relied on the statements described above and/or the integrity of the market price of Daimler securities during the Class Period in purchasing Daimler securities at prices that were artificially inflated as a result of Daimler’s and the Individual Defendants’ false and misleading statements. 84. As a result of the wrongful conduct alleged herein, Plaintiff and other members of the Class have suffered damages in an amount to be established at trial. 85. By reason of the foregoing, Daimler and the Individual Defendants have violated Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder and are liable to the plaintiff and the other members of the Class for substantial damages which they suffered in connection with their purchase of Daimler securities during the Class Period. 86. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 87. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants participated in the operation and management of Daimler, and conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of Daimler’s business affairs. Because of their senior positions, they knew the adverse non-public information about Daimler’s misstatement of revenue and profit and false financial statements. 88. As officers and/or directors of a publicly owned company, the Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to Daimler’s financial condition and results of operations, and to correct promptly any public statements issued by Daimler which had become materially false or misleading. 90. By reason of the above conduct, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for the violations committed by Daimler. BACKGROUND FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 10(B) AND RULE 10B-5 PROMULGATED THEREUNDER (AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS) VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 20(A) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT (AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS)

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19. Plaintiff is, and has been at all times relevant to this action, the regular and sole user of his cellular telephone number: 940-631-XXXX. 20. At 3:48 p.m. CDT on May 22, 2018, Plaintiff received a text message on his cellular telephone from SMS short code 30838 stating: The Fresh Start Program can reduce or remove what you owe to the IRS. I am in the office, click on the this number to call me now (949) 335-4642 55. Plaintiff brings this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and as a representative of the following class: All persons throughout the United States (1) to whom Defendants delivered, or caused to be delivered, a text message, (2) directed to a number assigned to a cellular telephone service, (3) by using an automatic telephone dialing system, (4) within four years preceding the date of this complaint through the date of class certification. 83. Plaintiff incorporates herein all preceding factual allegations. 84. A text message is a “call” as defined by the TCPA. See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009); Arredondo v. Flexi Corp., No. 5:17-CV-4, 2017 WL 7796192, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2017) (“Making a call using an automatic telephone dialing system triggers responsibility under the TCPA regardless of whether the recipient answers. . . . A text message to a cellular telephone qualifies as a ‘call’ for such purposes.”). 85. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) makes it “unlawful for any person within the United States . . . to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call . . . .” 86. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2) additionally states, with respect to advertisement and telemarketing calls—of which Defendants’ texts to Plaintiff are—that “[n]o person or entity may . . . [i]nitiate or cause to be initiated, any telephone call that includes or introduces an advertisement or constitutes telemarketing, using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, to any of the lines or telephone numbers described in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) through (iii) of this section, other than a call made with the prior express written consent of the called party . . . .” Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)

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10. Abacus purchased HotDocs in November, 2017.3 11. The text messages that Plaintiff received state that HotDocs requires an update: 26. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following Classes: Autodialed No Consent Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action through class certification (1) Defendant (or an agent acting on behalf of Defendant) text messaged, (2) on the person’s cellular telephone number, (3) using a text messaging platform substantially similar to the text messaging platform Defendant used to text message Plaintiff, (4) for whom Defendant claims (a) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to text message Plaintiff, or (b) it did not obtain prior express written consent. Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action through class certification (1) Defendant (or an agent acting on behalf of Defendant) texted more than one time; (2) within any 12-month period (3) where the person’s telephone number had been listed on the DNC for at least thirty days; (4) for a substantially similar reason that Defendant texted Plaintiff; and (5) for whom Defendant claims (a) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to text message Plaintiff, or (b) Defendant did not obtain prior express written consent. 32. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 31 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference. 33. Defendant and/or its agents sent unwanted solicitation text messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class using an autodialer. 34. These solicitation text messages were sent en masse without the consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class to receive such solicitation text messages. 35. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class are each entitled to, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation of such act. 36. In the event that the Court determines that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, it may, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class. Abacus Violates the TCPA By Sending Autodialed Text Messages to Consumers, Including to Consumers Who Have Registered their Phone Numbers on the DNC Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claims Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodial No Consent Class)

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14. Jo Malone owns and operates stores throughout the United States, including locations at 330 Bleecker Street, New York, New York, 1048 Lexington Avenue, New York, New York, and 225 Liberty Street, New York, New York. Jo Malone also sells its products at third-party retailers throughout the United States including Bloomingdales, Sephora and Blue Mercury. At these locations and third-party retailers, it sells perfumes, candles, body creams and similar items. 15. Jo Malone’s Website is heavily integrated with its stores and third-party retailers, serving as their gateway. Through the Website, Jo Malone’s customers are, inter alia, able to: learn information about the stores’ locations and hours of operation; book a spa service; learn about the items for sale in the stores and online, including available sizes, the materials used, details about the item and engraving options; and purchase items for delivery. 17. Plaintiff Olsen cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using screen-reading software. 21. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Olsen could independently navigate it, view goods and service items, locate Jo Malone’s stores and third-party retailers and learn their hours of operation, learn about the items for sale and complete a desired transaction such as purchasing an option or booking an appointment as sighted individuals do. 22. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Olsen has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 24. Jo Malone therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 25. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Olsen seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 27. Although Jo Malone may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Jo Malone lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 28. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Olsen and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 29. Jo Malone has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 30. Jo Malone has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 31. Plaintiff Olsen seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Jo Malone’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Jo Malone’s stores and third-party retailers during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 33. Plaintiff Olsen seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the New York City who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Jo Malone’s stores and third-party retailers during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 35. Plaintiff Olsen’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Jo Malone has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 36. Plaintiff Olsen will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because he has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because he has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Jo Malone has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. 37. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class and Subclass Members predominate over questions affecting only individuals, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 38. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 40. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 41. Jo Malone’s stores and third-party retailers are public accommodations under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Jo Malone’s stores and third-party retailers. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 42. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 43. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 45. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Olsen, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight under 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. 46. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Olsen requests the relief as set forth below. 47. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. Jo Malone’s State of New York stores constitute sales establishments and public accommodations under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Jo Malone’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of those stores. Jo Malone’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with those stores. 50. Jo Malone is violating the NYSHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Jo Malone makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(2)(a), 296(2)(c)(i), 296(2)(c)(ii). 51. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 52. Jo Malone’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class because of a disability, violating the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2), in that Jo Malone has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to Class Members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 54. As Jo Malone’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Olsen seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 55. Plaintiff Olsen is entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense. 56. Plaintiff Olsen is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 57. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. Jo Malone’s New York City locations are sales establishments and public accommodations under the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with those establishments. 61. Jo Malone is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Jo Malone makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(4)(a), 8-107(15)(a). 62. Jo Malone’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Subclass because of a disability, violating the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a,) in that it has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. As such, Jo Malone discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Olsen and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Jo Malone from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Plaintiff Olsen is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines for each offense. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 66. Plaintiff Olsen is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 67. Under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 68. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 69. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Olsen contends, and is informed and believes that Jo Malone denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its stores, which Jo Malone owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 70. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Jo Malone, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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19. Prior to May 15, 2017, Plaintiff registered his cellular telephone number on the National Do Not Call registry to try to avoid receiving unsolicited telemarketing calls on his cell phone. 20. On May 15, 2017, at 10:58 a.m., Plaintiff received a telemarketing sales call from Defendant, or on Defendant’s behalf, on his cellular telephone line, from the phone number 708- 640-8017. This telephone number is notorious for belonging to Defendant and for being used for telemarketing, in violation of the TCPA. See, supra, ¶ 11. A partially redacted screen shot of Plaintiff’s cell phone call log, taken on May 15, 2017, is attached as Exhibit B. 22. As there was no prior or current relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant, Defendant did not know anything about Plaintiff until Plaintiff chose to share certain personal information on the phone call. Plaintiff, for example, provided Defendant with his name and mailing address and agreed to receive a sales contract through the mail. Defendant stated on the phone call that it would be sending a sales contract through the mail to Plaintiff. 23. Plaintiff then received, via the mail, a letter, signed by Defendant’s CEO David Hernandez, and a “Welcome Kit” that included a contract entitled “LIBERTY POWER UNIFORM DISCLOSURE STATEMENT/CONTRACT SUMMARY – Illinois – Residential – Green (Wind).” The letter and contract are attached as Exhibit A to this Class Action Complaint. 24. The letter from Defendant stated that Defendant was “pleased to welcome [Plaintiff] to the Liberty Power family!” and stated that Defendant had “already coordinated with [Plaintiff’s] utility to ensure [Plaintiff’s] transition is simple and worry free.” See Exhibit A. 25. Defendant’s intentional violation of the TCPA in, for example, making a call to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone line, without Plaintiff’s prior express consent, using an automatic telephone dialing system, was rewarded by contact with Plaintiff (a potential customer), obtaining Plaintiff’s personal information, and Plaintiff’s acceptance of marketing materials and a contract from Defendant through the mail. 26. Defendant is and was aware that the above-described cellular telephone call was and is being made to consumers like Plaintiff who had not consented to receive them and whose telephone numbers were registered with the National Do Not Call Registry. 27. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) on behalf of himself and the proposed Class as defined as follows: All persons in the United States who from July 28, 2013, to the present (1) Defendant caused to be called using an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) or an artificial or prerecorded voice; (2) on the person’s cellular telephone service number; (3) not for emergency purposes; and (4) for whom Defendant had not obtained the prior express consent to call the person. 28. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant’s counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. Plaintiff anticipates the need to potentially amend the class definitions following discovery into the scope of the class and the identity of any other persons who should be included as party defendants. 29. Numerosity: The exact size of the Class is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant made calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Members of the Class can be identified through reference to objective criteria, including Defendant’s (or Defendant’s agent’s) business records, consumer phone records, and other evidence to be gained in discovery. 31. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class. Plaintiff and members of the Class suffered essentially identical harm and sustained damages as a result of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct during transactions with Plaintiff and the Class. 32. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 34. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy given that joinder of all parties is impracticable. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense of all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court for the Class. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. 35. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1-34. 37. Defendant made unsolicited and unwanted telemarketing calls to cellular telephone service numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, without their prior express written consent, in an effort to sell its products and services. 38. Defendant did not have the prior express consent of Plaintiff and other members of the Class to make these telephone calls. 39. None of the calls made by Defendant to Plaintiff and other members of the Class were initiated for emergency purposes or exempted by rule or order of the Federal Communications Commission. 40. Defendant made the telephone calls using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse. 41. Defendant utilized equipment that made the telephone calls to Plaintiff and other members of the Class simultaneously and without human intervention. 42. By making unsolicited telephone calls to Plaintiff and members of the Class’s cellular telephones without their prior express consent, and by utilizing an ATDS, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 43. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Class suffered actual damages in the form of monies paid to receive the unsolicited telephone calls on their cellular phones and, under Section 227(b)(3)(B), are entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 6. Defendant supplies retail electricity to residential, business and government customers. Founded in 2001, by CEO David Hernandez, “after separating from Enron in 2001,”1 and current President Alberto Daire,2 Defendant claims to currently serve “hundreds of thousands of customers across the nation.”3 8. Unfortunately for consumers, Defendant utilized (and continues to utilize) a sophisticated telephone dialing system to call cellular telephone service subscribers en masse to promote and market its services. 9. That is, in Defendant’s overzealous attempts to market its services, it placed (and continues to place) phone calls to consumers that never provided consent to call and to consumers with whom it had no prior relationship. Additionally, Defendant placed (and continues to place) repeated and unwanted calls to consumers whose cellular telephones service numbers are listed on the National Do Not Call Registry. Consumers place their phone numbers on the Do Not Call Registry for the express purpose of avoiding unwanted telemarketing calls like those alleged here. Violation OF 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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10. Beginning in or around July 2015 Defendants contacted Plaintiff Abante Rooter and Plumbing Inc -7511, -5154, -7210 and -1016, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendants’ services. 18. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the ATDS Class. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) • As a result of Defendants’ willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiffs and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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26. 3-D is an oilfield services company. 27. To provide services for its client, 3-D hires personnel to perform the necessary work. 28. Over the past three years, 3-D employed dozens of individuals, including Hembree, the Day Rate Workers, the New Mexico Workers to provide these services for its clients. 29. While exact job titles and job duties may differ, these oilfield workers are subjected to the same illegal pay practice for similar work. 30. Specifically, 3-D paid these workers a flat sum for each day worked, regardless of the number of hours that they worked that day (or in that workweek) and failed to pay them overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 31. For example, 3-D employed Hembree as a Test Operator. 32. Throughout this time, 3-D paid Hembree on a day rate basis. 33. As a Test Operator, Hembree’s primary job duties included rigging up “frac stacks,” rigging up wireline lubricators, and testing this equipment in order to ensure that they maintained the capacity to hold the necessary pressure to operate properly. 34. Hembree regularly worked well in excess of 40 hours while employed by 3-D. 35. The work Hembree performed was an essential part of 3-D’s core business. 36. For the purposes of an FLSA overtime claim, the Day Rate Workers performed substantially similar job duties related to the servicing of the oil and gas operations of 3-D’s clients in the field. 5 37. The Day Rate Workers also worked similar hours and were denied overtime as a result of the same illegal pay practice. 38. The Day Rate Workers all worked in excess of 40 hours each week and were often scheduled for daily 12-hour shifts for weeks at a time. 39. Instead of paying them overtime, 3-D paid the Day Rate Workers a day rate. 40. 3-D denied the Day Rate Workers overtime for any hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. 41. 3-D’s policy of failing to pay its workers, including Hembree, overtime violates the FLSA because these workers are entitled to overtime pay at one-and-one-half times their regular rates. 42. It is undisputed that the contractors are maintaining and working with oilfield machinery, performing manual labor, and working long hours out in the field. 43. Despite knowing the FLSA and NMMWA’s requirements, 3-D failed to pay Hembree, the Day Rate Workers, and the New Mexico Workers overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. 59. Hembree incorporates all previous paragraphs and alleges that the illegal pay practices 3-D imposed on them were likewise imposed on the members of the class. 60. Numerous individuals were victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which is in willful violation of the FLSA and the NMMWA. 61. Dozens of other individuals who worked with Hembree indicated they were paid in the same manner, performed similar oilfield services work, and were not properly compensated for all hours worked as required by state and federal wage laws. 62. 3-D employed dozens of Day Rate Workers in New Mexico and Texas, and also employed dozens of New Mexico Workers in New Mexico. As a result, joinder of their individual claims is impracticable, and a class and collective action serves the interests of judicial economy. 63. Based on his experiences and tenure with 3-D, Hembree is aware that 3-D’s illegal practices were imposed on other Day Rate Workers and New Mexico Workers. 64. The Day Rate Workers and the New Mexico Workers were all denied overtime compensation when they worked in excess of forty 40 hours per week. 65. 3-D is an “employer” of Hembree, the Day Rate Workers, and the New Mexico Workers. 66. 3-D’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by state and/or federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Day Rate Workers or the New Mexico Workers. 8 67. Hembree’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Day Rate Workers and the New Mexico Workers. 68. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the Day Rate Workers and the New Mexico Workers do not prevent class or collective treatment. 69. Hembree has no interests contrary to, or in conflict with, the Day Rate Workers or the New Mexico Workers. 70. Hembree has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages owed under state and/or federal law just like the Day Rate Workers and the New Mexico Workers. 71. A class and collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit. 72. Absent this action, many Day Rate Workers and New Mexico Workers likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and 3-D will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA and the

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44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 48. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 49. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. I, Dante Pride, hereby certify that, according to the computer program used to prepare this document, Complaint, contains 4658 words. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on this 30th day of January, 2017, in San Diego, California. /s/ Dante T. Pride Dante T. Pride Attorney for Plaintiff KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (TCPA) 47 U.S.C. 227 NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (TCPA) 47 U.S.C. 227 THE (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227 ET. SEQ.  As a result of Defendants negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).  Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future.  Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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(§5-423 General Obligations Law; §225.10 Penal Law) 12. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), and (b)(3) on behalf of a Class consisting of all those who entered the Lottery in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015, inclusive, for a chance of qualifying for the New York City Marathon and who were damaged thereby (the "Class"). 13. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiffs at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiffs believe that there are tens of thousands of members in the proposed Class who are geographically dispersed throughout the United States. Members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by Road Runners and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, email or other electronic means. 14. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. All members of the Class paid the fee to enter the Lottery for a chance to win a spot in the Marathon. All members of the Class were similarly affected by Defendant's wrongful conduct in violation of New York law that is complained of herein. 16. Common questions of law or fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the numerous questions of law or fact common to the Class are: a. whether Road Runners conducted an illegal lotteryfrom 2010 to 2015; b. whether Road Runners ever has obtained an identification number to conduct a game of chance from the New York Gaming Commission; c. whether Road Runners ever has obtained a license from New York City to conduct a game of chance; d. whether each year's Lottery netted proceeds in excess of $30,000; e. whether the aggregate value of the prizes awarded under each Lottery exceeded $500,000; f. whether Road Runners complied with sections 186 et seq. of N.Y. General Municipal Law in conducting the lotteries; and g. whether failure to comply with sections 186 et seq. of General Municipal Law gives rise to a private right of action under section 5-423 of General Obligations Law. 17. Road Runners has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. 19. Road Runners is the organizer and operator of the New York City Marathon, a prestigious, 26.2-mile road race through the five boroughs of New York City. 20. Though there are ways to qualify for the marathon other than participating in the Lottery - such as donating time or money to certain charities or running a qualifying time in another race. Once a person qualifies to run, he or she must pay a race-entry fee to run in the Marathon. The race entry fee, which in 2015 ranged from $216-347 depending on club membership and US residency, is not the subject of this action. 21. On information and belief, for each year from 2010 through 2015, approximately 80,000 prospective runners participated in the Lottery. 22. Road Runners allowed a limited number of these Lottery participants to qualify for the Marathon through the Lottery. 23. To enter the Lottery, prospective runners were required to pay Road Runners a fee of $11.The payment was nonrefundable. 24. On its website and in other promotional materials, Road Runners characterized the fee as a "processing fee." 25. The Lottery prize was qualification into the Marathon. Like all other qualifiers, however, those who qualified via the Lottery had to pay an additional race-entry fee to run in the race. 27. Plaintiff Konopa paid a fee to enter the Lottery for the 2014 New York City Marathon. He did not win the drawing. Road Runners retained the fee Konopa paid to enter the Lottery. 28. Plaintiff Clark paid to enter the Lottery for the 2011 New York City Marathon. He did not win the Lottery. Road Runners retained the fee that Mr. Clark paid to enter the Lottery. 29. Clark also paid to enter the Lottery for the 2015 Marathon. He did not win the Lottery, and Road Runners again retained the fee he paid. 30. All members of the Class paid a fee to enter the Lotteries for one or more of the New York City Marathons held in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, or 2015. 31. Road Runners retained the fees paid by Plaintiffs and the other member of the Class. 32. From 2010 to 20l5, the Lotteries generated millions of dollars in gross revenues for Road Runners. 33. For each and every year from 2010 to 2015, the net proceeds or net profits of the drawing exceeded $30,000as defined by section 186 of General Municipal Law. 34. For each and every year from 2010 through 2015, Road Runners did not have an identification number from the New York Gaming Commission, as generally is required under sections 189, 190 and 195-kof General Municipal Law. 36. For each and every year's Lottery from 2010 through2015, the aggregate value of the series of prizes awarded under the drawing exceeded $500,000.For purposes of this paragraph, the intended definition of the phrase "series of prizes" is the same as the definition described in section 186 of General Municipal Law. 37. In each and every year from 2010 to 2015, there was at least one day in which Road Runners collected more than $500in connection with the Lottery. 38. All prior paragraphs of this Complaint are re-alleged and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 39. Road Runners' Lotteries for entry into the Marathons held from 2010 to 2015 involved consideration (the payment of a fee to enter the drawing), chance (the drawing itself), and a prize (qualification for the respective marathon). 40. Road Runners' Lotteries for entry into the 2010 to 2015 Marathons were unlawful because Road Runners did not have an identification number or license when conducting them and, for each Lottery, awarded a series of prizes that had an aggregate value in excess of $500,000. 41. By paying a fee to participate in Road Runners' chance-based Lottery, Plaintiffs Konopa and Clark purchased a share, interest, ticket, certificate of any share or interest, or part of a ticket, or any paper or instrument purporting to be a ticket or share or interest in any ticket, or purporting to be a certificate of any share or interest in any ticket, or in any portion of any lottery. 43. Plaintiffs and each member of the Class are entitled to double the amount of the fee(s) each paid to enter the drawing(s) plus double costs of suit. 44. An injunction is necessary to prevent Road Runners from again conducting a drawing in violation of New York gaming laws because, on information and belief, Road Runners intends to continue charging a fee to participate in the drawing in violation of those laws. 53. All prior paragraphs of this Complaint are re-alleged and incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 54. Road Runners knowingly advanced or profited from the drawings for entry into the 2010 to 2015 New York City Marathons. 56. For each year's drawing, the winning chances were to be determined by a drawing or by some other method based upon the element of chance. 57. For each year's drawing, the holders of the winning chances were to receive something of value (qualification for the marathon). 58. As part of the drawing(s) for entry into the 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 or 2015 Marathon, each member of the Class paid something of value (the application fee(s)) for a chance to qualify for the respective marathon(s), which chance was represented and differentiated by numbers or by combinations of numbers or by some other media, one or more of which chances were to be designated the winning ones. 59. Under drawings for entry into the 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 or 2015 Marathon, the winning chances were to be determined by a drawing or by some other method based upon the element of chance. 60. Under the drawings for entry into the 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 or2015 Marathon, the holders of the winning chances were to receive something of value (qualification for the Marathon). 61. Road Runners' drawings for entry into the 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 or 2015 Marathon were unlawful because Road Runners did not have an identification number or license when conducting them and, for each Lottery, awarded a series of prizes that had an aggregate value in excess of $500,000. 63. Plaintiffs Konopa and Clark and each member of the Class, therefore, may sue for and recover the fee(s) that each paid to enter the drawing(s). 64. An injunction is necessary to prevent Road Runners from again conducting a drawing in violation of New York gaming laws because, on information and belief, Road Runners intends to continue charging a fee to participate in the drawings in violation of those laws. FOR RELIEF (§5-423 General Obligations Law)

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17. Plaintiff re-avers and re-alleges all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 16 above as if fully set forth herein. 18. Plaintiff is entitled to be paid time and one-half for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek and to have such overtime calculated in accordance with Federal Regulations, to include commission/bonus payments earned in the appropriate workweek in the calculation of the regular rate for the purposes of determining overtime entitlement. All similarly situated employees are similarly owed time and one-half, calculated properly, for those overtime hours they worked and for which they were not properly paid. 19. By reason of the willful and unlawful acts of the Defendants, all Plaintiffs (Plaintiff and those similarly situated to him) have suffered damages plus incurred costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 20. As a result of the Defendants’ violation of the Act, all Plaintiffs (Plaintiff and those similarly situated to him) are entitled to liquidated damages in an amount equal to that which they are owed as unpaid overtime. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, SPENCER AMADON, and those similarly situated to him, who have or will opt-in to this action, demand judgment against Defendants for the overtime compensation payments due them for the hours worked by them for which they have not been properly compensated, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit, and for all other relief the Court deems just and proper. 22. Plaintiff is entitled to be paid his statutory minimum wages for each hour worked per workweek. All similarly situated employees are similarly owed minimum wages, for those hours they worked and for which they were not properly paid. 23. By reason of the willful and unlawful acts of the Defendants, all Plaintiffs (Plaintiff and those similarly situated to him) have suffered damages plus incurred costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 24. As a result of the Defendants’ violation of the Act, all Plaintiffs (Plaintiff and those similarly situated to him) are entitled to liquidated damages in an amount equal to that which they are owed as unpaid overtime. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, SPENCER AMADON, and those similarly situated to him, who have or will opt-in to this action, demand judgment against Defendants for the minimum wages due them for the hours worked by them for which they have not been properly compensated, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit, and for all other relief the Court deems just and proper.

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31. Plaintiff, RICKY ESPINAL, repeats and re-alleges Paragraphs 14-30 as though fully set forth. 32. MCM used a third-party vendor to mail MCM’s Collection Letters to Plaintiff as well as other similarly formatted Collection Letters to other Florida consumers with addresses within this Judicial District. 33. In using a form/template collection letter to generate MCM’s Collection Letters, MCM caused Plaintiff’s name, address, the name of the creditor, the amount owed, the so-called “transaction date”, the account number for the creditor, and MCM’s reference number to be inserted into form/template collection letter. 35. Plaintiff did not consent to MCM communicating Plaintiff’s personal information and Plaintiff’s status as an alleged debtor with MCM’s letter vendor. 36. Sharing personal information of a consumer with third-parties violates Section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA. See, Hunstein v. Preferred Collection and Management Services, Inc., 994 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. April 21, 2021). 37. Section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA, titled “Communication with third parties,” with very limited exceptions, prohibits debt collectors from disclosing to third-parties that a “consumer” is obligated to pay debt to a creditor communicated to third-parties without consent of the consumer. See, Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., 994 F.3d 1341, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 11648 (11th Cir. 2021). 38. Section 1692c(b), entitled “Communication with third parties,” states as follows: Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, ... a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (emphasis supplied). 40. Section 1692b relates to the manner in which a debt collector may lawfully communicate "with any person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information." 15 U.S.C. § 1692b (emphasis supplied). 41. Section 1692a(7) defines the term “location information” to mean “a consumer’s place of abode and his telephone number at such place, or his place of employment”. 42. Defendant’s transmission of Plaintiff’s personal information and Plaintiff’s status as a debtor to Defendant’s letter vendor did not constitute an attempt to obtain “location information” related to Plaintiff. 44. “[T]he existence of a right of privacy is now recognized in the great majority of the American jurisdictions that have considered the question." Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A cmt. a. (Am. Law Inst. 1977)). 45. “[T]he term ‘invasion of privacy’ comprises an identifiable family of common-law torts—including, most relevantly here, ‘public disclosure of private facts.’ Invasion of Privacy, Black's Law Dictionary 952 (10th ed. 2014).” Id. at *8- *9. 46. “It is hornbook law that ‘[o]ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.’ Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977).” Id. at *9. 48. The tort of “invasion of privacy” comprises an identifiable family of common-law torts—including, most relevantly here, “public disclosure of private facts.” INVASION OF PRIVACY, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 952 (10th ed. 2014). It is hornbook law that “[o]ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). See also, 77 C.J.S. RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY § 32; 78. Plaintiff RICKY ESPINAL repeats and re-alleges Paragraphs 14-30 as though fully set forth. 79. In order to gain a competitive advantage over other debt collectors, and in defiance of the prohibitions set forth by Section 1692f(8) of the FDCPA, MCM caused form collection letters to be mailed to consumers like Plaintiff where the subject envelopes are marked with the words “TIME SENSITIVE DOCUMENT” or “Extremely Urgent”. 81. MCM knows that by enclosing collection letters inside of envelopes marked with the words “TIME SENSITIVE DOCUMENT” or Extremely Urgent, consumers are more likely read the enclosed letter and pay the subject debt – than if the letter was sent in a plain envelope. 82. MCM knows that by enclosing collection letters inside of envelopes marked with the words “TIME SENSITIVE DOCUMENT” or “Extremely Urgent”, consumers are more likely read the enclosed letter and call Defendant regarding the consumer’s debt. 83. For example, MCM’s Collection Letters informed Plaintiff that he could only take advantage of a certain discounted payment option if Plaintiff called a designated telephone number. 84. MCM knows that enclosing collection letters inside of envelopes marked with the words “TIME SENSITIVE DOCUMENT” or “Extremely Urgent” leads to increased connections with consumers in comparison to when MCM caused collection letters to be mailed inside of plain envelopes. 85. MCM has determined that it collects more money from consumers when it sends letters enclosed within envelopes marked with the words, “TIME SENSITIVE DOCUMENT” or “Extremely Urgent” in comparison to when MCM caused collection letters to be mailed inside of plain envelopes. 87. As discussed above, MCM has caused numerous Collection Letters to be sent to Plaintiff in an attempt to collection the Subject Debt. 88. At least one of MCM’s Collection Letters was mailed to Plaintiff inside of an envelope that contained the words “TIME SENSITIVE DOCUMENT” on its exterior in bold font. 89. At least one of MCM’s Collection Letters was mailed to Plaintiff inside of an envelope that contained the words “Extremely Urgent” on its exterior in bold blue colored font. 90. When Plaintiff observed the words “TIME SENSITIVE DOCUMENT” and “Extremely Urgent”, Plaintiff’s attention was immediately drawn to these words. 91. Reading the words

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37. Named Plaintiffs were employed and currently work for Defendants in Defendants’ Northern Virginia branch. 38. Plaintiffs’ job duties include safely and appropriately setting up work-zones in accordance with state or local Department of Transportation and Safety policies and procedures; reading, understanding and following safety policies and managers’ instructions; placing traffic control devices, signs, and markers in compliance with work zone diagrams; maintaining safety zones while directing movement of vehicular traffic through work zones using sign, hand, and flag signals; wear and maintain personal protective equipment (“PPE”); ensure Defendants’ customers’ workers are warned of any impending work zone violation if an incoming vehicle does not adhere to work zone; ensure all safety equipment, vehicles, lights, signs and company owned property is handled in a safe careful manner; among other duties. 39. Defendants compensate Flaggers, Crew Chiefs, or similar positions, on an hourly basis. Defendant classifies these employees as non-exempt under the FLSA. 40.1-28.10. 41. Additionally, Plaintiffs typically work one to two Saturdays or Sundays per month. During such weeks, Plaintiffs work approximately twelve (12) hour shifts, six (6) days per week, with a thirty (30) minute unpaid lunch break per shift, which Defendants automatically deduct from Plaintiffs’ time. 42. Prior to May 2021, Defendants did not require Plaintiffs to record their hours worked. Instead, Defendants determined Plaintiffs’ hours worked by taking the time recorded on the first and last “billing tickets” of each day, which are invoices generated for Defendants’ clients. Defendant would use the time shown on the first billing ticket of the day as Plaintiffs’ “start” time and would use the time shown on the last billing ticket of the day as Plaintiffs’ “end” time. 43. Starting in May 2021, Defendants now require Plaintiffs to record the time they arrive at Defendants’ shop in the morning until they leave for the first job site on paper timesheets. However, Defendants do not compensate Plaintiffs at their appropriate regular or overtime rate for this time, and instead compensate Plaintiffs at a minimum wage rate for whatever hours are reflected on these timesheets. Otherwise, Defendants still do not compensate Plaintiffs for their post-shift work, and still use the “billing tickets” to determine “start” and “end” times for Plaintiffs’ shifts. 45. During the relevant period, Plaintiffs typically perform approximately ninety (90) minutes of post-shift work each workday, including picking up cones, cleaning up road flares, picking up signage, traveling back to Defendants’ shop, unloading equipment from work trucks, inspecting equipment and vehicles for damage, and numerous other tasks to properly wind down Plaintiffs’ shifts. Because these duties must be performed after the time that is recorded on the last “billing ticket” of the day, which Defendants use as the “end time” for Plaintiffs’ shifts, Plaintiffs’ time engaged in such post-shift activities are not properly captured or compensated. 46. This required, pre- and/or post-shift work has to be performed before the “start” of each shift and following the “end” of each shift. The pre-shift work is necessary in order for Plaintiffs to fulfil their job duties while on job sites. Additionally, the post-shift work is necessary to adequately wind down Plaintiffs’ work for the day and to protect Defendants’ equipment, vehicles, and property. 47. Defendants, through their actions, directives, and policies, mandated that Plaintiffs perform this pre- and/or post-shift work. 48. If Plaintiffs do not perform this pre- and/or post-shift work, they risk receiving verbal and written warnings on their records. Multiple verbal and written warnings could result in disciplinary action or termination from employment. 50. Prior to May 2021, Defendants did not compensate Plaintiffs for any work performed prior to the time listed on the first “billing ticket,” or any work performed after the time recorded on the last “billing ticket.” After May 2021, Defendants now compensate Plaintiffs for pre-shift work and hours reflected on paper time sheets, but Defendants only do so at a minimum wage rate, not Plaintiffs’ regular rate or proper overtime rate. Additionally, Defendants still do not compensate Plaintiffs for any post-shift work completed. 51. Indeed, while Defendants compensate Crew Chiefs at the minimum wage rate for travel time to the first job site and travel time from the last job site, Defendants do this on an approximate basis via the time displayed in Google Maps. Defendants do not compensate any other Plaintiff, including Flaggers, for the time spent traveling to the first job site and time spent traveling from the last job site. 52. While Defendants do provide Crew Chiefs with some compensation for travel time, Defendants do not compensate Crew Chiefs for all of the travel time to the first job site and travel time from the last job site because Defendants do not compensate Crew Chiefs for the actual time spent traveling by Crew Chiefs, but rather pay Crew Chiefs for the time that is reflected in a GPS search using Google Maps. This method does not account for factors which could increase travel time from the time quoted by Google Maps, such as traffic, streetlights, inclement weather, and other factors. Every other employee, other than Crew Chiefs, are not paid for the time they spend traveling at all. 54. Further, Defendants have a policy of automatically deducting a thirty (30) minute lunch break from Plaintiffs’ time each day, despite Plaintiffs often working through this time and not being able to take lunch breaks. 55. Upon starting his employment with Defendants, Named Plaintiff Nelson was informed by his Facility Manager at the time, Quinton Garnett, that a thirty (30) minute lunch break would be automatically deducted from his time each workday. 56. While Quinton Garnett, who is now Area Manager for Defendants, has stated that Defendants look at notations on billing tickets to determine whether Plaintiffs took a lunch break for that day, and subsequently follow up with Plaintiffs if no notations are present, Named Plaintiffs have never been asked by Defendants if they were unable to take a lunch break. 57. Plaintiffs are often not able to leave the job sites to take a lunch break for a variety of reasons. For instance, Plaintiffs are often on job sites where they have to control the flow of traffic around construction sites. These construction sites have numerous hazards, such as holes in the ground, which require the constant presence of Plaintiffs to direct traffic around the hazards. Thus, Plaintiffs are unable to take any break whatsoever until such hazards are neutralized. 58. Defendants’ managers are aware that Plaintiffs often work through their lunch breaks. Defendants’ managers inform Plaintiffs upon hire that Plaintiffs might need to eat their lunch when driving between job sites or that they might not be able to eat lunch at all. Despite this, Defendants still automatically deduct a thirty (30) minute lunch break from Plaintiffs’ time, regardless of whether Plaintiffs actually take a lunch break. 60. On average, Plaintiffs worth through their lunch breaks approximately four (4) to five (5) days per week. 61. Defendants also do not properly pay Plaintiffs for the undercounted overtime hours that Defendants list on Plaintiffs’ earnings statements. Such overtime hours are undercounted because of the aforementioned pre-and/or post-shift work performed, travel time, and automatically deducted lunch breaks, which Defendants do not compensate Plaintiffs for. However, Plaintiffs are not properly compensated at the appropriate overtime rate even for the overtime hours that Defendants list on Plaintiffs’ earnings statements. This is because Defendants often list “OT” line items on Plaintiffs’ earnings statements with a certain amount of “hours” on the line item, but do not compensate Plaintiffs for this time. 62. Additionally, any payments that are made to Plaintiffs under the “OT” line items in Plaintiffs’ earnings statements do not accurately match the proper overtime compensation and proper overtime rate that Plaintiffs are entitled to pursuant to the FLSA, VMWA, and VWPA. 63. Beginning in early 2021, Defendant began to include a line item on one of Plaintiffs’ earnings statements for “retro pay.” Incredibly, even though Defendants have included this line item on Plaintiffs’ earnings statement, Plaintiffs have not actually been paid any of the “retro pay” listed. 65. Defendants’ failure to compensate for all pre-and/or post-shift work performed, travel time, and automatically deducted lunch breaks has affected all Plaintiffs similarly. 66. Named Plaintiffs bring the First Cause of Action of the instant Complaint as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated employees. 67. Members of the FLSA class are similarly situated. 68. Members of the FLSA class have substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are subject to common practices, policies, or plans that fail to compensate them for all work performed and fail to compensate them at the appropriate overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. 69. There are numerous (in excess of 300) similarly situated current and former Flaggers, Crew Chiefs, or similar positions that fall within the scope of the aforementioned FLSA class. 70. These similarly situated employees are known to Defendants, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendants’ records. Members of the proposed FLSA class, therefore, should be permitted to pursue their claims collectively, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 71. Pursuit of this action collectively will provide the most efficient mechanism for adjudicating the claims of Plaintiffs. 73. Named Plaintiffs request that they be permitted to serve as representatives of those who consent to participate in this action, and that this action be conditionally certified as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 74. Named Plaintiffs bring the Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action of the instant Complaint as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated employees, for relief to redress and remedy Defendant’s violations of the VMWA and VWPA, Virginia Code §§ 40.1-28.8 et seq., and 40.1-29 et seq. 75. Plaintiffs bring their state law counts for violations of the VMWA and VWPA as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated employees, for relief to redress and remedy Defendants’ violations of the VMWA and VWPA and failure to pay all wages due and owing pursuant to Defendants’ written employment contract and/or compensation plan and/or Defendants’ failure to pay full reasonable consideration for all compensable work duties performed for Defendants’ benefit. 76. Pursuit of this action as a class will provide the most efficient mechanism for adjudicating the claims of the Named Plaintiffs and the putative Class Plaintiffs. 78. Members of the Class and/or any Subclasses will be collectively referred to as “class members.” Plaintiffs reserve the right to re-define the Class and add additional Subclasses as appropriate based on investigation, discovery and specific theories of liability. 81. Public Policy Considerations: Employers in the Commonwealth of Virginia violate employment and labor laws every day. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing actions because they believe their former employers might damage their future endeavors through negative references and/or other means. Class actions provide the class members who are not named in the complaint with a type of anonymity that allows for the vindication of their rights at the same time as affording them privacy protections. 83. Plaintiffs hereby re-alleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 84. At all relevant times, Defendants have been, and continue to be, “employers” engaged in interstate “commerce” and/or in the production of “goods” for “commerce,” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. 85. At all relevant times, Defendants have employed, and continue to employ, “employee[s],” including Plaintiffs, and each of the members of the prospective FLSA Class, that have been, and continue to be, engaged in interstate “commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA, 92. Plaintiffs hereby re-alleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 93. At all relevant times, Defendants have employed, and/or continue to employ, Plaintiffs within the meaning of the VMWA. 94. Defendants employ Named Plaintiffs, and similarly situated employees, within the Commonwealth of Virginia. 96. Virginia Code § 40.1-28.8 et seq. also provides that “[f]rom May 1, 2021, until January 1, 2022, every employer shall pay to each of its employees’ wages at a rate not less than the greater of (i) $9.50 per hour or (ii) the federal minimum wage.” 97. During the relevant time period, Defendants paid Plaintiffs and class members less than minimum wages when they did not pay Plaintiffs and class members for all hours worked. For example, whenever Plaintiffs performed pre- and/or post-shift work, travel time, or worked through their lunch break, Defendants did not pay them at all for the time they spent working. To the extent these hours do not qualify for the payment of overtime, Plaintiffs and class members were not being paid at least minimum wages for their work. 98. During the relevant time period, Defendants regularly failed to pay at least minimum wages to Plaintiffs and class members for all hours worked pursuant to Virginia Code § 99. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and class members the required minimum wages violate Virginia Code § 40.1-28.10. Pursuant to Virginia Code § 40.1-29, Plaintiffs and class members are entitled to recover the unpaid balance of their minimum wage compensation as well as interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees. 100. Pursuant to Virginia Code § 40.1-29, Plaintiff and class members are entitled to recover liquidated damages in an amount equal to the wages unlawfully unpaid and interest thereon. 101. Pursuant to Virginia Code § 40.1-28.11, whoever knowingly and intentionally violates any provisions of this article shall be punished by a fine of not less than $10 nor more than $200. Violation of the Virginia Minimum Wage Act Virginia Code § 40.1-28.8 et seq. Brought by Named Plaintiffs on Behalf of Themselves and all Similarly Situated Employees Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Brought by Named Plaintiffs on Behalf of Themselves and all Similarly Situated Employees

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39. Plaintiff Canary is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by Plaintiff Canary STATUTORY VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. 128. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 129. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 130. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory damages for each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 131. Plaintiff and Class Members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendant’s violation of the TCPA in the future. 132. Plaintiff and Class Members are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs as provided by law.

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25. On or about June 27, 2019, Defendant called Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 6638 (“6638 Number”). 26. Upon Plaintiff answering the phone, Plaintiff heard a very long and noticeable pause before he was greeted by a live person. This pause is indicative of automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) technology. 28. When Plaintiff was transferred to a live person, the person introduced themselves as Diamond and stated that they were calling on behalf of Momentum Solar. Defendant then proceeded to try to sell Plaintiff solar panels and to try and setup a solar panel installation. 29. Plaintiff is the subscriber and/or sole user of the 6638 Number. 30. Additionally, Plaintiff has been registered on the National Do Not Call Registry since July of 2007. 31. Defendant called Plaintiff from 941-264-1066, a number which upon information and belief, Defendant owned and/or operated. 33. On or about July 8, 2019, Defendant called Plaintiff again at the 6638 Number from the telephone number 407-890-0217. During that telephone call, Plaintiff told Defendant to stop calling him. 34. Despite Plaintiff instructing Defendant to stop calling him, on or about July 19, 2019 Defendant called Plaintiff again at the 6638 Number from the telephone number 914-223-7530. 35. Plaintiff received the subject calls within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. 36. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused similar calls to be placed to individuals residing within this judicial district. 37. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with written express consent to be contacted. 39. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 40. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the below defined Class: No Consent Class: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were called by Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number, using the same equipment, or type of equipment, used to call Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, without their prior express written consent. Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) were called by or on behalf of Defendant; (2) more than one time within any 12- month period; (3) where the person’s telephone number had been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days; (4) for the purpose of selling Defendant’s products and/or services; and (5) for whom Defendant’s claim (a) it did not obtain prior express written consent, or (b) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff. 41. Defendant and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 44. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones using an automatic telephone dialing system; (2) Whether Defendant can meet their burden of showing that they obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 45. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants routinely calls telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 50. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 52. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency marketing telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and other members of the Class. 53. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express written consent from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express written consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 54. Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. 55. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. 56. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 49 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 58. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.” 59. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.” 60. Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c). 61. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. 63. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Perry Becker, on behalf of himself and the other members of the Class, prays for the following relief: a. A declaration that Defendant’s practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227; b. A declaration that Defendant’s violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, were willful and knowing; c. An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing system to call telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express consent of the called party; d. An award of actual, statutory damages, and/or trebled statutory damages; and e. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just. PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class)

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23. On February 8, 2010, Plaintiff Valdes registered his cellular phone number on the DNC to avoid receiving unsolicited phone calls. Since that time, the cellular phone number has been primarily for personal use. Plaintiff has never held the cellular phone number out to the public in connection with a business. 41. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 40 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference. 42. Defendant’s realtors made unwanted solicitation calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class using equipment that, upon information and belief, had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. 43. These solicitation telephone calls were made en masse without the prior express written consent of Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class. 44. Defendant’s realtors made these calls negligently or willfully and knowingly. 45. Defendant is vicariously liable for its realtors’ calls because it directed, apparently authorized, and/or ratified the realtors’ actions. 47. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 40 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference. 48. The TCPA’s implementing regulations provide that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not- call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c). 49. This regulation is “applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e). 56. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 40 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference. Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claims Harcourts Prime Directs Realtors to Cold Call Consumers Harcourts Prime’s Realtors Made Unsolicited, Autodialed Cold Calls to Plaintiff Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Internal Do Not Call Class) Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff Valdes and the Do Not Call Registry Class) Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodialed No Consent Class)

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14. Plaintiff restates each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully rewritten. 15. Plaintiff began her education with Chamberlain University in September 2018, by enrolling in the University’s Bachelor of Science in Nursing (“BSN”) program. 16. Prior to Plaintiff agreeing to attend Chamberlain University, the University made several representations to Plaintiff, including but not limited to, that Plaintiff would be receiving a live on-campus education at the University’s Cleveland campus, that Plaintiff would be receiving hands-on instruction, that Plaintiff would be receiving clinical experience essential to her education, that Plaintiff would be given access to on-campus resources and facilities, and that Plaintiff would be given the opportunity for one-on-one and small group instruction. 17. These representations were made to Plaintiff not only in her enrollment agreement, but additionally through the University’s website, printed literature, videos, campus tour and application process. 18. Based on these representations by the University, Plaintiff agreed to enroll in the University’s BSN program, with the understanding that Plaintiff would be required to complete 122 credit hours to earn her degree at cost to Plaintiff of $675 per credit and an estimated total cost of $88,045. 19. The University has generally charged Plaintiff $675 per credit hour for all semesters, including the March 2020 semester and beyond. 5 20. Chamberlain University operates on a year-round, two month “session” academic calendar wherein each full calendar year contains six sessions. Plaintiff and the members of the Class are charged tuition and Mandatory Fees each semester, i.e. every two months. 21. The credits that Plaintiff and the Class members pay for and receive from Chamberlain University have very limited or zero transferability to other academic institutions. 22. The March 2020 semester at the University began on or about March 1, 2020. On March 14, 2020, the University informed Plaintiff and the Class members that all campuses would be closing until further notice. 23. The practical effect of the University’s decision to close all campuses was that all classes were transitioned to online format only and Plaintiff and the Class members no longer had access to on-campus facilities and resources. 24. On March 20, 2020, the University informed Plaintiff and the Class members that campuses would remain closed and coursework would be delivered online only until at least April 10, 2020. 25. On March 27, 2020, the University informed Plaintiff and the Class members that campuses would remain closed and coursework would be delivered online only through the end of the May 2020 session (June 27, 2020). The University did not provide Plaintiff and the Class members any discount on tuition or Mandatory Fees for the May 2020 session. 26. On June 9, 2020, the University informed Plaintiff and the Class Members that coursework would continue to be delivered online only through the end of the July 2020 session (August 29, 2020). Plaintiff and the Class Members were informed that “limited clinicals and campus clinical demos” would resume and that the University would be providing more 6 information. The University did not provide Plaintiff and the Class members any discount on tuition or Mandatory Fees for the July 2020 session. 27. On July 15, 2020, the University informed Plaintiff and the Class Members that coursework would continue to be delivered online only through the end of the September 2020 session (October 24, 2020). Plaintiff and the Class Members were informed that clinicals and campus clinical demos would continue to be limited. The University did not provide Plaintiff and the Class members any discount on tuition or Mandatory Fees for the September 2020 session. 28. On September 30, 2020, the University informed Plaintiff and the Class Members that coursework would continue to be delivered online only through the end of the November 2020 session (December 19, 2020). Plaintiff and the Class Members were informed that clinicals would continue to be limited and that only campus simulation, skills labs, return demonstrations, fingerprinting and course testing would be resuming in person on campus. The University did not provide Plaintiff and the Class members any discount on tuition or Mandatory Fees for the November 2020 session. 29. On November 30, 2020, the University informed Plaintiff and the Class Members that coursework would continue to be delivered online only through the end of the January 2021 session (February 27, 2021). Plaintiff and the Class Members were informed that clinicals would continue to be limited and that only campus simulation, skills labs, return demonstrations, fingerprinting and course testing would be resuming in person on campus. The University did not provide Plaintiff and the Class members any discount on tuition or Mandatory Fees for the January 2021 semssion. 30. The University touts the quality of its on-campus education by representing to applicants that “[f]rom the classroom to high-tech simulation labs, you will have hands-on 7 experiences that will prepare you for all the scenarios being a nurse can present, and make you confident that you are prepared for your career.”3 31. Moreover, the University represents to Plaintiff and the Class Members that their on-campus education will include access to the University’s SIMCARE CENTER which “gives nursing students the opportunity to practice clinical skills on high-tech manikins…” and “lets students use advanced technology in a seemingly real clinical setting, so that students learn how to react to scenarios such as seizures, cardiac arrest and childbirth.”4 32. Additionally, the University represents to Plaintiff and the Class members that their on-campus education will include access to the University’s Center for Academic Success which is to provide students with in-person tutoring and a variety of academic and clinical resources.5 33. The online learning options being offered to the University’s students are sub-par in practically every aspect relative to the on-campus live coursework that Plaintiff and the Class members bargained for. 34. The difference in quality between a live in-person education and an online education is particularly stark in the field of nursing. The University’s live on-campus instruction is often designed around the use of computerized manikins that allow instructors to physically demonstrate nursing skills and then allows students to replicate that instruction. The online classes on the other hand, are much more dependent on power point presentations, present little to no opportunity or one-on-one instruction, are fraught with technical difficulties and offer an inferior forum for students, including Plaintiff, to interact with instructors. 3 https://go.chamberlain.edu/BSN (last visited Jan. 13, 2021). 4 https://www.chamberlain.edu/nursing-school/ohio/cleveland (last visited Jan. 13, 2021). 5 Id. 8 35. When Plaintiff and the Class members agreed to attend Chamberlain University and pay the requisite tuition, they did so in consideration of receiving the promised in-person coursework and on-campus resources, including but not limited to, the SIMCARE CENTER and the Center for Academic Success. 36. By closing their campuses, offering no clinical instruction, and then significantly restricting the opportunity for clinical instruction, the University has not provided the education that it agreed to provide in exchange for the tuition and Mandatory Fees charged. However, the University has failed to refund Plaintiff and the Class members the tuition and Mandatory Fees that have been paid. 37. Plaintiff and the Class members are therefore entitled to a pro-rated refund of the tuition and Mandatory Fees they paid. 38. Plaintiff brings this case individually and, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of the class defined as: All persons who paid tuition and the Mandatory Fees for a student to be enrolled at any Chamberlain University campus for the March 2020 Session through the January 2021 Session (the “Class”). 39. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained on behalf of the Class proposed herein under the criteria of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 40. The requirements of Rule 23(a)(1) have been met. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff, the identity of all such students is known to the University and can be identified through the University’s records. Class members may be notified of the pendency of 9 this action by recognized, Court-approved notice dissemination methods, which may include U.S. Mail, electronic mail, Internet postings, and/or published notice. 41. The requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) have been met. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class including, without limitation: a. Whether the University accepted money from Plaintiff and the Class members in exchange for the promise to provide an in-person and on- campus live education, as well as certain facilities and services throughout the relevant sessions; b. Whether the University breached its contracts with Plaintiff and the members of the Class by failing to provide them with an in-person and on-campus live education after March 14, 2020; c. Whether the University breached its contracts with Plaintiff and the members of the Class by failing to provide the services and facilities to which the Mandatory Fees pertained after mid-March 2020; d. Whether Defendant has been unjustly enriched by retaining a portion of the tuition and Mandatory Fees during the period of time the University has been closed, and Plaintiff and the members of the Class have been denied an in-person and on-campus live education and access and the services and facilities for which the Mandatory Fees were paid; e. The amount of damages and other relief to be awarded to Plaintiff and the Class members. 42. The requirements of Rule 23(a)(3) have been met. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class because Plaintiff and the other Class members each 10 contracted with Defendant for it to provide an in-person and on-campus live education for the tuition they paid and the services and facilities for the Mandatory Fees that they paid, that the University stopped providing in mid-March. 43. The requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) have been met. Plaintiff is an adequate class representative because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the other Class members who she seeks to represent, Plaintiff has retained competent counsel who are experienced in complex class action litigation, and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Class members’ interests will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and her counsel. 44. Class certification of Plaintiff’s claims is also appropriate pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) because the above questions of law and fact that are common to the Class predominate over questions affecting only individual members of the Class, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. The damages or financial detriment suffered by individual Class members are relatively small compared to the burden and expense of individual litigation of their claims against the University. It would, thus, be virtually impossible for the Class, on an individual basis, to obtain effective redress for the wrongs committed against them. Furthermore, Individualized litigation would create the danger of inconsistent or contradictory judgments arising from the same set of facts. Individualized litigation would also increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system from the issues raised by this action. By contrast, the class action device provides the benefits of adjudication of these issues in a single proceeding, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court, and presents no unusual management difficulties under the circumstances. 11 45. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the factual allegations above as if fully alleged herein. 46. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the Class. 47. By paying the University tuition and the Mandatory Fees, the University agreed to, among other things, provide an in-person and on-campus live education as well as access to on- campus clinics, services and facilities. As a result, Plaintiff and each member of the Class entered into a binding contract with the University. 48. Defendants are in possession of all contracts, materials, circulars, advertisements, and the like between the Plaintiff and members of the Class, on hand one, and the University, on the other. Plaintiff, on the other hand, is not in possession or does not have access to all of the contracts, materials, circulars, advertisements and the like that embody the agreement between Plaintiff, the members of Class and the University. Moreover, attachment of such voluminous materials hereto would be impractical if not impossible. 49. The University has failed to provide the contracted for in-person and on-campus live education, as well as the services and facilities to which the Mandatory Fees pertained, yet the University has retained monies paid by Plaintiff and the Class for a live in-person education and access to these services and facilities. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have therefore been denied the benefit of their bargain. 50. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have suffered damage as a direct and proximate result of the University’s breach in the amount of the prorated portion of the tuition and Mandatory Fees they each paid equal to the reduction in contracted for education and services 12 during the March 2020 Session and all future sessions where the campuses were closed or students were moved to distance/virtual learning. 51. The University should return such portions to Plaintiff and each Class Member. 52. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the factual allegations above, as if fully alleged herein. 53. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the Class in the alternative to the First Claim for Relief. 54. Plaintiff and members of the Class conferred a benefit on the University in the form of tuition and Mandatory Fees paid for the benefit of an in-person and on-campus live education and the services and facilities to which the Mandatory Fees pertained. The payment of tuition and Mandatory Fees for the semester were intended to provide these benefits to Plaintiff and the members of the Class throughout the entire semester. 55. The University has retained the full benefit of the tuition and Mandatory Fee payments by Plaintiff and the members of the Class for the semester, yet has failed to provide the quality of education and services and facilities for which tuition and the Mandatory Fees were paid, including those for an in-person and on-campus live education, and access to the University’s services and facilities. 56. The University’s retention of all of the tuition and Mandatory Fees paid by Plaintiff and members of the Class during the period of time the University has been closed, and Plaintiff and the members of the Class have been denied an in-person and on-campus live education and 13 access and the services and facilities for which the Mandatory Fees were paid, is unjust and inequitable under the circumstances. 57. Undoubtedly, the costs incurred for having an online only program is significantly lower than the overhead needed to provide classes and services on campus. 58. Allowing the University to retain the tuition and Mandatory Fees paid for in-person on campus education and experiences, after reducing the benefit provided and the costs incurred by the University, unjustly enriches the Defendants. 59. Accordingly, the University should return the prorated portion of the tuition and Mandatory Fees that Plaintiff and the Class members each paid equal to the reduction in benefit for education and services since the March 2020 Session. BREACH OF CONTRACT (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) UNJUST ENRICHMENT (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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10. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiffs seeking to solicit its services to Plaintiffs Case3:15-cv-00939-VC Document1 Filed02/28/15 Page3 of 9 14. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 17. Plaintiffs represent, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of All persons within the United States who received any collection telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously not provided their cellular telephone number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 18. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiffs do not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Case3:15-cv-00939-VC Document1 Filed02/28/15 Page4 of 9 7. Beginning in or around October of 2014, Defendant began contacting Plaintiff Barton on his cellular telephone number ending in 6675, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff Barton to utilize Defendant’s services in securing Plaintiff Barton a college degree. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff Barton from telephone number (707)736-1580. 8. On or around June 8, 2014, Plaintiff Barton inquired about the services in which Defendant provides via a questionnaire which he submitted online. This online submission notwithstanding, Plaintiff Barton never, at any time or through any medium, provided Defendant with his express consent to be contacted via an “automated telephone dialing system.” During all relevant times, Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff Barton on at least thirty-three (33) occasions using an “automated telephone dialing system,” since October of 2014, a time span of approximately three (3) months. Furthermore, Plaintiff Barton informed Defendant to cease contacting him several times when Defendant contacted him on several occasions. 9. Beginning in or around November of 2014, Defendant began contacting Plaintiff Abdullah on his cellular telephone number ending in 9885, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff Abdullah to utilize Defendant’s services in securing Plaintiff Abdullah a college degree. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. /// /// /// /// Case3:15-cv-00939-VC Document1 Filed02/28/15 Page8 of 9 Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiffs and the Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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(Breach of Contract) (Money Had And Received) (Unjust Enrichment) 11. Plaintiff Daniel Zagoria is a graduate student at NYU and is enrolled in a Master’s Degree program in Real Estate Investment and Finance. He has been enrolled at NYU since the 2018 academic year and is scheduled to graduate with a Master of Science degree in 2020. For the current 2019-2020 academic year, NYU charged tuition in an amount exceeding $2,000 per credit unit. Given the number of years and credits required to complete NYU’s graduate degree (or any undergraduate degree at NYU, for that matter) a student is expected to incur tens of thousands of dollars or more in tuition and fees during their enrollment at NYU. NYU Touted And Emphasized The Importance Of Its Schools’ Facilities And In-Person Instruction 12. The marketing and recruitment materials for NYU’s Schack Institute of Real Estate within NYU’s School of Professional Studies where Plaintiff is enrolled went to great lengths to highlight and tout the benefits of the in-classroom in-person teaching experience of its Real Estate program. Describing these benefits, the school’s website specifically pointed out this benefit: Networking Direct engagement with industry, through the nation’s leading conferences, regular speakers, internships, and more. https://www.sps.nyu.edu/homepage/academics/divisions-and-departments/schack-institute-of- real-estate.html (last visited May 6, 2020) (attached hereto as Exhibit 1 to Class Action Complaint). 14. Of course, NYU’s representations as to the benefits of its campus facilities and in- person instruction were not limited merely to those it made in connection with Plaintiff’s graduate program in Real Estate Investment. Instead, NYU touted the benefits of its facilities and campus instruction across the board to students and prospective students in all its schools and programs. For example, with respect to NYU’s Tandon School of Engineering, NYU’s website informed students and prospective applicants about the state-of-the-art laboratory facilities that students could avail themselves upon enrolling at NYU’s engineering school: Why NYU Tandon? Our reputation as a global education leader with a world-class faculty and state-of- the-art labs producing groundbreaking research make the School of Engineering the perfect place to pursue your degree. https://engineering.nyu.edu/admissions/why-nyu-tandon#chapter-id-23766 (last visited May 6, 2020) (attached hereto as Exhibit 2 to Class Action Complaint). 16. None of these Centers or Institutes—key facilities that NYU used to market the value of the science education afforded to students at the College of Arts and Sciences—actually is open or available for use to the students. Despite this, NYU continues to charge and demand tuition as though it were actually making these facilities and instruction therein available for students. 18. The reality, however, is that contrary to the foregoing representation, NYU’s Institute of Fine Arts is not offering any such instruction nor any access to the facilities or travel opportunities that NYU marketed as key benefits of its program. Instead, students at NYU’s Institute of Fine Arts have seen all the Institute’s facilities closed and have been relegated to instruction only through video remote learning. Despite this, NYU is charging and continues to demand full tuition and fees as though such instruction and facilities were being made available. 20. Despite these representations about the value of its “classroom instruction,” the fact is that no classroom instruction is being provided by NYU’s Stern School of Business. Instead, as with all other NYU schools, all courses have been moved to a remote learning video format. Despite this, NYU continues to charge and demand full tuition and fees as if the promised in- classroom instruction were actually being offered. NYU Now Recants And Implicitly Contends Online Distance Learning Without Campus Facilities Provides The Same Learning Experience And Value As Its On-Campus Classroom Instruction, Such That NYU Refuses To Provide Any Tuition Reimbursement. 22. That the putative class member students are not receiving the benefit of the bargain for which they contracted when they agreed to enroll at NYU for this academic year is independently evidenced by an online petition started by a NYU student. That petition entitled, “Partial Refund on NYU Tuition” is available online at https://www.change.org/p/nyu-students- request-partial-refund-from-nyu (last visited May 7, 2020). The petition demands a partial tuition and fee refund for NYU students for the Spring 2020 semester, as it maintains students are being charged fees and tuition for facilities and instruction they are not receiving. 24. The foregoing is just an illustrative sample of students’ postings. Countless postings expressing similar sentiments by NYU students are online expressing the view that neither the online instruction nor the lack of campus facilities equate with the bargained for service and instruction that students signed up for when they enrolled at NYU. NYU changed the bargain but has refused to make any refund of tuition or fees to the aggrieved students. Professors and Deans Publicly Agree That “Remote Distance Learning” Is Not Equivalent To, And Less Valuable Than, Traditional On-Campus University Education. 26. Other education experts are even more blunt. Professor Jonathan Zimmerman who specializes in the history of education at the University of Pennsylvania, was quoted in a recent Philadelphia Inquirer op-ed: “Most online instruction isn’t as effective as the traditional kind, which is why elite schools have consistently resisted it.” 27. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) and 23(b)(2) on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated students enrolled at NYU who pay or are obligated to pay any tuition or fees and any students enrolled at NYU in any future summer session or semester in which NYU does not provide access to its campus facilities or on-campus instruction yet continues to charge full tuition and fees without any proration. Excluded from the class are students who expressly registered for online courses at NYU before the commencement of the Spring 2020 semester. Also excluded from the class definition are all judicial officers assigned to this case and their staff. 28. Class certification is proper because the question raised by this complaint is one of a common or general interest affecting numerous persons, such that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court. 30. Plaintiff and his counsel are adequate representatives of the interests of the putative class. Plaintiff is a student at NYU who is being charged tuition or fees as part of his enrollment. He did not sign up for online instruction. He contends that NYU has breached its agreement with students by continuing to charge and demand full tuition and fees despite NYU not providing any in-person classroom instruction at any of its campuses and not making campus facilities available for students. 31. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in class action litigation to litigate and represent the interests of the class. 32. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims being raised on behalf of the absent class members. Like all absent class members, Plaintiff seeks redress for NYU’s failure to provide any in-person campus instruction or campus facilities while continuing to charge full tuition and fees. The claims Plaintiff asserts are the same and co-extensive as the claims raised on behalf of the absent class members. 37. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all previous allegations, as though set forth in full herein. 38. By the act of matriculation, together with payment of required fees, a contract between Plaintiff and the absent class members on the one hand and, on the other hand, NYU was created. Thus, in addition to any enrollment contract that may exist between NYU and the Plaintiff and class members, an implied-in-fact contract independently exists between the parties as a matter of New York law. 40. By ceasing all in-person classroom instruction, relegating Plaintiff and the class members to online instruction only, and shutting off campus facilities to Plaintiff and the class members, NYU has failed to provide the services that Plaintiff bargained for in entering his contractual relationship with NYU. 41. Although NYU may not bear culpability for the campus closures or the inability to provide any classroom instruction, neither do the enrolled students. Yet, while NYU has used the current COVID 19 shutdown circumstances to excuse its obligation to fully perform the obligations of its bargain with its students, NYU continues to demand that all students fully perform their contractual bargain to pay in full all tuition and fees without any reduction for NYU’s lack of full performance. This is contrary to ordinary tenets of contract law. 42. The nature of the instruction provided by NYU at the time Plaintiff and the class members enrolled (i.e., in-person classroom instruction) as well as the campus facilities offered by NYU across its schools and campuses were and are material terms of the bargain and contractual relationship between students and NYU. 43. NYU’s failure to provide any in-person classroom instruction and its shutdown of campus facilities amount to a material breach of the contract. 45. NYU’s breach and continued demand for full payment from Plaintiff and the absent class members are the proximate causes of Plaintiff’s and the class members’ injury. 46. Plaintiff and the class members have all been harmed as a direct, foreseeable, and proximate result of NYU’s actions because Plaintiff and the class members are being charged full tuition and fees for services that NYU is not providing. 47. Plaintiff and class members are entitled to an award of money damages or partial restitution in an amount to be determined at trial as redress for NYU’s breach. Plaintiff prays for the establishment of a Court-ordered and supervised common fund from which the claims of affected class members may be paid and the attorneys’ fees and costs of suit expended by class counsel, as approved by the Court, may be awarded and reimbursed. 48. NYU continues to insist that full tuition and fees are due from Plaintiff and the students despite NYU’s failure to fully perform their contractual obligations. Unless restrained by way of injunctive relief, NYU’s conduct is reasonably likely to lead to irreparable harm. Plaintiff and the class members are entitled to and do hereby pray for injunctive relief to enjoin NYU’s continued conduct. 49. NYU continues to falsely represent on its website that it offers campus facilities with significant benefit and value to students and continues to falsely represent the value of its in-person on-campus classes. Unless restrained by way of injunctive relief, NYU’s conduct is reasonably likely to lead to irreparable harm. Plaintiff and the class members are entitled to and do hereby pray for injunctive relief to enjoin NYU’s continued conduct. 51. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1-36 as though set forth in full herein. 52. Plaintiff and the class members conveyed money to NYU in the form of tuition and fees for on-campus instruction and facilities that NYU did not provide and is not providing. NYU has continued to retain these monies, despite not providing the on-campus instruction or facilities 53. Through this conduct, NYU has been unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff and the class members. 54. As between the two parties (NYU and the class members), it would be inequitable to permit NYU to fully retain all the benefits conferred upon it by Plaintiff and the class members in the form of tuition and fees paid. 55. Plaintiff and the class members are entitled to and do hereby pray for an order of partial restitution as redress for NYU’s unjust enrichment. Plaintiff prays for the establishment of a Court-ordered and supervised common fund from which the claims of affected class members may be paid and the attorneys’ fees and costs of suit expended by class counsel, as approved by the Court, may be awarded and reimbursed. 57. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1-36 as though set forth in full herein. 58. NYU received money from Plaintiff and the class members in the form of tuition and fee payments. 59. This money received by NYU from Plaintiff and the class members was supposed to be used by NYU for the benefit of the Plaintiff and class members; namely, it was supposed to be used for NYU’s provision of on-campus university instruction and campus facilities to Plaintiff and the class members. 60. NYU received and pocketed the money provided by Plaintiff and the class members in the form of tuition and fee payments but has not provided any campus facilities or on-campus instruction. NYU, therefore, is indebted to Plaintiff and the class members for this failure to provide on-campus instruction and campus facilities.

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18. Palmer offers and sells extended auto warranties and other products and services to American consumers, including to Oregon residents. Palmer generally relies on third party telemarketing agents that it, or its sister entity NCWC, engages to execute telemarketing campaigns by making calls to market or sell Palmer’s or NCWC’s products and services. 20. Palmer’s and NCWC’s telemarking campaigns have unlawfully invaded the privacy of countless American consumers, hundreds of which of which have submitted complaints about Palmer’s and NCWC’s unlawful practices. See, e.g., https://www.bbb.org/us/nj/ocean/profile/extended-warranty-contract- service-companies/palmer-administrative-services-0221- 90163943/customer-reviews; https://www.bbb.org/us/nj/allenhurst/profile/auto-warranty- processing/ncwc-inc-0221-11001474. 22. The Mey Class Action resulted in a class settlement (Mey Class Settlement), which was preliminarily approved by the court on April 6, 2017, certified a class including “[a]ll persons or entities in the United States to whom Got Warranty, Inc., or any third parties on its behalf, sent telemarketing calls promoting the goods or services of Defendants [Palmer and NCWC] at any time from August 6, 2011 to February 27, 2015,” and authorized a $650,000 class settlement fund. The Mey Class Settlement was granted final approval in a judgment entered on July 26, 2017. Mey Class Action, Doc. 149. 24. Palmer and NCWC and their telemarketing agents have altered their unlawful telemarketing campaigns to make it more difficult for consumers to be able to hold them accountable, through the use of phone number spoofing technology or similar tactics which make it nearly impossible for the recipients to discover the identity of the caller(s) without formal legal discovery. See https://www.fcc.gov/spoofing. These tactics also increase Palmer and NCWC’s profits, because calls from numbers with local area codes are much more likely to be answered by the recipients and calls from different numbers are nearly impossible to block. 26. On many occasions, plaintiff answered the calls. Each and every time she answered, she was presented with a prerecorded or artificial voice message soliciting extended auto warranties and stating that she should “dial 1” to speak with an operator or “dial 2” if she wanted her number removed, or similar language. 28. On many occasions plaintiff would not be able to answer the calls, and on each of these occasions one of multiple versions of a prerecorded or artificial voice message would be left on plaintiff’s voicemail. When plaintiff listened to each these messages, she heard a prerecorded or artificial voice consistent with the prerecorded or artificial voice messages that played when plaintiff answered the calls, marketing extended auto warranties. 29. Because plaintiff’s caller identification indicated that these calls were from different numbers, with mostly Oregon area codes, plaintiff was unable to block the calls or to identify the caller or discern the nature of the call, before answering the calls or listening to the messages featuring a prerecorded or artificial voice. 31. Plaintiff has suffered a concrete injury-in-fact and has standing because defendants’ unlawful and unsolicited telemarketing calls using a prerecorded or artificial voice at issue here without her consent “present the precise harm and infringe the same privacy interests Congress sought to protect in enacting the TCPA” and “by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of their recipients.” Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., Ltd. Liab. Co., 847 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2017). Moreover, plaintiff was personally affected by these unwanted calls as she has been frustrated and distressed by her inability to stop the calls, and the calls have invaded her privacy and have disrupted her daily activities and the peaceful enjoyment of her personal and professional life. 35. A class action is proper under FRCP 23(a) because based on information and belief and the investigation by plaintiff’s counsel, to be confirmed through defendants’ records, the class consists of thousands of individuals. Therefore, joinder of all members is impracticable. 37. Plaintiff’s claim is typical of the claims of the class members, based on the same factual circumstances, the same statute, and the same unlawful conduct—defendants’ unlawful telemarketing campaign using a prerecorded or artificial voice without consent—which was uniformly directed toward plaintiff and the other class members, and plaintiff’s and the other class members’ statutory damages will be calculated uniformly based on the number of calls they received.

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10. The Policy covers for damages resulting from business interruption when there is property damage, which is standard in most all-risk commercial property insurance policies, along with coverage for extra expenses. 11. The Policy also covers the actual loss of business income sustained and the actual, necessary, and reasonable extra expenses incurred when access to the Insured Property is specifically prohibited by order of civil authority as the direct result of a covered cause of loss to property in the immediate area of Plaintiff’s Insured Property. This additional coverage is identified as coverage under “Civil Authority.” 12. The Policy also covers the actual loss of business income sustained and the actual, necessary, and reasonable extra expenses incurred caused by direct physical loss or damage to a Dependent Property, such as the property of one of Plaintiff’s clients. 13. The Policy is an all-risk policy, insofar as it provides that a covered cause of loss, including but not limited to direct physical loss or direct physical damage, triggers unless the loss is specifically excluded or limited in the Policy. 14. An all-risk Policy such as that purchased by Plaintiff is one that protects against catastrophic events, such as the one occurring now, involving the global COVID-19 Pandemic that has resulted in the widespread, omnipresent, and persistent presence of COVID-19 throughout the United States, including Plaintiff’s Dependent Properties. 15. Coverage under an all-risk policy is to be broadly interpreted and provided, and exclusions are to be narrowly construed in favor of coverage. 17. The language in the Policy is “adhesionary” in that Plaintiff was not a participant in negotiating or drafting its content and provisions. 18. Plaintiff was not a participant in negotiating or drafting the Policy’s content and provisions. Plaintiff possessed no leverage or bargaining power to alter or negotiate the terms of the Policy, and more particularly, Plaintiff had no ability to alter, change or modify standardized language derived from the ISO format. 19. The presence of virus or disease can constitute physical damage to property, as the insurance industry has recognized since at least 2006. When preparing the Virus Exclusion, the ISO circulated a statement to state insurance regulators that included the following: Disease-causing agents may render a product impure (change its quality or substance),or enable the spread of disease by their presence on interior building surfaces or the surfaces of personal property. When disease-causing viral or bacterial contamination occurs, potential claims involve the cost of replacement of property (for example, the milk), cost of decontamination (for example, interior building surfaces), and business interruption (time element) losses. Although building and personal property could arguably become contaminated (often temporarily) by such viruses and bacteria, the nature of the property itself would have a bearing on whether there is actual property damage. An allegation of property damage may be a point of disagreement in a particular case. 20. Plaintiff purchased the Policy with an expectation that it was purchasing a policy that would provide coverage in the event of a business interruption, such as that suffered by Plaintiff as a result of the COVID-19 Pandemic. 22. The reasonable expectations of Plaintiff—i.e., an objectively reasonable interpretation by the average Policyholder of the coverage that was being provided—was that the Policy included coverage when a civil authority forced closure of the business’ Dependent Properties for an issue of public safety such as that involving the COVID-19 pandemic. 23. The purported exclusions of the Policy that Defendant has or is expected to raise in defense of Plaintiff’s claim under the Civil Authority coverage of the Policy are contradictory to the provision of Civil Authority coverage and violate public policy as a contract of adhesion and hence are not enforceable against Plaintiff. 24. Plaintiff is not seeking coverage because of personal injuries caused by the virus, but rather coverage for property damage, business income loss, and extra expense. 25. The civil authority orders prohibited access to Plaintiff’s Dependent Properties in response to dangerous physical conditions described above resulting from COVID-19. As a result of the presence of COVID-19 and the civil authority orders, Plaintiff suffered business income loss and incurred extra expenses. 26. The Policy does not exclude the losses suffered by Plaintiff, and therefore, the Policy does provide coverage for the losses incurred by Plaintiff. 27. Based on information and belief, Defendant has accepted the policy premiums with no intention of providing any coverage for property damage, business income loss or extra expense, or Civil Authority orders. 29. The scientific community, and those personally affected by the virus, recognize the Coronavirus as a cause of real physical loss and damage. It is clear that contamination of a Dependent Property would be a direct physical loss requiring remediation to clean the surfaces of the business. 30. The virus that causes COVID-19 remains stable and transmittable in aerosols for up to three hours, up to four hours on copper, up to 24 hours on cardboard and up to two to three days on plastic and stainless steel. See https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/new- coronavirus-stable-hours-surfaces (last visited April 9, 2020). 31. The CDC has issued a guidance that gatherings of more than 10 people must not occur. People in congregate environments, which are places where people live, eat, and sleep in close proximity, face increased danger of contracting COVID-19. 32. On March 11, 2020 the World Health Organization (“WHO”) made the assessment that 6. At all relevant times, Defendant issued a policy to Plaintiff to cover business interruption loss from February 1, 2020 until February 1, 2021 for its business at the Insured Property. The policy number is B 6024700178. This policy was intended to cover losses to business interruption. See Declaration, attached hereto as Exhibit 1 (the “Policy”). 69. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) on behalf of the following Class: All insureds of Defendant who have suffered business interruption and lost income as a result of Civil Authority Orders issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 7. The Policy is currently in full effect in providing, among other things, personal property, business income loss and extra expense, civil authority, and other coverage. 71. The exact number of the Class members is unknown as such information is in exclusive control of Defendant. However, due to the nature and commerce involved, Plaintiff believes the Class consists of hundreds of insureds nationwide, making joinder of the Class members impractical. 72. Common questions of law and fact affect the right of each Class member. Plaintiff is seeking Declaratory Relief for all Class members who run businesses with similar polices to Plaintiff’s. Declaratory relief will permit adjudication of the rights of all parties as to whether Defendant’s policies provide coverage for business interruptions losses the Class has suffered as a result of Civil Authority Orders. 73. Common questions of law and fact that affect the Class members include, but are not limited to: a. Whether Defendant was legally obligated to pay for business interruption as a result of Civil Authority Orders issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic; b. Whether Plaintiff and Class members have suffered direct physical loss or damage in accordance with the terms and conditions of Defendant’s business interruption insurance policies; c. Whether Plaintiff and Class members are excluded from coverage for losses they suffered due to the Civil Authority Orders as a result of the Virus Exclusion; and d. Whether Defendant is justified in denying Plaintiff and Class members’ claims. 74. The claims and defenses of Plaintiff, as representative plaintiff, are typical of the claims and defenses of the Class because Defendant wrongfully denied that its policies cover claims of Plaintiff and the Class members. 76. A class action provides a fair and efficient method for adjudication of the controversy. a. Prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of inconsistent and varying results against Defendant when confronted with incompatible standards of conduct; and b. Adjudications with respect to individual Class members could, as a practical matter, be dispositive of any interest of other members not parties to such adjudications and substantially impair their ability to protect their interests. 77. Defendant has taken steps to discourage the Class from submitting claims under their policies. For this reason, Declaratory relief for the entire class is appropriate and necessary. 78. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference into this cause of action each and every allegation set forth in each and every paragraph of this Complaint. 79. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), provides that in “a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 8. Plaintiff submitted a claim for a loss pursuant to its Policy seeking coverage under this Policy. Defendant rejected Plaintiff’s claim for coverage for business income loss and extra expense, civil authority, and other claims, contending, inter alia, that there was no physical loss or damage to Plaintiff’s Insured Property or surrounding property. 81. Resolution of the duties, responsibilities and obligations of the parties is necessary as no adequate remedy at law exists, and a declaration of the Court is needed to resolve the dispute and controversy. 82. Plaintiff seeks a Declaratory Judgment that Plaintiff’s Dependent Properties have experienced direct physical loss or damage. 83. Plaintiff seeks a Declaratory Judgment that the Orders constitute a prohibition of access to Plaintiff’s Dependent Properties. 84. Plaintiff seeks a Declaratory Judgment that the prohibition of access by the Orders has specifically prohibited access as defined in the Policy. 85. Plaintiff seeks a Declaratory Judgment that Plaintiff had no choice but to comply with the civil authority Orders and suspend operations at the business. 86. Plaintiff seeks a Declaratory Judgment that the Orders trigger coverage. 88. Plaintiff seeks a Declaratory Judgment that the Policy provides business income coverage in the event that the coronavirus has caused a loss or damage at a Dependent Property. 89. Plaintiff does not seek any determination of whether the coronavirus is physically in or at the Insured Property, an amount of damages, or any other remedy other than declaratory relief. DECLARATORY RELIEF I. Insurance Coverage VI. Insurance Coverage

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10. Defendants contacted Plaintiff via facsimile from telephone numbers confirmed to belong to Defendants. 11. Defendants contacted Plaintiff on or around April 2018 in an effort to solicit its business. 12. Defendants’ messages constituted “telephone solicitation” as defined by the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) and “unsolicited advertisement” as defined by the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5). 13. Defendants used an “telephone facsimile machine” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3) to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to sell or solicit its business services. 17. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone facsimile messages from Defendants to said person’s telephone facsimile number made through the use of any telephone facsimile machine and such person had not previously consented to receiving such messages 18. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of All persons within the United States who received any telephone facsimile messages from Defendants to said person’s telephone facsimile number made through the use of any telephone facsimile machine and such person had not previously provided their telephone facsimile number to Defendants within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 9. Beginning in or around April of 2018, Defendants contacted Plaintiff on his telephone facsimile numbers ending in -3052, in an effort to sell or solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. • As a result of Defendants’ willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C); and • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. • As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B); and • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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11. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 29. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (the “Class”). 41. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 42. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 46. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 47. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 48. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each member of the Class $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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60. Plaintiffs bring the claims in this Complaint arising out of the NYLL under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and a class consisting of all persons who have worked as waiters, busboys, bartenders, and runners for defendants at Russell’s (the “waitstaff”) for the past six years (the “Rule 23 Class”) 61. The waitstaff in the Rule 23 Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 62. Upon information and belief, the size of the Rule 23 Class is at least fifty people, although the precise number of such employees is unknown. Facts supporting the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of defendants. 64. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Rule 23 Class they seek to represent. 65. Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class work or have worked for defendants as waitstaff within the six years prior to the filing of this action. 66. Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class enjoy the same statutory rights under the NYLL to be paid at the correct minimum wage rates, and to keep the gratuities they earn. 67. Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class have sustained similar types of damages as a result of defendants’ failure to comply with the NYLL. 68. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class have all been injured in that they have been under-compensated due to defendants’ common policies, practices, and patterns of conduct. 70. Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in wage and hour litigation and class action litigation. 71. There is no conflict between the plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class members. 72. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 73. The members of the Rule 23 Class have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a result of defendants’ common policies, practices, and procedures. 74. Although the relative damages suffered by the individual class members are not de minimis, such damages are small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution of this litigation. 75. Individual plaintiffs lack the financial resources necessary to conduct a thorough examination of defendants’ compensation practices and to prosecute vigorously a lawsuit against defendants to recover such damages. 76. In addition, class action litigation is superior because it will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments about defendants’ practices. 77. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 79. The FLSA Collective consist of over fifty waitstaff who have been victims of defendants’ common policy and practices that have violated their rights under the FLSA by, inter alia, willfully denying them minimum wages and unlawfully misappropriating portions of the waitstaff’s tips. 80. The FLSA Collective consist of persons who, during their employment with defendants, worked as servers, bussers, runners, and bartenders and fell into the category of non-exempt, non-managerial tipped employees who customarily and regularly earned more than $30 per month in tips. 81. As part of their regular business practices, defendants have intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly harmed waitstaff by engaging in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA and NYLL. This policy and pattern or practice includes, inter alia, the following: a. failing to keep accurate records of hours worked by the FLSA Collective as required by the FLSA and the NYLL; b. failing to notify the FLSA Collective that defendants were taking a “tip credit” against their wages; c. failing to pay the FLSA Collective minimum wages for all hours worked; d. depriving the FLSA Collective of portions of their tips earned; e. requiring the FLSA Collective to pay for customer walkouts and/or other mistakes; and f. requiring the FLSA Collective to pay for their uniform vests without providing reimbursement of costs for their purchase or laundering. 82. Defendants have engaged in their unlawful conduct pursuant to a corporate policy of minimizing labor costs and denying employees their compensation. 84. The FLSA Collective would benefit from the issuance of a court- supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join the present lawsuit. 85. Those similarly situated employees are known to Russell’s and are readily identifiable and locatable through the records of Russell’s. 86. Those similarly situated employees should be notified of and allowed to opt into this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 87. Throughout plaintiffs’ employment, defendants paid the waitstaff at the reduced tipped employee minimum hourly wage rate. 88. Defendants did not provide waitstaff with written or oral notices stating defendants’ intention to take a “tip credit” against plaintiffs’ wages. 89. The waitstaff’s weekly wage statements did not reflect the amounts that defendants purportedly claimed to take as a tip credit against their wages. 90. For example, for the workweek of January 4 to 10, 2016, plaintiff Dowd worked 28.82 hours and was paid at the reduced hourly minimum wage rate of $7.50. 91. For that workweek, defendants did not pay Dowd at the full hourly minimum wage rate of $9.00. 92. Dowd’s paystub for that workweek, as well as her paystubs from every workweek throughout her employment, do not reflect the amounts that defendants claim to have taken as a tip credit against her wages. 94. For that workweek, defendants did not pay Silvaroli at the full hourly minimum wage rate of $8.75. 95. Silvaroli’s paystub for that workweek, as well as her paystubs from every workweek throughout her employment, do not reflect the amounts that defendants claim to have taken as a tip credit against her wages. Defendants’ Unlawful Misappropriation of Waitstaff Tips 96. Throughout a significant portion of plaintiffs’ employment, defendants employed, and continue to employ, a dining room manager named Santino. 97. Throughout Santino’s employment at Russell’s, each waitstaff member, including plaintiffs, was required to give $3.00 per night of his or her tips to Santino. 98. Until approximately January 2016, Santino was paid on a salary basis. Defendants’ Failure to Pay Waitstaff the Full Minimum Wage Rate

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18. On March 3, 2015, Plaintiff entered into an Apartment Lease to rent an apartment at Harbour Club Apartments. 4   19. A redacted copy of the Apartment Lease and other documents that were involved in the rental of the apartment at 48811 Denton Rd Bld (3) Apt (1), Belleville, Michigan is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 20. Harbour Club Apartments’ mailing address is 49000 Denton Rd., Belleville, Michigan. 21. The term of the Apartment Lease ended on April 11, 2016. 22. Plaintiff was provided a Move Out Statement dated 4/17/2016. (Exhibit B). 23. The Move Out Statement indicated that on move out a total of $529.40 (five hundred twenty-nine dollars and forty cents) was due from Plaintiff. (Exhibit B). 24. Plaintiff had fallen on hard times when his employer stopped paying his employees, including Plaintiff’s wages and medical insurance. 25. On October 31, 2016, Plaintiff, though his counsel, filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy in the Eastern District of Michigan, Case No. 16-54835-mbm. 26. Notice of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy filing was sent to Plaintiff’s creditors. 27. Rent Recover’s website in part states, “If you have failed to successfully complete the terms and conditions of your lease, you are still responsible for all outstanding rent, fees or damages owed. Your signed lease, security deposit bond or outstanding balance will result in your account being referred to Rent Recover for collection.” http://rentrecover.com/residents.cfm (last visited November 16, 2017). 28. Rent Recover sent or caused to be sent Plaintiff a letter dated January 17, 2017, stating in part: 5   Exhibit C. 29. Rent Recover’s letter to Plaintiff also states in part: 30. The two sentences above appear to be standard statements made by Rent Recover in letters sent to debtors in the State of Michigan. 31. On January 26, 2017, the bankruptcy court entered an Order Discharging Debtor. 32. Plaintiff expended time and costs in seeking out legal advise regarding Rent Recover’s post bankruptcy filing collection attempt. 33. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-32 herein. 34. Plaintiff’s contract with Harbour Club Apartments does not include a clause that unpaid amounts will accrue interest at a rate of 7.00 percent annum. 35. The putative class members’ contracts with their landlords do not include a clause that unpaid amounts will accrue interest at a rate of 7.00 percent annum. 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, in part, provides: A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: 6   (1) The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. 37. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, in pertinent part, provides: A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: * * * (2) The false representation of -- (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. . . . 38. The language quoted above in Rent Recover’s letter to Plaintiff violates 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, f, f(1). 39. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-32 herein. 40. MCL § 339.915a provides, in part, that “[a] licensee shall not commit any of the following acts: * * * (a) Communicating with a debtor in a misleading or deceptive manner[.]” 41. The language quoted above in Rent Recover’s letter to Plaintiff violates the language of MCL § 339.915a cited above. 42. A complaint need not define the class rather, “the obligation to define the class falls on the judge’s shoulders” who may ask the parties’ assistance. Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1); Kasalo v. Harris & Harris, Ltd., 656 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 20011). 43. Pursuant to Rule 23 class definitions may be modified by the Court or by Plaintiff prior to the entry of a judgment in this matter. 7   44. On information and belief there are more than 40 persons in Michigan whom within one-year of the filing of this Complaint who received a letter in the form of Exhibit C that included the language “Your account will accrue interest at a rate of 7.00 percent per annum.” 45. There are questions of law and fact common to each class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 46. The predominate questions are whether Michigan former tenant who is sent a letter in the form of Exhibit C that includes the language, “Your account will accrue interest at a rate of 7.00 percent per annum” violates the FDCPA and the MOC. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of a class. 48. Plaintiff has retained Curtis C. Warner, who is counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. 49. A class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 50. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-32 herein. 51. Due to the automatic stay in Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case, Defendant was not permitted to attempt to collect any monies from Plaintiff when the letter dated January 17, 2016, Exhibit C, was sent to Plaintiff. 52. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C §§ 1692e, e(2)(A), e(5), e(10), and 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests this Honorable Court to enter judgment on each of the claims under the FDCPA and MOC in her and the class’ favor and against Defendant for: 8   A. Actual and statutory damages available under the FDCPA and MOC, treble damages under the MOC if Defendant’s conduct is deemed to be willful; and B. Attorney’s fees and costs available under the FDCPA and MOC. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Curtis C. Warner BY: Curtis C. Warner For Plaintiff Peter Pilarski Curtis C. Warner

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38. Plaintiff has actual knowledge that the FLSA Class Members have also been denied overtime pay for hours worked over forty (40) per workweek as well. Plaintiff worked with and communicated with other Appraisers, and as such, has personal knowledge of their existence, status as Defendant’s employees, salary compensation scheme, and the overtime violations. 39. Other employees similarly situated to Plaintiff worked for Defendant in a similar capacity and were not paid overtime at the rate of one and one-half their regular rate when those hours exceeded forty (40) hours per workweek. Other employees similarly situated to Plaintiff worked for Defendant in a similar capacity and were not reimbursed for expenses such as gas and use of their vehicle. 54. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the “California Class,” which is comprised of: All current and former Appraisers employed by Defendant in California at any time during the four year period prior to the filing of this Complaint through the present. 55. Numerosity. The number of members in the California Class is believed to exceed forty. This volume makes bringing the claims of each individual member of the class before this Court impracticable. Likewise, joining each individual member of the California Class as a plaintiff in this action is impracticable. Furthermore, the identity of the members of the California Class will be determined from Defendant’s records, as will the compensation paid to each of them. As such, a class action is a reasonable and practical means of resolving these claims. To require individual actions would prejudice the California Class and Defendant.

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29. Defendant offers the commercial website, https://www.olympiasports.net/, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services offered by the Defendant and which Defendant ensures delivery of such goods throughout the United States including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to, the following, which allow consumers to: purchase clothing, footwear, sports equipment, watches, headphones, accessories and other products available online for purchase, and to ascertain information relating to pricing, ordering merchandise and return and privacy policies. 31. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 32. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in August, 2020, in an attempt to purchase a product from the Defendant, the Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted person and full and equal access to the goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the goods, and services of the Website by being unable to purchase clothing, footwear, sports equipment, watches, headphones, accessories and other products available online for purchase, and to ascertain information relating to pricing, ordering merchandise and return and privacy policies. 34. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually-impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 36. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 37. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s Website and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to use and enjoy the Website in the same manner as sighted individuals do, preventing Plaintiff from using the Website to purchase items and to view the items. 38. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 39. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired persons. 41. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 42. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 44. Web-based technologies have features and content that are modified on a daily, and in some instances an hourly, basis, and a one time “fix” to an inaccessible website will not cause the website to remain accessible without a corresponding change in corporate policies related to those web-based technologies. To evaluate whether an inaccessible website has been rendered accessible, and whether corporate policies related to web-based technologies have been changed in a meaningful manner that will cause the website to remain accessible, the website must be reviewed on a periodic basis using both automated accessibility screening tools and end user testing by visually-impaired persons. 45. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired persons could independently shop for and otherwise research the Defendant’s products via the Website. 47. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually-impaired consumers. 48. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 52. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class and Sub- Classes, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to visually- impaired persons, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to visually- impaired persons, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 53. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class and Sub-Classes. The Class, and Sub-Classes, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind persons, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class and/or the Sub-Classes. 55. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions are common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 56. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by visually-impaired persons throughout the United States. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 59. Defendant’s online retail store is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s online retail store 61. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 62. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 64. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 65. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 66. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 67. Defendant’s Website operates in the State of New York and constitutes an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant’s online retail establishment. 68. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and/or operates its Website in the State of New York. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 70. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 73. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 74. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 75. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate, against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 76. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 78. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 79. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 80. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 81. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 82. Defendant’s website is an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its online sales establishment. 83. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and/or operates its Website in the City of New York, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 85. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 86. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 87. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 89. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 90. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 91. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 92. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 93. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 95. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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