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16. Defendants manufacture, distribute, market, and sell the IGF-1 Plus line of health supplements on a nationwide basis. 17. Defendants presently offer six forms of the IGF-1 Plus products: (a) Super Max 200,000ng; (b) Maximum 100,000ng; (c) Ultra Plus 25,000ng; (d) Ultra 10,000ng; (e) Starter Plus 5,000ng; and (f) Starter 3,000ng. The products are nearly identical in their chemical composition: they each contain deer antler velvet (cervidae parvum comu) and stevia extract (leaves). The only differences are the amounts of deer antler velvet and stevia extract, and that the Super Max and Maximum IGF-1 Plus products come in a dropper form rather than a spray. The advertising and marketing messages for the products are nearly identical. See Exhibit A. All IGF-1 Plus products claim to have clinically tested components, and all products claim they build lean muscle mass, speed recovery time, promote healthy joints, and increase libido. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the actual quantity of deer antler velvet in any of the products is irrelevant because it is completely ineffectual when delivered to the human body in the droplet form. 18. The IGF-1 Plus products are sold throughout California and the United States via the Nutronics website. 19. Since the launch of the IGF-1 Plus products, Defendants have consistently conveyed the message to consumers throughout California and nationwide that the IGF-1 Plus products ingredients will help “build lean muscle mass and speed[] their recovery time,” “boost your energy levels,” and “promote sexual performance and function by raising libido.” While the main component of the IGF-1 Plus products, IGF-1, has been Case No. 6 39. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and seeks certification of the following Class: All persons who purchased the IGF-1 Plus products in California. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, and directors, those who purchased the IGF-1 Plus products for the purpose of resale, and those who assert claims for personal injury. 40. Numerosity. Members of the Class are so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the proposed Class contains many thousands of members. The precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff. 41. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. The common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to, the following: Case No. 14 46. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 47. Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive and equitable relief on behalf of the entire Class, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, to enjoin and prevent Defendants from engaging in the acts described, and requiring Defendants to provide full restitution to Plaintiff and Class members. 48. Unless a Class is certified, Defendants will retain monies that were taken from Plaintiff and Class members as a result of their conduct. Unless a Class-wide injunction is issued, Defendants will continue to commit the violations alleged, and the members of the Class and the general public will continue to be misled. 49. This cause of action is brought under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code § 1750, et seq. (the “Act”). Plaintiff and the proposed Class are consumers as defined by California Civil Code § 1761(d). Defendants’ IGF-1 Plus products are goods within the meaning of the Act. Case No. 16 57. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 58. As alleged herein, Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of Defendants’ conduct because he purchased the IGF-1 Plus products. 59. In the course of conducting business, Defendants committed unlawful business practices by, inter alia, making the representations (which also constitute advertising within the meaning of § 17200) and omissions of material facts, as set forth more fully herein, and violating Civil Code §§ 1572, 1573, 1709, 1711, 1770, Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq., 17500, et seq., and the common law. 60. Plaintiff and the Class reserve the right to allege other violations of law, which constitute other unlawful business acts or practices. Such conduct is ongoing and continues to this date. 61. Defendants’ acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices and non- disclosures as alleged herein also constitute “unfair” business acts and practices within the meaning of Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq., in that their conduct is substantially injurious to consumers, offends public policy, and is immoral, unethical, Case No. 18 67. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 68. Plaintiff, and each member of the Class, formed a contract with Defendants at the time Plaintiff and the other members of the Class purchased the IGF-1 Plus products. The terms of that contract include the promises and affirmations of fact made Case No. 19 Breach of Express Warranty The IGF-1 Plus products Violation of Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq. Violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act –Civil Code § 1750, et seq.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a cryptocurrency exchange company, and owns and operates the website, www.kraken.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.kraken.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse cryptocurrency for purchase, view prices, obtain defendant’s contact information, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in March 2021, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website. 26. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: 28. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen- reader users; 29. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and 30. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those various cryptocurrency for purchase and delivery, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 35. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 36. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 39. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 40. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 42. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 43. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 47. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 50. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 51. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 56. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 57. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 60. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 61. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 62. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 63. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 64. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 66. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 67. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 70. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 71. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 79. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 80. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 82. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 83. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 86. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 87. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 88. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 89. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 90. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 93. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 96. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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(Brought Individually and on a Class Basis Pursuant to Rule 23) VIOLATIONS OF THE MISSOURI MINIMUM WAGE LAW, MO. REV. STAT. § 290.500 (Brought Individually and on a Collective Basis Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)) VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 11 (Brought Individually and on a Class Basis Pursuant to Rule 23) BREACH OF CONTRACT 24. Plaintiff worked as a Representative for Defendant at its call center in St. Louis, Missouri from about November 1, 2018 through September 13, 2019. During her employment, Plaintiff earned $14.00 per hour. 25. Throughout her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff and other Representatives regularly worked off-the-clock. 26. In order to perform their jobs, Plaintiff and other Representatives were required to boot up their computers and start-up and log-in to various computer programs, software programs, and applications before the start of their scheduled shifts. This process took approximately ten minutes per shift. 27. The time spent booting up their computers, starting up and logging in to various 6 computer programs, software programs, and applications benefited Defendant and was essential to their responsibilities as Representatives. 28. Defendant prohibited Representatives from clocking in prior to the start of their scheduled shifts but required Plaintiff and other Representatives to be call-ready immediately at the start of their scheduled shifts. Because it took approximately ten minutes to boot up their computers and start-up and log-in to various computer programs, software programs, and applications in order to be call-ready, Defendant’s rule compelled them to perform these activities before clocking into Defendant’s timekeeping system. 29. During the course of the workday, Plaintiff and other Representatives took an unpaid lunch break, during which they were required to log out of their computers and log back in, but were not paid for such time. 30. Defendant required Plaintiff and other Representatives to clock out at the end of their scheduled shifts, causing them to perform post-shift work off the clock including closing/shutting down computer programs and systems. 31. Because Plaintiff and other Representatives typically worked at least 40 hours in a workweek, she was not paid for time spent working excess of 40 hours in a workweek, in violation of the FLSA, the MMWL, and Defendant’s contractual obligation to pay Representatives for all hours worked. 32. As a non-exempt employee, Plaintiff and other Representatives were entitled to full compensation for all overtime hours worked at a rate of 1.5 times their “regular rate” of pay. 33. At all relevant times, Defendant was Plaintiff’s “employer” and Defendant directed and directly benefited from the work performed by Plaintiff and other Representatives before the start of their scheduled shifts. 7 34. At all relevant times, Defendant controlled Plaintiff’s and all other Representatives’ work schedule, duties, protocols, applications, assignments, and employment conditions. 35. Defendant knew or should have known that the time Representatives spent in connection with the pre-shift start-up/log-in process, the mid-shift time spent on logging in and out of the computer during the unpaid lunch break, and the post-shift time spent closing/shutting down computer programs and systems is compensable under the FLSA, MMWL, and the common law. 36. At all relevant times, Defendant was able to track the amount of time that Plaintiff and other Representatives spent in connection with the pre-shift start-up/log-in process, the mid-shift time spent on logging in and out of the computer during the unpaid lunch break, and the post-shift time spent closing/shutting down computer programs and systems; however, Defendant failed to document, track, or pay them for such work. 37. At all relevant times, Defendant’s policies and practices deprived Plaintiff and the putative Collective of wages owed for the pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift activities Plaintiff and the putative Collective performed. Because Plaintiff and the putative Collective typically worked 40 hours or more in a workweek, Defendant’s policies and practices also deprived Plaintiff and the putative Collective of overtime pay at a rate of 1.5 times their regular rate of pay, as required under the FLSA. 38. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on her own behalf and on behalf of: All current and former hourly customer service representatives who worked for Defendant in any of its call centers in the United States at any time within the 8 three years preceding the commencement of this action and the date of judgment. (hereinafter referred to as the “Collective”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary. 39. Excluded from the Collective are Defendant’s executives, administrative and professional employees, including computer professionals and outside sales persons. 40. With respect to the claims set forth in this action, a collective action under the FLSA is appropriate because the employees described above are “similarly situated” to Plaintiff under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The Collective of employees on behalf of whom Plaintiff brings this collective action are similarly situated because (a) they have been or are employed in the same or similar positions; (b) they were or are subject to the same or similar unlawful practice, policy, or plan; and (c) their claims are based upon the same factual and legal theories. 41. The employment relationships between Defendant and every Collective member are the same and differ only in name, location, and rate of pay. The key issues – the amount of uncompensated pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift time owed to each employee – do not vary substantially from Collective member to Collective member. 42. The key legal issues are also the same for every Collective member, to wit: uncompensated pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift time is compensable under the FLSA. 43. Plaintiff estimates that the Collective, including both current and former employees over the relevant period, will include hundreds of members. The precise number of Collective members should be readily available from a review of Defendant’s personnel and payroll records. 44. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on her 9 own behalf and on behalf of: All current and former hourly customer service representatives who worked for Defendant in any of its call centers in Missouri at any time within the two years preceding the commencement of this action and the date of judgment. (hereinafter referred to as the “Rule 23 Missouri Class”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary. 45. The members of the Rule 23 Missouri Class are so numerous that joinder of all Rule 23 Missouri Class members in this case would be impractical. Plaintiff reasonably estimates that there are hundreds of Rule 23 Missouri Class members. Rule 23 Missouri Class members should be easy to identify from Defendant’s computer systems and electronic payroll and personnel records. 46. There is a well-defined community of interest among Rule 23 Missouri Class members and common questions of law and fact predominate in this action over any questions affecting individual members of the Rule 23 Missouri Class. These common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether the uncompensated pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift time is compensable under the FLSA; b. Whether Rule 23 Missouri Class members are owed wages for time spent performing pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift, and if so, the appropriate amount thereof; and 47. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Rule 23 Missouri Class in that she and all other Rule 23 Missouri Class members suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s common and systemic payroll policies and practices. Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same policies, practices, promises and course of conduct as all other Rule 23 Missouri Class members’ claims and her legal theories are based on the same legal theories as all other Rule 23 Missouri Class members. 10 48. Plaintiff will fully and adequately protect the interests of the Rule 23 Missouri Class and she has retained counsel who are qualified and experienced in the prosecution of Missouri wage and hour class actions. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel have interests that are contrary to, or conflicting with, the interests of the Rule 23 Missouri Class. 49. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, because, inter alia, it is economically infeasible for Rule 23 Missouri Class members to prosecute individual actions of their own given the relatively small amount of damages at stake for each individual along with the fear of reprisal by their employer. Prosecution of this case as a Rule 23 Class action will also eliminate the possibility of duplicative lawsuits being filed in state and federal courts throughout the nation. 50. This case will be manageable as a Rule 23 Class action. Plaintiff and her counsel know of no unusual difficulties in this case and Defendant and its corporate clients all have advanced, networked computer and payroll systems that will allow the class, wage, and damages issues in this case to be resolved with relative ease. 51. Because the elements of Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied in this case, class certification is appropriate. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393; 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010) (“[b]y its terms [Rule 23] creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action”). 52. Because Defendant acted and refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Rule 23 Missouri Class and declaratory relief is appropriate in this case with respect to the Rule 23 Missouri Class as a whole, class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) is also appropriate. 53. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein and further alleges as follows. 54. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant was an employer under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) of the FLSA, subject to the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 55. Defendant is engaged in interstate commerce, or in the production of goods for commerce, as defined by the FLSA. 56. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and other Collective members were “employees” of Defendant within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) of the FLSA. 57. Plaintiff and other Collective members either (1) engaged in commerce; or (2) engaged in the production of goods for commerce; or (3) were employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. 58. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant “suffered or permitted” Plaintiff and other Collective members to work and thus “employed” them within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) of the FLSA. 59. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant required Plaintiff and other Collective members to perform pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift work as described herein, but failed to pay these employees the federally mandated minimum wage or overtime compensation for such time. 60. The uncompensated pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift work performed by Plaintiff and other Collective members was an essential part of their jobs and these activities and the time associated with these activities is not de minimis. 61. In workweeks where Plaintiff and other Collective members worked 40 hours or more, the uncompensated pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift time should have been paid them at the federally mandated rate of 1.5 times each employee’s regularly hourly wage. 29 U.S.C. § 207. 12 62. Defendant’s violations of the FLSA were knowing and willful. Defendant knew or could have easily determined how long it took for its Representatives to complete the pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift activities and Defendant could have properly compensated Plaintiff and the Collective for such time, but did not. 63. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), provides that as a remedy for a violation of the Act, an employee is entitled to his or her unpaid wages (and unpaid overtime if applicable) plus an additional equal amount in liquidated damages (double damages), plus costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 64. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein and further alleges as follows. 65. At all times relevant to the action, Defendant was an employer covered by the mandates of the MMWL, and Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Missouri Class are employees entitled to the MMWL’s protections. 66. The MMWL requires employers to pay their employees minimum wages and time-and-a-half their regular rate of pay of hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.505. 67. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.527 provides that as a remedy for a violation of the MMWL, an employee is entitled to his or her unpaid wages (and unpaid overtime if applicable) plus an additional equal amount in liquidated damages (double damages), plus costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 68. Defendant violated the MMWL by regularly and repeatedly failing to compensate 13 Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Missouri Class for the time spent on the pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift work activities described in this Complaint, including hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 69. As a result, Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Missouri Class have and will continue to suffer loss of income and other damages. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Missouri Class are entitled to recover unpaid wages owed, liquidated damages, costs and attorneys’ fees, and other appropriate relief under the MMWL at an amount to be proven at trial. 70. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein and further alleges as follows. 71. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant had a contract with Plaintiff and every other Rule 23 Missouri Class member to pay each employee for each hour they worked at a pre-established (contractual) regularly hourly rate. 72. Each Rule 23 Missouri Class member’s contractual hourly rate is identified in paystubs and other records that Defendant prepares as part of its regular business activities. 73. Plaintiff and other Rule 23 Missouri Class members performed under the contract by doing their jobs and carrying out the pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift activities that Defendant required or accepted. 74. By not paying Plaintiff and other Rule 23 Missouri Class members the agreed upon hourly wage for the pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift activities, Defendant systematically breached its contracts with Plaintiff and other Rule 23 Missouri Class members. 75. Plaintiff’s and the Rule 23 Missouri Class members’ remedies under the FLSA are inadequate in this case to the extent Defendant paid them more than the federally mandated 14 minimum wage of $7.25 per hour but less than 40 hours per week (i.e., pure “gap time” claims). 76. Defendant also breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to keep track of the time Plaintiff and other Rule 23 Missouri Class members spent performing pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift activities, which are a fundamental part of an “employer’s job.” 77. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breaches of the contracts alleged herein, Plaintiff and other Rule 23 Missouri Class members have been damaged, in an amount to be determined at trial.

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14. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are and have been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are and have been subjected to Defendants’ decisions, policies, plans, programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and rules, all culminating in a willful failure and refusal to pay them overtime premium for hours worked in excess of forty (40) each workweek. The claims of Plaintiff stated herein are essentially the same as those of the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. 17. The claims for relief are properly brought under and maintained as an opt-in collective action pursuant to §16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from the Defendants. Notice can be provided to the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to the last address known to Defendants. 26. On or about June 6, 2016, Plaintiff SILVINO FELIX MARTINEZ was hired by to work as a scaffolding worker for Defendants’ Artisan Preservation business. 27. Plaintiff worked for Defendants until on or about August 16, 2016, 29. Throughout his employment by Defendants, Plaintiff was compensated at a fixed daily rate of $130 per day worked. Plaintiff was always paid his entire fixed daily salary in cash. Similarly, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members were also paid by Defendants at fixed daily rates in cash only. 30. Although Plaintiff regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek during his employment by Defendants, Defendants never paid him overtime premium at a rate of one and one-half times his straight time hourly rate for such hours that he worked in excess of forty (40), as required under the FLSA and NYLL. There was never any agreement that the fixed daily salary that Defendants paid Plaintiff covered overtime hours in excess of forty (40) that Plaintiff worked each week. 31. Similarly, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, and never received any overtime premium at a rate of one and one-half times their straight time hourly rates of pay for the hours in excess of forty (40) they worked. Like Plaintiff, other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members never formed any agreement that the fixed daily salaries that they received from Defendants were inclusive of overtime pay. 33. During his employment by Defendants, Plaintiff never received a proper wage statement. In fact, Defendants never provided Plaintiff with any wage statements during his employment. Similarly, Class Members never received proper wage statements. 34. Throughout his employment by Defendants, Plaintiff was the victim of severe and unrelenting gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment at the hands of his direct supervisors, as well as other employees of Defendants’ business. Defendants intentionally implemented policies resulting in an extremely hostile work environment, in which supervisory and managerial employees, among others, were permitted to openly discriminate against Plaintiff on the basis of gender and Plaintiff’s perceived gender-based characteristics, and to sexually harass him, without fear that such open discriminatory conduct would result in any negative consequences whatsoever. 35. Plaintiff was born with a speech impediment, causing him to speak in a very soft, low volume voice at all times. Plaintiff’s direct supervisors, foremen Luis [LNU] and Carlos [LNU] indicated to Plaintiff very shortly after the commencement of his employment that they viewed Plaintiff’s speech impediment to be a sign of his effeminacy and/or homosexuality. 37. Luis [LNU] and Carlos [LNU] would also request that Plaintiff retrieve tools for them, without having any intention of using such tools. Instead, once Plaintiff brought them the tools requested, they would reference the tools in crude, homophobic, remarks regarding Plaintiff, such as “Wow, this tool is shaped like a dick. I bet you would like to stick it up your ass, faggot.” The foremen would then require Plaintiff to return the tool to where he got it from, unused. Although Plaintiff was aware that the foremen were requiring him to retrieve tools for the sole purpose of harassing him, he was nevertheless required to obey his supervisors and retrieve the tools each time he was asked to. 38. During his employment by Defendants, Plaintiff was the lowest paid employee at Defendants’ business. Other new hires were typically compensated at a fixed daily rate of $160. However, due to Defendants’ policy of gender-based discrimination against him, Plaintiff was deemed unworthy of the standard initial salary provided to other new employees, and thus received a lower fixed daily rate of only $130 per day. Whenever Plaintiff attempted to broach the topic of his relatively low rate of daily compensation compared to other new employees with Luis [LNU] and Carlos [LNU], they would dismiss his concerns out of hand, and respond by calling him a “faggot”. 40. Plaintiff was unable to directly respond in any way to the above-described sexual harassment and homophobic, gender-based mockery because he believed that Defendatns would fire him if he did so. 41. Extremely distressed by the discriminatory conduct of his supervisors and fellow non-managerial employees towards him, and by the rampant sexual harassment that he was subjected to on the job each day that he worked, Plaintiff informed Defendant IGNACIO [LNU] of his situation. However, Defendant IGNACIO [LNU] refused to help. When Plaintiff persisted in attempting to contact IGNACIO [LNU] by telephone, Defendant IGNACIO [LNU] responded by blocking Plaintiff’s cellphone number. 42. Defendant CHRIS YACONO also willfully ignored Plaintiff’s attempt to advise Defendants of the harassment that he was subjected to, and was deliberately indifferent to his suffering at the hands of other employees. 44. Defendants unlawfully failed to pay Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members either the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half) or the New York State overtime rate (of time and one-half) for all hours they worked over 40 in a workweek. 45. Defendants unlawfully failed to provide Plaintiff and Class Members with wage and hour notices upon hiring, as required under the NYLL. 46. Defendants unlawfully failed to provide Plaintiff and Class Members with wage statements for each pay period, as required under the NYLL. 47. Plaintiff retained Lee Litigation Group, PLLC to represent Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members, in this litigation and have agreed to pay the firm a reasonable fee for its services. 48. Plaintiff realleges and reavers Paragraphs 1 through 47 of this class and collective action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 49. At all relevant times, Defendants were and continue to be employers engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207 (a). Further, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are covered individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207 (a). 51. At all relevant times, the Corporate Defendant had gross annual revenues in excess of $500,000.00. 52. At all relevant times, the Defendants engaged in a policy and practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time and one-half to Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek. 53. Plaintiff is in possession of certain records concerning the number of hours worked by Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and the actual compensation paid to Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. Further records concerning these matters should be in the possession and custody of the Defendants. Plaintiff intends to obtain all records by appropriate discovery proceedings to be taken promptly in this case and, if necessary, will then seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint to set forth the precise amount due. 54. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs of their rights under the FLSA. 55. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ willful disregard of the FLSA, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated (i.e., double) damages pursuant to the FLSA. 56. Due to the intentional, willful and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount not presently ascertainable of unpaid overtime wages, plus an equal amount as liquidated damages. 57. Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 65. Plaintiff realleges and reavers Paragraphs 1 through 64 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 66. The New York State Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment on the basis of an individual’s gender. 67. Plaintiff is an employee and a qualified person within the meaning of the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) and Defendants are covered employers under the 70. Plaintiff realleges and reavers Paragraphs 1 through 69 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 72. Defendants operated a business that discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of the NYCHRL by subjecting Plaintiff to a hostile work environment, in the form of constant harassment on the basis of gender. Such discriminatory conduct by Defendants ultimately led to Plaintiff’s termination by Defendants. 73. Due to Defendants’ violations under the New York City Human Rights Law, as amended, based on discrimination on the basis of gender, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants: (1) compensatory and punitive damages and (2) attorneys’ fees and costs. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND FLSA COLLECTIVE PLAINTIFFS VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (GENDER DISCRIMINATION)

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16. The CARES Act is the largest economic relief bill in U.S. history and will allocate $2.2 trillion in support to individuals and businesses affected by the coronavirus pandemic and economic downturn. 17. As part of the relief provided, the CARES Act expands the eligibility criteria for borrowers to qualify for loans that are available through the SBA by adding the PPP to the SBA’s gamut of loan programs. 18. The PPP provides federally-guaranteed loans up to a maximum amount of $10 million to eligible businesses, which can be conditionally forgivable, to encourage businesses to retain employees through the COVID-19 crisis by assisting in the payment of certain operational costs. To accommodate for this SBA expansion, the CARES Act has authorized commitments to the SBA 7(a) loan program, as modified by the CARES Act, in the amount of $349 billion. 20. The SBA’s interim final rule on the PPP provides the following information as to who is eligible for a PPP loan: You are eligible for a PPP loan if you have 500 or fewer employees whose principal place of residence is in the United States, or are a business that operates in a certain industry and meet the applicable SBA employee-based size standards for that industry, and: i. You are: A. A small business concern as defined in section 3 of the Small Business Act (15 USC 632), and subject to SBA’s affiliation rules under 13 CFR121.301(f) unless specifically waived in the Act; B. A tax-exempt nonprofit organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), a tax-exemptveterans organization described in section 501(c)(19) of the IRC, Tribal business concern described in section 31(b)(2)(C) of the Small Business Act, or any other business; and ii. You were in operation on February 15, 2020 and either had employees for whom you paid salaries and payroll taxes or paid independent contractors, as reported on a Form 1099-MISC. You are also eligible for a PPP loan if you are an individual who operates under a sole proprietorship or as an independent contractor or eligible self-employed individual, you were in operation on February 15, 2020. You must also submit such documentation as is necessary to establish eligibility such as payroll processor records, payroll tax filings, or Form 1099-MISC, or income and expenses from a sole proprietorship. For borrowers that do not have any such documentation, the borrower must provide other supporting documentation, such as bank records, sufficient to demonstrate the qualifying payroll amount. 13 CFR Part 120, pp. 5-6. 22. At 8:42 am on Friday, April 3, 2020 – the opening day of PPP loans – Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin tweeted that community banks “have already processed over 700 loans” for a total of $2.5 million. Hugh Son & Dawn Giel, Bank of America’s Small Business Loan Portal is Up, But Most Banks are having Trouble, CNBC (Apr. 3, 2020) [hereinafter “Hugh Son”], available at https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/03/bank-of-americas-small-business-loan-portal-is- up-making-it-the-first-bank-to-accept-applications.html (last accessed Apr. 3, 2020). 23. BOA announced on the morning of April 3, 2020, that it was accepting online applications for the Government’s $349 billion PPP, becoming the first major bank to do so. See Hugh Son. 25. BOA’s PPP loan portal went live at about 9 am ET Friday. See Hugh Son. Within an hour, the bank had 10,000 applications for loans. Id. 26. Profiles is a “small business” as defined under the SBA guidelines, and qualifies as an eligible applicant for a PPP loan. 27. Profiles is a private banking client of BOA, maintaining a depository relationship with BOA, including Profiles’ primary checking account and other operational accounts. 28. Profiles is not a current borrower of funds from BOA. 29. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the current financial climate, Profiles attempted to apply for a PPP loan from BOA. 30. However, when Profiles tried to apply for a PPP loan from BOA on the morning of April 3, 2020, Profiles was electronically denied access to an application. The denial flagged the fact that Profiles did not have a preexisting lending relationship with BOA. 31. Confused and distraught, Amy Elias (“Ms. Elias”), owner of Profiles, immediately contacted Marie Conley (“Ms. Conley”), Vice President, Bank of America, Preferred & Small Business Banking, Baltimore Metro Market, via email about BOA refusing to even allow her to apply for a PPP loan. 32. Ms. Conley responded, “Amy, I’m so sorry!!!!! I just got the news today on my conference call. I can imagine how devasted you must be. I’m trying to find out where else you can go to get money. Get back to you later.” 34. In disbelief, Ms. Elias wrote back, “I can not [sic] believe this.” Ms. Conley replied, “I know. . . . I’m very disappointed too.” 35. Nothing in the PPP federal law allows for the differentiation of a small business loan under the federal program between a bank’s depository clients and their lending clients. And, nothing in PPP federal law allows for BOA to determine who can participate in the federal program based on that improper criteria. 36. The purpose and motivation behind BOA’s discriminatory practice is transparent. In light of the fact that PPP is a limited funding program, BOA has decided to prioritize its balance sheet by supporting preexisting loans issued by BOA through the PPP program at the expense of small businesses that do not have a lending relationship with BOA. Had Congress intended to allow banks, like BOA, to limit access to the PPP funding program to only those small businesses that had a borrowing relationship with the bank, Congress would have said so. The purpose, however, of the PPP law is to assist all small business who qualify under the SBA rules and to provide equal access to those funds. 38. Indeed, Senator Marco Rubio criticized BOA for its decision, saying via Tweeter, “The requirement that a #SmallBusiness not just have a business account but also a loan or credit card is NOT in the law we wrote & passed or in the regulations.” See Hugh Son: 40. Named Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs by reference as if fully set forth herein. 41. Named Plaintiff, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), bring this action on behalf of themselves and as members of the Class defined below. 42. The Class consists of (a) all individuals or entities who qualify for a loan under the PPP and (b) who were prevented from even applying for a PPP loan by BOA solely because they do not have a pre-existing debt relationship with BOA. 43. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). The Class consists of individuals and companies, throughout the country. 45. The claims of Named Plaintiff, which arise out of BOA’s prohibition of qualifying small businesses to apply for PPP loans with BOA, are typical of the claims of the Class members. Likewise, Defendants’ defenses to the Named Plaintiff’s claims – both the myriad of legal defenses that can be anticipated, together with the factual defenses – are typical of the defenses to the Class claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). 46. The Named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). The Named Plaintiff is articulate and knowledgeable about its claims, and fully able to describe them. There are no conflicts of interest between the Named Plaintiff with respect to the interests of the Class members. The Named Plaintiff, like the Class members, have suffered financial loss as a result of Defendants’ acts. Named Plaintiff has sufficient financial resources to litigate this case and further the interests of the Class without compromising them. 47. Counsel for the Named Plaintiff are well-suited to represent their interests and the interests of the Class at large. Counsel include M. Celeste Bruce, Esq., Alan M. Rifkin, Esq., Charles S. Fax, Esq., Liesel J. Schopler, Esq. and Barry L. Gogel, Esq. (Rifkin Weiner Livingston LLC). The combined experience and areas of professional concentration of these attorneys are well-suited to representation of the interests of the Class. All these lawyers practice complex civil litigation and are experienced in class action litigation. 49. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). BOA will continue to commit the violations alleged, and the members of the Classes and the general public will continue to be unfairly denied access to critical relief that they are entitled to under the CARES Act’s PPP. BOA has acted and refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Class so that final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the Class as a whole. 50. Class certification is also appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The questions of law or fact common to the members of the Class, described above, predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. 51. Due to the individual amount at issue as to each Class member, as well as the cost and difficulty in litigating each case separately, the Class members have insufficient interest in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A). 52. The Class has not previously litigated the claims asserted in this complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B). 53. This Court is an appropriate forum for the litigation of the Class claims. 54. Any difficulties that might be incurred in the management of this class action are insubstantial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). 55. Named Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs by reference as if fully set forth herein. 57. There is an implied cause of action arising under the CARES Act. 58. The CARES Act, along with the SBA’s interim final rule on the PPP, provides the sole eligibility requirements to apply for a PPP loan. 59. The purpose of the CARES Act’s PPP is to assist all entities and individuals who qualify and to provide equal access to those funds. 60. In flagrant disregard for law, BOA has decided to protect itself through the PPP program – rather than intended entities and individuals – by creating an unnecessary requirement to apply for a PPP loan from it – a lending relationship with BOA. 61. Profiles met the eligibility requirements for a PPP loan. Nevertheless, BOA refused to allow Profiles to apply for a PPP loan because it did not have a lending relationship with BOA. 62. As a direct and proximate result of BOA’s wrongful actions, Profiles and Class members have suffered damages up to $10 million each due their inability to apply for a PPP loan with BOA despite being eligible therefor. 63. Named Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs by reference as if fully set forth herein. 65. The PPP is part of the SBA’s 7(a) loan program. 66. There is an implied cause of action arising under the SBA’s 7(a) loan program. 67. In flagrant disregard for law, BOA has decided to protect itself through the SBA’s 7(a) PPP program – rather than intended entities and individuals – by creating an unnecessary requirement to apply for a PPP loan from it – a lending relationship with BOA. 68. Profiles met the eligibility requirements for a PPP loan. Nevertheless, BOA refused to allow Profiles to apply for a PPP loan because it did not have a lending relationship with BOA. 69. As a direct and proximate result of BOA’s wrongful actions, Profiles and Class members have suffered damages up to $10 million each due their inability to apply for a PPP loan with BOA despite being eligible therefor. 70. Named Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs by reference as if fully set forth herein. 71. There is an actual controversy between Defendants and the Class concerning the application of the PPP. 72. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 this Court may “declare the rights and legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 73. BOA wrongfully prevented entities and individuals from applying for PPP loans from BOA, despite meeting all federally-imposed PPP loan eligibility requirements, for lack of a lending relationship with BOA. 75. Named Plaintiff and the Class are likely to succeed on the merits of their causes of action set forth in Counts I-III. 76. Named Plaintiff and the Class have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief enjoining BOA from depriving Named Plaintiff and the Class from the rights and benefits bestowed by the CARES Act and its regulations, and do not have an adequate remedy at law. 77. BOA will suffer no injury if the preliminary injunctive relief sought by the Named Plaintiff and the Class is granted. 78. The public interest will be served by the granting preliminary injunctive relief sought by the Named Plaintiff and the Class. Declaratory Judgment and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 (Against All Defendants) Violations of the CARES Act, H.R. 748 (Against All Defendants) Violations of the SBA’s 7(a) Loan Program, 15 U.S.C. 636(a) (Against All Defendants)

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NYLL § 190, 191, 193, 195 and 198 11. At all times relevant herein, Defendant paid Plaintiff’s wages and made applicable employment deductions including income and FICA taxes. 12. At all times relevant herein, Defendant issues Plaintiff an IRS W-2 form at the end of each year of employment with Defendant. 13. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a manual worker within the meaning of NYLL § 191, performing a variety of functions for Defendant including cleaning and organizing closets, lifting boxes, packing and unpacking garments, data entry, answering phones etc. 14. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from on or about June 13, 2012 until on or about August 11, 2017. 15. Upon information and belief, and at all times relevant herein, Plaintiff was paid at a regular rate of about $26 an hour. 16. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff was not paid at a rate of 1.5 times her regular rate for overtime hours worked (hours over 40 in a week). For example, for the weekly pay period ending April 9, 2017, Plaintiff worked at least 45.25 hours and was paid at a regular rate of $26.76 an hour for 40 hours and for the remaining 5.25 overtime hours, Plaintiff was paid at a rate of $20.70 an hour instead of the required rate of about $40.14 an hour – the amount of $936.87 was intended to cover up to 40 hours of work as also reflected in the pay stub for this pay period. This example is reflective of Defendant’s payment pattern and practice with respect to Plaintiff and the class. 18. Upon information and belief, and at all times relevant herein, Plaintiff worked approximately 41-47.5 hours a week for Defendant and likely more, 5 days a week and sometimes more. 19. A more precise statement of the hours and wages will be made when Plaintiff Arcos obtains the wage and time records Defendant was required to keep under the FLSA. Accurate copies of Plaintiff’s wage and time records that Defendant was required to keep pursuant to 29 USC 211 and 29 CFR 516. 20. Upon information and belief, and at all times relevant herein, Defendant had revenues and/or transacted business in an amount exceeding $500,000 annually. 21. At all times applicable herein, Defendant conducted business with vendors and other businesses outside the State of New York. 22. At all times applicable herein and upon information and belief, Defendant conducted business in interstate commerce involving the purchase of general items such as materials, equipment and supplies. 23. Defendant as a regular part of its business, makes payment of taxes and other monies to agencies and entities outside the State of New York. 24. Defendant as a regular part of its business, engaged in credit card transactions involving banks and other institutions outside the state of New York. 25. At all times applicable herein and upon information and belief, Defendant transacted business with insurance companies, banks and similar lending institutions outside the State of New York. 26. At all times applicable herein and upon information and belief, Defendant utilized the instrumentalities of interstate commerce such as the United States mail, internet electronic mail and telephone systems. 28. Upon information and belief, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the putative class members at a rate of 1.5 times their regular rate for each and all overtime hours worked (hours over 40 in a week). 29. The violations described and complained of herein as to Plaintiff, also apply to the putative class members. 30. At all times relevant herein, Defendant did not provide Plaintiff and the putative class with the notice(s) required by NYLL 195(1). 31. At all times relevant herein, Defendant did not provide Plaintiff and the putative class with the statement(s) required by NYLL 195(3) – all wage statements provided to Plaintiff and the putative class did not accurately reflect Plaintiff’s hourly rate and overtime rates, among other deficiencies. 32. Upon information and belief, and at all times relevant herein, Defendant had tens of millions of dollars in annual revenues and/or business volume. 33. The “present” or the “present time” as used in this complaint refers to the date this complaint was signed. 34. Plaintiff alleges on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated who opt into this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 33 above as if set forth fully and at length herein. 36. The FLSA cause of action is brought as a collective action on behalf of the named Plaintiff and all others who are/were similarly situated and who file consents to opt-in to the action. 37. The class of similarly situated individuals as to the FLSA overtime cause of action is defined as current and former employees of Defendant, and who: 1) worked more than forty hours in a week, within at least the three-year period, preceding the filing of this complaint; and 2) were not paid at an overtime rate of at least 1.5 times their regular rate for each and all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a week as also explained above. 38. The class includes but is not limited to current and former employees of Defendant who were paid the incorrect overtime rate and/or who were not paid for all overtime hours worked as set forth above and herein. 39. Although the precise number of putative class members is unknown, and facts on which the calculation of that number is based are presently within the sole control of Defendants, upon information and belief, there are hundreds or thousands of members of the class during the class period. See https://www.pvh.com/ and http://www.calvinklein.us. 40. The class definition will be refined as is necessary, including after discovery if necessary. 41. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and all those similarly-situated, were employed by Defendant within the meaning of the FLSA – 29 U.S.C 201 et Seq. 42. Upon information and belief, and at all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and all those similarly similarly-situated, were engaged in commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce and/or Defendant constituted an enterprise(s) engaged in commerce within the meaning of the FLSA including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a). 43. At all times relevant herein, Defendant transacted commerce and business in excess of $500,000.00 annually or had revenues and/or expenditures in excess of $500,000.00 annually. 45. Due to Defendant’s FLSA violations, Plaintiff, and all those similarly-situated, are entitled to recover from Defendant, their unpaid overtime compensation, plus maximum liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of the action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 46. Plaintiff alleges on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated as class members, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 44 above as if set forth fully and at length herein. 62. Plaintiff alleges on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated as class members, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 61 above as if set forth fully and at length herein. 63. Plaintiff sues on her own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rule 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 65. The class includes but is not limited to employees who did not receive wage statements for each and all weeks during their employment, employees who received wage statements but whose wage statements did not reflect all hours worked or all wages earned, and employees who did not receive the required wage notices setting forth the regular and overtime rate of pay among other information. 66. The class definition will be refined as is necessary, including after discovery if necessary. 67. Although the precise number of putative class members is unknown, and facts on which the calculation of that number is based are presently within the sole control of Defendant, upon information and belief, there are over hundreds or thousands of members of the class during the class period. 68. Upon information and belief, the putative class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 69. Upon information and belief, there are questions of law or fact common to the class – (a) whether Defendant failed to provide Plaintiffs with the notice(s) required by NYLL 195(1), and (b) whether Defendant failed to provide Plaintiffs and the putative class with the statement(s) required by NYLL 195(3). 70. Upon information and belief, the claims of the representative party are typical of the claims of the class. 71. The representative party will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 72. The Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. 74. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy - particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual Plaintiff lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against corporate defendant and in light of the large number of putative class members. 75. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and all those similarly-situated as class members, were employed by Defendant within the meaning of the New York Labor law, §§ 190 et seq., including §§ 191, 193, 195 and 198. 76. At all times relevant herein, Defendant failed and willfully failed to provide Plaintiffs and the class members with the notice(s) required by NYLL 195(1) – Plaintiffs and the class are therefore entitled to and seek to recover in this action the maximum recovery for this violation, plus attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to NYLL 198 including NYLL 198(1-b), as well as an injunction directing Defendant to comply with NYLL 195(1). 77. At all times relevant herein, Defendant failed and willfully failed to provide Plaintiff and the class members with the statement(s) required by NYLL 195(3) – Plaintiff and the class are therefore entitled to and seek to recover in this action the maximum recovery for this violation, plus attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to NYLL 198 including NYLL 198(1-d), as well as an injunction directing Defendant to comply with NYLL 195(1). Relief Demanded 9. Upon information and belief, and at all times relevant herein, Defendant was engaged in the clothing and apparel business across the United States and internationally. See https://www.pvh.com/ and http://www.calvinklein.us. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT - 29 U.S.C 201 et Seq. (Unpaid Overtime) NYLL 650 et Seq. and 12 NYCRR 142-2.2 etc. (Unpaid Overtime)

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20. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action on behalf of itself and the other public stockholders of Ultratech (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any defendant. 21. This action is properly maintainable as a class action. 22. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of September 30, 2016, there were approximately 26,868,613 shares of Ultratech common stock outstanding, held by hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals and entities scattered throughout the country. 23. Questions of law and fact are common to the Class, including, among others, whether defendants violated the 1934 Act and whether defendants will irreparably harm plaintiff and the other members of the Class if defendants’ conduct complained of herein continues. 27. Ultratech designs, manufactures, and markets photolithography and laser processing equipment. 28. Founded in 1979, the Company’s market-leading advanced lithography products deliver high throughput and production yields at a low, overall cost of ownership for bump packaging of integrated circuits and high-brightness LEDs. 29. A pioneer of laser processing, Ultratech developed laser spike anneal technology, which increases device yield, improves transistor performance, and enables the progression of Moore’s Law for 65-nm and below production of state-of-the-art consumer electronics. 73. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein. 74. The Individual Defendants disseminated the false and misleading Proxy Statement, which contained statements that, in violation of Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-9, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements therein not materially false or misleading. Ultratech is liable as the issuer of these statements. 75. The Proxy Statement was prepared, reviewed, and/or disseminated by the Individual Defendants. By virtue of their positions within the Company, the Individual Defendants were aware of this information and their duty to disclose this information in the Proxy Statement. 76. The Individual Defendants were at least negligent in filing the Proxy Statement with these materially false and misleading statements. 81. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein. 82. The Individual Defendants and Veeco acted as controlling persons of Ultratech within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as officers and/or directors of Ultratech and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the false statements contained in the Proxy Statement, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that plaintiff contends are false and misleading. 83. Each of the Individual Defendants and Veeco was provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Proxy Statement alleged by plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause them to be corrected. A. Background of the Company and the Proposed Transaction Claim for Violation of Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-9 Promulgated Thereunder Against the Individual Defendants and Ultratech Claim for Violation of Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act Against the Individual Defendants and Veeco

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10. Defendants contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone numbers belonging to Defendants, including without limitation (619) 889 – 8448. 11. Defendants’ calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 8. Beginning in or around August of 2018, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers ending in -1038 in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendants’ services. 9. Defendants used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) � As a result of Defendants’ willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C). � Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c) � As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5). � Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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(Breach of Contract) (Violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act - N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 et seq.) (Violation of Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act [TCCWNA], N.J.S.A. 56:12-14) 1. This is a consumer class action asserting a class of all persons who, nationwide and/or in the State of New Jersey, played slot machines at the Revel Casino with a Revel Card during the month of July 2013, lost monies and sought a slot refund coupon pursuant to the Revel Casino promotion and offer that stated “You Can’t Lose”, “All July Slot Losses Refunded”, “Free Slot Play!” (hereinafter the “You Can’t Lose Promotion” or the “Promotion”) (See Exhibit A – Email of Promotion). Revel Casino advertised, marketed and distributed the promotion that “You Can’t Lose, All July Slot Losses Refunded.” Revel Casino is owned by Defendants Revel AC, Inc., Revel AC, LLC and Revel Entertainment Group, LLC. 12. This action may properly be maintained pursuant to the provisions of F.R.C.P. 23 as a class action as it satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy requirements of the Rule. Plaintiffs seeks to certify two classes, a damage class as in addition to the above noted requirements, the proposed class meets the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) as well as an injunctive class as the action also satisfies the requirements of Rule(b)(2) inasmuch as Revel has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class making injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. 13. While the precise number of members cannot be ascertained without discovery, plaintiff believes that the Class is composed of hundreds, if not thousands, of persons who all are citizens of the United States who lost more than $100 in slots or electronic gaming devices at Revel Casino while playing with a Revel Card during July 2013 and received a free slot coupon for their losses, the joinder of whom in one action is impractical. The disposition of their claims in a class action will provide substantial benefits to both the parties and the Court. The numerosity requirement of F.R.C.P. 23(a)(1) is therefore satisfied. 15. Rule 23(a)(2) and (b)(3) are both satisfied because there are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual class member. The common questions include, inter alia, the following: a. Whether Defendants breached any express or implied warranties when they sold the “You Can’t Lose Promotion”; b. Whether Defendants’ business practices constitute violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; c. Whether Defendants’ conduct in failing to adequately disclose the relevant facts concerning the “You Can’t Lose Promotion” constitutes a violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; d. Whether Defendants violated the New Jersey Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act [“TCCWNA”], N.J.S.A. 56:12-14; e. Whether the Class has been damaged and/or suffered irreparable harm and, if so, the extent of such damages and/or the nature of the equitable and injunctive relief which each member of the Class is entitled. 17. Plaintiff’s claims and the claims of members of the Class all derive from a common nucleus of operative facts. 18. In satisfaction of F.R.C.P. 23(a)(3) and 23(a)(4), Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the claims of the entire Class, and Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests that are antagonistic to those of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff anticipates no difficulty in the management of this litigation as a Class action. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation. 19. Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), in connection with Revel’s continued promotions, advertising, and marketing of the allegedly deceptive “You Can’t Lose” Promotion, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making injunctive and/or declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. 2. Plaintiff brings this class action to secure both injunctive relief and compensatory relief on behalf of individuals and entities who have suffered harm as a result of the promotion. Plaintiff asserts the claims on behalf of himself and the Class for injunctive relief and damages against the Defendants for breach of contract, violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and violations of the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Fraud Act (N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to 12-18). 22. Revel advertised and marketed its “You Can’t Lose Promotion” through television, radio, direct email campaigns and other methods. (See Exhibit A – Email of “You Can’t Lose Promotion”) 23. Its promotion in advertising and marketing stated the following, “You Can’t Lose, All July Slot Losses REFUNDED, Gamblers Wanted”. Although the advertising and marketing of the “You Can’t Lose Promotion” are very clear, the terms of the offer show the promotion to be deceptive and a misrepresentation. First, you must lose more than $100 and all losses must be tracked by the use of a Revel Card during the losses. Second, gamblers do not get refunded their losses, they do not receive cash back for the cash they lost. They receive a casino loss refund coupon that may be used towards gambling on slots and electronic gaming machines again. Exposing those loss refund coupons to gambling odds, as opposed to refunds in cash, almost certainly causing the gambler to lose their supposed refund. More onerous, the loss refund must be used over a twenty week period in equal installments in coupons as an equal fraction of the losses. (See Exhibit B – July Slot “Loss” Refund Coupons) Finally, this twenty week coupon period forces gamblers to come back to Revel for twenty weeks in a row to use their coupons or face losing their coupon loss refund for each week in which they did not come back to play, it’s a “use it or lose it” policy. 25. The terms of the offer in Revel’s Rules & Regulations state in part the following: • Void where restricted by law. • Promotion play qualification period is 6 am Monday, July 1, 2013 through 5:59am on Thursday, August 1, 2013. • To qualify, A Revel Card Member must have a minimum actual loss of $100. Loss refunds will be capped at an actual loss of $100,000. • Only carded ratings on an electronic gaming device are eligible. This includes, but is not limited to, slot machine, video poker machine and digital table games (games that you are able to insert your Revel Card into). • Actual loss is defined as: coin in minus coin out minus promotional free slot play to receive the true value of customer loss. Promotional free slot play will not be included in the calculation to determine actual loss. Ratings other than those from a slot machine, slot reel machine, electronic table game or video poker machine will not be included in the calculation to determine actual loss refund for the customer. • Loss refund will be paid over 20 weeks as a weekly free slot play offer beginning August 7, 2013. Eligible Revel Card Members must use the weekly free slot play during the seven day valid period each week or it will be forfeit. Unused free slot play once expired will be invalid and will not be reinstated. Free slot play is non-transferable. (See Exhibit C – “Rules & Regulations”) 26. Plaintiff alleges that, at all relevant times, Defendant knew the “Promotion” did not make actual cash refunds of the losses, and did not refund the cash lost by consumers in its slots or electronic gaming machines. 28. Revel advertises, markets, sells and distributes promotions for its Revel gambling casino. Among such promotions was the “You Can’t Lose Promotion” made through television, radio, direct email campaigns and other methods. 29. Its promotion in advertising and marketing stated the following, “You Can’t Lose, All July Slot Losses REFUNDED, Gamblers Wanted”. The advertising and marketing of “the Promotion” are very clear. However, the consumer eventually learns that the actual terms of the offer differ substantially, masking the promotion deceptive and a misrepresentation. The consumer must lose more than $100 and all losses must be tracked by the use of a Revel Card during the losses. Second, consumers do not get refunded their losses as they do not receive cash back for the cash they lost. They receive a casino loss refund coupon that may be used towards gambling on slots and electronic gaming machines again. Exposing those loss refund coupons to gambling odds as opposed to refunds in cash, almost certainly causes consumers to lose any alleged “refund” making the offer illusory as best. More onerous, the loss refund must be used over a twenty week period in equal installments in coupons as an equal fraction of the losses. Finally, the requisite coupon period is spaced out over twenty (20) weeks, thus forcing the consumer to come back to Revel for twenty (20) weeks in a row to use their coupons or face losing even the coupon for each week in which they did not come back to play. In essence, even the chance to win back any of one’s losses in the illusory offer is based on a twenty week “use it or lose it” policy. 31. Plaintiff alleges that in violation of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, the Defendants advertised, marketed and sold the “Free Slot Play” and “All July Slot Losses Refunded” Promotions through use of affirmative misrepresentations, omissions of material facts with the intent that consumers rely thereupon, as well as the use of an unconscionable commercial practice. Specifically, the statements contained in the advertising and marketing of the “Free Slot Play” and “All July Slot Losses Refunded” Promotions contain affirmative misrepresentations in that the slot play is not free, as it is not refunded in cash but in coupons with severely limited restrictions as stated above. Further, the knowing advertising and marketing of the Promotions as “losses refunded” when the losses are not refunded in cash represent an unconscionable commercial practice. 32. Plaintiff and other class members have suffered an ascertainable loss as a result of the unlawful acts complained of in the proceeding paragraphs and are therefore entitled to the relief afforded by N.J.S.A. 56:8-19, including monetary relief and injunctive. 33. Plaintiff realleges and reincorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 32 above as though set forth in full herein. 35. Revel breached this implied covenant by selling to the Plaintiff and other class members a Promotion that was misrepresented in that it did not refund monies to consumers but coupons with free slot play with very restrictive terms of redemption that were exposed to the odds of gambling again. 36. As a result of this breach, Plaintiff and other members of the class have suffered damages. 37. Plaintiff realleges and reincorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 36 above as though set forth in full herein. 38. TCCWNA provides in part that: “No seller…shall in the course of his business offer to any consumer or prospective consumer or enter into any written contract or give or display any written consumer warranty, notice or sign…which includes any provision that violates a clearly established right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller…as established by State or Federal Law at the time the offer is made or the consumer contract is signed or the warranty, notice or sign is given or displayed.” 4. Thus, in reality, consumers would receive only a 1/20th credit of their losses to play each week that must be played or lost that week. Consumers would therefore not receive their monies back as advertised but merely a coupon giving them the opportunity to further play slots that which were subject to the same odds of losing when gambling. Simply put, the slot losses of July are NOT REFUNDED AS CASH. Instead consumers must play the odds of gambling with any “refunds” they are credited with AND they must play 1/20th of their losses each week over a 20 week period or they lose that part of their losses forever. 40. Revel’s “All July Slot Losses Refunded” Promotion that was displayed and written in emails and television is deceptive in that the losses are not refunded in cash and the slot coupon’s are severely restrictive in terms of use. This is an unconscionable commercial practice violative of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, a breach of contract and violative of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As Revel’s Promotion is violative of a clearly established consumer right and/or of the responsibilities of the seller, Revel has violated the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act. 41. Revel’s “Rules & Regulations” for the Promotion states, “Void where prohibited or restricted by law” without specifying which provisions are or are not void, unenforceable or inapplicable within the State of New Jersey also a violation of TCCWNA. 42. TCCWNA provides that : “any person who violates the provisions of this act shall be liable to the aggrieved consumer whom he aggrieved or injured for a civil damages penalty of not less than $100.00 or for actual damages, or both at the election of the consumer, together with reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs. The rights, remedies and prohibitions accorded by the provisions of this act are hereby declared to be in addition to and cumulative of any other right, remedy or prohibition accorded by common law, Federal law or statutes of this State. NATURE OF THE CASE

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(Deceit by Concealment, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1709, 1710) (Negligence) (Violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq.) (Violation of the California Customer Records Act, California Civil Code § 1798.80, et seq.) 14. Facebook created and operates social networking websites and mobile applications that facilitate private and public communications, including messages, posts, locations, activities, photographs, links, and videos, from and between its Users, as well as providing access to certain account information to third party applications. Facebook purports to allow its users the ability to share and restrict information based on their own specific criteria. By the end of 2017, Facebook had more than 2.2 billion active users. 22. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit as a class action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated as members of the proposed Class pursuant to pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(2), 23(b)(3), and 23(c)(4). This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of those provisions. 23. The Class is defined as: Nationwide Class: All individuals residing in the United States who registered for an account, at any time, from four years prior to the filing of this complaint to the time of class certification, with Facebook whose personal or financial information was accessed, compromised, or stolen in the 2018 Data Breach (the “Nationwide Class” or “Class”). California Sub-Class: All members of the Nationwide Class who registered for an account with Facebook and reside in the State of California. 24. Collectively, the Nationwide Class and the California Sub-Class, and their class members, will be referred to herein as the “Class” and “Class Members,” except where otherwise noted. 31. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in each and every paragraph of this Complaint. 32. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of himself and on behalf of the Nationwide Class, or in the alternative, on behalf of the California Sub-Class. 33. As a result of their reliance on Defendant’s representations and omissions, Facebook Users utilizing its social networking websites and mobile applications suffered an ascertainable loss due to Defendant’s failure to provide adequate protection of its Facebook Users’ personal and confidential information and failure to provide sufficient and timely notice or warning of potential and actual cybersecurity breaches. 34. California Business & Professions Code § 17200 prohibits acts of “unfair competition,” including any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice” and “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” 35. Plaintiff and Class Members are reasonable consumers who expected Defendant to vehemently protect the personal information entrusted to them and to be informed by Defendant of potential and actual cybersecurity vulnerabilities as soon as Defendant became aware of such threat. 44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in each and every paragraph of this Complaint. 45. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of himself and on behalf of the California Sub-Class. 46. The California Legislature enacted Civil Code § 1798.81.5 “to ensure that personal information about California residents is protected.” The statute requires that any business that “owns, licenses, or maintains personal information about a California resident … implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.” 47. Defendant is a “business” as defined by Civil Code § 1798.80(a). 48. Plaintiff and California Sub-Class Members are “individual[s]” as defined by Civil Code § 1798.80(d). 49. The personal information taken in the data breach was “personal information” as defined by Civil Code § 1798.80(e) and 1798.81.5(d), which includes “information that identifies, relates to, describes, or is capable of being associated with, a particular individual, including, but not limited to, his or her name, signature, Social Security number, physical characteristics or description, address, telephone number, passport number, driver’s license or state identification card number, insurance policy number, education, employment, employment history, bank account number, credit card number, debit card number, or any other financial information, medical information, or health insurance information.” 50. The breach of the personal information of “50 million Facebook users” was a “breach of the security system” of Defendant as defined by Civil Code § 1798.82(g). 57. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in each and every paragraph of this Complaint. 58. Plaintiff bring this cause of action on behalf of himself and on behalf of the Nationwide Class. 65. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in each and every paragraph of this Complaint. 66. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of himself and on behalf of the California Sub-Class. 67. Defendant had an obligation to disclose to all class members that their Facebook accounts and PII were an easy target for hackers and Defendant was not implementing measures to protect them. 68. Defendant did not do these things. Instead, Defendant willfully deceived Plaintiff and the Class by concealing the true facts concerning their data security, which Defendant was obligated to, and had a duty to, disclose. Additionally, Facebook made numerous representations following the prior exposures to ensure users that their PII and other data was safe, and Facebook was dedicated to maintaining that security.

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24. Defendant’s text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 25. Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff home healthcare software and solutions. 26. The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant’s services, which Defendant sends to promote its business. 27. Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 29. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 2962 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 2962 Number. 30. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)). 31. The text messages originated from telephone number (469) 708-2664, a number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant. 32. The number used by Defendant (469-708-2664) is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 34. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers without human intervention. 35. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. 36. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 37. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 38. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 39. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 40. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 41. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement. 43. The above execution these instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Platform is capable of transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less. 44. Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words, the platform controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function. 46. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life. 47. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm. Specifically, Plaintiff estimates that she spent approximately fifteen minutes investigating the unwanted text messages including how they obtained her number and who the Defendant was. 48. Furthermore, Defendant’s text messages took up memory on Plaintiff’s cellular phone. The cumulative effect of unsolicited text messages like Defendant’s poses a real risk of ultimately rendering the phone unusable for text messaging purposes as a result of the phone’s memory being taken up. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message-spam#text (finding that text message solicitations like the ones sent by Defendant present a “triple threat” of identity theft, unwanted cell phone charges, and slower cell phone performance). 49. Defendant’s text messages also can slow cell phone performance by taking up space on the recipient phone’s memory. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message- spam#text (finding that spam text messages can slow cell phone performance by taking up phone memory space). 50. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 52. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 56. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 61. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 62. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 63. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 64. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 65. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 66. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 68. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-60 as if fully set forth herein. 69. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 70. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. 71. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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[Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act—Overtime Wage Brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective] 21. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 22. Defendants knew that the nonpayment of overtime pay, spread of hours pay, and failure to provide the required wage notice at the time of hiring would financially injure Plaintiff and similarly situated employees and violate state and federal laws. 23. From on or about April 16, 2014 to February 2, 2018, Plaintiff was hired by Defendants to work as a cleaning person, stock up person, and customer service provider for Defendants’ clothing store located at 32 W. 28th Street, New York, NY 10001. 24. During her employment, Plaintiff regularly worked over ten (10) hours per day and over forty (40) hours per week. Specifically, Plaintiff worked six days a week with a varied off day. Her daily schedule ran from around 9:00am to around 7:30pm each day with one varied day off in her workweek. Plaintiff did not have any uninterrupted break during each of her work day, as such, Plaintiff worked approximately 63 hours per week. 25. Defendants did not implement any means (time punch card, written time sheets, computer time logs etc.) to track the number of hours Plaintiff actually worked. 27. Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff for minimum wages according to state and federal laws. 28. Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff for overtime compensation according to state and federal laws. 29. Plaintiff was not compensated for New York’s “spread of hours” premium for shifts that lasted longer than ten (10) hours. 30. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with a wage notices at the time of her hiring. 31. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 32. Defendants knew that the nonpayment of overtime and the “spread of hours” premium would economically injure Plaintiff and the Class Members by their violation of federal and state laws. 33. While employed by Defendants, Plaintiff was not exempt under federal and state laws requiring employers to pay employees overtime. 34. Plaintiff and the New York Class Members’ workdays frequently lasted longer than 10 hours. 35. Defendants did not pay Plaintiff and other Class members’ New York’s “spread of hours” premium for every day in which they worked over 10 hours. 37. Defendants committed the foregoing acts against the Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class. 38. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees either the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half), or the New York State overtime rate (of time and one-half), in violation of the FLSA and New York Labor Law and the supporting federal and New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 39. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying the New York State “spread of hours” premium to Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees. 40. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all other and former non- exempt employees who have been or were employed by the Defendants at their clothing store for up to the last three (3) years, through entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”) and whom failed to receive spread-of-hours pay, and overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week (the “Collective Action Members”), and have been subject to the same common decision, policy, and plan to not provide required wage notices at the time of hiring, in contravention to federal and state labor laws. 42. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Members, and have retained counsel that is experienced and competent in the field of employment law and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 43. This action should be certified as a collective action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the collective action would risk creating either inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual members of this class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interest of the other members not party to the adjudication, or subsequently impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 44. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as collective action. 46. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 47. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have been substantially damaged by Defendants’ unlawful conduct. 49. All said persons, including Plaintiff, are referred to herein as the “Class.” The Class members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Class members are determinable from the records of Defendants. The hours assigned and worked, the positions held, and the rate of pay for each Class Member is also determinable from Defendants’ records. For purpose of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under said F.R.C.P 23. 50. The proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parities and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of the number is presently within the sole control of the Defendants, upon information and belief, there are more than ten (10) members of the class. 51. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those claims which could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief that would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the Class members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants, as alleged herein, of failing to pay overtime compensation. Defendants’ corporation wide policies and practices, including but not limited to their failure to provide a wage notice at the time of hiring, affected all Class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/ or wrongful acts as to each Class member. Plaintiff and other Class members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 54. Upon information and belief, Defendants and other employers throughout the state violate the New York Labor Law. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. Class actions provide class members who are not named in the complaint a degree of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 56. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 57. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants have been, and continue to be, “employers” engaged in interstate “commerce” and/or in the production of “goods” for “commerce,” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§206(a) and §§207(a). Further, Plaintiff is covered within the meaning of FLSA, U.S.C. §§206(a) and 207(a). 58. At all relevant times, Defendants employed “employees” including Plaintiff, within the meaning of FLSA. 59. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendants have had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 60. The FLSA provides that any employer engaged in commerce shall pay employees the applicable minimum wage. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 61. At all relevant times, Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay the statutory minimum wage to Plaintiff, and the collective action members, for some or all of the hours they worked. 63. Defendants knowingly and willfully disregarded the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by failing to compensate Plaintiff and Collective Class Members at the statutory minimum wage when they knew or should have known such was due and that failing to do so would financially injure Plaintiff and Collective Action members. 64. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 65. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants within the meaning of New York Labor Law §§2 and 651. 66. Pursuant to the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, an employer who fails to pay the minimum wage shall be liable, in addition to the amount of any underpayments, for liquidated damages equal to the total of such under-payments found to be due the employee. 67. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ rights by failing to pay them minimum wages in the lawful amount for hours worked. 68. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 70. The FLSA provides that any employer who violates the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §207 shall be liable to the employees affected in the amount of their unpaid overtime compensation, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 29 USC §216(b). 71. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective their overtime pay violated the FLSA. 72. At all relevant times, Defendants had, and continue to have, a policy of practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time and a half to Plaintiff and Collective Action Members for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, which violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§207(a)(1) and 215(a). 73. The FLSA and supporting regulations required employers to notify employees of employment law requires employers to notify employment law requirements. 29 C.F.R. §516.4. 74. Defendants willfully failed to notify Plaintiff and FLSA Collective of the requirements of the employment laws in order to facilitate their exploitation of Plaintiff’s and FLSA Collectives’ labor. 76. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 77. Pursuant to the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, an employer who fails to pay proper overtime compensation shall be liable, in addition to the amount of any underpayments, for liquidated damages equal to the total of such under-payments found to be due the employee. 78. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class their overtime pay violated the NYLL. 79. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class was not in good faith. 80. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 81. The NYLL requires employers to pay an extra hour’s pay for every day that an employee works an interval in excess of ten hours pursuant to NYLL §§190, et seq., and §§650, et seq., and New York State Department of Labor regulations §146-1.6. 82. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and Rule 23 Class spread-of-hours pay was not in good faith. 84. The NYLL and supporting regulations require employers to provide written notice of the rate or rates of pay and the basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; allowances, if any, claimed as a part of minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging allowances; the regular pay day designated by the employer; the name of the employer; any “doing business as” names used by the employer; the physical address of employer’s main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer. NYLL §195-1(a). 85. Defendants intentionally failed to provide notice to employees in violation of New York Labor Law § 195, which requires all employers to provide written notice in the employee’s primary language about the terms and conditions of employment related to rate of pay, regular pay cycle and rate of overtime on his or her first day of employment. 86. Defendants not only did not provide notice to each employee at Time of Hire, but failed to provide notice to each Plaintiff even after the fact. 87. Due to Defendants’ violations of New York Labor Law, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants, jointly and severally, $50 for each workday that the violation occurred or continued to occur, up to $5,000, together with costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to New York Labor Law. N.Y. Lab. Law §198(1-b). 88. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 90. Defendants have failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the New York Labor Law with respect to compensation of each Plaintiff, and did not provide the paystub on or after each Plaintiff’s payday. [Violation of New York Labor Law—Spread of Time Pay Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Overtime Pay Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Minimum Wage Brought on behalf of the Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective] [Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act—Minimum Wage Brought on behalf of the Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Time of Hire Wage Notice Requirement] [Violation of New York Labor Law—New York Pay Stub Requirement]

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21. Defendant CFN is a privately held company that offers a range of financial services and products to small businesses. Upon information and belief, Defendants strategy for increasing the volume of its potential customers involves sending uninvited faxes to solicit business. 23. Defendants are responsible for sending the above-described Junk Faxes. 24. The Junk Fax received by Plaintiff encouraged the reader to contact CFN via toll free phone number 866-767-4447 or through its website at www.cfncash.com. Upon information and belief, the telephone number and website are all owned, maintained, and operated by Defendants. 25. The Junk Fax received by Plaintiff is marketing material for Defendants, advertising the commercial availability of Defendants’ goods and services, which include various cash and loan offers. 26. Plaintiff has no prior or existing business relationship with Defendants. 27. Plaintiff did not provide prior express consent to receive Junk Faxes from Defendants, did not voluntarily agree to make its facsimile number available for public distribution, and did not invite or give permission to Defendants to use their fax numbers.. 28. Defendants sent the facsimile to Plaintiff and the other putative class members without obtaining their prior express invitation or permission. 29. There are no reasonable means for Plaintiff, or any other class member, to avoid receiving illegal junk faxes such as the ones at issue in this case. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 30. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action on behalf of a National Class, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and/or 23(b)(3), defined as follows: All persons or entities who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods or services by or on behalf of Defendants. 32. Excluded from the National Class and New Jersey Class are Defendants, any entity in which Defendants have a controlling interest or that has a controlling interest in Defendants, and Defendants’ legal representative, assignees, and successors. Also excluded are the judge to whom this case is assigned and any member of the judge’s immediate family. 33. This action has been brought and may be properly maintained as a class action pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) as Plaintiff and the Classes satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements for maintaining a class action. 34. Numerosity. Upon information and belief, the number of members in the Class is so numerous as to render joinder impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believe that the proposed Classes contain hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of members. Upon information and belief, the precise size (and identity and contact information) of the Classes can be readily determined from documents and records maintained by Defendants. 35. Joinder. Joinder of all of these individuals is impracticable because of the large number of Class members and the fact that Class members are likely dispersed over a large geographical area, with many members located outside of New Jersey. 36. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff, like all members of the Classes, received an unsolicited advertisement from Defendants by way of facsimile transmission. As a result, Plaintiff and all members of the Classes were injured due to Defendants’ unlawful and improper conduct. 38. Adequacy. Plaintiff has the requisite personal interest in the outcome of this action and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes. Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to, or in conflict with, the interests of the members of the Classes. 40. Predominance. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Classes, and predominate over any questions that affect only individual members of the Classes. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation, the common and predominant questions of whether the Plaintiff and the Classes have been injured as a result of the Defendants’ conduct; whether Plaintiff and members of the Classes are entitled to damages and/or equitable relief and, if so, the measure and/or nature of this relief. 42. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 43. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of itself and on behalf of the members of the National Class against all Defendants. 44. The foregoing acts and omission of Defendants and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’ behalf constitute numerous and multiple violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(c), by transmitting Junk Faxes to Plaintiff and the other members of the National Class without obtaining their consent and without having had an existing business relationship with them. 45. As a result of Defendants’ and/or its affiliates, agents and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’ behalf negligent violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and members of the National Class are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory damages for each and every negligent facsimile in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 46. Plaintiff and members of the National Class are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants and/or its affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’ behalf from violating the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(I)(C), by sending Junk Faxes in the future. 48. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of itself and on behalf of the members of the National Class against all Defendants. 49. The foregoing acts and omission of Defendants and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’ behalf constitute numerous and multiple violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(c), by transmitting Junk Faxes to Plaintiff and the other members of the National Class without obtaining their consent and without having had an existing business relationship with them. 50. As a result of Defendants’ and/or its affiliates, agents and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’ behalf knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and members of the National Class are entitled to an award of $1,500 in statutory damages for each and every knowing and/or willful facsimile in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 51. Plaintiff and members of the National Class are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants and/or its affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’ behalf from violating the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(I)(C), by sending Junk Faxes in the future. 52. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each preceding and each succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 54. The NJCFA was enacted to protect citizens from deceptive, fraudulent, and misleading commercial practices and makes such practices unlawful. 55. The aforementioned unlawful practices by Defendants constitute a violation of N.J.S.A. § 56:8-158 because Defendants used a telephone facsimile machine to send unsolicited advertisements to a telephone facsimile machine within the State of New Jersey. 56. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 56:8-159, any person aggrieved by a violation of this act may bring an action in the Superior Court for damages, either the actual damages sustained or $500 for each violation, whichever is greater, or to enjoin further violations of this act, together with costs of suit and reasonable attorney’s fees. 57. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and New Jersey Class members have suffered a loss in accordance with the aforementioned statute. 58. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and New Jersey Class members have suffered an ascertainable loss in the form of direct monetary losses related to paper, toner, and other materials Plaintiff and New Jersey Class members were forced to incur as a result of Defendants’ unsolicited advertisements. Defendants’ actions also cost Plaintiff and New Jersey Class members’ time, as their time was wasted receiving, reviewing and routing Defendants’ illegal faxes. Finally, the Junk Faxes sent to Plaintiff and the New Jersey Class violated their right to privacy. 59. A causal relationship exists between Defendants’ unlawful, conduct and Plaintiff’s and the putative Classes’ injuries. Had Defendants’ not engaged in the aforementioned illegal conduct, Plaintiff and the New Jersey Class would not have incurred the injuries and costs associated with the receipt of unsolicited facsimile advertisements. KNOWING OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA VIOLATION OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSUMER FRAUD ACT (“NJCFA”)

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(Unjust Enrichment) (Breach of Contract) (Violation of N.J.S.A. 56: 8-1 et seq.) 1. Certifying this action as a class action, with a class as defined above; 2. On Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action, awarding against Defendant damages that Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have suffered, trebled, and granting appropriate injunctive relief; 3. On Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action, awarding against Defendant damages that Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have suffered as a result of Defendant’s actions; 47. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-46 above as if fully set forth herein. 5. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class punitive damages; 58. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-57 above as if fully set forth herein. 59. Plaintiff and the Class entered into valid contracts with North American Power for the provision of natural gas and/or electricity supply. 6. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class interest, costs and attorneys’ fees; and 60. Pursuant to that contract, North American Power agreed to charge a rate for natural gas that “will fluctuate on a monthly basis, based on the market price of natural gas, and will consist of the sum of a variable energy charge plus retail service charge and any applicable taxes.” 62. However, North American Power failed to perform its obligations under the contract because it charged a rate for natural gas that was not based on the factors upon which the parties agreed the rate would be based. 63. Plaintiff and the Class were damaged as a result because they were billed, and they paid, a charge for natural gas that was higher than it would have been had North American Power based its rate on the agreed upon factors. 64. Under the contract, North American Power promised to charge a rate for electricity that “will fluctuate, based on the market price of electricity, and will consist of the sum of a variable energy charge plus retail service charge and any applicable taxes” and “the rate may increase or decrease to reflect price changes in the wholesale power market.” 65. Pursuant to the contract, Plaintiff and the Class agreed to pay that rate, and they did so. 66. However, North American Power failed to perform its obligations under the contract because it charged a rate for electricity that was not based on the factors upon which the parties agreed the rate would be based. 67. Plaintiff and the Class were damaged as a result because they were billed, and they paid, a charge for electricity that was higher than it would have been had North American Power based its rate on the agreed upon factors. 69. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-68 above as if fully set forth herein. 7. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper. 70. By engaging in the conduct described above, Defendant has unjustly enriched itself and received a benefit at the expense of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class and Defendant is required, in equity and good conscience, to compensate them for the damages that they have suffered as a result of Defendant’s actions. 71. It would be unjust for Defendant to retain the payments Plaintiff and the Class made for excessive charges. 72. By reason of the foregoing, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class for the damages that they have suffered as a result of Defendant’s actions, the amount of such damages to be determined at trial, plus attorneys’ fees. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court should enter judgment against Defendant as follows:

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14. Todd Snyder owns and operates retail stores throughout the country, with a flagship location in New York City at 25 East 26th Street. It sells at this store and on its Website, clothing, shoes and accessories for men. 15. Todd Snyder’s Website is heavily integrated with its stores, serving as a gateway to those physical locations. Todd Snyder’s customers are, through the Website, inter alia, able to: learn information about available styles, including new arrivals and best sellers, the materials used, and details about the items; learn about sizing; purchase items for delivery; purchase items as a gift for third parties; sign up for the newsletter; and interact with the company’s social media accounts via links contained on the Website.. 16. It is, upon information and belief, Todd Snyder’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff Olsen and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its stores. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff Olsen and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Todd Snyder’s stores and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. -7- 17. Plaintiff Olsen cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using screen-reading software. 18. During his visits to the Website, the last occurring on or about May 23, 2019, Plaintiff Olsen encountered multiple access barriers that denied him the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Todd Snyder’s stores. Because of these barriers he was unable to, substantially equal to sighted individuals: a. Know what is on the Website. Plaintiff Olsen was unable to access several areas of the Website. Very few links are detected, and the only links he was able to access were “T-shirts,” “New Arrivals” and “Collection.” He was unable to learn about the Memorial Day sale because the link was embedded in an untagged image. Clicking the “sale” link from the main navigation toolbar also did not work. When a sighted user hovers over “Sale,” by contrast, he or she is given several sub links that are clickable and will take the user to a new page. These sub links were not detected by the screen reader. Plaintiff Olsen was able to shop for t-shirts using the link contained on the body of the home page, but in doing so, he was unable to learn about sizing. The only size that appears to the screen reader was labeled “lxl.” Further, the sizes are not clickable therefore he could not complete a purchase. Plaintiff Olsen could not even learn about how Defendant’s sizing works, because the size chart was completely inaccessible. It was not presented as a navigable table with proper row and column labels. Plaintiff Olsen was unable to learn about Todd Snyder’s social media accounts, because they were untagged. Plaintiff Olsen tried to purchase an item using the “Gift -8- Now” feature but was unable to do so because the form was not properly labeled. and he was unable to select a design. Once the “Gift Now” pop-up was open, he lost control of his screen reader and had to completely close out the Website in order to regain control. b. Navigate the Website. The screen reader had difficulty navigating the website. As mentioned above, very few links were accessible to the screen reader. Many elements were unlabeled and Plaintiff Olsen encountered repeated issues with screen reader focus. Ultimately, he was unable to complete a purchase for himself or a third party. He could not even sign up for the mailing list. The screen reader found the text to join the mailing list but no edit box was detected. 19. Plaintiff Olsen was denied full and equal access to the facilities and services Todd Snyder offers to the public on its Website because he encountered multiple accessibility barriers that visually-impaired people often encounter with non-compliant websites: a. Lack of alt-text for images. Images are labeled “Key Look 1,” for example. b. Frames have no titles. c. Button elements are empty and have no programmatically determined name. d. Forms have fields without label elements or title attributes. e. Webpages have duplicate IDs, which cause problems in screen readers. f. Headings are not nested correctly and approximately twenty (20) headings are empty. -9- g. Links use general text like “here” which does not explain the link’s purpose. h. Several links on a page share the same link text but go to a different destination. i. Webpages have markup errors. Todd Snyder Must Remove Barriers to Its Website 20. Due to the inaccessibility of its Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff Olsen, who need screen readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Todd Snyder offers to the public on its Website. The Website’s access barriers that Plaintiff Olsen encountered have caused a denial of his full and equal access in the past, and now deter him on a regular basis from accessing the Website. These access barriers have likewise deterred him from visiting Todd Snyder’s stores and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals. 21. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Olsen could independently navigate it, view goods and service items, learn about sale items, sign up for the newsletter and complete a desired transaction, as sighted individuals do. 22. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Olsen has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 23. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff Olsen and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff Olsen alleges that Todd Snyder has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: -10- a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Olsen; b. Failing to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Olsen; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff Olsen, as a member of a protected class. 24. Todd Snyder therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 25. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Olsen seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 26. Because its Website has never been equally accessible, and because Todd Snyder lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff Olsen seeks a permanent injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) requiring Todd Snyder to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff Olsen to assist Todd Snyder to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for its Website: a. Remediating the Website to be WCAG 2.0 AA compliant; b. Training Todd Snyder employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; -11- c. Regularly checking the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; d. Regularly testing user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Todd Snyder’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, e. Developing an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Todd Snyder’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 27. Although Todd Snyder may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Todd Snyder lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 28. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Olsen and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 29. Todd Snyder has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 30. Todd Snyder has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. -12- 31. Plaintiff Olsen seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Todd Snyder’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Todd Snyder’s stores and on the Website, during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 32. Plaintiff Olsen seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Todd Snyder’s stores and its Website, during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 33. Plaintiff Olsen seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Todd Snyder’s stores and its Website, during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 34. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: a. Whether Todd Snyder’s stores are places of “public accommodation”; b. Whether Todd Snyder’s Website is a “public accommodation” or a service or good “of a place of public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA; -13- c. Whether Todd Snyder’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” or an “accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; d. Whether Todd Snyder’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating Title III of the ADA; and e. Whether Todd Snyder’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 35. Plaintiff Olsen’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Todd Snyder has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 36. Plaintiff Olsen will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because he has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because he has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Todd Snyder has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. 37. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class and Subclass Members -14- predominate over questions affecting only individuals, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 38. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 39. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 40. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 41. Todd Snyder’s stores are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Todd Snyder’s stores. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 42. The Website, which is a commercial marketplace that affects interstate commerce, is a public accommodation under Title III, even absent any connection to a brick and mortar location. 43. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, -15- services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 44. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 45. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 46. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Olsen, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. -16- 47. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Olsen requests the relief as set forth below. 48. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 50. Todd Snyder’s State of New York stores constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Todd Snyder’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Todd Snyder. Todd Snyder’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these locations. 51. Todd Snyder is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its stores and the Website. Todd Snyder is a “person” within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 52. Todd Snyder is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Todd Snyder makes available to the non-disabled public. -17- 53. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 54. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 55. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 56. Todd Snyder’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class because of a disability, violating the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2), in that Todd Snyder has: -18- a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to Class Members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 57. Todd Snyder discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Olsen and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Todd Snyder’s Website and its stores under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Todd Snyder from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 58. As Todd Snyder’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Olsen seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 59. Plaintiff Olsen is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense. 60. Plaintiff Olsen is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. -19- 62. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 63. The NYCHRL provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(a). 64. Todd Snyder’s New York City stores are sales establishments and public accommodations within the meaning of the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 65. Todd Snyder is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its stores in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 66. Todd Snyder is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Todd Snyder makes available to the non-disabled public. 67. Todd Snyder is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et -20- seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 68. Todd Snyder’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Subclass because of a disability, violating the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a,) in that it has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 69. As such, Todd Snyder discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Olsen and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Todd Snyder from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 70. As Todd Snyder’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Olsen seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. -21- 71. Plaintiff Olsen is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines for each offense. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 72. Plaintiff Olsen is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 73. Under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 74. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 75. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Olsen contends, and is informed and believes that Todd Snyder denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its stores, which Todd Snyder owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 76. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Todd Snyder, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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39. Plaintiffs bring this matter on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated. As detailed at length in this Complaint, Defendant orchestrated deceptive marketing and labeling practices. Defendant’s customers were uniformly impacted by and exposed to this misconduct. Accordingly, this Complaint is suited for classwide resolution, including injunctive relief. 40. The Class is defined as all consumers who purchased the Products anywhere in the United States during the Class Period (the “Class”). 41. This action should be maintained as a class action under Rule 23(a), satisfying the class action prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy because: 42. Numerosity: Class Members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiffs believe that there are thousands of consumers who are Class Members described above who have been damaged by Defendant’s deceptive and misleading practices. 44. Typicality: Plaintiffs are members of the Class. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of each Class Member in that every member of the Class was susceptible to the same deceptive, misleading conduct and purchased the Defendant’s Products. Plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the same causes of action as the other Class Members. 46. Predominance: Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), the common issues of law and fact identified above predominate over any other questions affecting only individual members of the Class. The Class issues fully predominate over any individual issue because no inquiry into individual conduct is necessary; all that is required is a narrow focus on Defendant’s deceptive and misleading marketing and labeling practices. 48. Accordingly, this Class is properly brought and should be maintained as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) because questions of law or fact common to Class Members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating this controversy. 52. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in all the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. New York General Business Law Section 349 (“GBL § 349”) declares unlawful “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state . . .” 55. There is no fully adequate remedy at law. 56. Defendant misleadingly, inaccurately, and deceptively advertises and markets its Products to consumers. 57. Defendant’s false Nonstick Representations constitute consumer-oriented conduct which is misleading in a material way in that it, inter alia, induced Plaintiffs and the Class Members to purchase and pay a premium for Defendant’s Products and to use the Products when they otherwise would not have. Defendant made their untrue and/or misleading statements and representations willfully, wantonly, and with reckless disregard for the truth. 58. Plaintiffs and the Class Members have been injured inasmuch as they paid a premium for products based on the Nonstick Representations. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and the Class Members received less than what they bargained and/or paid for. 59. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in all the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. Defendant’s Nonstick Representations induced Plaintiffs and the Class Members to buy Defendant’s Products and to pay a premium price for them. 60. Defendant’s deceptive and misleading practices constitute a deceptive act and practice in the conduct of business in violation of New York General Business Law §349(a) and Plaintiffs and the Class Members have been damaged thereby. 60. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350 provides, in part, as follows: False advertising in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state is hereby declared unlawful. 61. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350a(1) provides, in part, as follows: The term ‘false advertising’ means advertising, including labeling, of a commodity, or of the kind, character, terms or conditions of any employment opportunity if such advertising is misleading in a material respect. In determining whether any advertising is misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other things) not only representations made by statement, word, design, device, sound or any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the advertising fails to reveal facts material in the light of such representations with respect to the commodity or employment to which the advertising relates under the conditions proscribed in said advertisement, or under such conditions as are customary or usual. . . 62. Defendant’s labeling and advertisements contain untrue and materially misleading statements concerning Defendant’s Products inasmuch as the Nonstick Representations are false. 64. Defendant’s advertising, packaging and products’ labeling induced the Plaintiffs and the Class Members to buy Defendant’s Products. 65. Defendant made their untrue and/or misleading statements and representations willfully, wantonly, and with reckless disregard for the truth. 66. Defendant’s conduct constitutes multiple, separate violations of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350. 67. Defendant made the material misrepresentations described in this Complaint in Defendant’s advertising, and on the Products’ packaging and labeling. 68. Defendant’s material misrepresentations were substantially uniform in content, presentation, and impact upon consumers at large. Moreover, all consumers purchasing the Products were and continue to be exposed to Defendant’s material misrepresentations. 69. As a result of Defendant’s recurring and unlawful deceptive acts and practices, Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to monetary, compensatory, treble and punitive damages, injunctive relief, restitution and disgorgement of all moneys obtained by means of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Defendant provided the Plaintiffs and Class Members with an express warranty in the form of the Nonstick Representations which were written affirmations of fact. 72. The Nonstick Representations were not couched as “belief” or “opinion,” and were not “generalized statements of quality not capable of proof or disproof.” 73. These affirmations of fact became part of the basis for the bargain and were material to the Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ transactions. 74. Plaintiffs and Class Members reasonably relied upon the Defendant’s affirmations of fact and justifiably acted in ignorance of the material facts omitted or concealed when they decided to buy Defendant’s Products. 75. Within a reasonable time after they knew or should have known of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiffs, on behalf of himself and Class Members, placed Defendant on notice of their breach, giving Defendant an opportunity to cure their breach, which they refused to do. 76. Defendant breached the express warranty because the Products are not "nonstick.” 77. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breach of express warranty, Plaintiffs and Class Members were damaged in the amount of the price they paid for the Products, in an amount to be proven at trial. 79. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provides a federal remedy for consumers who have been damaged by the failure of a supplier or warrantor to comply with any obligation under a written warranty or implied warranty, or other various obligations established under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. 80. The Products are “consumer products” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1). 81. Plaintiffs and other members of the Class are “consumers” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3). 82. Defendant is a “supplier” and “warrantor” within the meaning of the Magnuson- Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301(4) and 2301(5). 83. Defendant made the Nonstick Representations in writing. 84. These statements were made in connection with the sale of the Products and relate to the nature of the Products and affirm and promise that the Products are as represented and defect free and, as such, are “written warranties” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A). 86. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 87. Defendant is in the business of manufacturing, distributing, marketing and advertising the pans described above. 88. Under the Uniform Commercial Code’s implied warranty of merchantability, the Defendant warranted in writing and on the advertising and packaging that the pans were “Nonstick.” 89. Defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability in that Defendant’s Products’ characteristics deviate from the label and products’ description, and reasonable consumers expecting a product that conforms to its label would not accept the Defendant’s Products if they knew the pans did not conform to the Nonstick Representations. 90. Within a reasonable amount of time after the Plaintiffs discovered the Products’ misrepresentations, Plaintiffs notified the Defendant of such breach. 91. The inability of the Defendant’s Products to meet the label description was wholly due to the Defendant’s fault and without Plaintiffs’ or Class Members’ fault or neglect, and was solely due to the Defendant’s manufacture and distribution of the Products to the public. 93. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each preceding paragraph as though set forth at length herein. 94. Plaintiffs and the Class members conferred benefits on Defendant when they purchased the Gotham Steel pans or cookware. 95. Under the circumstances, it would be against equity and good conscience to permit Defendant to retain the entirety of the benefits conferred on it when Plaintiffs and the Class purchased the Products. This is because Defendant knew that the Nonstick Representations were material to consumers yet false. Plaintiffs and the Class members would not have purchased the Products if they had known the truth about the Nonstick Representations. 96. It would therefore be unjust and inequitable for Defendant to retain all of the benefits they received and not provide restitution to Plaintiffs and the Class. BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and All Class Members) BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTIBILITY (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and All Class Members) Unjust Enrichment (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiffs and All Class Members) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK GBL § 350 (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK GBL § 349 (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class) VIOLATION OF THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and All Class Members)

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11. HP employed Plaintiffs and members of the Collective Action Class in the Services Information Development, Technical Consulting, and ITO Service Delivery job families at HP’s locations within the United States. 12. Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Class regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek without receiving the legally required amount of overtime wages from HP for all hours worked by them as required by the FLSA. 13. Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Class primarily performed non-exempt job duties and, therefore, HP misclassified them as exempt from the FLSA. Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Class did not perform work directly related to management policies or general business operations and did not customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment. 15. HP maintained a uniform policy or practice of willfully failing to pay Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Class for all hours worked in a workweek including overtime. 16. HP also failed to maintain accurate and sufficient timekeeping records in compliance with the FLSA. 17. HP’s failure to comply with the FLSA caused Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Class members to suffer lost wages and interest thereon. 18. All actions and omissions described in this Complaint were made by HP directly or through its supervisory employees and agents. 19. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action on behalf of the Collective Action Class, as defined above. 20. Plaintiffs desire to pursue their FLSA claims on behalf of any individuals who opt in to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 21. Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Class are “similarly situated” as that term is used in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), because, inter alia, all such individuals worked pursuant to Defendant’s previously described common business policies and practices and, as a result of such policies and practices, were not paid the full and legally mandated overtime premium for hours worked over forty during the workweek. Defendant also failed to pay Plaintiffs and all Collective Action Members overtime compensation on a timely basis in violation of the FLSA. Resolution of this action requires inquiry into common facts, including, inter alia, Defendant’s common compensation, timekeeping and payroll practices. 23. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs. 24. At all relevant times, Defendant has been and continues to be, an employer engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 25. At all relevant times, Defendant employed, and/or continues to employ, Plaintiffs and each of the Collective Action Class members within the meaning of the FLSA. 26. At all relevant times, Defendant has had annual gross revenues exceeding $500,000. 28. As a result of Defendant’s willful failure to compensate Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Class members at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, Defendant has violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1) and 215(a). 29. Defendant has failed to make, keep and preserve records with respect to Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Class members sufficient to determine their wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(c) and 215(a). 30. Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 31. Due to Defendant’s FLSA violations, Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Class members are entitled to recover from Defendant their unpaid wages for the legally required amount of overtime compensation for all of the hours worked by them in excess of forty in a workweek, actual and liquidated damages, including the employer’s share of FICA, FUTA, state unemployment insurance, and any other required employment taxes, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

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27. Plaintiff Papp was hired by Defendant as a trainee for the General Manager position in or around March 2015 through December 2015. 28. As a prerequisite to becoming a General Manager, Plaintiff was required to work as a GMIT at the Wawa locations in Mullica Hill, Millville, Bridgeton, and Thorofare, New Jersey. 29. During Plaintiff’s training, Papp primarily performed work that would typically be expected of hourly employees, including re-stocking the store, running the deli counter, cleaning the coffee area and making coffee, ringing registers, and flowing goods to the sales floor. 31. Plaintiff was employed by Wawa as a GMIT at the store location in Hill, Millville, Bridgeton, and Thorofare, New Jersey. from approximately March 2015 through December 2015. 32. At all times during Plaintiff’s training and employment, he was paid by Wawa. 33. As a GMIT, Plaintiff was required to work a minimum of ten (10) hours a day, five (5) days per week. 34. Plaintiff worked approximately fifty (50) to sixty (60) hours per week during each week, and was not paid for the hours he worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. For example, during the week of August 23, 2015 through August 29, 2015, Plaintiff worked approximately fifty-five (55) hours. 35. The number of shifts Plaintiff worked per week can be ascertained from Defendant’s records. 36. Plaintiff never received overtime wages for working in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 37. Wawa assigned all of the work performed by Plaintiff and the other similarly situated current and former Trainees, and is aware of all the work that they have performed. 38. The work required of the Plaintiff and the GMITs did not include managerial responsibilities. 39. Plaintiff’s primary duties as a GMIT were unrelated to the management of the store. On a daily basis, Papp’s primary tasks included working the cash registers, making deli sandwiches, stocking shelves, cleaning the store, assisting customers, unpacking merchandise, and other manual tasks. 41. Plaintiff and collective and class members were required to train for the General Manager position and participate in Defendant’s Management Training programs. 42. During training for their General Manager positions, Plaintiff and other similarly situated Trainees’ primary duties have not been management. Plaintiff was for all intensive purposes, doing the duties of an hourly associate, which included ringing on the register, manning the deli, making hoagie sandwiches, filling up the cooler and doing other manual tasks that were usually performed by an associate. 43. Plaintiff and other similarly situated Trainees have not performed the duties of an exempt management employee. For example, while training for General Manager positions, Plaintiff and other Trainees have not interviewed potential employees, selected or trained employees; have not set or adjusted employees’ rates of pay or hours of work; have not recommended employees for promotion or demotion; have not handled employee complaints or grievances; have not determined techniques to be used in the stores; have not controlled the flow or distribution of materials or merchandise; have not maintained production or sales records; have not planned or controlled the budget; and have not monitored or implemented legal compliance measures. 44. While training for the General Manager position, Plaintiff and other Trainees have not customarily and regularly exercised discretionary powers. 45. While training for the General Manager position, Plaintiff and other Trainees have not customarily and regularly exercised discretion and independent judgment. 47. Upon information and belief, during the relevant liability periods, all Trainees for Defendant at its store locations in the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia and Florida have used standardized training materials issued by Defendant. 48. Upon information and belief, during the relevant liability periods, all Trainees for Defendant at their store locations in the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia and Florida have been subject to Defendant’s Management Training Program. 49. During the relevant liability periods in which Plaintiff and other similarly situated Trainees have trained for the General Manager position, Defendant has misclassified them as exempt and have not paid them overtime compensation for hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek. 50. As Trainees, Plaintiff was scheduled to work fifty (50) to sixty (60) hours a week. Upon information and belief, during the relevant liability periods, Trainees companywide have been consistently and uniformly worked in excess of fifty (50) hours per week during training. 51. As Trainees, Plaintiff was not paid overtime compensation for the hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek. Upon information and belief, during the relevant liability periods, all Trainees have been denied overtime compensation for hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek. 52. All work performed by the Plaintiff and other Trainees has been for the benefit of and accepted by Defendant. 54. Defendant was aware that the primary duties of Plaintiff and the other GMITs were non-managerial. 55. These assignments were given to Trainees mainly due to the pressure that the General Managers received from the District Managers to complete such tasks. 56. At all times relevant, Plaintiff and all other similarly situated Trainees were engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as required by 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207. 57. Wawa employed Plaintiff and other similarly situated current and former Trainees at their store locations in the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia and Florida. 58. Wawa issued paychecks to the Plaintiff and the other Trainees during their employment. 59. The Plaintiff was paid on a salary basis, and classified as exempt from overtime compensation by Wawa. 60. Plaintiff and the other Trainees worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, without receiving overtime compensation as required by the FLSA. 61. Plaintiff and the other Trainees worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, without receiving overtime compensation as required by the NJWHL. 62. Pursuant to Defendant’s policy and pattern or practice, Defendant did not pay Plaintiff and the other Trainees overtime wages for hours they worked for their benefit in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 64. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 216(b), Plaintiff seeks to prosecute his FLSA claims as a Collective Action on behalf of all similarly situated persons, currently or formerly employed by Wawa as Trainees at their store locations in the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia and Florida (the “Collective Action Members”) at any time three (3) years prior to the date of filing this Complaint, to the entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”). 65. During the FLSA Liability Period, Defendant employed numerous Trainees who are similarly situated to Plaintiff Papp in that they have performed the same duties as Trainees, and have been subjected to the same illegal pay practices as Plaintiff Papp. 66. During the FLSA Liability Period, Trainees, like Plaintiff Papp, have been victims of a common policy, plan, or scheme by Defendant to misclassify Trainees as exempt and to deny them overtime compensation required by the FLSA. 67. During the FLSA Liability Period, Trainees, like Plaintiff Papp, have been uniformly affected by Defendant’s centralized, companywide policy and/or practice to classify Trainees as exempt and to deny them overtime compensation required by the FLSA, which applies at all of the Defendant’s locations in the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia and Florida. 68. Defendant’s misclassification of Plaintiff Papp and other similarly situated Trainees, and Defendant’s unlawful compensation policies and/or practices, have been in willful disregard of the rights of Plaintiff Papp, and other similarly situated Trainees under the FLSA. 70. There are many Collective Action Members who have not been paid overtime wages in violation of the FLSA, who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it. Thus, notice should be sent to the Collective Action Members pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 71. The Collective Action Members are known to Defendant, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendant’s records. 72. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all of the preceding paragraphs. 73. Pursuant to Rules 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff sues individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons, currently or formerly employed by Wawa as Trainees within the State of New Jersey. 74. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), a Plaintiff must plead that: a. The class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable; b. There are questions of law or fact common to the class that predominate over any individual questions of law or fact; c. Claims or defenses of the representative are typical of the class; d. The representative will fairly and adequately protect the class; and, e. A class action is superior to other methods of adjudication. 76. The persons identified as the Class Members above are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of that number can be made are presently within the sole control of Defendant, upon information and belief, there are at least 100 Class Members during the Class Periods. Common Questions of Law and/or Fact 78. Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class Members, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class Members as a whole. 79. Plaintiff is committed to pursuing this action and has retained competent counsel experienced in wage and hour law and class action litigation. 80. Plaintiff has the same interests in this matter as all other Class Members, and Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class Members. Typicality of Claims and/or Defenses 81. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class Members and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual plaintiffs lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against the Defendant. Adequacy 82. Plaintiff is committed to pursuing this action and has retained competent counsel experienced in wage and hour law and class action litigation. 84. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the putative class. Indeed, at all relevant times herein, Defendant treated Plaintiff identically, or at the very least, substantially-similarly, to the Class Members. 85. Any lawsuit brought by a salaried GMIT of Defendants would be identical to a suit brought by any salaried GMIT for the same violations. Thus, separate litigation would risk inconsistent results. 86. Accordingly, this means of protecting the Class Members’ rights is superior to any other method, and this action is properly maintainable as a Class Action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). 87. Additionally, Plaintiffs’ counsel has substantial experience in this field of law. 88. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf the Collective Action Members, re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 71 as if set forth again herein. 89. At all relevant times, Defendant employed Plaintiff, and employed or continue to employ, each of the Collective Action Members within the meaning of the FLSA. 90. Wawa has engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the FLSA, as described in this Complaint. 91. Plaintiff consented in writing to be a party to this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 93. During the FLSA Liability Period, Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff Papp and all other similarly situated Trainees for all their hours worked for Defendant in excess of forty (40) hours per week as required by Section 207 of the FLSA. 94. Plaintiff Papp and all other Trainees similarly-situated to them, have been victims of a policy and plan by Defendant to misclassify them as exempt employees for their work as Trainees and to deny them overtime compensation required by the FLSA. 95. Defendant’s misclassification of Plaintiff Papp and all other Trainees similarly- situated to them as exempt employees, and Defendant’s failure to pay them in accordance with the requirements of Section 207 of the FLSA, has been in willful disregard of the overtime wage compensation requirements of the FLSA. 96. Defendant have not made, kept, or preserved records of the hours worked by Manager Trainees as required for non-exempt employees pursuant to Section 211(c) of the 98. Plaintiff Papp, individually and on behalf of all Class Members, re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 87 as if set forth again herein. 99. Wawa’s violations of the NJWHL have been willful. 100. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the Class Members were employed by Defendant within the meaning of the NJWHL. 101. Defendant willfully violated Plaintiff’s rights as well as the rights of the Class Members, by failing to pay them for all hours worked and overtime compensation at rates not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek in violation of the NJWHL. 102. Defendant’s NJWHL violations have caused Plaintiff and the Class Members irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. 103. Due to Defendant’s NJWHL violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendant their unpaid wages for all hours worked, overtime compensation, damages and/or interest for unreasonably delayed payment of wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to the NJWHL. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: UNPAID OVERTIME WAGES (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiff and All Collective Action Members)

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23. Defendant operates, manages, and markets its retail stores, sells store gift cards to the public, and uses them as a form of communication. One or more of its retail stores is located in New York City. Defendant’s retail stores constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s retail stores provide important goods and services to the public. 25. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s store gift cards, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public at its retail stores. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from purchasing, accessing, and utilizing the store gift cards and, as a result, Defendant’s retail stores. 26. These access barriers on Defendant’s store gift cards have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to purchase a Braille store gift card related to Defendant’s physical retail locations, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations. Plaintiff intends to immediately purchase a store gift card issued by the Defendant as soon as they become available in Braille. 27. If the store gift cards were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently purchase the store gift cards and complete a desired transaction utilizing gift cards as sighted individuals do. 28. Through his knowledge about the lack of Braille store gift cards, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 30. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 31. Title III of the ADA requires that public accommodations provide “appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). 32. Defendant discriminates on the basis of disability because they fail to afford individuals who are visually impaired with the same ability to independently access the goods and services provided to others, thus failing to ensure effective communication with its visually impaired customers during transactions for its goods and services. 33. The regulation sets forth numerous examples of “auxiliary aids and services”, including, without limitation, “Brailled materials and displays..." 28 C.F.R. § 34. In addition to this general nondiscrimination mandate, Title III prohibits public accommodations from engaging in specific types of discrimination, including the failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated, or otherwise treated differently because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, services, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(a). 35. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the provision of an auxiliary aid or service, (emphasis added) . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) Nothing in this section shall require a person with disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or organization … does not intend to comply with its provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) 36.303 (b)(2). “[I]n order to be effective, auxiliary aids and services must be provided in accessible formats, in a timely manner, and in such a way to protect the privacy and independence of the individual with a disability. 28 CFR 36.303 (c)(ii).6 37. If the store gift cards were accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently utilize them. 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding its store gift cards, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in marketing and selling its store gift cards and has generated significant revenue from the store gift cards. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its store gift cards equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the store gift cards, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who would like independent access to Defendant’s store gift cards and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who would like independent access to Defendant’s store gift cards and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s store gift cards are a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s store gift cards are a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s store gift cards deny the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s store gift cards deny the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Defendant’s retail stores are places of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s store gift cards are a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s retail stores. The store gift cards are a service that is integrated with these locations. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the store gift cards, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant’s physical locations are located in the State of New York and constitute sales establishments and places of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s store gift cards are a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s store gift cards are a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 60. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and sells its store gift cards. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 61. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its store gift cards, causing its store gift cards and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 64. Readily available manufacturing and/or printing capabilities exist for making store gift cards accessible to the blind and visually impaired. The addition to store gift cards of Braille on the gift card and packaging thereof and other related marketing materials would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s store gift cards and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 74. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and places of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its store gift cards are a service that is integrated with its establishments. 75. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its store gift cards, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its store gift cards, causing its store gift cards and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant is: a. developing, marketing and selling store gift cards that are inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. failing to sell store gift cards that are sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 79. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 80. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its store gift cards and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 81. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 84. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 85. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 86. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, Defendant’s store gift cards contain access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its store gift cards and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 87. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers On Its Store Gift Cards VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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(Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227) (Violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692) 10. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant owned, operated and/or controlled telephone number 877-395-3125. 11. Within one year prior to the filing of this action, Defendant constantly and continuously contacted Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number (347) 413-2034. 12. Within one year prior to the filing of this action, Defendant caused Plaintiff’s telephone to ring or engaged Plaintiff in telephone conversations repeatedly. 13. On or about March 31, 2014, Plaintiff received a telephone call from Defendant on his cellular telephone. Plaintiff requested that Defendant cease calling her there. 14. Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s communication in this regard, Defendant continued to contact Plaintiff on her cell phone. 15. Defendant’s conduct as described in detail above was done to harass, oppress, or abuse Plaintiff. 16. Defendant’s conduct as described in detail above amounted to an unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect the alleged debt. 4 17. At all times relevant to this action, while conducting business in Ohio, Defendant has been subject to, and required to abide by, the laws of the United States, which included the TCPA and its related regulations that are set forth at 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (“TCPA Regulations”), as well as the opinions, regulations and orders issued by the courts and the FCC implementing, interpreting and enforcing the TCPA and the TCPA regulations. 18. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant owned, operated and/or controlled an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) that originated, routed and/or terminated telecommunications. 19. Within four years prior to the filing of this action, Defendant called Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number (347) 413-2034 multiple times using an artificial prerecorded voice or using equipment which has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using random or sequential number generator and to dial such numbers, also known as an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(A) and (B). 20. Defendant never received Plaintiff’s consent to call Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone using an “automatic telephone dialing system” or an “artificial or prerecorded voice” as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a)(1). 21. Even assuming Defendant received Plaintiff’s consent to call Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone using an “automatic telephone dialing system” or an “artificial or prerecorded voice” as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a)(1), this consent was revoked when Plaintiff demanded that Defendant cease calling Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone on or about, but not limited to, March 12, 2014. 5 22. At no time have Plaintiff and Defendant had an “established business relationship” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(2). 23. Defendant is not a tax exempt nonprofit organization. 24. Defendant’s violation of the TCPA was willful. 25. Within four years prior to the filing of this action, Defendant willfully and/or knowingly contacted Plaintiff no less than five (5) times at Plaintiff’s cellular telephone using an “automatic telephone dialing system” or using an “artificial or prerecorded voice” in violation of the TCPA. V. 26. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 27. Defendant violated the FDCPA. Defendant’s violations include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d by engaging in conduct, the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress or abuse any person in connection with the collection of the alleged debt; and (b) Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5) by causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversations repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse or harass any person at the called number; and (c) Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f by using unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of an alleged debt. 6 28. Defendant’s acts as described above were done intentionally with the purpose of coercing Plaintiff to pay the alleged debts. 29. As a result of the foregoing violations of the FDCPA, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for declaratory judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, and costs and attorney fees. VI. 30. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 31. Defendant violated the TCPA. Defendant’s violations include, but are not limited to the following: (a) Within four years prior to the filing of this action, on multiple occasions, Defendant violated TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(iii) which states in pertinent part, “It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States . . . to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice — to any telephone number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone service . . . or any service for which the called party is charged for the call. (b) Within four years prior to the filing of this action, on multiple occasions, Defendant willfully and/or knowingly contacted Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s cellular telephone using an artificial prerecorded voice or an automatic telephone dialing system and as such, Defendant knowing and/or willfully violated the TCPA. 7 32. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of five hundred dollars ($500.00) in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). If the Court finds that Defendant knowingly and/or willfully violated the TCPA, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500.00), for each and every violation pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 33. Plaintiff is also entitled to seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 8. Within one year prior to the filing of this action, Defendant contacted Plaintiff to collect an alleged debt. 9. The alleged debt is an obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment. Thus, the alleged debt is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).

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11. Furthermore, The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5). 12. The Squip Junk Fax is a “dual purpose” fax. The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) defines these types of communications as “offers for free goods and services that are part of an overall marketing campaign to sell property, goods, or services.” Report and Order, In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, ¶¶ 139-142 (2003). In other words, the FCC has concluded that a “dual purpose” fax is an advertisement under the TCPA.3 14. Put broadly, Defendant offers free samples to those in the medical profession in hopes its recipients will purchase products from Defendant in bulk so its recipients can then sell Squip’s products to their patients. 15. While Defendant advertises its free Nasaline saline rinsing system within the Squip Junk Fax, it’s ulterior motive is clear: to advertise and solicit its recipients to go to Defendant’s website to purchase its products. Squip invites a viewer of its website how to order wholesaler and distributor purchasing.5 In Squip’s privacy policy on its website it mentions that “The information collected about you is used to process orders and to ensure that you are provided with the best service.”6 16. The Squip Junk Fax advertises the commercial availability of any property, goods, or services when it advertises its Nasaline saline rinsing system and solicits contact from its recipient. 18. Unsolicited faxes cause harm to their recipients. A junk fax recipient loses the use of its fax machine, paper, and ink toner. An unsolicited fax wastes the recipient’s time that would have been spent on something else. A junk fax also interferes with, invades, and intrudes upon the recipient’s privacy. Unsolicited faxes prevent fax machines from receiving authorized faxes, prevent their use for authorized outgoing faxes, cause undue wear and tear on the recipients’ fax machines, and require additional time and labor to attempt to discern the source and purpose of the unsolicited message. Such faxes are annoying and are a hassle to deal with. 19. On behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff brings this case as a class action asserting claims against Defendant under the JFPA. 21. On or about July 13, 2016 at 11:46 p.m., Squip transmitted by telephone facsimile machine an unsolicited fax to Plaintiff Lackawanna. See Exhibit A. 22. The Squip Junk Fax advertises the availability of Squip’s Nasaline saline rinsing system. See Exhibit A. 23. The Squip Junk Fax from Defendant also solicited Plaintiff to visit its website at www.squipusa.com. See Exhibit A. 24. The Squip Junk Fax from Defendant further solicited Plaintiff to enter his identification and address information in order to have a free saline nasal rinsing system sent to him. See Exhibit A. 26. Squip created or made the Squip Junk Fax, which it knew or should have known advertises its products (namely, its Nasaline nasal rinsing system) that Squip intended to and did in fact distribute to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 27. The Squip Junk Fax is part of Squip’s work or operations to market its goods or services that are performed by Squip and/or on behalf of Squip. Therefore, the Squip Junk Fax constitutes material furnished in connection with Squip’s work or operations. 28. Plaintiff had not invited or given permission to Squip to send the Squip Junk Fax and had no prior relationship with Squip. 29. Squip faxed the same unsolicited facsimile message to Plaintiff and more than 40 other recipients without first receiving the recipients’ express permission or invitation. 30. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other Class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners actually desire to receive. 32. In accordance with F. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the JFPA, on behalf of the following Class of persons: Squip Junk Fax Class: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of the initial complaint in this action, (2) were sent, by Defendant or on Defendant’s behalf a telephone facsimile message substantially similar to Exhibit A, (3) from whom Defendant claims it obtained prior express permission or invitation to send those faxes in the same manner as Defendant claims it obtained prior express consent to fax the Plaintiff. 33. The following individuals are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the class definitions following appropriate discovery. 36. Typicality (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)): Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all Class members. Plaintiff received an unsolicited facsimile sent by or on behalf of the Defendant advertising goods and services of the Defendant during the Class Period. Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendant has acted the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the Class members. 37. Fair and Adequate Representation (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the Class. Plaintiff is committed to keeping itself apprised of the litigation and to representing the Class Members’ interests. 40. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 41. The JFPA makes unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement …” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 42. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 43. The faxes sent by Defendant advertised its services, namely its retail- management and consulting services, which were commercial in nature, and were advertisements under the TCPA. See Exhibit A. 44. Plaintiff and the other members of the Squip Junk Fax Class never gave prior express consent, invitation or permission to receive the faxes. 48. Defendant’s Other Violations of the TCPA. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendant has sent via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines of members of the Squip Junk Fax Class faxes that constitute advertisements under the JFPA that were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation (and/or that Defendant is precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements in connection with such transmissions). Defendant violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendant is continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. 50. The JFPA is a strict liability statute. The Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff and the other members of the Squip Junk Fax Class even if it did not intend to send the faxes or to send them without first obtaining prior express invitation or permission. 51. The Defendant knew or should have known that (a) Plaintiff and the other members of the Squip Junk Fax Class had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendant or anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendant’s goods or services; (b) the Squip Junk Faxes constituted an advertisement; and (c) the Squip Junk Faxes did not apprise recipients of their legal right to opt out. 53. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Squip Junk Fax Class are each entitled to, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation of such act. 54. Furthermore, in the event the Court finds that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, the Court should, under 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Squip Junk Fax Class. 6. This case challenges Defendant’s practice of sending unsolicited fax advertisements. 7. Defendant is company that makes natural medical products which help those who suffer from allergies, asthma, bronchitis and other respiratory disorders. Defendant purportedly sells its natural medical products in 27 countries world-wide to domestic and international distributors and wholesalers, including the United States.1 2 8. In its ordinary course of business, Defendant utilizes a facsimile machine and sends solicitation faxes en masse in its overly aggressive attempts to market itself, its services, and its products. 9. To market Defendant’s services and products to potential clients, including doctors’ offices, Defendant sends out unsolicited faxes that advertise the existence of Defendant, its services, and its products. See “Squip Junk Fax,” a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Claim for Relief for Violation of the JFPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Squip Junk Fax Class)

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant operates a commercial website, www.zagg.com which serves as a manufacturer of protective coverings for consumer electronics and hand-held devices under the brand name “InvisibleShield.” Defendant offers a variety of well- designed screen protectors for consumer electronics such as cell phones manufactured by Apple, Samsung and Android phones. Defendant’s website also offers electronic accessories such as, Bluetooth speakers, headphones and keyboards for IPads. Defendant’s website offers potential consumers the option to purchase products and consumer electronic accessories for their electronic devices through its website and various retailers around the country. Defendant’s website also offers exclusive deals and sale discounts through its website. 21. Defendant’s website offers consumers the ability to purchase products and goods through its website or search for a retail store location within a distance of the consumers zip code. 22. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. -8- 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 24. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in March of 2019, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website, by being unable to learn more information about Defendant’s website and products and services it offers, the ability to browse various models of cases and goods, and related services available online. Plaintiff was unable to browse and proceed with the ordering process due to accessibility barriers. 25. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Lack of Alternative Text (“alt-text”), or a text equivalent. Alt-text is an invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that screen- reading software can speak the alt-text where a sighted user sees pictures, which includes captcha prompts. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation, but instead a text box shows when the mouse moves over the picture. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from -9- accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics. As a result, visually- impaired prospective customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse, look for Store locations and hours, the ability to browse the products, find information on promotions and coupons, and related goods and services available both in Stores and online. b. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen-reader users; c. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and d. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 26. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 27. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those specific goods and services available for purchase and delivery, -10- because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 28. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 29. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 30. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 31. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 32. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: -11- In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . .42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 33. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 34. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. -12- 35. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 36. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 37. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s -13- Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 42. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 43. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused -14- to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 44. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 45. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 47. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 48. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 49. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from -15- the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 51. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 52. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled -16- persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 53. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 55. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 56. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 57. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 58. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 59. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, -17- practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 61. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or -18- b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. -19- 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 71. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 72. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 73. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. -20- 74. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 75. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 76. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 77. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 78. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 79. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are -21- being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 80. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 81. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 82. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 83. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 84. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 85. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This -22- inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 86. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 87. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 88. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 89. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under -23- § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 90. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 91. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 92. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 93. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 94. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 95. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. -24- Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 96. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone numbers 209-498-4848, 209-732-5482, 888-868-0577, 480-750-0223, and 209- 253-2625. 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 19. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the two proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). 52. Pursuant to the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, Plaintiff is entitled to, and demands, a trial by jury. Respectfully Submitted this 24th Day of January, 2020. 8. Beginning in or around May 2017, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -3803, -5903, -7255, -7511, and - 1080 in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c) • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c) • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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21. BCforward is a global IT consulting and workforce fulfillment firm that provides services and resourcing for leading businesses and government organizations. 22. In order to provide services to its clients, BCforward hires employees it pays on an hourly basis. 23. Westerman worked for BCforward as a Senior Project Manager. 24. As a Senior Project Manager, Westerman had a number of job duties. 25. Westerman would determine the scope of a project and the costs associated with projects, review quality of work, and keep projects on time. 26. Westerman was employed by BCforward from June of 2016 until December of 2018. 27. Westerman was an hourly employee of BCforward. 28. When Westerman worked for BCforward, he was paid $70 for every approved hour that he worked. 29. Westerman and the Putative Class Members were not paid a guaranteed salary. 4 30. Westerman worked for BCforward in Indianapolis, Indiana. 31. BCforward staffed Westerman to Eli Lilly and Company and OneAmerica. 32. BCforward staffs the Putative Class Members to a wide variety of companies including healthcare, financial institutions, advisory companies, and the power industry. 33. Westerman reported the hours he worked to BCforward on a regular basis. 34. If Westerman and the Putative Class Members worked under 40 hours, they were only paid for the hours they worked. 35. But Westerman and the Putative Class Members would regularly work more than 40 hours in a week. 36. For example, Westerman would routinely work 45 hours every week. 37. Westerman is paid his standard hourly rate of $70 an hour for the hours he worked over 40 in a workweek. 38. The hours Westerman and the Putative Class Members worked are reflected in BCforward’s payroll records. 39. BCforward paid Westerman and the Putative Class Members the same hourly rate for all hours worked, including those hours in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. 40. BCforward did not pay Westerman and the Putative Class Members overtime for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. 41. Rather than receiving time and half as required by the FLSA, Westerman and the Putative Class Members only received “straight time” pay for overtime hours worked. 42. This “straight time for overtime” payment scheme violates the FLSA. 43. BCforward was aware of the overtime requirements of the FLSA. 44. BCforward nonetheless failed to pay certain hourly employees, such as Westerman, overtime. 5 45. Westerman and the Putative Class Members also worked similar hours and were denied overtime because of the same illegal pay practice. 46. Westerman and the Putative Class Members regularly worked in excess of 40 hours each week. 47. BCforward did not pay Westerman and the Putative Class Members on a salary basis. 48. Any purported “salary” paid to Westerman or the Putative Class Members was not reasonably related to their actual earnings.1 49. BCforward paid Westerman and the Putative Class Members “straight time for overtime.” 50. BCforward failed to pay Westerman and the Putative Class Members overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. 51. BCforward knew, or acted with reckless disregard for whether, Westerman and the Putative Class Members were paid in accordance with the FLSA. 52. BCforward’s failure to pay overtime to these hourly workers was, and is, a willful violation of the FLSA. 53. Westerman expressly incorporates the preceding paragraphs. 54. BCforward’s illegal “straight time for overtime” policy extends beyond Westerman. 55. It is the “straight time for overtime” payment plan that is the “policy that is alleged to violate the FLSA” in this FLSA collective action. Bursell v. Tommy’s Seafood Steakhouse, No. CIV.A. H- 06-0386, 2006 WL 3227334, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2006); Wellman v. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc., No. 1 The reasonable-relationship test will be met if the weekly guarantee is roughly equivalent to the employee’s usual earnings at the assigned hourly, daily, or shift rate for the employee’s normal scheduled workweek. Generally, a 1.5 to 1 ratio will be considered reasonably related. Because BCforward cannot meet the salary-basis test or the reasonable-relationship test, BCforward’s white-collar defenses are inapplicable. 6 CIV.A. 14-831, 2014 WL 5810529, at *5 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 2014) (certifying “straight time for overtime” claim for collective treatment). 56. BCforward has paid hundreds of hourly workers using the same unlawful scheme. 57. BCforward paid its employees straight time for overtime regardless of job position or job duties. 58. Any differences in job duties do not detract from the fact that these hourly workers were entitled to overtime pay. 59. Accordingly, the illegal pay practices BCforward imposed on Westerman were imposed on the Putative Class Members because they were all paid straight time for overtime. 60. Numerous individuals were victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which is in willful violation of the FLSA. 61. Numerous other individuals who worked with Westerman were paid in the same manner and were not properly compensated for all hours worked as required by federal wage laws regardless of job position or job duties. 62. Based on his experiences and tenure with BCforward, Westerman is aware that BCforward’s illegal practices were imposed on the Putative Class Members. 63. The Putative Class Members were not paid overtime when they worked more than 40 hours per week. 64. BCforward’s failure to pay overtime at the rates required by federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Putative Class Members. 65. Westerman’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Putative Class Members. 7 66. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the various members of the Putative Class Members do not prevent collective treatment. 67. Westerman has no interests contrary to, or in conflict with, the Putative Class Members. 68. Like each Putative Class Member, Westerman has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages owed under federal law. 69. The precise number and the identity of other Putative Class Members is ascertainable from the business records, tax records, and/or employee or personnel records maintained by BCforward. 70. A collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit. 71. Absent a collective action, many Putative Class Members will not obtain redress of their injuries and BCforward will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA. 72. Furthermore, even if some Putative Class Members could afford individual litigation against BCforward, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. 73. If individual actions were required to be brought by each Putative Class Member, it would necessarily result in a multiplicity of lawsuits and would create hardship to Putative Class Members, to BCforward, and to the Court. 74. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the Putative Class Members and provide for judicial consistency. 75. The questions of law and fact common to each of Putative Class Members predominate over any questions affecting solely the individual members. Among the common questions of law and fact are: 8 a. Whether BCforward required Westerman and the Putative Class Members to work more than 40 hours during individual work weeks; b. Whether BCforward’s decision to pay Westerman and the Putative Class Members straight time for overtime was made in good faith; c. Whether BCforward paid Westerman and the Putative Class Members on a salary basis; d. Whether BCforward failed to pay Westerman and the Putative Class Members at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay when they worked more than 40 hours in a single workweek; e. Whether BCforward’s violation of the FLSA was willful; and f. Whether BCforward’s illegal pay practices were applied to Westerman and the Putative Class Members. 76. Westerman and the Putative Class Members sustained damages arising out of BCforward’s illegal and uniform employment policy. 77. Westerman knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its ability to go forward as a collective action. 78. Westerman will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Putative Class Members. 79. Although the issue of damages may be somewhat individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Therefore, this issue does not preclude collective action treatment. 80. By failing to pay Westerman and the Putative Class Members overtime at one-and- one-half times their regular rates, BCforward violated the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 9 81. BCforward owes Westerman and the Putative Class Members overtime pay at the proper overtime rate. 82. Because BCforward knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, its pay practices violated the FLSA, BCforward owes these wages for at least the past three years. 83. BCforward is liable to Westerman and the Putative Class Members for an amount equal to all unpaid overtime wages as liquidated damages. 84. Westerman and the Putative Class Members are entitled to recover all reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action.

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13. Logue, doing business as Logue Law, permits NDM to use its status as law firm as a ‘front’ for NDM’s fraudulent debt settlement services. 14. On information and belief, Logue permits NDM to use the Logue Law name and letterhead in exchange for a monthly fee of $5,000 to solicit unwitting consumers by telephone and in writing for debt settlement services. NDM’s employees even answer consumer telephone calls as “Logue Law.” 15. Defendants create a false illusion that Logue Law is performing the services, when all of the purported debt settlement services, if any, are rendered solely by non-lawyers at 50. Gregorio repeats, re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-49, inclusive, above, as if fully set forth herein. Gregorio seeks to represent the following classes: 51. Gregorio brings this action on behalf of two (2) classes: A. Injunctive Class (DCCPPA and RICO Claims Only) All natural persons in the United States who, three (3) years prior to the commencement of this action, were solicited by the Defendants for debt settlement services. B. Monetary Class All natural persons in the United States who, three (3) years prior to the commencement of this action, paid Defendants to perform debt settlement services. 53. There questions of law and fact common to the class members, which common questions predominate over any questions that affect only individual class members. The common questions are:  Whether the Defendants have participated in a scheme to defraud or obtain money by false pretenses, representations, or promises in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 18 U.S.C. § 1341;  Whether the Defendants scheme constitutes an “enterprise” under RICO;  Whether the Defendants have committed a “pattern of racketeering activity” under RICO;  Whether due to their uniform acts, Defendants were unjustly enriched or received payments and/or monies that under the principles of equity they cannot retain;  Whether Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to Gregorio and the class members;  Whether such practices violate District of Columbia Code § 28-3904 et seq.; and  The amount of damages the Monetary Class has sustained as a result of the Defendants’ wrongful conduct, and the proper measure of such damages. 54. The claims of Gregorio are typical of the claims of class members because of the similarity, uniformity and common purpose of Defendants’ unlawful conduct. All claims are based on the same facts and the same legal theories. 56. Gregorio repeats, re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-55, inclusive, above, as if fully set forth herein. 57. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), Defendants have conducted, or participated directly or indirectly, in a pattern of racketeering activity through the use of wire and mail by soliciting unwitting consumers via telephone and in writing for debt settlement services under a false illusion that Logue Law is performing the services, when all of the purported debt settlement services were to be rendered solely by non-lawyers at NDM. 58. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), Defendants have conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) by conducting, or participating directly or indirectly, in a pattern of racketeering activity through the use of wire and mail by defrauding unwitting consumers via telephone and in writing for debt settlement services under a false illusion that Logue Law is performing the services, when all of the purported debt settlement services were to be rendered solely by non-lawyers at NDM. 60. Gregorio and the class members seek a judgment in their favor against the Defendants for treble the amount of damages suffered by them in the form of payments made to Defendants as a result of its predicate acts and violations of Section 1962(c) and (d) of RICO, together with treble the amount of interest due on payments delayed or withheld through the Defendants’ predicate acts and RICO violations. 61. Gregorio repeats, re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-60, inclusive, above, as if fully set forth herein. 62. The EFTA, and Regulation E promulgated thereunder, prohibit the initiation of electronic funds transfers without authorization. 63. Defendants violated the EFTA and Regulation E by initiating or causing to be initiated electronic funds transfers from Gregorio and the class members’ bank accounts without authorization. 64. Defendants’ unauthorized electronic fund transfers were for personal, family, or household purposes in that the automatic debits were made for purportedly rendering consumer debt settlement services. 66. Gregorio repeats, re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-65, inclusive, above, as if fully set forth herein. 67. This claim arises under 18 U.S.C. § 1964 which authorizes district courts to enjoin violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, and under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 which authorizes associated declaratory relief. 68. As set forth in Count I above, Defendants have violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and (d), and will continue to do so in the future against other consumers without injunctive relief. 69. Enjoining the Defendants from committing these RICO violations in the future and/or declaring their invalidity is appropriate as Gregorio and the class have no adequate remedy at law and, as set forth in paragraphs 13-49 above, will suffer irreparable harm through additional bank drafts without authorization and/or rendering any debt settlement services in the absence of the Court’s declaratory and injunctive relief. 70. Gregorio and the class members seek injunctive relief preventing the Defendants from soliciting, engaging in, or seeking payment for debt settlement services. Gregorio and the class members further pray for an award of attorneys fees and for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 1964(A) Defendants’ Conspiracy VIOLATIONS OF THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT 18 U.S.C. § 1962 ET SEQ. AND 18 U.S.C. § 1964 ET SEQ. VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER ACT (“EFTA”) 15 U.S.C. § 1693 AND REGULATION E UNDER 12 C.F.R. § 205

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10. To install the application on an Android device, users must visit the Google Play Store, the online digital media platform operated by Google. Once downloaded and installed, and upon opening the application for the first time, the USA Today App presents a screen that asks the user’s permission for the App to push (i.e., display) notifications on their device. (See Figure 1 below, showing the USA Today App when first opened.) After choosing “Yes” or “No,” the user is directed to the App’s main user interface. (See id.) (Fig. 1.) 12. As shown in Figure 2 below, the USA Today App is organized into categories accessible through the application’s main user interface. (See Figure 1 above; see also Figure 2 below, showing the App’s list of news categories.) Users may browse these sections to view news and entertainment-related articles or view video clips. (See id.) (Fig. 2.) 14. Today’s average consumer uses more than one device to access the Internet to do things like view digital content or make online purchases. This creates challenges for online advertisers and data analytics companies. Namely, to gain a broad understanding of a given consumer’s behavior across all of the devices and applications that an individual uses, these companies have to find ways to “link” their digital personas. The primary solution has been to use unique identifiers to connect the dots. 15. Unique identifiers are used to precisely identify a person and to link their activities across devices and applications. Data analytics companies—like Adobe—create user profiles comprised of behavioral data and unique identifiers, often supplied by hardware manufacturers. 16. An example of a hardware manufacturer supplied unique identifier in the consumer electronics context is a device’s Android ID. That’s because Android IDs are “persistent unique identifiers,” meaning they are unique to a specific device and user. 17. Indeed, even “[w]hen a device has multiple users [] each user appears as a completely separate device, so the ANDROID_ID value is unique to each user.”5 These properties make the Android ID a particularly attractive identifier for analytics companies, because it can be precisely linked to an individual person, and the person cannot avoid being tracked while using the device. 19. USA Today partnered with Adobe because its analytics services provide insights into the behaviors and demographics for the App’s user base. This helps USA Today to, among other things, accurately target advertisements to its users. 20. The reason Adobe (or any other analytics company) is capable of developing a complete understanding of an individual’s digital activities is because it collects an enormous amount of detailed information about a given consumer’s online behavior (as well as unique identifiers associated with a user’s devices) from a variety of sources. 21. For instance, an Android app that transmits its host device’s Android ID along with a record of user activity provides analytics companies with an intimate look at the different types of materials consumed by the individual. This data may reveal, or help create inferences about, the person’s political or religious affiliations, sexuality, or general reading and viewing preferences. 22. Once Adobe links a device’s Android ID with its owner, it can then connect new information retrieved from Android apps—including the USA Today App—with existing data in the person’s profile (which was previously collected by Adobe from other sources). 24. Later in the interview, Mr. Comstock discusses the collection of data from mobile and other devices: Q: Can you go into that? What are the different elements of cross-device your clients are talking about? Mr. Comstock: For us, it’s browser-to-browser or browser-to-app. Understanding those relationships. Work vs. home computers, understanding the behavior across those different devices. Mobile is the current trend but as we add Internet-connected TVs, Roku devices and with Comcast and Freewheel, the digital world is all over the place and it needs to extend beyond mobile, and have a platform able to bring in and capture devices in general. 25. Likewise, the Privacy Policy for Adobe’s analytics services states that: “[s]ome companies using Adobe services may send us information that allows them to identify you personally. Some companies may also buy additional information about you and then add that additional information to the information collected by Adobe’s products on their websites. This additional information may include things like email addresses, account information, or Facebook profile information, including photos and usernames.”7 27. Figure 3 details the depth of information captured by Adobe’s data analytics services. Of particular note are the “source[s]” of consumer data in the far right column. The graphic’s references to these sources—including “Web Analytics” and “Mobile”—implicate mobile software applications (like the USA Today App) that collect consumer data. These sources help Adobe generate profiles on individuals containing the wealth of information shown in the middle column of Figure 3. That information includes things like a person’s address, age, phone number, email, purchase history, behavioral activity, and income. 29. Accordingly, in this context Adobe uses data obtained from the USA Today App, among other sources, to personally identify users and associate their video viewing selections with a personalized profile in its databases. B. The President and Congress are responding to growing privacy concerns over the collection and misuse of personal information in the digital marketplace. 30. Concerns over the privacy risks associated with the collection and transmission of PII from digital devices to third parties is no longer just academic musing. In a recently issued sixty-two page policy memo, President Obama squarely addressed the issue, stating that there’s a growing problem with consumers’ privacy “in the age of the Internet, the World Wide Web and smartphones.”9 While the President’s memo provided a “blueprint” for protecting consumers’ privacy, he called on Congress to take the lead and pass legislation to curb behavior related to the corporate exploitation of user data. 32. In establishing this Subcommittee, Senator and Subcommittee Chair Al Franken noted that “[t]he boom of new technologies over the last several years has made it easier to keep in touch with family, organize a community and start a business . . . It has also put an unprecedented amount of personal information into the hands of large companies that are unknown and unaccountable to the American people.”11 33. Members of other subcommittees have made similar remarks. In a meeting of the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance, Senator John Rockefeller noted that, “third parties use [consumer data] to target advertising on individuals . . . It is very good business, but it is very cynical. It is an abuse of that power, passing on people’s profiles.”12 34. In response to the increased scrutiny on consumers’ privacy concerns, companies are also starting to change their data collection and usage practices. For instance, in the release of Apple’s most recent mobile device operating system, iOS 7, Apple discontinued the ability to transmit certain personally identifiable information to third parties for tracking purposes.13 44. Numerosity: The exact number of members of the Class is unknown and is not available to Plaintiff at this time, but individual joinder in this case is impracticable. The Class likely consists of thousands of individuals. Class members can be easily identified through Defendant’s records. 45. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include but are not limited to the following: a) Whether Defendant, through the USA Today App, unlawfully disclosed and continues to unlawfully disclose its users’ PII, including their video viewing records, in violation of the VPPA; b) Whether Defendant’s disclosures were committed knowingly; c) Whether Defendant disclosed Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ PII without consent; and d) Whether Defendant violated Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ rights to privacy. 47. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex litigation and class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and his counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interest adverse to those of the other members of the Class. 48. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This case is appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class, and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. The factual and legal bases of Defendant’s liability to Plaintiff and to the other members of the Class are the same, resulting in injury to the Plaintiff and to all of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have suffered harm and damages as a result of Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. 50. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the foregoing “Class Allegations” and “Class Definition” based on facts learned through additional investigation and in discovery. 51. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 52. Defendant is a “video tape service provider as defined by the VPPA because it “engage[s] in the business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of rental, sale, or delivery or prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials,” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4), inasmuch as it provides video (i.e., “similar audio visual materials” under the VPPA’s definition) to consumers via its USA Today App. 53. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by the VPPA because he downloaded, installed, and watched videos using the USA Today App. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1). Under the VPPA, this means that he was a “subscriber” of “goods or services from a video tape service provider.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1). 55. The USA Today App’s transmissions of Plaintiff’s PII to Adobe constitute “knowing[] disclosures” of Plaintiff’s “personally identifiable information” to a person as proscribed by the VPPA. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1). 56. Under the VPPA, the term “personally identifiable information” “includes information which identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3). The definition’s usage of the word “includes” means that a more expansive reading of the term was expressly contemplated. 57. As detailed more fully in Section II above, the information disclosed by USA Today—the combination of his device’s unique Android ID and the records of the videos that he viewed—constitutes “personally identifiable information” in this context because it allows Adobe to identify users such as Yershov, and to attribute their video viewing records to their Adobe-created profiles. 58. Consistent with this view, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines “personally identifiable information” as “any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity.”16 As described in detail in Section II above and throughout this Complaint, Plaintiff’s Android ID and video viewing records can be used by Adobe to distinguish or trace his identity. 60. At no time did Plaintiff ever provide USA Today with any form of consent— either written other otherwise—to disclose his PII to third parties. 61. Nor were USA Today’s disclosures made in the “ordinary course of business” as the term is defined by the VPPA. In particular, the USA Today App’s disclosures to Adobe (an analytics company) were not necessary for “debt collection activities, order fulfillment, request processing, [or] the transfer of ownership.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(2). 62. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful disclosures, Plaintiff and the Class have had their statutorily defined rights to privacy violated. Plaintiff seeks an injunction to prohibit USA Today from releasing his and the Class’s PII in the future, as well as the maximum statutory and punitive damages available under the VPPA. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c). 9. The USA Today App is a mobile software application that allows consumers to access news and entertainment media content on their Android mobile devices.2 I. USA Today Programmed its App to Transmit Users’ PII, Including Video Viewing Activity, to a Third Party Analytics Company Without Their Consent. Violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act (18 U.S.C. § 2710) (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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ACTION Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): 29 U.S.C. sections 201, et seq. Brief description of cause: Collective Action for unpaid overtime and other compensation, interest thereon, liquidated damages, costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees.

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14. Plaintiff is employed by Essex as a Community Manager in charge of one of Essex’s multifamily properties called Highlands at Wynhaven located in Issaquah, Washington. She is certified as an Accredited Residential Manager. 15. As a condition of her offer of employment from Essex, Plaintiff, along with every other Essex employee, was required to provide personal identifying information including her 52. Plaintiff brings this action on her own behalf, as well as on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals. PORTLAND, OR 97204 b. That Plaintiff be appointed as representative of the Class members; c. That counsel for Plaintiff be appointed as Class Counsel; d. A finding that Essex breached its duty to safeguard and protect the PII of Plaintiff and Class members that was compromised in the Data Breach; e. For damages, and all other appropriate legal and equitable relief; f. For appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief; g. For an award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; h. For reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and i. For such further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

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(Failure to Pay Overtime Wages – FLSA, Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of Herself and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs) (Failure to Pay Overtime Wages – NYLL, Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of Herself and the Class Members) (Wage Statement Violations – NYLL §195, Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of Herself and the Class Members) 14. Defendant employed Plaintiff as a full-time Home Health Aide. Plaintiff’s duties include household chores, hygiene assistance, personal healthcare and running errands for the persons to whom Defendant assigned her (“consumer”). 15. From October 18, 2016 until on or around February 21, 2017 (“Plaintiff’s relevant time period”), Defendant scheduled Plaintiff to work 7 consecutive 24 hour shifts. 4 16. Accounting for sleep and meal time, throughout Plaintiff’s relevant time period, Plaintiff worked ninety-one (91) hours per work week. 17. Defendant paid Plaintiff a daily rate of pay of one hundred and sixty-five dollars ($165) for thirteen (13) hours per work per day. 18. Defendant did not properly compensate Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class Members at the lawful overtime rates of one and one-half times their regular hourly rates of pay as required by law for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 19. Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class Members regularly worked over 40 hours per workweek. Despite Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class Members regularly working in excess of 40 hours per week, Defendant failed to pay them overtime premiums as required by law. 20. Defendant violated NYLL § 195(3) by failing to furnish Plaintiff and the Class Members with a statement with every payment of wages, listing, among other things, hours worked, rates paid, gross wages, deductions and net wages, and an explanation of how such wages were computed. 21. Defendant knew of, and/or showed reckless disregard for, the practices by which Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees of Defendant were not paid overtime premiums for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a week. Defendant knew that the nonpayment of overtime premiums would economically injure Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class Members, and that they violated the FLSA and the NYLL. 22. Defendant committed the foregoing acts knowingly, intentionally and 5 willfully against the Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class Members. 23. Plaintiff brings the First Claim for Relief as a collective action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all persons employed by Defendant as home health aides and scheduled to work four (4) or more 24 hour shifts from January 1, 2015. All said persons, including Plaintiff, are referred to herein as the “FLSA Collective Plaintiffs”. 24. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are and have been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements, job duties and pay provisions, and are and have been subject to Defendant’s decision, policy, plan, practice, procedure, routine and rules to willfully fail and refuse to pay them the legally required overtime premium for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. The claims of the Plaintiff herein are essentially the same as those of the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. 25. Other home health aides scheduled to work four (4) or more 24 hour shifts, currently or formerly employed by Defendant should have the opportunity to have their claims for violations of the FLSA heard. Certifying this action as a collective action under the FLSA will provide other construction workers to receive notice of the action and allow them to opt in to this action if they so choose. 26. The First Claim for Relief is properly brought under and maintained as an opt-in collective action pursuant to §216(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purpose of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendant. 6 Notice can be provided to the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to the last addresses known to Defendant. 27. Plaintiff brings the Second and Third Claims for Relief pursuant to the Fed. R. Civ. P. (“FRCP”) Rule 23, unpaid overtime, wage statements violations and other damages on behalf of all individuals employed in the State of New York by Defendant as home health aides and scheduled to work four (4) or more 24 hour shifts from January 1, 2015 (the “Class Period”). All said persons, including Plaintiff, are referred to herein as the “Class Members” and/or the “Class”. 28. The number, names and addresses of the Class Members are readily ascertainable from the records of the Defendant. The dates of employment and the rates of pay for each Class Member, the hours assigned and worked, and the wages paid to them, are also determinable from Defendant’s records. Notice can be provided by means permissible under FRCP Rule 23. 29. The proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all Class Members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a Class will benefit the parties and the Court. While the precise number of such persons is unknown to the Plaintiff and is presently within the sole control of Defendant, Plaintiff believes that through discovery he will obtain evidence to establish that there are at least 40 members of the Class. 30. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those claims of the Class Members, and the relief sought is typical of the relief which would be sought by each Class Member in separate actions. All the Class Members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendant, in that they were not compensated for overtime hours worked as required by 7 12 NYCRR § 142-2.2, and that Defendant failed to provide them with proper notices and wage statements as required by NYLL §195. Defendant’ corporate-wide policies and practices affected all Class Members similarly, and Defendant benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each Class Member. 31. As fellow employees of Defendant, which failed to adequately compensate Plaintiff and the members of the Class as required by law, Plaintiff and the other Class Members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 32. Plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the Class. Plaintiff has retained Gennadiy Naydenskiy, Esq., a competent and experienced employment litigator. 33. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy – particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit against corporate defendant. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expense that numerous individual actions engender. Because the losses, injuries and damages suffered by each of the individual Class Members are relatively small in the sense pertinent to a class action analysis, the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual Class Members to redress the wrongs done to them. On the other hand, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. The adjudication of individual 8 litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant and resulting in the impairment of Class Members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 34. Upon information and belief, employees of Defendant in these types of actions are often afraid to individually assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation and former employees are fearful of bringing individual claims because the fear that doing so could harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. A class action provides Class Members who are not named in the Complaint a degree of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 35. The questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members, including: (a) whether Defendant required Class Members to work uncompensated overtime as required by 12 NYCRR § 142-2.2, and (b) whether Defendant provided Class Members with sufficiently detailed wage statements as required by NYLL § 195(3). 9 36. Absent a class action, many of the Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Defendant will retain the proceeds of their violations of the 37. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, realleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 38. Throughout the statute of limitations period covered by these claims, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 39. At all relevant times, Defendant willfully, regularly, repeatedly and knowingly failed to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs the required overtime rates for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, seeks damages in the amount of their respective unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated (double) damages as provided by the FLSA for overtime violations, attorneys’ fees and costs, and such other legal and equitable relief as this Court deems just and proper. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, realleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 10 42. It is unlawful under New York law for an employer to suffer or permit a non-exempt employee to work without paying overtime premiums for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in any workweek. 43. Throughout the Class Period, Defendant willfully, regularly, repeatedly and knowingly failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members at the required overtime rates for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 44. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’ unlawful conduct, as set forth herein, Plaintiff and the Class Members have sustained damages, including loss of earnings, in an amount to be established at trial. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, seek damages in the amount of their respective unpaid wages, overtime compensation, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to NYLL, and such other legal and equitable relief as this Court deems just and proper. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, realleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 47. Defendant failed to supply Plaintiff and each Class Member with an accurate statement of wages as required by NYLL § 195, containing the dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the number of hours worked, 11 including overtime hours worked if applicable; deductions; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage; and net wages. 48. Due to Defendant’s violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to recover damages and/or statutory penalties from Defendant, as provided for by NYLL § 198, as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

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10. Neither Leyse nor the other Class Members had given Lifetime prior express invitation or permission to place a Lifetime Robocall to them. 12. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs “1” through “11” inclusive of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 13. The placement of the Lifetime Robocalls to Plaintiff and Members of the Class violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2). 14. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff and Members of the Class are entitled to statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(3)(B) and 227(b)(3)(C). 15. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff and Members of the Class are entitled to an Order, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), enjoining Defendant from violating 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2). 16. Plaintiff brings this action as a Class Action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons to whose residential telephone lines Lifetime, or a third party acting on behalf of Lifetime, placed one or more telephone calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice that delivered a message that advertised the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services, other than Defendant, its officers, employees, representatives, and their families (the “Class”), during the period from August 17, 2009, to the commencement of this action until the present (the “Class Period”). 17. The Members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all Members is impracticable. 19. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has retained competent litigation counsel. Plaintiff has no interests that are antagonistic to, or in conflict with, the Members of the Class. Indeed, Plaintiff’s interests are, for purposes of this litigation, coincident with the interests of the other Class Members. 20. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Because the Class is so numerous that joinder of all Members is impracticable, and because the damages suffered by most of the individual Members of the Class are too small to render prosecution of the claims asserted herein economically feasible on an individual basis, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it impractical for Members of the Class to adequately address the wrongs complained of herein. Plaintiff knows of no impediments to the effective management of this action as a class action. 7. On or about August 19, 2009, Lifetime, or a third party acting on behalf of Lifetime, placed, to Leyse’s residential telephone line, a telephone call using an artificial or prerecorded voice that delivered a message (“Message”) that advertised the commercial availability and quality of Lifetime Television, a cable-television network that Lifetime owns and operates (a “Lifetime Robocall”). 8. As the result of the placement of the Lifetime Robocall, Leyse: (i) was deprived of his substantive right not to have a Lifetime Robocall placed to his telephone line; (ii) was deprived of the use of his telephone line; (iii) lost his valuable time in listening to the Message; (iv) endured a nuisance; (v) endured an invasion of his privacy; (vi) endured an intrusion upon his seclusion; and (vii) endured a disturbance of his solitude. 9. During the Class Period, Lifetime, or one or more third parties acting on behalf of Lifetime has placed, to thousands of residential telephone lines, telephone calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice that delivered a message that advertised the commercial availability or quality of one of the cable-television networks that Lifetime owns and operates.

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13. Level 3 is an international communications company offering a wide-range of services for its clients. 14. Upon information and belief, either through its own telemarketing operations or a third-party, Defendant has made thousands of Robocalls and telemarketing calls to consumers' cellular telephones throughout the United States. 15. Plaintiff and Class Members have received more than one unsolicited telemarketing call within a 12-month period. 17. A simple internet search shows this number IS related to Level 3 Communications, LLC in Rogers, AR. 18. Just a few weeks later, on or about March 5, 2013 around 2:50 pm, Defendant placed a second call to Plaintiffs cellular telephone from 479-935-1122. When Plaintiff answered the phone, he heard a pre-recorded message about automobile insurance. Plaintiff then called the number back and received a message indicating that the number he had called was not a valid number. 19. A simple internet search shows this number Is related to Level 3 Communications, LLC in Rogers, AR. 20. Upon information and belief, Defendant used an automatic telephone dialing system to generate consumers' telephone numbers. 21. Plaintiffs cellular telephone numbers were at all relevant times registered on the national Do Not Call registry. 23. The TCPA was designed to protect consumers, Plaintiff, and the putative Class from these kinds of calls. 24. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf all others similarly situated pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of Rule 23. 25. Plaintiff seeks certification for the following class ("the Class" or "Class"): All natural persons residing in the United States who received a telephone call, made by or on behalf of Defendant, within the four years prior to the date of the filing of this Complaint, featuring an artificial voice or pre-recorded message. 26. Specifically excluded from the Class are: (a) all federal court judges who preside over this case and their spouses; (b) all persons who elect to exclude themselves from the Class; (c) all persons who have previously executed and delivered to Defendant releases of all their class claims; and (d) Defendant's employees, officers, directors, agents, and representatives and their family members. 27. Numerosity. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. At this time, Plaintiff does not know the exact size of each Class. Based on information and belief, the Class is comprised of at least thousands of members so as to render joinder of all Class Members impracticable. Class Members can be identified through Defendant's records. 29. Typicality. Plaintiffs claims are typical ofthe other Class Members' claims. As described herein, Plaintiff and Class Members sustained damages arising from Defendant's wrongful conduct and unsolicited telephone calls. Defendant uniformly violated the TCP A by engaging in the conduct as described herein, and these violations had the same effect on each member of the Class. 30. Adequacy. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because he fits within the Class definition and his interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Class he seeks to represent. Plaintiff will prosecute this action vigorously for the benefit of the entire Class. Plaintiff is represented by experienced and able attorneys. Class counsel have litigated numerous class actions and complex cases, and Plaintiffs counsel intend to prosecute this action vigorously for the benefit of the entire Class. Plaintiff and class counsel can and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of all of the members of the Class. 32. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein. 33. The allegations in this cause of action are brought on behalf of Class Members who received an unsolicited telephone call to their cellular phones from Defendant, or on behalf of Defendant, that included a pre-recorded or artificial voice message. 34. Defendant made unsolicited telephone calls to Plaintiff's and Class Members' telephone numbers without their prior express consent. 35. Defendant utilized artificial or pre-recorded voice messages when making the telephone calls. 37. By making these unsolicited calls, or allowing them to be made on Defendant's behalf, containing artificial or pre-recorded voice message without the Plaintiffs or Class Members' prior express consent, and by utilizing an automatic telephone dialing system, Defendant has violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(l)(B) and§ 227(b)(l)(A)(iii). 38. Accordingly, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and other Class Members, seeks an injunction under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A) enjoining Defendant's unlawful telemarketing practices. 39. Additionally, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and other Class Members, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), seeks an award of statutory damages of at least $500 for each of Defendant's violations of the TCP A and for the actual damages suffered in the form of monies paid to receive the unsolicited telephone calls. 40. If this Court should find that Defendant's actions were willful and knowing, it may, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), award treble damages recoverable by Plaintiff and Class Members. Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 USC§ 227(b)

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1. a statement that the recipient is legally entitled to opt-out of receiving future faxed advertisements – knowing that he or she has the legal right to request an opt-out gives impetus for recipients to make such a request, if desired; 13. On information and belief, Defendant receives some or all of the revenues from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A, and Defendant profits and benefits from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A. 14. Plaintiff had not invited or given permission to Defendants to send the fax. 15. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimiles without the required opt-out language to Plaintiff and more than 25 other recipients or sent the same and other advertisements by fax with the required opt-out language but without first receiving the recipients’ express invitation or permission. 16. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 17. Defendants’ facsimile attached as Exhibit A did not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 18. Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 17 as though fully set forth herein, as and for its paragraph 18. 2. a statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within 30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful – thereby encouraging recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”; 20. Class Size (F. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 22. Typicality (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)): The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same or similar faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of the Defendants advertising products, goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same or similar faxes or faxes which did not contain the proper opt-out language or were sent without prior express invitation or permission. 23. Fair and Adequate Representation (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 25. Common Conduct (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. 27. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 28. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 3. a statement advising the recipient that he or she may opt-out with respect to all of his or her facsimile telephone numbers and not just the ones that receive a faxed advertisement from the sender – thereby instructing a recipient on how to make a valid opt-out request for all of his or her fax machines; 31. The Fax. Defendants sent the on or about January 16, 2013, advertisement via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class. The Fax constituted an advertisement under the Act. Defendants failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Fax. The Fax was transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission and/or Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express invitation or permission or that Defendants had an established business relationship with Plaintiff and other members of the class, because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Fax via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class which includes this fax and all others sent during the four years prior to the filing of this case through the present. 33. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 34. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent. 36. The Defendants’ actions caused damages to the Plaintiff and the other class members. Receiving the Defendants’ junk faxes caused the recipients to lose paper and toner consumed in the printing of the Defendants’ faxes. Moreover, the Defendants’ faxes used the Plaintiff's and the other class members’ telephone lines and fax machine. The Defendants’ faxes cost the Plaintiff and the other class members time, as the Plaintiff and the other class members and their employees wasted their time receiving, reviewing and routing the Defendants’ unauthorized faxes. That time otherwise would have been spent on the Plaintiff's and the other class members’ business activities. The Defendants’ faxes unlawfully interrupted the Plaintiff's and other class members' privacy interests in being left alone. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, RUSSELL M. HOLSTEIN, PH.D., LLC, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, demands judgment in its favor and against Defendants, INCROWD, INC. and JOHN DOES 1-5, jointly and severally, as follows: A. That the Court adjudge and decree that the present case may be properly maintained as a class action, appoint the Plaintiff as the representative of the class, and appoint the Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the class; B. That the Court award actual monetary loss from such violations or the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00) for each violation, whichever is greater; C. That Court enjoin the Defendants from additional violations; and D. That the Court award pre-judgment interest, costs, and such further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 37. Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 36 as though fully set forth herein, as and for its paragraph 37. 38. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiff brings Count II for violation of the New Jersey Junk Fax Statute (56:8-157, et seq.), which is part of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (56:8-1 et seq.), on behalf of the following Class of persons: All New Jersey residents who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, and (3) from which Defendants did not have prior express invitation or permission, or (4) which did not display a proper opt-out notice. 40. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the other Class members. Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unsolicited advertising faxes. Neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s counsel has any interests adverse or in conflict with the absent Class members. 42. The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and the New Jersey Junk Fax Statute prohibit a person from using any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device from sending an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine within this state. 43. The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act which incorporates the New Jersey Junk Fax Statute defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission.” 44. The court shall award actual damages sustained or $500 for each violation, whichever is greater, along with costs of the suit, reasonable attorneys’ fees and to enjoin future violations. If the court finds that Defendants were requested to cease and desist, the court shall award $1000 for each subsequent transmission along with costs of suit and reasonable attorneys’ fees. N.J.S.A. 56:8-159. 45. Defendants violated N.J.S.A. 56:8-157 et seq. and 56:8-1 et seq. by sending unsolicited advertisements (such as Exhibit A) to Plaintiff and other members of the Class without first obtaining their prior express invitation or permission and by not displaying clear and conspicuous notices on the first page of the unsolicited advertisements as required by 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 49 as though fully set forth herein, as and for its paragraph 50. 51. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiff brings Count III for violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (56:8-1 et seq.), on behalf of the following Class of persons: All New Jersey residents who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, and (3) from which Defendants did not have prior express invitation or permission, or (4) which did not display a proper opt-out notice. 52. Defendants’ faxes are an “advertisement” as defined by N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(a). 53. Plaintiff, and all those similarly situated are “persons” as defined by N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(d). 54. Defendants’ violation of the New Jersey Junk Fax Statute constitute a per se violation of the New Jersey CFA, as the New Jersey Junk Fax Statute was promulgated pursuant to the CFA. JUNK FAX PREVENTION ACT OF 2005, 47 USC § 227 VIOLATION OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSUMER FRAUD ACT 56: 8-1 et seq.

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12. Defendant Mvelopes created a mobile personal finance application that offers consumers a number of personal financial management options, including budgeting their money, receiving financial advice and coaching, and receiving a customized financial program. 13. In an effort to increase the App’s download numbers, user base, and ultimately Defendant’s revenues, Defendant created and embarked upon a massive telemarketing campaign to promote the App. 15. Defendant sends these automated text messages to consumers’ telephones despite never obtaining the recipients’ prior express written consent to do so. 16. Upon calling the number included in the advertising text message, consumers are confronted with a prerecorded message promoting its financial programs. 17. Defendant’s goal in sending these text message advertisements extends beyond the offer of a free consultation. Rather, the free consultation serves as an inroad to promoting the App to thousands of additional users that wish to further their financial planning goals and ambitions. 19. These text messages constitute commercial advertising and telemarketing as contemplated by the TCPA. 20. Defendant made these text message calls to Plaintiff and putative Class members using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers en masse. The system(s) also had the capacity to send text messages to cellular telephones without human intervention. The messages sent by Defendant were automated, prewritten, and virtually identical each time they were sent. 21. Accordingly, Defendant was required to obtain prior express written consent before sending the text messages advertisements to thousands of consumers’ cellular telephones. 22. On April 20, 2017 at 12:18 p.m., Plaintiff received the text message promoting Mvelopes’s services on his cellular telephone from SMS shortcode 743-03. See Figure 1. 23. Upon information and belief, the telephone number displayed within the text message, 855-510-8682, connects a consumer to an agent of Mvelopes when called. 24. The telephone number 855-510-8682 and SMS shortcode 743-03 at all relevant times are or were owned, operated, and/or otherwise utilized by Mvelopes to send text messages and/or receive inbound telephone calls. 26. Defendant’s intrusive text messages adversely affected Plaintiff’s right to privacy. Defendant was and is aware that the above-described text message calls were being made on a widespread basis and that the text message calls were being made to consumers who had not consented to receive them. 27. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals, defined as follows: All persons in the United States who from a date four years prior to the filing of the initial complaint in this case through the present: (1) Defendant (or a third person acting on behalf of Defendant) sent text messages, (2) to the person’s cellular telephone number, and (3) without a record demonstrating prior express written consent. 28. The following individuals are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or their parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant has been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the Class definitions following appropriate discovery. 30. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class, in that Plaintiff and the members of the Class have sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited telephone calls. 31. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 32. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class’s members, and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendant’s practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Class’s members uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. 34. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy given that joinder of all parties is impracticable. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. 36. As described in detail above, Defendant made unauthorized and unwanted text message calls to Plaintiff’s and the Class’s cellular telephones without their prior express consent. 37. Defendant made unauthorized commercial text message calls to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the Class using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers en masse. 38. Defendant utilized equipment that made the text message calls to Plaintiff and other members of the putative Class simultaneously and without human intervention. 39. By making unwanted and unauthorized text message calls to Plaintiff’s and members of the Class’s cellular telephones without prior express consent, and by utilizing an ATDS, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 40. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the putative Class suffered actual damages and have also had their rights to privacy adversely impacted. Plaintiff and the Class are therefore entitled to, among other things, a minimum of $500 in statutory damages for each such violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 41. Because Defendant’s misconduct was willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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(Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) – Cellular Telephone Calls – Cell Phone Class) (Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) – Cellular Telephone Calls – Cell Phone Class) (Violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) & 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) – Internal Do-Not-Call List – Internal Do-Not-Call Class) 12. TruGreen is a national lawn care service provider headquartered in Memphis, Tennessee. 13. Part of TruGreen’s strategy for increasing the volume of lawn care customers involves the use of an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) and/or automated or prerecorded messages to solicit business. 14. Defendant uses ATDS equipment and software that has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called and which includes auto-dialers and predictive dialers. 16. TruGreen has previously been the subject of litigation for its unlawful telemarketing practices in Chapa v. TruGreen Inc., No. 1-13-CV-3957 (N.D. Ill.). Judge Leinenweber granted final approval of a $4,450,000 settlement on January 27, 2015. 17. However, TruGreen has continued its unlawful conduct. A. Factual Allegations Regarding Plaintiff 18. Since January 27, 2015, Plaintiff has received more than ten telemarketing calls on her cellular telephone, (501) 802-XXXX, from, or on behalf of, Defendant. 19. Whenever Plaintiff answered the calls, there was a lengthy pause and a click. Plaintiff had to say “hello” multiple times before a person came on the line, which indicated to her that the call was made using an ATDS. 20. The caller stated that they were calling on behalf of TruGreen and attempted to persuade Plaintiff to purchase lawn care services such as weed killing and frost protection. 21. Plaintiff was not in the market for lawn care and directly requested on several different calls that Defendant stop calling her. 22. Notwithstanding her request, Plaintiff continued to receive calls on her cellular telephone from, or on behalf, of Defendant. 23. Some of these calls were received thirty or more days after she explicitly instructed Defendant to stop calling. 24. Plaintiff registered her cellular telephone number with the National Do-Not-Call Registry on November 9, 2013. 25. Each of the above-described calls occurred after Plaintiff registered her cellular telephone number with the National Do-Not-Call Registry. 27. Plaintiff never provided prior express consent to receive ATDS generated and/or automated or prerecorded calls on her cellular telephone from, or on behalf of, Defendant. 28. Plaintiff’s privacy has been violated by the above-described calls from, or on behalf of, Defendant and they constitute a nuisance as they are annoying and harassing. 29. Defendant is responsible for making the above-described ATDS-generated and/or automated or prerecorded calls. 30. Defendant has made a significant number of ATDS-generated and/or automated or prerecorded calls to persons on their cellular telephones in Tennessee, Arkansas, and throughout the entire United States. 31. Defendant has made a significant number of telemarketing calls to persons who have registered their telephone numbers with the National Do-Not-Call Registry in Tennessee, Arkansas, and throughout the entire United States. 32. Defendant has made a significant number of telemarketing calls to persons who have explicitly requested that Defendant stop calling them in Tennessee, Arkansas, and throughout the entire United States. 33. Defendant intends to continue to make similar ATDS-generated and/or automated or prerecorded calls to persons on their cellular telephones in Tennessee, Arkansas, and throughout the entire United States. 35. Defendant intends to continue to make similar ATDS-generated and/or automated or prerecorded calls to persons who have explicitly requested that Defendant stop calling them in Tennessee, Arkansas, and throughout the entire United States. 36. Plaintiff and all members of the Classes, defined in paragraph 37, below, have been harmed by the acts of Defendant because their privacy has been violated, they were subject to annoying and harassing calls that constitute a nuisance, and they were charged for incoming calls. 38. Numerosity. The Classes are each so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. On information and belief, the Classes each have more than 1,000 members. Moreover, the disposition of the claims of the Classes in a single action will provide substantial benefits to all parties and the Court. 40. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Classes. Plaintiff’s claims, like the claims of the Classes, arise out of the same common course of conduct by Defendant and are based on the same legal and remedial theories. 41. Adequacy. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes. Plaintiff has retained competent and capable attorneys with significant experience in complex and class action litigation, including consumer class actions and TCPA class actions. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to prosecuting this action vigorously on behalf of the Classes and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel have interests that are contrary to or that conflict with those of the proposed Classes. 42. Predominance. Defendant has engaged in a common course of conduct toward Plaintiff and members of the Classes. The common issues arising from this conduct that affect Plaintiff and members of the Classes predominate over any individual issues. Adjudication of these common issues in a single action has important and desirable advantages of judicial economy. 44. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Appropriate. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Classes appropriate on a classwide basis. Moreover, on information and belief, and based on her experience, Plaintiff alleges that the automated calls made by Defendant and/or its affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendant’s behalf that are complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. 45. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 46. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant and/or its affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendant’s behalf constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), by making calls, except for emergency purposes, to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the Cell Phone Class using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice. 48. Plaintiff and members of the Cell Phone Class are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant and/or its affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendant’s behalf from violating the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), by making calls, except for emergency purposes, to any cellular telephone numbers using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice in the future. 49. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 50. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant and/or its affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendant’s behalf constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), by making calls, except for emergency purposes, to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the Cell Phone Class using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice. 52. Plaintiff and members of the Cell Phone Class are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant and/or its affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendant’s behalf from violating the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), by making calls, except for emergency purposes, to any cellular telephone numbers using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice in the future. 53. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 54. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant and/or its affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendant’s behalf constitute numerous and multiple violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d), by initiating any call for telemarketing purposes to Plaintiff and members of the Internal Do-Not-Call Class, without following procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls (“internal do-not-call list”). This includes Defendant’s failure to properly record do-not-call requests, failure to maintain a record of do-not-call requests, and failure to honor do-not-call requests. 55. As a result of Defendant and/or its affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendant’s behalf, violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d), Plaintiff and members of the Internal Do-Not-Call Class are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory damages for each and every call in violation of the internal do-not-call list regulation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5)(B).

win

23. Defendant operates, manages, and markets its places of entertainment, sells store gift cards to the public, and uses them as a form of communication. One or more of its places of entertainment is located in New York City. Defendant’s places of entertainment constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s places of entertainment provide important goods and services to the public. 25. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s store gift cards, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public at its places of entertainment. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from purchasing, accessing, and utilizing the store gift cards and, as a result, Defendant’s places of entertainment. 26. These access barriers on Defendant’s store gift cards have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to purchase a Braille store gift card related to Defendant’s physical motion picture house locations, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations. Plaintiff intends to immediately purchase a store gift card issued by the Defendant as soon as they become available in Braille. 27. If the store gift cards were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently purchase the store gift cards and complete a desired transaction utilizing gift cards as sighted individuals do. 29. Because simple changes to store gift cards would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to store gift cards and therefore Defendant’s locations, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Developing marketing and selling store gift cards that are inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to sell store gift cards that are not sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 30. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 31. Title III of the ADA requires that public accommodations provide “appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). 33. The regulation sets forth numerous examples of “auxiliary aids and services”, including, without limitation, “Brailled materials and displays..." 28 C.F.R. § 34. In addition to this general nondiscrimination mandate, Title III prohibits public accommodations from engaging in specific types of discrimination, including the failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated, or otherwise treated differently because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, services, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(a). 35. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the provision of an auxiliary aid or service, (emphasis added) . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) Nothing in this section shall require a person with disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or organization … does not intend to comply with its provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) 36.303 (b)(2). “[I]n order to be effective, auxiliary aids and services must be provided in accessible formats, in a timely manner, and in such a way to protect the privacy and independence of the individual with a disability. 28 CFR 36.303 (c)(ii).6 36.303(b)(2). 37. If the store gift cards were accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently utilize them. 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding its store gift cards, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in marketing and selling its store gift cards and has generated significant revenue from the store gift cards. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its store gift cards equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the store gift cards, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who would like independent access to Defendant’s store gift cards and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who would like independent access to Defendant’s store gift cards and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its store gift cards so they can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Defendant’s places of entertainment are places of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s store gift cards are a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s places of entertainment. The store gift cards are a service that is integrated with these locations. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the store gift cards, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant’s physical locations are located in the State of New York and constitute places of entertainment and places of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s store gift cards are a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s store gift cards are a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 60. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and sells its store gift cards. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 61. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its store gift cards, causing its store gift cards and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 64. Readily available manufacturing and/or printing capabilities exist for making store gift cards accessible to the blind and visually impaired. The addition to store gift cards of Braille on the gift card and packaging thereof and other related marketing materials would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s store gift cards and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 74. Defendant’s locations are places of entertainment and places of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its store gift cards are a service that is integrated with its establishments. 75. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its store gift cards, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its store gift cards, causing its store gift cards and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant is: a. developing, marketing and selling store gift cards that are inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. failing to sell store gift cards that are sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 79. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 80. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its store gift cards and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 81. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 84. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 85. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 86. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, Defendant’s store gift cards contain access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its store gift cards and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 87. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers On Its Store Gift Cards VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

win

24. Defendant’s text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 25. Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff real estate and real estate related services. 26. The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant’s property inventory as well as pre-approval information which Defendant sends to promote its business. 27. Defendant is located within this judicial district and therefore Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 29. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 4309 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 4309 Number. 30. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)). 31. The text messages originated from telephone number 754-333-6482, a number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant. 32. The number used by Defendant (754-333-6482) is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 34. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers without human intervention. 35. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. 36. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 37. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 38. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 39. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 40. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 41. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement. 43. The above execution these instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Platform is capable of transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less. 44. Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words, the platform controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function. 46. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life. 47. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm. Specifically, Plaintiff estimates that he spent approximately fifteen minutes investigating the unwanted text messages including how they obtained his number and who the Defendant was. 48. Furthermore, Defendant’s text messages took up memory on Plaintiff’s cellular phone. The cumulative effect of unsolicited text messages like Defendant’s poses a real risk of ultimately rendering the phone unusable for text messaging purposes as a result of the phone’s memory being taken up. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message-spam#text (finding that text message solicitations like the ones sent by Defendant present a “triple threat” of identity theft, unwanted cell phone charges, and slower cell phone performance). 49. Defendant’s text messages also can slow cell phone performance by taking up space on the recipient phone’s memory. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message- spam#text (finding that spam text messages can slow cell phone performance by taking up phone memory space). 50. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 52. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 56. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 61. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 62. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 63. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 64. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 65. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 66. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 68. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-60 as if fully set forth herein. 69. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 70. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. 71. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

win

(Unjust Enrichment) (Violation of Massachnsetts Unfair Trade Practices Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A) 18. Plaintiffrepeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 19. Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 93 § 105(a) provides that: No person, firm, partnership, corporation or other business entity that accepts a credit card for a business transaction shall write, cause to be written or require that a credit card holder write personal identification information, not required by the credit card issuer, on the credit card transaction form. Personal identification information shall include, but shall not be limited to, a credit card holder's address or telephone number. The provisions of this section shall apply to all credit card transactions. 20. Williams-Sonoma is a corporation that accepts credit cards for retail transactions. 22. The ZIP code is part of a credit card holder's address, and is therefore personal identification information under Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 93 § 105(a). Williams-Sonoma and other retailers are also able to use a customer's name and ZIP code to determine their address or telephone number using commercially available databases. 23. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93 § I05(c) provides that the collection ofpersonal identification information is a per se violation ofMass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A § 2: "Any violation ofthe provisions ofthis chapter shall be deemed to be an unfair and deceptive trade practice, as defined in section 2 of chapter 93A." 24. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A § 9 provides that: Any person ... who has been injured by another person's use or employment of any method, act or practice declared to be unlawful by section two ... may bring an action in the superior court ... for damages and such equitable relief, including an injunction, as the court deems to be necessary and proper ... Any persons entitled to bring such action may, if the use or employment of the unfair or deceptive act or practice has caused similar injury to numerous other persons similarly situated and if the court finds in a preliminary hearing that he adequately and fairly represents such other persons, bring the action on behalf ofhimself and such other similarly injured and situated persons. 26. In compliance with Mass. Gen. Laws. Ch. 93A § 9(3), on March 14,2013, Plaintiffs counsel sent Defendant a written demand for relief by Federal Express, identifying Ms. Brenner as a claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act alleged herein and the injury she and other Class members suffered. 27. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as iffully set forth herein. 28. Defendant knowingly and willingly accepted benefits from Plaintiffand the Class, to wit, their economically valuable personal identification information which Defendant used for its own profit, while providing Plaintiff and the Class nothing in return. 29. Under the circumstances described herein, it is inequitable for Defendant to retain the full monetary benefit ofthat information at the expense of Plaintiff and the Class.

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(Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693, et seq.) (Against Defendants JPay and Sunrise Bank) 204. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully restated herein. 205. The primary objective of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (“EFTA”) is to protect consumer rights by providing a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in the electronic fund and remittance transfer systems. 206. Defendants JPay and/or Sunrise Bank are financial institutions as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(9), and 12 C.F.R. §1005.2(a)(2)(i), because they directly or indirectly hold accounts belonging to consumers and/or they issue an access device to consumers. 207. Defendants’ JPay Cards are accounts pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1693a(2) and (Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693, et seq.) (Against Defendants JPay and Sunrise Bank) 194. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully restated herein. 195. The primary objective of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (“EFTA”) is to protect consumer rights by providing a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in the electronic fund and remittance transfer systems. 196. Defendants JPay and/or Sunrise Bank are financial institutions as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(9), and 12 C.F.R. §1005.2(a)(2)(i) (2013), because they directly or indirectly hold accounts belonging to consumers and/or they issue an access device to consumers. 197. Defendants’ JPay Cards are accounts pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1693a(2) and 25. Over 650,000 individuals are released from state and federal prisons annually, and local jails nationwide process an estimated 11.6 million people each year. 26. JPay is one of many for-profit businesses in an increasingly privatized prison industry. State spending on corrections was over $52.4 billion in 2012. Hundreds of private-sector contractors now provide food, clothing, riot gear, phone service, computers, and health care, in addition to directly operating many correctional facilities. A. Background

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(Fraud) (Conversion) 19. From 1975 through April 1993, Hoffenberg served as Chief Executive Officer of TFC, a corporation which provided a wide array of financial services and assistance to its clients. Specifically, TFC was in the business of purchasing large volumes of outstanding receivables, and then collecting on them. 20. TFC also owned and operated subsidiaries including Towers Credit Corporation, which purchased and purportedly collected on commercial accounts receivables; Towers Collection Services, Inc., which collected past-due accounts receivable for third parties on a contingency basis; and Towers Healthcare Receivables Funding Corporations I, II, III, IV and V (collectively the “THRFC Bond Funds”), which issued hundreds of millions of dollars in bonds and engaged in factoring healthcare receivables. 21. Hoffenberg and Epstein joined forces in the mid-1980s. Prior to that, Epstein had been running International Assets Group Inc., a consulting company, out of his apartment in New York City. 22. In or around 1987, Hoffenberg and TFC hired Epstein as an associate and expert consultant. This “consulting” engagement entailed Epstein assisting Hoffenberg full-time in all matters of business operations and management of TFC, as well as working with Hoffenberg to raise capital for TFC from investors. 23. Defendant Epstein, through entities including TFC and the Defendant Entities, raised over five hundred million dollars ($500,000,000) from investors in the course of carrying out the TFC Ponzi Scheme. 25. For example, in 1987, TFC acquired a controlling interest in United Diversified Corporation (“UDC”), which conducted business through two Illinois insurance company subsidiaries, Associated Life Insurance Co. (“Associated”) and United Fired Insurance Co. (“United Fire”). 26. Epstein was the architect of the plan to secure the approval from Illinois state regulators for TFC’s acquisition of the insurance companies. Indeed, approval was obtained because Epstein represented to regulators that TFC would contribute three million dollars ($3,000,000) to the surplus of United Fire – two million dollars ($2,000,000) immediately and an additional one million dollars ($1,000,000) at a later date. 27. Thereafter, in or around November 1987, Hoffenberg and Epstein used Associated and United bonds as collateral in securities brokerage accounts, controlled by Epstein, in a failed take-over attempt of Pan American Airways, Inc. (“Pan Am”). When the take-over failed, largely due to the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, United Fire and Associated suffered devastating trading losses, resulting in attendant losses for investors in TFC. 28. Epstein and Hoffenberg diverted investor funds to hide those catastrophic losses, while at the same time lining their own pockets with millions of dollars of investment capital to keep up with their lavish lifestyles. 29. Notably, between November 1987 and July 1988, checks were issued by TFC from UDC and United Fire’s accounts for a number of improper expenditures, including the payment of investment consultant fees for TFC consultants, including Epstein. 31. In the wake of these losses to TFC, Epstein manipulated the price of Emery stock to minimize the losses when the share price began to fall. In order to do so, Epstein opened and maintained a number of brokerage accounts to execute false trades in order to artificially inflate the price of Emery stock – while the company was in reality useless. Because Epstein did not have a license to trade, Epstein traded, purchased and sold stocks, bonds and other securities by what he referred to as “making the orders” through licensed brokers. 32. As the puppet master of Emery stock fraud, Epstein was making sizeable profits off his trading on insider information. According to Hoffenberg’s sworn affidavit, annexed hereto, Epstein misappropriated the proceeds for not only his personal use, but also to start his own company, Defendant TFTC. 33. United Fire and Associated lost over one million dollars ($1,000,000) on the purchase of Emery securities, due to the fact that the stock was purchased with funds borrowed by using insurance company bonds as collateral. 35. By the late 1980s, TFC became insolvent as a result of the massive losses it had incurred over the years. According to Hoffenberg, Epstein then devised a new fraudulent scheme to raise capital for TFC – namely, by selling Promissory Notes. 36. From January 1988 through March 1992, TFC sold the Promissory Notes in private placements by means of six (6) separate private placement offering memoranda (the “TFC Promissory Notes”). Defendant Epstein and TFC, represented to investors that the TFC Promissory Notes were collateralized by accounts receivable owned by TFC. 37. The six private placement offerings resulted in the sale of approximately two hundred seventy two million dollars ($272,000,000) in TFC Promissory Notes throughout the United States. 38. Epstein fraudulently induced investors to purchase the TFC Promissory Notes by assisting in the preparation and the distribution of financial statements which used falsified income and asset figures to deceitfully conceal TFC’s true financial condition. The falsified income and asset figures were a key component of continuing Defendant Epstein’s Ponzi scheme. Since TFC had taken such heavy losses on a series of failed investments, the company was deep in the red. In order to sell investors on the idea of future profits from investment in the TFC Promissory Notes, it was necessary to show investors that TFC was profitable. 39. As set forth in the accompanying Affidavit of Hoffenberg, annexed hereto, Epstein participated, directly and indirectly, in arranging to have a certified public accountant falsely verify that the financial statements reflected TFC’s financial condition. 41. Defendant Epstein, directly and indirectly, represented to investors that the face value of the collateral exceeded the face value of the TFC Promissory Notes. Instead, the collateral was a fiction backed by falsified receivables which did not exist. 42. In or about July 1990, Epstein, through TFC and in furtherance of the Ponzi scheme, made additional efforts to raise capital and expand TFC by offering and selling additional debt instruments in the form of bonds to investors (“TFC Bonds”). 43. Moreover, Defendant Epstein, directly and indirectly, created, or caused to have created, TFC subsidiaries, the THRFC Bond Funds, which were a series of corporate entities that issued the TFC Bonds. The TFC Bonds were sold pursuant to five (5) separate private placement memoranda which indicated that the proceeds from the sales of the TFC Bonds would be used by the THRFC Bond Funds, in whole or in part, to purchase healthcare receivables from TFC and that the healthcare receivables purchased from TFC would collateralize the TFC Bonds. 44. Defendant Epstein and Hoffenberg deliberately misrepresented how investor funds would be used and subsequently misused the proceeds from the sale of the TFC Bonds. 46. Despite the intended and stated purpose in the offering documents, Epstein diverted the funds and funneled a substantial amount of the proceeds of the sale of the TFC Bonds to pay TFC’s operating expenses. 47. To cover up the fraud, Defendant Epstein directed collateral to be moved from one THRFC Bond Fund to another and falsified collateral records in the periodic reports to investors and SEC filings. Further, Epstein and Hoffenberg created phony receivables, then included those items in reports designed to misrepresent the true financial picture of the THRFC Bond Funds. Despite Defendant Epstein’s central role in this now widespread, massive Ponzi scheme, his actions were taken on behalf of TFC – Hoffenberg’s company for which Epstein only “consulted”. 48. Between July 1990 and May 1992, TFC sold approximately two hundred ten million ($210,000,000) dollars in TFC Bonds. Like the TFC Promissory Notes, the financial statements provided to potential investors used falsified income and asset figures to conceal TFC’s true financial condition. 49. In February 1993, following a lengthy investigation, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filed suit against Hoffenberg, TFC, and other TFC officials for, among other things, securities fraud through the circulation of false and misleading financial statements to investors regarding TFC's financial condition. 50. In or around March 1993, TFC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, and the Noteholders and Bondholders filed claims with the Bankruptcy Court to support their loss claims.5 52. The very next day, on April 20, 1994, Hoffenberg was indicted in the Southern District of New York on numerous charges resulting from the SEC investigation and lawsuit, including mail fraud, securities fraud in connection with the sale of the TFC Promissory Notes and TFC Bonds, unlawful conspiracy and obstruction of justice. The indictment pending in the Northern District of Illinois was transferred to the Southern District of New York in April 1995. 53. In the course of the trial, Prosecutors in this District offered Hoffenberg a reduced sentence in exchange for information about his co-conspirators in the TFC Ponzi Scheme – namely Defendant Epstein’s role. However, Hoffenberg did not disclose any details about Defendant Epstein’s involvement, let alone orchestration, of the fraudulent scheme. It was only in May 2016 that Hoffenberg provided the first insight to the public and authorities regarding Defendant Epstein’s role.6 54. As a result of Hoffenberg’s refusal to implicate Defendant Epstein, Epstein was never indicted for his role in the TFC Ponzi Scheme. Epstein was never charged with any crime in connection with the TFC Ponzi Scheme. Rather, Epstein has been permitted to use the ill-gotten gains and misappropriated investor funds from his role in the TFC Ponzi Scheme to start and grow Defendant TFTC. 56. In or around April 1996, the Bankruptcy Court determined that the claims of the TFC Noteholders and Bondholders, in the total amount of $475,157,340, were valid and actionable. 57. On March 7, 1997, for his role in the TFC Ponzi Scheme, Hoffenberg was sentenced to twenty years' in prison, a term of supervised release, as well as a one million dollar ($1,000,000) fine, approximately four hundred seventy-five million dollars ($475,000,000) in restitution, and court surcharges. 58. The Sentencing Opinion sets forth fraudulent wrongful acts which were committed by Hoffenberg “and his co-conspirators.” The Affidavit of Hoffenberg, annexed hereto, makes abundantly clear that Defendant Epstein and the Defendant Entities were Hoffenberg’s co- conspirators. 60. Beginning in the early 1990’s, approximately one hundred (100) lawsuits, including, but not limited to, the cases listed below, were filed in the District Court of the Southern District of New York against Hoffenberg and TFC in connection with the TFC Ponzi Scheme: 1:89-cv-0 1689-RO Foti v. Towers Financial Corp. filed 03/13/89 closed 01/04/90 1:92-cv-08998-SS United Air Fleet v. Hoffenberg, et al filed 12/14/92 closed 11/16/93 1:93-cv-00810-WK-AJP Gold, et a! v. Towers Financial, et al filed 02/10/93 closed 01/05/00 I:93-cv-00855-WK-KAR Field v. Twrs Financial Corp., etl filed 02/11/93 closed 10/31/95 1:93-cv-00987-WK Ziegler v. Twrs Financial Corp., et al filed 02/19/93 closed 01/05/00 1:93-cv-0 1045-WK Izzo v. Towers Financial, et al filed 02/23/93 closed 01/05/00 1:93-cv-01047-WK Batten, et a1 v. Towers Financial, et al filed 02/23/93 closed 01/05/00 1:93-cv-01094-WK Casey, et al v. Twrs Financial Corp., et al filed 02/25/93 closed 01/05/00 1:93-cv-0 1095-WK Leibman, et a! v. Towers Financial, et al filed 02/25/93 closed 01/05/00 1:93-cv-01155-WK Penner v. Towers Financial, et al filed 03/01193 closed 01/05/00 1:93-cv-0 1303-WK Thorn, et al v. Twrs Financial Corp., et al filed 03/04/93 closed 01/05/00 1:93-cv-01543-WK Siudmak, et al v. Towers Financial, et al filed 03/12/93 closed 01/05/00 1:93-cv-01686-WK-KAR Bank Of Cape Verde v. TFC Funding Corp., eta filed 03/17/93 closed 03/10/97 1:93-cv-04449-WK Dinsmore v. Towers Financial, et al filed 06/30/93 closed 08/19/98 1:94-cv-00619-WK-KAR Davis v. Hoffenberg, et al filed 02/01/94 closed 08/02/00 1:94-cv-00724-WK Rothman v. Hoffenberg filed 02/04/94 closed 08/02/00 1:94-cv-00725-WK General Retirement, et al v. Hoffenberg, et al filed 02/04/94 closed 04/30/98 1:94-cv-00814-WK Izzo, et al v. Hoffenberg, et al filed 02/08/94 closed 08/02/00 1:94-cv-02727-WK Amer. Int’l. Lines, et al v. Towers Financial, et al filed 04/14/94 closed 11/30/98 1:94-cv-09344-WK-AJP Sheridan, et al v. Hoffenberg, et al filed 12/29/94 closed 06/26/96 1:96-cv-04656-MGC Cohen, et al v. Hoffenberg, et al filed 06/21/96 closed 06/28/96 1:96-cv-05125-PKL Cohen, et al v. Hoffenberg, et al filed 07/08/96 closed 07/15/96 1:93-cv-01080-WK-KAR Shawmut Bank v. Towers Financial, et al filed 02/25/93 closed 03/18/98 1:94-cv-0 1792-WK Shawmut Bank Conn. v. Hoffenberg, et al filed 03/15/94 closed 08/02/00 1:90-cv-00056-LBS Sahlen & Assoc. v. Towers Financial Cor filed 01/04/90 closed 12/10/90 1:88-cv-09178-RWS Associated Dry Goods v. Towers Financial filed 12/28/88 closed 03/06/91 1:93-cv-00992-WK Riviera v. Towers Financial, et al filed 02119/93 closed 01/05/00 1:93-cv-0 1543-WK Siudmak, et al v. Towers Financial, et al filed 03/12/93 closed 01/05/00 1:93-cv-04449-WK Dinsmore v. Towers Financial, et al filed 06/30/93 closed 08/19/98 1:91-cv-05231-LJF Superstock, Inc. v. Towers Fin. Corp., et al filed 08/01/91 closed 04/28/92 1:93-cv-00961-WK Murphy, et al v. Twrs Financial Corp., et al filed 02/18/93 closed 03/24/97 1:93-cv-0 1927-WK Von Stange v. Twrs Financial Corp., et al filed 03/24/93 closed 02/21/97 62. The full extent of Defendant Epstein’s involvement in the TFC Ponzi Scheme and related frauds, which harmed Plaintiffs and the Class, could not have been discovered prior to Hoffenberg’s execution of the Affidavit annexed hereto. Hoffenberg’s Affidavit, dated August 17, 2018, sets forth for the first time, under the penalty of perjury, Defendant Epstein’s full involvement in the TFC Ponzi Scheme.7 63. While Plaintiffs and the Class were aware of the illegal activities which caused them and many others to lose hundreds of millions of dollars, Plaintiffs and the Class only knew that Hoffenberg had “co-conspirators” who remained unnamed, uncharged, and unindicted. 64. Defendant Epstein continues to control the Defendant Entities which wrongfully received money fraudulently acquired from the Noteholders and Bondholders through the TFC Ponzi Scheme and the profits earned from monies misappropriated by Epstein and transferred as capital to the Defendant Entities including, but not limited to, Defendant TFTC. 65. Defendant Epstein, individually, and by and through the Defendant Entities, continuously engaged in the fraudulent activities by concealing his fraudulent Ponzi schemes from banks, financial institutions and current investors of his margin account syndication. 66. Defendant Epstein continues to deny his involvement in the TFC Ponzi Scheme and continues to wrongfully possess the funds to which Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled as victims of the TFC Ponzi Scheme. 68. This suit is a class action brought on behalf of a Class consisting of and defined as all investors, Noteholders, and/or Bondholders of TFC who, directly or indirectly, purchased the TFC Bonds and TFC Promissory Notes sold by TFC between 1987 and 1993. 69. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, any entity in which any Defendant has a controlling interest, and the officers, directors, legal representatives, heirs, successors, subsidiaries and/or assigns of any such individual or entity. 70. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members individually, in one action or otherwise, is impracticable. Plaintiffs believe that there are hundreds (if not thousands) of proposed Class members. 72. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class, and it is a member of the Class described herein. 73. Plaintiffs are willing and prepared to serve the proposed Class in a representative capacity with all of the obligations and duties material thereto. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has no interests adverse to, or which conflict with, the interests of other members of the Class. 74. Plaintiffs’ interests are co-extensive with and not antagonistic to those of the absent Class members. Plaintiffs will undertake to represent and protect the interests of absent Class members. 75. Plaintiffs have engaged the services of the undersigned counsel. Counsel is experienced in complex class action litigation, will adequately prosecute this action, and will assert and protect the rights of, and otherwise represent, Plaintiffs and absent Class members. 76. The questions of law and fact common to the Class, as summarized above, predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, in satisfaction of Rule 23(b)(3), and each such common question warrants class certification under Rule 23(c)(4). 77. A class action is superior to other available methods for the adjudication of this controversy. Individualized litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties and the court system given the complex legal and factual issues of the case, and judicial determination of the common legal and factual issues essential to this case would be far more fair, efficient, and economical as a class action maintained in this forum than in piecemeal individual determinations. 79. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final and injunctive relief with respect to the Class. 81. Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate and re-allege each and every allegation contained in all preceding paragraphs with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 82. With the intent to derive the use, enjoyment and profits from TFC, Plaintiffs and the Class, and with the intent to injure such individuals, Epstein actively participated in devising the TFC Ponzi Scheme and he participated in acquiring assets and funds from such entities and individuals though TFC for his own personal gain or use, or the gain or use of the Defendant Entities. 83. Under the guise of acting on behalf of TFC, Plaintiffs and the Class, Epstein actively participated in creating and executing several fraudulent Ponzi schemes. 85. Epstein utilized securities and cash, which properly belonged to TFC, Plaintiffs and the Class, and for which his co-conspirator Hoffenberg is court ordered to pay restitution, for the benefit of himself and/or the Defendant Entities. 86. Epstein utilized these funds in contravention of their intended, disclosed purpose, and Epstein, ignoring the intended, disclosed purpose, transferred the funds to himself and/or to the Defendant Entities, for his own personal gain or use. 87. TFC reasonably relied upon the Ponzi scheme, which was created and executed by Epstein, and that such scheme was in the best interests of TFC. 88. Plaintiffs and the Class reasonably relied upon the fraudulent Ponzi scheme, which was created and executed by Epstein, and that such scheme was in the best interests of Plaintiffs and the Class. 89. In an effort to continue to conceal this fraud from Plaintiffs and the Class, Epstein continues to hide and refuses to identify the assets and funds which were improperly transferred to Epstein and/or the Defendant Entities. 90. In an effort to conceal the fraud from banks, financial institutions and current investors of his holdings and syndication of margin accounts, Epstein continues to hide and refuses to identify the assets and funds which were improperly transferred to Epstein and/or the Defendant Entities. 91. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing fraudulent acts, Plaintiffs and the Class have been damaged. 92. The Defendants at all times acted with malice. 94. Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate and re-allege each and every allegation contained in all preceding paragraphs with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 95. From approximately 1987 through 1993, Epstein as a “consultant” to TFC, caused the transfer of securities, cash and assets from TFC to himself and/or to the Defendant Entities. 96. Through these transfers and his intentional diversion of cash and assets, Epstein, by and through the Defendant Entities, purposefully interfered with the rights of TFC, Plaintiffs and the Class deprived Plaintiffs and the Class of use and benefit of the cash and interest earned on the securities. 97. Instead Epstein, by and through the Defendant Entities dishonestly usurped the benefit and/or use of the cash and interest earned on the securities for himself and/or for the Defendant Entities. 98. As a result, because of use of the fraudulent means described herein, Epstein and/or the Defendant Entities have continued to enjoy, use, and benefit from funds diverted from TFC, Plaintiffs and the Class. 99. As a direct and proximate result of these improper acts by Epstein and/or the Defendant Entities, Plaintiffs and the Class have been damaged in an aggregate amount in excess of $500,000,000.

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12. Plaintiff is a natural person and citizen of the State of Missouri who resides in Joplin, Missouri, and is a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 13. Plaintiff is the subscriber and regular user of the cellular telephone number at issue, (417) xxx-1968. 14. Thus, Plaintiff is the “called party” within the meaning of the TCPA. 15. Defendant Skyline Metrics, LLC (“Skyline”) is a Virginia limited liability company with its principal place of business in Roanoke, Virginia, and is a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 16. Skyline conducts business under the fictitious name “OnceDriven,” which Skyline has registered with the State of Virginia. 17. On or about May 9, 2018, Plaintiff listed his vehicle for sale on Cars.com. The Cars.com terms and conditions provide, inter alia, “Prohibited Activities The following is a partial list of the kinds of activities that are prohibited on or through the Site: . . . (j) engaging in commercial activities and/or sales without prior written consent, such as contests sweepstakes, barter, advertising and pyramid schemes; . . . (l) using any robot, spider or other automated device, or a manual process, to monitor or copy web pages or the Content contained in the Site or for any other unauthorized purpose without the prior expressed written permission[.]” 19. On or about May 11, 2018, Plaintiff listed his vehicle for sale on Craigslist.org. Plaintiff’s telephone number was not provided in this listing. In the listing, Plaintiff made clear that he did not want and was not authorizing any telemarketing or advertising calls, stating “DO 37. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 36. 38. Defendant made calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number using an artificial or prerecorded voice without Plaintiff’s prior express consent. 39. The subject calls were not placed for emergency purposes within the meaning of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 40. Defendant willfully and knowingly violated the TCPA, including 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), each time it made a call to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number using an artificial or prerecorded voice without Plaintiff’s prior express consent. 41. The subject calls and messages to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number advertised the commercial availability of Defendant’s services, and therefore “included or introduced an advertisement” within the meaning of the TCPA. 42. The subject calls and messages to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number were for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, Defendant’s services, and therefore constitute “telemarketing” within the meaning of the TCPA. 43. Defendant did not have Plaintiff’s “prior express written consent,” as defined by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(8), to make the subject calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number. 45. As a result of Defendant’s illegal conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Class and each Subclass suffered actual damages and, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), are entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 46. Plaintiff and the Class and Subclass members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant from violating the TCPA in the future. 47. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, brings the above claims on behalf of a Class and Subclass. 48. In this case, Plaintiff seeks to certify the Class and Subclass, subject to amendment, as follows: 49. The Class consists of: (1) All persons in the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) Defendant placed a non-emergency telephone call (4) about Defendant’s services regarding the sale of a vehicle (5) using an artificial or prerecorded voice (6) within 4 years of the complaint (7) where Defendant did not have express written consent to call said cellular telephone number. The Scraper Subclass consists of: (1) All persons in the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) Defendant placed a non-emergency telephone call (4) about Defendant’s services regarding the sale of a vehicle (5) using an artificial or prerecorded voice (6) within 4 years of the complaint (7) after that person placed an advertisement on an Internet website such as Craigslist.org or Cars.com in connection with the sale of a vehicle. 51. Plaintiff is presently unaware of the exact number of members in the Class and each Subclass, but based upon the size and scope of Defendant’s business and the nature of the artificial or prerecorded voice messages, Plaintiff reasonably believes that the Class and Subclass members number, at a minimum, in the thousands. 52. Plaintiff and all members of the Class and each Subclass have been harmed by Defendant’s actions. 53. This Class Action Complaint seeks money damages and injunctive relief. 54. The joinder of all Class and Subclass members is impractical due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. 55. The disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to both the parties and the Court in avoiding multiplicity of identical suits. The Class and each Subclass can be easily identified through records maintained by Defendant or its agents. 57. As a person who received calls that were made using an artificial or prerecorded voice without prior express consent, all within the meaning of the TCPA, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of the members of the Class and each Subclass. 58. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and each Subclass, and Plaintiff does not have an interest that is antagonistic to any member of the Class or any Subclass. 59. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims involving violations of federal and state consumer protection statutes such as the TCPA. 60. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 61. Class-wide relief is essential to compel Defendant to comply with the TCPA. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the statutory damages in an individual action for violation of the TCPA are small. 63. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class and each Subclass, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class and each Subclass as a whole appropriate.

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2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 21. Defendant is a kitchen appliance company that owns and operates www.proctorsilex.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 25. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. Such issues were predominant in the section where Plaintiff was attempting, but was unsuccessful, in making a purchase. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)- (2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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44. On or about October 1, 2014, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant Yoh as a Hair and Make-up Artist. 45. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff remained employed as a Hair and Make-up Artist. 46. Immediately after hiring Plaintiff, Defendant Yoh placed Plaintiff “at CNBC as a Hair & Make-up Artist” and was directed to “report to the following address on [her] first day of employment: CNBC, NBC-900 Sylvan Avenue, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.” 47. Upon reporting to the office of the CNBC Defendants in Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Plaintiff was instructed to report to Defendant Guzman, the Production Manager at CNBC. 48. Plaintiff was required to undergo a 3-month probation period with the CBNC Defendants. 50. Plaintiff successfully completed her probation at CNBC. 51. During her first year of employment, Plaintiff was also allowed to work overtime hours and was paid time and a half her hourly rate for most of the overtime hours she worked. 52. Plaintiff worked an average of 5 hours of overtime during her first year of employment with Defendants. 53. After the completion of her first year of employment with Defendants, Plaintiff’s work hours were decreased to 30 hours per week. 55. However, Plaintiff consistently worked far over 30 hours each week and has not received the proper compensation or benefits during the remainder of her employment until the time of her unlawful termination on February 4, 2016. 56. As admitted by Defendant Guzman, Defendants were “carrying over” the hours that Plaintiff worked over 30 hours each week, so that Defendants continue to avoid properly compensating Plaintiff. 57. In fact, during her employment, Plaintiff repeatedly worked over 40 hours but was not paid any overtime, especially after Defendants started “carrying over” the hours that Plaintiff worked over 30 hours each week. 58. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff was assigned to work a fixed schedule. 59. After the completion of the first year of employment with Defendants, Plaintiff’s schedule became from 8:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. 60. However, as described herein, Plaintiff repeatedly worked longer than the designated schedule. 61. Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs have been victims of a common policy and plan perpetrated by Defendants that has violated their rights under the FLSA and the NYLL by denying them proper pay and benefits. 63. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs with a Notice and Acknowledgement of Wage Rate and Designated Payday Hourly Rate plus Overtime. 64. At all relevant times herein, Defendants’ unlawful conduct, policies, patterns and/or practices described herein have been willful. 65. As part of their ongoing business practices, Defendants have intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly harmed Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs by engaging in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA and the NYLL, as described herein. This ongoing policy, pattern or practice includes, but is not limited to: a. CNBC Defendants unlawfully classified Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs as independent contractors as opposed to employees; b. CNBC Defendants failed to adopt anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies applicable to Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs; and c. CNBC Defendants failed to keep accurate and adequate records of hours worked by Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs as required by the FLSA and the NYLL. 66. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ unlawful conduct described herein has been pursuant to a corporate policy or practice of minimizing labor costs by knowingly misclassifying certain employees as independent contractors in order to deny them proper compensation and benefits in violation of the FLSA and the NYLL. 68. Defendants’ unlawful conduct, as set forth herein, has been intentional, willful, and in bad faith, and has caused significant damages to Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. Whistleblower Claims 69. Plaintiff, who has over a decade of experience working as a Hair and Make-up Artist for some the biggest agencies and television personalities, is highly experienced and qualified in her field of work. 70. On or about June 8, 2015, and again on June 13, 2015, due to unsafe and negligently maintained conditions at the workplace, Plaintiff burnt her right and left hands because of unattended equipment. 71. Since on or about June 2015, Plaintiff repeatedly complained to her direct supervisor Guzman about the different safety risks and violations at the workplace and the unattended and mishandled equipment. 72. CNBC Defendants’ violations could easily cause bodily injuries to employees and guests, in the same manner that Plaintiff was injured, or even cause a fire. 73. In fact, immediately following the injuries she sustained, Plaintiff contacted Defendant Guzman and told her that she burnt her hands and asked to send an email to all the artists telling them to pay attention with their equipment or to take the necessary measures to avoid a catastrophic incident. 75. Such retaliatory actions in ignoring Plaintiff and reducing her work hours continued until her unlawful termination on February 4, 2016. 76. Furthermore, during her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff worked primarily from the New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”) building. 77. Upon information and belief, the NYMEX is a commodity futures exchange owned and operated by CME Group of Chicago, and located at One North End Avenue in Brookfield Place in the Battery Park City section of Manhattan, New York City. 78. At the time Plaintiff started working from the NYMEX location, the building was undergoing a construction project. 79. The health, safety and working conditions at NYMEX were very poor due to the ongoing construction. 80. For example, there were unattended dangerous equipment and tools, and the air quality was very harming, dangerous and unhealthy. 81. Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs were assigned to work in very close proximity to the construction area, which was filthy, unattended, unsecured, unhealthy, dangerous, and creating an extremely dangerous and poor air quality to the workers and guests. 82. No precautionary or safety measures were taken by Defendants to ensure the workers’ safety and well-being. 83. In fact, Defendants placed, or allowed the placement, of fans on the floor where Plaintiff and other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs were working, causing Plaintiff and others to breathe more dust and harmful air particles. 85. As a proximate cause of Defendants’ negligent and wrongful actions that endangered Plaintiff’s health and well-being, Plaintiff was forced to go to Bellevue Hospital Center approximately four (4) weeks after she started working at the NYMEX building. 86. On June 4, 2015, Plaintiff went to the emergency room due to breathing problems and pains in her respiratory organs, causing her a severe asthma attack. 87. Plaintiff requested from Guzman to inquire from Duffy whether Plaintiff’s medical expenses and costs would be covered by Defendants since her injuries were caused on the job and due to Defendants’ negligence. 88. However, Defendants, including Duffy and Guzman, refused to cover Plaintiff’s medical expenses and denied Plaintiff the right to apply for Worker’s Compensation benefits. 89. Plaintiff is still having difficulties breathing as a consequence of the working conditions she was compelled to work in. 90. Plaintiff was not the only person to get sick because of the air quality at the workplace. 91. Upon information and belief, the television personality that Plaintiff was working on, Jackie DeAngeles, also got sick and had to go to the hospital for treatment. 93. When Plaintiff complained to Defendant Guzman about the health and safety violations and the horrible air quality, Defendants refused and/or failed to take any remedial action, and instead Guzman stated to Plaintiff, “What do you want me to do. You still have to work there.” 94. Edmond Edmundo and Jackie DeAngeles both witnessed Plaintiff complaining to Defendant Guzman. 95. Upon her return from the hospital in or about June 10, 2015, Plaintiff and other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs were finally transferred to the “pit” of the NYMEX building, which is where all the brokers work from. 96. However, almost immediately after complaining of the health and safety violations until her unlawful termination, and in retaliation to the repeated complaints that she made, Defendants stopped approving Plaintiff’s requests to take time off and restricted her ability to perform other work. 97. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be an independent contractor, had to cancel her business trips several times causing her significant financial losses. 98. In further retaliation to Plaintiff’s complaints, Defendants also reduced Plaintiff’s work hours and gave Plaintiff’s hours to another hair and make-up artist. Color Discrimination in Violation of Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. Brought on behalf of Plaintiff 182. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, re-alleges and incorporates by reference all prior allegations in all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 183. Defendants violated Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq., by engaging in, perpetuating and permitting supervisory and decision making employees to engage in discriminatory employment practices in which Plaintiff’s skin color was the motivating, if not the only factor. 184. As a result of Defendants’ aforementioned conduct, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, loss of past and future wages and benefits, mental anguish, severe emotional distress, anxiety, loss of enjoyment of life, and other monetary damages connected with Defendants’ aforementioned violations. 185. Plaintiff continues to suffer and to incur additional damages by reason of the foregoing. 186. As a result of the outrageous and blatantly discriminatory conduct of Defendants, with such conduct that contravenes public policies and statutes, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages. Misclassification of Workers Race Discrimination in Violation of Executive Law § 296, et seq. Brought on behalf of Plaintiff 162. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, re-alleges and incorporates by reference all prior allegations in all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 163. Defendants violated Executive Law §296, et seq., by engaging in, perpetuating and permitting supervisory and decision making employees to engage in discriminatory employment practices in which Plaintiff’s race was the motivating, if not the only factor. 164. As a result of Defendants’ aforementioned conduct, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, loss of past and future wages and benefits, mental anguish, severe emotional distress, anxiety, loss of enjoyment of life, and other monetary damages connected with Defendants’ aforementioned violations. 165. Plaintiff continues to suffer and to incur additional damages by reason of the foregoing. 166. As a result of the outrageous and blatantly discriminatory conduct of Defendants, with such conduct that contravenes public policies and statutes, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages. Violation of the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) Failure to Provide Itemized Wage Statements Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs 158. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, re-alleges and incorporates by reference all prior allegations in all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 159. Upon information and belief, Defendants knowingly and intentionally failed to provide timely, accurate, and complete itemized wage statements including, inter alia, hours worked and taxes withheld, to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs in violation of the

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14. Defendants own, operate and KFC, Taco Bell, Long John Silver’s franchise restaurants among other restaurants. Upon information and belief, Defendants operate at least seventy four (74) franchised Yum! Brands restaurants in several states across the United States, including Tennessee, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and West Virginia. Please see a list of Defendants’ Yum! Brands Restaurant Locations attached as Exhibit C. 16. Defendants are and/or have been the “employer” of the Plaintiff and those similarly situated within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), during all times relevant to this Collective Action Complaint. 17. Plaintiff and all other similarly situated persons are current or former assistant managers or assistant unit managers of Defendants’ Yum! Brands restaurants. 18. Defendants employed Plaintiff and those similarly situated and were responsible for establishing and administering pay policies and practices, including pay classifications and overtime pay rates, during all times relevant to this Collective Action Complaint. 19. Defendants have had a centralized plan, policy and practice (scheme) of establishing and administering pay practices for their employees classified as Assistant Managers or Assistant Unit Managers. 20. At all times material to this action, Plaintiff and those similarly situated are or have been “employees” of Defendants as defined by Section 203(e)(1) of the FLSA and, worked for Defendants within the territory of the United States within three (3) years preceding the filing of this lawsuit. 21. At all times material to this action, the corporate Defendants have been an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as defined by Section 203(s)(1) of the FLSA, with annual revenue in excess of $500,000.00. 23. Defendants’ employ individuals classified as Assistant Managers or Assistant Unit Managers whose primary duties are non-managerial in nature and whose principal duties are to prepare and serve food items to customers. 24. As an assistant manager, the primary duties of Plaintiff and similarly situated putative class members were cleaning, taking orders, servicing customers, and preparing, cooking, and packaging food. Plaintiff and putative class members spent a vast majority of their work-time performing such duties. 25. During the statutory period, Defendants misclassified Plaintiff and other members of the class as salary exempt employees and as such paid Plaintiff and the class a fixed amount per week. 26. During the statutory period, Defendants directed Plaintiff and the putative class to work in excess of forty (40) hours per week, and Plaintiff and the class worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. Defendants typically scheduled Plaintiff and the class to work a minimum of fifty (50) hours per week. Plaintiff regularly and routinely worked a minimum of fifty (50) hours per week. 27. Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff and the class at a rate of one and one half time their regular rate of pay for all time worked in excess of forty (40) hours in individual work weeks. 28. Defendants employ a uniform electronic time keeping system for tracking and reporting employee hours worked at each of its restaurants. 30. The net effect of Defendants’ plan, policy and practice of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees classified as Assistant Managers Assistant Unit Managers overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week, during the relevant statutory limitations' period, was a scheme to save payroll costs and payroll taxes for which Defendants have enjoyed ill gained profits at the expense of Plaintiff and other members of the class. 31. Defendants are unable to bear their burden of showing that Plaintiff and the class fall within any of the FLSA overtime exemptions, including but not limited to those announced in 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.300, 541.301, 541.302, 541.303, or 541.304. 32. Upon information and belief, Defendants recently converted all of their Assistant Managers or Assistant Unit Managers to hourly non-exempt employees, and as such pay them an hourly rate for every hour they work, including time and a half (1.5) for hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek. 33. Although at this stage Plaintiff is unable to state the exact amount owed to her and other members of the class, she believes such information will become available during the course of discovery. However, when an employer fails to keep complete and accurate time records, employees may establish the hours worked solely by their testimony and the burden of proof of overcoming such testimony shifts to the employer. VI. 34. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if the same were fully set forth herein. 35. Plaintiff brings this collective action on behalf of Plaintiff and all other persons similarly situated pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, and 216(b), specifically, as follows: All Assistant Managers or Assistant Unit Managers employed by Defendants within the three years preceding the filing of this action who were misclassified as exempt employees even though they primarily performed non-exempt duties. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff believes that the definition of the class could be further refined following discovery of Defendants’ books and records. 36. The claims under the FLSA may be pursued by those who opt-in to this case under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 37. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all other members of the class is impracticable. While the exact number of the other members of the class is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and, can only be ascertained through applicable discovery, Plaintiff believes there are more than 200 individuals in the putative class. 39. Common questions of law and fact exist as to the class which predominate over any questions only affecting other members of the class individually and include, but are not limited to, the following:  Whether Plaintiff and other members of the class were misclassified as exempt from the FLSA;  Whether Plaintiff and other members of the class were expected and/or required to work hours without compensation;  Whether Defendants suffered and permitted Plaintiff and other members of the class to work hours without compensation;  Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and other members of the class all applicable straight time wages for all hours worked;  Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and other members of the class all overtime compensation due them for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week;  The correct statutes of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims and the claims of the other members of the class;  Whether Plaintiff and other members of the class are entitled to damages, including but not limited to liquidated damages, and the measure of the damages; and,  Whether Defendants are liable for interest, attorneys’ interest, fees, and costs. 40. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class as their interests are aligned with those of the other members of the class. Plaintiff has no interests adverse to the class and, Plaintiff has retained competent counsel who are experienced in collective action litigation. 42. Plaintiff and other members of the class have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable damage from the unlawful policies, practices, and procedures implemented and administered by Defendants. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the class, repeat and re-allege Paragraphs 1 through 42 above, as if they were fully set forth herein. 44. At all relevant times, Defendants have been and continue to be an employer engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). Plaintiff and class members also have engaged in interstate commerce during all relevant times to this Collective Action Complaint. 45. At all relevant times, Defendants employed (and/or continues to employ) Plaintiff and each of the other members of the class within the meaning of the FLSA. 46. At all times relevant, Defendants had a uniform plan, policy and practice of willfully refusing to pay the federal applicable overtime compensation to Plaintiff and other members of the class for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 48. At all times relevant, Defendants did not have a good faith basis for its failure to pay the federal applicable overtime compensation to Plaintiff and other members of the class for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 49. As a result of Defendants’ willful failure to pay Plaintiff and other members of the class the applicable federal applicable overtime compensation for all hours worked over forty (40) per week during the relevant statutory limitations' period, they have violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. 50. Defendants’ conduct constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 51. Due to Defendants’ willful FLSA violations and, and their lack of good faith, in its failure to pay Plaintiff and the other members of the class the federal applicable overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week during the relevant statutory limitations' period, they are entitled to recover from Defendants compensation for unpaid overtime wages, an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, as well as interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and disbursements relating to this action for the three-year statutory period under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). VIOLATION OF THE FLSA IN CONNECTION WITH OVERTIME COMPENSATION

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13. Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and the other public shareholders of Forescout (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any Defendant. 28. Forescout is a provider of device visibility and control solutions. The Company provides real-time identification, classification, assessment and continuous control over the devices, that collectively, comprise an organization’s network. The Company’s network extends across the campus information technology (IT) devices, the campus Internet of Things (IoT) devices, operational technology (OT) devices, the data center and within the third-party cloud. The Company offers Forescout platform, which provides organizations with situational awareness of extended enterprise and the ability to orchestrate actions to reduce cyber risk. The Company offers products such as eyesight, eyeSegment, eyeControl, eyeExtend, eyeManage and SilentDefense. 29. Advent is a private equity firm which invests in business, financial services, healthcare, industrial, retail, consumer, and leisure sectors, as well as offers investment advisory, wealth management, due diligence, and evaluation services. Advent has $48 billion in assets under management. 60. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein. 61. Defendants caused the Recommendation Statement to be issued with the intention of soliciting shareholder support of the Proposed Transaction. 62. Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act provides that it is unlawful “for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading . . . in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.” 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). 63. Defendants violated this clause of Section 14(e) because they negligently caused or allowed the Recommendation Statement to be disseminated to Forescout shareholders in order to solicit them to tender their shares in the Tender Offer, and the Recommendation Statement contained untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 68. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein. 69. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Forescout within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as officers and/or directors of Forescout and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the false and misleading statements contained in the Recommendation Statement, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contend are false and/or misleading. 70. Each of the Individual Defendants was provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Recommendation Statement alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause them to be corrected. 71. In particular, each of the Individual Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company, and, therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control and influence the particular transactions giving rise to the violations as alleged herein, and exercised the same. The Recommendation Statement contains the unanimous recommendation of the Individual Defendants to approve the Proposed Transaction. They were thus directly involved in the making of the Recommendation Statement. 72. By virtue of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. 74. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 75. By virtue of their role as directors and/or officers of the Company, the Individual Defendants are in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff and the other public stockholders of Forescout and owe them a duty of care, loyalty, good faith, candor, and independence. 76. To diligently comply with their fiduciary duties, the Director Defendants may not take any action that: (a) adversely affects the value provided to the Company’s stockholders; (b) favors themselves or discourages or inhibits alternative offers to purchase control of the corporation or its assets; (c) adversely affects their duty to search and secure the best value reasonably available under the circumstances for the Company’s stockholders; (d) will provide the Director Defendants with preferential treatment at the expense of, or separate from, the public stockholders; and/or (e) contractually prohibits the Director Defendants from complying with or carrying out their fiduciary duties. 77. The fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith require the Individual Defendants to refrain from: (a) participating in any transaction where the Director Defendants’ loyalties are divided; (b) participating in any transaction where the Director Defendants receive, or are entitled to receive, a personal financial benefit not equally shared by the public stockholders of the corporation; and/or (c) unjustly enriching themselves at the expense or to the detriment of the public stockholders. Against the Individual Defendants for Breaches of Their Fiduciary Duties Against the Individual Defendants for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Claims Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act I. Background and the Proposed Transaction

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3.1. Defendant is a service company providing security services to various commercial businesses in Colorado. Defendant is in the commercial support service industry as defined in the Wage Claim Act. 3.2. Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a security guard providing security services to commercial firms in Colorado. 3.3. Although Plaintiff was required to work overtime hours, and did so frequently, Plaintiff was not compensated at the mandated time and one-half rate for all these overtime hours. Given the nature of Plaintiff’s work, no overtime exemption applies to Plaintiff. 3.4. For example, during the week of January 8, 2019 through January 15, 2019 Plaintiff worked 58 hours. He was paid straight time for 50 hours at $16.00 per hour and overtime for only 8 of those hours at $24.00 per hour. Plaintiff should have been paid at the overtime rate for all 18 hours over 40 worked in that workweek. 3.5. It was a routine practice of Defendant not to pay overtime of all hours over 40 in a workweek. All of the security guards employed by Defendant were subject to this illegal policy. 4.1. Plaintiff brings this action as a FED. R. CIV. P. 23 class action, on behalf of himself and on behalf of a Class for which Plaintiff seeks certification. Pending any modifications necessitated by discovery, Plaintiff preliminarily defines this Class as follows: All security guards employed by Defendant beginning three years prior to the date of the filing of this lawsuit. 4.2.3. The claims asserted by Plaintiff are typical of the claims of Class Members and the Class is readily ascertainable from Defendant’s own records. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 4.2.1. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all Class Members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the number of Class Members exceeds fifty. 4.2.4. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of Class Members. The interests of Class Members are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, those of Plaintiff. Furthermore, Plaintiff is represented by experienced class action counsel. 4.2. This action is properly brought as a class action for the following reasons: 4.2.2. Numerous questions of law and fact regarding the liability of Defendant are common to the Class and predominate over any individual issues which may exist. 4.3. Plaintiff also seeks certification of an FLSA “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) for all claims asserted by Plaintiff because his claims are nearly identical to those of other Class Members. Plaintiff and Class Members are similarly situated, have substantially similar or identical job requirements and pay provisions, and were subjected to Defendant’s common practice, policy or plan regarding employee wages and hours. 5. FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF – Collective Action (Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §201, et seq.) 5.10. As a result, Plaintiff and Class Members has been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. 5.2. At all relevant times, each Defendant has been, and continues to be, an “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA. 5.3. Defendant is an enterprise engaged in interstate “commerce” and/or in the production of “goods” for “commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA. 5.4. At all relevant times, Defendant has had gross annual volume of sales in excess of $500,000. 5.5. At all relevant times, Defendant has employed, and continues to employ, non-exempt “employees,” including Plaintiff. Plaintiff consents to sue in this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 5.6. Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant within the meaning of the FLSA. 5.7. While employed by Defendant, Plaintiff was engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA. Plaintiff and the Class Members specifically handled and used materials that traveled in interstate commerce. 5.8.3. the interstate telephone systems, landline and cellular, to recruit and employ individuals for operational positions; 5.8. Two or more of Defendant’s employees, engage in commerce by using equipment that has traveled in interstate commerce. By way of example and not by limitation, Defendant’s employees used/use: 5.8.2. office equipment, such as copiers, that has been manufactured and shipped across state lines; 5.8.4. The United States postal system to send mail across state lines; and 5.8.5. the interstate banking systems to pay Defendant’s employees. 5.8.1. computers and telecommunications equipment that has been manufactured and shipped across state lines; 6. SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF – Class Action (Violation of the Colorado Wage Claim Act, §8-4-101, et seq.) 6.1. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs. 6.2. At all relevant times, Defendant has been, and continues to be, an “employer” within the meaning of the Wage Claim Act. 6.3. At all relevant times, Defendant has employed, and continues to employ, “employees”, including Plaintiff, within the meaning of the Wage Claim Act. 6.4. Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant within the meaning of the Wage Claim Act. 6.5. Defendant violated the Wage Claim Act as implemented by the Wage Order, when it failed to pay Plaintiff and others overtime wages for hours worked over forty in each given workweek. 7 CCR 1103-1(4). 6.6. Defendant violated the Wage Claim Act as implemented by the Wage Order, when it failed to pay Plaintiff and others overtime wages for hours worked over twelve in each given work day. 7 CCR 1103-1(4). 6.7. As a result of the foregoing conduct, as alleged, Defendant has failed to pay wages due under the Wage Claim Act, the FLSA and the Minimum Wage Act, thereby violating, and continuing to violate, the Wage Claim Act. These violations were committed knowingly, willfully and with reckless disregard of applicable law. 6.8. As a result, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. Plaintiff hereby demands payment on behalf of himself and all Class Members in an amount sufficient to provide compensation for all overtime hours worked. This demand for payment is continuing and is made on behalf of any current Defendant employees whose employment terminates at any time in the future. Such payment can be made care of undersigned counsel at the listed address. 7.1. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs. 7.2. At all relevant times, Defendant has been, and continues to be, an “employer” within the meaning of the Colorado Minimum Wage Act. 7.3. At all relevant times, Defendant has employed, and continues to employ, “employees”, including Plaintiff, within the meaning of the Minimum Wage Act. 7.4. Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant within the meaning of the Minimum Wage Act. 7.5. Defendant failed to pay overtime as required by the Minimum Wage Act. 7.6. As a result of the foregoing conduct, as alleged, Defendant has violated, and continues to violate, the Minimum Wage Act. These violations were committed knowingly, willfully and with reckless disregard of applicable law. 7.7. As a result, Plaintiff and Class Members have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial.

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58. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons who purchased LPL common stock during the Class Period (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are defendants and their families, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns, and any entity in which defendants have or had a controlling interest. 59. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. LPL stock is actively traded on the NASDAQ and there are nearly 89 million shares of LPL common stock outstanding. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, plaintiff believes that there are hundreds of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by LPL or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. 60. Common questions of law and fact predominate and include: (i) whether defendants violated the 1934 Act; (ii) whether defendants omitted and/or misrepresented material facts; (iii) whether defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that their statements were false; and (iv) whether defendants’ statements and/or omissions artificially inflated the price of LPL common stock and the extent and appropriate measure of damages. 62. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. 63. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 64. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations in ¶¶1-63 above by reference. 65. During the Class Period, defendants disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or recklessly disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 66. Defendants violated §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 in that they: (a) Employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud; (b) Made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (c) Engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon plaintiff and others similarly situated in connection with their purchases of LPL common stock during the Class Period. 68. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ wrongful conduct, plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their purchases of LPL common stock during the Class Period. 69. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations in ¶¶1-68 above by reference. 70. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of LPL within the meaning of §20(a) of the 1934 Act. By virtue of their positions with the Company, and ownership of LPL common stock, the Individual Defendants had the power and authority to cause LPL to engage in the wrongful conduct complained of herein. LPL controlled the Individual Defendants and all of its employees. By reason of such conduct, defendants are liable pursuant to §20(a) of the 1934 Act. For Violation of §20(a) of the 1934 Act Against All Defendants For Violation of §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants

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[Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act—Overtime Wage Brought on behalf of the Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective] 18. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 19. Defendants knew that the nonpayment of overtime pay and failure to provide the required wage notice at the time of hiring would financially injure Plaintiff and similarly situated employees and violate state and federal laws. 20. From 2006 until the present, Plaintiff was hired by Defendants to work as a store worker for Defendants’ business located at 31-85 Whitestone Expressway, Flushing, NY 11354. 21. For the applicable period, Defendants classified Plaintiff as an exempt employee and did not pay overtime compensation for hours worked over forty (40) per week. 5 22. Throughout the applicable period, Plaintiff generally worked six days per week according to the following schedule: on Mondays, Plaintiff worked from 8:30am until 2:00pm. On Wednesdays and Thursdays, Plaintiff worked from 10:30 a.m. until 8:00 p.m. On Fridays and Saturdays, Plaintiff worked from 8:30 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. On Sundays, Plaintiff worked from 9:00 a.m. until 7:30 p.m. Therefore, Plaintiff worked approximately fifty-four (54) hours per week. 23. Throughout his employment, Plaintiff’s main job responsibility was receiving and unloading merchandise from trucks, setting up the merchandise, and on-the-floor sales. 24. From 2011 until on or about 2015, Plaintiff’s title was Restaurant Supply Manager. 25. From 2015 until the present, Plaintiff’s title was Assistant General Manager for Restaurant Supplies Department. 26. Although Defendants classified Plaintiff as a manager, Plaintiff did not have any managerial authorities or duties such as hiring and firing, training and supervising employees, setting employees’ pay rate and schedule. 27. Plaintiff’s primary duty did not involve managing the enterprise or managing a customarily recognized department or subdivision of the enterprise 28. Plaintiff did not customarily and regularly direct the work of at least two or more other full-time employees or their equivalent. 29. Because Plaintiff was misclassified as an exempt employee, Plaintiff received a fixed annual salary regardless of the hours he actually worked. 30. From on or about September 2011 until on or about July 2012, Plaintiff received yearly salary of $39,000. 6 31. From on or about August 2012 until on or about June 2015, Plaintiff received yearly salary of $42,000 per year. 32. From July 2015 until September 2017, Plaintiff received yearly salary of $46,000. 33. Defendants misclassified Plaintiff as exempt and did not compensate Plaintiff for overtime compensation according to state and federal laws. 34. Plaintiffs were not compensated for New York’s “spread of hours” premium for shifts that lasted longer than ten (10) hours. 35. Defendants did not provide Plaintiffs with wage notices at the time of their hiring. 36. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 37. Defendants knew that the nonpayment of overtime and the “spread of hours” premium would economically injure Plaintiff and the Class Members by their violation of federal and state laws. 38. Defendants committed the foregoing acts against the Plaintiffs, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class. 39. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees either the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half), or the New York State overtime rate (of time and one-half), in violation of the FLSA and New York Labor Law and the supporting federal and New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 7 40. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying the New York State “spread of hours” premium to Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees. 41. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all other and former non- exempt employees who have been or were employed by the Defendants at their business location for up to the last three (3) years, through entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”), was misclassified and therefore not paid overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week (the “Collective Action Members”), and have been subject to the same common decision, policy, and plan to not provide required wage notices at the time of hiring, in contravention to federal and state labor laws. 42. Upon information and belief, the Collection Action Members are so numerous the joinder of all members is impracticable. The identity and precise number of such persons are unknown, and the facts upon which the calculations of that number may be ascertained are presently within the sole control of the Defendants. Upon information and belief, there are more than ten (10) Collective Action members, who have worked for or have continued to work for the Defendants during the Collective Action Period, most of whom would not likely file individual suits because they fear retaliation, lack adequate financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. Therefore, Plaintiff submits that this case should be certified as a collection action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 43. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Members, and have retained counsel that is experienced and competent in the field of employment law and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 8 44. This action should be certified as collective action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the collective action would risk creating either inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual members of this class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interest of the other members not party to the adjudication, or subsequently impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 45. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as collective action. 46. Questions of law and fact common to members of the collective action predominate over questions that may affect only individual members because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to all members. Among the questions of fact common to Plaintiffs and other Collective Action Members are: a. Whether the Defendants employed Collective Action members within the meaning of the FLSA; b. Whether Defendants has a policy of misclassifying the store workers as exempt from the coverage of the overtime provisions of the FLSA; c. Whether the Defendants failed to pay the Collective Action Members overtime wages for all hours worked above forty (40) each workweek in violation of the FLSA and the regulation promulgated thereunder; 9 d. Whether the Defendants failed to pay the Collective Action Members spread of hours payment for each day an employee worked over 10 hours; e. Whether the Defendants failed to provide the Collective Action Members with a wage notice at the time of hiring as required by the NYLL; f. Whether the Defendants’ violations of the FLSA are willful as that terms is used within the context of the FLSA; and, g. Whether the Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory, punitive, and statutory damages, interest, costs and disbursements and attorneys’ fees. 47. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 48. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have been substantially damaged by Defendants’ unlawful conduct. 49. Plaintiff brings his NYLL claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F. R. C. P.”) Rule 23, on behalf of all non-exempt persons employed by Defendants at their business location on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class Period”). 50. All said persons, including Plaintiff, is referred to herein as the “Class.” The Class members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Class members are determinable from the records of Defendants. The hours assigned and worked, the positions held, and the rate of pay for each Class Member is also determinable from Defendants’ records. For 10 purpose of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under said F.R.C.P 23. 51. The proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parities and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of the number is presently within the sole control of the Defendants, upon information and belief, there are more than ten (10) members of the class. 52. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those claims which could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief that would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the Class members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants, as alleged herein, of failing to pay overtime compensation. Defendants’ corporation wide policies and practices, including but not limited to their failure to provide a wage notice at the time of hiring, affected all Class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/ or wrongful acts as to each Class member. Plaintiffs and other Class members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 53. Plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the Class. Plaintiff is represented by attorneys who are experienced and competent in representing plaintiffs in both class action and wage and hour employment litigation cases. 54. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual Class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute corporate 11 defendants. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expenses that numerous individual actions engender. The losses, injuries, and damages suffered by each of the individual Class members are small in the sense pertinent to a class action analysis, thus the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual Class members to redress the wrongs done to them. Further, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and resulting in the impairment of class members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 55. Upon information and belief, defendants and other employers throughout the state violate the New York Labor Law. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. Class actions provide class members who are not named in the complaint a 12 degree of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 56. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, including: a. Whether Defendants employed Plaintiffs and the Class within the meaning of the New York law; b. Whether Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to overtime under the New York Labor Law; c. Whether Defendants maintained a policy, pattern and/or practice of willfully misclassifiying Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class as exempt from the overtime requirements of the NYLL; d. Whether Defendants maintained a policy, pattern and/or practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class spread-of-hours pay as required by the NYLL; e. Whether the Defendants provided wage notices at the time of hiring to Plaintiffs and class members as required by the NYLL; f. At what common rate, or rates subject to common method of calculation were and are the Defendants required to pay the Class members for their work 57. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 13 58. The FLSA provides that no employer engaged in commerce shall employ a covered employee for a work week longer than forty (40) hours unless such employee receives compensation for employment in excess of forty (40) hours at a rate not less than one and one- half times the regular rate at which he or he is employed, or one and one-half times the minimum wage, whichever is greater. 29 USC §207(a). 59. The FLSA provides that any employer who violates the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §207 shall be liable to the employees affected in the amount of their unpaid overtime compensation, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 29 USC §216(b). 60. Defendants’ unlawful misclassification of patternmakers resulted in none payment of overtime to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Action Members in violation of the FLSA. 61. At all relevant times, Defendants had, and continue to have, a policy of practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time and a half to Plaintiff and Collective Action Members for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, which violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§207(a)(1) and 215(a). 62. The FLSA and supporting regulations required employers to notify employees of employment law requires employers to notify employment law requirements. 29 C.F.R. §516.4. 63. Defendants willfully failed to notify Plaintiff and FLSA Collective of the requirements of the employment laws in order to facilitate their exploitation of Plaintiff’s and FLSA Collectives’ labor. 64. Defendants knowingly and willfully disregarded the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiff and Collective Class Members the statutory overtime rate of time and one half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week when 14 they knew or should have known such was due and that failing to do so would financially injure Plaintiffs and Collective Action members. 65. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 66. Pursuant to the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, an employer who fails to pay proper overtime compensation shall be liable, in addition to the amount of any underpayments, for liquidated damages equal to the total of such under-payments found to be due the employee. 67. Defendants’ unlawful misclassification of Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class resulted in nonpayment of overtime to Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class in violation of the NYLL. 68. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class their overtime pay violated the NYLL. 69. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class was not in good faith. 70. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 71. The NYLL requires employers to pay an extra hour’s pay for every day that an employee works an interval in excess of ten hours pursuant to NYLL §§190, et seq., and §§650, et seq., and New York State Department of Labor regulations §146-1.6. 15 72. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class spread-of-hours pay was not in good faith. 91. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 92. The NYLL and supporting regulations require employers to provide written notice of the rate or rates of pay and the basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; allowances, if any, claimed as a part of minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging allowances; the regular pay day designated by the employer; the name of the employer; any “doing business as” names used by the employer; the physical address of employer’s main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer. NYLL §195-1(a). 93. Defendants intentionally failed to provide notice to employees in violation of New York Labor Law § 195, which requires all employers to provide written notice in the employee’s primary language about the terms and conditions of employment related to rate of pay, regular pay cycle and rate of overtime on his or his first day of employment. 94. Defendants not only did not provide notice to each employee at Time of Hire, but failed to provide notice to each Plaintiff even after the fact. 95. Due to Defendants’ violations of New York Labor Law, each Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants, jointly and severally, $50 for each workday that the violation occurred or continued to occur, up to $5,000, together with costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to New York Labor Law. N.Y. Lab. Law §198(1-b). 16 Prayer For Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself, and the FLSA collective plaintiffs and rule 23 class, respectfully request that this court enter a judgment providing the following relief: a) Authorizing plaintiff at the earliest possible time to give notice of this collective action, or that the court issue such notice, to all persons who are presently, or have been employed by defendants as non-exempt tipped or non-tipped employees. Such notice shall inform them that the civil notice has been filed, of the nature of the action, of their right to join this lawsuit if they believe they were denied proper hourly compensation and premium overtime wages; b) Certification of this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; c) Designation of Plaintiff as representatives of the Rule 23 Class, and counsel of record as Class counsel; d) Certification of this case as a collective action pursuant to FLSA; e) Issuance of notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to all similarly situated members of the FLSA opt-in class, apprising them of the pendency of this action, and permitting them to assert timely FLSA claims and state claims in this action by filing individual Consent to Sue forms pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and appointing Plaintiff and his counsel to represent the Collective Action Members; f) A declaratory judgment that the practices complained of herein are unlawful under FLSA and New York Labor Law; g) An injunction against Home & Home, Corp., its officers, agents, successors, employees, representatives and any and all persons acting in concert with them as 17 provided by law, from engaging in each of unlawful practices and policies set forth herein; h) An award of unpaid overtime wages due under FLSA and New York Labor Law; i) An award of unpaid “spread of hours” premium due under the New York Labor Law; j) An award of damages for Defendants’ failure to provide wage notice at the time of hiring as required under the New York Labor Law. k) An award of liquidated and/or punitive damages as a result of Defendants’ knowing and willful failure to pay overtime compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216; l) An award of liquidated and/ or punitive damages as a result of Defendants’ willful failure to pay overtime compensation and “spread of hours” premium pursuant to New York Labor Law; m) An award of costs and expenses of this action together with reasonable attorneys’ and expert fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) and NYLL §§198 and 663; n) The cost and disbursements of this action; o) An award of prejudgment and post-judgment fees; p) Providing that if any amounts remain unpaid upon the expiration of ninety days following the issuance of judgment, or ninety days after expiration of the time to appeal and no appeal is then pending, whichever is later, the total amount of judgment shall automatically increase by fifteen percent, as required by NYLL §198(4); and q) Such other and further legal and equitable relief as this Court deems necessary, just, and proper. [Violation of New York Labor Law—Time of Hire Wage Notice Requirement] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Overtime Pay Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Spread of Time Pay Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class]

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(Breach of Contractl 43- Plaintiff reoeats. reiterates and incoroorates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered "1" through "42" herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at lenqth herein. (Violations of AIYS Gen. Bus, Law 5349, 53501 10. There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: (i) Whether Defendant violated various provisions of the NYS GBL SS 349 and 350; (ii) Whether Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Defendant's conduct; (c) Whether Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are entitled to restitution as a result of Defendant's wrongdoing and, if so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutory formula to be applied in determining such damages and restitution; and, (iv) Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief. 11. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class, and Plaintiff has no interests adverse or antagonistic to the interests of other members of the Class. 12. A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted, 13. The members of the Class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. 15. A class action will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment also will permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not othenruise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 16. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class members' interests, in that the Plaintiff's counsel is experienced and, further, anticipates no impediments in the pursuit and maintenance of the class action as sought herein. 17. Absent a class action, the Class members will continue to suffer losses borne from Defendant's breaches of their statutorily protected rights as well as monetary damages, thus allowing and enabling: (a) Defendant's conduct to proceed and; (b) Defendant to further enjoy the benefit of its ill-gotten gains. 18. Defendant has acted, and will act, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate a final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 19. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered "1" through "18" herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 21. Said vehicle was a 2015 Chevrolet Tahoe (hereinafter referred to as "the Vehicle"). 22. The Vehicle, and allvehicles manufactured by Defendant are equipped with an OnStar@ navigation system. 23. According to Plaintiff's lease agreement, Plaintiff and, upon information and belief, all consumers who lease Defendant's vehicles, are supplied with OnStal@ navigation system at no cost for a period of six (6) months. 24. Accordingly, Plaintiff's six-month free OnStar@ service would end on Aprrl2T , 2015. 25. In or about March, 2015, Plaintiff received a letter purporting to be from OnStarwhich letter informed Plaintiff that OnStar@ had reason to believe that The Vehicle had been sold or traded and therefore the OnStar@ services would be discorttinued within a very short period of time unless Plaintiff contacted Onstar. 26. ln or about March 2015, Plaintiff placed a telephone call to Defendant and was connected to a female employee who identified herself as a representative of OnStar@. Plaintiff referenced the letter and informed Defendant's representative that this information was incorrect and that The Vehicle, had only recently been leased on October 28,2014 and had been neither sold nor traded. Defendant's representative then stated that she would correct her records accordingly and the call concluded. 27. On April 10, 2015, Plaintiff received an electronic communication from Defendant, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 28. Defendant's e-mailfeatured extremely large letters stating: "CANCELLATION 36. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered "1" through "35" herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 39. Defendant violated (9) b of N.Y. GBS.LAW $349:NY Code-Section 349 by communicating to consumers using unfair and unconscionable threatening language and warnings. On April 10,2015 prior to the end of the six-month period, which ended on April 27,2015, Defendant communicated to Plaintiff by e-mail purportedly signed by "Terry M. lnch, OnStar, Chief Operating Officer," that Plaintiff's service was terminated, making a point to emphasize: "This means that, even in an emergency, you will no longer be able to count on OnStar to provide critical services, including: Automatic Crash Response; Live, 2417 OnSlar Advisor emergency assistance; Stolen Vehicle Assistance. We hope you keep us in mind as you move on to your next vehicle and allow us to continue to keep you and your loved ones safe and secure while on the road." 41. Defendant's communications imply that any consumer who declines to renew OnStar, prior to the actual expiration of the free six month Onstar trial period, will knowingly decline to "keep you and your loved ones safe and secure while on the road" and will agree that "... even in an emergency, OnStar will be unable to provide you with critical services." Consumers, like Plaintiff, an older adult with medical challenges, may well respond with the alarm Defendant unfairly intends to provoke with such threatening communications and actions such as prematurely terminated services. Defendant's deceptive sales practices are designed to intentionally cause plaintiff and other consumers fear and trepidation as a means to sell Onstar services. The use of sales tactics of this nature is reprehensible, causing Plaintiff and similarly situated consumers alarm, distress and emotional harm. 42. As a result of Defendant's above violations of the New York General Business Law. the Plaintiff has been damaged and is entitled to damages in accordance with the New York General Business Law. 45. The Vehicle, and all vehicles manufactured by Defendant are equipped with an OnStar navigation system. 46. According to the Plaintiff's lease agreement, Plaintiff and, upon information and belief, all consumers who lease Defendant's vehicles, are supplied with OnStar navigation system at no cost for a period of six (6) months, which free service period would end on Apri!27,2015. 4T . ln or about March 2015, Plaintiff received a letter from OnStar, stating that OnStar had reason to believe that the Vehicle had been sold or traded and therefore the OnStar services would be discontinued within a very short time unless Plaintiff contacted OnStar. 48. ln or about March 2015, Plaintiff contacted Defendant via telephone, and informed a representative for Defendant that this information was incorrect. and that the Vehicle had been neither sold nor traded. Defendant's reoresentative said she would correct her records accordingly. 50. On April 22,2015, Plaintiff received a second electronic communication from Defendant (Exhibit "B"). This communication threatened to discontinue Plaintiff's OnStar service unless he accepted the OnStar User Terms and Privacy Statement immediately. The notice went on to say "To avoid deactivation, please act immediately. Only then can you unsure that OnStar will be there for you 24 hours a day, 7 days a week." 51. These communications from Defendant to Plaintiff were in breach of the lease agreement, which provided that Plaintiff would receive free OnStar service through and until April2T , 2015. 6. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") Rule 23, on behalf of himself and all persons/consumers, along with their successors-in-interest, who have received similar letters/communications from Defendant which, as alleged herein, are in violation of the NYS GBL SS 349 and 350 as of the date of Plaintiffs Complaint (the "Class"). Excluded from the Class is Defendant herein, and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with the Defendant, including, without limitation, persons who are officers, directors, employees, associates or partners of Defendant. Upon information and belief, hundreds of persons have received debt collection notices and/or letters/communications from Defendant, which violate various provisions of the NYS GBL SS 349 and 350. 7. This Class satisfies all the requirements of FRCP Rule 23 for maintaining a class action, 9. The letters/communications from Defendant, received bythe Class, are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical "least sophisticated consumer".

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14) Upon information and belief, on a date better known by Defendant, Defendant began to attempt to collect an alleged consumer debt from the Plaintiff. 15) Within the one year immediately preceding the filing of this complaint, the Defendant contacted the Plaintiff on multiple occasions via telephone and left numerous voice messages in an attempt to collect the alleged obligation. -5- 16) By way of limited example only, the following is a transcript of one such message that Defendant left for Plaintiff on her cellular telephone voicemail system on or about February 11, 2013: "This is a very important message for Chana Lefkowitz; my name is Orellana; I'm contacting regards to a file that concerns you in my office; I’m trying to see if I can be of some assistance in helping you handling this on a voluntary basis, while you have the opportunity of doing so; if you could contact me back at your earliest convenience; I could be reached at 8889666016 my extension is 316; when you are calling, it’s important you reference your file number of 1460311; again, this is an important business matter." 17) During the said calls, Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with the notices required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11), namely, by failing to advise Plaintiff that the calls were from a debt collector or that the Defendant was attempting to collect a debt. 18) Each of the messages is a "communication" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 19) Each of the above messages uniformly failed to identify the callers as debt collectors attempting to collect a debt. 20) Each of the said messages uniformly failed to provide meaningful identification of the Defendant's legal name. 21) The least sophisticated consumer could believe that the messages were from an original creditor. -6- 22) The messages left by Defendant was deceptive and harassing per se in that it secreted the identity of the Defendant in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6). 23) Upon information and belief, it is the regular practice of the Defendant to leave messages on consumers' answering machines that do not meaningfully identify themselves, and/or do not identify themselves as a debt collector. 24) The only way for Plaintiff and/or any least sophisticated consumer to obtain the identity of the caller leaving the messages, and to ascertain the purpose underlying the messages, is to place a return call to the telephone number provided in the messages and speak with a debt collector employed by Frontier Financial Group, and to provide the debt collector with personal information. 25) The Defendant intended that the messages have the effect of causing Plaintiff, and least sophisticated consumers to place return calls to the telephone number provided in the messages and speak with its debt collectors, and then provide those debt collectors with their personal information, as the sole means of obtaining the identity of the caller leaving the messages, and to ascertain the purpose underlying the messages. Scores of federal court decisions -- including the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals and Districts Courts within the State of New York -- uniformly hold that the FDCPA requires debt collectors to provide meaningful identification of itself in telephonic voice messages left for consumers, such as the messages, by accurately stating the name of the debt collection company and stating the nature and/or purpose of the call. -7- 26) At all times relevant to this action, Frontier Financial Group was aware of the substantial weight of legal authority requiring it to provide meaningful identification of itself in telephonic voice messages left for consumers, such as the said messages, by accurately stating its company name and stating the nature and/or purpose of the call. 27) At all times relevant to this action, Frontier Financial Group willfully, deliberately, and intentionally chose not to provide meaningful identification of itself in telephonic voice messages left for consumers, such as the said messages, by accurately stating its company name and stating the nature and/or purpose of the call. 28) The Defendant's act of leaving the said messages for Plaintiff is conduct the natural consequences of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse a person in connection with the collection of a debt and is in violation of the FDCPA. 29) The Defendant's act of leaving the said messages for Plaintiff constitutes the use of a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt and is in violation of the FDCPA. 30) The FDCPA secures a consumer's right to have a debt collector cease further communications with the consumer. By failing to meaningfully identify itself, disclose the purpose of its call and state that Frontier Financial Group is a debt collector in a manner understandable to the least sophisticated consumer, the Defendant has engaged in conduct designed to deprive consumers of their right to have a debt collector cease further communications. -8- 31) It is Defendant's policy and practice to leave telephonic voice messages for consumers and other persons, such as the above said messages, that violate the FDCPA by, inter alia: (a) Failing to provide meaningful disclosure of Frontier Financial Group's identity; and (b) Failing to disclose that the call is from a debt collector; and (c) Failing to disclose the purpose or nature of the communication, i.e. an attempt to collect a debt. 32) Upon information and belief, such messages, as alleged in this complaint, number at least in the hundreds. 33) Upon information and belief, the said messages were either pre-scripted or pre-recorded. 34) Defendant has engaged in a pattern of leaving messages without disclosing that the communication is from a debt collector. 35) The said telephone messages are in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(6), 1692e, 1692e(10) and 1692e(11) for failing to indicate that the messages were from a debt collector which constitutes a deceptive practice. 36) Plaintiff seeks to end these violations of the FDCPA. Plaintiff and putative class members are entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, including, declaratory relief, and damages. -9- 37) This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action individually, and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 38) With respect to the Plaintiff's Class, this claim is brought on behalf of a class of (a) all persons in the State of New York. (b) for whom Frontier Financial Group left a voicemail or answering machine message, in the form of the above said messages, (c) that did not identify Frontier Financial Group by its true company name or state that the call was for collection purposes (d) made in connection with Frontier Financial Group's attempt to collect a debt (e) which the said messages violate the FDCPA (f) during a period beginning one year prior to the filing of this initial action and ending 21 days after the service of the initial complaint filed in this action. 39) The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Frontier Financial Group and those business and governmental entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts. 40) Excluded from the Plaintiff's Class is the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of Frontier Financial Group, and all of its respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of its immediate families. 41) There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff's Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class -10- members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant's telephonic voice messages, such as the above said messages, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(6), 1692e(10), and 1692e(11). 42) The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 43) The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause her not to vigorously pursue this action. 44) This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: (a) Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff's Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. (b) Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff's Class and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant's telephonic voice messages, such as the above said messages violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(6), 1692e(10), and 1692e(11). -11- (c) Typicality: The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint have claims arising out of the Defendant's common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. (d) Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. (e) Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(l)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate because adjudications with respect to individual members create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant who, on information and belief, collects debts throughout the United States of America. -12- 45) Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that a determination that the said messages violate 15 U.S.C. §1692d(6), 1692e(10), and/or §1692e(11) is tantamount to declaratory relief and any monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination. 46) Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff’s Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 47) Further, Defendant has acted, or failed to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Rule (b)(l)(A) and (b)(2) Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 48) Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R.Civ. P. 23(c)(4).

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18. Aequitas conducted its securities and other business activities through various affiliated entities. The complex organizational structure, consisting of approximately 75 active entities, aided Aequitas in hiding the true nature of Aequitas' business. I. THE AEQUITAS ENTITIES

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10. Beginning in or around the fall of 2013, Defendant began to utilize Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number, ending in 3046, to place virtually daily incessant calls to Plaintiff pertaining to an alleged debt owed by his son. 11. Plaintiff was not a borrower, co-signor, or in any other way affiliated with his son’s alleged loan with Defendant. 12. Plaintiff never provided Defendant with his cellular telephone number. 13. During this time, Defendant placed calls on a daily basis, often placing numerous calls a day. 14. The calls Defendant placed to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone were placed via an “automatic telephone dialing system” (“ATDS”), as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 15. This ATDS has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be dialed, using a random or sequential number generator. 16. The telephone number that Defendant, or its agents, called was assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 17. These telephone calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 19. These telephone calls by Defendant, or its agents, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 20. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 21. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any telephone call/s from Defendant or its agent/s and/or employee/s to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. 22. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 23. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 25. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the court. The Class can be identified through Defendant’s records or Defendant’s agents’ records. 26. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the following: a. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Defendant or its agents placed any calls to the Class (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) to a Class member using any automatic dialing system to any telephone number assigned to a cellular phone service; b. Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation; and c. Whether Defendant and its agents should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 27. As persons that received numerous calls from Defendant via an automated telephone dialing system, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class. 29. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the TCPA. 30. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal law. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class claims. 31. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 32. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 33. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above- cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 35. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A). WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court grant Plaintiff and the Class members the following relief against Defendant: (a) $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B); (b) Injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A); and (c) Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 36. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 37. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 38. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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10. That the said letter violates the FDCPA, including but not limited to § 1692g(a)(2), in that the letter does not clearly identify the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 11. That the letter's caption makes reference to the Law Office of Mel Harris, giving the consumer the impression that the account is owned by Mel Harris. 12. That Chase Bank USA, N.A. is referred to only as the original creditor, not the current creditor or simply the creditor, which gives the consumer the impression that Chase once owned the debt but as of the mailing of the letter, Chase no longer does so. 13. That, further, defendant's name is Zenith Acquisition Corp. and the letter directs plaintiff to make checks or money orders payable to defendant, thereby leading to the reasonable inference that defendant actually now owns the debt, having acquired it previously. 14. That neither plaintiff nor the least sophisticated consumer would know, by reading the letter, who is the current creditor of the debt sought to be collected. 15. That, on a fair reading of the letter, the current creditor could be a) Law Office of Mel Harris; b) Chase Bank USA, N.A.; or c) defendant itself. 16. That, as a result of defendant's said insufficient identification of the creditor to whom the debt is owed, defendant is, further, in violation of the FDCPA, §§1692e and 1692e(10) in that defendant's said letter constitutes a deceptive and misleading means to attempt to collect a debt. 17. That plaintiff re-a lieges paragraphs 1 to 16 as if fully re-stated 18. That each of the deceptive and misleading acts and practices above-mentioned was committed by defendant in the conduct of a business, trade or commerce or the furnishing of a service in New York State and constitutes a violation of 23. That plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1-22 as if fully re-stated herein. 24. That this action is brought on behalf of plaintiff and the members of a class. The class consists of all persons who defendant's records reflect resided in the United States and who were sent a collection letter (a) bearing the defendant's letterhead in substantially the same form as the letter sent to plaintiff; (b) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of an alleged consumer debt; (c) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (d) the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§1692e, 1692e(10) and 1692g(a)(2). The Class shall be defined as follows: All natural persons to whom were sent by defendant at an address within the United States a notice for the collection of a consumer debt, which notice contains the statement, in sum or substance: "Re: LMH001-Law Office of Mel Harris ... Original Creditor: Chase Bank USA NA. .. Your CHASE BANK USA NA account has been listed with our office for collection ... make your check or money order payable to Zenith Acquisition Corporation." The class does not include defendant and any person, firm, trust, corporation or other entity related to or affiliated with defendant, including, without limitation, persons who are officers, directors, employees, associates or partners of defendant. 25. That pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: (A) Based on the fact that the collection letter that is the gravamen of this litigation is a mass-mailed form letter, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, thousands of persons have received similar debt collection letters from defendant which violate the various provisions of the FDCPA. (B) There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether defendant violated the FDCPA by sending collection letters with an insufficient identification of the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§1692e, 1692e(10) and 1692g(a)(2). (C) The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who received the letters (the class members), a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of defendant. (D) The claims of plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. (E) Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members' interests. Plaintiff has retained experienced counsel. Plaintiff's interests are consistent with those of the members of the class. 26. That a class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members' claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA in 15 U.S.C. §1692k. The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of incompatible or varying standards of conduct for defendant and would not be in the interest of judicial economy. 27. That if the facts are discovered to be appropriate, plaintiff will seek to certify a class action pursuant to rule 23(b)(1)(A) or 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28. That communications from debt collectors, such as those sent by defendant, are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical "least sophisticated consumer". 29. That as a result of the above violations, defendant is liable to plaintiff and the members of the class for statutory damages in an amount to be determined at the time of trial, plus costs and attorneys' fees. WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that judgment be entered against defendant as follows: (a) certifying a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23; (b) statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k in an amount to be determined at the time of trial; (c) awarding class members the maximum statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k; (d) statutory damages pursuant to NYGBL §349 in an amount to be determined at the time of trial; (e) enjoining defendant from committing further deceptive acts and practices against plaintiff pursuant to NYGBL §349; (f) reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and disbursements pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k and NYGBL §349(h); and (g) for such other and further relief as may be just and proper. 5. That plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1 to 4 as if fully re-stated herein. 6. That at a time within the knowledge of defendant, defendant began collecting a consumer debt allegedly incurred by plaintiff for personal purposes. 7. That, on information and belief, sometime in early 2011, defendant wrote to plaintiff in an attempt to collect said debt. Said letter was defendant's first written communication with plaintiff. 8. That said letter states in its caption, in pertinent part,: ''Re: LMH001-LAW OFFICE OF MEL HARRIS ... Original Creditor: Chase Bank USA NA. .. Your CHASE BANK USA NA account has been listed with our office for collection ... make your check or money order payable to Zenith Acquisition Corporation." Defendant sent no other letter to plaintiff within 5 days after the said letter. 9. That plaintiff re-a lieges paragraphs 1 to 8 as if fully re-stated herein. FDCPA§§1692e, 1692e(10) and 1692g(a)(2) NYGBL§349

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10. This case arises from Related Realty’s use of repeated, unsolicited autodialed text messages to market its real estate listings and other properties. 11. Related Realty does not attempt to obtain consent from consumers before repeatedly sending consumers texts marketing its properties. And that is precisely what happened to Plaintiff. 13. Related Realty’s unsolicited texts were a nuisance that aggravated Plaintiff, wasted his time, invaded his privacy, diminished the value of the cellular services he paid for, caused him to temporarily lose the use and enjoyment of his phone, and caused wear and tear to his phone’s data, memory, software, hardware, and battery components. 15. In sending the unsolicited text messages at issue, Related Realty, or a third party acting on its behalf, used an automatic telephone dialing system; hardware and/or software with the capacity to store or produce cellular telephone number to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. This is evident from the circumstances surrounding the text messages, including the ability to trigger an automated response by replying “STOP,” the text messages’ commercial and generic content, that substantively identical texts were sent to multiple recipients, and that they were sent from a short code, which is consistent with the use of an automatic telephone dialing system to send text messages. 16. Accordingly, Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following Class: All persons who, on or after four years prior to the filing of the initial complaint in this action, (1) were sent a text message to their cellular telephone number by or on behalf of Related Realty, (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system, (3) for the purpose of soliciting their purchase of real estate, (4) without their prior express written consent. 18. Numerosity: The exact size of the Class is unknown and unavailable to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant sent unsolicited text messages to thousands of individuals who fall into the Class definition. Class membership can be easily determined from Defendant’s records. 19. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff is a member of the Class, and if Defendant violated the TCPA with respect to Plaintiff, then it violated the TCPA with respect to the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the Class sustained the same damages as a result of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct. 20. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: a) How Defendant gathered, compiled, or obtained the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the Class; b) Whether the text messages were sent using an automatic telephone dialing system; c) Whether Defendant’s text messages were sent for the purpose of marketing Defendant’s products and/or services; d) Whether Defendant sent some or all of the text messages without the consent of Plaintiff and the Class; and e) Whether Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing such that Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to treble damages. 22. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class, and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendant’s practices challenged herein apply to and affect the members of the Class uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. 24. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 23 of this complaint and incorporates them by reference. 25. Defendant and/or its agents agent transmitted text messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class using an automatic telephone dialing system. 26. These solicitation text messages were sent without the consent of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 27. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), entitling Plaintiff and the Class to a minimum of $500, and a maximum of $1,500, in damages for each violation. 8. Related Realty is a realty brokerage focused on selling South Florida’s most exclusive properties, including some being developed in new neighborhoods.1 Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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10. On October 30, 1984, Congress passed the Cable Communications Policy Act (“CCPA”) in order to promote competition among providers of cable services and establish a national policy concerning cable communications and their operators. An important objective of Congress in establishing such a policy was to protect cable subscribers’ sensitive personal information from misuse and improper disclosure. To that end, Congress made sure that the Act incorporated privacy guidelines jointly established several years earlier by the 34 nations comprising the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 11. When the CCPA was under debate, legislative leaders noted that both common- sense privacy concerns and the constitutional rights of citizens were at stake: Cable systems, particularly those with a ‘two-way’ capability, have an enormous capacity to collect and store personally identifiable information about each cable subscriber. Subscriber records from interactive systems can reveal details about bank transactions, shopping habits, political contributions, viewing habits and other significant personal decisions. It is [therefore] important that national cable legislation establish a policy to protect the privacy of cable subscribers. A national policy is needed because, while some franchise agreements restrict the cable operator’s use of such information, privacy issues raise a number of federal concerns, including protection of the subscribers’ first, fourth, and fifth amendment rights. At the same time, such a policy must also -4- recognize and unnecessarily or unreasonably impede those flows of information necessary to provide the service to the subscribers. H.R. Rep. 98-934 at 4666-67 (1984). 12. These observations, now nearly 30 years old, are just as relevant today. Subscribers continue to disclose some of their most sensitive identifying information to their cable operator as a condition to entering into a contract for service. Now – far more than ever before – Charter and other cable operators are equipped to rapidly collect and indefinitely retain large volumes of this valuable data in their electronic records. 13. There are numerous serious and troubling privacy issues implicated by Charter’s practice of retaining and misusing their former customers’ personal information, including the risk of identity theft and conversion of personal financial accounts. 14. Accordingly, the CCPA affords consumers significant protection with respect to the collection, maintenance, and disclosure of personally identifiable information (“PII”) provided by the subscriber to the cable operator. 15. Specifically, the CCPA requires cable operators to provide annual notice setting forth the “nature of personally identifiable information collected;” “the nature, purpose, and frequency of any disclosure” of that information; the “period during which such information will be maintained;” “the times and place at which the subscriber may have access to such information;” and the limitations imposed on the cable operator by this provision of the CCPA. 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(1). 16. In addition, the CCPA governs the way that cable operators are to destroy the PII of former subscribers. The CCPA requires that cable operators must destroy the PII of former subscribers “if the information is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected” and there are no outstanding requests or orders for such information. 47 U.S.C. § 551(e). -5- 17. Under the CCPA, “personally identifiable information” is not specifically defined. However, the courts have concluded that it broadly encompasses “specific information about the subscriber, or a list of names and addresses on which the subscriber is included.”1 Charter’s Collection of Consumers’ PII 18. Charter requires that subscribers provide PII to Charter in order to receive cable service, including social security numbers and/or driver’s license numbers, street addresses, phone numbers, financial information, bank account information, and credit card information. 19. Once Charter obtains that information, it maintains a digital record system with every subscriber’s personal information, adding to each consumer’s file as they acquire more information. 20. Charter’s Privacy Policy, available online, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Charter uses its system to collect personally identifiable information about You …. Personally identifiable information is any information that identifies or can potentially be used to identify, contact, or locate You. This includes information that is used in a way that is personally identifiable…including, but not limited to, name, address, phone or fax number, email address, spouses or other relatives' names, drivers license or state identification number, financial profiles, social security number, bank account information, and credit card information. Charter’s Unlawful Retention of Consumers’ PII 21. At all relevant times, Charter’s uniform policy and practice has been to retain customer PII indefinitely, long after customers’ accounts have been terminated. 22. Charter’s uniform policy and practice of retaining customer PII indefinitely is not necessary or required to satisfy any tax, accounting or legal obligations. 23. Charter’s uniform policy and practice of retaining customer PII indefinitely violates the CCPA, which requires cable operators to “destroy personally identifiable 1 See, e.g., Scofield v. Telecable of Overland Park, Inc., 973 F.2d 874, 876 fn. 2 (10th Cir. 1992). -6- information if the information is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected.” 47 U.S.C. § 551(e). Consumers Place a High Value on Their PII 24. At a Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) public workshop in 2001, then- Commissioner Orson Swindle described the value of a consumer’s personal information as follows: The use of third party information from public records, information aggregators and even competitors for marketing has become a major facilitator of our retail economy. Even [Federal Reserve] Chairman [Alan] Greenspan suggested here some time ago that it’s something on the order of the life blood, the free flow of information.2 25. Though Commissioner’s Swindle’s remarks are more than a decade old, they are even more relevant today, as consumers’ personal data functions as a “new form of currency” that supports a $26 billion per year online advertising industry in the United States.3 26. The FTC has also recognized that consumer data is a new – and valuable – form of currency. In a recent FTC roundtable presentation, another former Commissioner, Pamela Jones Harbour, underscored this point by observing: Most consumers cannot begin to comprehend the types and amount of information collected by businesses, or why their information 2 The Information Marketplace: Merging and Exchanging Consumer Data, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/infomktplace/transcript.htm (last visited May 20, 2012). 3 See Web’s Hot New Commodity: Privacy, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703529004576160764037920274.html (last visited May 20, 2012). -7- may be commercially valuable. Data is currency. The larger the data set, the greater potential for analysis – and profit.4 27. Recognizing the high value that consumers place on their PII, many companies now offer consumers an opportunity to sell this information to advertisers and other third parties. The idea is to give consumers more power and control over the type of information that they share – and who ultimately receives that information. And by making the transaction transparent, consumers will make a profit from the surrender of their PII.5 This business has created a new market for the sale and purchase of this valuable data.6 28. In fact, consumers not only place a high value on their PII, but also place a high value on the privacy of this data. Thus, the question is not whether consumers value such privacy; the question is “how much [consumers] value” that privacy.7 29. Researchers have already begun to shed light on how much consumers value their data privacy – and the amount is considerable. Indeed, studies confirm that “when [retailers’] 4 Statement of FTC Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour (Remarks Before FTC Exploring Privacy Roundtable), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/harbour/091207privacyroundtable.pdf (last visited May 20, 2012). 5 You Want My Personal Data? Reward Me for It, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/business/18unboxed.html (last visited May 20, 2012). 6 See Web’s Hot New Commodity: Privacy, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703529004576160764037920274.html (last visited May 20, 2012). 7 Hann et al., The Value of Online Information Privacy: An Empirical Investigation (Mar. 2003) at 2, available at http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~ipng/research/privacy.pdf (emphasis added) (last visited April 25, 2012). -8- privacy information is made more salient and accessible, some consumers are willing to pay a premium to purchase from privacy protective websites.”8 30. Consumers thus value their personal data highly, and place an economic value on the privacy of that data. In fact, when consumers were surveyed as to how much they valued their personal data in terms of its protection against improper access and unauthorized secondary use – two concerns at issue here – they valued the restriction of improper access to their data at between $11.33 and $16.58 per website, and prohibiting secondary use to between $7.98 and $11.68 per website.9 31. Given these facts, any company that transacts business with a consumer and then retains that consumer’s PII in contravention of statutorily guaranteed privacy protections has thus deprived that consumer of the full monetary value of the consumer’s transaction with the company. Facts Pertaining to Plaintiff Alex Braitberg 32. On or about July of 2007, Alex Braitberg signed up for Charter cable services. In order to activate his service, Charter required Braitberg to provide Charter with various forms of PII, including his address, telephone number, and social security number. 33. On or about June of 2010, Braitberg canceled his service with Charter. 34. On or about March of 2013, Braitberg contacted Charter and confirmed that all of the PII that he originally submitted back in July of 2007 remains in Charter’s system. 8 Tsai, Cranor, Acquisti, and Egelman, The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing Behavior, 22(2) Information Systems Research 254, 254 (June 2011). 9 Id. -9- V. 35. Plaintiff brings Count I, as set forth below, on behalf of himself and as a class action, pursuant to the provisions of Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class defined as: All persons in the United States who signed up for cable service with Charter, and whose personally identifiable information was retained by Charter after the termination of services (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Charter and its subsidiaries and affiliates; all persons who make a timely election to be excluded from the Class; governmental entities; and the judge to whom this case is assigned and any immediate family members thereof. 36. Certification of the Plaintiff’s claims for classwide treatment is appropriate because Plaintiff can prove the elements of his claims on a classwide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claims. 37. Numerosity – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1). The members of the class are so numerous that individual joinder of all Class members in impracticable. On information and belief, there are thousands of consumers who have been affected by Charter’s wrongful conduct. The precise number of the Class members and their addresses is presently unknown to Plaintiff, but may be ascertained from Charter’s books and records. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by recognized, Court-approved notice dissemination methods, which may include U.S. mail, electronic mail, Internet postings, and/or published notice. -10- 38. Commonality and Predominance – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3). This action involves common questions of law and fact, which predominate over any questions affecting individual Class members, including, without limitation: a. whether Charter engaged in the conduct as alleged herein; b. whether Plaintiff and the other Class members are entitled to actual, statutory, or other forms of damages, and other monetary relief and, if so, in what amount(s); and c. whether Plaintiff and other Class members are entitled to equitable relief, including but not limited to injunctive relief and restitution. 39. Typicality – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3). Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the other Class members’ claims because, among other things, all Class members were comparably injured through the uniform misconduct described above. 40. Adequacy of Representation – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4). Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the other Class members he seeks to represent; he has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation; and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously. The Class members’ interests will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and his counsel. 41. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). Charter has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and the other Class members, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and declaratory relief, as described below, with respect to Class members as a whole. -11- 42. Superiority – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). A class action is superior to any other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, and no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action. The damages or other financial detriment suffered by Plaintiff and the other Class members are relatively small compared to the burden and expense that would be required to individually litigate their claims against Charter, so it would be impracticable for Class members to individually seek redress from Charter’s wrongful conduct. Even if Class members could afford individual litigation, the court system could not. Individualized litigation creates a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and increases the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties, and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 43. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-42 as though fully set forth herein. 44. Charter is a “cable operator” as defined by the CCPA because Charter provides “cable services,” which is “the one-way transmission to subscribers of [ ] video programming, or [ ] other programming service; [and] subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection or use of such video programming or other programming service.” 47 U.S.C. § 522(5) & (6). -12- 45. The CCPA mandates, among other things, that a cable operator “destroy personally identifiable information if the information is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected.” 47 U.S.C. § 551(e). 46. After Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ accounts were terminated, Charter continued to maintain Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ PII, even though such information was no longer necessary to maintain for the purpose for which it was collected. 47. The foregoing conduct violates 47 U.S.C. § 551(e). 48. Plaintiff and the Class have suffered injuries as a result of Charter’s violation of 47 U.S.C. § 551. Charter’s failure to destroy their PII, as required 47 U.S.C. § 551, constitutes injury in the form of a direct invasion of their federally protected privacy rights. 49. Moreover, since Plaintiff and the Class purchased cable services from Charter, and Charter was obligated to comply with the CCPA, Charter’s failure to destroy their PII deprived them of the full value of the services that they bargained and paid for. Because Plaintiff and the Class ascribe monetary value to their ability to control their PII, Plaintiff and the Class have sustained, and continue to sustain, monetary and economic injuries as a direct and proximate result of Charter’s violation of 47 U.S.C. § 551. 50. The CCPA provides a private right of action to consumers who have been aggrieved by a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 551. Specifically, any person aggrieved by any act of a cable operator violating 47 U.S.C. § 551 may recover “actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher.” 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(2)(A). -13- 51. In addition, any person aggrieved by any act of a cable operator violating 47 U.S.C. § 551 may recover punitive damages and “reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.” 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(2)(B)&(C). 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class, therefore seeks redress as provided by 47 U.S.C. § 551, including liquidated damages to the full extent permitted by the CCPA, punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs. Failure to Destroy Personally Identifiable Information Violation of § 551(e) of the Cable Communications Policy Act (On Behalf of the Class) The Cable Communications Policy Act

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10. Plaintiff’s husband Michael Jones signed a contact with Home Depot Home Services for Home Depot Home Services to perform work on his home on or about September 27, 2011. In that application, Plaintiff’s husband Michael Jones provided his cell phone number. 17. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 18. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any unsolicited phone calls from Defendant or their agents on their paging service, cellular phone service, mobile radio service, radio common carrier service, or other service for which they were charged for the call, through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system as set forth in 47 U.S.C. Section 227(B)(1)(A)(3) or artificial or prerecorded voice, which phone calls by Defendant or its agents were not made for emergency purposes or with the recipient’s prior express consent, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 29. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 30. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant and its agents constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 31. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’, negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 32. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 33. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the above paragraphs 1 through 32, inclusive, of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 34. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and /or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 35. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 37. As a result of Defendant’s and Defendant’s agents’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 38. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 39. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 40. As a result of Defendant’s willful and /or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 7. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of South Carolina. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (32). 8. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and a “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (32). 9. At all times relevant Defendant conducted business in the State of California and in the County of San Diego, within this judicial district. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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13. On or around September 23, 2016, Infinity AR entered into a merger agreement whereby its wholly owned subsidiary, IAR Merger Sub, Inc., merged with and into Infinity AR. 14. All Infinity AR shareholders, including Plaintiff, received the following or similar message at the time of the merger: 26. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons and entities who held Infinity AR stock at the time of the merger and were harmed thereby (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any defendant. 27. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28. Numerosity: The members of the Class are so numerous and geographically diverse that joinder of all of them is impracticable. While the exact number and identities of members of the Class are unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes and avers that there are at least thousands of class members. 30. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class in that Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same course of deceptive conduct by Defendants that affects Class Members. Plaintiff does not have any claims adverse to the class. 31. Adequacy: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff’s claims are coextensive with, and not antagonistic to, the claims of other Class Members. Plaintiff is willing and able to vigorously prosecute this action on behalf of the Class. Plaintiff’s attorneys are competent and experienced in the area of representative and class actions. 32. Common questions of law and fact predominate over issues that are individual to members of the Class. The proposed Class is sufficiently cohesive to warrant class and representative treatment. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this action. The expense of litigating each Class Member’s claim individually would be so cost prohibitive as to deny Class Members a viable remedy. Plaintiff envisions no unusual difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 33. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing allegations. 35. By the acts, transactions and courses of conduct alleged herein, the Individual Defendants, individually and acting as a part of a common plan, knowingly or recklessly and in bad faith, have acted to unfairly deprive plaintiff and other members of the Class of the ability to make informed and intelligent decisions regarding their investment in Infinity AR. 36. As demonstrated by the allegations above, the Individual Defendants have knowingly or recklessly failed to exercise the care required, and have breached their duties of loyalty, good faith and independence owed to shareholders of Infinity AR because, among other reasons, they failed to provide all material information about the merger to shareholders and to act in accordance with their fundamental duties of good faith, due care and loyalty. 37. By reason of the foregoing acts, practices and course of conduct, defendants have violated their fiduciary obligations toward plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 38. As a result of defendants’ unlawful actions, plaintiff and the other members of the Class have been harmed. 39. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing allegations. 40. Defendant Infinity AR is sued herein as an aider and abettor of the breaches of fiduciary duties outlined above by the Individual Defendants as members of the Board of Infinity Aiding and Abetting the Individual Defendants’ Breach of Fiduciary Duties Against Infinity AR Breach of Fiduciary Duties Against the Individual Defendants

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35. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs by reference as if set forth fully in this section. 37. On information and belief, Rio Vista, Texas is/was the single site of employment, as defined by the WARN Act, for employees of Defendant, such as Cole and the Rio Vista Class Members. On information and belief, management of Defendant’s Southern U.S. District oilfield operations in addition to management and administrative support of Cole and the Rio Vista Class Members, is/was conducted at/from/through the Rio Vista, Texas single site of employment. 38. Cole worked with numerous other employees of Defendant. Those employees performed drilling operations/support of drilling operations for Defendant. Like Cole, those workers are/were subject to Defendant’s Mass Layoff and/or Plant Closing made the subject matter of this lawsuit. 39. Cole was verbally notified by Defendant on or about February 12, 2015 that his employment with Defendant was terminated or that he otherwise was subject to an employment loss. Cole was not discharged for cause, did not voluntarily resign, and did not retire. 40. On information and belief, the employment losses at the Rio Vista, Texas site of employment made the subject matter of this lawsuit occurred within a 30 day period of Cole’s employment loss. Alternatively, and on information and belief, those employment losses occurred within a 90 day period of Cole’s employment loss, such employment losses not being the result of separate and distinct actions and causes. 42. The exact number of employees who experienced an employment loss at the Rio Vista, Texas site of employment made the basis of this lawsuit within a 30 day and 90 day period of Cole’s employment loss is information that is only known to Defendant. Similarly, the exact number of employees employed at/from/through the Rio Vista, Texas site of employment is information that is currently known only to Defendant. 43. Cole and the Rio Vista Class Members were not provided with 60 days’ advance written notice by Defendant of their employment loss, Mass Layoff and/or Plant Closing. 44. Cole and the Rio Vista Class Members were not provided with any written notice by Defendant prior to their employment loss, Mass Layoff and/or Plant Closing. 45. Cole and the Rio Vista Class Members were not provided with written notice, at any time prior to their termination, of each and every of the following items in connection with their employment loss: (a) A statement as to whether the planned action is expected to be permanent or temporary and, if the entire plant is to be closed, a statement to that effect; (b) The expected date when the plant closing or mass layoff will commence and the expected date when the individual employee will be separated; (c) An indication whether or not bumping rights exist; (d) The name and telephone number of a company official to contact for further information. B. Mandan, North Dakota 47. Tippins worked with numerous other employees of Defendant. Those employees performed drilling operations/support of drilling operations for Defendant. Like Tippins, those workers are/were subject to Defendant’s Mass Layoff and/or Plant Closing made the subject matter of this lawsuit. 48. Tippins was verbally notified by Defendant on or about February 20, 2015 that his employment with Defendant was terminated or that he otherwise was subject to an employment loss. Tippins was not discharged for cause, did not voluntarily resign, and did not retire. 49. On information and belief, the employment losses at the Mandan, North Dakota site of employment made the subject matter of this lawsuit occurred within a 30 day period of Tippins’ employment loss. Alternatively, and on information and belief, those employment losses occurred within a 90 day period of Tippins’ employment loss, such employment losses not being the result of separate and distinct actions and causes. 51. The exact number of employees who experienced an employment loss at the Mandan, North Dakota site of employment made the basis of this lawsuit within a 30 day and 90 day period of Tippins’ employment loss is information that is only known to Defendant. Similarly, the exact number of employees employed at/from/through the Mandan, North Dakota site of employment is information that is currently known only to Defendant. 52. Tippins and the Mandan Class Members were not provided with 60 days’ advance written notice by Defendant of their employment loss, Mass Layoff and/or Plant Closing. 53. Tippins and the Mandan Class Members were not provided with any written notice by Defendant prior to their employment loss, Mass Layoff and/or Plant Closing. 54. Tippins and the Mandan Class Members were not provided with written notice, at any time prior to their termination, of each and every of the following items in connection with their employment loss: (a) A statement as to whether the planned action is expected to be permanent or temporary and, if the entire plant is to be closed, a statement to that effect; (b) The expected date when the plant closing or mass layoff will commence and the expected date when the individual employee will be separated; (c) An indication whether or not bumping rights exist; (d) The name and telephone number of a company official to contact for further information. C. Midland, Texas 56. Bell worked with numerous other employees of Defendant. Those employees performed drilling operations/support of drilling operations for Defendant. Like Bell, those workers are/were subject to Defendant’s Mass Layoff and/or Plant Closing made the subject matter of this lawsuit. 57. Bell was verbally notified by Defendant on or about March 6 2015 that his employment with Defendant was terminated or that he otherwise was subject to an employment loss. Bell was not discharged for cause, did not voluntarily resign, and did not retire. 58. On information and belief, the employment losses at the Midland, Texas site of employment made the subject matter of this lawsuit occurred within a 30 day period of Bell’s employment loss. Alternatively, and on information and belief, those employment losses occurred within a 90 day period of Bell’s employment loss, such employment losses not being the result of separate and distinct actions and causes. 60. The exact number of employees who experienced an employment loss at the Midland, Texas site of employment made the basis of this lawsuit within a 30 day and 90 day period of Bell’s employment loss is information that is only known to Defendant. Similarly, the exact number of employees employed at/from/through the Midland, Texas site of employment is information that is currently known only to Defendant. 61. Bell and the Midland Class Members were not provided with 60 days’ advance written notice by Defendant of their employment loss, Mass Layoff and/or Plant Closing. 62. Bell and the Midland Class Members were not provided with any written notice by Defendant prior to their employment loss, Mass Layoff and/or Plant Closing. 63. Bell and the Midland Class Members were not provided with written notice, at any time prior to their termination, of each and every of the following items in connection with their employment loss: (a) A statement as to whether the planned action is expected to be permanent or temporary and, if the entire plant is to be closed, a statement to that effect; (b) The expected date when the plant closing or mass layoff will commence and the expected date when the individual employee will be separated; (c) An indication whether or not bumping rights exist; (d) The name and telephone number of a company official to contact for further information. IV.

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12. IQVIA provides services to the healthcare and pharmaceutical industries including aggregating data collected from doctors’ offices, performing market analyses, marketing, providing medical sales forces.1 13. One of IQVIA’s commercial services is Physician Insights 360, for which IQVIA pays doctors’ offices and other medical facilities for information on what types of patients they are seeing, their typical ailments, treatments, medications they are prescribing, and then sells that aggregated data to pharmaceutical companies that can then target their marketing and sales directly to those doctors and facilities. 15. IQVIA goes on to advertise: “Find physicians with patients you want to drive business development through our market-leading Physician Intelligence Solution.”3 16. As part of an overall marketing plan to advertise their Physician Insight 360 and other analytics products and services, IQVIA sends unsolicited faxes to doctors soliciting them to enter into a commercial transaction with IQVIA and to complete surveys about their practices and pharmaceutical recommendations for money or other forms of payment. 17. For example, in the faxes IQVIA sent to Plaintiff, IQVIA offered monetary compensation ($30 or $35) and other compensation in the form of “Gift Cards,” “Tickets,” and “Merchandise” for information from Plaintiff, and declared the availability and quality of its data collection services and products for organizations. 18. IQVIA used a telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send the fax advertisements at issue. 19. Most of the fax advertisements at issue failed to provide recipients with the proper opt-out notice information required by the TCPA and its implementing regulations to send faxes to consumers with which Defendant may have had an established business relationship. 20. Between December 22, 2016 and June 28, 2018, IQVIA sent Plaintiff four unsolicited fax advertisements, three of which did not include a proper opt out notice. See Exhibit A. 22. Class Definition: Plaintiff Thomas brings this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) individually and on behalf of the class defined as follows: All persons and entities who, on or after four years prior to the filing of the initial complaint in this action, (1) received a fax soliciting the recipient to complete a survey, (2) sent by or on behalf of IQVIA, and (3) from whom Defendant (a) claims it obtained prior express consent to send fax advertisements in the same manner Defendant claims it obtained prior express consent to send fax advertisements to Plaintiff, or (b) does not claim to have obtained prior express consent. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) IQVIA, IQVIA’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the IQVIA or its parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and IQVIA’s counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 23. Numerosity: The exact size of the Class is unknown and unavailable to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, IQVIA faxed unsolicited advertisements to thousands of individuals and entities who fall into the definition of the Class. Class membership can be easily determined from Defendant’s records. 24. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff is a member of the Class, and if Defendant violated the TCPA with respect to Plaintiff, then it violated the TCPA with respect to the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages as a result of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct. 26. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 28. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy given that joinder of all parties is impracticable. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this case. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. 29. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 30. The TCPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement. . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 32. Defendant sent unsolicited fax advertisements many of which did not include an appropriate opt-out notice to Plaintiff and members of the Class without their consent to do so and without an existing business relationship with them. 33. By sending the unsolicited advertisement faxes at issue to Plaintiff and members of the Class without their prior express invitation or permission, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 34. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Class suffered actual damages, including the conversion or loss of paper and toner consumed in the printing of the faxes, the loss of use of the recipients’ fax machines during the time required to receive, review and route the unauthorized faxes, other costs associated with receiving the faxes, as well as increased labor expenses. 36. Additionally, as a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are entitled to an injunction to ensure that Defendant’s violations of the TCPA do not continue into the future. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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10. Plaintiff was at all times mentioned herein the subscriber or customary user of the cellular telephone number (304) ***-9852 (the “9852 Number”). The 9852 Number is, and at all times mentioned herein was, assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 11. During the preceding four years, Defendant transmitted, by itself or through an intermediary or intermediaries, at least one text message to Plaintiff’s 9852 Number and at least one text message (that was identical to or substantially the same as those received by Plaintiff) to each member of the putative Class. All of the subject text messages sent to Plaintiff and the members of the putative Class constituted “advertisements” or “telemarketing” messages within the meaning of the TCPA and its implementing regulations because each such message was aimed at promoting the commercial availability of Defendant’s products and services and ultimately selling such products and services. Defendant offered such products and services for sale to Plaintiff and the members of the putative class for the purpose of deriving commercial profit from the purchase of any such products or services ultimately made by Plaintiff. 12. All of the subject text messages received by Plaintiff and the members of the putative Class were transmitted by or on behalf of Defendant without the requisite prior “express written consent” of Plaintiff or any member of the putative Class. 13. For example, on or about May 22, 2018, Defendant transmitted or caused to be transmitted, by itself or through an intermediary or intermediaries, and without Plaintiff’s prior “express written consent,” a text message to the 9852 Number that stated as follows: Hello! This is Ashlee from JG Wentworth. We can communicate through text if you prefer, or you can call me 866-494-3690. I look forward to hearing from you. - 4 - 19. Class Definition. Plaintiff brings this civil class action on behalf of himself individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The “Class” which Plaintiff seeks to represent is comprised of and defined as follows: All persons in the United States who, at any time between the four years preceding the filing of this action and the present: (1) subscribed to a cellular telephone service; (2) received, at the telephone number assigned to such service, at least one text message promoting the sale of goods or services sent by or on behalf of Defendant using the same or substantially the same dialing technology that Defendant used to transmit the subject text messages to Plaintiff; and (3) for whom Defendant lacks any record establishing the person’s provision of “express written consent” to receive such message(s) prior to the initiation of such message(s). 20. Excluded from the class are Defendant, its officers and directors, members of the immediate families of the foregoing, legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns of the foregoing, and any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest. 21. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the definition of the Class (or add one or more subclasses) after further discovery. 22. Plaintiff and all Class members have been impacted and harmed by the acts of Defendant or its affiliates, agents, or subsidiaries acting on its behalf. 23. This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. 24. Defendant or any affiliates, subsidiaries, or agents of Defendant have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding - 6 -

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a furniture, jewelry, and decor company, and owns and operates the website, www.chairish.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS and NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 25. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. Such issues were predominant in the “appliances” section where Plaintiff was attempting, but was unsuccessful, in making a purchase. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. This was an issue on Defendant’s Website particularly in the home essentials section. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 28. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 29. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 30. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 31. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 32. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 34. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 35. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 37. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 38. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 59. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 63. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 75. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 76. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future, to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 82. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 83. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 85. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 86. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 87. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 90. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 91. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 92. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 96. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 97. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 98. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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17. Defendant’s skin structural representations appear prominently and conspicuously on each Product package as shown in Exhibit A, attached hereto. 20. Also evidencing Defendant’s intent to market the Products as drugs is that Defendant sells other skin care products – including, for example, another less expensive eye cream – that make only cosmetic claims. 21. Further evidencing Defendant’s intent to market the Products as drugs is that Defendant encourages consumers to use the whole line of Revitalift Products, stating in the “Directions” or “How to Use” section of some Product labels: “[f]or best results, use in conjunction with other Revitalift products”, and listing out specific Products to use in the “Your Recommended Regimen” section of some Product labels. 22. An over-the-counter face cream or moisturizer can be a drug, a cosmetic, or a combination of both. 21 U.S.C. § 359 (the categories of “drug” and “cosmetic” are not mutually exclusive). 24. A cosmetic is also a drug if it is “intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man”. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1). 25. California’s Sherman Law (California’s Health & Safety Code §§ 109875, et seq.) parallels the FDCA in material part and adopts all nonprescription drug regulations. 26. Like the FDCA, the Sherman Law defines a drug as “Any article other than food, that is used or intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of human beings.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 109925(c). 35. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated consumers pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and seeks certification of the following Class: All California consumers who within the applicable statute of limitations period until the date notice is disseminated, purchased the Products. Excluded from this Class are Defendant and its officers, directors and employees, and those who purchased the Products for the purpose of resale. 36. Numerosity. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the proposed Class contains thousands of purchasers of the Products who have been damaged by Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein. The precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff. 38. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class because, inter alia, all Class members were injured through the uniform misconduct described above. Plaintiff is also advancing the same claims and legal theories on behalf of herself and all Class members. 39. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in complex consumer class action litigation, and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff has no adverse or antagonistic interests to those of the Class. 41. Plaintiff seeks injunctive and equitable relief on behalf of the entire Class, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, to enjoin and prevent Defendant from engaging in the acts described and requiring Defendant to provide full restitution to Plaintiff and the Class members. 42. Unless a Class is certified, Defendant will retain monies received as a result of its conduct that were taken from Plaintiff and Class members. 43. Unless an injunction is issued, Defendant will continue to commit the violations alleged, and the members of the Class and the general public will continue to purchase products not lawfully being sold and not recognized as safe. 44. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein. 45. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Class. 46. The Unfair Competition Law, Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq. (“UCL”), prohibits any “unlawful” business act or practice. 48. As alleged herein, Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of Defendant’s conduct because she saw and read the skin structural representations, purchased the Anti-Wrinkle + Firming Eye Treatment, Anti-Wrinkle + Firming Night Cream Moisturizer, Triple Power Eye Treatment, and Double Lifting Eye Treatment Products based on the skin structural representations, and she would not have done so but for Defendant’s skin structural representations which she now knows were unlawful. In addition, but for Defendant’s illegal conduct, the Products, including those that Plaintiff purchased, would not have been on the market as anti-wrinkle, lifting, firming/tightening, and repair products. 49. The NDA process is intended to ensure that if the consuming public (e.g., Plaintiff) are sold a product that is a drug as defined under the FDA law and regulations that is not generally recognized as safe and effective under an approved monograph, it will have been put through the rigorous NDA process to ensure that it is safe and effective. 50. The UCL unlawful prong is intended to hold defendants who engage in unlawful conduct accountable for their violations by, among other things, paying full compensation to consumers who have purchased such illegally sold products that, by virtue of being banned from sale to the public, are valueless or, at a minimum, overpriced. 51. Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to the monies Defendant wrongfully obtained in the amount of the full purchase price or, at a minimum, the premium they paid for the Products. 53. Plaintiff also seeks, on behalf of herself, all similarly situated consumers and the public at large, declaratory relief and an injunction to enjoin and prevent Defendant from engaging in the acts described, and all other relief this Court deems appropriate, consistent with Business & Professions Code § 17203. // Violation of Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq. Unlawful Business Acts and Practices

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40. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 for the following Class of persons: All persons in the Sate of California who, within the applicable statute of limitations preceding the filing of this action, purchased a product from the GNC website at www.gnc.com. 41. Excluded from the Class are GNC, its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, any entity in which GNC has a controlling interest, all customers who make a timely election to be excluded, governmental entities, and any judge, justice or judicial officer presiding over this matter and members of their immediate families and judicial staff. 42. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class definition if further investigation and discovery indicates that the Class definition should be narrowed, expanded, or otherwise modified. 43. Numerosity. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, and will be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Class consists of thousands of members. The number of individuals who comprise the Class is so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impracticable and the disposition of their claims in a class action, rather than in individual actions, will benefit both the parties and the courts. 48. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 49. California Business and Professional Code, section 17501, states that: No price shall be advertised as a former price of any advertised thing, unless the alleged former price was the prevailing market price as above defined within three months next immediately preceding the publication of the advertisement or unless the date when the alleged former price did prevail is clearly, exactly and conspicuously stated in the advertisement. For the purpose of section 17501, the retail market price at the time of publication of such advertisement is the retail price in locality wherein the advertisement is published. 50. At all material times, GNC engaged in a scheme of advertising that its products were subject to a discount when such discounts were illusory and did not reflect the “prevailing marketing price” of the item for a particular time period in a particular location, or even the price at which the product was recently sold on GNC’s website. 57. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 58. GNC sells “goods” and “services” as defined by California Civil Code § 1761. 59. Each of the Defendants is a "person" as defined by California Civil Code § 1761(c). 60. Plaintiff and Class members are "consumers" within the meaning of California Civil Code §1761(d) because they purchased the products from GNC.com for personal, family or household use. 61. The sale of the products to Plaintiff and Class members via GNC’s website is a “transaction” as defined by California Civil Code § 1761(e). 68. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 69. California Business and Professional Code, section 17501, states: No price shall be advertised as a former price of any advertised thing, unless the alleged former price was the prevailing market price as above defined within three months next immediately preceding the publication of the advertisement or unless the date when the alleged former price did prevail is clearly, exactly and conspicuously stated in the advertisement. 79. Plaintiff hereby incorporate by reference each of the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 80. Plaintiff and other members of the Class suffered a substantial injury by virtue of GNC’s unlawful scheme of advertising that its products were subject to a discount when such discounts were illusory and did not reflect the “prevailing market price” of the item during any particular time period at a particular location or even the price at which the product was previously sold on GNC’s website. 81. GNC’s actions alleged herein violate the laws and public policies of California and the federal government as set out in preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 82. There is no benefit to consumers or competition by allowing GNC to deceptively market and advertise nonexistent discounts in violation of California Law. 87. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. Violation of CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750, et seq.- Misrepresentation of the Existence of a Discount Violation of CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, et seq. - Fraudulent Business Acts and Practices Violation of CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500, et seq. - Untrue, Misleading and Deceptive Advertising Violation of CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, et seq. - Unfair Business Acts and Practices Violation of CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, et seq. - Unlawful Business Acts and Practices

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16. Defendant Agentra, Defendant Data LP, and Defendant ILH sell and provide health insurance. (the “Health Insurance Defendants”). 17. Defendant Nunez sells its services in connecting property owners with purchasers. 18. To increase their sales and avoid paying for more expensive forms of advertising, Defendants called and played prerecorded voice messages to thousands or possibly tens of thousands of phones at once. 20. Unfortunately, Defendants failed to obtain consent from Plaintiff and the Class before bombarding their phones with illegal prerecorded voice messages. 21. On March 19, 2019, Plaintiff received a call from Defendant Nunez and/or his agents from 901-250-0463. 22. When Plaintiff listened to the message, Plaintiff heard a prerecorded voice advertising Nunez’s services connecting property owners to purchasers. 23. On April 4, 2019 at 10:17 a.m., Plaintiff received a call from the Health Insurance Defendants and/or their agents on Plaintiff’s cell phone from 970-713-2254. 24. When Plaintiff answered the phone, Plaintiff heard a prerecorded voice message advertising Defendants’ health insurance plans. 25. When Plaintiff responded to the automated prompt, Plaintiff was connected with the Health Insurance Defendants. 26. Plaintiff never consented to receive calls from Defendants. Plaintiff has no relationship with Defendants and has never requested that Defendants contact him in any manner. 28. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’ counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 29. Numerosity: The exact number of the Class members is unknown and not available to Plaintiff, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendants placed telephone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Members of the Class can be identified through Defendants’ records. 30. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class, in that Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited telephone calls. 31. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff’s claims are made in a representative capacity on behalf of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the interests of the other members of the proposed Class and is subject to no unique defenses. Plaintiff has retained competent counsel to prosecute the case on behalf of Plaintiff and the proposed Class. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class and have the financial resources to do so. 32. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class members and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendants’ practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Class members uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinge on Defendants’ conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. 34. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy as joinder of all parties is impracticable. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendants’ actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendants’ misconduct. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered, and uniformity of decisions ensured. 35. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 36. Defendants and/or its agent placed telephone calls to Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ cellular telephones without having their prior express written consent to do so. 38. Defendants played a prerecorded voice message to the cell phone and/or residential phones of Plaintiff and the Class members as proscribed by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 39. As a result of its unlawful conduct, Defendants repeatedly invaded Plaintiff’s and the Class’s personal privacy, causing them to suffer damages and, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), entitling them to recover $500 in civil fines for each violation and an injunction requiring Defendants to stop their illegal calling campaign. 40. Defendants and/or its agent made the violating calls “willfully” and/or “knowingly” under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 41. If the court finds that Defendants willfully and/or knowingly violated this subsection, the court may increase the civil fine from $500 to $1500 per violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.  As a result of Defendants’ willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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21. Dominion is one of the nation’s largest producers and transporters of energy. 22. To provide its services, Dominion uses staffing companies to hire employees to perform work. 23. Barker was a Utility Inspector for Dominion. 24. Barker worked for Dominion on a natural gas pipeline project in Dillon, South Carolina. 25. Barker would conduct inpesctions, run inspection reports, and turn them into Dominion supervisors. 26. Barker reported to Dominion’s Chief Inspector. 27. Barker was staffed to Dominion by Hunt, Guillot & Associates. 28. Hunt, Guillot & Associates is one of Dominion’s many staffing companies. 30. Dominion supervised and controlled, set pay, determined hours, and approved pay with respect to Barker and the Putative Class Members. 31. Many of these individuals worked for Dominion on a day-rate basis and make up the proposed Putative Class. 32. While exact job titles and job duties may differ, these workers are subject to the same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work. 33. Dominion through its staffing companies paid Barker and the Putative Class Members a flat sum for each day worked, regardless of the number of hours that they worked that day (or in that workweek) and failed to provide them with overtime pay for hours that they worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 34. For example, Barker worked for Dominion from April 2017 to June 2017. 35. During this time, Barker was paid on a day-rate basis. 36. Barker and the Putative Class Members normally worked 12 hours a day. 37. Dominion never guaranteed Barker and the Putative Class Members a salary. 38. Barker and the Putative Class Members were not paid on a salary basis. 39. The Putative Class Members worked hours similar to Barker. 40. The Putative Class Members were denied overtime by the same illegal pay practice that resulted in Barker being denied overtime wages. 41. Failing to pay Barker and the Putative Class Members overtime violates the FLSA because these workers are non-exempt. 47. Barker incorporates all previous paragraphs and alleges that the illegal pay practices Dominion imposed on Barker were likewise imposed on the Putative Class Members. 48. Numerous individuals were victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which is in willful violation of the FLSA. 49. Numerous other individuals who worked with Barker indicated they were paid in the same manner, performed similar work, and were not properly compensated for all hours worked as required by state and federal wage laws. 51. The Putative Class Members were all not afforded the overtime compensation when they worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 52. Dominion’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Putative Class Members. 53. Barker’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Putative Class Members. 54. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the Putative Class Members do not prevent collective treatment. 55. Barker and the Putative Class Members all performed work in furtherance of the power industry. 56. Barker has no interests contrary to, or in conflict with, the Putative Class Members. 57. Like each Putative Class Member, Barker has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages owed to him under state and/or federal law. 58. A collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit. 59. Absent this action, many Putative Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Dominion will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA. 60. Furthermore, even if some of the Putative Class Members could afford individual litigation against Dominion, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. 62. Barker’s claims are typical of the claims of the Putative Class Members. Barker and the Putative Class Members sustained damages arising out of Dominion’s illegal and uniform employment policy. 63. Although the issue of damages may be somewhat individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 64. Therefore, this issue does not preclude collective action treatment.

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24. Defendant’s text message was transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 25. Defendant’s text message constitutes telemarketing because it encourages the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff cannabis products. 26. The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant’s cannabis specials and prices, which Defendant sends to promote its business. 27. Defendant sent the subject texts within this judicial district, resides within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 29. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 7856 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 7856 Number. 30. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)). 31. The text message originated from telephone number 214-239-0959, a number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant. 32. The number used by Defendant is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 34. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers from a list without human intervention. 35. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. 36. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 37. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 38. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 39. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 40. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 41. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement. 43. The above execution these instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Platform is capable of transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less. 44. Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words, the platform controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function. 46. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life. 47. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm. Specifically, Plaintiff estimates that she has wasted approximately 10 minutes reviewing Defendant’s unwanted messages and retaining counsel for this case in order to stop Defendant’s unwanted messages. 48. Furthermore, Defendant’s text message took up memory on Plaintiff’s cellular phone. The cumulative effect of unsolicited text messages like Defendant’s poses a real risk of ultimately rendering the phone unusable for text messaging purposes as a result of the phone’s memory being taken up. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message-spam#text (finding that text message solicitations like the ones sent by Defendant present a “triple threat” of identity theft, unwanted cell phone charges, and slower cell phone performance). 49. Defendant’s text messages also can slow cell phone performance by taking up space on the recipient phone’s memory. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message- spam#text (finding that spam text messages can slow cell phone performance by taking up phone memory space). 50. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 52. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 56. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 61. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 62. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 63. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 64. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 65. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 66. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 68. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-60 as if fully set forth herein. 69. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 70. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. 71. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. 72. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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(Ohio Rule 23 Class - Violations of the Ohio Prompt Pay Act, R.C. 4113.15) 56. Named Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated as a collective action for unpaid wages and overtime under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 57. The collective class, or Opt-In Class, which Named Plaintiff seeks to represent is composed of and defined as follows [“FLSA Collective Class”]: All current or former Attorney Advisors or Case Managers employed by Special Counsel, Inc. and Innovative Emergency Management, Inc. during the past three years. 9 58. Named Plaintiff brings the Ohio Wage Act and OPPA claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 as a class action under Ohio law on behalf of the following class [“Ohio Rule 23 Class”]: All current or former Attorney Advisors or Case Managers employed by Special Counsel, Inc. and Innovative Emergency Management, Inc. during the past three years who worked within the State of Ohio. 59. The FLSA Collective Class and the Ohio Rule 23 Class, as defined above, are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 60. Named Plaintiff is a member of the FLSA Collective Class and the Ohio Rule 23 Class and his claims are typical of the claims of the members of the FLSA Collective Class and the Ohio Rule 23 Class as defined; indeed, apart from the hourly rate and number of days worked and the precise tasks in Defendant’s departments, Named Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Class and the Ohio Rule 23 Class are similarly situated in all material respects, including; the nature of the tasks that are integral and indispensable to their principal work activity and the uniform policies and practices of Defendant in not properly compensating for the time spent working. 61. Named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the FLSA Collective Class and the Ohio Rule 23 Class and the interests of all members of the FLSA Collective Class and the Ohio Rule 23 Class. 62. Named Plaintiff has no interest that is antagonistic to or in conflict with those interests that he has undertaken to represent on behalf of the FLSA Collective Class and the Ohio Rule 23 Class as Class Representatives; instead, their interests perfectly coincide with those of individuals similarly situated in all material respects. 63. Named Plaintiff retained competent and experienced class action counsel who can effectively represent the interests of the entire FLSA Collective Class and the Ohio Rule 23 Class. 64. Questions of law and fact that are common to the FLSA Collective Class and the Ohio Rule 23 Class predominate over any individual questions, specifically whether Defendants violated the FLSA and/or the Ohio Wage Act by failing to pay the appropriate overtime rate at one and one-half (1 ½) times the FLSA Collective Class’ and the Ohio Rule 23 Class’ regular rate for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a given workweek. 10 65. In both the FLSA Collective Class and the Ohio Rule 23 Class there is a community of interest among the class members in obtaining appropriate relief, damages, and compensation for costs and fees incurred herein. 66. A collective action for the federal overtime claim and a Rule 23 class action for the Ohio overtime claim and OPPA claim are superior to other litigation methods (including individual litigation) for the fair and efficient adjudication of Named Plaintiff’s and Putative Plaintiffs’ claims as presented by this Complaint and will prevent undue financial, administrative, and procedural burdens on the parties and the Court. 67. Named Plaintiff and his counsel are not aware of any pending Ohio litigation on behalf of the FLSA Collective Class and the Ohio Rule 23 Class, as defined herein, or individual Class members related to these claims. 68. Because the damages sustained by individual members of the Class are modest compared to the substantial resources of Defendant and due to the costs of individual litigation, it will be impracticable for Class members to pursue individual litigation against Defendant in order to vindicate their rights, and individual actions would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant with respect to its employees. 69. Named Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a FLSA Collective Class or a Rule 23 Class. 70. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 71. By not paying for all hours worked and for not paying one-and-one-half times the regular hourly rate to Named Plaintiff and the putative FLSA Collection Class for hours worked in excess of forty hours each week when the time spent performing tasks that are integral and indispensable to their principal activity, Defendant has violated the FLSA. 11 72. In violating the FLSA, Defendant acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable FLSA provisions. 73. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 74. By not paying for all hours worked and for not paying one-and-one-half times the regular hourly rate to Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class for hours worked in excess of forty hours each week when the time spent performing tasks that are integral and indispensable to their principal activity, Defendant has violated the Ohio Wage Act. 75. In violating the Ohio Wage Act and the OPPA, Defendants acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable Ohio Wage Act and OPPA provisions. 76. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 77. During all relevant times, Defendants have been an entity covered by the OPPA and Named Plaintiff and the Putative Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have been employed by Defendants within the meaning of the OPPA. 78. The OPPA requires that the Defendants pay Named Plaintiff and the Putative Ohio Rule 23 Class Members all wages, including unpaid overtime, on or before the first day of each month, for wages earned by them during the first half of the preceding month ending with the fifteenth day thereof, and on or before the fifteenth day of each month, for wages earned by them during the last half of the preceding calendar month. R.C. § 4113.15(A). 79. During all relevant times to this action, Named Plaintiff and the Putative Ohio Rule 23 Class Members were not paid all wages, including overtime wages at one and one-half times their regular rates within thirty (30) days of performing the work. 80. The wages of Named Plaintiff and the Putative Ohio Rule 23 Class Members remain unpaid for more than thirty (30) days beyond their regularly scheduled payday. 81. In violating the OPPA, Defendant acted willfully, without a good faith basis and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable Ohio law. 12 FLSA Collective Action Ohio Rule 23 Class Action

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10. Plaintiff made various charges to the credit card for personal purposes. 11. Due to financial difficultly, Plaintiff defaulted on her Kohl’s, Inc. credit card account (“subject debt”). 12. The subject debt is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 13. The subject debt was eventually placed with Defendant for collection. 14. On September 2, 2020, Defendant mailed Plaintiff a letter in an attempt to collect the subject debt (“Defendant’s Collection Letter”). 16. Defendant’s Collection Letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 17. Defendant’s Collection Letter did not conspicuously identify the current creditor as required by §1692g(a)(2) of the FDCPA. 18. Specifically, Defendant’s Collection Letter identified “Capital One, N.A.” as the “Original Creditor” and “Creditor” but did not identify the current creditor. 19. Moreover, Defendant’s Collection Letter represented that “Kohl’s, Inc. has assigned the above account to Viking Client Services, LLC for collections.” 20. Accordingly, Defendant’s Collection Letter confused Plaintiff as she was unable to determine whether “Kohl’s Inc.” or “Capital One, N.A.” was the current creditor to whom the subject debt is owed to. 22. Accordingly, Defendant’s Collection Letter failed to conspicuously identify the current creditor as required by the FDCPA. 23. The confusing presentation in Defendant’s Collector Letter impacted Plaintiff’s decision to pay the subject debt. 24. Accordingly, Plaintiff was deprived of her right to receive critical information required by the FDCPA. 25. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. 26. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“Putative Class”). 27. The Putative Class is defined as follows: All natural persons residing in the State of Florida (a) that received a correspondence from Defendant; (b) attempting to collect a consumer debt placed by Kohl’s Inc. with Defendant for collection; (c) that failed to conspicuously identify the current creditor; (d) within the one (1) year preceding the date of this complaint through the date of class certification. 29. Upon information and belief, Defendant mailed hundreds of similar letters to consumers nationwide. 30. The exact number of members of the Putative Class are unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. 31. Members of the Putative Class can be objectively identified from records of Defendant to be gained in discovery. B. Commonality and Predominance: 32. There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Putative Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Putative Class. C. Typicality: 33. Plaintiff’s claims are representative of the claims of other members of the Putative Class. 34. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of members of the Putative Class because Plaintiff and members of the Putative Class are entitled to damages as result of Defendant’s conduct. D. Superiority and Manageability: 35. This case is also appropriate for class certification as class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the efficient and fair adjudication of this controversy. 36. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Putative Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense required for individual prosecution. 38. Economies of effort, expense, and time will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. E. Adequate Representation: 39. Plaintiff will adequately and fairly represent and protect the interests of the Putative Class. 40. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Putative Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 41. Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced counsel with substantial experience in consumer law. 42. All Paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. Violation(s) of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g 44. Section 1692g of the FDCPA requires debt collectors to make certain disclosures, including the identity of the current creditor. 45. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g by failing to adequately provide Plaintiff with the disclosures required by the FDCPA 46. As set forth above, Defendant’s Collection Letter violated §1692g(a)(2) because it failed to conspicuously identify the current creditor to whom the debt is owed. See Steffek v. Client Services, Inc., 948 F.3d 761, 765 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding that the mere presence of the correct name of the current creditor is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of §1692g(a)(2)). 47. As pled above, Plaintiff was deprived of critical information required by the FDCPA and the confusing presentation in Defendant’s Collection Letter impacted Plaintiff’s decision to pay the subject debt. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the following relief: A. Declaring that Defendant’s Collection Letter violates Section 1692g(a)(2) of the 9. Plaintiff applied for and obtained a Kohl’s Inc. credit card. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.) (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Member of Putative Class)

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(12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 142-2.4: Spread of Hours or Split Shift) (FLSA: Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) (NYLL: Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) (NYLL: Failure to Furnish Wage Statements) 10. XPO Logistics meets the definition of an “employer” under the FLSA. By way of examples only, XPO Logistics controls how much the FLSA Collective Action members are paid, maintains all-time records for the FLSA Collective Action members, assigns and supervises all of the tasks given to the FLSA Collective Action members, and maintains and exercises control as to how the FLSA Collective Action members are to perform their tasks.
 11. Each of the FLSA Collective Action members are or were non-exempt employees entitled to overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours (but less than 51 hours) per workweek. 12. However, at all times during the FLSA Collective Action period, XPO Logistics failed to pay the Collective Action members overtime premiums for hours worked in excess of 40 hours (but less than 51 hours) per workweek. 14. There are, upon information and belief, more than 40 similarly situated current and former employees of Defendant who were subject to the aforementioned policies in violation of the FLSA who would benefit from the issuance of a Court-supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join in the present lawsuit. Those similarly situated individuals are known to Defendant and are readily identifiable through records. 15. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following defined class: New York Class: All persons who are or have been employed by XPO Logistics as dock workers, or other similar jobs, at any location operated by XPO Logistics in New York from six (6) years prior to this action’s filing date through the date of the final disposition of this action and who were subject to XPO Logistics’ unlawful practice of (i) failing to pay applicable overtime premiums for hours worked in excess of 40 hours (but less than 51 hours) per workweek, (ii) failing to pay applicable spread of hours or split shift compensation; and (iii) failing to furnish wage statements that specifically enumerated certain criteria, as required by NYLL § 195(3). 16. At all times during the time period relevant to the New York Class, XPO Logistics, as a matter of policy, (i) did not pay Plaintiff or the New York Class any wages or the applicable overtime premium pay rate for hours worked in excess of 40 hours (but less than 51 hours) per workweek; (ii) did not pay Plaintiff or the New York Class spread of hours or split shift compensation; and (iii) failed to furnish correct and accurate wage statements required by the NYLL. 18. XPO Logistics failed to make, keep and/or preserve accurate records with respect to Plaintiffs and the New York Class and failed to furnish to Plaintiff and the New York Class an appropriate statement of wages, in violation of the NYLL and supporting New York State Department of Labor regulations. 19. Numerosity: The proposed New York Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, during the relevant time period, XPO Logistics employed in excess of 40 people who fall within the New York Class and thus satisfy the numerosity definition of the proposed New York Class. 20. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the members of the proposed New York Class. During the New York Class period, XPO Logistics subjected Plaintiff and the members of the New York Class to the same policy and practice of failing to pay them minimum wage and overtime compensation required by the NYLL. 21. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 22. Adequacy: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the proposed New York Class and have retained counsel experienced in FLSA and NYLL class and collective action litigation. 24. The case is maintainable as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because prosecution of actions by or against individual members of the class could result in inconsistent or varying adjudications and create the risk of incompatible standard of conduct for Defendant. Further, adjudication of each individual member’s claim as a separate action would be dispositive of the interest of other individuals not party to this action, impeding their ability to protect their interests. 26. Plaintiffs intend to send notice to all members of the New York Class to the extent required by Rule 23. The names and addresses of the New York Class are available from Defendants. 27. As outlined above, Defendant employed Plaintiff as a dock worker from approximately July 10, 2017, until November 4, 2017. 28. As a dock worker, Plaintiff and other members of the proposed collective and Rule 23 classes were primarily responsible for unloading trucks and maintaining the cleanliness of the dock. 29. At all times during employment, Defendant classified Plaintiff as a non-exempt employee entitled to the protections of the FLSA and NYLL. 30. Defendant compensated Plaintiff on an hourly basis at a rate of $16.69 per hour. 31. During most weeks of employment, Defendant required Plaintiff to work in excess of 40 hours per week. 33. Defendant did not compensate Plaintiff with overtime at a rate of one-and-one- half times for hours worked in excess of 40 (but less than 51) per workweek. 34. In or around November 2017, Plaintiff inquired to management about his entitlement to overtime. In response, he was told that he was only entitled to receive overtime after working 51 hours. Shortly after, management fired Plaintiff giving him no explanation other than that his services were “no longer needed.” 35. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 36. During the relevant time period, Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective Action worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek and, because of above-outlined violations of the FLSA, were not paid appropriate overtime compensation. 37. Despite the hours worked by Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective Action, Defendant willfully, in bad faith, and in knowing violation of the FLSA, failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective Action appropriate overtime compensation. 38. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C §§ 216(b) and 255(a). 40. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 41. During the relevant time period, Plaintiffs and the members of the New York Class worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek and, because of XPO Logistics’ above- outlined violations of the NYLL, were not paid appropriate overtime compensation. 42. Despite the hours worked by Plaintiff and the members of the New York Class, Defendant willfully, in bad faith, and in knowing violation of the NYLL, failed and/or refused to pay them appropriate overtime compensation. 43. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the NYLL without a good faith basis within the meaning of NYLL § 198, and as a result Plaintiff and the members of the New York Class are entitled to liquidated damages and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. 44. Plaintiff and the members of the New York Class also seek to have their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs paid by Defendant, as provided by the NYLL. 45. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein. 46. At all relevant times, Defendant was an “employer” within the meaning of 12 52. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein. 53. During the relevant time period, Defendant failed to furnish Plaintiff and the members of the New York Class with accurate wage statements that specifically enumerated certain criteria, as required by NYLL § 195(3). 54. Defendant’s violation of the NYLL was willful and, as a result, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the members of the New York Class in the amount of $250 for each violation up to $5,000 per class member. 7. XPO Logistics’ conduct, as set forth in this Complaint, was willful and in bad faith, and has caused significant damages to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Action members. 9. XPO Logistics employed Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective Action during the time period relevant to the FLSA Collective Action, and classified Plaintiff as non-exempt from overtime requirements of the FLSA.

win

15. Heatherwood owns and manages apartment buildings throughout Long Island and Long Island City, New York, including a location at 27-03 42nd Road, Long Island City, New York, known as 27 on 27th (the “Building”). It rents within this Building, studio apartments, and apartments with one or more bedrooms. 16. Yardi owns and operates the Website, which provides information regarding the Building. 17. Yardi’s Website is heavily integrated with the Building, serving as a gateway to it. Through the Website, prospective tenants are, inter alia, able to: learn information about the Building, including its location and building amenities; learn about available apartments, including their layout and dimensions; learn about the neighborhood and community; read reviews; contact the Building via a form contained on the Website; and apply for an apartment online. 18. It is, upon information and belief, Defendants’ policy and practice to deny Plaintiff Fischler and other blind or visually-impaired users access to the Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with the Building. Due to their failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, Plaintiff Fischler and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to the Building and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the Website. -7- 19. Plaintiff Fischler cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using screen-reading software. 20. During his visits to the Website, the last occurring on or about December 20, 2018, Plaintiff Fischler encountered multiple access barriers that denied him the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of the Building. Because of these barriers he was unable to, substantially equal to sighted individuals: a. Know what is on the Website. This is largely because the non-text images lack alt-text describing them. Images are labeled “27 on 27 outdoor lounge” or “27 on 27 bed.” Plaintiff Fischler had difficulty learning about availabilities. The link to “See Available Units” was not detected by the screen reader. Plaintiff Fischler was only able to locate the link with assistance from a sighted user. However the link is not properly labeled. The label is read by the screen reader as “Apply Now.” When he selects the link, he is taken to a page with the available units. When he selects a unit, a pop-up window opens but screen reader focus is not placed in the pop up, therefore it appears to the screen reader that no new information is provided. It is only with assistance from a sighted user that he can find the information for the unit. When he selected the “1 Bedroom A Line,” he is given a list of available apartments. On this page, several elements are not properly labeled. The table could only be navigated with the assistance of a sighted user. When he selects “Apply Now,” he is taken to a page with multiple elements, but every element appears to be labeled “cozy chair for seating b. Navigate the Website. Plaintiff Fischler had difficulty navigating the Website. This is due in large part to several untagged elements. Several other -8- elements throughout the website are incorrectly tagged, where the tag does not properly describe where the link or button will take the user. 21. Plaintiff Fischler was denied full and equal access to the facilities and services Defendants offer to the public on the Website because he encountered multiple accessibility barriers that visually-impaired people often encounter with non-compliant Website: a. Lack of alt-text for images. b. All fields in a group of input fields are not properly labeled. c. Frames lack proper title attributes. d. Webpages have duplicate IDs which cause problems in screen readers. e. Radio buttons are not contained in a fieldset element. f. Form field labels are not unique on a page or enclosed in a fieldset with a legend that makes the label unique. g. Approximately twenty (20) headings are empty. h. Links use general text like “click here,” which does not explain the link’s purpose. Defendants Must Remove Barriers to the Website 22. Due to the inaccessibility of the Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff Fischler, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendants offer to the public on the Website. The Website’s access barriers that Plaintiff Fischler encountered have caused a denial of his full and equal access in the past, and now deter him on a regular basis from -9- accessing the Website. These access barriers have likewise deterred him from visiting the Building and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals. 23. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Fischler could independently navigate it, learn about the Building and the apartments, and apply for an apartment, as sighted users can. 24. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Fischler has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 25. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff Fischler and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff Fischler alleges that Defendants have engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; b. Failing to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff Fischler, as a member of a protected class. 26. Defendants therefore use standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. -10- 27. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Fischler seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 28. Because the Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendants lack a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause the Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff Fischler seeks a permanent injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) requiring Defendants to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff Fischler to assist Defendants in complying with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for the Website: a. Remediating the Website to be WCAG 2.0 compliant; b. Training Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly checking the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; d. Regularly testing user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that the Website complies with the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, e. Developing an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on the Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 29. Although Defendants may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating the Website, Defendants lack a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make it fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 30. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Fischler and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. -11- 31. Defendants have, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining the Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making the Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 32. Defendants have failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 33. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in the Building, during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 34. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in the Building, during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 35. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in the Building, during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 36. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: -12- a. Whether the Building is a place of “public accommodation[s]”; b. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” or a service or good “of a place of public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA; c. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” or an “accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; d. Whether the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of their goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating Title III of the ADA; and e. Whether the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of their goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 37. Plaintiff Fischler’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendants have violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 38. Plaintiff Fischler will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because he has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because he has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. -13- 39. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class and Subclass Members predominate over questions affecting only individuals, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 40. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 41. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 42. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 43. The Building is a public accommodation under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of the Building. The Website is a service that is integrated with the Building. 44. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). -14- 45. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 46. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 47. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Fischler, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. 48. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Fischler requests the relief as set forth below. -15- 49. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. The Building, located in the State of New York, constitutes a sales establishment and public accommodation under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). The Website is a service, privilege or advantage of the Building. The Website is a service that is by and integrated with the Building. 51. Defendants are subject to NYSHRL because they own and operate the New York apartment building and the Website. Defendants are a “person” under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 52. Defendants are violating the NYSHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Building to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendants make available to the non-disabled public. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(2)(a), 296(2)(c)(i), 296(2)(c)(ii). 53. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make the Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. -16- 54. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class because of a disability, violating the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2), in that Defendants have: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to Class Members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 55. Defendants discriminate, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website and the Building under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendants from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 56. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination, compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 57. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. -17- 58. The Building, located in New York City, is a sales establishment and public accommodation under the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and the Website is a service that is integrated with the Building. 59. Defendants are subject to NYCHRL because they own and operates the Building and the Website, making them a person under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 60. Defendants are violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Building to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendants make available to the non-disabled public. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(4)(a), 8-107(15)(a). 61. Defendants’ actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Subclass because of a disability, violating the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a,) in that it has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 62. As such, Defendants discriminate, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website and the Building under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendants -18- from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 63. As Defendants’ actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination, compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines for each offense, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 64. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 65. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Fischler contends, and is informed and believes that Defendants deny, that the Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of the Website and by extension the Building, which Heatherwood owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 66. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendants, Their Website And Their Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

win

[Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act—Overtime Wage Brought on behalf of the Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective] 18. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 19. Defendants knew that the nonpayment of overtime pay and failure to provide the required wage notice at the time of hiring and wage statement would financially injure Plaintiff and similarly situated employees and violate state and federal laws. 20. From June 16, 2013 to February 22, 2016, Plaintiff Lan was hired by Defendants to work as a bus driver for Defendants’ adult day care business located at 32-29 Blossom Avenue, Flushing, New York 11355. From June 16, 2013 to February 22, 2016, Plaintiff Lan worked as both driver and dispatcher for Defendants. 21. Defendants did not compensate the Plaintiff for overtime wages according to state and federal laws. 22. From June 16, 2013 until October, 2014, Plaintiff Lan worked from 6:40 a.m. to approximately 4:00 p.m., six days per week. Plaintiff typically had Sunday off during this period, except for March 9, 2014 through August 3, 2014. Plaintiff worked approximately 56 hours per week during this period. 23. From March 9, 2014 to August 3, 2014, Plaintiff Lan worked additionally on Sundays from 6:40 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. Plaintiff worked extra 21 Sundays during this period. 24. From November, 2014 to February 22, 2016, Plaintiff Lan worked from 7:00 a.m. to approximately 3:30 p.m., six days per week. Plaintiff typically had Sundays off during this period. Plaintiff therefore worked approximately 51 hours per week. 25. From June 16, 2013 to July, 2013, Plaintiff was paid a flat salary of $2,750 per month. 6 26. From August 2013 to October, 2013, Plaintiff was paid a flat salary of $2,500 per month. 27. From November, 2013 to March, 2014, Plaintiff was paid a flat salary of $2,700 per month. 28. From April 2014 to October, 2014, Plaintiff was paid a flat salary of $3,000 per month. 29. From November, 2014 to February, 22, 2016, Plaintiff was paid a flat salary of $2,800 per month. 30. At the commencement of Plaintiff’s employment with the Defendants, the Defendants promised the Plaintiff that they were going to pay him an hourly rate of $15 per hour. Defendants never paid the Plaintiff at this rate. 31. From June 16, 2013 to October, 2014, Defendants did not maintain any time records of the Plaintiff’s hours worked. 32. From November, 2014 to February 22, 2016, Defendants used punch cards to record Plaintiff’s hours worked. However, Defendants frequently required Plaintiff to work before punching in, and also after punching out. 33. Plaintiff was not allowed to take any breaks longer than 30 minutes during his shifts. 34. Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff for overtime compensation according to state and federal laws, or according to the rate of compensation that the Defendants promised to Plaintiff pursuant to state common law theories of breach of contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 35. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with any wage notices at the time of his hiring. 7 36. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 37. While employed by Defendants, Plaintiff was not exempt under federal and state laws requiring employers to pay employees overtime. 38. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff or other Class members with written notices about the terms and conditions of their employment upon hire in relation to their rate of pay, regular pay cycle and rate of overtime pay. These notices were similarly not provided upon Plaintiff’s and other Class members’ pay increase(s). 39. Defendants committed the foregoing acts against the Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class. 40. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees either the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half), or the New York State overtime rate (of time and one-half), in violation of the FLSA and New York Labor Law and the supporting federal and New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 41. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all other and former non- exempt employees who have been or were employed by the Defendants for up to the last three (3) years, through entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”) and who failed to receive overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week (the “Collective Action Members”), and have been subject to the same common decision, policy, and 8 plan to not provide required wage notices at the time of hiring, in contravention to federal and state labor laws. 42. Upon information and belief, the Collection Action Members are so numerous the joinder of all members is impracticable. The identity and precise number of such persons are unknown, and the facts upon which the calculations of that number may be ascertained are presently within the sole control of the Defendants. Upon information and belief, there are more than thirty (30) Collective Action members, who have worked for or have continued to work for the Defendants during the Collective Action Period, most of whom would not likely file individual suits because they fear retaliation, lack adequate financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. Therefore, Plaintiff submits that this case should be certified as a collection action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 43. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Members, and has retained counsel that is experienced and competent in the field of employment law and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 44. This action should be certified as collective action because the prosecution of separate action by individual members of the collective action would risk creating either inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual members of this class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interest of the other members not party to the adjudication, or subsequently impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 45. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively 9 small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as collective action. 46. Questions of law and fact common to members of the collective action predominate over questions that may affect only individual members because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to all members. Among the questions of fact common to Plaintiff and other Collective Action Members are: a. Whether the Defendants employed Collective Action members within the meaning of the FLSA; b. Whether the Defendants failed to pay the Collective Action Members overtime wages for all hours worked above forty (40) each workweek in violation of the FLSA and the regulation promulgated thereunder; c. Whether the Defendants’ violations of the FLSA are willful as that terms is used within the context of the FLSA; and, d. Whether the Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory, punitive, and statutory damages, interest, costs and disbursements and attorneys’ fees. 47. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 48. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have been substantially damaged by Defendants’ unlawful conduct. 10 49. Plaintiff brings his NYLL claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F. R. C. P.”) Rule 23, on behalf of all non-exempt persons employed by Defendants at Greater New York Social and Health Adult Day Care Center, LLC on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class Period”). 50. All said persons, including the Plaintiff, are referred to herein as the “Class.” The Class members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Class members are determinable from the records of Defendants. The hours assigned and worked, the positions held, and the rate of pay for each Class Member is also determinable from Defendants’ records. For purpose of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under said F.R.C.P 23. 51. The proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parities and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of the number is presently within the sole control of the Defendants, upon information and belief, there are more than thirty (30) members of the class. 52. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those claims which could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief that would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the Class members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants, as alleged herein, of failing to pay minimum wage, and overtime compensation. Defendants’ corporation wide policies and practices, including but not limited to their failure to provide a wage notice at the time of hiring, affected all Class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/ or wrongful acts as to each Class 11 member. Plaintiff and other Class members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 53. Plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the Class. Plaintiff is represented by attorneys who are experienced and competent in representing plaintiffs in both class action and wage and hour employment litigation cases. 54. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual Class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute corporate defendants. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expenses that numerous individual actions engender. The losses, injuries, and damages suffered by each of the individual Class members are small in the sense pertinent to a class action analysis, thus the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual Class members to redress the wrongs done to them. Further, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and resulting in the impairment of class members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in this 12 action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 55. Upon information and belief, defendants and other employers throughout the state violate the New York Labor Law. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. Class actions provide class members who are not named in the complaint a degree of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 56. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, including: a. Whether Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Class within the meaning of the New York law; b. Whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to overtime under the New York Labor Law; c. Whether the Defendants provided wage notices at the time of hiring to Plaintiff and class members as required by the NYLL; d. Whether the Defendants provided wage statement to Plaintiff and class members as required by the NYLL e. At what common rate, or rates subject to common method of calculation were and are the Defendants required to pay the Class members for their work 13 57. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 58. The FLSA provides that no employer engaged in commerce shall employ a covered employee for a work week longer than forty (40) hours unless such employee receives compensation for employment in excess of forty (40) hours at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he or she is employed, or one and one-half times the minimum wage, whichever is greater. 29 USC §207(a). 59. The FLSA provides that any employer who violates the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §207 shall be liable to the employees affected in the amount of their unpaid overtime compensation, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 29 USC §216(b). 60. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective their overtime pay violated the FLSA. 61. At all relevant times, Defendants had, and continue to have, a policy of practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time-and-a-half to the Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, which violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§207(a)(1) and 215(a). 62. The FLSA and supporting regulations required employers to notify employees of employment law requires employers to notify employment law requirements. 29 C.F.R. §516.4. 14 63. Defendants willfully failed to notify the Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective of the requirements of the employment laws in order to facilitate their exploitation of Plaintiff’s and FLSA Collectives’ labor. 64. Defendants knowingly and willfully disregarded the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate the Plaintiff and Collective Class Members the statutory overtime rate of time-and-one-half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week when they knew or should have known such was due and that failing to do so would financially injure the Plaintiff and Collective Action members. 65. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 66. Pursuant to the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, an employer who fails to pay proper overtime compensation shall be liable, in addition to the amount of any underpayments, for liquidated damages equal to the total of such under-payments found to be due the employee. 67. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class their overtime pays violated the NYLL. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class was not in good faith. 68. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 15 69. The Defendants failed to furnish to the Plaintiff at the time of hiring a notice containing the rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging allowances; the regular pay day designated by the employer in accordance with section one hundred ninety-one of this article; the name of the employer; any “doing business as” names used by the employer; the physical address of the employer’s main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer, and anything otherwise required by law; in violation of the NYLL, § 195(1). 70. Due to the Defendants’ violation of the NYLL, § 195(1), the Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the Defendants liquidated damages of $50.00 per workweek that the violation occurred, up to a maximum of $2,500.00, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to the NYLL, § 198(1-b). 71. The Defendants failed to furnish with each wage payment a statement listing: the dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; the regular hourly rate or rates of pay; the overtime rate or rates of pay; the number of regular hours worked, and the number of overtime hours worked; gross wages; deductions; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage; and net wages; in violation of the NYLL, § 195(3). 72. Due to the Defendants’ violation of the NYLL, § 195(3), the Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the Defendants liquidated damages of $100.00 per workweek that the violation occurred, up to a maximum of $2,500.00, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to the NYLL, § 198(1-d). 16 73. The Defendants’ NYLL violations have caused the Plaintiff irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. 74. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 75. Defendants have engaged in a pattern, practice, and policy of failing to compensate Plaintiff at an agreed hourly regular rate for all hours either worked or required to be compensated. 76. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff his wages at their agreed hourly regular rates for all hours worked or required to be compensated by law violates the New York Labor Law Article 6, §§ 190 et seq.. 77. Due to Defendants’ violations of New York Labor Law, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid wages, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and the costs of the action, pursuant to New York Labor Law Article 6, § 198. 78. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 79. Defendants collectively entered into oral, written, and/or implied contracts with the Plaintiff and each party’s acceptance was supported by good and valuable consideration. 80. Plaintiff fulfilled his contractual obligations by laboring for the benefit of Defendants. 81. Defendants breached the contracts with Plaintiff by failing to pay contractually established wages for work performed by the Plaintiff. 17 82. Because of Defendants’ breach of contract, Plaintiff suffered from a loss of expected wages. 83. Plaintiff is entitled to monetary damages equal to the amount specified in oral, written, and/or implied contracts entered with Defendants, plus interest. 84. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 85. Defendants collectively entered into written and/or oral contracts with Plaintiff and each party’s acceptance was supported by good and valuable consideration. 86. Plaintiff fulfilled his contractual obligations by laboring for the benefit of Defendants. 87. Defendants, in bad faith, denied Plaintiff the benefit of the contract by failing to pay the contractually established wages. 88. Defendants’ bad faith is demonstrated by Defendant’s failure to pay contractually required wages to the detriment of Plaintiff. 89. Because of Defendants’ breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff suffered from a loss of expected wages. 90. Plaintiff is entitled to monetary damages equal to the amount specified in contracts entered with Defendants, plus interest. 91. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 92. By laboring at Defendants’ center, Plaintiff provided benefits to Defendants. 93. Plaintiff expected to be compensated for the labor he provided to Defendants. Defendants’ unjust failure to pay Plaintiff’s wages for all labor performed constituted a distinct detriment to the Plaintiff. 94. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to money damages equal to the reasonable value of the labor provided to Defendants, plus interest. Prayer For Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the FLSA collective plaintiffs and rule 23 class, respectfully requests that this court enter a judgment providing the following relief: a) Authorizing plaintiff at the earliest possible time to give notice of this collective action, or that the court issue such notice, to all persons who are presently, or have been employed by defendants as non-exempt tipped or non-tipped employees. Such notice shall inform them that the civil notice has been filed, of the nature of the action, of their right to join this lawsuit if they believe they were denied proper hourly compensation and premium overtime wages; b) Certification of this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; c) Designation of Plaintiff as representatives of the Rule 23 Class, and counsel of record as Class counsel; d) Certification of this case as a collective action pursuant to FLSA; 19 e) Issuance of notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to all similarly situated members of the FLSA opt-in class, apprising them of the pendency of this action, and permitting them to assert timely FLSA claims and state claims in this action by filing individual Consent to Sue forms pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and appointing Plaintiff and his counsel to represent the Collective Action Members; f) A declaratory judgment that the practices complained of herein are unlawful under FLSA and New York Labor Law; g) An injunction against Greater New York Social and Health Adult Day Care Center, LLC, its officers, agents, successors, employees, representatives and any and all persons acting in concert with them as provided by law, from engaging in each of unlawful practices and policies set forth herein; h) An award of unpaid overtime wages due under FLSA and New York Labor Law; i) An award of damages for Defendants’ failure to provide wage notice at the time of hiring and failure to provide wage statement as required under the New York Labor Law. j) An award of liquidated and/or punitive damages as a result of Defendants’ knowing and willful failure to pay overtime compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216; k) An award of liquidated and/ or punitive damages as a result of Defendants’ willful failure to pay overtime compensation pursuant to New York Labor Law; l) An award of damages and/or punitive damages to the Plaintiff damages for unpaid wages; m) An award of damages and liquidated damages to the Plaintiff for the Defendants’ unlawful failure to pay Plaintiff’s agreed upon wages n) An award of costs and expenses of this action together with reasonable attorneys’ 20 and expert fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) and NYLL §§198 and 663; o) The cost and disbursements of this action; p) An award of prejudgment and post-judgment fees; q) Providing that if any amounts remain unpaid upon the expiration of ninety days following the issuance of judgment, or ninety days after expiration of the time to appeal and no appeal is then pending, whichever is later, the total amount of judgment shall automatically increase by fifteen percent, as required by NYLL §198(4); and r) Such other and further legal and equitable relief as this Court deems necessary, just, and proper. [Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing] [New York Labor Law Article 6 – Breach of Contract] [New York Labor Law Article 6 – Failure to Pay Agreed-Upon Wages] [Unjust Enrichment and Quantum Meruit] 18 [Violation of New York Labor Law—Overtime Pay Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Failure to Provide Wage Notice at the Time of Hiring and Failure to Provide Wage Statement]

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18. Midwest does not provide or obtain an appropriate stand alone disclosure and authorization from job applicants as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2) prior to acquiring these consumer reports. 19. Further, Midwest does not provide pre-adverse or adverse action notice to job applicants, including a copy of the applicants’ consumer report and a statement of the applicants’ rights as required by 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(3) and 1681m(a). 20. Midwest’s violations of the FCRA have been willful, wanton and reckless in that Midwest knew, or reasonably should have known, that it was failing to comply with the requirements of the FCRA. 21. 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a) permits a consumer to recover statutory and punitive damages, along with attorneys’ fees and costs for willful violations of the FCRA. 22. Pursuant to F. R. Civ. P. 23, Johnson brings this action on behalf of the Class initially defined below: 23. Johnson also alleges the following sub-classes, of which he is a member: Inadequate Disclosure and Authorization a. Consumers residing in the United States who applied for employment with Midwest in person, and during the application process, Midwest procured a consumer report without first, (i) providing the consumer(s) with a clear and conspicuous stand alone disclosure in writing in a document that consisted solely of the disclosure that a consumer report would be obtained for employment purposes, and (ii) obtaining the consumer’(s) proper written authorization to procure such consumer reports. Case: 2:11-cv-01061-ALM-TPK Doc #: 1 Filed: 11/28/11 Page: 4 of 10 PAGEID #: 4 5 Pre-Adverse Action Notice b. Consumers residing in the United States who applied in person during the applicable limitations period as established by 15 U.S.C. 1681p, preceding the filing of this action and during its pendency, and against whom Midwest took adverse action based in whole or in part on information contained in the consumer report before providing a copy of the consumer report as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i); c. Consumers residing in the United States who applied in person during the applicable limitations period as established by 15 U.S.C. 1681p, preceding the filing of this action and during its pendency, and against whom Midwest took adverse action based in whole or in part on information contained in the consumer report before providing a description in writing of the rights of the consumer as required by 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii); Adverse Action Notice d. Consumers residing in the United States who applied in person during the applicable limitations period as established by 15 U.S.C. 1681p, preceding the filing of this action and during its pendency, and against whom Midwest took an adverse action based in whole or in part on information contained in the consumer report without providing an oral, written or electronic notice that the consumer reporting agency did not make the decision to take adverse action and is unable to provide the consumer with the specific reason why the adverse action was taken, as required by 15 U.S.C. §1681m(a)(2)(B); e. Consumers residing in the United States who applied in person during the applicable limitations period as established by 15 U.S.C. 1681p, preceding the filing of this action and during its pendency, and against whom Midwest took adverse action based in whole or in part on information contained in the consumer report without providing oral, written or electronic notice of the consumer’s right to obtain within 60 days a free copy of the subject consumer report from the consumer reporting agency which prepared the report, as required by 15 U.S.C. §1681m(a)(3)(A). Case: 2:11-cv-01061-ALM-TPK Doc #: 1 Filed: 11/28/11 Page: 5 of 10 PAGEID #: 5 6 24. Upon information and belief, the putative Class exceeds 300 Members. Information concerning the exact size of the putative class is within the exclusive possession of Midwest. 25. The Class members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 26. Johnson’s claims are typical of the claims of the other Class Members as all Class Members were similarly affected by Midwest’s unlawful conduct in violation of the FCRA. 27. Johnson will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the Class Members and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class-action litigation. Johnson is a member of the Class and does not have any interests antagonistic to or in conflict with the members of the Class. Further, Johnson’s claims are the same as those of the Class, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based upon the same legal theories. 28. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all Class members and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual Class members, including: a. Whether Midwest violated 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) by failing to make a “clear and conspicuous” disclosure in a document that consists solely of the disclosure; b. Whether Midwest obtained a written authorization to procure or cause to be procured consumer reports for employment purposes required by §1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii); c. Whether Midwest provided a copy of the consumer report to the applicant or employee before declining to hire or discharging the applicant or employee based on the results thereof as required by 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A)(i); d. Whether Midwest provided a copy of a summary of the applicant or employee’s rights under the FCRA before declining to hire or discharging the applicant or employee as required by 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii); Case: 2:11-cv-01061-ALM-TPK Doc #: 1 Filed: 11/28/11 Page: 6 of 10 PAGEID #: 6 7 e. Whether Midwest provided oral, written or electronic notice of the adverse action to the consumer that the consumer reporting agency did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is unable to provide the consumer with the specific reasons why the adverse action was taken as required by 15 U.S.C. §1681m(a)(2)(B); f. Whether Midwest provided oral, written or electronic notice of the consumer’s right to obtain a free copy of the consumer report on the consumer from the consumer reporting agency that prepared the report as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)(3)(A)); 29. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because the membership of the Class is so numerous and involves claims that, taken individually, may not justify the costs and effort of bringing suit. 30. Further, the prosecution of several actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of varying adjudications with respect to members of the Class, as well as create inconsistent standards of conduct for those opposing the Class. Additionally, individual actions by members of the Class may be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the adjudication of the claim, which would impair or impede the ability of those individuals to protect their interests. 31. Johnson realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding allegations of law and fact. 32. Midwest willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) by failing to provide applicants and employees with a clear and conspicuous written disclosure in a document consisting solely of the disclosure that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes. Case: 2:11-cv-01061-ALM-TPK Doc #: 1 Filed: 11/28/11 Page: 7 of 10 PAGEID #: 7 8 33. Midwest willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) by failing to obtain a valid authorization in writing from Johnson and the Class Members to procure a consumer report for employment purposes. 34. Johnson and the Class Members seek statutory damages for these violations pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A). 35. Johnson and the Class Members also seek punitive damages for these violations pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2). 36. Johnson realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding allegations of law and fact. 37. Midwest willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i) by failing to provide a copy of the consumer report used to make an employment decision to Johnson and the Class Members before taking adverse action that was based in whole or in part on that report. 38. Midwest willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii) by failing to provide a copy of the summary of rights required by this section to Johnson and the Class Members before taking adverse action that was based in whole or in part on a consumer report. 39. Johnson and the Class Members seek statutory damages for these violations pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A). 40. Johnson and the Class Members also seek punitive damages for these violations pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2). 41. Johnson realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding allegations of law Case: 2:11-cv-01061-ALM-TPK Doc #: 1 Filed: 11/28/11 Page: 8 of 10 PAGEID #: 8 9 and fact. 42. Midwest willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)(3)(A) by failing to provide Johnson and the Class Members with oral, written or electronic notice of the consumer’s right to obtain within sixty (60) days a free copy of the consumer report regarding the consumer from the consumer reporting agency that prepared the report. 43. Midwest willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)(2)(B) by failing to provide Johnson and the Class Members with oral, written or electronic notice that the consumer reporting agency did not make the decision to take adverse action and is unable to provide the consumer with the specific reason why the adverse action was taken. 44. Johnson and the Class Members seek statutory damages for these violations pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A). 45. Johnson and the Class Members also seek punitive damages for these violations pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2). Case: 2:11-cv-01061-ALM-TPK Doc #: 1 Filed: 11/28/11 Page: 9 of 10 PAGEID #: 9 10 WHEREFORE, Johnson and the putative class respectfully pray for the following relief: A. An order certifying the proposed class herein pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) and appointing the undersigned counsel to represent same; B. The creation of a common fund available to provide notice of and remedy Midwest’s unlawful conduct; C. Statutory and punitive damages for all class claims; and D. Attorneys’ fees, expenses and costs. Respectfully submitted, STUMPHAUZER, O’TOOLE, McLAUGHLIN, McGLAMERY & LOUGHMAN CO., LPA Dennis M. O’Toole (0003274) /s/ Matthew A. Dooley Anthony R. Pecora (0069660) Matthew A. Dooley (0081482) 5455 Detroit Road Sheffield Village, Ohio 44054 Tel: (440) 930-4001 Fax: (440) 934-7208 Email: dotoole@sheffieldlaw.com apecora@sheffieldlaw.com mdooley@sheffieldlaw.com ADVERSE ACTION Case: 2:11-cv-01061-ALM-TPK Doc #: 1 Filed: 11/28/11 Page: 3 of 10 PAGEID #: 3 4 Consumers residing in the United States who applied for employment with Midwest, and about whom Midwest procured a consumer report for employment purposes during the application process. DISCLOSURE AND AUTHORIZATION PRE-ADVERSE ACTION

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(Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)) (Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)) 18. Defendant is a company that sells electronic payment services to businesses. 19. One of Defendant’s strategies for marketing its services and generating new customers is telemarketing. 20. Defendant’s strategy for generating new customers involves the use of an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) to solicit business. 21. Defendant uses ATDSs that have the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called. 22. Defendant’s ATDSs include predictive dialers. 23. Recipients of these calls, including Plaintiff, did not consent to receive them. 24. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). The Automated Telemarketing Call From Defendant to a Number Listed on the National Do Not Call Registry 50. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 54. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 55. As a result of knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), by Defendant, its affiliates or agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on its behalf, Plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500 for each and every call made to their cellular telephone numbers using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice in violation of the statute. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). IX.

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10. Intuit is a provider of financial software solutions to consumers and businesses. Intuit organizes its business into three reportable segments: Small Business, Consumer and Professional Tax. Intuit’s Consumer segment includes two product lines: Consumer Tax and Consumer Ecosystem. TurboTax products and services fall under Intuit’s Consumer Tax business. Intuit provides a variety of TurboTax products and services, on both a free and paid basis, that allow consumers to file their federal and state tax returns electronically, or e-file. 11. The TurboTax product line contains a number of products directed at consumers, including the TurboTax basic, for simple returns, TurboTax Deluxe for taxpayers who itemize 23. The requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) are met with respect to the Class defined below: All persons and businesses in the United States who had fraudulent tax returns filed in their name through TurboTax. 43. Plaintiff brings all claims as class claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44. Excluded from the Class are Defendant; officers, directors, and employees of Defendant; any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, is a parent or subsidiary, or which is controlled by Defendant; and the affiliates, legal representatives, attorneys, heirs, predecessors, successors, and assigns of Defendant. Also excluded are the judges and court personnel in this case and any members of their immediate families. 45. Certification of Plaintiff’s claims for class-wide treatment is appropriate because Plaintiff can prove the elements of the claims on a class-wide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claims. 46. All members of the proposed Class are readily ascertainable in that Intuit has access to addresses and other contact information for all members of the Class, which can be used for providing notice to Class members. 47. Numerosity. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The Class includes thousands of individuals and businesses had whose fraudulent tax returns filed in their names using TurboTax. While the exact number of class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, it includes at least 16,000 fraudulent returns identified by Alabama alone. It was reported that last year TurboTax products were used to prepare 29 million returns. 48. Commonality. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to Plaintiff and the Class, including the following: a) whether Intuit engaged in the wrongful conduct alleged in this Complaint; b) whether Intuit’s conduct was unlawful; 55. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 56. In its capacity as a tax preparer, i.e., an entity that collects and assembles highly confidential, sensitive information and transmits that information to the IRS and state tax agencies, Defendant Intuit owed a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent fraudulent tax filings including, at a minimum, not allowing new or additional accounts to be opened under the same Social Security number, and to implement a process to detect fraudulent filings in a reasonable amount of time. 59. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 60. In its capacity as a tax preparer, who undertook, for consideration, to render services to another, Intuit owed a duty to take reasonable steps necessary for the protection of third parties, i.e., Plaintiff and the Class. 61. Defendant Intuit failed to exercise reasonable care and therefore breached its duty to Plaintiff and the members of the Class by allowing fraudsters to file fraudulent tax returns in Plaintiff’s name and in the names of the members of the Class. 62. Plaintiff and the members of the Class were injured as a result of Defendant’s breach and seek to recover damages as a result thereof in an amount to be determined at trial. 63. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 64. Plaintiff brings this action for aiding and abetting a fraud. 65. On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Intuit had actual knowledge that fraudsters were filing false tax returns in the names of others such a Plaintiff and the Class. Plaintiff’s information and belief is based on the allegations of Intuit former employees as set forth in ¶¶ 28 through 35 herein. 66. Defendant Intuit provided substantial assistance to advance the fraud’s commission by taking the information fraudulently provided and filing false tax returns with the IRS and state tax agencies in the names of Plaintiff and the Class, and allowing tax refunds to be diverted to the fraudsters. 67. Plaintiff and the members of the Class were injured as a result of Defendant’s conduct and seek to recover damages as a result thereof in an amount to be determined at trial. 68. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 69. Plaintiff brings this action for aiding and abetting conversion. 70. Plaintiff alleges that the actions of the fraudsters who filed false tax returns in the names of Plaintiff and the Class constituted a conversion. 71. On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Intuit had actual knowledge that fraudsters were filing false tax returns in the names of others such as Plaintiff and the Class. Plaintiff’s information and belief is based on the allegations of Intuit former employees as set forth in ¶¶ 28 through 35 herein. 72. Defendant Intuit provided substantial assistance to advance the conversion by taking the information fraudulently provided and filing false tax returns with the IRS and state tax agencies in the names of Plaintiff and the Class, and allowing the tax refunds to be wrongfully diverted to the fraudsters. 73. Defendant’s conduct constitutes aiding and abetting conversion. 74. Plaintiff and the members of the Class were injured as a result of Defendant’s conduct and seek to recover damages as a result thereof in an amount to be determined at trial. 75. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 76. Plaintiff brings this action for violation of California Business and Professional Code § 17200 et seq., which prohibits unfair competition, which is defined as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” 77. As alleged herein, Defendants have engaged in unfair competition by engaging in unlawful and fraudulent acts. Defendants failed to provide adequate security measures to prevent the filing of fraudulent tax returns. Defendants lacked measures to identify potentially fraudulent returns for further review. Defendant’s unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent acts generated profit for Defendant. Defendant received payment from the fraudsters for each fraudulent return filed. COUNT I – NEGLIGENCE

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1. Old GM recklessly downplayed serious risks of injury when it chose to include the SDM Calibration Defect in the Class Vehicles. ................................. 24 1. Old GM recklessly downplayed serious risks of injury when it chose to include the SDM Calibration Defect in the Class Vehicles. 2. The 45 millisecond cutoff was not necessary to protect against “late” airbag deployments. 2. The 45 millisecond cutoff was not necessary to protect against “late” airbag deployments. ............................... 27 30. When functioning properly, the combination of seatbelts and airbags is highly effective in reducing the safety risk in automobile collisions. NHTSA reports that the use of seatbelts and airbags reduces fatality risk by 61 percent compared to an unbelted occupant in a vehicle without airbags.4 From 1987 to 2017, an estimated 50,457 lives were saved because frontal airbags deployed during a crash.5 31. Although airbags work effectively to protect occupants when necessary, they are not meant to deploy with every impact. A crash may be of lower intensity (e.g., a fender bender in a parking lot) such that the seatbelt alone will be sufficient protection for the occupant.6 Airbags are designed to deploy in “moderate to severe” frontal or near-frontal crashes. A “moderate to severe” frontal crash is the equivalent of hitting a solid, fixed barrier at 8-14 miles per hour or higher.7 33. The “brain” behind this operation is the airbag control unit or “ACU” (also known as an Electronic Control Unit or “ECU”). GM refers to this component as the “Sensing and Diagnostic Module” or “SDM,” and that term is used throughout this Complaint. SDMs are effectively computers that control the car’s safety systems. They are intended, where necessary, to issue a “command” to deploy airbags and tighten seatbelts to prevent or mitigate injury to the vehicle occupants in a crash. 34. The SDM operates in three basic phases. First, during regular vehicle operation, the SDM is set in a resting or “normal” mode. In this mode, the SDM constantly receives signals from sensors placed throughout the vehicle, which collect and report information on inputs such as acceleration, wheel speed, brake pressure, and impacts.8 The SDM monitors and interprets these signals to determine whether the vehicle is involved (or about to be involved) in a crash. 36. Third, the final phase in this sequence is the “reset” phase. From “wake up” mode, after it detects that a crash or a potential crash has fully completed, (i.e., that the vehicle has returned to normal operation after an irregular input) the SDM ultimately returns to its normal operating state through “resetting.” 38. This entire sequence—from sensing an irregular signal (the pothole), to waking up and searching for confirmation of a crash, to firing the airbag where needed—might take only fractions of a second. Indeed, a typical “crash duration” in a frontal, vehicle-to-barrier collision lasts for approximately 80-150 milliseconds (0.08-0.15 seconds).13 For that reason, timing this sequence properly is critically important to ensure that the seatbelts are tightened and the airbags deploy to protect the occupants when they need to. B. GM used a dangerous and defective SDM software calibration in its trucks and SUVs. 40. Crash sensing occurs in “real-time,” meaning that the sensing algorithm can only examine a limited window of data to predict and judge the severity of crash events before conclusion, so that the airbags can deploy and protect the occupant on impact.14 A decision to “deploy” the airbags should occur when thresholds set to tell the SDM a crash is severe enough (i.e. a moderate to severe frontal collision) are met or exceeded. These deployment thresholds are programmed into the SDM software through a process in which engineers “calibrate” the software in the vehicle. 42. This defect was no accident; rather, as detailed below, GM included it by design when it modified the SDM software program (known as ALGO-S) in the Class Vehicles to include it. 43. In affirmatively blocking these critical safety features after 45 milliseconds, GM greatly and needlessly increased the risk of injury and death in a variety of frontal crashes. Specifically, the defect manifests in frontal crashes that endure for 45 milliseconds or longer, and require airbag deployment or seatbelt tightening after 45 milliseconds. 44. For example, this includes frontal crashes with multiple, distinct points of impact known as “concatenated” events. A vehicle that first hits a curb and then veers and hits a tree, or first hits a speed bump and then crashes into the vehicle in front of it, are examples of concatenated crashes. By their nature, concatenated accidents involve multiple discrete inputs for the SDM to detect during a crash sequence. 46. In addition to concatenated crashes, the defect is also implicated in frontal crashes that increase in severity and require airbag deployment or seatbelt tightening after an initial, “soft” impact. These types of crashes are referred to herein as “prolonged” or “long-soft” crash onsets. This would include, for example, a crash into another vehicle’s bumper which—because the bumper is comparatively “soft”—may take time before the “soft” bumper collapses, and a “hard” impact into the engine compartment begins.16 “Soft” crashes involve a “relatively long crash duration” that may last 20-50 percent longer than a head-on crash into a rigid barrier, like a cement wall.17 48. In practice, this means that the airbags and seatbelt pretensioners in the Class Vehicles can only be fired within 45 milliseconds of a first, irregular signal. If a second signal occurs after 45 milliseconds, the SDM purposefully, by design, disregards signals that would otherwise trigger airbag deployment. 49. The net result is a “dead zone” starting just 45 milliseconds into a crash, after which vehicle occupants are completely vulnerable. The dead zone lasts until the SDM detects that the crash has ended completely (meaning that the irregular signals have concluded, and the vehicle has resumed normal operation), and then resets back to normal mode. 51. GM knew or had reason to know of the SDM Calibration Defect and the risks it entails from at least July 10, 2009, when GM acquired substantially all of Old GM’s books, records, and personnel, and the knowledge about the defective SDM software calibration those books, records, and personnel held. GM has continued to acquire knowledge—based on lawsuits implicating the SDM Calibration Defect and hundreds of publicly reported accidents with airbag and seatbelt failures—from 2009 to the present. 52. Nonetheless, GM has continued to conceal this problem and the pattern of accidents, injuries, and deaths that have resulted from it. GM has failed to share this information with the consumers who paid for and drive these Class Vehicles every day. 54. As is now public knowledge, millions of GM vehicles contain the dangerous and defective Takata airbag inflators that can explode with too much force and spray metal shrapnel into vehicle passenger compartments. While the dangers of these Takata airbags were widely known for years, GM lobbied regulators to delay a recall for its affected vehicles to avoid a resulting hit to its profits.18 In 2016, GM reported that recalling its vehicles with Takata inflators would cost hundreds of millions of dollars.19 56. Here, as in Takata, GM knew or should have known that the SDM software calibration in the Class Vehicles—which includes a dead zone that prevents the airbag and seatbelts from deploying after 45 milliseconds—was dangerous. Nonetheless, GM kept using it anyway, did not recall or repair the Class Vehicles to correct it, and still has not told consumers about it. 57. In general, the vehicle manufacturer sets the deployment thresholds in the SDM software calibration that will trigger a command to fire the airbags and/or tighten the seatbelts. The vehicle manufacturer uses results from laboratory crash testing to inform these parameters.21 58. But laboratory results are not sufficient in themselves, because real- world accidents—which can occur from multiple angles and involve inputs from myriad variables like weather, temperature, or incline—will differ from the testing environment.22 For that reason, manufacturers must exercise appropriate care to design crash sensing frameworks that function to keep people safe in the real world. 60. During this time, Old GM divided the design and development of its vehicles into a “cars” group and a “trucks” group, with the trucks group responsible for design, development, and production of larger model trucks and SUVs. After it reviewed the Delco team’s proposed SDM software algorithm, ALGO-S, the trucks group insisted on adding the 45 millisecond cut off described above when it calibrated that program for use in its trucks and SUVs. On information and belief, the trucks group proposed this cutoff based on test results which indicated that frontal-barrier accidents in its trucks and SUVs would be complete within 45 milliseconds or less in laboratory conditions. 61. In response, the Delco team expressly warned the trucks group that such an aggressive cutoff could fail to capture additional signals in complex crashes outside of the laboratory, leaving occupants completely unprotected during prolonged onset crashes or crashes with multiple impact points. The trucks group insisted, however, and the 45 millisecond cutoff was added in the SDM software calibration for GM trucks and SUVs. 63. Indeed, in the ALGO-S program as it was designed by Delco, the window in which the airbags and seatbelts can deploy in a crash is up to at least 150 milliseconds—over three times the interval that GM trucks added in the defective calibration. Tellingly, after the Delco team repeated the same warnings about the truck group’s proposed 45 millisecond cutoff to GM’s cars group, the cars group rejected the shorter cutoff. Instead, the cars group used the ALGO-S software with the Delco-recommended period of 150 milliseconds for deployment. 65. GM trucks group’s insistence on the 45 millisecond window after which the airbags and seatbelts cannot deploy was unjustified and unsafe. 66. On information and belief, the trucks group chose to set this aggressive cutoff due to concerns about the potential for airbags to deploy “too late” during an accident. But as the trucks group also knew, these concerns were unwarranted given technology that mitigated the risks of “late” airbag deployments. 67. A brief history of airbags in motor vehicles puts this reckless decision in context. Before 1998, airbag systems were effectively one-size-fits-all. Designed to protect against only frontal crashes, these “first-generation” airbags were built to meet a standardized government test that required they protect an unbelted, midsize adult male dummy (175 pounds) in a 30-MPH crash into a rigid barrier.24 To do so, an airbag had to fill up quickly with gas, resulting in a deployment speed of up to A. SDMs are supposed to detect crashes and control airbags and seatbelts. A. SDMs are supposed to detect crashes and control airbags and seatbelts. ....................................................................................... 13 B. GM used a dangerous and defective SDM software calibration in its trucks and SUVs. ...................................................... 17 C. GM knew that the SDM Calibration Defect was dangerous and unjustified but has failed to warn or compensate consumers. ....................................................................... 22 A. The Class Definition ............................................................................ 81 B. Numerosity: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1) ...................... 83 C. Commonality and Predominance: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3) ......................................................... 83 D. Typicality: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3) ......................... 85 E. Adequacy: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) ......................... 86 F. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) .............................................................................. 86 G. Superiority: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) ....................... 86 VI. COMMENTED ON THE ODDITY THAT, GIVEN THE DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY THE TAHOE AND THE VELOCITY AT IMPACT, THE AIRBAGS DEPLOYED ON ALL VEHICLES BUT THE TAHOE. *TR” x. NHTSA complaint #10641399 dated Saturday, October 4, 2014, reported an accident on Tuesday, June 7, 2011 involving a 2002 CHEVROLET TAHOE in Cheney, WA. The complaint states: “THE CONTACT STATED THAT CONSUMER STATED THAT THE SEAT BELT DID NOT KEEP HER FROM HITTING HER CHEST ON THE STEERING WHEEL.” g. NHTSA complaint #10108404 dated Tuesday, February 1, 2005, reported an accident on Tuesday, January 11, 2005 involving a 2000 CHEVROLET SILVERADO in Toney, AL. The complaint states: “A CAR PULLED OUT IN DOWN TO MEET WITH THE DEALER AND CONSUMER. THE REPRESENTATIVE INFORMED CONSUMER THAT THE VEHICLE WAS FUNCTIONING AS DESIGNED.” NHTSA complaint # 10087718. h. Another driver contacted GM after the airbags did not deploy in a February 2004 front end collision at 25-30 MPH in their 2000 Isuzu Rodeo in Westwood, NJ. “THE CONSUMER CONTACTED THE MANUFACTURER FAILURE.” 102. GM knew or had reason to know about these complaints, which are publicly available on NHTSA’s website. Indeed, many complaints explicitly state that GM was directly informed of and/or investigated these suspicious accidents. For example: a. A complaint about an August 2018 accident in a 2008 GMC Acadia details that the airbags and seatbelt pretensioners did not deploy after the complainant’s wife fell asleep at the wheel and struck a utility pole and then a large dirt embankment—which caused her to “hit the steering column so hard . . . it broke the column and broke her sternum,” and caused the granddaughter in the passenger seat to break her back in two places. It continues that “GENERAL MOTORS . . . MANUFACTURER WAS UNABLE TO DIAGNOSE THE VEHICLE; HOWEVER, AFTER INSPECTION OF THE VEHICLE, THE MANUFACTURER CONFIRMED THAT THE AIR BAGS WERE ENABLED AT THE TIME OF NEITHER TIME DID AIRBAGS DEPLOY. *TT” k. NHTSA complaint #10163811 dated Friday, July 28, 2006, reported an accident on Thursday, July 20, 2006 involving a 2000 ISUZU RODEO in Nederland, TX. The complaint states: “A GIRL RAN A RED LIGHT AND I HIT OF THE FAILURE; HOWEVER, THEY PROVIDED NO ASSISTANCE . . . THE CONSUMER’S VEHICLE WAS DAMAGED WHEN HE TRIED TO AVOID HITTING THE VEHICLE BY SWERVING SIDEWAYS AND SLIDING INTO OF THE FAILURE.” s. NHTSA complaint #10574295 dated Sunday, March 23, 2014, reported an accident on Friday, February 21, 2014 involving a 2010 GMC TERRAIN in Saint Joe, IN. The complaint states: “INVOLVED IN A 21 CAR PILE THINGS OFFICERS, EMTS AND WITNESSES SAID WAS “I CAN'T BELIEVE THE AIRBAGS DIDN'T GO OFF.” IN THE RECENT DAYS AFTER THE ACCIDENT I HAVE HAD SEVERAL MECHANICS AND SUCH Violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.01, et seq. (On Behalf of the Ohio State Class) 413. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 414. Plaintiff Matthew Mastracci (for the purposes of this count, “Plaintiff”) brings this claim on behalf of himself and the Ohio State Class against all Defendants. 415. Defendants, Plaintiff, and Ohio State Class members are “persons” within the meaning of Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.01(B). 416. Each Defendant is a “supplier” as defined by Ohio Rev. Code § e. NHTSA complaint #10082050 dated Thursday, July 15, 2004, reported an accident on Wednesday, July 14, 2004 involving a 2003 CHEVROLET SUBURBAN in Fresno, CA. The complaint states: “THE CONSUMER WAS

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105. Plaintiff brings the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action, FLSA claims, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated persons who work or have worked as Tipped Workers at Mandrake and Kiki on the River from December 17, 2016 and the date of final judgment who elect to opt-in to this action (the “FLSA Collective”). 95.11(3). 95.11(3). Fair Labor Standards Act - Misappropriated Tips (Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective) 136. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the FLSA Collective, reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 137. The provisions regarding misappropriate gratuities set forth in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and the supporting federal regulations, apply to Defendants and protect Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. 138. Defendants unlawfully demanded or accepted, directly or indirectly, part of the gratuities received by Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective in violation of § 203(m) of the FLSA and the supporting United States Department of Labor Regulations. 139. Defendants unlawfully retained gratuities and/or administrative fees intended for Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective in violation of § 203(m) of the FLSA and the supporting United States Department of Labor Regulations. 140. As a result of Defendants’ willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have suffered damages by having their gratuities misappropriated in amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.

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19. The claims in this Complaint arising out of the FLSA are brought by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated non-exempt employees (i.e. nail technicians and employees holding other job titles whose work duties are substantially similar to that of nail technicians) who work or have worked at Elegant Nail during the statutory period and elect to opt-in to this action (the “FLSA Collective”). 20. The FLSA Collective consists of approximately six similarly situated current and former employees of Elegant Nail, who, over the last three years have been victims of Defendants’ common policy and practices that have violated the employees’ rights under the FLSA by, inter alia, willfully denying them wages due under the FLSA. 22. Defendants have engaged in this unlawful conduct pursuant to a policy, plan, or practice of minimizing labor costs and denying employees compensation by knowingly violating the FLSA. 23. Defendants’ unlawful conduct has been intentional, willful, and in bad faith, and has caused significant damage to Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective. 24. The FLSA Collective would benefit from the issuance of a court- supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join the present lawsuit. Those similarly situated employees are known to defendants, are readily identifiable by defendants, and are locatable through defendants’ records. These similarly situated employees should be notified of and allowed to opt in to this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 25. During their employment Plaintiffs worked primarily doing manicures and pedicures at Elegant Nail. 26. From approximately January 2017 through approximately July 2017, Plaintiff Idrovo was regularly paid a salary of $50 per day. 27. From approximately August 2017 through approximately February 2018, Plaintiff Idrovo was regularly paid a salary of $60 per day. 28. From in or around March 2018 through her termination in March 2019, Plaintiff Idrovo was regularly paid a salary of $70 per day. 30. From approximately March 2015 through approximately March 2018, Plaintiff Becerra was regularly paid a salary of $75 per day. 31. From approximately April 2018 through approximately July 2018, Plaintiff Becerra was regularly paid a salary of $80 per day. 32. From in or around September 2018 through her termination in November 2018, Plaintiff Becerra was regularly paid a salary of $90 per day. 33. From March 2015 through March 2018, Plaintiff Becerra regularly worked approximately fifty (50) to sixty (60) hours per week: Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays from approximately 9:15 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. or 7:30 p.m. 34. From April 2018 through July 2018, Plaintiff Becerra’s hours were reduced to thirty (30) hours per week due to her pregnancy. 35. From August 2018 through September 3, 2018, Plaintiff Becerra was out of work due to maternity leave. 36. From September 3, 2018 through her termination on November 28, 2018, Plaintiff Becerra’s hours were thirty (30) hours per week. 38. Thoguhout their employment, Plaintiffs were not permitted to take breaks during the workday, and were not allowed to leave the nail salon for any reason during the workday. 39. Defendants paid Plaintiffs less than the statutorily required minimum wage per hour that they worked each week. 40. Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs overtime compensation at one and one half (1½) times their regular rate of pay, as required by the FLSA and the CMWA, for any hours they worked in excess of forty per workweek. 41. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 42. The FLSA requires that employers pay employees a minimum wage for all hours worked weekly up to forty. 43. Defendants are employers within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e) and 206(a), and employed plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. 44. The minimum wage provisions set forth in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. and the supporting federal regulations, apply to Defendants. 45. Defendants failed to pay plaintiff and the FLSA Collective the minimum wages to which they were entitled under the FLSA. 47. As a result of Defendants’ willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective suffered damages by being denied minimum wages in accordance with the FLSA in amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, attorneys’ fees and costs of this action, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 48. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. The CMWA requires that employers pay employees a minimum wage for all hours worked weekly up to forty. 50. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs the minimum wages to which they were entitled to under the CMWA. 51. Defendants have willfully violated the CMWA by knowingly and intentionally failing to pay Plaintiffs the minimum hourly wage. 52. Defendants willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs at least the minimum hourly wage for all hours worked. 54. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 55. Defendants have willfully violated the FLSA by knowingly and intentionally failing to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective overtime wages for all of the hours they worked in excess of forty in a workweek. 56. Defendants have not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to Plaintiffs’ and the FLSA Collective’s compensation. 57. Defendants were aware or should have been aware that the practices described in this Complaint were unlawful and have not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to the compensation of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective. 58. Due to defendants’ violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective are entitled to recover their unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre- and post-judgment interest. Connecticut Minimum Wage Act – Unpaid Minimum Wage Fair Labor Standards Act – Unpaid Minimum Wage Fair Labor Standards Act – Unpaid Overtime

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12. On February 23, 2016, Defendant sent an unsolicited advertisement to Plaintiff’s ink-and-paper facsimile machine. The fax advertises Ichthammol ointment (the “Product”). It touts that “Ichthammol ointment has a number of uses as a natural cure for a variety of minor skin injuries and conditions.” A copy of this facsimile is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit A. 13. Exhibit A is an exemplary of the junk faxes Defendant sends. 14. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff has received multiple fax advertisements from Defendant similar to Exhibit A. 15. Defendant did not have Plaintiff’s prior express invitation or permission to send advertisements to Plaintiff’s fax machine. 16. Defendant’s faxes do not contain opt-out notices that comply with the requirements of the TCPA. 17. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of the following class of persons (the “Class”): All persons and entities who hold telephone numbers that received a facsimile transmission from Defendant at any time during the applicable statute of limitations to present (the “Class Period”) that 1) promotes Defendant’s products and 2) contains an opt-out notice identical or substantially similar to that contained on the facsimile advertisement attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint. 19. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, any parent, subsidiary, affiliate, or controlled person of Defendant, as well as the officers, directors, agents, servants, or employees of Defendant and the immediate family members of any such person. Also excluded are any judge who may preside over this case and any attorneys representing Plaintiff or the Class. 20. Numerosity [Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)]. The Members of the Class are so numerous that joinder is impractical. Upon information and belief, Defendant has sent illegal fax advertisements to hundreds if not thousands of other recipients. 22. Typicality [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)]. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all Class Members. Plaintiff received an unsolicited fax advertisement from Defendant during the Class Period. Plaintiff makes the same claims that it makes for the Class Members and seeks the same relief that it seeks for the Class Members. Defendant has acted in the same manner toward Plaintiff and all Class Members. 23. Fair and Adequate Representation [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)]. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts, and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the Class. 26. The TCPA provides strict liability for sending fax advertisements in a manner that does not comply with the statute. Recipients of fax advertisements have a private right of action to seek an injunction or damages for violations of the TCPA and its implementing regulations. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 27. The TCPA makes it unlawful to send any “unsolicited advertisement” via fax unless certain conditions are present. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). “Unsolicited advertisement” is defined as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5). 28. Unsolicited faxes are illegal if the sender and recipient do not have an “established business relationship.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(i). “Established business relationship” is defined as “a prior or existing relationship formed by a voluntary two-way communication between a person or entity and a business or residential subscriber with or without an exchange of consideration, on the basis of an inquiry, application, purchase or transaction by the business or residential subscriber regarding products or services offered by such person or entity, which relationship has not been previously terminated by either party.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(2); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(6). 30. Defendant faxed unsolicited advertisements to Plaintiff that did not have compliant opt-out notices, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) and 47 C.F.R. § 31. Defendant knew or should have known (a) that Plaintiff had not given express invitation or permission for Defendant to fax advertisements about its products; (b) that Defendant’s faxes did not contain a compliant opt-out notice; and (c) that Exhibit A is an advertisement. 32. Defendant’s actions caused actual damage to Plaintiff and the Class Members. Defendant’s junk faxes caused Plaintiff and the Class Members to lose paper, toner, and ink consumed in the printing of Defendant’s faxes through Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ fax machines. Defendant’s faxes cost Plaintiff and the Class Members time that otherwise would have been spent on Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ business activities. 33. In addition to statutory damages (and the trebling thereof), Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief under the TCPA. 35. Plaintiff and the Members of the Sub-Class are “consumers” within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 501.203(7). 36. Defendant is a “person” or “entity” as used in FDUTPA. 37. Pursuant to FDUTPA, unfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are unlawful. 38. FDUTPA’s ‘unfair prong’ is also violated by a violation of “[a]ny law, statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance which proscribes unfair methods of competition, or unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable acts or practices.” Fla. Stat. 501.203(3)(c). Thus FDUTPA’s ‘unfair prong’ is violated by a violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 39. Within four years prior to the filing of this complaint and continuing to the present, Defendant violated FDUTPA by engaging in unfair practices against Plaintiff and the Sub-Class. 40. Defendant was engaging in “trade or commerce” within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 501.203(8). 41. The practices described herein also offend established public policy regarding the protection of the consuming public and legitimate business enterprises against companies, like Defendant, who engage in unfair methods of competition. 42. Defendant’s conduct, which caused substantial injury to Plaintiff and the Sub- Class could have been avoided, and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to any consumers or competition. 44. In addition to actual damages, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq. 64.1200(a)(4)(iii). 64.1200(a)(4). Violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq. Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)

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10. On or about February 29, 2012 and May 11, 2012, DEFENDANT mailed or caused to be mailed form collection letters to PLAINTIFFS, and each of them, in an attempt to collect a consumer debt from PLAINTIFFS allegedly owed to another. True and correct copies of the form letters are attached hereto as Exhibit “1”. 11. The form letters sent by DEFENDANT to PLAINTIFFS state, in pertinent part: If you choose not to pay your account in full within 30 days from the date of this letter, in accordance with Nevada Revised Statutes, Red Rock Financial Services will prepare and record a Lien for Delinquent Assessments on behalf of [the original creditor]. Additional fees estimated in the amount of $340.00 plus mailing fees will be added to the above account to cover the cost of preparing and/or recording the Lien for Delinquent Assessments. Please note these are estimated costs. A “30 day period” has been established for disputing the validity of the debt. Federal Law does not require Red Rock Financial Services to wait the “30 day period” to prepare and/or record the Lien for Delinquent Assessments. The “30 day period”, according to Federal Law, begins when this letter is received by you. All disputes regarding the validity of the debt must be submitted in written form to Red Rock Financial Services. When the dispute is received, Red Rock Financial Services will provide verification of the debt and a copy of such verification will be mailed to you. Collection efforts on the part of Red Rock Financial Services will cease during the research process. When the research is completed, you will receive a written response. In addition, Red Rock Financial Services will provide you with the original creditor(s) and address(es) if different from the current. In the event that Red Rock financial services does not receive in written form, a dispute of the debt, Red Rock Financial Services will assume the debt is valid. 12. In addition, these letters seek to collect unspecified “additional collection fees and costs.” 14. The second form letter states, in pertinent part: As of the date of this letter, the “30 Day Period” is still in effect. In the case that Red Rock Financial Services does not receive in written form a dispute of the debt, Red Rock Financial Services will assume the debt is valid. All disputes of the validity of the debt must be submitted in written form to Red Rock Financial Services. When the dispute is received, Red Rock Financial Services will provide verification of the debt and a copy of each such verification will be mailed to you. Upon receipt of a written dispute, collection efforts on the part of Red Rock Financial Services will cease. A written response will be provided detailing the result of our findings regarding said dispute. Allowed by Nevada Revised Statutes, Red Rock Financial Services may record a Notice of Default and Election to Sell no sooner then [sic] the 31st day from the mailing of the Lien for Delinquent Assessments. As a courtesy to you, an Intent to Notice of Default courtesy letter will be sent to you via first class mail at an additional charge. 15. This letter also seeks to collect unspecified “fines and collection fees and costs.” 16. PLAINTIFFS repeat, re-allege, and incorporates by reference, paragraphs 1 through 15 inclusive, above. 19. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims as Congress specifically envisioned class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C.§ 1692k. The members of the class are generally unsophisticated consumers, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would also create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards and would not be in the best interest of judicial economy. 20. If facts are discovered to be appropriate, PLAINTIFFS will seek to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 21. PLAINTIFFS repeat, re-allege, and incorporate by reference, paragraphs 1 through 20 inclusive, above. 23. The form letters sent by DEFENDANT to PLAINTIFFS and the class members are deceptive and misleading because they require that all disputes be submitted in writing in violation of 15 U.S.C. section 1692g(a). See Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2005). 24. As a result of the FDCPA violations by DEFENDANT, PLAINTIFFS are entitled to statutory damages plus actual damages to be shown specifically at the time of trial. 25. It has been necessary for PLAINTIFFS to obtain the services of an attorney to pursue this claim and PLAINTIFFS are entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees therefor. 26. PLAINTIFFS repeat, re-allege, and incorporate by reference, paragraphs 1 through 25 inclusive, above. 28. The form letters are deceptive and misleading, and violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) in that PLAINTIFFS’ and the class members’ rights to dispute the debt are overshadowed in the letter by DEFENDANT’S contradictory threat to record a lien on PLAINTIFFS’ and the class members’ property and impose additional costs and fees if the debt is not paid in full within 30 days of the date of the letter. See Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). 29. As a result of the FDCPA violations by DEFENDANT, PLAINTIFFS are entitled to statutory damages plus actual damages to be shown specifically at the time of trial. 30. It has been necessary for PLAINTIFFS to obtain the services of an attorney to pursue this claim and PLAINTIFFS are entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees therefor. 31. PLAINTIFFS repeat, re-allege, and incorporate by reference, paragraphs 1 through 30 inclusive, above. 33. In the form letters, DEFENDANT demanded that PLAINTIFFS and the class members pay additional unidentified “collection fees and costs,” “fees and costs,” and “fines and collection fees” to DEFENDANT. 34. The foregoing demands by DEFENDANT violated the FDCPA by attempting to collect from PLAINTIFFS and the class members an amount incidental to the principal obligation that is not expressly authorized or permitted. 35. As a result of the FDCPA violations by DEFENDANT, PLAINTIFFS and the class members are entitled to statutory damages plus actual damages to be shown specifically at the time of trial. 36. It has been necessary for PLAINTIFFS to obtain the services of an attorney to pursue this claim and PLAINTIFFS are entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees therefor. BROUGHT BY PLAINTIFFS INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF AND A CLASS OF SIMILARLY SITUATED PERSONS DEFINED HEREIN AS CLASS ONE AND CLASS TWO FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FDCPA 15 U.S.C.§ 1692g(a) BROUGHT BY PLAINTIFFS INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF AND A CLASS OF SIMILARLY SITUATED PERSONS DEFINED HEREIN AS CLASS ONE AND CLASS TWO FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FDCPA 15 U.S.C.§ 1692g(b) BROUGHT BY PLAINTIFFS INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF AND A CLASS OF SIMILARLY SITUATED PERSONS DEFINED HEREIN AS CLASS ONE AND CLASS TWO FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FDCPA 15 U.S.C.§ 1692f

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10. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its calls to Plaintiffs seeking to solicit its services. 22. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the four proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). The class concerning the ATDS claim for no prior express consent (hereafter “The ATDS Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 23. The class concerning the ATDS claim for revocation of consent, to the extent prior consent existed (hereafter “The ATDS Revocation Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had revoked any prior express consent to receive such calls prior to the calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 62. Pursuant to the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, Plaintiffs are entitled to, and demands, a trial by jury. Respectfully Submitted this 23rd Day of October, 2018. 9. Beginning in or around October 2017, Defendant contacted Plaintiffs on Plaintiffs’ cellular telephone numbers ending in -7210, -7511, and -5502 in an attempt to solicit Plaintiffs to purchase Defendant’s services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiffs and the DNC Class and DNC Revocation Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiffs and the ATDS Class and ATDS Revocation Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiffs and the ATDS Class and ATDS Revocation Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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28. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of the Plan and as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 29. Plaintiff seeks to certify, and to be appointed as representative of, the following class (“Class”): All participants and beneficiaries of the Plan whose Plan accounts had a balance in any of the Jackson National Funds at any time on or after March 29, 2011. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its directors, and any employees with responsibility for the Pan’s investment or administrative functions. 32. Class certification is also appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) because adjudications with respect to individual Plan participants, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of other Plan participants or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Any award of equitable relief by the Court such as removal of particular Plan investments or removal of a Plan fiduciary would be dispositive of non-party participants’ interests. The accounting and restoration of the property of the Plan that would be required under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109 and 1132 would be similarly dispositive of the interests of other Plan participants. 33. Class certification is also appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. Defendant’s conduct described in this Complaint has applied uniformly to all members of the Class. Class members do not have an interest in pursuing separate actions against Defendant, as the amount of each Class member’s individual claims is relatively small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution, and Plaintiffs are unaware of any similar claims brought against Defendants by any Class members on an individual basis. Class certification also will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments concerning Defendants’ practices. Moreover, management of this action as a class action will not present any likely difficulties. In the interests of justice and judicial efficiency, it would be desirable to concentrate the litigation of all Class members’ claims in a single forum. 34. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each of the allegations in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 35. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 imposes fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty on Defendant in their administration of the Plan and in their selection and monitoring of Plan investments. At all relevant times, the Benefit Committee and its members acted as fiduciaries within the meaning of ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C.§ 1002(21)(A), by exercising authority and control with respect to the management of the Plan and the Plan’s assets. 36. As described throughout this Complaint, the Defendant breached its fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty with respect to the selection and management of the Plan’s investment options by, their actions and omissions, in authorizing or causing the Plan to invest in Jackson National Funds and purchase products and services from Jackson National affiliates, and to pay investment management and other fees in connection therewith, to Jackson National affiliates, put Jackson National’s financial interests ahead of the Plan’s interests. Thus, the Defendant breached its duties of prudence and loyalty to the Plan under ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), (B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A), (B). 37. As a direct and proximate result of these breaches of duty, the Plan, and indirectly Plaintiff and the Plan’s other participants and beneficiaries, lost millions of dollars to Jackson National fees and inferior returns on their retirement savings. 38. Pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) and 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), the Defendant is liable to restore all losses suffered by the Plan caused by its breach of fiduciary duties. 39. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each of the allegations in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 40. Defendant is an employer of participants of the Plan as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5). 41. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) provides that the assets of an employee benefit plan “shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries.” 42. The purpose of this provision “is to apply the law of trusts to discourage abuses such as self-dealing, imprudent investment, and misappropriation of plan assets, by employers and others.” Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 23 (2004). 43. Plan assets improperly inured to the benefit of the Defendant as a result of the Plan’s investments in Jackson National Family mutual funds and the subsequent assessment of investment management expenses against the accounts of Plan participants. 44. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), the Defendant should be required to disgorge all Plan assets that have inured to them as a result of its self-dealing. These assets should be restored to the Plan under principles of equitable restitution. 46. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each of the allegations in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 47. At all relevant times, the Defendant acted as a fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C.§ 1002(21)(A), by exercising authority and control with respect to the management of the Plan and the Plan’s assets. 48. The Defendant, by its actions and omissions in authorizing or causing the Plan to invest in the Jackson National Funds and purchase Jackson National affiliated products and services, including Jackson National Funds, and to pay, directly or indirectly, investment management and other fees in connection therewith, caused the Plan to engage in transactions that Defendant knew or should have known constituted sales or exchanges of property between the Plan and parties in interest, the furnishing of services by parties in interest to the Plan, and transactions with fiduciaries in violation of §§ 406(a)(1)(A), (C), and 406(b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(1)(A), (C), and 406(b). 49. As a direct and proximate result of these prohibited transaction violations, the Plan, directly or indirectly, paid millions of dollars in investment management and other fees to the Defendant that were prohibited by ERISA and suffered millions of dollars in losses annually. 50. Pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) and 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), the Defendant is liable to restore all losses suffered by the Plan as a result of the prohibited transactions and all profits earned by the Defendant on the fees paid by the Plan to Defendant and its affiliates. Prohibited Transactions 29 U.S.C. § 1106

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(Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)) 10. Valarity told Plaintiff that he must contest the debt with the original creditor, Mercy Hospital and that his account must be a fraud. 11. Subsequently Plaintiff disputed the debt in writing with Mercy Hospital. 12. At no point has Plaintiff received any letters in the mail, or any form of verification of the alleged debt. 13. At no point had Plaintiff given Defendant or Valarity prior express written consent to call him on his cellular phone. 14. On or about February 2014, Plaintiff revoked any consent that Defendant or Valarity may have had, to call his cellular phone. 15. On or about March 13, 2014, Valarity called Plaintiff’s cellular phone through the automatic telephone dialing system that the TCPA was designed to regulate. 16. During said call, Valarity hung up on Plaintiff as soon as he tried to respond. 17. On or about March and April 2014, Valarity, again acting on behalf of and as an agent for Mercy Hospital, continued to use an automatic telephone dialing system to call Plaintiff’s cellphone repeatedly for a total of twenty four (24) times. Specifically, but not limited to on: March 7, 2014; March 8, 2014; March 12, 2014; March 13, 2014; March 14, 2014; March 15, 2014; March 19, 2014; March 20, 2014; March 21,2014; March 24, 2014; March 27, 2014; March 28, 2014; April 1,2014; April 2, 2014; April 3, 2014; April 4, 2014; April 5, 2014; April 9, 2014; April 10, 2014; twice on April 11, 2014; April 12, 2014; and twice on April 14, 2014. 18. Valarity would call and then hang up repeatedly. 19. Plaintiff continued to dispute the alleged debt. In addition, Plaintiff requested Mercy’s agent Valarity, to cease further calls to Plaintiff. 4 20. Despite these requests, Marcy’s agent Valarity, contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone in connection with the collection of the debt on numerous occasions. 21. Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), (b)(3) and (c)(4) on behalf the following Class: (1) All persons in the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) Varity, acting to collect the debts of Mercy, placed a non-emergency telephone call (4) using an autodialer (5) within four years of the complaint (6) where Mercy’s agent Valarity did not have express written consent to call said cellular telephone number (the “TCPA Class”). 22. Plaintiff represents and is a member of the TCPA Class. Excluded from the Class are Defendant and any entities in which Defendant has a controlling interest, Defendant’s agents and employees, any Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of the Judge’s staff and immediate family. 23. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Class, but based upon the size, Plaintiff reasonably believes that the Class numbers in the thousands. 24. The joinder of all Class members is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. The disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. The Class can be identified easily through records maintained by Defendant or its agent Valarity. 25. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class which predominate over any questions that affect only individual Class members. Those common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to, the following: i. Whether Valarity engaged in a pattern of using an autodialer to place calls to cellular phones; 5 ii. Whether Valarity was acting on behalf of and/or as an agent for Mercy Hospital in connection with the actions described herein ; ii. Whether Valarity had prior express consent to make the calls; iii. Whether Valarity failed to allow consumers to revoke consent to be called; iv. Whether Valarity negligently violated the TCPA; and v. Whether Valarity willfully violated the TCPA; vi. Whether Mercy Hospital is responsible for the actions of Valarity and is liable to Plaintiff and the Class for the damages sought in this complaint. 26. As a person who received telephone calls from Valairty using an autodialer to his cellular phone without his prior express consent, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of the members of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class, and has no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the Class. 27. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims, including class claims involving violations of federal and state consumer protection statutes such as the 32. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25 as if specifically stated herein. 33. Defendant’s conduct violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(l) in that Valarity, acting on behalf of and as an agent for Mercy Hospital, repeatedly used the automated dialing system to call Plaintiff’s cellular phone in February, March and April 2014, without Plaintiff’s prior express written consent to call him on his cellular phone. 34. Defendant’s conduct violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(l) in that Valarity, acting on behalf of and as an agent for Mercy Hospital , repeatedly used the automated dialing system to call Plaintiff’s cellular phone in February, March and April 2014, after Plaintiff expressly withdrew any consent to call him on his cellular phone. 35. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff has been damaged and 7 is therefore entitled to damages in accordance with the TCPA. 36. Defendant’s actions were willful and knowing and therefore Plaintiff Petri is entitled to treble damages for each violation in accordance with the TCPA. 5. At all times relevant to this action Mercy Hospital. Mercy Hospital engaged Valarity, LLC (Valarity), a company engaged in the collection of debts, to collect the debts of Mercy Hospital. Valarity maintains its headquarters in this District. 6. As described more fully below, Valarity, acting on behalf of and as an agent of Mercy Hospital, contacted Plaintiff Petri to collect a debt that was incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes. With regards to each of the acts set forth herein, Valarity was always acting as the authorized agent for Mercy. 7. On or around January 28, 2014, Valarity, acting on behalf of and as an agent for Mercy Hospital, commenced collection activities in an attempt to collect an alleged debt from Plaintiff, by contacting Plaintiff on his cellular phone. 8. The alleged debt supposedly arose from medical services claimed to be provided by Mercy Hospital to Plaintiff, which was ultimately found to be a mistake. 9. During this communication, Plaintiff disputed and requested verification of said 3 alleged debt.

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117. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of New York. 118. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of: All consumers to whom Defendant sent a collection letter substantially and materially similar to the Letter sent to Plaintiff, which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. 119. This action seeks a finding that Defendant's conduct violates the FDCPA, and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 120. The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons. 121. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual 12 issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 122. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 123. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant's conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws. 21. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”). 22. The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 23. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. 24. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 25. At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 4 26. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. 27. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by letter (“the Letter”) dated July 1, 2019. (A true and accurate copy is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”) 28. The Letter conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt. 29. The Letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 30. The Letter was the initial written communication Plaintiff received from Defendant concerning the alleged Debt. 31. The Letter was received and read by Plaintiff. 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g protects Plaintiff's concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest and right to receive a clear, accurate and unambiguous validation notice, which allows a consumer to confirm that he or she owes the debt sought to be collected by the debt collector. As set forth herein, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of this right. 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e protects Plaintiff's concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest and right to be free from deceptive and/or misleading communications from Defendant. As set forth herein, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of this right. 34. The deprivation of Plaintiff's rights will be redressed by a favorable decision herein. 35. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 37. As relevant here, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) requires the written notice provide “the amount of the debt.” 38. To comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), a statement of “the amount of the debt” must accurately convey, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the actual amount of the debt. 39. A statement of “the amount of the debt,” when the debt is not owed at all by the 5 consumer, violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 40. The Letter claims that Plaintiff owes $514.14. 41. Plaintiff did not owe $514.14. 42. Plaintiff did not owe any money at all to the entity on whose behalf Defendant was seeking to collect. 43. Defendant's statement of the amount of the alleged Debt, when Plaintiff did not owe any money at all to the entity on whose behalf Defendant was seeking to collect, violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 44. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 45. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 46. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides, generally, that a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 47. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt, when the debt is not owed at all by the consumer, is a false representation made in connection with the collection of any debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 48. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt, when the debt is not owed at all by the consumer, is a deceptive representation made in connection with the collection of any debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 49. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt, when the debt is not owed at all by the consumer, is a misleading representation made in connection with the collection of any debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 50. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) prohibits the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. 51. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt, when the debt is not owed at all by the consumer, is a false representation of the character of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 6 52. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt, when the debt is not owed at all by the consumer, is a false representation of the amount of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 53. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt, when the debt is not owed at all by the consumer, is a false representation of the legal status of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 54. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 55. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt, when the debt is not owed at all by the consumer, is a false representation made in an attempt to collect the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 56. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt, when the debt is not owed at all by the consumer, is a deceptive means used in an attempt to collect the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 57. The Letter alleges that Plaintiff owed $514.14. 58. Plaintiff did not owe $514.14. 59. Plaintiff did not owe any money at all to the entity on whose behalf Defendant was seeking to collect. 60. Defendant's allegation that Plaintiff owed $514.14, when Plaintiff did not owe any money at all to the entity on whose behalf Defendant was seeking to collect, is a false representation made by Defendant in connection with Defendant's collection of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 61. Defendant's allegation that Plaintiff owed $514.14, when Plaintiff did not owe any money at all to the entity on whose behalf Defendant was seeking to collect, is a deceptive representation made by Defendant in connection with Defendant's collection of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 62. Defendant's allegation that Plaintiff owed $514.14, when Plaintiff did not owe any money at all to the entity on whose behalf Defendant was seeking to collect, is a misleading representation made by Defendant in connection with Defendant's collection of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 7 63. Defendant's allegation that Plaintiff owed $514.14, when Plaintiff did not owe any money at all to the entity on whose behalf Defendant was seeking to collect, is a false representation of the character of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 64. Defendant's allegation that Plaintiff owed $514.14, when Plaintiff did not owe any money at all to the entity on whose behalf Defendant was seeking to collect, is a false representation of the amount of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 65. Defendant's allegation that Plaintiff owed $514.14, when Plaintiff did not owe any money at all to the entity on whose behalf Defendant was seeking to collect, is a false representation of the legal status of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 66. Defendant's allegation that Plaintiff owed $514.14, when Plaintiff did not owe any money at all to the entity on whose behalf Defendant was seeking to collect, is a false representation made in an attempt to collect the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 67. Defendant's allegation that Plaintiff owed $514.14, when Plaintiff did not owe any money at all to the entity on whose behalf Defendant was seeking to collect, is a deceptive means used in an attempt to collect the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 68. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 69. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 70. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 71. As relevant here, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) requires the written notice provide “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” 72. To comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2), the written notice must accurately state “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” 73. A statement of “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed,” when the consumer does not any money at all to the stated entity, violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 8 74. The Letter claims the name of the creditor to whom the alleged Debt is owed is Bureaus Investment Group Portfolio No 15 LLC. 75. Plaintiff did not owe the alleged Debt to Bureaus Investment Group Portfolio No 85. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 86. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides, generally, that a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 87. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt to a certain entity, when the debt is not owed by the consumer to that entity, is a false representation made in connection with the collection of any debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 9 88. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt to a certain entity, when the debt is not owed by the consumer to that entity, is a deceptive representation made in connection with the collection of any debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 89. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt to a certain entity, when the debt is not owed by the consumer to that entity, is a misleading representation made in connection with the collection of any debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 90. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) prohibits the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. 91. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt to a certain entity, when the debt is not owed by the consumer to that entity, is a false representation of the character of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 92. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt to a certain entity, when the debt is not owed by the consumer to that entity, is a false representation of the amount of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 93. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt to a certain entity, when the debt is not owed by the consumer to that entity, is a false representation of the legal status of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 94. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 95. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt to a certain entity, when the debt is not owed by the consumer to that entity, is a false representation made in an attempt to collect the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 96. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt to a certain entity, when the debt is not owed by the consumer to that entity, is a deceptive means used in an attempt to collect the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 97. The Letter claims that Plaintiff owes a debt to Bureaus Investment Group Portfolio No 15 LLC. 98. Plaintiff did not owe a debt to Bureaus Investment Group Portfolio No 15 LLC. 99. Bureaus Investment Group Portfolio No 15 LLC never offered to extend credit to Plaintiff. 100. Bureaus Investment Group Portfolio No 15 LLC never extended credit to 10 Plaintiff. 101. Plaintiff was never involved in any transaction with Bureaus Investment Group Portfolio No 15 LLC. 102. Plaintiff never entered into any contract with Bureaus Investment Group Portfolio No 15 LLC. 103. Plaintiff never did any business with Bureaus Investment Group Portfolio No 15 Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) Violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) Violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10)

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18. Defendants constitute an oilfield services company that operates throughout the United States including in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Texas, and North Dakota. 19. Plaintiff Meals worked for Defendants in oilfields in Pennsylvania as a SEO II from approximately March 2013 to April 2014. 20. Plaintiff Meals then worked for Defendants as a Treater in Training from approximately April 2014 to November 2015. 21. Defendants paid Plaintiff an hourly rate while he worked for Defendants in these jobs. He routinely worked more than 40 hours each week. 22. In addition to his hourly rate of pay, Defendants also paid Plaintiff, FLSA Bonus Class Members, and Pennsylvania Bonus Class Members a job bonus. This job bonus is a non-discretionary payment. 23. The job bonus is non-discretionary because Defendants based the bonus amount on the number of completions an operator performs in the field and the revenue Defendants derived from a job at an oil well. Typically, Defendants paid the bonus once a month. 24. The job bonus represents a significant portion of Plaintiff’s, FLSA Bonus Class Members’, and Pennsylvania Bonus Class Members’ earnings. Often the bonus payments are equal to or exceed what Defendants paid these employees monthly for the hourly earnings. 26. By failing to do so, Defendants paid overtime at an artificially lower rate than what the law requires, and thus violated the FLSA and Pennsylvania state law. 27. Plaintiff, the FLSA Bonus Class Members, and the Pennsylvania Bonus Class Members are required to work well in excess of forty (40) hours a week. A typical work schedule demands that such workers put in more than eighty (80) hours per week. 28. Plaintiff, the FLSA Bonus Class Members, and the Pennsylvania Bonus Class Members are not exempt employees under the FLSA or the PMWA. 29. Defendants classifies Plaintiff, the FLSA Bonus Class Members, and the Pennsylvania Bonus Class Members as non-exempt employees. 30. Defendants employed Plaintiff as a Supervisor I from approximately November 2015 to March 2016. 31. Defendants paid Plaintiff a salary no matter how many hours he worked per week plus a bonus. 32. Defendants did not pay overtime compensation to Plaintiff while Defendants employed him as a Supervisor I. 33. Likewise, Defendants did not pay overtime compensation to other Supervisor Is Defendants employed. 35. Defendants knew Plaintiff, the FLSA Supervisor I Class Members, and the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members worked more than forty hours in a week because Defendants expected them to perform work in the oil fields from early in the morning to well into the evening and on weekends. Defendants’ managers also witnessed them working these long hours in the oil fields. 36. Defendants uniformly denied Plaintiff, the FLSA Supervisor I Class Members, and the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members overtime pay. 37. Defendants treated/classified Plaintiff, the FLSA Supervisor I Class Members, and the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members as exempt employees, and therefore did not pay them all overtime compensation to which they are entitled, even though they routinely worked overtime hours. Defendants uniformly applied this policy and practice to all Supervisor Is. 38. Plaintiff, the FLSA Supervisor I Class Members, and the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members are and were non-exempt employees who are and were entitled to overtime pay. 39. Plaintiff, the FLSA Supervisor I Class Members, and the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members performed oil field manual production work, the same work performed by non-exempt, hourly employees. 40. Plaintiff, the FLSA Supervisor I Class Members, and the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members did not perform duties which qualify for any “white collar” exemption or any other exemption. 41. Plaintiff, the FLSA Supervisor I Class Members, and the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members did not regularly supervise the work of two or more employees. 43. Plaintiff, the FLSA Supervisor I Class Members, and the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members did not perform office work related to Defendants’ general business operations or its customers. 44. Plaintiff, the FLSA Supervisor I Class Members, and the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members had no advance knowledge in a field of science or learning which required specialized instruction that was required to perform the job. 45. Defendants do not require Plaintiff, the FLSA Supervisor I Class Members, and the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members to have a college degree to obtain a Supervisor I job. 46. All Supervisor Is are similarly situated in that they share common job duties and descriptions, Defendants treated them as exempt employees at relevant times, and they all performed work without overtime compensation. 47. Because Defendants did not pay Plaintiff, the FLSA Supervisor I Class Members, and the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members for all the hours they worked including overtime hours, Defendants’ wage statements did not accurately reflect compensation that Defendants was legally required to pay Plaintiff, the FLSA Supervisor I Class Members, and the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members for hours they worked. 48. Defendants thus did not provide Plaintiff, the FLSA Supervisor I Class Members, and the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members with accurate paychecks. 50. Defendants’ actions in this case were willful and in bad faith. Defendants knew the requirement to pay overtime at the rate of time and one half the regular rates of pay of its employees but intentionally and/or willfully chose to ignore such requirements. Defendants also knew or should have known that the job bonuses were non-discretionary. Defendants intentionally and/or willfully chose to ignore the requirement to include such payments in the regular rate of pay. Defendants likewise knew or should have known that the Supervisor Is were misclassified production employees to whom Defendants was legally required to pay overtime compensation. 51. Moreover, Defendants have been sued several times for like wage and hour violations including in this District. 52. Plaintiff brings Count I on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated employees as authorized under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The similarly situated employees are: All current and former employees paid on an hourly basis with paid bonuses who worked in the United States at any time within the last three years up to the entry of judgment in this case (the “FLSA Bonus Class”). 53. Plaintiff knows that FLSA Bonus Class Members exist who have been denied the FLSA’s overtime premium by being subjected to the same illegal pay practices described above. Plaintiff’s knowledge is based on working and talking with other employees of Defendants. 54. The FLSA Bonus Class Members are similarly situated to Plaintiff in that they share the same/similar duties and were subject to the same pay policies. 56. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the FLSA Bonus Class Members were subject to Defendants’ policy, decision, and/or plan of failing to pay appropriate overtime compensation because Defendants failed to include paid bonuses into the regular rate of pay. 57. Defendants are liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Bonus Class, and as such, notice should be sent to the FLSA Bonus. There are numerous similarly situated, current and former employees of Defendants who have been denied overtime pay in violation of the FLSA who would benefit from the issuance of a Court supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join. Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants’ records. 58. Plaintiff brings Count II on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated employees as authorized under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The similarly situated employees are: All current and former Supervisor I employees who Defendants designated as exempt and who worked in the United States at any time within the last three years up to the entry of judgment in this case (the “FLSA Supervisor I Class”). 59. Plaintiff knows that FLSA Supervisor I Class Members exist who have been denied the FLSA’s overtime premium by being subjected to the same illegal pay practices described above. Plaintiff’s knowledge is based on working and talking with other employees of Defendants. 60. The FLSA Supervisors I Class Members are similarly situated to Plaintiff in that they share the same/similar duties and were subject to the same pay policies. 62. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the FLSA Supervisor I Class Members were subject to Defendants’ policy, decision, and/or plan of failing to pay appropriate overtime compensation because Defendants designated them as exempt. 63. Defendants are liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Supervisor I Class, and as such, notice should be sent to the FLSA Supervisor I Class. There are numerous similarly situated, current and former employees of Defendants who have been denied overtime pay in violation of the FLSA who would benefit from the issuance of a Court supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join. Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants’ records. 64. Plaintiff sues on his own behalf and on behalf of the Pennsylvania Bonus Class Members and Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3). 65. Defendants violated the PMWA by failing pay overtime at the legally mandated rate of time and one half the regular rate of pay for all hours worked by failing to pay overtime on a regular rate of pay inclusive of the bonuses. 66. The Pennsylvania Bonus Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The number of Pennsylvania Bonus Class Members is believed to number over 30. These similarly situated employees are known to Defendants, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendants’ records. 68. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Pennsylvania Bonus Class Members. Plaintiff and Pennsylvania Bonus Class Members work or have worked for Defendants in the same/similar job, performing substantially the same work, and have been subjected to Defendants’ common practice and policy of failing to properly pay the appropriate overtime rate by failing to include bonuses in the regular rate of pay for overtime calculation purposes. 69. Defendants acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Pennsylvania Bonus Class Members as a whole by engaging in the same violations of law with respect to the Pennsylvania Bonus Class Members, thereby making any final relief appropriate with respect to the Pennsylvania Bonus Class as a whole. 70. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Pennsylvania Bonus Class. 71. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex wage and hour litigation and class and collective action litigation. 73. Defendants likewise violated the PMWA by misclassifying Supervisor I employees as exempt from overtime compensation and thus failing pay overtime at the legally mandated rate of time and one half the regular rate of pay for all hours worked inclusive of the bonuses. 74. The Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The number of Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members is believed to number over 30. These similarly situated employees are known to Defendants, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendants’ records. 75. There are common questions of law and fact common to the members of the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class that predominate over any questions solely affecting the individual members of the Class, including, without limitation: a. Whether Defendants classified Plaintiff and the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members as exempt and thus failed to pay them the legally required overtime for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week; b. Whether Defendant misclassified Plaintiff and the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members as exempt; and c. Whether Defendants is liable for all damages claimed by Plaintiff and Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members, including, without limitation, compensatory, interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees. 77. Defendants acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members as a whole by engaging in the same violations of law with respect to the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members, thereby making any final relief appropriate with respect to the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class as a whole. 78. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class. 79. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex wage and hour litigation and class and collective action litigation. 80. Defendants has damaged the Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members. They are entitled to recover damages as a result of Defendants’ common and uniform policies, practices, and procedures. 81. A Class Action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this case, particularly in the context of wage litigation such as the instant case where individual workers lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against a large company, such as Defendants. 82. Furthermore, class treatment is superior because it will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments about Defendants’ practices. 83. Plaintiff incorporates the above paragraphs of this Complaint into this Count. 88. Plaintiff incorporate the above paragraphs of this Complaint into this Count. 89. Defendants’ practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and FLSA Supervisor I Class Members overtime at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rate for all hours over forty (40) violates the FLSA because Defendants designated them as exempt and failed to pay them overtime. See 29 U.S.C. § 207. 90. None of the exemptions provided by the FLSA are applicable to the Defendants, or to the Plaintiff and FLSA Supervisor I Class Members. 91. Defendants has not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA. Defendants’ method of paying Plaintiff and FLSA Class Members in violation of the FLSA was willful and was not based on a good faith and reasonable belief that its conduct did not violate the FLSA. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 93. The PMWA requires that employees receive overtime compensation “not less than one and one-half times” the employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek. See 43 P.S. § 333.104(c). Under the PMWA, the regular rate of pay “shall be deemed to include all remuneration for employment.” 34 Pa. Code § 231.43. 94. Defendants violated the PMWA by failing to include all remuneration in the regular rate of Plaintiff and the Pennsylvania Bonus Class Members by excluding the bonus payments. 95. Defendants are an employer covered by the PMWA’s mandates, and Plaintiff and the other Pennsylvania Bonus Class Members are employees entitled to the PMWA’s protections. 96. As described above, Defendants violated the PMWA by paying overtime in a manner that is not permissible under Pennsylvania law. 97. Due to Defendants’ PMWA violations, Plaintiff and the Pennsylvania Bonus Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid overtime compensation for all hours worked by them in excess of forty in a workweek and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, pursuant to the PMWA. 98. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs by reference. Collective Action under § 2 1 6 ( b ) o f t h e Fair Labor Standards Act Overtime Claims – FLSA Supervisor I Class Collective Action under § 2 1 6 ( b ) o f t h e Fair Labor Standards Act Overtime Claims – FLSA Bonus Class Rule 23 Class Action -- Violation of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act Overtime Claims -- Pennsylvania Bonus Class Members Rule 23 Class Action -- Violation of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act Overtime Claims -- Pennsylvania Supervisor I Class Members

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22. Plaintiff seek to represent two classes of individuals ("the Classes") defined as follows: ClassA: Allpersons intheUnited States, from four years priorto thefiling oftheinstant Complaint through the date ofthe filing ofthe instant Complaint, towhom, without obtaining the persons' prior express consent, Defendant, using an automatic telephone dialing system as defined in theTCPA, and/oran artificial or prerecorded voicemade, initiated and/orcaused to be initiated any calls to the persons' cellular telephones or residential telephones, that dehvered a message identical or substantially similar to the message described above that was left for Plaintiff Class B: All persons in the United States, from October 16, 2013, through the date of the filing of the instant Complaint, to whom, without obtaining the persons' prior express written consent, Defendant, using an automatic telephone dialing system as defined in the TCPA, and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice, made, initiated and/or caused to be initiated any calls to the persons' cellular telephones or residential telephones that delivered a message identical or substantially similar to the message described above that was left for Plaintiff 23. Numerositv: The Classes are so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective Classes' members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 24. Upon information and belief Classes A and B contain at a minimum thousands of members. 26. Members of the Classes may be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in class actions, such as by published notice, e-mail notice, website notice, fax notice, first class mail, orcombinations thereof, orbyother methods suitable totheClasses and deemed necessary and/or appropriate bythe Court. 27. Typicality: Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the Classes are based on the same legal theories and arise fi:om the same unlawful conduct. 28. Defendant, using anautomatic telephone dialing system within themeaning of the TCPA, and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice, made, initiated and/or caused to be initiated at least one telephone call to Plaintiff and each member of class A, without obtaining the called parties' prior express consent, that delivered a message identical or substantially similar to the message described above that was left for Plaintiff. 29. Defendant, using an automatic telephone dialing system as defined in the TCPA, and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice, made, initiated and/or caused to be initiated at least one telephone callto Plaintiffand eachmemberof Class B, withoutobtaining the calledparties' prior express written consent, that delivered a message identical or substantially similar to the message described above that was left for Plaintiff. 30. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of common questions offact and law affecting the Plaintiffand members ofthe Classes. 33. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Classes because Plaintiffs interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members ofthe Classes and has no interests antagonistic to the members ofthe Classes. Plaintiff has retained counsel who is competent and experienced in litigation in the federal courts and class action litigation. 35. Iniunctive Relief: Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and members of Classes A and B, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiffand the members ofClasses A and B as a whole. 36. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in all of the above paragraphs and incorporates such allegations by reference. 37. By Defendant's above-described conduct, Defendant committed thousands of violations ofthe TCPA against Plaintiffand the members ofClass A. 38. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of Class A are entitled to statutory damages from Defendant under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) of greater than $5,000,000 and an injunction against Defendant ordering it to cease their violations ofthe TCPA. 39. If it is found that Defendant willfully and/or knowingly violated the TCPA, Plaintiff and the members of Class A request an increase by the Court of the damage award against Defendant, described in the preceding paragraph, to three times the amount available under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) for willfiil or knowing violations, which amounts to greater than $15,000,000. 41. By Defendant's above-described conduct, Defendant committed thousands of violations ofthe TCPA against Plaintiffand the members ofClass B. 42. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of Class B are entitled to statutory damages from Defendant under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) of greater than $5,000,000 and an injunction against Defendant ordering Defendant to cease its violations ofthe TCPA. 43. If it is found that Defendant willfully and/or knowingly violated the TCPA, Plaintiff and the members of Class B request an increase by the Court of the damage award against Defendant, described in the preceding paragraph, to three times the amount available under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) for willful or knowing violations, which amounts to greater than $3,750,000.

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11. Plaintiff Neuharth’s husband, Thomas Neuharth, allegedly entered into a consumer transaction with “CITY OF S MILWAUKEE FIRE DEPT” ON January 27, 2016, for ambulance transportation and associated medical services. 13. On or about March 2, 2016, Plaintiff received a bill ostensibly from “CITY OF S MILWAUKEE FIRE DEPT” (“SMFD”) regarding an alleged debt, allegedly owed to SMFD. A copy of the letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit A. 14. Exhibit A is a bill for a call for ambulance services provided to Thomas Neuharth by SMFD on January 27, 2016. 15. Upon information and belief, Exhibit A is a form letter, generated by computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiff inserted by computer. 16. Upon information and belief and the investigation of counsel, Lifequest mailed Exhibit A to Plaintiff. Exhibit A includes Lifequest’s address in Wautoma, Wisconsin. 17. On or about March 25, 2016, Plaintiff received a bill ostensibly from SMFD, regarding another alleged debt. A copy of the letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit B. 18. Upon information and belief, Exhibit B is a bill for a call for ambulance services provided to Thomas Neuharth by SMFD on November 7, 2015. 19. Upon information and belief, Exhibit B is a form letter, generated by computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiff inserted by computer. 20. Upon information and belief and the investigation of counsel, Lifequest mailed Exhibit B to Plaintiff. Exhibit B includes Lifequest’s address in Wautoma, Wisconsin. 21. Neither Exhibit A nor Exhibit B include the names “Lifequest” or “Life Line.” 22. On or about April 24, 2016, Plaintiff received a bill from Lifequest regarding the same alleged SMFD debt referenced in Exhibit A. A copy of the letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit C. 23. Exhibit C states that the sender is "LifeQuest Services." 24. Exhibit C also purports to be a debt collection letter. 26. Exhibit C also contains both the validation notice required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) and the notice required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11): ... 27. On or about April 24, 2016, Plaintiff received a bill from Lifequest regarding the same alleged SMFD debt referenced in Exhibit B. A copy of the letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit D. 28. Exhibit D is virtually identical to Exhibit C, except for the date of the ambulance services. Like Exhibit C, Exhibit D appears to be a debt collection letter. 29. Even if LifeQuest was billing for SMFD before the debt was in default, LifeQuest is a debt collector as a matter of law with respect to Exhibits A-D, regardless of which name it was using. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (“the term [debt collector] includes any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts.”); Catencamp v. Cendant Timeshare Resort Group -- Consumer Finance, Inc., 471 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 2006). 31. In fact, LifeQuest created and mailed bills, including Exhibits A and B, in the name of SMFD. 32. The purpose of using SMFD’s name on letters formatted as “bills” and then using LifeQuest’s name on subsequent communications formatted as “debt collection letters” is to deceive consumers into believing that a new debt collection agency is collecting the account when the status of the debt has not actually changed. Consumers are more concerned and upset by contacts from debt collectors than from original creditors or their billing services. 33. Plaintiff Neuharth was confused by Exhibits A-D. 34. Neuharth had to spend time and money investigating Exhibits A-D, and the consequences of any potential responses to Exhibits A-D. 35. The FDCPA presumes that violations cause injury to consumers, and that such injuries are concrete and particularized but difficult to quantify. For this reason, and to encourage consumers to bring FDCPA actions, Congress authorized an award of statutory damages for violations. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). 36. Moreover, Congress has explicitly described the FDCPA as regulating “abusive practices” in debt collection. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(a) – 1692(e). Any person who receives a debt collection letter containing a violation of the FDCPA is a victim of abusive practices. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(e) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses”). 38. Likewise, Exhibit D also states: 39. Exhibits C and D threaten to collect “Interest.” 40. Upon information and belief, Exhibits C and D falsely state or imply that LifeQuest has a right to collect interest on consumers’ alleged debts. 41. Further, upon information and belief, neither Defendant nor SMFD has any legal basis to add interest to the Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ alleged debts. 43. Upon information and belief, Exhibits C and D are threatening to collect prejudgment interest, despite the fact that no legal action has been initiated against the consumer. 44. A debt collector cannot collect prejudgment interest when that interest has not been awarded by a court or agreed to by contract. Paige v. Waukesha Health Sys., No. 12-cv-601-CNC; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96962, *18-20 (“Wisconsin cases suggest, as the Paiges argue, that absent a contractual agreement prejudgment interest cannot be automatically added by a creditor but instead must await a court judgment;”), citing Estreen v. Bluhm, 79 Wis. 2d 142, 156, 255 N.W.2d 473, 482 (1977); Erickson by Wightman v. Gundersen, 183 Wis. 2d 106, 123, n.8, 515 N.W.2d 293, 301, n.8 (Ct. App. 1994); Beacon Bowl, Inc. v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 176 Wis. 2d 740, 776-77, 501 N.W.2d 788, 802-03 (1993); see also Veach v. Sheeks, 316 F.3d 690, 692 (7th Cir. 2003); contra Trease v. Tri-State Adjustments, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Wis. 2013). 45. The alleged debts in Exhibits C and D have not been reduced to judgment, and Neuharth has never been sued to collect this alleged debt. 46. Neither Plaintiff Neuharth nor her deceased husband ever agreed to any contract specifying a contractual amount or rate of interest, with SMFD or Defendant. Lindenbach letters 47. Plaintiff Lindenbach allegedly entered into a consumer transaction with “CITY OF WEST ALLIS FIRE DEPT” for ambulance transportation and associated medical services. 49. Upon information and belief, Exhibit E is a form letter, generated by computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiff inserted by computer. 50. Exhibit E states the following: 51. Exhibit E also states: 52. LifeQuest’s threat to collect the debt through tax intercept was false. 53. Lindenbach filed a Wisconsin Homestead Credit Claim for 2015 with the Wisconsin Department of Revenue on or around February 1, 2016. 54. Lindenbach received his homestead credit in full about one week later. None of the credit was intercepted. 56. Upon information and belief, it is common practice in the debt collection industry for letters containing references to tax intercepts to be sent to consumers during the period when most consumers are preparing and filing tax returns. The threats are intended to scare consumers into making payments to avoid tax refund intercepts. 57. Exhibit E also threatens to collect “Interest.” 58. Upon information and belief, Exhibit E falsely states or implies that LifeQuest has a right to collect interest on consumers’ alleged debts. 59. Further, upon information and belief, neither Defendant nor “City of West Allis Fire Dept” has any legal basis to add interest to the Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ alleged debts. 60. Although the amount of “Interest” in Exhibit E is $0.00, the unsophisticated consumer would believe that the letter implies that interest could be added to the debt in the future. See, eg. Tylke v. Diversified Adjustment Serv., No. 14-cv-748; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153281, *7 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2014) (“the inclusion of a collection fee, even one showing a balance of zero, could imply the future possibility of one.”). 61. Upon information and belief, Exhibit E is threatening to collect prejudgment interest, despite the fact that no legal action has been initiated against the consumer. 63. The alleged debt in Exhibit E has not been reduced to judgment, and Lindenbach has never been sued to collect this alleged debt. 64. Lindenbach has never agreed to any contract specifying a contractual amount or rate of interest, with the City of West Allis Fire Department or Defendant. The FDCPA and WCA 65. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e generally prohibits “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 66. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2) specifically prohibits the “false representation of the character, amount, or legal status” of an alleged debt, or the “false representation of…compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection” of an alleged debt. 67. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) specifically prohibits threatening “to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.” 68. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) specifically prohibits the “use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 70. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) specifically prohibits the “collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 71. Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(j) specifically prohibits a debt collector from “[c]laim[ing], or attempt[ing] or threaten[ing] to enforce a right with knowledge or reason to know that the right does not exist.” 72. Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(L) also specifically prohibits a debt collector from “[t]hreaten[ing] action against the customer unless like action is taken in regular course or is intended with respect to the particular debt.” 73. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 74. Count I is brought on behalf of Plaintiff Neuharth. 75. LifeQuest’s use of SMFD’s name to send bills, prior to sending debt collection letters under LifeQuest’s own name, was confusing and misleading to the unsophisticated consumer. 76. The unsophisticated consumer would believe that a new collection agency was collecting the consumer’s account. 77. In fact, LifeQuest was still collecting the debt. 78. LifeQuest violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(a) and 1692e(10). 80. Count Ii is brought on behalf of Plaintiff Lindenbach. 81. LifeQuest falsely stated that Plaintiff’s debt would be collected through the State Tax Refund Intercept Program. 82. In fact, none of Plaintiff’s homestead credit refund was intercepted, despite Plaintiff’s filing for the credit two months after the date printed on Exhibit E. 83. LifeQuest violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692e(10). 84. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 85. Count III is brought on behalf of both Plaintiffs. 86. The inclusion of “Interest” in Exhibits C, D and E is a false, deceptive, and/or misleading representation to the unsophisticated consumer recipient. LifeQuest has no legal basis for collecting interest on Plaintiffs’ alleged debts. 87. The unsophisticated consumer would believe, or at a minimum would be confused, whether he may owe interest in the future for the alleged debt. There is no legitimate reason for the “Interest” field to be on the letter other than to make the consumer believe that the number will increase. 88. Exhibits C, D and E also falsely represent that Defendant is lawfully entitled to collect interest. 90. Exhibits C, D and E create a false impression as to its authorization or approval for collecting interest. 91. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2), 1692e(5), and 1692e(10). 92. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 93. Exhibits C, D and E claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a right to interest, even though Defendant knew, or should have had reason to know, that no such right existed at the time the letter was sent. 94. Defendant violated Wis. Stat. §§ 427.104(1)(j) and 427.104(1)(L). 95. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of three classes. 96. Class 1 is defined as (a) all natural persons in the State of Wisconsin (b) who were sent a communication in the form of Exhibit A or B to the complaint in this action, (c) seeking to collect a debt for personal, family or household purposes, (d) and who were subsequently sent a collection letter in the form of Exhibit C or D to the complaint in this action, (e) on or after August 22, 2015, (f) that was not returned by the postal service. 98. Class 3 is defined as (a) all natural persons in the State of Wisconsin (b) who were sent a communication in the form of Exhibit E to the complaint in this action, (c) seeking to collect a debt for personal, family or household purposes, (d) and whose next tax refund or homestead credit refund were not intercepted, (e) on or after August 22, 2015, (f) that was not returned by the postal service. 99. Each Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are more than 50 members of each Class. 100. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of each class, which common questions predominate over any questions that affect only individual class members. The predominant common question is whether Exhibits A-D violate the FDCPA and/or the Neuharth letters

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31. Plaintiffs were typically scheduled to work for Defendant Monday through Thursday from 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m., and from 9:00 a.m. until 2:00 p.m. on Friday, resulting in overtime hours on a weekly basis. Defendant promises its Agents a one-hour unpaid lunch break each Monday through Thursday. Thus, Agents are typically scheduled to work 41 hours each week (nine hours per day Monday through Thursday and five hours on Friday). Nevertheless, Defendant does not pay overtime to its Agents, nor does Defendant issue pay stubs to its Agents reflecting the number of hours worked in a pay period. (See Exh. B, D and F.) Rather, Plaintiffs’ pay stubs falsely represent that Plaintiffs are paid a salary. (See Exh. B and F.) 32. Throughout their employment with Defendant, Plaintiffs were required to work a substantial amount of unpaid time, including overtime, as part of their jobs as Agents. 33. Defendant’s Agents are responsible for, among other things: (a) booting up their computers and logging into essential computer software programs and applications before taking live calls; (b) verifying and prescreening inbound customer leads over the telephone and then delivering them via hot call transfer to a sales person; (c) ensuring that every live call is accounted for in the Auto Dialer; and (d) logging out of the computer software programs and applications and shutting down the computer. 34. Defendant has strict expectations that its Agents will remain on the phones during scheduled meal and rest breaks if there are not enough Agents to cover the phones or if the Agent is stuck on a live call; and Defendant threatens discipline if an Agent fails to do so. 36. Agents are assigned by Defendant to work on several different call campaigns, including mortgage lending, solar energy, home security, reverse mortgages, debt resolution, auto warranty, credit repair, and tax relief. 37. During his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff Baudin was assigned to work on the solar energy campaign. Plaintiff Duffney was assigned by Defendant to work on several different call campaigns including mortgage lending, solar energy, home security, and auto warranty. Likewise, Plaintiff Persaud was assigned by Defendant to work on several different call campaigns including mortgage lending, solar energy, debt resolution, auto warranty, and credit repair. Plaintiffs Duffney and Persaud regularly worked on multiple call campaigns at the same time, often during the same shift. 38. Defendant’s unlawful pay policies and timekeeping practices, as well as the Agents’ job duties, are substantially the same irrespective of the call campaign they are assigned to and irrespective of whether they work from home or from Defendant’s brick-and-mortar call center facility. 40. Upon information and belief, all Agents are and were hourly, non-exempt employees. 41. Defendant’s Agents use the same or substantially similar computer software programs and applications in the course of performing their job responsibilities. These programs and applications are integral and an important part of the Agents’ work, and they cannot perform their jobs effectively without them. 42. Defendant’s Agents receive substantially the same training, are subject to the same disciplinary policies, and are subject to quality assurance reviews based on the same or similar criteria. 43. Defendant expressly instructs and trains Agents to have all their computer software programs and applications open and ready at the start of their scheduled shifts so that they can change their status to “Active” in the Auto Dialer and begin taking live calls at the moment their shifts begin. 45. When an Agent receives a demerit, Defendant furnishes the Agent with a document explaining the nature of the “violation” and the penalty (i.e., the “demerit”) imposed upon the Agent for the violation. The Agent must sign the document, certifying that the Agent understands the nature of the violation and the penalty being imposed, and that the Agent “accepts” the demerit. 46. These policies reinforce that Agents are required to have the essential computer software programs and applications open and ready at the start of their shifts so that they can change their status in the Auto Dialer to “Active” and begin taking live calls at the moment their shifts begin. 48. Defendant requires its Agents to track their hours worked each and every day by manually recording their time on paper timesheets provided by Defendant. At the end of each pay period, the Agents must tally and record on their timesheets the number of hours worked during the pay period, sign their timesheets, and submit them to Defendant’s managers for approval. Defendant, however, will not approve an Agent’s timesheet unless the hours recorded on the timesheet substantially adhere to the Agent’s scheduled working hours, meaning that the Agents must record a clock-in time that matches their scheduled start-of-shift time and a clock- out time that matches their scheduled end-of-shift time, while also deducting a mandatory one- hour lunch break for their Monday through Thursday shifts. 49. Because Defendant trains and instructs its Agents not to record time spent performing pre-shift, mid-shift and post-shift work tasks, Defendant’s compensation system fails to properly account for and compensate Agents for all time worked, including their overtime hours, during each day and during each workweek. 50. The hours reflected on the Agents’ timesheets are not accurate, are contrived by Defendant, and are not related to the hours the Agents actually worked for Defendant. This is because Defendant requires its Agents to perform compensable work tasks before and after their shifts and during their unpaid meal periods but trains and instructs them not to record this time on their timesheets. 52. Pursuant to Defendant’s policies, training and direction, Defendant’s Agents are required to start up and log into essential computer software programs and applications in order to access information and take live calls. The pre-shift startup and login process takes substantial time on a daily basis, in the range of 5 to 10 minutes per shift, or even longer when technical issues arise. Before each shift and before taking live phone calls, Agents must undertake the following essential work tasks in chronological order: a. Locate their workstation and turn-on/warm-up their computer. b. Log into Microsoft Windows by clicking a single sign on button and wait for the computer to establish an internet connection. c. Open Google Chrome by clicking the Google Chrome icon and go to Ytel.com. d. Log into Ytel (the Auto Dialer) using a user ID (a four digit number provided by Defendant) and password (last four digits of the Agent’s Social Security Number), select your campaign (i.e., mortgage lending, solar energy, home security, credit repair, tax relief, etc.), and wait for the dashboard to appear. Once the dashboard appears, it will display three overlapping menus/panels, which the Agents must rearrange or resize so that they can simultaneously view each menu. e. Clear the cache in Google Chrome, which entails the following: i. From the “Menu” button in the upper-right corner of the Chrome window, choose “More Tools” > “Clear browsing data….” ii. Select the period of time you wish to delete cached information using the “Clear the following items from” drop down menu. From there, choose “Cached images and files”. iii. Select the “Clear browsing data” button and wait for Chrome to clear the cache. f. Change status in Ytel to “Active” and wait for the Auto Dialer to connect to a live call. 53. Agents who work from home are required to undertake the exact same login steps. 55. Defendant’s Agents are not compensated for this time because Defendant trains and instructs its Agents not to record this time on their timesheets. This policy results in Agents performing no less than 5 to 10 minutes of unpaid pre-shift work each and every day. 56. The unpaid work performed prior to each shift by Plaintiffs and all other Agents directly benefits Defendant, and the tasks undertaken in connection with the off-the-clock work are integral and indispensable to their job duties and responsibilities as Agents. B. Meal-Period Off-the-Clock Work 57. Defendant promises its Agents one unpaid 60-minute meal period each Monday through Thursday. However, in reality, Agents regularly work through unpaid meal periods—or take them late—when there are not enough Agents to cover the phones or when the Agent is stuck on a live call. 59. Instead of complying with the law, Defendant does not provide Agents with bona fide meal periods because it requires the Agents to resume taking live calls promptly at the end of their scheduled meal breaks, meaning that the Agents must return to their computer stations prior to the end of their unpaid meal breaks to log back in and reconnect to the Auto Dialer. 60. The work performed by Agents during their unpaid meal breaks takes substantial time on a daily basis, in the range of 5 minutes per shift, but Agents are not paid for this time. C. Post-Shift Off-the-Clock Work 61. Pursuant to Defendant’s policies, training and direction, at the conclusion of their scheduled shifts, Defendant’s Agents are required to log out of and shut down the computer software programs and applications and shut down the computer. The post-shift logout and shutdown process takes substantial time on a daily basis, ranging from 2 to 3 minutes per shift, but can take as long as 10 minutes if the Agent experiences technical problems with the computer, software or applications. 62. Defendant’s Agents are not compensated for this time because Defendant trains and instructs its Agents not to record this time on their timesheets. This policy results in Agents performing no less than 2 to 3 minutes of unpaid post-shift work each and every day. 63. The unpaid work performed subsequent to each shift by Plaintiffs and all other Agents directly benefits Defendant, and the tasks undertaken in connection with the off-the-clock work are integral and indispensable to their job duties and responsibilities as Agents. D. Additional Off-The-Clock Work 65. In sum, Defendant deducted 6.72 hours of compensable time from Plaintiff Persaud during the four representative pay periods identified above. (See Exh. H-I.) 66. Defendant’s pay violations illustrated above stem, at least in part, from Defendant’s decision to compensate its Agents for only such time that they are connected to Defendant’s Auto Dialer, meaning that they are only paid for time spent on the phones (i.e., “on the dialer”) and are not paid for any time spent disconnected from the Auto Dialer. 67. In this regard, Defendant tracks the amount of time that its Agents are not “on the dialer,” deducts all such time from its Agents’ compensable time, and fraudulently induces its Agents to sign off on this illegal policy by requiring its Agents to sign payroll reports at the end of each pay period acknowledging that they have reviewed the payroll report and “agree” with the calculations, while at the same time failing to disclose to the Agents the illegal nature of its pay policy. 68. Agents spend significant amounts of compensable time disconnected from the Auto Dialer, but Defendant does not pay them for this time. 69. For instance, if an Agent accumulates too much “dead time,” meaning that the Agent is connected to the Auto Dialer but is not on the phone with a live call, Defendant’s managers will manually boot the Agent from the Auto Dialer. The Agent is not paid for this time because they are no longer connected to the Auto Dialer, nor are they paid for the time spent logging back into and reconnecting to the Auto Dialer. 71. Defendant deducts additional time from the Agents if they are not “on the dialer” and ready to take calls promptly at the end of their scheduled rest breaks, prompting Defendant’s managers to manually boot the Agents from the Auto Dialer. The Agents are not paid for this time because they are no longer connected to the Auto Dialer, nor are they paid for the time spent logging back into and reconnecting to the Auto Dialer. 73. These policies result in Agents performing significant amounts of unpaid work each and every week. Because Agents typically work 40 or more hours per week, this policy also deprives them of overtime pay. 75. An example of specific workweeks where Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs all overtime due for hours worked in excess of 40 hours (as mandated by the FLSA) includes the following: Pay Period of 01/11/2019 to 01/25/2019  Plaintiff Baudin was paid gross wages equal to $1,615.36 for the pay period.  With unpaid pre-shift, meal-period, and post-shift time, in a range of 12 to 18 minutes per shift, at 11 shifts for the pay period, Plaintiff Baudin should have been paid an additional 132-198 minutes at his overtime rate of pay. (Exh. B, Baudin Pay Stub.) Pay Period of 09/09/2018 to 09/24/2018  Plaintiff Duffney was paid gross wages equal to $1,382.05 for the pay period.  With unpaid pre-shift, meal-period, and post-shift time, in a range of 12 to 18 minutes per shift, at 11 shifts for the pay period, Plaintiff Duffney should have been paid an additional 132-198 minutes at her overtime rate of pay. (Exh. D, Duffney Pay Stub.) F. Defendant Benefited from the Uncompensated Off-the-Clock Work 76. At all relevant times, Defendant directed and directly benefited from the work performed by Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees in connection with the above-described pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift activities performed by Agents. 78. At all relevant times, Defendant was able to track the amount of time Agents spent in connection with the pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift activities. However, Defendant failed to do so and failed to compensate Agents for the off-the-clock work they performed. 79. At all relevant times, Agents were non-exempt hourly employees, subject to the requirements of the FLSA. 80. At all relevant times, Defendant used its attendance and adherence policies against the Agents in order to pressure them into performing the pre-shift, mid-shift, and post- shift off-the-clock work. 81. Defendant expressly trained and instructed its Agents to perform the above- described pre-shift activities before the start of their scheduled shifts, to ensure they were prepared to take live calls (i.e., were “phone ready”) at the moment their shifts began. 82. At all relevant times, Defendant’s policies and practices deprived Agents of wages owed for the pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift activities they performed. Because Defendant’s Agents typically worked 40 hours or more in a workweek, Defendant’s policies and practices also deprived them of overtime pay. 83. Defendant knew or should have known that the time spent by Agents in connection with the pre-shift, mid-shift, and post-shift activities was compensable under the law. Indeed, in light of the explicit DOL guidance cited above, there is no conceivable way for Defendant to establish that it acted in good faith. 84. Despite knowing Agents performed work before and after their scheduled shifts and during their unpaid meal breaks, Defendant failed to make any effort to stop or disallow the off-the-clock work and instead suffered and permitted it to happen. 86. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on their own behalf and on behalf of: All similarly situated current and former hourly brick-and-mortar and/or at- home Account Representatives or Transfer Agents who work or have worked for Defendant at any time during the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint through judgment. (hereinafter referred to as the “FLSA Collective”). Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this definition if necessary. 87. Defendant is liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate Plaintiffs and other similarly situated Agents. 88. Excluded from the FLSA Collective are Defendant’s executives and administrative and professional employees, including computer professionals and outside salespersons. 89. Consistent with Defendant’s policy and pattern or practice, Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective were not paid premium overtime compensation when they worked beyond 40 hours in a workweek. 90. Defendant assigned and/or was aware of all of the work that Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective performed. 92. Defendant is aware or should have been aware that federal law required it to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective overtime premiums for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. 93. Defendant’s unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated and consistent. 94. A collective action under the FLSA is appropriate because the employees described above are “similarly situated” to Plaintiffs under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The employees on behalf of whom Plaintiffs bring this collective action are similarly situated because (a) they have been or are employed in the same or similar positions; (b) they were or are performing the same or similar job duties; (c) they were or are subject to the same or similar unlawful practices, policy, or plan; and (d) their claims are based upon the same factual and legal theories. 95. The employment relationships between Defendant and every proposed FLSA Collective member are the same. The key issues - the amount of uncompensated pre-shift start- up/log-in time, unpaid meal period time, and the amount of post-shift shut-down/log-out time owed to each employee - do not vary substantially among the proposed FLSA Collective members. 96. Many similarly situated current and former Agents have been underpaid in violation of the FLSA and would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it. 98. Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendant, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendant’s records. 99. Plaintiffs estimate the proposed FLSA Collective, including both current and former employees over the relevant period, will include hundreds of workers. The precise number of FLSA Collective members should be readily available from a review of Defendant’s personnel and payroll records.

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11. Defendant is a private university and contacts consumers to solicit them to sign up for college classes using an Automated Telephone Dialing System (“ATDS”). 12. As explained by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) in its 2012 order, the TCPA requires “prior express written consent for all autodialed or prerecorded [solicitation] calls to wireless numbers and residential lines.” In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG No. 02-278, FCC 12-21, 27 FCC Rcd. 1830 ¶ 2 (Feb. 15, 2012). 13. Yet in violation of this rule, Defendant fails to obtain any prior express written consent to make these autodialed solicitation calls to cellular telephone numbers. 15. In fact, HBU advertises its autodialing technology on its very own website, as shown below: 17. When placing these calls to consumers, Defendant failed to obtain prior express written consent as required by the TCPA from cellular telephone owners/users to make such calls. 18. At all times material to this Complaint, Defendant was and is fully aware that unwanted autodialed telemarketing calls are being made to consumers’ cellular telephones through its own efforts and their agents. 19. Defendant knowingly made (and continues to make) autodialed solicitation calls to cellular telephones without the prior express written consent of the call recipients. In so doing, Defendant not only invaded the personal privacy of Plaintiff and members of the putative Class, but also intentionally and repeatedly violated the TCPA. 20. On August 11, 2006, Plaintiff Hicks’ cellular telephone number was registered on the National Do Not Call Registry. 21. Plaintiff Hicks became a registered nurse after studying at Austin Community College (hereinafter “ACC”). 22. While studying at ACC, Hicks signed a document with ACC that stated that ACC would not share nor sell her information with any other schools or organizations. 24. The next day, on September 14, 2017 at 9:41 a.m., Hicks received another call from the 1710 Number (the “September 14th Call”). 25. Upon answering the September 14th Call, Hicks noticed a slight pause. This artificially long pause is indicative of the caller using an autodialer to place the calls. 26. During the September 14th Call, HBU again solicited Hicks to sign up for their online programs and their HBU agent explained to Hicks that HBU had partnered with her former school, although, curiously, HBU’s agent did not specifically state Hicks’ former school by name (ACC) until Hicks herself mentioned her former school’s name. 27. During the September 14th Call, Hicks demanded that HBU stop calling her. 28. HBU owns/operates and/or utilizes the 1710 Number to place solicitation calls to potential consumers. 30. By making unauthorized autodialed telephone calls as alleged herein, HBU has caused consumers actual harm in the form of annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of privacy. In addition, the calls disturbed Hicks’ use and enjoyment of her cellular telephone, in addition to the wear and tear on the phone’s hardware (including the phone’s battery) and the consumption of memory on Hicks’ cellular telephone. In the present case, a consumer could be subjected to many unsolicited collection calls as HBU does not take care to ensure that the recipients of its autodialed solicitation calls have given their prior express written consent to be called, even those on the National Do Not Call Registry. 31. In order to redress these injuries, Hicks, on behalf of herself and a class of similarly situated individuals, brings suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., which prohibits unsolicited autodialed telephone calls to cellular telephones. 32. On behalf of the Classes, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Defendant to cease all unsolicited autodialed telephone calling activities and an award of statutory damages to the class members, together with costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. 34. The following individuals are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the class definition following appropriate discovery. 35. Numerosity: The exact size of the Classes are unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant placed autodialed solicitation calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Members of the Class can be easily identified through Defendant’s records. 37. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Classes, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interest adverse to the Classes. 39. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing factual allegations as if fully set forth herein. 40. Defendant made autodialed solicitation telephone calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class without first obtaining prior express written consent to receive such calls. 41. Defendant made the telephone calls using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers using a random or sequential number generator, to receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, without human intervention. 42. The telephone dialing equipment utilized by Defendant, also known as a predictive dialer, dialed numbers from a list, or dialed numbers from a database of telephone numbers, in an automatic and systematic manner. Defendant’s autodialer disseminated information en masse to Plaintiff and other consumers. 44. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Autodialed No Consent Class are each entitled a minimum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 45. In the event that the Court determines that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, it may, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class. 46. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 47. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 48. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 51. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to wireless telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. These consumers requested to not receive calls from Defendant, as set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(3). 52. Defendant also violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) by failing to have a written policy of dealing with do not call requests, by failing to inform or train its personnel engaged in telemarketing regarding the existence and/or use of any do not call list, and by failing to internally record and honor do not call requests. 53. Defendant made more than one unsolicited telephone call to Plaintiff and other members of the Do Not Call Registry Class within a 12-month period without their prior express consent to receive such calls. Plaintiff and other members of the Do Not Call Registry Class never provided any form of consent to receive telephone calls from Defendant, and/or Defendant does not have a current record of consent to place telemarketing calls to them. 55. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class received more than one telephone call in a 12-month period made by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are each entitled, inter alia, to receive up to $500 in damages for such violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 56. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class. Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodialed No Consent Class) Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class)

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1. Probation fee of 40 per month flat fee (Basic or intensive supervision) 2. Onetime probationer set-up fee of $10.00.... 31. Individuals stopped and arrested have not been informed either on arrest or at the City Jail of their rights to avoid incarceration for their debts to the City or of their their rights to indigency hearings, counsel, or waivers or reductions of fixed pre- trial release bonds or appellate bonds. 32. The City of Montgomery uses monies collected from municipal fines, court costs, and fees to help finance the City's budget. The City of Montgomery 2013 year end budget reflects $15.9 million as the gross income from fines and forfeitures. The 2013 Municipal Court Survey for the City o Montgomery Municipal Court lists 86,161 filed cases in the category of Non-DUI traffic cases ("Other Traffic"), along with 87,596 such cases disposed of, and only 37 appeals. By comparison, in its 2013 Municipal Court Annual Survey, the City of Huntsville lists 27,889 Non-DUI traffic cases file, 7251 disposed of, and 1249 appealed. In 2013, the City of Montgomery (2013 estimated Census population of 201,846) raised more than three times as much money as Huntsville (2013 estimated Census population of 186,309) from fines and more than 15 times as much money from local court costs. 35. Indigent debtors were further faced with a coercive promised reduction of their debts by an additional $25 per day if they performed onerous and sometimes dangerous janitorial and other work within the jail, the Montgomery Municipal Court, or other city buildings. Record-keeping for time worked was poor and inmates did not even receive full credit due them for the jobs they performed. 36. While incarcerated, Plaintiffs were allowed only extremely limited visitation time with their families; frequently were subjected to the loss of jobs, homes or other property, and the pursuit of education; they and their families were forced to borrow or otherwise come up with money they needed for vital necessities to pay bonds or debts to avoid imprisonment; they incurred additional debts to family or friends who came to their aid; and they otherwise suffered humiliation, emotional and mental distress, and other injuries. 39. JCS agreed not to invoice the City or the Court for its services and in consideration of the probation services provided by JCS, the Court agreed that: "[E]ach Court Order shall provide for the following: 41. JCS "Probation Officers" routinely signed Municipal Court "Notice to Show Cause" forms that instruct probationers to appear in court for failure to pay and notify them that a warrant will be issued for their arrest if they fail to appear. The JCS-issued Notice to Show Cause also informs the probationer that they have failed to report and that in order to dismiss the court date they not only must report to their next scheduled appointment but also an amount they must pay to JCS (e.g., $1417) to rescind the scheduled hearing. The Certificate of Service on the Notice to Show Cause From indicates that the forms were sent to the probationer by regular U.S. mail. 42. The City of Montgomery's conduct of entering into the above-described contract with JCS on behalf of the City and the Court was a moving force behind the probation payments and conditions, probation revocations, and incarcerations in Plaintiffs' cases and the acts by employees of JCS and the Municipal Court can be fairly attributed to the City. 43. Defendants City of Montgomery, Presiding Judge Hayes and JCS systemically and repeatedly failed to advise Plaintiffs of any of their constitutional, federal or state law, or contractual rights, including rights to seek waivers or reductions of bail, bonds or fees, not to be imprisoned for inability to pay bail, bonds or debt, to receive meaningful pre-privation hearings, and to be afforded representation by counsel. 45. Defendants City of Montgomery, Chief of Police Ernest N. Finley, Jr., Former Chief of Police Kevin Murphy, Presiding Judge Hayes and JCS have been deliberately indifferent to the obvious need to train police, jail employees, judges and other court employees with respect to the constitutional and statutory rights of those subject to police stops, and those unable to pay fines, fees, costs, surcharges or bonds and previously have failed to adopt policies requiring such training and failed to provide such training These policies of failure to train have caused the deprivation of Plaintiffs' rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 22. Defendant is a cold-weather clothing and accessories company. Defendant is an online retailer of base layers for men, women and children. Defendant owns, operates, manages and controls the website, www.hotchillys.com (its “Website”), which is a cold weather apparel retailer. The Website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 23. Defendant’s Website is integrated with its retail business operations, serving as its gateway. The Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to learn about Defendant’s products and services, browse for items, information, access navigation bar descriptions, prices, savings and/or coupons and sale discount -8- items, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. The features offered by www.hotchillys.com include learning about the products and/or items, about the company, read reviews, and make purchases. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its retail operations. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s retail operations and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 25. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace without any physical location. Thus, Defendant’s Website is the main point of sale for its business operation. 26. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 27. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, www.hotchillys.com, the last occurring in March of 2020, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers which effectively denied him the full enjoyment of the goods and services of the Website. Plaintiff visited Defendant’s Website with an intent to browse for available socks and underwear for men. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a range of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to make his desired purchase. -9- 28. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. 29. Many features on the Website also fail to add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. This was an issue on Defendant’s Website particularly in the select style section. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 30. Plaintiff has made multiple attempts to complete a purchase on www.hotchillys.com, most recently in March of 2020, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused www.hotchillys.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 31. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed -10- to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. 32. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 33. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 34. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 35. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 36. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; -11- b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 39. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; -12- b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 40. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. -13- 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly, to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no -14- interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 52. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. -15- 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 56. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not -16- been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 61. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 62. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This -17- inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 66. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under -18- § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. -19- Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 73. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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53. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs by reference as if set forth fully in this section. 54. EOG is one of the largest oil and natural gas companies in the United States and has business operations in Texas and states other than Texas. EOG has significant operations in the Eagle Ford Shale area of South Texas.

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12. In 1991, Congress enacted the TCPA to regulate the explosive growth of the telemarketing industry. In so doing, Congress recognized that “[u]nrestricted telemarketing . . . can be an intrusive invasion of privacy [.]” Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(5) (1991) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227). The TCPA prohibits telemarketing calls to numbers listed on the Do Not Call Registry, unless the caller has the recipient’s signed, written consent 14. The TCPA and implementing regulations prohibit the initiation of telephone solicitations to residential telephone subscribers to the Registry. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2). 15. A person whose number is on the Registry, and who has received more than one telephone call within any twelve-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the TCPA, can sue the violator and seek statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 16. The regulations exempt from liability a caller who has obtained the subscriber’s signed, written agreement to receive telephone solicitations from the caller. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2)(ii). That agreement must also include the telephone number to which the calls may be placed. Id. The TCPA imposes vicarious liability on third-parties who do not physically dial the calls 17. Under the TCPA, a seller of a product or service may be vicariously liable for a third- party marketer’s violations of Section 227(c), even if the seller did not physically dial the illegal call, and even if the seller did not directly control the marketer who did. In re Joint Pet. filed by Dish Network, LLC, FCC 13-54 ¶ 37, 2013 WL 193449 (May 9, 2013) (“FCC Ruling”). 18. A seller is liable under Section 227(c) when it has authorized a telemarketer to market its goods or services. Id. ¶ 47. 20. The Plaintiff has previously placed his telephone number, (XXX) XXX-1324 on the National Do Not Call List, where it has been since March of 2014. 21. On May 30, 2014 and June 6, 2014, the Plaintiff received telephone calls from telemarketing representatives calling from Bankers Life. 22. The caller informed the Plaintiff at the beginning of each call that he was calling from Bankers Life and informed him that they were calling to offer him Medicare insurance. 23. At least one of the calls came from (407) 252-9012. 24. The Plaintiff never consented in any fashion to these telephone calls, and had no business relationship with this entity. 26. Plaintiff is not a customer of Defendant and has not provided Defendant with his personal information or telephone number. 27. In July of 2010 Bankers Life was fined $1,500,000 by Wisconsin insurance regulators related to violations of that state’s do-not-call list and home-solicitation rules. 28. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of the following class: All persons nationwide who, within the Class Period, whose phone numbers had been registered on the Do Not all Registry for 31 days or longer, and who within the four years before the filing of the initial Complaint, received more than one telemarketing call within any twelve-month period from, or on behalf of, the Defendant (the “Class”). 29. Alternatively, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of the following class: All persons in Florida who, within the Class Period, had their phone numbers had been registered on the Do Not all Registry for 31 days or longer, and who within the four years before the filing of the initial Complaint, received more than one telemarketing call within any twelve-month period from, or on behalf of, the Defendant (the “Class”). 30. The following persons are expressly excluded from the Class: (1) Defendant and their subsidiaries and affiliates; (2) all persons who make a timely election to be excluded from the proposed Class; (3) governmental entities; and (4) the Court to which this case is assigned and its staff. 32. Numerosity: Based upon Defendant’s publicly available phone records and phone number databases, it is estimated that the Class numbers is potentially in the hundreds of thousands, and the joinder of all Class members is impracticable. 33. Common Questions Predominate: The action involves common questions of law and fact applicable to each Class member that predominate over questions that affect only individual Class members. Thus, proof of a common set of facts will establish the right to each Class member to recover. Questions of law and fact common to each Class member include, for example: a. Whether Bankers Life violated the TCPA by engaging in advertising by unsolicited telemarketing calls; b. Whether Bankers Life has any defense(s) to engaging in a telemarketing campaign to individuals on the National Do Not Call Registry; c. Whether the Plaintiff and class are entitled to statutory damages as a result of Bankers Life’s actions. 34. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class because Plaintiff was illegally solicited by the Defendant during the Class Period. Defendant’s unlawful actions concern the same business practices described herein irrespective of where they occurred or were experienced. The injuries of each member of the Class were caused directly by Defendant’s wrongful conduct. In addition, the factual underpinning of Defendant’s misconduct is common to all Class members and represents a common thread of misconduct resulting in injury to all members of the Class. Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same practices and course of conduct that give rise to the claims of the Class members and a based on the same legal theories. 36. Superiority: There is no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy other than by maintenance of this class action. The prosecution of individual remedies by members of the Class will tend to establish inconsistent standards of conduct for Defendant and result in the impairment of Class members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they are not parties. Class Action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would create. Further, as the damages suffered by individual members of the Class may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation would make it difficult or impossible for individual members of the Class to redress the wrongs done to them, while an important public interest will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. Class treatment of common questions of law and fact would also be superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that class treatment will conserve the resources of the Court and the litigants, and will promote consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 38. The prerequisites to maintaining a class action pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) are met as questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. 39. Plaintiff and their counsel are unaware of any difficulties that are likely to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 40. Plaintiff is a member of the Class they seeks to represent. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class members’ claims. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff’s claims are typical and representative of the Class. 41. There are no unique defenses which may be asserted against Plaintiff individually, as distinguished from the Class. The claims of Plaintiff are the same as those of the Class. 42. No conflicts of interest exist between Plaintiff and the other Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel that is competent and experienced in complex class action litigation. Plaintiff and their counsel will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. 43. This class action is superior to any other method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this dispute. 45. The Defendant violated the TCPA by (a) initiating telephone solicitations to persons and entities whose telephone numbers were listed on the Do Not Call Registry, or (b) by the fact that others made those calls on its behalf. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(c); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2). 46. The Defendant’s violations were negligent and/or knowing. 47. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 43 above as if fully set forth herein. 48. The TCPA authorizes injunctive relief to prevent further violations of the TCPA. 49. The Plaintiff respectfully petitions this Court to order the Defendant and their employees, agents, and all other persons or entities working on their behalf to make these calls to immediately cease engaging in unsolicited telemarketing in violation of the TCPA. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO BAR FUTURE TCPA VIOLATIONS TCPA Background VIOLATION OF THE TCPA’S DO NOT CALL PROVISIONS

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10. Upon information and belief, Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone number; including but not limited to (850) 795- 4038, (234) 206-8892, (541) 204-4295, and (214) 396-5859; confirmed to be Defendant’s number. 53. Pursuant to the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, Plaintiff is entitled to, and demands, a trial by jury. Respectfully Submitted this 13th Day of July, 2018. 8. Upon information and belief, beginning in or around June 2018, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in - 6963, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Upon information and belief, Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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11. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 12. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and a “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 13. At all times relevant Defendant conducted business in the State of California and in the County of San Diego, within this judicial district. 14. Sometime prior to September 12, 2012, Plaintiff opened a credit card account ending in “6968” with Defendant. 15. Sometime prior to September 12, 2012, Plaintiff allegedly incurred a consumer debt to Defendant on this account. 16. Sometime prior to September 12, 2012, Defendant attempted to contact Plaintiff regarding this alleged debt. 17. On or about September 12, 2012, Plaintiff mailed a brief letter to Defendant demanding that Defendant cease and desist in communication with Plaintiff in any manner, including on her cellular telephone, regarding collections on this account. Additionally, this letter including the Plaintiff’s name, account number, and even the last four digits of her Social Security Number. 18. This letter was addressed to Defendant in Salt Lake City, UT, and mailed on that date by Certified Mail, with Delivery Confirmation Number ending in “4815.” 19. According to website for the United States Postal Service, this letter arrived at its destination in Salt Lake City, UT at 3:55 a.m. on September 15, 2012. 20. Upon receipt of this cease and desist letter, Plaintiff effectively revoked, in writing, any and all consent that Defendant may have had to contact Plaintiff on her cellular telephone for purposes of collecting on the account prior to that point. 29. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 30. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any artificial or prerecorded voice message/s from Defendant without prior express consent, which message by Defendant or its agents was not made for emergency purposes, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 31. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the tens of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 32. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using marketing and artificial or prerecorded voice messages, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 33. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class, and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 41. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 42. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 43. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 44. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): Brief description of cause: VII. REQUESTED IN KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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14. Ramirez was hired by the Company in Victoria, Texas, as an equipment operator. After working for the Company in Victoria, Texas, Ramirez was transferred to San Antonio, Texas. Unfortunately, the Company failed to pay Ramirez for all hours worked in both Victoria and San Antonio, Texas, including overtime hours. Similarly, other hourly employees, including without limitation, equipment operators, surveyors and laborers in both Victoria and San Antonio, Texas, were not paid for all hours worked, including overtime hours sy time-and-one-half their regular rate for all such hours worked. 15. At all times material to their employment, the Plaintiffs regularly worked more than forty (40) hours in a workweek for which they were entitled to be paid overtime compensation at one and one- half (1½) times their regular rate of pay. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2016). 16. No exemption excuses the Company from paying the Plaintiffs overtime compensation nor has the Company made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA. Instead, the Company knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out an illegal pattern or practice regarding the manner in which the Plaintiffs were compensated. 18. Other hourly employees, including equipment operators, surveyors and laborers, both in Victoria and San Antonio, Texas, have been subjected to the Company’s pay practices and policies which are in willful violation of the FLSA. Further, each member of the Class is or has been paid according to the same payment scheme. Thus, although the amount of damages may vary from individual to individual, the damages can be calculated by using a single mathematical formula that is individual1y applicable to each Member of the Class. The Members of the Class are, therefore, similarly situated in terms of pay provisions. 19. The Company’s failure to pay overtime compensation as required by the FLSA results from a generally applicable policy and job requirements that do not depend on the personal circumstances of the Members of the Class. This generally applicable policy is specifically prohibited by the FLSA. Thus, the Plaintiffs’ experiences are typical of the experiences of the Members of the Class. 21. Accordingly, the class of similarly situated Plaintiffs is properly defined as: All current and former hourly employees of the Company, including without limitation, equipment operators, surveyors, and laborers, working in Victoria and San Antonio, Texas, and the surround areas, during the three- year period preceding the filing of this complaint. 22. The Plaintiffs incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 21. 23. The Company’s practice of failing to pay the Plaintiffs and the Members of the Class overtime compensation for overtime hours worked at one and one-half (1½) times their regular rate of pay, was and is in violation of the FLSA. 24. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs and the Members of the Class are entitled to unpaid overtime compensation in an amount which is one and one-half times (1½) their appropriate regular rate of pay. 26. Finally, the Plaintiffs and the Members of the Class are entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of this action. 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b)(2016). Failure to Pay Overtime Violations of the FLSA

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24. Defendants PDC and ADS are a full-service solid waste company providing waste collection, recycling, and disposal services to a commercial, industrial, and residential customers across the states of Illinois and Missouri.2 25. To provide these services, Defendants employed (and continue to employ) numerous Waste Disposal Drivers—including Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members. While exact job titles may differ, these employees were subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work throughout the United States. 27. Defendants PDC and ADS are integrated companies that share customers, properties, employees, and all other assets. 28. Defendant ADS is a wholly owned subsidiary of PDC, acquired in 1989.3 29. Defendant PDC manages key internal relationships to Defendant ADS—that is, it directs the financials of Defendant ADS and controls the pay of Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members. 30. Moreover, all Defendants have (or had) the power to hire and fire Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members; supervise and control Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ work schedules and conditions of their employment; determine their rate and method of payment; and, jointly maintain their employment records. 31. As a result, all Defendants are responsible, both individually and jointly, for compliance with all of the applicable provisions of the FLSA and Illinois state law with respect to the entire employment for the workweeks at issue in this case. 32. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are (or were) non-exempt Waste Disposal Drivers employed by Defendants for the relevant time-periods preceding the filing of this Complaint through the final disposition of this matter. 33. Importantly, none of the FLSA exemptions relieving a covered employer (such as Defendants) of the statutory duty to pay its employees overtime at one and one-half times the regular rate of pay apply to Plaintiff or the Putative Class Members. 35. Defendants have a policy wherein they automatically deduct at least one, and as many as two, 30-minute meal periods from Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members daily time. 36. Waste Disposal Drivers, such as Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members, automatically have thirty (30) minutes per day for a meal period deducted from his or her hours worked if they work under twelve (12) hours in one day. Waste Disposal Drivers, such as Plaintiff and the Putative Class members, automatically have one full hour per day for meal periods deducted from his or her hours worked if they work over twelve (12) hours in one day. 37. Defendants were (and continue to be) aware that Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members regularly worked (and continue to work) through their meal periods without pay in violation of the FLSA. 38. When calculating Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ hours each workweek, Defendants deducted (and continue to deduct) up to one hour from Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ daily on-the-clock hours, in violation of the FLSA. 39. In other words, for each 5-day workweek, Defendants deducted (and continue to deduct) up to five (5) hours from each workweek’s total “on-the-clock” hours. For a 6-day workweek, Defendants deducted (and continue to deduct) up to six (6) hours from each workweek’s total “on-the-clock” hours. 41. Defendants’ systematic deduction of the meal periods from actual hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek deprived (and continues to deprive) Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members of the required and proper amount of overtime pay in violation of the FLSA. 42. As a result of Defendants’ failure to compensate Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for performing work “off-the-clock,” Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked overtime hours for which they were not compensated. 43. Defendants’ failure to compensate Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for their “off-the-clock” overtime hours violated (and continues to violate) the FLSA. 44. Defendants knew or should have known that they were miscalculating Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ regular rates of pay and that the proper amount of overtime compensation was not being paid to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members in violation of the 66. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 67. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this is a collective action filed on behalf of all of Defendants’ employees who have been similarly situated to Plaintiff with regard to the work they performed and the manner in which they have not been paid. 68. Other similarly situated employees of Defendants have been victimized by Defendants’ patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. 70. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members for all hours worked and overtime compensation at the rates required by the FLSA, results from generally applicable policies and practices of Defendants, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of Plaintiff or the FLSA Collective Members. 71. Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective Members. 72. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective Members do not prevent collective treatment. 73. All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be paid for all hours worked and at the proper overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 74. Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 75. Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Defendants will retain the proceeds of their rampant violations. 76. Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 77. Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as defined as in Paragraph 49 and notice should be promptly sent. 78. Plaintiff incorporate by reference all paragraphs and allegations set forth in the statement of facts of this complaint as though fully and completely set forth herein. 79. The Illinois Class is defined as: 96. Plaintiff Stinson brings her Illinois claims pursuant to Illinois Statutes as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 on behalf of all similarly situated individuals employed by Defendants to work in Illinois since March 27, 2017. 97. Class action treatment of Plaintiff Stinson and the Illinois Class Members’ claims is appropriate because, as alleged below, all of Rule 23’s class action requisites are satisfied. 98. The number of Illinois Class Members is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. 99. Plaintiff Stinson is a member of the Illinois Class, her claims are typical of the claims of other Illinois Class Members, and she has no interests that are antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of other class members. 100. Plaintiff Stinson and her counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Illinois Class Members and their interests. 101. Class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 102. Accordingly, the Illinois Class should be certified as defined in Paragraph 79. VI.

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7.1 Assignment. This Agreement shan bind and ~nsure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, successors, and assigns; provided, howevet, that sucti assrgnment shall not reDeve efther party of Its obligations to the ather as provided herein. 7.2. Force MaJeure. The obligations of the respective parties shall be abated for so long as, and to the extent that, their performance fs rendered commercially lmpraotlcable by causes and evems beyond the reasonable control of the affected par1y, incfucllng without timHation fires, floods, at1S of God, strikes, anavailabinty or delays of matertare or transportation, war, revolution. rnsum?Ction, acts of the public enemy. governmental regulallon or prohibition. The party daiming abatement of obllgetion hereunder shaR reasonably notify the other of the cause or event gMng rise to such claim9 and shall take all reasonable steps to Hmit the effect and duration of such cause or event 7.3 Headfngs. The headings In this Agreement are for lnfonnatlon and convenience only and shall not affect the oanstruction thereof. 7.4 Entire Agreement. This Agreement se1s forth the entire agreement betWeen eCllnfcalWorks and Customer with respe¢t to the subject matter hereof, and no modfffoatlon. amendment, wai\ter, terminafion, or discharge of this Agreement or any provisions hereof shall be binding upon either party unless confinned by written instrument signed J:>y both parties. 7.5 Notices. Any notices required to be given by one party to another hereunder shall be deemed duly given when sent in writing. postage prepaid. via certified or registered maB, With retum receipt, or delfvered by hand, and addressed to the appropriate party at the addre$Ses above or to such other address as either party sha.D have designated In wrlUng to the other. The specification of means for giving notice herein shall not preclude the use of other forms of written notice when in the context of their use they provide equal or greater effective ~I notice to the receiving party than the means specified herein. 7.7 Dispute Resolutron. tn the event of any dispute. the ~r'ties agree that the first recourse to resolutfon shaJI be by arbitration, and that no action at law shall be taken by either party previcus to an unsuaoessful resolUtion by arbitration. These provisions shall survive the tennination of this agreement, regardf ess, of the cause of such tennination. (Name - Print or Type) tJuwf- (Name - Print or Type) eermJcaMrorks (CUetomer Company· Print or Type) ltftoM (Company - Print or Type) ,,_,~oQ (Date) ' (Oate) eCtlnicalWQ(Q Up Front Ucense Agreement Rev 4J09 7.B Law and Severabillty. This Agreement. its validity, constructton, and effect shall be govemed by the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In the event that any part of this Agreement Is declared to be void or unenforceable by a court having jurisdiction, the remalndsr of this Agreement shall continue in full force and effect With such void or unenforceable part thereof deleted there from. PAGE 08/11

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(Class Action Alleging Violations of the Missouri Act) A. MISSOURI ACT COVERAGE (Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations) A. FLSA COVERAGE 20. Serco is a multinational services company that is headquartered in Reston, Virginia with locations in forty-five (45) states, four Canadian provinces and fourteen (14) countries around the world.2 Serco’s call centers operate throughout the United States and primarily serve federal, state, and local governments.3 2 https://www.serco-na.com/about/locations. 3 https://www.serco-na.com. Plaintiff’s Original Class/Collective Action Complaint Page 5 21. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ job duties generally consisted of answering phone calls made by Serco’s clients’ customers, answering customer inquiries, and generally assisting customers with their inquiries. 22. Plaintiff Sandoval was employed by Serco in customer service in Wentzville, Missouri from approximately October 2016 until February 2018. 23. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were (and are) non-exempt call-center employees who were (and are) paid by the hour. 24. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked approximately forty (40) “on-the- clock” hours per week. 25. In addition to their forty (40) “on-the-clock” hours, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked up to four hours “off-the-clock” per week and have not been compensated for that time. 26. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members have not been compensated for all the hours they worked for Serco as a result of Serco’s corporate policy and practice of paying its employees only for their scheduled shifts; that is, requiring its hourly call-center employees to clock-in only when ready to take their first call, at the start of their scheduled shift, and to work after their scheduled shifts had ended. 27. Specifically, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are required to start and log-in to their computer, open multiple different Serco computer programs, log in to each Serco program, and ensure that each Serco program is running correctly—all of which can take up to twenty minutes—before they are able to take their first phone call, which comes in as soon as their official shift starts. 28. In addition, Serco frequently required Plaintiff and the Putative Class to assist customers after the end of their scheduled shifts, and to remain at their computers during the lengthy Plaintiff’s Original Class/Collective Action Complaint Page 6 shut-down process, activities which were performed after the employees’ scheduled shifts had concluded. 29. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were not compensated during their start-up time, although they were expected to have completed this process in advance of their official start time. 30. Nor were Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members compensated for the time they worked for Serco after their shifts ended although they were required to continue assisting customers or waiting by their computers during the lengthy shut-down process. 31. Serco required Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to be logged on and have all the requisite computer programs running before their first phone call, at the start of their official shift. 32. Serco also forced Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to remain call available until the end of their scheduled shift, at which point they were clocked out despite having to complete their pending call, log out of all open programs, and shut down their computers. 33. As such, Serco required (and continues to require) Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to perform their start-up and shut-down tasks “off-the-clock” (and without pay) before their official shift begins, and after their official shift ends. 34. As a result of Serco’s corporate policy and practice of requiring Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to perform these start-up and shut-down tasks while off-the-clock before the beginning of their shifts, and after the ends of their shifts, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were not compensated for all hours worked, including all worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek at the rates required by the FLSA. 35. Serco has employed other individuals who perform(ed) the same or similar job duties under the same pay provisions as Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s Original Class/Collective Action Complaint Page 7 36. Serco is aware of its obligation to pay overtime for all hours worked and the proper amount of overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) each week to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members, but has failed to do so. 37. Because Serco did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for all hours worked and time and a half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, Serco’s pay policies and practices violate the FLSA. 38. Because Serco did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for all hours they worked on behalf of Serco, Serco’s pay policies and practices also violate Missouri state law. V. 39. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 40. The FLSA Collective is defined as: 56. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 57. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this is a collective action filed on behalf of all of Serco’s employees who have been similarly situated to Plaintiff with regard to the work they performed and the manner in which they were paid. Plaintiff’s Original Class/Collective Action Complaint Page 10 58. Other similarly situated employees of Serco have been victimized by Serco’s patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. 59. The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 40. 60. Serco’s failure to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members for all hours worked and overtime compensation at the rates required by the FLSA, results from generally applicable policies and practices of Serco, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of Plaintiff or the FLSA Collective Members. 61. Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective Members. 62. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective Members do not prevent collective treatment. 63. All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be paid for all hours worked and at the proper overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 64. Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 65. Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Serco will retain the proceeds of its violations. 66. Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 67. Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as defined as in Paragraph 40 and notice should be promptly sent. Plaintiff’s Original Class/Collective Action Complaint Page 11 68. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 69. The Missouri Act Class is defined as: 81. Plaintiff Sandoval brings her Missouri Act claims as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all similarly situated individuals employed by Serco to work in Missouri since September 17, 2016. 82. Class action treatment of Plaintiff Sandoval’s Missouri Act claims is appropriate because, as alleged below, all of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s class action requisites are satisfied. 83. The number of Missouri Class Members is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. 84. Plaintiff Sandoval is a member of the Missouri Class, her claims are typical of the claims of the Missouri Class Members, and she has no interests that are antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of the Missouri Class Members. Plaintiff’s Original Class/Collective Action Complaint Page 13 85. Plaintiff Sandoval and her counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Missouri Class Members and their interests. 86. Class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 87. Accordingly, the Missouri Class should be certified as defined in Paragraph 69. VI.

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50. Plaintiff  reasserts  and  re-­‐‑alleges  the  allegations  set  forth  above.   51. At   all   relevant   times   herein,   Plaintiff   and   all   other   similarly   situated   Delivery   Drivers  have  been  entitled  to  the  rights,  protections,  and  benefits  provided  under  the   FLSA,  29  U.S.C.  §§  201,  et  seq.   52. Section  13  of  the  FLSA,  29  U.S.C.  §  213,  exempts  certain  categories  of  employees   from   federal   minimum   wage   obligations,   but   none   of   the   FLSA   exemptions   apply   to   Plaintiff  or  other  similarly  situated  Delivery  Drivers.   54. Defendant  is  subject  to  the  FLSA’s  minimum  wage  requirements  because  it  is  an   enterprise   engaged   in   interstate   commerce,   and   its   employees   are   engaged   in   commerce.   55. Under  Section  6(a)  of  the  FLSA,  29  U.S.C.  §  206(a),  employees  have  been  entitled   to  be  compensated  at  a  rate  of  at  least  $7.25  per  hour  since  July  24,  2009.    Id.   56. As   alleged   herein,   Defendant   has   reimbursed   Delivery   Drivers   less   than   the   reasonably  approximate  amount  of  their  automobile  expenses  to  such  an  extent  that  it   diminishes  these  employees’  wages  beneath  the  federal  minimum  wage.     57. Defendant  knew  or  should  have  known  that  its  pay  and  reimbursement  policies,   practices   and   methodology   result   in   failure   to   compensate   Delivery   Drivers   at   the   federal  minimum  wage.   58. Defendant,  pursuant  to  its  policy  and  practice,  violated  the  FLSA  by  refusing  and   failing   to   pay   federal   minimum   wage   to   Plaintiff   and   other   similarly   situated   employees.   59. Plaintiff  and  all  similarly  situated  Delivery  Drivers  are  victims  of  a  uniform  and   employer-­‐‑based   compensation   and   reimbursement   policy.   This   uniform   policy,   in   violation  of  the  FLSA,  has  been  applied,  and  continues  to  be  applied,  to  all  Delivery   Driver  employees  in  Defendant’s  stores.   61. Defendant  has  acted  neither  in  good  faith  nor  with  reasonable  grounds  to  believe   that  its  actions  and  omissions  were  not  a  violation  of  the  FLSA,  and  as  a  result,  Plaintiff   and  other  similarly  situated  employees  are  entitled  to  recover  an  award  of  liquidated   damages  in  an  amount  equal  to  the  amount  of  unpaid  minimum  wages  under  29  U.S.C.   §  216(b).  Alternatively,  should  the  Court  find  Defendant  acted  in  good  faith  and  with   reasonable  grounds  to  believe  its  actions  were  lawful,  Plaintiff  and  all  similarly  situated   employees  are  entitled  to  an  award  of  prejudgment  interest  at  the  applicable  legal  rate.   63. At   all   relevant   times   herein,   Plaintiff   and   the   Class   have   been   entitled   to   the   rights,  protections,  and  benefits  provided  under  the  AEPWCL,  A.R.S.  §  23-­‐‑201  et  seq.       64. No  exemption  applies  to  Plaintiff  or  the  Class.       65. Arizona  law  regulates,  among  other  things,  the  payment  of  minimum  wage  by   employers  who  employ  any  person  in  Arizona.      A.R.S.  §  23-­‐‑363.       66. During   all   times   relevant   to   this   action,   Defendant   was   the   “employer”   of   Plaintiff  and  the  Class  within  the  meaning  of  Arizona  law.    A.R.S.  §  23-­‐‑362(B).   67. During  all  times  relevant  to  this  action,  Plaintiff  and  the  Class  were  Defendant’s   “employees”  within  the  meaning  of  Arizona  law.    A.R.S.  §  23-­‐‑362(A).   68. Under  A.R.S.  §  23-­‐‑363,  employees  have  been  entitled  to  be  compensated  at  a  rate   of  at  least  $7.80  per  hour  in  2013,  at  least  $7.90  per  hour  in  2014,  and  at  least  $8.05  per   hour  since  2015.    http://www.govdocs.com/arizona-­‐‑2015-­‐‑minimum-­‐‑wage-­‐‑increase/.   70. Defendant  knew  or  should  have  known  that  its  pay  and  reimbursement  policies,   practices  and  methodology  result  in  failure  to  compensate  Delivery  Drivers  at  Arizona’s   minimum  wage.   71. Defendant,  pursuant  to  its  policy  and  practice,  violated  Arizona  law  by  refusing   and   failing   to   pay   Arizona’s   minimum   wage   to   Plaintiff   and   other   similarly   situated   employees.   72. Because  Defendant  acted  willfully  and  knew,  or  showed  reckless  disregard  for,   whether   its   conduct   was   unlawful,   Plaintiff   and   all   similarly   situated   employees   are   entitled   to   damages   equal   to   the   minimum   wage   minus   actual   wages   received   after   deducting  reasonably  approximated  automobile  expenses  within  three  years  from  the   date  each  Plaintiff  joins  this  case,  plus  a  period  of  time  encompassing  all  violations  that   occurred   as   part   of   a   continuing   course   of   employer   conduct   regardless   of   the   date.     to  Reasonably  Reimburse  Vehicle  Expenses   to  Reasonably  Reimburse  Vehicle  Expenses  

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