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(Ohio Minimum Wage Violations – Ohio 4111.14(K) Collective) 63) Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 64) Defendants are individual and joint “employers” covered by the minimum wage requirements of the Ohio Wage Laws. 65) The Ohio Wage Laws requires that non-exempt employees be paid at least the lawful minimum wage for each hour worked in a workweek. 66) As employees of Defendants, Plaintiff and others similarly situated work or worked hours in a workweek in which they were not paid a minimum wage. 67) Defendants jointly violated the Ohio Wage Laws by having a company-wide policy of not paying Plaintiff and others similarly situated drive time, which resulted in unpaid minimum wages in the last three (3) years. 68) Plaintiff and others similarly situated were not exempt under the Ohio Wage Laws. Case: 2:19-cv-00278-JLG-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/29/19 Page: 10 of 14 PAGEID #: 10 11 69) Defendants’ failure to keep records of all drive time for each workday and the total hours worked each workweek by Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees further violated the Ohio Wage Laws. 70) By engaging in the above-mentioned conduct, Defendants willfully, knowingly, and/or recklessly violated provisions of the Ohio Wage Laws. 71) As a result of Defendants’ practices, Plaintiff and the Ohio 4111.14(K) Collective members have been damaged in that they have not received wages due to them pursuant to the Ohio Wage Laws; and because wages remain unpaid, damages continue. 72) Pursuant to the Ohio Revised Code, Plaintiff are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs incurred. (Overtime Violations – Ohio Overtime Class) 73) Plaintiff incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 74) Ohio law requires employers to pay overtime in the manner and methods provided in and subject to the exemptions of section 7 and section 13 of the "Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938," 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 207, 213, as amended; and O.R.C. § 4111.03(A). 75) Defendants are individual and joint “employers” covered by the overtime requirements set forth in the OMFWSA. 76) The OMFWSA requires that non-exempt employees be paid for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek at a rate of not less than one and one-half their regular rates. 77) As employees of Defendants, Plaintiff and others similarly situated work or worked more than 40 hours in a workweek, but were not paid overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40. Case: 2:19-cv-00278-JLG-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/29/19 Page: 11 of 14 PAGEID #: 11 12 78) Defendants violated the OMFWSA by having a company-wide policy by not paying Plaintiff and others similarly situated drive time, which resulted in unpaid overtime. 79) Plaintiff and others similarly situated were not exempt under the OMFWSA. 80) Defendants’ practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees drive time resulted in not being paid overtime compensation at a rate of one and one- half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) each workweek in violation of the OMFWSA. 81) By engaging in the above-mentioned conduct, Defendant willfully, knowingly, and/or recklessly violated provisions of the OMFWSA. 82) As a result of Defendants’ practices, Plaintiff and the Ohio Overtime Class members have been damaged in that they have not received wages due to them pursuant to the OMFWSA; and because wages remain unpaid, damages continue. 83) Pursuant to the Ohio Revised Code, Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs incurred. (Overtime – FLSA Collective) 55) Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 56) Defendants are individual and joint “employers” covered by the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA. 57) The FLSA requires that non-exempt employees be paid for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek at a rate of not less than one and one-half times their regular rates. 58) As employees of Defendants, Plaintiff and others similarly situated work or worked more than 40 hours in a workweek, but were not paid for drive time which resulted in unpaid overtime in those workweeks. Case: 2:19-cv-00278-JLG-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/29/19 Page: 9 of 14 PAGEID #: 9 10 59) Defendants’ failure to keep records of all drive time each workday and the total hours worked each workweek by Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees violated the 12) At all relevant times, Defendants are and have been individually and jointly in the business of providing home health care. 13) Plaintiff and others similarly situated were jointly employed by Defendants as non- exempt home health care providers. 14) Plaintiff and others similarly situated were required to travel to and from more than on work location within the same work day, but were not paid for this drive time. 15) Drive times for Plaintiff and others similarly situated ranged from 15 to 20 minutes to as much as 45 to 60 minutes, depending on the location and time of day. 16) Plaintiff typically worked Monday through Fridays. Case: 2:19-cv-00278-JLG-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/29/19 Page: 3 of 14 PAGEID #: 3 4 17) Plaintiff’s hourly rate ranged from about $8.50 to $8.56 per hour. 18) Plaintiff and others similarly situated regularly worked more than 40 hours in a workweek. 19) Defendants’ failure to pay drive time resulted in minimum wage and overtime violations. 20) Further, in the week of October 15 to October 19, 2018, Plaintiff worked 30 hours, but was paid only 24 hours, for an underpayment of six (6) hours. At $8.56 per hour, this resulted in an Ohio minimum wage violation. 21) Plaintiff estimates approximately 50 to 75 similarly situated employees. 22) At all relevant times, Plaintiff and those similarly situated were employees of Defendants within the meaning of the FLSA and the Ohio Wage Laws. 23) At all relevant times, Defendants were individual and joint employers within the meaning of the FLSA and the Ohio Wage Laws. 24) At all relevant times, Defendants comprised an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1). 25) At all relevant times, Plaintiff and those similarly situated were employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206- 207. 26) At all relevant times, Plaintiff and those similarly situated were not exempt from the protections of the FLSA or the Ohio Wage Laws. 27) At all relevant times, Defendants shared operational control over significant aspects of the day-to-day functions of Plaintiff and others similarly situated. Case: 2:19-cv-00278-JLG-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/29/19 Page: 4 of 14 PAGEID #: 4 5 28) At all relevant times, Defendants shared the authority to hire, fire and discipline employees, including Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 29) At all relevant times, Defendants shared the authority to set rates and methods of compensation of Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 30) At all relevant times, Defendants shared the authority to control the work schedules and employment conditions of Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 31) At all relevant times, Defendants shared ultimate authority and control of employment records. 32) At all relevant times, Defendants have mutually benefitted from the work performed by Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 33) At all relevant times, Defendants have not acted entirely independently of each other and have not been completely disassociated with respect to Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 34) At all relevant times, Defendants shared the services of Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 35) At all relevant times, Defendants acted directly or indirectly in the interest of each other in relation to Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 36) Defendants knowingly and willfully engaged in the violations of the FLSA and the Ohio Wage Laws described herein. 37) The exact amount of unpaid wages, including minimum wages and/or overtime compensation that Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated is not yet known by Plaintiff, because most, if not all, records needed to make such calculations are within the possession or control of Defendants or were not kept by Defendants. Case: 2:19-cv-00278-JLG-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/29/19 Page: 5 of 14 PAGEID #: 5 6 38) The FLSA and the Ohio Wage Laws require employers to make, keep, and preserve records of the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment, and to preserve such records. To the extent that Defendants failed to make, keep, and preserve records of all required and unpaid work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees, including drive time, Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable estimate of such time. 39) Plaintiff incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 40) Plaintiff brings this action on her own behalf pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and on behalf of other similarly situated employees who have been, are being, or will be, adversely affected by Defendants’ unlawful conduct. 41) The collective which Plaintiff seeks to represent and for whom Plaintiff seeks the right to send “opt-in” notices for purposes of the collective action, and of which Plaintiff is herself a member, is composed of and defined as follows: All former and current Home Health Aides, or similar home care providers with different job titles, who worked at more than one location in a workday during any workweek within three (3) years preceding the Complaint filing date and through the final disposition of this matter (the “FLSA Collective”). 42) This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) as to claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. In addition to Plaintiff, numerous current and former employees are similarly situated with regard to their claims for unpaid wages and damages. Plaintiff is representative of those other employees and is acting on behalf of their interests as well as her own in bringing this action. Case: 2:19-cv-00278-JLG-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/29/19 Page: 6 of 14 PAGEID #: 6 7 43) The similarly situated employees are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants’ payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action and allowed to opt-in pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 44) Plaintiff incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 45) Plaintiff brings this action on her own behalf and on behalf of other similarly situated employees pursuant to O.R.C. § 4111.14(K) who have been, are being, or will be, adversely affected by Defendants’ unlawful conduct. 46) The collective which Plaintiff seeks to represent and for whom Plaintiff seeks the right to send “opt-in” notices for purposes of the Ohio collective action, and of which Plaintiff is herself a member, is composed of and defined as follows: All former and current Home Health Aides, or similar home care providers with different job titles, who worked at more than one location in a workday during any workweek within two (2) years preceding the Complaint filing date and through the final disposition of this matter (the “Ohio 4111.14(K) Collective”). 47) This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to O.R.C. §4111.14(K) as to claims for unpaid minimum wages, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the Ohio Wage Laws. In addition to Plaintiff, numerous current and former employees are similarly situated with regard to her claim for unpaid wages and damages. Plaintiff is representative of those other employees and is acting on behalf of their interests as well as her own in bringing this action. Case: 2:19-cv-00278-JLG-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/29/19 Page: 7 of 14 PAGEID #: 7 8 48) The similarly situated employees are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants’ payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action and allowed to opt-in pursuant to O.R.C. § 41114.14(K), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the Ohio Wage Laws. 49) Plaintiff further brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of herself and a class of current or former employees employed by Defendants in Ohio, defined as: All former and current Home Health Aides, or similar home care providers with different job titles, who worked at more than one location in a workday during any workweek within two (2) years preceding the Complaint filing date and through the final disposition of this matter (the “Ohio Overtime Class”). 50) The class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is unable to state the exact size of the potential Ohio Overtime Class; but, upon information and belief avers that each class consists of at least 50 to 75 employees (the exact number will be in Defendants’ records). 51) There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Overtime Class including: whether Defendants’ practices in Ohio resulted in its employees not being paid overtime wages and whether such wages remain unpaid. 52) Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Overtime Class members. Her interests are not antagonistic to but, rather, are in unison with, the interests of the Ohio Overtime Class members. Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action wage- and-hour litigation and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio Overtime Class in this case. Case: 2:19-cv-00278-JLG-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/29/19 Page: 8 of 14 PAGEID #: 8 9 53) The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Overtime Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendants’ liability to the class are common to each class as a whole and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 54) Class action treatment is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring Ohio Overtime Class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many Ohio Overtime Class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation.

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25. Defendant Zendesk is a customer service software company founded in Copenhagen, Denmark in 2007 and now headquartered in San Francisco, California. The Company has been reporting to the SEC and listed on the NYSE since conducting its initial public stock offering 2014. 26. According to the Company, the Zendesk product family and platform is purpose-built to help companies deliver the best customer experiences and adapt to changing customer expectations. Zendesk products unify customer communication and customer data across disparate channels and departments and simplify the process of providing great omnichannel customer service and engagement across self-service, phone calls, live chat, messaging, and email. 53. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶1-52 by reference. 54. During the Class Period, defendants disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or deliberately disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 55. Defendants violated §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 in that they: (a) employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; (b) made untrue statements of material fact or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (c) engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon plaintiff and others similarly situated in connection with their purchases of Zendesk common stock during the Class Period. 56. Plaintiff and the Class have suffered damages in that, in reliance on the integrity of the market, they paid artificially inflated prices for Zendesk common stock. Plaintiff and the Class would not have purchased Zendesk common stock at the prices they paid, or at all, if they had been aware that the market prices had been artificially and falsely inflated by defendants’ misleading statements. 57. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶1-56 by reference. For Violation of §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants For Violation of §20(a) of the Exchange Act Against All Defendants

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant operates ILOVEKICKBOXING Fitness Centers as well as the ILOVEKICKBOXING website, and offers it to the public and offers features that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that Defendant offers regarding its Fitness Centers (hereinafter, its “Centers”). 21. Defendant operates ILOVEKICKBOXING Centers across the United States, including its location in New York City at 303 East 43rd Street, New York, NY 10017. 22. These Centers constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s Centers provide to the public important services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of information and services including Center locations and hours, access to details regarding its many programs and services, including access to its class schedules, the ability to sign up online for either a membership or free pass, promotional information, and other services available online and in Centers. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Centers. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Centers and the numerous facilities, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 25. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 28. These access barriers have deterred Plaintiff from revisiting Defendant’s website and/or visiting its physical locations, despite an intention to do so. Defendant Must Remove Barriers To Its Website 29. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired consumers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website, despite her intention to do so. 30. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical Center locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical Centers on its Website and other important information about the Centers locations and hours, access details regarding its many programs and services, including access to its class schedules, the ability to sign up online for either a membership or free pass, promotional information, and other services available online and in Centers. 32. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 33. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 34. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired consumers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 61. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 76. Defendant’s New York State physical locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is by and integrated with these establishments. 77. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 78. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 83. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 84. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 85. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 87. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 91. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 92. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 93. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 96. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 98. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind consumers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 99. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq.

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12. Plaintiff Rodgers has been employed by Defendants as a network operations center (“NOC”) technician since in or around May 2017. 13. Plaintiff Korff was employed by Defendants as a NOC technician from in or around February 2018 until in or around February 2019. 14. NOC technicians receive calls from Defendants’ clients and provide real-time customer service and technical support for software and hardware troubleshooting to Defendants’ clients by remotely accessing their computers and servers using high speed internet connections. 15. Plaintiffs and other NOC technicians are typically scheduled to work 40 hours each workweek. 16. Defendants offer NOC technician service and support to their clients 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 17. In order to provide around-the-clock NOC technician support to their clients, Defendants require NOC technicians to be engaged to work from home outside of normal business hours on rotating seven-week schedules. In other words, in addition to their normal work schedules at Defendants’ facilities, NOC technicians are scheduled to take turns working seven consecutive days outside of their ordinary schedule. 18. Plaintiffs and other NOC technicians must have their computer available, be connected to high speed internet, and prepared to field phone calls and handle customer service and technical support issues whenever it is their turn to provide NOC technician service and support outside of normal business hours. In other words, when scheduled to work outside of 4 business hours, NOC technicians perform the same services and tasks as they do during business hours. 19. Much if not all of the time spent by Plaintiffs and other NOC technicians when scheduled to work outside of business hours is in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 20. However, Defendants do not pay Plaintiffs and other NOC technicians for all time worked outside of business hours. Instead, Defendants only pay Plaintiffs and other NOC technicians for time spent actively handling their clients’ customer service and support needs. 21. As a result, Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiffs and other NOC technicians overtime pay at one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 22. Thus, Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and other NOC technicians proper overtime pay for hours over 40 in a workweek is in violation of the FLSA. 23. Defendants knew and/or acted with reckless disregard of the fact that their failure to pay Plaintiffs and other NOC technicians overtime violates the overtime requirements of the 24. Plaintiffs assert their FLSA claims pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action on behalf of the following class of similarly situated employees: All NOC technicians currently or formerly employed by Defendants at any time since April 2, 2016 who have been required to work outside of business hours at least once. 25. Plaintiffs and the class defined above are “similarly situated” as that term is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) because, among other things, they were all NOC technicians who were subject to a common policy and practice that resulted in uncompensated overtime work. Namely, Defendants have a common policy and practice of requiring them to work outside of 5 business hours without compensation for those hours. 26. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 27. Plaintiffs and the members of the class defined above are employees entitled to the FLSA’s protections. 28. Defendants are employers covered by the FLSA. 29. The FLSA requires that covered employees receive overtime compensation “not less than one and one-half times” their regular rate of pay. 30. Defendants have violated the FLSA by failing to compensate Plaintiffs and the class defined above for all hours above 40 worked in a workweek at one and one-half times their regular rates of pay. 31. In violation of the FLSA, Defendants have acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable FLSA provisions.

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22. Defendant called Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 7780 (“7780 Number”) with multiple pre-recorded voice messages in January and February of 2021. 24. When Plaintiff listened to the prerecorded messages, she was easily able to determine that it was prerecorded. Rahn v. Bank of Am., No. 1:15-CV-4485-ODE-JSA, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186171, at *10-11 (N.D. Ga. June 23, 2016) (“When one receives a call, it is a clear-cut fact, easily discernible to any lay person, whether or not the recipient is speaking to a live human being, or is instead being subjected to a prerecorded message.”). 25. Defendant’s prerecorded message calls constitute telemarketing/advertising because it encouraged her to purchase, rent, or invest in property, goods, or services of the Defendant. 26. Specifically, the prerecorded messages stated that she was receiving a message from “Hendrick Honda” and that if Plaintiff is interested in a car or SUV, she should come in and test drive a vehicle. 27. Plaintiff is the subscriber and/or sole user of the 7780 Number. 28. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to be contacted using a pre-recorded message on the 7780 Number. 29. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused similar prerecorded messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 30. Defendant’s unsolicited prerecorded message caused Plaintiff additional harm, including invasion of privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s call also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to Plaintiff’s daily life. 31. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of Plaintiff and all others similarly situated. 33. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the Class definitions as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 34. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in each the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 37. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to members of the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class are: a) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using a prerecorded message; b) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; c) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; d) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and e) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 43. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 42 as if fully set forth herein. 44. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any …artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 45. It is a violation of the TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC to “initiate any telephone call…using an… artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call.” 47 C.F.R. § 46. Additionally, it is a violation of the TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC to “[i]nitiate, or cause to be initiated, any telephone call that includes or introduces an advertisement or constitutes telemarketing, …artificial or prerecorded voice …other than a call made with the prior express written consent of the called party or the prior express consent of the called party when the call is made…” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2). 47. Defendant used prerecorded messages to make non-emergency telephone calls to the telephones of Plaintiff and other members of the Class. 48. Defendant did not have prior express written consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made and/or failed to honor opt-out requests regarding its prerecorded solicitations. 49. Defendant has, therefore, violated §§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), 64.1200(a)(1)(iii), and 51. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the members of the Class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 64.1200(a)(1)(iii). 64.1200(a)(2) by using prerecorded messages to make non-emergency telephone calls to the telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their consent. PROPOSED CLASS

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15. On or about June 18, 2008, Plaintiff successfully registered his cellular telephone number ending in -1774 with the National Do Not Call Registry. 16. During or about June of 2016, Defendant began sending unsolicited text messages to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 17. The text messages contained information related to sales and new apparel available from Defendant and also included an option to reply with the word “stop” in order to unsubscribe 4 from Defendant’s text messages. 18. Even though Plaintiff repeatedly replied to Defendant’s text messages with the word “stop,” Defendant continued to send text messages to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. By sending such replies, Plaintiff clearly indicated that he did not expressly consent to Defendant sending him these text messages. 19. Despite Plaintiff’s requests that Defendant cease sending text messages to his cellular telephone, Defendant sent numerous messages to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone after such “stop” requests were made. 20. Despite Plaintiff’s unequivocal request that Defendant stop sending him unsolicited text messages, Plaintiff continued to receive many more such messages from Defendant 21. Plaintiff has not previously sought out or requested information regarding Defendant’s business. Further, Plaintiff has not transacted any business with Defendant, nor provided authorization for Defendant to contact Plaintiff in any way, including via automated telephone call or text message. 22. Between June 12, 2017 and August 30, 2017, Plaintiff received at least 58 unsolicited text messages from Defendant on his cellular telephone. 23. On information and belief, Plaintiff has received more than 140 text messages since Defendant began sending them during or about June of 2016. 24. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class defined as follows (the “Class”): All persons or entities within the United States who received any text message or messages, sent by or on behalf of Defendant, without the consent of the recipient, within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 5 25. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the hundreds, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 26. The Class is so numerous that the individual joinder of all of their members is impractical. While the exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the Class include hundreds, if not thousands of members. Plaintiff alleges that the Class members may be ascertained by the records maintained by Defendant. 27. This suit is properly maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.23(a) because the Class are so numerous that joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class Action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the Court. 28. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members and include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following: a. Whether the Class members received any text messages, sent by or on behalf of Defendant, without the consent of the recipient, within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint; and b. Whether Defendant violated the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., by sending automated text messages to the Class members without proper consent. 6 29. As a resident of the United States who received text messages, sent by or on behalf of Defendant, without his consent, within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. 30. Plaintiff has no interest adverse or antagonistic to the interests of the other members of the Class. 31. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained attorneys experienced in the prosecution of class actions. 32. A class action is superior to other available methods of fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since individual litigation of the claims of all Class members is impracticable. Even if every Class member could afford individual litigation, the court system could not. It would be unduly burdensome to the courts in which individual litigation of numerous issues would proceed. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent or contradictory judgments and would magnify the delay and expense to all parties, and to the court system, resulting from multiple trials of the same complex factual issues. By contrast, the conduct of this action as a class action presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and of the court system and protects the rights of each Class member. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 33. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of adjudications with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other Class members not parties to such adjudications or that would substantially impair or impede the ability of such non-party Class members to protect their interests. 7 34. Defendant has acted or refused to act in respect generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final and injunctive relief with regard to the members of the Class as a whole. 35. Defendant failed to comply with the requirements of the TCPA, including but not limited to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b), and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) and (d), as to the Class members with respect to the above-alleged transactions. 36. The TCPA, specifically 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), provides that: It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States, or any person outside the United States if the recipient is within the United States to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice…to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call, unless such call is made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States… 37. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2) provides that: [n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation to…[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the Federal Government. 38. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) provides that: No person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity. The procedures instituted must meet the following minimum standards: … (3) Recording, disclosure of do-not-call requests. If a person or entity making a call for telemarketing purposes (or on whose behalf such a call is made) receives a request from a residential telephone subscriber not to receive calls from that person or entity, the person 8 or entity must record the request and place the subscriber's name, if provided, and telephone number on the do-not-call list at the time the request is made. Persons or entities making calls for telemarketing purposes (or on whose behalf such calls are made) must honor a residential subscriber's do-not-call request within a reasonable time from the date such request is made. This period may not exceed thirty days from the date of such request. 39. In multiple instances, Defendant sent text messages to the Class members without the prior express consent of the recipients, in violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 40. In multiple instances, Defendant sent text messages to the Class members after the members requested they stop and after the members registered with the federal government’s Do- Not-Call list, in violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., and 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(c). 41. In addition, on information and belief, Defendant has not instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing messages made by or on behalf of Defendant, in violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., and 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(d). 42. The size and definition of the Class can be identified through Defendant’s records and/or Defendant’s agents’ records. 43. Plaintiff incorporates all of the allegations and statements made in paragraphs 1 through 42 above as if reiterated herein. 44. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including, but not limited to, each and every one of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., including the implementing regulations of 47 C.F.R. 45. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., Plaintiff is entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 46. Plaintiff is also entitled to and seeks injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 47. Plaintiff incorporates all of the allegations and statements made in paragraphs 1 through 46 above as if reiterated herein. 48. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including, but not limited to, each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., including the implementing regulations of 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(c) and (d). 49. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., Plaintiff is entitled to an award of up to $1,500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 50. Plaintiff is also entitled to and seeks injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 64.1200(c) and (d). 9 NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

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13. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 15. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 16. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 17. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e, 1692g. 20. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 21. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 22. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 23. Some time prior to April 27, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. by the Plaintiff. 24. The Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transactions were primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 26. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(4). 27. Defendant MCM, a debt collector, purportedly purchased the Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. debt and the debt has now been placed with Defendant PFW for collections. 28. Defendants collect and attempt to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation I – April 27, 2020 Collection Letter 29. On or about April 27, 2020, Defendant PFW sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt currently owed to Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. See Exhibit A. 30. This letter did not contain all the requirements of the ‘‘G Notice.'' Specifically, this letter deceptively fails to identify who the current creditor is to whom the alleged debt is owed. 31. The letter only states: “This is to notify you that on 8/29/2019 Midland Credit Management, Inc. purchased your Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., account number xxxx, which has now been placed with Pressler, Felt & Warshaw, LLP for collection. 32. Nowhere does the letter clearly identify who the current creditor is as is required by the FDCPA. 33. The least sophisticated consumer cannot decipher from the body of the letter whom the current creditor is because it is not stated clearly. 35. It is deceptive to not clearly state who the creditor is in any collection letter sent to a consumer. 36. Mere illusions are not enough, but the letter must specifically and clearly state who the creditor is. 37. Defendant has failed to provide the consumer with a proper initial communication letter by failing to clearly identify the original and current creditors of the debt. 38. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive misleading and false debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged 39. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 40. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 41. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 42. Defendant violated said section by: a. Making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). 44. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 45. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 46. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692g, a debt collector must notify the consumer of the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. §1692g(a)(2). 47. This notice must be clearly conveyed so that the consumer is clearly advised as to whom the alleged debt is owed. 48. Defendant violated this section by unfairly failing to advise Plaintiff as to the identity of the current creditor who was attempting to collect a debt from her. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq.

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13. Defendant Sempris is a marketing company that offers numerous subscription- based, negative-option “Membership Programs” which purport to offer discounts and services, such as coupons and rebates, to “subscribing” consumers. 37. In or around December 2012, Georgia Noonan viewed a television infomercial for one of Defendant Hampton Direct’s products—the Wraptastic. 49. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) on behalf of herself and a Class and Subclass defined as follows: Sempris Class: All individuals who were enrolled in any Sempris Membership Programs following an over-the-phone purchase of a Hampton Direct product. Washington Subclass: All Sempris Class members who reside in the State of Washington. The following persons are excluded from the Class and Subclass: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers, and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the class; and (4) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons. 50. Numerosity: The exact numbers of the members of the Class and Subclass (together, the “Classes”) is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. Defendants have wrongfully obtained money from thousands of consumers who fall into the definition set forth above. Members of the Classes can be identified through Defendants’ records. 55. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations. 56. The Washington Consumer Protect Act [“CPA”] provides that “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are . . . unlawful.” RCW § 19.86.020. 57. As the purpose of the CPA is “to protect the public and foster fair and honest competition,” the act should be “liberally construed” to serve its beneficial purposes. RCW § 19.86.920. 58. The CPA prohibits (a) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (b) occurring in trade or commerce, (c) with a public interest impact, (d) that causes injury. 59. In the context of the CPA, pleading and proof of an unfair or deceptive act or practice bears little resemblance to pleading and proof of fraud. The term “deceptive” in RCW § 19.86.020 means having a capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public. 60. Defendants’ conduct, representations, and omissions regarding the terms of the Membership Programs, including the negative-option price and term, the account to be charged, and the actions necessary to prevent those charges, has or had the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public. 61. The price of a product is likely to affect the choice of, or conduct regarding, whether to purchase a product. Defendants’ confusing conduct, representations, and omissions related to the price of their products has or had the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public. 73. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations. 74. RCW ch. 19.56 regulates the provision of unsolicited goods or services. It states that “if unsolicited goods or services are provided to a person, the person has a right to accept the goods or services as a gift only” and “may use them or dispose of them in any manner without any obligation to the provider.” RCW § 19.56.020. 75. Goods or services are unsolicited “unless the recipient specifically requested, in an affirmative manner, to receive the goods or services according to the terms under which they are being offered.” RCW § 19.56.020. 84. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations. 91. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations, excluding paragraphs 84 through 90. 97. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations, excluding paragraphs 84 through 90. 98. Sempris, knowingly and without authorization, charged Membership Program fees to the credit and debit accounts of Plaintiff and the members of the Class. Breach of Contract (against Hampton Direct) (Individually and on behalf of the Class) Unjust Enrichment in the alternative to breach of contract (against Hampton Direct) (Individually and on behalf of the Class) Unjust Enrichment (against Sempris) (Individually and on behalf of the Class) Violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, RCW ch. 19.86 (against both Defendants) (Individually and on behalf the Washington Subclass) Violation of RCW ch. 19.56 (against Sempris) (Individually and on behalf of the Washington Subclass)

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25. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action on behalf of the following class of potential opt-in litigants: All individuals who are current or former non-exempt employees of HydroChem, LLC who performed work in the United States at any time between April 19, 2016 and the present, and who were paid pursuant to a daily rate compensation system (the “FLSA Class”). 26. Plaintiff desires to pursue his FLSA claim on behalf of any individuals who opt-in to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 28. Specifically, HydroChem paid Plaintiff and the FLSA Class a set amount of pay per week, regardless of the number of hours worked, and failed to pay overtime compensation as required by law. 29. Defendant’s violations have been willful. 30. There are questions of law and fact common to the class/collective. 31. The claims or defenses of the representative, Plaintiff Parham, are typical of the claims or defenses of the class/collective. 32. The representative, Plaintiff Parham, will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the collective/class. 33. The similarly situated employees are uniquely known to HydroChem, are readily identifiable, and can be located through HydroChem’s records. HydroChem employs many salaried non-exempt employees throughout the United States. These similarly situated employees may be readily notified of this action through direct United States mail and/or other means, and allowed to opt into it pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for overtime compensation, liquidated damages (or, alternatively, interest), and attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 34. Prosecuting this case as a class/collective action for similarly situated employees who have been unlawfully denied overtime wages will promote judicial efficiency and will best protect the interest of the class/collective members. 35. There are no conflicts of interest among the class/collective members. 36. Plaintiff’s written Consent to this action is attached as Exhibit 1 and incorporated by this reference. IV. 38. The FLSA requires that covered employees be compensated for every hour worked in the work-week. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(b). 39. The FLSA provides that, if an employee is a salaried and non-exempt that they be compensated for every hour worked in the excess of forty hours (40). 40. Plaintiff and the other Similarly Situated Employees are entitled to overtime at a rate of an additional one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 41. Plaintiff and the other Similarly Situated Employees have worked in excess of forty (40) hours in most workweeks within the past three years. 42. HydroChem has failed to pay overtime to Plaintiff and the other Similarly Situated Employees for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in the workweeks of the past three years. 43. Plaintiff and the other Similarly Situated Employees are further entitled to recover an additional equal amount as liquidated damages (29 U.S.C. § 216(c)) and attorneys’ fees and costs (29 U.S.C. § 216). 44. HydroChem’s failure to pay overtime was willful, thus entitling Plaintiff and the other Similarly Situated Employees to a three-year statute of limitations 45. During all relevant times, Plaintiff and the other Similarly Situated Employees were covered employees entitled to the above-described FLSA protections. V.

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(Declaratory Relief) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 103. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 104. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website contains access barriers denying deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals the full and equal access to the goods and services of the Website, which Defendant owns, operates, and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the deaf and hard of hearing. 105. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) 19. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website during the relevant statutory period.” 20. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website, during the relevant statutory period.” 22. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying deaf and hard-of-hearing persons access to the goods and services of the Website. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, deaf and hard-of-hearing persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse and watch videos on the Website. 23. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: a. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; c. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the laws of New York. 24. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are deaf or hard of hearing, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the Class of people who are legally deaf or hard of hearing. 26. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 27. Judicial efficiency will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it will avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with hearing disabilities throughout the United States. 28. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 29. Defendant operates the Website, which provides articles, information and videos on popular culture, celebrities, fashion, and reality television. It delivers information and entertainment to tens of millions of people and businesses across the United States. 30. The Website is a service and benefit offered by Defendant throughout the United States, including New York State. The Website is owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant. 32. Defendant’s videos are available with the click of a mouse and are played through the Internet on computers, cell phones, and other electronic devices. 33. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the deaf and hard of hearing access to the Website, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Website. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals have been and are being denied equal access to the Website, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 34. Defendant denies the deaf and hard of hearing access to goods, services, and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely enjoying, interpreting, and understanding the content on the Website. 35. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as reading news, watching videos, etc., for deaf and hard-of-hearing persons. 37. There are well established guidelines for making websites accessible to disabled people. These guidelines have been in place for several years and have been followed successfully by other large business entities in making their websites accessible. The Web Accessibility Initiative (“WAI”), a project of the World Wide Web Consortium which is the leading standards organization of the Web, has developed guidelines for website accessibility, called the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (“WCAG”). The federal government has also promulgated website accessibility standards under Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act. These guidelines are readily available via the Internet, so that a business designing a website can easily access them. These guidelines recommend several basic components for making websites accessible, including but not limited to adding closed captioning to video content. 38. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing persons, including but not limited to the lack of closed captioning. This barrier is in violation of WCAG 2.1 Guideline 1.2.2, which mandates that video content contain captioning. 40. The Website thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Website and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of the Website in New York State. 41. Plaintiff attempted to watch the video “This Season on Married to Medicine…” on the Website in March 2018 but was unable to do so independently because of the lack of closed captioning on the Website, causing it to be inaccessible and not independently usable by deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 42. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing the Website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 43. These access barriers have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits, and services of Defendant and the Website. 44. Defendant engages in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard- of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructing and maintaining a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obviously inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failing to take actions to correct access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 46. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 47. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 48. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by Title III of ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (“place of exhibition and entertainment,” “place of recreation,” and “service establishments”). 49. Defendant has failed to make its videos accessible to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing by failing to provide closed captioning for videos displayed on the Website. 50. Discrimination under Title III includes the denial of an opportunity for the person who is deaf or hard of hearing to participate in programs or services, or providing a service that is not as effective as what is provided to others. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I-III). 51. Discrimination specifically includes the failure to provide “effective communication” to deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals through auxiliary aids and services, such as captioning, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(III); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(C). 65. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 66. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 67. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 68. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 69. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the videos displayed on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 71. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 72. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exc. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard- of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 74. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 75. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 76. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 77. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 78. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 79. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 81. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . . .” 82. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 83. The Website is a public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 84. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 85. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing videos on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 87. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . . .” 88. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 89. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 90. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 91. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 93. The Website is a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 94. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 95. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 97. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 98. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm.

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28. Plaintiff, for himself and on behalf of others similarly situated, seeks class action certification pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) and 23 (b)(2) of all deaf and hard of hearing individuals in the United States who have been denied equal access to goods and services of the Defendant’s Website. 29. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) and 23 (b)(2) of all deaf and hard of hearing individuals in the State of New York who have been denied equal access to goods and services of the Defendant’s Website. 30. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of all deaf and hard of hearing individuals in the City of New York who have been denied equal access to goods and services of the Defendant’s Website. 31. The Class is so numerous, being composed of millions of deaf and hard of hearing individuals, that joinder of all members is impracticable. Additionally, there are questions of law and/or fact common to the Class and the claims of the Plaintiff are typical of the Class claims. 32. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class including: a. Whether the Website is a "public accommodation" under the ADA and New York laws; b. Whether there was a violation under the ADA due to the barriers that exist on the Defendant’s Website and whether the Plaintiff and the Class were denied full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations; and c. Whether there was a violation under New York law due to the barriers that exist on the Defendant’s Website and whether the Plaintiff and the Class were denied full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. 33. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class as they both claim that the Defendant violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to have its Website accessible. 34. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class members as the Plaintiff and the Class are both deaf or hard of hearing individuals having the same claims. 35. Class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) is proper because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds applicable to the Class as a whole, making declaratory and injunctive relief appropriate. 36. Questions of law or fact which affected Class members predominate questions which affected individual Class members and a class action will fairly and efficiently determine this litigation. 37. Counsel for the Plaintiff is experienced representing both Plaintiffs and Defendant in class actions. As such the Class will be properly represented. 38. Judicial economy requires this action be certified as a class action as it will prevent a voluminous amount of individual lawsuits filed by deaf or hard of hearing individuals throughout the United States. 39. Defendant owns, operates, controls and maintains the Website, which provides information and video content on innovators and breakthrough technologies, in addition to technology news, conference sessions, product information, blogs, opinion articles and videos, all of which is content on the Website, promotes live events and technology trade shows, and owns i3, CTA's flagship magazine which is focuses on innovation in technology, policy and business as well as the entrepreneurs, industry leaders and startups that grow the consumer technology industry. The Defendant also owns and leases numerous physical places of public accommodations and offices which operate in conjunction with its Website. 40. The Website can be viewed by individuals located in New York State in addition to individuals from all states throughout the United States and can be reached from computers, tablets and cellphones which can access the internet. 41. In order for the deaf and hard of hearing to access video content, a website, including the Defendant’s Website, must have the ability to turn voice content into readable content. Closed captioning is the process by which this is done. Without the use of closed captioning, a deaf or hard of hearing individual would have to have someone present while they are watching a video to interpret and explain the audio content for them. 42. Various recommendations and guidelines exist in order to make websites, including the Defendant’s Website, compliant with the ADA. Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (“WCAG”) is one of those guidelines. WCAG 2.1 Section 1.2.2 states that “Captions are provided for all prerecorded audio content in synchronized media, except when the media is a media alternative for text and is clearly labeled as such”. Additionally, Section 508, an amendment to the United States Workforce Rehabilitation Act of 1973, requires all electronic and information technology be accessible to individuals with disabilities and requires closed captioning for video content. 43. The Website’s numerous videos, which cannot be accessed by deaf and hard of hearing individuals, are in violation of the ADA and New York laws. Videos include most of the Websites videos in addition to the videos the Plaintiff tried to access mentioned herein. 44. The Plaintiff in this matter was on the Defendant’s Website in order to watch videos on the day of April 20, 2020, April 25 2020 and subsequent days. The Plaintiff attempted to watch various videos to learn about innovators and breakthrough technologies, in addition to technology news, conference sessions, product information, blogs, opinion articles and videos, and in addition to product information on www.ces.tech including but not limited to “The Path to the Future of Work”, “Daimler Keynote”, U.S. Department of Transportation Keynote, CES Thriving on the Business of Consumer Technology, CES 2021 Digital Reveal and CES 2021 Virtual Press Briefing but was unable to do so due to their lack of closed captioning. Plaintiff and Class members cannot watch videos on the Website and have been prevented from accessing the Website although they would like to and intend to visit the Website in the future and enjoy video content as non-deaf individuals can and do and learn about innovators and breakthrough technologies, in addition to technology news, conference sessions, product information, blogs, opinion articles and videos. Currently they cannot. The Website is non-accessible. If the Website were accessible, the Plaintiff and the Class want to access and would access all of its content. There is no closed captioning on the videos. There are additional videos on the Defendant’s Website which have no closed captioning. The Defendant’s access barriers prevent the Plaintiff from enjoying the goods, services and benefits offered by the Website in conjunction with their physical locations and as such denied the Plaintiff equal access. 45. This lack of closed captioning by the Defendant on its Website prevent not only the Plaintiff but also the deaf and hard of hearing located in New York State and nationally from having equal access as non-deaf and non-hard of hearing individuals have, preventing deaf and hard of hearing individuals from enjoying the goods, services and benefits offered by the Website. 46. Defendant has intentionally failed and refused to remove the Website’s barriers of access by failing to use closed captioning thereby denying equal access to the Plaintiff and the Class and discriminates against the Plaintiff and the Class in violation of the ADA and New York laws. 47. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “46” as if fully set forth herein. 48. The Plaintiff is deaf and requires closed captioning to have full and equal access to audio and audiovisual content and has an impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities and is therefore an individual with a disability as defined under the 63. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “62” as if fully set forth herein. 64. At all times relevant to this action, the New York Human Rights Law (“NYHRL”), Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law §§ 290 et seq. covers the actions of the Defendant. 65. Defendant qualifies as a person within the meaning of Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law § 292(1). 66. The Plaintiff, at all times relevant to this action, has a substantial impairment to a major life activity of hearing and is an individual with a disability under Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law § 292(21). The Defendant, at all relevant times to this action, owns and operates a place of accommodation, the Website, within the meaning of Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law § 292(9) along with its physical locations which include offices, production, blog and video studios, trade show and live event locations along with corporate, advertising and publishing locations. 67. Pursuant to Article 15 N.Y. Executive Law § 296(2)(a) “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation ... because of the ... disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof." 68. Discrimination includes the refusal to adopt and implement reasonable modifications in policies, practices or procedures when they are necessary to afford, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities. Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law§ 296(2)(a), § 296(2)(c)(i). 69. Defendant’s actions violate Article 15 of the N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) by discriminating against the Plaintiff and the Class, including the Subclass by (i) owning and operating the Website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard of hearing persons; and (ii) by not removing access barriers to its Website in order to make its videos accessible to the deaf and hard of hearing when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities. This inaccessibility denies the deaf and hard-of-hearing full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that the Defendant makes available to individuals who are not deaf or hard of hearing. Article 15 of the N.Y. Exec. Law§ 296(2)(c). 70. The Defendant’s discriminatory practice also include "a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” Article 15 of the N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii). 71. Well established guidelines exist for making a website accessible to the deaf and hard of hearing and are easily obtainable. The guidelines have been used and followed by government and businesses in making their websites accessible to the deaf and hard of hearing, including but not limited to the use of closed captioning. Incorporating this component by Defendant in its Website would not fundamentally alter the Defendant’s Website or business and would not result in an undue burden. 72. Defendant has intentionally and willfully discriminated against the Plaintiff, the Class and Subclass in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, Article 15 of the N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) and this discrimination continues to date. 73. Absent relief, Defendant’s discrimination will continue against the Plaintiff, the Class and Subclass causing irreparable harm. 74. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines for each and every discriminatory act in addition to reasonable attorney fees and the costs and disbursements of this action. Article 15 of the N.Y. Exe. Law §§ 297(9), 297(4)(c) et seq. 75. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “74” as if fully set forth herein. 76. Plaintiff served notice of this lawsuit upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 77. Persons within N.Y.S. are entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner of a place of public accommodation, shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40. 78. No person because of disability, as defined in § 292 (21) of the Executive Law, shall be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights by person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law (“CVR”) § 40-c. 79. § 292 of Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law deems a disability a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function. As such the Plaintiff is disabled under the N.Y. Civil Rights Law. 80. Defendant discriminates against the Plaintiff and Subclass under CVR § 40 as Defendant’s Website is a public accommodation that does not provide full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges to all persons and discriminates against the deaf and hard of hearing due to its lack of closed captioning for the death and hard of hearing. 81. Defendant intentionally and willfully failed to remove the barriers on their Website discriminating against the Plaintiff and Sub-Class preventing access in violation of CVR §40. 82. Defendant has failed to take any steps to halt and correct its discriminatory conduct and discriminates against and will continue to discriminate against the Plaintiff and the Sub- Class members. 83. Under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 a corporation which violates any of the provisions of §§ 40, 40-a, 40-b or 42 shall be liable for a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby… in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the plaintiff or defendant shall reside. 84. Plaintiff hereby demands compensatory damages of five hundred dollars for the Defendant’s acts of discrimination including civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. 85. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “84” as if fully set forth herein. 86. At all times, the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), New York City Administrative Code §§ 8-101 et seq. applied to the conduct of the Defendant as the Defendant owns and operates the Website and is a person under the law. 87. At all times concerning this action the Plaintiff has had a substantial impairment to a major life activity of hearing and is an individual with a disability under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(16). 88. At all times concerning this action the Defendant’s Website is a place of public accommodation as defined in N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 89. “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of the actual or perceived ……. disability …. of any person to withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations required to make reasonable accommodations to a disabled individual and may not “refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(a). 90. The willful and intentional non-removal of the Website’s barriers of access for the Plaintiff, the Class and the Subclass by the Defendant discriminates against the deaf and hard of hearing by denying them full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-deaf and hard of hearing individuals. 91. It is discriminatory for the Defendant “not to provide a reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to …. enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity." N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 92. Defendant’s actions will continue to prevent the Plaintiff, the Class and Subclass from accessing the Website as the remaining public can and the Plaintiff requests injunctive relief. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages for the injuries and loss sustained as a result of the Defendant’s discriminatory conduct in addition to punitive damages and civil penalties and fines for each offense, attorney fees, costs and disbursements of this action. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8), § 8-126(a) and § 8-502(a). 94. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “93” as if fully set forth herein. 95. The Plaintiff claims that the Website contains barriers denying deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals full and equal access to the goods and services of the Website. 96. Defendant’s Website fails to comply with applicable laws and the Defendant discriminates against the Plaintiff and Sub-Class under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law§ 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. 97. The Defendant denies these claims. 98. The Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment such that the parties understand and know their respective rights and obligations. CLASS AND SUB-CLASS FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF THE PLAINTIFF AND THE SUBCLASS Violation of New York State Human Rights Law THE PLAINTIFF, THE CLASS AND THE SUBCLASS Violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act THE PLAINTIFF AND THE SUBCLASS Violation of New York City Human Rights Law THE PLAINTIFF AND THE SUBCLASS Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law

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19. In Defendant’s overzealous attempt to market its services, it placed (and continues to place) phone calls to consumers who never provided consent to call and to consumers having no relationship with Defendant. Defendant knowingly made (and continues to make) these telemarketing calls without the prior express written consent of the call recipients. As such, Defendant not only invaded the personal privacy of Plaintiff and members of the putative Class, but also intentionally and repeatedly violated the TCPA. 20. Defendant contacted Plaintiff on his cellular telephone number via ATDS, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), over 20 times between February and August of 2015. Plaintiff never consented in any manner to receive these calls to his cellular telephone. 21. Plaintiff received all calls as described above on his cellular telephone assigned a number ending in 2411. 22. Plaintiff’s caller ID read “856-229-0988,” or “732-865-8040” whenever Defendant called his cellular phone. 23. Plaintiff answered several of the calls and interacted with Defendant’s automatic dialing system and live operators. 25. Plaintiff has received auto-dialed marketing calls before. Plaintiff associated the momentary pause as a sign a computer had auto-dialed his number and then automatically routed the call to a Defendant’s representative after Plaintiff answered the call. 26. Plaintiff could also hear the sounds of a call center in the background whenever Plaintiff spoke with a live operator. 27. Plaintiff wanted the calls to stop, so on at least one occasion, Plaintiff took steps to identify the company calling him so he could request to be removed from its call list. 28. Therefore, on an occasion when Defendant called from 856-229-0988, Plaintiff pressed “1” to speak with a “lending specialist” after and answered the call from Defendant’s automated, pre-recorded voice system. 29. Defendant’s automated system then routed Plaintiff to a female operator. Plaintiff asked who she worked for, and she told him “Business Loan Center.” 30. The operator then transferred Plaintiff to “Jerome” who said he worked for Capital Advance Solutions. 31. Plaintiff accidentally disconnected the call, but Jerome called back from the number (732) 865-8040. He provided Plaintiff Defendant’s website address and a direct call back number, (866) 995-7272. 32. Plaintiff was not interested in Defendant’s services and requested Defendant remove his number from Defendant’s dialing system. 33. Despite this reasonable request, Defendant’s automated system continued to call Plaintiff. He has requested Defendant stop calling his on multiple occasions, but the calls continue. 35. Based on the circumstances of the calls – including but not limited to, a signature pause before an operator started speaking, call center noise, receipt of multiple calls over a short period of time, and Defendants called despite Plaintiff’s requests to Defendants to stop calling (indicating a computer automatically dialed the number again) – Plaintiff believed Defendants called his cellular telephone using an ATDS that automatically selected his number from a computer database. 36. On information and belief, Defendant’s ATDS called Plaintiff on every occasion. 37. Plaintiff understood the purpose of Defendant’s calls was to solicit business from Plaintiff. 38. The telephone number Defendant called was assigned to a cellular telephone service for which charges incur for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 39. Plaintiff is the regular carrier and exclusive user of the cellular telephone assigned the number ending in 2411. 40. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1(A)(i). 41. Plaintiff did not provide Defendant with prior express written consent to receive calls to his cellular telephone utilizing an ATDS or artificial or pre-recorded voice, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3). 42. All calls Defendant made to Plaintiff violate 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 44. Plaintiff’s overriding interest is ensuring Defendant ceases all illegal telemarketing practices and compensate all members of the Plaintiff Class for invading their privacy in the manner the TCPA was contemplated to prevent. 45. In order to redress injuries caused by Defendant’s violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals, brings suit under the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., which prohibits certain unsolicited voice and text calls to cell phones. 46. On behalf of the Plaintiff Class, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Defendant to cease all wireless telemarketing and spam activities and an award of statutory damages to the class members, together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 47. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) on behalf of himself and the following classes defined as follows (the “Class”): All individuals in the United States who received a call made by or on behalf of Defendant to the individual’s cellular telephone through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system, or pre-recorded voice, or any other device having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, from October 16, 2013 to the date the Class is certified, where Defendant’s records fail to indicate prior express written consent from the recipient to make such call. 49. This suit seeks only damages, statutory penalties, and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class, and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. 50. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 51. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by Defendant’s acts in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using an ATDS, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of Plaintiff and the Class members. B. 67. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though set forth at length herein. 68. Defendant made unsolicited and unauthorized calls using an ATDS or pre-recorded voice to Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ cellular telephones for the purpose of marketing products and/or services to Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class Members. 69. Defendant made the calls without prior express written consent of the Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members. 70. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitutes numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et. seq. 71. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et. seq., Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class Members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 72. Because Defendant had knowledge that Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class Members did not consent to the receipt of the aforementioned telephone solicitations, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members. A. CLASS ALLEGATIONS VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227

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19. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(a) (1)-(4) and 23(b) (3), this action is brought and may be properly maintained as a class action. This action satisfies the ascertainability, numerosity, typicality, commonality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of those provisions. 20. Plaintiff brings this action on his own behalf, as well as on behalf of each and all other persons similarly situated, and thus, seeks class certification under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23. 21. All claims alleged herein arise under California law for which Plaintiff seeks relief as authorized by California law 22. The proposed class is comprised of and defined as: California Class: Any and all persons who are or were employed in non-exempt positions, however titled, by Defendants in the state of California within four (4) years prior to the filing of the complaint in this action until resolution of this lawsuit (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Class” or “Class Members”). 27. Plaintiff hereby incorporates each and every allegation contained above and re-alleges said allegations as if fully set forth herein. 30. At all times set forth herein, Defendants employed Plaintiff and other persons in the capacity of non-exempt positions, however titled, throughout the state of California. 31. Defendants employed Plaintiff as a Non-Exempt Cook working as a non-exempt hourly paid employee during the liability period until his separation in approximately July 2014. 32. Defendants continue to employ non-exempt employees, however titled, throughout the state of California. 42. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth herein. 43. At all times relevant, the IWC wage orders applicable to Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ employment by Defendants provided that employees working for more than eight (8) hours in a day or forty (40) hours in a work week are entitled to overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of eight (8) hours in a day or forty (40) hours in a work week. An employee who works more than twelve (12) hours in a day is entitled to overtime compensation at a rate of twice the regular rate of pay. 50. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth herein. 55. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth herein. 60. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth herein. DUE On Behalf of the Class Against All Defendants OVERTIME On Behalf of the Class Against All Defendants On Behalf of the Class Against All Defendants PERIODS On Behalf of the Class Against All Defendants PERIODS On Behalf of the Class Against All Defendants

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21. In 1991, Congress enacted the TCPA in response to a growing number of consumer complaints regarding certain telemarketing practices. 22. The TCPA regulates, among other things, the use of automated telephone equipment, or “autodialers,” defined as equipment which “has the capacity . . . (a) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (b) to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). Specifically, the plain language of section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) prohibits the use of autodialers to make any call to a wireless number in the absence of an emergency or the prior express consent of the called party. 33. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated. 34. Plaintiff proposes the following Class definition: All persons within the United States who were not listed in Defendant’s records as the intended recipient of a telephone call, and from four years prior to the filing of this action to the date that class notice is disseminated, received from or on behalf of Defendant one or more telephone calls on their cellular telephone. 35. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, this proposed Cass. Excluded from the Class is Defendant and any entities in which Defendant has a controlling interest, Defendant’s agents and employees, any Judge and/or Magistrate Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of such Judges’ staffs and immediate families. 55. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 56. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 57. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and members of the proposed class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). A. The TCPA of 1991 KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.

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1. Nationwide File Disclosure Class 106. Plaintiff Huff sues on behalf of himself and other persons similarly situated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Plaintiff Huff is a member of the Nationwide File Disclosure Class that he seeks to represent, which consists of all individuals (“consumers” as defined the FCRA) who requested and received a consumer disclosure called the “TeleCheck File Report” since September 12, 2009, which only contained information related to the identifier(s) provided by Plaintiff Huff and members of the Nationwide File Disclosure Class, and which excluded additional information in Defendants’ files linked or associated with Plaintiff Huff and members of the Nationwide File Disclosure Class. 107. Plaintiff Huff is a member of the Nationwide File Disclosure Class because he requested and received a TeleCheck File Report containing information related to the identifiers provided by Plaintiff Huff to Defendants, and which excluded additional information in Defendants’ files linked or associated with Plaintiff Huff. 1. Nationwide File Disclosure Class 113. The prosecution of the claims of Plaintiff Huff requires adjudication of questions of law and fact common to the putative Nationwide File Disclosure Class: whether Defendants have engaged in a systematic and uniform policy, practice or procedure in refusing or failing to provide consumers with full and complete file disclosures in compliance with 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1)-(4). 114. The claims of the Plaintiff Huff and the Nationwide File Disclosure Class that he seeks to represent are embedded in common questions of facts and law. Defendants have 31 engaged in a uniform and systematic refusal or failure to provide file disclosures containing information regarding identifiers that are linked or associated with Plaintiff Huff and members of the National File Disclosure Class. Thus, the common questions of law are: 1) whether Defendants’ conduct violated and/or continues to violate the FCRA; 2) whether Defendants’ noncompliance was and/or is a willful violation of the FCRA; 3) if willful, whether Plaintiff Huff and members of the Nationwide File Disclosure Class are entitled to statutory damages and/or punitive damages; and 4) if not willful, whether Defendants’ violations of the FCRA were and/or are negligent. 115. The questions of law and fact common to the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. 2. Tennessee File Disclosure Class 116. The prosecution of the claims of Plaintiff Bates requires adjudication of questions of law and fact common to the putative Tennessee File Disclosure Class: whether Defendants have engaged in a systematic and uniform policy, practice or procedure in refusing or failing to provide consumers with full and complete file disclosures in compliance with 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1)-(4). 117. The claims of the Plaintiff Bates and the Tennessee File Disclosure Class that he seeks to represent are embedded in common questions of facts and law. Defendants have engaged in a uniform and systematic refusal or failure to provide file disclosures containing information regarding both the eight-digit and nine-digit Tennessee driver license numbers. Thus, the common questions of law are: 1) whether Defendants’ conduct violated and/or continues to violate the FCRA; 2) whether Defendants’ noncompliance was and/or is a willful violation of the FCRA; 3) if willful, whether Plaintiff Bates and members of the Tennessee File 32 Disclosure Class are entitled to statutory damages and/or punitive damages; and 4) if not willful, whether Defendants’ violations of the FCRA were and/or are negligent. 118. The questions of law and fact common to the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. F. 2. Tennessee File Disclosure Class 108. Plaintiff Bates sues on behalf of himself and other persons similarly situated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Plaintiff Bates is a member of the Tennessee File Disclosure 29 Class that he seeks to represent, which consists of all individuals (“consumers” as defined by the FCRA) who requested and received a consumer disclosure called the “TeleCheck File Report” since September 12, 2009, which only contained information related to the eight-digit Tennessee driver license number issued to Plaintiff Bates and members of the Tennessee File Disclosure Class, and which excluded additional information in Defendants’ files related to the nine-digit Tennessee driver license issued to Plaintiff Bates and members of the Tennessee File Disclosure Class (and vice versa). 109. Plaintiff Bates is a member of the Tennessee File Disclosure Class because he requested and received a TeleCheck File Report containing information related to the nine-digit Tennessee driver license number issued to him, and which excluded additional information in Defendants’ files related to the eight-digit Tennessee license number issued to Plaintiff Bates. B. 27. Throughout the country, including the state of Tennessee, many businesses, 9 including merchants and retailers, accept checks and electronic fund transfers from consumers as methods of payment for goods and services. The business transactions are initiated by the consumers who wish to purchase goods or services from the businesses or merchants (hereinafter Plaintiffs refers to “businesses,” “merchants” and “retailers” interchangeably). 28. Businesses desire to accept checks and electronic fund transfers as methods of payment for goods and services, yet also want to minimize the potential risk of a check or electronic fund transfer being returned as an unpaid or dishonored item, such as one returned for non-sufficient funds. 29. Defendants engage in several business operations, including but not limited to electronic commerce, payment processing services and customer account management. In their Commercial Services segment, Defendants provide credit card processing, debit card processing, check and electronic fund verification, check and electronic fund guarantee, and prepaid card services. 30. Defendants provide the services stated in the above Paragraphs, including credit card processing, debit card processing, check and electronic fund verification, and check and electronic fund guarantee, to businesses in the state of Tennessee. 31. Defendants purports that their check verification and guarantee services use Defendants’ proprietary database system to assist in verifying that a check writer is a reasonable risk for a merchant; or to guarantee that approved checks presented to businesses for payment will be collectible. 32. Defendants’ databases, systems and files contain information regarding consumers, including those residing in Tennessee, regarding check writing and electronic fund transfer histories. Defendants claim that they use check writing and electronic fund transfer 10 histories of consumers as part of their risk analysis in providing check/electronic fund verification and guarantee services to businesses. 33. Defendants’ revenues from check verification and check guarantee services are earned primarily by charging merchant fees for their services. 34. Procedurally, when a consumer, including those in Tennessee, initiates a sales transaction with a business and presents a check or electronic fund transfer as a method of payment at the point of sale, the business processes the check or electronic fund transfer through Defendants’ systems, databases and files, typically by way of a terminal or by phone. Typically, the check or electronic fund transfer is processed by the business or merchant inputting identifiers unique to that consumer, primarily a driver license and/or bank number (MICR number, containing the bank’s ABA routing number and the consumer’s account number). The transaction is then processed through Defendants’ systems, databases and files. Thereafter, the merchant receives a “code” from Defendants indicating whether the check/electronic fund transfer is accepted (a “Code 1” or approval code); declined with a “Code 4,” which according to Defendants, means that there is evidence of an unpaid item, such as a returned check, in its databases, systems and files regarding the consumer, or that the bank account is closed; declined with a “Code 3,” which Defendants claim is a risk-based decline regarding the consumer; or declined with a “Code 0” (Call Center Code). 35. Under Defendants’ check/electronic funds transfer guarantee service, when a business is presented a check/electronic fund transfer as a method of payment from the consumer, the transaction is submitted to and analyzed by Defendants, purportedly utilizing their databases, systems and files, which according to Defendants, include the consumer’s check writing history. Defendants then either accept or decline the check/electronic fund transfer for 11 warranty or guarantee coverage. If Defendants approve the check/electronic fund transfer for warranty coverage and the business accepts the check/electronic fund transfer, the business then deposits the check in its bank account or processes the electronic fund transfer. If the check/electronic fund transfer is returned as an unpaid item by the businesses’ bank and the returned check/electronic fund transfer meets the requirements for warranty coverage, Defendants are required by their contract with the merchant to purchase the check/electronic fund transfer from the merchant at its face value. 36. Defendants charge a fee for each check/electronic fund transfer they guarantee, which generally is determined as a percentage of the check/electronic fund transfer amount. 37. Defendants also provide check verification services to merchants and generally receive a fee on each transaction processed through their databases, systems and files, even if the same check is being reprocessed by the merchant following receipt of a decline code. 38. As part of their business operations, Defendants regularly and routinely store information regarding checks/electronic fund transfers processed through their databases, systems and files. This information includes the date and time of the transaction, merchant, identifier(s) used to process the transaction, check number, check/electronic fund transfer amount, and code provided to the merchant (such as approval, decline, Code 0, Code 1, Code 3 or Code 4). 39. Transactions processed through Defendants databases and systems are typically stored under the identifier or identifiers used to process the transaction. For example, if a check/electronic fund transfer is processed using the MICR number only, information related to the transaction is stored under that particular identifier. If two identifiers are used to process the transaction, such as a MICR number and a driver license number, information related to the 12 transaction is stored under both identifiers. 40. Defendants also regularly and routinely store other information related to consumers, such as the consumer’s name, address and telephone number; the number of check/electronic fund transfer transactions processed using a particular identifier (such as the driver license and MICR number), the total dollar amount of check/electronic fund transfer transactions processed using a particular identifier; and information regarding returned checks and closed bank accounts. 41. Although information is generally stored under a particular identifier, Defendants regularly and routinely link identifiers associated with a particular consumer in their databases, systems and files. For example, if a consumer presents a check/electronic fund transfer to a merchant and the merchant uses the MICR number and the driver license number to process the transaction, the two identifiers (the consumer’s MICR number and driver license number) are “linked” in Defendants’ systems, databases and files. Once identifiers are linked, they are used in Defendants’ systems, databases and files when subsequent transactions are processed, and can affect the approval/decline code that Defendants provide to the merchant, recommending that the merchant approve or decline the check/electronic fund transfer. 42. As part of Defendants’ business operations, Defendants also furnish information regarding consumers from merchants and banks related to returned checks/electronic fund transfers and closed bank accounts. For returned checks/electronic fund transfers to merchants using Defendants’ guarantee service, Defendants purchase the returned checks/electronic fund transfers at face value, then inputs this information into their systems, databases and files under identifiers associated with the returned checks/electronic fund transfers and other identifiers linked to or associated with the particular consumer. In a subsequent check/electronic fund 13 transfer transaction, the merchant will receive a decline or “Code 4” decline code, and will typically reject the check/electronic fund transfer. The same is true if the consumer attempts to open a new bank account with a bank utilizing Defendants’ bank account opening service. In short, Defendants effectively “block” a consumer from receiving an approval on a subsequent check/electronic fund transfer from merchants using Defendants’ services, or from opening a new bank account with banks utilizing Defendants’ bank account opening services, until the consumer pays Defendants for the face amount of the check, and a returned check and/or other fees. Defendants routinely and regularly store this information in their databases, systems, and consumer files. 43. With respect to information regarding consumers from merchants who do not use Defendants’ check guarantee service related to returned checks/electronic fund transfers, and from banks related to closed accounts, Defendants input this information into their systems, databases and files and as discussed in Paragraph 42, effectively “block” a consumer from receiving an approval on a subsequent check/electronic fund transfers from merchants using Defendants’ check verification service; or from opening a new bank account with a bank using Defendants’ bank account opening services, until the consumer “makes good” or otherwise resolves the issue with the merchant with the returned check/electronic fund transfer. In theory, if and when the consumer “makes good” or otherwise resolves the issue with the merchant which received the returned check/electronic fund transfer, that merchant reports the item as paid or resolved to Defendants, who in turn, make the proper notations in their systems, databases, and files, and then eliminates the “block.” 44. Defendants routinely and regularly store information regarding returned checks/electronic fund transfers, and payment/resolution of said returned checks/electronic fund 14 transfers in their databases, systems, and files. 45. As part of Defendants’ business operations to collect on returned checks/electronic fund transfers purchased through their check/electronic fund guarantee service, and to assist merchants which do not utilize Defendants’ check guarantee service to collect on returned checks/electronic fund transfers, Defendants regularly and routinely link and/or associate the consumer’s identifiers, primarily the consumer’s driver license number(s) and MICR number(s), in its databases, systems and files. In so doing, Defendants attempt to increase the likelihood of Defendants or a merchant collecting on a returned check/electronic fund transfer, by essentially blocking a consumer’s check writing privileges at the thousands of merchants using Defendants’ services, and/or blocking the consumer’s ability to open a new checking account. 46. As part of their business operations, Defendants also offer bank account opening services to banks. Procedurally, for banks using this service, the bank inputs or provides information to Defendants, including identifiers unique to that consumer, such as driver license number and/or prior bank account numbers. The transaction is then processed through Defendants’ systems, databases and files, and the bank receives information on whether there is evidence of an unpaid item associated with the consumer in Defendants’ systems, databases and files (such as a returned check), as well as information regarding the consumer’s prior bank account activity. 47. As part of their business operations, Defendants also offer tenant screening services to landlords. Procedurally, for a landlord using this service, the landlord inputs or provides information to Defendants, including identifiers unique to that consumer, such as driver license number and/or bank account number(s). The transaction is then processed through 15 Defendants’ systems, databases and files, and the landlord receives information on whether there is evidence of an unpaid item associated with the consumer in Defendants’ systems, databases and files, such as a returned check, as well as information regarding the consumer’s prior bank account activity. 48. As part of its business operations, First Data offers multiple other payment processing services to merchants, including credit and debit card acceptance. First Data offers these to merchants in product “bundles” to cover all payment processing options available at the point of sale. First Data claims to serve more than six million merchant locations and holds itself out as one of the largest, if not the largest, payment processor in the world. First Data utilizes a sales force which markets these “bundled” payment solutions, including check/electronic fund transfer verification and/or guarantee services. 49. First Data provides its payment processing services, including the check/electronic fund transfer guarantee and verification services discussed in the preceding Paragraphs, either directly or through its wholly-owned subsidiaries, including TeleCheck Services, Inc. and/or TeleCheck International, Inc. 50. First Data provides bank account services discussed in the preceding Paragraphs either directly or through its wholly-owned subsidiaries, including TeleCheck Services, Inc. and/or TeleCheck International, Inc. 51. First Data collects or attempts to collect returned checks/electronic fund transfers either directly or through its wholly-owned subsidiaries, TeleCheck Services, Inc., TeleCheck International, Inc. and/or TRS Recovery Services, Inc. 52. First Data maintains a website titled www.firstdata.com. On its website, First Data lists various product solutions and payment services that it offers to merchants, including a 16 variety of electronic payment and online transaction processing solutions, such as credit and debit card acceptance, check guarantee, check verification and other payment options. 53. TeleCheck Services, Inc. and TeleCheck International, Inc. provide similar services to businesses and banks as alleged in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 54. First Data offers to businesses a terminal machine that supports all of its various payment processing products, including debit and credit cards, electronic check acceptance, check verification and check warranty. 55. On its website, First Data states that TeleCheck “is part of the First Data family.” 56. Defendants claim that they have built and maintain the nation’s largest system of databases and files containing check writer information, including those related to Tennessee consumers. The databases and files containing check writer information are shared by all Defendants and are accessible by them at various locations throughout the United States. 57. Defendants claim that they offer the most accurate check verification/guarantee services in the industry, with databases providing merchants with continually updated information, including bad check activity, automated inquiries using the consumer’s identification (driver license or State ID) and checking account data. 58. Defendants claim that through their services, they can help merchants separate good check writers from bad ones. Defendants also claim or have claimed that they can predict “with unmatched accuracy” the probability of a check being good. 59. Defendants engage in a common enterprise, which includes common operations related to consumer reporting. First Data exercises exclusive dominion and control over the remaining Defendants, which are wholly-owned subsidiaries and operate as First Data’s alter ego. 17 60. First Data controls and dictates the budget of the remaining Defendants. Defendants comingle financial resources in the operation of their business segments. 61. Defendants share or have shared the same business locations, including those in Houston, Texas, Greenwood Village, Colorado, and Atlanta, Georgia. 62. In addition to Houston, Texas, Greenwood Village, Colorado, and Atlanta, Georgia, Defendants also maintain common offices in City of Industry, California, where both consumers and merchants are directed to forward payments. 63. Defendants also operate several common “call centers” throughout the United States and abroad, and share common agents and employees at these facilities. Depending on the situation, the same call center employee may represent to a consumer that they are speaking on behalf of one Defendant, while later tell a different consumer that they are speaking on behalf of another Defendant. 64. Several of the same individuals are or were officers of both First Data and the other Defendants. 65. Defendants share manpower and resources. Defendants share the common databases, systems and files, as stated above, containing information regarding consumers, including check writing information, consumer debt information, collection activity and other consumer information. These common databases and systems are accessible by Defendants’ agents and employees throughout the country. 66. Defendants compile, maintain and input information about consumers in their common databases, systems and files, including information regarding check writing histories. 67. Defendants maintain files and other information on consumers in their databases and systems, including check writing histories. 18 68. Defendants provide check verification, electronic fund transfer verification, check guarantee and electronic fund guarantee services to merchants and banks in the state of Tennessee. 69. Defendants have created and implemented a uniform policy, practice and procedure for responding to consumers’ requests for disclosures and information under the FCRA, including consumer requests for disclosures by telephone or in writing. 70. In addition, Defendants have developed a uniform, standardized consumer disclosure format which is called the “TeleCheck File Report.” For at least five (5) years leading up to the filing of this Complaint, Defendants routinely provide the “TeleCheck File Report” to consumers utilizing the same uniform, standardized format. 71. During the Liability Period (five (5) years preceding the filing of this Complaint), it was and is Defendants’ policy, practice and procedure to only provide information to consumers related to check/electronic fund transactions processed through Defendants’ databases and systems stored under the identifier or identifiers provided by the consumer in his or her request for a consumer disclosure under the FCRA. Defendants regularly and routinely refuse or fail to provide information related to check/electronic fund transfer transactions processed under an identifier(s) linked or associated with that particular consumer. 72. In addition, during the Liability Period (five (5) years preceding the filing of this Complaint), it was and is Defendants’ policy, practice and procedure to only provide information to consumers related to returned checks (including those that Defendants’ records showed remained unpaid, paid or otherwise resolved) stored under the identifier or identifiers provided by the consumer in his or her request for a consumer disclosure under the FCRA. Defendants regularly and routinely refuse or fail to provide information related to returned checks (including 19 those that Defendants’ records showed remained unpaid, paid or otherwise resolved) under an identifier(s) linked or associated with that particular consumer. 73. Defendants have and continue to willfully refuse to disclose to consumers which checkwriting history or histories were/are utilized when processing a consumer’s transaction and providing consumer reports to businesses. Specifically, and as part of Defendants’ standard operating procedure, Defendants systematically and deliberately conceal how their verification/guarantee system, bank account opening and/or tenant screening services work, and/or the information which forms the basis for the decline/approval codes provided in the consumer reports to businesses, including but not limited to the fact that Defendants have taken no steps to combine, associate and/or link the checkwriting history stored under the consumer’s eight-digit Tennessee driver license number, with the consumer’s nine-digit Tennessee driver license number beginning with a “0,” and that the failure to combine, associate and/or link this information could affect the transaction. 74. Defendants have a policy, practice and/or procedure to provide consumers with standardized form letters and/or utilize standardized verbiage when speaking to consumers. For example, when providing information to a consumer who received a decline code, Defendants use vague, generalized language stating that the consumer’s check “did not meet the acceptance guidelines that TeleCheck has established.” Defendants willfully conceal what these guidelines are, and specifically, conceal the fact that a decline may have occurred because the consumer was viewed as a “first-time checkwriter” in Defendants’ system, or a checkwriter with limited checkwriting history, due to Defendants’ failure to combine checkwriting histories stored under the eight-digit and nine-digit Tennessee driver license numbers, or that a consumer’s check may have been declined due to a smaller “positive” checkwriting history because Defendants failed to 20 combine checkwriting histories stored under the eight-digit and nine-digit Tennessee driver license numbers. 75. Defendants repeatedly tell consumers only that the consumers’ checks or transactions “did not meet the acceptance guidelines” that Defendants have established. Even when consumer inquiries are escalated, Defendants’ employees are strictly forbidden to deviate from the use of Defendants’ standardized form letters and/or Defendants’ standardized verbiage, which state generally that the consumer’s check did not meet Defendants’ “acceptance guidelines.” In fact, David Hogan, Vice President of Service Operations and former Vice President of Operations, testified that even he would have to stick to the general content of Defendants’ standardized verbiage when speaking to a consumer in a highly escalated situation. 76. Based on Defendants’ policies, practices and procedures, it was/is virtually impossible for Plaintiffs and/or members of the putative classes to discover that Defendants have violated the FCRA by refusing or failing to associate, link and/or combine the consumer’s checkwriting history stored in Defendants’ databases, systems and files under the eight-digit Tennessee driver license number with the nine-digit Tennessee driver license number simply by communicating with Defendants and/or their agents. In fact, Defendants’ violations of the FCRA were only discovered in prior litigation against Defendants TeleCheck Services, Inc. and TeleCheck International, Inc., in which Defendants disclosed that a Tennessee consumer whose check was processed with the nine-digit Tennessee license number beginning with a “0” was declined because she was treated as a first-time checkwriter, despite having prior checkwriting history under the eight-digit Tennessee license number which would have resulted in an acceptance code; and that Defendants did not have a procedure in place to combine these histories. 21 77. Further, based on Defendants’ policies, practices and procedures, it was/is virtually impossible for Plaintiffs and/or members of the putative classes to discover Defendants’ processes and procedures for responding to requests for consumer disclosures under the FCRA, how Defendants collect and store information, and what file information that Defendants fail to include in disclosures to consumers pursuant to the FCRA. 78. Without information regarding Defendants’ policies, practices and procedures related to the linking or association of identifiers, information regarding the manner in which Defendants store information regarding consumers, and the procedures followed when providing a TeleCheck File Report, it was impossible for Plaintiff Huff, Plaintiff Bates and members of the Nationwide File Disclosure and Tennessee File Disclosure Classes to discover that Defendants violated the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1)-(4), by refusing or failing to provide: a) all information in the consumer’s file at the time of the request; b) the sources of the information in the consumer’s file at the time of the request; 3) the names of each person (or trade name of the person, if applicable) who procured a consumer report during the 1-year period preceding the date on which the request was made; and 4) the dates, original payees, and amounts of any checks upon which any adverse characterization of the consumer is based, and which is included in the file at the time of the disclosure. B. Change in Tennessee’s Driver License Numbering System 79. Prior to approximately February 2002, the state of Tennessee utilized an eight- digit numbering system for its driver licenses. 80. In approximately February 2002, the state of Tennessee modified its driver license numbering system, going from an eight-digit to a nine-digit system. For Tennesseans with existing driver licenses, the modification consisted of adding a “0” to the beginning of the license 22 number. For example, if the Tennessee consumer had a license number “23456789,” his/her number became “023456789.” For individuals obtaining a Tennessee driver license for the first time, he/she was issued a license beginning with a “1.” For example, “123456789.” 81. Although the state of Tennessee made an across the board change in its driver license numbering system in approximately February 2002, updated licenses were not sent to Tennessee license holders all at once. Instead, as each individual renewed his/her license, they were issued a new physical license with the “0” as the first number of the nine-digit format. 82. Prior to February 2002, Huff had a Tennessee license that was eight digits and began with the number “4.” On or about June 2, 2004, Huff received his nine-digit Tennessee license, which had the identical numbers from his previous, eight-digit Tennessee license, except that it began with a “0” based on the state of Tennessee’s nine-digit numbering system. 83. Prior to February 2002, Bates had a Tennessee license that was eight digits and began with the number “8.” On or about October 14, 2003, Bates received his nine-digit Tennessee license, which had the identical numbers from his previous, eight-digit Tennessee license, except that it began with a “0” based on the state of Tennessee’s nine-digit numbering system. 84. In January 2013, Huff requested a consumer disclosure and received a TeleCheck File Report dated January 30, 2013, which only contained information in Defendants’ files related to his nine-digit Tennessee license number. The January 30, 2013 TeleCheck File Report did not contain other information linked to or associated with Huff, such as check transactions processed under Huff’s eight-digit Tennessee license number and/or bank account(s) linked to or associated with Huff. 85. In approximately October 2009, Bates requested a consumer file disclosure and 23 received a TeleCheck File Report dated October 5, 2009, which was essentially blank. The October 5, 2009 TeleCheck File Report did not provide Bates with information in Defendants’ files related to Bates’ eight-digit Tennessee driver license number. V. A. CLASS DEFINITIONS A. Defendants’ Business Operations DISCLOSURE LICENSE CLASS) 151. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 - 150 above as part of Count II of this Complaint. 152. Alternatively, if it is determined that Defendants’ violations of the FCRA are not willful, Defendants’ violations of the FCRA are negligent. Despite having knowledge that there is additional information in their databases, systems and files that are linked or associated to a consumer, Defendants refuse to provide this information in the disclosure called the TeleCheck File Report. 153. Plaintiff Huff and members of the Nationwide File Disclosure Class have no plain, adequate or complete remedy of law to redress these wrongs alleged herein. A declaratory judgment is their only means of securing adequate and equitable relief. Further, Plaintiff Huff and members of the Nationwide File Disclosure Class are now and will continue to suffer irreparable injury from Defendants’ unlawful policies, practices and procedures unless enjoined by this Court. 154. As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of the FCRA, Plaintiff Huff and members of the Nationwide File Disclosure Class are entitled to declaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses. DISCLOSURE CLASS) 136. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 - 135 above as part of Count I of this Complaint. 137. Plaintiff Huff and the members of the Nationwide File Disclosure Class are “consumers” under the FCRA. 36 138. Defendants are “consumer reporting agencies” under the FCRA. Alternatively, Defendants are “nationwide specialty consumer reporting agencies” under the FCRA. 139. As consumer reporting agencies, Defendants are bound by the requirements of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. 140. Defendants provide check verification, electronic fund transfer verification, check guarantee and electronic fund transfer guarantee services to businesses, merchants and retailers. Further, Defendants provide account opening verification services to banks and tenant screening services to landlords. 141. On each occasion when a business, merchant or retailer process a consumer’s check or electronic funds transfer through Defendants’ systems, databases and files, Defendants provide a “consumer report” as defined by the FCRA. 142. On each occasion when a bank utilizes Defendants’ account opening verification service and the transaction is processed through Defendants’ systems, databases and files, Defendants provide a “consumer report” as defined by the FCRA. 143. On each occasion when a landlord utilizes Defendants’ tenant screening service and the transaction is processed through Defendants’ systems, databases and files, Defendants provide a “consumer report” as defined by the FCRA. 144. As consumer reporting agencies, Defendants are required to provide disclosure to consumers upon request which comply with the FCRA, including but not limited to the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1)-(4). 145. When consumers, including Plaintiff Huff and members of the Nationwide File Disclosure Class, request a disclosure as of right under the FCRA, Defendants only provide a disclosure containing information limited to the identifiers (typically a driver license number 37 and/or bank account number) given to Defendants by the consumers. Defendants routinely refuse or fail to provide other file information regarding identifiers that are linked to and/or associated with the consumer, although Defendants actually use this linked and/or associated information when preparing and providing consumer reports to users, such as merchants, banks and landlords. As a result, consumers (including Plaintiff Huff and members of the Nationwide File Disclosure Class) are given incomplete file information in willful violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1)-(4). 146. Plaintiff Huff and the Nationwide File Disclosure Class that he seeks to represent were subjected to a systematic and uniform policy, practice and procedure and common business practice by Defendants in violating the FCRA. 147. Defendants have and continue to violate the FCRA, including the provision contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1)-(4). 148. Defendants’ violations of the FCRA are willful. Despite having knowledge that there is additional information in their databases, systems and files that are linked or associated to a consumer, Defendants refuse to provide this information in the consumer disclosure called the TeleCheck File Report. 149. Plaintiff Huff and members of the Nationwide File Disclosure Class have no plain, adequate or complete remedy of law to redress these wrongs alleged herein. A declaratory judgment is their only means of securing adequate and equitable relief. Further, Plaintiff Huff and members of the Nationwide File Disclosure Class are now and will continue to suffer irreparable injury from Defendants’ unlawful policies, practices and procedures unless enjoined by this Court. 150. As a result of Defendants’ willful violations of the FCRA, Plaintiff Huff and 38 members of the Nationwide File Disclosure Class are entitled to declaratory relief, injunctive relief, statutory damages, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses. DISCLOSURE CLASS) 155. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 - 154 above as part of Count III of this Complaint. 39 156. As consumer reporting agencies, Defendants are required to provide disclosure to consumers upon request which comply with the FCRA, including but not limited to the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1)-(4). 157. When Tennessee consumers, including Plaintiff Bates and members of the Tennessee File Disclosure Class, request a consumer disclosure as of right under the FCRA, Defendants improperly limit the information contained in the disclosure to either the eight-digit or nine-digit Tennessee driver license number. For example, if the Tennessee consumer provides Defendants with an eight-digit license number, Defendants only provide information regarding the eight-digit license number, while refusing or failing to give information regarding the nine- digit license number which is identical except for a leading “0” at the beginning of the nine-digit number. The same is true if the Tennessee consumer provides Defendants with a nine-digit number. As a result, Tennessee consumers (including Plaintiff John Bates and the Tennessee File Disclosure Class) are given incomplete file information in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1)-(4). 158. Plaintiff Bates and the Tennessee File Disclosure Class that he seeks to represent were subjected to a systematic and uniform policy, practice and procedure and common business practice by Defendants in violating the FCRA. 159. Defendants have and continue to violate the FCRA, including the provision contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1)-(4). 160. Defendants’ violations of the FCRA are willful. Defendants either deliberately refuse to produce information contained in their databases, systems and files on both the eight and nine-digit numbers, or Defendants’ failure to do so is reckless. 161. Plaintiff Bates and members of the Tennessee File Disclosure Class have no plain, 40 adequate or complete remedy of law to redress these wrongs alleged herein. A declaratory judgment is their only means of securing adequate and equitable relief. Further, Plaintiff Bates and members of the Tennessee File Disclosure Class are now and will continue to suffer irreparable injury from Defendants’ unlawful policies, practices and procedures unless enjoined by this Court. 162. As a result of Defendants’ willful violations of the FCRA, Plaintiff Bates and members of the Tennessee File Disclosure Class are entitled to declaratory relief, injunctive relief, statutory damages, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses. DISCLOSURE LICENSE CLASS) 163. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 - 162 above as part of Count IV of this Complaint. 164. Alternatively, if it is determined that Defendants’ violations of the FCRA are not willful, Defendants’ violation of the FCRA are negligent. 165. Plaintiff Bates and members of the Tennessee File Disclosure Class have no plain, adequate or complete remedy of law to redress these wrongs alleged herein. A declaratory judgment is their only means of securing adequate and equitable relief. Further, Plaintiff Bates and members of the Tennessee File Disclosure Class are now and will continue to suffer irreparable injury from Defendants’ unlawful policies, practices and procedures unless enjoined by this Court. 166. As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of the FCRA, Plaintiff Bates and members of the Tennessee File Disclosure Class are entitled to declaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses.

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21. Defendant offers the commercial website, 37. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 41. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 42. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 43. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 45. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 46. Defendant’s restaurants are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s restaurants. The Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 47. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 48. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 50. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 51. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 54. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 55. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 56. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 58. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 59. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 61. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 62. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub- Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 63. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 64. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 65. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 66. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 67. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 69. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 70. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 71. Defendant’s New York City physical locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these establishments and is a gateway thereto. 72. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 75. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 78. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 79. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 80. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 81. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is heavily integrated with its establishments and is a gateway thereto. 82. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 83. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 85. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 86. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 88. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 89. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 90. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 91. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 92. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 93. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATES CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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24. Beginning in April of 2020, Defendant sent automated marketing calls and automated marketing text messages to be transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 5194 (“5194 Number”). 41. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. 42. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the Class defined as follows: NO CONSENT CLASS: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text message using the same type of equipment used to text message Plaintiff, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number for the purpose of promoting and/or advertising Defendant’s goods and/or services. DO NOT CALL CLASS: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action: (1) were sent a text message or phone call by or on behalf of Defendant; (2) more than one time within any 12- month period; (3) where the person’s telephone number had been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days; (4) for the purpose of advertising and/or promoting Defendant’s products and services. 43. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the Class definitions as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 44. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 47. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to members of the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class are: a) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; b) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; c) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; d) Whether Defendant initiated telemarketing calls to telephone numbers listed on the National Do Not Call Registry; e) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and f) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 48. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits calls to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 53. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 70. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1-52 as if fully set forth herein. 71. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 72. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.” 73. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.” PROPOSED CLASS Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class) Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and No Consent Class)

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34. Plaintiff Stancu was hired by Defendant Ethos in or around September of 2015. 35. Plaintiff Stancu was required to perform all relevant tasks in the front of the restaurant including acting as a bartender, waiter, busser and food runner. He also cleaned and stocked the bar and kitchen. 36. Plaintiff worked hard and diligently within the restaurant. 37. Due to his hard work, in or around May of 2016, Plaintiff was asked to work a few days a week in Defendants’ other food establishment, Pathos Café, located on 932 1st Ave, New York, NY 10022. 38. Throughout his employment, Plaintiff Stancu worked anywhere from thirty (30) to sixty (60) hours a week. 39. Throughout his employment, Plaintiff Stancu worked only as tipped employee. However, Defendants required that Plaintiff Stancu share his tips with other employees, including the manager. He was not paid any hourly wage for hours worked, nor any overtime wage for hours worked over forty (40). 40. Defendants never provided a wage statement or pay stub detailing hours worked or amount of tips accumulated. Defendants did not have a systematic way of fairly paying their workers. Tips were always kept in house and distributed unevenly between managers and other employees. 41. Throughout his employment, Plaintiff Stancu was never paid on time or on a regular basis. 43. While the tips collected by Defendant Ethos would often be more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) per week, Plaintiff Stancu would only be paid that much or less for the entire week no matter how much he actually accumulated. 44. Despite his hard work and long shifts, Plaintiff Stancu was not properly compensated and had his tips stolen from him on a regular basis through a tip pool which included members of management. 45. Defendants often threatened to fire Plaintiff Stancu if he did not agree with their way of payment. Mr. Chatiris was rude and malignant when Plaintiff insisted on being paid on time. Due to the fact Plaintiff was persistent, Mr. Chatiris began to harass him making his work unbearable. Mr. Chatiris often cursed at him in front of other employees and assigned Plaintiff to as much heavy lifting as possible knowing he had a persistent back pain. When Plaintiff asked for help from other workers, Mr., Chatiris refused to let anyone help him. On some occasions Plaintiff had to call out of work due to horrible back pains and soreness. 46. In or around the end of May of 2016, Plaintiff Stancu demanded that he be paid in full and on time because he needed the money. Mr. Chatiris ignored his request and told Plaintiff his pay was not ready. When Plaintiff Stancu insisted that he be paid, Mr. Chatiris responded with “I will give you the money now but you are fired”. 48. If Plaintiff Stancu had not complained about Defendants’ violations of the law then he would not have been terminated. In fact, this was the explicit reason given for his termination. 49. As a result, Plaintiff Stancu has lost pay to which he is entitled under the FLSA and NYLL and has been damaged in an amount yet to be determined. 50. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA and NYLL were done with knowledge of the law and with full understanding that this policy violated the law. 51. Plaintiff Stancu has lost income due to the loss of his job as he has suffered a period of unemployment. 52. Defendant Ethos is an employer under the FLSA and NYLL. 53. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in the above paragraphs of this complaint as if same were set forth herein fully at length. 54. Defendants willfully employed Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs in the afore-mentioned enterprise and failed to compensate them for all hours worked during their employment. 55. Defendants failed to pay any wages for hours worked by Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs. 56. Defendants failed to pay any wages for hours worked by Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs. 57. Defendants also failed to provide any pay the overtime premium rate of one and a half times their regular hourly rate as is required by the FLSA. 59. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in the above paragraphs of this complaint as if same were set forth herein fully at length. 60. Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs were employees of Defendants within the meaning of New York Wage Regulations (NYCRR Labor Section 138 et seq.). 61. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs any rate of pay for certain hours when they were required to be at work, ready to work, and actually performing work. 62. Defendants’ failure to comply with the New York Labor Law minimum wage protections caused Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs to suffer loss of wages and interest thereon. 63. Defendants’ failure to pay proper wages for each hour worked was willful. 64. Defendants also failed to pay overtime pay as is required by the New York Labor Law. 65. Defendants also stole tips which were owed to Plaintiff due to the work he performed, which were paid to Plaintiff by clients and to which he is entitled. 66. Defendants also failed to pay any spread of hours pay to Plaintiff for days in which he worked more than ten (10) hours. 67. On account of such violations, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for actual, statutory and liquidated damages. 68. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in the above paragraphs of this complaint as if same were set forth herein fully at length. 70. Defendants then retaliated against Plaintiff by immediately terminating his employment. 71. This action violates the New York Labor Law § 215. 72. As a result of this violation, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer loss of wages, benefits and emotional damages for which Defendants are liable. 73. Plaintiff is further entitled to reinstatement, liquidated damages, injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in the above paragraphs of this complaint as if same were set forth herein fully at length. 75. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants within the meaning of New York Labor Law §§ 190 et seq., including §§ 191, 193, 195, 198 and the applicable regulations thereunder. 76. At all times relevant herein, Defendants, individually and/or jointly, failed and willfully failed to provide Plaintiff with the notice(s) required by NYLL 195(1) – Plaintiff is therefore entitled to and seeks to recover in this action the maximum recovery for this violation, plus attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to NYLL 198 including NYLL 198(1-b). 77. At all times relevant herein, Defendants failed and willfully failed to provide Plaintiff with the statement(s) required by NYLL 195(3) – Plaintiff is therefore entitled to and seeks to recover in this action the maximum recovery for this violation, plus attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to NYLL 198 including NYLL 198(1-d) VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT VIOLATION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW VIOLATION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW (wage notice and statement) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW

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37. Defendants own, operate, lease and/or control Applebee’s restaurants throughout Pennsylvania and the United States. 38. As part of these operations, Defendants serve food and/or drinks at a bar area in each restaurant. 40. Plaintiff desired to be served at the restaurant’s bar dining area, and more specifically, desired to be served at and use the bar-top dining surface; however, Defendants have failed to provide accessible seating at the bar-counter dining surface for Plaintiff and others similarly situated to utilize. 41. The restaurant also did not have accessible seating in the bar’s lounge area. 43. Defendants’ policy and practice of failing to provide individuals with mobility disabilities accessible dining surfaces or accessible seating in its bar dining areas is discriminatory, segregationist, and in violation of the ADA. 45. Plaintiff intends to continue to test Defendants’ Restaurants. 46. Plaintiff has been, and in the absence of an injunction will continue to be, injured by Defendants’ policy and practice of failing to provide accessible dining areas to persons with disabilities. 47. Plaintiff brings this action under Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the federal rules of civil procedure and on behalf of herself and the following class: All individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility and who have been, or in the future will be, denied the full and equal enjoyment of bar counter dining services offered to patrons at Defendants’ Restaurants located within the United States because of the lack of accessible bar counter dining surface seating at those restaurants. 48. Numerosity: The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and the Court, and will facilitate judicial economy. 49. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 51. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation, generally, and who possess specific expertise in the context of class litigation under the ADA. 52. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the class as a whole. 53. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the previous paragraphs. 54. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the defined putative class of individuals similarly situated. 55. Plaintiff is an individual with a mobility disability and uses a wheelchair for mobility. Plaintiff, accordingly, is an individual with a disability pursuant to the ADA, in that Plaintiff suffers a physical impairment substantially limiting one or more major life activities. Violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq.

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30. Chase violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8) by using language or a symbol on any envelope when communicating with a consumer by mail as described above.

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15. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of all individuals and entities who purchased Helios common stock on the public market during the Class Period, and were damaged, excluding the Company, the defendants and each of their immediate family members, legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns, and any entity in which any of the defendants have or had a controlling interest (the “Class”). 17. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by the Defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of the federal securities laws complained of herein. 18. Plaintiff has and will continue to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the other members of the Class. 20. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action.

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14. Defendant owns and operates Bubby’s restaurants in New York City, with locations at 120 Hudson Street, New York, New York, and 73 Gansevoort Street, New York, New York. It sells, at these restaurants, pancakes, biscuits, fish, steak, salads, pies, wine, beer, and similar items. 15. Defendant’s Website is heavily integrated with its restaurants, serving as a gateway to them. Through the Website, Defendant’s customers are, inter alia, able to: learn information about the restaurants’ locations and contact information; learn about the items for sale in the restaurants; learn about hosting special events at the restaurants; learn about catering and pie orders and make a reservation. 16. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff Fischler and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its restaurants. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff Fischler and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s restaurants and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 20. Due to the inaccessibility of its Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff Fischler, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The Website’s access barriers that Plaintiff Fischler encountered have caused a denial of his full and equal access in the past, and now deter him on a regular basis from accessing the Website. These access barriers have likewise deterred him from visiting Defendant’s restaurants and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals. 21. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Fischler could independently navigate it, view goods and service items, locate Defendant’s restaurants and learn their hours of operation, learn about the items for sale, complete a purchase and make a reservation as sighted individuals do. 22. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Fischler has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 24. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 25. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Fischler seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 27. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 28. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Fischler and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 29. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 31. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s restaurants during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 32. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s restaurants, during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 33. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s restaurants, during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 35. Plaintiff Fischler’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind and claim that Defendant has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 36. Plaintiff Fischler will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because he has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because he has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. 38. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 39. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 40. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 41. Defendant’s restaurants are public accommodations under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s restaurants. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 42. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 44. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 45. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Fischler, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight under 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. 47. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 49. Defendant’s State of New York restaurants constitute sales establishments and public accommodations under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these restaurants. 50. Defendant is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its restaurants and the Website. Defendant is a “person” under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 51. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its restaurants to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 53. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 54. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 56. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its restaurants under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 57. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 58. Plaintiff Fischler is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense. 59. Plaintiff Fischler is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 62. The NYCHRL provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(a). 63. Defendant’s New York City locations are sales establishments and public accommodations under the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 64. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its restaurants in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 65. Defendant is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its restaurants to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 67. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Subclass because of a disability, violating the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a,) in that it has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 68. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 69. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff Fischler is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines for each offense. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 72. Under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 74. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Fischler contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its restaurants, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 75. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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(Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class 18. Enacted in 1991, the TCPA makes it unlawful “to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any telephone number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone service.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 19. Calls made by an ATDS or with a prerecorded or artificial voice are referred to as “robocalls” by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) and herein. 20. Encouraging people to hold robocallers accountable on behalf on their fellow Americans, the TCPA provides a private cause of action to persons who receive such calls. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 96. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 97. Defendant violated the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), by placing non-emergency calls to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the class using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice. 98. Plaintiff and class members are entitled to an award of up to $1,500 in damages for each knowing or willful violation and of $500 for each other violation. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 99. Plaintiff and class members are entitled to and seek an injunction prohibiting Defendant and all other persons who are in active concert or participation with it from violating the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), by placing non-emergency calls to any cellular telephone number using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice. A. The Enactment of the TCPA and the FCC’s Regulations Thereunder

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16. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 17. Through its Field Technicians, Defendant provides roof inspection services, ladder assist services, direct inspections of roof damage and tarping services, (“services”) to insurance companies nationwide. 18. According to its website, Field Technicians are available to assist its customers within 24-48 hours upon request. In weather catastrophes and emergencies, Field Technician teams traveled across the United States to assist and expedite the services requested. 19. During the Collective Action Period, Defendant employed Plaintiff as a Field Technician from May 2013 to June 2014. 20. As a Field Technician, Defendant directed Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members to perform services to its customers in the United States, including but not limited to, in North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, New York, Michigan, and Ohio. 22. Defendant assigned all of the work that Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members performed, and/or has been aware of it. The exact number of claims worked per week, and the locations they traveled to, can be ascertained from Defendant’s records. 23. Pursuant to its centralized, company-wide policy, pattern and/or practice, Defendant classified Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members, as independent contractors who were exempt from the overtime provisions of the 37. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all of the Collective Action Members, realleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 38. During the Collective Action Period, Defendant hired Field Technicians similarly situated to Plaintiff who performed the same work for Defendant and were subjected to the same pay practices as Plaintiff. 39. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members are all victims of the Defendant’s common policy and / or plan to violate the FLSA by (1) failing to pay all earned wages; (2) misclassifying Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members as exempt from minimum wage and overtime compensation; (3) failing to provide any wages for “off the clock” work; and (4) failing to provide overtime wages for all time worked in excess of 40 hours in any given week pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207. 41. Defendant is liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members. 42. There are many similarly situated Field Technicians employed by Defendant who have been underpaid in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it. Thus, Notice should be sent to the FLSA Collective pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 43. The similarly situated Field Technicians are known to Defendant, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendant’s records. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all of the Collective Action Members, realleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 46. At all relevant times and continuing to the present time, Defendant’s piece rate compensation system did not fully compensate Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members by failing to pay them the applicable minimum wages for all their hours worked as required by Section 206 of the FLSA. 47. Defendant’s misclassification of Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members as independent contractors, and Defendant’s failure to pay them in accordance with Section 207 of the FLSA, was in willful disregard of the overtime compensation requirements of the FLSA. 49. As a result of Defendant’s FLSA violations, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the Collective Action members for minimum wage compensation in an amount to be determined at trial, plus liquidated damages in the amount equal to the amount of unpaid wages, interest, attorneys’ fees and costs. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all of the Collective Action Members, realleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 51. At all relevant times and continuing to the present time, Defendant’s piece rate compensation system did not fully compensate Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members for all their hours worked for Defendant in excess of forty (40) hours per week as required by Section 207 of the FLSA. 52. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members were victims of a policy and plan by Defendant to classify them as independent contractors and to deny them overtime compensation required by the FLSA. 54. Defendant’s failure to perform a person-by-person analysis of Plaintiff’s and the Collective Action members’ job duties to ensure that they were properly classified as independent contractors, and its failure to compensate them for off the clock work, was in willful violation of the FLSA to save money. Defendant knew and/or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 55. As a result of Defendant’s FLSA violations, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members for unpaid overtime compensation in an amount to be determined at trial, plus liquidated damages in the amount equal to the amount of unpaid wages, interest, attorneys’ fees and costs. FLSA OVERTIME COMPENSATION (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiff and All Collective Action Members) FLSA MINIMUM WAGE COMPENSATION (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiff and All Collective Action Members)

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21. Defendant is an instructional food preparation company that owns and operates the website, store.177milkstreet.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant ensures the delivery of throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers its products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website using a screen-reader. 25. For example, many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to contain a proper label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This was a problem for Plaintiff because in certain instances the screen reader failed to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 30. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 36. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. Upon information and belief, because CPK MEDIA, LLC.’s Website has never been accessible and because CPK MEDIA, LLC. does not have, and has never had, an adequate corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring: a. that CPK MEDIA, LLC. retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant”) who shall assist it in improving the accessibility of its Website so the goods and services on them may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities; b. that CPK MEDIA, LLC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to ensure that all employees involved in website development and content development be given web accessibility training on a periodic basis, including onsite training to create accessible content at the design and development stages; c. that CPK MEDIA, LLC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform an automated accessibility audit on a periodic basis to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; d. that CPK MEDIA, LLC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform end-user accessibility/usability testing on a periodic basis with said testing to be performed by individuals with various disabilities to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; e. that CPK MEDIA, LLC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to create an accessibility policy that will be posted on its Website, along with an e-mail address and tollfree phone number to report accessibility-related problems; and f. that Plaintiff, their counsel and its experts monitor Defendant’s Website for up to two years after the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant validates it is free of accessibility errors/violations to ensure it has adopted and implemented adequate accessibility policies. 40. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 42. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 61. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 63. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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30. Plaintiff still has and had, at all relevant times to this action, telephone service at 954-327-7450 at its place of business at Scott Barr, DDS, 300 NW 70 Avenue, Suite 206A, Plantation, FL 33317. Plaintiff receives facsimile transmissions (hereinafter "faxes") at this number, using a telephone facsimile machine (hereinafter "fax machine"). 32. Exhibit A was wholly unsolicited in that Defendant sent it to Plaintiff without Plaintiff’s express invitation or permission. In addition, as stated above, Exhibit A does not contain the opt-out notice required by the TCPA. 33. Plaintiff brings this class action under rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) & (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of itself and of a similarly situated “Class” or “Class Members” defined as: All persons in the United States from four years prior to the date of the filing of the instant Complaint through the date of the filing of the instant Complaint to whom Defendant sent or caused to be sent a facsimile advertisement in the form attached as Exhibit A, promoting the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services. Excluded from the Class are: any Defendant, and any subsidiary or affiliate of that Defendant, and the directors, officers and employees of that Defendant or its subsidiaries or affiliates, and members of the federal judiciary. 35. Numerosity: At this time, Plaintiff does not know the exact number of Class Members, but among other things, given the nature of the claims and that Defendant's conducted consisted of a standardized fax campaign and widely disseminated standardized fax electronically sent to particular telephone numbers, Plaintiff believes, at a minimum, there are hundreds of Class Members. Plaintiff believes that the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable and the disposition of their claims in a class action rather than incremental individual actions will benefit the Parties and the Court by eliminating the possibility of inconsistent or varying adjudications of individual actions. 36. Upon information and belief, a more precise Class size and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records, including, but not limited to Defendant’s fax and marketing records. 37. Members of the Class may additionally or alternatively be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in class actions, such as by published notice, e-mail notice, website notice, fax notice, first class mail, or combinations thereof, or by other methods suitable to this class and deemed necessary and/or appropriate by the Court. 39. One or more questions or issues of law and/or fact regarding Defendant’s liability are common to all Class Members and predominate over any individual issues that may exist and may serve as a basis for class certification under Rule 23(c)(4). 40. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the Class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same course of conduct that violates the TCPA. 42. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel, who are competent and experienced in litigation in the federal courts, TCPA litigation and class action litigation. 44. Class-Wide Injunctive Relief and Rule 23(b)(2): Moreover, as an alternative to or in addition to certification of the Class under Rule 23(b)(3), class certification is warranted under Rule 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and members of Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and Class Members as a whole. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief on behalf of Class Members on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class in order to enjoin and prevent Defendant’s’ ongoing violations of the TCPA, and to order Defendant to provide notice to them of their rights under the TCPA to statutory damages and to be free from unwanted faxes 45. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in all of the above paragraphs and incorporates such allegations by reference. 46. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of the Class defined above against Defendant for its violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”), Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (1991) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227) and the rules prescribed under it by the FCC. 47. At all times material to this action, Defendant was a person that used or caused to be used a “telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device” to send, to a “telephone facsimile machine” an “unsolicited advertisement” or an “advertisement” within the meaning of the TCPA and its regulations. 49. Each of the foregoing advertisements violated the TCPA because they failed to contain the opt-out notice required by 47 U.S.C § 227(b)(1)(C)(iii); 47 C.F.R. § 50. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b). 51. If it is found that Defendant willfully and/or knowingly sent and/or caused to be sent fax advertisements to Plaintiff and the members of Class in violation of the TCPA, Plaintiff requests an increase by the Court of the damage award against Defendant, described in the preceding paragraph, to three times the amount available under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) for willful or knowing violations. 64.1200(a)(3)(iv); and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3)(iii). Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227)

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49. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 51. As a result of Defendant's negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff is entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 52. Plaintiff is also entitled to and seeks injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 53. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, all other paragraphs. 54. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. Knowing and/or Willful Violation Of The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) 47 U.S.C. § 227 Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) 47 U.S.C. § 227

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21. Defendant manufactures, markets, advertises and sells personal care and hygiene products in the United States and throughout the world. 22. Defendant markets numerous products under their “Kiss My Face” brand such as the Product purchased by Plaintiffs. The Product is available at many higher-end supermarket chains and grocery stores and other retail outlets throughout the United States, including but not limited to Whole Foods. 24. By representing that Product was “Natural,” Defendant sought to capitalize on consumers’ preference for natural products and the association between such products and a wholesome way of life. Consumers are willing to pay more for natural products because of this association as well as the perceived higher quality, health and safety benefits and low impact on the environment associated with products labeled as “Natural.” 25. Although Defendant represented the Product as “Natural,” they are not natural because they contain the highly processed ingredient Glycerin. 64. Plaintiff TRONCOSO seeks to represent a class consisting of the following subclass (the “New York Class”): All New York residents who made retail purchases of the Product during the applicable limitations period, and/or such subclasses as the Court may deem appropriate. 65. The proposed Classes exclude current and former officers and directors of Defendant, members of the immediate families of the officers and directors of Defendant, Defendant’s legal representatives, heirs, successors, assigns, and any entity in which they have or have had a controlling interest, and the judicial officer to whom this lawsuit is assigned. 66. Plaintiffs reserve the right to revise the Class definition based on facts learned in the course of litigating this matter. 67. This action is proper for class treatment under Rules 23(b)(1)(B) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While the exact number and identities of other Class members are unknown to Plaintiffs at this time, Plaintiffs are informed and believe that there are thousands of Class members. Thus, the Class is so numerous that individual joinder of all Class members is impracticable. 70. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and pursue the interests of the Class and have retained competent counsel experienced in prosecuting nationwide class actions. Plaintiffs understand the nature of their claims herein, have no disqualifying conditions, and will vigorously represent the interests of the Class. Neither Plaintiffs nor Plaintiffs’ counsel have any interests that conflict with or are antagonistic to the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs have retained highly competent and experienced class action attorneys to represent their interests and those of the Class. Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel have the necessary financial resources to adequately and vigorously litigate this class action, and Plaintiffs and counsel are aware of their fiduciary responsibilities to the Class and will diligently discharge those duties by vigorously seeking the maximum possible recovery for the Class. 71. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The damages suffered by any individual class member are too small to make it economically feasible for an individual class member to prosecute a separate action, and it is desirable for judicial efficiency to concentrate the litigation of the claims in this forum. Furthermore, the adjudication of this controversy through a class action will avoid the potentially inconsistent and conflicting adjudications of the claims asserted herein. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 73. The prerequisites to maintaining a class action for injunctive relief or equitable relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) are met, as questions of law or fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. 74. The prosecution of separate actions by members of the Class would create a risk of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. Additionally, individual actions may be dispositive of the interest of all members of the Class, although certain Class members are not parties to such actions. 75. Defendant’s conduct is generally applicable to the Class as a whole and Plaintiffs seek, inter alia, equitable remedies with respect to the Class as a whole. As such, Defendant’s systematic policies and practices make declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole appropriate. 76. Plaintiff TRONCOSO repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein and further alleges the following: 78. NY GBL § 349 provides that “deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state are . . . unlawful.” 79. Under the § 349, it is not necessary to prove justifiable reliance. (“To the extent that the Appellate Division order imposed a reliance requirement on General Business Law [§] 349 … claims, it was error. Justifiable reliance by the plaintiff is not an element of the statutory claim.” Koch v. Acker, Merrall & Condit Co., 18 N.Y.3d 940, 941 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (internal citations omitted)). 80. Any person who has been injured by reason of any violation of the NY GBL may bring an action in their own name to enjoin such unlawful act or practice, an action to recover their actual damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater, or both such actions. The court may, in its discretion, increase the award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages up to one thousand dollars, if the court finds the Defendant willfully or knowingly violated this section. The court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff. 81. The practices employed by Defendant, whereby Defendant advertised, promoted, and marketed that their Product contain “Natural” ingredients, were unfair, deceptive, and misleading and are in violation of the NY GBL § 349. 82. The foregoing deceptive acts and practices were directed at customers. 83. Defendant should be enjoined from marketing their Product as “Natural” as described above pursuant to NY GBL § 349. 85. Plaintiff TRONCOSO repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein and further alleges the following: 86. Plaintiff TRONCOSO brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the Class for violations of NY GBL § 349. 87. By the acts and conduct alleged herein, Defendant committed unfair or deceptive acts and practices by misbranding their Product as “Natural.” 88. The practices employed by Defendant, whereby Defendant advertised, promoted, and marketed that their Product are “Natural” were unfair, deceptive, and misleading and are in violation of NY GBL § 349. 89. The foregoing deceptive acts and practices were directed at consumers. 90. Plaintiff TRONCOSO and the other Class members suffered a loss as a result of Defendant’s deceptive and unfair trade acts. Specifically, as a result of Defendant’s deceptive and unfair trade acts and practices, Plaintiff and the other Class members suffered monetary losses associated with the purchase of the Product, i.e., the purchase price of the Product and/or the premium paid by Plaintiff and the Class for said Product. 92. Defendant, directly or through their agents and employees, made false representations, concealments, and nondisclosures to Plaintiffs and members of the Class. 93. In making the false, misleading, and deceptive representations and omissions, Defendant knew and intended that consumers would pay a premium for “Natural” labeled products over comparable products that are not labeled “Natural” furthering Defendant’s private interest of increasing sales for their Product and decreasing the sales of products that are truthfully offered as “Natural” by Defendant’s competitors, or those that do not claim to be “Natural”. 94. As an immediate, direct, and proximate result of Defendant’s false, misleading, and deceptive representations and omissions, Defendant injured Plaintiffs and the other Class members in that they paid a premium price for Product that were not as represented. 95. In making the representations of fact to Plaintiffs and members of the Class described herein, Defendant has failed to fulfill their duties to disclose the material facts set forth above. The direct and proximate cause of this failure to disclose was Defendant’s negligence and carelessness. 96. Defendant, in making the misrepresentations and omissions, and in doing the acts alleged above, knew or reasonably should have known that the representations were not true. Defendant made and intended the misrepresentations to induce the reliance of Plaintiffs and members of the Class. 98. As a result of Defendant’s wrongful conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Class have suffered and continue to suffer economic losses and other general and specific damages, including but not limited to the amounts paid for the Product and any interest that would have been accrued on those monies, all in an amount to be determined according to proof at time of trial. BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTIES (All States) INJUNCTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 349 (DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT) NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION (All States) The Nationwide Class VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 349 (DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT)

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38. Defendant has failed to pay Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals proper overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. 39. Defendant has a policy and practice of failing and refusing to pay Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated employees for all hours worked in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. 40. Defendant’s conduct in this regard was a willful violation of the FLSA. 41. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful acts, Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated current and former employees are being deprived of earned wages in amounts to be determined at trial. They are entitled to compensation for unpaid minimum wage and overtime wages, interest, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and any other remedies available at law or in equity. 8 42. Plaintiffs and the members of the putative class are employees within the meaning of the Ohio Wage Act. 43. Defendant has failed to pay Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees proper compensation for all hours worked in violation of the Ohio Wage Act. 44. Defendant’s policy and practice denied and continues to deny Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees from receiving payment of the overtime premium for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a work week. 45. Defendant’s conduct in this regard is a willful violation of O.R.C. §§4111.01, 4111.03 and 4111.10. 46. Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees who worked in Ohio are entitled to compensation for unpaid overtime wages, interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, and any other remedies available at law or in equity. 9 VIOLATION OF THE OHIO WAGE ACT, O.R.C. §§ 4111.01, 4111.03, 4111.10 BY PLAINTIFFS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVIDUALS VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES, VIOLATION OF THE OHIO PROMPT PAY ACT, O.R.C. § 4113.15, FAILURE TO PAY WAGES WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF PERFORMING THE WORK BY PLAINTIFFS, INDIVIDUALLY AND

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45. This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 46. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of the Defendants and those business and governmental entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts. -6- 47. Excluded from the Plaintiff's Class are the Defendants and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of the Defendants, and all of their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 48. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff's Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether Defendants' communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 49. The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 50. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 51. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: (a) Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff's Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. (b) Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff's Class and those questions predominate -7- over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendants' communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. (c) Typicality: The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint have claims arising out of the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. (d) Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. (e) Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(l)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate because adjudications with respect to individual -8- members create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants who, on information and belief, collects debts throughout the United States of America. 52. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that a determination that the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and is tantamount to declaratory relief and any monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination. 53. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff's Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 54. Further, Defendants have acted, or failed to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Rule (b)(l)(A) and (b)(2) Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 55. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). -9- 56. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered one (1) through fifty five (55) herein with the same force and effect is if the same were set forth at length herein. 57. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 58. The class involves all individuals whom Defendants' records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about October 3, 2018; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (c) the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692e(10) for providing multiple mailing addresses, thereby confusing the consumer as to which address to send disputes to. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 59. The Defendants' actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 60. Because the Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Plaintiff and the members of the class are entitled to damages in accordance with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, respectfully requests preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and that this Court enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor and against the Defendants and award damages as follows: (a) Statutory damages provided under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k); -10- (b) Attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs incurred in bringing this action; and (c) Any other relief that this Court deems appropriate and just under the circumstances. Dated: Brooklyn, New York November 15, 2018 /s/ Maxim Maximov_____ Maxim Maximov, Esq. Attorneys for the Plaintiff Maxim Maximov, LLP 1701 Avenue P Brooklyn, New York 11229 Office: (718) 395-3459 Facsimile: (718) 408-9570 E-mail: m@maximovlaw.com Plaintiff requests trial by jury on all issues so triable. /s/ Maxim Maximov_____ Maxim Maximov, Esq. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendants.

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100. Plaintiff incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 101. Plaintiff brings his overtime claims arising under the OMFWSA as a Rule 23 class action on behalf of the following class: Ohio Class: are all current and former day rate paid inspectors and all employees in substantially similar positions and/or with similar job titles who worked for Defendant in Ohio at any time during the three-year period before the filing of this Complaint to present. 102. Plaintiff believes there are more than 50 individuals that fit into the class. 103. Defendant’s employ more than 100 inspectors in Ohio. 104. Defendant’s employ more than 100 workers with the same job title as Plaintiff. 105. The members of the classes are so numerous that their individual joinder is impractical. 106. The identity of the members of the Ohio Class is readily discernible from Defendant’s records. 107. Plaintiff and the proposed Ohio Class on one hand, and Defendant on the other, have a commonality of interest in the subject matter and remedy sought, namely back wages plus penalties, interest, attorneys’ fees and the cost of this lawsuit. 16 108. Common questions of law and fact exist to all members of the class. These questions predominate over the questions affecting individual class members. These common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited, to the following: a) Whether Plaintiff and the Ohio Class Members worked hours in excess of forty per work week; b) Whether Plaintiff and the Ohio Class Members were denied overtime pay at a rate not less than one and one half times their regular rate as proscribed by Ohio law; c) Whether Defendant failed to properly classify Plaintiff and Ohio Class Members as exempt under Ohio law; and d) The calculation of damages. 109. These and other common questions of law and fact, which are common to the members of the classes, predominate over any individual questions affecting only individual members of the class. 110. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class because Plaintiff was not paid overtime wages in accordance with Ohio law and because Defendant classified him as exempt from overtime, just as was done with respect to the Ohio Class Members. 111. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the classes that he seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained competent counsel, highly experienced in complex class action litigation, and they intend to prosecute this action vigorously. The interests of the classes will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and his counsel. 17 112. The class action applying Ohio state law is superior to other available means of fair and efficient adjudication of the state law claims of Plaintiff and the Class Members. The injuries suffered by each individual class member are relatively small in comparison to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of a complex and extensive litigation necessitated by Defendant’s conduct. It would be virtually impossible for members of the class individually to redress effectively the wrongs done to them; even if the members of the class could afford such individual litigation, the court system could not. Individualized litigation presents the possibility for inconsistent or contradictory judgments. Individualized litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties and to the court system presented by the complex, legal and factual issues of the case. By contrast, the class action presents far fewer logistical issues and provides the benefits of a single adjudication, economy of scale and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 113. The operative question in this case is whether the workers in question are exempt from overtime wages. IX. 24. Defendant Cleveland Integrity Service, Inc., offers its clients a range of services to assist in the construction and implementation of pipeline, refinery, power plants, and mechanical integrity projects. The scope of these services ranges from planning, estimating, surveying, development, management, inspection, startup and commissioning. 25. Defendant is a staffing company. 26. Defendant staffs inspectors to various projects. 27. Plaintiff worked for Defendant under the job titles of Utility Inspector, Safety Inspector, and Quality Assurance Auditor. 28. Regardless of Defendant’s job titles, Plaintiff performed inspection work for Defendant. 29. Plaintiff was an inspector while working for Defendant and as such he is identified as an “inspector” throughout this Complaint as are the FLSA Collective Class Members and the Ohio Class Members. 30. Plaintiff worked for Defendant from approximately May of 2016 to November of 2016 and again from May of 2017 to October of 2017. 31. Defendant classified Plaintiff as an employee. 6 32. Defendant paid Plaintiff a day rate. 33. As an inspector, Plaintiff was responsible for observing the completion of pipeline installation by Defendant’s customers to ensure that such work conformed to industry safety standards. 34. For his labor, Defendant paid Plaintiff a day rate but did not pay him overtime for his hours in excess of forty per week. In other words, Defendant misclassified Plaintiff as exempt. 35. Plaintiff is a non-exempt employee. 36. Defendant paid hundreds of other inspectors classified as employees throughout the United States on the same day rate compensation system as Plaintiff. 37. Defendant has the following offices: a. 370690 East Old Hwy 64, Cleveland, OK 74020. b. 7302 Northland Dr., Stanwood, MI 49346. c. 2500 City West Blvd. Ste. 300, Houston, TX 77042. d. 207 Flatiron Dr., Buffalo, WY 82834. 38. In the last three years, Defendant has employed day rate paid inspectors in the following nonexclusive list of states: a. Texas; b. Ohio; c. Colorado; d. Michigan; e. Wyoming; 7 f. Oklahoma; g. Kansas; h. Missouri; i. Wisconsin; j. West Virginia; k. Pennsylvania; and l. Illinois. 39. Plaintiff and other inspectors commonly work in excess of 12 hours each day. 40. Inspectors usually work five to seven days each week, for a schedule that equates into workweeks well exceeding 40 hours. 41. Plaintiff typically worked five to seven days a week at twelve to fifteen hours per day. 42. However, despite working overtime hours, Defendant does not pay its inspectors overtime because it pays the same flat day rate regardless on the number of hours worked. 43. No exemption in the FLSA shelters Defendant from paying overtime to its inspectors. 44. Inspectors like Plaintiff are not guaranteed a set number of days to work per week. 45. Inspectors like Plaintiff are not guaranteed a set weekly payment. 46. Inspectors are paid on a day rate basis, not on a salary basis. 47. Plaintiff was paid on a day rate basis, not on a salary basis. 8 48. If an inspector did not work on any given day, such as because of an illness, the lack of available work, weather, or a company closure, that inspector would not be paid for that day’s work. 49. Plaintiff was not paid time-and-a-half for all hours worked over forty in a given workweek. 50. Plaintiff worked overtime as defined in the FLSA. 51. Other inspectors employed by Defendant worked overtime as defined in the 70. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 71. Defendant’s practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Class Members time-and-a-half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek violates the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 207. 11 72. None of the exemptions provided by the FLSA regulating the duty of employers to pay overtime at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which its employees are paid are applicable to Defendant, Plaintiff, or the FLSA Collective Class Members. VI. 73. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 74. Plaintiff has actual knowledge that FLSA Collective Class Members have also been denied overtime pay for hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek as a result of Defendant’s misclassification of its employees. 75. Plaintiff’s knowledge is based on his personal work experience and through communications with other workers of Defendant. Plaintiff personally knows of other inspectors under the same compensation structure at multiple job sites for Defendant. 76. Other workers similarly situated to the Plaintiff worked for Defendant throughout the United States but were not paid overtime at the rate of one and one-half their regular rates of pay when those hours exceeded forty (40) hours in a workweek. 77. Although Defendant permitted and/or required FLSA Collective Class Members to work in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek, Defendant denied them full compensation for their hours worked over forty (40). 78. Defendant misclassified and continues to misclassify FLSA Collective Class Members as exempt employees. 12 79. FLSA Collective Class Members perform or have performed the same or similar work as Plaintiff and were misclassified as exempt by Defendant. 80. Plaintiff had the same job duties as other employees of Defendant who had the same job title as Plaintiff and worked for Defendant at any time during the three years prior to the filing of this lawsuit. 81. FLSA Collective Class Members are not exempt from receiving overtime pay under the FLSA. 82. As such, FLSA Collective Class Members are similar to Plaintiff in terms of relevant job duties, pay structure, misclassification as exempt employees and/or the denial of overtime pay. 83. Defendant’s failure to pay overtime compensation at the rate required by the FLSA results from generally applicable policies or practices and does not depend on the personal circumstances of any FLSA Collective Class Member. 84. Defendant employed at least 100 other inspectors within the last 3 years who were paid on a day rate. 85. Defendant employed at least 200 other inspectors within the last 3 years who were paid on a day rate. 86. Defendant employed at least 400 other inspectors with the same job title as Plaintiff who were not paid overtime. 87. Defendant employed at least 500 other inspectors with the same job title as Plaintiff who worked overtime for at least one week during their employment with 13 Defendant and were not paid one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all overtime hours worked. 88. The experiences of Plaintiff, with respect to his pay, hours, and duties are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective Class Members. 89. The specific job titles or precise job responsibilities of each FLSA Collective Class Member does not prevent collective treatment. 90. All FLSA Collective Class Members, irrespective of their particular job requirements, are entitled to overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. 91. Although the exact amount of damages may vary among the FLSA Collective Class Members, the damages for the FLSA Collective Class Members can be easily calculated by a simple formula. The claims of all FLSA Collective Class Members arise from a common nucleus of facts. Liability is based on a systematic course of wrongful conduct by Defendant that caused harm to all FLSA Collective Class Members. 92. As such, the class of similarly situated plaintiffs for the FLSA Collective Class is properly defined as follows: All current and former inspectors, and all employees in substantially similar positions and/or with similar job titles, that worked for Defendant throughout the United States at any time during the three- year period before the filing of this Complaint to present that were paid on a day rate. 93. The similarly situated employees are known to Defendant, are readily identifiable, and may be located through Defendant’s records, as well as the records of any payroll companies that Defendant utilizes. Defendant employs many FLSA Collective 14 Members throughout the United States. These similarly situated employees may be readily notified of this action through direct U.S. mail, text message, email, and/or other appropriate means, and allowed to opt into it pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 94. Plaintiff incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 95. At all relevant times, Defendant has been, and continues to be, an “employer” within the meaning of the OMFWSA. At all relevant times, Defendant has employed and continues to employ, “employees,” including the Ohio Class Members and Plaintiff, within the meaning the OMFWSA. 96. The OMFWSA requires payment of one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate for each hour worked per week over 40 hours. O.R.C. § 4111.03. 97. In denying compensation at the requisite Ohio overtime rate, Defendant violated the OMFWSA. 98. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the Ohio Class Members have suffered and will continue to suffer a loss of income and other damages. Plaintiff and the Ohio Class Members are entitled to liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs incurred in connection with this claim. 99. Having violated the OMFWSA, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and Ohio Class Members pursuant to O.R.C. § 4111.10 for the full amount of their unpaid overtime 15 and for costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. Additionally, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and Ohio Class Members for an amount equal to twice their unpaid wages. O.R.C. § STANDARDS ACT, O.R.C. § 4111.01, et seq.

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20. NYX’s Website is heavily integrated with its physical stores, serving as a gateway to those brick and mortar locations. Through the Website, NYX customers are, inter alia, able to: find information about the stores’ locations and hours of operation; purchase makeup and makeup accessories (e.g., lipstick, lipgloss, bronzer, blush, eyeliner, brushes) and learn about those products (e.g., learn “what’s trending,” best sellers, “fan faves”); purchase a gift card; learn about and access special offers and sales (e.g., discounts, special mark downs); learn style tips; and learn about the company’s refund policies. 21. It is, upon information and belief, NYX’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff Young and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the goods and services that are offered and integrated with NYX’s stores. Due to NYX’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff Young and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to NYX’s stores and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 22. Plaintiff Young cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. Due to the inaccessibility of its Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff Young, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services NYX offer to the public on its Website. The Website’s access barriers that Plaintiff Young encountered have caused a denial of his full and equal access in the past, and now deter him on a regular basis from accessing the Website. These access barriers have likewise deterred him from visiting NYX’s physical stores and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals. 26. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Young could independently navigate it and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 27. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Young has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 29. NYX therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 30. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 32. Although NYX may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, NYX lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 33. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Young and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 34. NYX has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 36. Plaintiff Young seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access NYX’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in NYX’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 37. Plaintiff Young seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in NYX’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 38. Plaintiff Young seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in NYX’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 40. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that NYX has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 41. Plaintiff Young will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because he has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because he has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because NYX has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. 43. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 44. Plaintiff Young, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 45. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 46. NYX’s stores are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of NYX’s stores. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 47. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 49. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 50. These acts alleged herein violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Young, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. 51. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Young requests the relief as set forth below. 53. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 54. NYX’s physical locations are in the State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). NYX’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of NYX. NYX’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 55. NYX is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations and the Website. NYX is a “person” within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 56. NYX is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that NYX makes available to the non-disabled public. 58. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 59. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 61. NYX discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Young and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of NYX’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins NYX from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 62. As NYX’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Young seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 63. Plaintiff Young is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense. 64. Plaintiff Young is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 65. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 66. Plaintiff Young, individually and on behalf the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 68. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 69. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 70. NYX’s New York City physical locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40-c(2). NYX’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of NYX and its Website is a service that is by and integrated with these establishments. 71. NYX is subject to N.Y. Civ. Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. NYX is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 73. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 74. Under N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the Defendants shall reside . . .” 75. NYX discriminates, and will continue to discriminate against Plaintiff Young and the New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability, as they are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 77. Plaintiff Young, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 78. The NYCHRL provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(a). 79. NYX’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the meaning of the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 80. NYX is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 81. NYX is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that NYX make available to the non-disabled public. 83. NYX’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Subclass because of a disability, violating the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a,) in that it has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 84. As such, NYX discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins NYX from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 86. Plaintiff Young is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines for each offense. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 87. Plaintiff Young is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 88. Under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 89. Plaintiff Young, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 90. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Young contends, and is informed and believes that NYX denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which NYX owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 91. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF NYX’s Website And Its Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NEW YORK STATES CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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11. The claims of the named Plaintiff Bouas are typical of the claims of the Class. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of other members of the Class as there are no material differences in the facts and law underlying the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and by prosecuting his claims, Plaintiff will advance the claims of class members. 12. While the exact number of class members is unknown to Plaintiff now, the Class— upon information and belief—contains thousands of members. The potential class members are so numerous that joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable. Commonality And Predominance 14. These common questions of law and fact among all class members predominate over any issues affecting individual members of the class. Superiority 15. Class treatment of the claims set forth herein is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The expense and burden of individual litigation would make it impracticable or impossible for proposed class members to prosecute their claims individually. Absent a class action, a multiplicity of individual lawsuits would be required to address the claims between class members and Harley-Davidson, and inconsistent treatment and adjudication of the claims would likely result. 16. The litigation and trial of Plaintiff’s claims is manageable. The defects affecting the subject 2008-2010 Harley-Davidson Touring model motorcycles were common across all models and model years of the subject motorcycles, and Harley-Davidson maintains records making these motorcycles, and their purchasers, easily identifiable. The consistent provisions of the relevant laws, and the readily ascertainable identities of the subject motorcycles and many class members demonstrate that there would be no significant manageability problems with prosecuting this lawsuit as a class action. 18. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), Harley-Davidson has acted and refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Class as a whole, making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. 19. The conduct at issue—Harley-Davidson’s practices in refusing to disclose the existence of a dangerous defect in 2008–2010 Touring and CVO Touring models—apply to all members of the putative Class equally. This conduct is ongoing. A finding that such conduct is unlawful and changes to those practices will apply to all class members equally. 20. Harley-Davidson manufactures motorcycles for sale to the public. 21. Harley-Davidson added an optional anti-lock braking system (“ABS”) to its 2008 model year Touring and CVO Touring model motorcycles, which went on sale to the public in September 2007. 22. Because it was an optional feature, Harley-Davidson charged significantly more for motorcycles with ABS as opposed to previous and non-ABS motorcycles. For instance, the list price of a 2007 Harley-Davidson Road King Classic was $18,255.1 The list price of a 2008 Harley- Davidson Road King Classic with ABS was $19,320.2 Harley-Davidson suggested a list price of $795 for the ABS option on its Touring and CVO Touring motorcycles.3 1 Pricing information obtained from 9. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(b)(2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and proposes the following class: All individuals and entities in Illinois who purchased or leased a model year 2008 – 2010 Harley-Davidson Touring or CVO Touring model Motorcycle (the “Class Motorcycle”). Allegations Common To All Class Members

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40. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through thirty nine (39) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 41. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 42. The class consists of all persons whom Defendants’ records reflect resided in the State of New York who communicated with Defendants’ representatives within one year prior to the date of the within complaint up to the date of the filing of the complaint; (a) the Defendants denied the Plaintiff the right to dispute the debt verbally; and (b) when reporting the debt with the credit bureaus, the Defendant failed to report the disputed debt as disputed; and (c) the Defendant made false statements in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(8) and 1692e(10). 43. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: A. Based on the fact that form telephonic communications are at the heart of this litigation, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. B. There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The -7- principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendants violated the FDCPA. C. The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who had such communications with the Defendant (i.e. the class members), a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of Defendants. D. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. E. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members’ interests. The Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and collection-abuse claims. The Plaintiff's interests are consistent with those of the members of the class. 44. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties and would not be in the interest of judicial economy. 45. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, the Plaintiff will seek to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 46. Collection attempts, such as those made by the Defendants are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” -8- Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 47. The Defendants' actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 48. Because the Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Plaintiff and the members of the class are entitled to damages in accordance with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, respectfully requests preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and that this Court enter judgment in his favor and against the Defendants and award damages as follows: A. Statutory and actual damages provided under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k); B. Attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs incurred in bringing this action; and C. Any other relief that this Court deems appropriate and just under the circumstances. 49. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein, paragraphs 1 - 10, 19, 22, 25, 28, 29, 32, 37 and 38 in this action, that reference the Plaintiff being unable to dispute the alleged debt orally, and that when reporting the debt with the credit bureaus, the Defendants failed to report the disputed debt as disputed. 50. The Defendants both threatened the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8). -9- Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 51. The Defendants’ actions as set forth above in the within complaint violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on an individual basis Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the members of a class, as against the Defendants.

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24. Defendant’s text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 25. Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff cannabis products. 26. The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant’s sales and promotions, which Defendant sends to promote its business. 27. Defendant sent or caused to be sent the subject texts from within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 29. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 6002 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 6002 Number. 30. Plaintiff has been registered with the national do-not-call registry since April 23, 2011. 31. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)). 32. The text messages originated from telephone numbers 256-448-2699, 213-338-8965, and 218-400-1392, all numbers which upon information and belief are owned and operated by or on behalf of Defendant. 33. The numbers used by Defendant are known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit code that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 35. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers from a list without human intervention. 36. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. 37. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 38. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 39. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 40. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 41. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 42. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement. 44. The above execution these instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Platform is capable of transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less. 45. Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words, the platform controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function. 47. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life. 48. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm. Specifically, Plaintiff estimates that she has wasted approximately 15 minutes reviewing all of Defendant’s unwanted messages and retaining counsel for this case in order to stop Defendant’s unwanted messages. 49. Furthermore, Defendant’s text messages took up memory on Plaintiff’s cellular phone. The cumulative effect of unsolicited text messages like Defendant’s poses a real risk of ultimately rendering the phone unusable for text messaging purposes as a result of the phone’s memory being taken up. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message-spam#text (finding that text message solicitations like the ones sent by Defendant present a “triple threat” of identity theft, unwanted cell phone charges, and slower cell phone performance). 50. Defendant’s text messages also can slow cell phone performance by taking up space on the recipient phone’s memory. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message- spam#text (finding that spam text messages can slow cell phone performance by taking up phone memory space). 51. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 53. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 57. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 62. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 63. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 64. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 65. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 67. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 68. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 69. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-61 as if fully set forth herein. 70. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 71. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. 72. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. 73. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 75. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 76. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.”1 77. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.” 78. Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c). 79. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. 81. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class. Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class)

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56. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of herself and all legally blind individuals who have attempted to access Defendant’s ATMs (the “Rule 23(b)(3) Class”). 57. Plaintiff also brings this action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of herself and all legally blind individuals who have attempted to access, or will attempt to access, Defendant’s ATMs (the “Rule 23(b)(2) Class”). 58. The classes described above are so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 59. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the classes. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the classes are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 66. The allegations contained in the previous paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 67. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and the Rule 23(b)(2) Class in that it has failed to make its ATM banking services fully accessible to, and independently usable by, individuals who are blind in violation of Section 707 of the 2010 Standards, as described above. 68. Complying with the ADA and Section 707 of the 2010 Standards would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s banking services nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 69. Defendant’s conduct is ongoing, and, given that Defendant has not complied with the ADA’s requirements that public accommodations make ATM services fully accessible to, and independently usable by, blind individuals—as specifically defined in Section 707 of the 2010 Standards, Plaintiff invokes her statutory right to declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as costs and attorneys’ fees. 71. The allegations contained in the previous paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 72. “Public facilities includes…any other place of public accommodation, amusement, convenience, or resort to which the general public or any classification of persons from the general public is regularly, normally, or customarily invited.” Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 121.002(5). 73. Defendant owns or operates a public facility as defined in § 121.002(5). 74. The THRC states “[p]ersons with disabilities have the same right as the able- bodied to the full use and enjoyment of any public facility in the state.” Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 121.003(a). 75. “The discrimination prohibited by [the THRC] includes…a failure to…comply with Article 9102, Revised Statutes.”8 Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 121.003(d)(1). Thus, a violation of the TABA – and the 2012 TAS requirements adopted under the TABA – is a violation of the Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 121.003(d)(1). 76. In addition, the failure to “provide auxiliary aids and services necessary to allow the full use and enjoyment of the public facility” results in discrimination violative of the Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 121.003(d)(3). For Violation Of The THRC, Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 121.001 et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Members of the Rule 23(b)(3) Class) For Violation Of The ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Members of the Rule 23(b)(2) Class)

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11. 13. This action can be maintained as a class action under FRCP 23(a) and (b) because there are questions of law and fact common to the class members, which predominate over any questions relating to individual class members, including but not limited to: a) Whether Walgreen made false or misleading representations of fact about the true cost of consumer goods, b) Whether Walgreen advertised consumer goods as having a certain cost, with the intent not to provide its consumer goods for that advertised cost, c) Whether Walgreen’s behavior as alleged in this complaint violated Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act, d) Whether Walgreen behaved willfully, intentionally, recklessly or maliciously, and e) Whether under Oregon law, Walgreen should be able to retain the overcharges it wrongfully collected from its customers. 15. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Absent class-wide adjudication, members of the class are without effective recourse. Few, if any, class members can afford to prosecute individual actions against Walgreen, especially in light of the amounts of overcharges at issue. Absent class treatment, Walgreen’s alleged wrongdoing would go unabated, and no class member would be afforded the opportunity to seek judicial relief, whether for themselves or for the public good generally. 18. 9. Oregon’s Unit Pricing Law provides that “no person shall sell or offer for retail sale at a grocery store or food market any packaged consumer commodity unless there is clearly displayed upon the commodity package or at a place in reasonable proximity to where the commodity is offered for sale a statement of the unit retail price of the commodity pursuant to ORS 616.870 (prescribed pricing by units of measurement) and the total retail price of the commodity.” ORS 616.860(1) (emphasis added). On August 2, 2020 at approximately 8:20am, plaintiff stopped into a Walgreen store at 2829 N Lombard Street in Portland, Oregon to purchase consumer goods for his personal consumption. Plaintiff selected an eight-pack of Wyler’s Light Pink Lemonade drink mix off the shelf. Walgreen advertised that plaintiff’s cost for the eight-pack of Wyler’s Light Pink Lemonade drink mix was $1.00. Plaintiff took the eight-pack of Wyler’s Light Pink Lemonade drink mix to the register along with other consumer goods and handed his debit card to the clerk. Walgreen charged plaintiff’s debit card, then gave plaintiff a receipt. Under FRCP 23, plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated Oregon Walgreen customers. The class is initially defined as: a) Oregon Walgreen customers, who, after August 11, 2019, b) Were charged more by Walgreen for a multipack consumer good subject to Oregon’s Unit Pricing Law than the price advertised by Walgreen on the shelf for the multipack consumer good.

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13. Custody of one's child is one of the most precious of all rights, and "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberties recognized by [the Supreme] Court." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). "The bonds between a parent and child are, in a word, sacrosanct" and protected by federal law. Swipies v. Kofka, 419 F.3d 709, 715 (8th Cir. 2005). 14. The right of parents and children to maintain their relationship without unnecessary interference by the state is a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649-58 (1972). "Both parents and children have a liberty interest in the care and companionship of each other." Whisman v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303, 1309 (8th Cir.1997). 15. Every constitutionally protected liberty (or property) interest is protected against loss by the Due Process Clause. See Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 371, 381 (1987). That Clause requires the state to afford certain procedural safeguards whenever it seeks to limit or withhold a liberty or property interest. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Swipies, 419 F.3d at 713-14; Whisman, 119 F.3d at 1309.

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(Asserted on behalf of Plaintiff and the NJ Sub-Class) Violation of the New Jersey Fair Credit Reporting Act N.J. Stat. 56:11-28 et seq. (Asserted on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. 12. On or about April 21, 2016, Plaintiff traveled to a T-Mobile store in Paramus, New Jersey and spoke with an employee of Defendant to make a general inquiry about the availability of cell phone plans and rates. 13. Plaintiff spoke with a store representative at that time, who conducted a credit check without Mr. Boone’s knowledge, consent, or authorization. 14. Plaintiff never signed any agreement and never purchased any telephone services from Defendant. Plaintiff only subsequently learned that T-Mobile, without authorization to do so, had performed a hard credit inquiry that appeared on his credit report. 15. T-Mobile has been willfully and knowingly violating the FCRA and NJ FCRA for years, and failed to take any steps to correct its errors. 19. T-Mobile is an established business with access to legal advice through its own general counsel’s office and outside counsel, yet still continuously and extensively violates the law even after having been notified of the wrongdoing. 20. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant was acting by and through its agents, servants and/or employees who were acting within the course and scope of their agency or employment, and under the direct supervision and control of the Defendant. 21. At all times pertinent hereto, the conduct of the Defendant, as well as that of its agents, servants and/or employees, was intentional, willful, reckless, and in grossly negligent disregard for federal and state laws and the rights of the Plaintiff. 22. Plaintiff has been damaged, and continues to be damaged, in the following ways: (i) decreased credit score; (ii) denial of credit, loans, financing, financing on less favorable terms and/or other damages, not yet known to Plaintiff; (iii) invasion and violation of a protected right as created by Congress in passing the FCRA; and (iv) emotional distress and mental anguish associated with having incorrect derogatory personal information transmitted about Plaintiff to other people both known and unknown. 23. As such, Plaintiff and the Putative Class member are entitled to damages in the forms set forth below. 25. Plaintiff asserts his claim in Count Two individually and on behalf of the “NJ Sub- Class,” defined as follows: All persons within New Jersey who had a hard credit inquiry performed on his or her credit by Defendant who had not previously authorized a hard inquiry within the five years prior to the filing of the Complaint until the date of final judgment in this action. 26. Numerosity. The Class and the NJ Sub-Class (collectively, the “Putative Classes”) are so numerous that the individual joinder of all of its members is impracticable. While the exact number and identities of the Putative Classes members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Putative Classes include thousands of members, which can be ascertained by the records maintained by Defendant. 27. Typicality. Plaintiff and members of the Putative Classes were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant illegally, and without prior authorization, performed a hard inquiry on Plaintiff and the Putative Classes members’ credit that resulted in a decrease in Plaintiff and the Putative Class members’ creditworthiness, and their access to credit. The FCRA and the NJFCRA violations suffered by Plaintiff are typical of those suffered by other Putative Class members, and T-Mobile treated Plaintiff consistent with other Putative Class members. 29. Commonality. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Putative Classes and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Putative Classes, including but not limited to: a. Whether Defendant makes hard credit inquiries of consumers without first obtaining authorization to do so; b. Whether Defendant’s actions violated the FCRA (and NJ FCRA) by failing to obtain authorization to make hard credit inquiries; c. The proper measure of statutory and punitive damages; and d. The proper form of injunctive and declaratory relief. 30. This case is maintainable as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because prosecution of actions by or against individual members of the Putative Classes would result in inconsistent or varying adjudications and create the risk of incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. Further, adjudication of each individual Putative Class member’s claim as a separate action would potentially be dispositive of the interest of other individuals not a party to such action, impeding their ability to protect their interests. 31. This case is maintainable as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Putative Classes, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the Putative Classes as a whole. 33. Plaintiff intends to provide notice to all members of the Putative Classes to the extent required by Rule 23. The name and addresses of the Putative Class members are available from Defendant’s records. 34. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Putative Classes, consisting of all persons within the United States who had a hard inquiry performed on his or her credit by Defendant and such person had not previously authorized a hard inquiry within the five years prior to the filing of the Complaint. 35. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the New Jersey Sub-Class, consisting of all persons within New Jersey who had a hard inquiry performed on his or her credit by Defendant and such person had not previously authorized a hard inquiry within the five years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 37. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 38. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by the FCRA. 39. T-Mobile is a “person” as defined by the FCRA. 40. Defendant’s conduct violates 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(B) by obtaining a consumer report under false pretenses or knowingly without a permissible purpose by obtaining Plaintiff’s credit report in connection with a credit transaction in which he did not authorize to be involved in, and for no other permissible purpose. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 41. The foregoing violation was willful. T-Mobile knew that it was not authorized to request Plaintiff’s credit report, and acted in deliberate or reckless disregard of its obligations and the rights of Plaintiff and other Class members under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 42. Plaintiff and the Improper Authorization Class are entitled to statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000 for each and every one of these violations, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 168ln(a)(l)(A). 44. Plaintiff and the Class are further entitled to recover their costs and attorneys’ fees, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(3). 45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 46. Defendant’s conduct violated the NJ FCRA by obtaining a consumer report under false pretenses or knowingly without a permissible purpose by obtaining Plaintiff’s credit report in connection with a credit transaction in which he did not authorize to be involved in, and for no other permissible purpose. N.J. Stat. 56:11-31(f). 47. The foregoing violation was willful. T-Mobile knew that it was not authorized to request Plaintiff’s credit report, and acted in deliberate or reckless disregard of its obligations and the rights of Plaintiff and other Class members. 48. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000 for each and every one of these violations, pursuant to N.J. Stat. 56:11- 38(a)(1)(a). 49. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to punitive damages for these violations, pursuant to N.J. Stat. 56:11-38(a)(2).

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10. In pursuit of said debt, Defendant sent Plaintiff some collection letters. 12. Plaintiff paid the bill by credit card on or about September 2016. 13. However, while charging Plaintiff’s card, Defendant charged Plaintiff an additional service fee of $4.95. Exhibit A. 14. Service fees are incidental to the principal obligation. 15. Seeking to collect an incidental service fee in connection with the collection of a debt where underlying state law does not provide for such a fee, or where the underlying contract does not expressly permit such fees, is a violation of the FDCPA. 16. Upon information and belief, neither Arizona law nor the contract between Plaintiff and the original creditor expressly authorized a $4.95 service charge as Defendant charged here. 17. Credit card service fees typically vary depending on the size of the transaction and the credit card processor. Typically, a credit card service fee structure has a minimum fee per transaction (usually less than 50 cents), in addition to a percentage of the transaction (usually less than 1 percent). 18. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s set $4.95 rate applies to every transaction, and is not specifically tailored to the amount of Plaintiff’s debt. 19. Considering that credit card service fees sought are a percentage of the debt, and the debt here is in the amount of $188.18, the consistent $4.95 fee likely does not reflect the true processing or service cost. 21. Alternatively, upon information and belief, Defendant receives a portion of the excess amount as a kickback from the processor for providing the processor with extra revenue. 22. By falsely implying that Defendant is legally allowed to seek a $4.95 processing or service fee, and by collecting an illegal service fee, Defendant’s collection efforts violate the FDCPA. 23. After Plaintiff made his payment, Defendant emailed him a receipt. The email constituted a communication in connection with the collection of the debt. However, nowhere within the email did Defendant inform Plaintiff that it is a debt collector, as the FDCPA requires. Accordingly, said email violates the FDCPA. 24. Notwithstanding the above, Defendant’s collection letters also violated the FDCPA. Exhibit B. In its April 9, 2016 letter to Plaintiff, Defendant merely informed Plaintiff of the amount of the debt. The letter never provided any information to Plaintiff stating that in the event Plaintiff chose to pay via a credit card, he would be incurring an additional fee. By failing to provide this crucial information to Plaintiff, Plaintiff was misled into believing that he had no option but to pay the additional fee. Thus, Defendant’s letters also violate the FDCPA. 26. Plaintiff brings this as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 27. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following classes, initially defined as follows: Service Fee Class: All consumers within the United States that have made payment to Defendant concerning debts used primarily for personal, household, or family purposes within one year prior to filing of this complaint wherein Defendant charged the consumer an impermissible service fee. Fee Omission Class: All consumers within the United States that have received collection letters from Defendant, concerning debts used primarily for personal, household, or family purposes within one year prior to filing of this complaint which fail to inform the consumer of the different payment options and the subsequent fees incurred for specific payment options. 28. Excluded from the Class is Defendant herein, and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with the defendant, including, without limitation, persons who are officers, directors, employees, associates or partners of Defendant. Numerosity 30. The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s records. Common Questions of Law and Fact 31. There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominates over any questions affecting only individual Class members. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: (i) Whether Defendant violated the FDCPA; (ii) Whether Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Defendant's conduct; (iii) Whether Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are entitled to restitution as a result of Defendant's wrongdoing and, if so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutory formula to be applied in determining such damages and restitution; (iv) Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief; and, (v) Whether Defendant’s conduct was willful. Typicality 32. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class, and Plaintiff has no interests adverse or antagonistic to the interests of other members of the Class. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members 34. A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted. 35. The members of the Class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. 36. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties. 37. A class action will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment also will permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 38. Absent a class action, the Class members will continue to suffer losses borne from Defendant’s breaches of Class members’ statutorily protected rights as well as monetary damages, thus allowing and enabling: (a) Defendants conduct to proceed and; (b) Defendants to further enjoy the benefit of its ill-gotten gains. 40. Plaintiff repeats, realleges, and reincorporates the allegations contained in the paragraphs above and incorporates them as if set forth specifically herein. 41. Defendant’s illegal conduct has violated the following sections of the 7. On or about June 2013, Plaintiff incurred a medical debt. 8. The debt owed was $188.18. 9. Medical debt has long been considered debt for personal, family, and household use. The Class VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 22. Defendant is an asset management and investment firm that operates RW BAIRD Offices as well as the RW BAIRD website, offering features which should allow all consumers to access the services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. 23. Defendant operates RW BAIRD Offices across the United States. At least one of these Offices is located in New York City at 1155 6th Avenue, New York, NY 10036. 25. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.rwbaird.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to ascertain: Information about the financial and investment services that it provides, including stock trading, online investing, and related services. 26. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Offices. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Offices and the numerous services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 27. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 30. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 31. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical Office locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical Offices on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to take advantage of the services that it provides to the public. 32. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s Office locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related services available via the Website. 40. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 52. Defendant’s Offices are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Offices. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 56. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 61. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 64. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 67. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 68. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 69. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 73. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 74. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 76. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 78. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 79. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 80. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 81. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 83. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 84. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 85. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 86. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 87. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 89. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 90. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 91. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 93. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 94. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 96. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 97. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 98. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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10. Accordingly, Sinh Sinh is an enterprise engaged in commerce under the FLSA and is subject to its minimum wage and overtime provisions. 11. In the alternative, if Sinh Sinh is not subject to the FLSA, it is subject to the TMWA. 12. Sinh Sinh did not record the hours Tepaz and the putative class members worked. 13. Sinh Sinh paid Tepaz and the putative class members in cash. 14. Tepaz worked five days per week, from 7 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Accordingly, Tepaz regularly worked 50 or more hours per week. 16. Sinh Sinh did not pay the extra premium required by the FLSA for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week. 17. Minimum wage has been $7.25 per hour since July 24, 2009. 18. The weekly equivalent of Tepaz’s salary, when when divided by the number of hours he worked in the workweek, resulted in wages that were below the minimum wage of $7.25 required by the FLSA and the TMWA. 19. Further, Sinh Sinh did not pay hours Tepaz worked over forty in any workweek at one and one-half times his regular rate. 20. Sinh Sinh knew Tepaz worked over forty hours per week. 21. Sinh Sinh knew that Tepaz’s salary, when reduced to its hourly equivalent, was less than minimum wage. 22. Sinh Sinh knew Tepaz was not paid overtime at time and one-half his regular rate of pay. 23. Sinh Sinh has already been sued for the same payroll practices that caused Tepaz to not be paid minimum wage and overtime. 24. Sinh Sinh knew or showed reckless disregard for whether its payroll practices violated the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA. Accordingly, Sinh Sinh willfully violated the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime provisions. 25. Sinh Sinh also employed other kitchen workers similarly situated to Tepaz. These potential class members are similarly situated to Tepaz because they were denied overtime pay under the same salary payroll policy that applied to Tepaz as described above. 27. Like Tepaz, the putative class members were employees that performed manual labor similar to that performed by Tepaz, including: cleaning, preparing food, and washing dishes. Notice of this collective action is, therefore, properly sent to: All kitchen workers employed by Sinh Sinh Restaurant Corporation who were paid a salary and who worked over forty hours in any workweek during the last three years. 28. The putative class members, like Tepaz, were also denied minimum wage in workweeks when the weekly equivalent of their bimonthly salary, divided by the number of hours they worked in the workweek, resulted in a wage less than minimum wage. 7. Sinh Sinh employed Tepaz as a dishwasher in Sinh Sinh Cafe, a restaurant located in Houston, Texas. 8. Sinh Sinh had gross annual sales in excess of $750,000 during at least the last three years. 9. Sinh Sinh had two or more employees who handled, sold, or worked on goods or materials that were produced for interstate commerce, including kitchen supplies, cash registers, phones, and restaurant equipment.

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13. On or about August 26, 2019, April 21, 2020, April 27, 2020, June 3, 2020, and August 24, 2020, Defendants sent five unsolicited facsimiles to Plaintiff using a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device. See Group Exhibit A. 14. The August 26, 2019 Fax states, in part, as follows: “…We are a full services psychiatry practice dedicated and experienced inworking with individuals with mental health, substance abuse, and other cognitive disabilities. Services we provide: → Psychiatric Evaluation & Medication Management → Psychotherapy & Counseling Services → Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) → Neuropsychological Testing… We accept most forms of Insurances… 24. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the TCPA, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, (3) from whom Defendants did not obtain “prior express invitation or permission” to send fax advertisements, or (4) with whom Defendants did not have an established business relationship, or (5) where the fax advertisements did not include an opt-out notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4). Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their employees, agents and members of the Judiciary. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class which includes, but is not limited to, the fax advertisements sent to Plaintiff. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class certification discovery. 26. Commonality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)): Common questions of law and fact apply to the claims of all class members. Common material questions of fact and law include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) Whether the Faxes and other faxes sent during the class period constitute advertisements under the TCPA and its implementing regulations; (b) Whether Defendants meets the definition of “sender” for direct TCPA liability, meaning a “person or entity on whose behalf a facsimile unsolicited advertisement is sent or whose goods or services are advertised or promoted in the unsolicited advertisement,” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(10); (c) Whether Defendants had prior express invitation or permission to send Plaintiff and the class fax advertisements; (d) Whether the Fax(es) contain an “opt-out notice” that complies with the requirements of § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and the effect of the failure to comply with such requirements; (e) Whether Defendants should be enjoined from faxing advertisements in the future; (f) Whether Plaintiff and the other members of the class are entitled to statutory damages; and (g) Whether the Court should award treble damages. 28. Fair and Adequate Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4)): Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts, and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 30. The TCPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 31. The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 33. 2006 FCC Report and Order. The TCPA, in § (b)(2) of the Act, directed the FCC to implement regulations regarding the TCPA, including the TCPA’s Opt-Out Notice Requirements and the FCC did so in its 2006 Report and Order, which in addition provides among other things: (1). The definition of, and the requirements for, an established business relationship for purposes of the first of the three prongs of an exemption to liability under § (b)(1)(C)(i) of the Act and provides that the lack of an “established business relationship” precludes the ability to invoke the exemption contained in § (b)(1)(C) of the Act (See 2006 Report and Order ¶¶ 8-12 and 17-20); (2). The required means by which a recipient’s facsimile telephone number must be obtained for purposes of the second of the three prongs of the exemption under § (b)(1)(C)(ii) of the Act and provides that the failure to comply with these requirements precludes the ability to invoke the exemption contained in § (b)(1)(C) of the Act (See 2006 Report and Order ¶¶ 13-16); (3). The things that must be done in order to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements for the purposes of the third of the three prongs of the exemption under § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act and provides that the failure to comply with these requirements precludes the ability to invoke the exemption contained in § (b)(1)(C) of the Act (See 2006 Report and Order ¶¶ 24-34); 35. Defendants’ Other Violations. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendants have sent via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines of members of the Plaintiff Class the same or other faxes that constitute advertisements under the TCPA and its implementing regulations that were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission and Defendants are precluded from sustaining the established business relationship affirmative defense with Plaintiff and other members of the class because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendants may be continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. 37. The TCPA is a strict liability statute, so Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and the other class members even if its actions were only negligent. 38. Defendants knew or should have known that (a) Plaintiff and the other class members had not given prior express invitation or permission for Defendants or anybody else to send faxes advertising the commercial availability or quality of Defendants’ property, goods, or services; (b) Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship with Defendants; (c) Defendants transmitted advertisements; (d) the Faxes do not contain the required Opt-Out Notice, thereby precluding the affirmative defense of established business relationship; and (e) Defendants’ transmission of fax advertisements without prior express invitation or permission was unlawful.

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23. Defendant is a beard care product retailer. Defendant is an online retailer of beard care products for men, including beard trimmers, beard growth vitamins, beard brushes, and beard sprays, shampoos, balms, and oils. Defendant owns, operates, manages and controls the website, www.thebeardclub.com (its “Website”), which allows Defendant to sell its beard care products on both a national and international scale. With few to no brick and mortar stores currently operating today, Defendant’s Website is the exclusive point of sale for Defendant’s products. 24. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace. The Website offers features of a physical marketplace in that it allows all consumers to browse goods and services, provides details about the products, notifies them of special sale or clearance items, and completes purchases of products, which Defendant will thereafter ensure the delivery of throughout the United States, including in New York State. -9- 25. Defendant’s Website is integrated with its retail business operations, serving as its gateway. The Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to learn about Defendant’s products and services, browse for items, information, access navigation bar descriptions, prices, savings and/or coupons and sale discount items, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. The features offered by www.thebeardclub.com include products descriptions, information about the company, review boards, and purchase portals. 26. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its retail operations. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s retail operations and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 27. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using her NVDA screen-reader. 28. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, www.thebeardclub.com, the last occurring in August of 2020, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers which effectively denied her the full enjoyment of the goods and services of the Website. Plaintiff visited Defendant’s Website with an intent to browse and attempt to beard care products for her sons, who both have beards. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff -10- was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a range of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to make her desired purchase. 29. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. 30. Many features on the Website also fail to add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what she or she is expected to insert into the subject field. This was an issue on Defendant’s Website particularly in the select style section. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 31. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. -11- 32. Plaintiff has made multiple attempts to complete a purchase on www.thebeardclub.com, most recently in August of 2020, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused www.thebeardclub.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 33. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 34. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 35. But for the Website’s access barriers, Plaintiff would have returned to and further utilized Defendant’s Website. However, because the Website was effectively inaccessible to Plaintiff, she no longer intends to revisit the site. 36. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 37. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. -12- 38. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 39. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 40. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 41. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring: -13- a. that Defendant retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant”) who shall assist it in improving the accessibility of its Website so the goods and services on them may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities; b. that Defendant work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to ensure that all employees involved in website development and content development be given web accessibility training on a periodic basis, including onsite training to create accessible content at the design and development stages; c. that Defendant work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform an automated accessibility audit on a periodic basis to evaluate whether Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; d. that Defendant work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform end-user accessibility/usability testing on a periodic basis with said testing to be performed by individuals with various disabilities to evaluate whether Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; e. that Defendant work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to create an accessibility policy that will be posted on its Website, along with an e- mail address and tollfree phone number to report accessibility-related problems; and f. that Plaintiff, their counsel and its experts monitor Defendant’s Website for up to two years after the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant validates it is -14- free of accessibility errors/violations to ensure it has adopted and implemented adequate accessibility policies. 42. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 43. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial amounts of money in developing and maintaining its Website and, through the site, has generated significant revenue. The invested amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually-impaired consumers. 44. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. -15- 47. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly, to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 49. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. -16- 50. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 51. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 55. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). -17- 56. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 57. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 58. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled -18- persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 60. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 72 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 61. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 62. The Website www.thebeardclub.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 63. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates www.thebeardclub.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 64. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its site, causing www.thebeardclub.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. -19- 65. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law, “unlawful discriminatory practice” includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 66. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 67. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 68. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: -20- (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 70. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of www.thebeardclub.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 71. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 72. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the NYSHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 74. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 75. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297, and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. -21- 76. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 77. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 78. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 79. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 80. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 81. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights -22- in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 82. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 83. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 84. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 85. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. -23- 86. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 87. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 88. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 89. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 90. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services, and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 91. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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14. Plaintiff has received at least one of Defendants' advertisements by facsimile. A true and correct copy of the fax Plaintiff received in December, 2016 is attached as Exhibit A. 15. Exhibit A is a one·page document Defendants sent by fax promoting Spreemo's services locating and recommending radiological imaging providers for The Hartford patients. 16. Exhibit A prominently displays Spreemo's name, logo, telephone number, fax number, address, email address, and website in bolded font. 17. Exhibit A promotes the commercial availability or quality of services available from Spreemo for The Hartford by stating that Spreemo looks "forward to a strong partnership and providing exceptions care for The Hartford patients." 18. Exhibit A promotes the availability and quality of Spreemo's services by stating that Spreemo is the "Primary Diagnostic Vendor" for The Hartford. 19. Exhibit A does not include the opt·out notice required by the TCPA. See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (2) (D) & (E) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4) (iii) & (v). 20. On information and belief, Defendants sent advertisements by facsimile to Plaintiff and more than 39 other persons in violation of the TCP A. 22. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated as members of a class, initially defined as follows: Each person or entity that was sent one or more telephone facsimile messages ("faxes") on or after May 7, 2014 offering Spreemo' s diagnostic vending services for The Hartford patients. Plaintiff anticipates modifying the proposed class definition-including proposing subclasses if appropriate-after discovery about the scope of Defendants' fax advertising practices as well as discovery as to any potential affirmative defenses Defendants may plead. 23. Excluded from the class are Defendants, each of Defendants' officers, directors, legal representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns, any entity in which either Defendant has a controlling interest, any parent, subsidiary or affiliated company of either Defendant, and any Judge assigned to this action, including his or her immediate family. 24. In this action, Plaintiff intends to discover, include, and resolve the merits of claims about all advertisements Defendants sent to Plaintiff by fax, as well as all advertisements Defendants sent to the other class members. 26. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. This action satisfies Rule 23 (a)'s numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements. Additionally, prosecution of Plaintiffs claims separately from the putative class's claims would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications under Rule 23 (b) (1) (A). Furthermore, the questions of law or fact that are common in this action predominate over any individual questions of law or fact making class representation the superior method to adjudicate this controversy under Rule 23 (b) (3). 27. Numerosity/impracticality of foinder. On information and belief, the class consists of more than 39 persons and, thus, is so numerous that individual joinder of each member is impracticable. The precise number of class members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff, but will be obtained from Defendants' records or the records of third parties. 3. Private right of action. A person may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a state, bring in an appropriate court of that state: (A) An action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) An action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) Both such actions. 47 u.s.c. § 227 (b) (3). 30. Adequacy of representation. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because its interests do not conflict with the interests of the class it seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained undersigned counsel, who are competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and in TCPA litigation in particular, and Plaintiff intends to vigorously prosecute this action. Plaintiff and its counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interest of members of the class. 31. Prosecution of separate claims would yield inconsistent results. Even though the questions of fact and law in this action are predominantly common to Plaintiff and the putative class members, separate adjudication of each class member's claims would yield inconsistent and varying adjudications. Such inconsistent rulings would create incompatible standards for Defendants to operate under if/when class members bring additional lawsuits concerning the same unsolicited fax advertisements or if with or both Defendants choose to advertise by fax again in the future. 33. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 34. Plaintiff brings Count I on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated persons against Defendants. 35. The TCPA prohibits the "use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine .... " 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1). 36. On information and belief, Defendants or third parties on behalf of Defendants sent Exhibit A to the facsimile machines of Plaintiff and others similarly situated using a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device. 37. The TCPA defines "unsolicited advertisement" as "any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's express invitation or permission." 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (4). 39. Plaintiff did not expressly give permission or invitation to receive any advertisement from either Defendant by fax. 4 • lJ SJ~. & 227 Bn r description of cause: Vi 1>lation of the Telechone Consumer Protection Act 40. The TCPA provides a private right of action as follows: 41. The Court, in its discretion, may treble the statutory damages if it determines that a violation was knowing or willful. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 42. Here, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1) (C) by sending an advertisement by facsimile (such as Exhibit A) to Plaintiff and the other class members without their prior express invitation or permission. 43. Facsimile advertising imposes burdens on recipients that are distinct from the burdens imposed by other types of advertising. The required opt·out notice provides recipients the necessary information to opt·out of future fax transmissions, including a notice that the sender's failure to comply with the opt·out request will be unlawful. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4) (iii). 45. Even if Defendants did not intend to injure Plaintiff and the other class members, did not intend to violate their privacy, and did not intend to waste their valuable time with Defendants' advertisements, those facts are irrelevant because the TCPA is a strict liability statute. 46. If Defendants' actions were knowing or willful, then the Court has the discretion to increase the statutory damages up to 3 times the amount. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 47. Defendant Spreemo is liable for the fax advertisements at issue because it sent the faxes, caused the faxes to be sent, participated in the activity giving rise to or constituting the violation, the faxes were sent on its behalf, or its goods, products or services were promoted in the fax advertisement. 48. Defendant The Hartford is liable for the fax advertisements at issue because it participated in the activity giving rise to or constituting the violation, the faxes were sent on its behalf, or under general principles of vicarious liability, including actual authority, apparent authority and ratification. 50. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 51. Plaintiff brings Count II on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated persons and against Defendants. 52. By sending advertisements to their fax machines, Defendants improperly and unlawfully converted the class's fax machines to Defendants' own use. Where printed (as in Plaintiffs case), Defendants also improperly and unlawfully converted the class members' paper and toner to Defendants' own use. Defendants also converted Plaintiffs time to Defendants' own use, as they did with the valuable time of the other class members. 53. Immediately prior to the sending of the unsolicited faxes, Plaintiff and the other class members each owned an unqualified and immediate right to possession of their fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time. 54. By sending them unsolicited faxes, Defendants permanently misappropriated the class members' fax machines, toner, paper, and employee time to their own use. Such misappropriation was wrongful and without authorization. 55. Defendants knew or should have known that their misappropriation of paper, toner, and employee time was wrongful and without authorization. CONVERSION TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT. 47 U.S.C. § 227

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ILLEGAL WITHHOLDING OF WAGES 32. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and reallege all facts set forth above. 33. Defendants have misclassified the Plaintiffs and other similarly situated delivery drivers as independent contractors when they are actually employees under the Connecticut wage laws. 34. This misclassification violates Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-71a as interpreted by Tianti, ex rel. Gluck v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 231 Conn. 690, 651 A.2d 1286 (1995). This claim is asserted pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-72. 35. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and reallege all facts set forth above. 36. Defendants’ practice of making various unlawful and unauthorized deductions from the Plaintiffs’ and class members’ compensation violates Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-71e. 38. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and reallege all facts set forth above. 39. As set forth above, Defendants’ practice of requiring Plaintiffs and class members to pay tens of thousands of dollars in exchange for the right to work for Defendants violates Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-73. 40. This claim is brought pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-72. CONNECTICUT INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR LAW ILLEGAL REFUND OF WAGES FOR FURNISHING EMPLOYMENT UNJUST ENRICHMENT

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28. Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing/advertising because it promotes Defendant’s business, goods and services. 29. Specifically, Defendant asks the recipient of the text message to call the Defendant to see if they are eligible for student loan forgiveness. 30. Defendant makes money by selling its student loan document preparation services including document preparation for student loan forgiveness programs. 31. Upon Plaintiff calling the 561-721-7916 number included in the text message, he was advised by Defendant that he could visit their website at www.globaldocprep.com or call them back at the 561-717-2729. 32. Upon information and belief, the phone number (561-721-7916) included in the text message is owned and operated by Defendant. 33. Upon information and belief, the phone number (561-717-2729) provided to Plaintiff after he called Defendant is owned and operated by Defendant. 34. Plaintiff received the subject text message within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. 35. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused similar text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 36. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendants with his express consent to be contacted by text messages using an ATDS. 37. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 6000 Number. 39. Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code. 40. Upon information and belief, the platform utilized by Defendant has the current capacity to store numbers using a random or sequential number generator, and dial such numbers, as well as dial numbers automatically from a list of numbers without human intervention. 41. Further, the impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message, demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)). 43. Defendant’s unsolicited text message caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. At the time Plaintiff received Defendant’s text message, he was working and upon receiving the text message he had to stop what he was doing to see who was texting him and why they were texting him. Defendant’s actions caused disruption and aggravation to Plaintiff’s daily life. 44. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 45. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the below defined Class: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text message using the same type of equipment used to text message Plaintiff, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number. 46. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 49. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet their burden of showing that they obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 50. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 55. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 57. The TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system” (hereinafter “ATDS”) as “equipment which has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” Id. at § 227(a)(1). 58. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to store telephone numbers, using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers and/or to dial numbers from a list automatically, without human intervention, to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 59. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 60. Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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10. Defendant owns and operates Shorter University in Rome, Georgia. 11. Plaintiff attended Shorter during the 2008-2009 school year and was a member of the Shorter cheerleading team during that time. In order to participate in cheerleading, Plaintiff had to undergo a physical examination by a doctor associated with Shorter and also had to provide medical records to Shorter. In addition, following a tumbling accident, Plaintiff underwent an examination by a physical therapist associated with Shorter, and also provided records to Shorter for x-rays taken off campus. 12. Defendant maintained records of student athletes, including Plaintiff, in hard copy format stored on its campus. 13. These records, including medical records and physical exam records, contained PII and PHI such as names, social security numbers, birthdays, and basic medical information. 15. On September 23, 2014, Defendant discovered that records of as many as 900 former and current Shorter students had been stolen from the unlocked room by an unauthorized person. Defendant apparently notified some people by sending a letter, although Plaintiff did not receive any notification from Defendant. She did not discover the breach until she reported her stolen information to the Rome (Ga.) Police Department. 16. Defendant knew or had reason to know that the theft included medical records with PII and PHI but communicated to the public that it was uncertain if any personal information was actually obtained. 17. Plaintiff attempted to file her tax returns on January 28, 2015, and was notified by her tax preparer that someone had already used her social security number and other PII to file her tax returns and obtain her tax refund. 18. According to news accounts, more than thirty (30) people whose records were stolen from Shorter’s unlocked room have had similar fraudulent tax returns filed with their PII. 19. According to the same news account, Shorter did not return several calls for comment and has not explained why it communicated to the public and the Class that it was uncertain PII was stolen when it knew that medical records containing PII and PHI had been taken. 21. As a result of the breach, Plaintiff has not been able to receive her tax refund and has had to spend money on credit monitoring and protection services and will continue to pay a monthly fee for credit monitoring and protection services. In addition, Plaintiff’s husband, a Lance Corporal and Electrical Engineer with the United States Marine Corps, is also not able to file a tax return or receive a tax refund because Plaintiff and her husband file joint tax returns. The inability to file a tax return and receive a refund has greatly affected Plaintiff and her husband, as the money from their tax return was earmarked for assisting with their mortgage, contributing to their daughter’s college fund, and paying down student loan payments - loans which were incurred while Plaintiff was a student at Shorter. 22. This action may be brought and properly maintained as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, et seq. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and a class of all others similarly situated. 23. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of the following class: All individuals whose PII and/or PHI was stolen from the files of Defendant in September 2014. 24. In accordance with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number is not known at this time, it is generally ascertainable by appropriate discovery, and it is believed the class includes up to 900 members. 26. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. As with members of the Class, Plaintiff’s PII and PHI was stolen because Defendant failed to properly safeguard her data under lock and/or key. Plaintiff’s interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, those of the other class members. 27. In accordance with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. 28. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation and counsel will adequately represent the interests of the Class. 30. Plaintiff has or can acquire adequate financial resources to assure that the interests of the Class will not be harmed; and 31. Plaintiff is knowledgeable concerning the subject matter of this action and will assist counsel to vigorously prosecute this litigation. 32. In accordance with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, et seq, the class litigation is an appropriate method for fair and efficient adjudication of the claims involved. Class action treatment is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein; it will permit a large number of individual citizens of the State of Georgia to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort and expense that numerous individual actions would require. Class action treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by certain class members, who could not individually afford to litigate a complex claim against a large corporate defendant. Further, even for those class members who could afford to litigate such a claim, it would still be economically impractical, as the cost of litigation is almost certain to exceed any recovery they would obtain. 33. Plaintiff is unaware of any difficulty likely to be encountered in the management of this case that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 35. Defendant owed Plaintiff and the class a duty of reasonable care to protect their PII and PHI in its custody and control, and/or assumed a duty to protect that data by collecting and maintaining the PII and PHI in their offices. This duty includes following the standards and procedures under the HIPAA Security Standard and other federal and state statutes for the safeguarding of medical records, PII and PHI. 36. Defendant violated its duty of reasonable care by failing to store sensitive and private records containing PII and PHI in a safe manner that would protect this information from anyone who wanted to see it, use it, or take it. 37. Defendant also failed to comply with HIPAA data security standards, statutes and/or regulations prohibiting the storage of unprotected sensitive personal information. 38. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence, Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged by the theft and fraudulent use of their PII and PHI, including, but not limited to, the loss of their PII and PHI, fraudulent activity associated with the use of their compromised PII and PHI, and the loss of money and costs incurred as a result of the identity theft and/or the increased risk of identity theft, all of which have ascertainable value to be proven at trial. 40. Plaintiff and the Class, by participating in athletics and providing Defendant with their medical records and/or physical examinations, entered into an implied contract with Defendant whereby Defendant became obligated to reasonably safeguard Plaintiff and the Class’s sensitive, non-public information. 41. Plaintiff and the Class members would not have entrusted their medical records, PII and PHI to Defendant in the absence of such an implied contract. 42. Plaintiff and the Class members fully performed their obligations under the implied contract with Defendant. 43. Defendant breached the implied contract with Plaintiff and the Class by failing to take reasonable measures to safeguard their financial data and by failing to provide timely and accurate notice to them that their PII was compromised as a result of the theft. 44. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breach of the implied contracts between it and Plaintiff and the Class members, Plaintiff and the Class members suffered and will continue to suffer damages, including, but not limited to, the loss of their PII and PHI, fraudulent activity associated with the use of their compromised PII and PHI, and the loss of money and costs incurred as a result of the identity theft and/or the increased risk of identity theft, all of which have ascertainable value to be proven at trial. 46. Plaintiff and Class Members, as student athletes undergoing physicals and/or providing medical records to Defendant and competing on Defendant’s behalf, have a special relationship with Defendant. Defendant owes a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff and Class Members to keep their PHI and PII private and confidential and to protect it from misuse by others. 47. Defendant breached the fiduciary duty it owed to Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to adequately safeguard their PHI and PII against unauthorized disclosure and misuse. 48. Defendant further breached the fiduciary duties it owed to Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to timely and adequately notify them of the breach of their PHI and PII and misleading them about the nature of the breach and the information stolen. 49. Defendant’s failure to adequately safeguard Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PHI and PII has resulted in losses and damages to Plaintiff and members of the Class. 50. Plaintiff repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-33 as if fully set forth herein. 51. Defendant has engaged in a common fraud and/or misrepresentation. 52. Defendant knew of the theft on or about September 23, 2014, and knew that the theft included at least two files full of medical records and physical examination records that contained names, birthdays, Social Security numbers, and other identifying information. 54. Instead, on September 25, 2014, Shorter sent a letter to former student-athletes warning them to keep a close eye on their credit and financial records, but indicating that it was “uncertain if any personal information was actually obtained during the unauthorized access.” 55. According to a news article in the Rome Tribune on September 29, 2014, Defendant informed the public that the records were kept in a locked room and that the door was broken. However, a police investigation later found that the door had not actually been locked. 56. Finally, Plaintiff overpaid tuition in the expectation that a portion would be spent to adequately protect her PII and PHI by Defendant, Defendant wrongfully collected and kept this money, and Defendant did not provide adequate service to protect Plaintiff and the Class’ PII and PHI. 57. These misrepresentations, omissions and failures to notify Plaintiff and members of the Class that their medical records had been stolen and as a result their PII and PHI had been stolen were material misrepresentations and omissions. 58. Plaintiff and the Class are presumed to have justifiably relied on Defendant’s omissions and failures to disclose in not taking steps to safeguard their financial information, change their Social Security numbers or communicate to the IRS that their financial information had been stolen and therefore prevent the fraudulent tax returns filed by a third party. 59. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s common scheme of fraud, Plaintiff and Class were damaged, and are entitled to disgorgement BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and for this Count, alleges the following: BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and for this Count, alleges the following: COMMON LAW FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, for this Count, alleges the following: NEGLIGENCE Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, for this Count, alleges the following:

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11. Plaintiff was at all times mentioned herein the subscriber of the cellular telephone number (954) ***-3307 (the “3307 Number”). The 3307 Number was at all times mentioned herein assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 12. On or about April 8, 2019, Defendant transmitted or caused to be transmitted, by itself or through an intermediary or intermediaries, an automated text message offering its “gig economy,” courier-connection services to the 3307 Number without first obtaining Plaintiff’s prior express consent or prior express written consent, and without providing Plaintiff a mechanism to stop receiving such messages in the future. 24. Class Definition. Plaintiff brings this civil class action on behalf of himself individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The “Class” which Plaintiff seeks to represent is comprised of and defined as: All persons in the United States who, at any time between July 25, 2015 and the present, received one or more text message(s) from Postmates, Inc. (or an affiliate, subsidiary, or agent of Postmates, Inc.) and for whom Postmates, Inc. does not have a record of the requisite consent to be sent such text messages.

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11. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 12. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, an Iowa corporation and a “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 13. At all times relevant Defendant conducted business in the State of California and in the County of San Diego, and within this judicial district. 14. CBE is a nationwide leader in the consumer debt recovery industry. 15. Beginning in or around June of 2012, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on her cellular telephone ending in “5599,” in an attempt to collect an alleged outstanding Dish Network debt allegedly owed by a “Melissa Rodriguez.” 27. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (the “Class”), consisting of: “all persons within the United States who received any telephone call from Defendant or its agent to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or with an artificial or prerecorded voice, which call was not made for emergency purposes or with the recipient’s prior express consent, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint.” 28. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but the number of Class members is known to Defendant, and Plaintiff believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 29. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendant during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 38. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 42. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 43. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 44. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 45. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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19. Powerstroke is an oilfield services company.2 20. Powerstroke bills itself as an “industry-renowned expert in snubbing and underbalanced services.” 22. Lechot and the Day Rate Workers are members of the crews that perform Powerstroke’s work. 23. Even if the precise job titles and duties of the Day Rate Workers differ somewhat, Powerstroke subjected all its Day Rate Workers to the same, illegal, day rate plan. 24. For example, Powerstroke paid all its Snubbing Supervisors a flat sum for each day worked, regardless of the number of hours they worked that workweek. 25. Powerstroke did not pay them with overtime pay for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 26. Lechot has worked for Powerstroke for several years. 27. Starting in early 2018, Lechot started working for Powerstroke in the United States (mostly Colorado). 28. Lechot works primarily on snubbing rigs out in the oilfield. 29. For days in the field, Lechot is paid $600 a day. 30. He typically works at least 12 hours on each “field” days. 31. He also works certain days in Powerstroke’s shops. 32. For “shop days,” Powerstroke pays Lechot $200 a day. 33. Although he regularly works 60 or more hours a week, Powerstroke never pays Lechot any overtime. 34. In the 2-week period ending June 1, 2019, Lechot worked 10 days (7 in the field, 3 on the shop). 36. Instead, Powerstroke paid him the applicable day rate times the number of days he worked: 37. Powerstroke paid Lechot additional compensation (such “Wet Pay”), but this compensation simply increases Lechot’s regular rate and does not offset the overtime he is owed. 38. The Day Rate Workers worked similar hours and were denied overtime as a result of the same illegal pay practice. 39. The Day Rate Workers all worked in excess of 40 hours each week and were often scheduled for 12+hour shifts for weeks at a time. 40. Instead of paying them overtime, Powerstroke paid the Day Rate Workers a day-rate. 41. Powerstroke failed to pay the Day Rate Workers overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 47. Numerous employees have been denied overtime by Powerstroke’s day rate plan. 48. From his observations and experience at Powerstroke, Lechot is aware that the illegal practices or policies of Powerstroke have been imposed on the Day Rate Workers. 49. The Day Rate Workers all received a day rate, regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week, and were not paid overtime compensation. 50. These employees are similarly situated to Lechot in terms of relevant job duties, pay provisions, and employment practices. 51. Powerstroke’s failure to pay overtime as required by the FLSA results from a generally applicable, systematic pay plan that is not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Day Rate Workers. 52. Thus, Lechot’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the Day Rate Workers. 53. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the various Day Rate Workers do not prevent collective treatment. 54. All Day Rate Workers, regardless of their precise job requirements or rates of pay, are entitled to overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 in a week.

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10. As used in both 47 U.S.C. § 227 and 47 C.F.R. 64.1200, "[t]he tenn 'unsolicited advertisement' means any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission." (47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(t)(5).) 11. Paragraph (3) of 4 7 U .S.C. § 227(b) provides: (3) Private right of action A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State- (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the court finds that the def endanl willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under subparagraph (8) of this paragraph. 12. By accessing or using any part of DoctorsDirectory.com, users agree to the Medical Professional User Agreement and Privacy Policy posted on that website, which make it clear that the website's purpose is the collection of user data to use for marketing purposes. 1 13. Dol:lorsDircctory.com nrnrkcts a numbers or sen ici:s lo assist it in the collection or user contnct and internet usage data. including .. tools. applications. email. direct mail. phone calls. faxes. text messages. bulletin und message boards, chat areas. nC\\S groups. forums. communities. calendars and downlondablc mobile upplications related to the Site or proridcd through the Site:· 14. DoctorDirectory.com also shares with third-party advertisers users' personal information personal information (such as name, specialty, NPI number, and country of residence) and users' internet usage data and cookies, but disclaims that it "not control these advertisers or other parties' use of cookies or web beacons or what they do with the infonnation they collect." 16. User information collected includes, but is not limited to name, password, postal address, degree, specialty, e-mail address, phone number, fax number, State of Licensure, NPI, DEA, AMA and/or ME Number, affiliations, conditions treated, health plans, languages spoken and demographic information. 17. Once DoctorDircctory.com succcssfully solicits and indiddual to its site. including. through fa\cs such as the one at bar. it usc'> the personal conuict and imcrncl usage information it collects to send users ··promotional/marketing information, newsletters, research opportunities, pharmaceutical product and clinical information, opportunities to request authorized pharmaceutical samples, medical education opportunities and other offers and information regarding opportunities and functionality that we think would be of particular interest to" the particular user," which it delivers through ~·email messages, online messaging, fa.xes, texts, telephone, and/or direct mail." 45. Representative Plaintiff realleges and incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 36 above as if fully set forth herein. 46. The TCPA requires that all persons who send advertisements lo fax machines must include an Opt-Out Notice fully compliant with FCC regulations enacted pursuant to the TCPA found at 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(a)(3)(iii) and (iv). 47. As a result of the foregoing, any members of the proposed Class who received a facsimile from Defendants that did not include a fully compliant Opt·Out Notice are entitled to $500.00 in damages for each fax transmission in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 4 7 U.S.C.§227(b)(3)(B). 49. Defendants' actions willfully or knowingly violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 50. As a result of the foregoing, the Court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the statutory damages up to an amount equal to $1,500.00 per TCPA violation pursuant to 4 7 U.S.C.§227(b )(3 )(C). 51. The Court should use its discretion lo increase the amount of statutory damages to an amount equal to $1,500.00 per TCPA violation due to the Defendants' willful or knowing conduct. 9. In pertinent part, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a), a regulation prescribed under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) and effective as of December 20, 1992, provides that "No person may ... [u]se a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine." COMES Now David Neurology, P.A. on behalf of itself and all other persons or entities similarly situated, as Representative Plaintiff, and files this Class Action Complaint against the Defendants, DoctorDirectory.com, LLC, Everyday Health, Inc., and John Does 1-10 and would respectfully show the following: DAVIS NEUROLOGY, P.A. on behalf of itself and all other entities and persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, vs. TREBLE DAMAGES VIOLATIONS OF 47 USC §227 AND C.F.R. § 64.1200

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74. Plaintiff incorporates the above paragraphs as though set forth in full. 75. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by CCRAA section 1785.3(b). 76. Kaiser is a “person” as defined by CCRAA section 1785.3(j). 77. As alleged above, Kaiser is a provider of Medi-Cal covered services. 78. As alleged above, Kaiser knew that Plaintiff was covered by Medi-Cal when it provided the Medi-Cal covered services. 79. Kaiser violated CCRAA section 1785.25(a) when it, directly and/or through its agent USCB, furnished information about Medi-Cal covered charges to consumer credit reporting agencies concerning Plaintiff and members of the Joint Furnishing Class, information that it knew or should have known was inaccurate. 80. Kaiser violated CCRAA section 1785.25(a) when it, directly and/or through its agent USCB, furnished “information regarding the rendering of the Medi-Cal covered services to a consumer credit reporting agency” with respect to Plaintiff and members of the Joint Furnishing Class, a violation of CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14019.4(f). 81. Kaiser violated CCRAA section 1785.25(a) when it, failed “to provide corrections of, or instructions to delete, as appropriate, information regarding Medi-Cal covered services previously furnished . . . to a consumer [credit] reporting agency” with respect to Plaintiff and members of the Joint Furnishing Class, a separate violation of CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14019.4(f). 82. As alleged above, Kaiser’s conduct harmed Plaintiff and members of the Joint Furnishing Class. 85. Plaintiff incorporates the above paragraphs as though set forth in full. 86. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by FCRA section 1681a(c). 87. Kaiser is a “person” as defined by FCRA section 1681a(b). 88. FCRA section 1681s-2(b)(1)(A) requires the recipient of “a dispute of with regard to the completeness or accuracy of any information provided by a person to a consumer reporting agency” to “conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information.” 89. FCRA section 1681s-2(b)(1)(E) states that “if an item of information disputed by a consumer is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be verified after” any reinvestigation of the dispute information, the person must modify, delete, or permantly block the reporting of that item of information. 90. As alleged above, Plaintiff disputed one or more items of information concerning Medi-Cal covered services to one or more consumer credit reporting agencies. 91. As alleged above, on or more of the consumer credit reporting agencies to which Plaintiff disputed the items of information concerning the Medi-Cal covered services contacted USCB regarding Plaintiff’s dispute. 92. As alleged above, USCB contacted Kaiser in the course of its investigation of Plaintiff’s dispute. 93. As alleged above, Kaiser verified the charges concerning the Medi-Cal covered services to USCB. Grossly Negligent Billing Practices On behalf of Plaintiff and the Negligent Billing Practices Class and against Defendant Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. 112. Plaintiff incorporates the above paragraphs as though set forth in full. 113. Kaiser’s breach of its duty to exercise ordinary or skill in the management of its billing practices and procedures with respect to Plaintiff and members of the Negligent Billing Practices Class demonstrates either a want of even scant care or an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct. 114. As a direct and proximate result of Kaiser’s conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Negligent Billing Practices Class suffered the harm alleged above. 115. As a result of its gross negligence, Kaiser is liable to Plaintiff and the members of the Negligent Billing Practices Class for the relief sought herein. Violation of the California Unfair Competition Law CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 On behalf of Plaintiff and the Injunctive Relief Class and against Defendant Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. Violation of the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.25(a) On behalf of Plaintiff and the Joint Furnishing Class and against Defendant Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) On behalf of Plaintiff and the Verification Class and against Defendant Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. Violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p On behalf of Plaintiff and the Unlawful Collection Class and against Defendant USCB, Inc. 136. Plaintiff incorporates the above paragraphs as though set forth in full. 137. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by FDCPA section 1692a(3). 138. USCB is a “debt collector” as defined by FDCPA section 1692a(6). 139. As alleged above, USCB’s conduct with respect to Plaintiff and the members of the Unlawful Collection Class violated, without limitation, the following sections of the FDCPA: A. FDCPA section 1692e(8), which prohibits the communication to any person of credit information which a debt collector knows or should know is false; and B. FDCPA section 1692f(1), which prohibits the collection of any amount not permitted by law. 140. For its violations of the FDCPA, USCB is liable to Plaintiff and members of the Unlawful Collection Class for the relief sought herein.

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11. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, “persons” as defined by 47 42. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 43. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of: a. All persons within the United States who had or have a number assigned to a cellular telephone service, who received at least one call using an ATDS and/or an artificial prerecorded voice from STUDENT FINANCIAL HELP CENTER, or its agents, calling on behalf of STUDENT FINANCIAL HELP CENTER, between the date of filing this action and the four years preceding, where such calls were placed for marketing purposes, to non-customers of STUDENT FINANCIAL HELP CENTER, at the time of the calls. 44. SFHC and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 46. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 47. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the Court. The Class can be identified through Defendant’s records and/or Defendant’s agent’s records. 49. As a person that received numerous calls from Defendant in which Defendant used an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without Plaintiff’s prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class. 50. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. The size of Class member’s individual claims causes, few, if any, Class members to be able to afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 51. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 53. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 54. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 55. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 56. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 57. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 58. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 59. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 61. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 63. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 64. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 65. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 66. As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 67. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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18. Ensign U.S. Drilling (SW), Inc. (“Ensign”) provides drilling operations and rig management for the oil and gas industry throughout the State of Texas, the United States, and Canada.3 19. To provide their services, Ensign employed (and continues to employ) numerous oilfield workers who were paid a day rate and no overtime— including Plaintiff Ortiz and the individuals that make up the putative or potential class. 20. While exact job titles may differ, these workers were subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work in the oilfield. 21. Plaintiff Ortiz was employed by Ensign as a Rig Manager, working on Ensign’s client’s drilling pads located between Kenedy, Texas and Midland, Texas, from approximately 2012 until June 2019. 22. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were paid a day rate but no overtime. 23. Specifically, Plaintiff Ortiz was paid a day rate of $636.00 per day but did not receive overtime compensation at the required rate of time-and-one-half for all hours worked over forty (40) each week. 24. Although it is well-known that blue-collar oilfield workers like Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are not exempt from overtime, Ensign did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members the additional overtime premium required by the FLSA for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. 26. Specifically, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ primary job duties were to perform oilfield drilling operations, conduct drilling operations in a safe manner to ensure jobsite safety compliance, to point out any variances between the work performed and the plans and specifications to the work crew in the first instance, to note the progress of the drilling project to report to the drilling site owner and/or company contractor, and to report any variances in the work being performed and the plans and specifications to the drill site owner and/or the drill site contractor. 27. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members would conduct their day-to-day activities within designed parameters and in accordance with pre-determined operational plans coordinated by Ensign and/or their clients. 28. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not prepare the plans and specifications for the drilling operations coordinated by Ensign and/or their clients. 29. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not have the authority to change or authorize changes to the pre-determined plans and specifications provided by the well site owner(s) and/or drill site contractor(s). 30. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ daily and weekly activities were routine and largely governed by standardized plans and procedures set by Ensign and/or their clients, the American Petroleum Institute, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the American Welding Society, and the United States Department of Transportation. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(g). 32. In fact, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were prohibited from varying their job duties outside of these predetermined parameters. 33. Moreover, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ job functions were primarily routine and manual labor in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college education or other advanced degree. 34. Indeed, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members rely on their hands, physical skills, and energy to perform manual and routine labor in the oilfield. 35. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked long hours. 36. Specifically, Ensign regularly scheduled Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for a minimum of twelve (12) hours per day and they regularly worked a minimum of 84 hours per week. 37. The FLSA mandates that overtime be paid at one and one-half times an employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 each week. 38. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are non-exempt employees under the FLSA. 39. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a), an employee will be considered to be paid on a “salary basis” if the employee regularly receives each pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all or part of the employee’s compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed. 40. Plaintiff and Putative Class Members were paid based on the number of days worked. 41. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Putative Class Members only knew the amount of their pay after the number of days they worked each week. 42. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week but never received overtime compensation. 44. Ensign applied this pay practice despite clear and controlling law that states that the routine and manual labor duties which were performed by Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members consisted of non-exempt work. 45. Accordingly, Ensign’s pay policies and practices blatantly violated (and continue to violate) the FLSA. V. 46. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 47. The FLSA Collective is defined as: 66. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this is a collective action filed on behalf of all those who are (or were) similarly situated to Plaintiff. 67. Other similarly situated employees have been victimized by Defendant’s patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. 68. The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 47. 69. Defendant’s systematic failure to timely pay overtime compensation at the rates required by the FLSA results from generally applicable policies and practices and does not depend on the personal circumstances of Plaintiff. 71. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective Members does not prevent collective treatment. 72. All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be timely and properly compensated for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 73. Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Indeed, the FLSA Collective Members are non-exempt workers entitled to be paid the proper amount of overtime compensation for all hours worked over forty (40) each week. 74. Defendant has employed (and continue to employ) numerous Rig Managers during the past three years. 75. Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA class will not likely obtain redress of their injuries and Defendant will retain the proceeds of their rampant violations. 76. Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 77. Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as defined in Paragraph 47 and notice should be promptly sent. 78. Defendant can readily identify the members of the class, who are a certain portion of the current and former employees of Defendant. 80. The email addresses or cell phone numbers of many of the putative FLSA Collective Members are available from Defendant, and notice should be provided to the putative FLSA Collective Members via email and text message to their last known email addresses/cell phone. 81. Oilfield workers are by category not at their residences as frequently as many other working-class Americans. 82. As such, they rely on email or cell phone just as much or more so than typical wage earners, who themselves live their lives with a growing dependence upon email and text messaging as opposed to traditional U.S. Mail. VI. A. FLSA COVERAGE

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(THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE SPD IN VIOLATION OF ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1)) (THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE CONTINUATION COVERAGE ELECTION NOTICE TO MR. GILREATH IN VIOLATION OF ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4)) (THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE INITIAL RIGHTS NOTICE TO MR. GILREATH IN VIOLATION OF ERISA § 606(a)(1)) (THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE INITIAL RIGHTS NOTICE TO MRS. GILREATH IN VIOLATION OF ERISA § 606(a)(1)) (THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE CONTINUATION COVERAGE ELECTION NOTICE TO MRS. GILREATH IN VIOLATION OF ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4)) (THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE OPEN ENROLLMENT RIGHTS NOTICE TO MR. GILREATH IN VIOLATION OF ERISA § 606(a)(1)) (THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE OPEN ENROLLMENT RIGHTS NOTICE TO MRS. GILREATH IN VIOLATION OF ERISA § 606(a)(1)) (VIOLATION OF ERISA § 606(a)(2) and (4)) 14. Numerosity. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all the Class members is impracticable. On information and belief, the Class is comprised of more than 500 employees and spouses who elected coverage under the Total Safety Health Plan and are or were covered employees, participants and/or qualified beneficiaries in the Plan since June 20, 2015 and who did not receive (a) the Initial Rights Notice upon the commencement of coverage in the Total Safety Health Plan, (b) a copy of the SPD for the Total Safety Health Plan within ninety (90) days after the employee becoming a participant in the Plan, (c) the Continuation Coverage Election Notice within fourteen (14) days of the occurrence of a qualifying event under COBRA, (d) the opportunity to elect continuation health care coverage, (e) the Open Enrollment Notice, and/or (f) the same opportunity to elect other medical coverage as other Plan participants during an open enrollment period. All of these current and former employees and spouses are members of the Class. 15. Commonality. This case presents numerous common questions of law and fact. The following questions of law and fact are among those applicable to the members of the Class: a. Whether Total Safety is an employer within the meaning of ERISA Section 23. Total Safety is “the leading global provider of integrated industrial safety services, strategies and equipment.” Based in Houston, Texas, Total Safety operates from 165 locations in 23 countries. On information and belief, Total Safety employs approximately 1500 people within the United States and throughout the world. 24. During the Class Period, Defendant Total Safety provided its employees and the covered beneficiaries of the employees with health care coverage. Total Safety provided medical insurance for employees working in the United States through the Total Safety Group Health Plan. Upon information and belief, Defendant Total Safety has never provided a Summary Plan Description in compliance with ERISA to employees and their spouses and families covered by the Total Safety Group Health Plan. 25. On or about April 14, 2016, Gregory Gilreath was extended an offer of employment from Total Safety. On or about April 15, 2016, Mr. Gilreath signed the offer letter, indicating his acceptance to its terms. He was employed as a Pipefitter Foreman, beginning on April 22, 2016. 26. As an employee of Total Safety, Mr. Gilreath was eligible for paid vacation, a personal floating holiday, the Health & Welfare and 401(k) Retirement plans, and other employee benefits outlined in the Total Safety Employee Handbook. 27. When Mr. Gilreath became eligible to enroll in the Total Safety Health Plan, he did so for himself and his spouse, Eula Gilreath. 29. Likewise, Total Safety failed to send a copy of the SPD for the Total Safety Health Plan to Mr. Gilreath or Mrs. Gilreath within ninety (90) days after Mr. Gilreath became a participant in the Plan. 30. On May 16, 2016, Mr. Gilreath was injured in a multi-car motor vehicle accident while returning back to Total Safety’s shop in Pasadena, Texas. Although Mr. Gilreath was working at the time of the accident, Total Safety told Mr. Gilreath to file a medical claim under the Total Safety Group Health Plan. Mr. Gilreath did so. 31. In June 2016, Mr. Gilreath was diagnosed with “discogenic cervical and lumbar pain and a right knee contusion as a direct result of the motor vehicle accident.” In July 2016, it was determined that Mr. Gilreath had a partial tear of the ACL. On August 24, 2016, Mr. Gilreath had knee arthroscopy, revision ACL reconstruction, and bone marrow aspiration. Total Safety told Mr. Gilreath to use the Total Safety Group Health Plan for the surgery and treatment of his injuries. 32. After his surgery, Mr. Gilreath determined that his Total Safety should have filed a workers’ compensation claim for his injuries. On August 31, 2016, Mr. Gilreath emailed Michael Brady, Sr. Manager – Human Resources North America for Total Safety, and requested that Total Safety file a workers’ compensation claim for his injuries. Mr. Gilreath stated: “this is also a Workers Compensation claim, and should have been processed as such. I was on the clock, and getting paid for my duties.” 33. Rather than indicate that he would ensure that Total Safety would file a workers’ compensation claim, Mr. Brady responded: “Thank you for sharing. I appreciate it.” 35. Unbeknownst to Mr. Gilreath at the time, individuals within Total Safety’s Human Resource Department were discussing Mr. Gilreath’s injuries and the possible termination of his employment. Indeed, on August 29, 2016, Joe Saad, HR Manager sent an email to David Brown, VP of Human Resources for Total Safety, and Aurora Chalbaud Schmidt, Sr. HR Manager – Total Rewards for Total Safety, which stated: “Regarding termination, he [Mr. Gilreath] is protected under two scenarios: FMLA and ADA.” Total Safety terminated Mr. Gilreath seven (7) days later. 36. Total Safety terminated Mr. Gilreath because he sustained on the job injuries and requested that Total Safety file a workers’ compensation claim on his behalf. As of the date of his termination, Total Safety had not initiated a workers’ compensation claim with the Texas Department of Insurance for Mr. Gilreath’s injuries. Rather, Total Safety contended that Mr. Gilreath’s injuries were personal in nature. 37. While Total Safety required Mr. Gilreath to file medical claims with the Total Safety Group Health Plan, neither Total Safety nor the Total Safety Group Health Plan provided the Continuation Coverage Election Notice to Mr. Gilreath following the termination of his employment. 38. Neither Total Safety nor the Total Safety Group Health Plan provided the Continuation Coverage Election Notice to Mrs. Gilreath following the termination of Mr. Gilreath’s employment. 40. Total Safety’s failure to send the Continuation Coverage Election Notice to Mr. Gilreath, Total Safety deprived Mr. Gilreath of his right to elect continuation healthcare coverage under COBRA. As a result, Mr. Gilreath was without the necessary medical treatment to properly recover from his on the job injuries. 41. Mr. Gilreath’s spouse, Eula Gilreath, worked with Mr. Gilreath to help strengthen his leg and help him recover. 42. On September 9, 2016, Mr. Gilreath filed an Employee’s Claim for Compensation for a Work-Related Injury or Occupational Disease with the Texas Department of Insurance – Division of Workers’ Compensation. Total Safety, through its workers’ compensation carrier, denied the claim. On January 16, 2017, the Texas Department of Insurance – Division of Workers’ Compensation, found that Total Safety had failed to timely failed to report Mr. Gilreath’s injury. As a result, the Texas Department of Insurance issued a Warning Letter to Total Safety. 43. On February 24, 2017, the Texas Department of Insurance – Division of Workers’ Compensation found that Mr. Gilreath was, in fact, injured in the course and scope of his employment and awarded workers’ compensation benefits to him. 44. Following his wrongful termination, Mr. and Mrs. Gilreath were left without medical and dental benefits. As of today’s date, neither Total Safety nor the Total Safety Group Health Plan have provided Mr. Gilreath with a notice of his right to elect continuation health care coverage. 46. In addition to the need for the medical benefits under the Total Safety Group Health Plan to care for his knee, Mr. Gilreath has experienced other medical and dental conditions that would have been covered under the Plan. In 2017, Mr. Gilreath had dental surgery, including a tooth pulled and an implant and cap installed. Since Mr. Gilreath did not have the dental benefits under the Total Safety Group Health Plan, he was required to pay for the cost of the dental work himself. 47. In 2017, Mr. Gilreath was diagnosed with high blood pressure and was briefly hospitalized. Since Mr. Gilreath did not have the medical benefits under the Total Safety Group Health Plan, he was required to pay for the cost of the hospitalization himself. 48. Due to the lack of medical coverage, Mr. Gilreath was required to forgo some medical care or pay for the treatment out of pocket. In 2018, Plaintiff was diagnosed with bladder and prostate cancer. Since the diagnosis of cancer, Mr. Gilreath has had multiple surgeries and radiation treatment. Mr. Gilreath was required to pay out of pocket for many of the expenses related to the medical treatment, surgery, and follow up care. 49. If Mr. Gilreath had been covered by the Total Safety Group Health Plan, it is possible that Plaintiff’s cancer would have been discovered at an earlier stage. 50. As a beneficiary under the Total Safety Group Health Plan, Total Safety – as the Plan Sponsor and Plan Administrator of the Plan – was required under COBRA and ERISA to provide Ms. Gilreath with notice of the right to elect continuation health care coverage. However, neither Total Safety nor the Total Safety Group Health Plan sent a notice to Ms. Gilreath. 52. Additionally, Ms. Gilreath became pregnant around the time of Mr. Gilreath’s termination. Since Mr. and Mrs. Gilreath did not have regular medical coverage (due to the failure of Total Safety and the Plan to provide notice of their right to elect continuation health care coverage), and Mr. Gilreath could not work for a period of time, Ms. Gilreath was unable to receive the necessary prenatal care. She ultimately suffered a miscarriage. Due to Mr. Gilreath’s prostate cancer and the treatment for his cancer, the Gilreaths are unlikely to be able to have children in the future. 53. Mr. Gilreath has spent approximately $50,000.00 in out of pocket medical and dental expenses for him and his wife since the termination of his employment by Total Safety, exclusive of the expenses related to his cancer. 54. While Mr. Gilreath has been employed since the termination of his employment by Total Safety, many of his employers did not provide medical and dental insurance benefits. When Mr. Gilreath was able to enroll in medical and dental insurance benefits with a subsequent employer, the benefits provided by the employer were inferior to the health benefits provided by Total Safety and the Total Safety Group Health Plan. 56. On information and belief, other covered employees and qualified beneficiaries were also deprived of these same rights and opportunities under COBRA and ERISA. 57. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 56 as if fully set forth herein. 58. ERISA Section 606(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(1), requires a group health plan, at the time of commencement of coverage under the plan, to provide written notice to each covered employee and spouse of the covered employee (if any) of their rights under COBRA – the Initial Rights Notice. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-1(a), the plan administrator is required to provide this notice. 60. Because of their failure to provide the Initial Rights Notice to Mr. Gilreath, he requests that the Court award to him the statutory penalty of up to $110.00 per day from Total Safety and the Total Safety Group Health Plan. 61. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 56 as if fully set forth herein. 62. ERISA Section 606(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(1), requires a group health plan, at the time of commencement of coverage under the plan, to provide written notice to each covered employee and spouse of the employee (if any) of their rights under COBRA – the Initial Rights Notice. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-1(a), the plan administrator is required to provide this notice. 63. Total Safety, as the Total Safety Group Health Plan Administrator, and Total Safety Group Health Plan failed to provide, at the commencement of coverage under the Plan, written notice to each covered employee and spouse of the employee (if any) with the Initial Rights Notice in violation of ERISA Section 606(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(1). Because they were not advised of their COBRA rights, covered employees and qualified beneficiaries did not have notice, among other things, that they were responsible under ERISA Section 606(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(3), for notifying the Plan Administrator (in this case, Total Safety) of the occurrence of qualifying events described in ERISA Section 603(3) and/or (5), 29 U.S.C. § 1163(3) and/or (5). 65. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 56 as if fully set forth herein. 66. ERISA requires the plan administrator of a group health plan to furnish a copy of the summary plan description for the Total Safety Health Plan to the employee and/or qualified beneficiary within ninety (90) days after the employee becoming a participant in the Plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1). 67. Total Safety, as the Total Safety Group Health Plan Administrator, failed to provide a copy of the summary plan description for the Total Safety Health Plan to each covered employee and qualified beneficiary, including Mr. Gilreath and Mrs. Gilreath, within ninety (90) days after the employee becoming a participant in the Plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1). 68. Because of Total Safety’s failure to provide a copy of the Summary Plan Description to Mr. Gilreath and Mrs. Gilreath, Plaintiffs request that the Court award to them the statutory penalty of up to $110.00 per day from Total Safety. 69. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 56 as if fully set forth herein. 71. Total Safety, as the Total Safety Group Health Plan Administrator, and Total Safety Group Health Plan failed to provide the Continuation Coverage Election Notice to Mr. Gilreath following the termination of his employment by Total Safety. Because he was not advised of his right to elect continuation healthcare coverage, Mr. Gilreath was unable to elect the continuation health care coverage that he needed (a) to treat the injuries that he sustained as a result of the motor vehicle accident; (b) to provide the necessary dental care that he needed when he had the dental surgery; (c) to allow him to seek regular medical care which would have possibly prevented his hospitalization for high blood pressure; (d) to provide the medical treatment when he was hospitalized for high blood pressure; (e) to allow him to seek regular medical care which would have possibly detected his prostate and bladder cancer; and (f) to provide the medical treatment for prostate and bladder cancer. Mr. Gilreath requests that the Court order Total Safety and the Total Safety Health Plan to reimburse him for his out of pocket expenses that he incurred for the treatment that he received without the opportunity to elect continuation healthcare coverage, as well as to provide the medical benefits that he would have received had he had the opportunity to elect continuation healthcare coverage. 72. Additionally, Mr. Gilreath requests that the Court award to him the statutory penalty of up to $110.00 per day from Total Safety, as the Plan Administrator of the Total Safety Group Health Plan, for the failure to provide the Continuation Coverage Election Notice to him. 74. ERISA Section 606(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4), requires a plan administrator to notify any qualified beneficiary of their rights under COBRA upon the occurrence of a qualifying event. 75. Total Safety, as the Total Safety Group Health Plan Administrator, and Total Safety Group Health Plan failed to provide the Continuation Coverage Election Notice to Mrs. Gilreath following the termination of Mr. Gilreath’s employment by Total Safety. Because she was not advised of her right to elect continuation healthcare coverage, Mrs. Gilreath was unable to elect the continuation health care coverage that she needed (a) to provide the regular check – ups on her left aortic heart valve and (b) to receive the regular prenatal care following her pregnancy. Due to Mr. Gilreath’s prostate cancer and the treatment for his cancer, the Gilreaths are unlikely to be able to have children in the future. 76. Mrs. Gilreath requests that the Court order Total Safety and the Total Safety Health Plan to reimburse her and her husband for her out of pocket expenses that they incurred for the treatment that she received without the opportunity to elect continuation healthcare coverage, as well as to provide the medical benefits that she would have received had she had the opportunity to elect continuation healthcare coverage. 77. Additionally, Mrs. Gilreath requests that the Court award to her the statutory penalty of up to $110.00 per day from Total Safety, as the Plan Administrator of the Total Safety Group Health Plan, for the failure to provide the Continuation Coverage Election Notice to her. 79. Under COBRA, an employer must provide qualified beneficiaries with the same open enrollment rights as similarly situated active employees. Indeed, guidance on COBRA issued by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) states: Q – 4. Can a qualified beneficiary who elects COBRA continuation coverage ever change from the coverage received by that individual immediately before the qualifying event? 84. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 56 and Paragraphs 79 through 82 as if fully set forth herein. 85. Total Safety, as the Total Safety Group Health Plan Administrator, and Total Safety Group Health Plan failed to provide written notice to each covered employee and beneficiaries, including Mrs. Gilreath, with the Open Enrollment Rights Notice in violation of ERISA Section 606(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(1). Because she was not advised of her COBRA rights, covered employees and qualified beneficiaries did not have notice, among other things, of her right to enroll in other health plan types at open enrollment, change their plan option within health plan types, and add dependents. 87. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 56 as if fully set forth herein. 88. ERISA § 606(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(2), requires an employer of an employee under a group health plan to notify the administrator of qualifying events described in paragraph (1), (2), (4), or (6) of ERISA § 603, 29 U.S.C. § 1163, within 30 days of the of the date of the qualifying event. 89. ERISA § 606(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4), requires an administrator of a group health plan, at the time of a qualifying event, to notify any qualified beneficiary of the beneficiary’s right to elect COBRA coverage. 90. Total Safety was both the employer of employees under the Total Safety Group Health Plan and the Total Safety Group Health Plan Administrator and Sponsor. Total Safety, as the Total Safety Group Health Plan Administrator, was aware of qualifying events described in paragraph (1), (2), (4), and/or (6) of ERISA § 603, 29 U.S.C. § 1163, and, therefore, had a duty to notify any qualified beneficiary of his or her right to elect COBRA coverage as required by ERISA § 606(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4). 91. Total Safety, as the Total Safety Group Health Plan Administrator, failed to provide, at the time of qualifying events, written notice to qualified beneficiaries – including Plaintiffs – of their rights under the COBRA provisions of ERISA in violation of ERISA § 606(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4).

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12. On information and belief, on or about March 14, 2011, April-May, 2012, May 10, 2012, October 19, 2012, September 30, 2013 and October 8, 2013, Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile machine seven (7) unsolicited advertisements to Plaintiff. Copies of the facsimiles are attached hereto as Exhibit A. 13. Plaintiff did not invite or give permission to Defendants to send the faxes. 14. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimiles without the required opt out language to Plaintiff and more than 25 other recipients without first receiving the recipients’ express permission or invitation. 16. Defendants’ facsimile did not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 17. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the JFPA, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons in the United States who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action until the date of class certification, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, and (3) which did not display a proper opt-out notice. Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, their employees, agents and members of the Judiciary. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class certification discovery. 18. Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is more than 100. 20. Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)): The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of the Defendants advertising goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same faxes. 22. Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (1)): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or (b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties. 23. Common Conduct (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. 25. All Paragraphs of the Complaint are incorporated herein by reference. 26. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 30. The Faxes. Defendants, upon information and belief, sent on or about March 14, 2011, April-May, 2012, May 10, 2012, October 19, 2012, September 30, 2013 and October 8, 2013, advertisements via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class. The Faxes constituted an advertisement under the Act. Defendants failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Faxes. The Faxes were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation and/or Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. 31. Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Faxes via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class. 33. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendants may be continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. 34. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 35. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent.

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15. Defendant is an online retailer of ice cream products. Through the Website, customers can purchase different flavored ice cream products either per pint or as collections. 16. Defendant’s Website is heavily integrated with its retail operations. Through the Website, customers can learn about the company, purchase ice cream, learn about its founders, read the blog and read reviews. 18. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff Tatum-Rios and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its retail operations. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff Tatum-Rios and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s products and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 19. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. She is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. She has visited the Website on separate occasions using screen- reading software. 23. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Tatum-Rios could independently navigate it, view goods and service items; learn about items; and complete a purchase, as sighted individuals can. 24. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Tatum-Rios has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 26. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 27. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Tatum-Rios seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 28. Because its Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff Tatum-Rios seeks a permanent injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff Tatum-Rios to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for its Website: a. Remediating the Website to be WCAG 2.1 AA compliant; b. Training Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly checking the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; d. Regularly testing user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, e. Developing an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 30. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Tatum-Rios and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 31. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 32. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 33. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 34. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 36. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “commercial marketplace” effecting interstate commerce; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” or a service or good “of a place of public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA; c. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” or an “accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating Title III of the ADA; and e. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 38. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because she has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because she has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. 39. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class and Subclass Members predominate over questions affecting only individuals, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 40. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 41. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 43. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s online retail operations. The Website is a service that is integrated with Defendant’s online retail operation. 44. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 45. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 47. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, she has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. 48. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Tatum-Rios requests the relief as set forth below. 49. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 52. Defendant is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its Website, which is marketed to consumers located in the State of New York. Defendant is a “person” under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 53. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its online retail operations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 54. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 55. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 57. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class because of a disability, violating the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2), in that Defendant has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to Class Members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 58. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Tatum-Rios and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its online retail operations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 60. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense. 61. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 63. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 64. The NYCHRL provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 107(4)(a). 65. Defendant’s Website and, therein, its online retail operations, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations under NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its online retail operations. 67. Defendant is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 68. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 69. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Subclass because of a disability, violating the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a,) in that it has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 71. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Tatum-Rios seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines for each offense. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 73. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 75. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 77. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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12. Plaintiff seeks to prosecute the FLSA claim as an “opt-in” collective action on behalf of all persons who are or were employed by Best Budz as technicians in Colorado at any time in the last three (3) years through the date of entry of judgment in this case and (i) were not paid minimum wage for all hours worked (“Minimum Wage Collective”); and/or (ii) were not paid overtime for all hours worked, or were not paid at an appropriate rate of pay for hours worked, in excess of forty (40) in a workweek (“Overtime Collective”). The Minimum Wage Collective and Overtime Collective are referred to herein collectively as the “Collectives.” 13. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Collectives and has retained counsel who are experienced and competent in the fields of wage and hour law and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interest contrary to or in conflict with the members of this collective action. 14. The members of the Collectives are similarly situated because, among other things, they were all victims of the same company-wide policies and procedures that failed to pay them all the wages to which they are entitled under the FLSA. 16. Plaintiff brings her Colorado state law claim on behalf of all persons who were employed by Best Budz in Colorado at any time in the last three (3) years through the date of the entry of judgment in this case who hold or held the position of technician (regardless of actual job title) and (i) were not paid minimum wage for all hours worked (“Minimum Wage Class”); and/or (ii) were not paid overtime for all hours worked, or were not paid at an appropriate rate of pay for hours worked, in excess of 40 in a workweek or 12 hours in a work day (“Overtime Class”). The Minimum Wage Class and the Overtime Class are referred to herein collectively as the “Colorado Classes.” 17. The members of the Colorado Classes are so numerous that joinder of them is impracticable. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of Best Budz, upon information and belief, there are at least 20 members of the Colorado Classes. 18. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Colorado Classes. Plaintiff performed the same job as the members of the Colorado Classes; Best Budz paid Plaintiff and the members of the Colorado Classes pursuant to the same policies and procedures; and Plaintiff and the members of the Colorado Classes were victims of the same wrongful conduct in which Best Budz engaged in violation of the Colorado Wage Order. 20. Best Budz has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to all members of the Colorado Classes, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Colorado Classes as a whole. 21. Plaintiff is committed to pursuing this action and has retained competent counsel who are experienced in wage and hour law and class action litigation. 22. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Colorado Classes. 24. Plaintiff began her employment with Best Budz as a technician in or around February 2016 and has worked for Best Budz in that capacity on four (4) separate occasions in the intervening three and one-half years. 25. More specifically, Plaintiff was employed by Best Budz for approximately two months in early 2016 (“Block One”); approximately eight months in 2017 (“Block Two”); approximately six months in 2018 (“Block Three”); and (thus far) approximately one and one-half months in 2019 (“Block Four”). Plaintiff voluntarily ended Blocks One, Two, and Three for alternative employment outside the State of Colorado. She is presently employed with Best Budz and intends to so remain. 27. Best Budz paid certain technicians, including Plaintiff during Blocks Three and Four, “under the table” in cash at the end of each week. By way of example, Plaintiff is paid approximately $480 in cash for each workweek. Upon information and belief, inadequate time and payroll records are and have been kept. 28. Certain of Best Budz’s technicians were classified as W-2 employees; others were classified as 1099 independent contractors. During Block One, for example, Plaintiff was classified as a W-2 employee. During Block Two, Defendants changed Plaintiff’s classification from employee to 1099 independent contractor. During Blocks Three and Four, Plaintiff was classified as a 1099 independent contractor. Plaintiff’s job duties did not meaningfully change between her status as an employee and as an independent contractor. 29. Best Budz and its purported independent contractors have no written independent contractor agreements in effect. Under applicable law, such technicians should be, and should have been, classified as employees. 30. Whether classified as employees or (wrongly) as independent contractors, technicians are non-exempt under the FLSA and the Colorado Wage Order. 32. Best Budz has in place an inadequate timekeeping method for tracking and recording the time its technicians spend working. 33. Throughout all relevant time periods, Best Budz failed to maintain accurate and sufficient time records and strategically endeavored to maintain opacity in its pay practices. 34. Mr. Ringstrom frequently admitted that his operations, including his pay practices, were designed to minimize the taxes Best Budz paid. 35. Mr. Ringstrom stated that he would only pay technicians for 40 hours per workweek regardless of how many hours he directed them to work. In fact, Mr. Ringstrom instructed technicians to keep track of and report to him how many hours they worked. Despite knowing that technicians, including Plaintiff, worked well over 40 hours per workweek, Mr. Ringstrom only would pay them—usually in cash—for 40 hours at a regular (not overtime) rate of pay. In the past, Mr. Ringstrom would occasionally pay Plaintiff for hours worked over 40 per workweek, but this was inconsistent and was paid at straight-time, not overtime, rates. 36. On information and belief, all technicians, whether classified as employees or (wrongly) as independent contractors, are paid for only 40 hours per workweek and at a regular rate of pay. 37. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA and the Colorado Wage Order are willful. Mr. Ringstrom is well aware of Best Budz’s legal obligation to pay overtime compensation because he actively created schemes to avoid doing so. 39. At all relevant times, Best Budz has been, and continues to be, an employer engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the FLSA. 40. At all relevant times, Mr. Ringstrom has been, and continues to be, an employer engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the FLSA. 41. At all relevant times, Defendants employed and/or continue to employ Plaintiff and each of the members of the Collectives within the meaning of the FLSA. 42. At all relevant times, on information and belief, Best Budz has had gross annual revenues exceeding $500,000. 43. At all relevant times, Best Budz had a uniform policy and practice of failing to pay technicians for all hours worked, of failing to compensate them at the appropriate minimum wage, and of failing to pay overtime compensation for all overtime hours at one and one-half their respective proper regular rates of pay. 44. As a result of Best Budz’s willful failure to properly compensate its employees (whether classified as employees or independent contractors), including Plaintiff and the Collective members, Best Budz has violated, and continues to violate, the FLSA. 45. Best Budz has failed to make, keep, and preserve records with respect to each of its employees and wrongly-classified independent contractors sufficient to determine the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment in violation of the FLSA. 46. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 48. The FLSA opt-in form of Plaintiff is attached as Exhibit 1. 49. All preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein. 50. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the members of the Colorado Classes were employed (whether as employees or independent contractors) by Best Budz within the meaning of the Colorado Wage Order. 51. Best Budz is covered under the Colorado Wage Order as it is a retail and service entity. 52. Best Budz violated the Colorado Wage Order by failing to pay technicians for all hours worked at the minimum wage prescribed by the Colorado Wage Order, by failing to properly calculate overtime hours, and by failing to pay overtime compensation at the rates required. COLORADO WAGE ORDER CLASS ACTION AGAINST BEST BUDZ FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT COLLECTIVE ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

win

1.   a substantial risk of each individual plaintiff presenting in separate, duplicative proceedings the same or essentially similar arguments and evidence, including expert testimony; 1.   Numerosity (Rule 23(a)(1)). 2.   Existence of Common Questions of Law and Fact (Rule 23(a)(2)). 2.   a multiplicity of trials conducted at enormous expense to both the judicial system and the litigants; 22.   Plaintiffs bring the Claims for Relief for violation of Ohio’s Constitution as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3). Plaintiffs bring these claims on behalf of themselves and all members of the following class (the “Ohio Class”) comprised of: A.   Ohio Class B.   All current and former servers and bartenders who worked at one of the Defendants’ owned Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants located in the state of Ohio at any time during the applicable limitations period covered by the filing of this Complaint (three years prior to filing) up to and including the date of final judgment in this matter. C.   Rule 23 Allegations 23.   The potential quantity of members of the proposed Ohio Class as defined is so numerous that joinder of all members would be unfeasible and impractical. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the total number of current and formerly employed members of the Ohio Class number is in the hundreds. The quantity and identity of such membership is readily ascertainable via inspection of the Defendants’ employment and payroll records. 24.   There are common questions of law and fact as to the members of the Ohio Class which predominate over questions affecting only individual members which include, but are not limited to, the following: a.   Whether Defendants failed to keep accurate records of all hours worked and wages earned by members of the Ohio Class; b.   Whether Defendants failed to pay members of the Ohio Class the minimum wage in violation of Article II, §34a of the Ohio Constitution. c.   Whether the members of the Ohio Class are entitled to compensatory damages, and if so, the means of measuring such damages; d.   Whether the members of the Ohio Class are entitled to injunctive relief; Case: 2:17-cv-00476-ALM-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/03/17 Page: 6 of 21 PAGEID #: 6 7 e.   Whether the members of the Ohio Class are entitled to restitution; and f.   Whether Defendants are liable to members of the Ohio Class for attorneys’ fees and costs. 25.   The claims of the Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of all members of the Ohio Class they seek to represent because all members of the Ohio Class sustained injuries and damages arising out of Defendants’ common scheme to maximize profits by skimming wages. 26.   Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the proposed Ohio Class they seek to represent because will fairly protect the interests of the members of the Ohio Class, they have no interests antagonistic to the members of the Ohio Class, and they will vigorously pursue this suit via attorneys who are competent, skilled and experienced in litigating matters of this type. 27.   Injunctive Relief is appropriate pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the members of the Ohio Class, so that final injunctive relief as requested herein is appropriate respecting the Ohio Class as a whole. 28.   The nature of this action and the nature of the laws available to members of the Ohio Class make the use of the class action format particularly efficient and the appropriate procedure to afford relief to them for the wrongs alleged herein, for the following reasons: a.   By establishing a technique whereby the claims of many individuals can be resolved at the same time, the class suit both eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation; b.   This case involves a large number of individual class members with many relatively small claims. If each individual member was required to file an individual lawsuit, the Defendants would necessarily gain an unconscionable advantage because it would be able to exploit and overwhelm the limited resources of each individual class member Case: 2:17-cv-00476-ALM-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/03/17 Page: 7 of 21 PAGEID #: 7 8 with its vastly superior financial and legal resources; c.   Requiring each individual member to pursue an individual remedy would also discourage the assertion of lawful claims by class members, who would be disinclined to pursue action against Defendants because of an appreciable and justifiable fear of retaliation and permanent damage to their lives, careers and well-being; d.   Proof of a common business practice to maximize profits through wage theft will provide the common proof to establish liability against Defendants; e.   Absent class treatment, the prosecution of separate actions by the individual members of the Ohio Class, even if possible, would likely create: 29.   Finally, adjudicating this action on a class basis is appropriate because liability turns on Defendants’ own uniform and systematic scheme to maximize profits by depriving its employees of wages, overtime wages, and forcing them to work off the clock. Class-wide liability Case: 2:17-cv-00476-ALM-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/03/17 Page: 8 of 21 PAGEID #: 8 9 can be determined through manageable devices of common proof such as statistical random sampling, survey evidence based on scientific principles, representative testimony, documentary evidence and Defendants’ common policies and practices. Once liability is determined, the damages suffered by each member can also be determined by the same common proof. 3.   Typicality (Rule 23(a)(3)). 3.   inconsistent or varying verdicts or adjudications; and 30.   Plaintiffs do not contemplate class notice if the Ohio Class is certified under Rule 23(b)(2), which does not require notice, and notice to the putative Class may be accomplished through publication, or other forms of distribution, if necessary, if the Class is certified under Rule 23(b)(3), or if the Court otherwise determines class notice is required. Plaintiffs will, if notice is so required, confer with Defendants and seek to present the Court with a stipulation and proposed order on the details of a class notice program. 31.   Defendants are the owners, principal shareholders, or controlling members or managers of Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants in Ohio. 32.   At all relevant times, Defendants have continuously been an employer of multiple employees engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 33.   Defendant Larry Tipton resides in Lancaster, Ohio and has control over the day-to- day business operations of the corporate Defendants’ Buffalo Wild Wings restaurant. Among other things, Tipton has the authority to hire and fire employees, the authority to direct and supervise the work of employees, the authority to sign on each corporation’s checking accounts, including payroll accounts, and the authority to participate in decisions regarding employee compensation and capital expenditures. Tipton controls the “purse strings” of his Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants, including those operated through the corporate Defendants: he signs the corporate checks without limitation as to amount; provides funds to purchase goods, as well as pay employees; and has authority to sign on Case: 2:17-cv-00476-ALM-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/03/17 Page: 9 of 21 PAGEID #: 9 10 the checking accounts from which Plaintiffs were paid. 34.   The corporate Defendants are Ohio corporations with their principal business being Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants in Ohio. 35.   Plaintiff Zachary Barton is an Ohio citizen and resides in this judicial district. Defendants employed Plaintiff Zachary Barton as a server and bartender at their Buffalo Wild Wings restaurant in Athens, Ohio, between approximately November, 2012 and June, 2016. During his employment, Barton also worked occasionally as a Wing Certified Trainer. 36.   Plaintiff Ethan Forness is a Florida citizen and resides in Sarasota, Florida. Defendants employed Plaintiff Ethan Forness as a server and bartender at their Buffalo Wild Wings restaurant in Athens, Ohio between approximately October, 2014 and February, 2017. During his employment, Forness also worked occasionally as a Wing Certified Trainer. 37.   Defendants paid Plaintiffs less than minimum wage to work as a server and bartender. Plaintiffs were not informed by Defendants’ of the tip-credit provisions of the FLSA. Defendants also required Plaintiffs to “reimburse” expenses to the restaurant from tips in violation of the FLSA. 38.   While paying them sub-minimum wage, Defendants required Plaintiffs to spend over twenty percent of their work time in one or more individual workweeks performing related non- tipped work, and required them to perform unrelated non-tipped duties that had no customer interaction and that did not generate tips. A non-exhaustive list of these examples follows: a.   Cleaning bathrooms; b.   Sweeping, mopping, and/or deck scrubbing restaurant floors; c.   Sweeping up cigarette butts from the patio and/or removing them from the flower beds outside the restaurant; Case: 2:17-cv-00476-ALM-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/03/17 Page: 10 of 21 PAGEID #: 10 11 d.   Washing silverware, food platters, salad plates, and/or glassware; e.   Taking out garbage; f.   Cleaning restaurant walls; g.   Cleaning the soda machines; h.   Cleaning high chairs and booster seats; i.   Rolling silverware; j.   Setting up or breaking down the expo line; and k.   Portioning Food. 39.   Defendants’ requirement that Plaintiffs and the putative class portion food while working on tip credit required a substantial amount of time. This task alone often takes more than an hour during a shift. Common Factual Allegations 4.   potentially incompatible standards of conduct for Ultimate Fitness. f.   The claims of the individual members of the Ohio Class are not sufficiently large to warrant vigorous individual prosecution considering all of the concomitant costs and expenses attendant thereto; g.   Courts seeking to preserve efficiency and other benefits of class actions routinely fashion methods to manage any individual questions; and h.   Judicial precedent urges trial courts, which have an obligation to consider the use of innovative procedural tools to certify a manageable class, to be procedurally innovative in managing class actions. 4.   Adequacy Rule (23(a)(4)). 40.   Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants, including those owned and operated by Defendants, operate as a chain concept, so that customers can obtain essentially the same food and drink items, and experience the same customer service, at all Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants. 41.   Defendants trained their Buffalo Wild Wings employees, including Tip-Credit Employees and store managers, to perform the same, or essentially the same, job duties. This identical training is delivered regardless of the location where they are assigned to work. 42.   During the Plaintiffs’ employment, Defendants permitted servers to transfer between their Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants. 43.   Defendants require their Tip-Credit Employees to perform non-tipped work each shift in addition to serving customers. 44.   During the Plaintiffs’ employment, checklists were posted in Defendants’ Case: 2:17-cv-00476-ALM-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/03/17 Page: 11 of 21 PAGEID #: 11 12 restaurants with numerous non-tipped duties that servers and bartenders were required to perform in addition to serving customers. 45.   During the Plaintiffs’ employment, managers verified that severs and bartenders performed the non-tipped work covered in the checklists. 46.   When Plaintiffs and other Tip-Credit Employees performed non-tipped work, they did not interact with customers and did not have the opportunity to earn tips. 47.   Defendants require Tip-Credit Employees to perform non-tipped work before their restaurants are open to customers. 48.   Defendants require Tip-Credit Credit Employees to perform non-tipped work after they are finished serving customers and/or their restaurants are closed to customers. 49.   During Plaintiffs’ employment, Defendants had no policies prohibiting Tip-Credit Employees from performing certain types, or excessive amounts, of non-tipped work. 5.   Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (Rule 23(b)(2)). 50.   During Plaintiffs’ employment, Defendants did not record or track the amount of time Tip-credit Employees spent performing non-tipped work. 51.   Defendants use a standard point-of-sale system to record hours worked by Tip- Credit Employees at their Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants. 52.   Defendants analyze and evaluate information collected by their point-of-sale system, including labor cost information, for each of their restaurants. 53.   Defendants’ managers at their restaurants are eligible to receive bonuses based, in part, on meeting or exceeding certain labor cost targets. 54.   In their point-of-sale system, Defendants can create different “clock in” codes that would allow their Tip-Credit Employees to clock in at the full minimum wage rate when performing non-tipped work, while clocking in at a sub-minimum, tip-credit rate when serving customers. Case: 2:17-cv-00476-ALM-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/03/17 Page: 12 of 21 PAGEID #: 12 13 55.   Defendants did not allow their Tip-Credit Employees to clock in at the full minimum wage rate when performing the non-tipped work described in this Complaint, although Defendants had the capacity to do so. 56.   Defendants also routinely clocked Plaintiffs and the putative class out and required them to do significant work while clocked out, sometimes in excess of two hours at the close. I. Defendants Violated the FLSA by Requiring Plaintiffs and Class Members to Perform Substantial Non-Tip-Producing Tasks Without Being Paid Minimum Wage. 57.   Under the FLSA, as interpreted by the Department of Labor (the “DOL”), employers may not take the tip credit for time the employee is engaged in a non-tipped job and instead must pay their employees at the standard minimum wage. The DOL has formalized this concept under the “Dual Jobs” regulation which states as follows: Dual jobs. In some situations, an employee is employed in a dual job, as for example, where a maintenance man in a hotel also serves as a waiter. In such a situation the employee . . . is a tipped employee only with respect to his employment as a waiter. He is employed in two occupations, and no tip credit can be taken for his hours of employment in his occupation of maintenance man. Such a situation is distinguishable from that of a waitress who spends part of her time cleaning and setting tables, toasting bread, making coffee and occasionally washing dishes or glasses… 58.   The Dual Jobs regulation imposes both quantitative and qualitative restrictions on the employer’s ability to take the tip credit for non-tip-producing tasks, as explained in the DOL’s Field Operations Handbook (the “Handbook” or “FOH”). 59.   The quantitative restriction limits the amount of time an employee can spend on tasks related to the tipped occupation, as follows: 6.   Predominance and Superiority of Class Action (Rule 23(b)(3)). 60.   29 CFR 531.56(e) permits the employer to take a tip credit for time spent in duties Case: 2:17-cv-00476-ALM-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/03/17 Page: 13 of 21 PAGEID #: 13 14 related to the tipped occupation of an employee, even though such duties are not by themselves directed toward producing tips, provided such related duties are incidental to the regular duties of the tipped employees and are generally assigned to the tipped employee. For example, duties related to the tipped occupation may include a server who does preparatory or closing activities, rolls silverware and fills salt and pepper shakers while the restaurant is open, cleans and sets tables, makes coffee, and occasionally washes dishes or glasses. FOH § 30d00(e)(2) (rev. 668, June 20, 2012). 61.   The Handbook continues: [W]here the facts indicate that tipped employees spend a substantial amount of time (in excess of 20 percent of the hours worked in the tipped occupation in the workweek) performing such related duties, no tip credit may be taken for the time spent in those duties. All related duties count toward the 20 percent tolerance. 62.   This “20 percent tolerance,” which is one method of determining whether an employee is effectively engaged in a dual jobs position, is referred to as the “20 Percent Rule.” Courts have routinely utilized this quantitative standard. 63.   The qualitative aspect of the Dual Jobs regulation prohibits taking the tip credit for work that is "not related to the tipped occupation. For example, maintenance work (e.g., cleaning bathrooms and washing windows) are not related to the tipped occupation of a server; such jobs are non-tipped occupations." FOH § 30d00(e)(4). 64.   Defendants instituted a policy requiring Plaintiffs and Class Members to work dual jobs that included tipped tasks (directed toward producing tips) and substantial non-tip-producing tasks (“Non-Tipped Work”), exceeding 20 percent of their time, for which they were not paid the applicable minimum wage. 64. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class, repeat and re-allege all allegations above as though they are fully set forth herein. 65.   Such Non-Tipped Work for servers includes but is not limited to: setting up the dining room areas, brewing beverages, cutting lemons, filling ice bins, baking bread, polishing and Case: 2:17-cv-00476-ALM-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/03/17 Page: 14 of 21 PAGEID #: 14 15 stocking glassware, helping pack to-go orders, restocking salt/pepper and sugar caddies, pulling away tables to clean under booths, cleaning the server alley, sweeping floors, placing and removing silverware from dishwashing machine, polishing and rolling silverware, wiping wood, starting and warming the oven, maintaining and cleaning sanitation buckets, and cleaning and setting floor mats. 65. At all relevant times, Defendants have been and continue to be an employer engaged in interstate commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 66.   Such Non-Tipped Work for bartenders includes but is not limited to: setting up and cleaning the bar area (front and back), stocking glassware, wiping and washing glassware; cleaning sinks, keg coolers, gaskets, and ice baths; handling to-go orders for the restaurant; cashing out servers; and performing server side work. 66. At all relevant times, Defendants employed, and/or continue to employ, Plaintiffs and each of the Class Members within the meaning of the FLSA. 67. At all relevant times, Defendants had a uniform policy and practice of knowingly permitting Plaintiffs and Class Members to work off the clock without compensation. 67.   Defendants have a policy and practice of paying Plaintiffs and Class Members, sub- minimum, tip-credit wages, even when Defendants require them to perform Non-Tipped Work that is not related to their tipped occupation, such as baking bread and performing other tasks, including but not limited to those previously set forth in this Complaint, not related to their tipped occupation. 68.   Even if the Non-Tipped Work Defendants require Plaintiff and Class Members to perform was related to their tipped occupation, Defendants violate the FLSA by its policy and practice of requiring Plaintiffs and Class Members to perform such work for more than 20 percent of their time worked during the workweek. 68. Defendants’ policy and practice of not paying minimum wage for non-tip-producing work led to Plaintiffs and Class Members working off the clock without compensation. 69. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and Class Members wages for off-the-clock work. 69.   Plaintiffs were required to perform substantial non-tip-producing tasks for more than 20 percent of her hours in the workweek without being paid a minimum wage. 70. Defendants’ conduct constitutes willful violations of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Case: 2:17-cv-00476-ALM-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/03/17 Page: 18 of 21 PAGEID #: 18 19 70.   Plaintiffs were also required to perform tasks that were unrelated to and not incidental to her tip-producing occupation without being paid a minimum wage. 71. Due to Defendants’ FLSA violations, Plaintiffs and the Class Members were damaged and are entitled to recover from Defendants compensation for unpaid wages; an additional equal amount as liquidated damages; and reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses of this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 71.   Defendants’ policy and practice of requiring Plaintiffs and Class Members to perform excessive and/or unrelated Non-Tipped Work while paying them sub-minimum, tip-credit wages violates the FLSA. Case: 2:17-cv-00476-ALM-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/03/17 Page: 15 of 21 PAGEID #: 15 16 II. Defendants Violate the FLSA by Failing to Pay Plaintiffs and Class Members for Off-the-clock Work. 72.  Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all the preceding paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein. 72.   Defendants encourage Plaintiffs and Class Members to work off the clock by limiting the hours that they are permitted to be clocked in. 73.  As alleged above, Plaintiffs and members of the Ohio Class were consistently and uniformly not paid the minimum wage or overtime pay for all the work they performed during the course of their employment with Defendants. Defendants’ policy and practice was to force Ohio Plaintiffs and members of the Ohio Class to work off the clock to cut costs and increase profits. Defendants’ unlawful conduct was neither inadvertent, nor de minimis, but widespread, repeated and part of a pattern and practice of conduct affecting Ohio Plaintiffs and all members of the Ohio Class. 73.   Defendants require Plaintiffs and Class Members to perform substantial non-tip- producing work when they are clocked in. 74.  Defendants permitted, consented, and had actual or constructive knowledge the Plaintiffs and members of the Ohio Class were not receiving minimum wage or overtime pay because Defendants knowingly required non tip-related labor to be done off the clock and while on tipped wages. Defendants also knowingly fabricated wage statements in order to make it appear that the Plaintiffs and the Ohio Class were receiving minimum wage. 74.   Defendants have refused to pay Plaintiffs and Class Members minimum wage for non-tip-producing work that exceeds 20 percent of the hours in a workweek. 75.   Plaintiffs and Class Members worked off the clock without pay, with the knowledge, expectation, and acquiescence of Defendants. 75.  As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiffs and the members of the Ohio Class have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. The Ohio Constitution contains a three-year statute of limitations regardless of whether the violation was willful (the “Ohio Class Period”). Therefore, the Ohio Plaintiffs and members of the Ohio Class are entitled to treble damages and attorneys’ fees and costs and other relief, including penalties and interest, as this Court deems just and appropriate. Case: 2:17-cv-00476-ALM-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/03/17 Page: 19 of 21 PAGEID #: 19 20 Prayer for Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and similarly-situated Tip-Credit Employees, pray for judgment against Defendants as follows: A.   For an order certifying that the First Two Claims for Relief of this Complaint may be maintained as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and that prompt notice of this action be issued to potential members of the opt-in FLSA Class, apprising them of the pendency of this action, and permitting them to assert timely FLSA claims; B.   For an order certifying that the Third Claim for Relief be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 on behalf of the members of the Ohio Class who were either employed or who performed work in the State of Ohio during the Ohio Class Period and that notice of the pendency of this action be provided to members of the Ohio Class. C.   Designation of Plaintiffs as the Class Representatives for the FLSA Class; D.   Designation of the Plaintiffs as the Class Representatives for the Ohio Class; E.   Designation of Plaintiffs’ attorney as Class Counsel for both the FLSA Class and the Ohio Class; F.   A declaratory judgment that the practices complained of herein are unlawful under appropriate state law; G.   Appropriate equitable relief to remedy Defendants’ violations of state law, including but not necessarily limited to an order enjoining Defendants from continuing its unlawful practices; H.   For an award of unpaid Federal minimum wages for each hour worked as required by the 76.   Defendants clocked Plaintiffs and Class Members out yet required them to remain to complete multiple tasks, including but not limited to cleaning tables, mopping bathrooms, wiping sinks and mirrors, detailing the bar, filling salt and pepper shakers, replacing ketchups, sweeping and vacuuming carpets, mopping tile surfaces, cleaning dishes, restocking lids, cups, drink mixers, and sugar packets, rotating the beer cooler, cleaning dish area, organizing keg cooler, carrying keg to the cooler, wiping salt off the tables, 77.   The willful refusal to pay wages for off-the-clock work constitutes a violation of the 78.   Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate the previous paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth in this cause of action. 79.   This cause of action arises from Defendants’ violation of the FLSA for their failure Case: 2:17-cv-00476-ALM-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/03/17 Page: 16 of 21 PAGEID #: 16 17 to pay minimum wages and overtime pay to Plaintiff and similarly-situated Tip-Credit Employees. 80.   Plaintiffs bring this cause of action as a collective action under the FLSA, § 216(b). 81.   Defendants were Plaintiffs’ “employer” as defined by the FLSA, § 203(d). 82.   Plaintiffs were Defendants’ “employee[s]” as defined by the FLSA, § 203(e)(1). 83.   During the entire course of their employment by Defendants, Plaintiffs were not exempt from the minimum wage or overtime provisions of the FLSA. 84.   In one or more individual workweeks during their employment, each Plaintiffs’ average compensation (i.e. total weekly compensation divided by total weekly hours), excluding tips, fell below minimum wage. 85.   Defendants are, individually and collectively, an “enterprise” as defined by the FLSA, § 203(r)(1). 86.   Defendants are, individually and collectively, an enterprise(s) engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, § (203)(s)(1)(A). 87.   Defendants’ annual gross volume of sales made, or business done, has exceeded $500,000 in each of the last three calendar years. 88.   Defendants’ individual Buffalo Wild Wings restaurant(s), including those operating under the Defendant corporate entities are engaged in related activities performed for a common business purpose, through unified operation or common control. 89.   Defendants violated the FLSA by requiring Plaintiffs and similarly-situated Tip- Credit Employees to perform non-tipped work that is unrelated to their tipped occupation, while paying them less than minimum wage, such as: cleaning bathrooms, sweeping, mopping, or deck scrubbing floors, washing dishes, and cleaning the restaurant. 90.   Defendants also violated the FLSA by requiring Plaintiffs and similarly-situated Case: 2:17-cv-00476-ALM-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/03/17 Page: 17 of 21 PAGEID #: 17 18 Tip-Credit Employees to perform non-tipped work that, even if related to their tipped occupation, exceeded twenty percent of their time worked in one or more individual workweeks without paying them full minimum wage. 91.   Defendants violated the FLSA by making tip credit against the minimum wages of Plaintiffs and similarly-situated Tip-Credit Employees without informing them of the tip credit provisions of the FLSA. 92.   Defendants violated the FLSA by not paying overtime pursuant to the FLSA. 93.   Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were willful. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (Minimum Wage and Overtime, On Behalf of Themselves and the Class) VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT - UNPAID WAGES
(On Behalf of Themselves and the Class) VIOLATION OF ARTICLE II, §34A OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION -
(On Behalf of Themselves and the Ohio Class)

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17. Defendant manufactures, distributes, markets, and sells over-the-counter biotin products. This lawsuit concerns three of those products — Biotin 5000 mcg Fast Dissolve, Biotin 10,000 mcg Maximum Strength, and Biotin 10,000 mcg Fast Dissolve (collectively, “Biotin Products”). The Biotin Products are marketed as supplements with the purpose of providing certain health benefits. The Biotin Products are sold in major food, drug, and mass retail outlets in the country including, but not limited to Costco and Walgreens. A single container of the Biotin Products retails for approximately $6.00-$11.00. The Uniform Health Benefits Message 18. Throughout the relevant time period, Defendant has consistently conveyed the health benefits message to consumers throughout California and the United States. Consumer Exposure to the Health Benefits Message 20. Plaintiff and Class members have been and will continue to be deceived or misled by Defendant’s deceptive health benefit representations. Plaintiff and the Class members have been damaged in their purchases of the Biotin Products and have been deceived into purchasing the Biotin Products that they believed, based on Defendant’s representations, would provide them health benefits, when, in fact, they do not. 22. In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks certification of the following Class: Multi-State Class Action All consumers who, within the applicable statute of limitations period until the date notice is disseminated, purchased Biotin Products in California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, and Washington. Excluded from this Class are Defendant and its officers, directors, employees and those who purchased Biotin Products for the purpose of resale. 23. In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks certification of the following Class: California-Only Class Action All California consumers who within the applicable statute of limitations period until the date notice is disseminated, purchased Biotin Products. Excluded from this Class are Defendant and its officers, directors and employees, and those who purchased Biotin Products for the purpose of resale. 24. Numerosity. The members of the Classes are so numerous that joinder of all members of the Classes is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the proposed Classes contain thousands of purchasers of Biotin Products who have been damaged by Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein. The precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff. 26. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes because, inter alia, all Class members were injured through the uniform misconduct described above and were subject to Defendant’s deceptive health benefit representations on the front of each and every Biotin Product container. Plaintiff is also advancing the same claims and legal theories on behalf of herself and all members of the Classes. 27. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in complex consumer class action litigation, and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff has no adverse or antagonistic interests to those of the Classes. 29. Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive and equitable relief on behalf of the entire Classes, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Classes, to enjoin and prevent Defendant from engaging in the acts described, and requiring Defendant to provide full restitution to Plaintiff and Class members. 30. Unless a Class is certified, Defendant will retain monies received as a result of its conduct that were taken from Plaintiff and Class members. 31. Unless an injunction is issued, Defendant will continue to commit the violations alleged, and the members of the Classes and the general public will continue to be deceived. 32. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein. 33. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Classes. 34. As alleged herein, Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of Defendant’s conduct because she purchased Defendant’s Biotin Product in reliance on Defendant’s claim that the Biotin Product would provide her with health benefits, but did not receive a Biotin Product that provided those benefits. 35. Plaintiff suffered that injury at the time of her purchase, when she bought a product that does not deliver the benefits Defendant promises. 37. In the course of conducting business, Defendant committed “fraudulent business act[s] or practices” and false, deceptive or misleading advertising by, inter alia, making the health benefit representations (which also constitutes advertising within the meaning of §17200) regarding the Biotin Products on the Biotin Products’ labeling, as set forth more fully herein. 38. Defendant’s actions, claims and misleading statements, as more fully set forth above, are false, misleading and/or likely to deceive the consuming public within the meaning of Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq. 39. Plaintiff and other members of the Classes have in fact been deceived as a result of their reliance on Defendant’s material health benefit representations. Plaintiff and the other Class members have suffered injury in fact and lost money as a result of their purchase(s) of Defendant’s Biotin Products that do not provide health benefits. 40. Unless restrained and enjoined, Defendant will continue to engage in the above described conduct. Accordingly, injunctive relief is appropriate. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself, all others similarly situated, and the general public, seeks restitution of all money obtained from Plaintiff and the members of the Classes collected as a result of unfair competition, an injunction prohibiting Defendant from continuing such practices, corrective advertising, and all other relief this Court deems appropriate, consistent with Business & Professions Code §17203. 42. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein. 43. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Nationwide and California-Only Classes. 45. Plaintiff is a consumer as defined by California Civil Code §1761(d). The Biotin Products are “goods” within the meaning of the Act. 46. Defendant violated and continues to violate the Act by engaging in the following practices proscribed by California Civil Code §1770(a) in transactions with Plaintiff and the Classes which were intended to result in, and did result in, the sale of the Biotin Products: (5) Representing that [the Biotin Products have] . . . characteristics, . . . uses [and] benefits . . . which [they do] not have . . . . * * * 47. Pursuant to California Civil Code §1782(d), Plaintiff and the Classes seek a Court order enjoining the above described wrongful acts and practices of Defendant and for restitution and disgorgement. 48. Pursuant to §1782 of the Act, Plaintiff notified Defendant in writing by certified mail of the particular violations of §1770 of the Act and demanded that Defendant rectify the problems associated with the actions detailed above and give notice to all affected consumers of Defendant’s intent to so act. A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 49. If Defendant fails to rectify or agree to rectify the problems associated with the actions detailed above and give notice to all affected consumers within 30 days of the date of written notice pursuant to §1782 of the Act, Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to add claims for actual, punitive and statutory damages, as appropriate. 50. Defendant’s conduct is fraudulent, wanton and malicious. 51. Pursuant to §1780(d) of the Act, attached hereto as Exhibit C is the affidavit showing that this action has been commenced in the proper forum. The Biotin Products Violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act – Civil Code §1750 et seq. (On Behalf of the Nationwide and California-Only Classes) Violation of Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq. Fraudulent Business Acts and Practices (On Behalf of the Nationwide, Multi-State, or California-Only Class)

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11. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was the sole operator, possessor, and subscriber of the cellular telephone number ending in 8573. 12. At all times relevant, Plaintiff’s number ending in 8573 was assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 3 13. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was financially responsible for her cellular telephone equipment and services. 14. At no point in time did Plaintiff have an account or any other form of business relationship with Defendant. 15. In January 2021, Defendant began placing prerecorded calls (“robocalls”) to Plaintiff’s cellular phone in an attempt to collect an outstanding balance owed by an unknown third party by the name of “Jacob Baker.” 16. Upon answering Defendant’s calls, Plaintiff was greeted with a prerecorded message stating either: (1) “This call is for Jacob Baker. Please give Spectrum a call back at 844- 206-9035 regarding your account information” or (2) “This is Spectrum looking for Jacob Baker. Your service has been discontinued, please contact us at 844-206-9035.” 17. In calls that Plaintiff did not answer, Defendant would leave voicemails on Plaintiff’s cellular phone containing the same prerecorded messages described above. 18. Frustrated with Defendant’s robocalls, Plaintiff contacted Defendant to determine the reason for Defendant’s calls. 19. Plaintiff explained to Defendant’s representative that she did not know who Jacob Baker was and did not understand why she was receiving these calls. 20. Plaintiff explained that the calls were irritating her because they were coming in at such a high rate. 21. Plaintiff explained she has never had an account with Defendant and requested that the calls cease. 22. In response, Defendant’s representative assured Plaintiff that Defendant’s robocalls would cease. 4 23. Despite Plaintiff’s request and Defendant’s assurance that the calls would cease, Defendant continued placing robocalls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone number. 24. On March 18, 2021, infuriated with Defendant’s invasive robocalls, Plaintiff placed a call to Defendant and was connected with Defendant’s representative “Kyle.” 25. During this call, Plaintiff provided Kyle with her name, address, and phone number. Kyle was unable to locate an account for Plaintiff and advised Plaintiff that she is receiving calls from Defendant because someone used Plaintiff’s phone number to open an account with Defendant. 26. Kyle assured Plaintiff that the situation was resolved and sent Plaintiff a one-time confirmation code of the conversation that allegedly established that Plaintiff would no longer receive Defendant’s robocalls. 27. On March 19, 2021, Defendant placed three (3) robocalls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone number. 28. On March 20, 2021, Defendant placed two (2) robocalls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone number. 29. Despite Defendant’s repeated assurances that its robocalls would cease, Defendant continues to place daily robocalls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone number, with as many as 7 robocalls in a 24-hour period. 30. In total, Defendant placed no less than one-hundred (100) robocalls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone number utilizing a prerecorded voice in an effort to contact Jacob Baker. 31. Plaintiff has repeatedly requested that Defendant’s phone calls cease to no avail. 32. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide her cellular phone number to Defendant or otherwise consent to receiving phone calls from Defendant. 5 39. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. 40. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“Putative Class”) defined as follows: 6 All persons residing in the United States: (a) who do not have an existing account with Defendant; (b) to whom Defendant, or a third party acting on Defendant’s behalf, placed a phone call to his/her cellular phone number; (c) utilizing an artificial or prerecorded voice; (d) in connection with an outstanding balance allegedly owed by a third party; (e) at any time in the period that begins four years before the date of the filing of the original complaint through the date of class certification. 41. The following individuals are excluded from the Putative Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate Judge presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Putative Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. A. Numerosity 42. The exact number of members of the Putative Class is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. 43. Upon information and belief, Defendant made robocalls calls to thousands of individuals that fall within the definition of the Putative Class. 44. Members of the Putative Class can be objectively identified from the records of Defendant and any affiliated vendors to be gained through targeted discovery. B. Commonality and Predominance 45. There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Putative Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Putative Class. 7 C. Typicality 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of members of the Putative Class because Plaintiff and members of the Putative Class are entitled to damages as a result of Defendant’s conduct. D. Superiority and Manageability 47. This case is also appropriate for class certification as class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the efficient and fair adjudication of this controversy. 48. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Putative Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense required for individual prosecution. 49. By contrast, a class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 50. Economies of effort, expense, and time will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. E. Adequate Representation 51. Plaintiff will adequately and fairly represent and protect the interests of the Putative Class. 52. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Putative Class and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 53. Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced counsel in consumer class action litigation. 54. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. 8 55. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(iii) by placing or causing to be placed no less than one-hundred (100) non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number, utilizing an artificial or prerecorded voice, without Plaintiff’s consent. 56. As pled above, Defendant utilized an artificial or prerecorded voice that automatically played upon Plaintiff answering the call or the call reaching Plaintiff’s voicemail. 57. As pled above, Plaintiff has never provided her cellular phone number to Defendant or had any business relationship with Defendant. 58. Accordingly, it is clear that Defendant had actual knowledge it did not have consent to place robocalls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone number, but did so in utter disregard of the TCPA 59. As pled above, Plaintiff was harmed by Defendant’s robocalls to her cellular phone. 60. Upon information and belief, Defendant does not maintain policies and procedures designed to ensure compliance with the TCPA. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the members of the Putative Class, request the following relief: A. an order granting certification of the proposed class, including the designation of Plaintiff as the named representative, and the appointment of the undersigned as Class Counsel; B. an order finding that Defendant violated the TCPA; C. an order enjoining Defendant from placing further violating calls to non-customers; D. an award of $500.00 in damages to Plaintiff and the members of the Putative Class for each such violation; E. an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 to Plaintiff and the members of the Putative Class for each such violation; and 9 F. an award of such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. § 227 et. seq.) (On behalf of Plaintiff and members of the Putative Class)

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11. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 12. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York; b. to whom Defendant SBS sent a collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. that deceptively stated that both the original creditor and the debt collector would report to the credit bureaus; d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (21) days after the filing of this action. 4 13. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts and/or has purchased debts. 14. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 15. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibits A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f. 16. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 17. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. 5 b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, 1692f. c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Plaintiff Class. The Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent members of the Plaintiff Class. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 6 18. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member and in that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 19. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 20. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 21. Some time prior to December 2, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to National Grid fka Keyspan NY. 22. The National Grid fka Keyspan NY obligation arose out of an alleged debt for transactions primarily for personal, family or household purposes, specifically utility services. 23. The alleged National Grid fka Keyspan NY obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 24. National Grid fka Keyspan NY is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). 25. Defendant SBS contracted with National Grid fka Keyspan NY to collect the alleged debt. 7 26. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation December 2, 2020 Collection Letter 27. On or about December 2, 2020, Defendant sent the Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed to National Grid fka Keyspan NY. A true and correct copy of the Letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 28. The Letter states: Notification of Intent to Process Negative Credit Report We have not received your check in payment of this debt, and it is our obligation to inform you that a negative credit report, in your creditors name, will be made regarding your lack of cooperation with this matter. This report will be processed in approximately thirty days, unless full payment is received within twenty days from the date of this notification. Kindly give this matter the immediate consideration that it deserves. 29. The letter is unclear and deceptive if Defendant SBS will be doing the negative credit reporting or if the original creditor will be doing the negative credit reporting or if both the Defendant and the original creditor would be doing the negative reporting. 30. The letter implies that Defendant SBS will be doing the reporting because Defendant is informing the Plaintiff of the details of the reporting, yet the letter also states that a negative credit report will be made in “your creditor’s name” implying that the original creditor would also be reporting the negative credit information. 31. It is deceptive to state that two companies will report to the credit reporting agencies on the same debt. 8 32. Moreover, the letter intimidates and threatens the consumer by implying that his account information will be reported twice to the national credit reporting agencies. 33. Plaintiff incurred an informational injury as Defendant falsely asserted that the same debt would be reported twice to the national credit reporting agencies twice on the same debt. 34. In addition, the letter states that the negative credit reporting will be made “regarding your lack of cooperation with this matter,” implying that somehow the credit reporting will indicate “lack of cooperation.” 35. The negative credit reporting would not include details such as “lack of cooperation,” because it would only include basic indications regarding payment or lack thereof (or late payments) and to include such language in the collection letter is false and deceptive to the Plaintiff. 36. As a result of Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 44. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 45. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 46. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 47. Defendant violated this section by threatening to use language in a negative credit reporting that would not be used. 48. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.

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5.10 Plaintiff and members of the Class were each users of the ATMs since the date one year prior to the filing of this action. 5.11 Plaintiff and each member of the Class were illegally charged ATM fees as a result of Defendant's failure to comply with the ATM fee notice requirements of the 5.1 Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated persons pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5.3 Congress expressly intended “that the EFTA would be enforced, in part, through private class actions.” 15 U.S.C. § 1693m(a). 5.4 Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that there are at minimum, hundreds of members of the Class. 5.5 The exact size of the Class and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant's records. Defendant has exclusive control of this information. 5.6 Members of the Class may be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in class actions, such as by published notice, e-mail notice, website notices, first class mail, or combinations thereof, or by other methods suitable to this class and deemed necessary and/or appropriate by this Court. 5.7 Defendant can generate data for its ATMs identifying each transaction in which a fee was charged. The data will include the date of the transaction, the amount of the fee and the persona1 account number ("PAN") for the consumer. The PAN includes a bank identification number ("BIN"). This information can be used to identify class members. 5.8 The Class is sufficiently numerous to make bringing all parties before the Court impractical.

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11. In fact, Plaintiff regularly receives unsolicited marketing texts from Defendant notwithstanding Plaintiff's repeated requests that Defendant stop texting her. 12. For example, on February 14, 2020 at 6:57 am, Defendant sent an unsolicited text message to Plaintiff from short code 71203. Plaintiff responded to the text message less than an hour later by texting "STOP." Notwithstanding, Defendant sent Plaintiff another unsolicited text message the same day, only a few hours later, at 10:49 am: 13. Plaintiff has never provided her consent to Too Faced Cosmetics to send her text messages to her cellular phone number using an automatic telephone dialing system, and even if she had, she subsequently revoked such consent by texting "STOP" in response to many of Defendant's text messages . 14. Defendant's unsolicited texts were a nuisance that aggravated Plaintiff, wasted her time, invaded her privacy, diminished the value of the cellular services she paid for, caused her to temporarily lose the use and enjoyment of her phone, and caused wear and tear to her phone's data, memory, software, hardware, and battery components. 16. On information and belief, Too Faced Cosmetics, or a third-party acting on its behalf, sent substantively identical unsolicited text messages en masse to the cellular telephone numbers of thousands of consumers. This is evident from the text messages' commercial and generic content, that the text messages were unsolicited, and that they were using an automatic telephone dialing system. 17. To the extent the text messages were sent on Defendant's behalf to consumers, Defendant provided the third-party access to its records, authorized use of its trade name and devoted short code, otherwise controlled the content of the messages, and knew of, but failed to stop, the sending of the text messages in violation of the 26. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 25 of this complaint and incorporates them by reference. 27. Defendant and/or its agents transmitted text messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the ATDS Class using an automatic telephone dialing system. 28. These solicitation text messages were sent without the consent of Plaintiff and the other members of the ATDS Class. 29. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), and as a result, under 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(3)(B)-(C), Plaintiff and members of the ATDS Class are entitled to a minimum of $500 and a maximum $1,500 in damages for each violation. 8. Defendant is a cosmetics company. 9. To increase sales of Too Faced Cosmetics products and services, and as part of a general marketing scheme, Defendant markets its brand using text messages to consumers. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the ATDS Class)

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-14- -20- VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL 1. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL. 10. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 11. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). -17- 12. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 13. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 14. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 72 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 15. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 16. The Website www.rugs.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 17. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates www.rugs.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). -18- 18. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its site, causing www.rugs.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 19. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law, “unlawful discriminatory practice” includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 2. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly, to the Plaintiff, are severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, -15- NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 20. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 21. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. -19- 22. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 23. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 24. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of www.rugs.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 24. Defendant is a high-quality rug retailer that sells a huge selection of rugs of various colors, sizes, shapes, and styles. Defendant owns, operates, manages, and controls the website, www.rugs.com (its “Website”), which allows Defendant to sell its various rugs on both a national and international scale. With few to no brick and mortar stores currently operating today, Defendant’s Website is an exclusive point of sale for Defendant’s products. 25. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace. The Website offers features of a physical marketplace in that it allows all consumers to browse goods and services, provides details about the products, notifies them of special sale or clearance items, and completes purchases of products, which Defendant will thereafter ensure the delivery of throughout the United States, including in New York State. 25. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 26. Defendant’s Website is integrated with its retail business operations, serving as its gateway. The Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to learn about Defendant’s products and services, browse for items, information, access navigation bar descriptions, prices, sales, coupons, and discount items, as well as to simply peruse the numerous items offered for sale. The features offered by www.rugs.com include product descriptions, information about the company, review boards, and purchase portals. 26. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the NYSHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 27. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 27. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities -9- and services that are offered and integrated with its retail operations. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s retail operations and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 28. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using her NVDA screen-reader. 28. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 29. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297, and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 29. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, www.rugs.com, the last occurring in December of 2020, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers which effectively denied her the full enjoyment of the goods and services of the Website. Plaintiff visited Defendant’s Website with an intent to browse and attempt to purchase new area rug for her home. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a range of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to make her desired purchase. 3. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 30. The issues started on the homepage of the site where Plaintiff immediately found that she was unable to figure out how to navigate to other pages because her reader could not read the page options to her. She could see what appeared to be a menu of site options, but none of these were readable to her screen-reader, even when she actually clicked on them as opposed to just hovering her mouse over them. 30. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 31. Even further in the site, Plaintiff quickly found that many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to tell the differences between different rugs on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. -10- 31. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 32. Many features on the Website also fail to add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually-impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what she or she is expected to insert into the subject field. This was an issue on Defendant’s Website particularly in the style-selection sections. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually-impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 32. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 33. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non-existent or empty webpage. For the visually-impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 33. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 34. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 34. Plaintiff has made multiple attempts to complete a purchase on www.rugs.com, most recently in December of 2020, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused www.rugs.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 35. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). -21- 35. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 36. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the -11- facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 36. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 37. But for the Website’s access barriers, Plaintiff would have returned to and further utilized Defendant’s Website. 37. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 38. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 38. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 39. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 39. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 4. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 40. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. -22- 40. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. -12- 41. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 41. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 42. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 42. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 43. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring: a. that Defendant retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant”) who shall assist it in improving the accessibility of its Website so the goods and services on them may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities; b. that Defendant work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to ensure that all employees involved in website development and content development be given web accessibility training on a periodic basis, including onsite training to create accessible content at the design and development stages; c. that Defendant work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform an automated accessibility audit on a periodic basis to evaluate whether Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; -13- d. that Defendant work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform end- user accessibility/usability testing on a periodic basis with said testing to be performed by individuals with various disabilities to evaluate whether Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; e. that Defendant work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to create an accessibility policy that will be posted on its Website, along with an e-mail address and tollfree phone number to report accessibility-related problems; and f. that Plaintiff, their counsel and its experts monitor Defendant’s Website for up to two years after the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant validates it is free of accessibility errors/violations to ensure it has adopted and implemented adequate accessibility policies. 44. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services, and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 44. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually- impaired consumers. 45. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. 45. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial amounts of money in developing and maintaining its Website and, through the site, has generated significant revenue. The invested amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually-impaired consumers. 46. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 5. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 6. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 7. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. -16- 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 8. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 9. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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10. As a matter of economic reality, Nationwide Eviction advertises, on the "About Us" section of its website, that "owners select from a pool of experienced professionals for court representation that are knowledgeable of the intricacies of local law and processes pertaining to evictions, writs and collections." Specifically, Nationwide Eviction is in the business of providing a service to its customers—the very task that its “Agents” are hired to perform. However, the experienced professionals that Nationwide Eviction claimed to have on staff were not all attorneys or exempt employees. The work performed by the non-exempt Agents is integral to Defendant's business in that Nationwide Eviction simply could not function without their contributions. 11. Plaintiff and others similarly situated are entitled to overtime at one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek as required by 29 U.S.C. § 207. 12. Defendant did not pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. 14. As a result, Plaintiff and others similarly situated did not receive compensation they were legally entitled to receive. The work performed by Plaintiff and others similarly situated was with Defendant's knowledge. Defendant approved the Agent’s schedules, assigned work and supervised the work. 15. Defendant's violations of the FLSA were committed knowingly, willfully, and/or with reckless disregard to Plaintiff and similarly situated employees' rights. V. 16. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporate by reference all of the above numbered paragraphs. 17. Plaintiff and others similarly situated were employees of Nationwide Eviction, LLC as set forth above. 18. As employees of Nationwide Eviction, Plaintiff and others similarly situated were legally entitled to be paid minimum wage and at one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per each seven (7) day workweek. As employees of Nationwide Eviction, Plaintiff and others similarly situated were legally entitled to minimum wage. 19. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated at one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per each seven (7) day work week in violation of the FLSA 29 U.S.C. § 207. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated minimum wage in violation of the FLSA 28 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C).1 21. Defendant's violations of the FLSA were committed knowingly, willfully, and/or with reckless disregard to Plaintiff's and other similarly situated employees’ rights. 22. As a result of Defendant's willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and others similarly situated are entitled to reimbursement of unpaid overtime, an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys fees, costs and disbursements incurred in this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). VI. 23. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporate by reference all of the above numbered paragraphs. 24. The FLSA requires employers to keep accurate records of hours worked by nonexempt employees. 29 U.S.C. §211(c); 29 C.F.R. pt 516. 25. In addition to the pay violations of the FLSA described above, Defendant also failed to keep proper time records as required by the FLSA. 26. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporate by reference all of the above numbered paragraphs. 27. Upon information and belief, many other similarly situated employees employed by Defendant over the last three (3) years have been victimized by Defendant's violations of the 3. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Defendant was, and remains, an enterprise engaged in commerce within the meaning of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203, and is subject to the FLSA. 4. Defendant, Nationwide Eviction, LLC is a service company that provides a local presence to real estate companies engaged in the eviction process across the United States. The Company markets its proprietary technology to integrate local and county eviction procedures into its own cloud-based system. Defendant then provides its own local employees to attend hearings and assist with processing eviction documentation through the appropriate court system. 5. Defendant employed Plaintiff and others similarly situated at all relevant times within the meaning of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). Plaintiff asserts upon information and belief that Defendant's annual revenues exceeded $500,000.00 during the relevant time period. 6. In performing his duties for Defendant, Plaintiff and others similarly situated were employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. Specifically, Defendant has employees utilizing interstate telephone and broadband communications for the commercial purposes of Defendant's enterprise. Moreover, Defendant required Plaintiff and other non-attorneys to prepare for and attend and court hearings requiring them to travel through the corridors of interstate commerce. 8. Plaintiff and others similarly situated are paid a flat fee of $50.00 for each court appearance regardless of the amount of time it takes the Agent to perform the task. Plaintiff and others similarly situated were not compensated for expenses associated with using their own vehicles, cell phone data, car insurance gas, parking, and other expenses. 9. Upon information and belief, other similarly situated employees are also uniformly paid in a fashion similar to Plaintiff and not compensated for the expenses associated with performing their job duties.

lose

(Declaratory Relief) 112. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 111 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 113. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that Serovital.com contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of Serovital.com, which Sanmedica owns, operates and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 114. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. 26 (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.)) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) 100. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 99 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 101. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 102. Serovital.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 103. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates Serovital.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 102(1). 104. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Serovital.com, causing Serovital.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the 24 facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(15)(a). 105. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 106. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 107. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Serovital.com under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from 25 continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 108. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 109. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 110. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 111. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 25. Defendant, Sanmedica International, LLC, controls and operates Serovital.com. in New York State and throughout the United States. 26. Serovital.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale. The online store allows the user to browse and learn about hair restoration, skin care, and anti-aging therapies and related products, make purchases, and perform a variety of other functions. 27. Among the features offered by Serovital.com are the following: (a) Consumers may use the website to connect with Sanmedica on social media, using such sites as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest; (b) an online store, allowing customers to learn about and purchase hair restoration, skin care, and anti-aging therapies; and (c) learning about the product and the company, read reviews, get answers to frequently asked questions, and learn about promotions. 28. This case arises out of Sanmedica’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to the goods and services offered by Serovital.com. Due to Sanmedica’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Serovital.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to Sanmedica, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Serovital.com. 9 29. Sanmedica denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Serovital.com by preventing them from freely navigating Serovital.com. 30. Serovital.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen-reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible drop-down menus, the lack of navigation links, the lack of adequate prompting and labeling, the denial of keyboard access, empty links that contain no text, redundant links where adjacent links go to the same URL address, and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 31. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Serovital.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Serovital.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate and/or make purchases. 32. Serovital.com also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to allow blind shoppers who use screen-readers to locate and accurately fill-out online forms. On a shopping site such as Serovital.com, these forms include search fields to select order options and fields used to fill-out personal information, including address and credit card information. Due to lack of adequate labeling, Plaintiff and blind customers cannot make purchases or inquiries as to Defendant’s merchandise, nor can they enter their personal identification and financial information with confidence and security. 10 33. Specifically, when Plaintiff attempted to make a purchase, she encountered the following problems: Summary Serovital has a critical error at the very start of the page that renders the entire website useless to screen-reader users unless they enter their email address. The promotional pop-up is the second item announced on the website. Plaintiff and screen-reader users and keyboard-only users are trapped in this pop-up unless they enter their email address. The close button is not announced, nor does it receive focus so these users cannot move forward unless they enter their email. The homepage menus were announced but none of the other actionable elements on the homepage were announced. These should all be in the tab index but they were all skipped. After the menu, Plaintiff heard “dialog” once. Homepage  Focus moves to the pop-up but Plaintiff could only hear the email field and button. Plaintiff was unable to get any text to announce. Screen-reader users won’t know what this pop-up is for or why they’re being asked for their email.  Items such as the hamburger menu are not labeled so users hear random characters and don’t realize there is a menu available.  Plaintiff heard elements announced on the page such as “multiplication link” but could not find it on the page.  Focus randomly appears and disappears on the homepage.  The cart is not labeled.  Plaintiff heard other random unlabeled links and graphics but couldn’t tell where they were on the page. They were announced but it’s not clear what it was since they were not labeled and focus wasn’t available. Consequently, blind visitors to the website are unable to complete a transaction. 34. Furthermore, Serovital.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The image maps on Serovital.com’s menu page do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and the other blind individuals attempting to make a purchase. 11 35. Serovital.com also lacks accessible forms. Plaintiff is unable to locate the shopping cart because the shopping basket form does not specify the purpose of the shopping bag. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the shopping cart and to the ability to check out. Consequently, blind customers are unsuccessful in adding products into their shopping carts and are essentially prevented from purchasing items on Serovital.com. 36. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Defendant’s website makes attempting to navigate through Serovital.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 37. Serovital.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Serovital.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Serovital.com. 38. Due to Serovital.com’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to make their purchases at traditional brick-and-mortar retailers. Some blind customers may require a driver to get to the stores or require assistance in navigating the stores. By contrast, if Serovital.com was accessible, a blind person could independently investigate products and make purchases via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. According to WCAG 2.1 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the website. 12 Plaintiff must tab through every navigation bar option and footer on Defendant’s website in an attempt to reach the desired service. Thus, Serovital.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on Serovital.com. 39. Serovital.com thus contains access barriers which deny the full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Serovital.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Serovital.com in New York State and throughout the United States. 40. Plaintiff, Marion Kiler, has made numerous attempts to complete a purchase on Serovital.com, most recently on November 16, 2019, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Serovital.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to purchase the “SeroVital Anti-Aging Therapy.” 41. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Serovital.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 42. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Serovital.com. 43. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or 13 (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 44. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 45. Because of Defendant’s denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Serovital.com, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an injury- in-fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of Defendant’s conduct. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Serovital.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Serovital.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 47. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Serovital.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Serovital.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 48. There are hundreds of thousands of visually-impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually- impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is 14 impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 49. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of Serovital.com. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on Serovital.com. 50. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Serovital.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; (b) Whether Serovital.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Serovital.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Serovital.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 51. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims Sanmedica has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Serovital.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 15 52. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 53. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 54. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 55. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 56. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 55 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 57. Title III of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations 16 of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 58. Serovital.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7). 59. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates Serovital.com. 60. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 61. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 62. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 17 63. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 64. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 65. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Sanmedica who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Serovital.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 18 accommodations and/or opportunities of Serovital.com in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 68. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 69. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes her statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 71 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 73. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 74. Serovital.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 75. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates Serovital.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 19 76. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Serovital.com, causing Serovital.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 77. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 78. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 79. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 20 80. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Serovital.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 83. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 84. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 85. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 21 86. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 87. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 86 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 88. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 90. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 91. Serovital.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 92. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates Serovital.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 22 93. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Serovital.com, causing Serovital.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 94. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 95. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 96. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the Defendant shall reside . . .” 97. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 23 98. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 99. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense.

win

(On behalf of Plaintiff and the Ford PremiumCARE ESP Subclass) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class and Tennessee Subclass) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class and Tennessee Subclass) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class and Tennessee Subclass) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 10. Upon information and belief, Defendant began installing aluminum panels into the frames of its vehicles in or about the year 2000. Specifically, Defendant began installing aluminum panels into its Ford Expedition models in or about 2000, its Ford Explorer models in or about 2002, and its Ford Mustang models in or about 2005. 11. Defendant replaced heavier steel hoods – the section of the frame covering the engine – with lighter aluminum panels in order to reduce vehicle weight and increase fuel efficiency. 12. However, Defendant’s aluminum hoods carry an inherent, latent defect: they quickly corrode and cause their overlaying paint layer to bubble, peel, and/or blister. 14. Within a mere two years, on December 11, 2006, Ford reissued this same warning about the Corrosion Defect to its service technicians in TSB 06-25-15 (“2006 TSB”) – titled “ALUMINUM BODY PANELS—CORROSION—SERVICE TIP” – which applied to Ford Explorers from model years 2002–2007. Defendant intended for the 2006 TSB to supersede the 2004 TSB, and repeated the same concerns about the Corrosion Defect: Ford’s Scientific Research Laboratory has performed a number of tests on vehicle body parts returned for corrosion related concerns. Testing has revealed that the aluminum corrosion was caused by iron particles working their way into the aluminum body part, prior to it being painted. 15. Ten years later, Defendant still had not developed an answer for the Corrosion Defect. On February 26, 2016, Defendant issued a third TSB on the same problem. TSB 16-0028 (“2016 TSB”) – titled “Aluminum Panel Corrosion” – covered Ford Explorers from model years 2002-2016: 40. Plaintiff purchased a new 2015 Ford Explorer in January 2015. 41. Accordingly, the Extended Corrosion Warranty on Plaintiff’s 2015 Ford does not expire until January 2020. 42. Additionally, when she purchased her Explorer in January 2015, Plaintiff also purchased Defendant’s PremiumCARE ESP for 6 years or 75,000 miles for a price of $1,377.36. As part of her PremiumCARE purchase, Plaintiff was merely provided with Defendant’s marketing brochure and was only required to complete Defendant’s standard ESP registration form. 44. On February 19, 2019, shortly after she discovered the Corrosion Defect, Plaintiff brought her Explorer to the Ford dealership where she bought it – Landers Ford in Collierville, Tennessee – in order to have her corrosion damage repaired. 45. Plaintiff believed that her corrosion damage was covered by her Ford New Vehicle Warranty, and, if not, her PremiumCare ESP. 46. Even though Plaintiff’s Explorer was still within the Extended Corrosion Warranty, and Plaintiff’s PremiumCARE ESP was still active, the dealership refused to repair Plaintiff’s corrosion damage because it considered her warranty coverage to be expired and the damage not to be covered by the PremiumCARE ESP. On information and belief, Landers Ford refused to repair Plaintiff’s corrosion damage because her aluminum hood had not perforated completely, and considered the corrosion damage outside the scope of the PremiumCARE ESP. 47. The paint bubbling and other effects of the Corrosion Defect on Plaintiff’s Ford Explorer have resulted in a significant decrease in its resale value. The decreased value, and the money needed to even attempt to remedy the problem, is greater than simply the cost of a new paint job, because the underlying defect in the aluminum hood would cause any new paint to bubble as well. 49. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all similarly situated persons as the Court may determine to be appropriate for class certification treatment, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b). Plaintiff seeks to represent the following national class (“Class”) and two subclasses (“Subclasses”) as follows: The Class: All persons in the United States and its territories who, within the applicable statute of limitations period, and as shown by Defendant’s records, purchased or leased a new or used Ford Explorer. The Ford PremiumCARE ESP Subclass: All persons in the United States and its territories who, within the applicable statute of limitations period, and as shown by Defendant’s records, (1) purchased or leased a new or used Ford Explorer and (2) purchased a Ford PremiumCARE Extended Service Plan. The Tennessee Subclass: All Tennessee residents who, within the applicable statute of limitations period, and as shown by Defendant’s records, purchased or leased a new or used Ford Explorer. 50. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the other Class and Subclass members. If each Class and Subclass member were to bring their claims in a separate, individual action, such individual claims would require proof of many of the same facts, would seek the same relief, and would rely upon the same theories of recovery. 52. Absent this suit proceeding as a class action, most members of the Class and Subclass would find the cost of litigating their individual claims to be prohibitively expensive and would not be able to obtain any effective remedy for their damages. Treating common questions of law and fact on a class wide basis is superior to multiple individual actions because doing so would conserve the courts’ resources, as well as the resources of the parties, and would promote consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 53. Defendant has acted and failed to act on grounds applicable to both Plaintiff and the other members of the Class and Subclass, necessitating the imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class and Subclass, and making injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief appropriate for the Class and Subclass as a whole. 54. The factual and legal bases of Defendant’s liability to Plaintiff and to the other members of the Class and Subclass are the same, causing injury to Plaintiff and to all of the other members of the Class and Subclass. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class and Subclass have all suffered harm and damages due to the unlawful and wrongful conduct of Defendant. 55. Ford brand vehicles are some of the most popular vehicles sold in the United States, and the Ford Explorer (Plaintiff’s model vehicle) is one of Defendant’s flagship models. Defendant sells thousands of Ford Explorers every month, and upon information and belief, there are tens of thousands of members of the Class and at least hundreds of members of each Subclass, such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 57. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 58. Plaintiff and the other Class members are “consumers” within the meaning of 15 6. Defendant has produced Ford Explorers since the 1991 model year. 7. Of late, Defendant’s Ford Explorer marketing materials and brochures have touted the model’s structural strength. For example, Defendant’s 2011 Explorer marketing brochure claimed: “Capability: 2011 Explorer has a body/frame that’s lighter yet stronger than before.” 74. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 75. Defendant’s PremiumCARE ESP is a “service contract” within the meaning of 15 86. Plaintiff and the Class and Subclass members each contracted with Defendant, through its dealer-agents and its related entities, to purchase Ford Explorer vehicles, and the purchase price paid by Plaintiff and the Class and Subclass members constituted substantial consideration for the vehicles. 87. The Ford Explorer vehicles purchased by Plaintiff and the Class and Subclass members contained the inherent, latent Corrosion Defect that existed at the time the vehicles left the hands of Defendant. 88. Defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability that was provided by Defendant to each vehicle owner, as the Ford Explorer vehicles purchased by Plaintiff and the Class and Subclass members were not fit for the ordinary purposes for which they were to be used. The purchased vehicles were objectively unreasonable and would not pass inspection as conforming goods within the trade, because at the time of sale they had defective aluminum hoods that quickly corrode and cause their overlaying paint layer to bubble, peel, and/or blister, and will cause rust and corrosion, during the lifetime of the vehicle. 9. What Defendant has failed to communicate to prospective Ford Explorer buyers, however, is that its decision to move to a lighter vehicle frame has come at a significant price for Explorer owners. Defendant’s Unresolved Aluminum Body Panel Corrosion 90. Given the latent nature of the Corrosion Defect and Defendant’s concealment of the defect, any limitations period that would otherwise bar the claims of Plaintiff or the Class or Subclass members should be tolled. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class and Subclass members continue to suffer a violation of their legally protected interests each day that Defendant fails to remedy the defect and make them whole. 91. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 92. In connection with the purchase or lease of Plaintiff’s and the Class and Subclass members’ Ford Explorers, as detailed above, Defendant provided Plaintiff and the Class and Subclass members with a warranty covering defects in material and workmanship for three years or 36,000 miles, and an extended warranty covering corrosion damage relating to such defects for two additional years. 93. Defendant’s warranties were a basis of the bargain reached when Plaintiff and the Class and Subclass members purchased or leased their Ford Explorers. 95. Plaintiff and the Class and Subclass members have given Defendant several years of reasonable opportunity to cure its breach of express warranty, or else were not required to do so because any such opportunity to cure would be futile. 96. These damages include, inter alia: the decrease in resale value of the vehicles resulting from the Corrosion Defect, increased rust and corrosion and the paint layer bubbling, peeling, and/or blistering; expectation damages as a result of Plaintiff and the Class and Subclass members being denied the benefit of the bargain they agreed to with Defendant; and any further monetary or other damages that Plaintiff and the Class and Subclass members have incurred and/or will incur in order to effectively remedy their vehicles’ problems related to the Corrosion Defect. Defendant has been provided notice of the issues raised in this Count, as detailed above. 97. Given the latent nature of the Corrosion Defect and Defendant’s concealment of the defect, any limitations period that would otherwise bar the claims of Plaintiff or the Class or Subclass members should be tolled 98. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein.

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26. On or about June 18, 2019, Defendant sent the following telemarketing text messages to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 4155 (the “4155 Number”): 27. Defendant’s text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 29. The information contained in the text messages advertises Defendant’s “free real estate app to search properties,” which Defendant sends to promote its business. 30. Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 31. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express written consent to be contacted using an ATDS. 32. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 4155 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 4155 Number. 33. Additionally, Plaintiff was on the National Do Not Call Registry at the time that he received Defendant’s text messages. 34. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text messages demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. 35. The text messages originated from telephone number 954-945-7909, a number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant. 36. The number used by Defendant (954-945-7909) is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the messages were personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 38. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. 39. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers. 40. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers. 41. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order. 42. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers. 43. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention. 45. The above execution these instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Platform is capable of transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less. 46. Further, upon information and belief, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words, the platform controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function. 47. The following graphic summarizes the above steps and demonstrates that the dialing of the text messages at issue was done by the Platform automatically and without any human intervention: 49. Also, Plaintiff estimates that he has wasted approximately 10 seconds reading Defendant’s unwanted messages, and another 10 seconds clicking the hyperlinks in the messages and reviewing the information contained within those hyperlinks. 50. Plaintiff wasted an additional 30 seconds attempting to determine how Defendant had obtained his cellular telephone number. 51. Plaintiff also spent time consulting with counsel for the purposes of filing this suit. 52. In all, Defendant’s violations of the TCPA caused Plaintiff to waste at least 50 seconds of his time. This time was spent that Plaintiff could have used to pursue other personal activities. 53. Furthermore, Defendant’s text messages took up memory space on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, with each message taking up approximately 190 bytes. The cumulative effect of unsolicited text messages like Defendant’s poses a real risk of ultimately rendering the phone unusable for text messaging purposes as a result of the phone’s memory being taken up. 54. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 56. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 60. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 66. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 67. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 68. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 69. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 70. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 72. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 73. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-65 as if fully set forth herein. 74. At all times relevant, Defendant, having been previously sued for violating the TCPA, knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 75. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. 76. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. 77. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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19. Plaintiff files this case as an “opt-in” collective action, as is specifically allowed by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 20. Other employees have been victimized by Defendants’ ill-conceived patterns, practices, and policies that violate the FLSA. As such, other similarly situated employees are being denied their lawful wages, and Plaintiff’s experience is typical of the experience of members of the Plaintiff Class as it pertains to unpaid wages. 21. The specific job titles or job requirements of the various members of the Plaintiff Class do not prevent collective treatment. 22. Each non-exempt employee, regardless of job title, job requirements, or rate of pay, who is denied overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 in one or more workweek, is similarly situated to Plaintiff. 23. Furthermore, although the amount of damages may vary among individual employees, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 25. Thus, the class Plaintiff seeks to represent is comprised of all current and former employees the Defendants’ “enterprise” employed as hourly or non-exempt salaried workers who 1) worked at any business establishment of Defendants’ “enterprise” located in Texas that was owned, operated and / or acquired by Defendants’ “enterprise” during the class period, and 2) claim that Defendants’ “enterprise” either (a) misclassified the employee as exempt from overtime wages, or (b) did not misclassify the employee, but instead failed to properly and fully compensate the employee’s overtime wages due. 26. Individuals who opt in to the collective action will be added to the litigation, and copies of their written consents to join a collective action will be filed with the Honorable Court. V. 27. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants’ “enterprise” has been subject to the requirements of the FLSA. 28. For purposes of this action, the “relevant period” is the time-period commencing on the date that is three years prior to the filing of this action, and continuing thereafter until time of trial. 29. Defendants’ “enterprise” employed Mr. Ali as a store clerk at their business establishment doing business as “1960 Corner Food Store”, located at 17013 Nanes Drive, Houston, Texas 77090. 31. During his employment with the Defendants, Mr. Ali’s was promised a fixed wage of $4,000.00 per month. 32. Mr. Ali did not receive any overtime wages in addition to his fixed monthly wage of $4,000.00. 33. When Mr. Ali complained of his unpaid overtime wages, his employment was terminated in retaliation, and in violation of the FLSA. 34. As Defendants’ employee, Mr. Ali was required to perform duties typically performed by “hourly” or non-exempt employees. 35. Further, Plaintiff was required to work overtime hours in excess of 40 hours during each workweek of his employment. 36. Similarly, during at least all or part of the last three years, all non-exempt workers employed by all business establishments owned and/or operated by the Defendants were routinely required to work in excess of 40 hours per week to perform the function of their job which included the performance of duties otherwise typically performed by “hourly” paid non- exempt employees because the job required it and Defendants’ management required it. 37. Defendants required Plaintiff and all others similarly situated to perform all necessary work to include the performance of those duties otherwise typically performed by “hourly” employees, which duties routinely required Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees to work “overtime” hours as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 38. Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees were not paid at the proper premium hourly rates for the overtime hours they worked each week. 40. As victims of a common policy that violated the FLSA, Plaintiff and all other similarly situated non-exempt employees of the Defendants may properly be joined as a class under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 41. Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees thus sue the Defendants’ “enterprise”, as a class, for their unpaid overtime wages owed under the FLSA. VI.

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13. Plaintiff brings this action as a state wide class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”), on behalf of herself and all New York consumers and their successors in interest (the “Class”), who were sent debt collection letters and/or notices from the Defendants which are in violation of the FDCPA, as described in this Complaint. 14. This Action is properly maintained as a class action. The Class is initially defined as: • All New Jersey consumers who were sent letters and/or notices from SHARKEY between November 13, 2019 and May 14, 2021, concerning a debt owed to another, which included the alleged conduct and practices described herein. The class definition may be subsequently modified or refined. The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. 18. Plaintiff is at all times to this lawsuit, a "consumer" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 19. On or before November 14, 2020, Steven Hirschman incurred a financial obligation to West Caldwell Care Center (“WCCC”). 21. The WCCC obligation/debt was for Steven Hirschman’s personal use. 22. The WCCC obligation/debt did not arise from a business transaction. 23. The WCCC obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 24. WCCC is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). 25. On or before November 14, 2020, WCCC placed the WCCC debt with SHARKEY for the purposes of collection. 26. At the time WCCC place the debt with SHARKEY said debt was past due. 27. At the time WCCC place the debt with SHARKEY said debt was in default. 28. On November 13, 2020, SHARKEY caused to be mailed a letter to Steven Hirschman. A copy of said Letter is annexed hereto as Exhibit A. 29. The November 13, 2020 letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 30. Upon receipt, Steven Hirschman read said letter. 31. The November 13, 2020 letter did not inform Steven Hirschman that the letter was an attempt to collect a debt and that any information obtained could be used for that purpose. 32. Steven Hirschman passed away in March 2021. 33. The Essex Surrogates Court of the State – issued Letters of Testamentary to Plaintiff on May 6, 2021. 34. On May 14, 2021 SHARKEY send a letter addressed Plaintiff. A copy of said letter is annexed hereto as Exhibit B. 36. The May 14, 2021 letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 37. Upon receipt, Plaintiff read the May 14, 2021 letter. 38. The May 14, 2021 letter stated in part: Please also note that if you provide this office with a check in the amount of $105,481.45 prior to the June 22, 2021 date for your deposition, you will be able to avoid your deposition and production of documents altogether. [emphasis added]. 39. The May 14, 2021 letter was not addressed to Plaintiff as Executor of the Estate of Steven Hirschman. 40. The May 14, 2021 letter did not inform Plaintiff that he was not personally liable for the WCCC debt. 41. The May 14, 2021 letter did not contain the required validation notices pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(3),(4),(5). 42. The May 14, 2021 letter did not inform Plaintiff that the letter was an attempt to collect a debt and that any information obtained could be used for that purpose. 43. SHARKEY knew or should have known that its actions violated the FDCPA. 44. Defendants could have taken the steps necessary to bring their actions within compliance with the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review their actions to ensure compliance with the law. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, repeats and realleges all prior allegations as if set forth at length herein. 48. Collection letters and/or notices, such as those sent by Defendants, are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” 49. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 50. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA by using false, deceptive and misleading representations and means in connection with its attempts to collect debts from Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 51. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA in connection with its communications to Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 53. The May 14, 2021 letter sent by Defendants made a false representation as to the character of the debt. 54. Defendants violated Section 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA by stating in the May 14, 2021 letter that “if you provide this office with a check in the amount of $105,481.45 prior to the June 22, 2016 date for your deposition, you will be able to avoid your deposition and production of documents altogether”. 55. The least sophisticated consumer upon reading the May 14, 2021 letter would believe that he was personally liable to pay $105,481.45 to WCCC. 56. SHARKEY violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A) by falsely representing the character and legal status of the debt in the May 14, 2021 letter. 57. Plaintiff and others similarly situated, suffered an informational injury as a result of Defendants’ violation of 15 U.S.C §1692e(2)(A). 58. Plaintiff and others similarly situated, suffered a risk of economic injury as a result of Defendants’ violation of 15 U.S.C §1692e(2)(A). 59. Section 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 60. SHARKEY violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10) by using a false representation and deceptive means in the May 14, 2021 letter. 61. The May 14, 20201 letter failed to inform Plaintiff that he was not personally liable to pay the WCCC debt. 63. Plaintiff and others similarly situated, suffered an informational injury as a result of Defendants’ violation of 15 U.S.C §1692e(10). 64. Plaintiff and others similarly situated, suffered a risk of economic injury as a result of Defendants’ violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10). 65. U.S.C. §1692e(11) requires the debt collector to include a statement in all communications that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained could be used for that purpose. 66. SHARKEY violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e(11) be failing to information Steven Hirschman in the November 13, 2020 letter that it was is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained could be used for that purpose. 67. SHARKEY further violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e(11) be failing to information Plaintiff in the May 14, 2021 letter that it was is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained could be used for that purpose. 68. Plaintiff and others similarly situated, suffered an informational injury as a result of Defendants’ violation of 15 U.S.C §1692e(11). 69. Plaintiff and others similarly situated, suffered a risk of economic injury as a result of Defendants’ violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(11). 71. SHARKEY violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(3),(4),(5) by send the May 14, 2021 letter which failed to contain the required validation notices. 72. Plaintiff and others similarly situated, suffered a risk of economic injury as a result of Defendants’ violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(3),(4),(5). 73. Plaintiff and others similarly situated, suffered a risk of economic injury as a result of Defendants’ violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(3),(4),(5). 74. Congress enacted the FDCPA in part to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. 75. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to free from abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. 76. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to receive proper notices mandated by the FDCPA. 77. Plaintiff and others similarly situated were sent letters, which have the propensity to affect their decision-making with regard to the debt. 78. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have suffered harm as a direct result of the abusive, deceptive and unfair collection practices described herein. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. VIOLATIONS

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10. Mr. Williams informed Plaintiff that he gave Keiser University Plaintiff's name and telephone number in connection with an application for financial aid. 11. Defendant used an automatic telephone dialing system or pre-recorded or artificial voice to place calls to Plaintiff's cellular telephone without her consent. 12. None of Defendant’s telephone calls placed to Plaintiff were for “emergency purposes” as specified in 47 U.S.C. §227 (b)(1)(A). 13. The messages encroached upon Plaintiff's privacy and seclusion. 14. The class is defined as (i) all Florida citizens (ii) to whom Defendant placed a telephone call to that person’s cellular telephone service (iii) made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, (iv) during the four year period prior to the filing of the complaint in this matter through the date of class certification. 15. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief, based on Defendant’s use of telephone messages to a cellular telephone service through an automatic telephone dialing system or artificial voice, that the classes are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. 17. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from the class. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones, by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendant during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. 18. Plaintiff's claims are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. 19. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. He has retained counsel experienced in handling actions involving unlawful practices under the TCPA and consumer class actions. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 20. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate in that defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class thereby making appropriate declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. 22. Plaintiff requests certification of a hybrid class action combing Rule 23(b)(2) for equitable relief with Rule 23(b)(3) for monetary damages. 23. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 22. 24. Defendant, or others acting on its behalf, placed non-emergency telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone using an automatic telephone dialing system or pre- recorded or artificial voice violation of 47 U.S.C § 227 (b)(1)(A)(iii). WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and all similarly situated persons and against Defendant for: a. Statutory damages; b. a declaration that Defendant's calls violate the TCPA; c. a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendant from placing non- emergency calls to the Plaintiff and all similarly situated persons cellular telephone using an automatic telephone dialing system or pre-recorded or artificial voice; and d. Such other or further relief as the Court deems proper. 6. Within the last four years, Defendant left repetitive pre-recorded messages on Plaintiff’s voice mail on his cellular telephone seeking to assist a person who is a friend of Plaintiff , Sanjay R. Williams ("Mr. Williams"). 7. Defendant, or others acting on its behalf, left the following message on Plaintiff’s voice mail on his cellular telephone on or about the date stated: September 26, 2016 - Pre-recorded message Hello. This call is for Sanjay R. Williams Sanjay R. Williams we are calling you today from the I-3 Group on behalf of Keiser University, Fort Lauderdale. The purpose of our call today is to provide you with solutions, assistance or information regarding your education Keiser University, Fort Lauderdale. For your convenience you may call us toll free at 1-877-618- 3648 and or visit our website at www.I-3group.com. 8. In addition to the foregoing, Defendant left messages on other occasions and on still other occasions, called and hung-up without leaving any message. VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

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17. At all times for the three years prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter, Defendants have employed female entertainers at its nightclubs located throughout the United States. 18. At all times for the three years prior to the filing of the instant complaint, Defendants have categorized all entertainers working at the nightclubs as “independent contractors” or as “employees” but failed to pay any wages. 19. At all times for the three years prior to the filing of the instant complaint, Defendants have not required entertainers to have any specialized training or background. Defendants have, however: established specific work schedules for entertainers. 20. Defendants have required entertainers to dance at specified times and in a specified manner on stage and for customers. 22. Defendants have set the price entertainers were allowed to charge for dances. 23. Defendants have required entertainers to attend meetings at Defendants’ business. 24. Defendants have financed all advertising and marketing efforts undertaken on behalf of the club; 25. Defendants have made capital investments in the facilities, maintenance, sound system, lights, food, beverage and inventory; 26. Defendants have required and made all hiring decisions regarding waitstaff, security, entertainer, managerial and all other employees at the night clubs. 28. At all times for the three years prior to the filing of the instant complaint, Defendants have required entertainers, including Named Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated, to pay a specific amount, often referred to as a “tip out” or a “bar fee” in order to work on any given shift. 29. The specific amount entertainers, including Named Plaintiffs, were required to pay has varied over the last three years, but a single schedule has been in place for all entertainers at any given time. 30. The required bar fee or tip out the Named Plaintiffs has paid generally has been at least $60 per shift. 32. Named Plaintiffs have been subject to a variety of these fees and fines. 33. The fees and fines described in ¶¶ 28-32 constitute unlawful “kickbacks” to the employer within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and Plaintiffs are entitled to restitution of all such fees and fines. 34. Named Plaintiffs worked over forty hours in some weeks each worked for Defendants. 35. Named Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated were also required to attend mandatory meetings at Defendants’ place of business, but were not paid for their attendance at those meetings. 37. Instead, Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated only source of work related income were gratuities they receive from customers. 38. Because Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated any wages whatsoever, Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay when Plaintiffs and others similarly situated worked over forty hours in a given workweek. 39. As noted above this is the second suit over FLSA minimum wage and overtime violations thus, Defendants knew, or showed reckless disregard for the fact that they misclassified these individuals as independent contractors, and accordingly failed to pay these individuals the minimum wage and failed to pay overtime at the required rate under the FLSA. 41. On information and belief Defendants failed to maintain records of the number of hours worked by Plaintiffs and others similarly situated.

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10. At all times relevant, Plaintiffs were citizens of the State of California. Plaintiffs are, and at all times mentioned herein were each, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 11. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and a “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 12. At all times relevant Defendant conducted business in the State of California and in the County of San Diego, within this judicial district. 13. Beginning in or around June of 2013, Defendant began to utilize Plaintiffs’ cellular telephone number, ending in 0490, to place virtually daily incessant calls to Plaintiffs pertaining to an alleged debt owed stemming from medical services rendered in 2012. 14. In during this time, Defendant placed calls on a daily basis, often placing numerous calls a day. 15. In July of 2013, Plaintiffs delivered a written correspondence to Defendant, which amongst other things, made a written demand that any and all telephone calls regarding the alleged debt must cease. 23. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 35. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 36. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 37. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiffs and The Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 38. Plaintiffs and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 39. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 43. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiffs seek for themselves and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 44. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 45. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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1. a statement that the recipient is legally entitled to opt-out of receiving future faxed advertisements – knowing that he or she has the legal right to request an opt-out gives impetus for recipients to make such a request, if desired; 13. On information and belief, both Defendants receive some or all of the revenues from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A, and both Defendants profit and benefit from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A. 14. Plaintiff had not invited or given permission to Defendants to send the fax. 15. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimiles without the required opt-out language to Plaintiff and more than 25 other recipients or sent the same and other advertisements by fax with the required opt-out language but without first receiving the recipients’ express invitation or permission. 16. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 17. Defendants’ facsimile attached as Exhibit A did not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 18. Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 17 as though fully set forth herein, as and for its paragraph 18. 2. a statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within 30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful – thereby encouraging recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”; 20. Class Size (F. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 22. Typicality (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)): The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same or similar faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of the Defendants advertising products, goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same or similar faxes or faxes which did not contain the proper opt-out language or were sent without prior express invitation or permission. 23. Fair and Adequate Representation (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 25. Common Conduct (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. 27. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 28. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 3. a statement advising the recipient that he or she may opt-out with respect to all of his or her facsimile telephone numbers and not just the ones that receive a faxed advertisement from the sender – thereby instructing a recipient on how to make a valid opt-out request for all of his or her fax machines; 31. The Fax. Defendants sent the on or about October 17, 2012, advertisement via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class. The Fax constituted an advertisement under the Act. Defendants failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Fax. The Fax was transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission and/or Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express invitation or permission or that Defendants had an established business relationship with Plaintiff and other members of the class, because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Fax via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class which includes this fax and all others sent during the four years prior to the filing of this case through the present. 33. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 34. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent. 37. Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 36 as though fully set forth herein, as and for its paragraph 37. 38. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiff brings Count II for violation of the New Jersey Junk Fax Statute (56:8-157, et seq.), which is part of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (56:8-1 et seq.), on behalf of the following Class of persons: All New Jersey residents who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, and (3) which Defendants did not have prior express invitation or permission, or (4) which did not display a proper opt-out notice. 40. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the other Class members. Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unsolicited advertising faxes. Neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s counsel has any interests adverse or in conflict with the absent Class members. 42. The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and the New Jersey Junk Fax Statute prohibit a person from using any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device from sending an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine within this state. 43. The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act which incorporates the New Jersey Junk Fax Statute defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission.” 44. The court shall award actual damages sustained or $500 for each violation, whichever is greater, along with costs of the suit, reasonable attorneys’ fees and to enjoin future violations. If the court finds that Defendants were requested to cease and desist, the court shall award $1000 for each subsequent transmission along with costs of suit and reasonable attorneys’ fees. N.J.S.A. 56:8-159. 45. Defendants violated N.J.S.A. 56:8-157 et seq. and 56:8-1 et seq. by sending unsolicited advertisements (such as Exhibit A) to Plaintiff and other members of the Class without first obtaining their prior express invitation or permission and by not displaying clear and conspicuous notices on the first page of the unsolicited advertisements as required by 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 49 as though fully set forth herein, as and for its paragraph 50. 51. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiff brings Count III for violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (56:8-1 et seq.), on behalf of the following Class of persons: All New Jersey residents who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, and (3) which Defendants did not have prior express invitation or permission, or (4) which did not display a proper opt-out notice. 52. Defendants’ faxes are an “advertisement” as defined by N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(a). 53. Plaintiff, and all those similarly situated are “persons” as defined by N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(d). 55. Defendants’ practice of transmitting unauthorized advertisements that includes and/or excludes prohibited terms and/or information including, but not limited to per se violations of the CFA, constitutes an unlawful act and an unconscionable commercial practice under the CFA. JUNK FAX PREVENTION ACT OF 2005, 47 USC § 227 VIOLATION OF THE NEW JERSEY JUNK FAX STATUTE N.J.S.A 56: 8-157 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSUMER FRAUD ACT 56: 8-1 et seq.

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13. Defendants conduct background checks on many of its job applicants as part of a standard screening process. In addition, Defendants also conduct background checks on existing employees from time-to-time during the course of their employment. 15. Defendants procured a consumer report information on Plaintiff in violation of the FCRA. 16. Under the FCRA, it is unlawful to procure a consumer report or cause a consumer report to be procured for employment purposes, unless: (i) a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and (ii) the consumer has authorized in writing (which authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the report. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added). 17. Defendants failed to satisfy these disclosure and authorization requirements. 18. Defendants did not have a stand-alone FCRA disclosure or authorization form. The FCRA requires that a disclosure not contain extraneous information. This is commonly referred to as the “stand alone disclosure” requirement. 19. The FCRA also contains several other notice provisions, such as 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(a) (pre-adverse action); § 1681b(4)(B)(notice of national security investigation); § 1681c(h) (notification of address discrepancy); § 1681(g) (full file disclosure to consumers); § 1681k(a)(1) (disclosure regarding use of public record information); § 1681h (form and conditions of disclosure; and §1681(m)(a) (notice of adverse action). 21. Without clear notice that a consumer report is going to be procured, applicants and employees are deprived of the opportunity to make informed decisions or otherwise assert protected rights. 22. Using a FCRA disclosure that is not “stand alone” violates the plain language of the statute, and flies in the face of unambiguous case law and regulatory guidance from the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). Jones v Halstead Mgmt. Co., LLC, 81 F. Supp. 3d 324, 333 (S.D.N.Y 2015)(disclosure not “stand alone” when it contains extraneous information such as state specific disclosures); Moore v. Rite Aid Hdqtrs. Corp., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *35 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2015)(“The text of the statute and available agency guidance demonstrate that the inclusion of information on the form apart from the disclosure and related authorization violates § 1681b(b)(2)(a).”) 23. Defendants’ Authorization for Background Investigation form required applicants and employees to waive federal and state privacy rights. For example, information from an educational institution cannot be disclosed unless consent is received from the student. See Family Educational Rights & Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g); 34 CFR Part 99. Similarly, covered financial institutions are required to maintain the security of banking and financial information. See Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809. 25. Defendants knowingly and recklessly disregarded case law and regulatory guidance and willfully violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)(A) by procuring consumer report information on employees without complying with the disclosure and authorization requirements of the statute. Defendants’ violations were willful because Defendants knew they were required to use a stand-alone disclosure form prior to obtaining and using a consumer report on the Putative Class members. Specifically, Defendants used A-Check America, Inc. (“A-Check”) to procure consumer reports on Plaintiff and the members of the Putative Classes. A-Check provided guidance regarding FCRA compliance, which Defendants either disregarded or ignored. 26. Defendants’ conduct is also willful because: a. Defendants are large and sophisticated employers with access to legal advice through its own attorneys and there is no evidence it determined its own conduct was lawful; b. Defendants knew or had reason to know that its conduct was inconsistent with published FCRA guidance interpreting the FCRA, case law and the plain language of the statute; c. Defendants voluntarily ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless; d. Defendants ignored or failed to utilize the compliance guidance and materials offered by A-Check, the consumer reporting agency used by Defendants to procure consumer reports; 28. Plaintiff applied for employment with Defendants as a Warehouse Technician. 29. As part of the hiring process, Plaintiff was provided and executed a form titled Authorization for Background Investigation form on or around June 30, 2015. 30. The Authorization for Background Investigation form did not contain a clear, stand-alone FCRA disclosure. 31. The Authorization for Background Investigation form contained extraneous information and served as a functional waiver of rights afforded consumers pursuant to federal and state laws. 32. Plaintiff was confused by the extraneous language contained in the Authorization for Background Investigation form. 33. Subsequently, Defendants procured a consumer report on Plaintiff. It was unlawful for Defendants to procure a consumer report on Plaintiff without making the disclosures required by the FCRA. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) by procuring consumer reports on Plaintiff and other putative class members for employment purposes, without first making proper disclosures in the format required by the statute. 40. This case is maintainable as a class action because prosecution of actions by or against individual members of the Putative Classes would result in inconsistent or varying adjudications and create the risk of incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants. Further, adjudication of each individual Class member’s claim as separate action would potentially be dispositive of the interest of other individuals not a party to such action, thereby impeding their ability to protect their interests. 41. This case is also maintainable as a class action because Defendants acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Putative Classes, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to the Classes as a whole. 43. Plaintiff intends to send notice to all members of the Putative Classes to the extent required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The names and addresses of the Putative Class members are readily available from Defendant’s records. 44. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs 1-43. 47. Pursuant to § 1681(b)(2), Plaintiff was entitled to receive certain information at a specific time, namely a disclosure that a consumer report may be procured for employment purposes in a document consisting solely of the disclosure. Such a disclosure was required to be provided to Plaintiff before the consumer report was to be procured. By depriving Plaintiff of this information, in the form and at the time he was entitled to receive it, Defendant injured Plaintiff and the putative class members he seeks to represent. Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989); Federal Election Commission v. Atkins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 48. Defendants violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports on Plaintiff and other Background Check Class members without first making proper disclosures in the format required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b)(2)(A)(i). Namely, these disclosures had to be made: (1) before Defendants actually procured consumer reports, and (2) in a stand-alone document, clearly informing Plaintiff and other Background Check Class members that Defendants might procure a consumer report on each of them for purposes of employment. The required disclosures were not made, causing Plaintiff an informational injury. Graham v. Pyramid Healthcare Solutions, Inc., Case No.: 16-cv-01324 (M.D. Fla. October 26, 2016); Moody v. Ascenda USA Inc., Case No.: 16- cv-60364 (S.D. Fla. October 5, 2016); Thomas v. FTS USA, 2016 WL 3653878, at *8 (E.D. Va. Jun. 30, 2016). 50. Defendants invaded Plaintiff’s right to privacy. Under the FCRA, “a person may not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless” it complies with the statutory requirements (i.e., disclosure and authorization) set forth in the following subsections: 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b)(2). As one court put it, “[t]he FCRA makes it unlawful to ‘procure’ a report without first providing the proper disclosure and receiving the consumer’s written authorization.” Harris v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. F. Supp. 3d 868, 869 (N.D.Cal.2015). 51. Plaintiff’s consumer report contained a wealth of private information which Defendants had no right to access absent a specific Congressional license to do so. The report included, inter alia, Plaintiff’s date of birth, address history, educational history, drivers’ license number, driving history, partial social security numbers. By procuring reports containing this private information and delving deep into Plaintiff’s personal life without complying with the FCRA’s disclosure requirements, Defendants illegally invaded Plaintiff’s right to privacy. 52. Defendant’s illegal invasion into Plaintiff’s privacy created a foreseeable risk of harm. Plaintiff was required to provide a blanket authorization to a broad range of individuals, employers, federal and state agencies and educational institutions to release personal and private information about him to Defendants and the screening company. 53. Defendants created a foreseeable risk of harm that Plaintiff would believe he had waived his rights protected under federal and state law. 55. Defendants’ willful conduct is also reflected by, among other things, the following facts: a. Defendants are large corporations with access to legal advice through its own general counsels’ office and outside employment counsel, and there is not contemporaneous evidence that it determined that its conduct was lawful; b. Defendants knew or had reason to know that their conduct was inconsistent with published FTC guidance interpreting the FCRA and the plain language of the statute; and c. Defendants voluntarily ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless. 57. Plaintiff and the Background Check Class are further entitled to recover their costs and attorneys’ fees, in accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(3). 58. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs 1-43. 59. Defendants violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports relating to Plaintiff and other Background Check Class members without proper authorization. 60. The authorization requirement under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) follows the disclosure requirement of § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) and presupposes that the authorization is based upon a valid disclosure. “After all, one cannot meaningfully authorize her employer to take an action if she does not grasp what that action entails.” Burghy v. Dayton Racquet Club, Inc.,695 F. Supp. 2d 689, 699 (S.D. Ohio 2010); see also United States v. DeFries, 129 F. 3d 1293, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1997)(“[A]uthorization secured ‘without disclosure of …material information’ is a nullity.”) Plaintiffs’ First Concrete Injury under § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii): Informational Injury 62. Pursuant to § 1681 (b)(b)(2), Plaintiff was entitled to receive certain information at a specific time, namely a disclosure that a consumer report may be procured for employment purposes in a document consisting solely of the disclosure. Such a disclosure was required to be provided to Plaintiff before the consumer report was to be procured. By depriving Plaintiff of this information, Defendants injured Plaintiff and the putative class members he seeks to represent. Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989); Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) Then 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii). 63. Defendants violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports on Plaintiff and other Background Check Class members without first making proper disclosures in the format required by 15 U.S.C. §1681b(B)(2)(A)(i). Namely, these disclosures had to be made: (1) before Defendants actually procured consumer reports, and (2) in a stand-alone document, clearly informing Plaintiff and other Background Check Class members that Defendants might procure a consumer report on each of them for purposes of employment. 64. Plaintiff suffered an informational injury. Under the FCRA, “a person may not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless” it complies with the statutory requirements (i.e., disclosure and authorization) set forth in the following subsections: 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2). As one court put it, “[t]he FCRA makes it unlawful to ‘procure’ a report without first providing the proper disclosure and receiving the consumer’s written authorization.” Harris v. Home Depot U.S.A. Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 868, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Plaintiffs’ Second Concrete Injury under § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii): Invasion of Privacy 67. Defendants’ willful conduct is also reflected by, among other things, the following facts: a. Defendants are large corporations with access to legal advice through its own general counsel’s office and outside employment counsel, and there is not contemporaneous evidence that it determined that its conduct was lawful; b. Defendants knew or had reason to know that its conduct was inconsistent with published FTC guidance interpreting the FCRA and the plain language of the statute; and c. Defendants voluntarily ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless. 68. Plaintiff and the Background Check Class are entitled to statutory damages of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each and every one of these violations under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A), in addition to punitive damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2). 69. Plaintiff and the Background Check Class are further entitled to recover their costs and attorneys’ fees, in accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(3). Background Checks Failure to Obtain Proper Authorization in Violation of FCRA 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) Failure to Make Proper Disclosure in Violation of FCRA 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i)

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76. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through seventy five (75) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 77. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of two classes. 78. Class A consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about October 23, 2018; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt purportedly owed to Promptcare; and (b) the collection letter was returned by the postal service as undelivered; (c) and Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A) and 1692f(1) for the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of the debt, and for collecting on a debt which was not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. 79. Class B consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about October 23, 2018; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt purportedly owed to Promptcare; and (b) the collection letter was returned by the postal service as undelivered; (c) and Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2), 1692e(5), 1692e(10), 1692f, and 1692f(1) for attempting to collect a debt from a minor who was not liable for the alleged debt. -12- 80. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: A. Based on the fact that a form collection letter is at the heart of this litigation, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. B. There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendant violated the FDCPA. C. The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who received such collection letters (i.e. the class members), a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of Defendant. D. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. E. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members’ interests. The Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and collection-abuse claims. The Plaintiff's interests are consistent with those of the members of the class. 81. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would create the risk -13- of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties and would not be in the interest of judicial economy. 82. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, the Plaintiff will seek to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 83. Collection attempts, such as those made by the Defendant are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 84. The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

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11. Upon information and belief, eFinancial develops marketing campaigns using a combination of sales channels, with an emphasis on outbound telemarketing. 12. Upon information and belief, eFinancial utilizes third party vendors to market its insurance products. 14. Upon information and belief, eFinancial's ability to increase revenue depends significantly on their access to high-quality vendors. 15. eFinancial is subject to liability under the TCPA for actions of its third party vendors who engage in outbound telemarketing efforts on its behalf. 16. eFinancial’s third party vendors identify themselves as representatives of “eFinancial.” 17. Upon information and belief, eFinancial’s outbound telemarketing efforts include the use of telephone dialing systems (“ATDS”) to solicit consumers nationwide. 18. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has held that a basic function of an ATDS is the ability to dial thousands of numbers in a short time period. 19. The technology employed by eFinancial to place mass calls to consumers nationwide has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers. 20. An ATDS allows its telemarketing agents to only communicate with consumers who answer eFinancial’s phone calls. 21. Consequently, eFinancial shifts the burden of wasted time to consumers with unsolicited calls and messages. 22. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was the sole operator, possessor, and subscriber of the number ending in 9760. 24. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was financially responsible for his cellular telephone equipment and services. 25. In October 2020, Plaintiff requested insurance quotes from an online insurance broker (not eFinancial). 26. Immediately thereafter, Plaintiff started to receive phone calls from eFinancial. 27. Upon answering eFinancial’s phone calls, Plaintiff was met with a lengthy period of dead and was required to say “Hello” numerous times prior to being connected to eFinancial’s representative. 28. Uninterested in eFinancial’s sales pitch, Plaintiff demanded that eFinancial cease its telemarketing calls. 29. On November 3, 2020, Plaintiff received another telemarketing call from eFinancial. 30. Plaintiff answered the call and again requested that the calls cease, this time requesting that eFinancial place him on the “Do Not Call” list. 31. Despite Plaintiff’s multiple requests that the calls cease, eFinancial continued to bombard Plaintiff with telemarketing calls. 32. In early November 2020, Plaintiff visited eFinancial’s website and sent eFinancial a written request to cease its calls through the website’s “Contact Us” feature. 34. In the calls that Plaintiff did not answer, eFinancial left prerecorded messages on Plaintiff’s cellular phone stating that “Chris Marshall” is responding to Plaintiff’s request for life insurance coverage. 35. In total, eFinancial has placed no less than forty (40) phone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone number, from October 2020 through the present, utilizing a prerecorded voice and an ATDS without Plaintiff’s consent. 36. Plaintiff never provided his cellular phone number to eFinancial or otherwise provided eFinancial with consent to place calls to his cellular phone. 40. Paragraphs 10 through 39 of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. 41. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“Putative Classes”) defined as follows: ATDS Class All persons in the United States (1) to whom eFinancial placed, or caused to be placed, a phone call; (2) directed to a number assigned to a cellular telephone service; (3) using an automatic telephone dialing system; (4) without the prior express written consent of the called party; (5) within four years preceding the date of this compliant through the date of class certification. Prerecorded Message Class All persons in the United States (1) to whom eFinancial placed, or caused to be placed, a phone call; (2) directed to a number assigned to a cellular telephone service; (3) using an artificial or prerecorded voice; (4) without the prior express written consent of the called party; (5) within the four years preceding the date of this complaint through the date of class certification. 43. Upon information and belief, the members of the Putative Classes are so numerous that joinder of them is impracticable. 44. The exact number of the members of the Putative Classes is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, and can only be determined through targeted discovery. 45. The members of the Putative Classes are ascertainable because the Classes are defined by reference to objective criteria. 46. The members of the Putative Classes are identifiable in that their names, addresses, and telephone numbers can be identified in business records maintained by eFinancial. B. Commonality and Predominance 47. There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the claims of the members of the Putative Classes. 48. Those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Putative Classes. C. Typicality 49. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of members of the Putative Classes because Plaintiff and members of the Putative Classes are entitled to damages as a result of eFinancial’s conduct. D. Superiority and Manageability 50. This case is also appropriate for class certification as class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the efficient and fair adjudication of this controversy. 52. By contrast, a class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 53. Economies of effort, expense, and time will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. E. Adequate Representation 54. Plaintiff will adequately and fairly represent and protect the interests of the Putative Classes. 55. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the members of the Putative Classes and eFinancial has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 56. Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced counsel in consumer class action litigation. 57. Paragraphs 10 through 56 of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. 58. Among other things, the TCPA prohibits certain calls to wireless and residential numbers unless the caller has the prior express consent of the called party. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 60. “Prior express written consent” is required for (a) all telemarketing/promotional calls/texts made using an ATDS placed to wireless numbers, and (b) all artificial or prerecorded telemarketing/promotional voice calls to wireless and residential numbers.1 61. The TCPA consent rules define “prior express written consent” as “an agreement, in writing, bearing the signature of the person called that clearly authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the person called advertisements or telemarketing messages using an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice, and the telephone number to which the signatory authorizes such advertisements or telemarketing messages to be delivered.” 62. eFinancial placed or caused to be placed no less than forty (40) non-emergency solicitation/telemarketing calls, from October 2020 through the present, to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 9760 utilizing an ATDS, without Plaintiff’s prior express written consent in violation of 47 U.S.C. §227 (b)(1)(A)(iii). 63. In the alternative, in the event eFinancial had Plaintiff’s express written consent, that consent was revoked orally and in writing. 64. Upon information and belief, based on the lengthy period of dead air that greeted Plaintiff upon answering eFinancial’s calls, eFinancial employed an ATDS to place calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 66. Upon information and belief, the system employed by eFinancial to place the calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone produced Plaintiff’s telephone number using a random or sequential number generator as Plaintiff never provided his cellular phone number to eFinancial. 67. Upon information and belief, the system employed by eFinancial to place phone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers. 68. Moreover, eFinancial violated § 227 (b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by placing or causing to be placed non-emergency calls, from October 2020 through the present, to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone utilizing an artificial or prerecorded voice without Plaintiff’s prior express written consent. 69. As pled above, eFinancial used an artificial or prerecorded voice that automatically played upon the call reaching Plaintiff’s voicemail. 70. Upon information and belief, it is a systemic practice of eFinancial to call consumers without their prior express written consent; a practice designed to maximize profits at the expense of consumers. 71. Upon information and belief, eFinancial does not maintain adequate procedures that effectively document consumers’ requests that the calls cease, thus resulting in consumers receiving solicitation calls after they have requested that the solicitation calls cease. 73. As a result of eFinancial’s knowing and willful violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the members of the Putative Classes are entitled to receive up to $1,500.00 in treble damages for each such violation. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the members of the Putative Classes, requests the following relief: A. an order granting certification of the proposed classes, including the designation of Plaintiff as the named representative, and the appointment of the undersigned as Class Counsel; B. an order finding that Defendant violated the TCPA; C. an order enjoining Defendant from placing or causing to place further violating calls to consumers; D. an award of $500.00 in damages to Plaintiff and the members of the Putative Classes for each such violation; E. an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 to Plaintiff and the members of the Putative Classes for each such violation; and F. an award of such other relief as this Court deems just and proper Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. § 227 et. seq.) (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Members of TCPA Class)

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25. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 216(b), Plaintiffs seek to prosecute their FLSA claims as a collective action on behalf of themselves and the Collective Action Members. 26. Defendants are liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members. There are many similarly situated current and former COSs who have been underpaid in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join the present lawsuit. Those similarly situated COSs are known to Defendants, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendants’ records. Notice should be sent to the Collective Action Members pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 27. Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members worked for Defendants as COSs and regularly worked more than 40 hours a week. 29. Throughout the relevant period, it has been Defendants’ policy, pattern or practice to require, suffer, or permit Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members to work in excess of 40 hours per week without paying them premium overtime compensation for all of the overtime hours they worked. 30. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members all overtime compensation due and owing to them for the hours they worked in excess of 40 in a workweek as outlined in this Collective Action Complaint. 31. Defendants assigned all of the work that Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members performed and/or Defendants were aware of the work that they performed. 32. Defendants failed to keep accurate records of the hours worked by Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members. 33. Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members performed the same or similar primary job duties, which are non-exempt in nature. 35. Defendants are aware or should have been aware that federal law required them to pay their employees performing non-exempt duties an overtime premium for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 36. Defendants’ unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent. 37. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 38. Defendants have engaged in a widespread policy, pattern or practice of violating the FLSA in regard to Plaintiffs and the Collective, as detailed in this Collective Action Complaint. 39. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members were engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 40. The overtime wage provisions set forth in §§ 201 et seq. of the FLSA apply to Defendants. 41. Defendants were employers of Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members and were engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 43. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members all overtime compensation to which they are/were entitled under the FLSA. 44. Defendants failed to keep accurate records of time worked by the Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members. 45. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA, as described in this Collective Action Complaint, have been, and continue to be, willful and intentional. 46. Defendants are aware of their obligations under the FLSA, but did not make a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to their time keeping and compensation of Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members. 47. Because Defendants’ violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 48. As a result of Defendants’ willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members have suffered damages by being denied overtime wages in accordance with the FLSA, in amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees, costs and expenses pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Fair Labor Standards Act: Unpaid Overtime Wages Brought on Behalf of Plaintiffs and Similarly Situated Current and Former COSs Against Defendants

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10. Defendant, a large health system operating in North Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, and South Carolina, owns and operates 14 hospitals and more than 500 Physician clinic locations, including outpatient surgery centers, medical plazas, rehabilitation programs, diagnostic imaging centers, and community health outreach programs. 11. Plaintiffs are individuals who have worked for Defendant as hourly-paid medical workers. As an RN, Representative Plaintiff provided and assisted in the medical treatment of patients. 12. Amongst other things, medical workers all shared similar job titles, training, job descriptions and job tasks. Importantly, medical workers were all paid less than time and one half (1½) their hourly rate of pay for all time worked over 40 hours per week. 14. Medical workers were all compensated on an hourly basis. Representative Plaintiff was initially paid approximately $28.70 an hour, and then $30.99 following a raise in early 2018. When Representative Plaintiff worked overtime, she was compensated at insufficient and unlawful rates paying her anywhere from $0.70 to $1.10 in addition to her regular rate of pay. Representative Plaintiff was told that Defendant did not pay overtime as a matter of policy because Defendant needed to keep its costs under budget. 15. Despite the fact that Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers did not meet any test for exemption, Defendant failed to pay her and others the requisite overtime rate of 1½ times their regular rate for all hours worked more than 40 hours per week (“Overtime Hours”). Medical workers Routinely Worked Overtime Hours Without Being Paid Overtime Premium Compensation 16. Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers routinely worked Overtime Hours but were not paid the correct overtime premium compensation of time and one half (1½) required by the FLSA. 17. Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers often worked multiple shifts each week without taking meal breaks. Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers frequently worked more than their scheduled shifts, especially during busy periods or when there were shortages on a shift. 19. Rather, Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers were paid unlawful rates, all of which were significantly less than time and one half (1½) their regular rate of pay. 20. Defendant knew, and was aware at all times, of the above-mentioned violations. 21. The conduct alleged above reduced Defendant’s labor and payroll costs. 22. Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers were subject to Defendant’s uniform policies and practices and were victims of Defendant’s schemes to deprive them of overtime compensation. As a result of Defendant’s improper and willful failure to pay Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers in accordance with the requirements of the FLSA, Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers suffered lost wages and other related damages. Defendants Made Automatic Deductions for Meal Breaks, Including Those Not Taken, 23. Defendant maintains a written policy promising medical workers one 30-minute unpaid meal break and one 15-minute personal break per shift, to be taken when time allows. Defendant was obligated to ensure either that medical workers were completely relieved from all work-related duties during their unpaid meal break, or that they accurately tracked and recorded both their missed and interrupted meal breaks and received all wages due for all missed and interrupted meal breaks. 24. Defendant requires medical workers to prioritize their work-related responsibilities over their entitlement to an uninterrupted meal break. 26. Defendant does not maintain adequate staffing levels or provide dedicated relief workers to ensure medical workers are completely relieved from work-related duties during their entire unpaid meal break. 27. While Defendant has a system capable of allowing medical workers to track or report their interrupted or unused meal breaks, Defendant requires Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers to forgo this procedure in order to keep the Defendant within its annual budget. Representative Plaintiff is actively discouraged from tracking or reporting her interrupted or unused meal break. 28. Defendant knows that Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers regularly experience interrupted meal breaks because: Defendant maintains policies, practices and procedures that require medical workers to prioritize their patient care duties over their ability to take an uninterrupted meal break; Defendant has ready access to staffing, patient census and patient acuity information suggesting medical workers are regularly unable to take a full meal break; Defendant’s managers assign, oversee, or are responsible for the work Medical workers do during meal breaks; medical workers routinely perform meal break work in plain sight on Defendant’s premises; and medical workers perform work (like administering medication, completing electronic forms, or making CAT scans) that creates a readily-available time record during meal periods. 29. Despite having both actual and constructive knowledge that medical workers routinely work through meal breaks, Defendant has continued to direct its employees to forgo accurately tracking their unused and interrupted meal breaks. 31. Plaintiffs have been harmed as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, because Defendant regularly and consistently deprives Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers of overtime wages owed for meal break work they perform in workweeks of 40 hours or more. 32. For all the reasons stated above, Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers are similarly situated individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b). Defendant Willfully Violated the FLSA 34. Representative Plaintiff brings this collective action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, and other damages related to Defendant’s violation of the FLSA. 36. The Representative Plaintiff is a member of the Class she seeks to represent because she was employed by Defendant during the relevant period, was routinely suffered or permitted to work more than 40 hours per week, as described above, and was not paid an overtime premium rate for the time she worked over 40 hours per week. 37. Specifically, Defendant engaged in common schemes to avoid paying Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers overtime pay of time and one half (1½) when they worked in excess of 40 hours per week, even though Plaintiffs did not satisfy the necessary conditions exempting them from overtime. 38. Additionally, Representative Plaintiff was routinely suffered or permitted to work through her automatically deducted meal break without being properly compensated for the time she worked. 40. Defendant encouraged, suffered and permitted Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers to work more than forty (40) hours per week without proper overtime compensation. 41. Defendant encouraged, suffered and permitted Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers to work through their automatically deducted meal break without proper compensation. 42. Defendant knew Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers performed work that required additional wages and overtime compensation to be paid. Nonetheless, Defendant operated under a scheme, as previously described, to deprive Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers of wages and overtime compensation. 43. Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein was willful and has caused extensive damage to the Representative Plaintiff and other similarly situated medical workers. 45. Representative Plaintiff estimates that the collective class, including both current and former employees over the relevant period, will include at least one hundred (100) members. The precise number of collective Class Members should be readily available from Defendant’s personnel, scheduling, time and payroll records, and from input received from the Class Members as part of the notice and “opt-in” process provided by 29 U.S.C. §216(b). Given the composition and size of the collective class, its members may be informed of the pendency of this action directly via U.S. mail and e-mail. 46. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 23”), Representative Plaintiff brings claims for relief on her own behalf and as a representative a class under the NCWHA, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.1 et seq., to recover unpaid wages, statutory penalties, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, and other damages related to Defendant’s violation of the NCWHA. 47. Representative Plaintiff seeks class certification under Rule 23 for the following class under the NCWHA: All individuals who currently work, or have worked, for the Defendant as an hourly paid medical worker or any other similarly-titled, hourly- paid position in the state of North Carolina during the applicable statute of limitations period who were not timely paid all earned wages on their regular paydays (the “NCWHA Class”). 49. Upon information and belief, Representative Plaintiff estimates that there are at least (40) putative class members in the NCWHA Class. The precise number of NCWHA Class members can be easily ascertained using Defendant’s personnel, time, and payroll records and other records. Commonality 50. There are numerous and substantial questions of law and fact common to the NCWHA Class members, including, without limitation, the following: a. Whether Defendant failed to pay the NCWHA Class all earned accrued wages on their regular paydays; b. Whether Defendant maintained common timekeeping and payroll systems and policies with respect to the NCWHA Class, regardless of their work location; c. Whether Defendant failed to keep true and accurate records of the amount of time the NCWHA Class actually worked; d. Whether Defendant willfully or recklessly disregarded the law in implementing its wage and hour policies applicable to the NCWHA Class; and, e. The nature and extent of the class-wide injury and the appropriate measure of damages for the NCWHA Class. 51. Representative Plaintiff anticipates that Defendant will raise defenses that are common to the NCWHA Class. Adequacy 53. The claims asserted by the Representative Plaintiff are typical of the NCWHA Class members she seeks to represent. The Representative Plaintiff has the same interests and suffers as a result of the same unlawful practices as the NCWHA Class members. 54. Upon information and belief, there are no other NCWHA Class members who have an interest individually controlling the prosecution of his or her individual claims, especially in light of the relatively small value of each claim and the difficulties involved in bringing individual litigation against one’s employer. However, if any such class member should become known, he or she can opt out of this action pursuant to Rule 23. Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate and a Class Action is Superior to Joinder of Claims or Individual Lawsuits 55. The common questions identified above predominate over any individual issues because Defendant’s conduct and the impact of its policies and practices affected NCWHA Class members in the same manner: they were suffered and/or permitted to work without receiving all earned wages on their regular paydays. 57. On the other hand, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. The cost to the court system and the public for the adjudication of individual litigation and claims would be substantial and substantially more than if claims are treated as a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant, and/or substantially impair or impede the ability class members to protect their interests. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 58. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein. 59. Defendant operates an “enterprise” as defined by Section 3(r)(1) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)(1), and is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Section 3(s)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A). 60. Representative Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective are similarly situated employees within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 61. Section 207(a)(1) of the FLSA states that an employee must be paid an overtime rate equal to at least one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 63. Throughout the relevant period, Defendant violated the FLSA by routinely suffering or permitting Representative Plaintiff and members of the FLSA Collective to work overtime hours without paying them proper overtime compensation. 64. Throughout the relevant period, Representative Plaintiff and members of the FLSA Collective worked in excess of 40 hours per week, but were not paid an overtime premium of one and one-half times their regular hourly rate for those additional hours. 65. Representative Plaintiff and members of the FLSA Collective are not properly classified as exempt. 66. Throughout the relevant period, Defendant expected Plaintiffs and the Class members to be available to work during their promised meal break and after completion of their assigned shift for work-related tasks. 67. Defendant’s violations of the FLSA, as described herein, have been willful and intentional. Defendant failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to the compensation of Representative Plaintiff and members of the FLSA Collective. 68. Because Defendant’s violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 70. As a result of the unlawful acts of Defendant, Representative Plaintiff and members of the FLSA Collective have been deprived of overtime compensation and other wages in amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, costs and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 71. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein. 72. Representative Plaintiff is a member of the NCWHA Class, which meets the requirements for certification and maintenance of a class action pursuant to Rule 23. 73. It is unlawful under North Carolina law for an employer to require or permit an employee to work without paying compensation for all hours worked in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.6. 74. Defendant failed to pay Representative Plaintiff and the NCWHA Class members all accrued wages on the employees’ regular paydays for all hours worked. 75. Defendant’s conduct constitutes a willful violation of the NCWHA, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.1 et seq., including but not limited to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.6 and § 95-25.7. 76. Representative Plaintiff and the NCWHA Class members have sustained losses in compensation as a proximate result of Defendant’s violations of the NCWHA. Accordingly, Representative Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the NCWHA Class members, seeks damages in the amount of their unpaid earned compensation, plus liquidated damages and interest at the legal rate set for in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.22(a) and (a)(1). CLASS ACTION VIOLATION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA WAGE AND HOUR ACT COLLECTIVE ACTION VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

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14. In addition to the facts pled above, at various times prior to the filing of the instant complaint, including within one year preceding the filing of this complaint, DEFENDANT contacted PLAINTIFF in an attempt to collect an alleged outstanding debt. 15. On or about March of 2016, Plaintiff began receiving numerous calls from Defendant. 16. Defendant called Plaintiff multiple times a day, sometimes at least twelve calls a month. On several occasions, Plaintiff told Defendant to stop calling him, Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Cal. Civ. Code § 1788 et seq. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that judgment be entered against Defendant for the following: Violations of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that judgment be entered against Defendant for the following:

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24. At no point prior to or after March 4, 2017, did Plaintiff have an account with Defendant. 25. At no point prior to or after March 4, 2017, did Plaintiff inquire about Defendant’s services. 26. Nonetheless, on March 4, 2017, Defendant pulled Plaintiff’s Trans Union credit report without a permissible purpose. 27. Despite the fact that Plaintiff did not have an account with Defendant, Defendant performed an unauthorized regular or ”hard” credit report inquiry with Trans Union. 35. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (the “Class”). 48. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 49. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute numerous and multiple violations of the FCRA. 50. As a result of each and every negligent violation of the FCRA, Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(1); and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(2), from Defendant. THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1692X (FCRA)

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21. This Complaint may be brought and maintained as an “opt-in”  collective action pursuant to Section 16 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); in that the claims of Plaintiffs are similar to the claims of the Putative Plaintiffs/Class Members. 23. At all relevant times, Defendant has had a policy and practice of failing and refusing to compensate class members properly for all hours worked and overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per week. 24. The Plaintiffs and all Putative Plaintiffs/Class Members were subject to Defendant’s policies and practices of failing and refusing to properly compensate employees their regular or statutorily required rate of pay for all hours worked. 25. Each Putative Plaintiff /Class Member has been damaged and is entitled to recovery by reason of Defendant’s illegal policies and/or practices of permitting, suffering and/or failing to compensate employees for their regular or statutorily required proper rate of pay for all hours worked. 26. Collective action treatment will allow those similarly situated persons to litigate their claims in the manner that is most efficient and economical for the parties and the judicial system. 27. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, set forth additional collective action allegations in the various counts set forth herein. 29. Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant. During this time frame, Plaintiff performed work for Defendant in the position of Single Job Static EMT and/or Paramedic. 30. Prior to and during Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Defendant employed numerous other individuals who had the same job duties and compensation structure as Plaintiff (the collective class). 31. Plaintiff brings this Complaint as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §  216(b), on behalf of all persons who were, are, or will be employed by the Defendant as Single Job Static EMTs/Paramedics within three years from the commencement of this action who have not been properly paid straight time for all hours worked and overtime compensation, at one-and-one-half times the regular rate of pay, for all work performed in excess of forty hours per week. 32. This Complaint may be brought and maintained as an “opt-in”  collective action pursuant to Section 16 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §  216(b), for all claims asserted by the collective class because the claims of Plaintiff are similar to the claims of the Putative Plaintiffs of the representative action. 33. Plaintiff and the collective class are similarly situated, have substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are subject to Defendant’s common practice, policy, or plan of refusing to properly pay straight time and overtime in violation of the 47. As far as the factual allegations set forth above are applicable to the claims made in Count II, Plaintiff Dietrick hereby incorporates all of the above paragraphs in this Complaint as if fully set forth in this Count. 48. Plaintiff Dietrick was employed by the Defendant. During this time frame, Plaintiff performed work for Defendant in the positions of dual Job EMT and/or Paramedic (“Fire Medic”). 49. Prior to and during Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Defendant employed numerous other individuals who had the same job duties and compensation structure as Plaintiff (the collective class). 50. Plaintiff brings this Complaint as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §  216(b), on behalf of all persons who were, are, or will be employed by the Defendant as Fire Medics within three years from the commencement of this action who have not been paid straight time for all hours worked and overtime compensation, at one-and-one-half times the regular rate of pay, for all work performed in excess of forty hours per week. 51. This Complaint may be brought and maintained as an “opt-in”  collective action pursuant to Section 16 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §  216(b), for all claims asserted by the collective class because the claims of Plaintiff are similar to the claims of the collective class. 53. The names and addresses of the putative members of the representative action are available from Defendant. To the extent required by law, notice will be provided to said individuals via email, First Class Mail, posting at the workplace and/or by the use of techniques and a form of notice similar to those customarily used in representative actions. 54. At all relevant times, Defendant has been, and continues to be, an “employer”  within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. 55. At all relevant times, Defendant has employed, and/or continues to employ, “employee[s],” including each of the putative members of the FLSA representative action. 56. At all times relevant herein, Defendant has had gross operating revenues in excess of $500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Dollars). 57. The FLSA requires each covered employer, such as the Defendant, to compensate all non-exempt employees straight time for all hours worked and overtime compensation, at a rate of not less than one-and-one-half the regular rate of pay, for work performed in excess of forty hours in a work week. 58. Plaintiff and the putative members of the FLSA representative action are not exempt from the right to receive overtime pay under the FLSA and are not exempt from the requirement that their employer pay them overtime compensation under the FLSA. 60. Further, Defendant cannot invoke the §  207(k) exemption for time spent in the Fair Labor Standards Act – Scheme to Avoid Paying Overtime (Plaintiff Zimmerli and the Single Job Static EMTs/Paramedics)

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[Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act—Overtime Wage Brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective] 20. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 22. From on or about February 28, 2017 to February 2, 2018, Plaintiff was hired by Defendants to work as a busboy, cleaning person, and stock up person for Defendants’ restaurant and beer garden located at 4892 Broadway, New York, NY 10034. 23. During his employment, Plaintiff often worked (8) to (12) hours per day and over forty (40) hours per week. From February 28, 2017 to September 10, 2017, Plaintiff worked six days a week with Thursdays off. During this period Plaintiff was paid in cash, and his daily schedule ran as follows; Mondays from 2:00pm to 4:00am; Tuesdays from 6:00pm to 2:00am; Wednesdays from 4:00pm to 12:00am; Fridays from 6:00pm to 5:00am; Saturdays from 6:00pm to 5:00am; and Sundays from 2:00pm to 1:00am. Therefore, Plaintiff averaged a total of sixty-one (61) hours per week during this period. 24. From on or about September 11, 2017, Defendants began to pay by check and reduced Plaintiff’s weekly hours to an average of forty-five (45) hours per week. During this period, Plaintiff worked a total of five days a week with two varied days off. Plaintiff’s work schedule varied throughout the week, however, Plaintiff did not work more than nine (9) hours per workday. Throughout Plaintiff’s tenure with Defendants, Plaintiff did not receive a break. 25. At the start of his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff received an hourly rate of $7.50. On January 1, 2018, Defendants raised Plaintiff’s hourly rate to $8.65, which remained the same for the rest of Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants. 26. Defendants did not implement any means (time punch card, written time sheets, computer time logs etc.) to track the number of hours Plaintiff actually worked. 28. Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff for overtime compensation according to state and federal laws. 29. Plaintiff was not compensated for New York’s “spread of hours” premium for shifts that lasted longer than ten (10) hours. 30. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with a wage notices at the time of his hiring. 31. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 32. Defendants knew that the nonpayment of overtime and the “spread of hours” premium would economically injure Plaintiff and the Class Members by their violation of federal and state laws. 33. While employed by Defendants, Plaintiff was not exempt under federal and state laws requiring employers to pay employees overtime. 34. Plaintiff and the New York Class Members’ workdays frequently lasted longer than 10 hours. 35. Defendants did not pay Plaintiff and other Class members’ New York’s “spread of hours” premium for every day in which they worked over 10 hours. 36. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff and other Class members with written notices about the terms and conditions of their employment upon hire in relation to their rate of pay, regular pay cycle and rate of overtime pay. These notices were similarly not provided upon Plaintiff’s and other Class members’ pay increase(s). 38. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees either the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half), or the New York State overtime rate (of time and one-half), in violation of the FLSA and New York Labor Law and the supporting federal and New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 39. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying the New York State “spread of hours” premium to Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees. 40. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all other and former non- exempt employees who have been or were employed by the Defendants at their restaurant and beer garden for up to the last three (3) years, through entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”) and whom failed to receive spread-of-hours pay, and overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week (the “Collective Action Members”), and have been subject to the same common decision, policy, and plan to not provide required wage notices at the time of hiring, in contravention to federal and state labor laws. 42. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Members, and have retained counsel that is experienced and competent in the field of employment law and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 43. This action should be certified as a collective action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the collective action would risk creating either inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual members of this class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interest of the other members not party to the adjudication, or subsequently impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 44. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as collective action. 46. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 47. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have been substantially damaged by Defendants’ unlawful conduct. 48. Plaintiff brings his NYLL claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F. R. C. P.”) Rule 23, on behalf of all non-exempt persons employed by Defendants at their restaurant and beer garden location doing business as Inwood Bar And Grill on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class Period”). 50. The proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parities and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of the number is presently within the sole control of the Defendants, upon information and belief, there are more than ten (10) members of the class. 51. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those claims which could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief that would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the Class members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants, as alleged herein, of failing to pay overtime compensation. Defendants’ corporation wide policies and practices, including but not limited to their failure to provide a wage notice at the time of hiring, affected all Class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/ or wrongful acts as to each Class member. Plaintiff and other Class members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 53. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual Class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute corporate defendant. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expenses that numerous individual actions engender. The losses, injuries, and damages suffered by each of the individual Class members are small in the sense pertinent to a class action analysis, thus the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual Class members to redress the wrongs done to them. Further, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and resulting in the impairment of class members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 55. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, including: a. Whether Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Class within the meaning of the New York law; b. Whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to minimum wages under the New York Labor Law; c. Whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to overtime under the New York Labor Law; d. Whether Defendants maintained a policy, pattern and/or practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class spread-of-hours pay as required by the NYLL; e. Whether the Defendants provided wage notices at the time of hiring to Plaintiff and class members as required by the NYLL; f. At what common rate, or rates subject to common method of calculation were and are the Defendants required to pay the Class members for their work 57. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants have been, and continue to be, “employers” engaged in interstate “commerce” and/or in the production of “goods” for “commerce,” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§206(a) and §§207(a). Further, Plaintiff is covered within the meaning of FLSA, U.S.C. §§206(a) and 207(a). 58. At all relevant times, Defendants employed “employees” including Plaintiff, within the meaning of FLSA. 59. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendants have had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 60. The FLSA provides that any employer engaged in commerce shall pay employees the applicable minimum wage. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 61. At all relevant times, Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay the statutory minimum wage to Plaintiff, and the collective action members, for some or all of the hours they worked. 62. The FLSA provides that any employer who violates the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §206 shall be liable to the employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum compensation, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 64. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 65. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants within the meaning of New York Labor Law §§2 and 651. 66. Pursuant to the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, an employer who fails to pay the minimum wage shall be liable, in addition to the amount of any underpayments, for liquidated damages equal to the total of such under-payments found to be due the employee. 67. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ rights by failing to pay them minimum wages in the lawful amount for hours worked. 68. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 70. The FLSA provides that any employer who violates the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §207 shall be liable to the employees affected in the amount of their unpaid overtime compensation, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 29 USC §216(b). 71. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective their overtime pay violated the FLSA. 72. At all relevant times, Defendants had, and continue to have, a policy of practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time and a half to Plaintiff and Collective Action Members for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, which violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§207(a)(1) and 215(a). 73. The FLSA and supporting regulations required employers to notify employees of employment law requires employers to notify employment law requirements. 29 C.F.R. §516.4. 74. Defendants willfully failed to notify Plaintiff and FLSA Collective of the requirements of the employment laws in order to facilitate their exploitation of Plaintiff’s and FLSA Collectives’ labor. 76. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 77. Pursuant to the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, an employer who fails to pay proper overtime compensation shall be liable, in addition to the amount of any underpayments, for liquidated damages equal to the total of such under-payments found to be due the employee. 78. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class their overtime pay violated the NYLL. 79. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class was not in good faith. 80. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 81. The NYLL requires employers to pay an extra hour’s pay for every day that an employee works an interval in excess of ten hours pursuant to NYLL §§190, et seq., and §§650, et seq., and New York State Department of Labor regulations §146-1.6. 82. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and Rule 23 Class spread-of-hours pay was not in good faith. 84. The NYLL and supporting regulations require employers to provide written notice of the rate or rates of pay and the basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; allowances, if any, claimed as a part of minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging allowances; the regular pay day designated by the employer; the name of the employer; any “doing business as” names used by the employer; the physical address of employer’s main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer. NYLL §195-1(a). 85. Defendants intentionally failed to provide notice to employees in violation of New York Labor Law § 195, which requires all employers to provide written notice in the employee’s primary language about the terms and conditions of employment related to rate of pay, regular pay cycle and rate of overtime on his or her first day of employment. 86. Defendants not only did not provide notice to each employee at Time of Hire, but failed to provide notice to each Plaintiff even after the fact. 87. Due to Defendants’ violations of New York Labor Law, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants, jointly and severally, $50 for each workday that the violation occurred or continued to occur, up to $5,000, together with costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to New York Labor Law. N.Y. Lab. Law §198(1-b). 88. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 90. Defendants have failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the New York Labor Law with respect to compensation of each Plaintiff, and did not provide the paystub on or after each Plaintiff’s payday. [Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act—Minimum Wage Brought on behalf of the Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Time of Hire Wage Notice Requirement] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Minimum Wage Brought on behalf of the Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Overtime Pay Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class] [Violation of New York Labor Law—New York Pay Stub Requirement] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Spread of Time Pay Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class]

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17. The Plaintiff incorporates the previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 3 18. The Plaintiff is a "person" who falls under the protection of Article 2 of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (herein “WVCCPA”) and is entitled to the remedies set forth in Article 5 of the WVCCPA. 19. The Defendant, BCY, is a debt collector as defined by West Virginia Code §46A- 2-122(d) engaging directly or indirectly in debt collection as defined by West Virginia Code §46A-2-122© within the State of West Virginia. 20. The Defendant has engaged in repeated violations of Article 2 of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, including but not limited to, a. attempting to collect a debt by threats in violation of West Virginia Code §46A-2-124 by threatening legal action without notice after fourteen days; b. threatening to take any action prohibited by this chapter or other law regulating the debt collector’s conduct under 15 U.S.C. § 1692 in violation of West Virginia Code §46A- 2-124(f) by threatening to take legal action after failing to properly inform Plaintiff of his validation rights; c. engaging in unreasonable or oppressive or abusive conduct towards the Plaintiff in connection with the attempt to collect a debt in violation of West Virginia Code 22. The Plaintiff incorporates the previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 23. The Plaintiff is a "consumer" who falls under the protection of 15 U.S.C. 1692a(3) (herein “FDCPA”) and is entitled to the remedies set forth in Section 1692k of the FDCPA. 24. The Defendant, BCY, is a debt collector as defined by 1692a(6) of the FDCPA engaging directly or indirectly in debt collection within the State of West Virginia. 25. The Defendant has engaged in repeated violations of 1692 of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, including but not limited to, a. failing to notify Plaintiff within five days after its initial communication in writing of Plaintiff’s rights to seek validation of the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a); b. failing to provide Plaintiff a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty (30) days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, 5 the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector and instead providing Plaintiff with only fourteen (14) days and requiring written notice in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a)(3); c. failing to provide Plaintiff a statement that if the Plaintiff notifies the Defendant in writing within the validation period that the debt is disputed, then Defendant would obtain verification of the debt and provide such verification to Plaintiff in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a)(4); d. failing to provide Plaintiff a statement that it would cease collection efforts if the Plaintiff notifies the Defendant in writing within the validation period that the debt is disputed in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692g(b); e. engaging in conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, and abuse Plaintiff in connection with the collection of a debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692d; f. using deceptive or misleading representations or means in an attempt to collect a debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692e; and g. using unfair and/or unconscionable means to collect a debt from Plaintiff in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692f. 26. As a result of the Defendant’s actions, Plaintiff has been annoyed, inconvenienced, harassed, bothered, upset, angered, harangued and otherwise was caused indignation and distress. 27. The Plaintiff incorporates the previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 28. This action is also filed as a class action. Plaintiff, serving as class representative, tentatively defines the class and subclass as follows: (A) all consumers who were mailed letters of the type attached hereto as Exhibit 1 or substantial equivalents, in an attempt to collect a claim owed by a consumer at any time within one year prior to the filing of this civil action (which letters were not returned by the United States Post Office as undeliverable), and who have not previously filed an individual civil action alleging a similar violation of West Virginia or federal law. (B) All West Virginia consumers who were mailed letters of the type attached hereto as Exhibit 1 or substantial equivalents, in an attempt to collect a claim owed by a consumer at any time within four years prior to the filing of this civil action (which letters were not returned by the United States Post Office as undeliverable), and who have not previously filed an individual civil action alleging a similar violation of West Virginia or federal law. 29. Plaintiff reserves the right to refine the class definition in light of discovery and additional investigation. 30. The putative class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. 31. There are questions of law and fact common to the putative class, which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 7 32. The principal common issues involve whether Defendant Bailes, Craig & Yon’s conduct regarding the aforementioned letter(s) constitutes a violation of the unfair debt collection practices provisions of the WVCCPA and FDCPA. 33. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the putative class and said claims are based on the same legal and factual theories. 34. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. He has suffered pecuniary injury as a result of Defendant's actions and will, accordingly, vigorously litigate this matter. Plaintiff is greatly annoyed at being the victim of Defendant's illegal and fraudulent conduct and wishes to see that wrong remedied. To that end, Plaintiff has hired counsel experienced in claims involving unfair business practices. 35. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interest that might prevent them from vigorously pursuing this claim. 36. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this particular claim and controversy. 37. The interest of putative class members in individually controlling and maintaining the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small given the fact that they are unlikely to be aware of their legal rights and the amount of statutory or actual damages in an individual action is relatively small. 38. The management of this class claim is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties that those presented in many larger, and more complex, class actions. 8 39. As a proximate and/or foreseeable result of Defendant's wrongful conduct, each member of the putative class has suffered actual and/or statutory damages. CLASS CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 6 VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT VIOLATIONS OF THE WEST VIRGINIA CONSUMER CREDIT AND PROTECTION ACT

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1. Plaintiff alleges that at all times relevant herein Defendant conducted business in the State of Ohio, County of Lake, and within this judicial district. 12. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 13. Plaintiffs represent, and are members of the Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any telephone call from Defendant or their agent/s and/or employee/s to said person’s residential telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or with an artificial or prerecorded voice, which call was not made for emergency purposes within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 14. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiffs do not know the number of members in the Class, but believe the Class members number in the hundreds of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 15. Plaintiffs and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendants, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiffs and the Class members via landline telephones by using an ATDS, thereby causing Plaintiffs and the Class members to 2. At no time did Plaintiff ever enter into a business relationship with Defendant. 24. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 25. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 26. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiffs and The Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 27. Plaintiffs and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 28. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 29. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 3. Nor did Plaintiff ever contact Defendant at any time or provide Defendant with Plaintiff’s residential telephone number. 30. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiffs and The Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 4. Beginning in May 2013, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s residential telephone number, in an effort to solicit Plaintiff’s business. 5. Defendant placed more than one unsolicited advertisements to Plaintiff’s residential telephone in a period of months. 6. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its unsolicited calls to Plaintiff while using an “artificial or prerecorded voice” as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 7. This ATDS has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. 8. These telephone communications constituted telephone solicitations as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4). KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiffs seeks for themselves and each Class member $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiffs seeks for themselves and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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19. OSU hired Dr. Strauss in 1978 as an assistant professor of medicine. From 1981 to 1995, Strauss was the university’s team doctor and had contact with athletes in baseball, cheerleading, cross country, fencing, football, gymnastics, ice hockey, lacrosse, soccer, swimming, tennis, track, volleyball, and wrestling. 20. Dr. Strauss was employed by OSU until he retired in 1998. Dr. Strauss was a prolific sexual predator— he is estimated to have sexually assaulted, abused, battered, molested, and/or harassed 1,500 to 2,500 male student athletes during his 20- year tenure at Ohio State. 21. To many at OSU, Dr. Strauss was known simply as “Doc.” The student athletes, however, had a different nickname for Dr. Strauss: “Dr. Jelly Paws.” Dr. Strauss earned the nickname from his notoriously hands-on physical examinations. 22. For decades, Dr. Strauss was a fixture in the locker rooms, showers, and saunas of Larkins Hall, the former student and faculty recreation center on the Ohio State campus that housed the wrestling, gymnastics, and swimming teams. 23. A former OSU wrestling coach described Larkins Hall as “a cesspool of deviancy,” saying “Coaching my athletes in Larkins Hall was one of the most difficult things I ever did.”2 2 Rachael Bade and John Bresnahan, ‘A cesspool of deviancy’: New claims of voyeurism test Jordan denials, 66. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (b)(3) or (c)(4) on behalf of themselves and the following “Nationwide Class”: All male students or student-athletes of Ohio State University who (1) were examined by Dr. Richard Strauss at Ohio State University or (2) participated in a varsity athletic sport that utilized the locker rooms, showers, and/or saunas at Larkins Hall at any time between 1978 and 1998. 67. The Classes consists of hundreds, if not thousands, of men throughout the United States, making joinder impracticable, in satisfaction of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). The exact size of the Class and the identities of the individual members are ascertainable through records maintained by the Ohio State. 68. The claims of Plaintiffs are typical of the Classes. The claims of the Plaintiff and the Classes are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same factual pattern involving the Defendant’s misconduct. 69. There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiffs and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect only individual Class members within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), (b)(3), and (c)(4). 70. Common questions of fact or common questions of law affecting members of the Class include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether Defendant owed a legal duty to the members of the Class under federal and/or state law? Case: 2:18-cv-00692-MHW-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 07/16/18 Page: 12 of 23 PAGEID #: 12 Page 13 b. Whether Defendant violated Title IX of 20 U.S.C. §1681? c. Whether Defendant violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983? d. Whether Defendant displayed deliberate indifference to the sexual abuse, assaults, and discrimination at Ohio State? e. Whether Defendant had knowledge or knew that Richard Strauss was engaging in sexual abuse of Ohio State’s male students and student-athletes? f. Whether Plaintiffs were damaged by the violations caused by Defendants? 71. Absent a class action, most of the members of the Class would find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitive and would have no effective remedy. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation, particularly as to liability, in that it conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants and promotes the consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 72. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs have retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting complex litigation and class actions, and who have expertise in prosecuting personal injury, sexual abuse, and civil rights cases on behalf of vulnerable victims. 73. Plaintiffs and their counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the other Class members, and they have the financial resources and experience in handling sex abuse cases to do so. 74. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have any interests adverse to those of Case: 2:18-cv-00692-MHW-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 07/16/18 Page: 13 of 23 PAGEID #: 13 Page 14 the other members of the Class. 75. Plaintiffs and the Class will have personal injury damages that are individualized, but those can be managed separately.

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(COLORADO WAGE CLAIM ACT) (COLORADO MINIMUM WAGE ACT) (FAIR LABOR STANDARD ACT) 15. Defendant employed Plaintiff and the Collective and Class Action Members as Operators. 16. Defendant operated in Colorado and Texas during the relevant time period. 17. Defendant maintains control, oversight, and discretion over the operations of worksites, including employment practices with respect to Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members. 18. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members’ work as Operators was integrated into and performed in the normal course of Defendant’s business. 20. Plaintiff and other Operators would frequently punch in at the start of the day on the time clock in the yard and punch out at the time clock when they returned to the yard after their shift. 21. After punching in at the yard, Plaintiff and other Operators would then drive in a company vehicle, including Chevy Silverado pickup trucks, to and from the pad. 22. Plaintiff and other Operators either drove the Chevy Silverado pickup truck, loaded it with supplies that needed to be secured in the bed or the cab – such as napkins, lab materials, trash materials, and filter shock – or served as driver’s helpers including by helping the Operator stay awake. 23. Plaintiff and other Operators drove to and from the pad approximately 1 hour to 3 hours per day round trip six days per week and were not paid for this time. 24. Rather, Plaintiff and other Operators were only paid for the 12 hour shifts that they were on the pad. 25. Plaintiff had an information pass-over meeting for 30 minutes per day and was not paid for that. 26. Thus, Plaintiff and other Operators would often work 16+ hour days, and the Defendant only paid them for 12 hours. 27. Plaintiff initially worked a “10 on 4 off” and then a “14 on and 7 off” rotation. 28. The number of shifts that Plaintiff and each individual Collective Action Member worked per week can be ascertained from Defendant’s records. 30. During the entire time that Plaintiff was employed by Defendant, Plaintiff was not paid properly for his driving time as detailed herein. 31. Defendant cannot dispute that it owed Plaintiff and Collective Action Members overtime compensation for all hours worked over 40 per workweek and/or 12 per day. 32. Plaintiff complained about his pay issues to many of his superiors, but they did not remedy their failure to pay him for all hours worked. 33. Some, or all of, the overtime compensation due to Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members remained unpaid for thirty days beyond the regularly scheduled payday. 34. Plaintiff and all members of the Class and Collective Action performed the same primary job duties. 35. Defendant is aware of the totality of work that Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members performed. 36. This work did not require managerial responsibilities, or the exercise of meaningful decision-making on matters of significance that impacted the business and no interaction with the management of the home office. 37. Throughout the Class and Collective Action periods, the primary job duties of Plaintiff and the Class and Collective Action Members did not include: hiring, firing, disciplining, or directing the work of other employees, nor exercising meaningful independent judgment and discretion. 39. Defendant is liable under the FLSA and Colorado wage and hour laws for, inter alia, failing to properly pay overtime wage to Plaintiff and similar employees. 40. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action on behalf of the Collective Action Members, as defined above. 41. Plaintiff desire to pursue his FLSA claim on behalf of any individuals who opt in to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 42. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members are “similarly situated” as that term is used in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), because, inter alia, all such individuals worked pursuant to Defendant’s above described common business policies and practices and, as a result of such policies and practices, were not paid the full and legally mandated wages for all hour worked in a workweek or the legally mandated overtime premium for hours worked over 40 during a workweek. 43. Resolution of this action requires inquiry into common facts, including, among other things, Defendant’s common compensation, timekeeping, and payroll practices. 45. These similarly situated individuals are known to the Defendant, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendant’s payroll record which Defendant was required to maintain pursuant to the FLSA, see, 29 U.S.C. § 211(c); 29 C.F.R. § 215.2 et seq. 46. Conditional certification of this case as a collective matter pursuant to U.S.C. § 216(b) is proper and necessary so that these employees may be readily notified of this action through direct U.S. mail and/or other means including email, and allowed to opt in for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for overtime compensation, liquidated damages (or, alternatively, interest), and attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 47. There are many similarly situated current and former Operators who have not been paid proper overtime waged in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it. Thus, notice should be sent to the Collective pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all the Class Members, re-alleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 49. Plaintiff and all Members of the Colorado Class assert factually related claims, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3). 50. Defendant violated the Colorado wage and hour laws because it failed to pay Plaintiff and the Colorado Class at a rate of 1.5 times their regular hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week and/or 12 per day. 51. Although the precise number of the Colorado Class is unknown, Members are readily identifiable and can be located through Defendant’s records. 53. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Members of the Colorado Class. 54. Plaintiff is an adequate class representative, is committed to pursuing this action, and has retained competent counsel experienced in wage and hour law and class action litigation. 55. Class certification of Plaintiff’s Colorado wage and hour law claim is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class a whole. The Members of the Colorado Class are entitled to injunctive relief to end Defendant’s common and uniform policy and practice of denying the Colorado Class the wage to which they are entitled. 57. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that would be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all the Collective Action Members, re-alleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 59. At all relevant times, Defendant has been and continues to be, an employer engaged in interstate commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 60. At all relevant times, Defendant employed, and/or continues to employ, Plaintiff and each of the Collective Action Members within the meaning of the FLSA. 61. At all relevant times, Defendant had a policy and practice of willfully refusing to pay its Operators for all wages earned and the legally required amount of overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek, in violation of the FLSA. 62. As a result of Defendant’s willful failure to compensate Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members for all wages earned and for wages earned at a rate not less than 1.5 times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, Defendant has violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1), 215(a), and 29 C.F.R. §§ 778.104. 63. Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 65. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all the Colorado Class members, re-alleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 66. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the Colorado Class members were employed by Defendant within the meaning of the Wage Claim Act. 67. At all relevant times, Defendant has employed, and continues to employ, “employees,” including Plaintiff and the Colorado Class members, within the meaning of the Wage Claim Act. 68. As a result of the foregoing conduct, as alleged, Defendant has failed to pay wages due under the Wage Claim Act, the FLSA and the Minimum Wage Act, thereby violating, and continuing to violate, the Wage Claim Act. These violations were committed knowingly, willfully and with reckless disregard of applicable law. 70. Defendant’s violations of the C Wage Claim Act have caused Plaintiff and the Colorado Class irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. 71. Due to Defendant’s violations of the Wage Claim Act, Plaintiff and the Colorado Class are entitled to recover from Defendant their unpaid wages, including for the legally required amount of overtime compensation for all hours worked by them in excess of forty in a workweek, statutory penalties, actual and all other damages permitted by Colorado law, including the employers’ share of FICA, FUTA, state unemployment insurance, and any other required employment taxes, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to the Wage Claim Act. 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all the Colorado Class members, re-alleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 73. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the Colorado Class members were employed by Defendant within the meaning of the Minimum Wage Act. 74. At all relevant times, Defendant has employed, and continues to employ, “employees,” including Plaintiff and the Colorado Class members, within the meaning of the Minimum Wage Act. 75. As a result of the foregoing conduct, as alleged, Defendant has violated and continues to violate, the Minimum Wage Act. These violations were committed knowingly, willfully and with reckless disregard of applicable law. 77. Due to Defendant’s violations of the Minimum Wage Act, Plaintiff and the Colorado Class are entitled to recover from Defendant their unpaid wages, actual and all other damages permitted by Colorado law, including the employers’ share of FICA, FUTA, state unemployment insurance, and any other required employment taxes, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to the Minimum Wage Act.

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23. Plaintiff seeks class certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(1)(B), (2) and (3) related to all claims for which monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief is sought. 24. This Class is defined as: “All peaceful protestors who have been injured as a result of Defendants’ actions and who have thereafter been reluctant to speak out against police violence against citizens.” 25. A class action is the only practicable means by which Plaintiffs and unknown members of the class can challenge Defendants’ illegal actions. 26. As set forth below, this action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a). 28. The Class consists of hundreds of people who cannot or will not be able to afford to retain counsel and litigate their cases though to judgment. The class is forward-looking with the potential for new members to join the Class on an ongoing basis as citizens continue to be subjected to such behavior. 29. Finally, members of the proposed Class are spread out across the metro area and potentially the state and include hundreds of low-income individuals who lack financial resources to bring an independent action or to be joined in this action. Putative members of the class include countless young adults, persons presently engaged in job transitions, and persons searching for work after recent COVID-19 layoffs: It is reasonable to assume such persons would also be unable to afford counsel to bring their own separate action against Defendants. 30. Commonality: All persons comprising the proposed Class are equally suited in that all individuals are or were protected under federal law. 32. Common questions of law include: a. Whether Defendants acted in violation of the protestors’ civil rights. b. Whether the Defendants committed acts of unnecessary force. c. Whether the Defendants committed acts of police brutality. d. Whether individuals have suffered harm sufficient to bring their claims in court. 33. The relief sought for the proposed Class is common to all members of that respective Class. Plaintiffs seek relief enjoying the police from using such tactics against protestors. They additionally seek: (a) an order preventing Defendants from using force against individuals solely on the basis they disagree with their political views concerning police tactics, (b) an order prohibiting the “corral and combat” strategy, and (c) monetary relief for past injuries. 34. Typicality: The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class as Plaintiff and all members have suffered and will continue to suffer harm from the complained of tactics of the Minneapolis police department. 35. Because Plaintiff and the proposed class members challenge the same conduct of Defendants, Defendants will likely assert similar defenses against Plaintiff and the proposed Class members. Moreover, the answer to whether Defendants’ tactics are unlawful under §1983 will determine the success of the claims of the named Plaintiff and every other proposed Class member. If Plaintiff succeeds in the claim that Defendants have violated §1983, that ruling will likewise benefit every other member of the proposed Class. 37. Rule 23(b)(2): Class action status under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate because the Defendants have acted or failed and/or refused to act on grounds that generally apply to the proposed Class, such that preliminary and final monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief is appropriate and necessary with respect to each member of the Class. Specifically, pursuant to §1983, the Defendants have systematically deprived individuals of their constitutional rights, privileges and immunities. The acts and omissions of Defendants are generally applicable the proposed Class. 38. Accordingly, (a) a declaration that Defendants have infringed on the first amendment rights of members of the class, (b) an injunction prohibiting Defendants from continuing such behavior, and (c) monetary relief for all individuals harmed by Defendants’ illegal actions to date, would benefit every member of each of the proposed Class. 40. Plaintiff realleges the above allegations as if hereinafter set forth in full and further states and alleges as follows: 41. This claim arises under Title 42 of the United States Code (Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended), including but not limited to §1983. 42. Defendants acted alone and/or together (2 or more in concert), and one or more of them committed some act in furtherance of the conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s rights and those of the Class as peaceful protestors (and Plaintiff and proposed class members were damaged). 44. Defendants (and each of them) knew they were violating the federal law and constitutional rights of Plaintiff and/ or acted with intent and/ or deliberate indifference to the rights of Plaintiff as noted above, or with malice. 45. The Defendants acted under color of law (public officials acting alone and/or conspiring with private officials) of a statute, ordinance, regulation, resolution, policy, custom or usage when they deprived Plaintiff of his Constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities. 46. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' conduct, inaction, policy or customs as set forth in more detail above, Plaintiff and other protestors suffered the deprivation of their constitutional and/or federal statutory rights and suffered personal injuries, including physical injury, humiliation, mental anguish and suffering, and emotional distress. Violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Against all Defendants) (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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20. Defendant is an online manufacturer and retailer of shaving equipment, and owns and operates the website, www.harrys.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.harrys.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse shavers and related products for purchase and delivery, find information on promotions, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in February 2019, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website, by being unable to learn more information, the ability to browse shavers and related products for purchase and delivery, find information on promotions, and related goods and services available online. 27. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 29. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 30. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 31. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 32. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 34. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 35. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 36. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 37. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 38. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 43. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 45. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 46. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 52. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 54. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 55. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 56. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 57. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 58. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 62. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 64. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 66. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 72. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 73. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 75. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 78. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 79. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 84. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 85. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 87. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 88. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 89. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 91. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 92. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 94. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 95. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 97. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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17.45(3), as it is a corporation, and business entity and/or association. 29. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (the “Class”), defined as follows: All persons within the United States who purchased the Products within four years prior to the filing of this complaint through to the date of class certification. 30. Plaintiff also brings this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed sub-class (the “Sub-Class”), defined as follows: All persons within Texas who purchased the Products within four years prior to the filing of this complaint through to the date of class certification. 31. Defendants, their employees and agents are excluded from the Class and Sub-Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class and Sub- Class, but believes the members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 43. Plaintiff incorporates all of the allegations and statements made in paragraphs 1 through 42 above as if fully reiterated herein. 44. Plaintiff is a “person” as defined in Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.45(3), as she is a natural person. 45. Defendant is a “person” as defined in Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 46. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.46(a) states: False, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful and are subject to action by the consumer protection division under Sections 17.47, 17.58, 17.60, and 17.61 of this code. 53. Plaintiff incorporates all of the allegations and statements made in paragraphs 1 through 52 above as if fully reiterated herein. 54. Through its false advertisements that the Products can be colored and bleached, Defendant made false statements of material fact. 55. At the time Defendant made its statements that the Products can be colored and bleached to Plaintiff, it knew, or reasonably should have known, that the statements described above were false. 56. At the time Defendant made the statements to Plaintiff, it intended to induce Plaintiff to purchase the Products. 57. Plaintiff relied upon the truth of the statements described above and purchased the Products, only to find that the Products are damaged and unusable when colored or bleached. 58. As a result of their reasonable reliance upon Defendant’s false statements of material fact as set forth above, Plaintiff and other members of the Class and Sub-Class have suffered concrete and particularized injuries, harm and damages which include, but are not limited to, the loss of money spent on products they did not want to buy, and stress, aggravation, frustration, inconvenience, emotional distress, mental anguish, and similar categories of damages. 59. Plaintiff incorporates all of the allegations and statements made in paragraphs 1 through 58 above as if fully reiterated herein. 7. Defendant manufactures, advertises, markets, sells, and distributes hair extension and wig products throughout California and the United States under brand name “Mayvenn Hair.” COMMON LAW FRAUD UNJUST ENRICHMENT Violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.46, et seq.

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(Unjust Enrichment) (Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) (Violations of M.G.L. c. 93A) 19. On information and belief, there are thousands of class members. Therefore, the class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder would be impracticable. 20. There are issues of law and fact common to each class, which common issues predominate over any issues particular to individual class members. The principal common issues are: whether Atlantic engaged in trade or commerce in Massachusetts within the scope of M.G.L. c. 93A; §1; whether Atlantic is a debt collector within the scope of the MDCPA and the FDCPA; whether Atlantic was required to be licensed as a debt collector by the Division of Banks during the class periods; whether Atlantic was licensed as a debt collector by the Division during the class periods; whether Atlantic violated the rights of Plaintiff and class members as alleged; and whether Atlantic’s violations of M.G.L. c. 93A were willful or knowing in nature. 21. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of class members. Plaintiff and all class members were all injured by being subjected to consumer debt collection activity that was prohibited by law because Atlantic was not licensed as a debt collector in Massachusetts. All claims are based on the same legal theories, and all claims arise from the same unlawful conduct. 23. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since: (a) the economic harm suffered by many individual class members is either non-existent or not substantial, therefore, the expense and burden of individual litigation would be economically unfeasible; and (b) the prosecution of separate lawsuits by individual class members would entail the risk of inconsistent and conflicting adjudications that could establish conflicting standards of conduct for Defendant; and (c) there will be no unusual or extraordinary management difficulties in administering this case as a class action. 24. The allegations of all preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. 25. At relevant times, Atlantic was engaged in trade or commerce in Massachusetts within the scope of M.G.L. c. 93A, §1. 26. Atlantic violated M.G.L. c. 93, §24A and M.G.L. c. 93A, §2, by engaging in the business of consumer debt collection in Massachusetts without being licensed to do so by the Division of Banks. 27. Atlantic’s violations of M.G.L. c. 93, §24A and M.G.L. c. 93A, §2, were willful and knowing in nature. 29. A pre-suit demand under M.G.L. c. 93, §9, is not required, as Atlantic does not maintain an office or keep assets in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Honorable Court enter judgment: (a) Awarding her and each class member actual damages equal to monies paid to Atlantic or creditors due to Atlantic’s unlawful conduct or statutory damages of $25.00, whichever is greater; (b) Doubling or trebling all actual damages awarded; (c) Awarding interest on all damages awarded; (d) Awarding costs and reasonable attorney’s fees; (e) Awarding such further relief as shall be just and proper. 30. The allegations of all preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. 31. Atlantic’s unlicensed debt collection activities in Massachusetts violated the following provisions of the FDCPA: (a) section 1692e(5), by taking and threatening to take actions that could not legally be taken; (b) section 1692e(10), by using deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect debts; (c) section 1692d(1), by engaging in conduct involving the threat and use of criminal means to harm the property of Plaintiff and class members; (d) section 1692d, by engaging in conduct the natural consequence of which was to oppress and abuse Plaintiff and class members. 33. The allegations of all preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. 34. Atlantic wrongfully and unlawfully collected consumer debts in Massachusetts without being licensed as a debt collector by the Division of Banks. 35. Atlantic earned fees as a result of recovering money for creditors. 36. Atlantic has been unjustly enriched by obtaining fees due to its unlawful debt collection activities. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Honorable Court enter judgment: (a) Ordering Atlantic to disgorge all fees obtained due to its unlawful collection activities; (b) Awarding interest on all monies awarded; (c) Awarding costs and reasonable attorney’s fees; (d) Awarding such further relief as shall be just and proper. 5. Atlantic, as its name reflects, is a collection agency. During the time period encompassed by this complaint, most (if not all) of the debts which Atlantic collected and attempted to collect in Massachusetts were incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, otherwise known as “consumer” debts. 6. During the time period encompassed by this complaint, Atlantic engaged in a business in Massachusetts the principal purpose of which was consumer debt collection. 7. During the time period encompassed by this complaint, Atlantic regularly attempted and attempted to collect, directly or indirectly, consumer debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another by Massachusetts residents. 8. During the time period encompassed by this complaint, Atlantic was a “debt collector” within the meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §1692a (“FDCPA”) and within the meaning of the Massachusetts Debt Collection Practices Act, M.G.L. c. 93, §24 A. Facts pertaining to Atlantic

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(Aiding & Abetting Violations of the CEA) (Violation of 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1)(D) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1)) (Violation of 7 U.S.C. § 6b(e)(3)) 14. Section 6b(e)(3) of the CEA makes it unlawful for TD Ameritrade to “directly or indirectly, bu the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, . . . in or in connection with any order to make, or the making of, any contract of sale of any commodity for future delivery (or option on such a contract), . . . on a group or index of securities (or any interest therein or based on the value thereof) — . . . to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.” 15. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 is a rule promulgated by the CFTC in the wake of Dodd-Frank. The rule makes it unlawful for TD Ameritrade to “directly or indirectly, in connection with any . . . contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or contract for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, to intentionally or recklessly: . . . [e]ngage, or attempt to engage, in any act, practice, or course of business, which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person . . . .” 17. Plaintiffs are individual investors with brokerage accounts at TDA. As with most if not all TDA customers, trades made by Plaintiffs through TDA were cleared by TDAC. And because some of Plaintiffs’ investments, including the investments at issue here, were options on futures contracts, TD Ameritrade’s futures-related entity, TDAFF, became involved. 18. Futures contracts “are financial contracts obligating the buyer to purchase an asset or the seller to sell an asset, such as a physical commodity or a financial instrument, at a predetermined future date and price. Futures contracts detail the quality and quantity of the underlying asset; they are standardized to facilitate trading on a futures exchange.”1 An option on a futures contract gives the option holder the right to buy or sell a futures contract. 19. On February 5, 2018, Plaintiffs held substantial investments in options on E-Mini S&P 500 futures contracts (“E-Mini S&P Option Contracts”) through TDA. 21. E-Mini S&P contracts represent “agreements to buy or sell the cash value of an underlying contract at a specified date in the future. Each contract is sized at a certain value multiplied by the underlying contract’s price. The e-mini S&P 500 . . . has a contract size of $50 times the S&P 500 Index. . . . Like stocks, the value of the contract changes throughout the trading session in response to economic events and market activity.”3 22. Most E-Mini S&P contracts and options on those contracts are purchased on “margin,” although margin debt operates somewhat differently in connection with investment in futures contracts than it does with stock investments. Investopedia explains that: “The concept of margin differs between stock . . . and futures because stock . . . trading involves buying something tangible (part of a company . . . ) and futures trading involves buying or selling a contract whose obligation will be met at a future date. Margin for stock . . . trading is defined as borrowed money, whereas futures margin is considered an initial deposit or an ‘earnest money’ deposit.” 4 23. To invest in and trade E-Mini S&P Option Contracts, Plaintiffs contracted with TD Ameritrade to act as their broker, either directly or through various TD Ameritrade affiliates that have access to the Exchange where E-Mini S&P Option Contracts are traded. 25. Plaintiffs understood and accepted that investments in E-Mini S&P Option Contracts carried substantial investment risk. What Plaintiffs did not know or accept was that TD Ameritrade would act in bad faith in a manner that would operate as a fraud or deceit on Plaintiffs in connection with the liquidation of Plaintiffs’ margin accounts. B. The Events of February 5, 2018 26. Throughout the day on February 5, 2018, the value of several of the stocks that underlie the S&P 500 index fluctuated and, in many instances, dropped. Falling values and fluctuations in the value of the S&P 500 Index caused volatility. This volatility increased the amount and speed at which prices were moving up and down in the market for E-Mini S&P Option Contracts. 27. TD Ameritrade made no effort to force the sale of positions in Plaintiffs’ accounts throughout the trading day for the S&P 500 stocks that underlie the E-Mini S&P Option Contracts. Instead, TD Ameritrade waited until the stock market closed at 3:15 p.m. Central time. 28. In this “after-market,” particularly as a result of the volatility throughout the trading day, there was so little liquidity for E-Mini S&P Option Contracts that there was effectively no real market for the E-Mini S&P Option Contracts. 29. After the markets closed on February 5, TD Ameritrade took full control of Plaintiffs’ accounts. Despite there being virtually no liquidity in the after-hours market, TD Ameritrade liquidated the E-Mini S&P Option Contracts in Plaintiffs’ accounts. 31. Instead of waiting for the market to reopen on February 6, TD Ameritrade phoned its LP’s to liquidate Plaintiffs’ E-Mini S&P Option Contracts overnight. Because of the lack of any competition in the overnight market, these LP’s set the terms for their participation in the transactions. The LP’s set inflated prices and hedged against those positions prior to completing the trades, so as to substantially reduce their downside risk. 32. The liquidation of Plaintiffs’ E-Mini S&P Option Contracts was not done in an arms-length transaction. The terms of the sale were dictated by TD Ameritrade’s chosen LP’s. TD Ameritrade accepted the terms without negotiation or seeking any alternative bids. The liquidation of the E-Mini S&P Option Contracts in Plaintiffs’ accounts, and the accounts of the proposed class members, was accompanied by payment of a substantial “liquidity premium” in an arbitrary amount determined unilaterally by TD Ameritrade’s chosen LP’s. 33. This contrived “market” resulted in large immediate profits for TD Ameritrade’s chosen LP’s at the expense of Plaintiffs. 34. Alternatively, even if TD Ameritrade did not use its LP’s to liquidate some or all of the E-Mini S&P Option Contracts in Plaintiffs’ accounts and instead used an electronic market to liquidate the positions, there was so much volatility and so little liquidity in the “market” for the E-Mini S&P Option Contracts in the accounts of the Plaintiffs and the proposed class members that the liquidation of E-Mini S&P Option Contracts through an electronic market after the close of the underlying stock markets on February 5th was grossly negligent. 36. For example, Plaintiff Rahimi made a purchase of 10 “2500 put” contracts that could have been liquidated by TD Ameritrade at $46.50 each at the market’s closing on February 5. TD Ameritrade liquidated those contracts in the aftermarket at 11:07 p.m. Central time at $116.25 each — figure that was more than two-and-a-half times more expensive to Rahimi. When the market reopened on the morning of February 6, the contracts’ liquidation position stood at about $42 each. Two hours later, they were down to $20.70 each. 37. Similarly, Plaintiff Krukever made a purchase of 294 “2040 put” contracts that could have been liquidated by TD Ameritrade at $4.15 each as the market neared its close on February 5. TD Ameritrade liquidated those contracts in the aftermarket at 8:20 p.m. Central time at $37.25 each — a figure that was approximately nine times more expensive to Krukever. When the market reopened on the morning of February 6, the contracts’ liquidation position stood at about $10.50 each. An hour later, they were down to $1.20 each. 38. Each Plaintiff began February 5 with substantial positive balances in their E-Mini positions. Following TD Ameritrade’s after-market actions, TD Ameritrade contends that each Plaintiff suffered enormous losses in their accounts. TD Ameritrade contends that the substantial positive values in each Plaintiffs’ accounts were eliminated and further that each Plaintiff now owes a substantial deficiency debt to TD Ameritrade. 40. TD Ameritrade’s conduct breached its obligations of good faith, fair dealing and commercial reasonableness to Plaintiffs. TD Ameritrade’s course of business operated as a fraud or deceit upon Plaintiffs in connection with an order to make options on contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery and resulted in substantial damages to Plaintiffs. 41. TD Ameritrade’s conduct was knowing and intentional if not reckless. 42. TD Ameritrade did not suffer actual out-of-pocket losses from the liquidation of Plaintiffs’ E-Mini positions. Any “losses” claimed by TD Ameritrade simply reflect the valuations improperly attributed to Plaintiffs’ E-Mini positions after TD Ameritrade’s after-hours and commercially unreasonable liquidation of Plaintiffs’ accounts substantially destroyed the value of Plaintiffs’ E-Mini S&P Option Contracts. 43. Any recovery by TD Ameritrade on any debt purportedly owed by any Plaintiff due to the prices set by TD Ameritrade’s LPs for the improper liquidation of Plaintiffs’ E-Mini S&P Option Contracts is barred by TD Ameritrade’s bad faith and failure to act in a commercially reasonable manner in contravention of the CEA. 45. Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their directors, officers or employees. 46. This action may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because it meets all the requirements of Rule 23(a)(1-4), including the numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy requirements, and it satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) in that the predominance and superiority requirements are met. 47. Numerosity. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although Plaintiffs do not know the exact number of Class members as of the date of filing, Plaintiffs believe that there are hundreds or thousands of Class members throughout the United States. 49. Typicality. Plaintiffs have claims that are typical of the claims of all of the members of the Class. Plaintiffs’ claims and all of the Class members’ claims arise out of the same uniform course of business employed by TD Ameritrade on February 5 and 6, 2018, and arise under legal theories that apply to the claims of Plaintiffs and all other members of the Class. 50. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiffs do not have claims that are unique to Plaintiffs, nor are there defenses unique to Plaintiffs that could undermine the efficient resolution of the Class’ claims. Further, Plaintiffs are committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action and have retained competent counsel, experienced in class action litigation, to represent it. There is no hostility between Plaintiffs and the unnamed Class Members. Plaintiffs anticipate no difficulty in the management of this litigation as a class action. 51. Predominance. Common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. The only individual issues likely to arise will be the exact amount of damages recovered by each Class member, the calculation of which does not bar certification. 52. Superiority. A class action is superior to all other feasible alternatives for the resolution of this matter. Individual litigation of multiple cases would be highly inefficient and would waste the resources of the courts and of the parties. 54. Defendants have acted similarly with respect to the entire Class by uniformly subjecting Plaintiffs and the Class to the course of business described above. 55. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 54 as if fully set forth herein. 56. Plaintiffs, through TD Ameritrade, made the E-Mini S&P 500 Option Contracts at issue here. The E-Mini S&P 500 Option Contracts are options on contracts for the future delivery of commodities, specifically, an index of securities, as described in the CEA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 25(a)(1)(B) and 6b(e)(3). 57. Through the conduct described above, TD Ameritrade engaged in an act, practice, or course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon Plaintiffs. 58. TD Ameritrade acted as alleged above, directly or indirectly, in connection with Plaintiffs’ making of the E-Mini S&P 500 Options Contracts at issue here. 59. TD Ameritrade’s conduct was in violation of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6b(e)(3). 60. Plaintiffs suffered actual losses as a result of TD Ameritrade’s violation of the 61. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 54 as if fully set forth herein. 63. Through the conduct described above, TD Ameritrade engaged in an act, practice, or course of business which operated as a fraud or deceit upon Plaintiffs. 64. TD Ameritrade acted as alleged above, directly or indirectly, in connection with Plaintiffs’ making of the E-Mini S&P 500 Options Contracts at issue here. 65. TD Ameritrade’s conduct was in violation of the Dodd-Frank amendment to the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1)(D), and regulations promulgated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(3). 66. Plaintiffs suffered actual losses as a result of TD Ameritrade’s violation of the 67. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 54, 56 through 60, and 62 through 66 as if fully set forth herein. 68. Plaintiffs sustained losses as a result of the conduct of TDA, TDAC and TDAFF, acting collectively, here referred to as TD Ameritrade, in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 6b(e)(3) and 17

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant operates CKO KICKBOXING Centers as well as the CKO KICKBOXING website, and offers it to the public and offers features that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that Defendant offers regarding its Fitness Centers (hereinafter, its “Centers”). 21. Defendant operates CKO KICKBOXING Centers across the United States, including its location in New York City at 401 East 84th Street, New York, NY 10028. 22. These Centers constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s Centers provide to the public important services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of information and services including Center locations and hours, access to details regarding its many programs and services, including access to its class schedules, the ability to sign up online for either a membership or free pass, learn about class instructors and membership opportunities, promotional information, and other services available online and in Centers. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Centers. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Centers and the numerous facilities, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 25. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 28. These access barriers have deterred Plaintiff from revisiting Defendant’s website and/or visiting its physical locations, despite an intention to do so. Defendant Must Remove Barriers To Its Website 29. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired consumers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website, despite his intention to do so. 31. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and learn about Defendant’s operations as sighted individuals do. 32. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 33. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 34. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired consumers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Defendant’s Centers are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Centers. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 61. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 64. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 65. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or his civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 76. Defendant’s New York State physical locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is by and integrated with these establishments. 77. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 78. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 83. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 84. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 86. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 87. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 91. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 92. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 93. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 97. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 98. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind consumers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 99. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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21. Defendant is a personal care company that operates its personal care company as well as the Website to the public. The personal care company is located at 110 Grand Street, # B, New York, New York, New York. Defendant’s personal care company constitutes a place of public accommodation. Defendant’s personal care company provides to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services which allow consumers to find information about the personal care company location and hours, skin care products and services, to inquire about pricing and other products available online and in the personal care company for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by the Defendant. 22. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s Website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s personal care company. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s personal care company and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 24. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in February 2020, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s physical location in New York by being unable to learn more information on the location and hours of the personal care company, skin care products and services, inquiries about pricing and other products available online and in the personal care company for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by Defendant. 26. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 27. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical location, and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical personal care company on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the location to purchase skin care products and services. 29. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 30. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually- impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is not sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 31. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 33. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that their permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 34. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently locate Defendant’s personal care company’s locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related products and services via the Website. 36. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 37. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 47. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 48. Defendant’s personal care company is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s personal care company. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 51. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 53. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 55. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 56. Defendant’s physical location is located in the State of New York and constitute a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with this physical location. 57. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical location and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 59. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 71. Defendant’s location is a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishment. 72. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical location in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 73. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical location to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 75. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical location, which Defendant owns, operate and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 84. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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35. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, Defendants transitioned all classes to online delivery effective March 23, 2020.2 36. However, Defendants have refused and continue to refuse to offer any pro-rated tuition discounts as a result of moving classes online. 37. Although Defendants are still offering some level of academic instruction via online classes, Plaintiff and members of the proposed Tuition Class have been and will be deprived of the benefits of on campus learning as set forth more fully above. 38. Moreover, the value of any degree issued on the basis of online or pass/fail classes will be diminished for the rest of their lives. 39. Although Defendants have refused and continue to refuse to reduce tuition for Spring semester students, they have determined, upon information and belief, that students expecting to take Summer classes in person (who will now be forced to take them online) will be charged the distance education rate as opposed to the normal rate for such classes.3 41. Likewise, all university in-person events, meetings, and travel have been canceled.4 42. The following University services or facilities, among others, have been suspended and/or closed: all recreation and wellness facilities; Career Services; Center for Counseling & Student Development; most dining facilities; Dowdy Student Stores; all libraries; the Student Center; the Pirate Academic Success Center; all residence halls; the Speech Communication Center; most transit services; and the University Writing Center. 43. These embody exactly the facilities and services for which the fees described in Paragraph 28 are intended to cover. 44. Plaintiff and members of the proposed Fees Class have been and will be deprived of utilizing these services for which they have already paid. 45. To date, Defendants have not announced any plans to discount these fees. 47. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and as a class action, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following Classes: The Tuition Class: All people who paid tuition for or on behalf of students enrolled in classes at the University for the Spring 2020 semester who were denied live in-person instruction and forced to use online distance learning platforms for the latter portion of that semester. The Fees Class: All people who paid fees for or on behalf of students enrolled in classes at the University for the Spring 2020 semester. 48. Excluded from the Classes are The Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina and any of their respective members, affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, officers, directors, employees, successors, or assigns; and the judicial officers, and their immediate family members, and Court staff assigned to this case. Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify or amend the Class definitions, as appropriate, during the course of this litigation. 49. Certification of Plaintiff’s claims for class-wide treatment is appropriate because Plaintiff can prove the elements of her claims on a class-wide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claims. 50. This action has been brought and may be properly maintained on behalf of the Class proposed herein under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Numerosity: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 53. Plaintiff’s claim is typical of the other Class member’s claims because, among other things, all Class members were similarly situated and were comparably injured through Defendants' wrongful conduct as set forth herein. Adequacy: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) 54. Plaintiff is an adequate Class representative because her interests do not conflict with the interests of other members of the Class she seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex litigation; and Plaintiff intends to prosecute the action vigorously. The Class’s interests will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and her counsel. Superiority: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) 56. Even if Class members could afford individual litigation, the Court system likely could not. Individualized litigation creates a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and increases the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, comprehensive supervision by a single court, and finality of the litigation. Certification of Specific Issues: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) 57. To the extent that a Class does not meet the requirements of Rules 23(b)(2) or (b)(3), Plaintiff seeks the certification of issues that will drive the litigation toward resolution. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) 58. The University has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and the other Class members, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and declaratory relief, as described herein, with respect to the Class members as a whole. 59. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 60. Plaintiff brings this count on behalf of herself and other members of the Tuition Class. 62. Plaintiff and other members of the Tuition Class fulfilled their end of the bargain when they paid tuition for the Spring 2020 semester either out-of-pocket or by using student loan financing. 63. The University breached the contract with Plaintiff and the Tuition Class by moving all classes for the Spring 2020 semester to online distance learning platforms, without reducing or refunding tuition accordingly. 64. The University retained tuition monies paid by Plaintiff and other members of the Tuition Class, without providing them the full benefit of their bargain. 65. Plaintiff and other members of the Tuition Class have suffered damage as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach, including but not limited to being deprived of the value of the services the tuition was intended to cover, namely live in-person instruction in a physical classroom. 66. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach, Plaintiff and the Tuition Class are legally and equitably entitled to damages, to be decided by the trier of fact in this action, to include but not be limited to disgorgement of the difference between the value of the online learning which is being provided versus the value of the live in-person instruction in a physical classroom that was contracted for. 67. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 69. The University has received a benefit at the expense of Plaintiff and other members of the Tuition Class to which it is not entitled. 70. Plaintiff and other members of the Tuition Class paid substantial tuition for live in-person instruction in physical classrooms and did not receive the full benefit of the bargain. 71. Plaintiff and other members of the Tuition Class conferred this benefit on Defendants when they paid the tuition. 72. Plaintiff and other members of the Tuition Class did not confer this benefit gratuitously. 73. Defendants have realized this benefit by accepting such payment. 74. Defendants have retained this benefit, even though Defendants have failed to provide the access and services for which the tuition was collected, making Defendants' retention unjust under the circumstances. 75. Equity and good conscience requires that the University return a portion of the monies paid in tuition to Plaintiff and other members of the Tuition Class. 76. Defendants should be required to disgorge this unjust enrichment. 77. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 78. Plaintiff brings this count on behalf of herself and other members of the Fees Class. 80. Plaintiff and other members of the Fees Class fulfilled their end of the bargain when they paid these fees for the Spring 2020 semester either out-of-pocket or by using student financing, or otherwise. 81. The University breached the contract with Plaintiff and the Fees Class by moving all classes for the Spring 2020 semester to online distance learning platforms, constructively evicting students from campus, and closing most campus buildings and facilities. 82. The University retained fees paid by Plaintiff and other members of the Fees Class, without providing them the full benefit of their bargain. 83. Plaintiff and other members of the Fees Class have suffered damage as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach, including but not limited to being deprived of the value of the benefits and services the fees were intended to cover. 84. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach, Plaintiff and the Fees Class are legally and equitably entitled to damages, to be decided by the trier of fact in this action, to include but not be limited to disgorgement of the pro-rata amount of fees that was collected but for which access and services were not provided. 85. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 86. Plaintiff brings this count on behalf of herself and other members of the Fees Class. 87. The University has received a benefit at the expense of Plaintiff and other members of the Fees Class to which it is not entitled. 89. Plaintiff and other members of the Fees Class conferred this benefit on Defendants when they paid the fees. 90. Plaintiff and other members of the Fees Class did not confer this benefit gratuitously. 91. Defendants have realized this benefit by accepting such payment. 92. Defendants have retained this benefit, even though Defendants have failed to provide the access and services for which the fees were collected, making Defendants' retention unjust under the circumstances. 93. Equity and good conscience requires that the University return a pro-rata portion of the monies paid in fees to Plaintiff and other members of the Fees Class. 94. Defendants should be required to disgorge this unjust enrichment. BREACH OF CONTRACT (Plaintiff and Other Members of the Fees Class) BREACH OF CONTRACT (Plaintiff and Other Members of the Tuition Class) UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Plaintiff and Other Members of the Tuition Class) UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Plaintiff and Other Members of the Fees Class)

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(Breach Of Express Warranty) (Breach Of The Implied Warranty Of Merchantability) (Breach Of Implied Warranty Of Fitness For A Particular Purpose) (Unjust Enrichment) (Violation Of The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq.) (Violation Of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Civil Code § 1750, et seq.) (Violation Of California’s False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, et seq. 113. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 114. Plaintiff brings this Count VIII individually and on behalf of the members of the California Subclass against all Defendants. 115. California’s False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, et seq. (“FAL”), makes it “unlawful for any person to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the public in this state, ... in any advertising device ... or in any other manner or means whatever, including over the Internet, any statement, concerning ... personal property or services, professional or otherwise, or performance or disposition thereof, which is untrue or misleading and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.” Case4:13-cv-04361-DMR Document1 Filed09/19/13 Page29 of 37 29 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (Violation Of The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) 120. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 121. Plaintiff brings this Count IX individually and on behalf of the members of the California Subclass against all Defendants. 122. Plaintiff Smith and the members of the California Subclass are “retail buyers” within the meaning of Section 1791(b) of the California Civil Code. 123. Defendants’ Defective Washing Machines are “consumer goods” within the meaning of Section 1791(a) of the California Civil Code. Case4:13-cv-04361-DMR Document1 Filed09/19/13 Page30 of 37 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (Violation Of The Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.) 104. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 105. Plaintiff brings this Count VII individually and on behalf of the members of the California Subclass against all Defendants. Case4:13-cv-04361-DMR Document1 Filed09/19/13 Page27 of 37 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15. The Defective Washing Machines include six models of automatic washing machines manufactured by Defendant LG: LG brand WT5001CW, WT5101HV, and WT5101HW, and Kenmore Elite brand models 29002, 29272, and 29278. The washing machines are a top-load style manufactured in beige, white and graphite colors. 16. Defendant LG manufactured, produced, and/or distributed the Defective Washing Machines to several leading retailers including Home Depot, Sears, Kmart, and Best Buy. 17. Three of the defective models were sold under the Kenmore brand name. Kenmore is a brand of household appliances established by Sears, and sold exclusively at Sears and Kmart. Kenmore products bear the Kenmore brand label, but are produced by various third-party Case4:13-cv-04361-DMR Document1 Filed09/19/13 Page6 of 37 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 50. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class defined as all persons in the United States who purchased a Defective Washing Machines (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are persons who made such purchase for purpose of resale. 51. Plaintiff also seeks to represent a subclass of all Class Members who have purchased the Defective Washing Machines in California (the “California Subclass”). 52. Members of the Class and Subclass are so numerous that their individual joinder herein is impracticable. Defendants sold approximately 457,000 units of the Defective Washing Machines between 2010 and 2012. The precise number of Class and Subclass Members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff Smith at this time but may be determined through discovery. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail and/or publication through the distribution records of Defendants and third party retailers and vendors. Case4:13-cv-04361-DMR Document1 Filed09/19/13 Page16 of 37 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 58. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. Case4:13-cv-04361-DMR Document1 Filed09/19/13 Page18 of 37 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 68. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 69. Plaintiff brings this Count II individually and on behalf of the members of the Class against all Defendants. 70. In connection with the sale of the Defective Washing Machines, Defendants issued written Express Warranties. Defendants, as the designers, manufacturers, marketers, distributors, or sellers expressly warranted that the Defective Washing Machines were fit for their intended purpose as High Efficiency washing machines by making the Express Warranties to Plaintiff and the Class. Case4:13-cv-04361-DMR Document1 Filed09/19/13 Page20 of 37 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 74. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 75. Plaintiff brings this Count III individually and on behalf of the members of the Class against all Defendants. 76. Defendants are “merchants” as to the Defective Washing Machines within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). Defendants manufactured, distributed and marketed the Defective Washing Machines, which are “goods” within the meaning of the UCC. Consequently, Defendants impliedly warranted that the Defective Washing Machines were merchantable, including that they could pass without objection in the trade under the contract description, that they were fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used, that they were of fair average quality within the description, that they were adequately labeled, and that they would conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on their containers or labels. However, each of these implied warranties was false. 77. In reliance on Defendants’ skill and judgment and the implied warranties of fitness for the purpose, Plaintiff and Class Members purchased the Defective Washing Machines for use as residential washing machines. 78. The Defective Washing Machines were not altered by Plaintiff and Class Members. 79. The Defective Washing Machines were defective when they left the exclusive control of Defendants. 80. Defendants knew the Defective Washing Machines would be purchased and used without additional testing for efficacy by Plaintiff and Class Members. 81. The Defective Washing Machines were defectively designed and unfit for their intended purpose, and Plaintiff and Class Members did not receive the goods as warranted. Case4:13-cv-04361-DMR Document1 Filed09/19/13 Page22 of 37 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 84. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 85. Plaintiff bring this Count IV individually and on behalf of the members of the Class against all Defendants. Case4:13-cv-04361-DMR Document1 Filed09/19/13 Page23 of 37 23 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 90. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 91. Plaintiff brings this Count V individually and on behalf of the members of the Class against all Defendants. Case4:13-cv-04361-DMR Document1 Filed09/19/13 Page24 of 37 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 96. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 97. Plaintiff brings this Count VI individually and on behalf of the members of the California Subclass against all Defendants. 98. In connection with the sale of the Defective Washing Machines, Defendants represented that the Defective Washing Machines: (i) “will provide many years of reliable service”; (ii) “[are] designed and manufactured for years of dependable service”; (iii) were capable of operating “extra high” spin speed cycles at the advertised 1050-1100 RPMs; (iv) were Energy Case4:13-cv-04361-DMR Document1 Filed09/19/13 Page25 of 37 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 The Defective Washing Machines

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(Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability) 104. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each ofthe above allegations as iffully set forth herein. (Unjust Enrichment) I 0 I. Plaintiff repeats and rea lieges each of the above allegations as if fully set forth herein. (Violation of A.C.A. § 4-88-101 et seq.) 42. Food manufacturers are required to comply with state laws and regulations that govern the labeling of food products. First and foremost among these is the A.C.A. § 20-56-201, et seq. 43. Arkansas law provides in relevant part that food shall be deemed misbranded "[i]f its labeling is false or misleading in any particular." Arkansas also discourages the misbranding of food through the availability of remedies pursuant to the state's consumer protection laws. Therefore, any labeling violation of A.C.A. § 20-56-20 I, et seq, is also a violation of Arkansas common law and the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. B. Defendant's Use of "All Natural" is Unlawful 45. Defendants unlawfully labeled some of its food products as being "All Natural," when they actually contain artificial ingredients and flavorings, artificial coloring and chemical preservatives. For example, Defendant's 365 Everyday Value Cola bought by Plaintiff is represented to be "All Natural," but contains caramel coloring, tartaric acid, citric acid and carbon dioxide. Defendant's 365 Everyday Value Ginger Ale and Root Beer bought by Plaintiff are represented to be "All Natural," but contain caramel coloring, citric acid and carbon dioxide. 46. Plaintiff purchased Whole Foods' 365 Everyday Value sodas throughout the Class Period, including 365 Everyday Value Cola, 365 Everyday Value Ginger Ale and 365 Everyday Value Root Beer, in reliance on Defendant's false representations that the products were "All Natural." Had Plaintiff known this representation was false, she would not have purchased the products or paid a premium for them. 47. Consumers reasonably expect that products carrying an "All Natural" claim must not contain any artificial flavoring, color ingredients, chemical preservatives, or artificial or synthetic ingredients, and be only minimally processed by a process that does not fundamentally alter the raw product. A reasonable consumer would understand that "natural" products do not contain synthetic, artificial or excessively processed ingredients. 49. The term "organic" adds a premium to food products and makes them appear fresher, minimally processed and safer. Seeking to profit from consumers' desire for organic food products and recognizing that the labeling of products as "Organic" implicitly conveys to consumers that the products carry health benefits important to consumers, Whole Foods has falsely represented its Whole Foods Products as "Organic" when that is not true. On the principal display panel of its product labels, Whole Foods claims that such products are "Organic" despite the fact that they contain nonorganic ingredients that preclude the labeling of the very types of products at issue here as being "organic." 50. Defendant unlawfully labeled some of its food products as being "Organic," when they actually contain nonorganic. For example, Defendant's 365 Everyday Value Organic Tomato Ketchup and 365 Everyday Value Organic Chicken Broth bought by Plaintiff is represented to be "Organic," but contains nonorganic ingredients. 51. Plaintiff purchased Whole Foods' 365 Everyday Value Organic Tomato Ketchup and 365 Everyday Value Organic Chicken Broth in reliance on Defendant's false representations that the products were "Organic." Had Plaintiff known this representation was false, she would not have purchased the products or paid a premium for them. 53. Consumers are thus misled into purchasing Defendant's products with ingredients that are not natural as falsely represented on their labeling. Defendant's products in this respect are misbranded under Arkansas law. Plaintiff did not know, and had no reason to know, that the Purchased Products were misbranded, and bore natural claims despite failing to meet the requirements to make those natural claims. Plaintiff would not have bought these products had they been accurately labeled and disclosed the information required by law. Because of this improper manner in which ingredients were described, Plaintiff purchased Defendant's products and paid premiums for them. Defendants have violated these referenced regulations and thlls misled Plaintiff and the Class who were injured as a result and suffered economic loss. D. Defendant has Knowingly Violated Arkansas Laws 54. Defendant has violated A.C.A. § 20-56-209 by, inter alia, failing to reveal material facts on the label of Defendant's Misbrand Food Product. 55. Defendant has violated Arkansas A.C.A. § 20-56-209 because Defendant's Misbranded Food Products are fabricated from two (2) or more ingredients, but fail to utilize the common or usual name of each ingredient on their labeling. 56. Defendant has violated Arkansas A.C.A. § 20-56-209 because words, statements, or other information required pursuant to Arkansas's food labeling laws to appear on the label or labeling are not prominently placed upon the label or labeling with conspicuousness, as compared with other words, statements, designs, or devices in the labeling and in terms as to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual under customary conditions of purchase and use. 58. Defendant has violated Arkansas A.C.A. § 20-56-215 which make it unlawful to manufacture, sell, deliver, hold, or offer to sell any misbranded food. 59. Defendant has violated Arkansas A.C.A. § 20-56-214 and§ 20-56-215 which make it unlawful to falsely or misleadingly advertise food or food. 60. Defendant has a duty to disclose the true nature of the contents of Defendant's Misbranded Food Products and failed to abide by that duty. 61. Significantly, the food labeling laws of Arkansas, Defendant's violations of the food labeling laws of Arkansas (including all of the aforementioned provisions) are strict liability crimes for which no showing of intent to deceive or defraud is required. 62. Under the food labeling laws of Arkansas, it is a strict liability crime to, inter alia, manufacture, sell, deliver, hold, or offer for sale any food that is misbranded. 63. By manufacturing and selling misbranded products, Defendant has committed a predicate unlawful act, regardless of any misrepresentation or reliance thereon. 64. Because Defendant's Misbranded Food Products are misbranded and illegal they have a value of zero. Plaintiff and other consumers were injured when paying money for a worthless product. E. Plaintiff Purchased Defendant's Misbranded Food Product 65. Plaintiff cares about the nutritional content of food and seeks to maintain a healthy diet. 67. At point of sale, Plaintiff did not know, and had no reason to know, that the Purchased Products was unlawful and misbranded as set forth herein, and would not have bought the product had Plaintiff known the truth about it, i.e., that the product was illegal to purchase and possess. 68. After Plaintiff learned that Defendant's Purchased Products was falsely labeled, Plaintiff stopped purchasing them. 69. As a result of Defendant's unlawful misrepresentations, Plaintiff and thousands of others in Arkansas purchased the Purchased Product. 70. Defendant's labeling as alleged herein is false and misleading and was designed to increase sales of the product at issue. Defendant's misrepresentations are part of its systematic labeling practice and a reasonable person would attach importance to Defendant's misrepresentations in determining whether to purchase the product at issue. 71. A reasonable person would also attach importance to whether Defendant's product is "misbranded," i.e., legally salable, and capable of legal possession, and to Defendant's representations about these issues in determining whether to purchase the product at issue. Plaintiff would not have purchased Defendant's product had Plaintiff known it was not capable of being legally sold or held. 73. Plaintiff cares about the nutritional content of food and seeks to maintain a healthy diet. During the class period, Plaintiff read the labels on Defendant's Misbranded Food Products before purchasing the product. Based on those representations, Plaintiff purchased the Whole Foods Products at grocery stores and third-party retailers in and around Little Rock, Arkansas. At point of sale, Plaintiff did not know, and had no reason to know, that Defendant's claims on its label were unlawful and unauthorized as set forth herein. Had Plaintiff known Defendant's product that Plaintiff purchased were not "All Natural" and/or "Organic," Plaintiff would not have purchased the product. As a result, Plaintiff suffered injury-in-fact and lost money. 74. Plaintiff seeks to avoid and/or minimize unnatural and nonorganic ingredients in the food products that Plaintiff purchases. At the time Plaintiff read the label of the Whole Foods, Plaintiff attempted to determine whether the Whole Foods Products contained unnatural or nonorganic ingredients by reading the ingredient list. When Plaintiff read the ingredient list of the Whole Foods Products to determine if unnatural or nonorganic ingredients had been added, none were listed, thus Plaintiff was led to believe that the Whole Foods Products that Plaintiff purchased did not contain unnatural or nonorganic ingredients. 75. Plaintiff was deceived because the Whole Foods Products were not "All Natural" or "Organic." 76. Defendant's labeling, advertising and marketing as alleged herein are false and misleading and were designed to increase sales of the products at issue. Defendant's misrepresentations and material omissions are part of an extensive labeling, advertising and marketing campaign, and a reasonable person would attach importance to Defendant's misrepresentations and material omissions in determining whether to purchase the products at issue. 78. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to the Arkansas Rule of Procedure 23 on behalf of the following class: 88. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each of the above allegations as if fully set forth herein. 89. Defendant's conduct constitutes unlawful deceptive and unconscionable trade practices. Defendant's conduct was consumer-oriented and this conduct had broad impact on consumers at large. Defendant engaged in false, misleading and unlawful advertising, marketing and labeling of Defendant's Misbranded Food Products. Defendant's manufacturing, distribution and sale of Defendant's Misbranded Food Products were similarly unlawful. 90. Defendant unlawfully sold Defendant's Misbranded Food Products tn Arkansas during the Class Period. 91. As fully alleged above, by advertising, marketing, distributing and selling mislabeled and misbranded Defendant's Misbranded Food Products to Plaintiff and other members of the Class who purchased Defendant's Misbranded Food Products in Arkansas, Defendant engaged in, and continue to engage in, unlawful deceptive and unconscionable trade practices. 92. Defendant's misleading marketing, advertising, packaging and labeling of Defendant's Misbranded Food Products were likely to deceive reasonable consumers. 94. Defendant has engaged in unlawful deceptive and unconscionable trade practices. 95. Plaintiff and other members of the Class who purchased Defendant's Misbranded Food Products in Arkansas were injured by Defendant's unlawful deceptive and unconscionable trade practices. 96. Defendant's fraud and deception caused Plaintiff and other members of the Class who purchased Defendant's Misbranded Food Products in Arkansas to purchase Defendant's Misbranded Food Products that they would otherwise not have purchased had Plaintiff known the true nature of these products. 97. Plaintiff and other members of the Class who purchased Defendant's Misbranded Food Products in Arkansas were injured as a result of Defendant's unlawful deceptive and unconscionable trade practices. 98. In violation of the labeling laws of the state of Arkansas and A.C.A. §§ 4-88- I 07 and 4-88- I 08, Defendant sold to Plaintiff and the members of the Class who purchased Defendant's Misbranded Food Products in Arkansas, a product that was not capable of being sold legally, and which has no economic value. Defendant's violation of A.C.A. §§ 4-88-107 and 4-88- I 08 remains ongoing. 99. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant violation of A.C.A. §§ 4-88-1 07 and 4- 88-108, Plaintiff and the members of the Class who purchased Defendant's Misbranded Food Products in Arkansas were injured when they paid for this illegal and worthless products. Plaintiff and the members of the Class who purchased Defendant's Misbranded Food Products in Arkansas have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. A. Identical Arkansas Laws Regulate Food Labeling DIVISION CONNIE STAFFORD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, -against-

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21. On August 3, 2016, Banner first acknowledged in a public statement (the “Statement”) that beginning on June 23, 2016, hackers gained unauthorized access to Banner Health’s computer servers. 22. According to the Statement, Banner’s initial discovery was that the attackers targeted payment card data, including cardholder names, card numbers, expiration dates, and security codes, for payment cards used at Banner facilities across the country. 23. Banner has identified that food and beverage outlets affected during the two-week period between June 23 and July 7, 2016 are located in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, and Wyoming.6 24. According to Banner Health, this portion of the cyberattack continued until July 7, 2016 – the date on which Banner Health supposedly first learned of the data breach. Banner Health merely stated that it “worked quickly to block the attackers”7 without providing any more information as to what steps it took to stop the attack and to ensure that the attack would not continue or resume, or that its servers would not be subjected to another attack of this type. 25. Also in its Statement, Banner identified that on July 13 it subsequently learned that the attack ran deeper than the credit card information attack that began on June 23. Banner announced that beginning a week earlier on June 17, 2016, attackers “may have” gained unauthorized access to patient information, health plan member and beneficiary information, and information about physicians and healthcare providers. 27. Although Banner has not been able to identify with any sense of certainty the extent of the attack or the exact information and data obtained by the attackers, Banner Health spokesman Bill Byron identified that the attack is “extensive throughout the [Banner Health] network.”9 28. Banner did not make it a top priority to report this breach to its customers immediately. It was only on August 3, 2016 – almost an entire month after Banner learned of this breach – that Banner Health decided it would issue the Statement acknowledging the cyberattack. 29. The Statement is underwhelming. The lack of details contained in the Statement signals that Banner is either withholding information from the public (most importantly its customers) or that, despite the passage of nearly two months since the attack began, Banner has been unable to determine critical details concerning the breach, including the extent of the breach and the volume of compromised information. 31. The letter that has been sent or that is being sent by Banner to affected customers is equally devoid of information and details regarding the breach. The letter identifies: the barebones details of the timeline of the data breach; that customer information (names, birthdates, addresses, clinical information, Social Security numbers, insurance information, etc.) “may have” been obtained by attackers; that affected customers are being offered one year of free credit-monitoring services from Kroll; and – without providing any information regarding how the breach actually occurred or the exact measures that Banner will take going forward – that Banner is “further enhancing the security of [its] systems to help prevent something like this from happening again.” See, e.g., Exhibit A. 33. Banner has even had the audacity to implore customers to resume using payment cards at Banner facilities so that it can continue to make money, stating that customers can do so “with confidence.”12 But customers like Plaintiff and Class Members are anything but confident that their information is secure and will not be used to perpetrate future crimes – including identity theft – in light of Banner’s nonchalant response to this incident. 34. Banner’s response to this incident is particularly egregious given the number and magnitude of data breaches experienced across the United States recently. 35. Over the past couple of years, large data breaches and cyberattacks have become somewhat commonplace, as evidenced by the widely publicized incidents at Target, Home Depot, Anthem, and many others. With 3.7 million potentially affected customers, the Banner Health breach is the largest of 2016 and would be the eighth largest attack according to HHS’ Office for Civil Rights. As a result of the frequency of these types of cyber security breaches, companies that store and maintain confidential and highly sensitive information must develop, implement, and maintain up-to-date data security and retention policies that reduce the risk of cyberattack and unauthorized release of this information. But many companies do not take these precautions or the measures taken fall short of being adequate. 37. According to another cyber security expert, Chris Ensey, chief operating officer of Dunbar Security Solutions in Hunt Valley, Maryland, following a breach of this magnitude a company’s IT personnel would need to restart the entire network from scratch and reset all the components of the network to the state they were in when they arrived from the factory in order to be certain the breach has been fixed. He also identified that there is a chance hackers created a “back door” in the initial breach that may not be caught. Ensey stated “That would make me, if I were in the shoes of the folks there, really struggle with being able to sleep at night for a while, until they had the opportunity to do a complete overhaul . . . .”14 38. But Banner merely identifies that it is still investigating to find out exactly what happened, and spokesman Byron said he cannot say when the investigation will be concluded, stating “I don’t know that there is a timeline . . . The goal is to complete the investigation.”15 40. Victims of Banner’s data breach face a number of other frustrating and challenging hurdles. For example, victims of a data breach of this type face imminent risk of health insurance discrimination. Individuals risk denial of coverage, improper “redlining,” and denial or difficulty obtaining disability or employment benefits because information was improperly disclosed to a provider. 41. Victims of healthcare data breaches are also particularly susceptible to tax return fraud. It is estimated that in 2016 there will be $21 billion in losses due to fraudulent tax refunds, and data breaches are large factor contributing to this reality. The U.S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration has recognized that “[t]he increasing number of data breaches in the private and public sectors means more personal information than ever before is available to unscrupulous individuals.”17 43. Despite having knowledge of the recent wave of high-profile data breaches and the need for heightened security measures, Banner Health failed to develop, implement, and maintain data security and retention policies that reflect industry standards. Had Banner done so, it would have both detected the breach earlier and helped reduce the severity of the breach, or potentially would have prevented the breach entirely. 44. This catastrophic and complete failure by Banner resulted in increased exposure to data breaches, and caused the release of consumers’ personal and medical data. The release of this information will likely lead to identity theft and fraud-related issues for the months and years to come. 45. Furthermore, there is no indication by its words or deeds that Banner is approaching and responding to this security catastrophe with an utter and necessary sense of urgency. 46. As of the date of this Complaint, there is no indication as to whether Banner Health has implemented recommended security improvements, leaving Plaintiff and Class Members’ data vulnerable to future data breaches. 47. Plaintiff brings this action on her own behalf, and on behalf of the following Class pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) and (3): All former or present Banner Health patients, health plan members or health plan beneficiaries, food and beverage customers, or medical and healthcare providers who had their personal, medical, financial, or other sensitive information compromised as a result of the data breach of Banner Health’s computer servers that began on June 17, 2016. 49. Numerosity: Members of the Class are so numerous that their individual joinder is impracticable, as the proposed Class appears to include millions of members who are geographically dispersed. While the precise number of Class members has not yet been determined, Banner Health has admitted that the medical, financial, and/or personal identification records of approximately 3.7 million patients, health plan members (and their beneficiaries), food and beverage customers, and physicians and healthcare providers were likely compromised in the data breach. 50. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Plaintiff and all members of the Class were injured through Banner’s uniform misconduct. The same event and conduct that gave rise to Plaintiff’s claims are identical to those that give rise to the claims of every other Class member because Plaintiff and each member of the Class had their data compromised in the same way by the same conduct by Banner. 51. Adequacy: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class that they seek to represent; Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and highly experienced in class-action litigation; and Plaintiff and her counsel intend to prosecute this action vigorously. The interests of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and her counsel. 54. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates all previous allegations. 55. Banner required Plaintiff and Class Members to submit sensitive personal, medical, and financial information order to obtain services. 57. Banner further owed a duty to Plaintiff and Class members to implement processes that would detect a breach of its security system in a timely manner and to timely act upon warnings and alerts, including those generated by its own security systems. 58. Banner owed a duty to Plaintiff and members of the Class to provide security consistent with industry standards and requirements, to ensure that its computer systems and networks, and the personnel responsible for them, adequately protected the medical, financial, and personal information of Plaintiff and members of the Class whose confidential data Banner obtained and maintained. 59. Banner Health owed a duty to timely and accurately disclose to Plaintiff and members of the Class that their medical, financial, and personal information had been or was reasonably believed to have been compromised. Timely disclosure was required, appropriate, and necessary so that, among other things, Plaintiff and members of the Class could take appropriate measures to avoid identity theft if possible. 60. Banner knew, or should have known, of the risks inherent in collecting and storing the medical, financial, and personal information of Plaintiff and members of the Class and of the critical importance of providing adequate security of that information. 61. Banner’s conduct created a foreseeable risk of harm to Plaintiff and members of the Class. This conduct included but was not limited to Banner’s failure to take the steps and opportunities to prevent and stop the data breach as described in this Complaint. Banner’s conduct also included its decision not to comply with industry standards for the safekeeping and maintenance of the medical, financial, and personal information of Plaintiff and Class members. 63. To the extent a “special relationship” is required as between Banner, on the one hand, and Plaintiff and Class members, on the other hand, a “special relationship” exists between Banner and the Plaintiff and Class Members. Banner entered into a “special relationship” with the Plaintiff and Class Members whose personal information was requested, collected, and received by Banner as a prerequisite to rendering services. A “special relationship” also exists between Banner, on the one hand, and Plaintiff and Class members, on the other hand, because Banner is a provider of health and health plan services and thus stands in a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff and Class Members. Banner entered into a “special relationship” with Plaintiff and Class Members by placing their personal information on Banner’s computer servers – information that Plaintiff and Class Members had been required to provide to Banner. Furthermore, Banner also created a “special relationship” with Plaintiff and Class Members who provided their information to Banner by playing a large in role in creating and maintaining centralized computer systems and data security practices that were used for storage of all of Banner customers’ personal information. 64. Banner breached the duties it owed to Plaintiff and members of the Class by failing to exercise reasonable care and implement adequate security systems, protocols, and practices sufficient to protect the medical, financial, and personal information of Plaintiff and members of the Class, as identified above. This breach was a proximate cause of injuries and damages suffered by Plaintiff and Class members. 65. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates all previous allegations. 66. Pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §45), Banner had a duty to provide fair and adequate computer systems and data security practices to safeguard Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ personal information. 67. Pursuant to HIPAA (42 U.S.C. § 1302d et seq.), Banner had a duty to implement reasonable safeguards to protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ personal information. 68. Pursuant to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. § 6801), Banner had a duty to protect the security and confidentiality of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ personal information. 69. Pursuant to Arizona state law, Banner had a duty to Plaintiff and Class Members to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices to safeguard Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ personal information. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 75. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates all previous allegations. 76. Banner negligently and recklessly misrepresented material facts pertaining to the sale of health benefits services to Plaintiff and Class Members by representing that it would maintain adequate data privacy and security practices and procedures to safeguard Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ personal and sensitive information from unauthorized disclosure, release, data breaches, and theft. 77. Banner negligently and recklessly misrepresented material facts pertaining to the sale of health benefits services to Plaintiff and Class Members by representing that they did and would comply with the requirements of relevant federal and state laws pertaining to the privacy and security of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ personal information. 78. Because of the inadequacy of their security systems and data protection systems, Banner either knew or should have known that their representations were not true. 79. In reliance upon these misrepresentations, Plaintiff and Class Members purchased health benefits services from Banner. 81. As direct and proximate consequence of Banner’s negligent misrepresentations, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered the injuries alleged herein. 82. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates all previous allegations. 83. Plaintiff and Class Members conferred a monetary benefit on Banner in the form of monies paid for the purchase of health benefits services. 84. Banner appreciated or had knowledge of the benefits conferred upon them by Plaintiff and Class Members. 85. The monies for health benefits services that Plaintiff and Class Members paid (directly or indirectly) to Banner were supposed to be used by Banner, in part, to pay for the administrative costs of reasonable data privacy and security practices and procedures. 86. As a result of Banner’s conduct, Plaintiff and Class Members suffered actual damages in an amount equal to the difference in value between health benefit services with the reasonable data privacy and security practices and procedures that Plaintiff and Class Members paid for, and the inadequate health benefits services without reasonable data privacy and security practices and procedures that they received. 88. Banner should be compelled to disgorge into a common fund for the benefit of Plaintiff and Class Members all unlawful or inequitable proceeds received by it. 89. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates all previous allegations. 90. Plaintiff Clark brings this claim on behalf of herself and the Class. 91. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the ACFA, which provides in pertinent part: The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, deceptive or unfair act or practice, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely on such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is declared to be an unlawful practice. Id. § 44-1522. 92. Plaintiff Clark and members of the Class are “persons” as defined by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1521(6), Banner provides “services” as that term is included in the definition of “merchandise” under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1521(5), and Banner is engaged in the “sale” of “merchandise” as defined by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1521(7). 95. Defendant intended that Plaintiff and the Class rely on its deceptive and unfair acts and practices, misrepresentations, and the concealment, suppression, and omission of material facts, in connection with Banner’s offering of medical services and incorporating Plaintiff’s and Class members’ sensitive information on its computer servers, in violation of the AFCA. 96. Banner also engaged in unfair acts and practices, in connection with the sale of health benefits services by failing to maintain the privacy and security of Class Members’ personal information, in violation of duties imposed by and public policies reflected in applicable federal and state laws, resulting in the data breach. These unfair acts and practices violated duties imposed by laws including the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45), HIPAA (42 U.S.C. § 1302d et seq.), and the Gramm- Leach-Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. § 6801), and the Arizona Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-2113). 97. Banner’s wrongful practices occurred in the course of trade or commerce. 98. Banner’s wrongful practices were and are injurious to the public interest because those practices were part of a generalized course of conduct on the part of Banner that applied to all Class members and were repeated continuously before and after Banner obtained confidential medical, financial, and personal data concerning Plaintiff and Class members. All Class members have been adversely affected by Banner’s conduct and the public was and is at risk as a result thereof. Negligence (Individually and on Behalf of the Class) Negligent Misrepresentation (Individually and on Behalf of the Class) Unjust Enrichment (Individually and on Behalf of the Class) Violation of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§44-1521, et seq. (“ACFA”) (Individually and on behalf of the Class)

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