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12. Sony Computer Entertainment America was founded in 1994 and has become a household name in consumer gaming technology. Sony Computer Entertainment America is a Case3:14-cv-03530-JCS Document1 Filed08/05/14 Page3 of 29 57. Class Definition: Plaintiff Douglas Ladore brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and a Class of similarly situated individuals defined as follows: All persons in the United States who purchased a copy of the Killzone: Shadow Fall video game. Excluded from the Class are (1) Defendant, Defendant’s agents, subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest, and those entities’ current and former employees, officers, and directors, (2) the Judge to whom this case is assigned and the Judge’s immediate family, (3) persons who execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class, (4) persons who have had their claims in this matter finally adjudicated and/or otherwise released, and (5) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded person. 58. Numerosity: The exact number of members of the Class is unknown and is not available to Plaintiff at this time, but individual joinder in this case is impracticable. The Class likely consists of hundreds of thousands of individuals. Class members can be easily identified through Defendant’s records. 59. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to Plaintiff’s claims and those of the other members of the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include but are not limited to the following: a) Whether Defendant made false statements, promises, and/or descriptions regarding the resolution capabilities of Killzone’s multiplayer mode; b) Whether Defendant made such false statements, promises, and/or descriptions to deceive consumers into purchasing its product; Case3:14-cv-03530-JCS Document1 Filed08/05/14 Page15 of 29 65. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. Case3:14-cv-03530-JCS Document1 Filed08/05/14 Page17 of 29 85. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 86. California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., protects both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services. 87. The UCL prohibits any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice. A business practice need only meet one of these three criteria to be considered unfair competition. An unlawful business practice is anything that can properly be called a business practice and that is forbidden by law. 88. As described above, Defendant has violated the unlawful prong by violating the 97. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 98. Defendant engaged in advertising and marketing to the public, and offered the Killzone video game for sale on a nationwide basis, including in California. Defendant publicly represented and advertised that the Killzone video game was capable of rendering 1080p multiplayer graphics. Defendant did so with the intent to induce Plaintiff and Class members to Case3:14-cv-03530-JCS Document1 Filed08/05/14 Page22 of 29 Breach of Express Warranties (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 104. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 105. Pursuant to California Commercial Code § 2313, Defendant’s sale of the Killzone video game included express warranties created by Defendant’s affirmations of fact, made through the statements made on the game’s physical packaging and through Defendant’s online representations. 106. Defendant’s express warranties included affirmations of fact and promises that the Killzone video game would conform to the performance capabilities represented on the game’s packaging and through Defendant’s online representations. Case3:14-cv-03530-JCS Document1 Filed08/05/14 Page23 of 29 Fraud in the Inducement (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 114. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 115. As detailed herein, Defendant misrepresented and/or failed to disclose material facts regarding Killzone’s ability to render 1080p multiplayer graphics. 116. Through the misrepresentations and omissions detailed herein, Defendant wrongfully induced Plaintiff and the other members of the Class to purchase Killzone when they otherwise would not have purchased the game or would only have agreed to purchase it at a lower price. 117. Defendant knew or should have known that its misstatements and omissions regarding the inclusion of 1080p multiplayer graphics in Killzone were false, misleading, incomplete, and deceptive, and would cause Plaintiff and Class members to purchase the Killzone video game when they otherwise would not have purchased the game or would only have agreed to purchase it at a lower price. 118. Defendant intended that consumers rely upon the misstatements and omissions detailed in this Complaint in purchasing the Killzone video game. 119. Defendant knew that consumers would rely upon the misstatements and omissions detailed in this Complaint in purchasing the Killzone video game. 120. Plaintiff and the members of the Class relied upon those misstatements when purchasing the Killzone video game, and in opening the packaging (thereby making it impossible to return the video game). 121. In deceiving Plaintiff and the other members of the Class into believing that Killzone was capable of rendering 1080p multiplayer graphics, Defendant has engaged in fraudulent conduct designed to induce consumers to purchase the Killzone video game. Case3:14-cv-03530-JCS Document1 Filed08/05/14 Page25 of 29 I. A Brief Introduction to Sony and Killzone: Shadow Fall. Negligent Misrepresentation (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 123. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 124. Through its public statements and marketing materials, including its pre-release representations and online statements, and the prominently displayed text on the game’s packaging, Defendant represented to Plaintiff and the members of the Class that Killzone would be capable of rendering 1080p multiplayer graphics. 125. Those representations were false, and at the time such false statements were made, Defendant knew or should have known of their falsity or, at the very least, Defendant acted with negligence and carelessness in ascertaining the truth of the statements. Defendant knew or should have known that Killzone was not capable of rendering 1080p multiplayer graphics. Defendant did not have any reasonable ground for believing its statements to be true. 126. Defendant intended that Plaintiff and the members of the Class rely on its misrepresentations and omissions in purchasing the Killzone video game. 127. Defendant knew that its affirmative statements about the inclusion of 1080p multiplayer graphics had been widely disseminated on video game related websites and in other publications, and further understood—and intended—that its current and future customers would see those statements. 128. Likewise, Defendant knew that its on-box representation that the Killzone video game would utilize and feature unqualified 1080p graphics—including multiplayer graphics— would be seen and relied upon by the purchasing public. 129. Defendant had a duty not to make the above-described misrepresentations, and to take steps to correct the dissemination of such misrepresentations both before the Killzone video Case3:14-cv-03530-JCS Document1 Filed08/05/14 Page26 of 29 Unjust Enrichment (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 133. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 134. Plaintiff and the Class have conferred a benefit upon Defendant in the form of the money Defendant collected from them for the purchase of the Killzone video game, which did not perform as Defendant promised. 135. Defendant appreciates and/or has knowledge of the benefits conferred upon it by Plaintiff and the Class. 136. Under principles of equity and good conscience, Defendant should not be permitted to retain the money obtained from Plaintiff and the Class Members, which Defendant has unjustly obtained as a result of its deceptive and misleading advertising. 137. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Class seek full disgorgement and restitution of any money Defendant has retained as a result of the unlawful and/or wrongful conduct alleged herein. Case3:14-cv-03530-JCS Document1 Filed08/05/14 Page27 of 29 Violation of False Advertising Law Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Violations of the Unfair Competition Law Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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(Violation of ERISA) (Violation of Collective Bargaining Agreements) 1. Certify the Plaintiff Class and two subclasses under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 11. Maintenance of this action will promote the efficient administration of justice by obviating the need of numerous individual members, many of who do not have resources to independently retain counsel, to commence their own actions. 12. Maintenance of this action as a class action will promote the equitable administration of justice since pursuing claims on an individual basis would be disproportionately expensive. 13. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 14. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent adjudication with respect to individual members of the class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing the class. 15. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of adjudication with respect to individual members of the class that would, as a practical matter, substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 16. Kraft Heinz operates meat processing plants and other food processing facilities throughout the country. It operates a meat processing plant located in Madison, Wisconsin under a subsidiary called Oscar Mayer Foods, Inc. 18. Kraft Heinz has provided health and prescription drug insurance to employees and retirees represented by UFCW Local 538 in accordance with the terms of its CBA’s. Under the terms of these CBA’s, Plaintiffs and other Class Members (“Plaintiff Class”) continue to pay the same premium contributions they paid when they were active employees prior to their retirement. 19. During negotiations for the CBA effective December 9, 2013, Kraft Heinz representatives proposed, “Coverage under the Company retiree medical plan shall terminate when the retiree attains age 65 or becomes eligible for Medicare.” 2. Declare Kraft Heinz has violated the CBA’s with UFCW Local 538 by unilaterally terminating Plaintiff Class’ health and prescription drug insurance plans; 20. UFCW Local 538 representatives rejected this proposal and Kraft Heinz subsequently withdrew it from the bargaining table. Plaintiff Class Members continued to receive health and prescription drug insurance under the same terms and conditions as they previously enjoyed. 21. By letter dated September 1, 2015, Kraft Heinz informed Plaintiff Class that effective January 1, 2016, their current retiree health and prescription drug insurance plans would be terminated. 22. For certain members of the Plaintiff Class, Kraft Heinz provided the option of participating in OneExchange, a privately operated medicare insurance exchange. (These Class Members are hereinafter referred to as the “OneExchange Subclass”). The OneExchange Sublcass members are required to pay out-of-pocket all premiums and other costs of supplemental medicare health and prescription drug insurance. 24. OneExchange Sublass members who participate in OneExchange will be forced to bear the costs of any differences in the amounts of Kraft Heinz’ contributions to their HRA’s and the actual costs of obtaining comparable health and prescription drug coverage, including premium contributions. They will also be forced to bear the costs of future increases in the amounts of premium contributions they incur in obtaining supplemental medicare health and prescription drug insurance. At some point, even with the HRA, the amount of premium contributions OneExchange Subclass members pay will exceed the amount of premiums contributions they currently pay. 25. By letter dated September 1, 2015, Kraft Heinz notified other members of Plaintiff Class who were covered by health and prescription drug insurance plans sponsored by the Aetna Life Insurance Company and its affiliates (hereinafter referred to as the “Aetna Subclass”) that they had the option of enrolling in the Aetna Medicare Advantage Preferred Provider Organization with Extended Service Area (“Aetna Medicare Advantage PPO ESA Plan”), a medicare plan available under Part C of Medicare. 27. Under their prior Aetna health and prescription drug insurance plans, the Aetna Subclass was not responsible for any copays or co-insurance. 28. Under the Aetna Medicare Advantage PPO ESA Plan, Aetna Sublcass members’ spouses and dependents are not covered. 29. Under their prior Aetna health and prescription drug insurance plans, the Aetna Subclass’s spouses and eligible dependents were covered and could continue coverage under the same terms after the death of the Aetna Subclass member. 3. Declare Kraft Heinz has violated ERISA by altering the terms of its health and prescription drug insurance plans to deviate from the health and prescription drug insurance plans provided to Plaintiff Class by terminating the plans and replacing them with the plans announced in the September 1, 2015 letters; 30. Kraft Heinz did not negotiate with UFCW Local 538 the termination of Plaintiff Class’ health and prescription drug insurance plans, or any of the changes announced in the September 1, 2015 letters to either the OneExchange Sublcass or the Aetna Subclass. 31. UFCW Local 538 did not agree to the termination of the health and prescription drug plans covering Plaintiff Class or any of the changes announced in the September 1, 2015 letters to either the OneExchange Sublcass or the Aetna Subclass. 32. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate paragraphs 1-31 above as though fully set forth herein. 33. The CBA’s between Kraft Heinz and UFCW Local 538 in effect when Plaintiff Class retired require Kraft Heinz to provide retiree health and prescription drug insurance coverage for them. 35. The CBA’s covering the OneExchange Subclass required that the retiree health and prescription drug insurance be provided at the same premium rate they paid as active employees at the time they retired. 36. The termination of the Plaintiff Class’ health and prescription drug insurance plans and the replacement coverage announced in the September 1, 2015 letters violate the terms of the CBA’s, Section 301 of the LMRA, and the vested rights of the Plaintiff Class to receive the retiree health and prescription drug insurance coverage. 37. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate paragraphs 1-36 above as though fully set forth herein. 38. The health and prescription drug insurance plans covering Plaintiff Class are employee welfare benefit plan as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) and are governed by the Employee Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §1001, et seq. 39. Plaintiff Class are participants of these plans within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). 4. Order Kraft Heinz to cease and desist from violating the CBA’s and the terms of the Plaintiff Class’ health and prescription drug insurance plans; 5. Order Kraft Heinz affirmatively to: a. restore the Plaintiff Class’ health and prescription drug plans in effect prior to January 1, 2016; b. make whole all Plaintiff Class members for all losses proximately caused by the changes; and, 6. Order Defendant to pay attorneys fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g). 7. Individual Plaintiffs seek to represent a class consisting of all former UFCW Local 538-represented employees of Kraft Heinz who are participants in the Kraft Heinz retiree health and prescription drug insurance plans and who are age 65 or over. Plaintiffs seek two subclasses: (a) all class members who were covered by health and prescription drug insurance plans sponsored by Aetna; and, (b) all class members who were covered by health and prescription drug insurance plans sponsored by other providers. There are approximately 500 members of the proposed class. 8. There are questions of law and fact common to the class, including the following: whether Kraft Heinz unilaterally reduced retiree health insurance benefits for its UFCW Local 538-represented retirees by terminating their coverage, increasing their premiums and changing their health insurance benefits; whether such reduction violates the terms of the CBA’s between Kraft Heinz and UFCW Local 538; whether such reduction violates ERISA; and, whether Kraft Heinz can establish any defenses justifying its conduct. 9. The claims of the Plaintiffs are typical of the class they seek to represent and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The interests of the named Plaintiffs are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, those of the class. The named plaintiffs are represented by counsel who are experienced in class action litigation.

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25. Yet in violation of this rule, Defendant fails to obtain any express written consent prior to sending autodialed text messages to consumers, such as Plaintiff. 26. In placing the calls that form the basis of this Complaint, Defendant utilized an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS” or “autodialer”) in violation of the TCPA. Specifically, the hardware and software used by Defendant has the capacity to generate and store random numbers, and/or receive and store lists of telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. Defendant’s automated dialing equipment also is, or includes features substantially similar to, a predictive dialer, meaning that it is capable of making numerous phone calls simultaneously and automatically connecting answered calls to then available callers and disconnecting the rest (all without human intervention). 28. An IMC Sales Representative is expected to initiate between 55-65 dials per hour: 6 29. Upon information and belief, including complaints about IMC’s telemarketing calls and Plaintiff’s experience, IMC contact center agents place calls to consumers using an autodialer. 30. IMC also sends unsolicited, autodialed text messages to consumers like the ones Plaintiff received. 32. There are a number of online complaints about Defendant’s calls to consumers who never gave consent to be called, including consumers that requested Defendant stop calling only to receive more calls: • 7 • “I have asked over and over to stop calling…”8 • “Iconic mortgage, these people will not stop.calling and switch numbers after you block them, all times of the night and day and weekends, never had any dealings with them but they seem adamant on calling”9 • “Robocall. Non-stop calls. Always a pause when I answer. Definite robocaller.”10 • “Unwanted Call”11 33. On February 27, 2019 Plaintiff registered her phone number on the DNC. 34. Plaintiff uses her cell phone for personal use only. It is not used for business purposes. 36. On December 9, 2019, Plaintiff received an unsolicited call from IMC using phone number 540-215-1008 to her cell phone. This call was not answered. 37. Plaintiff called 540-215-1008 on December 9, 2019 at 2:25 PM and spoke to a live agent, specifically asking for the calls to stop. 38. Despite her clear opt-out request, Plaintiff received an unsolicited, autodialed call to her cell phone from Defendant using phone number 540-215-1008 on December 13, 2019 at 57. The following individuals are excluded from the Classes: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Classes; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the Class definitions following appropriate discovery. 58. Numerosity: On information and belief, there are hundreds, if not thousands of members of the Classes such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 60. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Classes, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interest adverse to the Classes. 62. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 61 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 63. Defendant and/or its agents made unwanted solicitation telephone calls/text messages to phone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class using an autodialer. 64. These solicitation calls/texts were made/sent en masse without the consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class to receive such solicitation calls. 65. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class are each entitled to a minimum of $500 in damages, and up to $1,500 in damages, for each violation. 66. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 61 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 67. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 68. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) is “applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.”14 69. Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c). 70. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, phone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective phone numbers on the DNC, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. 71. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Do Not Call Registry Class are each entitled to up to $1,500 in damages for each violation. 72. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 61 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 74. Defendant made marketing calls to Plaintiff and members of the Internal DNC Class without implementing internal procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to be called by the entity and/or by implementing procedures that do not meet the minimum requirements to allow Defendant to initiate telemarketing calls. 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(d)(1)-(6). 75. The TCPA provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 76. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Internal Do Not Call Class are each entitled to up to $1,500 per violation. Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claims Arising From IMC’s Calls IMC Repeatedly Called and Texted Plaintiff Without Consent, Despite Plaintiff Having Registered Her Phone Number on the DNC IMC Markets its Products and Services by Making Autodialed Calls to Consumers Without Consent, Regardless of Whether Their Numbers are Registered on the DNC Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff Correll and the Autodialed No Consent Class)

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a radio controlled car retailer that owns and operates www.traxxas.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in October of 2019, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.traxxas.com, to make a purchase. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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15. Circle K runs a rewards program called “Easy Rewards” to incentive consumers to shop at Circle K, for which it sends unsolicited sign up text messages to consumers. 23. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action through class certification (1) Defendant (or an agent acting on behalf of Defendant) text messaged, (2) on the person’s cellular telephone number, (3) using a text messaging platform substantially similar to the text messaging platform Defendant used to text message Plaintiff, (4) for whom Defendant claims (a) it obtained prior express consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express consent to text message Plaintiff, or (b) it did not obtain prior express consent. 29. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 28 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference. 30. Defendant and/or its agents sent unwanted solicitation text messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class using an autodialer. 31. These solicitation text messages were sent en masse without the consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Class to receive such solicitation text messages. 32. Defendant’s conduct was negligent, wilful, or knowing. 33. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are each entitled to between $500 and $1,500 for each and every text message. Circle K Sends Unsolicited Text Messages Using an Autodialer Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claim Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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2. Whether Defendant accepts guide dogs and, if so, if there are any charges associated with the guide dogs, their policies with respect to guide dogs and if there are any rest areas for guide dogs. 25. Defendant owns and operates numerous hotels in the City of New York as well as the rest of the United States. Many of these locations also offer dining and entertainment options, including on-site restaurants, room service and lobby lounges. 27. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, using Defendant’s Website access to information through their reservation system relating to the availability of ADA compliant rooms and handicap accessible features of the hotel, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s hotels. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to add information through their reservation system relating to its accessibility for visually-impaired persons on their Website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s hotels and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public at Defendant’s hotels. 28. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Defendant’s Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 3. Whether the hotels provide a braille and/or large print menu for restaurants and/or room service and, in the alternative, if they have trained staff to read the menu to blind or vision- impaired guests. 30. Due to the lack of information relating to the accessibility features of Defendant’s hotels through the reservation system on the Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public in their hotels. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis using the services that the hotels offer to the public because of the lack of information on accessibility through the reservation system on the Website. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant’s hotels or book rooms in Defendant’s hotels in the future if the Plaintiff was able to learn about the accessibility of Defendant’s hotels and guest rooms for blind and vision-impaired persons through the reservation system on their website and those accessibility features meet the needs of the Plaintiff. 32. If the hotels and the Website reservation system were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through visiting the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the lack of information on accessibility features available on the reservation system on the Website that result in making the services and facilities of the hotel inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 34. Because simple compliance with the provisions of the ADA relating to providing information about accessibility features of the hotels and the guest rooms on its Website reservation system would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the services and facilities at Defendant’s hotels, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the failure to provide information on its Website reservation system sufficient to advise that the hotels are fully ADA compliant, and for each accessible guest room, to specify the room type, the type of accessible facility in the room, and the communications features in the room. 35. Defendant therefore use standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 37. Because Defendant’s Website reservation system has never included the required information, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause the Website reservation system to include the required information relating to accessibility, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with the ADA regulations requiring certain accessibility information to be included on Defendant’s Website reservation system. Plaintiff seeks that their permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website for accessibility and compliance to identify and describe accessible features in the hotels and guest rooms on the Website reservation system and a statement that the hotels are fully ADA compliant, and for each accessible guest room, to specify the room type, the type of accessible facility in the room including a detailed description of the features of such facility so that a blind or visually-impaired person can determine if the features meet such person’s needs, and the communications features in the room including a detailed description of the communications features so that a blind or visually-impaired person can independently determine if the features meet such person’s needs, including, but not limited to: 38. If the ADA-required information is included on the Website reservation system, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently determine through use of the Website if Defendant’s hotels and guest rooms are ADA compliant and if the facilities described relating the facilities and communications equipment in guest rooms are acceptable to the Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people 39. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website and the inclusion of information on the Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system to make such information fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 4. Whether or not emergency exit signs are complaint with ADAAG4 requirements and emergency evacuation plans and information are provided in braille and large print. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website reservation system to obtain information relating to ADA accessibility of the hotels and their guest rooms, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA-required accessibility information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA- required information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA- required information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant have violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system so individuals with disabilities can independently assess if Defendant’s hotels or guest rooms meet the accessibility needs of the Plaintiff and the Class. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 5. Whether or not all accessible signage complies with the requirements of the ADAAG. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 52. Defendant’s hotels are places of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s hotels. The Website is a service that is integrated with the Defendant’s hotels and is a gateway thereto. 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 6. Whether or not the stairs, escalators and elevators comply with ADAAG standards, such as braille for floor numbers in the elevator and a verbal annunciator for each floor. 60. Defendant’s physical hotels are located in the State of New York and constitute places of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 61. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. The Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden." 64. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for including the ADA-required information on websites making such websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. Incorporating the basic components to make the Website reservation system include the ADA-required information would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 67. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 68. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and their physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 69. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 7. Whether or not the hotels have removed or protected protruding objects which protrude more than 4” into walkways and hallways such as drinking fountains, fire extinguishers, and planters and if they provide cane detectable warnings for the underside of stairways. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 75. Defendant’s hotels are places of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and the Website is a service that is integrated with their establishments. 76. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates physical locations in the City of New York and the Website, making the Defendant a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update the Website and remove access barriers to its hotels by failing to include the ADA- required information on its reservation system, causing the services integrated with their physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non- disabled public. 78. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 8. Whether or not the guest rooms contain tactile and large print thermostat controls and talking/large print clocks. 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website and their establishments under § 8- 107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 82. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 84. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 86. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 87. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website does not contain the ADA-required information on its reservation system denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of the Website and by extension their physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 88. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Website and Compliance with Requirement to Describe Accessibility Features VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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14. In or about February 2001, Joseph Mazzei instituted the Mazzei action against the HomEq Defendants. 15. The Mazzei action arose from the following facts and allegations. Mr. Mazzei took out a mortgage loan with HomEq in 1994. 16. In 1998, Mr. Mazzei fell behind on his mortgage payments and, in 2000, the company accelerated his loan and initiated a non-judicial foreclosure action in California. 17. In or about October 2000, with a foreclosure sale looming, Mazzei decided to sell his home to pay off the outstanding amount on the loan, and requested a payoff quote. Thereafter, Mazzei paid the amounts quoted, and was advised that his loan was Paid in Full. 69. On July 15, 2016, the Second Circuit affirmed the decertification of the Late Fee Class, and the refusal to grant a new trial to the Split Fee Class. A. Affirming Decertification 70. The Court determined that a lower court has the right to decertify a class after a jury verdict in the class’s favor. While the Second Circuit recognized the “tension” between permitting post-verdict decertification under Rule 23 and the rights accorded by the Seventh Amendment, (App.17), it found that “the right of absent class members to adjudication by jury is unimpaired” by post-verdict decertification because they could file another action in which they would have a right to a jury. (App.12) As a result, according to the Second Circuit, “[t]he right of absent class members to a jury trial is protected, not impaired, by the Rule 23(c)(1)(C) decertification procedure.” 71. The Second Circuit determined that a court entertaining a decertification motion against a prevailing class should apply Rule 59 in assessing the evidence credited by the jury, because “decertification [] has the same effect as would a grant of a motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule 59(a).” (App.13) Thus, as on a motion for a new trial under Rule 59, the Second Circuit found that a judge entertaining a post-verdict decertification motion is permitted to weigh the evidence and the credibility of witnesses and need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. (App.16-17, n.9 (citations and internal quotations omitted)) A. THE MAZZEI LITIGATION Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Against All Defendants) 146. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each preceding Paragraph of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 147. As alleged above, and by reason of the foregoing acts, the HomEq Defendants have breached the terms of the Loan documents executed by the parties by charging plaintiffs and the prospective classes for late fees after acceleration which are not permitted by the parties’ contract. 148. Implied in the agreements executed by the parties is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, Defendants’ conduct as alleged in this Complaint was in derogation of that covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 149. Plaintiffs and members of the prospective classes have performed all conditions, covenants, and promises required on their part to be performed in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreements. 150. However, Defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by, among other things, collecting and retaining late fees from plaintiffs and members of the proposed class as additional compensation under the guise of the late fee provision in the loan documents. 151. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiffs and members of prospective classes have suffered damages in an amount to be established at trial.

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10. Beginning on or about November 14, 2013, Defendant started placing telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone ending in 6721. 11. Defendant placed multiple calls for Plaintiff, on her cellular phone, and left her multiple voice-messagesn in the form of pre-recorded messages, asking for a return call at (866)368-1565. 13. The telephone number that Defendant or its agents called was assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1). 14. These telephone calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(i). 15. Plaintiff never provided any personal information, including her cellular telephone number to Defendant. At no time did Plaintiff provide Defendant or its agents with prior express consent to receive telephone calls from an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A). 16. These telephone calls by Defendant, or its agents, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 17. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (―the Class‖). 18. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of: All persons within the United States who received any telephone call(s) from Defendant, or its agent(s) and/or employee(s), to said person’s cellular telephone, made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system, or an artificial or prerecorded voice, within the four years prior to the filling of the Complaint. 19. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 21. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class, and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 22. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the court. The Class can be identified through Defendant’s records or Defendant’s agents’ records. 23. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the following: a) Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Defendant or its agents placed any calls to the Class (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) or to a Class member using any automatic dialing system, or an artificial or prerecorded voice, to any telephone number assigned to a cellular phone service; b) Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation; and c) Whether Defendant and its agents should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 25. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. Because of the size of the individual Class member’s claims, few, if any, Class members could afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 26. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 27. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal and state law. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class claims. 28. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 32. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 34. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 35. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 36. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 37. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 38. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 39. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. /// FOR KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiffs seek for themselves and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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(Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 20. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant during the relevant statutory period.” 21. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant, during the relevant statutory period.” 22. There are hundreds of thousands of visually impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually impaired. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 23. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of Defendant and Defendant Stores. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently access the Website. 25. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 26. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 28. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 29. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 30. The Website is a service and benefit offered by Defendant throughout the United States, including New York State. 31. The Website is an online dating website. The Website allows the user to create a profile; browse potential dates; interact with other users; and perform a variety of other functions. 32. Among the features offered by Defendant are the following: (a) a Discover tab, which allows users to browse profiles and find potential matches; (b) a Matches tab, which allows users to view their daily matches; (c) an Interests tab, which allows users to see who has viewed their profile; (d) information about the Website’s local events; (e) dating articles, success stories, and dating tips; (f) information about the Website’s company history and privacy policy; and (g) information about subscribing to the Website. 34. The Website denies the blind access to services and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely navigating the Website. 35. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as shopping, banking, etc., for sighted and blind persons. 36. The blind access websites by using keyboards in conjunction with screen-reading software which vocalizes visual information on a computer screen. Except for a blind person whose residual vision is still sufficient to use magnification, screen access software provides the only method by which a blind person can independently access the Internet. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, blind persons are unable to fully access Internet websites and the information, products and services contained therein. 38. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible forms, the lack of adequate prompting and labeling; lack of navigation links; the denial of keyboard access; and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 39. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen reader can speak the alternative text while a sighted user sees the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Defendant that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics. (Screen readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user.) On the Website, the graphics and images simply do not contain text equivalents, rendering other users’ profiles entirely unreadable by screen reader software. As a result, Plaintiff and blind Defendant customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the site, investigate the Website’s navigation bar and/or find matches. 41. The Website also lacks accessible forms. Editable boxes allow users to specify the gender, age range, and search radius of potential matches. On the Website, blind customers are unable to fill in their desired specifications because the screen reader does not indicate the function of the boxes. For example, instead of reading “seeking [men] or [women]”, the box simply reads, “edit, blank”. As a result, blind customers are denied access to appropriate date search. Therefore, blind customers are unsuccessful in searching and browsing through profiles on the Website. 42. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on the Website makes attempting to navigate through the Website even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 43. The Website requires the use of a mouse to create a profile and browse potential matches. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, the Website’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to browse profiles, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate the Website. 44. Due to the Website’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time and energy in online dating. If the Website was accessible, a blind person could independently enjoy dating services via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. 46. The Website thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Website and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Defendant. 47. Plaintiff has made numerous attempts to enjoy the services of the Website, most recently in September 2017, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on the Website, causing it to be inaccessible and not independently usable by, blind and visually impaired individuals. 49. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Defendant contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually impaired individuals. 50. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the benefits and services of Defendant. 51. The Website engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 52. The Website utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 53. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 55. The Website is a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). The Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 56. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because they own and operate the Website. 57. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I) it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 58. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 60. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 61. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 62. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of the Website who are blind have been denied full and equal access to The Website, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 66. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 70. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 72. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because they own and operate the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 73. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing Defendant and the services integrated with Defendant to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 74. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 75. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 77. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exc. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 78. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 79. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant and Defendant Stores under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 80. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 82. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 83. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 84. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 85. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 86. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof …” 87. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of … disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision” 89. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because they own and operate the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 90. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing Defendant and the services integrated with the Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 91. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 92. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two … shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby…” 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 95. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 96. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 97. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 98. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of … disability … directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”

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28. The number of persons in the class makes joinder of the individual class members impractical. 29. There are questions of fact and law common to all class members. Factually, all class members are public employees and union nonmembers who have been forced to pay “fair-share fees” to the NYSUT as a condition of their employment. Legally, the U.S. Constitution and New York tort law afford the same rights to every member of the class. 30. Ms. VanOstrand’s claims are typical of other class members, as each class member has objected to NYSUT membership yet was subject to “agency fees” de- spite their refusal to join the union. 31. Ms. VanOstrand adequately represents the interests of their fellow class members, and she has no interests antagonistic to the class. 32. A class action can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) because separate actions by class members could risk inconsistent adjudications on the underlying legal issues. 33. A class action can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) because an adju- dication determining the constitutionality of compulsory “agency fees” will, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of all class members. 35. Mr. Pellegrino seeks to represent a separate class of union members who would have quit the union but chose to remain because they would have been com- pelled to pay “agency fees” had they resigned. This class includes all individuals who: (1) are or previously were employed by the State of New York or any of its subunits, including any school district in the State; (2) are or were members of the NYSUT who would have quit the union had they not been forced to work in an unconstitu- tional agency shop. The class includes everyone who has ever fallen within this defi- nition, including former or retired teachers or teachers who have moved to other States, and it includes anyone who comes within the class definition at any time be- fore the conclusion of this action. 36. The number of persons in the class makes joinder of the individual class members impractical. 37. There are questions of fact and law common to all class members. Factually, all class members are reluctant NYSUT nonmembers who remained in the union only because they would have been forced to pay “agency fees” had they resigned. Legally, the U.S. Constitution and New York tort law afford the same rights and remedies to every member of the class. 38. Mr. Pellegrino’s claims are typical of other class members, as each class member opposes the NYSUT yet has chosen to remain in the union on account of the unconstitutional agency-shop arrangement. 40. A class action can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) because separate actions by class members could risk inconsistent adjudications on the underlying legal issues. 41. A class action can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) because an adju- dication determining the constitutionality of compulsory “agency fees” and the ap- propriate remedy for reluctant union members such as Mr. Pellegrino will, as a prac- tical matter, be dispositive of the interests of all class members. 42. A class action can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(3) because the common questions of law and fact identified in the complaint predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy because, among other things, all class members are subjected to the same violation of their constitu- tional rights, but the amount of money involved in each individual’s claim would make it burdensome for class members to maintain separate actions.

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37. Mr. Baltierra incorporates the preceding allegations by reference. 38. At all times relevant to this complaint, Orlans Associates sought to collect a "consumer" debt from Mr. Baltierra . 39. Orlans Associates actions to collect this alleged debt from Mr. Baltierra violated the provisions of the FDCPA including, but not limited to15 U.S.C. § 1692e and 1692g. 40. Mr. Baltierra suffered statutory damages as a result of these violations of the FDCPA. 41. Mr. Baltierra incorporates the preceding allegations by reference. 42. Orlans Associates is a "regulated person" under the Michigan Collection Practices Act ("MCPA"), M.C.L. § 445.251(g)(xi). 43. Orlans Associates 's actions to collect from Mr. Baltierra violated the MCPA including but not limited to the following M.C.L. § 445.252. 44. Mr. Baltierra suffered statutory damages as a result of these violations of the MCPA. 45. These violations of the MCPA were willful. Demand for Jury Trial 46. Plaintiff demands trial by jury in this action. Demand For Judgment for Relief

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17. As introduced above, “beacons” are new technologies that seek to track and monitor consumers and how they interact with advertisements and marketing.2 Fundamental to 2 Beacon Technology: The Where, What, Who, How and Why, http://www.forbes.com/sites/homaycotte/2015/09/01/beacon-technology-the-what-who-how- why-and-where/#668c740b4fc1 (last visited Nov. 15, 2016). 5 beacon technology is the smartphone, which consumers carry on their person everywhere they go. Built into smartphones are a plethora of radio transmitting and receiving devices, including a “Bluetooth” radio. 18. Bluetooth is a wireless personal area network technology used for transmitting data over short distances. A smartphone with Bluetooth will invariably attempt to communicate with other Bluetooth devices in its vicinity. While those other Bluetooth devices take the form of hands-free car radios, headphones, or stereos, marketers found a new use—canvasing Bluetooth devices in specific locations (e.g., retail stores) that exist only to capture an attempted Bluetooth connection. By monitoring which Bluetooth radio (and the corresponding smartphone and owner) attempts to connect to the placed-Bluetooth devices, marketers can track the physical path a smartphone takes through that location. 19. For instance, suppose a department store placed a Bluetooth beacon in the men’s shoes, accessories, and children’s departments. While the consumer navigates from the men’s shoes department to the children’s department, his or her smartphone would attempt to connect to the beacons in the men’s shoes and then the children’s departments. The retailer now would have a record of that path, which may inform the retailer on certain consumer behavior. 20. The next logical step for marketers was to create beacons that interact more fully with consumer’s smartphone. In that same example described above, the retailer might want to cause the consumer’s smartphone to “pop up” an alert whenever he or she enters the kids department. The pop up could be simple text advertising a sale or even a coupon. For this to work, however, the retailer would need access to the consumer’s smartphone through an application or a system-wide protocol. 21. Because beacon tracking is inherently invasive (consumers are continuously 6 tracked), industry standards dictate that consumers opt-in to beacon tracking.3 Often, the form of the opt-in is through the Apple iBeacon protocol in Apple iPhones, or through an application developer’s mobile application. If the retailer, in the example above, operates their own mobile application, they might seek consent through an explicit disclosure or, at least, a privacy policy. 22. Defendant Lisnr utilizes a novel beacon technology called audio beacons. Defendant Lisnr’s audio-based beacon technology, in contrast to Bluetooth beacon technology, requires Defendant Lisnr to ascertain a consumer’s physical location through sounds rather than through radio signals. Instead of canvasing a location with only Bluetooth devices, Lisnr partners with entities like the Colts to place speakers throughout locations. Each speaker is mapped to a location and emits a unique audio signal. A device that can “hear” a Lisnr audio beacon must be near that speaker. As such, Lisnr is able to quickly ascertain the location of that device and its approximate distance from the speaker. 23. Lisnr describes its beacon technology in the following way: LISNR is the creator of SmartTones, a new technology that sends data over audio. LISNR uses an inaudible digital sound file to turn any device into a beacon. LISNR gives brands and content creators a platform that delivers second-screen experiences and proximity-based messaging.4 24. But for the technology to work, Lisnr requires a microphone to continuously listen for its audio signals. For that, Lisnr involuntarily enlists thousands of sports fans that have downloaded and installed the app from their favorite team. 34. Plaintiff Alan Rackemann downloaded the App sometime in 2012 from the Google Play store. As soon as the App downloaded, Plaintiff opened the App. Over the years, Plaintiff regularly used the App to follow the progress of the Indianapolis Colts. Over that time period, the App was also regularly updated. Plaintiff stopped using the App on or about mid- September 2016 when he became aware that it was listening in. 35. From 2012 until mid-September 2016, Plaintiff carried his smartphone on his person. He would take his smartphone to places where he would not invite other people, and to places where he would have private conversations. That is, his phone was present in locations and personal and private situations not generally accessible to the public where the expectation was that his conversations were to remain private. 36. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff and without his consent, Defendants programmed the App to turn on his smartphone’s Microphone and listen-in. Specifically, because Plaintiff carried his smartphone to locations where he would have private conversations and the App was continuously running on his phone, Defendants App listened-in to private oral communications. 37. At no time did Plaintiff consent to the App using his Microphone to listen-in to his oral conversations. 38. Class Definition: Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (3) on behalf of himself and a Class of similarly situated individuals, defined as follows: 11 Lisnr Class: All individuals in the United States who downloaded and opened any mobile application from the Google Play store that included but did not disclose the presence of Lisnr audio beacon code. Colts Class: All individuals in the United States who downloaded and opened the Indianapolis Colts mobile application from the Google Play store. Excluded from the Classes (the “Class,” unless otherwise specified) are: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest and their current, former, purported, and alleged employees, officers, and directors; (3) counsel for Plaintiff and Defendants; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors, or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) all persons who have previously had claims similar to those alleged herein finally adjudicated or who have released their claims against Defendants. 39. Numerosity: The exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. Defendants have listened in on thousands of consumers who fall into the Class definition. Ultimately, the Class members will be easily identified through Defendants’ records. 40. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual Class members. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: a) whether Defendants listened to and/or recorded the Class members’ oral communications; b) whether Defendants obtained consent to listen to and/or record the Class members’ oral communications; 12 c) whether Defendants used the contents of Class members’ oral communications for Defendants’ benefit; d) whether Defendants’ conduct violates the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et seq.; and e) whether Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to equitable relief as well as actual and/or statutory damages resulting from Defendants’ conduct. 41. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all the other Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members sustained substantially similar damages as a result of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct, based upon the same interactions that were made uniformly with Plaintiff and the public. 42. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the other Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting complex litigation and class actions. Plaintiff and his counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the Class members and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interest adverse to those of the other Class members. 43. Policies Generally Applicable to the Classes: Defendants have acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and the other Class members, requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Classes. 44. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy as joinder of all parties is impracticable. The damages suffered by individual Class members will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of 13 individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendants’ actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for individual Class members to obtain effective relief from Defendants’ misconduct. Even if Class members could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court. Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. 45. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the Class Definitions and Class Allegations based on further investigation, including facts learned in discovery. 46. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations. 47. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et seq. prohibits any person from intentionally intercepting any oral communication or from intentionally using, or endeavoring to use, the contents of any oral communication while knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of an oral communication. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(a), (d). 48. Plaintiff and each member of the Lisnr Class downloaded and installed an application with Defendant Lisnr’s audio beacon technology built in. 49. During the time Plaintiff and the members of the Lisnr Class had (or still have) 14 the applications with Defendant Lisnr’s audio beacon technology built in, Defendant Lisnr intercepted (by listening in and recording) Plaintiff’s and the Lisnr Class’s private conversations, including oral communications, where Plaintiff and the Lisnr Class exhibited expectations that such communications were to remain private and would not otherwise be subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). 50. Defendant Lisnr did not inform nor obtain consent from Plaintiff and the Lisnr Class to listen in and/or record their private conversations. Plaintiff and the Lisnr Class had no reason to know or suspect that Defendant Lisnr would constantly and continuously record and analyze their conversations. 51. As detailed herein, Defendant Lisnr programmed applications with its audio beacon technology to listen to and record oral communications belonging to Plaintiff and members of the Class as soon as technically feasible and used the contents of those communications to its economic benefit, including for marketing purposes. 52. At all times, Defendant Lisnr acted intentionally by programming the audio beacon technology and partnering with app developers to include in their applications and to turn on consumers’ Microphones without consent. 53. As a proximate cause of Defendant Lisnr’s violation of the ECPA, Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured by and through the wear and tear on their smartphones, consuming the battery life of their smartphones, and diminishing their use, enjoyment, and utility of their devices. 54. Plaintiff and the members of the Lisnr Class suffered harm as a result of Defendant Lisnr’s violations of the ECPA, and therefore seek (a) preliminary, equitable and declaratory relief as may be appropriate, (b) the sum of the actual damages suffered and the 15 profits obtained by Defendant Lisnr as a result of its unlawful conduct, or statutory damages as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 2520(2)(B), whichever is greater, (c) punitive damages, and (d) reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees. 55. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations. 56. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et seq. prohibits any person from intentionally intercepting any oral communication or from intentionally using, or endeavoring to use, the contents of any oral communication while knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of an oral communication. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(a), (d). 57. Plaintiff and each member of the Colts Class downloaded and installed the Colts App with Defendant Lisnr’s audio beacon technology built in. 58. During the time Plaintiff and the members of the Colts Class had (or still have) Defendants’ App on their smartphones, Defendants intercepted (by listening in and recording) Plaintiff’s and the Colts Class’s private conversations, including oral communications, where Plaintiff and the Colts Class exhibited expectations that such communications were to remain private and would not otherwise be subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). 59. Defendants did not inform nor obtain consent from Plaintiff or the Colts Class to listen to and record their private conversations. Plaintiff and the Colts Class had no reason to know or suspect that the App would constantly and continuously record and analyze their 16 conversations. 60. As detailed herein, once the App is downloaded and opened on their smartphones, Defendants listen to and record oral communications belonging to Plaintiff and members of the Class and use the contents of those communications to their economic benefit, including for marketing purposes. 61. At all times, Defendants acted intentionally by programming the App to specifically turn on consumers’ Microphones without consent. And, each defendant is integrally involved with the inclusion of the Lisnr audio beacon code and with the operation of the offending software. 62. The Colts leveraged its mobile application with a large number of consumers who downloaded and installed the App (likely greater than 50,000) to serve as the host of the Lisnr audio beacon technology. Reasonable consumers that downloaded the Colts App did not have the understanding that the requested “microphone” permission would result in the surreptitious monitoring of their oral communications. Instead, consumers trusted the Colts when they downloaded the application. And when the Colts requested the microphone permission, consumers trusted that it was for some disclosed purpose (e.g., media). Without the Colts’ trusting fans, Defendants could not have obtained access to enough microphones for their scheme to be viable. 63. Defendant Lisnr, for its part, not only provided the specific technology at issue here, but was and is integral to the continued operation of the listening device. Specifically, Lisnr owns and controls the rule issuing server that causes consumers’ microphones to activate. Without Lisnr’s server, consumers’ microphones would not be activated. As a result, Lisnr’s actions are an integral link in the development and operation of the listening device (i.e., the 17 App) that performs the unlawful interceptions at issue. 64. Defendant Adept Mobile develops and maintains the codebase of the App and ensures the deliverability of the App to the Google Play Store and, ultimately, consumers. Adept Mobile integrated the Lisnr audio beacon technology into the Colts App, conducted testing and analysis, and then issued the App for distribution through the Google Play Store and to consumers. Adept Mobile’s actions are an integral link in the development and distribution of the listening device (i.e., the App) that performs the unlawful interceptions at issue. 65. As a proximate cause of Defendants’ violation of the ECPA, Plaintiff and members of the Colts Class have been injured by and through the wear and tear on their smartphones, consuming the battery life of their smartphones, and diminishing their use, enjoyment, and utility of their devices. 66. Plaintiff and the Colts Class members suffered harm as a result of Defendants’ violations of the ECPA, and therefore seek (a) preliminary, equitable and declaratory relief as may be appropriate, (b) the sum of the actual damages suffered and the profits obtained by Defendants as a result of its unlawful conduct, or statutory damages as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 2520(2)(B), whichever is greater, (c) punitive damages, and (d) reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees. I. An Introduction to Beacon Surveillance Technology. Violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act Against Defendant Lisnr 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Lisnr Class) Violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act Against All Defendants 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Colts Class)

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2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 21. Defendant is an exercise machine retailer that owns and operates www.corehandf.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 25. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. Such issues were predominant in the section where Plaintiff was attempting, but was unsuccessful, in making a purchase. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)- (2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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52. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through fifty-one (51) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 53. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of two classes. 54. Class A consists of all persons whom Defendant’s records reflect resided in the State of New York who communicated with Defendant’s representatives within one year prior to the date of the within complaint up to the date of the filing of the complaint; (a) the -9- Defendant denied the Plaintiff the right to dispute the debt; and (b) the Defendant made false statements in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(8) and 1692e(10). 55. Class B consists of all persons whom Defendant’s records reflect resided in New York who received telephonic messages from Defendant within one year prior to the date of the within complaint up to the date of the filing of the complaint; (a) the telephone call was placed to a the consumer's home or similar party seeking payment of a consumer debt by leaving a message for the Plaintiff; and (b) the Plaintiff asserts that the telephone message was in violation 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b), 1692d, 1692e, 1692e(10), 1692e(11), and 1692f. 56. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: A. Based on the fact that form telephonic communications are at the heart of this litigation, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. B. There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendant violated the FDCPA. C. The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who communicated with, or received communications from, the Defendant (i.e. the class members), a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of Defendant. D. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. -10- E. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members’ interests. The Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and collection-abuse claims. The Plaintiff’s interests are consistent with those of the members of the class. 57. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties and would not be in the interest of judicial economy. 58. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, the Plaintiff will seek to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 59. Collection attempts, such as those made by the Defendant are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 60. The Defendant’s actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 61. Because the Defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Plaintiff and the members of the class are entitled to damages in accordance with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, respectfully requests preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and that this Court enter judgment in his favor and against the Defendant and award damages as follows: -11- A. Statutory and actual damages provided under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k); B. Attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs incurred in bringing this action; and C. Any other relief that this Court deems appropriate and just under the circumstances. 62. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein, all paragraphs in this action, that reference the Plaintiff being unable to dispute the alleged debt with D&A Services. 63. That on or about February 19, 2020, the Plaintiff called and spoke to a representative from D&A Services, LLC. 64. During the call, the Plaintiff attempted to dispute the debt, yet the Defendant would not accept the dispute, but rather, instructed the Plaintiff to direct all disputes to the original creditor directly. 65. Defendant further demanded a reason for the dispute. 66. The FDCPA does not require the consumer to provide any reason at all in order to dispute a debt. 67. The FDCPA allows the consumer to dispute a debt directly with the debt collector. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 68. The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on an individual basis

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48. Defendants intentionally exercised unauthorized dominion and control over funds paid by Kilman and Class to obtain the release of their animals. FOURTH CLAIM – Outrage (as to Kilman only) 50. Morgan acted under color of state law in violating Kilman’s rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments by seizing Max and withholding him from Kilman by extracting, attempting to extract, and extorting funds without any lawful basis, and compelling Kilman to execute unconscionable, unconstitutional, and unlawful Claim Forms in order to recover Max. Morgan also intentionally gave Max to a third party over Kilman’s objection, knowing the anguish it would cause her and her children. 51. Such unconstitutional acts were performed intentionally, recklessly, and/or with deliberate indifference. 52. Morgan’s actions and inactions in seizing Max, extracting funds from Kilman, withholding Max from Kilman, and thereafter giving Max away to a third party, shocked the conscience and interfered with her liberty and property interests in Max, thus constituting an impermissible seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment and procedural and substantive dimensions of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause. 54. Whether construed as willful conversion or trespass to chattels, Morgan intentionally exercised unauthorized dominion and control over Max, withholding and converting him by extorting money from Kilman and compelling her to execute unconscionable and illegal contracts, causing damage. 55. Morgan intentionally exercised unauthorized dominion and control over funds paid by Kilman to obtain the release of Max. FOURTH CLAIM – Outrage (as to Kilman only) 56. Morgan recklessly or intentionally caused severe emotional distress to Kilman by outrageously extracting illegal sums from her and then refusing to release Max altogether, giving him to another individual without any lawful basis, constituting theft.. JESSICA KILMAN, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated; Plaintiffs, vs. Ongoing Violation of Federally-Protected Constitutional and Statutory Rights, and Monetary Damages (42 U.S.C. § 1983, Ch. 7.40 and 7.24 RCW) and Monetary Damages (42 U.S.C. § 1983) (as to Kilman only)

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(Unjust Enrichment) 11. Upon information and belief, while engaging in these practices, LifePoint routinely seeks payment for the medical bills from those same patients, either directly or indirectly. 12. Upon information and belief, LifePoint seeks payment for medical bills through means that include demanding cash payment directly from the patients, and placing unlawful hospital liens upon patients' third-party tort claims and recovery and/or patients' automobile- insurance benefits (medical-payments benefits and uninsured/underinsured-motorist benefits). 13. LifePoint pursues this course of conduct despite the patients having health insurance and being contractually entitled to have their medical bills submitted to their health insurance carriers for payment. 15. Upon information and belief, LifePoint is precluded by its contracts with health insurance carriers (such as Plaintiff's insurer, United Healthcare) from seeking payment for covered services from other sources, including from the patient directly, or by filing hospital liens. 16. Such patients are unable to submit their medical bills directly to their health insurance carriers because LifePoint is the entity responsible for such submission. LifePoint is the only entity in possession of the information required to make such a submission, and LifePoint is the entity that has a contract with the health insurance carrier for a reduced compensation for treating patients with health insurance. 17. Through LifePoint's billing and bill-collection practices, it attempts to maximize the amount it receives for covered services by seeking from patients the full amount charged (which is more than it is entitled to receive for the covered treatment), rather than accepting the discounted amount it has contractually agreed to accept as full payment, except for copays and deductibles, from the patients' health insurance carriers. Upon information and belief, LifePoint derives considerable profit from this policy and business model. 19. On May 19, 2015, Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident in Covington County, Alabama. On the day of the accident, she was transported by ambulance to Andalusia Regional Hospital for emergency-room ("ER") treatment for injuries she received in the wreck. 20. At that time, Plaintiff had health insurance with United Healthcare, which covered the ER services she received. Andalusia Regional Hospital did not submit Plaintiffs medical bills to United Healthcare for payment. Instead, Andalusia Regional Hospital charged Plaintiff the undiscounted sum of $11,740.75 for ER services rendered. Pursuant to Plaintiffs health insurance policy with United Healthcare, however, Plaintiff only owed Andalusia Regional Hospital a $150 copay. 21. Andalusia Regional Hospital subsequently obtained $5,000 in med pay from Plaintiffs automobile insurer, Allstate. Andalusia Regional Hospital applied this sum to the payment of Plaintiff's undiscounted medical bills. 22. On June 10, 2015, Andalusia Regional Hospital filed a hospital lien for $6,740.75 in Covington County, Alabama, on all claims or demands accruing to Plaintiff on the account of her injuries. The lien recited that it was filed by "Andalusia Regional Hospital - LifePoint" "operated by/owned by LifePoint." 24. On May 4, 2016, Plaintiff's personal-injury attorney used $6,740.75 from the settlement to pay Andalusia Regional Hospital and satisfy the hospital lien, as the lien was preventing Plaintiff from receiving any compensation for her injuries. 25. This action is brought as a plaintiffs' class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Plaintiff brings this action on her own behalf, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as representative of the following Class: All persons in the United States who received any type of healthcare treatment from any healthcare facility that is owned or operated by LifePoint Health, while covered by private health insurance or while a participant in a group health and welfare plan (hereinafter collectively referred to as "health insurance"), and within six years preceding the commencement of this action, whose medical bills for covered treatment were not submitted to the patient's health insurance carrier for payment, and LifePoint Health Obtained payment for the undiscounted medical bills directly from the patient, and/or from the patient's third-party tort recovery and/or automobile-insurance benefits (medical-payments benefits and uninsured/underinsured-motorist benefits), or LifePoint Health placed a hospital lien on the patient's third-party tort claim and/or automobile-insurance benefits which has not been satisfied. Excluded from the Class are (1) the officers, directors, and employees of LifePoint Health, and of healthcare facilities owned or operated by LifePoint Health; and (2) all judicial officers of the United States who preside over or hear this case, and all persons related to them as specified in 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5). 26. The members of the Class are readily identifiable from the information and records in the possession or control of LifePoint. 29. Plaintiff's claims are typical of those of the Class and are based on the same legal theory as those of the Class members. Plaintiff's claims and those of the Class members all arise from the same pattern or practice by LifePoint, set out above. 30. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are highly experienced and competent in complex consumer class-action litigation, and Plaintiff and her counsel intend to prosecute this action vigorously. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests that might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. Plaintiff's interests are coextensive with those of the Class, and Plaintiff has no interests adverse to those of the Class members. 32. Plaintiff and her counsel are aware of no litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against Class members. This also indicates that the Class members' interest in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions is minimal. 33. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in managing this action as a class action. 34. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding allegations, and alleges as follows against LifePoint on behalf of herself and the members of the Class: 35. Plaintiff and the Class members are intended third-party beneficiaries of the contracts between LifePoint and their health insurance carriers. At the time of contracting, LifePoint and the health insurance carriers intended to confer a direct benefit upon Plaintiff and the Class members, in that LifePoint would submit Plaintiff's and the Class members' medical bills to their health insurance carriers for payment at discounted rates, whereby Plaintiff and the Class members would only be obligated to pay copays and deductibles, and LifePoint Would be precluded from seeking payment for the medical bills, other than for copays and deductibles, from any other source, directly or indirectly, including Plaintiff and the Class members. 37. As a proximate result of LifePoint's breach of its contracts with the health insurance carriers, Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged. They paid for undiscounted medical bills they were not indebted to pay, they lost insurance proceeds they were entitled to receive, and/or they lost money they were entitled to receive from third-party tort recoveries. In the case of Class members with unsatisfied hospital liens, they cannot access funds subject to the liens that they are entitled to receive and have lost the use of those monies. 38. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 37 above, and alleges as follows against LifePoint on behalf of herself and the members of the Class: 39. As alleged above, LifePoint has engaged in a pattern of subverting the financial interest and insurance agreements of Plaintiff and the Class, for its own pecuniary gain. 40. LifePoint has filed hospital liens for the undiscounted medical bills upon Plaintiff's and the Class members' third-party tort claims and recoveries and/or automobile- insurance benefits, and has obtained payment for the undiscounted medical bills from the Class members' third-party tort recoveries and/or automobile-insurance benefits, and/or from the Class members directly. 41. LifePoint has been unjustly enriched because it received and retained the benefit of proceeds to which it was not entitled. 42. LifePoint unjustly retains benefits it received at the expense of Plaintiff and the Class members. 44. Therefore, LifePoint holds monies which in equity and good conscience belong to Plaintiff and the Class members. 5. LifePoint is a healthcare company that owns and/or operates hospitals in twenty- two states. LifePoint owns and/or operates two hospitals in the State of Alabama, Andalusia Health, also known as Andalusia Regional Hospital, in Andalusia, Alabama, and Vaughan Regional Medical Center in Selma, Alabama. LifePoint is a for-profit healthcare company. 6. Upon information and belief, LifePoint controls the manner, methods, and means of the billing practices and bill-collection practices at the hospitals it owns and/or operates, such that those hospitals are LifePoint's agents for the purposes of their billing and bill-collection practices. 7. Upon information and belief, the billing and bill-collection practices described herein are conducted by the hospitals owned and/or operated by LifePoint at LifePoint's direction and under its control, such that these activities are the actions of LifePoint as its agents' principal. 8. LifePoint, as described in detail below, routinely subverts the financial interests of its patients for its own benefit and profits through unlawful and predatory billing practices. 9. Upon information and belief, LifePoint screens all patients and makes a determination regarding the reason for treatment and whether there may be sources of payment other than health insurance available. BREACH OF CONTRACT (ThirdParty Beneficiary)

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19. At all relevant times, Plaintiff had a deposit account with San Diego County Credit Union (the “Account”). 2. Authorization obtained by third party. The account-holding financial institution does not violate the regulation when a third-party payee fails to obtain the authorization in writing or fails to give a copy to the consumer; rather, it is the third-party payee that is in violation of the regulation. 20. The Account was established primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and thus, is an “account” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1693a(2). 21. On or about May 18, 2015, Defendant sent a written communication to Plaintiff in connection with the collection of the Debt. A true and correct copy of the May 18, 2015 communication to Plaintiff is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 22. The May 18, 2015 written communication advised Plaintiff that she owed a debt to Paypal Inc. in the amount of $2,937.38. 24. The May 18, 2015 written communication then encouraged Plaintiff to call Defendant or mail payment to its office if she was “interested in taking advantage of this offer….” Id. 25. On or about May 29, 2015, Plaintiff called Defendant in response to the May 18, 2015 written communication. 26. During the call, Defendant solicited from Plaintiff over the telephone information about the Account in order to initiate recurring transfers for payments toward the Debt. 27. Plaintiff and Defendant then agreed, orally, that Defendant would electronically transfer $30.00 from the Account each month for four consecutive months (the “EFT Agreement”). 28. Defendant did not obtain from Plaintiff written authorization for the EFT Agreement. Plaintiff has not authorized, in writing, any of the preauthorized electronic fund transfers from the Account. 29. Defendant did not provide Plaintiff with a copy of any document which Plaintiff signed authorizing the EFT Agreement or the preauthorized electronic fund transfers. 31. Upon information and belief, Defendant has taken electronic fund transfers from the accounts of numerous other consumers throughout California, on regularly scheduled intervals, without written authorization, and without providing a copy of such authorization to those consumers. 33. Upon information and belief, the proposed Classes are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number of members of the Classes is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery. The proposed Classes are ascertainable in that, upon information and belief, the names and addresses of all members of the Classes can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant. 34. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes because Plaintiff and all Class members’ claims originate from the same conduct, practice and procedure on the part of Defendant and Plaintiff has suffered the same injuries as each member of the Classes. Like all proposed members of the Classes, Plaintiff entered into an oral preauthorized electronic fund transfer agreement with Defendant that was not authorized by a writing signed or similarly authenticated by Plaintiff. 35. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Classes and has retained counsel experienced and competent in class action litigation. 37. Issues of law and fact common to the members of the Classes predominate over any questions that may affect only individual members, in that Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Classes. Among the issues of law and fact common to the Classes are: a. Defendant’s failure to obtain from Plaintiff and other members of the Classes written authorization to electronically transfer funds on a recurring basis from their bank accounts; b. Defendant’s failure to provide Plaintiff and other members of the Classes with a copy of any document which they signed authorizing the electronic fund transfers. c. the availability of declaratory relief; d. the availability of statutory penalties; and e. the availability of attorneys’ fees and costs. 39. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in paragraphs 1 - 38. 40. 15 U.S.C. § 1693e(a) provides, in pertinent part: A preauthorized electronic fund transfer from a consumer’s account may be authorized by the consumer only in writing, and a copy of such authorization shall be provided to the consumer when made. (emphasis added). 41. 12 C.F.R. § 1005.10(b) provides, in pertinent part: Written authorization for preauthorized transfers from consumer’s account. Preauthorized electronic fund transfers from a consumer’s account may be authorized only by a writing signed or similarly authenticated by the consumer. The person that obtains the authorization shall provide a copy to the consumer. (emphasis added). 42. The Official Staff Interpretations to the EFTA, at 12 C.F.R. Pt. 1005.10(b), Supp. I, provide, in pertinent part: 43. The EFT Agreement was not authorized by a writing signed or similarly authenticated by Plaintiff. Rather, Defendant purportedly obtained authorization from Plaintiff verbally, never obtaining a writing from Plaintiff authorizing the preauthorized electronic fund transfers. Further, as there was no signed agreement authorizing the transfers, Defendant never provided a copy of the signed, written agreement to Plaintiff. 44. Thus, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1693e(a) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.10(b). 45. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in paragraphs 1-38. 46. The FDCPA at 15 U.S.C. §1692 f provides that “[a] debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 48. Thus, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 6. Requirements of an authorization. An authorization is valid if it is readily identifiable as such and the terms of the preauthorized transfer are clear and readily understandable. (emphasis added). AS TO PLAINTIFFS AND THE FDCPA CLASS REGULATION E, 12 C.F.R. § 1005.10(b) AS TO PLAINTIFF AND THE EFTA CLASS

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27. Within the last four years, Defendant has caused numerous calls with prerecorded messages to be transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone ending in 8532 (the “8532 Number”), including on or about November 13, 2019 and November 14, 2019. 28. The prerecorded calls at issue were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 29. When Plaintiff listened to Defendant’s message she was easily able to determine that it was a prerecorded message. Rahn v. Bank of Am., No. 1:15-CV-4485-ODE-JSA, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186171, at *10-11 (N.D. Ga. June 23, 2016) (“When one receives a call, it is a clear- cut fact, easily discernible to any lay person, whether or not the recipient is speaking to a live human being, or is instead being subjected to a prerecorded message.”). 30. Defendant’s prerecorded call constitutes telemarketing because it encourages the future purchase or investment in property, goods, and/or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff insurance policies from its various insurance industry customers. 31. The prerecorded call Plaintiff received originated from a telephone number owned and/or operated by or on behalf of Defendant. 37. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 38. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the Class defined as follows: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a call using an artificial or prerecorded voice, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number, without emergency purpose and without the recipient’s prior express written consent. 42. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to members of the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class are: a) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; b) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; c) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; d) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and e) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 48. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 49. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 50. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 51. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 52. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 53. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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10. Plaintiff had no business relationship with Defendant, did not give Defendant its number, and had not consented to be sent a facsimile. 3 11. No opt out notice was provided as required on all faxes. 12. On information and belief, Defendant continues to send these facsimiles nationwide without prior consent to do so. 13. Plaintiff was damaged by these faxes by suffering a monetary loss due to the faxes, incurring the costs of the use of facsimile paper, ink and toner, loss of employee time to review the fax, invasion of privacy, nuisance, interruption of work, trespass to its chattel by interfering with its office facsimile used to aid patients, stress, aggravation, and because a violation of the TCPA itself is a concrete injury. 14. Class Definition: Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of itself and a Class of similarly situated individuals or business, defined as follows: A. All person in the United States who received a facsimile from or on behalf of Defendant and who had no ongoing business relationship with Defendant and had not given consent to receive facsimiles from defendant or where the facsimiles did not provide opt out language, within the six years prior to the filing of the Complaint, until this class is certified. 15. Numerosity: The exact number of each Class is unknown and is not available to Plaintiff at this time, but individual joinder in this case is impracticable. The Class likely consists of thousands of individuals and businesses. Class members can be easily identified through Defendant’s records. 4 16. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and other members of the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include but are not limited to the following: a) Whether Defendant sent the faxes or had them sent on its behalf; b) Whether Defendant had consent; c) Whether Defendant has processes in place to prevent these facsimiles; d) Whether Defendant’s conduct was willful; e) Whether Defendant’s facsimiles were solicitations; and f) Whether Defendant’s conduct constitutes a violation of the TCPA. 17. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other Class members and it sustained the same damages as other members of the Class as a result of Defendant’s actions. 18. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex litigation and class actions including TCPA cases. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and its counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of members of the Class and have the financial resources to do so. 19. Superiority: This case is appropriate for certification because class proceedings are the best method available for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy in light of the common issues across the class. 5 31. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 32. The TCPA expressly prohibits unsolicited fax advertising, 47 U.S.C.§ 227(b) 7. On or about April 18, 2017, Plaintiff received a facsimile on its fax machine from Defendant. 8. The form fax was one page and stated it was from: “RxPedite Pharmacy”. 9. The fax, attached hereto as Exhibit 1, solicited the Plaintiff to provide the generic drug Doryx AG to its patients, and touted itself as “the only pharmacy, in Ohio” to carry the generic brand. Violation of 47 U.S.C § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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19. Whey is a complete protein source, which means it contains all the essential amino acids the human body needs to build protein-based compounds such as muscle tissue, skin, fingernails, hair and enzymes. Daily protein needs depend on one’s size, gender and activity levels, although they likely amount to somewhere between 46 grams and 56 grams. For elite athletes, daily protein requirements are well over 100 grams, a need that is difficult to fulfill with simply ingesting food. Others may also need to supplement their protein intake for reasons of ill health. 20. Whey protein powder is especially rich in branched-chain amino acids -- leucine, isoleucine and valine -- which are metabolized directly within the muscles as opposed to being processed in the liver first. 56. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding factual allegations as if fully set forth herein. 57. Plaintiff and each member of the Class is a “Consumer” as that term is defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(d). 58. The Products are a “Good” as that term is defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(a). 59. Defendant is a “Person” as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(c). 60. The transaction(s) involved here are “Transaction(s)” as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(e). 61. Plaintiff and members of the Class are Consumers who purchased the Products for personal use within the applicable statute of limitations period. 62. Plaintiff has standing to pursue this cause of action because Plaintiff has suffered injury-in-fact and has lost money or property as a result of Defendant’s actions as set forth here. 63. Plaintiff and Class members purchased the Products in reliance on Defendant’s labeling and marketing claims. 71. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding factual allegations as if fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff and the Class have standing to pursue a cause of action for false advertising under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17500, et seq., because Plaintiff and members of the Class have suffered an injury-in-fact and lost money as a result of Defendant’s actions as set forth herein. 73. Defendant labeled, advertised, marketed, and otherwise disseminated misleading information to the public through the product labels. 74. Defendant continues to disseminate such statements. 75. Defendant’s statements are misleading. 76. Defendant knows that these statements are misleading, or could have discovered their misleading nature with the exercise of reasonable care. 77. Plaintiff and Class members relied on Defendant’s marketing and labeling. 78. Defendant’s actions violate Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500, et seq. 79. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s actions, as set forth herein, Defendant has received ill-gotten gains and/or profits, including but not limited to money from Plaintiff and Class members who paid for the Products. Therefore, Defendant has been unjustly enriched. 82. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding factual allegations as if fully set forth herein. 83. Plaintiff and the Class have standing to pursue a cause of action for false advertising under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq., because Plaintiff and members of the Class have suffered an injury-in-fact and lost money as a result of Defendant’s actions as set forth herein. 84. Defendant’s actions as described herein constitute unfair competition within the meaning of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, in that Defendant has engaged in deceptive business practices by falsely advertising the content of whey protein in the Products. 85. Defendant’s actions as described herein constitute unfair competition within the meaning of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, in that Defendant has engaged in unlawful, unfair and deceptive business practices by deceiving consumers and violating California’s Sherman Food Drug & Cosmetic Act and California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act. 86. Defendant’s actions as described herein constitute unfair competition within the meaning of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, on the additional grounds that Defendant has failed to properly label the Products in accordance with 21 C.F.R. § 101, et seq. The Differences Between Whey Protein & Free Form Amino Acids Violation of the False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500, et seq. (On Behalf of the California Subclass) Violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §1750, et. seq. (On Behalf of the California Subclass) Violation of the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. (On Behalf of the California Subclass Members)

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11. Nationwide profited from and received the benefits of marketing of its products and services by fax and is a responsible party under the JFPA. 12. Defendant created or caused to be made Exhibit A hereto, which Defendant knew or should have known advertises Defendant’s goods or products, and Defendant intended to and did in fact distribute Exhibit A to Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes. 13. Exhibit A is a fact advertisement that is part of Defendant’s work or operations, including its marketing of its products, which is performed by Defendant and/or on behalf of Defendant. Therefore, Exhibit A constitutes material furnished in connection with Defendant’s work or operations. 14. Plaintiff never consented or invited Defendant to send the faxes, nor has Plaintiff ever given permission to Defendant to send the Fax and had no prior relationship with Defendant. 15. On information and belief, Defendant faxed the same unsolicited facsimile to Plaintiff and more than 40 other recipients without first receiving the recipients’ express permission or invitation to send such faxes. 16. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the communications their owners actually desire and consent to receive. 17. Defendant’s facsimile did not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 C.F.R. 64.1200. Among other things, it did not apprise recipients of their legal right to opt out. 19. The following individuals are excluded from the Classes: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or their parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Classes; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the class definitions following appropriate discovery. 20. Numerosity: The exact number of members within the Classes is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant has sent facsimile advertisements to hundreds or thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Classes. However, the exact number of members of the Classes can only be identified through Defendant’s records. 22. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts, and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the Classes. 24. Conduct Similar to the Class as a Whole: Class certification is appropriate because Defendant has acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), et seq. 26. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 27. The JFPA makes unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement …” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 29. The faxes sent by Defendant advertised its financial products, were commercial in nature, and are advertisements under the TCPA. 30. Plaintiff and the other class members never gave prior express consent, invitation or permission to receive the faxes. 31. The Faxes. Defendant sent the April 18, 2018 fax via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the No Consent Class. The Fax constituted an advertisement under the Act. The Faxes were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation and/or Defendant is precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements as explained below. Defendant violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Faxes via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the No Consent Class. 33. The JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the No Consent Class to redress Defendant’s violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 34. The JFPA is a strict liability statute. The Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff and the other members of the No Consent Class even if it did not intend to send the faxes or to send them without first obtaining prior express invitation or permission. 35. The Defendant knew or should have known that (a) the Plaintiff and the other members of the No Consent Class had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendant or anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendant’s goods or services; (b) the faxes constituted an advertisement; and (c) the Fax did not apprise recipients of their legal right to opt-out. 37. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the No Consent Class are each entitled to, under section 227(b)(3)(B), a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation of such act. 38. Furthermore, in the event the Court finds that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, the Court should, under section 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the No Consent Class. 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 41. The Faxes. Defendant sent Exhibit A via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Insufficient Opt-Out Notice Class. The Faxes constituted an advertisement under the Act. Defendant failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Faxes. The faxes failed to apprise recipients of their legal right to opt-out, or indeed provide any information regarding opting out or a means to opt-out. The Faxes were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation and/or Defendant is precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. Defendant violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Faxes via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Insufficient Opt-Out Notice Class. 43. The JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Insufficient Opt-Out Notice Class to redress Defendant’s violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 44. The JFPA is a strict liability statute. The Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if it did not intend to send the faxes or to send them without first obtaining prior express invitation or permission. 45. The Defendant knew or should have known that (a) Plaintiff and the other members of the Insufficient Opt-Out Notice Class had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendant or anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendant’s goods or services; (b) the faxes constituted an advertisement; and (c) the Faxes did not provide a cost free means for recipients of to opt-out. 47. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Insufficient Opt-Out Notice Class are each entitled to, under section 227(b)(3)(B), a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation of such act. 48. Furthermore, in the event the Court finds that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, the Court should, under section 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Insufficient Opt-Out Notice Class. 5. This case challenges Defendant’s practice of sending unsolicited fax advertisements. 7. Unsolicited faxes cause damage to their recipients. A junk fax recipient loses the use of its fax machine, paper, and ink toner. An unsolicited fax wastes the recipient’s time that would have been spent on something else. A junk fax also invades the recipient’s privacy. Unsolicited faxes prevent fax machines from receiving authorized faxes, prevent their use for authorized outgoing faxes, cause undue wear and tear on the recipients’ fax machines, and require additional labor to attempt to discern the source and purpose of the unsolicited message. 8. On behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff brings this case as a class action asserting claims against Defendant under the JFPA. 9. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on such information and belief states, that this action is based on a common nucleus of operative fact because the facsimile transmissions at issue were and are being performed in the same or similar manner. This action is based on the same legal theory, namely liability under the JFPA stemming from the same faxes being sent from the same equipment. This action seeks relief expressly authorized by the JFPA: (i) injunctive relief enjoining Defendant, its employees, agents, representatives, contractors, affiliates, and all persons and entities acting in concert with them, from sending unsolicited advertisements in violation of the JFPA, and (ii) an award of statutory damages in the minimum amount of $500 for each violation of the JFPA, and to have such damages trebled, as provided by § 227(b)(3) of the Act. Claim for Relief for Violation of the JFPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the No Consent Class) Claim for Relief for Violation of the JFPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Insufficient Opt-Out Notice Class)

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10. Accordingly, on May 2, 2017, Mr. Dugger sent Verizon Wireless a letter, via certified mail demanding that they cease collection of the Verizon debt, which was discharged in Mr. Dugger’s bankruptcy. A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit F. 11. Plaintiff’s bankruptcy is a matter of public record, is on his credit reports, is in the files on the creditor, and is readily discoverable by any competent debt collector via one of the bankruptcy “scrub” services. In fact, on May 22, 2017, Defendant Convergent pulled Mr. Dugger’s Experian credit report, which clearly lists his bankruptcy upon it. A portion of this credit report is attached as Exhibit G. 14. All of Defendant Convergent’s collection actions at issue in this matter occurred within one year of the date of this Complaint. 15. Defendants’ collection communications are to be interpreted under the “least sophisticated consumer” standard, see, Jeter v. Credit Bureau, 760 F.2d 1168, 1176 (11th Cir. 1985); LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1193-1194 (11th Cir. 2010). 16. Plaintiff adopts and realleges ¶¶ 1-15. 17. Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using any false and/or any deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of a debt, including, but not limited to, the false representation of the character, amount or legal status of any debt, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 18. Demanding payment of a debt that is no longer owed, due to a bankruptcy, is false and/or deceptive or misleading, in violation of § 1692e of the FDCPA, see, Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F3d 726, 728-730 (7th Cir. 2004). 19. Defendant Convergent’s violation of § 1692e of the FDCPA renders it liable for actual and statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 21. Section 1692c(c) of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from communicating with a consumer after a direction to cease communications, and from continuing to demand payment of a debt that the consumer has indicated that they refuse to pay, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). 22. Here, the bankruptcy and the notices issued by that court (Exhibits B, C and D), as well as Mr. Dugger’s letter to Defendant (Exhibit F) provided notice to cease communications and cease collections. By communicating regarding this debt and demanding payment (Exhibit H), Defendant violated § 1692c(c) of the FDCPA. 23. Defendant Convergent’s violation of § 1692c(c) of the FDCPA renders it liable for actual and statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 24. Plaintiff, Christopher Dugger, brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of Alabama from whom Defendant attempted to collect a delinquent consumer debt, allegedly owed to Verizon Wireless, which had been discharged in a bankruptcy, via the same form collection letter that Defendant sent to Plaintiff (Exhibit H), from one year before the date of this Complaint to the present. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s form letter violates the FDCPA, and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by § 1692k(a)(2) of the FDCPA. 26. The Class consists of more than 35 persons from whom Defendant Convergent attempted to collect delinquent consumer debts by sending other consumers the same form collection letter they sent Plaintiff Dugger. 27. Plaintiff Dugger’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this class action complaint affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. This class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 28. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 6. On January 12, 2017, Mr. Dugger filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in a matter styled In re: Dugger, N.D. AL. Bankr. No. 17-80117-CRJ7. Among the debts listed on Mr. Dugger’s Schedule F was a debt that he allegedly owed to Verizon Wireless, see, attached as Exhibit B. 8. On April 11, 2017, Mr. Dugger received a discharge of his debts, and on April 13, 2017, Verizon Wireless was sent notice of this discharge via U.S. Mail, see, the Certificate of Service to the Discharge of Debtor, which is attached as Exhibit D. 9. On April 25, 2017 and April 26, 2017, Verizon Wireless sent Mr. Dugger collection letters, demanding payment of the Verizon Wireless debt he allegedly owed prior to the bankruptcy. Copies of these letters are attached as Group Exhibit E. Violation Of § 1692e Of The FDCPA -- Demanding Payment Of A Debt That Is Not Owed Violation Of § 1692c(c) Of The FDCPA -- Failure To Cease Communications And Cease Collections

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14. Gustech relies on Satellite Technicians, such as Plaintiffs, to install and repair DirecTV services and products in states such as North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Florida. 15. Gustech maintains a website which describes its business as installing satellite television in homes. 17. Gustech Technicians perform core work that is necessary to Gustech’s business, namely providing installations, upgrades, and support for DirecTV customers; without the Technicians, Defendant would have no business. 18. Gustech improperly misclassified Plaintiffs and Class Members as independent contractors, when the economic reality of the position is that of an employee, and Gustech retains the right of control, and, in fact, actually does control the work of its Satellite Technicians. 19. As a result of the misclassification of its Satellite Technicians, Gustech did not pay them in accordance with the FLSA and state wage laws and otherwise forced the Technicians unlawfully to bear certain costs of Gustech’s business by deducting such amounts from their pay. 20. Plaintiffs and Class Members qualify as employees under the FLSA, the NCWHA, and the SCPWA, as further described below. 21. The work performed by Plaintiffs and Class Members is an integral part of Gustech’s business. Gustech is in the business of providing DirecTV satellite installation and repair services. Plaintiffs and Class Members installed, upgraded, and provided technical services for DirecTV satellite products to Gustech’s customers. 22. Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ duties do not involve managerial work. They follow the protocols provided to them by Gustech in performing their work, which is basic installation and technical services. 23. Plaintiffs and Class Members do not make any significant relative investments in relation to their work with Gustech. 25. Gustech requires Plaintiffs and Class Members who do not have prior experience to undergo training lasting one to three weeks during which they work alongside other Gustech technicians without pay. 26. Plaintiffs and Class Members are not customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business. 27. Plaintiffs and Class Members have little or no authority to refuse or negotiate Gustech’s rules and policies; they must comply or risk deduction in hours and/or termination. 28. In addition to reserving the right to control the work performed by Plaintiffs and Class Members, Gustech, in fact, exercises control over the method and manner in which Plaintiffs and the Classes perform their labor for Gustech’s clients. 30. Gustech requires Plaintiffs and Class Members to submit to a consumer background report as part of the application process. 31. Gustech controls Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ work assignments through the Field Services Tech Passport (FSTP) application. Gustech assigns routes for each technician and assigns jobs based on the Technician’s score. Work assignments are easily monitored or changed by Gustech at any time for any reason. 32. Gustech tracks Plaintiffs and Class Members with the phone tracking application FSTP. Plaintiffs and Class Members are required to download the application to their phones in order for Gustech to track their work and location throughout the day. 34. Gustech monitors the information in FSTP throughout the day and calls Technicians who are running behind the estimated schedule. 35. Gustech requires Plaintiffs and Class Members to attend mandatory meetings every two weeks to discuss current performance and ways to increase productivity. 36. Gustech’s Technicians are supervised closely by Gustech personnel. Gustech evaluates and scores Plaintiffs and Class Members, which determines the quantity and quality of jobs assigned to the Technician. 37. Gustech assigns Plaintiffs and Class Members additional jobs installing and repairing Dish Network equipment for Airtech Communications, LLC, which is affiliated with Gustech. 38. Gustech can unilaterally alter whether it classifies Plaintiffs and Class Members as independent contractors or employees. In approximately May or June 2017, Gustech required its Technicians to sign documents stating that they would be classified as employees. Gustech, however, continued to classify the Technicians as independent contractors. 40. For return service calls, Gustech will issue a chargeback for any repair or other return service needed within 90 days of an installation performed by the Satellite Technician. 41. Gustech deducts the cost of tools and equipment, such as cables, tie wraps, tape, silicon, fittings, and barrels, from the Technician’s pay. 42. Gustech Technicians are required to purchase the necessary tools and equipment for the job. These required purchases are primarily for the benefit of Gustech’s business and can cost Technicians hundreds of dollars. For example, Technicians are required to purchase an aim-meter to work for Gustech. 43. Plaintiffs and Class Members are paid on a per project or job basis with a rate schedule set by Gustech based on the service provided. 44. Plaintiffs are not notified when there has been a repeat service call that will result in a deduction from their pay. 45. As a result of being required to pay for equipment, as well as penalty deductions taken from Technicians’ paychecks, Gustech Technicians have received an hourly rate that is less than the federal and state minimum wage rates in certain work weeks. 46. Plaintiffs worked on average between five (5) to seven (7) days per week, ten (10) to twelve (12) hours per day. Plaintiffs observed that Class Members routinely work the same schedule. 47. Plaintiffs and Class Members routinely work in excess of forty (40) hours per week each week without. 49. Plaintiff Burrell routinely worked more than 40 hours a week and, pursuant to Defendant’s classification of him as an independent contractor, received no overtime pay. For example, from January 22 to January 28, 2018 and from January 29 to February 4, 2018 Plaintiff Burrell worked seven days a week, totaling over 60 hours a workweek, without receiving overtime pay. 50. Plaintiff Lee routinely worked more than 40 hours a week and, pursuant to Defendant’s classification of him as an independent contractor, received no overtime pay. For example, from April 24 to April 30, 2017, Plaintiff Lee worked over 60 hours during the workweek without receiving overtime pay. 51. By virtue of the extensive control Gustech exerts over them, and the nature of their relationship with Gustech, the Technicians are not independent business operators or agents of independent business operators, as Gustech has misclassified them, but rather, all Technicians that perform work on behalf of Gustech are employees of Gustech under the FLSA, North Carolina, and South Carolina state law. 52. Gustech has intentionally misclassified Plaintiffs and the Classes to avoid Gustech’s obligations under the FLSA and state wage laws. Gustech saves thousands of dollars in avoiding expenses associated with its core business by not providing Plaintiffs and the Classes with proper minimum wage, overtime, or other benefits ordinary employees are entitled to and enjoy. 54. Plaintiffs desire to pursue their FLSA claim on behalf of all individuals who opt-in to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 55. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class are “similarly situated” as that term is used in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) because, inter alia, all such individuals currently work or worked pursuant to Gustech’s previously described common business and compensation practices as described herein, and, as a result of such practices, have been misclassified as independent contractors and have not been paid the full and legally mandated minimum wage for all hours worked. Resolution of this action requires inquiry into common facts, including, inter alia, Gustech’s common misclassification, compensation, and payroll practices. 56. Specifically, Gustech misclassified Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class as independent contractors and paid them a set piece rate. 57. The similarly situated employees are known to Gustech, are readily identifiable, and can easily be located through Gustech’s business and human resources records. Gustech employs many FLSA Class Members throughout the United States. These similarly situated employees may be readily notified of this action through U.S. mail and/or other means, and allowed to opt-in to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for overtime compensation, minimum wage deficiencies, liquidated damages (or, alternatively, interest), and attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 59. The members of the North Carolina Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are more than forty (40) members of the North Carolina Class. 60. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the North Carolina Class because there is no conflict between the claims of Plaintiffs and those of the North Carolina Class, and Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the North Carolina Class. Plaintiffs’ counsel are competent and experienced in litigating class actions and other complex litigation matters, including wage and hour cases like this one. 61. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed North Carolina Class, which predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members, including, without limitation: whether Gustech has violated and continues to violate statutory and common law through its policies or practices of not paying its Satellite Technicians for all hours worked and overtime compensation. 62. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the North Carolina Class in the following ways, without limitation: (a) Plaintiffs are members of the North Carolina Class; (b) Plaintiffs’ claims are of the same policies, practices and course of conduct that form the basis of the claims of the North Carolina Class; (c) Plaintiffs’ claims are based on the same legal and remedial theories as those of the North Carolina Class and involve similar factual circumstances; (d) there are no conflicts between the interests of Plaintiffs, the North Carolina Class Members; and (e) the injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are similar to the injuries suffered by the North Carolina Class Members. 64. Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein. Such treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would entail. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Members of the North Carolina Class are readily identifiable from Gustech’s own records. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the North Carolina Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual North Carolina Class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Gustech. 65. A class action is superior to other available methods for adjudication of this controversy because joinder of all members is impractical. Further, the amounts at stake for many of the North Carolina Class, while substantial, are not great enough to enable them each to maintain separate suits against Gustech. 66. Without a class action, Gustech will retain the benefit of its wrongdoing, which will result in further damages to Plaintiffs and the North Carolina Class. Plaintiffs envision no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. B. The South Carolina Class 68. The members of the South Carolina Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are more than forty (40) members of the South Carolina Class. 69. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the South Carolina Class because there is no conflict between the claims of Plaintiffs and those of the South Carolina Class, and Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the South Carolina Class. Plaintiffs’ counsel are competent and experienced in litigating class actions and other complex litigation matters, including wage and hour cases like this one. 70. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed South Carolina Class, which predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members, including, without limitation: whether Gustech has violated and continues to violate statutory and common law through its policies or practices of not paying its Satellite Technicians for all hours worked and overtime compensation. 71. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the South Carolina Class in the following ways, without limitation: (a) Plaintiffs are members of the South Carolina Class; (b) Plaintiffs’ claims are of the same policies, practices and course of conduct that form the basis of the claims of the South Carolina Class; (c) Plaintiffs’ claims are based on the same legal and remedial theories as those of the South Carolina Class and involve similar factual circumstances; (d) there are no conflicts between the interests of Plaintiffs, the South Carolina Class Members; and (e) the injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are similar to the injuries suffered by the South Carolina Class Members. 73. Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein. Such treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would entail. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Members of the South Carolina Class are readily identifiable from Gustech’s own records. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the South Carolina Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual South Carolina Class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Gustech. 74. A class action is superior to other available methods for adjudication of this controversy because joinder of all members is impractical. Further, the amounts at stake for many of the South Carolina Class, while substantial, are not great enough to enable them each to maintain separate suits against Gustech. 75. Without a class action, Gustech will retain the benefit of its wrongdoing, which will result in further damages to Plaintiffs and the South Carolina Class. Plaintiffs envision no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 76. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 78. The FLSA defines “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer,” 29 U.S.C. 203(e)(1), and “employer” as including “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee,” 29 U.S.C. 203(d). The FLSA’s definition of “employ” broadly covers anyone who is “suffer[ed] or permit[ed] to work.” 29 U.S.C. 203(g). 79. Gustech is subject to the wage requirements of the FLSA because Gustech is an “employer” under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 80. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class are covered employees entitled to the above-described FLSA’s protections. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). 81. At all relevant times, Gustech is an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. 82. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class are not exempt from the requirements of the FLSA. 83. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class are entitled to be paid overtime for hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207. 84. Gustech does not maintain accurate records of all hours that Plaintiff and the FLSA Class worked each workday and the total number of hours worked each workweek as required by the FLSA. See 29 C.F.R. § 516.2(a)(7). 86. By failing to pay Plaintiffs for some hours worked, such as for training hours and troubleshooting calls, and by requiring Plaintiffs to pay for expenses that primarily benefitted Gustech through various deductions to their wages, Gustech knowingly failed to compensate Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class overtime in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207. 87. In violating the FLSA, Gustech acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable FLSA provisions. 88. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 89. The FLSA requires that covered employees be minimum wage for all hours worked. See 29 U.S.C. § 206. 90. The FLSA defines “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer,” 29 U.S.C. 203(e)(1), and “employer” as including “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee,” 29 U.S.C. 203(d). The FLSA’s definition of “employ” broadly covers anyone who is “suffer[ed] or permit[ed] to work.” 29 U.S.C. 203(g). 91. Gustech is subject to the wage requirements of the FLSA because Gustech is an “employer” under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 92. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class are covered employees entitled to the above-described FLSA’s protections. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). 94. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class are not exempt from the requirements of the FLSA. 95. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class are entitled to be paid minimum wage for all of their hours worked, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 206. 96. By failing to pay Plaintiffs for some hours worked, such as for training hours and troubleshooting calls, and by requiring Plaintiffs to pay for expenses that primarily benefitted Gustech through various deductions to their wages, Gustech knowingly failed to compensate Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class minimum wage in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206. In violating the FLSA, Gustech acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable FLSA provisions. 97. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 98. North Carolina’s Wage and Hour Act (“NCWHA”) requires an employer to pay all wages due to its employees. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.6. A. The North Carolina Class North Carolina Wage and Hour Act (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the North Carolina Class) Violation of the FLSA – Minimum Wage (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class) Violation of the FLSA – Overtime Compensation (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class)

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14. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, “persons” as defined by 43. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 45. GLOBAL and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 46. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendants in at least the following ways: Defendants illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendants or their agents, during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 47. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 48. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the Court. The Class can be identified through Defendants’ records and/or Defendants’ agent’s records. 50. As a person who received calls from Defendants in which Defendants used an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without Plaintiff’s prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class. 51. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendants’ unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendants will likely continue such illegal conduct. The size of Class member’s individual claims causes, few, if any, Class members to be able to afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 53. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendants to comply with federal and California law. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendants is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those that would be presented in numerous individual claims. 54. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 55. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 56. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 57. As a result of Defendants' negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) 59. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 60. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 61. As a result of Defendants' knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each of the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 62. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 64. As a result of Defendants' negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) 67. As a result of Defendants' willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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10. Upon information and belief, other similarly situated employees are also uniformly paid in a fashion similar to Plaintiff and not compensated for the expenses associated with performing their job duties. 11. As a matter of economic reality, DoorDash advertises, on the "About Us" section of its website, that "through the DoorDash marketplace, people can purchase goods from local merchants and have them delivered in less than 45 minutes—thanks to our revolutionary logistics technology." Specifically, DoorDash is in the business of delivering goods to its customers—the very task that drivers are hired to perform. The work performed by drivers is integral to Defendant's business in that DoorDash simply could not function without its drivers. 13. Defendant did not pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. 14. Defendant violated the FLSA because it did not pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated the overtime pay they should have received for the hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. Plaintiff and others similarly situated did not receive minimum wage for hours worked for DoorDash. 15. As a result, Plaintiff and others similarly situated did not receive compensation they were legally entitled to receive. The work performed by Plaintiff and others similarly situated was with Defendant's knowledge. Defendant approved driver's schedules, assigned work and supervised the work. 16. Defendant's violations of the FLSA were committed knowingly, willfully, and/or with reckless disregard to Plaintiff and similarly situated employees' rights. V. 17. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporate by reference all of the above numbered paragraphs. 18. Plaintiff and others similarly situated were employees of DoorDash, Inc., as set forth above. 19. As employees of DoorDash, Plaintiff and others similarly situated were legally entitled to be paid at one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per each seven (7) day workweek. As employees of DoorDash, Plaintiff and others similarly situated were legally entitled to minimum wage. 21. As a result, Plaintiff and others similarly situated did not receive the compensation they were legally entitled to receive. 22. Defendant's violations of the FLSA were committed knowingly, willfully, and/or with reckless disregard to Plaintiff's and other similarly situated employees’ rights. 23. As a result of Defendant's willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and others similarly situated are entitled to reimbursement of unpaid overtime, an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys fees, costs and disbursements incurred in this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). VI. 24. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporate by reference all of the above numbered paragraphs. 25. The FLSA requires employers to keep accurate records of hours worked by nonexempt employees. 29 U.S.C. §211(c); 29 C.F.R. pt 516. 26. In addition to the pay violations of the FLSA described above, Defendant also failed to keep proper time records as required by the FLSA. 27. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporate by reference all of the above numbered paragraphs. 28. Upon information and belief, many other similarly situated employees employed by Defendant over the last three (3) years have been victimized by Defendant's violations of the 3. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Defendant was, and remains, an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203, and is subject to the FLSA. 4. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Defendant was, and remains, an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203, and is subject to the FLSA. 5. Defendant, DoorDash, Inc. is a food delivery service that allows customers to place food orders, through a mobile phone application or through its website, from various restaurants in the "DoorDash marketplace". DoorDash, Inc. then utilizes its "Dashers" (i.e. delivery drivers) to deliver those food orders to its customer's homes or businesses. 6. Defendant employed Plaintiff and others similarly situated at all relevant times within the meaning of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). Defendant's annual revenues far exceeded $500,000 during the relevant time period. 7. In performing his duties for Defendant, Plaintiff and others similarly situated were employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. Specifically, Defendant has employees utilizing interstate telephone and broadband communications for the commercial purposes of Defendant's enterprise. Moreover, Defendant required that Plaintiff regularly travel through the corridors of interstate commerce as they traveled from customer to customer to make deliveries. 9. Plaintiff and others similarly situated are paid a flat fee for every delivery completed plus gratuity added by the customer. Often drivers do not make minimum wage for every hour worked during their shifts. DoorDash does not compensate drivers for the expenses associated with using their own vehicles, cell phone data, car insurance (though a requirement of employment if you use a car to make deliveries), gas, parking, and other expenses.

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10. Pursuant to the Policy, Plaintiffs paid Auto-Owners an annual premium in exchange for insurance coverage. The required premiums were paid at all times relevant to this Complaint. 11. On or about May 10, 2016, Plaintiffs’ residential buildings located on the Insured Premises suffered hail damage (the “Loss”). 12. The Policy was in effect at the time of the Loss, and the Loss is compensable under the terms of the Policy. As it relates to the Loss, there is no applicable exclusion. 13. Plaintiffs promptly notified Auto-Owners of the Loss and made a claim against the Policy. 14. On or about August 15, 2016, Auto-Owners sent an adjuster, Amanda Carroll, to inspect and adjust the Loss. 15. After its inspection, Auto-Owners determined that the Loss was covered by the terms of the Policy. Auto-Owners informed Plaintiffs that their loss “will be settled on an actual cash value basis and your policy may contain a replacement cost provision. If it contains such a provision, full cost of replacement can be considered if the property is actually replaced. You have the right to make further claim under this provision within 180 days after the loss.” 16. Auto-Owners calculated its actual cash value (“ACV”) payment obligation to Plaintiffs by first estimating the cost to repair or replace the damage with new materials (replacement cost value, or “RCV”), then subtracted depreciation. 17. The Policy defines ACV as “the cost to replace damaged property with new property of similar quality and features reduced by the amount of depreciation applicable to the damaged property immediately prior to the loss.” 4 18. As such, for purposes of calculating “actual cash value,” depreciation is limited to that “applicable to the damaged property.” B. Auto-Owners Calculation of ACV and ACV Payment 19. In adjusting Plaintiffs’ claim, Auto-Owners affirmatively and unilaterally chose to use a “replacement cost less depreciation” methodology to calculate the loss and make its ACV payment to the Plaintiffs. 20. Auto-Owners did not calculate any portion of Plaintiffs’ casualty loss by reference to or analysis of the alleged increases or decreases in the market value of Plaintiffs’ property, or the market value of any portion of Plaintiffs’ property. Auto-Owners did not conduct an appraisal of the market value of any portion of Plaintiffs’ property. 21. Auto-Owners has waived, and is estopped from asserting, any right to contend that ACV should have been calculated under any methodology other than the methodology actually used by Auto-Owners, specifically including any market value methodology. 22. Auto-Owners used commercially-available computer software to make its RCV, depreciation and ACV calculations. 23. Auto-Owners calculated the RCV of Plaintiffs’ damaged property at $12,146.55. 24. Auto-Owners calculated the depreciation for Plaintiffs’ damaged property in the amount of $2,160.19. 25. After subtraction of the depreciation from the RCV, and, also subtraction of what Auto-Owners contended was the Policy’s applicable deductibles, Auto-Owners paid Plaintiffs an ACV payment of $8,986.36. 26. Auto-Owners sent Plaintiffs an estimate reflecting its ACV calculations. A copy of the estimate is attached hereto as Exhibit “2”. 5 27. Plaintiffs were underpaid on their ACV claim as described below. C. Auto-Owners’ Practice of Depreciating Labor 28. In this pleading, whenever reference is made to depreciating “labor,” “labor” means intangible non-materials, specifically including both the labor costs and the laborers’ equipment costs necessary to restore Plaintiffs’ property to its condition immediately prior to the loss, as well as “removal” costs to remove damaged property, under the software program described below. 29. The ACV payment Auto-Owners made to Plaintiffs depreciated the cost of both materials and labor required to repair or replace Plaintiffs’ property, even though labor does not depreciate in value over time. Auto-Owners depreciated costs associated with labor throughout its ACV calculations. Auto-Owners also depreciated labor costs for other work necessary to repair and replace Plaintiffs’ property. 30. Auto-Owners’ depreciation of labor costs associated with the repair or replacement of Plaintiffs’ property resulted in Plaintiffs receiving payment for the loss in an amount less than Plaintiffs were entitled to receive under the Policy. Auto-Owners breached its obligations under the Policy by improperly depreciating the cost of labor. 31. Plaintiffs themselves cannot determine the precise amount of labor that has been depreciated based upon the written estimate provided. 32. Plaintiffs concede that finished goods and construction materials can diminish in value over time due to use, wear, obsolescence, and age. Therefore, finished goods and construction materials depreciate. In contrast, both removal labor and installation labor are not susceptible to aging or wear. Their value does not diminish over time. Conceptually, practically, 6 and under common understanding, depreciation cannot be applied to labor to remove damaged property or repair damaged property in the context of indemnification insurance. 33. Labor, by its nature, does not depreciate, and an insurer therefore may not depreciate labor. For example, materials used in the repair or replacement of a roof (roofing shingles) diminish in value over time due to the wear that age and use inflict on them. In contrast, labor is not susceptible to aging or wear, it does not lose value over time, and there is no depreciable life of labor. Labor’s value does not diminish over time; only the materials depreciate. 34. Auto-Owners’ practice of depreciating labor costs is inconsistent with the universally accepted premise that the fundamental purpose of property insurance is to provide indemnity to policyholders. To indemnify means to put the insured back in the position he or she enjoyed before the loss—no better and no worse. A policy, like Auto-Owners’ policy, that provides for payment of the ACV of a covered loss is an indemnity contract because the purpose of an ACV payment is to make the insured whole after the loss that occurred. 35. To provide an example of the dispute at hand concerning depreciation of labor when calculating actual cash value, if an insured’s 15 year-old roof was damaged during a hail storm necessitating replacement of the shingles, the law, common sense, and Auto-Owners insurance policies require that, after the damage, the insured would be entitled to have on his house 15 year old shingles, or their value in money. The insured should not bear the cost of installing those shingles, because that would deprive him of that for which he contracted – being made whole as if the damage had not occurred. 36. While an insurer may lawfully depreciate material costs when calculating the amount of an ACV payment owed to an insured, it may not lawfully depreciate repair labor. 7 Auto-Owners’ failure to pay the full cost of the labor necessary to return Plaintiffs back to their pre-loss condition left Plaintiffs under-indemnified and underpaid for the Loss. 37. Auto-Owners materially breached its duty to indemnify Plaintiffs by depreciating labor costs associated with repairing or replacing Plaintiffs’ property in its ACV payment, thereby paying Plaintiffs less than they were entitled to receive under the terms of the Policy. D. The Tennessee Department of Insurance’s Response to The 2008 NAIC Survey 38. Auto-Owners has been aware of ongoing disputes between members of the insurance industry, on the one hand, and state insurance regulators and policyholders, on the other hand, over the practice of depreciating not only finished goods, construction materials and physical property due to wear, tear, condition and obsolescence, but also the new practice of depreciating non-tangible items, such as labor, when calculating the ACV of damaged property. 39. As it relates to this dispute within the State of Tennessee, in 2008, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC survey”) published a copyrighted survey of state insurance departments and their respective positions on the depreciation of labor. The Tennessee Department of Insurance (“TDOI”) formally responded to the survey. 40. On information and belief, at all relevant times hereto, Auto-Owners knew of the existence of the NAIC survey and the TDOI’s responses to the same. 41. First, the NAIC survey asked “Does your state allow the depreciation of labor under an actual cash value (ACV) loss settlement provision for property?” The TDOI stated in response: “It is generally the belief that labor is not depreciable, but the Department has no written position on the matter. We believe there is some case law supporting this aspect. To our knowledge, this is not a problem here.” (emphasis added) 8 42. Second, the survey also asked “Is depreciation for labor allowed on an ACV roof if it is totally replaced?” The TDOI stated in response: “We do not believe insurers are depreciating labor unless their provision calls for it. At least one insurer has a policy provision addressing this issue.” (emphasis added). 43. Auto-Owners was aware that the TDOI took a position against the depreciation of labor based upon the NAIC 2008 survey, and that the TDOI believed that insurers were not engaging in the practice within the State of Tennessee. E. Concealment 44. At all times relevant hereto, Auto-Owners was under an affirmative duty to disclose the manner in which it calculates ACV payments to policyholders. 45. In addition, when providing estimates to Plaintiffs and similarly situated policyholders, Auto-Owners was under a duty to be truthful. 46. After issuance of the NAIC survey, on information and belief, Auto-Owners knew that the TDOI’s understandings concerning the labor depreciation practices within the State of Tennessee were incorrect, as Auto-Owners knew that Auto-Owners itself was depreciating labor for Tennessee policyholders’ ACV claims contrary to the TDOI’s statements in the survey. 47. On information and belief, Auto-Owners never notified the TDOI that its understandings as set forth in the NAIC survey were incorrect, and that Auto-Owners was depreciating labor within the State of Tennessee. 48. To conceal its practice of depreciating labor from policyholders, Auto-Owners did not separate the amounts it depreciated for labor charges from amounts it depreciated for materials in the estimates provided to insureds with their ACV payments. 9 49. The commercial estimating software used by Auto-Owners easily permits further separation of the line item charges so policyholders can determine whether labor was being depreciated. Auto-Owners did its best to make it impossible for an ordinary consumer to know that Auto-Owners depreciated labor, and not merely materials, when reviewing estimates provided to policyholders. 50. To further conceal its practice of depreciating labor in the estimates, for some line items that only contain obvious labor costs standing alone, such as scaffolding labor charges, Auto-Owners did not depreciate labor —all to help avoid detection of its depreciation of labor in other line items. 51. Auto-Owners was in a superior position over policyholders to know that it was depreciating labor through its estimating software. Auto-Owners controlled the settings for the software, which expressly permit an adjuster to properly limit depreciation to materials only. 52. Auto-Owners fraudulently concealed its breaches of contract from Plaintiffs and similarly situated policyholders. 53. The facts misrepresented, concealed, or otherwise not disclosed to Plaintiffs and similarly situated policyholders were material facts that a reasonable person would have considered important in deciding whether to purchase insurance and accept ACV payments from Auto-Owners. 54. The concealment of information in estimates was performed by Auto-Owners with the intent that policyholders, including Plaintiffs, believe that only materials were being depreciated. 10 56. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit as a class action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated. This action satisfies the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Only to the extent it is a requirement under applicable law, the class is ascertainable. 57. The proposed class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is defined as follows: All persons and legal entities insured under an Auto-Owners homeowner or property policy who received “actual cash value” payments from Auto-Owners for direct physical loss to a dwelling or other structure located in Tennessee in which the cost of repair or replacement labor was depreciated. 58. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend the definition of the proposed class. The following persons are expressly excluded from the Class: (1) Defendant and its subsidiaries and affiliates; (2) all persons who make a timely election to be excluded from the proposed Class; and (3) the Court to which this case is assigned and its staff. 59. Members of the putative class as defined all have Article III standing as all such persons and entities, at least initially, received lower claim payments than permitted under the policy. Certain amounts initially withheld as depreciated labor may be later repaid to policyholders upon further adjustment of the claim. However, policyholders who have been subsequently repaid for initially withheld labor depreciation still have incurred damages, at the 11 least, in the form of the lost “time value” of money during the period of withholding, i.e., interest. 6. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs were the insureds pursuant to an insurance contract whereby Auto-Owners agreed to insure the residential buildings located on the Insured Premises against property damage, bearing Policy No. 96-583-854-04 (the “Policy”). As relevant hereto, the term of the Policy was July 15, 2015 to July 15, 2016. 60. The proposed class definition, when referencing labor, includes all non-tangible depreciation of labor, including but not limited to, labor equipment or removal labor. 61. The members of the proposed class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiffs reasonably believe that thousands of people geographically dispersed across Tennessee have been damaged by Auto-Owners’ actions. The names and addresses of the members of the proposed class are readily identifiable through records maintained by Auto- Owners or from information readily available to Auto-Owners. 62. The relatively small amounts of damage suffered by most members of the proposed class make filing separate lawsuits by individual members economically impracticable. 63. Auto-Owners has acted on grounds generally applicable to the proposed class in that Auto-Owners has routinely depreciated labor costs in its adjustment of property damage claims under its policies of insurance. It is reasonable to expect that Auto-Owners will continue to depreciate the cost of labor to reduce the amount it pays to its insureds under these policies absent a decision by the Court. 64. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the proposed class and predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The questions of law and fact common to the proposed class include, but are not limited to: A. Whether Auto-Owners’ policy language allows Auto-Owners to depreciate labor costs in its calculation of ACV payments; B. Whether Auto-Owners’ policy language is ambiguous concerning the depreciation of labor costs in calculating ACV payments, and, if so, how Auto-Owners’ insurance policies should be interpreted; 12 C. Whether Auto-Owners’ depreciation of labor costs in its calculation of ACV payments breaches the insurance policies; D. Whether Auto-Owners has a custom and practice of depreciating labor costs in its calculation of ACV payments; E. Whether Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class have been damaged as a result of Auto-Owners’ depreciation of labor costs in its calculation of ACV payments; F. Whether Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class are entitled to a declaration, as well as potential supplemental relief, under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act; G. Whether Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class are entitled to equitable relief in the form of specific performance, unjust enrichment, declaratory relief or restitutionary damages; and H. Whether Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class are entitled to punitive damages. 65. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of all proposed class members, as they are all similarly affected by Auto-Owners’ custom and practice concerning labor depreciation. Further, Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of all proposed class members because their claims arise from the same practices and course of conduct that give rise to the claims of the class members and are based on the same factual and legal theories. Plaintiffs are not different in any material respect from any other member of the proposed class. 66. Plaintiffs and their counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the proposed class. Plaintiffs’ interests do not conflict with the interests of the proposed class they seek to represent. Plaintiffs have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in class action and insurance litigation. Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel have the necessary financial resources to adequately and vigorously litigate this class action, and Plaintiffs and counsel are aware of their fiduciary responsibilities to the Class members and will diligently discharge those duties by vigorously seeking the maximum possible recovery for the Class. 13 67. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Joining all proposed class members in one action is impracticable and prosecuting individual actions is not feasible. The size of the individual claims is likely not large enough to justify filing a separate action for each claim. For many, if not most members of the proposed class, a class action is the only procedural mechanism that will afford them an opportunity for legal redress and justice. Even if proposed class members had the resources to pursue individual litigation, that method would be unduly burdensome to the courts in which such cases would proceed. Individual litigation exacerbates the delay and increases the expense for all parties, as well as the court system. Individual litigation could result in inconsistent adjudications of common issues of law and fact. 68. In contrast, a class action will minimize case management difficulties and provide multiple benefits to the litigating parties, including efficiency, economy of scale, unitary adjudication with consistent results and equal protection of the rights of Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class. These benefits would result from the comprehensive and efficient supervision of the litigation by a single court. 69. Questions of law or fact common to Plaintiffs and the proposed class members, including those identified above, predominate over questions affecting only individual members (if any), and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Class action treatment will allow a large number of similarly situated consumers to prosecute their common claims in a single forum, simultaneously, efficiently, and without the necessary duplication of effort and expense that numerous individuals would require. Further, the monetary amounts due to many individual proposed class members are likely to be relatively small, and the burden and expense of individual litigation 14 would make it difficult or impossible for individual proposed class members to seek and obtain relief. On the other hand, a class action will serve important public interests by permitting consumers harmed by Auto-Owners’ unlawful practices to effectively pursue recovery of the sums owed to them, and by deterring further unlawful conduct. The public interest in protecting the rights of consumers favors disposition of the controversy in the class action form. 7. A copy of the Policy is attached hereto as Exhibit “1”. 70. Class certification is further warranted because Auto-Owners has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. 71. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference all preceding allegations. 72. Auto-Owners entered into policies of insurance with Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class. These insurance policies govern the relationship between Auto-Owners, Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class, as well as the manner in which claims for covered losses are handled. 73. The policies of insurance between Auto-Owners and Plaintiffs and the other proposed class members are binding contracts under Tennessee law, supported by valid consideration in the form of premium payments in exchange for insurance coverage. 74. Auto-Owners drafted the insurance policies at issue, which are essentially identical in all respects material to this litigation. 75. In order to receive ACV claim payments, Plaintiffs complied with all material provisions and performed all of their respective duties with regard to their insurance policy. 76. The policies of insurance Auto-Owners issued to Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class state that, in the event of a partial loss, Auto-Owners may fulfill its initial 15 contractual obligation to an insured party by paying the ACV of the loss. At all times relevant hereto, Auto-Owners’ custom and practice has been, and is, to make such payments based upon Auto-Owners’ calculation of the ACV for the partial loss, less any applicable deductible. 77. Auto-Owners breached its contractual duty to pay Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class the ACV of their claims by unlawfully depreciating labor costs. 78. Auto-Owners’ actions in breaching its contractual obligations to Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class benefitted and continue to benefit Auto-Owners. Likewise, Auto- Owners’ actions damaged and continue to damage Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class. 79. Auto-Owners’ actions in breaching its contractual obligations, as described herein, are the direct and proximate cause of damages to Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class. 8. The Policy provided insurance coverage for accidental direct physical loss to the buildings located on the Insured Premises, except as specifically excluded or limited by the Policy. 80. In light of the foregoing, Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class are entitled to recover damages sufficient to make them whole for all amounts Auto-Owners unlawfully withheld from their ACV payments as labor cost depreciation. 81. Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class seek any and all relief as may be permitted under Tennessee law to remedy the ongoing breaches of contract. 82. Auto-Owners’ breaches of contract were intentional, fraudulent, malicious, and/or reckless, therefore justifying an award of punitive damages. Specifically, Auto-Owners intentionally, fraudulently, maliciously, and/or recklessly: (1) failed to effectuate a prompt and fair settlement of Plaintiffs’ and members of the proposed class’ claims when liability was clear; (2) unjustly refused to fully and fairly pay Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class the ACV amounts to which they were entitled for its own financial preservation with no reasonable or justifiable basis; (3) failed to fully inform Plaintiffs of their rights and obligations under the 16 Policy; (4) engaged in acts and practices toward Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class that amount to acts of baseness, vileness and/or depravity that are contrary to the fiduciary duties owed to them; (5) intentionally concealed from Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class its practice of depreciating labor costs; (6) failed to properly and fully investigate and adjust Plaintiffs and other proposed class members’ claims and to pay such claims fully; (7) failed to pay all amounts due and owing under the subject insurance policies with no reasonable or justifiable basis; (8) misrepresented pertinent facts relating to the insurance coverage at issue; and (9) denied full and appropriate ACV payment of Plaintiffs’ and the proposed class members’ claims with no honest disagreement or innocent mistake concerning the validity or the nature and amount of Plaintiffs’ claim. Auto-Owners knew, or reasonably should have known, that Plaintiffs and the proposed class members were justifiably relying on the money and benefits due them under the terms of the subject insurance policies. Nevertheless, acting with conscious disregard for the rights of Plaintiffs and the proposed class members and with the intention of causing or willfully disregarding the probability of causing unjust and cruel hardship, Auto- Owners consciously refused to fully compensate Plaintiffs and the proposed class members for their losses, and withheld monies and benefits rightfully due Plaintiffs and the proposed class members. In so acting, Auto-Owners intended to and did injure Plaintiffs and the proposed class members in order to protect its own financial interests, and should be punished. Plaintiffs and the proposed class members seek, and are entitled to, punitive damages. 83. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference all preceding allegations. 84. This Court is empowered by the Declaratory Judgment Act as codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 to declare the rights and legal relations of parties regardless 17 of whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. 85. A party may seek to have insurance contracts, before or after a breach, construed to obtain a declaration of rights, status, and other legal relations thereunder adjudicated. 86. Plaintiff and members of the proposed class have complied with all relevant conditions precedent in their contracts. 87. Plaintiffs seek, personally and on behalf of the proposed class, a declaration that Auto-Owners’ property insurance contracts prohibit the deduction of depreciated labor costs when adjusting partial losses under the methodology employed here. 88. Plaintiffs further seek, personally and on behalf of the proposed class, any and all equitable relief available under the law that the Court deems necessary and proper to the administration of justice, including, but not limited to, identifying and locating policyholders, and notifying the same of the circumstances complained of and the restoration of their rights and remediation of their losses, and preclusion by Auto-Owners in engaging in the conduct described herein, as may be permitted by law. 89. Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class have suffered injuries. 9. This lawsuit only concerns property insurance coverage for buildings, and not personal contents, such as clothes and furniture. 3 A. The Property Insurance Policy and Casualty Loss BREACH OF CONTRACT DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND RELIEF

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32. Any necessary conditions precedent to the filing of this action occurred or have been waived by Defendant. 33. Plaintiff purchased property by obtaining a mortgage on August 30, 2018 and signing Promissory Note on the same date. 34. Plaintiff stopped paying on the mortgage and note obligations. 35. Subsequently, Defendant obtained servicing of the loan. 36. On January 10, 2020, Defendant filed a foreclosure action against Plaintiff. 37. Plaintiff’s Counsel filed a Notice of Appearance in the Foreclosure case. 38. On or around December 10, 2020, Plaintiff’s counsel faxed a letter to Defendant that it cease contact with Plaintiff. 39. Regardless, Defendant continued to call multiple times 40. Defendant’s telephone calls were made to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers ending in 8928 (Cellular Telephone) using an artificial or pre-recorded voice (hereinafter, 52. Plaintiff brings Counts One and Two under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the Classes defined as follows: Count One TCPA Class: Subclass (i): All persons in the United States who within the last four years (i) received calls from Defendant with an artificial or pre-recorded voice without their prior express consent; Subclass (ii) All persons in the United States who within the last four years requested to be placed on Defendants’ internal do not call lists and continued to receive more than one call in a twelve-month period starting 30 days after the request. Subclass (iii) All persons in the United States who within the last four years had their telephone numbers registered on the National Do Not Call list and received two or more calls from Defendant within a twelve month period. Count Two FCCPA Class: All Florida residents to whom Defendants conveyed debt collection information within the last two years after being advised of their representation by counsel. 53. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the Class definitions as he obtains further information, including telemarketing call records, through discovery. 55. The proposed Class can be identified through the business and telephone records of Defendant. 56. The number of Class Members is so numerous that individual joinder of all Class Members is impracticable. 57. Plaintiff is a member of the proposed Classes. 58. There are questions of law and fact common to Plaintiff and to the proposed Class, including but not limited to the following: a. Did Defendant call the cell phones of Plaintiff and Class Members through the use of an artificial or per-recorded voice without their prior express consent? b. Did Defendant initiate calls to Plaintiffs and Class Members after being requested by Plaintiff and Class Members to be placed on an internal do not call list? c. Did Defendant call numbers that were registered on the National Do Not Call List? d. Did the aforesaid conduct violate the TCPA? e. Did Defendants continue to communicate with Plaintiff and Class Members concerning debt collection after being advised of their representation by counsel? f. Did the aforesaid conduct violate the FCCPA? g. Did Defendants act willfully so as to entitle Plaintiffs and the Class Members to treble damages? h. Should Defendants be enjoined from further unlawful conduct? 60. Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with those of Class Members. He will fairly and adequately protect interests of Class Members. He is represented by counsel experienced in class action litigation. 61. Common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and a class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 62. The interest of Class Members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendants is small due to the time and expense necessary to pursue individual litigation. Management of these claims in a class action poses no significant impediments. 63. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Classes as a whole appropriate. Plaintiff is informed and believe that the TCPA, FDCPA and FCCPA violations complained of herein are likely to continue unless an injunction is entered. 65. Defendant used an artificial or pre-recorded voice to call Plaintiff’s Cellular Telephone multiple times in its attempt to collect the Debt. 66. Plaintiff is informed and believes that multiple such calls were made to Class Members. 67. At no time did Defendant possess Plaintiff’s prior express consent to call Plaintiff on his Cellular Telephone. Similarly, Defendant had no consent to call Class Members. 68. Additionally, if Defendant contends these phone calls were made for “informational purposes only,” it nonetheless lacked the required prior express written consent necessary to make such informational calls to Plaintiff’s or Class Members’ phones using an APV. 69. In addition, Defendants violated the TCPA by ignoring the request of Plaintiff and Class Members that calls cease. They should have been placed on an internal do not call list. 70. Further, regardless of any alleged prior consent, that consent was revoked when instant the Plaintiff and the Class Members requested that calls cease. 72. Defendant is subject to, and violated the provisions of, Florida Statutes, Section 559.72(18) that they should not communicate with a debtor if they know that the debtor is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and address, unless the debtor’s attorney fails to respond within 30 days to a communication from the person, unless the debtor’s attorney consents to a direct communication with the debtor, or unless the debtor initiates the communication. 73. Specifically, at no time did Defendant have authority to call Plaintiff after the letter of December 10, 2020 and anytime thereafter. Similarly, Defendant had no authority to communicate with Class Members after they were advised that they were represented by counsel. 75. At all material times herein, Defendant knew of Plaintiff’s counsel representation and Class Member’s representation when communicated to them. 76. As such, Defendant knowingly called Plaintiff and Class Members who were represented by counsel. 77. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff and Class Members sustained damages as defined by Florida Statutes, Section 559.77. TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT- VIOLATION OF 47 UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 227(b)(1)(A) Plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs one (1) through sixty-four (64) as if fully restated herein and further states as follows: UNLAWFUL DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICE – VIOLATION OF FLORIDA STATUTES, SECTION 559.72(18) Plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs one (1) through seventy-one (71) as if fully restated herein and further states as follows:

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a general products retail company that owns and operates www.harrietcarter.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in May of 2020, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.harrietcarter.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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25. Defendant operates multiple stores throughout the United States, including its store located at 3015 E 2nd Ave, Denver, CO 80206. 26. Defendant offers its Website in connection with its physical locations. The goods and services offered by Defendant through its Website include but are not limited to the following: store locations and hours, contact information, the ability to make an online purchase, and related goods and services available both online and in stores. 27. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually impaired users, access to Defendant’s Website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s stores. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s stores and the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 28. Plaintiff is a visually impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen- reader user and uses it to access the Internet. 30. Due to Defendant’s failure to build its Website in a manner that is compatible with screen reader programs, Plaintiff is and was unable to understand, and thus is denied the benefit of, much of the content and services he wishes to access or use. For example: a. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. b. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. c. The Website also contains a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non-existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s stores on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to take advantage of the goods and services that it provides to the public. 34. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. In fact, Plaintiff intends to return to the Website when it is equally accessible for visually-impaired consumers in order to complete his intended transaction, as it is more convenient for Plaintiff to access the Website to make a purchase than to travel to a physical location to make the same purchase. However, as long as the Access Barriers continue to exist on the Website, Plaintiff is prevented from making such a purchase. 35. These barriers, and others, deny Plaintiff full and equal access to all of the services the Website offers, and now deter him from attempting to use the Website and/or visit Defendant physical stores. Still, Plaintiff would like to, and intends to, attempt to access Defendant’s Website in the future to research the services the Website offers, or to test the Website for compliance with the ADA. 37. If the Website were accessible, i.e. if Defendant removed the access barriers described above, Plaintiff could independently research the Website’s offerings, including store locations and hours and promotions available at the its physical locations. 38. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually impaired people. 39. Though Defendant may have centralized policies regarding the maintenance and operation of its Website, upon and information and belief, Defendant has never had a plan or policy that is reasonably calculated to make its Website fully accessible to, and independently usable by, individuals with vision related disabilities. As a result, the complained of access barriers are permanent in nature and likely to persist. 40. The law requires that Defendant reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disabilities by removing these existing access barriers. Removal of the barriers identified above is readily achievable and may be carried out without much difficulty or expense. 41. Plaintiff’s above request for injunctive relief is consistent with the work performed by the United States Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, and U.S. Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (the “Access Board”), all of whom have relied upon or mandated that the public-facing pages of website complies with an international compliance standard known as Web Content Accessibility Guidelines version 42. Plaintiff and the Class have been, and in the absence of an injunction will continue to be, injured by Defendant’s failure to provide its online content and services in a manner that is compatible with screen reader technology. 43. Defendant has long known that screen reader technology is necessary for individuals with visual disabilities to access its online content and services, and that it is legally responsible for providing the same in a manner that is compatible with these auxiliary aids. 44. Indeed, the Disability Rights Section of the DOJ reaffirmed in a 2015 Statement of Interest before the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts that it has been a “longstanding position” of the Department of Justice “that the ADA applies to website of public accommodations.” See National Association of the Deaf v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, No. 3:15-cv-300024-MGM, DOJ Statement of Interest in Opp. To Motion to Dismiss or Stay, Doc. 34, p. 4 (D. Mass. Jun. 25, 2015) (“MIT Statement of Interest”); see also National Association of the Deaf. v. Harvard University, No. 3:15-cv-30023- MGM, DOJ Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Doc. 33, p.4 (D. Mass. Jun. 25, 2015) (“Harvard Statement of Interest”). 45. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 47. While DOJ has rulemaking authority and can bring enforcement actions in court, Congress has not authorized it to provide an adjudicative administrative process to provide Plaintiff with relief. 48. Plaintiff alleges violations of existing and longstanding statutory and regulatory requirements to provide auxiliary aids or services necessary to ensure effective communication, and courts routinely decide these types of matters. 49. Resolution of Plaintiff’s claims does not require the Court to unravel intricate, technical facts, but rather involves consideration of facts within the conventional competence of the courts, e.g. (a) whether Defendant offers content and services on its Website, and (b) whether Plaintiff can access the content and services. 50. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, thereby violating their rights. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 53. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, like Plaintiff, are visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA by failing to remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 54. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. 55. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 56. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 57. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits throughout the United States. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. Defendant’s physical locations are a public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 61. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 62. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 63. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 65. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 66. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 67. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 68. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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(Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York Subclass) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York Subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq.—Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York Subclass) 25. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide Class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally metabolically-disabled individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Public Facility and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered in the Public Facility during the relevant statutory period.” 26. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York Subclass pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all metabolically-disabled individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Public Facility and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant during the relevant statutory period.” 27. Millions of people have a physical disability that is partly treatable by diet in the United States, including in New York. Thus, the persons in the Class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 28. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible Public Facility, denying metabolically-disabled persons access to the events, goods, and services of the Public Facility and Defendant. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of imposing access barriers, metabolically-disabled persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to the Public Facility. 30. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to Plaintiff, have metabolic disorders that render them metabolically-disabled, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by imposing access barriers on the Public Facility, such that it is not accessible to the Class of people who are legally disabled due to eating constraints. 31. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 33. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with metabolic disabilities throughout the United States. 34. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 35. Defendant operates the Public Facility located at 217 E Houston Street, New York, NY 10002 . 36. The Public Facility is a service and benefit offered by Defendant in New York. The Public Facility is owned, controlled, and/or operated by Defendant. Defendant sells tickets to events at the Public Facility and on their Website, including in New York State. 37. The Public Facility, which is marketed to consumers located in New York State, is a commercial Public Facility that hosts events and sells goods and services. 39. Defendant denies the metabolically-disabled access to goods, services, and information made available through the Public Facility by preventing them from freely entering the Public Facility with the food they need to treat their disability. 40. Allowing disabled people to bring medical supplies into the Public Facility presents no significant obstacles or difficulties for Defendant. Other public facilities allow diabetic individuals to bring insulin supplies onto their premises. However, simply bringing insulin supplies is insufficient because: 1) diabetic individuals need readily available food in case their blood sugar drops, 2) many diabetic individuals (including Plaintiff) need to bring pre-measured food to match their insulin to the quantity of food consumed, and 3) Defendant’s policy ignores metabolically-disabled individuals with other disabilities that are treated by food. 41. The Public Facility states clearly on the Website that it does not allow outside food, which constitutes an access barrier that prevents free and full use by Plaintiff and metabolically- disabled persons. See Exhibit A. 42. The Public Facility thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Public Facility and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Defendant. 44. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s Public Facility contains access barriers causing the Public Facility to be inaccessible to—and not independently usable by—metabolically-disabled individuals. 45. These barriers have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits, and services of the Public Facility and Defendant. Plaintiff did not attempt to attend an event at the Public Facility because she understood Defendant’s discriminatory policy and knew that such an attempt would be futile. The ADA explicitly does not require “a person with a disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or organization . . . does not intend to comply [with Title III of the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2)). This is particularly true for Plaintiff, for whom going out in public without available snacks would be a health risk. Disabled Ams. for Equal Access, Inc. v. Ferries del Caribe, Inc., 405 F.3d 60, 65 n.7 (1st Cir. 2005). 47. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 48. Plaintiff and the Class are disabled for purposes of the ADA. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12102 reads in pertinent part: (1) Disability. The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual— ▪ (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; . . . . (2) Major life activities. ▪ (A) In general. For purposes of paragraph (1), major life activities include, but are not limited to . . . eating . . . . 49. Accordingly, courts have interpreted diseases such as food disorders and diabetes as disabilities because those diseases interfere with eating. 51. Even episodic disabilities less severe than Plaintiff’s disease would qualify for protection under Title III. Service v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1192 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (“Plaintiff need not be in a constant state of distress or suffer an asthmatic attack to qualify as disabled under the ADA.”). Plaintiff’s disease is severe enough to decisively limit her major life activity of eating. 52. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 54. The Public Facility, located in New York, is a public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) because it is “a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment.” (emphasis added). 55. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates the Public Facility. 56. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 57. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 59. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 60. Many public facilities allow outside food into their venues (as required under the ADA). The policy of allowing outside food does not unduly burden those venues. Plaintiff and the Class merely seek to bring into the Public Facility the food they need for medical reasons. This would not disrupt the Public Facility’s operations. 61. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Defendant who are metabolically-disabled have been denied full and equal access to the Public Facility, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 62. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA and therefore Plaintiff invokes her statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 67. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 68. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 69. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 70. The Public Facility, located in New York State, is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). The Public Facility is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant. Food at the Public Facility is sold by, and integrated with, the Public Facility. 72. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in imposing access barriers to the Public Facility, causing the Public Facility and the services integrated with the Public Facility to be completely inaccessible to the metabolically-disabled. This inaccessibility denies metabolically-disabled patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 73. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 74. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 75. To make the Public Facility accessible to the metabolically-disabled, Defendant need only cease its existing policy. Making the Public Facility accessible by allowing people to bring in food would not alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 77. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 78. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Public Facility and Defendant under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 79. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 81. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 82. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 83. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 84. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 85. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . . .” 86. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 88. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Public Facility. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 89. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in imposing access barriers to the Public Facility, causing the Public Facility and the services integrated with the Public Facility to be completely inaccessible to the metabolically-disabled. This inaccessibility denies metabolically-disabled patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 90. To make the Public Facility accessible to the metabolically-disabled, Defendant need only cease its existing policy. Making the Public Facility accessible by allowing people to bring in food to would not fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 91. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . . .” 93. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 94. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Subclass on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 95. Plaintiff and Subclass members are entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 96. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 98. The Public Facility and the Website, targeting New York citizens in New York State, are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). The Public Facility and the Website are services, privileges, and/or advantages of Defendant. Food at the Public Facility is sold by, and integrated with, the Public Facility. Events at the Public Facility are integrated with ticket sales and information on the Public Facility website.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a car manufacturing company, and owns and operates the website, www.nissanusa.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.nissanusa.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse cars and accessories for purchase and delivery, view a dealer locator, obtain defendant’s contact information, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in December 2020, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website. 26. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: 28. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen- reader users; 29. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and 30. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those various cars and accessories for purchase and delivery, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 34. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 36. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 40. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 41. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 43. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 49. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 51. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 55. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 57. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 58. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 61. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 62. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 63. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 64. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 65. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 67. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 68. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 70. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 71. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 75. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 79. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 80. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 81. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 83. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 85. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 86. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 88. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 89. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 90. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 93. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 95. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 96. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. DECLARATORY RELIEF 100. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 101. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 102. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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(Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and 17 C.F.R. § 244.100 Promulgated Thereunder) (Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 Promulgated Thereunder) (Against the Individual Defendants for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act) 23. Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and the other public shareholders of Presidio (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any Defendant. 25. Presidio is a provider of information technology solutions that delivers its services through a full life-cycle model of professional, managed and support services including strategy, consulting, implementation and design. The Company helps its clients to harness technology advances, simplify information technology complexity and optimize their environments today while enabling future applications, user experiences and revenue models. 64. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 65. Section 14(a)(1) of the Exchange Act makes it “unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 78l of this title.” 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1). 66. As set forth above, the Proxy omits information required by SEC Regulation G, 17 C.F.R. § 244.100, which independently violates Section 14(a). SEC Regulation G, among other things, requires an issuer that chooses to disclose a non-GAAP measure to provide a presentation of the “most directly comparable” GAAP measure and a reconciliation “by schedule or other clearly understandable method” of the non-GAAP measure to the “most comparable” GAAP measure. 17 C.F.R. § 244.100(a). 67. The failure to reconcile the non-GAAP financial measures included in the Proxy violates Regulation G and constitutes a violation of Section 14(a). 69. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 70. SEC Rule 14a-9 prohibits the solicitation of shareholder votes in registration statements that contain “any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading[.]” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a). 71. Regulation G similarly prohibits the solicitation of shareholder votes by “mak[ing] public a non-GAAP financial measure that, taken together with the information accompanying that measure . . . contains an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the presentation of the non-GAAP financial measure . . . not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 244.100(b) (emphasis added). 72. Defendants have issued the Proxy with the intention of soliciting shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction. Each of the Defendants reviewed and authorized the dissemination of the Proxy, which fails to provide critical information regarding, amongst other things, the financial projections for the Company. 74. The Individual Defendants knew or were negligent in not knowing that the Proxy is materially misleading and omits material facts that are necessary to render it not misleading. The Individual Defendants undoubtedly reviewed and relied upon the omitted information identified above in connection with their decision to approve and recommend the Proposed Transaction. 75. The Individual Defendants knew or were negligent in not knowing that the material information identified above has been omitted from the Proxy, rendering the sections of the Proxy identified above to be materially incomplete and misleading. 76. The Individual Defendants were, at the very least, negligent in preparing and reviewing the Proxy. The preparation of a registration statement by corporate insiders containing materially false or misleading statements or omitting a material fact constitutes negligence. The Individual Defendants were negligent in choosing to omit material information from the Proxy or failing to notice the material omissions in the Proxy upon reviewing it, which they were required to do carefully as the Company’s directors. Indeed, the Individual Defendants were intricately involved in the process leading up to the signing of the Merger Agreement and the preparation of the Company’s financial projections. 77. Presidio is also deemed negligent as a result of the Individual Defendants’ negligence in preparing and reviewing the Proxy. 79. As a direct and proximate result of the dissemination of the false and/or misleading Proxy Defendants used to recommend that shareholders approve the Proposed Transaction, Plaintiff and the Class will suffer damages and actual economic losses (i.e. the difference between the value they will receive as a result of the Proposed Transaction and the true value of their shares prior to the merger) in an amount to be determined at trial and are entitled to such equitable relief as the Court deems appropriate, including rescissory damages. 80. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 81. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Presidio within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as directors and/or officers of Presidio, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the incomplete and misleading statements contained in the Proxy filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are materially incomplete and misleading. 83. In particular, each of the Individual Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company and, therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the Exchange Act violations alleged herein and exercised the same. The Proxy at issue contains the unanimous recommendation of each of the Individual Defendants to approve the Proposed Transaction. They were thus directly involved in preparing the Proxy. 84. In addition, as the Proxy sets forth at length, and as described herein, the Individual Defendants were involved in negotiating, reviewing, and approving the Merger Agreement. The Proxy purports to describe the various issues and information that the Individual Defendants reviewed and considered. The Individual Defendants participated in drafting and/or gave their input on the content of those descriptions. 85. By virtue of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants have violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. 86. As set forth above, the Individual Defendants had the ability to exercise control over and did control a person or persons who have each violated Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 by their acts and omissions as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as controlling persons, these Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. As a direct and proximate result of Individual Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and the Class will be irreparably harmed. I. The Proposed Transaction

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21. Defendant is a cosmetic and skincare products company that owns and operates the website, www.jouercosmetics.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant ensures the delivery of throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers its products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website using a screen-reader. 25. For example, many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to contain a proper label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This was a problem for Plaintiff because in certain instances the screen reader failed to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 30. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 36. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. Upon information and belief, because JOUER COSMETICS, LLC’s Website has never been accessible and because JOUER COSMETICS, LLC does not have, and has never had, an adequate corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring: a. that JOUER COSMETICS, LLC retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant”) who shall assist it in improving the accessibility of its Website so the goods and services on them may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities; b. that JOUER COSMETICS, LLC work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to ensure that all employees involved in website development and content development be given web accessibility training on a periodic basis, including onsite training to create accessible content at the design and development stages; c. that JOUER COSMETICS, LLC work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform an automated accessibility audit on a periodic basis to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; d. that JOUER COSMETICS, LLC work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform end-user accessibility/usability testing on a periodic basis with said testing to be performed by individuals with various disabilities to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; e. that JOUER COSMETICS, LLC work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to create an accessibility policy that will be posted on its Website, along with an e-mail address and tollfree phone number to report accessibility- related problems; and f. that Plaintiff, their counsel and its experts monitor Defendant’s Website for up to two years after the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant validates it is free of accessibility errors/violations to ensure it has adopted and implemented adequate accessibility policies. 40. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 42. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 61. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 63. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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10. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the Debt”). 11. The Debt was primarily for personal, family or household purposes and is therefore a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 12. Sometime after the incurrence of the Debt, Plaintiff fell behind on payments owed. 13. Thereafter, at an exact time known only to Defendant, the Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 14. In its efforts to collect the debt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by letter (“the Letter”) dated April 16, 2018. (“Exhibit 1.”) 15. The Letter was the initial communication Plaintiff received from Defendant. 16. The Letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 17. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 18. The written notice must contain the amount of the debt. 19. The written notice must contain the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 20. The written notice must contain a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the 3 49. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of New York from whom Defendant attempted to collect a consumer debt using a collection letter having the same deficiencies as the Letter herein, from one year before the date of this Complaint to the present. 50. This action seeks a finding that Defendant's conduct violates the FDCPA, and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 51. Defendant regularly engages in debt collection. 52. The Class consists of more than 35 persons from whom Defendant attempted to collect delinquent consumer debts using a collection letter having the same deficiencies as the Letter herein. 53. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this class action complaint affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. This class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 54. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 55. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class action proposed is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this class action complaint will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant's conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws. 6

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(FLSA Overtime Wage Violations) (NJWHL Overtime Wage Violations) 22. Plaintiff commenced his employment with Defendants approximately three (3) years ago. 23. From the commencement of his employment through the termination of his employment on or about June 3, 2018, Plaintiff was paid on an hourly basis. 24. Plaintiff earned $8.60 per hour. 26. Plaintiff’s general work schedule was Monday through Sunday, 7:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. 27. During the previous year and a half, Plaintiff generally worked more than forty (40) hours per week every week. 28. In those weeks in which Plaintiff worked more than forty (40) hours per week, he worked approximately forty and one-half (40.5) hours of overtime per week. 29. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff at 1.5 times his regular hourly rate for his extensive overtime hours. 30. Moreover, Defendants falsified time records by ordering employees to clock in and out on time cards with their names in blue at times to reflect approximately twenty (20) hours per week (“blue time cards”) and to clock in and out on time cards with their names in red for all additional time worked (“red time cards”). 31. Defendants paid Plaintiff on the books at his regular hourly rate via paycheck based on the hours on the blue time cards. 32. Defendants paid Plaintiff off the books at his regular hourly rate via cash for all hours on the red time cards. 33. The red time cards were then disposed of immediately after Plaintiff was paid in cash. 35. As a result, Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff at 1.5 times his regular hourly rate for overtime, and they failed to accurately record his hours actually worked. 36. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants have committed the foregoing acts and/or omissions with knowledge that they have been violating federal and state law and that Plaintiff has been and continues to be economically injured. 37. Defendants’ failure to comply with the FLSA extends beyond Plaintiff to all other similarly situated employees insofar as Defendants had a policy to (1) not pay their employees at the rate of 1.5 times their regular rate of pay for the hours they worked in excess of forty (40) hours, and (2) falsify time records. 38. Plaintiff seeks certification of this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action on behalf of himself, individually, and all other similarly situated current and former employees performing similar duties for Defendants. 39. The consent to sue form for the Plaintiff is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 40. Upon information and belief, there are at least 10 current and former employees who have been denied proper overtime wage compensation, and regular wage payments while working for Defendants. 49. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 50. Throughout the statute of limitations period covered by these claims, Plaintiff and others similarly situated regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week. 51. At all relevant times hereto, Defendants have had and operated under a decision, policy and plan, and under common policies, programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines and rules of knowingly and willfully failing and refusing to pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated at one and a half times their regular rate of pay for all hours of work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, and willfully failing to keep required records, in violation of the 53. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 54. Defendants engaged in a widespread pattern, policy, and practice of violating the NJWHL, as described herein. 56. At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the New Jersey Class Members were employees and Defendants were employers within the meaning of the NJWHL. 57. Defendants employed Plaintiff and the New Jersey Class Members in New Jersey within the meaning of the term “employ[s]” in the NJWHL. 58. Plaintiff and the New Jersey Class Members are “person[s]” within the meaning of the term “person[s]” in the NJWHL. 59. Plaintiff and the New Jersey Class Members were “employees” within the meaning of the term “employee[s]” in the NJWHL, including the definition of “employee” in NJWHL, N.J.S.A. § 34:11-4.1(b). 60. Plaintiff and the New Jersey Class Members were persons suffered or permitted to work by Defendants as their employer. 61. The overtime wage provisions of the NJWHL apply to Defendants and protect Plaintiff and the New Jersey Class Members. 62. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the New Jersey Class Members overtime to which they are entitled under the NJWHL. 63. Defendants failed to keep, make, preserve, maintain, and furnish accurate records of time worked by Plaintiff and New Jersey Class Members and failed to furnish to each of them their wage and hour records showing all wages earned and due for all work performed for labor or services rendered. 65. Due to these violations, Plaintiff and the New Jersey Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendants unpaid overtime, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

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(Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. – Telephone Consumer Protection Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 11. In an effort to solicit consumers, Defendant sent (or directed to be sent on its behalf) unsolicited text messages, without consent, to cellular telephones while using automatic telephone dialing equipment having the capacity to store and dial telephone numbers, en masse. As a result, Defendant has repeatedly violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (the “TCPA”). 12. Given the relatively low cost associated with sending bulk text messages, many marketers have turned to disseminating advertisements or promotions through mass text message campaigns. 13. Seeking to encourage customers to renew their insurance contracts, and, in turn, pay GoAuto money, Defendants engaged in this especially invasive form of advertising. 14. Defendants sent unauthorized text messages to the phones of thousands of consumers. 16. In fact, the promotional text message calls alleged herein were exclusively made by Defendant and not by any consumer. Defendant made, or had made on its behalf, the same (or substantially the same) text message calls en masse to thousands of cellular telephone numbers. 17. While Defendant sent these unauthorized text messages to consumers to market its services, it never obtained recipients' express consent to do so. 18. Through its conduct, Defendant caused consumers actual harm by sending unauthorized text message calls at issue. Plaintiff and members of the Class were not only subjected to the aggravation that necessarily accompanies the receipt of unauthorized text messages, but also because consumers frequently have to pay their cell phone service providers for the receipt of such unauthorized text messages. 20. Class Definition: Plaintiff Oscar Medina brings this action on behalf of himself and a class defined as follows: Class: All individuals in the United States whose wireless telephone number Defendant, or someone on Defendant’s behalf, called in connection with Defendant’s text message advertising campaign. Excluded from the Class are: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’ counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 22. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the putative Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: (a) Whether Defendant’s conduct violated the TCPA; (b) Whether Defendant sent text messages to Class Members using an ATDS, as contemplated by the TCPA; (c) Whether Defendant systematically sent text message advertising calls to Class Members who did not previously provide it with prior express written consent to receive such text message calls; (d) Whether Defendant sent text message advertising calls to Class Members where those messages did not include opt-out instructions; (e) Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendant’s conduct. 23. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class in that Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited text message calls. 25. Appropriateness: This class action is also appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court's imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class and making final class-wide injunctive relief appropriate. Defendant’s practices applies to and affect the members of the Class uniformly, and Plaintiff's challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. Additionally, the damages suffered by individual members of the Class will likely be small relative to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct on an individual basis. A class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions will be ensured. 27. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 28. In an effort to solicit consumers and to increase its profits, Defendant sent unauthorized and unwanted text message advertising calls to Plaintiff and the class's cellular telephones without their prior express written consent. 29. Defendant sent the text message advertisements to Plaintiff and the class's cellular telephone numbers using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers en masse. 30. Defendant utilized equipment that sent the text message advertisements to Plaintiff and other members of the putative class simultaneously and without human intervention. 31. Defendant took steps to physically place such text message calls and/or was so involved in placing the calls as to be deemed to have initiated them. 32. By sending the text message advertisements to Plaintiff and members of the class's cellular telephones without prior express written consent and by utilizing an ATDS, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(I)(A)(iii). 34. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the putative class suffered actual damages and have also had their rights to privacy adversely impacted. Plaintiff and the class are therefore entitled to, among other things, a minimum of $500 in statutory damages for each such violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 35. Because Defendant’s misconduct was willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the Plaintiff and the other members of the putative class. 36. Additionally, as a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the class are entitled to an injunction under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A) to ensure that Defendant’s violations of the TCPA do not continue into the future.

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21. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 22. Plaintiff brings this FLSA claim as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of all persons in the United States, who, since August 2016, previously worked or currently work for Defendants as home health caregivers, who worked in excess of 40 hours per week, but were not paid overtime for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week, thereby depriving them of federally mandated overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week. 24. Plaintiff estimates that there are dozens, if not hundreds, of members of the FLSA Collective Classes who have been affected by Defendants’ improper policies and practices, based upon the number of current employees of Defendants, the number of work locations maintained by Defendants, the Defendants’ treatment of all of its employees in the same manner, and the turnover rate of Defendants’ employees in the last three years. It would be impractical to join all of those employees and former employees in this action. 25. The precise number of persons in each of the FLSA Collective Action Classes can be easily identified and located using Defendants’ timesheets, payroll, time records and other personnel records. 26. Given the composition and size of the FLSA Collective Classes, potential opt-in class members may be informed of the pendency of this Collective Action by text message, direct mail and email. 28. In addition, because Defendants applied their unlawful employment and payment policies in the same manner to all potential members of the FLSA Collective Action Plaintiffs, common issues of law and fact predominate, and therefore pursuing this matter as a collective action serves as the most expeditious use of the court’s time and resources, as well as avoiding multiple actions on these issues, with the potential for differing or inconsistent judgments. 30. In January 2017, Plaintiff began working for Defendants as a home health caregiver. 31. She worked for Defendants until December 2017. 32. Her hourly rate of pay was $8.00. 33. While working for Defendants, Plaintiff worked 56 hours per week performing services for Defendants’ clients. 34. However, despite the fact that Plaintiff worked in excess of 40 hours per week for Defendants, she was not and has not been properly paid overtime for all hours she worked in excess of 40 per week. 35. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 36. As a result of Defendants’ payment and scheduling policy whereby it did not pay Plaintiff or similarly situated employees overtime for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week for Defendants, Plaintiffs have been deprived of federally mandated overtime pay. 38. At all times material hereto, Defendants have failed to maintain proper time records as mandated by the FLSA. 39. Defendants’ actions were willful and/or showed reckless disregard for the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by its failure to compensate Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Action Plaintiffs at a rate equal to one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all of the hours they worked in excess of 40 hours per week when it knew, or should have known, such was and is due. 40. Defendants have failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Action Plaintiffs of their rights under the FLSA. 41. Due to the intentional, willful, and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Action Plaintiffs have suffered lost compensation for time worked over 40 hours per week, plus liquidated damages. 42. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Action Plaintiffs are also entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). LABOR STANDARDS ACT

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10. The envelope also provides data symbols similar to a QR code through the glass window of the letter. 11. Courts have repeatedly found such information to directly violate §1692f(8) of the FDCPA which clearly prohibits any language or symbol other than a business name on the outside of an envelope. 12. Plaintiff brings this as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated who have received similar debt collection notices and/or communications from Defendant which, as alleged herein, are in violation of the FDCPA. 14. Excluded from the Class is Defendant herein, and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with the Defendant, including, without limitation, persons who are officers, directors, employees, associates or partners of Defendant. Numerosity 15. Upon information and belief, Defendant has sent similar collection letters in attempt to collect a debt to hundreds of consumers throughout the State of Pennsylvania, each of which violates the FDCPA. The members of the Class, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 16. The letters sent by Defendant and received by the Class, are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” 17. The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s records. Common Questions of Law and Fact 19. The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint have claims arising out of the Credit America’s common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class, and Plaintiff has no interests adverse or antagonistic to the interests of other members of the Class. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members 20. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class members' interests, in that the Plaintiff's counsel is experienced and, further, anticipates no impediments in the pursuit and maintenance of the class action as sought herein. 21. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable 22. A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted, this being specifically envisioned by Congress as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA, as codified by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692(k). 23. The members of the Class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. 25. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that a determination that the said letters violate the FDCPA is tantamount to declaratory relief and any monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination. 26. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff's Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 27. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 28. A class action will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment also will permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 29. Absent a class action, the Class members will continue to suffer losses borne from Defendant’s breaches of Class members' statutorily protected rights as well as monetary damages, thus allowing and enabling: (a) Defendant’s conduct to proceed and; (b) Defendant to further enjoy the benefit of their ill-gotten gains. 30. Defendant has acted, and will act, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate a final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 31. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the above paragraphs and incorporates them as if specifically set forth at length herein. 32. Defendant engaged in unfair and deceptive acts and practices, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8). WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Tatenda Nyanhongo, respectfully requests that this Court do the following for the benefit of Plaintiff: a. Enter an Order declaring Defendant’s actions, as described above, in violation of the FDCPA; b. Enter an Order for injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future; c. Appoint Plaintiff as the Class Representative, and appoint Plaintiff’s Counsel as Lead Counsel for the Class; d. Enter a judgment against Defendant for statutory damages, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k; e. Award costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k; and f. Grant such other and further relief as may be just and proper. 6. On March 4, 2020, Defendant mailed a collection letter to Plaintiff’s address. The letter sought to collect a personal debt from Plaintiff that was incurred through a personal insurance bill. 7. The letter is not compliant with the FDCPA. 8. The letter arrived at Plaintiff’s address with additional information on the outside of the envelope. 9. The envelope explicitly states PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL. The Class

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15. Plaintiff had residential service with Verizon. 16. Plaintiff advised Verizon that she was moving and ordered that her service be transferred by Verizon to her new address. 17. However, Verizon failed to transfer the services and instead kept the services active at the old address after Plaintiff had moved, as well as at her new address. 18. Thereafter, Verizon billed Plaintiff $382.25 for services provided to the old address (“the alleged Debt”). 19. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff did not owe Verizon $382.25 (“the Claimed Amount”). 20. Nevertheless, at an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred by Verizon to Defendant for collection. 21. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant decided to contact Plaintiff by written correspondence. 22. Upon information and belief, rather than preparing and mailing such written correspondence to Plaintiff on its own, Defendant decided to utilize a third-party in Oaks, Pennsylvania to perform such activities on its behalf. 23. Upon information and belief, the third party is RevSpring. 24. Upon information and belief, as part of its utilization of RevSpring, Defendant conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt to RevSpring by electronic means. 4 25. Upon information and belief, the information conveyed by Defendant to RevSpring included Plaintiff’s status as a debtor, the precise amount of the alleged Debt, the account number, the entity to which Plaintiff allegedly owed the debt, among other things. 26. Defendant’s conveyance of the information regarding the alleged Debt to RevSpring is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 27. Upon information and belief, RevSpring then populated some or all this information into a prewritten template, printed, and mailed the correspondence to Plaintiff at Defendant’s direction. 28. That correspondence, dated July 15, 2020, was received, and read by Plaintiff. (A true and accurate copy of that correspondence (the “Letter”) is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”) 29. The Letter, which conveyed information about the alleged Debt, is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 30. The Letter was the initial written communication Plaintiff received from Defendant concerning the alleged Debt. 31. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) provides that, subject to several exceptions not applicable here, “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt,” with anyone other than the consumer “without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector.” 33. RevSpring does not fall within any of the exceptions provided for in 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). 5 34. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with RevSpring concerning the alleged Debt. 35. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with RevSpring concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information. 36. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with anyone concerning the alleged Debt or concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information. 37. Upon information and belief, Defendant has utilized RevSpring for these purposes thousands of times. 38. Defendant utilizes RevSpring in this regard for the sole purpose of maximizing its profits. 39. Defendant utilizes RevSpring without regard to the propriety and privacy of the information which it discloses to such third-party. 40. Defendant utilizes RevSpring with reckless disregard for the harm to Plaintiff and other consumers that could result from Defendant’s unauthorized disclosure of such private and sensitive information. 41. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to RevSpring. 42. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f provides that a debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 43. The unauthorized disclosure of a consumer’s private and sensitive information is both unfair and unconscionable. 44. Defendant disclosed Plaintiff’s private and sensitive information to RevSpring. 45. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f when it disclosed information about 6 Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to RevSpring. 46. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b) and 1692f and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 47. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 48. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 49. As relevant here, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) requires the written notice provide a statement of the amount of the debt. 50. To comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), the statement of the amount of the debt must accurately set forth the actual amount of the debt. 51. A statement of the amount of the debt, when the debt is not owed at all by the consumer, violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 52. As set forth in paragraphs 15 through 18 of this Complaint, Plaintiff did not owe the Claimed Amount. 53. As such, Defendant did not accurately set forth the actual amount of the alleged debt as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 54. In sum, Defendant’s statement of the amount of the alleged Debt, when Plaintiff did not owe that amount, violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 55. As also relevant here, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) requires the written notice to provide a statement of the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 7 56. To comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2), the statement of the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed must accurately set forth the name of the entity that actually owns the debt. 57. A statement of the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed, when the consumer does not owe money to the stated entity, violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 58. As set forth in paragraphs 15 through 18 of this Complaint, Plaintiff did not owe money to Verizon. 59. As such, Defendant did not accurately set forth the name of the entity that actually owns the debt as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 60. In sum, Defendant’s statement that Verizon was the name of the creditor to whom the alleged debt was owed, when Plaintiff did not owe any money to Verizon, violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 61. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g, 1692g(a)(1) and 1692g(a)(2) and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 62. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 63. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides, generally, that a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 64. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) prohibits the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. 65. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 8 66. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt to a certain entity when the consumer does not owe a debt to that entity is a violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10). 67. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a certain amount of money when the consumer does not that amount is a violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10). 68. As set forth in paragraphs 15 through 18 of this Complaint, Plaintiff did not owe the Claimed Amount. 69. As set forth in paragraphs 15 through 18 of this Complaint, Plaintiff did not owe money to Verizon. 70. As such, Defendant’s allegation that Plaintiff owed the Claimed Amount is a false, deceptive, and/or misleading representation made in connection with the collection of the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 71. Defendant’s allegation that Plaintiff owed money to Verizon is a false, deceptive, and/or misleading representation made in connection with the collection of the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 72. Defendant’s allegation that Plaintiff owed the Claimed Amount is a false representation of the character, amount, and/or legal status of the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 73. Defendant’s allegation that Plaintiff owed money to Verizon is a false representation of the character, amount, and/or legal status of the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 9 74. Defendant’s allegation that Plaintiff owed the Claimed Amount is a false representation made in an attempt to collect the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 75. Defendant’s allegation that Plaintiff owed money to Verizon is a false representation made in an attempt to collect the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 76. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 77. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all consumers similarly situated in Suffolk County, New York. 78. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of: i. All consumers where Defendant sent information concerning the consumer’s debt to a third-party vendor without obtaining the prior consent of the consumer, which disclosure was made on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. 79. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s conduct violates the FDCPA and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 80. The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons. 81. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 82. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to 10 the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 83. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws. Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) and § 1692f Violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) Violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g, 1692g(a)(1), 1692g(a)(2)

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29. Without a brick-and-mortar store, most online payday and other predatory lenders rely heavily on marketing and advertising to prey on consumers.^ 31. Lead generators pay high fees to several sources to acquire borrower information, including consumer reporting agencies. Often, lead generators use a non-Big 3^ consumer reporting agency, such as Clarity, because ofit does not impose the demanding verification and "permissible purpose" restrictions like the Big-3. rits lax policies and procedures which do not meaningfully attempt to limit the furnishing of consumer reports for the purposes listed in § 1681b. 32. Lead generators primarily obtain the consumer reports to review consumers' personal fmancial information in order to obtain details of the consumers' lifestyle, mode of living, whether the consumer has recently applied for other subprime credit and other evidence ofa vulnerability to high cost credit. 33. In turn, lead generators then auction the consumer information to lenders who make predatory loans or to intermediary databrokers, who thenre-sell the leads to such lenders. 34. Typically, lead generators resell the same applicant's information to other companies after an exclusivity period for the "first-look buyer," who pays a higher cost for a briefexclusivity periodin orderto be the first lenderto contactthe consumer. 35. Often times, lists—such as a list of people who have applied for payday loans— are soldand then resoldby brokers, especially if a company does not wishto makea loan. 36. Ultimately, this practice leads to instantaneous harassment and solicitation by numerous online lenders and data brokersas soonas a consumer appliesfor a singleonline loan. 38. As reflected by the credit reports of the named Plaintiffs, this results in the improper access ofa consumer's credit report bymultiple entities formonths, often years, after a consiuner applies for a smgle internet loan by entities that a consumer never contacted, nor authorized to obtain their private financial details. 39. As reflected by the credit reports of the named Plaintiffs and confirmed by other facts known to the Plaintiffs and their counsel, this same lead generator scheme as outlined in the above paragraphs waspresent andmade available against each of thenamed Plaintiffs because of and by Clarity. 40. Clarity knowingly participates in this scheme despite its knowledge of the requirements of §§ 1681b and 1681e(a). In sum, Clarity impermissibly accesses consumer reports (often on multiple occasions) from Experian without having a permissible purpose under the FCRA to collect information on consumers seeking Internet payday loans. Then, Clarity resells and provides access to this data to companies that it knew or should have known were lead generators or data brokers, often times at rapid speeds that would ordinarily serve as wammgs signs ofthe misuse ofconsumer reports. Common Allegations as to Clarity 42. Clarity holds itselfoutasa credit reporting agency that"provides information that is not available from traditional reporting agencies, and assists lenders in gaining a competitive advantage by viewing subprime consumer data."^ 43. As part of this process. Clarity permits access to its consumer database for impermissible purposes, primarily to allow its customers to identify potential payday lending opportunities and then sell the identities of thoseconsumers as "leads". 44. Clarity either knew or should have known that entities specifically identified below were accessing its consumer reports to generate leads. 45. By way of example, and without limitation. Clarity could have discovered with minimal Internet research and/or an onsite visit that the following companies were lead generators; Clickspeed, Lead Express, 123 CashDepot, Inc.,and SonicCash. 46. Moreover, upon information and belief, "The Servicing Company" is also a lead generator and/or a "ghost company". If a minimal investigation was conducted, Clarity would have discoveredthat The Servicing Company was an impermissible user ofconsumer reports. 47. Hereafter, Clickspeed, Lead Express, 123 Cash Depot, Inc., Sonic Cash, and The Servicing Company are collectively referred to as the "Impermissible Users". 48. As a consumer reporting agency focusing on subprime lendmg. Clarity understands the nature of lead generating and that such companies often impermissibly access consumer reports as a means of generating leads. 50. For example, upon information and belief, Clarity does not have any vetting process to verify the identity of new prospective users prior toallowing them toobtain consumer reports from its database. Instead, upon information and belief, Clarity will allow any ornearly any company to access itsconsumer report solong asthatcompany iswilling to pay a fee for the consumer report. 51. Upon information and belief, Clarity does not perform basic research on its users or make reasonable efforts to visit a prospective user's business location to ensure that the prospective company isa reliable andlegitimate user of Clarity's database. 52. Upon information and belief, no investigation is performed by Clarity to determine a company's legitimacy or reliability even though Clarity knows that lead generation andmass marketing companies with no legitimate reason to obtain consumer reports frequently use Clarity's consumer reports as a means of obtaining private, financial information on consumers. 53. In addition. Clarity regularly permits illegitimate companies to access the consumer reports of consumers dozens of times within a single hour. Where such repeated uses would ordinarily serve as warning signs of misuse of consumer reports, Clarity continued to allow unfettered access to its database without consideration ofthese unusual use patterns. 55. Moreover, each time Clickspeed accessed Ms. Tumage's consumer report— which occurred at least 19 times in less than a month—Clickspeed entered the same "permissible" purpose code, which signified that Clickspeed's purpose for obtaining Ms. Tumage's consumer report was a "pre-check." 56. Clarity defines this purpose as "a request to find a creditor, through a lead generator that was initiated by you." 57. This is not one of the permissible purposes established in § 1681b(a). Moreover, given the frequent use of Clarity's database by Clickspeed and other similar entities. Clarity knew or should have known that its consumer reports were not being obtained for a permissible purpose because such conduct and the stated purposes were entirely inconsistent with the permissiblepurposes established in § 1681b(a). 58. Upon information and belief, even after the frequent use of Clarity's database, it still does not investigate any of its users, nor has it ever prohibited any user from accessing its database. 59. Moreover, given the fi-equent use of Clarity's database by Clickspeed and other similar entities. Clarity should have identified the repeated use of its database as a "red flag" and prohibited such companies from accessing its database. This is especially true given the known business purpose of Clickspeed and the other Impermissible Users as leadgeneration companies and not actual lenders engaging in credit transactions with the named Plaintiffs. 61. In doing so. Clarity also further violated of 1681b(a), as well as § 1681e(a), which prohibits a consumer reporting agency from furnishing a consumer report if it has "reasonable grounds for believing that the consumer report willnot be used for a purpose" listed in § 1681b. 62. Moreover, in order to be more valuable to such companies. Clarity repeatedly obtains consumer reports from Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("Experian") so that it can incorporateExperian's databases into its own records. 63. Clarity did not have a lawful piupose to obtain and use the Plaintiffs' credit reports andthePlaintiffs never authorized Clarity to receive their credit reports. 64. Clarity's disclosed purposes for the sale of its consumer reports - "PC" for Pre- Check and "AR" for new credit were uniformly false. Neither signified an actual existing credit "accountreview", new creditapplication specifically initiatedby the consumer or a pre-approved firm offer ofcredit governed by the FCRA. 65. Further, upon information and belief, because Clarity does not even know the identity of the "end-user" for which the Experian information could be used - the Internet payday lender that will ultimately purchase the data from the Impermissible User or lead generator - it didnotandcould possible have made thedisclosures required by § 1681e(e) when it obtained for resale information from Experian. 67. In April 2013, Ms. Tumage sent correspondence to Clarity requesting a copy of her consumer disclosure. 68. On or about April 29, 2013, Clarity forwarded Ms. Tumage a copy of her consumer report. 69. Ms. Tumage's Clarity consumer report contained forty-three inquiries from Clickspeed that werecoded"PC" for Pre-Check. Someof these Clickspeed inquiries werewithin seconds of one another. There were also four inquires for The Servicing Company that were coded "AR" for new credit. There was one inquiry each for Lead Express and 123 Cash Depot, Inc., that were coded as "AR" for new credit even though neither of these companies are lenders. All of these inquiries were coded as "Cl" or "C3" identifying an Intemet payday loan and Intemet unsecured loan respectively. 70. Upon review of her report, Ms. Tumage identified inaccurate tradeline information in her Clarity consumer report. 71. On or about October 9, 2013, Ms. Tumage sent correspondence to Clarity requesting that they remove the inaccurate information in her Clarity consumer report. 72. In correspondence dated October 29, 2013, Clarity responded that it would not investigate her disputeand informedMs. Tumage that it "determinedyour disputeis frivolous." 73. In subsequent correspondence dated November 15, 2013, Clarity removed the inaccurate tradeline information in Ms. Tumage's Clarity consumer report. 74. On or about February 21, 2013, Ms. Tumage obtained a copy of her Experian consumer disclosure which identified seven impermissible pulls by Clarity. 76. On or about May 9, 2014, Mr. Gillison sent correspondence to Clarity requesting a copy ofhis consumer report. 77. Onor about May 19,2014,Clarity forwarded Mr. Gillison a copy of hisconsumer report. 78. Mr. Gillison's Clarity consumer report contained eleven inquiries including four inquiries from Clickspeed that were coded "PC" for Pre-Check. These four Clickspeed inquiries all occurred on September 6,2013 withinseconds of one another. 79. There was also one inquiry each for Lead Express that was coded as "AR" for new credit. All ofthese inqumes were coded as"Cl" or"C3"identifying aninternet payday loan and internet unsecured loan respectively. Facts as to Polly Larimer 80. On or about September 27, 2014, Ms. Larimer sent correspondence to Clarity requesting a copy ofher consumer report. 81. On or about October 4, 2013, Clarity forwarded Ms. Larimer a copy of her consumer report. Clarity did not provide any documentation with her consumer report defining anyofthe codes to enable herto understand whatwasin her consumer report. 82. Ms. Larimer's Clarity consumer report contained a Clickspeed inquiry that was coded "PC" for Pre-Check. 83. Upon review of her report, Ms. Larimer identified inaccurate tradeline information in her Clarity consumer report. 85. Clarity did not respond to Ms. Larimer's correspondence. 86. On or about September 27, 2013, Ms. Larimer obtained a copy of her Experian consumer disclosure which identified eleven impermissible pulls by Clarity. 87. At no time did Ms. Larimer receive an offer of credit from Clarity, have a credit relationship with Clarity, or give Clarity permission to obtain a copy ofher credit report. Facts as to Carshena Jackson 88. On or about October 10, 2013, Ms. Jackson sent correspondence to Clarity requesting a copy ofher consumer report. 89. On or about October 21, 2013, Clarity forwarded Ms. Jackson a copy of her consumer report. Clarity did not provide any documentation with her consumer report defining any ofthe codes to enable her to understand what was in her consumer report. 90. Ms. Jackson's Clarity consumer report contained one inquiry from Clickspeed that was coded "PC" for Pre-Check. 91. Upon review of her report, Ms. Jackson identified inaccurate tradeline information in her Clarity consumer report. 92. On or about November 4, 2013 Ms. Jackson sent correspondence to Clarity requesting that they remove the inaccurate information in her Clarity consumer report. 93. Clarity did not respond to Ms. Jackson's correspondence. Facts as to Michelle Campbell 95. On or about December 4, 2013, Clarity forwarded Ms. Campbell a copy of her consumer report. Clarity did not provide any documentation with her consumer report defining any of the codesto enable herto understand whatwas in her consumer report. 96. Ms. Campbell's Clarity consumer report contained thirteen inquiries from Clickspeed thatwere coded "PC" for Pre-Check. Some of these Clickspeed inquiries were within seconds ofone another. There was also one inquiry from The Servicing Company. 97. On or about January 11, 2014, Ms. Campbell obtained a copy of her Experian consumer disclosure which identified twelve impermissible pulls by Clarity. 98. At no time did Ms. Campbell receive an offer of credit from Clarity, havea credit relationship with Clarity, or giveClarity permission to obtain a copy of her credit report. Facts as to Sharon Holmes OverviewofLead Generation

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27. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of and Class Members of the proposed Class pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) and/or (b)(2). 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 40. Defendant’s repeated calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone without any prior express consent constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above- cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 41. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 43. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 44. Defendant made repeated telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone without being in any business relationship or contract. 45. Defendant’s actions constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including, but not limited to, each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 46. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., Plaintiff and each of the Class members are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 47. Plaintiff and the Class members are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant and Defendant’s agent’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Costs of suit. • Attorneys’ fees pursuant to, inter alia, the common fund doctrine. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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22. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following Class: Autodialed No Consent Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) Defendant (or an agent acting on behalf of Defendant) called/texted, (2) on the person’s cellular telephone, (3) using substantially the same equipment used to call/text Plaintiff, (4) for substantially the same reason Defendant called/texted Plaintiff, and (5) for whom Defendant claims (a) it obtained consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it obtained consent to call/text Plaintiff, or (b) Defendant did not obtain consent. 23. The following individuals are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the Class definitions following appropriate discovery. 24. Numerosity: On information and belief, there are hundreds, if not thousands of members of the Class such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 28. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-27 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference. 29. Defendant and/or its agents sent unsolicited text messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class using an autodialer. 30. These text messages were sent en masse without consent. 31. Defendant sent these text messages negligently or willfully and knowingly. 9. In violation of the TCPA, Defendant sends autodialed text messages to consumers without consent. Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claim Life for Relief Sends Autodialed Text Messages to Consumers’ Cellular Phone Numbers Without Consent Life for Relief Repeatedly Texted Plaintiff’s Cell Phone Number Without Plaintiff’s Consent Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodialed No Consent Class)

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(FLSA: Unpaid Minimum Wage) (FLSA: Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) (NYLL: Unpaid Minimum Wage) (NYLL: Unlawful Deductions) (NYLL: Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) (NYLL: Failure to Furnish Wage Statements) (On Behalf of Plaintiff Silva) (NYLL: Retaliation) 10. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and other employees similarly situated, as authorized under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The employees similarly-situated are: FLSA Collective Action: All persons who are or have been employed by Defendants as Account Executives, or other similar job title(s) at any location operated by Defendants in the State of New York from three (3) years prior to this action’s filing date through the date of the final disposition of this action and who were subject to Defendants’ unlawful practice of (i) failing to pay the applicable minimum wage; and (ii) failing to pay applicable overtime premiums for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 11. Defendants employed Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective Action during the time period relevant to the FLSA Collective Action, and classified Plaintiffs as non- exempt from the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA. 12. Defendants each meet the definition of an “employer” under the FLSA. By way of examples only, Defendants control how much the FLSA Collective Action members are paid, maintain all-time records for the FLSA Collective Action members, assign and supervise all of 4 the tasks given to the FLSA Collective Action members, and maintain and exercise control as to how the FLSA Collective Action members are to perform their tasks.� 13. Each of the FLSA Collective Action members are or were non-exempt employees entitled to overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 14. However, at all times during the FLSA Collective Action period, Defendants failed to pay the Collective Action members overtime premiums for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. 15. Defendants required Plaintiffs to routinely work in excess of 50 hours per workweek, but rarely, if ever, paid any wages or overtime premium at all for hours worked in excess of 43.5 hours per workweek. 16. Moreover, for the maximum of 3.5 hours in excess of 40 per workweek for which Defendants did, at times, pay an “overtime premium” rate, that “overtime premium rate” was less than 1.5 times Plaintiffs’ applicable hourly rate under the FLSA. 17. Defendants’ conduct, as set forth in this Complaint, was willful and in bad faith, and has caused significant damages to Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Action members. 18. Defendants are liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Action members and, as such, notice should be sent to the FLSA Collective Action members. 19. There are, upon information and belief, more than 40 similarly situated current and former employees of Defendants who were subject to the aforementioned policies in violation of the FLSA who would benefit from the issuance of a Court-supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join in the present lawsuit. Those similarly situated individuals are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants’ records. 5 20. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following defined class: New York Class: All persons who are or have been employed by Defendants as Account Executives or other similar job title(s) at any location operated by Defendants in New York from six (6) years prior to this action’s filing date through the date of the final disposition of this action and who were subject to Defendants’ unlawful practice of (i) failing to pay the applicable minimum wage; and (ii) failing to pay applicable overtime premiums for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek (iii) taking deductions from Plaintiffs’ earned wages in violation of NYLL § 193; and (iv) failing to furnish wage statements that specifically enumerated certain criteria, as required by NYLL § 195(3). 21. At all times during the time period relevant to the New York Class, Defendants, as a matter of policy, (i) did not pay Plaintiffs or the New York Class any wages or the applicable overtime premium pay rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek; (ii) took deductions from Plaintiffs’ earned wages based on Defendants’ assessment of Plaintiffs’ work performance and for other reasons and purposes prohibited by the NYLL; and (iii) failed to furnish correct and accurate wage statements required by the NYLL. 22. The facts as alleged in Paragraphs 11-19 with respect to the FLSA Collective Action are similarly true for the New York Class during the time period relevant to the New York Class. 23. Defendants failed to make, keep and/or preserve accurate records with respect to Plaintiffs and the New York Class and failed to furnish to Plaintiffs and the New York Class an accurate statement an appropriate statement of wages, in violation of the NYLL and supporting New York State Department of Labor regulations. 24. Numerosity: The proposed New York Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, during the relevant time period, 6 Defendants employed in excess of 40 people who fall within the New York Class and thus satisfy the numerosity definition of the proposed New York Class. 25. Typicality: Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the members of the proposed New York Class. During the New York Class period, Defendants subjected Plaintiffs and the members of the New York Class to same policy and practice of failing to pay them minimum wage and overtime compensation required by the NYLL. 26. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 27. Adequacy: Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the proposed New York Class and have retained counsel experienced in FLSA and NYLL class and collective action litigation. 28. Commonality: Common questions of law and fact exist with respect to all members of the proposed New York Class that predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the proposed New York Class, including but not limited to: a. Whether Defendants violated the NYLL as alleged herein; b. Whether Defendants unlawfully failed to pay the applicable minimum wage to members of the New York Class in violation of the NYLL; c. Whether Defendants unlawfully failed to pay appropriate overtime compensation to members of the New York Class in violation of NYLL; d. Whether Defendants took unlawful deductions from wages earned by members of the New York Class in violation of NYLL; e. Whether Defendants employed Plaintiffs and the New York Class within the meaning of New York law; 7 f. Whether Defendants should be enjoined from continuing the practices that violate the NYLL; g. What the proper measure of damages sustained by the New York Class are; and h. Whether Defendants’ actions were “willful.” 29. The case is maintainable as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because prosecution of actions by or against individual members of the class could result in inconsistent or varying adjudications and create the risk of incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. Further, adjudication of each individual member’s claim as a separate action would be dispositive of the interest of other individuals not party to this action, impeding their ability to protect their interests. 30. Class certification is also appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to the New York Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. Defendants’ common and uniform policies and practices denied the New York Class the wages to which they are entitled. The damages suffered by the New York Class members are small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution of this litigation. In addition, class certification is superior because it will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments of Defendants’ practices. 31. Plaintiffs intend to send notice to all members of the New York Class to the extent required by Rule 23. The names and addresses of the New York Class are available from Defendants. 8 32. As outlined above, Defendants employed Plaintiff Silva as an “Account Executive” from approximately July 2013 through July 25, 2016. 33. As an Account Executive, Mr. Silva was responsible for contacting potential clients of Defendants by telephone to solicit leases from Defendants of portable toilets and toilet- trailers at construction sites and other venues in the greater New York City area. 34. Mr. Silva and other Account Executives were also tasked with spending a portion of each workweek driving to construction sites and other venues of Defendants’ potential clients to inform them of Defendants’ services and to request contact information for Defendants to follow-up by phone in connection with Defendants’ solicitation efforts. 35. Mr. Silva and other Account Executives were also required to spend a portion of each workday fielding customer service-related inquiries and complaints from existing clients of Defendants. 36. At all times during his employment, Defendants classified Mr. Silva as a non- exempt employee entitled to the protections of the FLSA and NYLL. 37. Defendants compensated Mr. Silva on an hourly basis as well as through commission payments earned by securing leases for Defendants’ portable toilets and toilet trailers. 38. During most weeks of his employment, Defendants required Mr. Silva to work in excess of 40 hours per week. 39. During the “summer” months – from approximately May through October of each year – Mr. Silva generally worked in excess of 50 hours per workweek. 9 40. During the remainder of the year, Mr. Silva generally worked approximately 43 hours per workweek. 41. Defendants at times compensated Mr. Silva at “overtime premium” rates for up to a maximum of 3.5 hours in excess of 40 hours that he worked each workweek –– provided that such overtime hours had been formally scheduled in advance by Defendants. However, the “overtime premium” that Defendants paid for even that maximum of 3.5 hours per week was still less than 1.5 times Mr. Silva’s applicable hourly rate of pay. 42. Defendants paid no wages at all for hours worked in excess of 43.5 per workweek, including the approximately 7 additional hours that Mr. Silva worked during most weeks from May through October each year. 43. Defendants also took deductions from Mr. Silva’s earned wages for failing to satisfy certain performance measures imposed by Defendants. For example, Defendants routinely deducted portions of Mr. Silva’s earned wages on a sliding scale based on the number of hours that Mr. Silva spent soliciting new customers by phone during each workweek. 44. On Friday, July 22, 2016 –– after meeting or exceeding Defendants’ legitimate expectations for his position during the preceding three years of his employment –– Mr. Silva approached his immediate supervispr to inquire into the basis and justification for Defendants’ routine deductions from his earned wages. Mr. Silva’s supervisor responded that she was unable to explain the basis or justifications for such deductions, and informed Mr. Silva that he should address his inquiry to Defendant Howard, who was away from the office that day. 45. On Monday, July 25, 2016, Defendant Howard spoke to Mr. Silva in response to Mr. Silva’s inquiry to his supervisor on July 22nd. Defendant Howard informed Mr. Silva that 10 he was terminating Mr. Silva’s employment effective immediately because he no longer “trusted” Mr. Silva as a result of his inquiry and objection to Defendants’ payroll practices. 46. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 47. As outlined above, during the relevant time period, Defendants’ practices violated the provisions of the FLSA regarding payment of a minimum wage to Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective Action by, among other things, failing to pay them the applicable minimum wage for all hours worked. 48. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective Action are entitled to the difference between the wages paid by Defendants and the FLSA minimum wage as damages for Defendants’ violations of the FLSA’s minimum wage provisions. 49. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C §§ 216(b) and 255(a). 50. Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective Act seek recovery of their attorneys’ fees and costs to be paid by Defendant, as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. 51. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 11 52. During the relevant time period, Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective Action worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek and, because of Defendants’ above-outlined violations of the FLSA, were not paid appropriate overtime compensation. 53. Despite the hours worked by Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective Action, Defendants willfully, in bad faith, and in knowing violation of the FLSA, failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective Action appropriate overtime compensation. 54. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C §§ 216(b) and 255(a). 55. Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective Action seek recovery of their attorneys’ fees and costs to be paid by Defendants, as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. 56. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 57. As outlined above, Defendants’ pay practices failed to pay Plaintiffs and the members of the New York Class a minimum wage required by the NYLL. 58. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and the members of the New York Class are entitled to the difference between the NYLL minimum wage and the wages paid by Defendants as damages for Defendants’ violations of the NYLL and Minimum Wage Order’s minimum wage provisions. 59. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the NYLL without a good faith basis within the meaning of NYLL § 198, and as a result Plaintiffs and the 12 members of the New York Class are entitled to liquidated damages and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. 60. Plaintiffs and the members of the New York Class also seek to have their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs paid by Defendants, as provided by the NYLL. 61. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 62. During the relevant time period, Plaintiffs and the members of the New York Class worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek and, because of Defendants’ above-outlined violations of the NYLL, were not paid appropriate overtime compensation. 63. Despite the hours worked by Plaintiffs and the members of the New York Class, Defendants willfully, in bad faith, and in knowing violation of the NYLL, failed and/or refused to pay them appropriate overtime compensation. 64. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the NYLL without a good faith basis within the meaning of NYLL § 198, and as a result Plaintiffs and the members of the New York Class are entitled to liquidated damages and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. 65. Plaintiffs and the members of the New York Class also seek to have their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs paid by Defendant, as provided by the NYLL. 66. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 13 67. During the relevant time period, as set forth above, Defendants unlawfully deducted portions of Plaintiffs’ earned wages for purposes that were not for Plaintiffs’ benefit and were outside the enumerated categories of permissible deductions from employee wages under NYLL § 193. 68. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the NYLL without a good faith basis within the meaning of NYLL § 198, and as a result Plaintiffs and the members of the New York Class are entitled to liquidated damages and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. 69. Plaintiffs and the members of the New York Class also seek to have their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs paid by Defendant, as provided by the NYLL. 70. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein. 71. During the relevant time period, Defendants failed to furnish Plaintiffs and the members of the New York Class with accurate wage statements that specifically enumerated certain criteria, as required by NYLL § 195(3). 72. Defendants’ violation of the NYLL was willful and, as a result, Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs and the members of the New York Class in the amount of $5,000 for each violation. 73. In addition to statutory penalties, Plaintiffs and the members of the New York Class are entitled to recover from Defendants reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. 14 74. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein. 75. Plaintiff Silva engaged in a protected activity in July 2016 by complaining to Defendant Howard about Defendants’ improper pay practices.� 76. Defendants took adverse action against Mr. Silva by terminating his employment on or about July 25, 2016. 77. There is a clear causal nexus between Mr. Silva’s protected activity and his termination, as Defendant Howard explained that he was terminating Mr. Silva in response to Mr. Silva’s complaints about Defendants’ pay practices. 78. Accordingly, Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff Silva for engaging in a protected activity in violation of Labor Law § 215. 79. Plaintiff Silva is therefore entitled to an award of damages to compensate Plaintiff for all monetary and/or economic harm, including, but not limited to, the loss of past and future income, wages, compensation, and other benefits of employment; an award of damages for any and all other monetary and/or non-monetary losses suffered by Plaintiff; and an award of punitive damages, each in amounts to be determined at trial, plus pre- and post-judgment interest, as well as Plaintiff’s reasonable attorneys’ fees to the fullest extent permitted by law. 15

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13. Texts sent by or on behalf of Nations Info are solicitations for Nations Info’s rent- to-own membership services. 48. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following Classes: Autodialed No Consent Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action through class certification (1) Defendant (or an agent acting on behalf of Defendant) placed text message calls, (2) to the person’s cellular telephone number, (3) using the text messaging platform Defendant used to place text message calls to Plaintiff, (4) for whom Defendant claims it obtained prior express consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express consent to text message Plaintiff. Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action through class certification (1) Defendant (or an agent acting on behalf of Defendant) texted more than one time; (2) within any 12-month period (3) where the person’s telephone number had been listed on the DNC for at least thirty days; (4) for the same reason that Defendant texted Plaintiff; and (5) for whom Defendant claims it obtained prior express consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express consent to text message Plaintiff. 54. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 52 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference. 55. Defendant and/or its agents sent unwanted solicitation text messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class using an autodialer. 56. These solicitation text messages were sent en masse without the consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class to receive such solicitation text messages. 60. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 52 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference. 61. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 62. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.”26 63. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.” Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claims Nations Info Markets its Products by Placing, or Having Placed On its Behalf Unsolicited Text Messages Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et. seq.) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodial No Consent Class) Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et. seq.) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class)

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11. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 13. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 14. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 15. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e, 1692f. 16. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 18. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 19. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 20. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 21. Some time prior to January 3, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Citibank, N.A. by the Plaintiff. 22. The Citibank, N.A. obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transactions were primarily for personal, family or household purposes, specifically a Citi Mastercard account. 23. The alleged Citibank, N.A. obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). 24. Citibank, N.A. is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(4). 25. Defendant UCB, a debt collector, was contracted by Citibank, N.A. to collect the alleged debt which originated with Citibank, N.A. 27. On or about January 3, 2020, Defendant UCB sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt currently owed to Defendant Citibank, N.A. See Exhibit A. 28. The collection letter provides the following description for the amount owed. 1) Account Balance: $12,197.02 2) Minimum Payment Due: $1882.02 29. The collection letter states: “Because of interest and/or other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on the day you pay may be greater. Hence, if you pay the amount shown above, an adjustment may be necessary after your payment is received.” 30. The Defendant’s Letter fails to explain whether the potential “adjustment” is applicable to a payment of the “Minimum Payment Due,” or the “Account Balance.” 31. Plaintiff is without any guidance on where the purported amount written for each category is sufficient or whether the adjustment will be applied to both the “Minimum Payment Due,” and the “Account Balance,” or neither. 32. Additionally, Defendant’s letter does not explain the term “other charges” and Plaintiff has no way of determining what the “other charges” may be. 33. Plaintiff has no basis to determine what “other charges” could affect his balance day to day besides interest and late fees. 35. If Defendant is aware of “other charges” that would lead to an increase in the balance, Defendant should clarify and explain them in the letter. 36. Plaintiff is unable to evaluate how much is owed, and what charges may actually be included in an overall balance upon the time of payment. 37. This statement from the Defendant is also a threat to collect an amount that is not provided in the contract or by law. 38. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 39. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 40. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 41. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 42. Defendant violated said section by: a. Making a false and misleading representation in violation of but not limited to §1692e (10). b. by failing to delineate to which listed amount the “adjustment” may be applied. 44. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 45. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 46. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 47. Defendant violated this section by a. unfairly stating that the balance may increase due to “other charges”, when no other charges are allowed by contract or law; 48. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f, et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.

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14. Thom Browne owns and operates stores throughout the United States, including a location at 100 Hudson Street, New York, New York. It sells, at these stores, shirts, pants, jackets, eyewear, shoes, accessories and similar items. 15. Thom Browne’s Website is heavily integrated with its stores, serving as a gateway to them. Through the Website, Thom Browne’s customers are, inter alia, able to: learn information about the stores’ locations and hours of operation; the items for sale in the stores and online, including available sizes, the materials used, details about the items, and care instructions; purchase items for delivery; learn about the return policy; learn about the “New Arrivals” and “Collections”; learn about the company; learn about items on sale; and read and view the “TB Journal.” 17. Plaintiff Olsen cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using screen-reading software. 20. Due to the inaccessibility of its Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff Olsen, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Thom Browne offers to the public on its Website. The Website’s access barriers that Plaintiff Olsen encountered have caused a denial of his full and equal access in the past, and now deter him on a regular basis from accessing the Website. These access barriers have likewise deterred him from visiting Thom Browne’s stores and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals. 21. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Olsen could independently navigate it, view goods and service items, locate Thom Browne’s stores and learn their hours of operation, learn about the items for sale and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 22. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Olsen has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 24. Thom Browne therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 25. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Olsen seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 27. Although Thom Browne may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Thom Browne lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 28. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Olsen and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 29. Thom Browne has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 31. Plaintiff Olsen seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Thom Browne’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Thom Browne’s stores during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 32. Plaintiff Olsen seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Thom Browne’s stores during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 33. Plaintiff Olsen seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the New York City who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Thom Browne’s stores during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 35. Plaintiff Olsen’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Thom Browne has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 36. Plaintiff Olsen will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because he has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because he has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Thom Browne has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. 38. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 39. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 40. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 41. Thom Browne’s stores are public accommodations under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Thom Browne’s stores. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 42. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 44. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 45. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Olsen, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight under 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. 47. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. Thom Browne’s State of New York store constitutes a sales establishment and public accommodation under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Thom Browne’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Thom Browne. Thom Browne’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with that store. 49. Thom Browne is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its New York store and the Website. Thom Browne is a “person” under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 50. Thom Browne is violating the NYSHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Thom Browne makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(2)(a), 296(2)(c)(i), 296(2)(c)(ii). 52. Thom Browne’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class because of a disability, violating the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2), in that Thom Browne has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to Class Members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 53. Thom Browne discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Olsen and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Thom Browne’s Website and its stores under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Thom Browne from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 55. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 56. Thom Browne’s New York City location is a sales establishment and public accommodation under the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishment. 57. Thom Browne is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its store in the New York City and its Website, making it a person under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 58. Thom Browne is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Thom Browne makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(4)(a), 8-107(15)(a). 60. As such, Thom Browne discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Olsen and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishment under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Thom Browne from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 61. As Thom Browne’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Olsen seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination, compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines for each offense, and attorneys’ fees and expenses. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120, 8-126(a). 62. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 64. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Thom Browne, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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19. The Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind persons in the City of New York who have attempted to access the Defendant’s website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in the Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 20. Common questions of law and fact exist among the class, including: whether the Defendant’s website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; whether the Defendant’s website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; whether the Defendant’s website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and whether the Defendant’s website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 21. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including -6- without limitation, the following: a. Whether www.airbnb.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether www.airbnb.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of the New York; c. Whether Defendant through its website www.airbnb.com denies the full and equal enjoyment of its services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant through its website www.airbnb.com denies the full and equal enjoyment of its services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the laws of New York. 22. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class. The class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, claim that the Defendants violated the ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Defendant’s website so it can be independently accessible to the class. 23. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class because the Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because the Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Plaintiff and the class as a whole. -7- 24. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to the class predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 25. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by individuals with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 26. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 34. The Defendant’s website is offered to the public. The website offers features that should allow all individuals to access the services that the Defendant offers through their website and corporate office location(s). Defendant’s premises provide to the public important Products and services. Defendant’s website provides consumers with access to information about the services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical corporate office locations. Through the Website, -11- its customers are, inter alia, able to: find information about the various apartments, condos and houses it offers for rent in New York and throughout the country, privacy policies, promotional information and other services. 35. It is, upon information and belief, the Defendant’s policy and practice to deny the Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to the Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the services that are offered and are heavily integrated with the Defendant’s locations. Due to the Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, the Plaintiff and other visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s website information and services, information about hours of operation, and related services. 36. The Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. The Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. The Plaintiff has visited the website on separate occasions using the NVDA screen-reader. 37. During the Plaintiff’s visits to the website, the last occurring in November 2018, the Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied the Plaintiff full and equal access to the services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied the Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the services of the website, as well as to the services of the Defendant’s locations in New York by being unable to learn more information about office locations. 38. While attempting to navigate the website, the Plaintiff encountered multiple -12- accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired individuals that include, but are not limited to: (1) Lack of alternative text (“alt-text”), or a text equivalent. Alt- text is an invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that screen- reading software can speak the alt-text where a sighted user sees pictures, which includes captcha prompts. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation, but instead a text box shows when the mouse moves over the picture. The lack of alt- text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics. As a result, the Defendant’s visually-impaired customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse, look for office locations, information about office amenities, including hours of operation, and services. (2) Empty links that contain no text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen-reader users. (3) Redundant links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users. (4) Linked images missing alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 39. Due to the inaccessibility of the Defendant’s website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as the Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities and services the Defendant offers to the public on its website. The access barriers the Plaintiff encountered have caused -13- a denial of the Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter the Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the website. 40. These access barriers on the Defendant’s website have deterred the Plaintiff from visiting the Defendant’s physical office location(s) and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: the Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of the Defendant’s locations on its website, preventing the Plaintiff from visiting the locations to enjoy its services. The Plaintiff intends to visit the Defendant’s website and physical locations in the near future if the Plaintiff could access the Defendant’s website. 41. If the website was equally accessible to all, the Plaintiff could independently navigate the website and complete a desired transaction, as sighted individuals do. 42. The Plaintiff, through the Plaintiff’s attempts to use the website, has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired persons. 43. Because basic compliance with WCAG 2.0 would provide the Plaintiff and other visually-impaired persons with equal access to the website, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired persons, including the Plaintiff; failing to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired persons, including the Plaintiff; and failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired persons , such as the Plaintiff, as a -14- member of a protected class. 44. The Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination against others, as alleged herein. 45. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that the Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of … this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities …. Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the … modification of a policy ….42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 46. Because the Defendant’s website has never been equally accessible, and because the Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause the Defendant’s website to become and remain accessible, the Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring the Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to the Plaintiff to assist the Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for the Defendant’s website. The website must be accessible for individuals with disabilities who use desktop computers, laptops, tablets, and smartphones. The Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction require the Defendant to cooperate with the agreed-upon consultant to: train the Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; regularly check the accessibility of the website under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; regularly -15- test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that the Defendant’s website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on the Defendant’s website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems and require that any third-party vendors who participate on the Defendant’s website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with WCAG 2.0. 47. If the Defendant’s website were accessible, the Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired persons could independently access information about office locations, information about office amenities, including hours of operation, and related services. 48. Although the Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating the Defendant’s website, the Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make the Defendant’s website fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually- impaired persons. 49. The Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining the Defendant’s website and the Defendant has generated significant revenue from the Defendant’s website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making the Defendant’s website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 50. Without injunctive relief, the Plaintiff and other visually-impaired persons will continue to be unable to independently use the Defendant’s website, violating their rights. -16- 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 52. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 53. Defendant’s offices are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s office(s). The Website is a service that is integrated with these location(s). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 55. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 56. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, -17- privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 57. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)- (2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 58. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 59. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, -18- superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 61. Defendant’s physical location(s) are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 62. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 63. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 64. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or -19- accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 65. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 66. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 67. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of -20- substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 68. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 69. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 70. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 73. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 74. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. -21- 75. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 76. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 78. Defendant’s New York State physical location(s) are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is by and integrated with these establishments. 79. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical location(s) and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). -22- 80. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical location(s) to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 81. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 82. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 83. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 84. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. -23- and/or its implementing regulations. 85. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 86. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 87. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 88. Defendant’s location(s) are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishment(s). 89. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 90. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. -24- This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 91. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 92. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 93. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 94. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and -25- its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 95. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 96. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 98. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 99. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 100. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, -26- 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 101. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant operates a commercial website, www.oliverwicks.com which serves as an online custom-suit retailer for men. Defendant offers potential consumers the ability to order made-to-measure custom suits from Italian and European fabrics. Defendant’s website also offers men’s dress shirts and shoes for online order and delivery. In addition to its goods and products, Defendant’s website offers 365 day alterations for any custom made-to-measure suit or blazer. Defendant’s website also offers exclusive deals and sale discounts through its website. 21. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 22. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. -8- 23. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in March of 2019, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website, by being unable to learn more information about Defendant’s website and products and services it offers, the ability to browse various models of prodcuts and goods, and related services available online. Plaintiff was unable to browse and proceed with the ordering process due to accessibility barriers. 24. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Lack of Alternative Text (“alt-text”), or a text equivalent. Alt-text is an invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that screen- reading software can speak the alt-text where a sighted user sees pictures, which includes captcha prompts. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation, but instead a text box shows when the mouse moves over the picture. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics. As a result, visually- impaired prospective customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse, look for Store locations and hours, the ability to browse -9- the products, find information on promotions and coupons, and related goods and services available both in Stores and online. b. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen-reader users; c. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and d. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 25. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 26. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those specific goods and services available for purchase and delivery, because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. -10- 27. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 28. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 29. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 30. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 31. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . .42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). -11- 32. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 33. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 34. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated -12- to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 35. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 36. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 37. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. -13- 40. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 41. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 42. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. -14- 43. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 44. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 46. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 47. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 48. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). -15- 49. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 50. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 51. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. -16- 52. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 53. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 54. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 55. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 56. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 57. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 58. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless -17- such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 59. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 60. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 61. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or -18- c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 62. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 63. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 64. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 65. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 67. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. -19- 68. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 69. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 70. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 71. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 72. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. -20- 73. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 74. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 76. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 77. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 78. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are -21- being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 79. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 80. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 81. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 82. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 83. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 84. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This -22- inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 85. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 86. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 87. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 88. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under -23- § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 89. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 90. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 91. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 92. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 93. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 94. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. -24- Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 95. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq.

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(FLSA Overtime Violations) (Ohio Overtime Violations) (Violations of Ohio Revised Code 4113.15) 12. At all times relevant, Defendant was an “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 13. Defendant’s hourly employees included Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins. 14. At all times relevant, Defendant was an enterprise within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(r), and an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1). 15. Defendant is a covered employer within the meaning of the Ohio Wage Act and the Ohio Prompt Pay Act and, at all times relevant, employed Plaintiff and similarly situated employees. 16. At all times relevant, Defendant maintained control, oversight and direction over Plaintiff and similarly situated employees, including timekeeping, payroll, and other employment practices that applied to them. Hourly Employees’ Compensation 17. Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class are current or former hourly employees of Defendant. 18. Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins frequently worked more than forty (40) hours in a single workweek, entitling them to overtime compensation under the FLSA. 19. Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class frequently worked longer than their assigned schedules and clocked in and out, accordingly. 4 20. Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class were not paid any time beyond what was provided in their schedules as the punch in and punch out clock would inappropriately round time down. 21. Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class regularly began work for the day up to 10 to 15 minutes, or more, before their scheduled start time but, pursuant to Defendant’s uniform companywide policy, did not start getting paid until their scheduled start time. 22. The types of tasks that were performed before Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class’s scheduled shifts include obtaining and returning the necessary tools to perform their jobs; obtaining parts needed to perform their jobs; performing production work; and walking to and from their assigned areas of the production floor. 23. Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class were full time employees regularly scheduled to work 40 hours a week or more. Thus, by failing to pay Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class for work performed before and after their scheduled shift, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class for all of their overtime in nearly every week in which they worked. 24. Defendant’s practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and those similarly situated for the time they worked over their scheduled shift and for the actual amount of time they worked resulted in Plaintiff and others similarly situated being paid less than the amount actually owed to them. 25. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 5 26. Plaintiff brings this case as an FLSA “collective action” pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which provides that “[a]n action to recover the liability” prescribed by the FLSA “may be maintained against any employer … by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 27. The Opt-Ins who are “similarly situated” to Plaintiff with respect to Defendant’s FLSA violations consist of: All present and former hourly employees of Defendant during the period three years preceding the commencement of this action to the present who worked more than forty hours in one or more workweeks. 28. Such persons are “similarly situated” with respect to Defendant’s FLSA violations in that all were hourly employees of Defendant, all were subjected to and injured by Defendant’s unlawful practice of failing to pay its employees for all hours worked, and all have the same claims against Defendant for unpaid wages and overtime compensation as well as for liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 29. Conditional certification of this case as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) is proper and necessary so that such persons may be sent a Court-authorized notice informing them of the pendency of this action and giving them the opportunity to “opt in.” 30. Plaintiff cannot yet state the exact number of similarly-situated persons. Such persons are readily identifiable through the payroll records Defendant has maintained, and was required to maintain, pursuant to the FLSA and Ohio law. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) & 29 C.F.R. § 215.2; Ohio Const. art. II, § 34a. 31. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 6 32. Plaintiff also brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of themselves and other members of a class of persons who assert claims under the laws of the State of Ohio (the “Ohio Class”), defined as: All present and former hourly employees of Defendant during the period three years preceding the commencement of this action to the present who worked more than forty hours in one or more workweeks. 33. The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff cannot yet state the exact number of class members but avers, upon information and belief, that it consists of at least hundreds of people. The number of class members as well as their identities are ascertainable from the payroll records Defendant has maintained, or was required to maintain, pursuant to the FLSA and Ohio law. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) & 29 C.F.R. § 215.2; Ohio Const. art. II, § 34a. 34. There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not limited to: Whether Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and other class members for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek; and, Whether Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiff and other class members for time worked beyond their scheduled shifts is lawful. 35. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Class. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendant, and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of other class members. 36. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Class. Plaintiff’s interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of other class members. Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action litigation, including 7 wage-and-hour litigation, and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio Class in this case. 37. The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendant’s liability to the class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 38. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 40. Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions on behalf of herself and the Opt-Ins who have joined this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiff’s written consent to becoming a party to this action pursuant to § 216(b) has been filed or will be filed with the Court. 41. The FLSA requires that non-exempt employees be paid at a rate of one and one half times their regular rate for every hour worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 8 42. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek. 43. Instead, Defendant had a companywide policy of failing to pay its employees for all time worked before their scheduled start time. 44. Defendant’s practices resulted in Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins receiving less overtime compensation than they were owed. 45. By engaging in these practices, Defendant willfully violated the FLSA and regulations thereunder that have the force and effect of law. 46. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins were injured in that they did not receive overtime compensation due to them pursuant to the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) entitles them to an award of “unpaid overtime compensation” as well as “an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Section 216(b) further provides that “[t]he court … shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or Plaintiff, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” 47. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 48. Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03, on behalf of herself, the Potential Opt-Ins who may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and all members of the Ohio Class for which certification is sought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 49. At all times relevant, Defendant was an employer covered by the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03. 9 50. Defendant violated the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03, by failing to pay all overtime compensation to its hourly workers including Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class. 51. Specifically, among other things, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the Ohio Class for all time spent working beyond their scheduled shift. This practice has resulted in an underpayment of overtime premiums due to the Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins and the Ohio Class. 52. Defendant’s violations of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03 injured Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class members in that they did not receive overtime compensation due to them pursuant to that statute. 53. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.10(A) provides that Defendant, having violated § 4111.03, is “liable to the employee[s] affected for the full amount of the overtime wage rate, less any amount actually paid to the employee[s] by the employer, and for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as may be allowed by the court.” 54. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully written herein. 55. Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of Ohio Revised Code 4113.15, on behalf of herself, and all members of the Ohio Class for which certification is sought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 56. At all times relevant, Defendant was Plaintiff and the Ohio Class’ employer for purposes of overtime compensation owed. 10 57. Defendant violated Ohio Revised Code § 4113.15, by failing to pay overtime compensation to its hourly workers including Plaintiff and the Ohio Class within thirty days of their regularly scheduled payday. 58. The number of hours and minutes actually worked by Plaintiff and the Ohio Class is reflected in time-clock records maintained by Defendant. 59. Ohio Revised Code Ann. § 4113.15 provides that Defendant, having violated § 4113.15, “is liable to the employee in the amount equal to six per cent of the amount of the claim still unpaid and not in contest or disputed or two hundred dollars, whichever is greater.” Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Defendant’s Status as an “Employer”

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10. Since at least 2018, Defendants have engaged in a practice of leaving repeated, unsolicited, prerecorded messages on the cellular telephone voicemails of individuals who own property in Arizona. 11. Defendants’ telemarketing calls are not initiated or monitored by a live person. 13. The voicemail message since at least 2018 was similar or identical to the following: Hi! How’s it going? This is Lisa, I am not sure if I have the right number, to be honest, but I came across your property and thought I would reach out to you. I just wanted to see if you’d be interested in a cash offer for your home. I am a local investor here in the area and I usually buy around five to ten homes every few months. If you’re interested, please give me a call back my phone number is 602- 833-5317. Thank you so much. Bye, bye. 14. Upon information and belief, “Lisa” does not exist or is not otherwise employed by Defendants. 15. The purpose of these automated calls and prerecorded voicemail messages was to solicit business. 16. Notably, when dialing the number “Lisa” leaves on the voicemails, Defendant acknowledges the calls are subject to the TCPA and provides an option to be added to the “Do Not Call List.” 17. On or about June 2018, Plaintiff started receiving on his cellular telephone the above-described unsolicited calls from Defendants with the same prerecorded message alleged above. Plaintiff received numerous of these calls on his cellular telephone and “ringless” voicemails per month with the same prerecorded message from “Lisa.” 18. At no point did Plaintiff provide Defendants with his express written consent to be contacted using an Automated Telephone Dialing System (“ATDS”) with an artificial or prerecorded message. 20. Plaintiff called the number that “Lisa” left in the voicemail message and was eventually routed to Defendant Geary. Defendant Geary in this call acknowledged responsibility for the voicemails from “Lisa” and that the calls were solicitations by Defendants to purchase Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff informed Defendant Geary that his number was on the “Do Not Call” register, requested to be removed from the ATDS registry, and asked not to be called again. 21. Despite speaking with Defendant Geary in December 2018, Plaintiff continued to receive multiple calls and voicemails from “Lisa” in 2019 and 2020. 22. Defendants’ unsolicited prerecorded message caused Plaintiff actual harm, including, but not limited to invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendants’ prerecorded message also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life. 23. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to represent the following class of individuals: All persons within the United States who received an unsolicited call or voicemail from Defendants or someone acting on Defendants’ behalf or direction using an artificial or prerecorded voice without emergency purpose and without the recipient’s prior express written consent within the four years preceding the filing of this Complaint. 24. Upon information and belief, Defendants have left hundreds of prerecorded messages on recipients’ voicemails. The members of the class, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 26. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the class. These common questions include (a) whether Defendants utilize an automated telephone dialing system and leave artificial or prerecorded messages without the recipients’ prior express written consent for telemarketing purposes; (b) whether Defendants authorized, directed, or condoned the calls to the extent initiated by a third party; (c) whether such conduct, if proven, constitutes a violation of the ATDS; (d) whether Defendants’ conduct was knowing or willful; and (e) the statutory damages to be awarded for violations of the TCPA. 27. Plaintiff shares the same interests and has suffered the same injuries as each class member. Plaintiff asserts identical claims and seeks identical relief on behalf of the class members. Plaintiff’s claims are, therefore, typical of the class members’ claims, and Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the absent class members’ claims and serve as a class representative. 28. Plaintiff is prepared to serve as the named class representatives for the class. Plaintiff has also retained competent counsel that will diligently pursue this action on behalf of the absent class members. 29. A class action is superior to all available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the claims of all members of the class is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. While the aggregate damages sustained by the class are in the hundreds of thousand dollars, the individual damages incurred by each member of the class resulting from Defendants’ wrongful conduct are too small to warrant the expense of individual lawsuits. The likelihood of individual class members prosecuting their own separate claims is remote, and, even if every member of the class could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases. 31. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). 32. Plaintiff incorporates all of the above allegations as if set forth fully herein. 33. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express written consent of the called party) using any automated telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 34. Defendants – or third parties directed by Defendants and acting at their direction and on their behalf – transmitted calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice to the cellular telephone number of Plaintiff and members of the class. 35. These calls were made without regard to whether Plaintiff provided express written consent for Defendants to make such calls. Defendants never obtain express written consent from Plaintiff or other members of the class. In fact, Plaintiff expressly requested not to be contacted again by Defendants but continued to receive the unsolicited telemarketing calls from Defendants. 36. Defendants actions violate § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an artificial or prerecorded voice to make non-emergency telephone calls to Plaintiff’s and other class members’ cell phone without their prior express written consent. 37. Plaintiff and other members of the class were harmed and are entitled to a minimum of $500.00 for each violation of the TCPA and an injunction under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 39. Defendants’ calls and “ringless” voicemails caused Plaintiff and members of the class actual harm including, but not limited to invasion of privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendants’ prerecorded message also inconvenienced Plaintiff and other members of the class and caused disruption in their daily lives. 40. Accordingly, Plaintiff and other members of the class should be awarded $1,500.00 each in statutory damages for each violation of the TCPA. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff on behalf of himself and other members of the class pray for relief against Defendants as follows: (A) Awarding Plaintiff statutory damages in an amount to be determined by the court; (B) Awarding an injunction enjoining Defendants from further violations of the TCPA; and (C) Awarding such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. DATED this 31st day of December 2020. 6. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., makes it unlawful to engage in unsolicited telemarketing using an automated telephone dialing system or artificial or prerecorded messages without the recipients’ prior express written consent. 7. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is empowered to issue rules and regulations implementing the TCPA. 8. The FTC has issued rulings and clarified that to obtain an individual’s consent, a clear, unambiguous, and conspicuous written disclosure must be provided to the individual. See 2012 FTC Order, 27 FTC Rcd. At 1839 (“Requiring prior written consent will better protect consumer privacy because such consent requires conspicuous action by the consumer – providing permission in writing – to authorize autodialed or prerecorded telemarketing calls….”). 9. The courts and the FTC have issued rulings and clarified that consumers are entitled to the same content-based protections for “ringless” voicemails as they are for calls to wireless numbers. See Schaevitz v. Braman Hyundai, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1248 (S.D. FL. 2019); Toney v. Quality Res., Inc., 75 F. Supp. 3d 727, 734 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (defendant bears the burden of showing that it obtained Plaintiff’s prior express consent before contacting the individual). VIOLATION OF 47 U.S.C. §227

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&_Arvairik, Fulton County Superior Court ***EFILED*'"IVV Date: 4/13/2017 9:10:15 AM X Cathelene Robinson, Clerk tlher -Tyier on -)(11-1- Off' [•,ve am," Lmoirvl,c-; DWaYli./ Plaintiff VS. 1-,_Yr(1 I (d/b/ 4 ' 4'v-ectt "3. alper Fred -J -py) youtt.i) t and_ 'Opf.J..S 136 PRYOR STREET, ROOM C-103, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 SUMMONS M ani 6 \no 110,(6 , SoLcho, d lcconfo and Wa-trer -1\ner, cn hOW -thenitsolvos lat[ 04as 90001 ',•-tioidd Plaintiff, vs. FreCtinlOrtS OP icy nP,cee Tfinr. /1,16), Fr-ec-Ps , ed‘' SaR9-1 ' hay frnet6,1); arid DeRs tto, ncluslve Defendant 16. Plaintiffs bring this Class action on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23. 17. The Class which Plaintiffs seek to represent is defined as: All consumers to whom Defendants, within two years from the date of filing this action, provided an electronically printed receipt at the point of a sale or transaction at any of Defendants' physical store locations in the United States, on which receipt Defendants printed more than the last 5 digits of the consumer's debit card (the "Class").' 19. Numerosity: The Class is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of their claims through this Class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 20. Plaintiffs believe and thereon allege that there are, at a minimum, thousands (i.e., two thousand or more) of members that comprise the Class. 21. The exact size of the Class is ascertainable through Defendants' records, including but not limited to Defendants' sales and transaction records. 22. Members of the Class may be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in Class actions, such as by published notice, e-mail notice, wcbsite notice, and/or first-Class mail, or combinations thereof, or by other methods suitable to this Class and deemed necessary and or appropriate by the Court. 23. Typicality: Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the entire Class. The claims of Plaintiffs and members of the Class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 25. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There are a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting the members of the Class. 26. The questions of fact and law common to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual members and include the following: (a) Whether Defendants' conduct of providing Plaintiffs and the Class with sales or transaction receipts whereon Defendants printed more than the last 5 digits of the card violated the FACTA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq.; (b) Whether Defendants' conduct was willful; and (c) Whether Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to statutory damages, punitive damages, costs, and or attorney fees for Defendants' acts and conduct. 28. Consistency Of Adjudications: A class action would promote the consistency of adjudicating the rights of Class members. In contrast, the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. 30. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in this Complaint. 31. Plaintiffs assert this claim on behalf of themselves and the Class against Defendants. 33. By its express terms, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) applies to "any cash register or other machine or device that electronically prints receipts for credit card or debit card transactions" after December 3, 2006. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(3). 34. Defendants transact business in the United States and accept credit cards and debit cards in the course of transacting business with persons such as Plaintiffs and members of the Class. In transacting such business, Defendants use cash registers and or other machines or devices that electronically print receipts for credit card and debit card transactions. 35. After December 3, 2006, and within two years from the date of filing this action, Defendants, at the point of a sale or transaction with Plaintiff Melanie Wallace, provided Plaintiff Melanie Wallace with one or more electronically printed receipts on each of which Defendants printed more than the last 5 digits of her debit card number. More specifically, Defendants printed the first 6 digits and the last 4 digits of Plaintiff Melanie Wallace's debit card number on her customer receipt(s). 37. After December 3, 2006, and within two years from the date of filing this action, Defendants, at the point of a sale or transaction with Plaintiff Heather Tyler, provided Plaintiff Heather Tyler with one or more electronically printed receipts on each of which Defendants printed more than the last 5 digits of her debit card number. More specifically, Defendants printed the first 6 digits and the last 4 digits of Plaintiff Heather Tyler's debit card number on her customer receipt(s). 38. After December 3, 2006, and within two years from the date of filing this action, Defendants, at the point of a sale or transaction with members of the Class, provided each member of the Class with one or more electronically printed receipts on each of which Defendants printed, for each respective Class member, more than the last 5 digits of their debit card number. 39. As set forth above, FACTA was enacted in 2003 and gave merchants who accept credit and or debit cards up to December 4, 2006 to comply with its requirements. 4. Nor is Defendants' willful violation of FACTA a trifling matter. In the statement provided during his signing of FACTA in 2003, the President underscored the importance of the legislation in combating rampant identity theft: This bill also confronts the problem of identity theft. A growing number of Americans are victimized by criminals who assume their identities and cause havoc in their financial affairs. With this legislation, the Federal Government is protecting our citizens by taking the offensive against identity theft. 41. For example, but without limitation, several years ago, VISA, MasterCard, the PCI Security Standards Council (a consortium founded by VISA, MasterCard, Discover, American Express and JCB), companies that sell cash register and other devices for the processing of credit or debit card payments, companies that sell software to operate payment card devices, companies that maintain and repair hardware or software used to process payment card transactions, and other entities informed Defendants about FACTA, including its specific requirements concerning the truncation of credit and debit card numbers and prohibition on the printing of expiration dates, and Defendants' need to comply with same. 42. Other entities, including but not limited to Defendants' payment card processor (also known as the acquirer, merchant bank, or acquiring bank) which processes credit and debit card payments for transactions occurring at Defendants' stores, likewise informed Defendants about FACTA, including its specific requirements concerning the truncation of credit and debit card numbers and prohibition on the printing of expiration dates, and Defendants' need to comply with same. 45. Moreover, the Government, through the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), provided notice of FACTA's requirements to businesses on no less than three separate occasions in 2007, reminding them of the requirement to truncate credit and debit card information on receipts. Defendants were informed of and knew about these notices from the FTC. In one such notice, entitled "FTC Business Alert" "Slip Showing? Federal Law Requires All Businesses to Truncate Credit Card Information on Receipts," and dated May 2007, the FTC reminded businesses, among other things, of the following: What's on the credit and debit card receipts you give your customers? The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the nation's consumer protection agency, says it's time for companies to check their receipts and make sure they're complying with a law that's been in effect for all businesses since December 1, 2006. According to the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act (FACTA), the electronically printed credit and debit card receipts you give your customers must shorten — or truncate the account information. You may include no more than the last five digits of the card number, and you must delete the card's expiration date. For example, a receipt that truncates the credit card number and deletes the expiration date could look like this: 5. Courts have likewise emphasized the purpose of FACTA. For example, the Ninth Circuit recently emphasized that Thin fashioning FACTA, Congress aimed to 'restrict the amount of information available to identity thieves.'" Bateman v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 718 (9t11 Cir. 2010) (quoting 149 Cong. Rec. 26,891 (2003) (statement of Sen. Shelby)). 51. Defendants have also harmed Plaintiffs and the Class by exposing them to at least an increased risk of identity theft and debit card fraud. 52. As a result of Defendants' willful violations of FACTA, Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs and each member of the Class in the statutory damage amount of "not less than $100 and not more than $1,000" for each violation. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 6. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit recently explained that "[i]dentity theft is a serious problem, and FACTA is a serious congressional effort to combat it." Redman v. Radioshack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 639 (7th Cir. 2014). For Violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class as against Defendants) STATE OF GEORGIA MELANIE WALLACE, SASCHA FELICIANO and HEATHER TYLER, on )) behalf of themselves and all others similarly ) situated, ) Plaintiffs, v. cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card number . . . upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction." 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) (emphasis added).

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(FLSA – COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME) (O.R.C. § 4111.03 – RULE 23 CLASS ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME) (R.C. § 4113.5 – RULE 23 CLASS ACTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE OHIO PROMPT PAY ACT) 23. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff was jointly employed by Defendants as an STNA from approximately May 2017 when Defendants jointly purchased and/or began jointly operating Isabelle Ridgway through August 2017. 24. As an STNA, Plaintiff was an hourly, non-exempt employee of Defendants as defined in the FLSA and the Ohio Acts. 25. During her employment with Defendants, Named Plaintiff was not fully and properly paid for all of her compensable hours worked because Defendants did not properly calculate her regular rate of pay for the purposes of lawfully paying her for her overtime hours worked, resulting in unpaid overtime wages. 26. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 27. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were compensated on an hourly, not a salary or fee basis. 29. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees routinely earned additional remuneration to their hourly compensation. 30. The FLSA and Ohio Wage Act required Defendants to pay overtime compensation to their employees at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rate for the hours they worked in excess of forty. 29 U.S.C. § 207; O.R.C. §§ 4111.03, 4111.10. 31. Defendants did not pay overtime compensation to Plaintiff and/or similarly situated employees at the time-and-a-half regular rate required. The FLSA and Ohio Wage Act required Defendants to pay overtime compensation to their hourly employees at one and one-half times their “regular rate” of pay, and to include in the calculation of their regular rates “all remunerations for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee,” including commissions. 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(3); 29 C.F.R. 778.117; O.R.C. § 4111.03(A) (incorporating FLSA standards). 32. Defendants unlawfully excluded the additional remuneration that was paid to Plaintiff and other members of the FLSA Collective and the Ohio Class in determining their “regular rates” for purposes of overtime compensation during weeks wherein they worked more than forty (40) hours. Defendants thereby miscalculated their regular rates and underpaid their overtime compensation. 33. Defendants are each jointly an “employer” of Plaintiff and others similarly situated as that term is defined by the FLSA and the Ohio Wage Act. 34. Upon information and belief, Defendants, at all times relevant hereto, were fully aware of the fact that they were legally required to comply with the wage and overtime payment laws of the United States and of the State of Ohio. 36. Defendants are in possession and control of necessary documents and information from which Plaintiff would be able to precisely calculate damages. 37. Plaintiff neither primarily performed managerial duties nor supervised two or more employees. Plaintiff could not hire, fire, or discipline employees. 38. Plaintiff’s primary job duties did not consist of the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. 39. At all times, Plaintiff was employed as a non-exempt hourly employee entitled to overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in any workweek. 40. During the relevant time period, Defendants applied the same pay practices and policies to all hourly, non-exempt employees, including Plaintiff. 41. Named Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees have not been fully and lawfully compensated for all of their compensable hours worked due to the aforementioned policies and practices of not paying employees the correct overtime rate for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek. 42. Defendants knew or should have been aware that Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek and were entitled to be paid an overtime rate based on the correct regular rate of pay, but they willfully elected not to fully compensate their employees during all times relevant. 43. Defendants’ joint failure to fully and properly pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees resulted in unpaid overtime wages. 44. Named Plaintiff brings her FLSA claims pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a representative action on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated employees of the opt-in class, consisting of: All current and former hourly, non-exempt employees of Defendants who received remuneration payments in addition to their normal hourly rate of pay during any workweek that they worked over 40 hours in any workweek beginning three years preceding the filing date of this Complaint and continuing through the date of final disposition of this case (the “§216(b) Class” or the “§216(b) Class Members”). 45. This FLSA claim is brought as an "opt-in" collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) as to claims for overtime compensation withheld in violation of the FLSA, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees. In addition to the Named Plaintiff, numerous putative 216(b) Class Members have been denied proper overtime compensation due to Defendants’ company-wide payroll policy and practice of not fully and properly compensating their employees at the proper overtime rate during workweeks when they received remuneration payments in addition to their normal hourly rate of pay. The Named Plaintiff is representative of those other similarly situated employees and is acting on behalf of their interests as well as her own in bringing this action. 46. The identity of the putative 216(b) Class Members are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants’ payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action, and allowed to opt into it pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and costs under the FLSA. 48. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 49. Named Plaintiff brings her Ohio Wage Act claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 as a class action on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated of the following class, consisting of: All current and former hourly, non-exempt employees of Defendants who received remuneration payments in addition to their normal hourly rate of pay during any workweek that they worked over 40 hours in any workweek beginning three years preceding the filing date of this Complaint and continuing through the date of final disposition of this case (the “Ohio Rule 23 Class,” the “Rule 23 Class,” or the “Ohio Rule 23 Class Members”). 50. During relevant times, Plaintiff and those Ohio Rule 23 Class Members worked more than forty (40) hours per workweek, but were not correctly compensated at a rate of at least one and one-half times their correct regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 because of Defendants’ policy and practice of not fully and properly compensating their employees at the proper overtime rate during workweeks when they received remuneration payments in addition to their normal hourly rate of pay. 51. The Ohio Rule 23 Class, as defined above, is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 52. Named Plaintiff is a member of the Ohio Rule 23 Class and her claims for unpaid wages are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class. 54. Named Plaintiff has no interest that is antagonistic to or in conflict with those interests of the Ohio Rule 23 Class that she undertaken to represent. 55. Named Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced class action counsel who can ably represent the interests of the entire Ohio Rule 23 Class. 56. Questions of law and fact are common to the Ohio Rule 23 Class. 57. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because individual actions would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants with respect to their non-exempt employees. 58. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) as Defendants acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Ohio Rule 23 Class, making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class as a whole. 59. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) as the questions of law and facts common to the Ohio Rule 23 Class predominate over questions affecting individual members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 61. A class action is superior to individual actions for the fair and efficient adjudication of Named Plaintiff’s and the Ohio Rule 23 Class’ claims and will prevent undue financial, administrative and procedural burdens on the parties and the Court. Named Plaintiff and counsel are not aware of any pending Ohio litigation on behalf of the Ohio Rule 23 Class, as defined herein, or on behalf of any individual alleging a similar claim. Because the damages sustained by individual members are modest compared to the costs of individual litigation, it would be impractical for class members to pursue individual litigation against the Defendants to vindicate their rights. Certification of this case as a class action will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. 62. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 63. This claim is brought as part of a collective action by the Named Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the §216(b) Class. 64. During the relevant time period preceding this Complaint, Defendants jointly employed the Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Class Members. 66. Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Class Members worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 67. The FLSA requires that covered employees be compensated for every hour worked in a workweek. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(b). 68. The FLSA requires that non-exempt employees receive overtime compensation of their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 69. Under 29 U.S.C. § 207(e), “regular rate” of pay shall be broadly deemed to include all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee like the type of Named Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(e); see also 29 C.F.R. § 778.208. 70. Named Plaintiff was not exempt from receiving FLSA overtime benefits because, inter alia, she was not an “executive,” “administrative,” or “professional” employee, as those terms are defined under the FLSA. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1, et seq. 71. Named Plaintiff was not exempt from receiving FLSA overtime benefits because, inter alia, she was not a “learned professional” employee, as that term is defined under the FLSA. See 29 CFR § 541.301. 72. Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Class Members frequently worked in excess of 40 hours per week and received additional remuneration to their hourly rates at times during such workweeks. 74. Defendants violated the FLSA with respect to Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Class by, inter alia, failing to fully compensate them at time-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked over forty (40) hours in workweeks because Defendant did not properly calculate their employees’ overtime rate when they received remuneration payments in addition to their normal hourly rate of pay. 75. Defendants knew or should have known of the overtime payment requirements of the FLSA. Defendants jointly and willfully withheld and failed to pay the overtime compensation to which Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Collective Members are entitled. 76. The exact total amount of overtime compensation that Defendants failed to pay the Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Class Members is unknown at this time, as many of the records necessary to make such precise calculations are in the possession of Defendants or were not kept by Defendants. 77. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ joint conduct, the Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Class Members have suffered and continue to suffer damages. The Named Plaintiff seeks unpaid overtime and other compensation, liquidated damages, interest and attorneys’ fees, and all other remedies available, on behalf of herself and the 216(b) Class Members. 78. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 79. This claim is brought under Ohio Law. 81. Ohio Law requires that employees receive overtime compensation “not less than one and one-half times” (1.5) the employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) in one workweek, “in the manner and methods provided in and subject to the exemptions of section 7 and section 13 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937.” See O.R.C. § 4111.03(A); see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 82. The Named Plaintiff and Ohio Rule 23 Class worked in excess of the maximum weekly hours permitted under O.R.C. § 4111.03, but were not correctly paid their overtime rate for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek in workweeks that they received remuneration payments in addition to their normal hourly rate of pay. 83. Defendants’ company-wide corporate policy and/or practice of not properly paying their hourly, non-exempt employees the correct overtime rate for each hour worked over forty (40) hours in workweeks that employees received remuneration payments in addition to their normal hourly rate of pay resulted in unpaid overtime wages for the Named Plaintiff and Ohio Rule 23 Class. 84. Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated Ohioans were not exempt from the wage protections of Ohio Law. 85. Defendants violated the Ohio Wage Act with respect to Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class by, inter alia, failing to compensate them at time-and-one-half times their correct regular rates for hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek because Defendants did not properly calculate their employees’ overtime rate when they received remuneration payments in addition to their normal hourly rate of pay. 87. Defendants’ repeated and knowing failure to pay overtime wages to the Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated Ohioans were violations of R.C. §4111.03, and as such, Defendants jointly acted willfully. 88. For Defendants’ violations of R.C. §4111.03, by which the Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated Ohioans have suffered and continue to suffer damages; the Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated Ohioans seek unpaid overtime and other compensation, liquidated damages, interest and attorneys’ fees, and all other remedies available. 89. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 90. During relevant times, Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have been jointly employed by Defendants. 91. During relevant times, Defendants were each an entity covered by the OPPA and the Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have been jointly employed by Defendants within the meaning of the OPPA. 93. During relevant times, Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class were not paid all wages, including overtime wages at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay within thirty (30) days of performing the work. See O.R.C. § 4113.15(B). 94. The Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members’ unpaid wages remain unpaid for more than thirty (30) days beyond their regularly scheduled payday. 95. The Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have been harmed and continue to be harmed by such unpaid wages. 96. In violating the OPPA, Defendants jointly acted willfully, without a good faith basis and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable Ohio law.

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20. RCS is a nationwide staffing firm that provides services to the energy, engineering, and utility sectors. 21. In order to provide these services, it employs individuals like Weller. 22. Weller was an hourly employee of RCS. 23. Weller was hired around August of 2016. 63. RCS’s illegal “straight time for overtime” policy extends beyond Weller.

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10. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well. 11. Defendant Locums, Inc., is responsible for sending or causing the sending of the faxes. 13. Defendant Locums, Inc., either negligently or wilfully violated the rights of Plaintiff and other recipients in sending the faxes. 14. Each fax refers to a website registered to Defendant Locums, Inc. 15. Plaintiff had no prior relationship with Defendant and had not authorized the sending of fax advertisements to Plaintiff. 16. The fax does not contain an “opt out” notice in the form required by 47 U.S.C. § 227. 17. On information and belief, the fax attached hereto was sent as part of a mass broadcasting of faxes. 18. On information and belief, Defendant has transmitted similar unsolicited fax advertisements to at least 40 other persons in Michigan. 19. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff or other recipients of Defendant’s unsolicited advertising faxes to avoid receiving illegal faxes. Fax machines must be left on and ready to receive the urgent communications authorized by their owners. 20. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-19. 21. The TCPA makes unlawful the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ...” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). 23. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s statutory right of privacy was invaded. 24. Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages. 25. Defendant violated the TCPA even if its actions were only negligent. 26. Defendant should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 27. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons (b) who, on or after a date four years prior to the filing of this action (28 U.S.C. §1658), (c) were sent faxes by or on behalf of Defendant Locums, Inc., promoting its goods or services for sale (d) and which did not contain an opt out notice as described in 47 9. On July 15, 2014, Plaintiff Western Wayne Urgent Care, P.C. received the unsolicited fax advertisement attached as Exhibit A on its facsimile machine.

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14. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone calls from Defendant or Defendant’s agent/s and/or employee/s to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system and/or artificial or prerecorded voice within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 15. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of All persons within the United States who received any telephone calls from Defendant or Defendant’s agent/s and/or employee/s to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system and/or artificial or prerecorded voice within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 16. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 17. The Class is so numerous that the individual joinder of all of its members is impractical. While the exact number and identities of The Class members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that The Class includes thousands of members. Plaintiff alleges that The Class members may be ascertained by the records maintained by Defendant. 6. In or around November of 2015, Defendant placed numerous telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 5901, which Plaintiff has possessed exclusively for more than four (4) years. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C). • Injunctive relief. • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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33. Defendant owns, manages and/or operates hotels throughout the United States. 34. As a fundamental part of these operations, Defendant provides hotel rooms with sleeping beds to its customers. 35. Within the applicable limitations period, Plaintiff called the Courtyard by Marriott located in Coraopolis, Pennsylvania (“Coraopolis Courtyard”) and was told by an agent of Defendant that the Coraopolis Courtyard provides accessible rooms for its guests but that the sleeping beds in these rooms have a sleeping surface that is 27 inches from the floor. 36. The seat height for Plaintiff’s wheelchair is approximately 18 inches from the ground, and the average height of wheelchair seats generally is 18-20 inches. 37. The sleeping surfaces of the beds in Defendant’s accessible rooms are sufficiently high that they render it difficult if not impossible for Plaintiff to independently transfer from his wheelchair to the bed. 38. Plaintiff can safely, easily, and independently transfer to horizontal surfaces that are approximately the same height as his wheelchair seat, such as dining chairs, toilet seats, benches, and lower passenger vehicle seats. 39. Transferring to horizontal surfaces that are significantly higher than his wheelchair seat is difficult and dangerous for Plaintiff; he must hoist his bodyweight up to the height of the higher surface using primarily upper body strength. 41. An investigation performed on Plaintiff’s behalf confirmed that the bed heights in Defendant’s accessible rooms are, in most cases, between 25 and 31 inches from the ground and are therefore not readily accessible to Plaintiff and the proposed class. 42. The investigation performed on behalf of Plaintiff further confirmed that, in addition to the Coraopolis Courtyard, Defendant owns, manages and/or operates a substantial number of other hotels in the United States that offer purportedly accessible rooms with bed sleeping surfaces that are too high to be accessible to wheelchair or scooter users. 48. Plaintiff brings this action under Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the federal rules of civil procedure and on behalf of himself and the following class: “All individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility and who have been, or in the future will be, denied the full and equal enjoyment of accessible sleeping surfaces (beds) at hotels owned, operated and/or controlled by Defendant. 50. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 51. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class in that they all have been and/or are being denied their civil rights to full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment of, Defendant’s goods, services and facilities due to the policies and practices described above. The questions of law and fact common to the class include, but are not limited to: A. Whether Defendant owns, operates and/or controls places of public accommodation subject to Title III of the ADA, and its implementing regulations; B. Whether Defendant provides accessible sleeping surfaces in its hotel rooms; C. Whether Defendant adequately disperses guest rooms that have accessible sleeping surfaces; and D. Whether Defendant’s policies and practices discriminate against Plaintiff and the putative class members in violation of Title III of the ADA and its implementing regulations. 53. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the class as a whole. 54. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation herein. 55. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the class. 56. Plaintiff is an individual with a disability under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). 57. Defendant provides public accommodations under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). 58. Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 59. Defendant operates hotels, or “places lodging,” that are places of public accommodation under Title III of the ADA. Id. 60. Defendant has engaged in illegal disability discrimination by, without limitation, failing to ensure that the beds or sleeping surfaces in use at the hotels it manages and/or operates are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs,. 62. Defendant’s ongoing and continuing violations of Title III have caused, and in the absence to an injunction will continue to cause harm to the Plaintiff and the class. 63. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff requests relief as set forth below. For Violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq.

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32. Advertising to cellular phones uses the called party’s equipment. 33. Lower Insurance Rates transmitted autodialed and prerecorded calls to cellular phones—those of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class— to promote Direct Auto Insurance’s products and services without the called parties’ prior express written consent. A. Relationship between Lower Insurance Rates and Direct Auto Insurance. 34. Lower Insurance Rates offers insurance rate comparison tools to consumers on behalf of insurance companies and service providers. 35. Lower Insurance Rates contracts with various insurance companies and service providers, including Direct Auto Insurance, to generate business and connect to consumers to offer “competitive” insurance quotes. 36. Lower Insurance Rates is an “online marketplace, [that is] run by, and work[s] directly with insurance providers to help aggregate the right insurance offers and present them to [consumers.]. See www.lower-insurance-rates.com (last visited June 13, 2019). 37. Lower Insurance Rates acts as an intermediary between insurance companies, such as Direct Auto Insurance, to solicit business. 39. Once Lower Insurance Rates connects with a consumer through a robocall, Lower Insurance Rates uses prerecorded voice prompts and menu transfer the call to an insurance company, such as Direct Auto Insurance, to generate an insurance quote. 40. Lower Insurance Rates programs its autodialer menu to transfer a connected call directly to Direct Auto Insurance after the called party answers a series of voice prompts with their information. 41. Once a call is transferred, Direct Auto Insurance collects additional information from the called party to advertise and promote an insurance quote. B. Lower Insurance Rates called cellular phones on behalf of Direct Auto Insurance using an autodialer and prerecorded voice. 42. Lower Insurance Rates called Plaintiff’s cellular phone using an autodialer and a prerecorded voice to advertise Direct Auto Insurance’s “competitive” rates and insurance options on behalf of Direct Auto Insurance. 43. On August 24, 2018, Plaintiff received two autodialed and prerecorded calls from Lower Insurance Rates that were made on behalf of Direct Auto Insurance. 44. The first call began with “dead air.” Plaintiff answered and said “Hello?” three times before he heard a distinctive “click” and a prerecorded voice introduced himself as “Justin” from Lower Insurance Rates. 46. Once the call was transferred, Plaintiff completed an over-the-phone application with for an auto insurance quote with one of Direct Auto Insurance’s license insurance agents. 47. After Direct Auto Insurance provided Plaintiff with an insurance quote, Plaintiff received a second call that same day. 48. The second call began with a distinctive pause and a “click.” After Plaintiff said, “Hello?” a prerecorded voice came on the line: Hi there! This is a courtesy call from the insurance network customer satisfaction team. We’re calling to confirm that you received a competitive quote from one of our agents. Press “1” is you already received a quote and are satisfied with your experience. Press “2” if you didn’t receive a quote or would like to get an additional quote. 49. Both calls began with a distinctive pause and a “click” after Plaintiff answered. A pause followed by a “click” is evidence of the caller’s use of a predictive dialer, which uses an algorithm to “predict” when telemarketing agents will be available to field the call. See 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. at 14022, n. 31.2 50. The above facts demonstrate that the calls were made as part of a telemarketing campaign, and that the calls were made using an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) and a prerecorded voice. 52. “The statutory definition of ATDS is not limited to devices with the capacity to call numbers produced by a ‘random or sequential number generator,’ but also includes devices with the capacity to dial stored numbers automatically. Accordingly, we read § 227(a)(1) to provide that the term automatic telephone dialing system means equipment which has the capacity—(1) to store numbers to be called or (2) to produce numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator—and to dial such numbers.” Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041, 1052 (9th Cir. 2018). 53. Lower Insurance Rates used a device that had either: (A) the capacity to call numbers produced using a random or sequential number generator, or (B) the capacity to dial stored numbers automatically. Id. 54. Lower Insurance Rates initiated unauthorized telephone solicitations to the cellular phones of Plaintiff and other members of the Class using an ATDS and prerecorded voice to advertise the availability of a refinance with Direct Auto Insurance without their prior express written consent. 56. Defendants’ autodialed and prerecorded voice calls to cellular phones were designed to encourage and offer Direct Auto Insurance’s goods or services for sale, including “competitive” insurance quotes. 57. Plaintiff did not give Lower Insurance Rates or Direct Auto Insurance his cellular telephone number or request that either company call his cellular phone about an insurance quote. 58. Plaintiff did not expressly consent in writing to receive Defendants’ autodialed or prerecorded telemarketing calls to his cellular phone. 59. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated throughout the United States. 60. Plaintiff proposes the following class definition: All persons in the United States to whom one or more telemarking or advertising calls were initiated (1) to their cellular telephone number, (2) by or on behalf of any or all of the Defendants, (3) using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, (4) on or after June 21, 2015, and (5) without their prior express written consent. 61. Excluded from the class are Defendants, any entity in which any Defendant has a controlling interest, each of their respective officers or legal representatives, and any Judge assigned to this action, including his or her immediate family. 63. Plaintiff is a member of the proposed class. 64. The automated technology that Lower Insurance Rates used to call Plaintiff’s cellphone is capable of contacting thousands of people a day, and so the potential class members number in the hundreds or thousands, at least. Individual joinder of so many persons is impracticable. 65. Use of a prerecorded voice and voice prompt menu further increases the scale at which Lower Insurance Rates can make the calls without human intervention. 67. Plaintiff’s claims are based on the same facts and legal theories as the claims of all class members and therefore are typical of the claims of class members. Plaintiff and the other class members all received telephone calls to their cellular telephone lines through the same or similar dialing system and or the same or similar prerecorded voice. 68. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class he seeks to represent. Plaintiff is a victim of ATDS telemarketing to his cellular phone using a prerecorded voice without any emergency purpose and without his prior express written consent, and he is committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex TCPA class action litigation. Plaintiff will vigorously prosecute this action. Plaintiff and his counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interest of members of the class. 70. The likelihood that individual class members will prosecute separate actions is remote because individual litigation of the claims of all class members is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable given the expense involved and the small recoveries available through individual actions. 71. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein, and brings Count I individually and on behalf of the class. 72. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227, by making calls, except for emergency purposes, to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the class using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice. 73. As a result of Defendants’ violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227, Plaintiff and members of the class are entitled to an award of $500 in damages for each and every call made to their cellular telephone numbers using an ATDS or artificial or prerecorded voice in violation of the TCPA, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 75. Defendants’ violations were knowing or willful. CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ.

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42. By investing or keeping invested funds in Plaintiffs' retirement accounts for purposes other than their benefit after receiving their written transfer requests, TIAA-CREF exercised authority or control respecting the management or disposition of such accounts and must be deemed a fiduciary under section 3(21)(A) ofERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). 43. An ERISA fiduciary is obligated to "discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and ... for the exclusive purpose of ... providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries" under section 404(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). 44. By investing or keeping invested retirement funds belonging to Plaintiffs and others similarly situated for purposes other than their benefit after receiving their written transfer requests, TIAA-CREF was not acting solely in the interest of Plaintiffs or for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to Plaintiffs or their retirement plan, as ERISA requires. 45. TIAA-CREF is liable to the ERISA Plans in which Plaintiffs and other members of Subclass A and Subclass B were participants or beneficiaries for the value of the use of the plan assets in their retirement accounts, and for the disgorgement of any investment profits made through the use of such funds, under sections 409, 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) ofERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109(a); 1132(a)(2); 1132(a)(3). 46. TIAA-CREF is also liable for the reasonable costs and attorney's fees of this action under Section 502(g)(l) ofERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(l), as well as prejudgment interest. gra~~e~ IATTORNEYSATLAW 76 St. Paul Street Post Office Box 369 Burlington, Vermont 05402-0369 47. By investing or keeping invested funds in Plaintiffs' retirement accounts for purposes other than their benefit after receiving their written transfer requests, TIAA-CREF exercised authority or control respecting the management or disposition of such accounts and must be deemed a fiduciary under section 3(21)(A) ofERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). 48. Under section 404(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a), a fiduciary is required to act impartially with respect to plan participants and their beneficiaries. 49. By compensating certain customers for their lost investment experience but not others whose funds remained invested after TIAA-CREF received their written transfer requests, TIAA-CREF violated its fiduciary duty of impartial treatment under section 404 ofERISA. 50. TIAA-CREF is liable to the ERISA plans in which Plaintiffs and other members of Subclass B were participants or beneficiaries for the difference between the compensation which it paid (if any) and the lost investment experience such participants and beneficiaries actually suffered. 51. TIAA-CREF is also liable for the reasonable costs and attorney's fees of this action under Section 502(g)(l) ofERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(l), as well as prejudgment interest. gra"s~e~ I ATTORNEYS AT LAW - 13- 76 St. Paul Street Post Office Box 369 Burlington, Vermont 05402-0369 52. TIAA-CREF, and each of the Defendant entities of which it is comprised, are "parties in interest" under section 3(14)(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(A). 53. Section 406(a)(l)(D) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(l)(D), prohibits the "use by or for the benefit of a party in interest of any assets of the plan." Such use is barred categorically and is a per se violation of ERISA. 54. All amounts in the retirement account of Plaintiffs and other members of Subclass A were "assets ofthe plan" within the meaning of section 401(a)(1)(D). TIAA-CREF's investment of such assets following the receipt of their written transfer or withdrawal requests for any purpose other than the benefit of the account holder violates section 406 of ERISA, 29 57. TIAA-CREF owed a fiduciary and contractual duty to act in the best interest of Plaintiffs and other Class Members in handling their retirement accounts, including a duty not to use funds in such accounts for any purpose other than their benefit. 58. Although there was no practical impediment to transferring or distributing account funds promptly, TIAA-CREF routinely retained them for up to four weeks or more after receiving their written transfer or withdrawal requests. During such period, TIAA-CREF invested the account funds or kept them invested. 59. In violation of its fiduciary and contractual duties, TIAA-CREF did not pay Plaintiffs and other Class Members investment gains generated by their accounts after receipt of their written transfer or withdrawal requests. 60. TIAA-CREF owed a fiduciary duty to treat Plaintiffs and other Class Members impartially. 61. By compensating certain customers for their lost investment experience but not others whose funds remained invested after the receipt of their written transfer or withdrawal requests, TIAA-CREF violated its fiduciary duty of impartial treatment. 62. By compensating certain customers whose redemption or transfer payments were delayed seven days or less but not others, TIAA-CREF violated its fiduciary duty of impartial treatment. 63. TIAA-CREF is liable to Plaintiffs and other Class Members at common law for the value of the use of their funds or the actual amount of investment earnings generated during the unauthorized investment period, whichever is greater. gra~~e~ I ATTORNEYS AHAW - 15- 76 St. Paul Street Post Office Box 369 Burlington, Vermont 05402-0369 64. TIAA-CREF engaged in an unfair practice in commerce by investing or keeping invested the retirement account funds of Plaintiffs and other Class Members for purposes other than the customer's benefit, after receipt of their written transfer or withdrawal requests. Such practices are prohibited by the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act, 9 Vt. Stat. Ann. §§ 2451 et. seq., and by similar "mini-FTC" statutes in other states. 65. Under 9 Vt. Stat. Ann.§§ 2451 et. seq. and similar "mini-FTC" statutes, Plaintiffs and other Class Members are entitled to compensatory damages based on the unauthorized investment of their retirement account funds for purposes other than their benefit, as well as exemplary damages not to exceed three times the amount of consideration. In addition, Plaintiffs and other Class Members are entitled to the reasonable attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this action. On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs request the following relief: (a) Compensatory damages and appropriate equitable relief, including disgorgement, for TIAA-CREF' s breach of its fiduciary duties under sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) of ERISA and common law; (b) Equitable relief, including disgorgement of investment profits, under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, for engaging in prohibited transactions involving plan assets under section 406(a) of ERISA; gra~~e~ I ATTORNEYS AT LAW - 16- 76 St. Paul Street Post Office Box 369 Burlington, Vermont 05402-0369 Common Law Violations Consumer Fraud ERISA Breach of Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty (Claim by Subclass A) ERISA Prohibited Transactions (Claim by Subclass A) ERISA Breach of Fiduciary Duty of Impartiality (Claim By Subclasses A and B)

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32. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired Imperva publicly traded securities during the Class Period (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are defendants and their families, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which defendants have or had a controlling interest. 33. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The stock is actively traded on the NYSE and there are over 26 million shares of Imperva stock outstanding. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, plaintiff believes that there are hundreds of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by Imperva or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. 34. Common questions of law and fact predominate and include: (i) whether defendants violated the 1934 Act; (ii) whether defendants omitted and/or misrepresented material facts; (iii) whether defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that their statements were false; and 38. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations in ¶¶1-37 above by reference. 39. During the Class Period, defendants disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or recklessly disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 40. Defendants violated §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 in that they: (a) Employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; (b) Made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or 43. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations in ¶¶1-43 above by reference. 44. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Imperva within the meaning of §20(a) of the 1934 Act. By virtue of their positions with the Company, and ownership of Imperva stock, the Individual Defendants had the power and authority to cause Imperva to engage in the wrongful conduct complained of herein. Imperva controlled the Individual Defendants and all of its employees. By reason of such conduct, defendants are liable pursuant to §20(a) of the 1934 Act. For Violation of §20(a) of the 1934 Act Against All Defendants For Violation of §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants

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16. Defendants provide oil and gas well monitoring services to energy companies nationwide. 17. Defendants employ their workforce to monitor and maintain oil and gas wells in multiple states including Texas, Oklahoma, Colorado, Pennsylvania and North Dakota. 19. Plaintiff and Class Members are employed by Defendants as flow testers. As such, their primary duties consist of monitoring oil and gas wells. 20. Plaintiff and Class Members worked on a regular basis for Defendants at various oil and gas well locations, monitoring such oil and gas wells. 21. Plaintiff Christopher Coker worked for Defendants’ benefit monitoring oil and gas wells at multiple locations throughout Texas. 22. While working for Defendants at these various locations, Plaintiff interacted with and became familiar with the way Defendants treat its other employees with respect to overtime pay and that it misclassifies such workers as independent contractors. Therefore, Plaintiff has first-hand personal knowledge of the same pay violations throughout Defendants’ operation at multiple geographical locations. 23. Defendants paid Plaintiff and Class Members on an hourly basis. 24. Defendants hired/fired, issued pay, supervised, directed, disciplined, scheduled and performed all other duties generally associated with that of an employer with regard to Plaintiff and Class Members. 25. In addition, Defendants instructed Plaintiff and Class Members about when, where, and how they were to perform their work. 27. Furthermore, the degree of investment Plaintiff and Class Members made to perform their work pales in comparison to the expenses Defendants incurred. Plaintiff and Class Members were required to supply simple hand tools, such as wrenches or a hammer. On the other hand, Defendants provided equipment worth hundreds of thousands of dollars including sand separators, water pumps, earth moving equipment, flowback tanks, manifolds, valves, gauges, pipe, test separators, generators, line stacks and flare stacks. 28. A substantial portion of Defendants’ annual revenue is derived from work performed by Plaintiff and Class Members. 29. Despite these facts, Defendants improperly classified Plaintiff and Class Members as independent contractors and not employees. 30. However, at all times, the flow testers and other similarly situated workers were employees of Defendant, as that term is defined under the FLSA and interpretative case law. 31. Defendants tracked the time and days the flow testers worked just as is common for typical employer-employee relationships. 32. Although Plaintiff and Class Members have been required to work more than forty (40) hours per work-week, and did so frequently, they were not compensated at the FLSA mandated time-and-a-half rate for hours in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 34. That is, Defendants paid Plaintiff and Class Members straight time for overtime. 35. No FLSA exemption applies to hourly-paid employees such as Plaintiff and Class Members. 36. Defendants’ method of paying Plaintiff and Class Members in violation of the FLSA was willful and was not based on a good faith and reasonable belief that its conduct complied with the FLSA. Indeed, Defendants’ conduct is all the more egregious because it intentionally set up a paper profile that belied the true interaction and conduct of the company and its workforce. For example, Defendants insisted that its workers submit so-called “invoices,” not time sheets. Defendants even created the “invoice form” its workers were required to use, which was nothing more than a time sheet. Defendants required its workers complete other paper work which Defendants intended to, on the surface, give the impression that their workforce was composed of dozens of independent contractors. In reality, Defendants operated as an oil and gas monitoring company and sold its services through a workforce of dozens of employees. 37. That is, Defendants’ misclassification was not by accident, but a well thought out scheme to reduce its labor costs. Accordingly, Defendants’ violations of the FLSA are willful. 41. Plaintiff has actual knowledge that Class Members have also been denied overtime pay for hours worked over forty (40) hours per workweek as a result of Defendants’ misclassification of its employees. 42. Plaintiff’s knowledge is based on his personal work experience and through communications with other workers of Defendants while performing work throughout Texas. 43. Other hourly paid workers similarly situated to the Plaintiff work for Defendants throughout the United States, but are not paid overtime at the rate of one and one-half their regular rate when those hours exceeded forty (40) hours per workweek. 44. Although Defendants permitted and/or required Class Members to work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, Defendants has denied them full compensation for their hours worked over forty (40). 45. Defendants have classified and continue to classify Class Members as independent contractors. 46. Class Members perform or have performed the same or similar work as Plaintiff and were misclassified as independent contractors by Defendants. 47. Class Members are not exempt from receiving overtime pay under the FLSA. 48. As such, Class Members are similar to Plaintiff in terms of relevant job duties, pay structure, their misclassification as independent contractors and/or the denial of overtime pay. 50. The experiences of Plaintiff, with respect to his pay, hours, and duties are typical of the experiences of Class Members. 51. The specific job titles or precise job responsibilities of each Class Member does not prevent collective treatment. 52. All Class Members, irrespective of their particular job requirements, are entitled to overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) during a workweek. 53. Although the exact amount of damages may vary among Class Members, the damages for Class Members can be easily calculated by a simple formula. The claims of all Class Members arise from a common nucleus of facts. Liability is based on a systematic course of wrongful conduct by Defendants that caused financial harm to all Class Members. 54. As such, the class of similarly situated Plaintiffs is properly defined as follows: All current and former hourly-paid workers classified as independent contractors who performed work for Defendants associated with monitoring and maintaining oil and gas wells throughout the United States during the three-year period before the filing of this Complaint up to the date the Court authorizes notice.

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60. This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 61. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records F.H. Cann & Associates, Inc. and those business and governmental entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts. 62. Excluded from the Plaintiff’s class is the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of F.H. Cann & Associates, Inc. and all of their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 63. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff’s Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 64. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 65. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff’s Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor their attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 66. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: . (a) Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis allege, that the Plaintiff’s Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. . (b) Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff’s Class and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. . (c) Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff’s Class defined in this complaint have claims arising out of the Defendant's common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. . (d) Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor their counsel have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. (e) Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(l)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate because adjudications with respect to individual members create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant who, on information and belief, collects debts throughout the United States of America. 67. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that a determination that the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and is tantamount to declaratory relief and any monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination. 
 68. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff’s Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 69. Further, Defendant has acted, or failed to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Rule 
 (b)(l)(A) and (b)(2) Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect 
 to the Class as a whole. 70. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the 
 time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 
 Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant. 71. Plaintiff Bautista repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered one (1) through seventy (70) herein with the same force and effect is if the same were set forth at length herein. 72. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff Bautista and the members of a class. 73. The class involves all individuals whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff Bautista on or about March 23rd, 2017; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (c) the Plaintiff Bautista asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) of the FDCPA for the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt and for misrepresenting the amount of the debt owed by the Plaintiff. 
 Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 74. The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 75. Because the Defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Plaintiff and the members of the class are entitled to damages in accordance with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 
 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, respectfully requests preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and that this Court enter judgment in Plaintiff’s favor and against the Defendant and award damages as follows: . (a) Statutory damages provided under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k); . (b) Attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs incurred in bringing this action; and . (c) Any other relief that this Court deems appropriate and just under the circumstances. Date: Brooklyn, New York April 21, 2017 /s/ Daniel Cohen Daniel Cohen, Esq. (DC7967) Attorney for the Plaintiff Daniel Cohen, PLLC 300 Cadman Plaza W, 12th floor Brooklyn, New York 11201 E-mail: dan@dccohen.com Office: (646) 645-8482 Fax: (347) 665-1545 Plaintiff requests trial by jury on all issues so triable. /s/ Daniel Cohen Daniel Cohen, Esq

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10. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. 11. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone numbers (310) 219-3150 and (619) 543-8187. 12. Plaintiff requested Defendant to put him on their internal do-not-call list. 13. Despite this, Defendant continued to call Plaintiff in an attempt to solicit its services and in violation of the Do-Not-Call provisions of the TCPA thus repeatedly violating Plaintiff’s privacy. 45. Pursuant to the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, Plaintiff is entitled to, and demands, a trial by jury. Respectfully Submitted this 18th day of May, 2018. 8. Beginning in or around March 2018, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers ending in -9191 and -1977, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s products. 9. Defendant continued to numerously call Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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10. Defendant contacted Plaintiff between on or around December of 2016 in an effort to solicit its business. 11. Defendant’s messages constituted “telephone solicitation” as defined by the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) and “unsolicited advertisement” as defined by the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5). 12. Defendant used an “telephone facsimile machine” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3) to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to sell or solicit its business services. 13. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 14. Defendant’s calls were placed to telephone facsimile numbers assigned to a telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming messages. 15. Plaintiff is not a customer of Defendant’s services and has never provided any personal information, including his telephone facsimile number(s), to Defendant for any purpose whatsoever. Accordingly, Defendant never received Plaintiff’s “prior express consent” to receive calls using a telephone facsimile machine pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)C). 18. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone facsimile messages from Defendant to said person’s telephone facsimile number made through the use of any telephone facsimile machine and such person had not previously consented to receiving such messages and such messages did not contain any opt-out notice within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 19. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of All persons within the United States who received any telephone facsimile messages from Defendant to said person’s telephone facsimile number made through the use of any telephone facsimile machine and such person had not previously not provided their telephone facsimile number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, nor did the telephone facsimile message contain an opt-out notice. 20. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 8. Beginning in or around December of 2016, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on its telephone facsimile number ending in -8083 in an effort to sell or solicit its services. 9. Defendant contacted Plaintiff via facsimile from telephone numbers confirmed to belong to Defendant, including without limitation (801) 437-2019. Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing and Write a Brief Statement of Cause (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): LENGTH OF TRIAL via ______ days estimated (for both sides to try entire case) Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C); and • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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23. Defendant is a women’s fashion boutique and clothing retailer. Defendant is an online retailer of women's clothing, footwear, jewelry, and other accessories, carrying popular brands such as Adidas, Champion, and I.AM.GIA, as well as Defendant’s own private labels.. Defendant owns, operates, manages, and controls the website www.shopakira.com (its “Website”), which allows Defendant to function as a global fashion retailer. With few to no brick and mortar stores currently operating today, Defendant’s Website is the exclusive point of sale for Defendant’s products. 24. Defendants Website is a commercial marketplace. The Website offers features of a physical marketplace in that it allows all consumers to browse goods and services, notifies consumers of special sale or clearance items, provides details about the products, and completes purchases of Defendant’s products, which Defendant will thereafter ensure the delivery of throughout the United States, including in New York State. 25. Defendant’s Website is integrated with its retail business operations, serving as its gateway. The Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to learn about Defendant’s products and services, browse for items, information, access navigation bar descriptions, prices, savings and/or coupons and sale discount items, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for -9- sale. The features offered by www.shopakira.com include learning about the products and/or items, about the company, read reviews, and make purchases. 26. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its retail operations. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s retail operations and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 27. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace without any physical location. Thus, Defendant’s Website is the main point of sale for its business operation. 28. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 29. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, www.shopakira.com, the last occurring in July of 2020, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers which effectively denied her the full enjoyment of the goods and services of the Website. Plaintiff visited Defendant’s Website with an intent to browse and attempt to purchase a pair of sheer leggings. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a range of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to make her desired purchase. -10- 30. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. 31. Many features on the Website also fail to add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. This was an issue on Defendant’s Website particularly in the size selection section. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 32. Plaintiff has made multiple attempts to complete a purchase on www.shopakira.com, most recently in July of 2020, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused www.shopakira.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 33. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed -11- to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 34. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 35. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 36. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 37. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, -12- c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 38. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 39. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 40. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring: a. that Defendant retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant”) who shall assist it in improving the accessibility of its Website so the goods and services on them may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities; b. that Defendant work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to ensure that all employees involved in website development and content development be given web accessibility training on a periodic basis, including onsite training to create accessible content at the design and development stages; -13- c. that Defendant work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform an automated accessibility audit on a periodic basis to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; d. that Defendant work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform end-user accessibility/usability testing on a periodic basis with said testing to be performed by individuals with various disabilities to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; e. that Defendant work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to create an accessibility policy that will be posted on its Website, along with an e- mail address and tollfree phone number to report accessibility-related problems; and f. that Plaintiff, their counsel and its experts monitor Defendant’s Website for up to two years after the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant validates it is free of accessibility errors/violations to ensure it has adopted and implemented adequate accessibility policies. 41. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 42. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial amounts of money in developing and maintaining its Website and, through the site, has generated -14- significant revenue. The invested amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually-impaired consumers. 43. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment -15- of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 47. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly, to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 48. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 49. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 50. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 52. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 53. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 55. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 56. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or -17- accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 57. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 58. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 59. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, -18- withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 61. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 62. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 63. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 64. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 65. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive -19- and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. -20- 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 74. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. -16-

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14. Defendant is an online retailer of CBD products. Products available for purchase on its Website include apparel, salves, honey, and tincutres (concentrated herbal extracts) for men, women, and pets. 15. Defendant’s Website is heavily integrated with its retail operation, serving as its gateway. Through the Website, Defendant’s customers are, inter alia, able to: learn information about Defendant’s company; learn information about CBD, including its uses and benefits and how it works in the body; learn about the products available for purchase on the Website; view lab reports; read reviews and purchase items for delivery. 16. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace. Without any brick and mortar locations, its Website is the main point of sale for its business. 17. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff Olsen and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its retail operations. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff Olsen and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s retail operations and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 18. Plaintiff Olsen cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to -7- access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using screen- reading software. 19. During his visits to the Website, the last occurring on or about December 12, 2019, Plaintiff Olsen encountered multiple access barriers that denied him the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s retail operations. Because of these barriers he was unable to, substantially equal to sighted individuals: a. Know what is on the Website. Plaintiff Olsen had difficulty learning about Defendant’s products. The lab reports available on the Website are completely inaccessible as they are presented as images without any alt-text, labeled only with file names. There are no tagged images of the items on the shopping pages. Plaintiff Olsen also had difficulty learning about CBD in general on the Website. The sublinks under “Learn” are not detected by the screen reader. Therefore, there is no way to access the “4CC Newsletter”. On the “Learn” page, there is a heading “more info about CBD” with several links below that heading. However, clicking on the links does not load any new information that is detected by the screen reader. A sighted user is given a pop-up window with new information. b. Navigate the Website. This site is difficult to navigate using a screen reader. After clicking on the category links to shop, he is taken to a new page, but focus is dropped in the “featured products” section. This is confusing to a screen reader user because after selecting “Apparel,” Plaintiff Olsen was taken to a page where the first product was a tincture. This led him to believe that the link did not work properly and he required assistance from a sighted user to find apparel. When he tried to purchase an -8- item that was out of stock, there was no alert that the item was out of stock. He clicked add to cart and was taken to a button labeled “OK.” He clicked on the button and then went to his cart to checkout only to find the item was not there. He needed sighted assistance to learn that the item was not in stock. 20. Plaintiff Olsen was denied full and equal access to the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website because he encountered multiple accessibility barriers that visually-impaired people often encounter with non-compliant websites: a. Lack of alt-text for images. b. Tables are not properly labeled with row and column headers. c. Some pages have the same title, so the title cannot be used to distinguish pages. d. Form controls have no label and no programmatically determined name. e. Forms have fields without label elements or title attributes. f. Headings are not nested correctly and some headings are empty. g. Several links on a page share the same link text but go to a different destination. h. Webpages have markup errors. Defendant Must Remove Barriers to Its Website 21. Due to the inaccessibility of its Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff Olsen, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. -9- The Website’s access barriers that Plaintiff Olsen encountered have caused a denial of his full and equal access in the past, and now deter him on a regular basis from accessing the Website. These access barriers have likewise deterred him from taking advantage of Defendant’s online retail marketplace and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals. 22. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Olsen could independently navigate it, view goods and service items, learn about the benefits of CBD; learn about Defendant’s products, and read the newsletter, as sighted individuals can. 23. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Olsen has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 24. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Levels A and AA Guidelines would provide Plaintiff Olsen and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff Olsen alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Olsen; b. Failing to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Olsen; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff Olsen, as a member of a protected class. -10- 25. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 26. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Olsen seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 27. Because its Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff Olsen seeks a permanent injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff Olsen to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 Levels A and AA guidelines for its Website: a. Remediating the Website to be WCAG 2.0 A and AA compliant; b. Training Defendant employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 A and AA guidelines; c. Regularly checking the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.0 A and AA guidelines; d. Regularly testing user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 A and AA guidelines; and, e. Developing an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. -11- 28. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 29. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Olsen and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 30. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 31. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 32. Plaintiff Olsen seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of Defendant’s retail services and the products offered for sale online during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 33. Plaintiff Olsen seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal -12- enjoyment of Defendant’s retail services and the products offered for sale online during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 34. Plaintiff Olsen seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the New York City who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of Defendant’s retail services and the products offered for sale online during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 35. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: a. Whether Defendant’s online retail services constitute a “public accommodation”; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “commercial marketplace” under Title III of the ADA; c. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” or a service or good “of a place of public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA; d. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” or an “accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; e. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating Title III of the ADA; and -13- f. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 36. Plaintiff Olsen’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 37. Plaintiff Olsen will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because he has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because he has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. 38. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class and Subclass Members predominate over questions affecting only individuals, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 39. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. -14- 40. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 41. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 42. Defendant’s online retail marketplace is a public accommodation under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s online retail services. The Website is a service that is integrated with its retail operations. 43. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 44. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 45. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to -15- individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 46. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Olsen, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight under 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. 47. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Olsen requests the relief as set forth below. 48. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability -16- of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 50. The Website is a public accommodation under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 51. Defendant is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its online retail marketplace and the Website. Defendant is a “person” under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 52. Defendant is violating the NYSHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its online retail operations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(2)(a), 296(2)(c)(i), 296(2)(c)(ii). 53. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 54. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class because of a disability, violating the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2), in that Defendant has: -17- a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to Class Members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 55. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Olsen and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its online retail operations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 56. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Olsen seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 57. Plaintiff Olsen is entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense. 58. Plaintiff Olsen is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 59. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. -18- 60. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 61. The NYCHRL provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(a) 62. The Website is a public accommodation under NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 63. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 64. Defendant is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its online retail services to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(4)(a), 8-107(15)(a). 65. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Subclass because of a disability, violating the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a,) in that it has: -19- a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 66. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Olsen and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its online retail operations under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Olsen seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff Olsen is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines for each offense. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 69. Plaintiff Olsen is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. -20- 71. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Olsen contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its online retail services, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 73. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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12. Plaintiff Houck attended Georgetown University Law Center, where she was an Editor on the Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy.7 After graduation in 2011, Plaintiff Houck passed the bar exam and was sworn into the California Bar later that same year. 13. Plaintiff Houck joined Steptoe & Johnson on May 1, 2013, after having worked as a litigation associate for the previous two years.8 14. Plaintiff Houck was initially given the title of “contract attorney,” with an annual salary of $85,000. She was told by the Century City Managing Partner that the firm would consider changing her title to “associate” after her first year at the firm. 15. Curiously, Steptoe explained that while Plaintiff Houck would be identified as an “attorney” on all external correspondence and on the Firm’s website, internally and on the Firm’s intranet, she would be identified as an “associate.” 16. Apart from unequal pay, Plaintiff Houck otherwise received the same benefits provided to all associates. 73. Plaintiff alleges violations of the federal Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) on behalf of: any woman employed by Steptoe & Johnson LLP at any time during the applicable liability period as a contract attorney and/or associate (the “Nationwide EPA Class”). 74. Members of the Nationwide EPA Class were not compensated equally to males who performed equal work based on Steptoe’s common and centralized employment policies, procedures and practices and/or were denied assignment, placement, promotion and/or advancement opportunities that would have resulted in greater compensation in favor of less-qualified males based on Steptoe’s common and centralized employment policies, procedures and practices. Federal Equal Pay Act Claims are Brought on Behalf of a Nationwide Class Plaintiff Houck’s Experience at Steptoe

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10. Unfortunately, many of the people whose cell phones were called as a result of Defendant’s autodialing and artificial or prerecorded voice message practices never actually consented to receive such calls. 11. On information and belief, many of these individuals were called more than once, and Defendant lacks a sufficiently adequate system for limiting the number of autodialed or prerecorded calls to cell phones for which it does not have prior express permission to call. These are unsolicited “cold calls” made for the purpose of generating leads for sales of Defendant’s products and/or services. Facts Relating to Plaintiff Benzion 12. Starting in or about March 2012, Plaintiff Benzion began to receive calls to his cell phone—sometimes multiple times a day—consisting of an automated, prerecorded message advertising a “free” wireless security system in exchange for putting the company’s sign in his yard. 13. These calls came from numbers including but not limited to (503) 563-0357, (503) 902-8127, and (503) 902-8279. 14. After answering one of these calls from (503) 902-8279 on or about April 9, 2012, Plaintiff Benzion went through the call’s automated process to speak with a live representative, who informed Plaintiff that he was promoting Vivint. 15. Many, if not all, of these calls from or on behalf of Defendant were made using an automatic telephone dialing system, equipment having the capacity to dial Plaintiff’s number without human intervention. 17. Plaintiff has never given Defendant permission to contact his cell phone, whether through the use of an autodialer, prerecorded or artificial voice message, or otherwise. Plaintiff’s number is registered with the National Do-Not-Call List. 18. In fact, on at least one occasion in or around April 2012, in which Defendant caused Plaintiff’s cell phone to be called using a prerecorded voice message, when the message prompted Plaintiff to press a certain number to be removed from the call list, Plaintiff pressed that number. This had no effect in stopping Defendant’s calls to Plaintiff’s cell phone; Defendant continued to call Plaintiff’s cell phone via an autodialer and/or using prerecorded voice messages. Plaintiff even continued to receive calls from or on behalf of Defendant after directly requesting that further calls cease during his conversation with Defendant’s representative on or about April 9, 2012. 19. Plaintiff was damaged by Defendant’s calls. His privacy was wrongfully invaded, and Plaintiff has become understandably aggravated with having to deal with the frustration of repeated, unwanted phone calls forcing him to divert attention away from his work and other activities, especially given Defendant’s complete disregard of his repeated requests to cease. Facts Relating to Plaintiff Glaser 20. Plaintiff Glaser owns and pays for two prepaid cellular telephones, one of which is used primarily by his wife. 22. The call consisted of a prerecorded voice message offering a “free” wireless security system in exchange for Plaintiff putting its sign in his yard. 23. On information and belief, this call was made by or on behalf of Defendant, and the sign referenced in the message was to be a sign for Vivint. 24. Additionally, on or about April 23, 2012, Plaintiff’s wife received a call on her cell phone from (253) 246-8515. 25. On information and belief, this was a similar prerecorded voice message call made by or on behalf of Defendant. 26. On information and belief, these and the other prerecorded voice calls from Defendant were made using an autodialer—equipment with the capacity to dial phone numbers without human intervention. 27. Neither Plaintiff nor his wife has ever given Vivint express permission to contact their cell phones, let alone via an autodialer or with an artificial or prerecorded voice message. 28. Both cell phone numbers attributable to Plaintiff are listed on the National and Florida Do-Not-Call Lists. 29. On information and belief, Plaintiff’s phones have received other home security sales calls from Vivint, as well. 30. Plaintiff was damaged by Defendant’s conduct; not only was Plaintiff Glaser’s privacy wrongfully invaded, but the calls cost him money through his prepaid phone plan. 32. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 33. “Automatic telephone dialing system” refers to any equipment that has the “capacity to dial numbers without human intervention.” See, e.g., Hicks v. Client Servs., Inc., No. 07-61822, 2009 WL 2365637, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2009) (citing FCC, In re: Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Request of ACA International for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, 07–232, ¶ 12, n. 23 (2007)). 34. Defendant used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class defined below. Many of these calls, including calls to Plaintiffs, utilized prerecorded messages. 35. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 36. As such, Defendant’s calls were willful or, at a minimum, negligent. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(f)(1). 38. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to Section 227(b)(3)(B) of the TCPA, Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. 39. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative Class had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed and prerecorded voice calls to their cellular telephones—and/or willfully used an automatic telephone dialing system and/or prerecorded voice message to call the cell phones of Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class without prior express permission—the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to Section 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. Class Allegations 40. Plaintiffs bring this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: All persons in the United States who, within four years prior to the filing of this action, Defendant or some person on Defendant’s behalf called on their cell phone using an artificial or prerecorded voice message or device with the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, where Defendant’s records fail to indicate prior express permission from the recipient to make such call. 41. Upon information and belief, Defendant called more than 100 phone numbers in the four years prior to the filing of this action utilizing a device with the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention or a message that had been recorded ahead of time, where Defendant did not have prior express permission for such call. 43. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the putative Class. The factual and legal bases of Defendant’s liability to Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative Class are the same: Defendant violated the TCPA by causing the cellular telephone number of each member of the putative Class, including Plaintiffs, to be called using an automatic telephone dialing system and/or artificial or prerecorded voice message without prior express permission. 44. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs have no interests that might conflict with the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs are interested in pursuing their claims vigorously, and they have retained counsel competent and experienced in class and complex litigation, including with regards to the claims alleged herein. 46. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 47. Defendant has acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class, thereby making relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the putative Class, should they even realize that their rights have been violated, would likely create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct. 7. Defendant is a home automation company that provides and markets home security products and services, among other things. 8. Within the four years prior to the filing of this action, Defendant—whether directly, through affiliate marketers, or otherwise—used equipment to dial the cellular telephone numbers of potential customers, including Plaintiffs. On information and belief, the dialing equipment used had the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention. Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)

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10. In or about May of 2013, Plaintiff went to Wal-Mart and purchased a Bell+Howell-trademarked electronic/ultrasonic pest control device manufactured and marketed by Defendant in order to expel these pests from her house. 11. Defendant BHH licenses the Bell+Howell trademark to Van Hauser and EMSON for the purpose of designing, manufacturing, distributing, marketing, and selling the ultrasonic pest control device purchased by Plaintiff. 12. The ultrasonic pest control device’s packaging labels the device as an “electronic pest repeller” and includes the Bell+Howell trademark, as well as Bell+Howell’s corporate logo. The packaging further states the product is “distributed under licensing” by Van Hauser, LLC, New York, NY 10001. 13. The customer service and product representative contact information listed on the Bell+Howell website at www.bellhowell.com directs consumers to phone numbers and an email address belonging to EMSON.1 14. The EMSON website http://www.emsoninc.com/ lists 36 different Bell+Howell products it manages and markets via direct consumer product television and internet advertising 1 See http://www.bellhowell.com/ (last viewed March 23, 2015); 4 campaigns and in-store distribution. One of the products is a Bell+Howell trademarked “electromagnetic ultrasonic pest repeller”.2 15. The EMSON website states that the company is “Accustomed to strict quality assurance” and a “Manufacturer, not just a wholesaler or rep organization. So Emson has control over quality.” 16. The device’s packaging states that it contains “Ultrasonic Pest Repellers” that uses “Ultrasonic sound waves help to eliminate mice, rats, roaches, spiders and ants”. The packaging goes on to say “Plug It In ... Drive Pests Out!” An example of the packaging is included here immediately below: 2 See http://www.emsoninc.com/bell-howell (last viewed March 23, 2015); 5 17. At Defendants’ website http://bellhowellpestrepeller.com/, Defendants further state: “Get rid of mice, ants, spiders and other pests without messy traps or poisons. Ultrasonic power using wiring within the walls to emit a signal that drives away insects and rodents. Plug in unit protects one floor level.”3 “Uses constantly changing ultrasonic signals which most rodents have a difficult time adapting to”. 18. Plaintiff purchased the device based on Defendants’ representations. 19. Indeed, the only reason Plaintiff, or any other class member, purchases this product is to repel pests. 20. Plaintiff used the device as instructed, expecting that it would perform as advertised and repel pests. 21. However, the device did not repel pests in and/or around Plaintiff’s home. 22. The scientific literature indicates that these products have no effect on pests.4 23. Defendants had reason to know that their claims and representations about the essential purpose of the product were false and contrary to scientific evidence.5 24. Upon information and belief, despite its representations, Defendants do not possess competent and reliable scientific evidence to support its advertising claims and its sale of these products. 25. Even though Defendants have known that these devices do not work, they have continued to advertise these devices as effectively controlling pests. 3See http://bellhowellpestrepeller.com/ (last viewed March 23, 2015); 4See http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=vpc14 (last viewed March 23, 2015); http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1049&context=vpc14 (last viewed March 23, 2015); http://extension.usu.edu/files/publications/publication/NR_WD_010.pdf (last viewed March 23, 2015); http://www.birddeter.com.au/pdfs/sonicdeterrents.pdf (last viewed March 23, 2015). 5See http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2001/05/ftc-warns-manufacturers-and-retailers-ultrasonic-pest- control (last viewed March 23, 2015); See also footnote 3, supra. 6 26. Plaintiff and the putative class members relied on these representations, forming the entirety of the advertising, marketing and labeling of these products, that the product would repel pests, but these representations were false, and Plaintiff and the class members have been harmed. 27. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein all previous paragraphs of this Complaint. 28. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and for all other persons similarly situated (herein collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs” or “putative class members”) who: Purchased one or more electronic pest control devices manufactured and/or marketed by Defendants during the putative class period, including, but not limited to, the Bell+Howell-branded Electronic/Ultrasonic Pest Repellers. 29. This class numbers over forty (40) persons and is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, and it is further impracticable to bring all such persons before this Court. 30. The injuries and damages to these class members present questions of law and fact that are common to each class member, and that are common to the entire class as a whole, including: a. Whether Defendants’ representations were based on competent and reliable evidence; b. Whether Defendants’ representations were fraudulent; c. Whether Defendants breached their contract with Plaintiff when they failed to provide a device that repelled pests; d. Whether Defendants fraudulently represented to Plaintiff that their product would repel pests; 7 e. Whether Defendants fraudulently represented to Plaintiff that their product was proven to repel pests; f. Whether Defendants was unjustly enriched in their transactions with Plaintiff. 31. Defendants have engaged in the same conduct regarding all of the other members of the class asserted in this suit. 32. The claims, defenses, and injuries of the representative Plaintiff are typical of the claims, defenses, and injuries of the entire class, and the claims, defenses, and injuries of each class member are typical of those of the entire class. 33. Representative Plaintiff will fully and adequately protect and represent the entire class, and all of its putative class members. 34. The identity of all members of this class cannot be determined at this time, but will be so determined at a later time upon obtaining discovery from Defendants and others. 35. The prosecution of separate actions by each member of this class would create a substantial risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with regard to individual members of the class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. 36. The prosecution of separate actions would also create a substantial risk of adjudication with respect to individual members of the class which, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interest of other members not parties to the adjudication, thereby substantially impairing and impeding their ability to protect these interests. Further, the maintenance of this suit as a class action is the superior means of disposing of the common questions which predominate herein. 37. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein all previous paragraphs of this Complaint. 38. This count is brought pursuant to Ohio’s Consumer Sales Practices Act, Ohio Revised Code § 1345, et seq. (“CSPA”). At all relevant times hereto, including at all times during the transactions between Plaintiff and Defendant, and the consumer transactions between the putative class members and Defendant, Plaintiff and each of the putative class members were “consumers” as defined in the CSPA, and the transactions were “consumer transactions” as defined in the CSPA. 39. At all relevant times hereto, Defendant was a “supplier” as defined in the CSPA. 40. The CSPA states that “No supplier shall commit an unfair or deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction. Such an unfair or deceptive act or practice by a supplier violates this section whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction.” R.C. § 1345.02. 41. The CSPA goes on to state it is a deceptive act or practice for a supplier to represent that “… the subject of a consumer transaction has sponsorship, approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits that it does not have.” R.C. § 1345.02(B)(1). 42. By advertising that its pest repellant products could repel pests when they could not and where there was no objective basis for these representations, Defendant has violated R.C. 56. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein all previous paragraphs of this Complaint. 57. Defendants represented to Plaintiff and all putative class members that their electronic pest control products would repel pests. 58. These representations as to this characteristic of the product were the essential purpose of the product and, indeed, the only purpose. It was the only reason anyone would buy the subject product, and, based on these representations, Plaintiff purchased Defendants’ electronic pest control product. 59. These representations were material to the transaction, because Plaintiff would not otherwise have purchased the electronic pest control product. 60. These representations were false, and Defendants made these representations with knowledge that these claims were false, or, in the alternative, with utter disregard and recklessness as to whether these representations were false, at the time the Defendants marketed and advertised the product. 61. Defendants made these representations to Plaintiff with the intention that Plaintiff and the putative consumer class members would rely on the representations and purchase the product. 62. Plaintiff and the putative class members justifiably relied on these representations in purchasing the product. 12 63. This reliance on Defendants’ representations resulted in injury to the Plaintiff. 64. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ fraud and Plaintiff’s justifiable reliance upon Defendants’ representations, Plaintiff has suffered injury. 65. Defendants engaged in the same fraud against the putative class members, and they were similarly injured. 66. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein all previous paragraphs of this Complaint. 67. Defendant offered its electronic pest control product for sale. 68. Plaintiff responded to Defendants’ offer by purchasing the product. 69. Plaintiff paid for the product and performed any other conditions precedent required, or they were waived. 70. A material term of that contract was for Defendants to supply a product which repelled pests. 71. In breach of contract, Defendants did not provide a product which repelled pests. 72. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ breach of contract, Plaintiff has suffered damages. 73. Defendants engaged in the same conduct against the class members, breaching its contracts with them, and the class members were similarly damaged. 8. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein all previous paragraphs of this Complaint. 9. Plaintiff had pests, including spiders and mice, in and/or around her house. Breach of Contract Fraud Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act Ohio Revised Code § 1345 et seq. 8

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2018CH15633 Brenda Mason ("Plaintiff'') files this Class Action Complaint against Heartland Employment Services, LLC ("Defendant") for violations of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act. 24. When Plaintiff scanned her fingerprint in Defendant's biometric time clock, her fingerprint- or a geometric representation of her fingerprint- was disseminated and disclosed to Defendant's time-keeping vendor. 25. Defendant never provided Plaintiff any written materials about its collection, retention, destruction, use, or dissemination of her fingerprints. 26. Defendant never obtained Plaintiff's written consent, or release as a condition of employment, before collecting, storing, disseminating, or using her fingerprint. 4 27. Defendant violated Plaintiffs privacy by capturing or collecting her unique biometric identifiers and information, and sharing those identifiers and information with its time- keeping vendor, without her consent. 28. Defendant diminished the value of Plaintiffs biometric identifiers and information by storing them without publishing data retention and destruction policies required by the Biometric Information Privacy Act. 29. Based on Defendant's violations of the informed-consent and data destruction/retention publishing policies of the Biometric Information Privacy Act, Plaintiff experiences emotional distress over whether Defendant is currently storing, or will eventually dispose of, her biometric identifiers and information securely. 30. Plaintiff also experiences emotional distress because she recognizes that she will not learn of any data breach that compromises her biometric identifiers and information until after that data breach has occurred. 31. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of hourly employees of Defendant in Illinois who were required to scan their fingerprints in Defendant's biometric time clock system without their written consent ("the Class"). 32. Plaintiff and the Class are similar to one another because they were all subject to the same allegedly illegal practices: being required to scan their fingerprints in Defendant's biometric time clock system despite Defendant failing to adhere to the requirements of the Biometric Information Privacy Act. 33. The Class includes more than 40 members. 34. As a result, the Class is so numerous that joining of all class members in one lawsuit 5 is not practical. 35. The issues involved in this lawsuit present common questions of law and fact, including: whether Defendant required the Class use their fingerprints to clock in and out during shifts; whether the Class's fingerprints qualify as "biometric identifiers" or "biometric information" under the Biometric Information Privacy Act; and whether Defendant complied with the procedures of the Biometric Information Privacy Act. 36. These common questions of law and fact predominate over the variations that may exist between members of the Class, if any. 37. Plaintiff, the members of the Class, and Defendant have a commonality of interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit and the remedy sought. 38. If individual actions were required to be brought by each member of the Class injured or affected, the result would be a multiplicity of actions, creating a hardship to the Class, to the Court, and to Defendant. 39. Accordingly, a class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit and distribution of the common fund to which the Class are entitled. 40. The books and records of Defendant are material to Plaintiffs case as they disclose how and when Plaintiff and the Class scanned their fingerprints in Defendant's biometric time clock system and what information Defendant provided Plaintiff and the Class about the collection, retention, use, and dissemination of their biometric identifiers and information. 41. Plaintiff and her counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 42. Plaintiff retained counsel experienced in complex class action litigation. 6 w ~ " " w -' iL 43. 44. 46. Defendant has "biometric information" from Plaintiff and the Class based on its acquisition and retention of Plaintiff's and the Class's "biometric identifier[s]," as defined in the previous paragraph. 4 7. Defendant violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act by capturing or collecting Plaintiff's and the Class's fingerprints without first informing them in writing that Defendant was doing so. 48. Defendant violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act by capturing or collecting Plaintiff's and the Class's fingerprints without first informing them in writing of the purpose of Defendant doing so and the length oftime Defendant would store and use Plaintiff's and the Class's biometric identifiers and/or biometric information. 49. Defendant violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act by capturing or collecting Plaintiff's and the Class's fingerprints without first obtaining their written consent or other release authorizing Defendant to capture or collect Plaintiff's and the Class's biometric identifiers and/or biometric information. 50. Defendant violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act by possessing Plaintiff's and the Class's fingerprints without creating a written policy, made available to the public, 7 establishing a retention schedule and destruction guidelines for its possession of biometric identifiers and information. 51. Defendant violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act by disclosing or otherwise disseminating Plaintiffs and the Class's fingerprints to Defendant's time-keeping vendor without first obtaining their consent for that disclosure or dissemination. 52. Defendant knew or should have known of the requirements of the Biometric Information Privacy Act. 53. As a result, Defendant's violations of the Biometric Information Privacy Act were reckless or, in the alternative, negligent. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the Class pray for a judgment against Defendant as follows: A. Awarding liquidated monetary damages to Plaintiff and the Class for each violation of the Biometric Information Privacy Act as provided by 740 ILCS 14/20(1)-(2); B. Enjoining Defendant from committing further violations of the Biometric Information Privacy Act as authorized by 740 ILCS 14/20{4); C. Awarding Plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in filing and prosecuting this action as provided by 740 ILCS 14/20(3); and D. Such other and further relief as this Court deems appropriate and just as provided by 740 ILCS 14/20( 4). COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION BRENDA MASON, on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, known and unknown, Plaintiff, v. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Violation of the Biometric Information Privacy Act (Class Action) Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the previous allegations of this Complaint. Defendant is a "private entity" under the Biometric Information Privacy Act. 740 Plaintiff's and the Class's fingerprints qualify as "biometric identifier[s]" as defined by the Biometric Information Privacy Act. 740 ILCS 14/10.

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34. In or about November 2013 Defendants hired Plaintiff to work as a non-exempt employee at one of the locations of the chain of mobile telecommunications store Defendants own and operate. 35. Plaintiff at all relevant times was a covered employee within the meaning of the FLSA and NYLL. 36. For the first approximately two years, Plaintiff worked at various stores in Brooklyn, seven days per week, from 10am to 8pm, taking a day off approximately once a month and sometimes less frequently than that. On occasion Plaintiff had to come into work earlier or stay later beyond the regular hours. Plaintiff was paid wages of $350 per week. This did not compensate Plaintiff in amount equal to the proper minimum wage, overtime wage, and spread- of-hours pay for all of the time that he was suffered or permitted to work each workweek. 37. For the approximately next 8 months, Plaintiff worked at stores in Buffalo, NY, earning $700 per week. Defendants explained that they needed someone with experience to work at their new stores in Buffalo and they would offer a pay raise to any employee willing to go. Plaintiff accepted the offer. In Buffalo Plaintiff worked seven days per week from 10am to 8pm, taking a day off approximately once a month and sometimes less frequently than that. On occasion Plaintiff had to come into work earlier or stay later beyond the regular hours. This did - 7 - not compensate Plaintiff in amount equal to the proper minimum wage, overtime wage, and spread-of-hours pay for all of the time that he was suffered or permitted to work each workweek. 38. Plaintiff then returned to working at stores in New York because Buffalo was an undesirable location and he did not wish to work there. Upon his return, he worked at various stores in Brooklyn, NY, seven days per week, from 10am to 8pm, taking a day off approximately once a month and sometimes less frequently than that. On occasion Plaintiff had to come into work earlier or stay later beyond the regular hours. Plaintiff was paid wages of $500 per week. This did not compensate Plaintiff in amount equal to the proper minimum wage, overtime wage, and spread-of-hours pay for all of the time that he was suffered or permitted to work each workweek. 39. At no point did Defendants inform Plaintiff of the minimum wage or overtime provisions of the FLSA or the NYLL. 40. Plaintiff has had direct first hand conversations with employees at each of the locations and knows from those conversations that Defendants have a policy of paying all of their employees a fixed weekly salary that does not properly compensate employees for the minimum due under state and federal wage laws. 41. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees either the federal or New York State minimum wage, the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half), and the New York State overtime rate (of time and one-half), in direct violation of the FLSA and New York Labor Law and the supporting federal and New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 42. Defendants knowingly and willfully operate their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees "spread of hours" premium for each day - 8 - that they work a shift in excess of ten (10) hours, in direct violation of the New York Labor Law and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 43. Defendants did not furnish Plaintiff with an accurate statement with every payment of wages, listing gross wages, deductions and net wages as required by New York Labor Law § 195. 44. Defendants failed to display, in a place accessible to employees and in a visually conspicuous manner, the notices of employee rights to receive the minimum wage and overtime pay at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate as required under the New York Labor Law. 45. Defendants failed to display, in a place accessible to employees and in a visually conspicuous manner a copy of New York Labor Law § 193 regarding the prohibition on illegal deductions from wages. 46. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as class representative on behalf of the “Proposed FLSA Collective” defined as: all other current and former non-exempt employees who have been or were employed by Defendants at one of their franchise locations as hourly workers in the three years preceding the date of the filing of this action. 47. Upon information and belief, the total number of members of the proposed collective action class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts upon which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of the Defendants, upon information and belief, there are more than fifty (50) Collective Action Members who worked for the Defendants during the Collective Action Period, most of whom would not be likely to file individual suits because - 9 - they lack adequate financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. Therefore, Plaintiff submits that this matter should be certified as a collective action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 48. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Members and has retained counsel that is experienced and competent in the fields of employment law and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 49. This action should be certified as a collective action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of either inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class, or adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 50. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a collective action. 51. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the collective action predominate over questions that may affect only individual members because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to all members. Among the common questions of law and fact common to Plaintiff and other Collective Action Members are: - 10 - a. Whether the Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members within the meaning of the FLSA; b. Whether the Defendants failed to keep true and accurate time and pay records for all hours worked by Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members; c. What proof of hours worked is sufficient where the employer fails in its duty to maintain time records; d. Whether the Defendants' violations of the FLSA are willful as that term is used within the context of the FLSA; and, e. Whether the Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory, liquidated and statutory damages, interest, attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements. f. Whether the Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members minimum wages for all hours worked; and g. Whether the Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 52. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 53. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have been substantially damaged by the Defendants' wrongful conduct. 54. Plaintiff sues on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 55. In addition to bringing this action as a proposed collective action to remedy - 11 - violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff also brings this action on behalf of a “Proposed Rule 23 Class”, under Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and consisting of: all other current and former non-exempt employees who have been or were employed by Defendants at one of their franchise locations in New York as hourly service workers in the six year period preceding the filing of this action. 56. Upon information and belief, the persons in the Proposed Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the identity and precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts upon which the calculation of that number may be ascertained are presently within the sole control of the Defendants, the Proposed Class consists of all non- managerial current and former employees and, therefore, is so numerous that joinder is impracticable and most of whom would not be likely to file individual suits because they lack financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. 57. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Proposed Class, and a Rule 23 class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation, where individuals lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against a corporate defendant. 58. The Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Proposed Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Proposed Class as a whole. 59. Plaintiff has committed himself to pursuing this action and has retained counsel experienced in employment law and class action litigation. 60. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Proposed Class. Plaintiff understands that, as a class representative, he assumes a fiduciary responsibility to the - 12 - Class Members to represent their interests fairly and adequately, and that he must consider their interests just as he would represent and consider her own interests, and that he may not favor her own interests over theirs. 61. Plaintiff recognizes that any resolution of a Rule 23 class action lawsuit, including any settlement or dismissal thereof, must be in the best interests of the Class. Plaintiff understands that in order to provide adequate representation, he must remain informed of litigation developments and he understands that he may be called upon to testify in depositions and at trial. 62. Plaintiff has the same interests in this matter as all other members of the Proposed Class and Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Proposed Class. 63. There are questions of law and fact common to the Proposed Class which predominate over any questions solely affecting the individual members of the Proposed Class, including but not limited to: a. Whether the Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Class members within the meaning of the New York Labor Law; b. Whether the Defendants failed to keep true and accurate time and pay records for all hours worked by Plaintiffs and the Class members; c. What proof of hours worked is sufficient where the employer fails in its duty to maintain time records; d. Whether the Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff and the Class members the applicable minimum wage for all straight time hours worked and the required overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, in violation of the New York Labor Law and the regulations - 13 - promulgated thereunder; e. Whether the Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff and the Class members "spread of hours" premium for each day they worked a shift in excess of ten (10) hours, in violation of the New York Labor Law and the regulations promulgated thereunder; f. Whether the Defendants' violations of the New York Labor Law are willful as that term is used within the context of the New York Labor Law; and, g. Whether the Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory, liquidated and statutory damages, interest, costs, attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements. 64. Plaintiff re-alleges and re-avers each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs "l" through "62" of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 65. Plaintiff has consented in writing to be a party to this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 66. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants were and continue to be an employer engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). Further, Plaintiff and the Proposed FLSA Collective members are covered individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 67. At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Proposed FLSA Collective members within the meaning of the FLSA. - 14 - 68. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendants have had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 69. Plaintiff and the Proposed FLSA Collective members were entitled to be paid at the applicable federal minimum wage for all straight time hours worked. 70. Plaintiff and the Proposed FLSA Collective members were entitled to be paid at the rate of time and one-half for all hours worked in excess of the maximum hours provided for in the FLSA. 71. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Proposed FLSA Collective members minimum wage or overtime compensation in the lawful amount for all hours worked in excess of the maximum hours provided for in the FLSA. 72. At all relevant times, Defendants had, and continue to have a policy and practice of refusing to pay minimum wage. 73. At all relevant times, Defendants had, and continue to have a policy and practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time and one-half to Plaintiff and the Proposed FLSA Collective members for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week, which violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(l) and 215(a). 74. Defendants knowingly and willfully disregarded the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiff and the Proposed FLSA Collective members at the minimum wage and the statutory overtime rate of time and one-half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week, when they knew or should have known such was due and that non-payment of minimum wage and overtime compensation would financially injure Plaintiff and the Proposed FLSA Collective members. - 15 - 75. As a result of the Defendants' failure to properly record, report, credit and/or compensate its employees, including Plaintiff and the Proposed FLSA Collective members, 76. Defendants have failed to make, keep and preserve records with respect to each of its employees sufficient to determine the wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.A. §§ 201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 21 l(c) and 215(a). 77. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff and the Proposed FLSA Collective members of their rights under the FLSA. 78. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' violation of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the Proposed FLSA Collective members are entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to the 81. Plaintiff re-alleges and re-avers each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs "l" through "79" of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 82. Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members within the meaning of New York Labor Law §§ 2 and 651. 83. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated the rights of Plaintiff and the Rule - 16 - 23 Proposed Class members by failing to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members the applicable minimum wage for all straight time hours worked and required overtime compensation at the rate of time and one-half for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 84. Employers are required to pay a "spread of hours" premium of one (1) additional hour' s pay at the statutory minimum hourly wage rate for each day where the spread of hours in an employee's workday exceeds ten (10) hours. New York State Department of Labor Regulations § 146-1.6. 85. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated the rights of Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members by failing to pay "spread of hours" premium to Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members for each day they worked in excess of ten (10) hours pursuant to New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 86. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members of their rights under the New York Labor Law. 87. Defendants failed to furnish Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members with a statement with every payment of wages listing gross wages, deductions and net wages, in contravention of New York Labor Law § 195(3) and New York State Department of Labor Regulations § 146-2.3. 88. Defendants failed to keep true and accurate records of hours worked by each employee covered by an hourly minimum wage rate, the wages paid to all employees, and other similar information in contravention of New York Labor Law § 661. 89. Defendants failed to establish, maintain, and preserve for not less than six (6) years payroll records showing the hours worked, gross wages, deductions, and net wages for - 17 - each employee, in contravention of the New York Labor Law§ 194(4), and New York State Department of Labor Regulations§ 146-2.1. 90. At the time of their hiring, Defendants failed to notify Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members of their rates of pay and their regularly designated payday, in contravention of New York Labor Law § 195(1). 91. Due to the Defendants' New York Labor Law violations, Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members are entitled to recover from Defendants the difference between their actual wages and the amounts that were owed under the New York Labor law. The deficiency accounts for minimum wage for all straight time hours, overtime compensation for all overtime hours, "spread of hours" premium, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to New York Labor Law§§ 663(1), 198. 92. Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members are also entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to New York Labor Law§ 663(1), as well as civil penalties and/or liquidated damages pursuant to the New York State Wage Theft Prevention Act. 93. Plaintiff re-alleges and re-avers each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs "l" through "91" of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 94. Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiff and the members of the Rule 23 Class with wage notices, as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), in English or in the language identified by Plaintiff and the members of the Rule 23 Class as their primary language, containing Plaintiff and the members of the Rule 23 Class' rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the regular pay day designated by the - 18 - employer in accordance with NYLL, Article 6, § 191; the name of the employer; any "doing business as" names used by the employer; the physical address of the employer's main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer; plus such other information as the commissioner deems material and necessary. 95. Through their knowing or intentional failure to provide Plaintiff and the members of the Rule 23 Class with the wage notices required by the NYLL, Defendants have willfully violated NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 96. Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiff and the members of the Rule 23 Class with accurate statements of wages as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), containing the dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the number of hours worked, including overtime hours worked if applicable; deductions; and net wages. 97. Through their knowing or intentional failure to provide Plaintiff and the members of the Rule 23 Class with the accurate wage statements required by the NYLL, Defendants have willfully violated NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 98. Due to Defendants' willful violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), Plaintiff and the members of the Rule 23 Class are entitled to statutory penalties of fifty dollars each day that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff and the members of the Rule 23 Class with wage notices, or a total of five thousand dollars each, reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and injunctive and - 19 - declaratory relief, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198(1-b ). 99. Due to Defendants' willful violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), Plaintiff and the members of the Rule 23 Class are entitled to statutory penalties of two hundred fifty dollars for each workweek that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff and the members of the Rule 23 Class with accurate wage statements, or a total of five thousand dollars each, reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and injunctive and declaratory relief, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198(1-d). Brough on behalf of Plaintiff and the Proposed Rule 23 Class Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the Proposed FLSA Collective Brough on behalf of Plaintiff and the Proposed Rule 23 Class

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a garbage removal servicer that operates JUNK KING Offices as well as the JUNK KING website, offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with its Office. 22. Defendant operates JUNK KING offices (its “Office”) across the United States, including its New York City Office located at 175 Varick Street, New York, NY 10014. 23. Its Office constitutes a place of public accommodation. Defendant’s Office provides to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services including Office locations, information pertaining to the junk removal services it offers, information about service pricing, including the ability to book online and receive a discount, and related goods and services. 25. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Offices. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Offices and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 26. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 29. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 30. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and the ability to book online and receive a discount of Defendant’s physical Offices on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to take advantage of the goods and services that it provides to the public. 31. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 34. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 35. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 37. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s physical locations and the ability to book online and receive a discount, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Defendant’s Offices are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Offices. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 60. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 61. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 64. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 77. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 78. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 80. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 82. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 83. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 84. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 85. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 86. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 88. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 90. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 92. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 93. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 96. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 97. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 99. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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42. Proposed Class Definition: Plaintiff Calderon brings this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, defined as follows (the “Class”): All Google Photos users located in Illinois for whom Google created and stored a face template after May 28, 2015. 43. Numerosity: The number of persons within the Class is substantial, believed to amount to millions of persons. It is, therefore, impractical to join each member of the Class as a named plaintiff. Further, the size and relatively modest value of the claims of the individual members of the Class renders joinder impractical. Accordingly, utilization of the class action mechanism is the most economically feasible means of determining and adjudicating the merits of this litigation. 47. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 48. The BIPA makes it unlawful for any private entity to, among other things, “collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifiers or biometric information, unless it first: (1) informs the subject . . . in writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or stored; (2) informs the subject . . . in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, stored, and used; and (3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric identifier or biometric information . . . .” 740 ILCS 14/15(b). 49. Google is a corporation and thus qualifies as a “private entity” under the BIPA. See I. Biometric Technology Implicates Consumer Privacy Concerns Violation of 740 ILCS 14/1, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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11. Upon information and belief, Defendant develops marketing campaigns using a combination of sales channels, with an emphasis on outbound telemarketing. 12. Upon information and belief, Defendant utilizes third party vendors to market its services. 13. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s vendors are essential to their telemarketing activities. 14. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s ability to increase revenue depends significantly on its access to high-quality vendors. 16. Defendant’s third party vendors identify themselves as representatives of “EverQuote.” 17. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s outbound telemarketing efforts include the use of an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) to solicit consumers nationwide. 18. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has held that a basic function of an ATDS is the ability to dial thousands of numbers in a short time period. 19. The technology employed by Defendant has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers. 20. An ATDS allows Defendant’s telemarketing agents to only communicate with consumers who answer their phone. 21. Consequently, Defendant shifts the burden of wasted time to consumers with unsolicited calls and messages. 22. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was the sole operator, possessor, and subscriber of the number ending in 8898. 23. At all times relevant, Plaintiff’s number ending in 8898 was assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 25. Years ago (less than four years), Plaintiff was on the market for automobile insurance and may have submitted his contact information to an insurance broker (not Defendant) that was assisting Plaintiff in securing automobile insurance. 26. Shortly thereafter, Defendant began placing sales calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone. 27. Plaintiff answered Defendant’s calls on numerous occasions and advised Defendant that he already secured automobile insurance coverage and requested that Defendant cease the sales calls. Specifically, Plaintiff told Defendant to “lose my number.” 28. During each answered call, Plaintiff experienced a lengthy pause prior to being connected to a representative of Defendant. 29. Despite Plaintiff’s request that the calls cease, Defendant continued placing sales calls to Plaintiff cellular phone. 30. Defendant’s sales calls came from various numbers, including (800) 928- 8914. 31. In total, Plaintiff received dozens of sales calls from Defendant after he requested that the calls cease. 32. At no time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with express written consent to place calls to his cellular phone. 34. Concerned with Defendant’s intrusive conduct, Plaintiff retained counsel to compel Defendant to cease its sales calls. 35. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. 36. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“Putative Class”) defined as follows: All persons residing in the State of Colorado: (a) to whom Defendant and/or a third party acting on Defendant’s behalf, made one or more non- emergency phone call(s); (b) promoting Defendant’s products or services; (c) to their cellular telephone number; (d) using an automatic telephone dialing system; and (e) at any time in the period that begins four years before the date of the filing of the original complaint through the date of class certification. 38. The exact number of members of the Putative Class are unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. 39. Upon information and belief, Defendant made phone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Putative Class. 40. Members of the Putative Class can be objectively identified from records of Defendant and any affiliated marketers/vendors to be gained in discovery. B. Commonality and Predominance 42. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of members of the Putative Class because Plaintiff and members of the Putative Class are entitled to damages as result of Defendant’s conduct. D. Superiority and Manageability 43. This case is also appropriate for class certification as class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the efficient and fair adjudication of this controversy. 44. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Putative Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense required for individual prosecution. 45. By contrast, a class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 46. Economies of effort, expense, and time will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. E. Adequate Representation 48. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Putative Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 49. Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced counsel in consumer class action litigation. 50. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. 51. Among other things, the TCPA prohibits certain calls to wireless and residential numbers unless the caller has the prior express consent of the called party. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 52. Under the TCPA consent rules, some types of calls require prior express written consent, while other types of calls do not require that the consent be in writing. 53. “Prior express written consent” is required for (a) all telemarketing/promotional calls/texts made using an ATDS placed to wireless numbers, and (b) all artificial or prerecorded telemarketing/promotional voice calls to wireless and residential numbers.1 55. Defendant and/or a third party acting on Defendant’s behalf placed or caused to be placed solicitation phone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 8898 utilizing an ATDS without Plaintiff’s prior express written consent in violation of 47 U.S.C. §227 (b)(1)(A)(iii). 56. Upon information and belief, based on the noticeable pause Plaintiff experienced upon answering Defendant’s phone calls, Defendant employed an ATDS to place calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 57. Upon information and belief, the ATDS employed by Defendant transfers the call to a live representative once a human voice is detected, hence the conspicuous delay before being connected to a live representative. 58. Upon information and belief, the system employed by Defendant to place the calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone produced Plaintiff’s telephone number using a random or sequential number generator as Plaintiff never provided his phone number to Defendant. 60. Upon information and belief, Defendant has no database to maintain and update consumers’ contact preferences and consent to call them. 61. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the members of the Putative Class are entitled to receive $500.00 in damages for each such violation. 63. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. 64. In Colorado, “to prevail on a claim for intrusion upon seclusion as a violation of one’s privacy, a plaintiff must show that another has intentionally intruded, physically or otherwise, upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, and that such intrusion would be considered offensive by a reasonable person.” Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d 1060, 1065 (Colo. App. 1998). 65. This tort can encompass conduct such as persistent and unwanted telephone calls. Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1073 (10th Cir. 2003). 66. Defendant’s relentless telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone violated Plaintiff’s right to privacy based on an intrusion upon his seclusion. Invasion of Privacy by Seclusion (Plaintiff’s Individual Claim) Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. § 227 et. seq.) (On behalf of Plaintiff and Members of the Putative Class)

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43. On May 28, 2020, days after George Floyd’s death, protests began across New York City. One protest in Union Square saw a mobilization of hundreds of NYPD officers in response who made several arrests. A group of protestors marched to City Hall where officers kettled them with bicycles, and arrested approximately 75 people. 44. Protests continued on May 29th at Foley Square and Barclays Center. At Barclay’s Center, NYPD officers peppered sprayed and struck protesters with batons. 444. Pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the named Plaintiffs ADAMA SOW, DAVID JAKLEVIC, ALEXANDRA DE MUCHA PINO, 45. On May 30th, protests continued in New York City in all five boroughs. The protests were again met with NYPD shows of force including pepper spray, baton strikes, and mass arrests. In the Flatbush area of Brooklyn, a police helicopter flew low overhead swirling debris, trash, and dust into the marchers’ faces. 46. On May 31st, the protests in New York City continued, even garnering support from some officers who knelt in a symbolic allegiance with the cause of the protestors. While some individuals participated in property crimes, the defendants failed to distinguish among the protestors and other individuals. Defendant de Blasio’s Curfew Orders and the NYPD’s Subsequent Arrests 48. On the evening of June 1, 2020, Defendant de Blasio announced he would be extending the curfew to the evening of June 2, 2020. 2 49. On June 2, 2020, Defendant de Blasio issued Emergency Executive Order No. 119, ordering “a City-wide curfew to be in effect each day from 8:00 p.m. until 5:00 a.m., beginning at 8:00 p.m. on June 3, 2020 and ending at 5:00 a.m. on June 8, 2020” during which “no persons or vehicles” could “be in public.”3 50. Under the Curfew Orders4: “Failure to comply with this Order shall result in orders to disperse, and any person who knowingly violates the provisions in this Order shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.” 51. The Curfew Orders specifically exempted certain categories of workers that were deemed “essential” workers, including “police officers, peace officers, firefighters, first responders and emergency medical technicians, individuals travelling to and from essential work and performing essential work, people experiencing homelessness and without access to a viable shelter, and individuals seeking medical treatment or medical supplies.” 52. Pursuant to the Curfew Orders, “any person who knowingly violate[d] the provisions in th[e] Order[s] [was] guilty of a Class B misdemeanor” under NYC Administrative Code § 3-108. 54. Under New York Penal Law § 15.05, “A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists.” 55. On June 1st, the NYPD Operations Division issued a FINEST message regarding the curfew orders, instructing officers that “[e]nforcement will only be taken after several warnings are issued and the violator is refusing to comply.” (emphasis added). 56. On June 3rd, another FINEST message omitted the instruction to issue a dispersal order prior to curfew enforcement stating that, for a “person violating the curfew, a C-summons may be issued . . . for violating the Mayoral emergency order.” 57. As seen below, many Plaintiffs other arrestees were arrested in connection with purported violations of the Curfew Orders, under circumstances in which the NYPD members ordering or making the arrests had not given clearly communicated dispersal orders and/or provided meaningful opportunities to disperse. 58. On June 7, 2020, Defendant de Blasio lifted the Curfew Orders - one day earlier than the last of the orders was to remain in effect. 59. While the Curfew Orders were in effect, the NYPD arrested approximately 1,350 individuals, disproportionately Black and minority individuals, for allegedly violating the Curfew Orders. 61. On June 1st, demonstrations continued. Officers continued to fail to distinguish the protesters from individuals taking advantage of the demonstrations to destroy property and steal from businesses. 62. On June 2nd, police effectuated mass arrests of protesters demonstrating across the City, in some cases shortly after curfew, using excessive force, including in the form of punching, kicking, tackling, and striking them with batons. 63. For example, around 2,000 protesters were trapped by the NYPD on the Manhattan Bridge for over an hour and a half after officers closed both sides of the bridge and refused to let protesters either proceed into Manhattan or return to Brooklyn. 64. On June 3rd, protest participation increased, with demonstrations widely dispersed across the City, including at Cadman Plaza in Brooklyn and in front of Gracie Mansion in Manhattan. Officers in both locations kettled protesters and shoved and struck protesters with batons. Officers at Cadman Plaza deployed tear gas. 65. A federal lawsuit filed on behalf of four attendees of the Cadman Plaza and Barclays Center protests describes this NYPD conduct including, inter alia, “kettling,” abusive language, and excessive force including of the use of batons, bicycles, chemical irritants, and tightly fastened flex-cuffs and handcuffs. See Gelbard et al. v. City of New York et al., 20-cv-3163 Black Lives Matter Protests from May 28, 2020 to June 6, 2020 FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: UNLAWFUL SEIZURE/ FALSE ARREST .............................. 65 SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: EXCESSIVE FORCE ............................................................ 69 THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FIRST AMENDMENT INFRINGEMENTS, INCLUDING FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: DUE PROCESS ..................................................................... 76 FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: EQUAL PROTECTION AND SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT ....................................................................................................................................................... 81

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(Declaratory Relief) (Disability Discrimination in Violations of NYC Human Rights Law § 8-107(4)) (Injunctive Relief and Damages on Behalf of Plaintiffs) (Failure to Reasonably Accommodate in violation of NYC Human Rights Law § 8-107(15)) (Injunctive Relief and Damages on Behalf of Plaintiffs) (Violations of New York State Human Rights Law) (Injunctive Relief and Damages on Behalf of Plaintiffs) (Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (Injunctive Relief) (Violations of New York State Civil Rights Law) (Statutory Damages on Behalf of Plaintiffs) 27. Plaintiff is paralyzed and cannot walk. As a result, he uses a wheelchair for mobility. 28. Defendant 207TH STREET REALTIES, LLC owns or leases the commercial property which houses the public accommodation named Guadalupe Restaurant located at 597 West 207th Street, New York, NY 10034 (hereinafter ‘public accommodation’). 29. Upon information and belief, Defendant ALTAGRACIA I. ABREU owns or operates the public accommodation named Guadalupe Restaurant located at 597 West 207th Street, New York, NY 10034. 30. Since 1992, Defendants public accommodation has undergone several alterations to the areas which affects or could affect access to or usability of its place of public accommodation. 31. In 2004, Defendant 207TH STREET REALTIES, LLC submitted a building permit application to install a new handicap accessible bathroom. 32. In the 3 years prior to this action being filed, Plaintiff had attempted to enter Defendants' public accommodation, however was unable to enter because of an unlawful architectural barrier. 35. Plaintiff is deterred from visiting Defendants’ public accommodation because of the existing accessibility barriers. 36. Plaintiff has the intention to return to Defendants’ public accommodation once it becomes readily accessible to and usable. 37. The removal of existing architectural barriers is readily achievable. 38. To date, Defendants have failed to remove the architectural barriers. 39. Defendants’ public accommodation named Guadalupe Restaurant located at 597 West 207th Street, New York, NY 10034 is a public accommodation within the meaning of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181; 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. 40. Defendants have failed to make adequate accommodations and modifications to its public accommodation named Guadalupe Restaurant located at 597 West 207th Street, New York, NY 10034. 41. Defendants have failed to remove all architectural barriers that are structural in nature in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). 42. There exist readily achievable modifications which would make Defendants' public accommodation accessible and readily usable by Plaintiff and all others similarly situated. 43. Defendants failed to make the necessary readily achievable modifications to its public accommodation. 44. It is not impossible for Defendants to remove the architectural barriers which exist at its public accommodation. 46. It is not structurally impracticable for Defendants’ public accommodation to be accessible. 47. Defendants failed to alter its public accommodation to the maximum extent feasible in violation of 42 U.S. Code § 12183(a)(2). 48. Defendants’ public accommodation is not fully accessible to, or readily useable by individuals with disabilities. 49. Defendants have discriminated against Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, on the basis of disability, in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of its public accommodation in violation of 42 U.S. Code § 12182(a). 50. Defendants have subjected Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, on the basis of disability, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, to a denial of opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of Defendants in violation of 42 U.S. Code § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 51. Defendants have not afforded Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, on the basis of disability, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is equal to that afforded to other individuals in violation of 42 U.S. Code § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Defendants have not afforded plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations in the most integrated setting appropriate in violation of 42 U.S. Code § 12182(b)(1)(B). 54. Defendants have denied Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, the opportunity to participate in such program or activities that is not separate or different in violation 42 U.S. Code § 12182(b)(1)(C). 55. Defendants have imposed or applied an eligibility criteria that screened out or tended to screen out Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered in violation of 42 U.S. Code § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i). 56. Defendants have failed to make reasonable modifications in their policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to Plaintiff in violation of 42 U.S. Code § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). 57. Defendants should have achieved accessibility by January 26, 1992. 58. The barriers to access Defendants’ public accommodation continue to exist. 59. Reasonable accommodations exist which do not impose an undue hardship on the operation of the Defendants’ program or activity. 61. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference all of the allegations set forth in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 62. Defendants’ public accommodation named Guadalupe Restaurant located at 597 West 207th Street, New York, NY 10034 is a public accommodation within the meaning of New York State Human Rights Law § 292(9). 63. Defendants have not provided Plaintiff and others similarly situated with evenhanded treatment in violation of New York State Human Rights Law § 296. 64. Defendants’ direct or indirect unevenhanded treatment of Plaintiff and others similarly situated is demonstrated when he was segregated from all other customers. 65. Defendants have, because of Plaintiff’s disability, directly or indirectly, refused, withheld from or denied Plaintiff any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of their public accommodation. 66. Defendants have demonstrated that the patronage or custom thereat of Plaintiff and others similarly situated, is unwelcome, objectionable or not acceptable, desired or solicited. 67. Defendants and its agents discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of New York State Human Rights Law § 296. 68. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff by creating, fostering, and otherwise failing to prevent or remedy the discrimination against Plaintiff, in violation of New York State Human Rights Law § 296. 70. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference all of the allegations set forth in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 71. On the basis of Plaintiff’s disability, Defendants have violated his Civil Rights. 72. Consequently, Plaintiff is entitled to recover the penalty prescribed by Civil Rights Law § 40-c and 40-d, in the amount of $500 for each and every violation. 73. Pursuant to NY Civil Rights law, Defendants are guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 74. Notice of the action has been served upon the Attorney-General as required by Civil Rights Law § 40-d. 75. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference all of the allegations set forth in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 76. Defendants’ public accommodation named Guadalupe Restaurant located at 597 West 207th Street, New York, NY 10034 is a place or provider of public accommodation within the meaning of New York City Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 78. In violation of New York City Admin. Code, Defendants have unlawfully discriminated against Plaintiff and all others similarly situated. 79. In violation of New York City Admin. Code, the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, agent and employee of defendants' public accommodation, have, because of the actual or perceived disability of the Plaintiff, directly or indirectly, refused, withheld from and denied Plaintiff the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof. 80. In violation of New York City Admin. Code, on the basis of Plaintiff’s disability, Defendants have demonstrated that the patronage or custom of Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, is unwelcome, objectionable, and not acceptable. 81. Pursuant to New York City Human Rights Law § 8-502, notice of this action has been served upon New York City's Commission on Human Rights. 82. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants disability discrimination in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish and emotional distress, including but not limited to depression, humiliation, stress, embarrassment, anxiety, loss of self-esteem and self-confidence, and emotional pain and suffering. 83. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference all of the allegations set forth in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 85. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff reasonable accommodations and modifications in violation of NYC Human Rights Law 8-107(15). 86. In violation of New York City Admin. Code 8-102(4) and (18), and 8-107(4) and 8- 107(15), Defendants have not reasonably accommodated Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 87. In violation of New York City Admin. Code, Defendants have unlawfully discriminated against Plaintiff and all others similarly situated. 88. Reasonable accommodations and modifications are necessary to enable Plaintiff and all others similarly situated the ability to enjoy the non-restricted access and use of the public accommodation in question. 89. In violation of New York City Admin. Code, the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, agent and employee of defendants' public accommodation, have, because of the actual or perceived disability of the Plaintiff, directly or indirectly, refused, withheld from and denied Plaintiff the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof. 90. In violation of New York City Admin. Code, Defendants have demonstrated that, because of Plaintiff's disability, the patronage or custom of Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, is unwelcome, objectionable, and not acceptable. 91. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants disability discrimination in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish and emotional distress, including but not limited to depression, humiliation, stress, embarrassment, anxiety, loss of self-esteem and self-confidence, and emotional pain and suffering. 93. Plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment concerning the violations committed by Defendant specifying the rights of Plaintiff and other persons similarly situated as to the policies, practices, procedures, facilities, goods and services provided by Defendant.

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45. Arc provides weld inspection services to the oilfield and other industries. 46. Malone began working for Arc in January 2018. 47. Howard began working for Arc in July 2018. 48. Kinworthy began working for Arc in September 2018 49. Malone, Howard, and Kinworthy were employed as inspectors/radiographers providing inspection services to Arc’s clients. 50. Malone, Howard, and Kinworthy worked as weld inspectors for Arc. 51. Malone, Howard, and Kinworthy were hourly employees of Arc. 52. Arc did not pay Malone, Howard, or Kinworthy a salary. 53. Arc did not pay Malone, Howard, or Kinworthy on a fee basis. 54. Arc paid Malone, Howard, and Kinworthy by the hour. 55. For example, Arc paid Malone $24 per hour. 56. Arc paid Malone $26 per hour. 57. And Arc paid Kinworthy $23 per hour. 58. Malone, Howard, and Kinworthy reported the hours they worked to Arc on a regular basis. 59. Malone, Howard, and Kinworthy’s hours are reflected in Arc’s records. 60. Arc paid Lewis at the same hourly rate for all hours worked, including those in excess of 40 in a workweek. 62. When they worked more than 40 hours in a week, Arc did not pay Malone, Howard, and Kinworthy at 1.5x their regular rate for any of these overtime hours. 63. Sometimes, Arc would simply pay Malone, Howard, and Kinworthy the same hourly rate for all hours they worked (“straight time for overtime”). 64. Even when it paid them overtime, Arc would base that overtime rate only on their regular hourly rate. 65. In other words, Arc did not add in non-discretionary bonuses when calculating Arc’s overtime rate. 66. But under the FLSA, Arc was required to include those bonuses in calculating Malone, Howard, and Kinworthy’s overtime pay. 67. As a result, even when they were paid overtime, Malone, Howard, and Kinworthy were paid only on their hourly rates, rather than their full “regular rate” as required by the FLSA. 68. Arc’s standard operating procedure is to calculate overtime, when paying it at all, without including the non-discretionary bonuses in its workers’ regular rates of pay. 69. Arc was well aware of the overtime requirements of the FLSA. 70. Arc nonetheless failed to pay overtime to certain hourly employees, such as Malone, Howard, and Kinworthy. 71. These hourly employees performed work that is primarily manual labor in nature. 73. While some training by Arc may be involved, Malone, Howard, Kinworthy, and the Putative Class Members’ jobs do not require advanced skill or intense study. 74. Malone, Howard, Kinworthy, and the Putative Class Members are not highly trained mechanics, technicians, or engineers. 75. Malone, Howard, Kinworthy, and the Putative Class Members were not allowed to vary from the job duties that were predetermined for them. 76. Malone, Howard, Kinworthy, and the Putative Class Members were provided with mandatory forms, reports, and other documents that had to be completed each day and/or for each project. 77. Truly, these workers have little or no discretion in how to do their job, or the jobs of others they work with. 78. Even though Malone, Howard, Kinworthy, and the Putative Class Members perform very routine, technical, and manual labor job duties, Arc uniformly failed to pay overtime to these workers. 79. Arc knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, its policy of not calculating and paying overtime at the full, regular hourly rate violated the FLSA. 80. Arc’s failure to pay full overtime to these hourly workers was, and is, a willful violation of the FLSA. 81. Malone, Howard, and Kinworthy incorporate all other allegations. 82. The illegal pay practices Arc imposed on Malone, Howard, and Kinworthy were likewise imposed on the Putative Class Members. 84. Numerous individuals were victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which is in willful violation of the FLSA. 85. Based on their experiences and tenure with Arc, Malone, Howard, and Kinworthy are aware that Arc’s illegal practices were imposed on the Putative Class Members. 86. These workers were similarly situated within the meaning of the FLSA. 87. Arc’s failure to pay overtime compensation at the rates required by the FLSA result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Putative Class Members. 88. Malone, Howard, and Kinworthy incorporate all other allegations. 89. By failing to pay Malone, Howard, Kinworthy, and the other Putative Class Members overtime at 1.5 times their regular rates, Arc violated the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). 90. Arc owes Malone, Howard, Kinworthy, and the other Putative Class Members the difference between the rate actually paid and the proper overtime rate. 91. Because Arc knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, its pay practices violated the FLSA, Arc owes these wages for at least the past three years. 92. Arc also owes Malone, Howard, Kinworthy, and the other Putative Class Members an amount equal to the unpaid overtime wages as liquidated damages.

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14. Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is a national banking association that “is one of the oldest financial institutions in the United States.” Defendant is a “leader in investment banking, financial services for consumers and small businesses, commercial banking, financial transaction processing and asset management” whose stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange. https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About- JPMC/about-us.htm. 15. At all relevant times, Defendant has been, and continues to be, an “employer” engaged in the interstate “commerce” and/or in the production of “goods” for “commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. At all relevant times, Defendant has employed, and/or continues to employ, “employee[s],” including Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees. At all relevant times, Defendant has had gross operating revenues in excess of $500,000.00 which is the threshold test for the “enterprise” requirement under the FLSA. 16. Defendant classifies Plaintiff and other Investigators as exempt employees not entitled to overtime and paid them a “salary.” 18. Plaintiff originally worked as an Investigator in Defendant’s Tempe, Arizona office. Chase classified Plaintiff as a non-exempt, hourly employee entitled to overtime during the time she performed the Investigator job there. 19. Subsequently, Plaintiff moved to Defendant’s Tampa, Florida office and resumed her Investigator job. Defendant, however, classified Plaintiff as an exempt employee not entitled to overtime when she performed the Investigator job in Tampa, Florida. She performed the same or similar Investigator job when she worked Tempe, Arizona and Tampa, Florida. 20. Defendant uniformly applied its exempt-designated, payment structure to all Investigators. 21. Defendant suffered and permitted Plaintiff and other Investigators to work more than forty hours per week without overtime compensation for all hours worked. For example, Plaintiff and other Investigators regularly worked at least five days a week. They usually began work in the early morning. In addition, Plaintiff and other Investigators regularly worked into the evenings and on the weekends, causing their hours worked to exceed forty in a week on a regular basis. 22. For example, while an Investigator, Plaintiff’s schedule has fluctuated from day-to-day and during the time she has worked for Defendant. Her current regular work schedule has her working Mondays through Fridays, generally from 6:00 am until 3:00 pm without any breaks or meal periods. As such, during this time period, Plaintiff’s regular schedule had her working an average of 45 hours per week. This has been Plaintiff’s approximate work schedule for about the last six (6) months. 24. On information and belief, Chase is working other Investigators long hours to meet mandatory production quotas which includes long work hours during early morning and later evening work, and weekend work. 25. Defendant knows Plaintiff and other Investigators worked more than forty hours in a week because Defendant expects Plaintiff and Investigators to be available meet production quotas which required working in the evenings and on weekends. Defendant’s management employees constantly communicate with Plaintiff and other Investigators to direct them to meet production quotas and work long hours to meet these quotas. 26. In addition, for example, Chase knows Plaintiff and other Investigators work long hours including overtime because Chase expects Plaintiff and the other Investigators to timely work cases in the que to complete their quotas including working in the evenings and on the weekends. 27. Defendant uniformly deny Plaintiff and other Investigators overtime pay. 28. Defendant classifies Plaintiff and other Investigators as exempt employees who are not entitled to overtime compensation. 29. Defendant uniformly applies this policy and practice to all Investigators nationwide. 31. Plaintiff and the other Investigators have/had the same primary duty of applying Defendant’s mandatory guidelines, policies, and procedures via computer data entry to verify the accuracy of customer and/or prospective customer submissions. 32. Plaintiff and other Investigators are and were non-exempt computer, data-entry employees who are and were entitled to overtime pay. 33. Plaintiff and other Investigators do not customarily and regularly make sales at their customers’ home or place of business. 34. Plaintiff and other Investigators do not regularly supervise the work of two or more employees. 35. Plaintiff and other Investigators do not exercise discretion and independent judgment as to matters of significance. 36. Plaintiff and other Investigators do not perform office work related to Chase’s general business operations or its customers. 37. Plaintiff and other Investigators had no advance knowledge in a field of science or learning which required specialized instruction that was required to perform the job. 38. Chase does not require Plaintiff and other Investigators to have a college degree to obtain an Investigator job. 39. All Investigators are similarly situated in that they share common job duties and descriptions, Chase treated them as exempt employees, and were all subject to Chase’s misclassification policy and practice that failed to pay them overtime compensation. 41. Defendant did not provide Plaintiff and the other Investigators with accurate paychecks. 42. Defendant did not pay Plaintiff and other Investigators for all their overtime hours. Accordingly, Defendant did not provide Plaintiff and other Investigators with all compensation owed to them, including their unpaid overtime, at the time they separated from the company. 43. Defendant is aware of wage and hour laws, as evidenced by the fact that Defendant is a large, sophisticated employer who employees have previously sued multiple times for wage and hour violations, and Defendant provides minimum wage and overtime compensation to other employees who are not Investigators. 44. Defendant’s conduct, as set forth in this Complaint, was willful and in bad faith, and has caused significant damages to Plaintiff and other Investigators. FLSA Collective 45. Plaintiff brings Count I on behalf of herself and other similarly situated employees as authorized under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The similarly situated employees are: All persons who are, have been, or will be employed by Defendant as “Investigators” “Investigations Specialists,” and other similar investigation employees in similar job titles in Chase’s Fraud Compliance Operations and Investigations (“FCOI”) Division within the United States at any time during the last three years through the entry of judgment in this case (“FLSA Collective”). Plaintiff will subclass the FLSA Collective as necessary for certification and/or litigation purposes. 47. Defendant’s exempt classification of Plaintiff and other Investigators is a uniform policy, decision, and/or plan that applies to all Investigators. 48. Defendant’s failure to pay for work hours over 40 per week is a uniform policy, decision, and/or plan that applies to all Investigators. 49. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are subject to Defendant’s policy, decision, and/or plan of failing to pay appropriate overtime compensation at the appropriate rates. 50. Defendant’s unlawful FLSA conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent. 51. Upon information and belief, Defendant knows that Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective performed work that required overtime pay. Defendant requires them to work long hours and weekends to hit production quotas without the proper pay, and Plaintiff and/or those similarly situated complained to Defendant about these practices. Defendant operates under a scheme to deprive these employees of overtime compensation by misclassifying them as exempt and failing to properly compensate them for all overtime hours worked. 52. Defendant’s conduct, as set forth in this Complaint, is and was willful and in bad faith, and has caused significant damages to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. 54. Plaintiff hereby incorporate by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint into this count. 55. The FLSA requires each covered employer such as Defendant to compensate all non- exempt employees at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours per work week. 56. The FLSA requires each covered employer such as Defendant to include all compensation paid to employees such as incentive compensation and/or bonuses into the employees’ regular rate of pay unless that compensation is specifically excluded. The FLSA does not exclude Defendant’s incentive compensation and/or bonus payments. 57. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are entitled to be paid overtime compensation for all hours worked at the appropriate rates of pay. 58. Defendant, pursuant to its policies and practices, fails and refuses to pay overtime premiums to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective for all of their hours worked. 59. Defendant violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. by failing to compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective for all overtime compensation at the legally required rates. 60. By failing to record, report, and/or preserve accurate records of hours worked by Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective, Defendant failed to make, keep, and preserve records with respect to each of their employees sufficient to determine their wages, hours, and other conditions and practice of employment, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 62. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the FLSA Collective, seeks damages in the amount of all respective unpaid overtime compensation at a rate of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours in a work week, plus liquidated damages as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), interest, and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. Collective Action under §216(b) of the FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT Overtime Claims

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10. The Single Phone Report search provided Plaintiff the option of making a regular purchase, or obtaining a special offer price of $0.95 to purchase the Single Phone Report by signing up for a Spokeo trial membership. 11. Plaintiff selected the Single Phone Report with Spokeo trial membership, and was then taken to another page, still on the www.spokeo.com domain, that advised Plaintiff of the benefits of a Spokeo trial membership. The page also advised Plaintiff that she was signing up for a 7-day free trial with Spoeko, and that after the trial ended, her credit/debit card would be charged $19.95 per month for a monthly membership. The page advised Plaintiff that she could cancel at any time. 12. Plaintiff selected “Continue,” and was taken to another page, still on the www.spokeo.com domain, where she was to enter her e-mail address, and credit or debit card information in order to purchase the Single Phone Report and sign up for the Spokeo trial membership. 13. Plaintiff inputted her e-mail address and debit card information for her checking account, and then selected “Purchase and See Results,” at which point she was provided with the Single Phone Report. 14. Plaintiff’s checking account was established primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and thus, is an “account” as defined by 15 U.S.C. 1693a(2). 15 U.S.C. § 1693e(a) AS TO PLAINTIFF AND THE EFTA CLASS 16. Subsequently, Plaintiff received two emails from “Spokeo, Inc.” referencing her monthly trial membership for Spokeo. These emails informed Plaintiff that she would be charged $19.95 per month, and again advised Plaintiff that she could cancel at any time. 17. On June 27, 2013, Plaintiff contacted Spokeo, Inc., and canceled her membership. Later that day, Plaintiff received an e-mail from Spokeo, Inc. confirming that her membership had been canceled and that she would not be billed again. 18. Thereafter, no further charges from Spokeo, Inc. appeared on Plaintiff’s bank statements. 19. However, on July 22, 2013, a debit charge was electronically transferred from Plaintiff’s bank account and appeared on Plaintiff’s bank statement as follows: 2. Authorization obtained by third party. The account-holding financial institution does not violate the regulation when a third-party payee fails to obtain the authorization in writing or fails to give a copy to the consumer; rather, it is the third-party payee that is in violation of the regulation. 20. The debit charge was for $14.95, from a company going by the name “PRIVPR.” 21. Plaintiff first noticed the $14.95 charge shortly after the electronic fund transfer from “PRIVPR” was made from her bank account. 22. Upon noticing the $14.95 charge, Plaintiff called the phone number for the company listed on her checking account statement as “PRIVPR.” The individual who answered the phone stated that Plaintiff had reached the “identity protection billing department.” 23. Based on the conversation with the “PRIVPR” representative, Plaintiff learned that the $14.95 charge was to recur every month indefinitely, and that it was allegedly related to her visit to the www.spokeo.com domain. 25. “PRIVPR” ultimately refunded Plaintiff’s money—without interest—and ceased its regularly recurring electronic fund transfers from Plaintiff’s bank account. Had Plaintiff not demanded that Defendant cease making charges using her debit card, the charges would have continued to recur on a monthly basis in the amount of $14.95. 26. Thereafter, Plaintiff searched “PRIVPR” on the internet and found numerous other similar complaints from consumers who claimed that “PRIVPR” was debiting $14.95 on a monthly basis from their bank accounts and/or charging $14.95 on a monthly basis to their credit cards even though the consumers had never heard of “PRIVPR,” and had never done any business with the Company. 27. Upon information and belief, Defendant is “PRIVPR.” Spokeo, Inc. maintains a page on its website at https://www.spokeo.com/idf that allows consumers to sign up for a 30-day free trial of IdentityForce (a page which Plaintiff never visited prior to having money debited from her bank account by “PRIVPR.”). The IdentityForce program costs $14.95 per month on a recurring basis if the trial is not canceled within 30 days. 28. The IdentityForce “privacy policy” on the Spokeo website identifies IdentityForce as “a service division of Bearak Reports, Inc.” and states that “all references herein to Identity Force shall mean and include Bearak Reports, Inc.” Further, Defendant owns and operates a product called “Identity Force identity protection,” owns and operates the website www.identityforce.com, and is the registered owner of the IdentityForce service mark. 30. The proposed Classes are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number of members of the Classes is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery. The proposed Classes are believed to be ascertainable in that the names and addresses of all members of the Classes can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant. 31. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes because Plaintiff and all Class members’ claims originate from the same conduct, practice and procedure on the part of Defendant and Plaintiff possesses the same interests and has suffered the same injuries as each member of each of the Classes. 33. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual members of the Classes may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impracticable for the members of the Classes to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 34. Issues of law and fact common to the members of the Classes predominate over any questions that may affect only individual members, in that Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class. Among the issues of law and fact common to the Class are: a. Defendant’s violations of the EFTA as alleged herein; b. Defendant’s violations of the ECPA as alleged herein; c. the availability of statutory penalties; and d. the availability of attorneys’ fees and costs. 35. Upon information and belief, absent a class action, Defendant’s violations of the law will be allowed to proceed without a full, fair, judicially supervised remedy. 36. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-35. 38. The Official Staff Interpretations to the EFTA, at12 C.F.R. Pt. 1005.10(b), Supp. I, provide, in pertinent part: 39. Defendant entered into an agreement to make fund transfers, authorized in advance, to recur at substantially regular intervals, from Plaintiff and the other members of the EFTA class’s accounts. 40. Defendant did not, however, provide Plaintiff or other members of the EFTA Class with a copy of any such authorization when such authorization was made. 41. As such, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1693e(a) and 12 C.F.R. § 1005.10(b). 42. Upon information and belief, Defendant engages in a uniform practice of failing to provide consumers with the authorization it is required to obtain for preauthorized electronic fund transfers under the EFTA. 43. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-35. 44. This count is pled in the alternative to Count I. 46. Plaintiff’s and the other members of the ECPA Class’s submission of their debit card, credit card, and/or bank account information to Spokeo, Inc. was an “electronic communication” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). 47. Defendant intentionally intercepted, endeavored to intercept, or procured another person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, Plaintiff and the other members of the ECPA’s Class’s electronic communications with Spokeo, Inc., including the transmission of her debit card information to Spokeo, Inc. 48. As such, Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2511. 49. Upon information and belief, Defendant engages in a uniform practice of intercepting, endeavoring to intercept, or procuring another person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, electronic communications between consumers and Spokeo, Inc., including the transmission of her debit card and/or credit card information to Spokeo, Inc. 50. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-35. 52. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s inappropriate practices, Plaintiff and members of the Classes have suffered injury, including at least temporary loss of use of the funds. 6. On or about June 22, 2013, Plaintiff visited the website www.spokeo.com for the purpose of searching for information about a friend. Spokeo is a search engine that organizes people-related information from phone books, social networks, marketing lists, business sites, and other public sources. 7. Upon arriving at the www.spokeo.com homepage, Plaintiff entered a phone number she had for the friend in the search box in the middle of the screen and then selected “Search.” 9. Upon reaching this page, Plaintiff selected “Get Full Results,” and was then taken to another page, still on the www.spokeo.com domain, that offered her the opportunity to obtain either a Single Phone Report, or a Professional Phone Search. PRIVACY ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 AS TO PLAINTIFF AND THE ECPA CLASS

lose

22. All Plaintiffs performed substantially similar duties. 23. Plaintiffs at all relevant times were covered employees within the meaning of the FLSA and NYLL. 24. Plaintiff Castro’s employment began in or about 2008. He was and continues to be employed as a busboy. 25. Plaintiff Castro’s regular work schedule varied. He typically worked 6 days per week. A typical schedule for him would be something like the following: Monday 5pm- 2am, Tuesday 5pm-9pm, Thursday –Saturday 5pm-3am and Sunday 4pm-1am. He worked mostly night shifts. 26. Plaintiff Castro estimates that he averaged about 56 hours per week, until about one year ago when he began averaging about 51 hours per week. 27. Plaintiff Castro routinely worked more than 40 hours per week and routinely - 20 - had workweeks with workshifts that exceeded 10 hours per day. 28. Plaintiff Vasquez’s employment began about 12 years ago. He was employed as a busboy. 29. Plaintiff Vasquez’s regular work schedule varied. In the beginning of the employment he typically worked from 11am to 9pm, six days per week. 30. Starting about four years ago, this changed so that he was typically working from 7am to 4pm, four days per week, and a fifth day (usually Fridays) from 7am to 5pm. 31. Defendants paid Plaintiffs a day-rate as a base wage, and allowed Plaintiff to receive a share of a tip pool. 32. Defendants never provided Plaintiffs with a notice or other document concerning their intention to take a tip credit. 33. Plaintiff routinely worked more than 40 hours per week and routinely had workweeks with workshifts that exceeded 10 hours per day. 34. Defendants has a policy of not monitoring or recording the actual hours worked by Plaintiffs and other employees. 35. Upon information and belief, until the present, Defendants charged customers a gratuity on all bills and catered events. 36. Upon information and belief, until the present, Defendants engaged in a policy and practice of failing to properly remit the gratuity to Plaintiffs, in violation of NYLL Article 6 § 196-d and the cases interpreting the same. 37. Plaintiffs were required to perform job duties for which customers do not regularly tip or leave a gratuity. This included for Plaintiff Vasquez this included sweeping - 20 - the floors everyday and cleaning the bathroom every shift (two times per shift). This included for Plaintiff Santos cleaning the bathroom every shift, at least once and usually twice; and occasionally cleaning the outside of the establishment, including sweeping garbage from the outside floor. 38. Plaintiffs were required to prior to their scheduled start time, and help with stocking items in the diner, including ketchup, milk, coffee, sugar, salt and pepper, sour cream, napkins, cups, silverware, etc. This would usually take between 5 and 15 minutes. 39. Plaintiffs were required to work past the end of their scheduled workshift because they were required to finish clearing all of their assigned tables before leaving, and on a routine basis, this meant that they had to work 15 to 30 minutes past the end of their scheduled workshift. Also they would have to stay past their schedule end time on occasions in order to cover for an employee who was arriving late for the next shift or who called out of work. 40. Plaintiffs did not receive a regularly scheduled and uninterrupted meal break or rest breaks as required by the New York Labor Law. 41. At no point did Defendants inform Plaintiffs of the minimum wage or overtime provisions of the FLSA or the NYLL. 42. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees either the federal or New York State minimum wage, the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half), and the New York State overtime rate (of time and one-half), in direct violation of the FLSA and New York Labor Law and the supporting federal and New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 43. Defendants knowingly and willfully operate their business with a policy of not - 20 - paying Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees "spread of hours" premium for each day that they work a shift in excess of ten (10) hours, in direct violation of the New York Labor Law and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 44. Defendants did not furnish Plaintiffs with an accurate statement with every payment of wages, listing gross wages, deductions and net wages as required by New York Labor Law § 195. 45. Defendants failed to display, in a place accessible to employees and in a visually conspicuous manner, the notice of employee rights to receive the minimum wage and overtime pay at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate as required under the New York Labor Law. 46. Defendants failed to display, in a place accessible to employees and in a visually conspicuous manner a copy of New York Labor Law § 193 regarding the prohibition on illegal deductions from wages. 47. Defendants failed to provide written notice concerning the terms of a commission program under which employees were eligible to receive commissions. 48. There is no written contract or other written document, signed or otherwise, reflecting the terms of the commissions program offered and administered by Defendants. 49. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and as class representative on behalf of the “Proposed FLSA Collective” defined as: all current and former employees of Defendants for the three year period prior to the filing of the complaint. 50. Upon information and belief, the total number of members of the proposed collective action class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts upon which the calculation of that - 20 - number are presently within the sole control of the Defendants, upon information and belief, there are more than fifty (50) Collective Action Members who worked for the Defendants during the Collective Action Period, most of whom would not be likely to file individual suits because they lack adequate financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. Therefore, Plaintiffs submit that this matter should be certified as a collective action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 51. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Members and have retained counsel that is experienced and competent in the fields of employment law and class action litigation. Plaintiffs have no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 52. This action should be certified as a collective action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of either inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class, or adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 53. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a collective action. 54. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the collective action predominate over questions that may affect only individual members because Defendants have - 20 - acted on grounds generally applicable to all members. Among the common questions of law and fact common to Plaintiffs and other Collective Action Members are: a. Whether the Defendants employed Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members within the meaning of the FLSA; b. Whether the Defendants failed to keep true and accurate time and pay records for all hours worked by Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members; c. What proof of hours worked is sufficient where the employer fails in its duty to maintain time records; d. Whether the Defendants' violations of the FLSA are willful as that term is used within the context of the FLSA; and, e. Whether the Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory, liquidated and statutory damages, interest, attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements. f. Whether the Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members minimum wages for all hours worked; and g. Whether the Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 55. Plaintiffs know of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 56. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated have been substantially damaged by the Defendants' wrongful conduct. 57. Plaintiffs sue on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. - 20 - 58. In addition to bringing this action as a proposed collective action to remedy violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs also bring this action on behalf of a “Proposed Rule 23 Class”, under Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and consisting of: all current and former employees of Defendants during the six year period prior to the filing of the complaint. 59. Upon information and belief, the persons in the Proposed Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the identity and precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts upon which the calculation of that number may be ascertained are presently within the sole control of the Defendants, the Proposed Class consists of all non- managerial current and former employees and, therefore, is so numerous that joinder is impracticable and most of whom would not be likely to file individual suits because they lack financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. 60. The claims of Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Proposed Class, and a Rule 23 class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation, where individuals lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against a corporate defendant. 61. The Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Proposed Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Proposed Class as a whole. 62. Plaintiffs have committed themselves to pursuing this action and has retained counsel experienced in employment law and class action litigation. 63. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Proposed Class. Plaintiffs understand that, as a class representatives, they assume a fiduciary responsibility to the - 20 - Class Members to represent their interests fairly and adequately, and that they must consider their interests just as he would represent and consider their own interests, and that they may not favor their own interests over those of the Class Members. 64. Plaintiffs recognize that any resolution of a Rule 23 class action lawsuit, including any settlement or dismissal thereof, must be in the best interests of the Class. Plaintiffs understand that in order to provide adequate representation, they must remain informed of litigation developments and that they may be called upon to testify in depositions and at trial. 65. Plaintiffs have the same interests in this matter as all other members of the Proposed Class, and Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the Proposed Class. 66. There are questions of law and fact common to the Proposed Class which predominate over any questions solely affecting the individual members of the Proposed Class, including but not limited to: a. Whether the Defendants employed Plaintiffs and the Class members within the meaning of the New York Labor Law; b. Whether the Defendants failed to keep true and accurate time and pay records for all hours worked by Plaintiffs and the Class members; c. What proof of hours worked is sufficient where the employer fails in its duty to maintain time records; Whether the Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Class members the applicable minimum wage for all straight time hours worked and the required overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, in violation of the New York Labor Law and the regulations promulgated thereunder; d. Whether the Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Class members "spread of hours" premium for each day they worked a shift in excess of ten (10) hours, in violation of the New York Labor Law and the regulations promulgated - 20 - thereunder; e. Whether Defendants' violations of the New York Labor Law are willful as that term is used within the context of the New York Labor Law; and, f. Whether Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory, liquidated and statutory damages, interest, costs, attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements. 67. Plaintiffs re-allege and re-aver each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs above of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 68. Plaintiffs have consented in writing to be a party to this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 69. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants were and continue to be an employer engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). Further, Plaintiffs and the Proposed FLSA Collective members are covered individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 70. At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiffs and the Proposed FLSA Collective members within the meaning of the FLSA. 71. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendants have had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 72. Plaintiffs and the Proposed FLSA Collective members were entitled to be paid at the applicable federal minimum wage for all straight time hours worked. - 20 - 73. Plaintiffs and the Proposed FLSA Collective members were entitled to be paid at the rate of time and one-half for all hours worked in excess of the maximum hours provided for in the FLSA. 74. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Proposed FLSA Collective members minimum wage or overtime compensation in the lawful amount for all hours worked in excess of the maximum hours provided for in the FLSA. 75. At all relevant times, Defendants had, and continue to have a policy and practice of refusing to pay minimum wage. 76. At all relevant times, Defendants had, and continue to have a policy and practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time and one-half to Plaintiffs and the Proposed FLSA Collective members for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week, which violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(l) and 215(a). 77. Defendants knowingly and willfully disregarded the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiffs and the Proposed FLSA Collective members at the minimum wage and the statutory overtime rate of time and one-half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week, when they knew or should have known such was due and that non-payment of minimum wage and overtime compensation would financially injure Plaintiffs and the Proposed FLSA Collective 78. Defendants have failed to make, keep and preserve records with respect to each of its employees sufficient to determine the wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.A. §§ 201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 21 l(c) and 215(a). 79. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiffs and the Proposed - 20 - FLSA Collective members of their rights under the FLSA. 80. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' violation of the FLSA, Plaintiffs and the Proposed FLSA Collective members are entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to the 83. Plaintiffs re-allege and re-aver each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs above of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 84. Defendants employed Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members within the meaning of New York Labor Law §§ 2 and 651. 85. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated the rights of Plaintiffs and the Rule23 Proposed Class members by failing to pay Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members the applicable minimum wage for all straight time hours worked and required overtime compensation at the rate of time and one-half for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 86. Employers are required to pay a "spread of hours" premium of one (1) additional hour' s pay at the statutory minimum hourly wage rate for each day where the spread of hours in an employee's workday exceeds ten (10) hours. New York State Department of Labor Regulations § 146-1.6. - 20 - 87. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated the rights of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members by failing to pay "spread of hours" premium to Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members for each day they worked in excess of ten (10) hours pursuant to New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 88. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members of their rights under the New York Labor Law. 89. Defendants failed to furnish Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members with a statement with every payment of wages listing gross wages, deductions and net wages, in contravention of New York Labor Law § 195(3) and New York State Department of Labor Regulations § 146-2.3. 90. Defendants failed to keep true and accurate records of hours worked by each employee covered by an hourly minimum wage rate, the wages paid to all employees, and other similar information in contravention of New York Labor Law § 661. 91. Defendants failed to establish, maintain, and preserve for not less than six (6) years payroll records showing the hours worked, gross wages, deductions, and net wages for each employee, in contravention of the New York Labor Law§ 194(4), and New York State Department of Labor Regulations§ 146-2.1. 92. At the time of their hiring, Defendants failed to notify Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members of their rates of pay and their regularly designated payday, in contravention of New York Labor Law § 195(1). 93. Due to the Defendants' New York Labor Law violations, Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members are entitled to recover from Defendants the difference between their actual wages and the amounts that were owed under the New York Labor law. The deficiency accounts for minimum wage for all straight time hours, overtime compensation for all overtime - 20 - hours, "spread of hours" premium, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to New York Labor Law§§ 663(1), 198. 94. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Proposed Class members are also entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to New York Labor Law§ 663(1), as well as civil penalties and/or liquidated damages pursuant to the New York State Wage Theft Prevention Act. 95. Plaintiffs re-allege and re-aver each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs above of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 96. Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class with wage notices, as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), in English or in the language identified by Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class as their primary language, containing Plaintiffs’ and the members of the Rule 23 Class' rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the regular pay day designated by the employer in accordance with NYLL, Article 6, § 191; the name of the employer; any "doing business as" names used by the employer; the physical address of the employer's main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer; plus such other information as the commissioner deems material and necessary. 97. Through their knowing or intentional failure to provide Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class with the wage notices required by the NYLL, Defendants have willfully violated NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 98. Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule - 20 - 23 Class with accurate statements of wages as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), containing the dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the number of hours worked, including overtime hours worked if applicable; deductions; and net wages. 99. Through their knowing or intentional failure to provide Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class with the accurate wage statements required by the NYLL, Defendants have willfully violated NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 100. Due to Defendants' willful violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class are entitled to statutory penalties of fifty dollars each day that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class with wage notices, or a total of five thousand dollars each, reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and injunctive and declaratory relief, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198(1-b ). 101. Due to Defendants' willful violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class are entitled to statutory penalties of two hundred fifty dollars for each workweek that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class with accurate wage statements, or a total of five thousand dollars each, reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and injunctive and declaratory relief, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198(1-d). Brough on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Proposed Rule 23 Class Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Proposed FLSA Collective Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Proposed Rule 23 Class

win

27. Defendant offers the commercial website, WWW.JERSEYSHOREPOWERSPORTS.COM, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the products and services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The products and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, and the Defendant’s website allows consumers to find information about: showroom location and hours, products and/or services offered for sale, technical specifications of its products, prices, warranties, awards and other vital information needed by prospective consumers in order to make informed decisions about the Defendant’s products and/or services. 29. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 30. Plaintiff, CEDRIC BISHOP, attended the boat fair at Javits during its sales exhibition January 23-27, 2019 in order to obtain information from the personal boat, watercraft and related accessories and/or services sellers presenting and marketing at the fair, including the Defendant. 31. Soon after attending the Javits fair, the Plaintiff attempted to access the Defendant’s website in order to obtain additional information about the Defendant’s products and services but was thwarted in his efforts to do so due to the inaccessibility of the Defendant’s website as set forth herein. 34. By its failure to provide a website that is accessible to the blind or vision impaired, Defendant intentionally violated federal, state and city statutes and regulations designed to protect those members of society who are in need of protection by those various laws. Defendant Must Remove Barriers To Its Website 35. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 37. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 38. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 39. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination or with deliberate indifference, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 40. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 42. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. The Website must be accessible for individuals with disabilities who use computers, laptops, tablets and smart phones. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 43. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view products and services, locate Defendant’s showroom and sales exhibits and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related products and services available via the Website such as prices, warranties, consumer reviews and other vital information. 44. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 45. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 46. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of products and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of products and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 51. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL and NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 52. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 53. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 54. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 56. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 57. Defendant’s showrooms and sales exhibits at Javits are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s physical sales locations. The Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 58. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 59. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 61. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 62. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 63. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 65. Defendant’s physical sales locations are located in the State of New York and constitutes a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 66. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 67. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 69. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 70. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 72. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 73. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the State Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 74. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 75. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 76. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 77. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 78. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 80. Defendant’s physical sales locations are public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 81. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical sales locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 82. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical sales locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 84. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the City Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 85. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 86. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed City Sub-Class on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the City Sub-Class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 87. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 89. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 90. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 91. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 92. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical sales locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 93. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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10. Plaintiff alleges that at all times relevant herein Defendant conducted business in, and is incorporated in San Jose, California, within this judicial district. 11. On February 3, 2016, Plaintiff received an e-mail from Defendant informing Plaintiff that Defendant needed Plaintiff’s help resolving an alleged issue with Plaintiff’s account that Defendant deemed “unusual activity.” 34. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 35. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any text message and/or prerecorded message from Defendant or their agent/s and/or employee/s to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or with an artificial or prerecorded message, which text message was not sent for emergency purposes within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 36. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the hundreds of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 46. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 47. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 48. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 49. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 50. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 51. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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(Class Claims Under New York General Business Law §349) (Plaintiff Individually-Breach of Contract)) (Plaintiff Individually- Bad Faith Claims) 10. Prior to September 2011, Plaintiff purchased an automobile liability insurance policy No. 012852471C71017 (the “Policy”) from USAA in New York, which in pertinent part, provided underinsured motorist insurance to Plaintiff. 11. Underinsured motorist bodily injury insurance covers the insured for bodily/personal injuries, damages, or death caused by an at-fault driver with insufficient insurance (is underinsured). Underinsurance pays the difference between what’s covered by the other driver's insurance coverages, which can’t meet the amount of your damages, and the bodily injury limits listed on the insured’s policy. 12. On September 26, 2011 Plaintiff was involved in a vehicular accident in which the auto she was operating was violently struck in the rear by the WHYTE vehicle. As a result of the rear impact collision, of which Plaintiff was free of any negligence or fault contributing thereto, Plaintiff sustained severe and permanent injuries. 13. In or about December 2011, Plaintiff settled her bodily claims with WHYTE’s carrier, Nationwide Insurance Company of America, for $25,000.00, which represented the full policy limits of $25,000 per person/$50,000 per occurrence. 14. By sworn affidavit, WHYTE certified that he did not have an umbrella policy or any excess insurance policy in effect or applicable to the vehicular accident of September 26, 2011. 15. On or about February 28, 2012, Plaintiff demanded an underinsured (UIM) policy limit payment from USAA. 16. More than two (2) years and two (2) months have elapsed and USAA has failed and refused to make any payment to Plaintiff, as was required under the UIM Insurance Policy. 17. USAA’s refusal to make payment to Plaintiff was made without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 18. USAA’s refusal to make adequate payment to Plaintiff was made in bad faith and for the purpose of denying the benefits of contract for underinsured motorist coverage to Plaintiff. 19. USAA’s refusal to make adequate payment to Plaintiff was an unlawful attempt to force Plaintiff to accept less money than the amount due under the Policy. 20. USAA possessed the duty to honor the UIM insurance contract for the entire policy duration. 21. USAA possessed the duty to conduct a prompt, reasonable and diligent investigation of the facts of the case to determine the validity of the claims made by Plaintiff against the third party driver. 22. USAA possessed the duty to evaluate the Plaintiff’s claims fairly. 23. USAA possessed the duty to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair and equitable settlement of a claim where liability is reasonable clear. 24. USAA possessed the duty to act promptly and reasonably in settling the claim. 25. USAA possessed the duty not to put its insureds through unnecessary litigation. 26. USAA possessed the duty to not to put its insureds’ assets at risk. 27. USAA possessed the duty to refrain from actions that would injure the Plaintiff’s insured ability to obtain the benefits of the insurance contract. 28. USAA possessed the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 29. As a proximate result of USAA’s foregoing wrongful acts and conduct, Plaintiff has sustained economic and non-economic injury, damages and loss. 30. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all preceding paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein. 31. Plaintiff brings this action in her representative capacity on behalf of all similarly situated Class members, who were affected by the actions, policies and business practices of USAA, as described herein. 32. In addition, and in the alternative, Plaintiffs brings this action in her individual capacity, separate and apart from the Class claims set forth herein. 33. Class certification is appropriate under Rule 23 because all of the requirements thereof are satisfied. 34. The Class is defined as follows: All consumers, within the statutory period, who made underinsured (UIM) policy claims against USAA, under issued New York auto liability insurance policies and were not paid any benefit by USAA within 60 days of the making of such claim. Excluded from the Class are officers directors and members of USAA; members of the immediate families of the officers, directors and members of USAA and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which they have or have had a controlling interest. 35. Plaintiff is a member of the Class she seeks to represent. 36. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action against USAA pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community of interest in the litigation and the proposed Class is easily ascertainable. 37. Numerosity is satisfied. Plaintiff does not know the exact size of the Class, but, it is estimated that the Class is composed of at least one thousand persons and entities. While the exact number and identities of Class members are unknown at this time, this information can be readily ascertained through appropriate discovery of the records maintained by USAA. 38. The persons in the Class are so numerous that the joinder of all such persons is impracticable and the disposition of their claims in a class action rather than in individual actions will benefit the parties and the courts. 39. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, and those common issues predominate over any issues that may affect only individual class members. 40. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Classes are: (a) Whether USAA’s insurance claim settlement practices, as alleged in the Complaint, constituted deceptive business practices that violated §349 of the New York General Business Law. (b) Whether Plaintiff and members of the Class have sustained actual injury as a result of USAA’s violation of §349 of the New York General Business Law. 41. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the Class members. Plaintiff’s' claims encompass the challenged practices and course of conduct of USAA. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s' legal claims are based on the same legal theories as the claims of the putative Class members. The legal issues as to which New York State laws were violated by such conduct apply equally to Plaintiffs and to the Class 42. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class she seeks to represent.She has retained counsel competent and highly experienced in complex class action litigation; and she intends to prosecute this action vigorously. The interests of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and her counsel. 43. A class action is superior to other available means of fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of Plaintiff and members of the Class. The injury suffered by each individual Class member is relatively small in comparison to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex and extensive litigation necessitated by USAA'S conduct. USAA has acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive and other equitable relief in favor of Plaintiff and the Class. 44. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members presents a potential for inconsistent and contradictory judgments that may establish incompatible standards of conduct for USAA. Individualized litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties and to the court system, as a result of the complex legal and factual issues of the case. 45. The class action device presents far fewer management difficulties, and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 46. Difficulties, if any, that may exist in the management of this class action will be greatly outweighed by the salutary benefits of the class action procedure, including but not limited to providing Class members with a method for redress of claims that may not otherwise warrant individual litigation. 47. Plaintiff reiterates, realleges and incorporates each and every allegation of the Complaint previously set forth. 48. USAA issued automobile liability insurance policy No. 012852471C71017 k, which in pertinent part, provided underinsured motorist coverage to Plaintiff. 49. USAA issued this insurance policy for valuable consideration in the form of policy premiums, which have been paid by Plaintiff. 50. Plaintiff has complied with all terms, conditions and prerequisites to coverage set forth in the insurance agreement and remains ready to perform all of her obligations under the agreement. 51. At all relevant times, there has been a valid and existing insurance agreement between Plaintiff and USAA. 52. In or about February 2012, Plaintiff duly notified USAA of her UIM claim pursuant to the terms of the insurance agreement. 53. The losses suffered by Plaintiff clearly fall within the ambit of the UIM coverage provided in the subject policy of insurance. 54. USAA breached the insurance agreement by failing and refusing to pay Plaintiff for her damages under the UIM coverage. 55. As a result of USAA'S breach of the insurance agreement, Plaintiff has sustained economic injury and pecuniary loss. 56. Plaintiff has sustained damages in excess of the UIM policy limits, as a result of USAA’S breach of the insurance agreement. 57. Plaintiff has been required to retain the services of an attorney to commence this action and is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs. 58. Plaintiff reiterates, realleges and incorporates each and every allegation of the Complaint previously set forth. 59. There is implied in every contract a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 60. USAA breached its common law duty of good faith and fair dealing in connection with its contract of automobile liability insurance with Plaintiff. 61. USAA breached its duty owed to Plaintiff to act in good faith and to deal fairly in the payment of UIM benefits pursuant to the terms and conditions of the subject contract of insurance. 62. There was an absence of a reasonable basis for USAA'S denial of benefits to Plaintiff under the subject contract of insurance. 63. USAA undertook a conscious campaign calculated to delay and avoid payment on UIM claims, while having determined at the outset that it would deny coverage or offer a "lowball" settlement. 64. USAA engaged in a systematic and ongoing pattern of avoiding UIM claims by making multiple and serial requests for documents, authorizations, medical records and additional information, upon receipt of which the Plaintiff's claims file would be transferred to a new examiner, who in turn would make more requests. 65. USAA waited approximately 2 years to request or schedule an independent medical examination of the Plaintiff. 66. USAA exhibited a reckless disregard and indifference to facts or proofs submitted by Plaintiff in support of her claim for UIM payment of benefits under the subject contract of insurance. 67. USAA was guilty of bad faith in refusing to pay Plaintiff's UIM claim without a reasonable basis. 68. USAA was guilty of bad faith in failing to pay Plaintiff's UIM claim, with knowledge of the lack of a reasonable basis for withholding such payment. 69. USAA was guilty of bad faith in not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlement of Plaintiff’s claim in which liability was reasonably clear. 70. USAA was guilty of bad faith in failing to properly investigate and process the claim in a timely manner. 71. USAA was guilty of bad faith by engaging in deceptive practices and making deliberate misrepresentations to avoid paying the claim. 72. USAA was guilty of bad faith in making arbitrary and unreasonable demands for proof of damages. 73. USAA was guilty of bad faith in violating its own internal policies, procedures, practices and guidelines for the handling of underinsured motorist claims. 74. USAA was guilty of bad faith in compelling Plaintiff to hire attorneys and institute litigation to recover amounts due under UIM. 75. As a result of USAA'S breach of its duty owed to Plaintiff to act in good faith and to deal fairly in the payment of UIM benefits, Plaintiff has sustained economic injury and pecuniary loss. 76. As a result of USAA'S breach of its duty owed to Plaintiff to act in good faith and to deal fairly in the payment of UIM benefits, Plaintiff has sustained foreseeable damages beyond the policy limits. 77. USAA is liable to Plaintiff for consequential damages, including emotional distress, proximately resulting from its breach of its duties as alleged herein. 78. Plaintiff has sustained damages in excess of the UIM policy limits, as a result of USAA’S breach of its duty owed to Plaintiff to act in good faith and to deal fairly in the payment of UIM benefits. 79. Plaintiff has been required to retain the services of an attorney to commence this action and is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs. 8. The United Services Automobile Association is a Texas-based Fortune 500 diversified financial services group of companies including a Texas Department of Insurance regulated reciprocal inter-insurance exchange and subsidiaries offering banking, investing, and insurance. At the end of 2013, there were 10.1 million members. 80. Plaintiff reiterates, realleges and incorporates each and every allegation of the Complaint previously set forth. 81. USSA’S breach of its duty to act in good faith and to deal fairly in the payment of UIM benefits has had a broad impact on Plaintiff, members of the Class and consumers at large. 82. The New York Legislature has determined and declared in § 401 of the Insurance Law that the business of insurance directly and indirectly affects all sectors of the public, business and government and involves many transactions which have the potential for abuse and illegal activities. 83. USAA”s conscious campaign calculated to delay and avoid payment on UIM claims, while having determined at the outset that it would deny coverage or offer a "lowball" settlement,  was likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances. 84. USAA’S practice of inordinately delaying and then denying a claim without reference to its viability goes beyond a private contract dispute as to policy coverage, and affects the public interest. 85. USSA’S claim settlement practices constitutes a deceptive or misleading practice. 86. USAA exclusively possessed the information related to its claim settlement practices, which information a reasonable consumer would want to know, but could not discover until after the purchase of a policy of insurance from USAA and a claim made thereunder. USAA’S failure to disclose constitutes a material deception and fraudulent practice in violation of New York General Business Law, §349. 87. USAA’S' material deceptions by omission were likely to mislead Plaintiff and members of the Class as reasonable consumers acting reasonably in the circumstances. 88. By reason of USAA’S deceptive and fraudulent business practices, Plaintiff and members of the Class paid more for the UIM coverage than it was worth. 89. Neither the Plaintiff nor class members would have purchased auto liability policies containing UIM coverage from USAA, if they had known of USAA’S deceptive business practices alleged herein. 9. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, (“USAA”) is a wholly owned subsidiary of The United Services Automobile Association, and is licensed to sell insurance in all states, including New York. 90. By reason of all of the foregoing, USAA is liable to Plaintiff and members of the class for violations of New York General Business Law, §349. 91. Plaintiff and members of the Class have suffered actual injury, and consequential damages because the UIM coverage and benefits actually received, from USAA failed to measure up to reasonable expectations associated with the product, which Plaintiff and members of the Class were led to believe they had purchased. 92. Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured by reason of the USSA’s violation of this statute and may bring an action to enjoin such unlawful acts. 93. By reason of USAA’S violation of this statute, Plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to recover actual damages. Punitive damages are waived. 94. By reason of USAA’S’ violation of this statute, Plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to be paid by USAA.

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20. EVHC conducts background checks, which include investigations of criminal history, of its job applicants as part of its standard screening and hiring process. 21. In addition, EVHC periodically conducts such background checks on existing employees during the course of their employment with EVHC. 22. EVHC does not perform these background checks in-house. Rather, EVHC relies on outside consumer reporting firms to obtain this information and report it to EVHC for a fee. 24. One of the outside consumer reporting firms EVHC has utilized is InfoCubic, located at 9250 East Costilla Avenue, Suite 525, Greenwood Village, Colorado 80112. 25. InfoCubic is a “consumer reporting agency” under the FCRA. 26. EVHC purchases “consumer reports” from InfoCubic on a regular and frequent basis. 27. As it pertains to the FCRA’s violations, EVHC’s online employment application process is standardized across the United States, and applicants follow the same steps in applying for a job regardless of whether they seek employment with “EmCare”, “Evolution Health”, “American Medical Response”, “AMR”, “Air Ambulance Specialists”, “MedicWest”, “Guardian Healthcare”, “Reimbursement Technologies” or any other division of EVHC. 28. When any applicant applies for employment with EVHC online, EVHC’s website directs the applicant through an identical set of steps to apply for the desired job opening, irrespective of the type of job, the location of the job, or the division / subsidiary in which the job resides. 2 29. For instance, irrespective of whether an individual seeks employment with American Medical Response, EmCare, or Evolution Health (divisions / subsidiaries of EVHC), each such applicant is directed to the same website page as its starting point, and thereafter, each applicant follows the identical procedures to complete an employment application with EVHC’s divisions / subsidiaries. Id. 31. Similarly, EVHC includes other prohibited extraneous language in the online job application portion seeking authorization and providing the FCRA’s required disclosures prior to obtaining a background information report (i.e., “consumer report”) on the job applicant. Id. 32. No subsequent attempt to cure these violations is effective. EVHC’s violations of the FCRA continue because the release of liability is not limited in time, and any additional allegedly corrected disclosures serve only to defeat the “clear and conspicuous” and “in a document that consists solely of the disclosure” requirement of the FCRA. EVHC’S violations of the FCRA relating to Background Check Class 33. EVHC procured consumer report information in violation of the FCRA. 34. The FCRA makes it unlawful to procure a consumer report or cause a consumer report to be procured for employment purposes, unless: i) a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and ii) the consumer has authorized in writing (which authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the report. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) [emphasis supplied]. 35. EVHC has not satisfied these disclosure and authorization requirements. 37. The sequential steps of the online job application process are uniform across EVHC’s various job openings at its various locations across the United States. Id. 38. On the last page of a standard 6-page online employment application, EVHC purports to include in a lengthy paragraph, in obscurely small sized font, an authorization seeking permission to obtain the job applicant’s background information for EVHC’s hiring decision. 4 39. The paragraph reads in part as follows: 50. Mr. Landrum applied for work with EVHC on October 26, 2013, by completing EVHC’s standard online employment application.10 51. As discussed, EVHC’s standard online employment application failed to obtain proper authorization from Mr. Landrum under the FCRA; EVHC similarly failed to make the proper disclosure to Mr. Landrum required under the FCRA. Id. 52. EVHC’s standard online employment application violated the FCRA by impermissibly requiring Mr. Landrum to release not only EVHC, but also numerous other parties and individuals. Id. 53. EVHC’s standard online employment application further violated the FCRA by including additional extraneous language in the disclosure. Id. 54. At no time between (a) Mr. Landrum’s application for employment with EVHC on October 26, 2013, and (b) EVHC’s adverse employment decision, did EVHC give Mr. Landrum a copy of the consumer background report as is required by the FCRA. 55. EVHC violated FCRA’s pre-adverse action notice requirements after it reviewed Mr. Landrum’s criminal background report and decided not to offer employment to him. 57. Subsequently, after learning that EVHC would not hire him, Mr. Landrum was placed with the impermissible burden a) to discover why he was not hired; b) to himself obtain the background report from the consumer reporting agency after EVHC had already decided not to hire him (instead of automatically receiving it from EVHC before being notified by EVHC that he was not going to be hired); and c) to require Mr. Landrum to obtain and supply EVHC a corrected background report as a condition of being hired with the company. 58. Thereafter, although EVHC briefly employed Mr. Landrum, it did not cure EVHC’s violations of the FCRA occurring prior to such employment. 59. Had Mr. Landrum not insisted on inquiring (on his own initiative) about why he was un-hirable with EVHC, and had he not made the un-required effort to obtain a corrected background report himself, he would have not have been hired by EVHC. 60. Regardless, EVHC violated the FCRA as to Mr. Landrum, and indeed, as to numerous other similarly situated individuals over the relevant five-year look-back period. 61. It was unlawful for EVHC to procure a consumer report without proper authorization and without first making the proper disclosures the FCRA required. By doing so, EVHC had no permissible purpose to receive and review Mr. Landrum’s consumer report. 62. Similarly, it was unlawful for EVHC to not provide Mr. Landrum a copy of his consumer report in the statutorily required timeframe. 64. Plaintiff asserts his claim in Count 1 on behalf of a Putative Adverse Class defined as follows: Proposed Adverse Action Class: All employees or prospective employees of EVHC who received notice on or after October 26, 2008 (or who did not receive any such required notice) that EVHC was taking adverse employment action against them based, in whole or in part, on information contained in a consumer report, and (i) who were not given a copy of such report in advance, or (ii) were not provided a copy, in writing, of the FCRA’s disclosure document entitled “A Summary of Your Rights Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act”. 65. Plaintiff asserts his claim in Counts 2 and 3 on behalf of a Putative Background Check Class defined as follows: Proposed Background Check Class: All employees or prospective employees of EVHC who were the subject of a consumer report procured by EVHC (or that EVHC caused to be procured) on or after October 26, 2008. 66. Numerosity under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a): The Putative Classes are so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. EVHC regularly purchases and utilizes information in consumer reports to conduct background checks on prospective employees and existing employees, and frequently relies on such information, in whole or in part, as a basis for adverse employment action. Upon information and belief, during the relevant time period, more than five thousand (5,000) employees and prospective employees satisfy the definition of the Putative Classes. 68. Adequacy under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a): Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Putative Classes, and has retained counsel experienced in complex class action litigation. 71. Members of the Putative Classes do not have an interest in pursuing separate actions against Defendant, as the amount of each Class member’s individual claims is small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution, and Plaintiff is unaware of any similar claims brought against Defendant by any members of the Putative Classes on an individual basis. Class certification also will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments concerning Defendant’s practices. 72. Moreover, management of this action as a class action will not present any likely difficulties. In the interests of justice and judicial efficiency, it would be desirable to concentrate the litigation of all Putative Class members’ claims in a single forum. 73. Plaintiff intends to send notice to all members of the Putative Classes to the extent required by Rule 23. The names and addresses of the Putative Class members are available from Defendant’s records. EVHC conducts employment background checks (including criminal background checks) during its hiring process

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(Against the Sales Defendants) (Against Bioceutica) (Against the Sales Defendants) 29. Plaintiff brings this class action for Defendants’ violations of the TCPA and GBL 399-p on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated under rule 23(a) and 23(b)(1)- 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 30. Plaintiff seek to represent two classes of individuals (“the Classes”) defined as follows: Class A: All persons in the United States from four years prior to the date of the filing of the instant Complaint through on or about June 2012, who did not have an established business relationship with Defendants, whose cellular telephone or residential telephone lines the Sales Defendants called, using an automatic telephone dialing system which was also an automatic dialing-announcing device, without the consent of the persons’ called, which calls contained a prerecorded message identical or substantially similar to the prerecorded message the Sales Defendants left for Plaintiff in this case on or about April 28, 2011. Class B: All persons in New York State, from three years prior to the date of the filing of the instant Complaint through on or about June 2012, whom the Sales Defendants called, using an automatic telephone dialing system which was also an automatic dialing-announcing device, which calls contained a prerecorded message identical or substantially similar to the prerecorded message the Sales Defendants left for Plaintiff in this case on or about April 28, 2011. 31. Numerosity: The Classes are so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 32. Upon information and belief each of the Classes contains at a minimum thousands of members. 8 33. Upon information and belief, the Classes’ size and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendants’ records, including, but not limited to Defendants’ call records. 34. Members of the Classes may be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in class actions, such as by published notice, e-mail notice, website notice, fax notice, first class mail, or combinations thereof, or by other methods suitable to the Classes and deemed necessary and/or appropriate by the Court. 35. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the Classes are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 36. Defendanst placed a telephone call to Plaintiff and each of the members of Class A, using an automatic telephone dialing system which was also an automatic dialing-announcing device, without the consent of the person called, which call contained a prerecorded message identical or substantially similar to the prerecorded message the Sales Defendants left for Plaintiff in this case on or about April 28, 2011. 37. Defendants placed a telephone call to Plaintiff and each of the members of Class B, using an automatic telephone dialing system which was also an automatic dialing-announcing device, which call contained a prerecorded message identical or substantially similar to the prerecorded message the Sales Defendants left for Plaintiff in this case on or about April 28, 2011. 38. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of common questions of fact and law affecting the Plaintiff and members of the Classes. 39. The questions of fact and law common to Plaintiff and Class A predominate over 9 questions which may affect individual members and include the following: (a) Whether Defendants’ conduct of placing a call to Plaintiff and each of the members of the Class A using an automatic telephone dialing system which was also an automatic dialing-announcing device, without the consent of the person called, which call contained a prerecorded message identical or substantially similar to the prerecorded message the Sales Defendants left for Plaintiff in this case, violated the TCPA (47 U.S.C §§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), 227(b)(1)(B)) and/or the regulations promulgated thereunder; (b) Whether Plaintiff and the members of Class A are entitled to statutory damages under the TCPA (47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)) for Defendants’ acts and conduct; (c) Whether Defendants’ acts in violation of the TCPA were willful and/or knowing such that Plaintiff and class A are entitled to treble statutory damages; and (d) Whether Plaintiff and members of the Class A are entitled to a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from continuing to violate the TCPA. 40. The questions of fact and law common to Plaintiff and Class B predominate over questions which may affect individual members and include the following: (a) Whether Defendants’ conduct of placing a call to Plaintiff and each of the members of the Class B using an automatic telephone dialing system which was also an automatic dialing-announcing device, which call contained a prerecorded message identical or substantially similar to the prerecorded message the Sales Defendants left for Plaintiff in this case, violated GBL § 399-p(3)(a); (b) Whether Plaintiff and the members of Class B are entitled to statutory damages under GBL § 399-p(9) for Defendants’ acts and conduct; (c) Whether Plaintiff and members of the Class B are entitled to a permanent injunction 10 under GBL § 399-p(9) enjoining Defendant from continuing to violate GBL 399-p; and (d) Whether Plaintiff and the members of Class B are entitled to the costs and attorneys’ fees under GBL § 399-p(9). 41. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Classes because Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the Classes and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Classes. Plaintiff has retained counsel who is competent and experienced in litigation in the federal courts and class action litigation. 42. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of the Classes. While the aggregate damages which may be awarded to the members of the Classes are likely to be substantial, the damages suffered by individual members of the Classes are relatively small. As a result, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it economically infeasible and procedurally impracticable for each member of the Classes to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. Plaintiff does not know of any other litigation concerning this controversy already commenced against Defendants by any member of the Classes. The likelihood of the individual members of the Classes prosecuting separate claims is remote. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and would increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same factual issues. In contrast, the conduct of this matter as a class action presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and would protect the rights of each member of the Classes. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the 11 management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 43. Injunctive Relief: Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and members of the Classes A and B, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and Classes A and B. 44. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in all of the above paragraphs and incorporates such allegations by reference. 45. By Defendants’ above-described conduct Defendants committed over 3,000 violations of the TCPA against Plaintiff and Class A. 46. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Class A are entitled to statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) greater than $1,500,000. 47. Should the court determine that the Defendants’ above-described conduct was willful and/or knowing, Plaintiffs and the members of class A are entitled to statutory damages of more than $4,500,000. 48. In addition, Plaintiff and Class A are entitled to an injunction against Defendants ordering Defendants to cease their violations of the TCPA. 49. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in all of the above paragraphs and incorporates such allegations by reference. 50. By Defendants’ above-described conduct Defendants committed over 1000 violations of GBL 399-p(3)(a) against Plaintiff and Class B. 12 51. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Class B are entitled to over $50,000 in statutory damages provided under GBL § 399-p(9), plus attorney’s fees and costs of this action. 52. In addition, Plaintiff and Class B are entitled to an injunction against Defendants ordering Defendants to cease its violations of the GBL § 399-p(3)(a). 53. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in all of the above paragraphs and incorporates such allegations by reference. 54. Upon information and belief, on or about June 2012, Bioceutica purchased and/or otherwise acquired TTN. Upon information and belief, as part of that purchase and/or acquisition, Bioceutica agreed to assume all of the TTN’s liabilities, whether known or unknown. 55. In the alternative, upon information and belief, and or about June 2012, Bioceutica intended to absorb and continue the operation of TTN through a de facto merger, in which TTN transferred all of its assets to Bioceutica, payment was made by Bioceutica’s issuing membership in its LLC directly to TTN’s members, and in exhange for their ownership TTN, Bieoceutica agreed to assume all of TNN’s debts and liabilities. In the alternaitve, Bioceutica ia mere continuation of the business of TTN. 56. Bioceutica is the successor to TNN and the Sales Defendants’ liabilities. Accordingly, Bioceutica is liable for the Sales Defendants’ committing: (a) over 3,000 violations the TCPA against Plaintiff and Class A (First Claim for Relief) and (b) over 1000 violations of GBL 399-p(3)(a) against Plaintiff and Class B (Second Claim for Relief). 57. As to its successor liability for the First Claim for Relief, Bioceutica is liable to Plaintiff and Class A are entitled to statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) greater than 13 $1,500,000. 58. Should the court determine that the Sales Defendants’ violation of the TCPA was willful and/or knowing, Bioceutica is liable to Plaintiffs and the members of class A for statutory damages of more than $4,500,000. 59. As to its successor liability for the Second Claim for Relief, Bioceutica is liable to Plaintiff and Class B for over $50,000 in statutory damages provided under GBL § 399-p(9), plus attorney’s fees and costs of this action. 60. Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to an injunction against Bioceutica ordering Bioceutica to cease its violations of the TCPA and GBL § 399-p(3)(a).

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10. Bulk text messaging has become a popular means by which companies can directly communicate with cell phone owners for the purpose of soliciting business. 11. Short Messaging Service, or “SMS” is a cellular telephone messaging system that allows the cellular telephone subscribers to use their cellular devices to send and receive short text messages, usually limited to 160 characters. 12. When an SMS message call is transmitted, the recipient’s cell phone rings to indicate a text message has arrived. 13. Defendants harvest cellular telephone numbers for the purpose of transmitting SMS advertisements to large groups of cellular subscribers. 35. Pursuant to Rules 23(b) and (c) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Plaintiff brings this action on his own behalf and on behalf of the proposed Plaintiff Class. Plaintiff seeks certification of a Plaintiff Class consisting of: All persons within the United States who received any text message sent from Defendants or its agents to said person’s cellular telephone promoting Jim Feist products and/or services. 36. The following individuals are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest, and its current or former employees, officers, and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendants have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. 37. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the tens of thousands, if not more. This matter should therefore be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 38. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by Defendants’ acts in at least the following ways: Defendants, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones by sending unsolicited text messages for the purpose of advertising products or services, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to 48. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though set forth at length herein. 49. Defendants made unsolicited and unauthorized text message calls, including text message calls referenced in paragraph 22, to the wireless telephone numbers of Plaintiffs and the Class. Each such text message call was made using equipment that, upon information and belief, had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. 50. The text calls were made en masse and without the prior express consent of Plaintiff and other members of the Class to receive such wireless spam. 51. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 52. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et. seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 53. Because Defendant had knowledge that Plaintiff and the Class Members did not consent to the receipt of the aforementioned telephone solicitations, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the Plaintiff and Class Members. 54. Plaintiff and the Class Members are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227

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( Overtime Wages Under the FLSA) (Overtime Under the NYLL) (Unpaid Wages Under the NYLL) 15. At all time relevant, each Plaintiff was hired and employed by Defendant within the City and State of New York and worked primarily in Richmond County. 16. Plaintiffs have worked for Defendant to provide supervisory services for security 4 guards employed by Defendant for its clients within and outside the City of New York including Richmond County. 17. Plaintiffs were Defendant’s non exempt employees as that term is used under the FLSA and NYLL. 18. Plaintiffs and other similarly situated workers were paid on a salaried basis. 19. Plaintiffs and other similarly situated workers were and still are entitled to be paid at least one and one half of their respective regular hourly rates of pay for each hour in excess of forty (40) hours that they worked in any work week to the FLSA and NYLL. 20. During the relevant times periods, Plaintiffs and other similarly situated workers worked in excess of forty (40) hours during a single work week and were entitled to receive overtime wages. 21. Plaintiffs and other similarly situated workers were not paid for all hours worked as required by NYLL §191 and §663 22. When all compensable time is accounted for Defendant willfully failed to, in the case of some Plaintiffs, pay the minimum wage for all hours worked as required by the NYLL and FLSA and/or such Plaintiffs were not compensated for overtime hours. 23. Indeed, Plaintiffs regularly worked more than then ten hours in a single day. When Plaintiff and other similarly situated workers were paid at or less then the New York minimum wage or not paid for overtime, NYCRR §142-2.4 required Defendants to pay these workers for an additional hour at the New York minimum wage when the spread of hours exceeded ten hours in a single work day. Defendants willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs the spread of hours premium pay when due. 5 24. Defendants willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees and the overtime premium of one half times their regular hourly work rate for any hours that they worked in excess of 40 hours per week, in violation of the FLSA and NYLL. 25. First, Defendants willfully paid Plaintiffs and other similarly situated workers nothing for the uncompensated hours in excess of forty hours in a work week. 26. Second, Defendant willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs and other similarly situated workers compensated hours in excess of forty hours in a work week at the overtime rate. Defendants paid only straight time, with no premium for overtime hours worked. 27. Since late 2010, Plaintiffs and other similarly situated workers have been entitled to wage statements indicating the regular and overtime rate of pay, the basis of the rate of pay, the dates covered by the payment; the name, address and phone number of the employer; and itemized allowances and deductions pursuant to NYLL §195(3). Defendants fail to furnish wage statements in compliance with the statute. 28. Between late 2010 and 2015, Plaintiffs and other similarly situated workers were entitled to receive notifications of wage rate pursuant to the Wage Theft Prevention Act indicating their hourly rates and other payroll information annually and at the commencement of their employment pursuant to NYLL 195(1). Defendants failed to furnish such notices in compliance with the statute. 36. Marventano bring this case as a representatives of a class of all similarly situated supervisors to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and similarly situated supervisors employed by Defendant from the period commencing six years prior to the filing of this complaint of the date of final judgment in this matter. 37. Marventano estimates that the Class includes over 50 similarly situated individuals who have not been paid overtime wages, who have not been paid for travel time, and who have not received proper payroll stubs and payroll notification pursuant to the Wage Theft Prevention Act. 38. The Class is so numerous as to make it impracticable to join all members of the Class as Plaintiffs. 39. Members of the Class are readily ascertainable through Defendant’s records. 7 40. There are questions of law and fact common to all members of the Class and those questions predominate over any question affecting only individual class members. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to all class members in that Defendant’s acts and omissions constitute a violation of the wage laws of the State of New York. 41. Common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to the following: a. Whether Defendant has consistently failed to pay class members overtime wages at one and one half times their regular rate of pay as required by the NYLL; b. Whether Defendant has failed to pay Plaintiffs at an hourly rate below the New York State minimum wage. c. Whether Defendant has failed to pay overtime to Plaintiffs. d. Whether Defendant has paid Plaintiffs for travel time and from the job sites. e. Whether Defendant has consistently failed to provide Plaintiffs wage statements as required by the NYLL; f. Whether Defendant has in failing to make the required payments to Plaintiffs acted willfully and with the intent of depriving members of the class of such compensation. 42. Plaintiffs’ wage and hour claims and Defendant’s anticipated affirmative defenses thereto are typical of the claims of all Class members and of Defendant’s anticipated affirmative defense thereto. 43. Marventano will fairly and adequately protect the interests of all Class members in the prosecution of this action and in the administration of all matters relating to the claims of the Class. Plaintiffs are similarly situated with, and have suffered similar injuries as, the members of the Class they seek to represent. 8 44. Marventano has retained counsel capable of handling Class action suits similar to those sought to be brought in this action. Neither Marventano nor his counsel have an interest which is in conflict with the Class or which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 45. Pursuant to F.R.C.P 23 (b) (3), class certification is appropriate here because questions of law or fact common to members of the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and because a class action is superior to other methods available to the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 46. Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims are brought as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216 (b). 47. Employees are “similary situated” for purposes of FLSA collective wage suits if they are subject to a common policy, plan or design. 48. Marventano brings the FLSA claims on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, namely employees of Defendant who worked as supervisors from the period commencing three years from the date of filing of this complaint to the date of final judgment in this matter (hereinafter referred as the (“Collective”). 49. Upon information and belief, the Collective and the Class consist of roughly fifty similarly situated individuals who have not been paid proper overtime wages and who would benefit from the insurance of a Court-supervised notice of the lawsuit and the opportunity to join the lawsuit. 9 50. Upon information and belief, Defendant has failed to pay overtime to those in the Collective, and Plaintiffs reserve the right to broaden their definition of the Collective group and/or subgroups to this claim as additional members are discovered. 51. Defendant is liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate Plaintiffs and other similarly situated. 52. Those similarly situated potential Collective members are known to Defendant, are readily identifiable and can be located through Defendant’s records. 53. Members of the Collective are entitled to collectively participate in this action by choosing to “opt in” and submit written Consents to Join this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b). 54. Marventano and members of the Collective and the class defined above, (collectively “Members”) have been victims of a common policy and plan perpetrated by Defendant that has violated their rights under the FLSA and NYLL by denying them pay, including without limitation, overtime wages. 55. As part of their ongoing business practice, Defendant has intentionally, willfully and repeatedly harmed Plaintiffs and the Members by engaging in a pattern, practice and/or policy of violating the FLSA and/or the NYLL. 56. Defendant has substantially benefitted and profited from the work that Plaintiffs and the Members have performed. 57. Defendant’s conduct, policies, and practices and described herein are ongoing and continuing. 10 58. Defendant’s conduct, policies and practices have been intentional, willfull, and in bad faith, and has cause significant damages to Plaintiffs and the Members. 59. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. 60. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of themselves and the Members. 61. At all relevant times, Defendant was subject to the overtime wage requirements set forth in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et. seq. 62. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the Members were employees of Defendant within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §203 (e). 63. At all relevant times, Defendant was engaged in commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203 (e) (m), and 206 (a). 64. Defendant suffered or permitted Plaintiffs and the Members to work more than forty (40) hours a week throughout their employment. 65. Defendant suffered or permitted Plaintiffs and the Members a rate of one and one half times their hourly rate of pay for all the hours they worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 66. Defendants willfully, knowingly, and intentionally did not, and continue not to, compensate Plaintiffs and the Members for overtime at a rate of one and one half times their hourly rate of pay for all of the hours they worked in excess of forty (40) hours a week. 67. As a result of Defendant’s violation of the law and failures to pay Plaintiffs required overtime wages, Plaintiffs and the Members have been damaged and are entitled to 11 recover from Defendant, all wages due, along with reasonable attorney fees, interests and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b). 68. As Defendant did not have a good faith basis to believe that its failure to pay overtime wages to Plaintiff and the Collective was in compliance with the law, Plaintiff and the Collective are entitled to additional damages equal to one hundred percent of the total amount of wages due, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216 ( b). 69. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. 70. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of themselves and the Class. 71. At all relevant times, Defendant was subject to the, overtime wage requirements set forth in Articles 6 and 19 of the NYLL. 72. Pursuant to NYLL §190 et seq and 650 et seq., and 12 NYCRR 142-2.2, non- exempt employees are required to be paid one and one-half times the employees' regular rate of pay for any hours in excess of forty (40) worked in any workweek. 73. Defendant expected Plaintiffs and the Members, to work more than forty (40) hours per week, and Plaintiffs’ and the Members regularly worked more than forty (40) hours per week throughout their employment. 74. At no time has Defendant paid Plaintiffs and the Members a rate of one and one-half times their hourly rate of pay for all the hours they worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 75. Defendant willfully and intentionally have no, and continue not to, 12 compensate Plaintiffs and the Members for overtime at a rate of one and half times their hourly rate for pay for all the hours they worked in excess of forty (40) hours a week. 76. Plaintiffs repeat and reallage each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. 77. Plaintiff Marventano brings this claim on behalf of themselves and the Class. 78. Plaintiffs and the Class were entitled to be compensated for every hour worked at their regular hourly rate (or at their overtime rate). 79. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Members the wages due to them for the hours they worked, including time traveling between jobsite after reporting to work. 80. Defendant violated NYLL § 191 et. seq and § 663 et. seq. by failing to pay Plaintiffs of all their earned wages. 81. Upon information and belief, Defendant did not have a good faith basis for failing to pay Plaintiffs all of their wages, and willfully denied Plaintiff these wages. 82. Judgment should be entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant on the claim for relief for unpaid wages, liquated damages, reasonable attorney fees, interest and costs in an amount to be determined by this Court.

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from multiple telephone numbers. 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 12. Defendant’s calls were placed to telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 18. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the ATDS Class. 19. The class concerning the ATDS claim for no prior express consent (hereafter “The ATDS Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 8. On or around December 2019, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -5400 in an attempt collect a debt. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to collect a debt. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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(FLSA – COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME) (R.C. § 4113.5 – RULE 23 CLASS ACTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE OHIO PROMPT PAY ACT) (R.C. § 4111.03 – RULE 23 CLASS ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME) 23. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 24. During his employment with Defendants, Named Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were not fully and properly paid for all of their compensable hours worked because Defendants did not properly calculate their regular rate of pay for the purposes of meeting the minimum requirements set forth in the FLSA, resulting in unpaid overtime wages. 25. Defendants pay Named Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees an hourly wage for hours worked (hereinafter “Base Hourly Wage”). 27. During the last three years preceding the filing of this Complaint, Named Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees regularly received their Base Hourly Wage and Additional Remuneration as described above in numerous workweeks. 28. When Defendants paid Named Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees both their Base Hourly Wage and Additional Remuneration, Defendants failed to properly calculate their employees’ regular rate of pay for purposes of overtime pay because Defendants did not include the Additional Remuneration in its regular rate calculations. 29. Consequently, Defendants failed to properly compensate Named Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees the overtime wages they were due in accordance with the minimum requirements of the FLSA. 30. Defendants instead paid Named Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees overtime compensation at one and one-half times their Base Hourly Wage, and not one and one- half times their regular rate of pay, as that phrase is defined under the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(e). 31. Upon information and belief, Defendants, at all times relevant hereto, was fully aware of the fact that it was legally required to comply with the wage and overtime payment laws of the United States and of the State of Ohio. 32. During relevant times, Defendants had knowledge of and acted willfully regarding its conduct described herein. 34. For the three years preceding this filing, Defendants applied the same pay practices and policies to all hourly, non-exempt employees, including Named Plaintiff. 35. Named Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees have not been fully and lawfully compensated for all of their compensable hours worked due to the aforementioned policies and practices of not paying employees the correct overtime rate for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek. 36. Defendants knew or should have been aware that Named Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek and were entitled to be paid an overtime rate based on their regular rate of pay, as that phrase is defined under the FLSA, but they willfully elected not to fully compensate their employees during all times relevant. IV. 37. Named Plaintiff brings his FLSA claims pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a representative action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated employees of the opt-in class, consisting of: All current and former hourly, non-exempt employees of Defendants, who received a Base Hourly Wage and Additional Remuneration during any workweek that they worked over 40 hours in any workweek beginning three years preceding the filing date of this Complaint and continuing through the date of final disposition of this case (the “§216(b) Collective Class” or the “§216(b) Collective Class Members”). 38. This FLSA claim is brought as an "opt-in" collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) as to claims for overtime compensation withheld in violation of the FLSA, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees. 40. The identity of the putative §216(b) Collective Class Members are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants’ payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action and allowed to opt into it pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and costs under the FLSA. 41. The net effect of Defendants’ policies and practices is that Defendants willfully failed to fully and properly pay Named Plaintiff and §216(b) Collective Class Members overtime wages. Thus, Defendants enjoyed substantial profits at the expense of the Named Plaintiff and §216(b) Collective Class Members. B. Fed.R.Civ. P. 23 Class Action for Unpaid Overtime Wages. 43. During relevant times, Named Plaintiff and those Ohio Rule 23 Class Members worked more than forty (40) hours per workweek, but were not correctly compensated at a rate of at least one and one-half times their correct regular rate of pay, as that phrase is defined under the FLSA, for all hours worked in excess of 40 because of Defendants’ policy and practice of not fully compensating their employees at the proper overtime rate during workweeks when they received additional forms of remuneration as described herein. 44. The Ohio Rule 23 Class, as defined above, is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 45. Named Plaintiff is a member of the Ohio Rule 23 Class and his claims for unpaid wages are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class. 46. Named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Ohio Rule 23 Class and the interests of all members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class. 47. Named Plaintiff has no interest that is antagonistic to or in conflict with those interests of the Ohio Rule 23 Class that he has undertaken to represent. 48. Named Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced class action counsel who can ably represent the interests of the entire Ohio Rule 23 Class. 49. Questions of law and fact are common to the Ohio Rule 23 Class. 50. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because individual actions would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants with respect to their non-exempt employees. 52. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) as the questions of law and facts common to the Ohio Rule 23 Class predominate over questions affecting individual members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 53. Questions of law and fact that are common to the Ohio Rule 23 Class include, but are not limited to: (a) whether Defendants violated the Ohio Wage Act by failing to pay the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members their correct overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per week as a result of Defendants’ failure to properly calculate the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members’ regular rate of pay when they received additional forms of remuneration; (b) whether Defendants’ violations of the Ohio Wage Act were knowing and willful; (c) what amount of unpaid and/or withheld overtime compensation is due to the Named Plaintiff and other members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class on account of Defendants’ violations of the Ohio Wage Act; and (d) what amount of prejudgment interest is due to Ohio Rule 23 Class members on the overtime or other compensation which was withheld or not paid to them. 55. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 56. This claim is brought as part of a collective action by the Named Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the §216(b) Collective Class Members. 57. During the relevant time period preceding this Complaint, Defendants employed the Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Collective Class Members. 58. Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Collective Class Members were paid on an hourly basis when working in non-exempt positions. 59. Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Collective Class Members worked in excess of 40 hours in numerous workweeks during their employment. 60. The FLSA requires that covered employees be compensated for every hour worked in a workweek. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(b). 61. The FLSA requires that non-exempt employees receive overtime compensation of their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 63. Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Collective Class Members were not exempt from receiving FLSA overtime compensation. 64. Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Collective Class Members worked in excess of forty hours per week during all times relevant. 65. Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Collective Class Members should have been paid the correct overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek during the three years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 66. Defendants violated the FLSA with respect to Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Collective Class Members by, inter alia, failing to fully compensate them at time-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked over forty (40) hours in workweeks because Defendants did not properly calculate its employees’ overtime rate when they received Additional Remuneration as described herein. 67. Defendants knew or should have known of the overtime payment requirements of the FLSA. Defendants willfully withheld and failed to pay the overtime compensation to which Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Collective Class Members are entitled. 68. The exact total amount of overtime compensation that Defendants failed to pay the Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Collective Class Members is unknown at this time, as many of the records necessary to make such precise calculations are in Defendants’ possession. 70. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 71. This claim is brought under Ohio law, which incorporates the FLSA without limitation. 72. The Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have been employed by Defendants and Defendants are employers covered by the overtime requirements under Ohio law. 73. Ohio law requires that employees receive overtime compensation “not less than one and one-half times” (1.5) the employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) in one workweek, “in the manner and methods provided in and subject to the exemptions of section 7 and section 13 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937.” See R.C. § 4111.03(A); see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 74. The Named Plaintiff and Ohio Rule 23 Class worked in excess of the maximum weekly hours permitted under R.C. § 4111.03 but were not correctly paid their overtime rate for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek in workweeks that they received additional forms of remuneration as described herein. 75. Defendants’ company-wide corporate policy and/or practice of not properly paying their hourly, non-exempt employees the correct overtime rate for each hour worked over forty (40) hours in workweeks that employees also received additional forms of remuneration as described herein resulted in unpaid overtime wages for the Named Plaintiff and Ohio Rule 23 Class. 76. Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated Ohioans were not exempt from the wage protections of Ohio law. 78. The Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class were not exempt from the wage protections of Ohio law. 79. Defendants’ repeated and knowing failure to pay overtime wages to the Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated Ohioans were violations of R.C. §4111.03, and as such, Defendants acted willfully. 80. For Defendants’ violations of R.C. §4111.03, by which the Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated Ohioans have suffered and continue to suffer damages; the Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated Ohioans seek unpaid overtime and other compensation, liquidated damages, interest and attorneys’ fees, and all other remedies available. 81. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 82. During relevant times, Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have been employed by Defendants. 83. During relevant times, Defendants were entities covered by the OPPA and the Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have been employed by Defendants within the meaning of the OPPA. 85. During relevant times, Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class were not paid all wages, including overtime wages at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay as described herein within thirty (30) days of performing the work. See R.C. § 4113.15(B). 86. The Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members’ unpaid wages remain unpaid for more than thirty (30) days beyond their regularly scheduled payday. 87. The Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have been harmed and continue to be harmed by such unpaid wages. 88. In violating the OPPA, Defendants acted willfully, without a good faith basis, and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable Ohio law. VI. A. 216(b) Collective Action for Unpaid Overtime Wages.

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10. On December 9, 2009, Defendants filed a foreclosure lawsuit in Cook County court against Plaintiff, Case No. 09 CH 49203. In June 2010, F&S filed an Affidavit of Prove- Up Pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/15-1506 (“Affidavit”), contemporaneously with motions for judgment and default, in that lawsuit. 11. The Affidavit purports to be based upon personal knowledge and seeks judgment for specified damages and dollar amounts, including, inter alia, for specified dollar amounts for inspections, preservation, appraisal, insurance, taxes and attorneys’ fees. 12 . The Affidavit purports to be notarized, and signed by an officer of Deutsche Bank 4 National Trust Company, but, the foreclosure lawsuit lodged against Plaintiff has been specifically identified in General Administrative Order No. 2011-11 of the Cook County Court, County Department, Chancery Division (the “Order”), as one of a long list of F&S foreclosure actions containing affidavits with altered content such as altered additions of insurance costs, preservation costs, inspection costs, and/or taxes incurred on the property. 13. F&S presented said Affidavit to the Cook County foreclosure court on June 24, 2010, to obtain a foreclosure judgment in Plaintiff’s case, and the court entered such judgment against Plaintiff on that date; but the Affidavit contains false, altered specifications of the amount of insurance costs, preservation costs, inspection costs, and/or taxes incurred in connection with Plaintiff’s loan/mortgage/property, which Defendants asserted to be due and owing by Plaintiff. Yet, pursuant to and consistent with the Affidavit, F&S obtained judgment against Plaintiff. 14. F&S and Doe Defendants caused similar false affidavits, containing unverified and/or false content, to be filed with courts in foreclosure actions filed by lenders and Doe Defendants against similarly situated home loan borrowers. 15. Such alteration or forgery of affidavits, which are instruments employed for debt collection, are prohibited by applicable law. 16. The false affidavits have resulted in improper judgments, improper reporting of debts to credit bureaus, and court-sanctioned debts for improper or unlawful amounts. 17. The conduct of F&S and Doe Defendants was willful and demonstrates reckless disregard for Plaintiff and the Class. 18. As a result of Defendants’ above-described conduct, Plaintiff and the Class were damaged; for example, they had foreclosure judgments entered against them, Defendants asserted and entered debts against them that were invalid and unenforceable and for incorrect 5 amounts, their credit ratings were adversely, prematurely, and detrimentally affected, and they are entitled to statutory damages. 19. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her Complaint accordingly to file additional causes of action arising out of such facts. 29. Plaintiff brings her claims individually and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 23 on behalf of a Class presently defined as all persons named as a defendant in a foreclosure lawsuit containing an affidavit altered by Fisher and Shapiro, LLC, one of its agents, or a Doe Defendant. Excluded from the Class are current and former executives and officers of Defendants, Defendants’ counsel, Plaintiff’s counsel, and any member of the judiciary presiding 7 over this action. Plaintiff reserves her right to amend the class definition as appropriate and/or following discovery. 30. Plaintiff reasonably believes that the Class includes at least 1,700 members as more fully described above, making joinder of all members of the Class impracticable. 31. Defendants’ unlawful conduct as set forth herein is generally applicable with respect to the Class as a whole, so that declaratory relief and corresponding injunctive relief are appropriate. 32. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other Class members. 33. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class; Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class; and Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in class action litigation. 34. Common questions of law or fact exist as to all members of the Class, and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, including, without limitation, as follows: a. Did Defendants alter affidavits employed in foreclosure lawsuits filed against Plaintiff and the Class? b. Does the alteration of said affidavits violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, as more fully set forth herein? c. Are Plaintiff and the Class entitled to declaratory relief as more fully set forth herein? 35. A class action provides a superior and manageable method for fairly and efficiently adjudicating this controversy because, among other things, joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable, and many members of the Class cannot feasibly vindicate their rights by individual suits because they cannot afford to hire counsel and/or because the monetary value of their recoveries are outweighed by the burden and expense of litigating individual actions 8 against the Defendants. 36. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference each of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein in full. 37. F&S and Doe Defendants are “debt collectors” and/or enforcers of security interests pursuant to the FDCPA, and/or routinely file foreclosure lawsuits on behalf of lenders including in order to collect debts asserted by lenders and enforce lender security interests. 38. Said Defendants, by their aforesaid conduct and use of false and misleading affidavits in foreclosure actions filed against Plaintiff and the Class as set forth more fully above, violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, including without limitation FDCPA prohibitions against using any false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 39. Defendants’ above-described conduct is further prohibited, for example, by the following FDCPA provisions: (a) Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2) by falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of the debt; (b) Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) by communicating credit information which is known or which should be known to be false; (c) Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) by attempting to collect an amount that is not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law; and (d) Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) by failing to cease collection of the debt or any disputed portion thereof until the debt collector obtained 9 verification of the debt. Indeed, as set forth above, the above-described affidavits presented by F&S and Doe Defendants to the foreclosure courts in order to obtain judgment against Plaintiff and the Class contained fraudulent and false or altered assertions of debt amounts purportedly owed by Plaintiff and the Class for, inter alia, inspections, preservation, appraisal, insurance, taxes and/or attorneys’ fees. As such, Defendants’ employment of said affidavits misrepresented the character and amount of the asserted debts purportedly owed by Plaintiff and the Class, which were known to be false, without obtaining verification of said amounts due, and without agreement by Plaintiff and the Class. 40. F&S and other Doe Defendants intentionally, frequently and persistently employed false and misleading affidavits in order to collect on lender debts. The above- described Order identifies approximately 1,700 instances of such conduct. 41. As a result of Defendants’ numerous above-described violations of the FDCPA, Plaintiff and the Class were damaged and are entitled to actual and statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k in an amount to be proven at trial. 42. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 43. The Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS § 505 et seq. (“ICFA”), is designed to protect consumers against unfair, deceptive, false or misleading business practices. 44. The ICFA prohibits false, deceptive, misleading and unfair acts or practices, 10 “including but not limited to the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact.” 54. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 55. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to a declaration of the parties’ rights and Defendants’ obligations pursuant to the FDCPA, including whether Defendants’ conduct violates the FDCPA and whether Defendants are liable for their above-described conduct in violation of these statutes, as more fully set forth above. 56. Plaintiff and other Class members, and Defendants, have adverse legal interests, and there is a substantial controversy between Plaintiff and other Class members, and Defendants, so as to warrant issuance of a declaratory judgment as to whether Defendants’ practice of altering affidavits used in foreclosure proceedings is unlawful and violates the FDCPA, and issuance of notice to the Class regarding same. 57. As a result of Defendants’ above-described conduct in violation of the FDCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are additionally entitled to corresponding injunctive and equitable relief. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT INCLUDING CORRESPONDING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT VIOLATIONS OF THE ILLINOIS CONSUMER FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ACT (UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE CONDUCT)

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40. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 41. Defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 42. Plaintiff is a consumer as defined by the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 43. The Debt that Defendant sought to collect was a consumer debt as defined by the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 44. Defendant’s conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e in that Defendant attempted to collect a debt using false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of the debt. 45. Defendant’s conduct violated 15 U.S.C. 1692e(2)(A)&(B) in that Defendant made false, deceptive, and misleading representations concerning the character, amount, or legal status of the Debt or any amount which may be collected or sought to be collected by a debt collector in connection with the collection of a debt. 8. On or before May 22, 2014, an obligation (the “Debt”) was allegedly incurred by Plaintiff Terri Gwinn to the original creditor, Texas Health Dallas (“Creditor”). 9. The Debt arose out of a transaction in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes and therefore it meets the definition of a “debt” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) and TEX. FIN. CODE § 392.001(2). VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS DEBT COLLECTION ACT, TEX. FIN. CODE § 392.001, et seq. Brought by Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the Texas Class VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Brought by Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of Both Classes

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14. Plaintiff and the members of the Class are present and former patients of CCP. 15. As a condition for receiving treatment, Plaintiff and Class members were required by CCP to confide and make available to it, its agents, and its employees, sensitive and confidential PII, including, but not limited to, their names, dates of birth, addresses, health insurance information, and other clinical and treatment information related to the care sought there. 17. By obtaining, collecting, using, and deriving a benefit from its patients’ PII, CCP assumed legal and equitable duties to those individuals and knew or should have known that it was responsible for protecting their PII from unauthorized disclosure. 18. Plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to maintain the confidentiality of her PII. Plaintiff, as a current and former patient, relied on CCP to keep her PII confidential and securely maintained, to use this information for business purposes only, and to take reasonable steps to ensure that its vendors would make only authorized disclosures of this information. 19. Indeed, CCP maintains a policy which specifically acknowledges its legal obligation to maintain the privacy of patient PII entrusted to it and to control the disclosure thereof. 20. CCP’s policy is outlined in its Notice of Privacy Practices (CCP’s “Privacy Policy”), which was effective on April 14, 2003, and was last revised on June 1, 2013.6 22. Plaintiff entrusted her PII to CCP solely for the purpose of effectuating treatment and the payment therefor with the expectation and implied mutual understanding that CCP would strictly maintain the confidentiality of the information and safeguard it from theft or misuse. 23. Plaintiff would not have entrusted CCP with her highly sensitive PII if she had known that CCP would entrust it to a vulnerable vendor, such as BST, thereby failing to protect it from unauthorized use or disclosure. B. The security of patients’ PII was compromised in the Data Breach 24. Plaintiff has been a patient of CCP for years. 25. When Plaintiff presented herself to CCP for treatment, its agents prominently posted and/or provided Plaintiff with various disclosure statements regarding CCP’s Privacy Policy and its obligations under HIPAA to safeguard patients’ PII–as CCP was required to do by law.11 27. Plaintiff reasonably relied upon CCP’s representations to her detriment and would not have provided her sensitive PII to CCP if not for CCP’s explicit and implicit promises to adequately safeguard that information. 28. CCP entrusted the PII that is at issue in this action to BST in order to use its accounting services. 29. According to CCP, on or around December 4, 2019, one or more wrongdoers obtained access to BST’s information technology systems and stole private and confidential PII, including CCP’s patients’ “name[s], date[s] of birth, billing codes, insurance description[s] (A definition of the billing / CPT code), and medical record number[s].”12 30. According to CCP, “there was an unauthorized intrusion into BST’s network that contained Community Care Physicians’ data… by an unknown individual or individuals outside of BST who gained access to part of the network where certain client files are stored, including files from CCP…” by way of a ransomware virus.13 32. Per CCP’s notification, cybercriminals had uninhibited access to Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII for nearly four days. 33. As a result of this Data Breach, the PII of 170,000 individuals whose PII was in the possession of BST was compromised. 34. The Data Breach was preventable and a direct result of BST’s failure to implement adequate and reasonable cyber-security procedures and protocols necessary to protect patients’ PII. 35. The Data Breach was moreover a direct result of CCP entrusting the Plaintiff’s PII to BST without conducting reasonable inquiry into BST’s data security practices. 36. Further, BST allegedly discovered the breach on December 7, 2019, but Plaintiff and the Class were not notified for months, on or about February 14, 2020. 37. On or about February 14, 2020, CCP sent letters to the Class members notifying them that their PII had been compromised during the Data Breach.15 C. The healthcare industry is a prime target for cybercriminals 39. Data breaches within the healthcare industry in general, and with vendors in particular, continued to rapidly increase. According to the 2019 Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society Cybersecurity Survey, 68 percent of participating vendors reported having a significant security incident within the last 12 months, with a majority of those being caused by “bad actors.”19 41. The PII stolen in the Data Breach is significantly more valuable than the loss of, say, credit card information in a large retailer data breach. Victims affected by those retailer breaches could avoid much of the potential future harm by simply cancelling credit or debit cards and obtaining replacements. The information stolen in the Data Breach— most notably name and date of birth —is difficult, if not impossible, to change. 43. PII data for sale is so valuable because PII is so broad, and it can therefore be used for a wide variety of criminal activity such as creating fake IDs, buying medical equipment and drugs that can be resold on the street, or combining patient numbers with false provider numbers to file fake claims with insurers. 44. The value of Plaintiff’s PII on the black market is considerable. Stolen PII trades on the black market for years, and criminals frequently post stolen private information openly and directly on various “dark web” internet websites, making the information publicly available, for a substantial fee of course. 45. As storehouses of that lucrative information, business associates like BST are also highly targeted by cybercriminals because they lack “sufficient resources to prevent or quickly detect a data breach” making them an easier target.23 47. Companies can mount two primary defenses to phishing scams: employee education and technical security barriers. 48. Employee education is the process of adequately making employees aware of common phishing attacks and implementing company-wide policies requiring the request or transfer of sensitive personal or financial information only through secure sources to known recipients. Employee education and secure file- transfer protocols provide the easiest method to assist employees in properly identifying fraudulent e-mails and preventing unauthorized access to PII. 50. HIPAA circumscribes security provisions and data privacy responsibilities designed to keep patients’ medical information safe. HIPAA compliance provisions, commonly known as the Administrative Simplification Rules, establish national standards for electronic transactions and code sets to maintain the privacy and security of protected health information.27 51. HIPAA provides specific privacy rules that require comprehensive administrative, physical, and technical safeguards to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and security of PII is properly maintained.28 52. Moreover, since CCP is a covered entity, and BST is its business associate, HIPAA requires that CCP, inter alia, obtain satisfactory assurances from BST that it will appropriately safeguard the PII it receives or creates on behalf of 80. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23. The Class is preliminarily defined as: All individuals whose PII was compromised as a result of the Data Breach with BST & Co. CPAs, LLP which was announced by Community Care Physicians, P.C. on February 19, 2020. 81. Excluded from the Class are CCP, BST and their subsidiaries and affiliates, their officers, directors and member of their immediate families and any entity in which they have a controlling interest, the legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns of any such excluded party, the judicial officer(s) to whom this action is assigned, and the members of their immediate families. 82. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed Class and/or to add a subclass(es) if necessary, before this Court determines whether certification is appropriate. 93. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 94. As a condition of receiving health care services, Plaintiff and Class members were obligated to provide CCP their PII. 95. Plaintiff and the Class members entrusted their PII to CCP with the understanding that CCP would safeguard it. 96. CCP had full knowledge of the sensitivity of the PII and the types of harm that Plaintiff and Class members could and would suffer if the PII were wrongfully disclosed. 98. Further, BST had a duty to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding, securing, and protecting such information from being compromised, lost, stolen, misused, and/or disclosed to unauthorized parties. This duty includes, inter alia, designing, maintaining and testing its security protocols to ensure that Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII in its possession was adequately secured and protected and that employees tasked with maintaining such information were adequately trained on cyber security measures regarding patient PII. A. Plaintiff and the Class Members entrusted their PII to CCP NEGLIGENCE (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class against CCP and BST)

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25. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every paragraph above as though fully alleged herein. 26. Plaintiff and each Class Member entered into a Membership Agreement with Massage Envy and/or Massage Envy’s franchisee clinics. 27. Plaintiff and each Class Member obliged by the Membership Agreement by pre-paying Massage Envy for the massage services that were subject to the refund clause in Massage Envy’s Membership Agreement. 28. No additional conditions besides payment of membership charges are contractually required of Plaintiff and Class Members for Massage Envy to perform the massage services for Plaintiff and Class Members. 29. Massage Envy and its agents and privies franchisee clinics breached the Membership Agreement’s refund clause by failing to provide refunds for unredeemed prepaid “paid in full” membership services upon Class Members that either cancelled or fell into arrears. 30. Massage Envy instituted its forfeiture policies as a method to compel timely payment, penalize non-payment, and as a means to unjustly increase revenue without having to provide massage services (i.e., as a means to generate unfair profits). Massage Envy had no good faith business rationale for its forfeiture policies. 32. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every paragraph above as though fully alleged herein. 33. The Membership Agreement contains as a matter of law an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 34. Massage Envy interferes with and frustrates Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ ability to obtain the benefits of their Membership Agreements by forfeiting all their prepaid massages upon cancellation. 35. As a direct and proximate result of Massage Envy’s breaches of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff and each Class Member has sustained loss, cost, damage, and expense in an amount to be proven at trial. 36. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every paragraph alleged above as though fully alleged herein. 37. The UCL prohibits business practices or acts that are unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent. 9. Massage Envy markets itself as a “pioneer and national leader of affordable massages and spa services.” Massage Envy has over 700 clinics nationwide with approximately 132 of these locations in California. Massage Envy employs approximately 16,000 massage therapists making it one of the largest employers of licensed/registered massage therapists in the United States. Massage Envy has since acquired over 1 million members at all clinic locations. A. Allegations Concerning All Class Members COLLECTIONS COSTS, INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES.. . 6-lnappropriate behavior from clients or therapists will not be tolerated in any manner. We request that you immediately notify the CliniC Administrator for appropriate action. We have the right to refuse or discontinue service at any time for any 'reason. Member agrees to follow all clinic rules and regulations. Violation of clinic rules and regulations may result in suspension or cancellation of your membership. Member will be r"esponsible for payment in full upon revocation of membership. We reserve the right to change clinic rules, regulations or pricing at any time upon reasonable notice. In addition, Massage Envy cannot be responsible for lost or stolen articles. . On Behalf of Plaintiff and All Class Members for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing On Behalf of Plaintiff and All Class Members for Unfair Competition Under California Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq. (the “UCL”) On Behalf of Plaintiff and All Class Members for Breach of Contract On Behalf of Plaintiff and All Class Members for Declaratory Relief Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201

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10. Attorneys routinely contact their clients in both TCJ and TCCC by phone or videoconference to discuss confidential matters. They do so with the understanding their conversations are private. Similarly, inmates understand remote conversations with their attorneys are confidential and not recorded. 11. TCJ and TCCC’s phone and videoconferences services are provided by Securus Technologies. Its software automatically records communications between inmates and the outside world, including (and unlawfully) inmates’ communication with attorneys. It stores those recordings in a computer server, to which the Sheriff’s Department has access. 12. The Sheriff’s Department tells the public it does not record attorney-client calls. For instance, its “Jail Information” webpage says an inmate’s calls to his attorney “are free of charge and are not recorded.”1 Similarly, Securus Technology’s website promises “[video] visits are secure and completely private for legal counsel.”2 13. But in reality, Securus Technology and the Sheriff’s Department do record confidential attorney-client communications. They also disclose those recorded conversations to prosecutors in the Travis County and District Attorneys’ Offices. 15. Although defense attorneys in Austin have discerned Defendants’ practices and confronted them, Defendants appear to have no intention of ceasing their unlawful, unconstitutional eavesdropping and invasion of attorney-client communication. 24. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b), Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated persons, defined as attorneys practicing criminal defense in Austin or Travis County. The Class seeks certification of claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. 26. Commonality: The Class has a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact in this matter – including the recording/use of their confidential communications, the practice’s unlawfulness, and the necessity for declaratory and injunctive relief. 27. Typicality: The individual Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of Class members’ claims, because Plaintiffs are individual members of the larger community of local criminal defense attorneys with clients in the TCJ and TCCC, who have similar practices and operate under similar constraints. 28. Adequacy: Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Class because their interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class members they seek to represent. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the members of the Class; they intend to prosecute this action vigorously. 29. This suit may also be maintained as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) because Plaintiffs and the Class seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiffs and the Class as a whole, thereby making declaratory and/or injunctive relief proper. 9. A person is arrested in Austin or Travis County is typically brought to TCJ downtown to be booked. TCJ is run by the Sheriff’s Department. In most cases, if the Sheriff’s Department plans to hold that person for more than a short time, it soon transfers the individual to TCCC in Del Valle, Texas. OFFICE, and DAVID ESCAMILLA, in his official capacity. Defendants. § § § § § § § § § § and GREG HAMILTON, in his official capacity; TRAVIS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, and ROSEMARY LEHMBERG, in her official capacity; and

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(Fair Labor Standards Act - Unpaid Overtime) (NJWHL/NJWPL- Unpaid Overtime) 30. The claims in this Complaint arising out of the FLSA, New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and New Jersey Wage and Payment Law are brought by Plaintiff under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of himself and of a class consisting of all similarly situated non-exempt employees (i.e. cashier, cleaning worker, maintenance worker, care service worker, marketing and accounting clerks) who work or have worked at King Spa for the past six years (the "Rule 23 Class"). 31. The employees in the Rule 23 Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 32. The size of the Rule 23 Class is at least forty (40) individuals, although the precise number of such employees is unknown Facts supporting the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of defendants. 33. Defendants have acted or have refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Rule 23 Class, thereby malting appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Rule 23 Class as a whole. 35. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Rule 23 Class he seeks to represent. Plaintiff and the members of the Rule 23 Class work or have worked for defendants within the six years prior to the filing of this action. They enjoy the same statutory rights under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and New Jersey Wage and Payment Law to be paid at the correct overtime wage for all hours worked and to keep the gratuities they earn. Plaintiff and the members of the Rule 23 Class have sustained similar types of damages as a result of defendants' failure to comply with the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and New Jersey Wage and Payment Law. 36. Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class have all been injured in that they have been under-compensated due to defendants' common policies, practices, and patterns of conduct. 37. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Rule 23 Class. 38. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in wage and hour litigation and class action litigation. 39. There is no conflict between Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class members. 41. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 42. The claims in this Complaint arising out of the FLSA are brought by the Plaintiff on behalf of himself and all similarly situated non-exempt employees (i.e. cashier, cleaning worker, maintenance worker, care service worker, marketing and accounting clerks) who work or have worked at King Spa within three years of the date of the filing of this action and who elect to opt-in to this action (the "FLSA Collective"). 43. The FLSA Collective consists of approximately one hundred similarly situated current and former non-exempt employees of King Spa, who have been victims of defendants' common policy and practices that have violated their rights under the FLSA by, inter alia, willfully denying them overtime pay and other monies. 45. As part of their regular business practices, defendants have intentionally, willfully, repeatedly, and in bad faith harmed Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective by engaging in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA, New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and New Jersey Wage and Payment Law. This policy and pattern or practice include, inter alia: a. failing to pay employees the proper overtime pay for all hours worked over forty; b. failing to pay non-exempt employees one hour's pay at the minimum hourly wage rate for each day during which employees worked more than ten hours; c. failing to keep accurate records of hours worked by employees as required by the FLSA and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and New Jersey Wage and Payment Law. 46. The FLSA Collective would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join the present lawsuit. Those similarly situated employees are known to defendants, are readily identifiable by defendants and are locatable through defendants' records. These similarly situated employees should be notified of and allowed to opt into this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 47. Rhee worked as a cashier throughout his time employed by defendants. 48. Working as a cashier, Rhee fell into the category of "non-exempt" employee pursuant to the FLSA. 50. Rhee’s starting and ending times varied depending on his shift. He regularly worked at least 9 hours a day for 6 days a week and sometimes for 7 days a week. 51. Defendants failed to compensate Rhee at one and one-half times his hourly rate for the hours he worked in excess of forty per workweek. 52. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Defendants are required to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective one and one- half (1 ½ ) times the regular rate at which Plaintiff was employed for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek pursuant to the overtime wage provisions set forth in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, et seq. 54. Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective the overtime wages to which they are entitled under the FLSA. 55. Defendants have willfully violated the FLSA by knowingly and intentionally failing to pay Plaintiff and FLSA Collective overtime wages. 56. Due to defendants' violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are entitled to recover their unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. 58. Under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and supporting New Jersey State Department of Labor Regulations, defendants were required to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class one and one half (1 ½ ) times the regular rate of pay for all hours they worked in excess of forty. 59. Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class the overtime wages to which they were entitled under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law. 60. Defendants have willfully violated the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law by knowingly and intentionally failing to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class overtime wages. 61. Due to defendants' willful violations of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class are entitled to recover their unpaid overtime wages, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the action, liquidated damages and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

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21. Defendant is a beauty products company that owns and operates the website, www.hudabeauty.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant ensures the delivery of throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers its products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website using a screen-reader. 24. Plaintiff most recently visited Defendant’s website in March of 2020 to browse and potentially make a purchase. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a user experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to enjoy the privileges and benefits of Defendant’s public accommodation. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to contain a proper label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This was a problem for Plaintiff because in certain instances the screen reader failed to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contains a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. 31. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 33. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 36. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 37. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 39. Web-based technologies have features and content that are modified on a daily, and in some instances, an hourly, basis, and a one time “fix” to an inaccessible website will not cause the website to remain accessible without a corresponding change in corporate policies related to those web-based technologies. To evaluate whether an inaccessible website has been rendered accessible, and whether corporate policies related to web-based technologies have been changed in a meaningful manner that will cause the website to remain accessible, the website must be reviewed on a periodic basis using both automated accessibility screening tools and end user testing by disabled individuals. 41. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 42. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 52. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 56. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 61. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 62. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 66. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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10. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as this case is brought pursuant to The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (section #216 for jurisdictional placement). 12. Plaintiff worked for Defendant as pool installer and concrete worker from on or about November 20, 2016 through to on or about March 27, 2020. 13. Defendant's business activities involve those to which the Fair Labor Standards Act applies. Both the Defendant’s business and the Plaintiffs’ work for the Defendants affected interstate commerce for the relevant time period. Plaintiffs’ work for the Defendants affected interstate commerce for the relevant time period because the materials and goods that Plaintiffs used on a constant and/or continual basis and/or that were supplied to him by the Defendants to use on the job moved through interstate commerce prior to and/or subsequent to Plaintiffs’ use of the same. The Plaintiffs’ work for the Defendants was actually in and/or so closely related to the movement of commerce while he worked for the Defendants that the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to Plaintiffs’ work for the Defendants. 14. Additionally, Defendants regularly employed two or more employees for the relevant time period who regularly handled goods or materials that travelled through interstate commerce, or used instrumentalities of interstate commerce, thus making Defendants’ business an enterprise covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 15. Upon information and belief, the Defendant Corporation had gross sales or business done in excess of $500,000 annually for the years 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019. 16. Upon information and belief, the Defendant Corporation’s gross sales or business done has exceeded $250,000 for the first six months of the year 2020 and is expected to exceed $500,000 for the year 2020. 18. Between the period of on or about January 1, 2020 through to on or about March 27, 2020, Plaintiff worked 7 days a week, worked an average of 90 hours a week for Defendant and was paid nothing at all for the 50 hours worked in excess of 40 in a week as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act. Plaintiff therefore claims the time and half time overtime rate of $15.00 for each hour worked above 40 in a week. 20. This Court has jurisdiction for Plaintiff’s unpaid wage claim as this is a claim for unpaid wages pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 448.08. 21. Plaintiff orally contracted for employment with Defendants and Defendants verbally agreed to pay Plaintiff. 22. From on or about January 1, 2020 through to on or about March 27, 2020, of Plaintiff employment with Defendants, Plaintiff worked 7 days each week for Defendants. During this time Plaintiff worked approximately 90 hours per week for Defendants. However, Defendants have not paid Plaintiff any wages for the 12 weeks that Plaintiff worked for Defendants during this time at a rate of $10.00 per hour for 40 hours and $15.00 per hour for the 50 overtime hours worked in each week from January 1, 2020 through to on or about March 27, 2020. 23. As a direct proximate result of Defendants action, Plaintiff has suffered damages. 25. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (a) (1) states "Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages at the following rates: except as otherwise provided in this section, not less than-- $5.85 an hour, beginning on the 60th day after May 25, 2007; $6.55 an hour, beginning 12 months after that 60th day; and $7.25 an hour, beginning 24 months after that 60th day…” [29 U.S.C. § 206 (a) (1)]". On July 24, 2007 Federal minimum wage was raised to $5.85/hr. On July 24, 2008, Federal minimum wage was raised to $6.55/hr. On July 24, 2009, Federal minimum wage was raised to $7.25/hr. 26. Between the period of on or about January 1, 2020 through to on or about March 27, 2020, Plaintiff worked an average of 90 hours a week for the Defendants. Plaintiff was paid $0.00/hr for said work in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act as said payment of $0.00/hr did not meet the applicable Federal Minimum Wage required for said period of time. Therefore, Plaintiff claims difference between his average hourly rate of $0.00/hr and the applicable minimum wage rate of $7.25/hr for all hours worked. 8. This action arises under the laws of the United States. 9. This case is brought as a collective action under 29 USC 216(b). It is believed that the Defendant has employed several other similarly situated employees like Plaintiff who have not been paid overtime wages for work performed in excess of 40 hours weekly from the filing of this complaint back three years. COME NOW PLAINTIFF, through Counsel, and re-adopts the factual and jurisdictional statements in paragraphs 1-19 above and further states: JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY COMES NOW PLAINTIFF, through Counsel, and re-adopts the factual and jurisdictional statements in the paragraphs 1-7 as though fully set forth herein and further states: JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY COMES NOW PLAINTIFF, through Counsel, and re-adopts the factual and jurisdictional statements in paragraphs 1-24 above and further states:

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone number 503-468-5336. 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 12. During all relevant times, Defendant did not possess Plaintiff’s “prior express consent” to receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice on his cellular telephone pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 13. Further, Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -7558 was added to the National Do-Not-Call Registry at least 30 days prior to receiving Defendant’s calls. 14. Defendant placed multiple calls soliciting its business to Plaintiff on his cellular telephone ending in -7558 in or around April 2018. 15. Such calls constitute solicitation calls pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 17. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the two proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). The class concerning the ATDS claim for no prior express consent (hereafter “The ATDS Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone facsimile messages from Defendant to said person’s telephone facsimile number made through the use of any telephone facsimile machine and such person had not previously consented to receiving such messages and such messages did not contain any opt-out notice within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 18. The class concerning the National Do-Not-Call violation (hereafter “The DNC Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States registered on the National Do-Not-Call Registry for at least 30 days, who had not granted Defendant prior express consent nor had a prior established business relationship, who received more than one call made by or on behalf of Defendant that promoted Defendant’s products or services, within any twelve-month period, within four years prior to the filing of the complaint. 64.1200(c)(2) as they were attempts to promote or sell Defendant’s services. 8. Beginning in or around April 2018, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -7558, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 (b) • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C); and • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c) • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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11. In or around May 2011 through December 2011, Plaintiff Frank Ortega purchased Cobra from CVS in Reseda, Los Angeles County, California and from Rite- Aid and Target stores located in Northridge, California. The cost was approximately $16- $17 per bottle. 12. Mr. Ortega first discovered Defendants’ unlawful acts described herein in December 2012, when he learned that the Defendants’ Product violates the FDCA and its implementing regulations and that the labels were untrue and/or misleading. 13. Plaintiff Troy Lambert purchased Cobra from the Rite-Aid located at 300 East Willow Street in Long Beach, California approximately ten times. His most recent purchase was in November 2012. The cost was approximately $16-17 per bottle. 14. Mr. Lambert first discovered Defendants’ unlawful acts described herein in 2 98. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (the “Class”) in accordance with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 99. The Class is defined as: All persons (excluding officers, directors, and employees of NBI and NIC) who purchased, on or after January 1, 2006, Defendants’ Cobra Products (in all packaging sizes and iterations) in the United States for their own use rather than resale or distribution. 100. Questions of law and fact common to Plaintiffs and the Class include: 20 Violations of the Unfair Competition Law, Unfair and Fraudulent Prongs Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., 116. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 117. California Business and Professional Code § 17200 prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” 118. The acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices, and non-disclosures of Defendants as alleged herein also constitute “unfair” business acts and practices under the UCL in that Defendants’ conduct is immoral, unscrupulous, and offends public policy by seeking to profit from male vulnerability to false or deceptive virility or aphrodisiac claims. Further, the gravity of Defendants’ conduct outweighs any conceivable benefit of such conduct. 119. The acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices, and non-disclosures of Defendants as alleged herein constitute “fraudulent” business acts and practices under the UCL in that Defendants’ claims are false, misleading, and have a tendency to deceive the Class and the general public, as detailed herein. 120. In accordance with Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203, Plaintiffs seek an order enjoining Defendants from continuing to conduct business through unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent acts and practices, and to commence a corrective advertising campaign. 121. Plaintiffs further seek an order for the disgorgement and restitution of all monies from the sale of the Defendants’ Product, which were acquired through acts of unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent competition. / / / / / / / / / / / / 24 Violations of the Unfair Competition Law, Unlawful Prong Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., 109. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 110. California Business and Professional Code § 17200 prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” 111. The acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices, and non-disclosures of Defendants as alleged herein constitute “unlawful” business acts and practices in that Defendants’ conduct violates the False Advertising Law, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and the Lanham Act. 112. Defendants’ conduct is further “unlawful” because it violates the FDCA and its implementing regulations in the following ways: a. Defendants’ deceptive statements violate 21 U.S.C. §§ 343(a) and 352, which deem a food or drug (including nutritional supplements) misbranded when the label contains a statement that is “false or misleading in any particular;” b. Defendants’ deceptive statements violate 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(b)(3)(i), which mandates “substances” in dietary supplements consumed must contribute and retain “nutritive value,” as defined under 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(a)(2)(3) when consumed at levels necessary to justify a claim; 22 Violations of the False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq. 122. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 123. In violation of California Business and Professional Code § 17500 et seq., the advertisements, labeling, policies, acts, and practices described herein were designed to, and did, result in the purchase and use of Cobra. 124. Defendants knew and reasonably should have known that the labels on the Defendants’ Product were untrue and/or misleading. 125. As a result, Plaintiffs, the Class, and the general public are entitled to injunctive and equitable relief, restitution, and an order for the disgorgement of the funds by which Defendants were unjustly enriched. Violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq. 126. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 127. The CLRA prohibits deceptive practices in connection with the conduct of a business that provides goods, property, or services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 128. Defendants false and misleading labeling and other policies, acts, and practices were designed to, and did, induce the purchase and use of the Defendants’ Products for personal, family, or household purposes by Plaintiffs and class members, and violated and continue to violate the following sections of the CLRA: a. § 1770(a)(5): representing that goods have characteristics, uses, or benefits which they do not have. 25

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39. Mr. Brown adopts by reference the contents of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 40. Barring oral requests for money now but not regulating requests for money later as the panhandling statute does is a form of content discrimination. 41. The panhandling statute therefore violates the First Amendment because it is not “narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest," and there are "less restrictive alternatives that would serve the Government's purpose." 42. The panhandling statute is a policy of the District of Columbia. 43. The District’s enforcement of the panhandling statute against Mr. Brown and the other members of the classes described below injured Mr. Brown and the other members of the classes by subjecting them to arrest, prosecution, and loss of liberty. 44. Accordingly, Mr. Brown and the other members of the Arrest Class and the Prosecution Class are entitled to damages and other relief as set forth below. 45. Mr. Brown on behalf of himself and the Arrest Class bring this action under Rules 23(a), 23(b) (2) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of each person who: (i) in the period beginning three years before the date of filing of the original complaint in this case and going forward until the case is terminated; (ii) was arrested for a violation of the panhandling statute. 46. Mr. Brown on behalf of himself and the other members of the Prosecution Class bring this action under Rules 23(a), 23(b) (2) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of each person who: (i) in the period beginning three years before the date of filing of the original complaint in this case and going forward until the case is terminated; (ii) was prosecuted for a violation of the panhandling statute. 47. Certification of these classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) is appropriate, because the District of Columbia has a policy, pattern, and practice for each claim that has uniformly affected all members the class, and injunctive relief and declaratory judgment and a judgment against the District will benefit each and every plaintiff and class member. 48. Mr. Brown and the classes are entitled to injunctive relief including an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the panhandling statute and sealing of the arrest records of class members for their arrests under the panhandling statute. 49. Mr. Brown and the classes are entitled to declaratory judgment against the District that D.C. Code § 22-2301(2) is facially unconstitutional and their arrests on those charges are a nullity. Claim 1 § 1983 Liability of District of Columbia under the First Amendment

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11. Plaintiffs purchased a single-family home in San Marcos, California, with the transaction closing on or about October 19, 2018. 12. At around the same time and in connection with their purchase, Plaintiffs entered into a mortgage loan agreement with lender loanDepot.com, LLC (the “2018 Mortgage”). That loan funded on or about October 18, 2018. 27. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(1), (b)(2) and/or (b)(3) on behalf of themselves and as representatives of the following class: All borrowers on mortgage loans for a one- to four-family residence located in California and maintained or serviced by Nationstar (including its subsidiaries, successors, predecessors, and other related entities) who paid money into an escrow account for the purpose of paying taxes, insurance, or other costs associated with the mortgaged property and did not receive interest thereon. The following persons and entities are excluded from the class: Nationstar and its officers, directors, employees, subsidiaries, and affiliates; all judges assigned to this case and any members of their immediate families or chambers staff; and the parties’ counsel in this litigation. Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify, change, or expand the class definition based upon discovery and further investigation. 28. Numerosity. The members of the class are so numerous that their individual joinder is impracticable. Nationstar is one of the country’s largest servicers of residential mortgages, and the class includes at least thousands of members. 29. Typicality. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of each class member. All class members have been subjected to Nationstar’s systematic and unlawful failure to pay interest on escrowed funds and have sustained damages as a result. 34. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege all paragraphs previously alleged. 35. The UCL prohibits acts of “unfair competition,” including any “unlawful [or] unfair . . . business act or practice.” 36. Due to Nationstar’s unlawful and unfair business acts or practices, Plaintiffs, class members, and the public at large have suffered and continue to suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. Unlawful 37. Nationstar is a “financial institution” as defined in Civil Code section 2954.8(c). 46. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege all paragraphs previously alleged. 47. Nationstar entered into binding mortgage loan agreements with Plaintiffs and class members that require Nationstar to comply with applicable law, including state laws requiring the payment of interest to borrowers on their escrowed funds. 48. Plaintiff and class members fulfilled or substantially fulfilled all obligations to Nationstar under the relevant mortgage loan agreements. 49. Through its failure to pay interest to Plaintiffs and class members on their escrowed sums, Nationstar breached its contractual obligation to them to comply with applicable law, including state laws that require paying interest to borrowers on such escrowed funds. Nationstar’s nonpayment of interest violates section 2954.8 of the California Civil Code. 50. As a result of Nationstar’s breaches of contract, Plaintiffs and class members have been harmed in an amount to be determined at trial. A. Plaintiffs’ Mortgage Loan Agreements Breach of Contract Violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. (“UCL”)

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