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During the Class Period Plaintiff Nichole Hubbard’s child, C.H., watched videos on the YouTube Platform using via YouTube.com, the YouTube mobile app, and the YouTube Kids App. C.H. viewed several monetized YouTube channels owned by Channel Owner Defendants during the Class Period, including, inter alia, the following channels: ChuChuTV Nursery Rhymes & Kids Songs, Ryan ToysReview, My Little Pony Office, and CookieSwirlC. Defendants collected C.H.’s Personal Information for the purposes of tracking, profiling, and targeting C.H. with advertisements as she watched Channel Owner Defendants’ YouTube videos. Defendants did not obtain verifiable parental consent prior to the collection of C.H.’s Personal Information. Defendants actively and fraudulently concealed their unlawful acts described herein and further deceptively misled parents and the public about Defendants’ intentional design and employment of the You Tube Platform and the monetized channels thereon to attract and provide video viewing to minors under the age of thirteen and to exploit such minors’ Personal Information for Defendants’ enormous financial gain. Plaintiff could not have reasonably discovered Defendants’ conduct earlier through investigation. Defendants’ tracking, profiling, and targeting of C.H. without parental consent is highly offensive and constitutes an invasion of C.H.’s privacy.

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14. Defendant is a medical service provider. Customers pay one flat fee and get access to unlimited doctor’s appointments, preventative and sick care, lab and genetic testing and remote access. Defendant operates two medical offices in New York City, located at 555 Madison Avenue, New York, New York, and 1153 Broadway, New York, New York. 15. Defendant’s Website is heavily integrated with its medical service, serving as its gateway. Through the Website, Defendant’s customers can, inter alia: learn about Defendant’s service; learn about the Defendant’s physicians and medical board; learn about the New York City locations, including their address and contact information and take a virtual tour of the locations, read reviews and become a member. 16. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff Nisbett and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its medical offices and services. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff Nisbett and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s medical services and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 19. Plaintiff Nisbett was denied full and equal access to the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website because he encountered multiple accessibility barriers that visually-impaired people often encounter with non-compliant websites: a. Lack of alt-text for images. b. Documents do not have a title. c. Frames do not have a title. d. Webpages have no pages. e. Some pages share the same name, so it is hard to distinguish pages. f. Webpages have markup errors. Defendant Must Remove Barriers to Their Website 21. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Nisbett could independently navigate it, learn about Defendant’s services, including its doctors and locations, and find out if he is a candidate. 22. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Nisbett has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 23. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff Nisbett and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff Nisbett alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Nisbett; b. Failing to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Nisbett; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff Nisbett, as a member of a protected class. 24. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 26. Because its Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff Nisbett seeks a permanent injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff Nisbett to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for its Website: a. Remediating the Website to be WCAG 2.0 AA compliant; b. Training Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly checking the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; d. Regularly testing user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, e. Developing an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 27. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 28. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Nisbett and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 30. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 31. Plaintiff Nisbett seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of Defendant’s medical services during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 32. Plaintiff Nisbett seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of Defendant’s medical services during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 33. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class Members and the New York Subclass Members: a. Whether Defendant’s online medical services constitute a “public accommodation” or a service or good “of a place of public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” or an “accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege” under the 39. Plaintiff Nisbett, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 40. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 41. Defendant’s medical services constitute a public accommodations under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Their Website is a service, privilege, or advantage that is integrated with its medical services. 42. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 44. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 45. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Nisbett, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. 46. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Nisbett requests the relief as set forth below. 48. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 49. Defendant’s State of New York medical offices are public accommodations under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of these offices and its medical services. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with Defendant’s medical offices and its medical services. 50. Defendant is subject to NYSHRL because its owns and operates its medical offices and the Website. Defendant is a “person” under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 51. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its medical offices and services to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 53. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 54. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 56. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Nisbett and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its medical offices and services under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 57. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Nisbett seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 58. Plaintiff Nisbett is entitled to compensatory damages and civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense. 59. Plaintiff Nisbett is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 61. Plaintiff Nisbett, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 63. The Website is a public accommodation under NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 64. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website and its medical offices located in the City of New York, making it a person under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 65. Defendant is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its medical offices and services to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(4)(a), 8-107(15)(a). 66. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Subclass because of a disability, violating the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a,) in that it has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 68. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Nisbett seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff Nisbett is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines for each offense. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 70. Plaintiff Nisbett is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff Nisbett, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 74. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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1. California Copyright Law 13. The facts in support of this action are based on Plaintiff’s review of publicly- available information. Based on a review of these documents, and as described in greater detail herein, Plaintiff believes that discovery will result in the production of many more inculpatory documents within Defendants’ sole possession, custody, or control. A. State Copyright Law Regulates Pre-1972 Recordings 14. Under the 1972 Amendments of the United States Copyright Act, Congress provided that sound recordings “fixed” (i.e., recorded) before February 15, 1972 are within the exclusive province of state law. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c). Thus, state common and statutory law applies to these Pre-1972 Recordings. 15. Plaintiff asserts claims under California, New York, and Florida law. Each of these state’s protections for Pre-1972 Recordings is discussed in greater detail below. 16. The music industry is synonymous with California. The making and exploitation of sound recordings in California employs tens of thousands of Californians and contributes millions upon millions of dollars to the state and local economies. California, in turn, has Case3:15-cv-00703-JCS Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page4 of 18 39. This lawsuit is brought on behalf of Plaintiff individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3). Plaintiff seeks relief on behalf of itself and members of a Class defined as follows: All owners of sound recordings or musical performances that were initially “fixed” on a physical medium (i.e., recorded) prior to February 15, 1972 and whose sound recordings were reproduced, performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited by Sony in the States of California, New York and Florida through its Music Unlimited and for which Sony had not received authorization or license to reproduce, perform, distribute, or otherwise exploit. 40. Excluded from the Class are Defendants; any affiliate, parent, or subsidiary of Case3:15-cv-00703-JCS Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page8 of 18 48. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference, as though fully set forth here, all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 49. Plaintiff brings this cause of action individually and on behalf of the Class. 50. Under California Civil Code § 980(a)(2), Plaintiff and members of the Class possess exclusive ownership interests in and to the Pre-1972 Recordings, including the performances embodied in those recordings. 51. Defendants, without authorization or license, reproduced, performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited Pre-1972 Recordings, including Plaintiff’s Recordings, through its Music Case3:15-cv-00703-JCS Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page10 of 18 54. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference, as though fully set forth here, all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 55. Plaintiff brings this cause of action individually and on behalf of the Class. 56. California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. prohibits acts of unfair competition, which mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices. 57. Fair dealings with artists are matters of great public concern in California and elsewhere. As a society, we value creative expression, and accordingly foster and protect such expression through copyright, trademark and other intellectual property laws. Specifically applicable here is Senate Bill No. 1034, where the California Legislature determined that “the recording industry is an important industry to the State of California,” and that “artistic labor is an important resource to the people of California that is vital to maintaining a healthy and vibrant recording industry.” 58. As alleged herein, Defendants, without authorization or license, reproduced, performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited Pre-1972 Recordings, including Plaintiff’s Recordings, through its Music Unlimited. As such, Defendants have infringed Plaintiff’s and Case3:15-cv-00703-JCS Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page11 of 18 65. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference, as though fully set forth here, all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 66. Plaintiff brings this cause of action individually and on behalf of the Class. 67. Under California, New York and Florida law, Plaintiff and the members of the Class possess exclusive ownerships in and to the Pre-1972 Recordings, including the artistic performances embodied in those recordings. 68. Plaintiff and the members of the Class (or their predecessors in interest) invested substantial time and money in developing the Pre-1972 Recordings that Defendants reproduced, performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited on Music Unlimited. 69. Because Defendants did not obtain licenses to the Pre-1972 Recordings, they did not incur any of the costs that a licensee would otherwise be obligated to pay in order to reproduce, perform, distribute, or otherwise exploit these recordings. 70. Defendants have and continue to misappropriate for its commercial benefit the Pre-1972 Recordings through its Music Unlimited. 71. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ misappropriation, Defendants have received and retained money and value that rightfully belongs to Plaintiff and the Class. 72. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violation of California, New York and Florida law, Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial, but which is likely to be tens of millions of dollars. 73. Defendants acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. Defendants’ conduct was undertaken in conscious disregard of Plaintiff and other members of the Class’s rights to the Pre- 1972 Recordings. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to punitive damages against Case3:15-cv-00703-JCS Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page13 of 18 Misappropriation Under California, New York And Florida Law Unlawful and Unfair Business Acts and Practices in Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. Violation of California Civil Code § 980(a)(2)

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(For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty And Violation Of ERISA’s Prohibited Transaction Rules) (For Co-Fiduciary Breach And Liability For Knowing Breach Of Trust) (For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty) 11. Upon information and belief, the Plan was established in 2002 by SLC to provide health insurance benefits to its employees and their dependents. 12. At all relevant times, SLC withheld Employee Contributions from Plaintiffs’ pay and its employees’ pay for remittance to the Plan. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, these Employee Contributions were retained in SLC’s corporate bank account until they were remitted to the Plan’s third-party administrator, Key Benefit Administrators, Inc. 13. At all relevant times, SLC was responsible for causing Employee Contributions and Employer Contributions to be remitted to Key Benefit Administrators, Inc. 14. At some point in 2015, SLC failed to remit Premiums to Key Benefit Administrators, Inc. SLC’s failure to remit these Premiums caused the Plan’s health insurance Case: 1:16-cv-00732-MRB Doc #: 1 Filed: 07/05/16 Page: 3 of 11 PAGEID #: 3 -4- coverage to lapse, and caused Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees to lose their health insurance coverage for a portion of 2015. 15. During the period of time that the Plan’s coverage lapsed, Egbers was pregnant and, in connection with that pregnancy, incurred approximately $2,500 in medical expenses that should have been covered by the Plan. 16. During the period of time that the Plan’s coverage lapsed, Williams was pregnant and gave birth to a child and, in connection with that birth and ensuing medical complications, incurred medical expenses of approximately $400,000 that should have been covered by the Plan. 17. Similarly, during the period of time that the Plan’s coverage lapsed, thousands of Defendant’s employees (1) paid for health insurance coverage that was never provided; and (2) incurred medical expenses that should have been at least partially covered by the Plan. 18. Plaintiffs bring this class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, as members of the proposed class (“Class”), defined as follows: All current and former participants or beneficiaries of the Senior Lifestyle Corporation Employees Medical Plan whose health insurance coverage lapsed on or after July 5, 2010 due in whole or in part to Defendant’s failure to remit Premiums to fund the Plan. 19. Numerosity. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that there are at least thousands of Class members throughout the United States. As a result, the members of the Class are so numerous that their individual joinder in this action is impracticable. 20. Commonality. There are numerous questions of fact and/or law that are common to Plaintiffs and all the members of the Class, including, but not limited to the following: Case: 1:16-cv-00732-MRB Doc #: 1 Filed: 07/05/16 Page: 4 of 11 PAGEID #: 4 -5- (a) whether Defendant acted as a fiduciary under ERISA in connection with the conduct described herein; (b) whether Defendant breached its fiduciary duties under ERISA by failing to remit Premiums to fund the Plan; (c) whether Defendant engaged in prohibited transactions by, inter alia, converting the Premiums for its own benefit; and (d) whether and what form of relief should be afforded to Plaintiffs and the Class. 21. Typicality. Plaintiffs are members of the Class and have claims that are typical of all Class members. Plaintiffs’ claims and all of the Class members’ claims arise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendant and arise under the same legal theories that are applicable as to all other members of the Class. 22. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiffs have no conflicts of interest with or interests that are any different from the other members of the Class. Plaintiffs have retained competent counsel experienced in class action and other complex litigation, including class actions under ERISA. 23. Predominance. Common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and the Court and parties will spend the vast majority of their time working to resolve these common issues. Indeed, virtually the only individual issues of significance will be the exact amount of damages recovered by each Class member, the calculation of which ultimately will be a ministerial function that poses no bar for class certification. 24. Superiority. A class action is superior to all other feasible alternatives for the Case: 1:16-cv-00732-MRB Doc #: 1 Filed: 07/05/16 Page: 5 of 11 PAGEID #: 5 -6- resolution of this matter. Many of the Class members are unaware of Defendant’s breaches of fiduciary duty and prohibited transactions such that they will never bring suit individually. Furthermore, even if they were aware of the claims they have against Defendant, the claims of the many Class members would be too small to economically justify individual litigation. Finally, individual litigation of multiple cases would be highly inefficient, a gross waste of the resources of the courts and of the parties, and potentially could lead to inconsistent results that would be contrary to the interests of justice. 25. Manageability. This case is well suited for class treatment and can easily be managed as a class action since evidence of both liability and damages can be adduced, and proof of liability and damages can be presented, on a class wide basis, while the allocation and distribution of damages to Class members would be essentially a ministerial function. 26. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 27. Defendant is a fiduciary of the Plan under ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(a), as explained above, as well as because it is a named fiduciary and a sponsor of the Plan, and is a fiduciary based on the exercise of its discretion, authority, and/or control with respect to the management of the plan and/or the disposition of its assets, as well as the discretionary authority and responsibility that Defendant has with respect to the administration of the Plan. 28. During 2015, Defendant withheld at least hundreds of thousands of dollars from its Case: 1:16-cv-00732-MRB Doc #: 1 Filed: 07/05/16 Page: 6 of 11 PAGEID #: 6 -7- employees’ pay as Employee Contributions to the Plan, but failed to remit the amounts so withheld to Key Benefits Administrators, Inc., the third-party administrator of the Plan. Defendant also failed to remit the Employer Contributions owed to Key Benefits Administrators, Inc. 29. By the conduct described above, Defendant: A. violated ERISA § 403(a) and (c)(1), 29 U.S.C. §1103(A) and (c)(1), which provide that all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust and never inure to the benefit of the employer; B. violated ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1)(A), by failing to act solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries, and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of plan administration; and C. as detailed below, violated ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106, by engaging in prohibited transactions that also are per se breaches of fiduciary duty under 32. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 33. By the conduct described above, Defendant: A. violated ERISA § 406(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. §1106(a)(1)(D), by causing the Plan to engage in transactions which Defendant knew, or should have known, constituted a direct or indirect transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a party in interest, of assets of the Plan; B. violated ERISA § 406(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. §1106(b)(1), by dealing with assets of the Plan in Defendant’s own interest and/or for its own account; C. violated ERISA § 406(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. §1106(b)(2), by acting on behalf of a party whose interests were adverse to the interests of the Plan or the interests of its participants and beneficiaries; and D. violated ERISA § 406(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. §1106(b)(3), by receiving consideration for its own account from a party dealing with the Plan and/or in connection with a transaction involving the assets of the Plan. 34. Because Defendant engaged in the above-described prohibited transactions, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to all equitable or remedial relief as the Court may deem appropriate and just, as well as the remedies of disgorgement and restitution as may be appropriate. Case: 1:16-cv-00732-MRB Doc #: 1 Filed: 07/05/16 Page: 8 of 11 PAGEID #: 8 -9- 35. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 36. In the alternative, to the extent that Defendant is not deemed a fiduciary or co-fiduciary under ERISA, Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs and the Class for all recoverable damages and relief as a non-fiduciary that knowingly participated in a breach of trust. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class, demand judgment against Defendant for the following relief: (a) Disgorgement, restitution, and/or damages as set forth above, plus any and all other equitable or remedial relief as the Court may deem appropriate pursuant to ERISA §§ 409(a) and 502(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109(a) and 1132(a); (b) Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the maximum permissible rates, whether at law or in equity; (c) Attorneys’ fees, costs, and other recoverable expenses of litigation; and (d) Such further and additional relief to which Plaintiffs and the Class may be justly entitled and the Court deems appropriate and just under all of the circumstances. NOTICE PURSUANT TO ERISA § 502(h) To ensure compliance with the requirements of ERISA § 502(h), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(h), the undersigned hereby affirms that, on this date, a true and correct copy of this Complaint was served upon the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of the Treasury by certified mail, return receipt requested. Case: 1:16-cv-00732-MRB Doc #: 1 Filed: 07/05/16 Page: 9 of 11 PAGEID #: 9 -10- Dated: July 5, 2016 Respectfully submitted, /s/Jeffrey S. Goldenberg Jeffrey S. Goldenberg (0063771) Todd B. Naylor (0068388) Goldenberg Schneider LPA One West Fourth Street, 18th Floor Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 Telephone: (513) 345-8291 Facsimile: (513) 345-8294 Email: jgoldenberg@gs-legal.com tnaylor@gs-legal.com James E. Miller (pro hac to be filed) Laurie Rubinow (pro hac to be filed) Shepherd Finkelman Miller & Shah, LLP 65 Main Street Chester, CT 06412 Telephone: (860) 526-1100 Facsimile: (866) 300-7367 Email: jmiller@sfmslaw.com lrubinow@sfmslaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class Case: 1:16-cv-00732-MRB Doc #: 1 Filed: 07/05/16 Page: 10 of 11 PAGEID #: 10 -11-

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14. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated as a member of the proposed class concerning the ATDS claim for no prior express consent (hereafter “The Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendants to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 6. On or around August 13, 2020, Defendants contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers ending in -7447 to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendants’ services. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) • As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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10. Plaintiff has never provided his cellular number to Defendant and never consented to be contacted by Defendant on his cellular telephone. 11. Despite Plaintiff’s request that Defendant cease making automated calls to his cellular phone, Defendant continued to place automated calls to Plaintiff. 12. Plaintiff received automated calls from Defendant on or about February 27 and 28, 2013, and March 1 and 6, 2013. 14. Upon information and belief, each of the aforementioned calls was placed using an ATDS and used an artificial or prerecorded voice, as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 15. The telephone number that Defendant used to contact Plaintiff was and is assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 16. Defendant did not have prior express consent to place automated calls to Plaintiff on his cellular telephone. 17. Defendant’s calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone were not for “emergency purposes.” 18. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 19. Plaintiff’s proposed Class is as follows, subject to amendment as appropriate: Class Definition. All persons within the United States who, at any time during the last four years, received one or more non-emergency telephone calls from Kohl’s to a cellular telephone through the use of an ATDS and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice, and who did not provide prior express consent for such calls. 21. Upon information and belief, Defendant has placed calls using an ATDS and/or using an artificial or prerecorded voice to cellular telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers throughout the United States, without their prior express consent. The members of the Class, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 22. The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s call records. C. Common Questions of Law and Fact 23. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. These questions include: a. Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice; b. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior express consent to make each call; c. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing willful, and/or negligent; d. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and e. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 25. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all based on the same factual and legal theories. E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members 26. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. F. Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable 27. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecutions of separate claims against Kohl’s is small because it is not economically feasible for Class members to bring individual actions. 29. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 30. Defendant negligently placed multiple automated calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent. 31. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a negligent violation of the TCPA. 32. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 33. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. 34. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 35. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed multiple automated calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent. 36. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a knowing and/or willful violation of the TCPA. 38. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. 9. Beginning in or around December 2012, Defendant repeatedly placed automated calls using an ATDS to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. A. The Class Dated: March 20, 2013 Respectfully submitted, By /s/ Sergei Lemberg Sergei Lemberg (BBO# 650671) Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.

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11. At all times relevant, Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a California corporation, and therefore, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C § 153 (39). 12. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 44. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 45. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of: All persons within the United States who had or have a number assigned to a cellular telephone service, who received at least one telephone call using an ATDS from Defendant, or their agents calling on behalf of Defendant, between the date of filing this action and the four years preceding, where such calls were placed for the purpose of marketing, to non-customers of Defendant, at the time of the calls. 46. Defendant and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 47. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendant or its agents, during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 49. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the Court. The Class can be identified through Defendant’s records and/or Defendant’s agent’s records. 50. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the following: i. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint, Defendant made any call(s) (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) to the Class members using any ATDS to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service; ii.Whether Defendant called non-customers of Defendant for marketing purposes; iii.Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation(s); and iv.Whether Defendant should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 52. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. The size of Class member’s individual claims causes, few, if any, Class members to be able to afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 53. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 54. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal and California law. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those that would be presented in numerous individual claims. 55. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 57. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 58. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 59. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 60. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 61. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 62. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each of the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 63. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 65. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for itself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 66. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 67. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 68. As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for itself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 69. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 70. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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33. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all legally blind individuals who have attempted, or will attempt, to use Minute Key Kiosks at all locations throughout the United States. 34. Numerosity: The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 36. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 37. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation, generally, and who possess specific expertise in the context of class litigation under the ADA. 38. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole.

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26. Plaintiff brings this class action for Defendants’ violations of the TCPA and GBL 399-p, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1)- 8 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 27. Plaintiff seek to represent three classes of individuals (“the Classes”) defined as follows: Class A: All persons in the United States, from four years prior to the filing of the instant Complaint through the date of the filing of the instant Complaint, to whom Defendants, using the autodialer, made a call or caused to be made a call to the person’s cellular telephone or residential telephone and left a prerecorded or artifical-voice message identical or substantially similar to the messages Defendants left for Plaintiff descibed above, without obtaining the person’s prior express consent. Class B: All persons in the United States, from October 16, 2013 through the date of the filing of the instant Complaint, to whom Defendants, using the autodialer, made a call or caused to be made a call to the person’s cellular telephone or residential telephone and left a prerecorded or artifical-voice message identical or substantially similar to the messages Defendants left for Plaintiff descibed above, without obtaining the person’s prior express written consent. Class C: All persons in New York State from three years prior to the filing of the instant Complaint through the date of the filing of the instant Complaint, whom Defendants called or caused to be made a call using the autodialer, where the calls contained a prerecorded message identical or substantially similar to the messages described above that Defendants left for Plaintiff which message did not state at the end the address and telephone number of the person on whose behalf the call was being transmitted. 28. Numerosity: The Classes are so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective Classes’ members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 9 29. Upon information and belief Classes A, B and C contain at a minimum thousands of members. 30. Upon information and belief, the Classes’ sizes and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendants’ records, including, but not limited to Defendants’ call records. 31. Members of the Classes may be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in class actions, such as by published notice, e-mail notice, website notice, fax notice, first class mail, or combinations thereof, or by other methods suitable to the Classes and deemed necessary and/or appropriate by the Court. 32. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the Classes are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 33. Defendants, using the autodialer, initiated or caused to be initiated at least one telephone call to Plaintiff’s and each member of Class A’s cellular telephone line or residential telephone line, which telephone call contained a pre-recorded and/or artificial voice message identical or substantially similar to the messages described above that Defendants left for Plaintiff, where Defendants did not receive prior express consent to make such call to the called party. 34. Defendants, using the autodialer, initiated or caused to be initiated at least one telephone call to Plaintiff’s and each member of Class B’s cellular telephone line or residential telephone line, which telephone call contained a pre-recorded and/or artificial voice message identical or substantially similar to the messages described above that Defendants left for Plaintiff, where Defendants did not receive prior express consent to make such call to the called 10 party. 35. Defendants, using the autodialer, initiated or caused to be initiated at least one telephone call to Plaintiff and each member of Class C, which contained a pre-recorded and/or artificial voice message identical or substantially similar to the messages described above that Defendants left for Plaintiff, which message did not state at the end the address and telephone number of the person on whose behalf the call was being transmitted. 36. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of common questions of fact and law affecting the Plaintiff and members of the classes. 37. The questions of fact and law common to Plaintiff and Class A predominate over questions which may affect individual members and include the following: (a) Whether Defendants’ conduct of calling Plaintiff and the members of Class A using the autodialer with a precorded and/or artificial message identical or substantially similar to messages Defendants left for Plaintiff described above violated the TCPA? (b) Whether Plaintiff and the members of Class A are entitled to statutory damages from Defendants under the TCPA? (c) Whether Defendants’ violations of the TCPA were willful or knowing? (d) Whether Plaintiff and the members of Class A are entitled to up to triple statutory damages under the TCPA from Defendants for Defendants’ willful and knowing violations of the TCPA? (e) Whether Plaintiff and the members of Class A are entitled to multiple statutory damages (or multiple triple statutory damages for Defendants’ willful and knowing violations of the TCPA) for each of Defendants’ calls that violated multiple portions of the TCPA and the regulations thereunder? 11 (f) Whether Plaintiff and the members of the Class A are entitled to a permanent injunction under the TCPA enjoining Defendants from continuing to engage in their unlawful conduct? 38. The questions of fact and law common to Plaintiff and Class B predominate over questions which may affect individual members and include the following: (a) Whether Defendants’ conduct of calling Plaintiff and the members of Class B using the autodialer with a precorded and/or artificial message identical or substantially similar to messages Defendants left for Plaintiff described above violated the TCPA? (b) Whether Plaintiff and the members of Class B are entitled to statutory damages from Defendants under the TCPA? (c) Whether Defendants’ violations of the TCPA were willful or knowing? (d) Whether Plaintiff and the members of Class B are entitled to up to triple statutory damages under the TCPA from Defendants for Defendants’ willful and knowing violations of the TCPA? (e) Whether Plaintiff and the members of Class B are entitled to multiple statutory damages (or multiple triple statutory damages for Defendants’ willful and knowing violations of the TCPA) for each of Defendants’ calls that violated multiple portions of the TCPA and the regulations thereunder? (f) Whether Plaintiff and members of the Class B are entitled to a permanent injunction under the TCPA enjoining Defendants from continuing to engage in their unlawful conduct? 39. The questions of fact and law common to Plaintiff and Class C predominate over questions which may affect individual members and include the following: 12 (a) Whether Defendants’ conduct of calling Plaintiff and the members of Class C using the autodialer with a prerecorded and/or artificial message identical or substantially similar to messages Defendants left for Plaintiff described above violated GBL § 399-p? (b) Whether Plaintiff and the members of Class C are entitled to statutory damages from Defendants under GBL § 399-p? (c) Whether Plaintiff and members of the Class C are entitled to a permanent injunction under GBL § 399-p enjoining Defendants from continuing to engage in their unlawful conduct? (d) Whether Plaintiff and members of Class C are entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees, costs and expenses from Defendants under GBL 399-p for this action? 40. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Classes because Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the Classes and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Classes. Plaintiff has retained counsel who is competent and experienced in litigation in the federal courts and class action litigation. 41. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of the Classes. While the aggregate damages which may be awarded to the members of the Classes are likely to be substantial, the damages suffered by individual members of the Classes are relatively small. As a result, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it economically infeasible and procedurally impracticable for each member of the Classes to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. Plaintiff does not know of any other litigation concerning this controversy already commenced against 13 Defendants by any member of the Classes. The likelihood of the individual members of the Classes prosecuting separate claims is remote. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and would increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same factual issues. In contrast, the conduct of this matter as a class action presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and would protect the rights of each member of the classes. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 42. Injunctive Relief: Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and members of Classes A, B and C, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the members of Classes A, B and C as a whole. 43. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in all of the above paragraphs and incorporates such allegations by reference. 44. By Defendants’ above-described conduct, Defendants committed more than 10,000 violations of the TCPA against Plaintiff and the members of Class A. 45. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of Class A are entitled to statutory damages from Defendants under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) of greater than $5,000,000 and an injunction against Defendants ordering them to cease their violations of the TCPA. 46. If it is found that Defendants willfully and/or knowingly violated the TCPA through their calls to Plaintiff and the members of Class A, Plaintiff and the members of Class A request an increase by the Court of the damage award against Defendants, described in the preceding paragraph, to three times the amount available under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), as 14 authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) for willful or knowing violations, which amounts to greater than $15,000,000. 47. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in all of the above paragraphs and incorporates such allegations by reference. 48. By Defendants’ above-described conduct, Defendants committed more than 2,500 violations of the TCPA against Plaintiff and the members of Class B. 49. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of Class B are entitled to statutory damages from Defendants under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) of greater than $1,250,000 and an injunction against Defendants ordering Defendants to cease their violations of the TCPA. 50. If it is found that Defendants willfully and/or knowingly violated the TCPA through their calls to Plaintiff and the members of Class B, Plaintiff and the members of Class B request an increase by the Court of the damage award against Defendants, described in the preceding paragraph, to three times the amount available under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) for willful or knowing violations, which amounts to greater than $3,750,000. 51. By Defendants’ above-described conduct, Defendants committed over 10,000 violations of GBL § 399-p(3) against Plaintiff and the members of Class C. 52. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of Class C are entitled to statutory damages under GBL § 399-p(9) of greater than $500,000 plus attorney’s fees, costs and expenses incurred in bringing this action. 53. In addition, Plaintiff and the members of Class C are entitled to an injunction 15 against Defendants ordering Defendants to cease its violations of GBL § 399-p.

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone numbers (516) 453-6886 and (310) 294-1337, confirmed to be Defendant’s number. 8. Beginning in or around January 2016, and continuing on through May 2016, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -6147, -3803, -5154, -0106; in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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15. Omnicare is a pharmacy that sells and delivers prescription medications and medical devices to nursing homes, medical facilities, and homes across the United States. These items are only available by delivery; thus delivery is an integral part of Omnicare’s business. 16. Omnicare holds a competitive bidding process for provision of delivery services in specific regions of the United States. As part of this process, Omnicare develops the routes delivery drivers must run in a particular region and includes them in its requests for proposal. 17. The lowest bidder receives all Omnicare’s delivery work in that particular state or region. 18. As a result of the bidding process, Omnicare selected Act Fast Delivery of Kentucky to deliver Omnicare products to customers in Kentucky. 19. Act Fast entered into an agreement with Omnicare to deliver Omnicare products to customers throughout Kentucky. Omnicare is Act Fast’s largest customer. 20. Omnicare operates three regional distribution centers located in Lexington, Ashland, and Beattyville, Kentucky. Act Fast provides delivery services for these distribution centers. 21. Act Fast hires drivers to deliver Omnicare products in Kentucky. While nominally working for Act Fast, these drivers make deliveries on behalf of Case: 5:18-cv-00142-REW-MAS Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/19/18 Page: 4 of 13 - Page ID#: 4 5 Omnicare from Omnicare facilities to Omnicare customers when and where Omnicare directs them to do so and in the manner Omnicare requires. 22. Plaintiffs and members of the putative class (collectively, Drivers) use their personal vehicles to make deliveries for Defendants’ benefit. 23. Upon information and belief, Defendants employ more than 100 individuals as Drivers based in Kentucky. 24. Drivers make regularly scheduled deliveries to Omnicare’s customers travelling routes set by Omnicare. After completion of the route, Omnicare requires Drivers to return to their assigned regional distribution center to return Omnicare’s boxes, bags, totes, and paperwork. 25. Defendants pay Drivers a flat, predetermined rate for each route. When calculated as an hourly rate, these flat rates result in a sub-minimum wage to Drivers. 26. Drivers also make stat runs, which are individual deliveries from Omnicare facilities to Omnicare customers made on an expedited, emergency, and ad hoc basis. Drivers are required to be on-call on regular schedules to make such stat runs. Omnicare directs when and where Drivers make stat runs. Defendants typically pay Drivers approximately 70 cents per mile one way for stat deliveries, although some short stat runs are paid on a flat fee basis. Defendants calculate the mileage for stat runs, which is often less than the actual number of miles driven. 27. At some times relevant to this Complaint, Defendants also employed dispatchers who assigned Omnicare’s stat run orders to Drivers. Defendants Case: 5:18-cv-00142-REW-MAS Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/19/18 Page: 5 of 13 - Page ID#: 5 6 required Dispatchers to perform delivery services as Drivers, even while dispatching other Drivers. Some Dispatchers not only assigned stat runs in the relevant Kentucky area, but also for Act Fast affiliates in Texas. 28. Drivers routinely work in excess of 40 hours per week, but are not paid at the overtime rate for these hours. 29. Defendants misclassified Drivers as independent contractors as a part of a fraudulent scheme to avoid their wage payment obligations under Kentucky’s wage and hour laws. 30. The employer–employee relationship between Defendants and Drivers is evidenced by the following: a. Defendants require Drivers to follow specific routes to deliver products and specify the exact time to drive those routes. b. Defendants control the method Drivers used to electronically report their deliveries at each stop and mandate compliance with that method. Defendants additionally require Drivers to complete specific paperwork at each stop. c. Defendants do not permit Drivers to negotiate a fee for their services. d. Defendants issue Drivers a daily work schedule with the Driver’s scheduled routes for the day. Defendants do not permit Drivers to reject these assignments or any stat runs assigned to them. e. Defendants require Drivers to wear a uniform imprinted with Act Fast’s logo. Case: 5:18-cv-00142-REW-MAS Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/19/18 Page: 6 of 13 - Page ID#: 6 7 f. Defendants require Drivers to sign a non-compete agreement, prohibiting them from working for any competitors. g. Defendants’ application materials refer to Drivers as Employee[s] and to Act Fast as Employer. h. Defendants require Drivers to fill out a USCIS Form I-9 to verify their employment eligibility, which is only required for employees. 31. As employees, Drivers are not exempt from overtime or minimum wage requirements as set forth in KRS 337, et seq. or the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 32. Act Fast and Omnicare are joint employers of the Drivers as evidenced by, but not limited to, the following: a. As set forth previously, Omnicare directs, controls, and supervises the way that Drivers perform their work. This level of control is expressly contemplated in the contract between Omnicare and Act Fast. b. Due to the level of control Omnicare exercises over the Drivers, it knows or should know that Act Fast is unlawfully underpaying the Drivers and misclassifying them as independent contractors, all on Omnicare’s behalf. c. Upon information and belief, Omnicare is Act Fast’s only customer in the Ashland and Beattyville areas and is Act Fast’s largest customer in the Lexington area, representing nearly all deliveries in that area. Thus, if Omnicare were to stop using Act Fast in Kentucky, Act Fast would go out of business, as has happened in other states and regions when Omnicare stopped contracting with Act Fast. Case: 5:18-cv-00142-REW-MAS Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/19/18 Page: 7 of 13 - Page ID#: 7 8 33. In the course of using their own vehicles for Defendants’ benefit, Drivers incur various necessary and required costs, including but not limited to gasoline, vehicle parts and fluids, automobile repair and maintenance services, insurance, and depreciation. Drivers incur vehicle rental fees when their own vehicles are unusable, as they are not permitted to reject routes or stat runs. Collectively, all such costs are referred to herein as Vehicle Costs. 34. Defendants do not reimburse Drivers for Vehicle Costs. 35. In addition, Defendants require Drivers to provide kickbacks to Defendants in the form of unreimbursed Vehicle Costs. Because of Defendants’ failure to account for these kickbacks, Drivers’ wages are not paid free and clear as required by law. 36. This underpayment is further compounded by Defendants’ unlawful deductions from Drivers’ wages, including but not limited to deductions for payroll processing fees and data transfer fees (collectively, Unlawful Deductions). 37. Defendants also unlawfully charge Drivers for expenses solely for Defendants’ benefit. These expenses include, but are not limited to, uniforms and employment screening fees (collectively, Unlawful Expenses). 38. Defendants also unlawfully fail to withhold income taxes, payroll taxes, FICA taxes, and other required payments (collectively, Required Deductions) for the Drivers’ benefit. 39. Thus, at all relevant times, Defendants: Case: 5:18-cv-00142-REW-MAS Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/19/18 Page: 8 of 13 - Page ID#: 8 9 a. Failed to pay the minimum wages for all hours worked (including wait time, on call time, and all other hours worked but not counted); b. Failed to pay at least 1.5 times the regular or minimum wage rate for hours worked in excess of 40 per week (including wait time, on-call time, and all other hours worked but not counted); c. Failed to reimburse for Vehicle Costs and other such kickbacks such that Drivers were paid below legal minimums; d. Withheld the Unlawful Deductions such that Drivers were paid below legal minimums; e. Charged the Unlawful Expenses such that Drivers were paid below legal minimums; and f. Failed to make Required Deductions. 40. Upon information and belief, the class includes more than 100 individuals. Although too numerous to join individually, the class members are identifiable through employment records. 41. There are common questions of law and fact to the class. Each class member was subject to Defendants’ common scheme of systematic underpayment and lack of reimbursement of kickbacks during the relevant period. While Drivers were paid different amounts for different routes, all such routes underpaid each Driver as a result of this common scheme. Case: 5:18-cv-00142-REW-MAS Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/19/18 Page: 9 of 13 - Page ID#: 9 10 42. Further, as described above, all class members were subject to the same Unlawful Deductions, Unlawful Expenses, and lack of Required Deductions pursuant to Defendants’ standard Driver payment policy. 43. Further, as described above, all class members were subject to Defendants’ control rendering them employees of both, not independent contractors. 44. The claims of the representative party, Davis, are typical of the class members. Davis was subject to the same common scheme regarding underpayment, failure to reimburse kickbacks, Unlawful Deductions, Unlawful Expenses and lack of Required Deductions as the members of the class. As such, his claims are identical to the class. 45. The representative party will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the parties. Plaintiff Davis has agreed to serve as class representative if a class is certified and accepts his obligation to act in the best interest of the class. 46. The proposed Class is also appropriate because questions of law or fact common to Class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. Further, proceeding as a class is superior to other available methods of fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Questions of law and fact predominate as every Class member was subject to identical efforts by Defendants’ to impose their unlawful wage practices upon them. Further, absent treatment as a class, Class members would be required to file individual lawsuits throughout the Commonwealth to vindicate their rights under KRS 337, et seq. and 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Case: 5:18-cv-00142-REW-MAS Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/19/18 Page: 10 of 13 - Page ID#: 10 11 47. As alleged herein, the proposed Class is also appropriate because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Class, so that final declaratory and/or injunctive relief is appropriate respecting the Class as a whole. 48. As such, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, the Class is properly defined as follows (the “Class”): All current and former delivery drivers or dispatchers classified as independent contractors who were based at a Kentucky distribution center and performed work for Defendants from November 15, 2012 to the day the Court authorizes notice. 49. Defendants’ conduct as set forth in this Complaint violates Kentucky and federal minimum wage and overtime requirements, including but not limited to KRS 337.275, 337.285, 29 U.S.C. § 206, and 29 U.S.C. § 207. 50. Pursuant to KRS 337.385 and 29 U.S.C. § 216, each and every member of the Class is entitled to recover all unpaid minimum wages, overtime wages, Vehicle Costs and other kickbacks, Unlawful Deductions, and Unlawful Expenses, as well as unpaid Payroll Deductions. 51. Additionally, pursuant to KRS 337.385 and 29 U.S.C. § 216, each and every member of the Class is entitled to recover liquidated damages in an amount equal to their unpaid wages damages as well as all attorney’s fees, costs, and other expenses associated with bringing this action. Each and every member of the Class is also entitled to pre- and post-judgment interest on all monetary awards. Case: 5:18-cv-00142-REW-MAS Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/19/18 Page: 11 of 13 - Page ID#: 11 12 52. Defendants’ conduct as set forth in this Complaint violates KRS 337.060, Kentucky’s statutory prohibition on payroll deductions. 53. Pursuant to KRS 337.385, each and every member of the Class defined above is entitled to recover liquidated damages in an amount equal to these unlawful deductions as well as all attorney’s fees, costs, and other expenses associated with bringing this action. Each and every member of the Class is also entitled to pre- and post-judgment interest on all monetary awards. 54. Defendants were unjustly enriched by the shifting of a portion of the cost of doing business onto Drivers. Such costs include, but are not limited to, Drivers’ Vehicle Costs and other kickbacks, Unlawful Deductions, and Unlawful Expenses. 55. Each and every member of the Class is entitled to restitution for all of Defendants’ costs or fees that have been levied upon them, including but not limited to the Unlawful Deductions and Unlawful Expenses. Each and every member of the Class is also entitled to pre- and post-judgment interest on all monetary awards.

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30. Plaintiff brings this claim for relief for violation of the FLSA as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all persons similarly situated as Hands and/or Operators and/or who were or are employed by Defendants and who are entitled to payment for all of their overtime wages which Defendants failed to pay from three years prior to the date of the filing of this lawsuit, through the time of the trial of this case. 31. Plaintiff is unable to state the exact number of the class but believes that the classes membership exceeds 30 persons but is less than 150 persons. Defendants can readily identify the members of the classes, who are a certain portion of the current and former employees of Defendants. 33. The email addresses of many of the probable FLSA collective action Plaintiffs are available from Defendants, and notice should be provided to the probable FLSA collective action Plaintiffs via email to their last known email addresses as soon as possible. 34. Oilfield workers are by category not at their residences as frequently as many other working-class Americans. As such, they rely on email just as much or more so than typical wage earners, who themselves live their lives with a growing dependence upon email as opposed to traditional U.S. Mail. 35. The proposed FLSA class members are similarly situated in that they have been subject to uniform practices by Defendants which violated the FLSA, including: A. Defendants’ uniform failure to compensate employees pursuant to the requirements of the FLSA; and B. Defendants’ failure to pay members of the class proper overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 36. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants improperly calculated their regular rate of pay and overtime for Plaintiff and other Hands and Operators employed by Defendants. V. 37. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all the preceding paragraphs of this Original Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 38. Within the time period relevant to this case, Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a Hand/Operator. 40. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were classified as hourly employees. 41. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were also paid non- discretionary bonuses on a regular basis. 42. In addition, Defendants paid Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees one-and-one-half of their base hourly rate for each hour they worked over forty (40) in a workweek. 43. However, Defendants did not include bonuses of Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees into their regular rate when calculating their overtime pay. 44. Section 778.208 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations requires that non-discretionary bonuses “must be totaled in with other earnings to determine the regular rate on which overtime pay must be based.” 45. Defendants violated the FLSA by not including bonuses of Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees into their regular rate when calculating their overtime pay. 46. Plaintiff worked for Defendants in various places in Texas and Defendants’ pay practices were the same at all locations. 47. Defendants knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, the way they paid Plaintiff and their other Hands and/or Operators violated the FLSA. 49. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all the preceding paragraphs of this Original Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 50. 29 U.S.C. § 207 requires employers to pay employees one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate for all hours that the employee works in excess of forty (40) per week. 29 U.S.C.S. § 207 (LEXIS 2013). 51. Defendants violated Section 778.208 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations by not including bonuses of Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees into their regular rate when calculating their overtime pay. 52. Defendants’ conduct and practice, as described above, has been and is willful, intentional, unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith. 53. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged herein, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for, and Plaintiff seeks, unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, pre- judgment interest, civil penalties and costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees as provided by the FLSA. 54. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all the preceding paragraphs of this Original Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 56. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of themselves individually and all other similarly situated employees, former and present, who were and/or are affected by Defendants’ willful and intentional violation of the FLSA. 57. In the past three years, Defendants have employed dozens of Hands and Operators. 58. Like Plaintiff, these Hands and Operators regularly worked more than 40 hours in a week. 59. Defendants failed to pay these workers at the proper overtime rate. Because these employees are similarly situated to Plaintiff, and are owed overtime for the same reasons, the opt-in class is properly defined as: All Hourly Paid Hands And/Or Operators Employed By Defendants Within The Past Three Years. This Group Includes, but is not necessarily limited to, hourly paid workers employed in States where Defendants do business. V.

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22. Plaintiff realleges the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 23. Pursuant to CR 23, Plaintiff brings this class action on his own behalf and on behalf of all employees similarly situated (“Class Members” or “Class”) pursuant to RCW 24. Plaintiffs propose the following class definition: All First Line Leaders (FLLs) in Manufacturing and Production who worked for Defendant in the state of Washington at any time from three years preceding the filing of this Complaint through the present. 25. Numerosity. The class is so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, Defendant employed hundreds of FLLs in Manufacturing in Washington State during the proposed class period. 49.46 and RCW 49.52.

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12. Homejoy is a San Francisco-based cleaning service, which provides cleaning services in cities throughout the country via an on demand dispatch system. 13. Homejoy offers customers the ability to request a cleaner on a mobile phone application or online through their website. 14. Homejoy’ website advertises that customers can “If you are not completely satisfied with your cleaning, we will come back and re-clean it for free!” 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 22. Plaintiff J.C. Iglesias brings the second and third causes of action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all Homejoy cleaners who have worked anywhere in the United States (except for California). 23. Plaintiff and other class members have uniformly been deprived reimbursement of their necessary business expenditures and overtime wages. 24. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. 25. Common questions of law and fact regarding Homejoy’s conduct in classifying cleaners as independent contractors, failing to reimburse them for business expenditures, and failing to pay them overtime wages exist as to all members of the class and predominate over any questions affecting solely any individual members of the class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the class are: a. Whether class members have been required to follow uniform procedures and policies regarding their work for Homejoy; b. Whether the work performed by class members—providing cleaning services to customers—is within Homejoy’s usual course of business, and whether such service is fully integrated into Homejoy’s business; c. Whether these class members have been required to bear the expenses of their employment, such as expenses for their cleaning supplies and equipment, vehicles, gas, and other expenses. 26. Named Plaintiff J.C. Iglesias is a class member, who suffered damages as a result of Defendant’s conduct and actions alleged herein. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 Unpaid Overtime Under the FLSA The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §207(a)(1), states that an employee must be paid overtime, equal to one and one-half (1.5) times the employee’s regular rate of pay, for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week. Plaintiff worked at times in excess of forty (40) hours per week but was not paid premium pay for hours worked beyond 40 in a week. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered lost wages and other damages. This claim is brought on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals (outside California) who may choose to “opt in” to this case, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 Violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 2802 Defendant’s conduct, as set forth above, in misclassifying Homejoy cleaners (outside California) as independent contractors, and failing to reimburse them for expenses they paid that should have been borne by their employer, constitutes a violation of California Labor Code Section 2802. Violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§1194, 1198, 510, and 558 Defendant’s conduct, as set forth above, in failing to pay Homejoy cleaners (outside California) overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty per week as required by California state law, violates Cal. Lab. Code §§1194, 1198, 510, and 558.

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11. As explained by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) in its 2012 order, the TCPA requires “prior express written consent for all … prerecorded [solicitation] calls to wireless numbers and residential lines.” In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG No. 02-278, FCC 12-21, 27 FCC Rcd. 1830 ¶ 2 (Feb. 15, 2012). 12. Yet in violation of this rule, Defendant and/or its agents fail to obtain express written consent before making prerecorded voice sales calls to consumers such as Plaintiff. 14. Even if eHealth is not placing the calls directly, eHealth benefits financially from each sale it acquires through the agents that place the calls. 15. eHealth’s prerecorded voice calls direct consumers to either press ‘2’ to speak to a live agent or press ‘9’ to be opted-out. 16. The prerecorded messages offer insurance from “A-rated insurers.” 18. In early March 2019, Plaintiff Edwards began receiving prerecorded calls to his cellular phone from Defendant. 20. Plaintiff pressed ‘9’ multiple times, but the calls continued. When he would press ‘9’, the line would simply go dead. 21. Frustrated by the fact that the calls had not stopped, and because he was receiving multiple calls daily, Plaintiff pressed ‘2’ to speak to a live agent. When he asked for the calls to stop, the agent simply hung up. 22. Plaintiff repeated this process at least two more times, in which he asked a live agent to stop calling him, but the calls continued to flood in. 24. On March 20, 2019 Plaintiff answered a call from Defendant using phone number 678-919-3485 at 3:41 PM. Plaintiff pressed ‘2’ and spoke with a live agent, going along with the solicitation to confirm the telemarketer’s identity. After a couple of minutes, Plaintiff confirmed that the call he received was from eHealth and was told the website address ehealthinsurance.com. 25. As with the majority of the calls that Plaintiff received, 678-919-3485 is a spoofed number that cannot be called back. 26. In total, Plaintiff received over 100 unsolicited, prerecorded calls to his cellular phone, despite multiple opt-out attempts that included pressing ‘9’ to opt-out and at least 3 instances when Plaintiff asked a live agent to remove his number from Defendant’s call list. 27. Plaintiff’s cellular phone is used for personal use only and is not associated with a business. 28. Plaintiff does not have a relationship with eHealth, or any of its affiliated companies, nor has he ever consented to any contact from Defendant. 29. Simply put, eHealth did not obtain Plaintiff’s prior express written consent to place any solicitation telephone calls to him using a prerecorded voice message. 30. Defendant’s unauthorized telephone calls harmed Plaintiff in the form of annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of privacy, and disturbed Edwards’s use and enjoyment of his phone, in addition to the wear and tear on the phone’s hardware (including the phone’s battery) and the consumption of memory on the phone. 32. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following t Classes: Prerecorded Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) Defendant (or agents acting on behalf of Defendant) called, (2) using a prerecorded voice message, (3) for substantially the same reason Defendant called Plaintiff. Internal Do Not Call Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) Defendant (or agents acting on behalf of Defendant) called more than one time (2) within any 12-month period (3) for substantially the same reason Defendant called Plaintiff. 33. The following individuals are excluded from the Classes: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, their subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Classes; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the Class definitions following appropriate discovery. 34. Numerosity and Typicality: On information and belief, there are hundreds, if not thousands of members of the Classes such that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is a member of both Classes. 36. Adequacy: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and his counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Classes, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interest adverse to the Classes. 38. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 37 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 39. Defendant and/or its agents made unwanted solicitation telephone calls to Plaintiff and the other members of the Prerecorded No Consent Class using a prerecorded voice message. 40. These prerecorded voice message calls were made en masse without the consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Prerecorded Class. 41. Defendant’s conduct was negligent or wilful and knowing. 42. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Prerecorded are each entitled to a minimum of $500 in damages, and up to $1,500 in damages, for each violation. 43. Plaintiff Edwards repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 37 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference. 45. Defendant or its agent made prerecorded marketing calls to Plaintiff and members of the Internal Do Not Call Class without implementing internal procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to be called by the entity and/or by implementing procedures that do not meet the minimum requirements to allow Defendant to initiate telemarketing calls. 46. The TCPA provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 47. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Internal Do Not Call List Class are each entitled to up to $1,500 per violation. Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claims Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff Edwards and the Internal Do Not Call Class) Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff Edwards and the Prerecorded No Consent Class) eHealth Markets its Products by Placing Unsolicited Prerecorded Calls to Consumers eHealth Placed Prerecorded Calls to Plaintiff Without His Consent, Despite Requests for the Calls to Stop

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10. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 11. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York; b. to whom Defendant MCM sent a collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. that offered options designed to save the consumer money; d. one of options was unclear if it was a discount or payment in full; e. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. 13. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 14. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e et seq. 15. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 18. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 19. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 20. Some time prior to January 20, 2021, an obligation was allegedly incurred to creditor Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. (hereinafter “Capital One”). 21. The Capital One obligation arose out of transactions incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes, specifically a personal credit card. 22. The alleged Capital One obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 23. Capital One is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 24. Capital One purportedly sold the defaulted debt to Defendant MCM, who is the current owner of the alleged debt, for the purpose of debt collection. Violation – January 20, 2021 Collection Letter 25. On or about January 20, 2021, Defendant MCM sent the Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt originally owed to Capital One. (See a true and correct copy of the Letter attached as Exhibit A.) 26. The Letter states a current balance of $4,399.93. 27. The Letter goes on to state “You have been pre-approved for options designed to save you money. Act now to maximize your savings…” 29. The third option provided by Defendant is not adequately explained and results in two different possible interpretations. 30. First, Option 3 might be construed as an option by which a discounted total amount is paid by monthly installments of $50 per month. 31. Alternatively, Option 3 might be construed as an option by which monthly installments of $50 are made until the total debt amount is paid in full. 32. By failing to explain whether Option 3 is a settlement option or an option to pay in full, the Letter is false, deceptive and misleading. 33. Furthermore, the Letter references “savings” and proclaims that it is “designed to save [the consumer] money”. 34. If in fact Option 3 is an offer for payment in full on the entire balance, the promises made by Defendant in the Letter to the Plaintiff consumer are completely false. 35. These violations by Defendant were knowing, willful, negligent and/or intentional, and Defendant did not maintain procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such violations. 36. Defendant’s collection efforts with respect to this alleged debt from Plaintiff caused Plaintiff to suffer concrete and particularized harm, inter alia, because the FDCPA provides Plaintiff with the legally protected right not to be misled or treated unfairly with respect to any action regarding the collection of any consumer debt. 38. The Plaintiff has no ability to consider all three offers in the proper context, since the final offer was unclear and could not be considered in light of the other two. 39. Defendant’s actions created an appreciable risk to Plaintiff of being unable to properly respond or handle Defendant’s debt collection. 40. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 41. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 42. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 43. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 45. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment in that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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27. In attempting to access the programs, services, and activities at SUNY Purchase, students and visitors with mobility disabilities, including those who use wheelchairs and other mobility devices, encounter pervasive barriers in violation of federal and state disability law. 28. Students and visitors must navigate a network of pedestrian rights-of-way plagued by ADA violations including but not limited to: A lack of curb ramps; non-compliant curb ramps and cross-walks; paths of travel that are unnecessarily long, have excessive slope, or crumbling concrete or asphalt; inadequate accessible parking; inadequate vertical access to the campus and public buildings; a lack of signage indicating accessibility; failing to provide alternative routes blocked by ongoing construction; non-compliant safety features such as call-boxes; and frequently broken accessibility features such as automatic door openers. 30. SUNY Purchase has failed on a systemic basis to provide and maintain accessible rights-of-way for all students and visitors. 31. Pervasive throughout the campus along paths of travel connecting parking, the campus, and the public buildings, are non-compliant and hazardous curb cuts that fail to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”) standards. Many curb cuts have excessive slope and cross-slope, contain abrupt changes in elevation, lack the necessary top-landing and tactile warnings, and are unsafe due to uneven and loose or crumbling pavement, creating numerous hazards for persons with mobility disabilities. 32. In many instances, curb cuts are missing altogether, including at the ends of the cross walk spanning the street between the front entrance of the Performing Arts Center and the elevator to the Main Plaza. 33. In addition to non-compliant curb ramps, other barriers along paths of travel substantially impede accessibility and create safety hazards for people who use canes, walkers, or other mobility aids; those at risk of tripping on the uneven surfaces; and for wheelchair users at risk of being thrown when the wheels catch on the loose and uneven surfaces. 35. Many other campus walkways connecting parking lots, the main campus, and public buildings on campus have excessive slope and cross slope impeding the path of travel for people with mobility disabilities. 36. There is no accessible route from the Outback Residence Hall across the quad to the Dining Hall, or to the elevator in the Dining Hall, which provides vertical access to the Main Plaza. 37. Accessible paths of travel are further impeded during the winter months because snow removal is inconsistent and unreliable. 38. Ongoing construction on campus impedes and in some cases totally blocks access and provides no temporary alternative routes and no signage indicating temporary alternative routes of travel. B. Parking Barriers for Students and Visitors with Mobility Disabilities at SUNY Purchase 39. The main parking lots for visitors and commuting students at SUNY Purchase are designated W-1 and W-2. The routes from these lots to the main campus and public buildings are excessive and unnecessarily long, lack sufficient vertical access or signage, and are replete with barriers along the paths of travel, such as missing or deficient curb ramps and uneven and crumbling surfaces. 41. Campus parking lots are missing safe and accessible pathways forcing pedestrians in wheelchairs to travel from their parking spaces to campus buildings behind parked cars, where they are not easily visible and are therefore at risk that vehicles might back into them. 42. In addition to these physical access barriers, SUNY Purchase has failed to adequately train parking enforcement staff regarding the rights of persons with mobility disabilities. Parking enforcement staff have instructed persons with disabilities who possess the necessary permits seeking to park on campus that they are not permitted to park in designated accessible spaces and have redirected them to parking lots farther from the center of campus. 43. To assist students in navigating the campus and traveling to and from nearby White Plains and Port Chester, SUNY Purchase provides a shuttle bus service, the “Purchase Loop.” This shuttle bus would greatly assist students with disabilities to navigate the current barrier-strewn paths of travel and lack of vertical access, yet the buses are not accessible to wheelchair users. C. Lack of Vertical Access at SUNY Purchase 44. SUNY Purchase’s academic buildings, as well as the Student Services Building, Library, bookstore, and Neuberger Museum, are located on and around a central plaza which is elevated from the street and main parking lot level. The campus lacks adequate vertical access between the two levels for students and visitors with mobility disabilities, including wheelchair users. 46. Access to the main exterior elevator from the W-1 and W-2 parking lots to the main plaza is hindered by unnecessarily long routes of travel, missing and/or insufficient signage, and missing or deficient and non-compliant curb cuts and paths of travel. Additionally, the elevator, functionally the sole point of vertical access to the main campus and public buildings, is often subject to closure due to break-downs, maintenance, and blocked routes related to the ongoing construction. 47. A potential third route is through an academic building. However, this is not an adequate alternative as the building is not generally open to the public nor are the doors unlocked at all times. Moreover, the path of travel between the building and the W-1 parking lot is particularly long and replete with barriers such as missing and non-compliant curb cuts. Further, there is no directional signage alerting pedestrians that it potentially provides vertical access to campus. 49. The Performing Arts Center is a multi-story facility containing four different performance spaces. Only one elevator, located on the east side of the building, provides access between floors. 50. Within the Performing Arts Center, the service counters at which visitors purchase tickets or inquire about performances and programs are too high for wheelchair users to execute ticket purchases or to interact with staff. 51. Inside the performance spaces, the three theaters with permanent seating configurations each include only four designated spaces for persons using wheelchairs. In each theater, all accessible spaces are located together in the back rows of the orchestra levels. For certain kinds of performances, these are the worst seats in the house. Moreover, because the accessible spaces are crowded together, audience members who use wheelchairs have a decreased chance of sitting with companions who do not use wheelchairs, and often face an obstructed view of the stage. E. Other Barriers Facing Students and Visitors with Mobility Disabilities at SUNY Purchase 52. Along pedestrian pathways, drinking fountains and emergency call boxes are out of accessible reach for persons in wheelchairs. 53. Seating areas throughout the main campus lack accessible tables. 54. The student mailroom lacks an accessible service counter or accessible table. 56. Elevators within buildings break down frequently, impeding vertical access within buildings for students and visitors with disabilities. 57. Defendants have failed and are failing to prepare and implement a complete and publicly available transition plan relating to structural changes to be undertaken to achieve program accessibility, as required under federal law. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(d). F. Harm to Plaintiff WILC 58. WILC is directly harmed by Defendants’ failure to ensure that the SUNY Purchase campus is accessible to persons with disabilities. WILC has expended resources combating accessibility barriers on campus. As a result of discriminatory practices at SUNY Purchase, WILC therefore has fewer resources to dedicate to its other programs. In addition, WILC staff who have mobility disabilities encounter accessibility barriers when they visit SUNY Purchase to pursue WILC’s advocacy work. This injury to WILC is ongoing and would be directly redressed by injunctive and declaratory relief. 59. WILC’s consumers who have mobility disabilities are directly harmed by Defendants’ failure to ensure that the SUNY Purchase campus is accessible to persons with disabilities, in that they are deprived of meaningful access to its educational and cultural programs, activities, and services. G. Harm to Plaintiff Hill 61. When no accessible path is available, Ms. Hill often drives between locations on campus. She has provided documentation of her disability to SUNY Purchase and received a campus parking pass that permits her to park in designated accessible spaces. She also has a state-issued parking pass for the disabled. On several occasions, when she has parked in a space designated for persons with disabilities, she has been issued a parking ticket or challenged by parking enforcement personnel who state that she should park elsewhere because she “does not look disabled.” Staff have accused her of abusing her parking pass. These confrontations with parking enforcement personnel cause Ms. Hill serious distress, and have resulted in her missing class. H. Harm to Plaintiff Hellmann 63. During his visits to SUNY Purchase, Mr. Hellmann has found that the pavement in the visitor parking lots is full of potholes and cracks and is therefore difficult to comfortably navigate in a wheelchair. In addition, because there are no clear pedestrian pathways from the accessible spaces through the parking lots to the campus buildings, he is required to travel behind parked cars, where he is not easily visible and is therefore at risk that vehicles might back into him. Mr. Hellmann has experienced difficulty traveling from the parking lots to the plaza level independently because of a lack of vertical access. While on campus, he has traveled from the visitor parking lots to the main plaza using the pedestrian pathway. He has found that the curb cut connecting the hill to the parking lot is unstable. In addition, because the pathway is excessively steep and lacks a handrail, landings, and edge protections, Mr. Hellmann experiences difficulty reaching the plaza level without assistance and is exhausted when he reaches the top of the slope. Mr. Hellmann has seen no signage directing him to an alternative accessible route to the plaza level. 65. Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs bring this action for injunctive and declaratory relief on their own behalf and on behalf of all persons similarly situated. Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of all persons with mobility disabilities who use and/or will use pedestrian rights-of-way at SUNY Purchase. The claims asserted herein are solely for injunctive and declaratory relief for the class. Damages claims are not included in this complaint. 66. The persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impracticable and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. The class includes all students with mobility disabilities at SUNY Purchase, as well as visitors to the Neuberger Museum, Library, and Performing Arts Center, prospective students, and other guests. 67. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact affecting the parties to be represented in that they are all being denied, or will be denied, their civil rights and meaningful access to the educational and cultural programs available at SUNY Purchase, due to the barriers described herein. 69. Plaintiffs are adequate class representatives because they and the persons they represent are directly affected by Defendants’ failure to provide program access to persons with mobility disabilities at the SUNY Purchase campus. The interests of the Plaintiffs are not antagonistic to, or in conflict with, the interests of the class as a whole. The attorneys representing the class are experienced in representing plaintiffs in civil rights class actions for injunctive relief, including actions challenging barriers to access involving pedestrian rights-of-way. 70. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the class as a whole because the Plaintiffs are similarly affected by Defendants’ failure to provide meaningful access to the educational and cultural programs available at SUNY Purchase. 71. Defendants have acted and/or failed to act on grounds generally applicable to all class members, thereby making final declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole appropriate. 72. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein all previously alleged paragraphs of the Complaint. 74. The term “disability” includes physical and mental impairments that substantially limit one or more major life activities, such as walking. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)-(2). A “qualified individual with a disability” is “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). 75. Plaintiffs, many consumers, board members and staff of the organizational Plaintiff, and the members of the class are persons with disabilities within the meaning of the statute in that they have impairments which substantially limit one or more major life activities, such as walking. They are also qualified in that they are students of or visitors to SUNY Purchase, and thus are eligible to benefit from the College’s educational and cultural programs. Plaintiffs, many consumers, board members and staff of the organizational Plaintiff, and the members of the class are therefore qualified individuals with disabilities within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102, 12131, and 28 C.F.R. § 35.104. 76. A “public entity” includes any state or local government and its agencies, departments, and instrumentalities. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). Defendant State University of New York at SUNY Purchase is a public entity within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12131 and 82. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein all previously alleged paragraphs of the Complaint. 83. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 84. Plaintiffs, many consumers, board and staff members of the organizational Plaintiff, and members of the class are otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities within the meaning of the statute in that they have impairments which substantially limit one or more major life activities, such as walking, and have reason to and are otherwise eligible to participate in Defendants’ educational and cultural programs at SUNY Purchase. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 12102); see also 28 C.F.R. § 39.103. 86. Defendants have violated and continue to violate Section 504 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. By failing to remediate the pervasive access barriers on campus, Defendants exclude Plaintiffs from participation in Defendants’ programs and activities, deny Plaintiffs the benefits of those programs and activities, and subject Plaintiffs to discrimination, solely by reason of their disabilities. 87. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ aforementioned conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the class have been injured, and continue to be injured. 88. Defendants’ conduct constitutes an ongoing and continuous violation of Section 504 and, as a result, Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief as set forth below. 89. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein all previously alleged paragraphs of the Complaint. 90. The New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) provides that [i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement, because of the . . . disability . . . of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a). 92. The term “place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” in the NYSHRL includes, “regardless of whether the owner of operator of such place is a state or local government entity or a private individual or entity, . . . wholesale and retail stores and establishments dealing with goods or services of any kind, . . . theatres, . . . music halls, . . . public halls, public rooms, public elevators, and any public areas of any building or structure.” As such, cultural attractions including the Performing Arts Center, Library, and Neuberger Museum are places of public accommodation within the meaning of the NYSHRL. N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 93. The term “disability” in the NYSHRL means “a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(21)(a). Plaintiffs, many consumers, board members and staff of the organizational plaintiff, and members of the class are persons with disabilities within the meaning of the NYSHRL. 94. Defendants, as persons under the statute and managers of the Performing Arts Center, Library, and Neuberger Museum, have withheld from and denied persons with mobility disabilities the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of those attractions by failing to maintain accessible pedestrian rights-of-way on campus. 95. Through the conduct described above, Defendants have committed unlawful discriminatory practices against Plaintiffs and have violated the NYSHRL. 97. Defendants’ conduct constitutes an ongoing and continuous violation of the NYSHRL and, as a result, Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief as set forth below. 98. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein all previously alleged paragraphs of the Complaint. 99. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have failed and are failing to comply with applicable laws prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities in violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. 100. Plaintiffs contend, and are informed and believe, that Defendants deny failing to comply with applicable laws prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities. 101. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATION OF SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794) VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290 ET SEQ.) VIOLATION OF TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (42 U.S.C. § 12131 ET SEQ.)

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35. Given ERISA’s distinctive representative capacity and remedial provisions, courts have observed that ERISA litigation of this nature presents a paradigmatic example of a FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1) class action. 36. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes there are at least tens of thousands of members of the Class. For example, the Allergan Plan’s 2015 Form 5500 shows that there were 7,962 participants in the Allergan Plan at the start of 2015, and the Actavis Plan’s 2015 Form 5500 shows that there were 11,527 participants in the Actavis Plan at the start of 2015. 38. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class because the Plan, Plaintiff, and the other members of the Class each sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of ERISA as complained of herein. 39. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plan and members of the Class because he/she has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Plan or the Class. In addition, Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in class action litigation, complex litigation, and ERISA litigation. 40. Class action status in this ERISA action is warranted under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) because prosecution of separate actions by the members of the Class would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class which would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the action, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 41. Class action status is also warranted under the other subsections of Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) because: (i) prosecution of separate actions by the members of the Class would create a risk of establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants; and (ii) Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive, declaratory, or other appropriate equitable relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 43. The 2013 10-K also stated: We believe that we are able to effectively compete in the distribution market, and therefore optimize our market share, based on three critical elements: (i) competitive pricing, (ii) high levels of inventory for approximately 12,725 SKUs for responsive customer service that includes, among other things, next day delivery to the entire U.S., and (iii) well established telemarketing relationships with our customers, supplemented by our electronic ordering capabilities. 46. On August 5, 2014, Allergan issued a press release attached as Exhibit 99.1 to a Current Report on Form 8-K filed with the SEC, announcing certain of the Company’s financial and operating results for the quarter ended June 30, 2014 (the “Q2 2014 8-K”). The press release stated, in part: “Our exceptional performance during the second quarter resulted from double digit revenue growth in both our North American brand and generics businesses and Anda Distribution,” said Paul Bisaro, who became Executive Chairman of Actavis on July 1, 2014 following the close of the acquisition of Forest Laboratories and the second quarter. “Overall revenue growth of 31 percent in our commercial pharmaceutical business was supported by our North American Brands business, which benefitted from the expanded portfolio resulting from the acquisition of Warner Chilcott in October 2013, as well as continued strong sales of core products in the U.S. We also saw strong growth within our generics business, powered by our strong base business along with continued strong sales of the generic versions of Lidoderm® and Cymbalta®. Revenue in our international operations reflected the divestiture of our generics commercial operations in seven markets in Western Europe to Aurobindo Pharma Limited in April 2014.” 49. On February 18, 2015, Allergan also filed an Annual Report for year end 2013 on Form 10-K (the “2014 10-K”), reporting its financial performance for 2013. Allergan stated, in part: Business Strategy We apply three key strategies to achieve growth for our North American Brands and North American Generics and International businesses: (i) internal development of differentiated and high- demand products, including, in certain circumstances as it relates to generics, challenging patents associated with these products, (ii) establishment of strategic alliances and collaborations and (iii) acquisition of products and companies that complement our current business. The Company also develops and out licenses generic pharmaceutical products through its Medis third party business. Our Anda Distribution business distributes products for approximately 340 suppliers and is focused on providing next-day delivery and responsive service to its customers. Our Anda Distribution business distributes a number of generic and brand products in the U.S. Growth in our Anda Distribution business will be largely dependent upon customer expansion, FDA approval of new generic products in the U.S. and expansion of our base of suppliers. 52. On May 11, 2015, Allergan issued a press release attached as Exhibit 99.1 to a Current Report on Form 8-K filed with the SEC, announcing certain of the Company’s financial and operating results for the quarter ended March 31, 2015 (the “Q1 2015 8-K”). The press release stated, in part: “Actavis achieved exceptional operational performance while simultaneously focusing on the completion of the Allergan acquisition and accelerating the integration of our combined company to create a Growth Pharma leader,” said Brent Saunders, CEO and President of Actavis. “I am proud of our combined team for maintaining their focus on our customers and delivering tremendous operational results.” “Our first quarter performance was highlighted by strong revenue growth from Namenda XR®, Linzess®, Bystolic®, Viibryd®/ Fetzima®, LoLoestrin® Fe, Saphris®, Estrace® Cream as well as continued growth within our generics business, powered by strong sales of the generic versions of Concerta®, Intuniv® and the recent launch of our generic version of OxyContin®. 53. On July 27, 2015, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. announced that it signed a definitive agreement with Allergan plc to acquire Allergan Generics, Alergan’s global generic pharmaceuticals business. 55. On November 4, 2015, Allergan issued a press release attached as Exhibit 99.1 to a Current Report on Form 8-K filed with the SEC, announcing certain of the Company’s financial and operating results for the quarter ended September 30, 2015 (the “Q3 2015 8-K”). The press release stated, in part: “Allergan delivered exceptional performance across the board in the third quarter that exceeded expectations. These strong results were driven by our continued focus on customers, fueling volume- driven year-over-year growth in our U.S. Brands, Medical Aesthetics, International Brands and Anda Distribution segments, while also executing pre-integration activities ahead of the divestiture of the Generics business to Teva, which remains on track to be completed in the first quarter of 2016,” said Brent Saunders, CEO and President of Allergan. “I would like to thank our more than 30,000 global employees for their continued laser focus as we continue to better serve our customers, their patients and transform Allergan into a branded Growth Pharma leader.” 57. On February 26, 2016, Allergan filed with the SEC an Annual Report for 2015 on Form 10-K (the “2015 10-K”), reporting its financial performance for 2015. Allergan stated, in part: Business Strategy We apply three key strategies to achieve growth for our US Brands, US Medical Aesthetics and International Brands businesses: (i) internal development of differentiated and high- demand products, (ii) establishment of strategic alliances and collaborations and (iii) acquisition of products and companies that complement our current business. Our Anda Distribution business distributes products for approximately 340 suppliers and is focused on providing next-day delivery and responsive service to its customers. Our Anda Distribution business distributes a number of branded products in the United States. Growth in our Anda Distribution business will be largely dependent upon customer expansion, FDA approval of new generic products in the U.S. and expansion of our base of suppliers. 62. On November 2, 2016, Allergan issued a press release attached as Exhibit 99.1 to a Current Report on Form 8-K filed with the SEC, announcing certain of the Company’s financial and operating results for the quarter ended September 30, 2016 (the “Q3 2016 8-K”). The press release stated, in part: Discontinued Operations and Continuing Operations As a result of the completed divestiture of the Company's Global Generics business to Teva on August 2, 2016, and the completed divestiture of the Company's Anda distribution business to Teva on October 3, 2016, the third quarter 2016 financial results of these businesses are being reported as discontinued operations in the condensed consolidated statements of operations. Included in segment revenues are product sales that were sold by the Anda Distribution business once the Anda Distribution business had sold the product to a third party customer. These sales are included in segment results and are excluded from total continuing operations revenues through a reduction to Corporate revenues. Cost of sales for these products in discontinued operations is equal to our average third-party cost of sales for third-party brand products distributed by Anda Distribution. 90. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 91. This Count alleges fiduciary breaches against the Company and the Committee Defendants (collectively, the “Prudence Defendants”) for continuing to allow the investment of the Plan’s assets in Allergan Stock throughout the Class Period despite the fact that they knew or should have known that such investment was imprudent as a retirement vehicle because Allergan Stock was artificially inflated during the Class Period. 92. At all relevant times, as alleged above, the Prudence Defendants were fiduciaries of the Plan within the meaning of ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A), in that they exercised discretionary authority or control over the administration and/or management of the Plan and/or disposition of the Plan’s assets. 94. Upon information and belief, Defendants failed to engage in a reasoned decision- making process regarding the prudence of Allergan Stock. An adequate investigation by Defendants would have revealed the risks of investing in artificially inflated Allergan Stock and caused a reasonable fiduciary to conclude that the Fund was over-valued and likely to fall in price during the Class Period. A prudent fiduciary would have acted to prevent or mitigate the losses that the Plan experienced during the Class Period, but the Defendants failed to do so. 95. The Prudence Defendants breached their duties to prudently manage the Plan’s assets. During the Class Period, the Prudence Defendants knew or should have known that, as described herein, Company Stock was not a suitable and appropriate investment for the Plan. Yet, during the Class Period, despite their knowledge of the imprudence of the investment, the Prudence Defendants failed to take any meaningful steps to protect the Plan’s Participants. 97. As a result of Defendants’ knowledge of and, at times, implication in, creating and maintaining public misconceptions concerning Allergan’s business activities, any generalized warnings of market and diversification risks that Defendants made to Participants regarding the Plan’s investment in the Fund did not effectively inform the Participants of the past, immediate, and future dangers of investing in Company Stock. 98. The Prudence Defendants also breached their co-fiduciary obligations by, among their other failures, knowingly participating in each other’s failure to protect the Plan from inevitable losses. The Prudence Defendants had or should have had knowledge of such breaches by other fiduciaries of the Plan, yet the Prudence Defendants made no effort to remedy those breaches. FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY MONITOR OTHER FIDUCIARIES AND PROVIDE THEM WITH ACCURATE INFORMATION IN VIOLATION OF ERISA § 404 FAILURE TO PRUDENTLY MANAGE THE PLAN’S ASSETS IN VIOLATION OF ERISA §§ 404(a)(1)(B) AND 405 (BY THE COMPANY AND THE COMMITTEE DEFENDANTS)

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27. Plaintiff Fitzhenry is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 28. In September of 2014 the Plaintiff received a telephone call to his residential telephone line that he has had for more than 15 years, (843) 209-XXXX. 29. When the phone was answered, a pre-recorded message played, that pre-recorded message was automated and stated Let the memories begin. You have been selected for a magical Walt Disney World area holiday special. Your claim number is 545. To take advantage of this promotion, press 1 now. 31. The Plaintiff also spoke with a manager named “Amber”, and during their conversation “Amber” informed the Plaintiff that the company’s legal name was Lily Management and Marketing Company, LLC, and that USA Vacation Station was “under” Lily Management. 32. “Amber” also informed the Plaintiff that the company “represents” Westgate, and that they book stays for two Westgate properties, Westgate Lakes and Spa and Westgate Vacation Villas. 33. USA Vacation Station has a contractual relationship with Westgate that allows them to both advertise Westgate properties and book vacations at the Westgate properties. 34. “Amber” also verified that USA Vacation Station sent and managed the pre- recorded message that was delivered to the Plaintiff, informing the Plaintiff that they needed to have their “tech person” look into the message, because a few people had told her that the recorded message was hard to understand. 35. Plaintiff did not provide prior express written consent to receive the pre-recorded phone call, and has not done business with either of the defendants. The Defendants’ Marketing Scheme 36. Westgate relies on a series of third parties (“Westgate Brokers”) to promote its goods or services. 37. Westgate maintain interim control over its Brokers’ actions, both as to telemarketing and other activities. 39. Four days after the complaint was filed, Westgate stipulated to a judgment and permanent injunction that included a monetary payment of $900,000.00 and a permanent injunction. 40. The permanent injunction prevented Westgate from: [E]ngaging in, causing other persons to engage in, or assisting other persons to engage in, violations of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, including but not limited to initiating any outbound telephone call to a person's telephone number on the National Do Not Call Registry of persons who do not wish to receive outbound telephone calls to induce the purchase of goods or services. 41. Initiating a pre-recorded telemarketing call without a prior express written permission is a violation of the Telemarketing Sales Rule. Vicarious Liability Under the FCC’s Order 43. Under the standards outlined in the FCC’s order and by other Courts interpreting that Order, Westgate is liable to the Plaintiff under the following theories: a. Direct Liability b. Actual Authority c. Ratification d. Apparent Authority Each is discussed below. Direct Liability 44. Westgate actively participated in the telemarketing calls that are the subject of this case. 45. The call to the Plaintiff is an example of how. Although USA Vacation Station made the call and took the Plaintiff’s information, Westgate itself participated in the call by setting the pricing guidelines and pre-qualifications for the promotion offered to the Plaintiff. 46. Had the Plaintiff accepted that offer, Westgate would have sold its resort services to him. 47. Each call that USA Vacation Station placed, regardless of how “far” the call recipient permitted the sales pitch to go, was intended by all parties involved to result in sales of Westgate’ products and services. Actual Authority 49. The purpose of Westgate’s Brokers is to serve Westgate by booking vacations for consumers on behalf of Westgate. 50. Indeed, USA Vacation Station did this through the pre-recorded telemarketing alleged in this Complaint. 51. Westgate also directed the quality, timing, geographic location and volume of USA Vacation Station’s bookings that it sent to them. In fact, as the Plaintiff was informed, USA Vacation Station only was allowed by Westgate to book vacations as two of its properties. 52. Both of these properties were located in the same geographic area as USA Vacation Station. Ratification 53. In the alternative, Westgate repeatedly ratified USA Vacation Station’s illegal marketing scheme by knowingly accepting the benefits of USA Vacation Station’s activities when they accepted applications and customers from them. 54. Since at least January of 2009, Westgate has been on notice of its obligations to monitor and prevent third parties from violating federal telemarketing law when using telemarketing to promote its goods and services. 55. After being aware of the telemarketing practices used by third parties, Westgate continued to allow USA Vacation Station to telemarket its goods and services using pre-recorded messages. 57. Because it accepted the calls’ benefits from USA Vacation Station, including continued customers, Westgate cannot avoid the burden associated with their ratification. 58. Vicarious liability for TCPA violations can arise out of ratification. As the FCC stated: Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03, cmt. c. As commonly understood under modern agency principles reflected in the Third Restatement, such apparent authority can arise in multiple ways, and does not require that “a principal’s manifestation must be directed to a specific third party in a communication made directly to that person. Id., reporter’s note a. Rather, “a principal may create apparent authority by appointing a person to a particular position.” Id. Similarly, “a principal may permit an agent to acquire a reputation of authority in an area or endeavor by acquiescing in conduct by the agent under circumstances likely to lead to a reputation.” Id., cmt. c. And “[r]estrictions on an agent’s authority that are known only to the principal and the agent do not defeat or supersede the consequences of apparent authority for the principal’s legal relations” with others.” Id. In such circumstances, for example, the presence of contractual terms purporting to forbid a third-party marketing entity from engaging in unlawful telemarketing activities would not, by themselves, absolve the seller of vicarious liability. In re Joint Pet. Filed by Dish Network, LLC, CG Docket No. 11-50, 2013 WL 1934349 *16, ¶ 34, fn 102. 59. Westgate knowingly and actively accepted business that originated through the illegal telemarketing calls complained of herein. 61. Westgate gave their agents, including USA Vacation Station, substantial power to affect their legal relations with third parties, including with the Plaintiff and consumers generally. 62. Westgate cloaked their agents with apparent authority to enter into advertising arrangements on their behalf, including lead generation telemarketing which the Plaintiff received. 63. USA Vacation Station transferred customer information for the vacations that were booked directly to Westgate. Thus, USA Vacation Station has the “ability . . . to enter consumer information into the seller’s sales or customer systems,” as discussed in the May 2013 FCC Ruling. USA Vacation Station is an apparent agent of Westgate. 64. By hiring USA Vacation Station to make calls on behalf of its agents to book vacation, and giving them detailed information regarding the parameters of those bookings, Westgate “manifest[ed] assent to another person . . . that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control” as described in the Restatement (Third) of Agency. 65. USA Vacation Station knew that its calls were resulting in sales of the Westgate products. 66. The services sold were being completed by Westgate themselves. 68. Plaintiff bring this action individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated (hereinafter referred to as “the Class”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 69. Plaintiff propose the following Class definition, subject to amendment as appropriate: All persons within the United States who received a non-emergency telephone call from USA Vacation Station, placed while acting on behalf of Westgate, through the use of an artificial or prerecorded voice within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint in this action. Collectively, all these persons will be referred to as “Class members.” Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class. 70. Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, and any entities in which the Defendants have a controlling interest, the Defendants’ agents and employees, any Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of such Judge’s staff and immediate family, and claims for personal injury, wrongful death and/or emotional distress. 71. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Class, but Plaintiff reasonably believe Class members number, at minimum, in the thousands. 72. Plaintiff and all members of the Class have been harmed by the acts of the Defendants. 73. This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages. 74. The joinder of all Class members is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. 75. Additionally, the disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. 77. There are well defined, nearly identical, questions of law and fact affecting all parties. 78. The questions of law and fact, referred to above, involving the class claims predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members. 79. Such common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether USA Vacation Station, acting on behalf of Westgate, used an artificial or prerecorded voice in its non-emergency calls to Class members’ telephones. b. Whether the Defendants can meet their burden of showing they obtained consent (i.e., written consent that is clearly and unmistakably stated), to make such calls; c. Whether the Defendants’ conduct was knowing and/or willful; d. Whether the Defendants are liable for statutory damages; and e. Whether the Defendants should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 80. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. 81. Further, Plaintiff has no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the Class. 82. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims involving violations of federal consumer protection statutes, including claims under the TCPA. 83. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 85. The interest of the Class members in individually pursuing claims against the Defendants is slight because the statutory damages for an individual action are relatively small, and are therefore not likely to deter the Defendants from engaging in the same behavior in the future. 86. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than are presented in many class claims because the calls at issue are all automated and the Class members, by definition, did not provide the prior express consent required under the statute to authorize such calls to their cellular telephones. 87. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole appropriate. 88. Moreover, on information and belief, Plaintiff allege that the TCPA violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. 89. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 91. As a result of the Defendants’ violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory damages for each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 92. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendants’ violation of the TCPA in the future. 93. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 94. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 95. The foregoing acts and omissions of the Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 96. As a result of the Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each member of the Class is entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500 for each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 97. Plaintiff and all Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCPA by the Defendants in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. (Against all Defendants) NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. (Against all Defendants)

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12. Defendant Vegas Package is a purported vacation retail company that offers Las Vegas vacation packages to consumers. Among Vegas Package’s offerings is a four-day stay in Las Vegas, including dinner for two and two show tickets, for $399. 13. Unfortunately for consumers, Vegas Package casts its marketing net too wide. That is, in an attempt to promote its business and to generate leads for its financial products Defendants conducted (and continues to conduct) a wide scale telemarketing campaign that repeatedly makes unsolicited autodialed calls to consumers' telephones including cellular telephones all without any prior express consent to make these calls. 14. To make matters worse, Defendants place these calls to telephones using an ATDS without consumers’ prior written express consent in violation of the TCPA. 17. At no time did Defendants obtain prior express consent from the Plaintiff and the Class members orally or in writing to receive autodialed calls. 18. In making the phone calls at issue in this Complaint, Defendants and/or their agents utilized an ATDS. Specifically, the hardware and software used by Defendants and/or their agents has the capacity to store, produce, and dial random or sequential numbers, and/or receive and store lists of telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. Defendants’ automated dialing equipment includes features substantially similar to a predictive dialer, inasmuch as it is capable of making numerous calls simultaneously, without human intervention. 19. Defendants knowingly made, and continue to make, telemarketing calls without the prior express consent of the recipients. As such, Defendants not only invaded the personal privacy of Plaintiff and members of the putative Class, but also intentionally and repeatedly violated the TCPA. 20. Plaintiff Fisher is the subscriber to and customary user of the personal cellular telephone number 602-750-6084. 21. On approximately July 8, 2019, Plaintiff received a call from the phone number (702) 983-2098. 22. After answering the call, Plaintiff was met with “dead air” for several seconds before he was apparently connected to a live representative. 24. The representative spent several minutes describing a Las Vegas vacation package offer for $399 that he encouraged Plaintiff to purchase. 25. Near the end of the call, Plaintiff politely declined the offer and asked the representative to not call him again, to which the representative replied with a homophobic slur before ending the call. 26. Plaintiff Fisher never consented either orally or in writing to receive prerecorded and/or autodialed calls from Vegas Package, Douglas, or any of their affiliates or agents. 27. Plaintiff does not have a relationship with Defendants, has never provided his telephone number directly to Defendants, and has never requested that Defendants place prerecorded and/or autodialed calls to him or offer him its services. Simply put, Plaintiff has never provided any form of prior express written or oral consent to Defendants to place prerecorded and/or autodialed calls to him and has no business relationship with Defendants. 28. Defendants were, and are, aware that the above described autodialed calls were made to consumers like Plaintiff who have not consented to receive them. 29. By making unauthorized autodialed calls as alleged herein, Douglas and Vegas Package have caused consumers actual harm, including the aggravation, nuisance and invasions of privacy that result from the receipt of such calls, the wear and tear on their cellphones, consumption of battery life, lost cellular minutes, loss of value realized for monies paid to their wireless carriers for the receipt of such calls, and in the form of the diminished use, enjoyment, value, and utility of their telephones and telephone plans. Furthermore, Defendants made the calls knowing they interfered with Plaintiff and the other Class members’ use and enjoyment of, and the ability to access, their cellphones, including the related data, software, and hardware components. 31. On information and belief, Douglas Douglas personally directed and oversaw the making of the calls by Defendants’ employees or agents. Douglas Douglas was directly involved in the making of the calls. Douglas committed, directly participated in, or otherwise authorized the commission of wrongful acts within the scope of his employment as a corporate officer of Defendant. Defendant failed to take efforts to implement appropriate policies or procedures designed to comply with the TCPA or authorized or personally engaged in conduct that clearly violated the TCPA. 32. To redress these injuries, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a Class of similarly situated individuals, brings this suit under the TCPA, which prohibits unsolicited prerecorded and/or autodialed calls to telephones. On behalf of the Class, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Defendants to cease all unauthorized autodialed calling activities and an award of statutory damages to the class members, together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 33. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and the Class defined as follows: Autodialed No Consent Class: All persons in the United States who (1) Defendants, or a third person acting on behalf of Defendants, called; (2) on the person’s cellular telephone; (3) for the purpose of selling Vegas Package’s products and services; (4) using an autodialer as defined in the TCPA; and (4) for whom Defendants claim they obtained prior express consent in the same manner as Defendants claims they supposedly obtained prior express consent to call the Plaintiff. 35. Numerosity: The exact number of members within the Class is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant has placed pre-recorded calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the defined Class. However, the exact number of members of the Class can only be identified through Defendant’s records. 36. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class, in that Plaintiff and the members of the Class sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct. 37. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendants have no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 39. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Joinder of all parties is impracticable, and the damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendants’ actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendants’ misconduct. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. 40. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 41. Defendant Vegas Package, by and through its agents, made unsolicited and unwanted telemarketing calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class—without their prior express written consent—in an effort to generate leads for Defendants’ products and services. 43. Defendants failed to obtain any prior express consent that included, as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(8)(i), a “clear and conspicuous” disclosure informing the person signing that: (A) By executing the agreement, such person authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the signatory telemarketing calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice; and (B) The person is not required to sign the agreement (directly or indirectly), or agree to enter into such an agreement as a condition of purchasing any property, goods, or services. 44. Further, Defendants made the telephone calls using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse. Defendants utilized equipment that made the telephone calls to Plaintiff and other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class simultaneously and without human intervention. 45. By making unsolicited telephone calls to Plaintiff and members of the Class’s cellular telephones without prior express consent, and by utilizing an ATDS while doing so, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 46. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Class suffered actual damages in the form of monies paid to receive the unsolicited telephone calls on their cellular telephones and, under Section 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodialed No Consent Class)

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a clothing and accessories company that owns and operates www.therow.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in October of 2019, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.therow.com, to make a purchase. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. 30. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 33. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 35. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 36. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 37. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 39. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 61. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 62. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 64. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 66. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 72. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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11. OhDAP was initially established in 1990 under the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Extension Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300ff, et seq. This federal legislation has been renewed four times -- 1996, 2000, 2006 and 2009 -- and is now called the Ryan White Program within Ohio and nationwide. 12. There are three main components within OhDAP. One component is for direct drug provision for eligible uninsured individuals (i.e., individuals with HIV who are not eligible for Medicaid due to income level or citizenship status). Another component is used to provide premium assistance to eligible individuals (i.e., ACA, Medicare Part D, private health insurance Case: 2:18-cv-00238-EAS-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 03/21/18 Page: 5 of 17 PAGEID #: 5 - 5 - or the employee copayment or coinsurance portion of employer-based insurance). The last component assists insured individuals with their co-pays for their life-saving HIV specialty medications. 13. In March 2017, the Ohio Department of Health awarded an exclusive contract for pharmaceutical provision services for OhDAP to CVS, effective July 2017. Under that contract, CVS is to provide OhDAP-eligible clients with HIV medications and is responsible for communications with participants relating to such medications. 14. Beginning in approximately late July or early August 2017, Defendants mailed a letter containing membership cards and information about the CVS program and how persons would access their HIV-related prescriptions. This letter was mailed to an estimated 6,000 participants in OhDAP, regardless of whether they were active pharmacy customers of CVS. 15. Even though the information contained in this letter contained the Personal Health Information (“PHI”) of each individual, specifically information relating to their HIV-positive status, the envelopes containing these mailings had two clear glassine windows. One, in the upper left, contained the logo of “CVS/caremark,” the words “Ohio Department of Health,” and an address for the Ohio Department of Health, and the envelope refers in big red letters to “new prescription benefits,” thereby revealing that the mailing involved health-related information, including information about prescription medications. A second window contained the recipient’s name and address, with the designation “PM 6402 HIV” directly above the person’s name. This reference to the recipient’s HIV status was plainly visible through the glassine window. The designation “HIV” in the program identification number was not required by the Ohio Department of Health, but rather was created by CVS. Defendants clearly made no advance effort to test or review the disclosure of such information prior to disseminating the mailing, Case: 2:18-cv-00238-EAS-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 03/21/18 Page: 6 of 17 PAGEID #: 6 - 6 - since had they done so they would have seen that the identification number with “HIV” next to it was prominently visible through the envelope, as shown by the following: 16. The Defendants’ combined use of a glassine windowed envelope, their design of the letter containing the HIV status of the individual recipient such that it could be seen through the envelope window instead of using an opaque envelope or a letter that was properly spaced not to publicly reveal such information through the envelope window, and an identification reference with the term “HIV,” resulted in the potential or actual disclosure of recipients’ HIV status to numerous individuals, including their families, friends, roommates, landlords, neighbors, mail carriers, and complete strangers. 17. The use of envelopes with transparent windows contravenes the standard practice of the Ohio Department of Health, which is to send all mailings relating to HIV-related issues in opaque, non-windowed envelopes. 18. Defendants either knew or reasonably should have known that this mailing was disseminated in violation of both federal and state laws. Defendants also acted with a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of causing Case: 2:18-cv-00238-EAS-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 03/21/18 Page: 7 of 17 PAGEID #: 7 - 7 - substantial harm. Defendants knew that it is unlawful and likely harmful to disclose patients’ HIV status to the public, and that any persons whose PHI was disclosed were to be separately notified of that breach. CVS’s “Notice of Privacy Practices” states, “We are required by law to protect the privacy of your PHI and to provide you with this Notice explaining our legal duties and privacy practices regarding your [Protected Health Information]…. You have a right to be notified in the event there is a breach of your unsecured PHI as defined by HIPAA.” https://www.cvs.com/content/patient-privacy (accessed March 14, 2018). Fiserv advertises its compliance as well: “From enrollment to payment, let Fiserv help you create, maintain and grow member engagement while adhering to the strongest risk and compliance standards, including 25. This action is brought by the Plaintiffs both on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiffs seek to represent the following class (“Class”): All participants in OhDAP to whom Defendants sent a mailing in or about July or August 2017 in which the participant’s name and the letters “HIV” were visible through the envelope window. 26. The precise number and identity of Class members are unknown to the Plaintiffs but can be obtained from the records of Defendants. News reports have estimated the recipients of the mailings to be more than 6,000 persons. 27. Common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting individual members of the Class. Such common legal and factual questions include the following: (a) Whether Defendants’ conduct was tortious and violated the applicable standard of care; Case: 2:18-cv-00238-EAS-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 03/21/18 Page: 11 of 17 PAGEID #: 11 - 11 - (b) Whether Defendants’ conduct was unlawful, including in violation of the state and federal statutes and regulations cited above; (c) Whether the Class members are entitled to damages and the extent of those damages; and (d) Whether the Class members are entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief. 28. The Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class members because similar mailings to those identified above were sent to Plaintiffs and every Class member. 29. The Plaintiffs are willing and prepared to serve the Court and the proposed Class in a representative capacity. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and have no interests adverse or antagonistic to or that materially and irreconcilably conflict with the interests of the other members of the Class. Based on the facts detailed above, the interests of the Plaintiffs are reasonably coextensive with those of absent Class members. 30. The Plaintiffs have engaged the services of counsel who are experienced in complex class litigation and the issues raised in this Complaint who will vigorously prosecute this action, and who will assert and protect the rights of and otherwise adequately represent the rights of the Plaintiffs and absent Class members. 31. Prosecuting separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. 32. By sending similar mailings to thousands of people and later refusing to send notification thereof Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to Case: 2:18-cv-00238-EAS-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 03/21/18 Page: 12 of 17 PAGEID #: 12 - 12 - the Class, thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate respecting the Class as a whole. 33. Because all Class members are seeking the same relief based on the same course of conduct by Defendants, the questions of law or fact common to Class members as set forth in this Complaint predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. Thus, a class action is superior to other available group-wide methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating this controversy, to the extent necessary in order to maintain this action on behalf of the Class. 34. Damages need not be proven for each Class member because Ohio law permits the award of damages without individualized proof of the extent of emotional distress. But even if damages must be proven individually, the Class can be certified for purposes of determining whether the actions of Defendants were tortious and violated applicable Ohio law.

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23. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as though fully stated herein. 24. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, the subscriber of the cellular telephone number (720) ***-9071 (the “9071 Number”). The 9071 Number is, and at all times mentioned herein was, assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 42. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of herself individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (the “Class”). The Class which Plaintiff is a member of and seeks to represent is comprised of and defined as follows: All persons within the United States to whom, within four (4) years prior to the filing of this action, one or more text message(s) promoting Defendants’ goods or services was sent by Defendants or an affiliate, subsidiary, or agent of Defendants, utilizing an automatic telephone dialing system, without prior express written consent to be sent such text message(s). 43. Defendants, their employees, and agents are excluded from the Class. 44. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or expand the definition of the Class (or add one or more subclasses) as warranted as facts are learned or confirmed after further investigation and discovery. 58. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as if fully stated herein. 63. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as if fully stated herein. 64. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA by Defendants, including but not limited to violations of each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq. 65. As a result of Defendants’ violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to, and do seek, injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCPA in the future pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A). 66. As a result of Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff the Class members are also entitled to, and do seek, an award of treble damages as provided by statute, of $1,500.00 in statutory damages for each violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and § 227(b)(3)(C). KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, ET SEQ.

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20. BHI provides specialty services and staffing solutions to the power generation, energy, and government markets. http://www.bhienergy.com/about-us/overview/ (last visited June 4, 2018). 21. BHI’s workforce includes more than 8,500 experienced project management and technical, professional, and craft labor operating at over 130 global project locations. Id. 22. Plaintiffs were hourly employees of BHI. 23. BHI hired Klapatch around February of 2015 and Lee around January 2017. 24. Klapatch performed work for BHI in power plants located in Minnesota and Connecticut. 25. Lee performed work for BHI in power plants located in Texas. 26. Klapatch was a Training & Development Coordinator for BHI. 27. Lee was an Electrical Supervisor for BHI. 28. BHI paid Lee $75 per approved hour worked. 29. Klapatch left BHI’s employment in April 2017 and Lee left BHI’s employment in September 2017. 30. Plaintiffs reported the hours they worked to BHI on a regular basis. 31. If Plaintiffs worked fewer than 40 hours in a week, they would be paid only for the hours worked. 32. Plaintiffs regularly worked over 40 hours in a week. 33. The hours Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members worked are reflected in BHI’s records. 35. Rather than receiving time and half as required by the FLSA, Plaintiffs only received “straight time” pay for overtime hours worked. 36. BHI’s “straight time for overtime” payment scheme violates the FLSA. 37. BHI was aware of the overtime requirements of the FLSA. 38. BHI nonetheless failed to pay certain employees, such as Plaintiffs, overtime. 39. BHI’s failure to pay overtime to these workers was, and is, a willful violation of the 40. BHI’s illegal “straight time for overtime” policy extends beyond Plaintiffs. 41. It is the “straight time for overtime” payment plan that is the “policy that is alleged to violate the FLSA” in this FLSA collective action. Bursell v. Tommy’s Seafood Steakhouse, No. CIV.A. H- 06-0386, 2006 WL 3227334, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2006); Wellman v. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc., No. CIV.A. 14-831, 2014 WL 5810529, at *5 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 2014) (certifying “straight time for overtime” claim for collective treatment). 42. BHI paid hundreds of workers using the same unlawful scheme. 43. Any differences in job duties do not detract from the fact that these workers were entitled to overtime pay. 44. The workers impacted by BHI’s “straight time for overtime” scheme should be notified of this action and given the chance to join pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 45. Therefore, the class is properly defined as: All employees of BHI who were, at any point in the past 3 years, paid “straight time for overtime.” (“FLSA Class”)

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16. AudioEye is the creator of patented audio browsing and automated publishing and accessibility technology platforms that create voice-driven technologies to enhance the mobility, usability, and accessibility of Internet-based content in the United States. The company develops patented, Internet content publication and distribution software that enables conversion of any media into accessible formats, as well as allows for real-time distribution on any Internet-connected device. Its solutions and services enable users of AudioEye-enabled customers’ Websites or mobile environments to transact, communicate, and engage with products, brands, and content using its patented interactive voice technologies. The company offers Audio Internet, a software-as-a service technology platform to Internet and mobile publishers, developers, owners, and operators. It serves private- and public-sector customers, such as corporate publishers; consumer Websites; federal, state, and local governments and agencies; and mobile advertisers. 33. As alleged herein, Defendants acted with scienter in that they knew that the public documents and statements issued or disseminated in the name of the Company were materially false and misleading; knew that such statements or documents would be issued or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and substantially participated or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of such statements or documents as primary violations of the federal securities laws. As set forth elsewhere herein in detail, Defendants, by virtue of their receipt of information reflecting the true facts regarding AudioEye, their control over, and/or receipt and/or modification of AudioEye’s allegedly materially misleading misstatements and/or their associations with the Company, which made them privy to confidential proprietary information concerning AudioEye, participated in the fraudulent scheme alleged herein. 47. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 48. This Count is asserted by Plaintiff on behalf of itself and the Class against all the Defendants and is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, promulgated thereunder. 59. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. BACKGROUND The Company announced that cash bookings for the quarter ended March 31, 2015 are expected to approximate $2.0 million. MANAGEMENT COMMENTS “With great care and expediency, we are committed to both restate our financial statements and cure the control and process issues that created the need for the restatements,” said Carr Bettis, Executive Chairman of AudioEye, Inc. “At its core, AudioEye is a technology company with the most complete and functional accessibility solutions available. We are very pleased with feedback from our customers, and our mandate is to pursue with a laser-like focus additional sales, increasing customer adoption rates, and the enhancement of Internet accessibility for all users.” Violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants Violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants

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(Breach of Implied Warranty) (Fraud) (Strict Liability – Failure to Warn) (Unjust Enrichment) (Violations of California Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq., Based on Commission of Unlawful Acts) (Violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq., Based on Fraudulent Acts and Practices) (Violations of California Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq., Based on Unfair Acts and Practices) 11. The People of the State of California declared by initiative under Proposition 65 their right “[t]o be informed about exposures to chemicals that cause cancer, birth defects, or other reproductive harm.” Proposition 65, § 1(b). To effectuate this goal, California’s Proposition 65, Health & Safety Code § 25249.5, et seq., prohibits exposing people to chemicals listed by the State of California as known to cause cancer, birth defects or other reproductive harm above certain levels without a “clear and reasonable warning,” unless the business responsible for the exposure can prove that it fits within a statutory exemption. 24. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class defined as all persons in the United States who purchased the Vega Products (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are persons who made such purchases for purpose of resale. 25. Plaintiff also seeks to represent a Subclass of all Class Members who purchased the Vega Products in California (the “California Subclass”). 26. At this time, Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members of the Class; however, given the nature of the claims and the number of retail stores in the United States selling the Vega Products, Plaintiff believes that Class members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 33. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein and, to the extent necessary, plead this cause of action in the alternative. 34. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the California Subclass under California law. 35. Under California Business & Professions Code §17200, any business act or practice that is likely to deceive members of the public constitutes a fraudulent business act or practice. 36. Defendants have engaged, and continues to engage, in conduct that is likely to deceive members of the public. This conduct includes, but is not limited to, failing to disclose that the Vega Products contain heightened levels of lead and cadmium. 37. After reviewing the packaging for a Vega Product, Plaintiff purchased the Vega Product in reliance on Defendants’ omissions and/or representations. Plaintiff would not have purchased the Products at all, but for Defendants’ false promotion of the Vega Products. Plaintiff and the Subclass have all paid money for the Vega Products. However, Plaintiff and the Subclass did not obtain the full value or any value of the advertised products due to Defendants’ misrepresentations and/or omissions regarding the heightened levels of lead and cadmium. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Subclass have suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a direct result of Defendants’ misrepresentations and material omissions. 38. By committing the acts alleged above, Defendants have engaged in fraudulent business acts and practices, which constitute unfair competition within the meaning of California Business & Professions Code §17200. 41. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein and, to the extent necessary, plead this cause of action in the alternative. 42. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the California Subclass against Defendants. 43. The violation of any law constitutes an unlawful business practice under California Business & Professions Code §17200. 44. Defendants have violated §17200’s prohibition against engaging in unlawful acts and practices by, inter alia, making the representations and omissions of material facts, as set forth more fully herein, and violating California Civil Code §§1572, 1573, 1709, 1710, 1711, 1770, California Business & Professions Code §17200 et seq., California Health & Safety Code §110660, 21 U.S.C. §321, and by violating the common law. 45. By violating these laws, Defendants have engaged in unlawful business acts and practices, which constitute unfair competition within the meaning of Business & Professions Code §17200. 49. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein and, to the extent necessary, plead this cause of action in the alternative. 50. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the California Subclass against Defendants. 51. Under Business & Professions Code §17200, any business act or practice that is unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and/or substantially injurious to consumers, or that violates a legislatively declared policy, constitutes an unfair business act or practice. 52. Defendants have engaged, and continue to engage, in conduct which is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and/or substantially injurious to consumers. This conduct includes failing to disclose that the Vega Products contain heightened levels of lead and cadmium. 53. Defendants have engaged, and continue to engage, in conduct that violates the legislatively declared policies of: (1) California Civil Code §§1572, 1573, 1709, 1710, 1711 against committing fraud and deceit; (2) California Civil Code §1770 against committing acts and practices intended to deceive consumers regarding the representation of goods in certain particulars; (3) California Health & Safety Code §110660 and 21 U.S.C. §321 against misbranding food; and (4) Proposition 65. Defendants gain an unfair advantage over its competitors, whose labeling, advertising, and marketing for other similar products must comply with these laws. 68. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein and, to the extent necessary, plead this cause of action in the alternative. 69. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the Class against Defendants. 70. The Uniform Commercial Code §2-314 provides that unless excluded or modified, a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. 71. Defendants manufactured, marketed, and sold the Vega Products and represented that the Vega Products were fit for consumption by consumers. Contrary to such representations, Defendants failed to disclose that the Vega Products were not fit for consumption as they contain heightened levels of lead and cadmium, toxic heavy metals known by the State of California to cause cancer and reproductive harm. 79. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein and, to the extent necessary, plead this cause of action in the alternative. 80. Defendants manufactured, marketed, sold, and/or distributed the Vega Products to consumers. 81. The Vega Products that Defendants manufactured, marketed, sold, and/or distributed were defective in design and manufacturing. Further, the Vega Products were defective when they left the control of the Defendants such that: (1) the Vega Products had heightened amounts of lead and cadmium; and (2) they were unreasonably dangerous, more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect, as they contain toxic heavy metals 86. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein and, to the extent necessary, plead this cause of action in the alternative. 87. Plaintiff bring this claim individually and on behalf of members of the Class and against Defendants. 88. As discussed above, Defendants failed to disclose to class members that use of Vega Products would expose Plaintiff and other members of the Class to heightened levels of lead and cadmium. Defendant also misrepresented that the Vega Products were healthy. 89. The false and misleading representations and omissions were made with knowledge of their falsehood. 92. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein and, to the extent necessary, plead this cause of action in the alternative. 93. Plaintiff bring this claim individually and on behalf of members of the Class and against Defendants. 94. Plaintiff and Class members conferred benefits on Defendants by purchasing Vega Products. 95. Defendants has knowledge of such benefits. 96. Defendants have been unjustly enriched in retaining the revenues derived from Plaintiff’s and Class members’ purchases of Vega Products. Retention of those moneys under these circumstances is unjust and inequitable because Defendants failed to disclose that the Vega Products contain heightened levels of lead and cadmium, in violation of Proposition 65. 97. Because Defendants’ retention of the non-gratuitous benefits conferred on it by Plaintiff and Class members is unjust and inequitable, Defendants must pay restitution to Plaintiff and the Class members for their unjust enrichment, as ordered by the Court. A. Lead and Cadmium are Toxic Heavy Metal that Increase Cancer Risks and Cause Reproductive Harm

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12. At all times relevant to the complaint herein, Defendant engaged in telecommunications by means of telephone facsimile machines as defined by the TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3). 13. Upon information and belief, Defendant regularly advertises its goods and services to recipients by transmitting fax advertisements. 14. Upon information and belief, the faxes were sent by means of a telephone facsimile machine that has the capacity to transcribe text or images, or both, from paper into an electronic signal and to transmit that signal over a regular telephone line, or onto paper, and send thousands of faxes per day to facsimile numbers that were preselected by Defendant. 15. Upon information and belief, Defendant has no procedure or means for recipients who do not consent to receiving the faxes to stop receiving them. 16. In this instant case, Defendant had no prior established business relationship with Plaintiff. Plaintiff had never in the past used Defendant’s services, nor given Defendant consent to receive unsolicited fax advertisements from Defendant. 17. Within four (4) years prior to the commencement of this action, Defendant, or a third party agent acting on behalf of Defendant, willfully and knowingly transmitted facsimiles to Plaintiff that advertised the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services. 18. Specifically, on or about April 8, 2014 and June 9, 2014 the Defendant caused to be delivered, which Plaintiff received at Plaintiff’s facsimile number ending in 4993, facsimile advertisements which solicited Plaintiff’s business by advising Plaintiff that Defendant sells dental supplies on their website. See Exhibit A and Exhibit B. 20. Plaintiff did not give Defendant, or any third party acting on behalf of Defendant, prior express invitation or permission to transmit the aforementioned facsimiles, thereby rendering them unsolicited. 21. Plaintiff did not agree to make available its facsimile number for advertisement in a directory. 22. Defendant transmitted at least two (2) unsolicited advertisement to Plaintiff. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes. 24. Defendant’s failed to provide the proper notice to Plaintiff and the putative class members of the method and/or process of how to opt-out of receiving such future facsimile advertisements with the all of the requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D). 25. Specifically, Defendant’s failed to comply with the statute, which requires: a notice contained in an unsolicited advertisement complies with the requirements under this subparagraph only if— (i) the notice is clear and conspicuous and on the first page of the unsolicited advertisement; (ii) the notice states that the recipient may make a request to the sender of the unsolicited advertisement not to send any future unsolicited advertisements to a telephone facsimile machine or machines and that failure to comply, within the shortest reasonable time, as determined by the Commission, with such a request meeting the requirements under subparagraph (E) is unlawful; (iii) the notice sets forth the requirements for a request under subparagraph (E); (iv) the notice includes— (I) a domestic contact telephone and facsimile machine number for the recipient to transmit such a request to the sender; and (II) a cost-free mechanism for a recipient to transmit a request pursuant to such notice to the sender of the unsolicited advertisement; the Commission shall by rule require the sender to provide such a mechanism and may, in the discretion of the Commission and subject to such conditions as the Commission may prescribe, exempt certain classes of small business senders, but only if the Commission determines that the costs to such class are unduly burdensome given the revenues generated by such small businesses. 27. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 28. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Classes, consisting of: a. All persons in the United States who received any unsolicited fax advertisement on their telephone facsimile machines from Defendant or its agents(s) and/or employee(s) within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. b. All persons in the United States who received any unsolicited fax advertisement on their telephone facsimile machines from Defendant or its agent(s) and/or employee(s) where said advertisements failed to properly notify the recipient of their ability to opt-out of receiving such fax advertisements from Defendant in the future. 29. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Classes, but believe the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 30. Plaintiff and members of the Classes were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their telephone facsimile machines by either: 1) sending unsolicited fax advertisements; or 2) sending fax advertisements which failed to properly inform Plaintiff and the class members of their ability to opt-out of receiving such fax advertisements from Defendant in the future. Plaintiffs and the Class members were damaged thereby. 32. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the court. The Class can be identified through Defendant’s records or Defendant’s agents’ records. 33. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to the Classes predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the following: a. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Defendant or its agents sent any unsolicited fax advertisements to a Class member; b. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Defendant or its agents sent any fax advertisement to a Class member which failed to properly advise the recipient of an ability to opt-out of receiving such future fax advertisements from Defendant; c. Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation; and d. Whether Defendant and its agents should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 35. Plaintiff and the members of the Classes have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Classes will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. Because of the size of the individual Class member’s claims, few, if any, Class members could afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 36. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 37. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal and state laws. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class claims. 38. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein at length. 40. At all times herein, Plaintiff was and is entitled to the rights, protections and benefits provided under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. 42. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 227(b)(3)(C). 43. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to an Order, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), enjoining Defendant from transmitting any advertisements in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein at length. 45. At all times herein, Plaintiff was and is entitled to the rights, protections and benefits provided under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. 46. The transmission of facsimiles to Plaintiff as set forth above, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D). 47. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(3)(B) and 227(b)(3)(C). 48. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to an Order, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), enjoining Defendant from transmitting any advertisements in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D). Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227

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10. Defendant placed, or had placed on its behalf, telephone calls en masse to thousands of cellular telephone numbers throughout the United States. 11. In placing the solicitation telephone calls at issue in this Complaint, Defendant utilized an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”). Specifically, the hardware and software used by Defendant or its agent has the capacity to store, produce, and dial random or sequential numbers, and/or receive and store lists of telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. Defendant’s ATDS includes features substantially similar to a predictive dialer, inasmuch as it is capable of placing numerous telephone calls simultaneously (all without human intervention). 12. In fact, Defendant advertises its use of automated technology on its very own website. There, Defendant explicitly states that it may use automated technology to contact consumers. The image below is taken from https://www.freedommortgage.com. 13. The above image reads, “[b]y clicking “submit,” you are providing Freedom Mortgage with your express consent to be contacted through automated means such as autodialing, text SMS/MMS (charges may apply), and prerecorded messaging …” 15. The essential job functions include to “[s]erve as subject matter expert in telephony technology, specifically outbound dialer functionality and optimization.” 16. In addition, a disgruntled employee wrote on glassdoor.com about her experience working for Freedon Mortgage as “Inbound Leads are TERRIBLE!! They come from an autodialer making ‘ringlesss calls’ to people that DON’T even OWN HOMES, NOR DO THEY 28. In 2015, Defendant FMC acquired Plaintiff Sieleman’s home mortgage from his previous mortgage lender Bell Bank Mortgage. 30. When Sieleman would answer these calls, he would hear a noticeable pause/delay. This artificial pause/delay is indicative of the use of an ATDS. Sieleman has answered approximately four (4) calls. 31. Sieleman has requested that FMC stop calling him twice. Despite these requests, the auto-dialed calls to his cell phone continued. 32. During one of these calls from FMC, when Sieleman spoke to an agent to find out if the calls were legitimate, he was transferred to one of FMC’s agents, who confirmed that Sieleman was already receiving the best rate and could not get a refinanced mortgage if he wanted one. Sieleman again asked FMC’s agent to to stop calling him at the end of the call. 33. On September 14, 2017, FMC attempted to contact Sieleman in an effort to solicit his business, despite the two stop-call requests that he made. Sieleman did not answer and FMC left a message on his voicemail. FMC’s agent stated that the purpose of the call was to refinance Sieleman’s loan. 34. Sieleman has never provided his telephone number directly to FMC, or requested that FMC place solicitation telephone calls to him or alert him of its services. Simply put, Sieleman has never provided his prior express written consent to FMC to place solicitation telephone calls to him. 36. In order to redress these injuries, Sieleman, on behalf of himself and Classes of similarly situated individuals, brings suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., which prohibits unsolicited voice calls to cellular telephones. 37. On behalf of the proposed Classes, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring FMC to cease all unwanted autodialed calling activities and an award of statutory damages to the Class members, together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 38. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following four Classes: Autodialed No Consent Class: All persons in the United States who from a date four years prior to the filing of the initial complaint to the present: (1) Defendant (or a third person acting on behalf of Defendant) sent text messages, (2) to the person’s cellular telephone number, (3) for the purpose of selling Defendant’s products and/or services, (4) using an automated telephone dialing system, and (5) for whom Defendant claims it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to send automated text messages to the Plaintiff. Autodialed Stop Class: All persons in the United States who from a date four years prior to the filing of the initial complaint to the present: (1) Defendant (or a third person acting on behalf of Defendant) text messaged, (2) on the person’s cellular telephone, (3) for the purpose of selling Defendant’s products and/or services, (4) using an automated telephone dialing system, (4) after the person informed Defendant that s/he no longer wished to receive text messages from Defendant. 40. On information and belief, there are hundreds, if not thousands of members of the Classes such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 41. There are several questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Classes, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Classes. Common questions for the Classes that may be answered in a single stroke include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: (a) whether Defendant’s conduct constitutes a violation of the TCPA; (b) whether Defendant utilized an automatic telephone dialing system to send text messages to members of the Classes; (c) whether members of the Classes are entitled to statutory and treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendant’s conduct; (d) whether Defendant obtained prior express written consent to contact any Class members; and (e) to the extent Defendant’s conduct does not constitute telemarketing, whether Defendant obtained prior express oral consent to contact any class members. 43. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the other members of the Classes. Plaintiff’s claims are made in a representative capacity on behalf of the other members of the Classes. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the interests of other members of the proposed Classes and is subject to no unique defenses. Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting complex litigation and TCPA class actions. Plaintiff and his counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Classes and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interest adverse to those of the other members of the Classes. 45. In addition, this suit may be maintained as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because a class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Absent a class action, most members of the Classes would find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitive, and will have no effective remedy. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants, and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. The claims asserted herein are applicable to all customers throughout the United States who received an unsolicited solicitation text message from Defendant. The injury suffered by each individual class member is relatively small in comparison to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex and extensive litigation necessitated by Defendant’s conduct. It would be virtually impossible for members of the Classes individually to redress effectively the wrongs done to them. Even if the members of the Classes could afford such litigation, the court system could not. Individualized litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties, and to the court system, presented by the complex legal and factual issues of the case. By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties, and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 46. Adequate notice can be given to the members of the Classes directly using information maintained in Defendant’s records or through notice by publication. 47. Plaintiff repeats and realleges by reference paragraphs 1-40 of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 48. Defendant and/or its agents agent transmitted unwanted solicitation telephone calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class using equipment that, upon information and belief, had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, without human intervention. The telephone dialing equipment utilized by Defendants and/or its agent, which is substantially similar to a predictive dialer, dialed numbers from a list, or dialed numbers from a database of telephone numbers, in an automatic and systematic manner. 49. These solicitation telephone calls were made en masse without human intervention and without the prior express written consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class to receive such solicitation telephone calls. 50. At no time did Defendant obtain prior express written consent from the Plaintiff orally or in writing to receive solicitation telephone calls. Also, at no time did Defendant obtain prior express written consent that contained a disclosure informing Plaintiff or any other consumer that agreeing to receive solicitation telephone calls was not a condition of the purchase of any property or service. 52. In the event that the Court determines that Defendant’s conduct was wilful and knowing, it may, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class. 53. Plaintiff incorporate and realleges by reference paragraphs 1-40 as if fully set forth herein. 54. Defendant placed unsolicited and unwanted telephone calls to telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed Stop Class on their cellular telephones after they had demanded that Defendant stop calling them. 55. Defendant placed the telephone calls using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called and/or texted using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse. 56. Defendant utilized equipment that placed the telephone calls to Plaintiff and other members of the Autodialed Stop Class simultaneously and without human intervention. 58. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Autodialed Stop Class suffered actual damages in the form of monies paid to receive the unsolicited telephone calls on their cellular phones and, under Section 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 59. Should the Court determine that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to Section 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed Stop Class. 8. Defendant places autodialed telephone calls to consumers’ cellular telephones in an attempt to solicit their business and to promote its mortgage-lending and refinancing services. Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Autodialed Stop Class)

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14. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are and have been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are and have been subjected to Defendants’ decisions, policies, plans, programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and rules, all culminating in a willful failure and refusal to pay them proper compensation for all hours worked, due to a policy of time shaving. The claims of Plaintiff stated herein are essentially the same as those of other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. 15. The claims for relief are properly brought under and maintained as an opt-in collective action pursuant to §16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from the Defendants. Notice can be provided to FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to the last address known to Defendants. 16. Plaintiff bring claims for relief pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 23, on behalf of all current and former non-exempt employees (including but not limited to maintenance workers, waiters, bartenders, food preparers, porters, chefs, dishwashers among others) employed by Defendants on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class Period”). 18. The proposed Class is so numerous that a joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parties and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown because the facts on which the calculation of that number rests presently within the sole control of Defendants, there is no doubt that there are more than forty (40) members of the Class. 19. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those claims, which could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief, which would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the Class members were subject to the same Defendants’ corporate practices of (i) failing to pay proper compensation for all hours worked, (ii) failure to pay proper overtime, (iii) failing to pay proper wages, including those due to time shaving, (ii) failing to provide Class members with proper wage statements with every payment of wages, and (iii) failing to properly provide wage notices to Class members, at date of hiring and annually, per requirements of the NYLL. 20. Defendants’ corporate-wide policies and practices affected all Class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each Class member. Plaintiff and other Class members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 22. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of the wage and hour litigation where individual class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit against corporate defendant. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expense that numerous individual actions engender. Because losses, injuries and damages suffered by each of the individual Class members are small in the sense pertinent to a class action analysis, the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual Class members to redress the wrongs done to them. On the other hand, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and resulting in the impairment of class members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 25. Plaintiff MIGUEL HERREROS TORREZ: (a) In March 2020, Plaintiff MIGUEL HERREROS TORREZ began employment with Defendants as a maintenance worker for Defendants’ Restaurant. (b) His schedule was 6am to 3pm, 5 days per week. Plaintiff worked approximately 45 hours per week. (c) Throughout Plaintiff’s employment by Defendants, Plaintiff was required to clock out for a thirty (30) minute meal break every day. However, at least two days a week, Plaintiff did not take the break. Plaintiff was not paid for such off- the-clock work and as a result, was time-shaved one (1) hour per week. (d) Plaintiff MIGUEL HERREROS TORREZ was compensated at a rate of sixteen dollars ($16.00) per hour, for all hours worked up to forty (40) hours per week, and at an overtime rate of twenty one dollars and seventy five cents ($24.00) for hours worked over forty (40) hours per week (e) In June 2020 Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. 27. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff and Class members with proper wage notices at hiring and annually thereafter. Plaintiff did not receive proper wage notices either upon being hired or annually since the date of hiring in violation of the NYLL. 28. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not compensating Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members for all hours worked due to a policy of time-shaving. 29. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not providing proper wage statements as required under the NYLL. 30. Defendants failed to provide proper wage notices to employees, at the beginning of employment and annually thereafter, pursuant to the requirements of the NYLL. 31. Plaintiff retained Lee Litigation Group, PLLC to represent Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members, in this litigation and have agreed to pay the firm a reasonable fee for its services. 32. Plaintiff reallege and reaver Paragraphs 1 through 32 of this Class and Collective Action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 34. At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs within the meaning of the FLSA. 35. At all relevant times, Corporate Defendant had gross annual revenues in excess of $500,000. 36. At all relevant times, the Defendants engaged in a policy of time-shaving, including refusing to compensate Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs for all of their hours worked. 37. Plaintiff are in possession of certain records concerning the number of hours worked by Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and the actual compensation paid to Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. Further records concerning these matters should be in the possession and custody of the Defendants. Plaintiff intend to obtain all records by appropriate discovery proceedings to be taken promptly in this case and, if necessary, will then seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint to set forth the precise amount due. 38. Defendants knew of and/or showed a willful disregard for the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs for all hours worked when Defendants knew or should have known such was due. 39. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs of their rights under the FLSA. 40. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ willful disregard of the FLSA, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated (i.e., double) damages pursuant to the FLSA. 42. Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 43. Plaintiff reallege and reaver Paragraphs 1 through 43 of this Class and Collective Action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 44. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and Class members were employed by the Defendants within the meaning of the NYLL, §§2 and 651. 45. At all relevant times, the Defendants engaged in a policy of time-shaving, refusing to compensate Plaintiff and Class members for all of their hours that they worked each week. 46. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ rights by failing to pay them proper wages in the lawful amount for hours worked. 47. Defendants failed to provide proper wage statements with correct payment as required by NYLL § 195(3). 48. Due to the Defendants’ NYLL violations, Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid wages, unpaid overtime wages, resulting from time shaving, damages for unreasonably delayed payments, reasonable attorneys’ fees, liquidated damages, statutory penalties and costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to New York Labor Law. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW

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30. Defendant Evangeline Parish operates EPSO as an agency of the municipality in Evangeline Parish, Louisiana. EPSO is responsible for patrolling all of Evangeline Parish, assisting 9 with criminal investigations in towns within the Parish, and operating the Evangeline Parish Jail (“Parish Jail”). 31. Defendant Ville Platte operates VPPD as an agency of the municipality in Ville Platte, Louisiana. It also operates the Ville Platte City Jail (“City Jail”) next to VPPD headquarters. 32. Defendants acknowledged to the DOJ that both EPSO and VPPD work together to address criminal activity in Ville Platte. 33. When a detective at either EPSO or VPPD wants to question someone in connection with an ongoing criminal investigation, the detective instructs a patrol officer to find that individual in the community and bring him or her in for questioning. So ordered, the patrol officer locates the individual and commands them to ride in a patrol vehicle to either the City or Parish jail. 34. Upon arriving at either the City or Parish jail, pursuant to the jails’ standard procedures, the individual is strip-searched by jail personnel and then placed in a holding cell until a detective is available to conduct questioning. 35. At the City Jail, there are two holding cells, each equipped with a hard metal bench and nothing else. Neither holding cell has a mattress, running water, shower, or toilet in the cell. 36. Similarly, at the Parish Jail, the holding cell is equipped with only a long metal bench, and the walls are made of metal grating. EPSO detectives and deputies colloquially refer to the process of detaining individuals for questioning in the Parish Jail holding cell as “putting them on ice.” Both EPSO and VPPD officially refer to these detentions as “investigative holds.” 37. Investigative holds initiated by VPPD often last for 72 hours – and sometimes significantly longer, with booking logs from 2012-2014 referencing several dozen investigative holds lasting for at least a full week. During this time, detainees are forced to spend nights sleeping on either a concrete floor or metal bench. Additionally, VPPD exerts full control over the 10 detainees’ liberty: the detained individual is not permitted to make phone calls to inform family members or employers as to their whereabouts, and have no access to bathrooms or showers unless and until taken into the jail’s general population area. 38. EPSO conducts similar investigative holds, which often last for three full days and sometimes longer. During the hold, detainees are forced to sleep on the Parish Jail’s concrete floor. As with VPPD, EPSO also controls the detainee’s liberty: EPSO also does not permit detainees on investigative hold to make phone calls, and in fact, EPSO detectives have threatened Parish Jail officers with retaliation if the officers allowed the detainees to make phone calls. 39. Detectives of both EPSO and VPPD have acknowledged to the DOJ that they use investigative holds specifically where they lack probable cause or sufficient evidence for an arrest, instead using them when they have a “hunch” or a “feeling” that the individual detained may be connected to criminal activity. 40. Officers at both EPSO and VPPD admitted to the DOJ that they use the time that a person is on investigative hold to develop their case, either by gathering evidence or by convincing the detainee to confess. However, both agencies confirmed that they used holds to detain individuals whom they did not suspect of any involvement in criminal activity, but who instead were related to suspects, witnessed crimes, or otherwise might have knowledge of criminal activity. Because officers of EPSO and VPPD are willing to arrest and detain individuals who are merely possible witnesses in criminal investigations, literally anyone in Evangeline Parish or Ville Platte could be arrested and placed on investigative hold at any time. 41. For example, a woman and her family were detained in 2014 after a grocery shopping trip in which they might have witnessed an armed robbery and shooting. The woman informed VPPD officers that she did not witness the crime, and therefore had no information 11 relating to it. She was nevertheless commanded to come to the police station to answer questions, along with her boyfriend and a juvenile who was staying at their house at the time, and was taken into custody at the City Jail. Officers strip-searched the woman, who was menstruating at the time, and forced her to remove her tampon. They then placed her in custody overnight – first in a holding cell, and then in the Jail’s general population – without access to sanitary products. Roughly nine hours later, the woman was interrogated by VPPD detectives and the district attorney. VPPD officers also held the woman’s boyfriend overnight in a holding cell, and held the juvenile for at least seven hours in a separate holding cell before releasing him to a family member. None of these individuals were suspected of having any connection to the robbery or shooting, and yet all were detained for significant periods of time before being shown a line up or asked questions about what they witnessed. When the woman called VPPD the day after being released to complain about her treatment, the VPPD Chief responded that the detention was pursuant to department policy. 42. EPSO and VPPD have used these unconstitutional investigative holds as standard practice for more than two decades. 43. Defendants intentionally placed Plaintiffs on investigative holds. 44. During the course of Plaintiffs’ detentions on investigative holds, Defendants did not provide Plaintiffs any opportunities to challenge their continued detention, or even to notify anyone of the fact of their detention. 45. In no case involving an investigative hold was there prior judicial approval given for the use of the investigative hold practice, thereby removing any justification for said holds under any conception of material witness detentions. The holds are made without a warrant, without any showing that the testimony is essential and that obtaining it via subpoena is 12 impracticable, and without any attempt to obtain prior judicial approval, or even subsequent judicial review. 46. Defendants have a policy, practice or custom of violating the civil rights of detainees on investigative holds. 47. In April 2015, defendants EPSO, VPPD and Ville Platte openly admitted that their practice of using investigative holds is unconstitutional. 48. Because of Defendants’ unlawful actions, Plaintiffs have suffered loss of liberty, loss of enjoyment of life, humiliation, mental suffering, emotional distress, stress, and other non- economic losses in an amount to be determined at trial. 49. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) as well as Rule 23(b)(2) and/or Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This action is brought pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive or declaratory relief and Rule 23(b)(3) for money damages. 50. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves, and on behalf of a class of all other persons similarly situated, who were forced to undergo unlawful investigative holds propagated, maintained, and under the control of Defendants, EPSO Supervisory defendants, and VPPD Supervisory defendants during the period January 1, 1997 through the cessation of the Defendants’ pattern and practice of unlawful investigative holds (the “Class Period”). 51. On information and belief, and based on the DOJ’s December 19, 2016 released results of its investigation of VPPD and EPSO, Plaintiffs allege the investigative holds to which they and class members were subjected were done pursuant to Defendants’ policy and practice to 13 arrest and detain citizens of Evangeline Parish and Ville Platte without regard to: (i) Probable cause; (ii) Presence or existence of a warrant for arrest; (iii) Duration of detention; (iv) Conditions of detention; or (v) Civil rights of detainees held on investigative holds. 52. On information and belief, and based on the DOJ’s December 19, 2016 released results of its investigation of VPPD and EPSO, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, EPSO Supervisory defendants, and VPPD Supervisory defendants have a policy of maintaining these investigative holds in direct violation of detainees’ Fourth Amendment and state law rights, as described above. 70. Plaintiffs hereby re-allege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 71. Without any basis in state law, Defendants willfully and intentionally detained Plaintiffs in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful search and seizure without probable cause. 72. As a direct result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs were unlawfully deprived of their liberty. 73. A municipal government may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where a plaintiff demonstrates that a deprivation of a federal right occurred as a result of a policy of the local government’s legislative body, or the actions of local officials where those acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality. 19 74. Investigative holds have been municipal policies for both Evangeline Parish and Ville Platte for over two decades, as they have been used with willful disregard for the Fourth Amendment rights of Defendants’ citizens for that entire duration, and the investigative holds are directly causally linked to the deprivation of those rights. 75. Given the two-decade-plus duration of EPSO and VPPD’s practice of using illegal investigative holds, the Defendants’ policy and actions of their local officials, as well as the clear municipal policies these investigative holds represent, make Defendants liable to Plaintiffs under 76. Plaintiffs hereby re-allege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 77. Defendants arrested and imprisoned Plaintiffs in the hope of eliciting information relating to criminal activity. 78. Defendants did not have, nor seek to have, a judge issue warrants for Plaintiffs’ arrests. 79. Defendants also did not attempt to subpoena Plaintiffs, nor entertain the possibility of doing so. 80. Accordingly, Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ rights under Louisiana law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:257. 20 81. Plaintiffs hereby re-allege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 82. Defendants arrested and imprisoned Plaintiffs without warrants or probable cause. 83. Defendants maintained Plaintiffs’ detention for longer than 48 hours without any determination being made as to whether there was probable cause for their arrests and incarcerations. 84. Following the expiration of 48 hours’ detention, Plaintiffs were not released on their own recognizance. 85. Accordingly, Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ rights under Louisiana law, La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 230.2(A), (B)(1). Fourth Amendment – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 230.2 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:257

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12. PNI provides a proprietary transactional software platform that is used by several leading retailers such as Costco, CVS Pharmacy, and Rite Aid to sell personalized photo services and products to consumers. 13. PNI’s digital software connects these retailers’ websites, in-store kiosks, and mobile platforms so that consumers are presented with a uniform storefront at a retailer’s photo center service. 14. Historically, PNI’s software platform has been used in over 19,000 retail locations and 8,000 kiosks, where consumers made over 18 million transactions for personalized photo products. 15. Plaintiff has utilized PNI’s software platform through CVS Pharmacy, where Ms. Nedlouf created an account on CVSPhoto.com for her digital photo needs. 16. Ms. Nedlouf either established a contractual relationship with PNI or is a third-party beneficiary of PNI’s contractual relationship with CVS. 18. When Ms. Nedlouf provided PNI with this sensitive personal and financial information, she reasonably believed PNI would maintain this personal and financial information in a secure manner and provided her information to PNI on that basis. 19. Had Ms. Nedlouf known that PNI would not maintain her information in a reasonably secure manner, she would not have provided that information to 25. The Plaintiff Class consists of all United States citizens whose personal information was compromised by the PNI data breach. 26. Excluded from the Class is PNI, including any entity in which PNI has a controlling interest or is a parent or subsidiary, as well as the officers, directors, affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, predecessors, successors, and assigns of PNI. Also excluded are the judges and court personnel in this case and any members of their immediate families. 27. Numerosity. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The Class includes thousands, possibly hundreds of thousands, of individuals whose personal information was compromised by the PNI data breach. 29. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class in that she, like all Class members, had her personal information compromised in the PNI data breach. 30. Adequacy. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are experienced in class-action and complex litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to, or in conflict with, other members of the Class. 31. The questions of law and fact common to the Class members predominate over any questions which may affect only individual members. 33. A class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. There is no special interest in the members of the Class individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions. The loss of money and other harm sustained by many individual Class members will not be large enough to justify individual actions, especially in proportion to the significant costs and expenses necessary to prosecute this action. The expense and burden of individual litigation makes it impossible for many members of the Class individually to address the wrongs done to them. Class treatment will permit the adjudication of claims of Class members who could not afford individually to litigate their claims against Defendant. Class treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single form simultaneously, efficiently, and without duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would entail. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 35. The prosecution of separate actions by the individual Class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Class members, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for PNI. In contrast, the conduct of this action as a class action presents far fewer management difficulties, conserves judicial resources and the parties’ resources, and protects the rights of each Class member. 36. Plaintiff incorporates by reference those paragraphs set out above as if fully set forth herein. 38. PNI owed a duty, as articulated in its own policies, to protect its customers’ personal information. 39. PNI owed a duty to timely disclose the material fact that PNI’s computer systems and data security practices were inadequate to safeguard individuals’ personal information. 40. PNI breached these duties by the conduct alleged herein by (a) failing to protect its customers’ personal information; (b) failing to maintain adequate computer systems and data security practices to safeguard customers’ personal information; (c) failing to disclose the material fact that PNI’s computer systems and data security practices were inadequate to safeguard customers’ personal information; and (d) failing to disclose in a timely and accurate manner to Plaintiff and members of the Class the material fact of the PNI data breach. 43. When Plaintiff and members of the Class provided their personal information to PNI, Plaintiff and members of the Class entered into implied contracts with PNI pursuant to which PNI agreed to safeguard and protect such information and to timely and accurately notify Plaintiff and Class members that their data had been breached and compromised. 44. Plaintiff and Class members would not have provided and entrusted their personal information to PNI in the absence of the implied contract between them and PNI. 45. Plaintiff and members of the Class fully performed their obligations under the implied contracts with PNI. 46. PNI breached the implied contracts it made with Plaintiff and Class members by failing to safeguard and protect the personal information of Plaintiff and members of the Class and by failing to provide timely and accurate notice to them that their personal information was compromised in and as a result of PNI data breach. 48. Plaintiff incorporates by reference those paragraphs set out above as if fully set forth herein. 49. PNI has a contractual obligation to maintain the security of its customers’ personal information. 50. PNI breached that contractual obligation by failing to safeguard and protect the personal information of Plaintiff and members of the Class and by failing to provide timely and accurate notice to them that their personal information was compromised as a result of PNI data breach. 51. The losses and damages sustained by Plaintiff and Class members as described herein were either the direct and proximate result of PNI’s breaches of the contracts between PNI and Plaintiff and members of the Class or the direct and proximate result of PNI’s breaches of its contract(s) with CVS or other non-parties, of which Plaintiff and the Class are third-party beneficiaries. 53. In having their personal information delivered to PNI for the purposes of photo services, Plaintiff and Class members intended and understood that PNI would adequately safeguard their personal and financial information. 54. PNI accepted possession of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ personal information for the purpose of providing photo services. 55. By accepting possession of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ personal information, PNI understood that Plaintiff and Class members expected PNI to adequately safeguard their personal information. Accordingly, a bailment (or deposit) was established for the mutual benefit of the parties. 56. During the bailment (or deposit), PNI owed a duty to Plaintiff and Class members to exercise reasonable care, diligence, and prudence in protecting their personal information. 57. PNI breached its duty of care by failing to take appropriate measures to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class members’ personal information, resulting in the unlawful and unauthorized access to and misuse of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ personal information. 59. Plaintiff incorporates by reference those paragraphs set out above as if fully set forth herein. 60. The Georgia Legislature has enacted a data breach statute. See O.C.G.A. § 10-1-910, et seq. This statute generally requires that any person or business conducting business within the state that engages in whole or in part in the business of collecting, assembling, evaluating, compiling, reporting, transmitting, transferring, or communicating information concerning individuals for the primary purpose of furnishing personal information to nonaffiliated third parties, shall disclose any breach of the security of the system to any resident of the state whose personal information was acquired by an unauthorized person, and further require that the disclosure of the breach be made in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay. 61. The PNI data breach constitutes a breach of the security system of PNI within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 10-1-910, et seq. and the data breached is covered by the Georgia data breach statute. 63. PNI unreasonably delayed in informing the public, including Plaintiff and members of the Class (or suitable Subclass) about the breach of security of Plaintiff’s and Class (or suitable Subclass) members’ confidential and non-public personal information after PNI knew or should have known that the data breach had occurred. 64. PNI failed to disclose to Plaintiff and the Class (or suitable Subclass) without unreasonable delay and in the most expedient time possible, the breach of security of Plaintiff’s and Class (or suitable Subclass) members’ personal and financial information when PNI knew or reasonably believed such information had been compromised. 65. Plaintiff and members of the Class (or suitable Subclass) suffered harm directly resulting from PNI’s failure to provide and the delay in providing Plaintiff and Class (or suitable Subclass) members with timely and accurate notice as required by the Georgia data breach statute. 66. Plaintiff suffered the damages alleged above as a direct result of PNI’s delay in providing timely and accurate notice of the data breach. 68. PNI’s failure to provide timely and accurate notice of the data breach violated the Georgia data breach statute. 69. Plaintiff and members of the Class seek all remedies available under the Georgia data breach statute. 70. Plaintiff incorporates by reference those paragraphs set out above as if fully set forth herein. 71. This count is brought in the alternative to Plaintiff’s breach of contract counts. If claims for breach of contract are ultimately successful, this count will be dismissed. 72. Plaintiff and Class members conferred a benefit on PNI by way of customers’ paying PNI to maintain Plaintiff and Class members’ personal information. 74. PNI failed to provide reasonable security, safeguards, and protections to the personal information of Plaintiff and Class members, and as a result PNI was overpaid. 75. Under principles of equity and good conscience, PNI should not be permitted to retain the money because PNI failed to provide adequate safeguards and security measures to protect Plaintiff’s and Class members’ personal information that they paid for but did not receive. 76. PNI wrongfully accepted and retained these benefits to the detriment of Plaintiff and Class members. 77. PNI’s enrichment at the expense of Plaintiff and Class members is and was unjust. 78. As a result of PNI’s wrongful conduct, as alleged above, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to restitution and disgorgement of profits, benefits, and other compensation obtained by PNI, plus attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest thereon.

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30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered thereby. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 33. The Plaintiff intends to immediately revisit the Website to purchase a product from the Defendant as soon as the access barriers are removed from the Website. 35. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually-impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 36. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non-existent or empty webpage. For the visually-impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. Defendant Must Remove Barriers To Its Website 38. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s Website and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to use and enjoy the Website in the same manner as sighted individuals do, preventing Plaintiff from using the Website to purchase items and to view the items. 39. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 40. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired persons. 42. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 43. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 45. Web-based technologies have features and content that are modified on a daily, and in some instances an hourly, basis, and a one time “fix” to an inaccessible website will not cause the website to remain accessible without a corresponding change in corporate policies related to those web-based technologies. To evaluate whether an inaccessible website has been rendered accessible, and whether corporate policies related to web-based technologies have been changed in a meaningful manner that will cause the website to remain accessible, the website must be reviewed on a periodic basis using both automated accessibility screening tools and end user testing by visually-impaired persons. 46. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired persons could independently shop for and otherwise research the Defendant’s products via the Website. 47. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 49. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 54. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class and Sub-Classes. The Class, and Sub-Classes, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind persons, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class and/or the Sub-Classes. 56. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions are common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 57. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by visually-impaired persons throughout the United States. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 61. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 62. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 63. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 65. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 66. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 67. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 68. Defendant’s Website operates in the State of New York and constitutes an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant’s online and physical retail store. 70. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated therewith to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 74. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 75. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 76. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate, against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 78. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 80. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 81. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 82. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 83. Defendant’s website is an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its online sales establishment. 84. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and/or operates its Website in the City of New York, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 86. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 87. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 88. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 90. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 91. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 92. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 93. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 94. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 96. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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13. The Class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23 of the FRCP for maintaining a class action: • Upon information and belief, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable because there may be hundreds and/or thousands of persons who were sent debt collection letters and/or notices from the Defendants that violate specific provisions of the FDCPA. Plaintiff is complaining of a standard form letter and/or notice. (See Exhibit A, except that the undersigned attorney has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 redacted the financial account numbers and/or personal identifiers in an effort to protect Plaintiff’s privacy); • There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: a. Whether the Defendants violated various provisions of the 13. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that all times herein mentioned each Defendant was acting as the agent, servant, employee, partner, co-conspirator, and/or joint venturer of each remaining Defendant. 14. Plaintiff brings this action as a state wide class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”), on behalf of himself and all City of New York consumers and their successors in interest (the “Class”), who were sent debt collection letters and/or notices from the Defendants which are in violation of the FDCPA, as described in this Complaint. 14. Plaintiff is at all times to this lawsuit, a "consumer" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 15. Prior to June 3, 2019, Plaintiff incurred a financial obligation to HSBC CARD 33. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, repeats and realleges all prior allegations as if set forth at length herein. 34. Collection letters and/or notices, such as those sent by RAUSCH STURM, are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” 36. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(1) by sending a letter dated June 3, 2019, to Plaintiff, which failed correctly state the amount of the alleged debt. 37. The June 3, 2019 letter states: “Total amount of the debt due as [of] the date of charge-off…………….” 38. The June 3, 2019 letter provides that there is no amount due as of the charge off date. 39. The June 3, 2019 letter further states: “Total amount of interest accrued on the debt after charge-off…………… $3,843.55”. 40. The June 3, 2019 letter further states: “Total payments and credits made on the debt after charge-off…………$4,380.67”. 41. The June 3, 2019 letter further states: “Balance…..$8,224.22”. 42. Pursuant to the June 3, 2019 letter, Plaintiff should have a credit balance of $537.12. 43. 15 U.S.C. §1692e(A)(2) prohibits the false representation of the character, amount or legal status of any debt. 44. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e(A)(2) by falsely representing the amount of the debt. 45. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e(A)(2) by falsely representing the itemization of the debt. 46. 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 48. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10) by by falsely representing the itemization of the debt. 49. 15 U.S.C. §1692f(1) prohibits a debt collect from collecting any amount, unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the dent or permitted by law. 50. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. §1692f(1) by attempting to collect to collect an amount of $8,224.22, when pursuant to the June 3, 2019 letter, Plaintiff has a credit balance of $537.12. 51. Congress enacted the FDCPA in part to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. 52. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to free from abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. 53. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have suffered harm as a direct result of the abusive, deceptive and unfair collection practices described herein. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. VIOLATIONS

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(Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations) A. FLSA COVERAGE 18. Waitr Incorporated and Landcadia Holdings, Inc. merged on November 15, 2018. The surviving entity is now known as Waitr Holdings, Inc. (“Waitr”).4 19. Waitr is a food delivery service that allows its patrons to utilize a mobile or desktop app to order food and have it delivered from participating restaurants. 20. Waitr operates in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.5 21. Plaintiffs Halley worked for Waitr as a driver from approximately April 2017 to July 2017. 22. Plaintiff Gongaware has worked and continues to work for Waitr as a driver since approximately October of 2016 and was misclassified as an independent contractor. 24. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members incurred (and continue to incur) costs for gasoline, vehicle parts and fluids, repair and maintenance services, insurance, depreciation, and other expenses (“automobile expenses”) while delivering food items for the primary benefit of Waitr. 25. Waitr does not reimburse its delivery drivers—Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members—for their automobile expenses. 26. This reimbursement policy applies to all of Waitr’s delivery drivers throughout the United States. 27. During the applicable FLSA limitations period, the IRS standard business mileage reimbursement rate has ranged between $.545 and $.575 per mile.6 28. Plaintiff Halley drove, on average, approximately 469 miles each week. 29. Plaintiff Gongaware drove, on average, approximately 500 hundred miles each week. 30. Using the lowest IRS rate in effect during the period of Plaintiffs’ employment as a reasonable approximation of Plaintiffs’ automobile expenses, every mile driven on the job decreased Plaintiffs’ net wages by approximately $.55 per mile. 31. Considering Plaintiff Halley’s estimate of 469 miles driven each week, Waitr underpaid Plaintiff Halley approximately $257.95 per week ($.55 x 469 average weekly miles). 32. Likewise, considering Plaintiff Gongaware’s estimate of 500 miles driven each week, Waitr underpaid Plaintiff Gongaware approximately $275.00 per week (.55 x 500 average weekly miles). 34. Further, Waitr (mis)classified some of its drivers as independent contractors and paid them only a delivery fee, in addition to gratuities received from Waitr’s patrons (if any), and did not pay them the federally mandated minimum wage or overtime compensation. 35. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members would conduct their day-to-day activities within designed parameters and in accordance with pre-determined operational plans coordinated by Clean Harbors and/or its clients. 36. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not) include the exercise of independent discretion or judgment. 37. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not) concern work directly related to the management or general business operations of Waitr. 38. Waitr set all employment-related policies applicable to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members. 39. Waitr maintained control over pricing and marketing and the online platform that Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members interact with. 40. Waitr had the power to hire and fire Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members. 41. Waitr made all personnel and payroll decisions with respect to Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members, including but not limited to, the decision to pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members an hourly rate with no overtime pay. 42. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members did not employ their own workers. 43. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members relied on Waitr for their work. 44. Waitr did not permit Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to market any business or services of their own. 46. Because Waitr did not adequately reimburse Plaintiffs and the Putative Class members for their business expenses, and did not pay those employees (mis)classified as independent contractors any overtime compensation, Waitr’s pay policies and practices violated (and continue to violate) the FLSA. V. 47. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 48. The FLSA Collective is defined as: 65. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 66. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this is a collective action filed on behalf of all of Waitr’s delivery drivers throughout the United States who have been similarly situated to Plaintiffs with regard to the work they performed and the manner in which they were paid. 67. Other similarly situated deliver drivers of Waitr have been victimized by Waitr’s patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. 69. Waitr’s failure to pay Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members minimum wages and overtime results from generally applicable policies and practices of Waitr, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of Plaintiffs or the Putative Class Members. 70. Thus, Plaintiffs’ experiences are typical of the experiences of the Putative Class Members. 71. All of the Putative Class Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be paid minimum wage for all hours worked and overtime compensation for all hours worked over forty (40) in a single workweek. 72. Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 73. Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Waitr will retain the proceeds of its violations. 74. Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 75. Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated Plaintiffs should be certified as defined as in Paragraph 48 and notice should be promptly sent. VI.

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40. Plaintiff brings this suit as a class action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated Cree customers (the “Class”) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.23. Plaintiff seeks to represent the following Class: All persons in Oregon who purchased the LED Lightbulbs during the applicable limitations period. Excluded from the Class are (a) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (b) the Defendant and its subsidiaries and affiliates; and (c) all persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class (the “Class”). 41. Plaintiff reserves the right to re-define the Class (hereinafter referred to as the “Class,” unless otherwise specified) prior to moving for class certification. 51. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though set forth fully herein. 68. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though set forth fully herein. 69. Defendant, either directly and/or through agents, made material misrepresentations and concealed material information concerning the qualities, characteristics, reliability, durability, longevity, benefits and lifespan of the LED Lightbulbs from its customers as set forth above. 70. At the times Defendant misrepresented and concealed these material facts, Plaintiff and the members of the Class had no knowledge of the material facts that Defendant misrepresented and failed to disclose. 71. At all times relevant, Defendant had superior knowledge regarding the qualities, characteristics, reliability, durability, longevity, benefits and lifespan of the LED Lightbulbs than did Plaintiff and Class members. 77. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as though set forth fully herein. FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION AND CONCEALMENT STOLL STOLL BERNE LOKTING & SHLACHTER P.C. 209 S.W. OAK STREET, SUITE 500 PORTLAND, OREGON 97204 UNJUST ENRICHMENT VIOLATION OF THE OREGON UNLAWFUL TRADE PRACTICES LAW, ORS 646.605, et seq.

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1. Balancing the interests of public disclosure with an individual's right to privacy is a delicate, but essential, task for government. The Driver Privacy Protection Act (H.R. 3365), safeguards the privacy of drivers and vehicle owners by prohibiting the release of personal information--including a person's name and address—to anyone without a specific business-related reason for obtaining the information. 19. The DPPA’s primary purpose is to protect the privacy and safety of all consumers that have provided information to the DMV. 2. H.R. 3365 acknowledges that there are many businesses that depend on access to motor vehicle records to serve their customers, including insurance companies, financial institutions, vehicle dealers, and others. By focusing this legislation on the personal information contained within a driver file, this bill does not limit those legitimate organizations in using the information. It does, however, restrict access to all those without a legitimate purpose. 21. Defendants entered into contracts to obtain access to thousands of motor vehicle records on a continuous basis in 30 states within the United States. 22. To protect the privacy and safety of licensed drivers, and to limit misuse of the information contained in these government record systems, Congress enacted the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725. The Act imposed strict rules for collecting the personal information in driver records, and provided for liability in cases where an entity improperly collects, discloses, uses, or sells such records. Congress paid particular attention to differences between motor vehicle records and other public records containing similar information, which it decided not to regulate. One concern that motivated enactment of the DPPA was that personal information in motor vehicle records, including names and addresses, is associated with license plate numbers, which drivers must display to the general public. 24. Congressional testimony in 1993 highlighted potential threats to privacy and personal safety from disclosure of personal information held in state DMV records. 25. The testimony before Congress also discussed concerns that the personal information contained in state DMV records had considerable commercial value. In particular, the personal information sold by state DMVS were being used extensively at that time to support the direct-marketing efforts of businesses. See 1994 WL 212836 (Feb. 3, 1994) (statement of Richard A. Barton, Direct Marketing Association) (“The names and addresses of vehicle owners, in combination with information about the vehicles they own, are absolutely essential to the marketing efforts of the nation's automotive industry.”). Personal information in DMV records “is combined with information from other sources and used to create lists for selective marketing use by businesses, charities, and political candidates.” 140 Cong. Rec. H2522 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Rep. Moran) (“Marketers use DMV lists to do targeted mailings and other types of marketing.”). 28. The “opt out” provisions of the original version of the DPPA was changed to “opt in” provisions in §§ 2721(b)(11) and (12) by the October 1999 amendments to the DPPA. See Pub. L. No. 106-69, 113 Stat. 986 (Oct. 9, 1999). Personal information in motor vehicle records could now be disclosed in certain circumstances for bulk distribution for surveys, marketing, or solicitation, but only if individuals are provided an opportunity, in a clear and conspicuous manner, to block such use of information pertaining to them. 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(12). Thus, disclosure of motor vehicle information about an individual for direct-marketing purposes is prohibited unless (a) the individual is provided the opportunity, under Section 2721(b)(11), to block general disclosure of their personal information, and declines that opportunity, or (b) the individual is given the opportunity to block use of their personal information for direct marketing specifically, and declines that opportunity. 29. The DPPA defines “personal information” as “information that identifies an individual, including an individual's photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name address, telephone number, and medical or disability information, but does not include information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver's status.” 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3). The DPPA's general prohibition on disclosure of personal information is subject to fourteen (14) exceptions—the permissible purposes—which allow for the limited disclosure of personal information. 31. Sections 2721(a) and 2722(a) make nondisclosure of personal information the default rule. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (“In general” prohibiting disclosure of personal information “except as provided in subsection (b)”); 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal information . . . for any use not permitted under section 2721(b) of this title.”). Section 2721(b) then lists fourteen discrete exceptions to non-disclosure. 32. According to section 2721(c), “[a]n authorized recipient of personal information (except a recipient under subsection (b)(11) or (12) may resell or re-disclose the information only for a use permitted under subsection (b) (but not for uses under subsection (b)(11) or (12)). An authorized recipient under (b)(11) may resell or re-disclose personal information for any purpose. An authorized recipient under section (b)(12) may resell or re-disclose personal information pursuant to subsection (b)(12).” 18 U.S.C. § 2721(c). 33. Any person who receives personal information from a DMV and resells or further discloses that information must, for five years, maintain records identifying each person or entity to whom a further resale or re-disclosure was made, and the permitted purpose for such resale or re-disclosure. See 18 U.S.C. 2721(c). 34. The DPPA creates a private right of action for “the individual” whose personal information was knowingly obtained, disclosed, or used “for a purpose not permitted” under section 2721(b). 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a). “It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal information . . . for any use not permitted under section 2721(b) of this title.” 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a). 36. The Congressional record is clear: the core aims of the DPPA are to prevent the unauthorized obtainment of a citizen’s personal information and the statute creates a tangible right to have one’s information secure. The violation of that security is a harm that supports standing. “Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.” Linda v. Texas, 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973); furthermore, “The actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing ….” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). 38. This literal reading of the DPPA was designed to promote public safety and to protect individual privacy, construed so as to maximize their deterrent effect – in particular, by shifting burdens to institutional actors who regularly engage in the targeted conduct or are otherwise in a position to minimize future violations. 39. Congress intended the states to be the “gatekeepers” of the motor vehicle records, limiting the number of people with access to the personal information because the greater the number of people with access, the greater the risk that personal information will be disseminated to those who do not have valid uses for the personal information. 41. In each sentence of section 2721(c) Congress linked the term “authorized recipient” to the specific section of 2721(b) that had authorized the release of the information to the recipient. Congress intended that the authorized recipients to be individuals, entities, or their agents, qualified to receive the information by the terms of section 2721(b). Resellers cannot obtain all of the personal information in the database simply by calling themselves resellers. Entities requesting motor vehicle records have to justify their receipt of personal information under the 2721(b) exception is applicable. Defendant PoliceReports.US, LLC. was not an “authorized recipient.” 42. The United States Supreme Court analyzed the D.P.P.A.’s use of “authorized recipient” (albeit in dicta) in Reno v. Condon, noting a person must have initially obtained the data for an permissible purpose before resale or dissemination of the data: After listing section 2721(b)’s fourteen permissible purposes, Chief Justice Rehnquist equated authorized recipients under section 2721(c) with “private persons who have obtained drivers’ personal information for one of the aforementioned permissible purposes to further disclose that information for any one of those purposes.” This is also the most logical conclusion based on the language of the DPPA, the purpose of the statute, the legislative history, and common sense. (quoting Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. at 146 (citing 18 U.S.C. §2721(c)). 44. The DPPA regulates the activity of resellers when acting as a “middleman”, and places civil damage liability on the person and/or company that knowingly obtains, re-discloses, resells, and purchases the motor vehicle records for improper purposes. 45. In light of the text, structure, and legislative history of the DPPA, resellers are subject to a duty of reasonable care before disclosing DPPA-protected personal information, 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)-(c). Resellers must exercise reasonable care in responding to requests for personal information drawn from motor vehicle records. Resellers are liable if they do not secure proof that representations made by the recipient of personal information were valid. Defendants failed to exercise such reasonable care when reselling the motor vehicle records. 47. The structure of the DPPA clearly indicates that the liability of a reseller of motor vehicle records is not predicated on their knowledge of the end user’s actual purpose. Rather, it is the same as the end user’s. That is because section 2722(a) makes no distinction between the mental state required by the person who obtains motor vehicle records and one who discloses it. Indeed, the statue on its face applies equally to those who “obtain” and those who “disclose” personal information. 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a). 48. Section 2721(c) does not suggests that a reseller may re-disclose protected information so long as its customer claims to have a permissible use. Rather, the DPPA authorizes the resale of information only if there is an actual, not just a stated, permitted use. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(c); Thus, as a purely textual matter, the DPPA indicates that a reseller who sells protected information to a client without an actual permissible purpose is liable regardless what “certifications” that client has made. 50. Subsection (b)(12) implements an important objective of the DPPA—to restrict disclosure of personal information contained in motor vehicle records to businesses for the purpose of direct marketing and solicitation. Direct marketing and solicitation presented a particular concern not only because these activities are of the ordinary commercial sort but also because contacting an individual is an affront to privacy even beyond the fact that a large number of persons have access to the personal information. The DPPA was enacted in part to respond to the States’ common practice of selling personal information to businesses that used it for marketing and solicitations. Congress chose to protect individual privacy by requiring a state DMV to obtain the license holder’s express consent before permitting the disclosure, acquisition, and use of personal information for bulk solicitation. 51. Defendants PoliceReports and LexisNexis acted as resellers/sources with an actual legal duties, other than the ministerial task of soliciting rote representations from prospective requestors. Resellers must confirm those obtaining motor vehicle records have a DPPA permissible use to obtain motor vehicle records. This obligation is not met merely by accepting the end user’s “say-so” in the presence of red flags suggesting the requested information was being sought for an improper DPPA purpose. A cursory review Defendants’ websites would reveal their business objectives, and provide “red flags” requiring additional review prior to the release of the Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ MVRs. 53. Defendants websites allow the purchase of crash reports by report date, location, or driver name and payment by credit card, prepaid bulk accounts or monthly accounts. Purchasers are not required to establish any permissible use provided in the DPPA to obtain access to Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ MVRs. 54. Defendants’ activities occurred throughout the United States, obtaining the motor vehicle records of Plaintiffs and the Class Members for purposes not permitted - a course of action, and a body of information, that is protected from access and disclosure by federal law. 55. The collection, use, and disclosure of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ motor vehicle records by Defendants implicate Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ privacy and physical safety. Such information is afforded special attention due to the consequences for both privacy and physical safety that may flow from its disclosure. The heightened privacy and physical safety concerns generated by obtaining, using, and disclosing such information, without authorization, is apparent in U.S. law, creating restrictive consent standards for its obtainment, use, and disclosure. 57. Defendants knowingly obtained, disclosed, and/or used Plaintiffs and Class Members personal information, derived from motor vehicle records, for a purpose not permitted legally, a violation of a federal statutory right. 58. At all times material, Defendants, and agents of the Defendants, knew, or reasonably should have known, that their actions violated clearly established statutory rights of the Plaintiffs and the Class members. 59. Plaintiffs and Class Members were harmed when Defendants intentionally, or in the alternative, negligently, obtained, processed, disseminated, stored, and used motor vehicle records to market and solicit Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’, obtained without authorization, and invading their right of privacy. 60. Defendants failed to acquire, independently, and in concert, the express consent, of Plaintiffs and Class Members before obtaining, collecting, generating, deriving, disseminating, storing, or causing to be stored, re-disclosing or purchasing the MVR data of Plaintiffs and Class Members. 61. The Defendants failed to provide adequate policies, practices, and procedures relating to the re-disclosure and resale to third parties obtaining the Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ motor vehicle records. 63. During the Class Period, each Plaintiff named herein had personal motor vehicle records obtained, used, re-disclosed, stored, resold, and purchased for purposes that included marketing and solicitation, without their express consent. Such data was identifiable as to each of the Plaintiffs and Class Members and were transmitted to third parties for purposes wholly unrelated to its use and functionality when Plaintiffs and Class Members produced such to the state. 64. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs seek certification of the following class: NATIONWIDE CLASS: All persons in the United States who, on or after, four (4) years prior to the date of this filed complaint, through the final disposition of this or any related actions (the “Class Period”), had their personal motor vehicle records, maintained by their State Motor Vehicle Departments, directly obtained, used, re- disclosed, and/or resold, for purposes not authorized by the DPPA, without their express consent by the named Defendants. 66. Plaintiffs reserve the right to revise these definitions of the classes based on facts they learn as litigation progresses. 67. The Class consists of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of individuals and other entities, making joinder impractical. 68. The members of the Class are identifiable from the information and records in the custody of the Defendants identified in the Class definition. 69. Defendants’ conduct, as complained of herein, is generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. The claims of Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of all other Class Members. 70. The claims of Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of all other Class Members. 72. Plaintiffs’ have retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting complex litigation and class actions involving unlawful commercial practices. Plaintiffs and their counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the Class Members, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have any interest that might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 73. A class action will cause an orderly and expeditious administration of Class Members’ claims and economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered, and uniformity of decisions will be ensured. Individual Class Members are unlikely to be aware of their rights and are not likely to be in a position (either through experience or financially) to commence individual litigation against Defendants. 74. Absent a class action, most Class Members would find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitive and will have no effective remedy. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants, and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 75. The Defendants have acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiffs and all of the other Class Members, requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class Members. 77. Certification of a class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 is appropriate because Plaintiffs and the putative Class Members have questions of law and fact that are common to the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class, and a class action is superior to all other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy in fact, the wrongs suffered and remedies sought by Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class are premised upon an unlawful scheme participated in by Defendants. 79. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege all paragraphs previously alleged herein. 80. As set forth herein, Defendants violated the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721, by engaging in the acts alleged in this complaint. 81. The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §2721 (a) et seq., regulates obtaining and disclosing personal information gathered by State Departments of Motor Vehicles, making it unlawful for a person or organization from knowingly obtaining or disclosing personal information, or highly restricted personal information contained in motor vehicle records for any purpose not specifically enumerated under §2721(b). 82. Accordingly, Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. §2721 et seq. by intentionally obtaining, using, re-disclosing, and reselling Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ motor vehicle records without knowledge, consent, or authorization, for purposes not specifically enumerated with the act. 83. Plaintiffs and Class Members are “person[s] referencing” “an individual, organization, or entity, but does not include a State or agency thereof”, within the meaning of 18 Violations of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, § 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq. Against All Defendants

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1. California Copyright Law 12. The facts in support of this action are based on Plaintiff’s review of publicly- available information. Based on a review of these documents, and as described in greater detail herein, Plaintiff believes that discovery will result in the production of many more inculpatory documents within Defendant’s sole possession, custody, or control. A. State Copyright Law Regulates Pre-1972 Recordings 13. Under the 1972 Amendments of the United States Copyright Act, Congress provided that sound recordings “fixed” (i.e., recorded) before February 15, 1972 are within the exclusive province of state law. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c). Thus, state common and statutory law applies to these Pre-1972 Recordings. 14. Plaintiff asserts claims under California, New York, and Florida law. Each of these state’s protections for Pre-1972 Recordings is discussed in greater detail below. 15. The music industry is synonymous with California. The making and exploitation of sound recordings in California employs tens of thousands of Californians and contributes millions upon millions of dollars to the state and local economies. California, in turn, has provided protections to owners of sound recordings for more than forty years against those who exploit these sound recordings without license or compensation. 16. California common law has protected sound recordings for more than 40 years and California statutory law has protected sound recordings for more than 30 years. California first recognized a property right in Pre-1972 Recordings in 1969. In 1982, the California legislature amended the state’s civil code to statutorily provide for the protection of Pre-1972 Recordings as follows: The author of an original work of authorship consisting of a sound recording initially fixed prior to February 15, 1972, has an Case3:15-cv-00698 Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page4 of 18 39. This lawsuit is brought on behalf of Plaintiff individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3). Plaintiff seeks relief on behalf of itself and members of a Class defined as follows: All owners of sound recordings or musical performances that were initially “fixed” on a physical medium (i.e., recorded) prior to February 15, 1972 and whose sound recordings were reproduced, performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited by Rdio in the States of California, New York and Florida through its Rdio Music and for which Rdio had not received authorization or license to reproduce, perform, distribute, or otherwise exploit. 40. Excluded from the Class are Defendant; any affiliate, parent, or subsidiary of 1 Rdio Acquires Dhingana with Plans to Launch in India, Rdio Press, available at http://www.rdio.com/press/rdio-acquires-dhingana-with-plans-to-launch-in-india-/ . Case3:15-cv-00698 Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page8 of 18 48. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference, as though fully set forth here, all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 49. Plaintiff brings this cause of action individually and on behalf of the Class. 50. Under California Civil Code § 980(a)(2), Plaintiff and members of the Class possess exclusive ownership interests in and to the Pre-1972 Recordings, including the performances embodied in those recordings. 51. Defendant, without authorization or license, reproduced, performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited Pre-1972 Recordings, including Plaintiff’s Recordings, through its Rdio Music. As such, Defendant has infringed Plaintiff and the members of the Class’s exclusive Case3:15-cv-00698 Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page10 of 18 54. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference, as though fully set forth here, all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 55. Plaintiff brings this cause of action individually and on behalf of the Class. 56. California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. prohibits acts of unfair competition, which mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices. 57. Fair dealings with artists are matters of great public concern in California and elsewhere. As a society, we value creative expression, and accordingly foster and protect such expression through copyright, trademark and other intellectual property laws. Specifically applicable here is Senate Bill No. 1034, where the California Legislature determined that “the recording industry is an important industry to the State of California,” and that “artistic labor is an important resource to the people of California that is vital to maintaining a healthy and vibrant recording industry.” 58. As alleged herein, Defendant, without authorization or license, reproduced, performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited Pre-1972 Recordings, including Plaintiff’s Recordings, through its Rdio Music. As such, Defendant has infringed Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ exclusive ownership interests in the Pre-1972 Recordings in violation of California Civil Code § 980(a)(2). Case3:15-cv-00698 Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page11 of 18 65. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference, as though fully set forth here, all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 66. Plaintiff brings this cause of action individually and on behalf of the Class. 67. Under California, New York and Florida law, Plaintiff and the members of the Class possess exclusive ownerships in and to the Pre-1972 Recordings, including the artistic performances embodied in those recordings. 68. Plaintiff and the members of the Class (or their predecessors in interest) invested substantial time and money in developing the Pre-1972 Recordings that Defendant reproduced, performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited on Rdio Music. 69. Because Defendant does not obtain licenses to the Pre-1972 Recordings, it does not incur any of the costs that a licensee would otherwise be obligated to pay in order to reproduce, perform, distribute, or otherwise exploit these recordings. 70. Defendant has and continues to misappropriate for its commercial benefit the Pre- 1972 Recordings through its Rdio Music. 71. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant’s misappropriation, Defendant has received and retained money and value that rightfully belongs to Plaintiff and the Class. 72. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s violation of California, New York and Florida law, Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial, but which is likely to be tens of millions of dollars. 73. Defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. Defendant’s conduct was undertaken in conscious disregard of Plaintiff and other members of the Class’s rights to the Pre- 1972 Recordings. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to punitive damages against Defendant in an amount sufficient to punish and make an example of Defendant and to discourage Defendant and others from engaging in the same or similar conduct in the future. Case3:15-cv-00698 Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page13 of 18 Misappropriation Under California, New York And Florida Law Unlawful And Unfair Business Acts and Practices in Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. Violation of California Civil Code § 980(a)(2)

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12.4 and 12.5 percent, which is in line with our previous guidance.” Exelis indicated that approximately $25 million of its anticipated free cash flow for 2014 shifted into 2015 due to some delayed collections, but that its estimate for 2015 free cash flow is being increased to approximately $275 million. Exelis also expects depreciation and amortization of approximately $106 million in 2014, net debt of $139 million and a net unfunded pension liability of approximately $1.9 billion at the end of 2014. Exelis ended the year with an estimated $2.8 billion in funded backlog. Financial highlights Based on an expected June 2015 closing, the transaction is expected to be slightly accretive to Harris in the first full year and a significant contributor thereafter. Harris has identified estimated net pre-tax cost synergies from the combination in a range of $100 million to $120 million, with savings expected to achieve annual run-rate in year three. Savings are expected from consolidating headquarters and eliminating public company costs and from operational and functional efficiencies. Harris has secured $3.4 billion of fully committed bridge financing from Morgan Stanley Senior Funding, Inc. and expects to put in place permanent financing in 11 the form of term loans and unsecured bonds prior to closing. Following the transaction, Harris expects to continue to have a solid balance sheet supported by strong free cash flow from the combined business, enabling it to pay down debt rapidly. Integration plan Harris has developed a detailed execution plan to ensure seamless integration and achieve identified cost synergies. The dedicated integration team will have executive leadership and be comprised of senior members of both organizations. Harris is confident in its ability to effectively combine these two companies and provide the organizational alignment to achieve full strategic value. Advisors Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC is acting as financial advisor to Harris Corporation and Sullivan & Cromwell LLP is serving as principal legal counsel. J.P. Morgan Securities LLC is acting as financial advisor to Exelis, and Jones Day is serving as legal counsel. 31. Plaintiff brings this action on his own behalf and as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23, on behalf of all holders of Exelis common stock who are being and will be harmed by Defendants’ actions described below (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any of the Defendants. 32. This action is properly maintainable as a class action because: a. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of October 28, 2014 there were over 186 million shares of Exelis common stock outstanding. The holders of these shares are believed to be geographically dispersed through the United States; b. There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting individual Class members. The common questions include, inter alia, the following: i. Whether the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty, independence, or due care with respect to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction; ii. Whether the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duty to secure and obtain the best price reasonable under the circumstances for the benefit of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction; iii. Whether Harris and Merger Sub aided and abetted the Individual Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duty; 9 iv. Whether the Individual Defendants, in bad faith and for improper motives, have impeded or erected barriers to discourage other offers for the Company or its assets; and v. Whether Plaintiff and the other members of the Class would suffer irreparable injury were the Proposed Transaction consummated. c. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class, has retained competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature, and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class; d. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class and Plaintiff does not have any interests adverse to the Class; e. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the Class; and f. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class with respect to the matters complained of herein, thereby making appropriate the relief sought herein with respect to the Class as a whole. 33. On February 6, 2015 Exelis and Harris issued a press release announcing the Proposed Transaction, which states in relevant part: MELBOURNE, Fla. & MCLEAN, Va.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Feb. 6, 2015-- Harris Corporation (NYSE:HRS) and Exelis, Inc. (NYSE:XLS) today announced a definitive agreement under which Harris will acquire Exelis in a cash and stock transaction valued at $23.75 per share, or an approximately $4.75 billion enterprise value. The agreement has been unanimously approved by the Boards of Directors of both companies. The transaction is expected to close in June 2015 and is subject to customary closing conditions, including regulatory and Exelis shareholder approval. 10 Under the terms of the transaction, Exelis shareholders will receive $16.625 in cash and 0.1025 of a share of Harris common stock, based on Harris' closing price as of February 5, 2015, for each share of Exelis common stock. Upon closing, Harris shareholders will own approximately 85 percent of the combined company, and Exelis shareholders will own approximately 15 percent. On a pro forma basis for the latest twelve months ended December 31, 2014, the combined company would have had more than $8 billion in revenue and about 23,000 employees globally, including 9,000 engineers and scientists. “Acquiring Exelis is transformational for Harris,” said William M. Brown, chairman, president and chief executive officer of Harris. “The combination of the two companies’ highly complementary core franchises creates a competitively stronger company with significantly greater scale. We are expanding in a market where we have decades of success and a workforce dedicated to providing our customers with innovative and cost-effective solutions for some of their most complex challenges.” “This agreement to become part of Harris Corporation represents an exciting new chapter for Exelis,” said David F. Melcher, chief executive officer and president of Exelis. “Combining the companies not only creates shareholder value, but the commitment to excellence and innovation that both companies share will significantly benefit customers and provide new opportunities for employees.” Melcher also noted, “Our 2014 was another strong year, and we expect to report revenue of approximately $3.25 billion and adjusted operating margin between 34. As discussed below, the $23.75 per share implied value of the Merger Consideration Exelis’ public shareholders stand to receive is insufficient, as it fails to account for the Company’s significant future earning potential and falls below the premium other defense contractors have recently sold for. B. The Merger Consideration Is Inadequate In Light Of Exelis’ Strong Background & Promising Financial Prospects 35. Exelis provides command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) related products and systems in the United States and internationally. The Company’s C4ISR Electronics and Systems segment offers intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; integrated electronic warfare systems; electronic attack and release systems, including aircraft-armament suspension and release equipment, weapons interface systems, and surveillance aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles. This segment also provides radio frequency and acoustic surveillance sensors, integrated radar and precision air traffic control surveillance systems, electronic warfare and signals intelligence 12 systems, and mine sweeping systems; and tactical, mobile satellite, wireless, special mission, mobile ad hoc networking systems, as well as integrated command, control, and communications solutions. In addition, it offers night vision products; positioning, navigation, and timing systems; and aerospace assembly structures, and sub-assemblies and components. The Company’s Information and Technical Services segment provides systems integration, network design and development, air traffic management, cyber, intelligence, operations, sustainment, engineering, and space launch and range-support solutions. Exelis serves the U.S. Department of Defense and its prime contractors, U.S. Government intelligence agencies, NASA, the Federal Aviation Administration, the U.S. Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force, and allied foreign governments, and commercial customers. 36. The Company was formerly known as ITT DCO, Inc. (“ITT”). In 2011 ITT announced that it planned to separate into three independent publicly traded companies by the end of the year. On October 31, 2011 Exelis became a publicly traded company incorporated under the laws of Indiana and headquartered in McLean, Virginia. 37. On September 27, 2014, Exelis completed the spin-off of its former Mission Systems business division into a separate, publicly traded company (the “Spin-Off”), Vectrus, Inc. (“Vectrus”). Vectrus was launched as a provider of infrastructure asset management, information technology and network communication services, and logistics and supply chain management. At the time of the Spin-Off, existing Exelis shareholders owned all of the common shares of Vectrus, with each Exelis shareholder receiving one share of Vectrus common stock for every eighteen shares of Exelis stock held as of September 18, 2014, the Spin-Off record date. 38. The Spin-Off is expected to free Exelis from the burden of the underinvested Mission Systems Services business, which is experiencing severe declines in revenue due to 13 budget constraints and the drawdown of U.S. troops in the Middle East. The Mission Systems business had been weighing on the rest of Exelis and concealing the improved growth profile of Exelis’ C4ISR and IT Systems business unit.6 Thus, the Proposed Transaction comes at a particularly opportune time for Harris, as it has been able to acquire Exelis on the cheap as a result of the fact that the Company’s revenues have been suppressed by the struggling Mission Systems Services business segment. However, as a result of the Spin-Off, Exelis is poised to experience significant improvement in its financial results over the coming quarters, making the Merger Consideration inadequate. 39. In November 2014 Exelis also authorized a $350 million share buyback program over the next two years, signaling that the Company believed its stock was undervalued. While the buyback program was initiated in response to third quarter results that missed expectations, Company executives announced that they believe they can make up for a decrease in U.S. government spending through gains in the private sector and international growth.7 The Company also stated that its growing work backlog would carry it through in terms of revenue and reputation as a solid contractor. 40. While the entire defense industry has faced pressure to expand its customer base amidst the Pentagon’s announced plan to reduce spending by $1 trillion over the next decade, Exelis has nonetheless recently won several lucrative contracts with the U.S. military, which stand to drive the Company’s financial performance in the coming months and years. 6 Aronson Capital Partners, Federal M&A Trends in Spin-Off and Divestiture Transactions, 60. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein. 61. The Individual Defendants have violated fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith owed to Exelis shareholders. 62. By the acts, transactions, and courses of conduct alleged herein, Defendants, individually and acting as a part of a common plan, are attempting to unfairly deprive Plaintiff and other members of the Class of the true value of their investment in Exelis. 63. As demonstrated by the allegations above, the Individual Defendants failed to exercise the care required, and breached their duties of loyalty, good faith, and care owed to Exelis shareholders because, among other reasons, they failed to take reasonable steps to obtain and/or ensure that Exelis shareholders receive adequate consideration for their shares and agreed to restrictive deal protection devices that deter other suitors from making a superior bid for the Company. 20 64. By reason of the foregoing acts, practices, and courses of conduct, the Individual Defendants have failed to exercise ordinary care and diligence in the exercise of their fiduciary obligations toward Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 65. As a result of the actions of Defendants, Plaintiff and the Class will suffer irreparable injury in that they have not and will not receive their fair portion of the value of Exelis’ assets and businesses and have been and will be prevented from obtaining a fair price for their Exelis common shares. 66. Unless the Court enjoins Defendants, they will continue to breach their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the members of the Class, all to the irreparable harm of the members of the Class. 67. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of this Court’s equitable powers can Plaintiff and the Class be fully protected from the immediate and irreparable injury that Defendants’ actions threaten to inflict. 68. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein. 69. Harris and Merger Sub have acted and are acting with knowledge of, or with reckless disregard to, the fact that the Individual Defendants are in breach of their fiduciary duties to Exelis shareholders, and have participated in such breaches of fiduciary duties. 70. Harris and Merger Sub knowingly aided and abetted the Individual Defendants’ wrongdoing alleged herein. In so doing, Harris and Merger Sub rendered substantial assistance 21 in order to effectuate the Individual Defendants’ plan to consummate the Proposed Transaction in breach of their fiduciary duties. 71. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of this Court’s equitable powers can Plaintiff and the Class be fully protected from the immediate and irreparable injury that Defendants’ actions threaten to inflict. A. The Proposed Transaction On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Against the Individual Defendants for Breach of Fiduciary Duties On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Against Harris and Merger Sub for Aiding and Abetting the Individual Defendants’ Breaches of Fiduciary Duty

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11. Beginning in or around February of 2015, Defendants contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers ending in -5154, -3803, -1080, - 5405, -1636, -7511, -7210, and -0106 in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendants’ services. 12. Defendants used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. 13. Defendants contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone numbers belonging to Defendants, including without limitation (863) 862-1011, (931) 218-7792, (501) 800-5085, and (213) 457-9243. 14. Defendants’ calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 15. Defendants’ calls were placed to telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 16. During all relevant times, Defendants did not possess Plaintiff’s “prior express consent” to receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice on its cellular telephones pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 17. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers ending in -5154, -1080, -1636, -7511, and -0106 have been on the National Do-Not-Call Registry well over thirty (30) days prior to Defendants’ initial calls. 18. Defendants placed multiple calls soliciting its business to Plaintiff on its cellular telephones beginning in or around February of 2015 and continued until in or around March of 2017. 19. Such calls constitute solicitation calls pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 24. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the four proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). The class concerning the ATDS claim for no prior express consent (hereafter “The ATDS Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendants to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendants’ willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class and DNC Revocation Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class and DNC Revocation Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class and ATDS Revocation Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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20. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated under rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1)-(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 21. Plaintiff seeks to represent three classes (the “Classes”) of individuals, each defined as follows: 6 Class A: All persons from four years prior to the date of the filing of the instant Complaint through the date of the filing of the instant Complaint to whom Defendant sent or caused to be sent at least one solicited or unsolicited facsimile advertisement advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which did not contain an opt-out notice. Class B: All persons from four years prior to the date of the filing of the instant Complaint through the date of the filing of the instant Complaint to whom Defendant sent or caused to be sent at least one unsolicited facsimile advertisement advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which did not contain an opt-out notice. Class C: All persons in the State of New York to whom, from three years prior to the date of the filing of the instant Complaint through the date of the filing of the instant Complaint, Defendant sent or caused to be sent at least one facsimile advertisement without having obtained express invitation or permission to do so and/or which did not contain an opt-out notice. 22. Numerosity: The Classes are so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit the parties and this Court. Upon information and belief there are, at a minimum, thousands of class members of Classes A, B and C. Upon information and belief, the Classes’ sizes and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records, including Defendant’s fax and marketing records. 23. Members of the Classes may be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in class actions, such as by published notice, 7 e-mail notice, website notice, fax notice, first class mail, or combinations thereof, or by other methods suitable to the Classes and deemed necessary and/or appropriate by the Court. 24. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of Class A because the claims of Plaintiff and members of Class A are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. Among other things, Plaintiff and members of Class A were sent or caused to be sent by Defendant at least one fax advertisement advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which did not contain an opt-out notice. 25. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of Class B because the claims of Plaintiff and members of Class B are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. Among other things, Plaintiff and the members of Class B were sent or caused to be sent by Defendant, without Plaintiff’s or the Class B members’ express permission or invitation, at least one fax advertisement advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which did not contain an opt-out notice. 26. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of Class C because the claims of Plaintiff and members of Class C are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. Among other things, Plaintiff and members of Class C were sent or caused to be sent by Defendant, without Plaintiff’s or the Class C members’ express permission or invitation, at least one fax advertisement advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which did not contain an opt-out notice. 27. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community 8 of common questions of fact and law affecting the Plaintiff and members of the Classes. 28. The questions of fact and law common to Plaintiff and Class A predominate over questions that may affect individual members, and include: (a) Whether Defendant’s sending and/or causing to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of Class A, by facsimile, computer or other device, fax advertisements advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods or services which did not contain opt-out notices violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) and the regulations thereunder; (b) Whether Defendant’s sending and/or causing to be sent such fax advertisements was knowing or willful; (c) Whether Plaintiff and the members of Class A are entitled to statutory damages, triple damages and costs for Defendant’s conduct; (d) Whether Plaintiff and members of Class A are entitled to multiple statutory damages per fax advertisement Defendant sent or caused to be sent to them because each fax advertisement contains multiple violations of the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder; and (e) Whether Plaintiff and members of Class A are entitled to a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant from continuing to engage in its unlawful conduct. 29. The questions of fact and law common to Plaintiff and Class B predominate over questions that may affect individual members, and include: (a) Whether Defendant’s sending and/or causing to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of Class B, without Plaintiff’s or the Class B members’ express invitation or permission, by facsimile, computer or other device, fax 9 advertisements advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which did not contain opt out notices violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) and the regulations thereunder; (b) Whether Defendant’s sending and/or causing to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of Class B such unsolicited fax advertisements was knowing or willful; (c) Whether Plaintiff and the members of Class B are entitled to statutory damages, triple damages and costs for Defendant’s conduct; (d) Whether Plaintiff and members of Class B are entitled to multiple statutory damages per fax advertisement Defendant sent or caused to be sent to them because each fax advertisement contains multiple violations of the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder; and (e) Whether Plaintiff and members of Class B are entitled to a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant from continuing to engage in its unlawful conduct. 30. The questions of fact and law common to Plaintiff and Class C predominate over questions that may affect individual members, and include: (a) Whether Defendant’s sending and/or causing to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of Class C, without Plaintiff’s and Class C’s express invitation or permission, by facsimile, computer or other device, fax advertisements advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services, violated GBL § 396-aa; and (b) Whether Plaintiff and the members of Class C are entitled to statutory damages for Defendant’s conduct; and 10 (c) Whether Plaintiff and members of Class C are entitled to multiple statutory damages per fax advertisement Defendant sent or cause to be sent to them because each fax advertisement contains multiple violations of GBL 396-aa. 31. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Classes because its interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the Classes and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Classes. Plaintiff has retained counsel who is competent and experienced in litigation in the federal courts, class action litigation, and TCPA cases. 32. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the Classes’ claims. While the aggregate damages that may be awarded to the members of the Classes are likely to be substantial, the damages suffered by individual members of the Classes are relatively small. The expense and burden of individual litigation makes it economically infeasible and procedurally impracticable for each member of the Classes to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. The likelihood of the individual Class members’ prosecuting separate claims is remote. Plaintiff is unaware of any other litigation concerning this controversy already commenced against Defendant by any member of the Classes. 33. Individualized litigation also would present the potential for varying, inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and would increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same factual issues. The conduct of this matter as a class action presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and would protect the rights of each member of the Classes. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the 11 management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 34. Injunctive Relief: Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the members of Classes A and B, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to Classes A and B. 35. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-34. 36. By the conduct described above, Defendant committed more than five thousand (5,000) violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) against Plaintiff and the members of Class A, to wit: the fax advertisements Defendant sent and/or caused to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of Class A were either (a) unsolicited and did not contain notices satisfying the requirements of the TCPA and regulations thereunder, or (b) solicited and did not contain notices satisfying the requirements of the TCPA and regulations thereunder. 37. Plaintiff and the members of Class A are entitled to statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) in an amount greater than two million, five hundred thousand dollars ($2,500,000). 38. If it is found that Defendant willfully and/or knowingly sent and/or caused to be sent fax advertisements that did not contain notices satisfying the requirements of the TCPA and regulations thereunder to Plaintiff and the members of Class A, Plaintiff requests that the Court increase the damage award against Defendant to three times the amount available under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 12 39. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-34. 40. By the conduct described above, Defendant committed more than five thousand (5,000) violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) against Plaintiff and the members of Class B, to wit: the fax advertisements Defendant sent and/or caused to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of Class B were unsolicited and did not contain notices satisfying the requirements of the TCPA and regulations thereunder. 41. Plaintiff and the members of Class B are entitled to statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) in an amount greater than two million, five hundred thousand dollars ($2,500,000). 42. If it is found that Defendant willfully and/or knowingly sent and/or caused to be sent unsolicited fax advertisements that did not contain notices satisfying the requirements of the TCPA and regulations thereunder to Plaintiff and the members of Class B, Plaintiff requests that the Court increase the damage award against Defendant to three times the amount available under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 43. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-34. 44. Defendant committed thousands of violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b). 45. Under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), Plaintiff and the members of Classes A and B are entitled to an injunction against Defendant, prohibiting Defendant from committing further violations of the TCPA and regulations thereunder. 13 FOURTH CLAIM FOR VIOLATION OF GBL § 396-aa 46. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-34. 47. By the conduct described above, Defendant committed numerous violations of GBL § 396-aa against Plaintiff and the members of Class C, to wit: the fax advertisements Defendant sent and/or caused to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of Class C were unsolicited and/or did not contain notices satisfying the requirements of GBL § 396-aa. 48. Pursuant to GBL § 396-aa, Plaintiff and the members of Class C are entitled to statutory damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

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(Class Action) (Collective Action) 11. Styrolution is a global styrenics supplier that provides styrenic applications for many common products across a wide range of industries. 12. The Company schedules Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class working in maintenance responsibilities for eight and a half (8.5) hour shifts, which include a thirty (30) minute unpaid meal break. In addition, the Company schedules members of the Plaintiff Class working in operations, logistics and the lab for twelve (12) hour shifts without a specified meal break. Thus, because Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class typically work at least five (5) days per week, they are scheduled to work forty (40) hours or more per week. 13. The Company has a dress code policy for its hourly employees at the Channahon facility. Specifically, according to Styrolution’s policy “[e]mployees working in Operations, Maintenance, Logistics, and the Lab are required to wear the uniform provided by the company and safety shoes.” The dress code policy also refers to a Company safety procedure for Personal Protective Equipment. 4 14. The Personal Protective Equipment that Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class are required by Styrolution to don and doff each day at the beginning and end of their shifts includes flame-retardant coveralls, steel-toed boots, safety glasses, and a hard hat. 15. The Personal Protective Equipment is required because Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class work with, and are exposed to, dangerous chemicals as part of the Company’s business. 16. Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class are required to be ready for work at the start of their shift. As such, Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class must arrive prior to the start of their scheduled shift in order to don their Personal Protective Equipment. 17. It typically takes Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class between five (5) and ten (10) minutes to don their Personal Protective Equipment. 18. After donning their Personal Protective Equipment, Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class walk approximately 250 yards from the employee locker room to the Company’s manufacturing floor and/or a meeting room (collectively “work station”), whereupon they begin their shift. 19. It typically takes Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class between two (2) and five (5) minutes to walk from the employee locker room to their work station before their shift. 20. In total, it would take Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class up to fifteen (15) minutes to complete their pre-shift activities. 21. Although the above-described pre-shift activities are an integral and indispensable part of the principal work activities for which Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class are employed, Styrolution does not compensate Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class for said time. 5 22. Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class are required by Styrolution to stay at work until the end of their shift. Moreover, the Company prohibits them from leaving their work stations before being properly relieved by the next shift. 23. At then end of their shift, Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class would walk approximately 250 yards from their work station to the employee locker room, whereupon they would doff their required Personal Protective Equipment. 24. It typically takes Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class between two (2) and five (5) minutes to walk from their work station to the employee locker room at the end of their shift. 25. It typically takes Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class between five (5) and ten (10) minutes to doff their Personal Protective Equipment. 26. In total, it would take Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class up to fifteen (15) minutes to complete their post-shift activities. 27. Although the above-described post-shift activities are an integral and indispensable part of the principal work activities for which Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class are employed, Styrolution does not compensate Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class for said time. 28. Thus, the Company failed to compensate Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class at a rate of one and one-half times their regular hourly rate of pay (the “overtime rate”) for all time worked in excess of forty (40) hours in individual workweeks. 29. Styrolution does compensate certain contractors for the time they spend doffing the same Personal Protective Equipment Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class are required to don and doff. 6 30. Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraphs 1 – 29 as though fully set forth herein. 31. This Count arises from Defendant’s violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., for Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated at the overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 32. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this action may be maintained by a plaintiff who has been damaged by a defendant’s failure to comply with 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 – 207. Plaintiffs attach as Group Exhibit A their Notices of Consent to Become a Party Plaintiff in a Collective Action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 33. All past and present hourly employees who have worked for Defendant at its Channahon, Illinois facility during the previous three (3) years in Operations, Maintenance, Logistics and/or the Lab, and were required to don and doff Personal Protective Equipment at the beginning and end of their respective shifts, are similarly situated to Plaintiffs. 34. Defendant applied its compensation policies, which violate the FLSA, on a company-wide basis, including towards Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class. 35. Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class are or were engaged in job duties and responsibilities integral and indispensable to the operation of Defendant’s business, and neither Plaintiffs nor any other member of the Plaintiff Class has received proper overtime compensation for all hours worked over forty (40) in one workweek. 36. Defendant’s failure to pay compensation for all time worked and, as a result, its failure to pay compensation at the overtime rate for all hours worked over forty (40) per workweek, is a willful violation of the FLSA, since Defendant’s conduct shows that it either 7 knew that its conduct violated the FLSA or showed reckless disregard for whether its actions complied with the FLSA. 37. Plaintiffs’ experiences are typical of the experiences of the putative class members. 38. For all members of the Plaintiff Class to become fully aware of their right to join this cause of action, a certain period of time, as determined by this Court, is necessary to send notice to the entire Plaintiff Class, as well as certain additional time for those members to file consent forms with this Court as provided by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 39. The members of the Plaintiff Class who are still employed by Defendant may be reluctant to raise individual claims for fear of retaliation. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated persons, known and unknown, respectfully requests that this Court enter an order as follows: a) Awarding judgment for back pay equal to the amount of all unpaid wages for the three (3) years preceding the filing of this Complaint, according to the applicable statute of limitations for willful violations of the FLSA; b) Awarding liquidated damages in an amount equal to the amount of unpaid overtime compensation found due pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); c) Awarding prejudgment interest with respect to the amount of unpaid overtime compensation; d) Awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in filing this action; e) Entering an injunction precluding Defendant from violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.; and f) Ordering such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate and just. 8 40. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1 – 29 as though fully set forth herein. 41. This Count arises from Defendant’s violation of the IMWL, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/1, et seq., for Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class at the overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 42. Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class were entitled to be compensated for all work performed, including but not limited to time spent donning and doffing required Personal Protective Equipment. 43. Pursuant to the IMWL, for all weeks during which Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class worked in excess of forty (40) hours, they were entitled to be compensated at the overtime rate. 44. Defendant has violated the IMWL by failing to compensate Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class at the overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 45. Plaintiffs seek certification of this lawsuit as a class action in order that their rights and those of the Plaintiff Class, including all overtime and other wages due, , statutory damages, prejudgment interest and any other damages due, be resolved. 46. This action is brought as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because the number of individuals who comprise the Plaintiff Class is so numerous that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. While the precise number of members of the Class has not been determined at this time, Plaintiffs believe Defendant has employed in excess of fifty (50) persons who have been subject to Defendant’s common unlawful pay practices during the statutory three (3) year period preceding the filing of this Complaint. 9 47. Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class have been equally affected by Defendant’s failure to properly pay overtime wages. 48. The Plaintiff Class members who are still employed by Defendant may be reluctant to raise individual claims for fear of retaliation. 49. The issues involved in this lawsuit present common questions of law and fact, which predominate over any variations that may exist between members of the Class. 50. Plaintiffs, the Plaintiff Class, and Defendant have a commonality of interest in the subject matter and remedy sought. 51. Plaintiffs are able to fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Plaintiff Class. 52. Plaintiffs’ Counsel is competent and experienced in litigating large wage and hour class and collective actions. 53. If individual actions were required to be brought by each member of the class injured or affected, the result would be a multiplicity of actions, creating a hardship to the members of the Class, to the Court, and to Defendant. Accordingly, a class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit and distribution of the common fund to which the Class is entitled. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated persons, known and unknown, respectfully requests that this Court enter an order as follows: a) Determining that this action may be maintained as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); b) Appointing Plaintiffs as Class Representatives and their Counsel as Class Counsel; c) Awarding judgment in an amount equal to all unpaid back pay owed to Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated pursuant to the IMWL; 10 d) Awarding prejudgment interest on the back pay in accordance with 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 205/2; e) Awarding statutory damages pursuant to the formula set forth in 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/12(a); f) Awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in filing this action; g) Entering an injunction precluding Defendant from violating the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/1 et seq.; and h) Ordering such other and further relief as this Court deems appropriate and just. Dated: January 22, 2019 Marc J. Siegel, IARDC No. 6238100 Bradley Manewith, IARDC No. 6280535 James D. Rogers, IARDC No. 06324570

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1. Because of any person’s actual or perceived … disability …, directly or indirectly: (a) to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person the full and equal enjoyment, on equal terms and conditions, of any of the accommodations, advantages, services, facilities or privileges of the place or provider of public accommodation; NYC Admin. Code §8-107(4) 169. The Defendants have not reasonably accommodated the Plaintiff, and other disabled individuals, in violation of New York City’s Administrative Code §8-102(4), (16), (17), (18), §8-107(4) and §8-107(15). 170. In violation of the New York City Administrative Code, the Defendants have unlawfully discriminated against the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated. 171. Reasonable accommodations and modifications are necessary to enable the Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, the ability to enjoy non-restricted access and use of the Defendants’ Subject Facility. 172. In violation of the New York City Administrative Code the owners, operators, lessees, proprietors, managers, agents and/or employees of the Defendants’ Subject Facility have, because of the actual, or perceived, disability of the Plaintiff directly, or indirectly, refused, withheld from, and denied him the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges thereof. 31 173. In violation of the New York City Administrative Code, on the basis of the Plaintiff’s disability, the Defendants have demonstrated that the patronage, or custom, of the Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, is unwelcome, objectionable and not acceptable. 174. The Defendants are in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law by denying the Plaintiff full and safe access to all of the benefits, accommodations and services of the Subject Facility. 175. Pursuant to New York City Human Rights Law §8-502(c), notice of this action is being served upon the New York City Commission on Human Rights in accordance with the statute. 176. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ disability discrimination, in violation of the New York City Human Rights Laws, the Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, personal injuries, including mental anguish and emotional distress, including, but not limited to, depression, humiliation, stress, embarrassment, anxiety, loss of self-esteem and self-confidence, emotional pain and suffering. 177. The Plaintiff requests compensatory damages in the amount of $1,000 from each Defendant under the New York City Human Rights Law, NYC Admin. Code §8-125. 60. The Plaintiff, who was born in 1949, is an elderly man aged beyond his 70 years. He suffers from debilitating diseases and was diagnosed with a neurological condition, which affects his walking. The Plaintiff’s treating neurologist determined that he has gait dysfunction, the causes of which include peripheral neuropathy due to diabetes mellitus, chronic right basilar ganglia lacunar infarct and cerebellar ataxia. The Plaintiff’s treating neurologist also determined that he has essential tremor. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has 15 decreased vision due to glaucoma and is blind in the right eye. The Plaintiff’s gait is unsteady and he falls when he walks short distances. His treating neurologist prescribed him a wheelchair and a handicapped parking placard. The Plaintiff obtained the wheelchair and uses it regularly. The New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission issued him a disabled person parking placard together with a handicapped identification card. The handicapped placard can be used in any car, in which the Plaintiff is travelling. The Plaintiff relies on his wheelchair and parks appropriately in handicapped accessible parking spaces. He also needs appropriate and statutorily mandated space next to that car, so that he may transfer from the car to the wheelchair. The Plaintiff is disabled under the statute, which in pertinent part states that Disability means, with respect to an individual, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual… . The phrase major life activities means functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working. Violations of the New York City Human Rights Laws 167. The Plaintiff re-alleges, and incorporates by this reference, all the allegations set forth in this complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 30 168. The New York City Human Rights Law, in relevant part, provides the below. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person who is the owner, franchisor, franchisee, lessor, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation: Violations of the ADA Violations of the New York State Human Rights Laws 147. The Plaintiff re-alleges, and incorporates, by this reference, all the allegations set forth in this complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 148. The New York State Human Rights Law, in relevant part, provides the following: It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability … of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof … to the effect that any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any such place shall be refused, withheld from or denied to any person on account of … disability … . NYS Executive Law §296(2)(a) 149. The Defendants’ Subject Facility is a place of public accommodation, as defined in New York State Human Rights Law §292(9). 150. The Defendants have further violated the New York State Human Rights Law by being in violation of the rights provided under the ADA. 151. The Defendants are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law by denying the Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, full and safe access to all of the benefits, accommodations and services of the Subject Facility. 152. The Defendants do not provide the Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, with equal opportunity to use their public accommodation. 28 153. The Defendants have failed to make all readily achievable accommodations and modifications to remove barriers to access in violation of Executive Law §296(2)(c)(iii). 154. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ unlawful discrimination, which is in violation of the Executive Law, the Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, personal injuries, which include emotional distress, including, but not limited to, humiliation, embarrassment, stress and anxiety. 155. The Defendants have not provided the Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, with evenhanded treatment in violation of New York State Human Rights Law §296. 156. The Defendants’ direct, or indirect, unequal treatment of the Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, was demonstrated when he was discriminated against. 157. The Defendants have, because of the Plaintiff’s disability, directly, or indirectly, refused, withheld from, or denied him the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of their public accommodation. 158. The Defendants have demonstrated that the patronage, or custom, of the Plaintiff, and other similarly situated individuals, is unwelcome, unwanted, undesirable, unacceptable and objectionable. 159. In violation of the New York State Human Rights Laws the Defendants and their agents discriminated against the Plaintiff. 160. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ unlawful discrimination, which was, and is, in violation of the New York State Human Rights laws, the Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, personal injuries, such as mental anguish and emotional distress, including, but not limited to, depression, humiliation, stress, 29 embarrassment, anxiety, loss of self-esteem and self-confidence, together with emotional pain and suffering. 161. The Plaintiff requests compensatory damages from each Defendant in the amount of $1,000 under the New York State Human Rights Law, NY CLS Exec §297(9). Violations of the New York State Civil Rights Laws 162. The Plaintiff re-alleges, and incorporates by this reference, all the allegations set forth in this complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 163. The Defendants have violated the Plaintiff’s civil rights on the basis of his disability. 164. Consequently, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover the penalty prescribed by Civil Rights Law §40-c and §40-d, in the amount of $500 for each violation from each Defendant. 165. Pursuant to the New York Civil Rights law, §40-d, the Defendants are guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 166. Notice of this action is being served upon the attorney general, as required by New York Civil Rights Law, §40-d, in accordance with the statute.

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15. Plaintiff Morales immediately stopped using the still full box of Huggies diapers. But the rash persisted for another four days until she took J.F. to a doctor on February 15, 2018. 17. When she initially removed the diaper, Plaintiff Morales noticed blue crystals that were within, but touching the surface of, the Huggies diaper, which she had not noticed when she first put the diaper on J.F. Plaintiff’s Morales’s Experience is not Unique 19. In the same vein, commenters on community.babycenter.com2 relate: We were using the Huggies Little Snugglers newborn size diapers on her; never any problems. When we realized she was growing too big for them, I searched her closet for size 1 diapers (since that's all we got from her shower) and decided to use Huggies Snug & Dry size 1's, with Mickey Mouse on them. I decided to wait on trying the Pampers or Luvs and Target brand size 1's that we also have a bunch of, since she was doing so well on the Huggies before. Now I'm seriously confused because after just half a day of wearing the Snug & Dry, she's got terrible diaper rash!!! She's never had even a spot of redness down there before. I understand it could just be a coincidence, but I'm baffled because I change her diapers so often (probably too much) and all of a sudden, she's in pain, screaming and a firery red rash all up her privates, in the creases and spreading back to the crack of her bum. My daughter is fine with any Huggies diapers except the snug and dry. She got a terrible rash on them. I returned them to Walmart, and got a different line of Huggies. I have also herd from friends that their children are super sensitive to the snug and dry diapers. Although when we use disposables Huggies are my favorite by far. Little Snugglers are #1 and Little Movers are #2. And nothing works as well overnight as their overnight diapers! When my DD (dear daughter) was that age, we found a great deal on a pack of huggies. Most regrettable diaper purchase ever. Less than an hour of wearing one and she started screaming. Horrible red rash all over privates and bum. We never used huggies products since. I had to switch DD (dear daughter) from Huggies Snug and Dry because it caused a HORRIBLE rash in just a matter of days. It could be a coincidence that your daughter is getting it right as you changed diapers, but that's what it was for mine. This sounds just like a reaction one of mine had to Huggies. We switched to Pampers and had no more problems. 21. The same points are reiterated in customer complaints on Huggies’s very own website. On dissatisfied customer wrote as recently as the latter half of July 2018: I bought the snug and dry diapers for my toddler 2 months ago through Amazon subscription. I was excited bc it was a great savings compared to the luvs we were buying from Walmart. He never has a diaper rash, but I started noticing his bottom stayed red all of sudden and he would cry (sometimes scream) when I changed him. It seemed odd but I hadn't even thought it may be the diapers. Well we ran out before the next shipment [sic] came and so we bought our usual luvs. He had zero issues with a diaper rash during this time. The next box arrived last week. After just 2 days of using the huggies again his bottom is bright red! He screams when he soils the diaper. He screams when we change and bathe him so much that his little body is shaking! It is absolutely the diapers causing the rash! I'm have about 160 diapers left and I'm throwing them out!!9 23. Notwithstanding its announced interest in learning more, the facts on the ground show that Defendant has learned nothing. Defendant’s Actionable Conduct 24. Defendant is in the business of developing, designing, manufacturing, marketing, advertising, and distributing Huggies diapers and other personal care and cleaning products to consumers. Huggies is among the top-selling diapers in the country and is sold in supermarkets, convenience stories, and pharmacies throughout the United States. 25. Through its advertising and marketing, Defendant promoted and continues to promote Huggies as being safe and comfortable for infants. The Product website states that the Product’s characteristics will ensure “more quality time with baby” and “help keep baby dry so they can giggle a little longer.”11 Yet J.F. was very far from giggling after Plaintiff Morales applied the Product to him, and Plaintiff Morales did not consider the ensuing doctor’s visit to be quality time. 26. Whether or not they viewed these specific representations, Plaintiff and the Class did, and a reasonable consumer would, expect the Product to be safe and comfortable for infants. No reasonable consumer would expect the Product to cause prolonged, painful rashes that lead to doctors’ visits. 28. Defendant failed to warn consumers that the Product carried the unreasonable dangers exemplified in Plaintiff Morales’s experience. 29. Defendant owed a legal duty to Plaintiff and Class members to exercise reasonable care by developing, manufacturing, and marketing a product that was safe for its intended use. Defendant knew or should have known that its failure to ensure reasonable safety standards would cause serious pain and injury to vulnerable infants. 30. Plaintiff and Class members would not have purchased the Product had they known it carried these dangers. 31. Plaintiff and Class members had no way of independently discovering that Defendant’s design and/or manufacturing process assigned little importance to infant health and safety. 32. Defendant breached its duty to consumers, which directly and proximately resulted in Plaintiff and other Class members suffering injury in fact, physical injury and suffering, financial injury, the personal expenditure of time and resources, and mental anguish. 34. Plaintiff Morales seeks to represent a class consisting of: All persons or entities who purchased the Product in the United States during the applicable limitations period, and/or such subclasses as the Court may deem appropriate (“the Nationwide Class”) 35. In the alternative, Plaintiff Morales seeks to represent a class consisting of: All persons or entities who purchased the Product in New York during the applicable limitations period, and/or such subclasses as the Court may deem appropriate (“the New York Class”) 36. The proposed Classes exclude current and former officers and directors of Defendant, members of the immediate families of the officers and directors of Defendant, Defendant’s legal representatives, heirs, successors, assigns, and any entity in which it has or has had a controlling interest, and the judicial officer to whom this lawsuit is assigned. 37. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise Class definitions based on facts learned in the course of litigating this matter. 38. Class members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through the appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are thousands of members in the proposed Classes. Other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by Defendant and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, or by advertisement, using the forms of notice customarily used in class actions such as this. 40. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of Class members in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of other Class members. Plaintiff has retained experienced and competent counsel. 41. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Since the damages sustained by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impracticable for them to individually seek redress for the wrongful conduct alleged herein. If class treatment of these claims were not available, Defendant would likely unfairly receive hundreds of thousands of dollars or more in improper charges. 43. The prosecution of this action as a Class action will reduce the possibility of repetitious litigation. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty which will be encountered in the management of this litigation which would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 44. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The damages suffered by any individual class member are too small to make it economically feasible for an individual class member to prosecute a separate action, and it is desirable for judicial efficiency to concentrate the litigation of the claims in this forum. Furthermore, the adjudication of this controversy through a class action will avoid the potentially inconsistent and conflicting adjudications of the claims asserted herein. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 45. The prerequisites to maintaining a class action for injunctive relief or equitable relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) are met, as Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive or equitable relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 47. The prosecution of separate actions by members of the Class would create a risk of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. 48. Defendant’s conduct is generally applicable to the Classes as a whole and Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, equitable remedies with respect to the Classes as a whole. As such, Defendant’s systematic policies and practices make declaratory relief with respect to the Classes as a whole appropriate. 49. Plaintiff Morales realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 50. Plaintiff Morales brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Class for an injunction for violations of NY GBL § 349. 51. NY GBL § 349 provides that deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state are unlawful. 53. Defendant both expressly and by omission misrepresented the nature of the Product, failing to warn consumers of its significant dangers for the health and safety of vulnerable infants. 54. Defendant knowingly and falsely represented that the Product was fit to be used for the purpose for which it was intended when it knew that the Product was defective and dangerous. 55. Defendant’s misrepresentations and concealment of material facts constitute unconscionable commercial practices, deception, fraud, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and/or the knowing concealment, suppression, or omission of materials facts with the intent that others rely on such concealment, suppression, or omission in connection with the sale and advertisement of the Products. 56. Defendant engaged in the deceptive acts and practices alleged herein in order to sell the Product to the public, including Plaintiff and the Class. 57. Defendant’s practices, acts, policies, and course of conduct, including its omissions, as described above, were intended to induce, and did induce, Plaintiff and the Class to purchase the Product. 59. Acts and omissions by Defendant were likely to mislead a reasonable consumer into purchasing the Product. Defendant’s deceptive acts and omissions are material because they concern an essential feature of the Product, its safety for vulnerable infants. 60. Defendant has refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff, thereby making final injunctive relief appropriate. 61. Defendant persists in its deceptive and unfair marketing and sales practices regarding the Product to the detriment of consumers across the country, including Plaintiff and the Class. 62. If Defendant is allowed to continue with these practices, consumers, including Plaintiff and the Class, will be irreparably harmed. Plaintiff and the Class do not have a plain, adequate, speedy, or complete remedy at law to address all of the wrongs alleged in this Complaint unless injunctive relief is granted to stop Defendant’s deceptive marketing and sale of the Product. 63. Plaintiff Morales is therefore entitled to an injunction requiring Defendant to cease its unfair and deceptive practices relating the sale of the Product. 65. Plaintiff Morales realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 66. Plaintiff Morales brings this claim for damages under NY GBL § 349 & § 350. 67. Defendant engaged in consumer-oriented, commercial conduct by selling and advertising the Product. 68. Defendant misrepresented and omitted material information regarding the Product by failing to disclose foreseeable risks created by its systematic indifference the harmful, rash- inducing nature of its diapers. 70. Defendant knowingly and falsely represented that the Product was fit to be used for the purpose for which it was intended, when Defendant knew it was defective and dangerous. 71. Defendant engaged in the deceptive acts and practices alleged herein in order to sell the Product to the public, including to Plaintiff Morales and the Class. 72. Defendant’s practices, acts, policies, and course of conduct, including its omissions, as described above, were intended to induce, and did induce, Plaintiff Morales and Class members to purchase the Product. 73. Defendant sold the Product knowingly concealing that it contained the defects alleged herein. 74. As a direct and proximate result of these unconscionable, unfair, and deceptive acts or practices, Plaintiff Morales and the Class were injured when they paid money for a product that did not have the qualities and attributes that Defendant had advertised. 75. Plaintiff and the Class are therefore entitled to compensatory damages, equitable and declaratory relief, punitive damages, costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. 76. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 78. Defendant impliedly warranted and represented through advertisements, marketing, packaging, labels, websites and other material that the Product is fit for the ordinary purposes of diapers, which is to capture infant’s waste products without unnecessary pain or discomfort. 79. Defendant breached said warranty because the Product purchased by Plaintiff induced painful rashes that are not created by other brands of diapers and which reasonable consumers do not expect. 80. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, Plaintiff purchased unsafe products and her son was physically harmed as a result. 81. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. 83. At all times herein mentioned, Defendant designed, researched, manufactured, tested, advertised, promoted, marketed, sold and/or distributed the Product used by Plaintiff and the Class. 84. The Product was expected to, and did, reach the usual consumers, handlers, and persons coming into contact with it without substantial change in the condition in which it was produced, manufactured, sold, distributed, and marketed by Defendant. 85. In order to plead a manufacturing defect, a plaintiff must assert that (1) the product was not reasonably safe as marketed; (2) the plaintiff used the product for a normal purpose; (3) by exercising reasonable care, plaintiff would not have discovered the defect and apprehended its danger; and (4) plaintiff would not have otherwise avoided injury by exercising ordinary care. Derienzo v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 376 F.Supp.2d 537, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 86. Element #1 is satisfied because The Product was not reasonably safe as marketed. 87. Element #2 is satisfied because Plaintiff used the Product for its normal, intended purpose—as a diaper. 88. Element #3 is satisfied because Plaintiff could not have discovered the danger of the Product through the exercise of reasonable care, as the Product did not have any obvious signs of defect. 89. Element #4 is satisfied because while Plaintiff stopped using the Product after it caused injury to J.F., she could not have anticipated this outcome ahead of time. 91. In combination with myriad consumer complaints posted throughout the internet, the circumstances of J.F’s injury establish that the Product was defectively manufactured—that is, manufactured without the safety precautions appropriate for diapers. 92. Defendant failed to warn Plaintiff of this problem even though it knew or had reason to know of it, having been aware of complaints regarding it for years. 93. Defendant had a duty to give conspicuous warning of the dangers associated with the Product, which it knew or should have known existed. 94. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s manufacturing process and failure to warn of the dangers created by that process, Plaintiff, J.F., and the Class suffered physical injury and/or economic harm. 95. Defendant’s actions and omissions as identified in this Complaint show that Defendant acted maliciously and intentionally disregarded the rights of Plaintiff, J.F., and the Class, thus warranting the imposition of punitive damages. 96. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein, and further alleges as follows: 98. Defendant had a duty to exercise reasonable care in designing, manufacturing, assembling, marketing, selling and/or distributing the Product. Defendant placed the Product into the stream of commerce. It had a duty to ensure that the Product would perform as intended and not create serious health risks to Plaintiff. BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY (brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class, in conjunction with the substantively similar breach of warranty laws of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent New York breach of warranty laws are inapplicable to out-of-state Class members, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the New York Class) Background: Defendant’s Culture of Reckless Indifference to Infant Health and Safety DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF NY GBL § 349 and § 350 (DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES/FALSE ADVERTISING) (Brought Individually and on Behalf of the Class) (brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class, in conjunction with the substantively similar consumer protection laws of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent New York consumer protection laws are inapplicable to out-of-state Class members, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the New York Class) INJUNCTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF NY GBL § 349 (DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT) (brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class, in conjunction with the substantively similar consumer protection laws of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent New York consumer protection laws are inapplicable to out-of-state Class members, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the New York Class) NEGLIGENCE (brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class, in conjunction with the substantively similar negligence law of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent New York negligence law is inapplicable to out-of-state Class members, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the New York Class) STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Manufacturing Defect and Failure to Warn) (brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class, in conjunction with the substantively similar strict products liability laws of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent New York strict liability law are inapplicable to out-of-state Class members, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the New York Class)

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4.84.080. 5.1 Plaintiff’s bring this claim on behalf of the following classes, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 5.2 The Class consists of: (a) all individuals with addresses in the state of Washington; (b) who were sued by Defendant in a Washington superior court; (c) in a lawsuit that could have been commenced in a Washington county district court; (d) Where the complaint requested an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to RCW 4.84.080. 5.3 The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 6.1 Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 6.2 On February 13, 2018, Defendant served Ms. Allen with an unfiled Spokane County Superior Court summons and complaint. 6.3 Defendant’s unfiled complaint contained a request for attorney’s fees pursuant to RCW 4.84.080. 6.4 RCW 4.84.080 states in relevant part: “When allowed to either party, costs to be called the attorney fee, shall be as follows: (1) In all actions where judgment is rendered, two hundred dollars.” (emphasis added) 6.5 The total principal amount requested in Defendant’s complaint was one thousand one hundred forty dollars and seventy-six cents ($1,140.76). 7.1 Plaintiff repeat, reiterate, and incorporate the allegations contained in the paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 7.2 Defendant attempted to collect attorney’s fees pursuant to RCW 7.3 Defendant is not entitled to attorney’s fees under RCW 4.84.080 when it files actions in the Washington Superior Courts, which could have been filed in Washington county district courts. 7.4 Attempting to collect fees to which it is not entitled is misleading to the least sophisticated consumer. 7.5 Defendant’s improper request for attorney’s fees is material because it may impact how a consumer chooses to respond to a lawsuit. 7.6 Defendant’s improper request for attorney’s fees constitutes a concrete informational injury that is particularized to the state-court defendant who receives the lawsuit. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 15 U.S.C §1692e et seq.

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17. Definition of Class. E.S. proposes the following class: All individuals: (1) who have been, are, or will be participants or beneficiaries in the Marsh McLennan Companies Health & Welfare Benefit Programs administered by Aetna at any time since January 1, 2014 and/or the relevant statute of limitations; (2) who have received, require, or are expected to require out- of-network residential psychiatric treatment services; and (3) whose request for coverage of the out-of-network residential psychiatric treatment was “administratively excluded” based upon requirements that are not part of the terms of the Plan document. 18. Size of Class. The Class of persons who have received, require or are expected to require residential psychiatric treatment services is expected to number over 40 individuals and is so large that joinder of all members is impracticable. 20. Common Questions of Law and Fact. This action requires a determination of whether the Defendants’ application of a hidden exclusion to deny coverage of out-of-network treatment facilities violates the Federal Parity Act, the Affordable Care Act and the terms of the Plan as modified by applicable federal law. Adjudication of this issue will in turn determine whether the Defendants are liable under ERISA for their conduct. 21. Separate suits would create risk of varying conduct requirements. The prosecution of separate actions by class members against the Plan would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct. Certification is therefore proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1). 22. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class. Defendants, by applying policies and practices that result in the improper exclusion of out-of-network coverage of residential psychiatric treatment services, have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, rendering declaratory relief appropriate respecting the entire class. Certification is therefore proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). 24. No pending class action. Upon information and belief, there is no pending class action suit filed against these defendant for the same relief requested in this action, for a class of ERISA insureds. 25. Venue. This action can be most efficiently prosecuted as a class action in the District of New Jersey, where Defendants are located. 26. Class Counsel. E.S. has retained experienced and competent class counsel. 27. During certain time periods, E.S. and members of the Class have been, are or will be participants or beneficiaries of the Plan, which is subject to ERISA pursuant to 34. E.S. re-alleges all paragraphs above. 35. Defendant Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. Benefits Administration Committee is a fiduciary under ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A), because it is the Plan Administrator and exercises discretionary authority or discretionary control with respect to the Plan. 37. Defendant Aetna is a fiduciary under ERISA because it has been delegated discretionary authority to make claims determinations, and exercised that discretionary authority to adjudicate claims submitted on behalf of E.S. and members of the Class. 38. ERISA imposes strict fiduciary duties upon plan fiduciaries. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C), states, in relevant part, that a plan fiduciary must discharge its duties with respect to a plan “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and … in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this title and Title IV.” 39. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), states, in relevant part: Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the Plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the Plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary. 40. The terms of an ERISA plan include applicable provisions of substantive law, such as the requirements in the Federal Parity Act and certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act. Defendants have failed to comply with the terms of the Plan, which include the applicable requirements of the Federal Parity Act, the Affordable Care Act and their implementing regulations. Under ERISA, Defendants have both a fiduciary and a legal duty to ensure that the Plan complies with the applicable federal law. 42. As a direct and proximate result of these acts and omissions, E.S., Class members and the Plan have suffered harm and losses and are entitled to relief under ERISA against Defendants. 43. E.S., Class members and the Plan seek recovery of all losses to the Plan, including, but not limited to, relief compelling Defendants to restore to the Plan all losses, including interest, arising from the breaches of fiduciary duties when treatment required by the terms of the Plan as governed by the Federal Parity Act and the Affordable Care Act was denied. 44. E.S. re-alleges all the paragraphs above. 45. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), provides that a participant or beneficiary may bring an action to “recover benefits due to [her] under the terms of [her] plan, to enforce [her] rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify [her] rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” 46. E.S. and the Class are entitled to recover benefits due them under the terms of the Plan. They are also entitled to a declaration of present and future rights to coverage of medically necessary out-of-network residential psychiatric treatment services without the application of hidden, invalid exclusions. 48. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), provides that a participant or beneficiary may “enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.” E.S. and the Class seek to enjoin Defendants from continuing to apply a hidden, illegal exclusion on out-of-network residential psychiatric treatment services. E.S. and the Class also seek to have Defendants provide the Class with corrective notice and reformation of the relevant Plan documents. 49. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), further provides that a participant or beneficiary may obtain other appropriate equitable relief to redress violations of ERISA or enforce plan terms. To the extent full relief is not available under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) or ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), then E.S. and the Class seek equitable remedies including, without limitation, unjust enrichment, disgorgement, restitution, surcharge and consequential damages arising out of the Defendants’ failure to administer the terms of the Plan as governed by the applicable provisions of the Federal Parity Act and the Affordable Care Act. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES ERISA § 404(a)(1); §502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) CLAIM FOR RECOVERY OF BENEFITS, CLARIFICATION OF RIGHTS UNDER TERMS OF THE PLANS AND CLARIFICATION OF RIGHT TO FUTURE BENEFITS UNDER THE PLAN ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) CLAIM TO ENJOIN ACTS AND PRACTICES IN VIOLATION OF THE TERMS OF THE PLANS, TO OBTAIN OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF AND TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF THE PLANS ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)

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23. As touted on its web site, Defendant first notifies an alleged debtor that his debt has been referred to a collection agency and that if full payment is not made within 30 days, a lien will be filed on the consumer’s home.4 24. Defendant charges consumers a fee for sending this initial collection letter. 25. If full payment is not made within 30 days, Defendant then files a lien on the consumer’s home, and charges the consumer additional fees for doing so. 26. At that point, if the consumer does not resolve his debt—and Defendant’s resulting fees—the consumer’s file would move to the “constant contact” phase, whereby Defendant repeatedly calls and sends letters to the consumer in an attempt to collect the alleged debt. At the same time, Defendant tacks on an additional fee. 27. Thereafter, if the outstanding debt still is not resolved, Defendant notifies the consumer of its intent to foreclose on the consumer’s home and move forward with foreclosure by advertisement. B. EquityExperts.org, LLC’s efforts to collect an alleged debt from Plaintiff 28. In connection with the collection of the Debt, Defendant sent Plaintiff an initial written communication dated February 26, 2015. A true and correct copy of Defendant’s February 26, 2015 communication is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 30. Defendant’s February 26, 2015 communication demanded payment of a current balance of $560.00. Ex. A. 31. Defendant’s February 26, 2015 communication stated, in pertinent part: 49. The proposed Classes satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) because they are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery. The proposed Classes are ascertainable in that, upon information and belief, the names and addresses of all members of the proposed Classes can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant. 50. The proposed Classes satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and (3) because Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes. To be sure, the claims of Plaintiff and all of the members of the Classes originate from the same conduct, practice and procedure on the part of Defendant and Plaintiff possesses the same interests and has suffered the same injuries as each member of the proposed Classes. 52. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. 53. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual members of the Classes may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impracticable for the members of the Classes to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 55. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in Paragraphs 1-54 above 56. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) provides: False or misleading representations A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: (2) The false representation of— (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; 57. In its February 26, 2015 communication, Defendant falsely, deceptively, and/or misleadingly stated the amount of the Debt owed by Plaintiff by including “collection fees” of $270 in Plaintiff’s alleged balance. 58. Because Plaintiff did not owe any collection fees to Defendant, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) by falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of the alleged Debt. 59. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in Paragraphs 1-54 above. 61. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) by charging fees and costs of collection that were neither expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or by law. 62. Defendant also violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) by charging fees and costs of collection that were not borne by the original creditor. 63. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in Paragraphs 1-54 above. 65. Defendant’s February 26, 2015 communication was its initial communication to Plaintiff regarding the Debt. 66. The February 26, 2015 communication was in connection with an attempt to collect the Debt from Plaintiff. 68. The February 26, 2015 communication did not contain the proper disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. §1692g, nor did Defendant provide such disclosures within five days thereafter. 69. Specifically, Defendant’s February 26, 2015 communication violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(4) by failing to inform Plaintiff that Defendant need only mail verification of the debt to him, and a copy of any judgment, if he notified Defendant of his request in writing. 70. “Every district court to consider the issue has held that a debt collector violates § 1692g(a) by failing to inform consumers that requests under subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5) must be made in writing.” Osborn v. Ekpsz, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 859, 870 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (citing Bicking, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 844–46; Beasley v. Sessoms & Rogers, P.A., No. 5:09–CV–43–D, 2010 WL 1980083, at *6–7 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2010); Nero v. Law Office of Sam Streeter, 655 F. Supp. 2d 200, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); McCabe v. Crawford & Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 736, 742–44 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Carroll v. United Compucred Collections, Inc., No. 1–99–0152, 2002 WL 31936511, at *8–9 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 15, 2002); Grief v. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, 217 F. Supp. 2d 336, A. EquityExperts.org, LLC’s debt collection strategy VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) On behalf of Plaintiff and the Fee Class VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a) On behalf of Plaintiff and the Disclosure Class VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) On behalf of Plaintiff and the Fee Class

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10. The TCPA prohibits companies, such as Realgy Energy, from placing calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice (“prerecorded calls”) when making calls to cellular telephones without first obtaining consent. 11. Realgy Energy has violated, and continues to violate, the TCPA and its implementing regulations by placing, or having placed on its behalf, prerecorded calls to cellular telephone subscribers (a) who have not expressly consented to receiving such calls and/or (b) who have expressly requested not to receive such calls. 12. As Congress recognized: 4 Many customers are outraged over the proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls to their homes from telemarketers…. Banning such automated or prerecorded telephone calls to the home, except when the receiving party consents to receiving the call or when such calls are necessary in an emergency situation affecting the health and safety of the consumer, is the only effective means of protecting telephone consumers from this nuisance and privacy invasion.1 13. Senator Larry Pressler, one of the original drafters of the TCPA, explained the need for the TCPA by observing that “[u]nlike other communications media, the telephone commands our instan[t] attention. Junk mail can be thrown away. Television commercials can be turned off. The telephone demands to be answered.” 137 Cong. Rec. S18785 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Pressler). 14. As explained by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)2, the TCPA requires “prior express written consent for all autodialed or prerecorded telemarketing calls to wireless numbers and residential lines.” In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG No. 02- 278, FCC 12-21, 27 FCC Rcd. 1830 ¶ 2 (Feb. 15, 2012). 15. Yet, in violation of this rule, Defendants fail to obtain any prior express written consent to place prerecorded calls to consumers’ cellular telephone numbers. 16. Consumer complaints about Realgy Energy’s invasive and repetitive calls are legion. As a sample, consumers have complained as follows: • Realgy Energy Management owns this number. They have called twice in as many days, rings three times and hangs up. This smells like a spoof since Legitimate companies honor the DNC list. The short ring in is a robo call using a spoofed number give away.3 1 Pub. L. No. 102-243 § 2(6, 12) (1991), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227. 2 The FCC is the federal agency given the administrative authority to interpret and enforce the TCPA. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2). 3 https://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-877-431-8527 5 • Realgy Energy. Relates to electricity deregulation in Illinois. They want me to switch to them. But the caller id says “UNAVAILABLE”; and when I called back on the number, it said it was disconnected. Seems somewhat legitimate (although I’m on the FTC do-not-call list); but also like it could be a scam.4 • Every week at least twice we are getting called from 217-464-4421 and nothing then the call switches off. I am tried [sic] of it.5 • They are allegedly a Realgy Energy Services, with offices in Michigan, Illinois and Indiana. While it is a 773 number, when you call it back, you allegedly are talking to someone in Clearwater, Florida. It seems they may be using a Google Voice number so, if they are caught, they are difficult to trace. 6 17. In response to the liability risk associated with the TCPA, numerous commercially available services exist to help companies that call others using prerecorded voices, such as Defendants, to identify cellular subscribers and otherwise ensure that calls are only made to consenting consumers. For instance, companies such as Infutor, Nextmark List, and Contact Center Compliance advertise their ability to instantly identify and flag disconnected telephone numbers from cellular telephone number data lists on a recurring basis (such as weekly or monthly). This type of service can identify disconnected numbers before they are recycled, thereby alerting mobile marketers that any consent associated with those telephone numbers has been terminated. 18. Despite the FCC’s ruling, the industry guidelines, and the commercial availability of programs that help callers filter out non-consenting numbers, Defendants fail to take the necessary steps to ensure that their prerecorded calls are placed only to consenting recipients. 4 https://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-217-464-4421 5 Id. 6 https://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-773-840-5091/2 6 19. Rather, in an effort to increase revenue and skirt additional costs, Defendants simply ignore the law when contacting individuals via prerecorded calls to their cellular telephones. 20. Indeed, Realgy Energy has been sued before for alleged TCPA violations.7 21. Defendants know or should know that their prerecorded calls are placed to non-consenting cellular telephone subscribers. Ultimately, Defendants are responsible for verifying telephone number ownership and obtaining consent before placing prerecorded calls to cellular telephone subscribers. 22. Defendants were, and are, aware that their unsolicited prerecorded calls were, and are, unauthorized as they fail to obtain prior express written consent before placing those calls to consumers. Ultimately, consumers are forced to bear the costs of receiving these unsolicited prerecorded calls. 23. By placing the unsolicited prerecorded calls at issue in this Complaint, Defendants caused Plaintiff and the other members of the Class actual harm and cognizable legal injury. This includes the aggravation, nuisance, and invasions of privacy that result from the sending and receipt of such prerecorded calls, a loss of value realized for the monies consumers paid to their carriers for the receipt of such prerecorded calls, and a loss of the use and enjoyment of their phones, including wear and tear to the related data, memory, software, hardware, and battery components, among other harms. 24. In response to Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff filed this action seeking (a) an injunction requiring Defendants to cease all unsolicited prerecorded calling 7 See Primack v Realgy, LLC, Case. 1:14-cv-03257 (N.D. Ill. filed May 5, 2014). 7 activities and, (b) an award of actual or statutory damages to the members of the Class under the TCPA, together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 25. Plaintiff Lindenbaum is the registered account owner and regular user of a cellular telephone number 216-xxx-2902. 26. On November 26, 2019 at 12:13 pm, Plaintiff received an unsolicited, pre- recorded phone call on her cellular telephone from, or on behalf, of Defendants. 27. The November 26, 2019 call used a pre-recorded voice and stated that John Doe Corporation was calling to offer Plaintiff energy services. 28. Plaintiff pressed “1” to speak with a live person and was connected with one of John Doe Corporation’s telephone representatives. 29. John Doe Corporation’s phone representative asked Plaintiff for her billing account number and asked if Plaintiff received any government assistance with her utility bill and confirmed that Defendant Realgy Energy would be the energy supplier. 30. Plaintiff was annoyed and inconvenienced by this unwanted invasion of her privacy, forcing her to spend time and effort to determine exactly who was attempting to solicit her and for what, and to get them to stop. 31. Plaintiff has never provided prior express written consent to Defendants to receive prerecorded calls to her on the 216-xxx-2902 number. 32. Defendants failed to obtain prior express written consent that included, as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(8)(i) a “clear and conspicuous” disclosure informing the person signing that: 8 (A) By executing the agreement, such person authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the signatory telemarketing calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice; and (B) The person is not required to sign the agreement (directly or indirectly), or agree to enter into such an agreement as a condition of purchasing any property, goods, or services. 33. By placing the prerecorded calls as alleged herein, Defendants have caused consumers actual harm in the form of annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of privacy. In addition, the prerecorded call disturbed Plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of her phone, in addition to the wear and tear on the phone’s hardware (including the phone’s battery) and the consumption of memory on Plaintiff’s phone. 34. In order to redress these injuries, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the other members of the Class, brings suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., which prohibits unsolicited prerecorded calls to cellular telephones. 35. On behalf of the Class, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Defendants to cease all unsolicited pre-recorded calling activities and an award of actual or statutory damages to the class members, together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 57. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following Class: Robocall No Consent Class: All persons in the United States who from a date four years prior to the filing of the initial complaint to the present: (1) Defendants (or a third person acting on behalf of Defendants) called; (2) on the person’s cellular telephone number using an artificial or prerecorded voice; and (3) for whom Defendants lacked prior express consent to call that cellular telephone number at the time the call was made. 58. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest, and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’ counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 13 59. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the definition of the Class following class discovery, including discovery revealing the manner by which Defendants claim they obtained prior express consent to place autodialed and/or pre- recorded calls to the Plaintiff. 60. Numerosity: The exact number of members within the Class is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendants have placed unsolicited calls to hundreds or thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Members of the Class can be identified through Defendants’ records. 61. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class in that Plaintiff and the members of the Class sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct, namely their unauthorized telemarketing calls. Plaintiff is a member of the Class defined herein, and if Plaintiff is able to recover for the claims set forth in this Complaint, then the other members of the Class will have a right to recover as well. 62. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions, including class actions under the TCPA and related statutes. Plaintiff has no conflicts with, or interests antagonistic to, those of the Class, and Defendants have no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 63. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate 14 over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: a) Whether Realgy Energy is liable for the conduct of their third-party vendor; b) Whether John Doe Corporation made calls with a prerecorded message; c) Whether Defendants’ conduct constitutes a violation of the TCPA; d) Whether Defendants utilized an artificial or prerecorded voice to place calls to members of the Class; e) Whether members of the Class are entitled to statutory and treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendants’ conduct; f) Whether Defendants obtained prior express consent to contact any class members; g) Whether Defendants’ calls constitute telemarketing or were dual purpose messages; and h) To the extent Defendants’ conduct does not constitute telemarketing, whether Defendants obtained prior express oral consent to contact any class members. 64. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Joinder of all parties is impracticable, and the damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendants’ actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendants’ misconduct. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action. Individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to 15 all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. 65. Adequate notice can be given to the members of the Class directly using information maintained in Defendants’ records or through notice by publication. 66. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 67. Defendants and/or their agents placed unsolicited calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Robocall No Consent Class. 68. These calls were made without the prior express written consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Robocall No Consent Class to receive such calls. 69. These calls, including those to Plaintiff, utilized an artificial or prerecorded voice. 7. Realgy Energy is a certified supplier in the Ohio Energy Choice Program, offering electricity and natural gas to consumers in Ohio. 70. To the extent prior written express consent was required, Defendants failed to obtain prior written express consent that disclosed to the consumer that agreeing to receive pre-recorded calls was not a condition of purchase or use of any goods or service. Neither was oral consent provided. 16 71. To the extent Realgy Energy’s agent, John Doe Corporation, placed the calls at issue, Realgy Energy’s agent acted with actual or apparent authority and/or in accordance with a contract between Realgy Energy and its agent, John Doe Corporation. Realgy Energy’s agent acted under Realgy Energy’s control and for Realgy Energy’s benefit and/or with Realgy Energy’s knowledge and approval. Realgy Energy controlled its agent and knew about, and received the benefits of, the agent’s calling activities. Realgy Energy ratified the agent’s conduct with respect to the placing of such calls. 72. Defendants have, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B). As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Robocall No Consent Class are each entitled to, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation of such act. 73. In the event that the Court determines that Defendants’ conduct was willfull and knowing, it may, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Robocall No Consent Class. 8. In recent years, energy suppliers such as Realgy Energy have turned to unsolicited telemarketing as a way to increase their customer base. Widespread telemarketing is a primary method by which Realgy Energy solicits new customers. 9. John Doe Corporation initiated prerecorded telemarketing calls to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the Class to promote Realgy Energy in violation of the TCPA. Realgy Energy, or one of Realgy Energy’s vendors, hired John Doe Corporation to originate new customers and is liable for its illegal telemarketing conduct. Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Robocall No Consent Class)

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22. On or around May of 2007, Plaintiff first purchased a Dell computer for personal use and made subsequent personal purchases thereafter. 23. In conjunction with Plaintiff’s order and each subsequent order, Dell Inc., agreed to provide goods to Plaintiff and through that same transaction with Dell Inc., Plaintiff’s purchase of goods was financed. 24. This financing process is similar to those done by an automobile dealership, where the dealership sells the good and arranges financing for the buyer. 25. On information and belief, Dell placed the financing of Plaintiff’s purchase for goods with Dell Financial Services LLC (“DFS”) and per DFS’ agreement with CIT Bank, within two days from the date of the loan’s origination CIT transferred title of the loan back to 46. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-45 above. 15 U.S.C § 1692e, in pertinent part, provides: A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: * * * (2) The false representation of -- (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. . . . * * * (5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken. . . . * * * (10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer. 47. The FDCPA broadly prohibits unfair or unconscionable collection methods including filing suit on a time barred debt. See e.g. Murray v. CCB Credit Services, Inc., 04 C 7456, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25361, 2004 WL 2943656, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2004) ("[A] violation of the FDCPA occurs if the attempt to collect the time-barred debt is accompanied by a threat to sue, or if litigation has actually begun."); Walker v. Cash Flow Consultants, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 613, 616 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Kimber v. Federal Financial Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480 (M.D. Ala. 1987). Therefore, Plaintiff and the class members have a legal substantive right of not being sued on a time barred debt. 49. Defendants’ conduct for the purpose of the state law claim was willful. 50. The subject debt and all debts like it that were incurred for purchases from Dell where Dell arranged the financing, were subject to the Uniform Commercial Code, and therefore subject to a 4-year statute of limitations. 51. Defendants’ conduct related to the state court matter violated 15 U.S.C §§ 1692e(2)(A), e(5) and e(10). 52. In defending the state court matter, Plaintiff incurred out of pocket actual damages. 53. A complaint need not define the class rather, “the obligation to define the class falls on the judge’s shoulders” who may ask the parties’ assistance. Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1); Kasalo v. Harris & Harris, Ltd., 656 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 20011). 54. On information and belief, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that there are more than 40 similarly situated persons as Plaintiff who were sued on a time barred debt originating with the same creditor. 55. There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The predominant common question is whether Plaintiff and the class members were sued on a time barred debt. 57. A class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 58. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-45 above. 59. 15 U.S.C § 1692e, in pertinent part, provides: A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: * * * (2) The false representation of -- (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. . . . * * * (5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken. . . . * * * (10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer. 60. Defendants’ conduct likewise violated MCL 445.252(e) and MCL 445.252(f)(ii). CLASS CLAIM INDIVIDUAL CLAIM

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11. Coca-Cola uses the term “diet” in Diet Coke, on both its label and in advertising. 12. Dictionary definitions of the term “diet” commonly refer to weight loss. 55. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, plaintiff seeks to represent a class comprised of all persons in California who, on or after October 16, 2013 purchased, for personal or household use, and not for resale, Diet Coke in cans or bottles. 64. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 65. The FAL prohibits any statement in connection with the sale of goods “which is untrue or misleading,” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500. 66. Coca-Cola’s use of the term “diet” in marketing Diet Coke is deceptive in light of the strong evidence that aspartame causes weight gain. 67. Coca-Cola knew, or reasonably should have known, that marketing Diet Coke as “diet” was untrue or misleading. 68. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 74. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 81. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 82. Through the label of Diet Coke, Coca-Cola made affirmations of fact or promises, and made descriptions of goods, that formed part of the basis of the bargain, in that plaintiff and the class purchased the Diet Coke in reasonable reliance on those statements. Cal. Com. Code § 2313(1). 83. Specifically, Coca-Cola made statements that Diet Coke is “diet.” 84. Coca-Cola breached its express warranties by selling products that are not “diet,” i.e., do not assist in weight loss or healthy weight management, but which in fact cause weight gain. 85. That breach actually and proximately caused injury in the form of the lost purchase price that plaintiff and class members paid for the Diet Coke. 86. Plaintiff gave Coca-Cola notice of the breach before filing or asserting the claim, but Coca-Cola failed to remedy the breach. 87. As a result, plaintiff seeks, no behalf of herself and other class members, actual damages arising as a result of Coca-Cola’s breach of express warranty. 88. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. A. Diet Coke is Marketed to Assist in Weight Loss and Healthy Weight Management Due to Its Non-Caloric Artificial Sweetener, Aspartame BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY, CAL. COM. CODE § 2313(1) BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, CAL. COM. CODE § 2314 VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200 ET SEQ. VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSUMERS LEGAL REMEDIES ACT, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750 ET SEQ. VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA FALSE ADVERTISING LAW, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500 ET SEQ.

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1. Whether the class members could afford individual litigation. Whether individual litigation would be an unnecessary burden on the Courts. Whether individual litigation presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory 1. m. judgments. n Whether individual litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties. 24. Henderson had suffered a series of rejections for employment based on inaccurate background checks furnished by multiple consumer reporting agencies. He had sought legal advice, disputed those reports and even commenced litigation about them. Nevertheless, new reports continued to surface showing the inclusion of felony records for an out of state stranger with a similar name. 25. As a result, Henderson attempted to determine and dispute the content of his consumer file with each database that he discovered warehoused and sold criminal background checks. 27. In addition, in that same correspondence, Henderson disputed inaccurate information (the inaccurate attribution of a Pennsylvania felony conviction of a similarly named stranger) that he believed Defendant maintained in its file. 28. Neither Defendant nor anybody on behalf of Defendant replied to Henderson's letter which was sent by regular and certified mail. 29. Defendant did not provide Henderson a copy ofhis consumer file. 30. It is Defendant's policy to refuse to provide a consumer disclosure pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) if it has not previously furnished a consumer report regarding that consumer to a third party. 31. In February 2012 Manuel applied for a job as a banker with Wells Fargo. 32. Wells Fargo purchased a background check on Manuel from First Advantage, for an employment purpose. 33. On February 9, 2012 Manuel interviewed with a Wells Fargo recruiter. 34. The following week Manuel interviewed with an individual at a branch of Defendant. 35. On February24, 2012 Wells Fargo offered Manuel a position at the branch where he had his immediately preceding interview. 36. Defendantprovided Manuel with an offer letter dated February 24, 2012 and asked him to sign and return it ifhe was interested in the position. 37. Manuel signed the offer letter on February 27, 2012 and immediately returned it to Wells Fargo. 39. Upon information and belief, Wells Fargo ordered a consumer report on Manuel from Defendant on February 27, 2012. 40. As March 13, 2012 approached, Manuel still did not know exactly where to report for work atDefendant, nor had hesigned any additional employment related papers. 41. Manuel sentemailsto his contacts at Wells Fargo to no avail. 42. Later, Manuel calledthe recruiter from Wells Fargo, and she informed Manuel that theywere waiting ontheresults of Manuel's background report. 43. The recruiter also informed Manuel that she could not talk about his background report results with him. 44. The recruiter referred Manuel to the Defendant. 45. Manuel called Defendant and was told that Defendant was waiting for additional information. 46. Upon information and belief, Defendant completed the consumer report April 2, 2012 andimmediately conveyed theinformation inthereport to Wells Fargo. 47. Onor about April 2, 2012 therecruiter for Wells Fargo told Manuel thatthe report had been completed and theresult disqualified Manuel for employment at Wells Fargo. 48. Later in April Manuel receiveda copy of a "pre-adverse action notification" and a copy ofhis consumer report from either Wells Fargo orFirst Advantage. 49. The letter was dated April 3, 2012, butManuel does notknow when the sender put the letter in the mail. 50. The report provided by First Advantage contained numerousmaterial errors. 52. In creating and furnishing Manuel's consumer report, Defendant failed to follow reasonable procedures toensure the report was as accurate asmaximally possible. 53. Forexample, Defendant allowed and/or usedvery loose match criteria to determine whether to include information pertaining to a stranger with a different social security number living ina different state atadifferent address within Manuel's consumer report. 54. In response to Manuel's request for a copy of his file, Defendant didnotrespond or provide any documents. 55. Defendant failed to provide Manuel witha letteror any othercommunication "at the time" his consumerreportwas furnished to Wells Fargo. 56. Despite providing a report for employment purposes containing public record information likely to have an adverse effect upon his ability to obtain or maintain employment, Defendant failed to provide notice "at thetime" of the fact thatthepublic record information was beingreported by it, together with the name and address of the person to whom such information was being reported. 57. Uponinformation and belief, Defendant did not attempt for any consumer to follow the option available at 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a)(2), which requires a consumer reporting agency to actually contact the original source of public records information (e.g. the Court Clerk) immediately before furnishing a report which includes such information. Title 15 U.S.C. §1681k(a)(2) is thus inapplicable to the consumer reports at issuein this case. 59. FirstAdvantage refused to process the dispute until Manuel completed Defendant's proprietary form entitled "Notice ofConsumer Dispute" and an"Authorization for Reinvestigation of Consumer Dispute." 60. Manuel signed, completed and forwarded those forms to FirstAdvantage, but First Advantage never, as faras Manuel knows, corrected thereport or responded. 61. In 2008, Thomas applied and was hired by CableviewCommunications. 62. Thomas applied for a job with Cableview to cover its territory in and about the Richmond, Virginia geographic area. 63. Thomas may have authorized a background report. 64. In the fall of 2011, Cableview decided to sells its operation to FTS. 65. Cableview and FTS collectively ordered a background report on Thomas from Backgroundchecks.com on September 30,2011. 66. The background report contained numerous felony convictions for another individual. 67. Based on the results of the background report, Cableview declined to retain Thomas and FTS declined to hire him. 68. This led Thomas to question what other background check companiesmight report on him as he returned to the job market. 69. On or about December 4, 2014 Thomas sent a letter to First Advantage requesting a copy ofhis entire file. 71. White was hired by Wells Fargo and worked there for four years before being transferred to the mortgage department. 72. In connection with the transfer he submitted his fingerprints and First Advantage prepared a consumer report on him. 73. The consumer report revealed a class six misdemeanor which caused him to not only be turned down for the newposition, butto be discharged from Wells Fargo effective March 21, 2002. 74. At no time did either Wells Fargo or First Advantage provide White with a copy of the consumer report, so he is unsure whether it was accurate or not. 75. White was informed that he would not get the position before he received any written correspondence from either Wells Fargo or First Advantage. 76. Neither Defendant nor Wells Fargo ever provided White with a copy of his consumerreport or a written summary ofhis FCRA rights. 77. First Advantage knew or should have known about its legal obligations under the FCRA. These obligations are well established in the plain language of the FCRA and in the promulgations ofthe Federal Trade Commission. 78. First Advantage obtained or had available substantial written materials that apprised it of its duties under the FCRA. 80. First Advantage's conduct as alleged herein was consistent with its established and systematically executed procedures and policies for compliance with the FCRA. 81. The conduct, action, and inaction of Defendant was reckless, rendering Defendant liable for statutory and punitive damages in an amount to be determined bythe Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 82. Inthe alternative, the conduct,action,and inaction of Defendantwas negligent, rendering Defendant liable pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681o, with a separate trial for actual damages if established. 83. Plaintiffs and other membersofthe putativeclassand subclasses are entitledto recover costs and attorney's fees, as well as appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief from Defendant, in a manner and an amountto be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and I68I0. 84. Numerosity. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that the members ofthe Class are so numerous that joinder ofall is impractical. The names and addresses of members of the Class are identifiable through documents maintained by Defendant and members of the Class may be notified of the pendency of this action by publishedand/or mailed notice. 86. Typicality. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the Class members. Plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the same causes of action as the other members of the Class. Without limitation, the procedures of Defendant were uniform and systemic. The reports obtained and used regarding Plaintiffs and the circumstances for which such reports were furnished was uniform and typical ofthe facts for each member ofthe Class. 87. Adequacy. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiffs are adequate representatives ofthe Class because their interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests ofthe members of the Class they seek to represent, they have retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation, and intend to prosecute this action vigorously. The interests ofmembers of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiffs and their counsel. 89. Injunctive Relief Appropriate for the Class. Class certification is appropriate because Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate equitable injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiffs and the Class Members. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). SERVICES, CORP. Defendant. Civil Action No. 3: /HtV^SJ

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26. On or about September 15, 2014, Defendant hired Plaintiff into the position of Press Helper. 27. On or about June 22, 2018, Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant ended. 28. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant and in addition to performing compensable work in the position of Press Helper, Plaintiff also performed compensable work in and held the positions of Press Operator and Finishing Operator. 30. Plaintiff was an hourly-paid, non-exempt employee during the entirety of his employment with Defendant. 31. The vast majority of Defendant’s employees during the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1) were hourly-paid, non-exempt employees. 32. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff’s usual and customary weekly work schedule was Monday through Friday, 6:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. 33. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), the vast majority of Defendant’s hourly-paid, non-exempt employees had usual and customary weekly work schedules, including normal and customary daily scheduled shift start and end times. 34. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees often worked at least and/or in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 35. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees often worked at least and/or in excess of five (5) days per workweek. 36. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Defendant compensated its hourly-paid, non-exempt employees, including Plaintiff, bi-weekly via check. 38. On a daily basis during Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff worked alongside other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees at Defendant’s Appleton, Wisconsin location. 39. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Defendant provided Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees with a written “Employee Handbook.” 40. Defendant’s “Employee Handbook” was last revised as of January 1, 2014. 41. Defendant’s “Employee Handbook” contained the terms and conditions of employment for its hourly-paid, non-exempt employees, including Plaintiff. 42. Defendant’s “Employee Handbook” contained the company-wide, uniform policies applicable to its hourly-paid, non-exempt employees, including Plaintiff. 43. Defendant’s “Employee Handbook” contained the company-wide, uniform policies applicable to its hourly-paid, non-exempt employees, including Plaintiff, relating to hours worked, work performed, timekeeping, recordkeeping, and compensation. 44. Defendant’s “Employee Handbook” contained a “Time Keeping” policy that applied to its hourly-paid, non-exempt employees, including Plaintiff. 45. Defendant’s “Time Keeping” policy as contained in its “Employee Handbook” stated in full: 66. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated employees as authorized under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The similarly situated employees include: FLSA Collective: All hourly-paid, non-exempt employees who are or have been employed by Defendant within three (3) years immediately prior to the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1) who have not been compensated for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek as a result of impermissible and unlawful time shaving and rounding by Defendant. 67. Defendant, as a matter of policy and practice, did not compensate its employees for all hours of compensable work performed by the FLSA Collective during a workweek. 68. These practices resulted in Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective being denied overtime compensation by Defendant at the rate of one and one-half times their regular hourly rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. 70. The First Claim for Relief is brought under and maintained as an opt-in Collective Action pursuant to § 216(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b), by Plaintiff on behalf of the FLSA Collective. 71. The FLSA Collective claims may be pursued by those who affirmatively opt in to this case, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 72. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are and have been similarly situated, have and have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are and have been subject to Defendant’s decisions, policies, plans and programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and rules willfully failing and refusing to compensate them for each hour worked including overtime compensation. The claims of Plaintiff stated herein are the same as those of the FLSA Collective. 73. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective seek relief on a collective basis challenging, among other FLSA violations, Defendant’s practice of failing to properly and lawfully compensate employees for all hours worked, including overtime compensation. 74. The FLSA Collective is readily ascertainable. For purpose of notice and other purposes related to this action, the names, phone numbers, and addresses are readily available from Defendant. Notice can be provided to the FLSA Collective via first class mail to the last address known by Defendant and through posting at Defendant’s facility in areas where postings are normally made. 76. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated employees pursuant to the WWPCL, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The similarly situated employees include: Wisconsin Class: All hourly-paid, non-exempt employees who are or have been employed by Defendant within two (2) years immediately prior to the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1) who have not been compensated for all hours worked in a workweek, including at an overtime rate of pay for those hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek, as a result of impermissible and unlawful time shaving and rounding by Defendant. 77. The Wisconsin Class members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Wisconsin Class members are determinable from the records of Defendant. The job titles, length of employment, and the rates of pay for each Wisconsin Class member are also determinable from Defendant’s records. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendant. Notice can be provided by means permissible under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 78. The proposed Wisconsin Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, and more importantly the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parties and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, upon information and belief, there are over one-hundred (100) members of the Wisconsin Class. 80. Plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Wisconsin Class and has no interests antagonistic to the Wisconsin Class. Plaintiff is represented by counsel who are experienced and competent in both collective/class action litigation and employment litigation and have previously represented plaintiffs in wage and hour cases. 81. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy – particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit against corporate defendants. Class action treatment will permit a number of similarly-situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expense that numerous individual actions engender. Because the losses, injuries and damages suffered by each of the individual Wisconsin Class members are small in the sense pertinent to a class action analysis, the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual Wisconsin Class members to redress the wrongs done to them. 83. Defendant has violated the WWPCL regarding payment of wages and overtime premium wages. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. Class actions provide class members who are not named in the Complaint a degree of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 85. The questions set forth above predominate over any questions affecting only individual persons, and a class action is superior with respect to considerations of consistency, economy, efficiency, fairness and equity, to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the state law claims. 86. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the FLSA Collective, reasserts and incorporates by reference all paragraphs set forth above as if restated herein. 87. At all times material herein, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have been entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 88. At all times material herein, Defendant was an employer of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective as provided under the FLSA. 89. At all times material herein, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were employees of Defendant as provided under the FLSA. 90. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are victims of uniform compensation policy and practice in violation of the FLSA. 91. Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to account for and compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective for overtime premium pay for each hour they worked in excess of forty (40) hours each workweek. 93. The FLSA regulates, among other things, the payment of an overtime premium by employers whose employees are engaged in commerce, or engaged in the production of goods for commerce, or employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 94. Defendant was and is subject to the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA because Defendant is an enterprise engaged in commerce and/or its employees are engaged in commerce, as defined in FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203(b). 95. Defendant’s failure to properly compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective and failure to properly record all compensable work time was willfully perpetrated. Defendant has not acted in good faith nor with reasonable grounds to believe its actions and omissions were not a violation of the FLSA, and as a result thereof, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are entitled to recover an award of liquidated damages in an amount equal to the amount of unpaid overtime premium pay described above pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Alternatively, should the Court find that Defendant did not act willfully in failing to pay overtime premium pay wages, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are entitled to an award of pre- judgment interest at the applicable legal rate. 97. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are entitled to damages equal to the mandated overtime premium pay within the three (3) years preceding the date of filing of this Complaint, plus periods of equitable tolling because Defendant acted willfully and knew or showed reckless disregard of whether its conduct was prohibited by the FLSA. 98. Pursuant to FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), successful Plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement of the costs and attorneys’ fees expended in successfully prosecuting an action for unpaid wages and overtime wages. Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as Amended (Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the FLSA Collective) Violation of WWPCL – Unpaid Overtime (Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Wisconsin Class)

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27. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all legally disabled individuals who have attempted to access, or will in the future attempt to access, Defendant’s hotel. 2 Plaintiff, or an agent of Plaintiff, intends to visit Defendant’s hotel periodically to monitor whether Defendant is in compliance with the ADA’s requirements calculated to confirm that pools are fully accessible to, and independently usable by, disabled people.   -6- 28. The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 29. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 30. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class in that they all have been and/or are being denied their civil rights to full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment of, Defendant’s facilities and/or services due to Defendant’s failure to make its pool fully accessible and independently usable as above described. 31. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation. 32. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. LLC, D/B/A RAINTREE INN, Defendant. § § § § § § § § § § § § § Civil Action No.: 1:13-cv-470

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10. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its daily calls to Plaintiff seeking to collect the debt allegedly owed by her mother 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 12. Defendant’s calls were placed to telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 13. On several occasions, Plaintiff answered Defendant’s telephone call and informed an agent for Defendant that: 1) Plaintiff’s mother cannot be reached on Plaintiff’s telephone; 2) that Defendant has an incorrect telephone number and; 3) that Defendant must cease placing such calls to Plaintiff. 14. Despite receiving this information on numerous occasions, Defendant continued to place daily calls to Plaintiff, on her cellular telephone, using an “automated telephone dialing system.” 16. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any collection telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 17. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of All persons within the United States who received any collection telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system and such person had not previously not provided their cellular telephone number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 18. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 19. The Class is so numerous that the individual joinder of all of its members is impractical. While the exact number and identities of The Class members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that The Class includes thousands of members. Plaintiff alleges that The Class members may be ascertained by the records maintained by Defendant. 8. Beginning in or around January of 2012, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on her cellular telephone, (909) 684-4164, in an attempt to collect an alleged outstanding debt owed by her now deceased mother, Virgie Smith. 9. Defendant placed multiple calls in a single day, often upwards of four (4) to five (5) calls a day to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone seeking to collect the alleged debt owed by her mother. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Respectfully Submitted this 12th Day of October, 2012.

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10. Defendant MOHELA is generally engaged in the debt collection business and conducts debt collection activities on a nationwide basis. 11. Plaintiff owes no debt to any creditor associated with Defendant MOHELA whatsoever. 12. Sometime in or before July 2015, however, Defendant MOHELA began making collection calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 13. Defendant MOHELA placed collection calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone at phone number ending in “1030.” 14. Per its business practices, each of Defendant MOHELA’s calls were placed using an “automatic telephone dialing system” (“ATDS”), as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) and/or with an artificial or prerecorded voice, as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 15. At no time did Plaintiff consent, express or implied, to receive such unsolicited telephone calls from Defendant. 16. Through the unsolicited telephone calls, Defendant MOHELA contacted Plaintiff’s cellular telephone for debt collection purposes via an ATDS and/or artificial or pre-recorded voice as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) and prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 17. Upon information and belief, the ATDS used by Defendant MOHELA to call Plaintiff has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. 18. The telephone number Defendant MOHELA called was assigned to cellular telephones service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 26. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated (“the Class”). 47. Plaintiff re-alleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. The forgoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and everyone one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 49. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 51. Plaintiff re-alleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 52. The forgoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and everyone one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 53. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of up to $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 54. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the TCPA (Against all Defendants) Negligent Violations of the TCPA (Against all Defendants)

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1. Plaintiff Glen Ellyn Pharmacy, Inc., brings this action to secure redress for the actions of defendant Attix Pharmaceutical USA, LLC, in sending or causing the sending of unsolicited advertisements to telephone facsimile machines in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §227 (“TCPA”), the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/2 (“ICFA”), and the common law. 10. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well. 11. Defendant Attix Pharmaceutical USA, LLC, is responsible for sending or causing the sending of the faxes. 12. Defendant Attix Pharmaceutical USA, LLC, as the entity whose products or services were advertised in the faxes, derived economic benefit from the sending of the faxes. 13. Defendant Attix Pharmaceutical USA, LLC, either negligently or wilfully violated the rights of plaintiff and other recipients in sending the faxes. 14. Each fax refers to a website registered to defendant Attix Pharmaceutical 2. The TCPA expressly prohibits unsolicited fax advertising. Unsolicited fax advertising damages the recipients. The recipient is deprived of its paper and ink or toner and the use of its fax machine. The recipient also wastes valuable time it would have spent on something else. Unsolicited faxes prevent fax machines from receiving and sending authorized faxes, cause wear and tear on fax machines, and require labor to attempt to identify the source and purpose of the unsolicited faxes. 20. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-18. 21. The TCPA makes unlawful the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ...” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). 22. The TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3), provides: Private right of action. A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State– (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the Court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under the subparagraph (B) of 4 this paragraph. 23. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. Furthermore, plaintiff’s statutory right of privacy was invaded. 24. Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages. 25. Defendants violated the TCPA even if their actions were only negligent. 26. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 35. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-18. 36. Defendants engaged in unfair acts and practices, in violation of ICFA § 2, 815 ILCS 505/2, by sending unsolicited fax advertising to plaintiff and others. 37. Unsolicited fax advertising is contrary to the TCPA and also Illinois law. 720 ILCS 5/26-3(b) makes it a petty offense to transmit unsolicited fax advertisements to Illinois residents. 38. Defendants engaged in an unfair practice by engaging in conduct that is contrary to public policy, unscrupulous, and caused injury to recipients of their advertising. 39. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. 40. Defendants engaged in such conduct in the course of trade and commerce. 41. Defendants’ conduct caused recipients of their advertising to bear the cost thereof. This gave defendants an unfair competitive advantage over businesses that advertise lawfully, such as by direct mail. For example, an advertising campaign targeting one million recipients would cost $500,000 if sent by U.S. mail but only $20,000 if done by fax broadcasting. The reason is that instead of spending $480,000 on printing and mailing his ad, the fax broadcaster misappropriates the recipients’ paper and ink. “Receiving a junk fax is like getting junk mail with the postage due”. Remarks of Cong. Edward Markey, 135 Cong Rec E 2549, Tuesday, July 18, 1989, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. 42. Defendants’ shifting of advertising costs to plaintiff and the class members 7 in this manner makes such practice unfair. In addition, defendants’ conduct was contrary to public policy, as established by the TCPA and Illinois statutory and common law. 43. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 51. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-18. 52. By sending plaintiff and the class members unsolicited faxes, defendants converted to their own use ink or toner and paper belonging to plaintiff and the class members. 53. Immediately prior to the sending of the unsolicited faxes, plaintiff and the class members owned and had an unqualified and immediate right to the possession of the paper and ink or toner used to print the faxes. 54. By sending the unsolicited faxes, defendants appropriated to their own use the paper and ink or toner used to print the faxes and used them in such manner as to make them unusable. Such appropriation was wrongful and without authorization. 9 55. Defendants knew or should have known that such appropriation of the paper and ink or toner was wrongful and without authorization. 56. Plaintiff and the class members were deprived of the paper and ink or toner, which could no longer be used for any other purpose. Plaintiff and each class member thereby suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes. 57. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 58. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(3), plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons and/or entities with Illinois fax numbers (b) who, on or after a date five years prior to the filing of this action, or such shorter period during which faxes were sent by or on behalf of defendant Attix Pharmaceutical USA, LLC, and on or before a date 20 days following the filing of this action, (c) were sent faxes by or on behalf of defendant Attix Pharmaceutical USA, LLC, promoting its goods or services for sale (d)that do not contain an opt out notice. 59. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that there are more than 40 members of the class. 60. There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The predominant common questions include: a. Whether defendants engaged in a pattern of sending unsolicited fax advertisements; b. Whether defendants thereby violated the TCPA; c. Whether defendants thereby committed the tort of conversion; d. Whether defendants thereby engaged in unfair acts and practices, in violation of the ICFA. 10 e. Whether defendants thereby converted the property of plaintiff. 61. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither plaintiff nor plaintiff’s counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 62. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 63. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against defendants is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions. 64. Management of this class action is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties that those presented in many class actions, e.g. for securities fraud. WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and the class and against defendants for: a. Appropriate damages; b. An injunction against the further transmission of unsolicited fax advertising; c. Costs of suit; d. Such other or further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 11 /s/ Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Michelle R. Teggelaar Julie Clark Heather A. Kolbus 9. On June 21, 2011, plaintiff Glen Ellyn Pharmacy, Inc., received the unsolicited fax advertisement attached as Exhibit A on its facsimile machine. INTRODUCTION

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(Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) 19. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally deaf and hard of hearing individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Bizjournals.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Bizjournals.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 20. There are hundreds of thousands of deaf or hard of hearing individuals in New York State. There are approximately 36 million people in the United States who are deaf or hard of hearing. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 21. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying deaf and hard of hearing persons access to the goods and services of Bizjournals.com. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, deaf and hard of hearing persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse and watch videos on Bizjournals.com. 23. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are deaf or hard of hearing, and claim that New York Business Journal has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the website, Bizjournals.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally deaf or hard of hearing. 24. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 26. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with hearing disabilities throughout the United States. 27. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 28. New York Business Journal operates Bizjournals.com, a leading news media company delivering news, fashion and entertainment to hundreds of millions of people across the United States. New York Business Journal is one of the most popular video websites in the world. 29. Bizjournals.com is a service and benefit offered by New York Business Journal throughout the United States, including New York State. Bizjournals.com is owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant. 30. Bizjournals.com allows the user to browse news, entertainment and videos. New York Business Journal Video Channel covers a variety of topics such as business, art, politics and health and science. New York Business Journal’s videos are available with the click of a mouse and are played through the internet on one’s computer, cell phone and other electronic devices. 32. New York Business Journal denies the deaf and hard of hearing access to goods, services and information made available through Bizjournals.com by preventing them from freely navigating Bizjournals.com. 33. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as shopping, banking, etc., for deaf and hard of hearing persons. 34. The deaf and hard of hearing access videos through closed captioning, which is a transcription or translation of the audio portion of a video as it occurs, sometimes including description of non-speech elements. Except for a deaf or hard of hearing person whose residual hearing is still sufficient to apprehend the audio portion of the video, closed captioning provides the only method by which a deaf or hard of hearing person can independently access the video. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, deaf and hard of hearing persons are unable to fully access the service provided through the video on New York Business Journal’s website. 35. Bizjournals.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and other deaf or hard of hearing persons. 37. Bizjournals.com thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Bizjournals.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Bizjournals.com in New York State. 38. Plaintiff PHILLIP SULLIVAN JR. attempted to watch the video “Cohn Says Alternative Minimum Tax Will Be Repealed.” on Bizjournals.com in April 2017, but was unable to do so independently because of the lack of closed captioning on Defendant’s website, causing Bizjournals.com to be inaccessible and not independently usable by, deaf and hard of hearing individuals. 39. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Bizjournals.com contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, deaf and hard of hearing individuals. 40. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Bizjournals.com and Bizjournals.com. 42. New York Business Journal utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 43. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 44. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 45. Defendant New York Business Journal operates a place of public accommodation as defined by Title III of ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (“place of exhibition and entertainment,” “place of recreation,” and “service establishments”). 46. New York Business Journal has failed to make its videos accessible to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing by failing to provide closed captioning for videos displayed on its website. 48. Discrimination specifically includes the failure to provide “effective communication” to deaf and hard of hearing individuals through auxiliary aids and services, such as captioning, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(III); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(C). 49. Discrimination also includes the failure to maintain accessible features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disability. 62. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 63. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 64. Defendant New York Business Journal operates a place of public accommodation as defined by N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 65. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because they own and operate Bizjournals.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 67. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 68. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 70. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 71. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Bizjournals.com under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 72. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 74. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 77. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof …” 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of … disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision” 80. Bizjournals.com is a public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 82. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Bizjournals.com, causing videos on Bizjournals.com to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard of hearing patrons full and equal access to the goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 83. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two … shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby…” 84. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside …” 85. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 87. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 88. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 89. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of … disability … directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 90. Bizjournals.com is a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 91. Defendant is subject to City Law because they own and operate Bizjournals.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 102(1). 93. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8- 107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (d) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard of hearing class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (e) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to deaf and hard of hearing class members; and/or (f) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard of hearing class members. 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 96. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.

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36. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class, consisting of all persons and entities that acquired Flower Foods securities between February 7, 2013, and August 10, 2016, inclusive, and who were damaged thereby (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 42. The market for Flower Foods’ securities was open, well-developed and efficient at all relevant times. As a result of these materially false and/or misleading statements, and/or failures to disclose, Flower Foods’ securities traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period. Plaintiff and other members of the Class purchased or otherwise acquired Flower Foods’ securities relying upon the integrity of the market price of the Company’s securities and market information relating to Flower Foods, and have been damaged thereby. 43. During the Class Period, Defendants materially misled the investing public, thereby inflating the price of Flower Foods’ securities, by publicly issuing false and/or misleading statements and/or omitting to disclose material facts necessary to make Defendants’ statements, as set forth herein, not false and/or misleading. The statements and omissions were materially false and/or misleading because they failed to disclose material adverse information and/or misrepresented the truth about Flower Foods’ business, operations, and prospects as alleged herein. 65. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 66. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Flower Foods within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their high-level positions, and their ownership and contractual rights, participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the false financial statements filed by the Company with the SEC and disseminated to the investing public, the Individual Defendants had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision-making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements which Plaintiff contends are false and misleading. The Individual Defendants were provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Company’s reports, press releases, public filings and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. Background Violation of Section 10(b) of The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants Violation of Section 20(a) of The Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants

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(ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONWIDE CLASS AND THE CALIFORNIA CLASS) (Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17500, et seq. – False and Misleading Advertising) (ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONWIDE CLASS AND THE CALIFORNIA CLASS) (Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. ) (ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONWIDE CLASS AND THE CALIFORNIA CLASS) (Violation of California Civil Code §§ 1750, et seq. – Consumers Legal Remedies Act) 28. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Plaintiff seeks to represent the following classes: a. The “California Class,” which consists of: All consumers within the State of California who purchased Asahi Dry during the Class Period for their personal use, rather than for resale or distribution. Excluded from the California Class are Defendant’s current or former officers, directors, and employees; counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant; and the judicial officer to whom this lawsuit is assigned. b. The “Nationwide Class,” which consists of: All consumers in the United States and its territories who purchased Asahi Dry during the Class Period for their personal use, rather than for resale or distribution. Excluded from the Nationwide Class are Defendant’s current or former officers, directors, and employees; counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant; and the judicial officer to whom this lawsuit is assigned. (Collectively referred to as the “Class”). 38. Plaintiff incorporate by reference all allegations contained in the complaint as if fully set forth herein. 39. Plaintiff brings the following claim on behalf of the Nationwide Class, or in the alternative, on behalf of the California Class. 40. California Business & Professions Code section 17200 (“UCL”) prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” 41. The acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices, and non-disclosures of Defendant, as alleged herein, constitute “unlawful” business acts or practices in that they violate the California False Advertising Law (“FAL”) and California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) as stated below. 42. The false and misleading labeling of Asahi Dry, as alleged herein, also constitutes “unfair” business acts or practices because such conduct is immoral, unscrupulous, and offends public policy. Further, the gravity of Defendant’s conduct outweighs any conceivable benefit of such conduct. 43. The acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices, and non-disclosures of Defendant as alleged herein constitute “fraudulent” business acts or practices, because Defendant’s conduct is false and misleading to Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class. 44. Defendant leveraged its deception to induce Plaintiff and members of the Nationwide Class to purchase products that were of lesser value and quality than advertised. 48. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations contained in the complaint as if fully set forth herein. 49. Plaintiff brings the following claim on behalf of the Nationwide Class, or in the alternative, on behalf of the California Class. 50. California False Advertising Law (Cal. Business & Professions Code sections 17500 and 17508) prohibits “mak[ing] any false or misleading advertising claim.” 51. As alleged herein, Defendant makes “false [and] misleading advertising claim[s],” as it deceives consumers to believe that Asahi Dry is imported from Japan. 52. In reliance on these false and misleading advertising claims, Plaintiff and members of the Nationwide Class purchased Asahi Dry believing it was imported from Japan. 53. Defendant knew or should have known that its labeling and marketing was likely to deceive consumers. 55. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations contained in the complaint as if fully set forth herein. 56. Plaintiff brings the following claim on behalf of the Nationwide Class, or in the alternative, on behalf of the California Class. 57. The CLRA adopts a statutory scheme prohibiting various deceptive practices in connection with the conduct of a business providing goods, property, or services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes 6. Imported beer is the fastest growing segment of the American beer market, nearly doubling in market share during the 1990s.1 7. Asahi currently markets and sells Asahi Dry throughout the United States. Asahi Dry is Marketed and Advertised as Being Imported from Japan

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39. Plaintiff and those similarly situated incorporate herein by this reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 38 of this Complaint as if set forth verbatim. 40. Plaintiff brings her First Claim for Relief, the FLSA claim, as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). In addition to the claims of Class Representatives, Plaintiff brings a Colorado Wage Act claim and a breach of contract claim as a collective action pursuant to Colo. R. Civ. P. 23 and/or Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and as representatives of the following class: all current and former non-exempt employees of Defendants who worked for the Defendants at any time in the last three years who were not paid for all of the time they performed work-related tasks including overtime. 41. The FLSA claims may be pursued by those who opt-in to this case, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The Colorado State law claims, if certified for class-wide treatment, may be pursued by all similarly-situated Colorado Opt-in Plaintiffs who do not opt-out of the class. 50. Plaintiff and those similarly situated re-allege, and incorporate here by reference, all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 49 of this Complaint as if set forth verbatim. 51. At all times material herein, Opt-in Plaintiffs have been entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 52. The FLSA regulates, among other things, payment of overtime pay by employers such as the Defendants. 53. Defendants were, and are, subject to the recordkeeping and overtime pay requirements of the FLSA because they are an enterprise engaged in commerce and its employees are engaged in commerce. 54. Defendants violated the FLSA by failing to pay Opt-in Plaintiffs for all of their time worked, including overtime. In the course of perpetrating these unlawful practices, Defendants have also willfully failed to keep accurate records of all hours worked by employees. Defendants have also willfully failed to provide paystubs to their employees and/or documentation of hours worked and monies paid to their employees. 55. Section 13 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 213, exempts certain categories of employees from overtime pay obligations. None of the FLSA exemptions apply to Opt-in Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Opt-in Plaintiffs must be paid overtime pay in accordance with the FLSA. 56. Opt-in Plaintiffs were automatically clocked out by Defendants for their meal breaks, but were/are required to perform work-related duties during meal breaks. P Opt-in Plaintiffs were/are not paid for work-related interruptions that occurred/occur during meal breaks during their shifts wherein they worked more than five consecutive hours. Defendants failed to change Plaintiff’s and those Opt-in Plaintiffs’ time records to reflect the additional time worked on behalf of the employer even when Opt-in Plaintiffs and those similarly situated requested that their time records be corrected by management. 62. Plaintiff and those similarly situated re-allege, and incorporate here by reference, all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 61 of this Complaint as if set forth verbatim. 63. At all times material herein, Plaintiff, individually, is entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 64. The FLSA regulates, among other things, payment of overtime pay by employers such as the Defendants. 65. Defendants were, and are, subject to the recordkeeping and overtime pay requirements of the FLSA because they are an enterprise engaged in commerce and its employees are engaged in commerce. 74. Plaintiff and those similarly situated re-allege, and incorporate here by reference, all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 73 of this Complaint as if set forth verbatim. Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and Failure to Maintain Records (ALL CLASS MEMBERS) Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and Failure to Maintain Records (CLASS REPRESENTATIVE, INDIVIDUALLY) Violation of the Colorado Wage and Hour Laws and Failure to Maintain Records (ALL CLASS MEMBERS)

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12. As part of just such an advertising campaign, CPP has placed and continues to place unsolicited calls to Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ telephones without prior express written consent and in violation of the DNC List. 13. Plaintiff has been a subscriber of the telephone number ending in 8391 since at least 2007 and registered that number on the DNC List on October 23, 2007. 14. From June 2015 to the date of this filing, CPP placed approximately 100 phone calls to Plaintiff’s telephone number in an attempt to market and promote its payment processing products and services. 15. For example, from late August 2015 to late September 2015 alone, Plaintiff received twenty six (26) unsolicited calls from CPP. 16. For each of these twenty six calls, Plaintiff’s caller ID displayed the calling number as “(972) 301-3798” in Richardson, Texas, and the calling party as “CPP.” The calls occurred on the following dates and times:  August 28, 2015 at 8:52 a.m. CDT  August 31, 2015 at 9:48 a.m. CDT  September 1, 2015 at 10:59 a.m. CDT  September 1, 2015 at 12:47 p.m. CDT  September 2, 2015 at 9:11 a.m. CDT  September 3, 2015 at 10:10 a.m. CDT 2 Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, THE 25. Plaintiff brings this action, as set forth below, on behalf of himself and as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class (the “Class”) defined as: All individuals and entities in the United States who, within a 12- month period, received two or more telemarketing phone calls from or on behalf of Defendant Certified Payment Processing, L.P. soliciting its products and services at a time when the called number was registered on the National Do Not Call Registry. Excluded from the Class are Defendant and its subsidiaries and affiliates; all persons who make a timely election to be excluded from the Class; governmental entities; and the judge to whom this case is assigned and any immediate family members thereof. 26. Certification of Plaintiff’s claims for class-wide treatment is appropriate because Plaintiff can prove the elements of his claims on a class-wide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claims. 27. Numerosity – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1). The members of the Class are so numerous that individual joinder of all Class members is impracticable. On information and belief, there are thousands of consumers who have been damaged by CPP’s wrongful conduct as alleged herein. The precise number of Class members and their addresses is presently unknown to Plaintiff, but may be ascertained from CPP’s books and records. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by recognized, Court-approved notice dissemination methods, which may include U.S. mail, electronic mail, Internet postings, and/or published notice. 29. Typicality – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3). Plaintiff’s claim is typical of the other Class members’ claims because, among other things, all Class members were comparably injured through the uniform prohibited conduct described above. 30. Adequacy of Representation – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4). Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the other Class members he seeks to represent; he has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex commercial and class action litigation; and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously. The interests of the Class members will be fairly and adequately protected by the Plaintiff and his counsel. 31. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). CPP has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and the other Class members, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and declaratory relief, as described below, with respect to the Class as a whole. 33. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 35. The Commission did in fact implement such regulations establishing the DNC List. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 36. Under 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2), “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation to . . . [a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the Federal Government [i.e., the DNC List]. Such do-not-call registrations must be honored indefinitely, or until the registration is cancelled by the consumer or the telephone number is removed by the database administrator.” 37. Upon information and belief, and based on the approximately 100 phone calls CPP placed to Plaintiff after he instructed CPP that his number was registered with the DNC List, as well as the numerous consumer complaints regarding similar unwanted telemarketing calls received from CPP, CPP does not maintain the proper standards – including written procedures, personnel training, recording of numbers not to be contacted, and access to the DNC List – required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2)(i). 38. CPP did not obtain the Plaintiff’s or Class members’ prior express invitation or permission, evidenced by a signed written agreement, to place these telemarketing calls to Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ residential telephones. 40. CPP and/or its agents placed unauthorized telephone calls to the telephone number of Plaintiff and the other Class members en masse without their prior express, written consent. 41. CPP placed the calls, or had them placed on its behalf, using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers. 42. CPP utilized equipment that placed the calls to Plaintiff and other Class members simultaneously and without human intervention. 43. By placing the unauthorized calls to Plaintiff and the Class, CPP has violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). As a result of CPP’s unlawful conduct, the Class members suffered actual damages in the form of monies paid to their telephone carriers and under section 227(c)(5) are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. Under that same subsection, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to injunctive relief enjoining CPP from placing such unauthorized, illegal calls in the future. 44. Should the Court determine that CPP’s conduct was willful or knowing, the Court may, pursuant to section 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other Class members. VI. Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of the Class)

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24. Plaintiffs are all former employees of Defendants at Shipley’s warehouse and corporate office in Houston, Harris County, Texas. Both facilities are located on the same site on or about 5200 North Main Street in Houston. 25. The Shipley’s business involves mixing and preparing products such as yeast mix, fillings and other food goods to be delivered to retail stores and franchises across Texas and other states within the United States. At the North Main Street location in Houston, Shipley’s employs non-exempt employees who work in the warehouse, who perform clerical/secretarial functions in the corporate office, and who clean the offices, company-owned houses located adjacent to the warehouse and corporate office and personal residences of Defendant Lawrence Shipley or his family members and of other Shipley’s employees. 26. Plaintiff Esmeralda Sanchez was employed in a non-exempt secretarial/clerical position. She answered the phone, took phone orders from retail stores and franchisees, translated from Spanish to English and vice versa, distributed mail, sent store orders to the warehouse, performed data entry, made copies and ran general errands. She was supervised by Defendant Lawrence Shipley. She was paid forty hours each workweek regardless of the number of hours she worked and was not paid any overtime. 27. Plaintiff Martha Garcia was a non-exempt cleaning/housekeeping employee. She cleaned the office and cleaned other properties at the request of Shipley, including personal residences of family members, the company-owned houses located adjacent to the warehouse and corporate office, and Shipley’s employees’ residences. She was supervised by Defendant Lawrence Shipley. She was paid forty hours each workweek regardless of the number of hours 7 she worked each workweek and was not paid any overtime. Her hourly rate was $11.00 at the time of her termination. 28. Plaintiff Elizabeth Peralta was a non-exempt cleaning/housekeeping employee. She cleaned the office and cleaned other properties at the request of Shipley, including personal residences of family members, the company-owned houses located adjacent to the warehouse and corporate office, and Shipley’s employees’ residences. She was supervised by Defendant Lawrence Shipley. She was paid forty hours each workweek regardless of the number of hours she worked each workweek and was not paid for any overtime. Her hourly rate was $9.00 at the time of her termination. 29. Plaintiff Juan Sanchez was a non-exempt warehouse employee. He primarily worked at the Shipley’s warehouse for 40-60 hour workweeks with minimal breaks. He was paid forty hours each workweek regardless of the number of hours he worked each workweek and was occasionally paid overtime. 30. All Plaintiffs regularly worked over forty hours per week. Shipley’s knew or reasonably should have known that Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty hours per workweek. 31. At the direction of Defendant Lawrence Shipley, Plaintiff Peralta regularly drove her personal vehicle long distances from the Shipley’s corporate office and warehouse on N. Main Street to other locations in the Houston area to clean residences or other properties owned by Defendants. The expenses incurred by Plaintiff Peralta in connection with her driving, plus the number of hours she worked in excess of a 40-hour workweek, reduced her minimum wage below the applicable required minimum wage rate. Shipley’s never reimbursed Plaintiff Peralta for any mileage or expenses incurred with these trips made at Defendant Lawrence Shipley’s request and solely for Defendants’ benefit. 8 32. Shipley’s did not pay Plaintiffs or other warehouse and secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees overtime “at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which [they were] employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 33. Instead, Shipley’s paid Plaintiffs and other warehouse and secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees only forty hours for each workweek regardless of how many hours they worked. They received little or no compensation for overtime hours. 34. Plaintiffs Peralta and Garcia were paid an hourly rate of $9.00 per hour. When they worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, this wage would produce an hourly rate below the applicable required minimum wage. 35. Peralta’s repeated usage of her personal vehicle for trips during the work day at Defendant Lawrence Shipley’s request and solely for Defendants’ benefit would produce an hourly rate below the applicable minimum wage. 36. Shipley’s kept no timekeeping records for Plaintiffs and other warehouse and secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees. On information and belief, Shipley’s had a timekeeping clock for a brief period of time in the warehouse, but it quit working and no other method of timekeeping was adopted. Shipley’s kept no timekeeping records for the secretarial/clerical and housekeeping/cleaning personnel. 37. Shipley’s knew or showed a reckless disregard for whether its pay practices violated the FLSA. 38. Shipley’s is liable to Plaintiffs and other non-exempt warehouse and office personnel for unpaid minimum wages and overtime wages, liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 9 39. All current and former non-exempt warehouse and secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees of Shipley’s at the warehouse and corporate office location are similarly situated to Plaintiffs because they (1) work (or worked) at Shipley’s warehouse and corporate office with a fairly small number of employees (less than 100) whose work hours and pay rates were singularly controlled by Defendant Lawrence Shipley; (2) Defendant Lawrence Shipley decided not to pay Plaintiffs and similarly situated warehouse, secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees for overtime hours; (3) Defendants did not keep timekeeping records for Plaintiffs and similarly situated warehouse, secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees; (4) Plaintiffs and similarly situated warehouse, secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees were not paid the applicable minimum wage, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 206(a); (5) Plaintiffs and similarly situated warehouse, secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees were not paid for overtime hours regularly worked in excess of forty hours per workweek, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); and (6) are entitled to recover their unpaid minimum wages and overtime wages, liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs from Shipley’s pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 40. Under the FLSA, employers such as Defendants are generally required to pay non-exempt employees like Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth Peralta time and one-half their regular rate for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). As the Fifth Circuit has stated: “The Fair Labor Standards Act generally requires that employees be paid an overtime premium of ‘time-and-one-half’ for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a week.” Samson v. Apollo Resources, Inc., 242 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)). 10 41. There are some exceptions to this rule (for example, for “computer professionals” as defined by the FLSA and its interpretive regulations), but none of them applied to Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth Peralta, or any of their similarly situated current and former non-exempt warehouse and secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees of Shipley’s at the warehouse and corporate office location. Thus, for every hour Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth Peralta worked over 40 in a workweek, Defendants were required by the FLSA to pay them time-and-one-half their regular rate. Defendants, however, failed to do that. Thus, Defendants violated the FLSA rights of Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth Peralta. 42. Defendants owe Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth Peralta an equal amount in liquidated damages. This is so because, under the FLSA, an employer who violates the overtime provisions is liable not only for the unpaid overtime compensation, but also for “an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). While an employer may try to avoid liquidated damages by showing its FLSA violations was in “good faith,” that is a standard that is extremely difficult to satisfy. As the Fifth Circuit has put it, “[a]n employer ‘faces a “substantial burden” of demonstrating good faith and a reasonable belief that its actions did not violate the FLSA.’” Singer v. City of Waco, 324 F.3d 813, 823 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bernard v. IBP, Inc. of Neb., 154 F.3d 259, 267 (5th Cir. 1998)). 43. Defendants have no evidence that its violation of the FLSA’s basic “time-and- one-half” overtime rule was in “good faith.” The fact is that the rule Defendants violated is so basic that it could not have been in “good faith,” but must instead have been willful. This is especially obvious given that Shipley’s has previously been sued for FLSA violations. See 11 Alvarado et al. v. Shipley Donut Flour & Supply Co., Inc., 4:06-CV-02113 (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2006); Chavez-Cipriano et al. v. Shipley Donut Flour & Supply Co., Inc., 4:07-CV-02314 (S.D. Tex. July 15, 2007). 44. All conditions precedent, if any, to this suit, have been fulfilled. 45. At all material times, Plaintiffs Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth Peralta were employees under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). 46. At all material times, warehouse and secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees of Shipley’s at the warehouse and corporate office location similarly situated to Plaintiffs Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth Peralta were and are employees under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). 47. At all material times, Defendants were and are a covered employer under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 48. At all material times, Defendant Lawrence Shipley was and is a covered employer under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 49. At all material times, Plaintiffs Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth Peralta and those current and former non-exempt warehouse and secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees of Shipley’s at the warehouse and corporate office location similarly situated to Plaintiffs routinely worked in excess of 40 hours per seven-day workweek, and Defendants knew that. 50. At all material times, Plaintiffs Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth Peralta and those current and former non-exempt warehouse and secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees of Shipley’s at the warehouse and 12 corporate office location similarly situated to Plaintiffs were and are entitled to overtime compensation for hours worked over 40 in a seven-day workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 51. At all material times, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth Peralta and those current and former non-exempt warehouse and secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees of Shipley’s at the warehouse and corporate office location similarly situated to Plaintiffs overtime compensation of one and one-half their regular hour rate of pay for hours worked over 40 in a seven-day workweek. Rather, at all material times, Defendants only paid Plaintiffs Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth Peralta and those similarly situated to Plaintiffs regular straight-time for a 40-hour workweek and paid them nothing for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 52. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). See Singer v. City of Waco, 324 F.3d 813, 821-22 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding a jury finding of willfulness). 53. Defendants did not and have not made a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 260. 54. Plaintiffs adopt by reference all of the facts set forth above. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c). 55. Defendants knowingly, willfully and intentionally failed to compensate Plaintiffs the applicable minimum hourly wage in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 56. Further, Defendants willfully required Plaintiff Peralta to incur expenses while driving her personal vehicle at the request of Defendants and solely for their benefit. The 13 expenses she incurred further reduced her wages below the minimum wage in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) and applicable regulations, specifically 29 C.F.R. § 531.35. 57. Because of Defendants’ willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from Defendants, jointly and severally, their unpaid minimum wages, and an amount equal in the form of liquidated damages, as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of action, including pre-judgment interest, pursuant to the FLSA, all in an amount to be determined at trial. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 58. Plaintiffs adopt by reference all of the facts set forth above. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c). 59. The FLSA requires employees to keep accurate records of hours worked by non- exempt employees. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c); 29 C.F.R. pt. 516. 60. In addition to the pay violations of the FLSA described above, Defendants also failed to keep proper time records, as required by the FLSA. 61. Plaintiffs adopt by reference all of the facts set forth above. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c). 62. On information and belief, other current and former employees of Shipley’s have been victimized by the violations of the FLSA committed by Defendants, as identified above. 63. Where, as here, “the employers’ actions or policies were effectuated on a companywide basis, notice may be sent to all similarly situated persons on a companywide basis.” Ryan v. Staff Care, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 820, 825 (N.D. Tex. 2007). 14 64. All current and former non-exempt warehouse and secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees of Shipley’s at the warehouse and corporate office location are similarly situated to Plaintiffs because they (1) work (or worked) at Shipley’s warehouse and corporate office with a fairly small number of employees (less than 100) whose work hours and pay rates were singularly controlled by Defendant Lawrence Shipley; (2) Defendant Lawrence Shipley decided not to pay Plaintiffs and similarly situated warehouse, office secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees for overtime hours; (3) Defendants did not keep timekeeping records for Plaintiffs and similarly situated warehouse, office secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees; (4) Plaintiffs and similarly situated warehouse, office secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees were not paid the applicable minimum wage, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 206(a); (5) Plaintiffs and similarly situated warehouse, office secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees were not paid for overtime hours regularly worked in excess of forty hours per workweek, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); and (6) are entitled to recover their unpaid minimum wages and overtime wages, liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs from Shipley’s pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). This class of similarly situated employees does not include warehouse foremen or supervisors who were/are properly treated as exempt under the FLSA. 65. Defendants’ policy or practice of failing to pay the legally-required minimum wage and overtime compensation is a generally applicable policy or practice and does not depend on the personal circumstances of the putative class members. Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. On information and belief, Plaintiffs’ experiences are typical of the experiences of the putative class members, and, thus, collective action treatment is appropriate. 15 66. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Esmeralda Sanchez, Juan Sanchez, Martha Garcia and Elizabeth Peralta seek to represent a class under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of: “all current and former non-exempt warehouse, secretarial/clerical and cleaning/housekeeping employees of Shipley’s at the warehouse and corporate office location at 5200 North Main Street in Houston who were employed by Shipley’s during the three-year period preceding the filing of this complaint.”

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25. MonaVie is a Utah limited liability company headquartered in South Jordan, Utah. MonaVie manufactures and distributes fruit juice beverages. MonaVie’s business model is to distribute its product through multi-level marketing, resembling a pyramid scheme of distributors. MonaVie was founded by D. Larsen in January 2005. 27. MonaVie sells its products through a multi-level marketing distribution system. MonaVie ranks its distributors and provides incentives as a distributor progresses through the ranks in the following ascending order of prestige: Star, Bronze, Silver, Gold, Ruby, Emerald, Diamond, Blue Diamond, Hawaiian Blue Diamond, Black Diamond, Royal Black Diamond, Presidential Black Diamond, Imperial Black Diamond, and Crown Black Diamond. MonaVie promotes that its juices contain antioxidants from açai or other fruits in its blends. 28. MonaVie’s 2007 Statement of Policies and Procedures (“Policies and Procedures”) provide for income disclosure to distributors and prospective distributors, through a developed Income Disclosure Statement (“IDS”). According to MonaVie’s policies and procedures, the IDS was “designed to convey truthful, timely, and comprehensive information regarding the income that MonaVie distributors earn.” Further, the MonaVie policies and procedures required an IDS be provided to all prospective distributors, as well as any time distributor compensation was discussed. The IDS also was required to be produced anytime an income claim or earnings representation was made, including statements that refer to average earnings, ranges of earnings, for example “our average Black Diamond distributor makes XXX per month.” 30. MonaVie’s Policies and Procedures also allowed distributors to utilize Internet web pages to promote their business, however, all distributors were required to do so through MonaVie’s official website or through replicating already approved MonaVie websites. Distributors who reached the rank of Black Diamond or higher were allowed to develop their own websites, but could only use text found on MonaVie’s official website and were prohibited from supplementing their websites with text from any source other than MonaVie. 31. In 2007, the FDA issued a Warning Letter to MonaVie distributor Kevin Vokes for misleading promotional materials claiming that MonaVie was an effective treatment for inflammation, high cholesterol, and muscle/joint pain. Amidst serious criticism, MonaVie issued a statement that many of its distributors may have unwittingly violated its internal advertising practices. 32. According to MonaVie's 2007 Income Disclosure Statement, a federally required printout of their distributor earnings, most of the sales were generated by selling MonaVie juices to its own salesforce. More than 90 percent were considered "wholesale customers," whose earnings are mostly discounts on sales to themselves. 33. In July 2008, MonaVie, and several of its top level distributors were sued in this Court by Quixtar, Inc.(“Quixtar”) and Amway, Corp. (“Amway”) for unfair competition and for raiding the sales forces of Quixtar and Amway through false and misleading statements regarding MonaVie’s products and the health benefits associated with MonaVie’s products. 36. According to the Quixtar and Amway Complaint, repeatedly in the Harts’ sales meetings, potential MonaVie customers and distributors were told that MonaVie products reduce blood pressure and relieve the symptoms of fibromyalgia despite the fact that MonaVie’s products were not approved by the FDA for medicinal use. 38. The 2008 Quixtar and Amway Complaint also alleged that Dr. Niles’ outrageous misrepresentations of the healing effects of MonaVie products were found on Club MonaVie Radio via the internet at www.blogtalkradio.com/live2a120/2007/12/09/MONAVIE- 65. The Plaintiff Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the exact number and identities of Class Members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, the ESOP’s form 5500 filing for 2013 indicates that there are 458 participants in the ESOP. 67. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Plaintiff Class. For example, Plaintiff, like other ESOP participants in the Plaintiff Class, suffered a diminution in the value of his ESOP account because the ESOP plunged in value after purchasing MonaVie stock for more than fair market value, and he continues to suffer such losses in the present because Defendants have failed to correct the overpayment by the ESOP. 68. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions, ERISA, and employee benefits litigation. 70. In addition, Class certification of Plaintiff’s Claims for Relief for violations of ERISA is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. The members of the Class are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy Defendants’ violations of ERISA. 71. The names and addresses of the Plaintiff Class are available from the ESOP. Notice will be provided to all members of the Plaintiff Class to the extent required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 72. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein. 74. ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109, provides, inter alia, that any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan and who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed on fiduciaries by Title I of ERISA shall be personally liable to make good to the plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and additionally is subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of the fiduciary. 75. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), permits a plan participant to bring an action for relief under ERISA § 409. 76. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), permits a plan participant to bring an action to obtain appropriate equitable relief to enforce the provisions of Title I of ERISA or to enforce the terms of a plan. 78. ERISA § 410 prohibits agreements that purport to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any fiduciary duty. 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a). Specifically, § 410 states that “any provision in an agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation, or duty under this part shall be void as against public policy.” 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a). 79. Any indemnification agreement between Bankers Trust, on the one hand, and MonaVie or the ESOP, on the other hand, violates ERISA § 410 and is therefore null and void. Defendant’s acts and omissions caused millions of dollars of losses to the Plan and its participants in an amount to be proven more specifically at trial. 80. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein. 81. ERISA § 406(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a), requires that a plan fiduciary “shall not cause the plan to engage in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect sale or exchange, or leasing of any property between the plan and a party in interest,” or a “transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a party in interest, of any assets of the plan.” 83. ERISA § 408(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(e) provides a conditional exemption from the prohibited transaction rules for sale of employer securities to or from a plan if a sale is made for adequate consideration. ERISA § 3(18)(B) defines adequate consideration as “the fair market value of the asset as determined in good faith by the trustee or named fiduciary.” ERISA’s legislative history and existing case law make clear that ERISA § 3(18)(B) requires that the price paid must reflect the fair market value of the asset, and the fiduciary must conduct a prudent investigation to determine the fair market value of the asset. 84. Defendant Bankers Trust engaged in a prohibited transaction in violation of ERISA §§ 406(a)-(b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)-(b), in the 2010 ESOP Transaction, and the prohibited transaction did not meet the conditional exemption requirements of ERISA § 408(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(e). Defendant Bankers Trust failed to ensure that the ESOP paid no more than fair market value for the MonaVie stock purchased by the ESOP from the Selling Shareholders, all parties in interest to the ESOP, in 2010. Specifically, the ESOP paid more than fair market value for shares sold by the Selling Shareholders. 86. Specifically, the ESOP paid more than fair market value for shares sold by the Selling Shareholders, and Bankers Trust failed to conduct an independent and prudent investigation into the fair market price before entering into the stock purchase agreement with MonaVie and the Selling Shareholders. 87. ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109, provides, inter alia, that any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan and who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed on fiduciaries by Title I of ERISA shall be personally liable to make good to the plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and additionally is subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of the fiduciary. 88. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), permits a plan participant to bring a suit for relief under ERISA § 409. 89. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), permits a plan participant to bring a suit to obtain appropriate equitable relief to enforce the provisions of Title I of ERISA or to enforce the terms of a plan. 90. Defendant Bankers Trust has caused millions of dollars of losses to the ESOP by the prohibited transactions in an amount to be proven more specifically at trial. 91. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein. 93. The Individual Defendants knew of and participated in Defendant Bankers Trust’s violations of ERISA, which are detailed in Plaintiff’s First and Second Claims for Relief. 94. Specifically, each of the Individual Defendants knew before and at the time of the 2010 ESOP Transaction that MonaVie was in dire financial condition, as detailed above. Each of the Individual Defendants knew that: (1) sales of MonaVie products were declining; (2) MonaVie had been widely criticized in various media outlets; (3) several of its top distributors had multi-million dollar judgments entered against them; (4) several of its top distributors and representatives had engaged in routine and repeated false and misleading health claims about MonaVie products; (5) MonaVie was mired in several costly and bitter lawsuits; and (6) virtually all of its sales were to wholesale distributors who left the distribution chain rapidly, rather than to retail consumers. 95. Despite their knowledge that the ESOP was essentially insolvent and worthless on day one, the Individual Defendants hired Bankers Trust to represent the ESOP as Trustee and knowingly participated in Bankers Trust’s violations of ERISA. 96. The Selling Shareholders reaped millions from the ESOP Transaction. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA §§ 502(a)(2) and (a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2) and (a)(3) Engaging in Prohibited Transactions Forbidden by ERISA §§ 406(a)-(b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)-(b) Knowing Participation in Violations of ERISA

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(BREACH OF CONTRACT) (BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING) (VIOLATION OF RESPA) 13. Scotiabank issues and services residential home mortgages on St. Croix, St. Thomas and St. John. 14. Scotiabank and its borrowers enter into a standard mortgage agreement prepared by Scotiabank. All of the borrowers’ agreements contain substantially the same terms and conditions. A copy of Scotiabank’s standard mortgage agreement is attached asExhibit 1. 15. Scotiabank’s mortgage agreement requires the borrower to maintain hazard insurance on the property securing the mortgage. 16. Under Scotiabank’s standard mortgage agreement, if a borrower’s insurance policy lapses, Scotiabank has the right to “force-place” new coverage on the property and then charge the borrower for the cost of coverage. Scotiabank does not actually purchase forced-placed insurance for the borrower. Rather, Scotiabank has a master policy already in place and adds the borrower’s property to the master policy. Scotiabank is the named insured under the master policy. 18. Scotiabank’s standard mortgage agreement requires the borrower to give Scotiabank notice when his or her property is damaged. The agreement provides that any insurance proceeds will be used to repair the property if the repairs do not compromise Scotiabank’s interest in the property. If the proceeds are not used to make repairs, they must be used to reduce the borrower’s loan balance. 19. After Hurricanes Irma and Maria, Scotiabank’s borrowers with force- placed insurance asked Scotiabank to submit claims to its insurer to pay for the repairs to their homes. 20. Scotiabank has refused to file the force-placed claims. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Scotiabank has implemented a company-policy and practice of refusing to file force-placed claims. 32. Plaintiffs bring this action against Scotiabank pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and the following class: All persons with residential home mortgage loans owned or serviced by Scotiabank on property in the U.S. Virgin Islands who were charged by Scotiabank for force-placed hazard insurance in effect in September 2017 and who submitted to Scotiabank claims for hurricane damage to their home caused by Hurricanes Irma or Maria. 33. Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify or amend the definitions of the proposed classes before the court determines whether certification is appropriate. 34. Scotiabank subjected Plaintiffs and the Class members to the same unfair, unlawful, and deceptive practices and harmed them in the same manner. A. Numerosity 36. There are questions of law and fact that are common to Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ claims. These common questions predominate over any questions that go particularly to any individual member of the Class. Among such common questions of law and fact are the following: a. Whether Scotiabank has a reinsurance or other financial obligation with respect to the payment of force-placed claims; b. Whether Scotiabank’s policy and practice of refusing to file claims on behalf of borrowers charged for force-placed insurance violates its standard mortgage agreement. c. Whether Scotiabank violated RESPA by charging plaintiffs and Class members for force-placed insurance that does not provide coverage for their properties. d. Whether Scotiabank breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to file Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’ claims for damage to their homes. C. Typicality 38. Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Classes they seek to represent and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of those classes. Plaintiffs are committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action and have retained competent counsel, experienced in litigation of this nature, to represent them. There is no hostility between Plaintiffs and the unnamed Class members. Plaintiffs anticipate no difficulty in the management of this litigation as a class action. 39. To prosecute this case, Plaintiffs have chosen the undersigned law firm, which is experienced in class action litigation and has the financial and legal resources to litigate this case. E. Requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) 40. The questions of law or fact common to Plaintiffs’ and each Class member’s claims predominate over any questions of law or fact affecting only individual members of the class. All claims by Plaintiffs and the unnamed Class members are based on Scotiabank’s blanket policy and practice of refusing to process or adjust force- placed claims and on Scotiabank’s unnecessary charges for a master insurance policy that allegedly does not even cover its own interest in its collateral. 41. Common issues predominate where, as here, liability can be determined on a class-wide basis, even when there will be some individualized damage determinations. F. Superiority 44. Prosecuting separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class. 45. Defendants have acted or failed to act in a manner generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 46. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1-44, above. 47. At all relevant times, Scotiabank acted as the servicer of plaintiffs’ and the Class members’ loans. 48. RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2605(m), provides that all charges related to force- placed insurance imposed on the borrower by or through the servicer shall be bona fide and reasonable. 50. As a result of Scotiabank’s violation of RESPA, plaintiffs and the Class have suffered actual and statutory damages in the $2,000 for each class member. 51. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1-50, above. 52. Scotiabank has an obligation under the mortgage agreement to file claims made by borrowers who have been charged with force-placed insurance. The agreement provides that the borrower must notify Scotiabank of property damage and that Scotiabank will use the proceeds of the insurance to repair the property or to reduce borrower’s loan balance. 53. Scotiabank has breached the mortgage agreement by implementing a policy of refusing to file plaintiffs’ claims with its force-placed insurer. 54. As a direct result of Scotiabank’s breach, plaintiffs and the Class have suffered damages, including the cost of repairs to their homes. 60. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1-59, above. 61. Scotiabank’s mortgage agreement includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Scotiabank is required to perform its contractual obligations in good faith to refrain from interfering with plaintiffs’ rights under the agreement. 63. As a result of Scotiabank’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, plaintiffs and the Class have suffered damages, including the costs of repairs to their homes. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all Class members similarly situated, seek a judgment in their favor awarding actual damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs. DATED: February 14, 2018 By: Respectfully submitted,

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a ticket retailer that markets and sells tickets to entertainment venues and events and owns and operates www.ticketliquidator.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 25. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. Such issues were predominant in the section where Plaintiff was attempting, but was unsuccessful, in making a purchase. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 70. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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17. At all times relevant, Plaintiffs are individuals residing within City of Redwood City, County of San Mateo, in the State of California. 18. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that at all times relevant, Defendant conducted business in the State of California. 19. Plaintiff are informed and believe, and thereon allege that sometime before July 15, 2015, Plaintiffs allegedly incurred financial obligations to an original creditor, Franklin Credit Management Corporation, that were money, property, or their equivalent, which is due or owing, or alleged to be due or owing, from a natural person to another person and were therefore “debt(s)” as that term is defined by California Civil Code §1788.2(d), and a “consumer debt” as that term is defined by California Civil Code §1788.2(f) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 20. Sometime thereafter, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff allegedly fell behind on the payments allegedly owed on the alleged debt. Plaintiff currently takes no position as to the validity of the alleged debt. 21. Subsequently, the alleged debt was allegedly assigned, placed, or otherwise transferred, to Defendant for collection activity. 22. On or about July 16, 2015, Defendant sent Plaintiff an initial written communication in regards to the alleged debt in an attempt to collected the alleged past due amount (the “Letter”). This Letter is considered a “communication” as 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) defines that term, and “debt collection” as that phrase is defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(b). 51. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 52. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute numerous and multiple violations of the FDCPA. 53. As a result of each and every violation of the FDCPA, Plaintiffs are entitled to any actual damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1); statutory damages for a knowing or willful violation in the amount up to $1,000.00 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A); and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) from Defendant. 54. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 55. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute numerous and multiple violations of the RFDCPA. VIOLATION OF THE ROSENTHAL FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788-1788.32 (RFDCPA) [AGAINST DEFENDANT] VIOLATION OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692(p) (FDCPA) [AGAINST DEFENDANT]

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a stock media company that owns and operates www.pond5.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in May of 2021, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.pond5.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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62. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 63. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 64. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non- emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 65. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 69. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 70. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 71. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. 72. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. 73. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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1. The amount of the debt; 10. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 11. The Class consists of: a. all individual consumers in the State of New Jersey; b. to whom Defendant sent an in initial collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. in which Defendant states “see list below” next to “creditor”; d. without providing a clearly identifiable list with the original creditor’s name; e. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. 12. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 14. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the form attached as Exhibit A violates 15 U.S.C. § l692e et seq. 15. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 17. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 19. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 2. The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 20. Some time prior to March 4, 2021, upon information and belief, an obligation was incurred by Plaintiff for alleged medical treatments received by Plaintiff’s minor son. The subject debt was allegedly incurred by Plaintiff’s son solely for personal, household or family purposes. 21. Upon information and belief, a creditor contracted with Defendant to act as its agent in collecting the subject debt from the Plaintiff. 22. The Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(3). 23. The subject obligation is consumer-related, and therefore a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 24. Defendant was contracted by a creditor for the purpose of debt collection. Therefore, Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(6). Violation – March 4, 2021 Collection Letter 25. On or about March 4, 2021, the Defendant sent the Plaintiff an initial collection letter (“Letter”) regarding the alleged debt. (See Letter at Exhibit A.) 26. Toward the top portion, the Letter states: “Creditor; See List Below” 28. In addition, toward the bottom of the Letter, Defendant includes a caption with the following text, in relevant part: 33. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 34. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 35. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 37. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment in that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 38. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 39. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 4. A statement that the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and 40. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g: Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing – 41. Defendant violated this section by failing to meaningfully identify the name of the creditor, as required by §1692g(2) in an initial collection letter. 42. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment in that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 5. A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq.

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14. Robinhood has grown substantially since its start in 2013. The firm raised $323 million in funding in 2019 at a $7.6 billion valuation. With its marketing geared primarily towards younger investors, Robinhood now claims over 10 million users of its trading app. 34. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and the following proposed class, within which the term “Outages” is defined to include Robinhood’s total outages on March 2, 2020, March 3, 2020, and March 9, 2020: All Robinhood customers within the United States who were not able to execute trades on securities or change limit orders during the Outages and incurred financial losses. 35. Excluded from the proposed class are Defendants; any affiliate, parent, or subsidiary of Defendants; any entity in which any Defendant has a controlling interest; any officer, director, or employee of Defendants; any successor or assign of any Defendant; anyone employed by counsel in this action; any judge to whom this case is assigned and his or her spouse; and members of the judge’s staff. 36. Numerosity. Robinhood has millions of customers. Although the precise number of proposed class members is presently unknown to Plaintiff, there are likely thousands of proposed class members based on publicly available news reports. Proposed class members are thus too numerous to practically join in a single action. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by reference to Robinhood’s records, or by other alternative means. 42. Plaintiff incorporates the above allegations by reference. 43. As set forth above, Plaintiff and proposed class members entered into binding and enforceable contracts with Robinhood. 48. Plaintiff incorporates the above allegations by reference. 49. As set forth above, Plaintiff and proposed class members entered into binding and enforceable contracts with Robinhood. 54. Plaintiff incorporates the above allegations by reference. 55. As a licensed provider of financial services, Robinhood at all times relevant herein was a fiduciary to Plaintiff and proposed class members and owed them the highest good faith and integrity in performing its financial services on their behalf. 58. Plaintiff incorporates the above allegations by reference. 59. Robinhood owed Plaintiff and proposed class members a duty to exercise reasonable care in executing trades and other requested customer actions in a full and prompt manner. 63. Plaintiff incorporates the above allegations by reference. 64. Robinhood owed Plaintiff and proposed class members a duty to exercise reasonable care in executing trades and other requested customer actions in a complete and timely manner. 69. Plaintiff incorporates the above allegations by reference. 70. Robinhood is a “person” within the meaning of Civil Code §§ 1761 and 1770, and it has provided “goods” or “services” within the meaning of Civil Code §§ 1761 and 1770. 71. Plaintiff and members of the proposed class are “consumers” within the meaning of Civil Code §§ 1761 and 1770, and have engaged in a “transaction” within the meaning of Civil Code §§ 1761 and 1770. 85. Plaintiff incorporates the above allegations by reference. 86. Robinhood has obtained unjust benefits from Plaintiff and proposed class members resulting in inequity. Breach of Contract Breach of Fiduciary Duty Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Gross Negligence Negligence Unjust Enrichment Violation of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, et seq. Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.

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23. Defendant operates the 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 47. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 49. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 50. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 52. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 55. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 56. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 58. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 59. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 62. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 63. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 64. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 65. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 67. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 68. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 70. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 73. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 74. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 75. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 76. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 78. Defendant’s New York State physical locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is by and integrated with these establishments. 79. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 80. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 81. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 83. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 84. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 85. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 86. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 88. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 89. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 90. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 91. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 93. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 94. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 95. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 96. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 100. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 101. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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(Breach of Fiduciary Duty) (Negligence) 40. The proposed Class is defined as: All former and current Customers of Robinhood in the United States and its territories who were affected by Robinhood’s failure to prevent customers from using its interface for stocks which were subject to a T1 Halt at any time (a) within 4 years preceding the filing of this lawsuit (the “Class Period”). 41. Excluded from the Class are Robinhood, its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, any entity in which Robinhood has a controlling interest, all Customers who make a timely selection to be excluded, governmental entities, all judges assigned to hear any aspect of this litigation, as well as their immediate family members, and any of the foregoing’s legal heirs and assigns. 42. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed Class before the Court determines whether certification is appropriate. 43. Plaintiff does not currently know the exact number of Class Members or their identities because such information is in the exclusive control of Robinhood and can only be ascertained by review of its records. However, Plaintiff believes that there are thousands of Class Members, and that the Class Members are sufficiently numerous and geographically dispersed so that joinder of all Class Members is impracticable. Plaintiff further believes that Robinhood failed to prevent customers from using its interface for stocks subject to T1 holds during the Class Period. Accordingly, it is believed that the amount in controversy easily exceeds $5,000,000.00. 45. The factual basis of Robinhood’s misconduct is common to all Class Members and resulted in injury to all Class Members. 46. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class and those common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members, including whether Robinhood: a. Was negligent by not preventing its customers from using its interface on stocks that were subject to a T1 halt; and b. the appropriate measure of damages sustained by Plaintiff and other Class Members. 47. A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Treatment as a class action will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to adjudicate their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, effectively, and without the duplication of effort and expense, and risk of inconsistent rulings that numerous individual actions would cause. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by Class Members who otherwise might not be able to afford to litigate their claims individually. This class action presents no difficulties in management that would preclude maintenance as a class action. 48. This forum is particularly desirable for the prosecution of this class action because Robinhood maintains its regional headquarters in Lake Mary, Florida, and the lead Plaintiff is also domiciled in Florida. As a result of the foregoing, litigating on a class action basis in this forum will likely decrease the cost of discovery and prosecution, generally. 50. Finally, the Class is readily definable and is one for which records likely exist in the files of Robinhood. 51. Plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 50, above, as if fully set forth herein. 52. Plaintiff brings this negligence claim on her own behalf, and on behalf of all Class Members who were injured by Robinhood’s failure to prevent customers from using its interface for stocks that are undergoing a trade halt within four (4) years preceding the filing of this lawsuit. 53. As a securities broker-dealer, Robinhood owed its targeted customers a duty of care in accordance with the standard of care used by similar professionals in the community under similar circumstances using their deliberately engineered interface to facilitate specific transactions and receipt of information for the “newcomer” to stocks. That includes, but is not limited to, a duty to prevent customers from using its interface for stocks that are subject to a T1 Halt. 54. Robinhood breached its duty, and the standard of care expected from similar professionals in the community under similar circumstances by allowing customers to use its interface for stocks that were subject to a T1 Halt. 56. As a result of Robinhood’s failure to prevent its targeted customers from using its interface for stocks that were subject to a T1 Halt, the Plaintiff (and all Class Members) used Robinhood’s interface on stocks that were subject to high volatility. 57. Once the T1 Halt was lifted, the result was a loss of money to the Plaintiff (and all Class Members). 58. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff (and all Class Members) have suffered damages. 59. Plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 50, above, as if fully set forth herein. 60. Robinhood owed a duty to Plaintiff and the Class Members as its fiduciary to inform them of information surrounding certain stocks, as it advertised to, and provided this service for, its customers. This is especially true since it advertised to the novice stockholder. This duty included informing customers of T1 Halts. 61. Robinhood breached this duty by not informing customers of the T1 Halts and by not preventing them from using its interface for certain stocks not available because of the T1 Halts. 62. Its breaches of fiduciary duties were committed directly against and directly damaged Plaintiff and the Class Members, and they have suffered actual damages. CASE NO.: SHTERNA PINCHASOV, on her own behalf, and on behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiff Shterna Pinchasov Plaintiff Case # Judge vs. Robinhood Financial, LLC Defendant II.

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(Overtime Compensation Due Under 29 U.S.C. § 207) 26. Plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 25 above and incorporates them here by reference. 28. Specifically, Defendants failed to properly compensate Plaintiff and similarly situated current and former employees for all overtime hours worked through their custom, policy, and/or practice of failing to compensate non-exempt employees at the overtime rate – i.e., a rate of pay equal to one and one-half times their regular rate – for all hours worked over 40 within each workweek in violation of the FLSA. 29. Additionally, Defendants failed to properly compensate Plaintiff and similarly situated current and former employees for all overtime hours worked through their custom, policy, and/or practice of routinely requiring non-exempt employees to perform compensable work during meal breaks for which time was automatically deducted. 30. Defendants’ actions in failing to compensate Plaintiff and persons similarly situated in accordance with the FLSA were willful, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), and committed with a conscious disregard for the rights of Plaintiff and similarly situated individuals.

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16. Defendant conducts background checks on many of its job applicants as part of a standard screening process. In addition, Defendant also conducts background checks on existing employees from time-to-time during the course of their employment. 17. Defendant does not perform these background checks in-house. Rather, Defendant relies on an outside consumer reporting firm to obtain this information and report it to the Defendant. These reports constitute “consumer reports” for purposes of the FCRA. FCRA Violations Relating to Background Check Class 18. Defendant procured a consumer report information on Plaintiff in violation of the FCRA. 20. Defendant failed to satisfy these disclosure and authorization requirements. 21. Defendant did not have a stand-alone FCRA disclosure or authorization form. The FCRA requires that a disclosure not contain extraneous information. This is commonly referred to as the “stand alone disclosure” requirement. 22. The FCRA also contains several other notice provisions, such as 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(a) (pre-adverse action); §1681b(4)(B)(notice of national security investigation); §1681c(h) (notification of address discrepancy); §1681g (full file disclosure to consumers); §1681k(a)(1) (disclosure regarding use of public record information); §1681h (form and conditions of disclosure; and §1681m(a) (notice of adverse action). 23. The purpose of FCRA notice provisions, including 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i), is to put consumers on notice that a consumer report may be prepared. This gives consumers the opportunity to exercise substantive rights conferred by the FCRA or other statutes, allowing consumers the opportunity to ensure accuracy, confidentiality and fairness. 24. Without clear notice that a consumer report is going to be procured, applicants and employees are deprived of the opportunity to make informed decisions or otherwise assert protected rights. 26. Along similar lines, many states have data privacy laws that restrict the disclosure of the information in their possession. See, e.g. Russom, Mirian B., Robert H. Sloan and Richard Warner, Legal Concepts Meet Technology: A 50 State Survey of Privacy Laws, ACSAC, (December 2011) (available at https://www.acsac.org/2011/workshops/gtip/p- Russom.pdf). 27. Defendant knowingly and recklessly disregarded case law and regulatory guidance and willfully violated 15 U.S.C. §§1681b(b)(2)(A) by procuring consumer report information on consumers without complying with the disclosure and authorization requirements of the statute. Defendant’s violations were willful because Defendant knew it was required to use a stand-alone disclosure form prior to obtaining and using a consumer report on the Putative Class members. 28. Defendant’s conduct is also willful because: a. Defendant is a large and sophisticated employer with access to legal advice through its own attorneys and there is no evidence it determined its own conduct was lawful; b. Defendant knew or had reason to know that its conduct was inconsistent with published FCRA guidance interpreting the FCRA, case law and the plain language of the statute; c. Defendant voluntarily ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless; 30. The FCRA also provides that “in using a consumer report for employment purposes, before taking any adverse action based in whole or in part on the report, the person intending to take such adverse action shall provide to the consumer to whom the report relates . . . a copy of the report[.]” 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A)(i). 31. Defendant typically does not provide consumers with a copy of their consumer reports before taking adverse action against them based on the information in such reports. In the instant case, Plaintiff was terminated from employment on the basis of information contained in Plaintiff’s consumer report that was obtained by Defendant and; however, Plaintiff never received any pre-adverse action notice from Defendant. 32. Defendant’s practice also runs counter to long-standing regulatory guidance from the FTC. Specifically, 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A) requires that all employers who use consumer reports provide a copy of the report to the affected consumer before any adverse action is taken. Employers must comply with this provision even where the information contained in the report (such as a criminal record) would automatically disqualify the individual from employment or lead to an adverse employment action. Indeed, this is precisely the situation where it is important that the consumer be informed of the negative information.1 34. Plaintiff applied for employment with Defendant on or around February 2, 2016 as a traffic control specialist. 35. Plaintiff was terminated on March 13, 2017 purportedly because “something came up on his background check.” 36. Defendant procured a consumer report on Plaintiff. The consumer report contained private, confidential information about Plaintiff. 37. It was unlawful for Defendant to procure a consumer report on Plaintiff without making the disclosures required by the FCRA. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) by procuring consumer reports on Plaintiff and other putative class members for employment purposes, without first making proper disclosures in the format required by the statute. 38. Plaintiff was distracted by the presence of additional information in the purported FCRA Disclosure. Specifically, Defendant unlawfully inserted extraneous provisions into forms purporting to grant Defendant authority to obtain and use consumer report information for employment purposes. The FCRA forbids this practice, since it mandates that all forms granting the authority to access and use consumer report information for employment purposes be “stand- alone forms” that do not include any additional agreements. 39. Plaintiff was confused about his rights due to the presence of the additional language contained in Defendant’s forms. 4 4 . Plaintiff asserts claims under Counts 1 and 2 of this Complaint on behalf of a Putative Background Check Class defined as follows: All Area Wide Protective, Inc. employees and job applicants in the United States who were the subject of a consumer report that was procured by All Area Wide Protective, Inc within five years of the filing of this complaint through the date of final judgment in this action as required by the FCRA. 41. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A) when it took adverse employment action against Plaintiff and other putative class members based on information in their consumer reports without first providing Plaintiff and other affected class members with a copy of their consumer reports, notifying them of their rights under the FCRA, and giving them a reasonable opportunity to respond to the information in the report and engage in discussion with Defendant. 43. Defendant failed to follow these long-established FCRA requirements. 50. This case is maintainable as a class action because prosecution of actions by or against individual members of the Putative Classes would result in inconsistent or varying adjudications and create the risk of incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendant. Further, adjudication of each individual Class member’s claim as separate action would potentially be dispositive of the interest of other individuals not a party to such action, thereby impeding their ability to protect their interests. 51. This case is also maintainable as a class action because Defendant acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Putative Classes, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to the Classes as a whole. 53. Plaintiff intends to send notice to all members of the Putative Classes to the extent required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The names and addresses of the Putative Class members are readily available from Defendant’s records. 54. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs 1-53. 55. In violation of the FCRA, the FCRA Disclosure form Defendant required the Background Check Class to complete as a condition of its employment with Defendant does not satisfy the disclosure requirements of 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) because Defendant failed to provide a stand-alone document as to the consumer report information being obtained and utilized. Plaintiffs’ First Concrete Injury under §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i): Informational Injury 57. Pursuant to §1681b(b)(2), Plaintiff was entitled to receive certain information at a specific time, namely a disclosure that a consumer report may be procured for employment purposes in a document consisting solely of the disclosure. Such a disclosure was required to be provided to Plaintiff before the consumer report was to be procured. By depriving Plaintiff of this information, in the form and at the time he was entitled to receive it, Defendant injured Plaintiff and the putative class members he seeks to represent. Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989); Federal Election Commission v. Atkins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 59. Defendant’s Failure to provide Plaintiff and the Putative Classes with a lawful disclosure created a risk of harm that Plaintiff and members of the Putative Class would be confused and distracted by the extraneous language. Plaintiff’s Second Concrete Injury under §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i): Invasion of Privacy 60. Defendant invaded Plaintiff’s right to privacy. Under the FCRA, “a person may not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless” it complies with the statutory requirements (i.e., disclosure and authorization) set forth in the following subsections: 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2). As one court put it, “[t]he FCRA makes it unlawful to ‘procure’ a report without first providing the proper disclosure and receiving the consumer’s written authorization.” Harris v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. F. Supp. 3d 868, 869 (N.D.Cal.2015). 62. The forgoing violations were willful. At the time Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) Defendant knew they were required to provide a stand-alone form (separate from the employment application) prior to obtaining and then utilizing a consumer report on Plaintiff and the Putative Class. A plethora of authority, including both case law and FTC opinions, existed at the time of Defendant’s violations on this very issue that held waivers cannot be included in the FCRA forms at issue. Defendant’s willful conduct is also reflected by, among other things, the following facts: a. Defendant knew of potential FCRA liability (which is precisely why it tried to avoid it); b. Defendant is a large corporation with access to legal advice through its own general counsel’s office and outside employment counsel, and there is not contemporaneous evidence that it determined that its conduct was lawful; c. Defendant knew or had reason to know that their conduct was inconsistent with published FTC guidance interpreting the FCRA and the plain language of the statute; and d. Defendant voluntarily ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless. 63. Plaintiff and the Background Check Class are entitled to statutory damages of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each and every one of these violations under 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(1)(A), in addition to punitive damages under 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(2). 65. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs 1-53. 66. Defendant violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports relating to Plaintiff and other Background Check Class members without proper authorization. 67. The authorization requirement under 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) follows the disclosure requirement of §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) and presupposes that the authorization is based upon a valid disclosure. “After all, one cannot meaningfully authorize her employer to take an action if she does not grasp what that action entails.” Burghy v. Dayton Racquet Club, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 689, 699 (S.D. Ohio 2010); see also United States v. DeFries, 129 F. 3d 1293, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1997)(“[A]uthorization secured ‘without disclosure of …material information’ is a nullity.”) Plaintiffs’ First Concrete Injury under §1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii): Informational Injury 68. Plaintiff suffered a concrete informational injury because Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with information to which he was entitled to by statute, namely a stand-alone FCRA disclosure form. Thus, through the FCRA, Congress has created a new right—the right to receive the required disclosure as set out in the FCRA—and a new injury—not receiving a stand- alone disclosure. Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12414, *1 (11th Cir. July 6, 2016); Moody v. Ascenda USA Inc., Case No.: 16-cv-60364 (S.D. Fla. October 5, 2015). Thomas v. FTS USA, 2016 WL 3653878, at *8 (E.D. Va. Jun. 30, 2016). 70. Defendant violated the FCRA by procuring consumer reports on Plaintiff and other Background Check Class members without first making proper disclosures in the format required by 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). Namely, these disclosures had to be made: (1) before Defendant actually procured consumer reports, and (2) in a stand-alone document, clearly informing Plaintiff and other Background Check Class members that Defendant might procure a consumer report on each of them for purposes of employment. 71. Plaintiff suffered an informational injury. Under the FCRA, “a person may not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless” it complies with the statutory requirements (i.e., disclosure and authorization) set forth in the following subsections: 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2). As one court put it, “[t]he FCRA makes it unlawful to ‘procure’ a report without first providing the proper disclosure and receiving the consumer’s written authorization.” Harris v. Home Depot U.S.A. Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 868, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 73. Additionally, Defendant invaded Plaintiff’s right to privacy and intruded upon his seclusion. Under the FCRA, “a person may not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless” it complies with the statutory requirements (i.e., disclosure and authorization) set forth in the following subsections: 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2). As one court put it, “[t]he FCRA makes it unlawful to ‘procure’ a report without first providing the proper disclosure and receiving the consumer’s written authorization.” Harris v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 868, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Plaintiff’s consumer report contained a wealth of private information which Defendant had no right to access absent a specific Congressional license to do so. Defendant invaded Plaintiff’s privacy and intruded upon Plaintiff’s seclusion by procuring a consumer report on him and viewing his private and personal information without lawful authorization. Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc., No-16-13031, (11th Cir., April 27, 2017)(Violation of statutory right that has a close relationship to a harm traditionally recognized in English or American law is a concrete harm for purposes of Art. III standing). 75. Plaintiff and the Background Check Class are entitled to statutory damages of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each and every one of these violations under 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(1)(A), in addition to punitive damages under 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(2). 76. Plaintiff and the Background Check Class are further entitled to recover their costs and attorneys’ fees, in accordance with 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(3). 77. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs 1-53. 78. Defendant used a “consumer report,” as defined by the FCRA, to take adverse employment action against Plaintiff and other members of the Adverse Action Class. 80. The foregoing violations were willful. Defendant acted in deliberate or reckless disregard of its obligations and the rights of Plaintiff and other Adverse Action Class members under 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A). Defendant knew or should have known of its legal obligations under the FCRA. These obligations are well established in the plain language of the statute and in the promulgations of the Federal Trade Commission. Defendant obtained or otherwise had available substantial written materials that apprised Defendant of its duties under the FCRA. Any reasonable employer knows of the existence of these FCRA mandates, or can easily discover their substance. 81. Moreover, at the time Defendant failed to follow 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A) a plethora of FTC opinion and case law existed, including case law from this District in a case recently presided over also by Judge Byron in a case styled Miller v. Johnson & Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 1284, (M.D. Fla. 2015) (granting summary judgment as to liability to plaintiff on 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(A) claim). Miller addressed pre- adverse notices in compliance with the FCRA, which, apparently, Defendant intentionally or recklessly ignored. Plaintiff’s First Concrete Injury: Informational Injury 83. Through the FCRA, Congress has created a new right—the right to receive pre- adverse notice as set out in the FCRA—and a new injury—not receiving said notice. The Plaintiff’s “inability to obtain [that] information” is therefore, standing alone, “a sufficient injury in fact to satisfy Article III.” Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). Plaintiff’s Second Concrete Injury: Inability to Learn of the Contents of His Report and Tell His Side of the Story 84. Separately from the informational injury suffered, Plaintiff and Class Members have Article III standing to pursue claims for violations of §1681b(b)(3) because Defendant’s failure to provide timely notice deprived Plaintiff and Class Members of the opportunity to learn of the charges against them and tell Defendant their side of the story before Defendant terminated their employment. Thomas v. FTS USA, LLC, 193 F. Supp. 3d 623, 638 (E.D. Va. 2016). 85. With these two recognized injuries directly traceable to Defendant’s failure to timely provide the notices required by §1681b(b)(3), Plaintiff unquestionably has established Article III standing. 86. Plaintiff and the Adverse Action Class are entitled to statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000 for each and every one of these violations under 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(1)(A), in addition to punitive damages as the Court may allow under 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(2). Background Checks Failure to Obtain Proper Authorization in Violation of FCRA 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) Failure to Make Proper Disclosure in Violation of FCRA 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) Failure to Provide Notice in Violation of FCRA 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)

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(Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 19. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website during the relevant statutory period.” 20. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website, during the relevant statutory period.” 21. There are hundreds of thousands of deaf or hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State. There are approximately 36 million people in the United States who are deaf or hard of hearing. Thus, the persons in the Class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 23. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: a. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; c. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the laws of New York. 24. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are deaf or hard of hearing, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the Class of people who are legally deaf or hard of hearing. 26. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 27. Judicial efficiency will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it will avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with hearing disabilities throughout the United States. 28. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 29. Defendant operates the Website, which provides articles, information and research on health, medicine, and the pharmaceutical sector. It delivers information to tens of millions of people and businesses across the United States. 30. The Website is a service and benefit offered by Defendant throughout the United States, including New York State. The Website is owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant. 32. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the deaf and hard of hearing access to the Website, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Website. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals have been and are being denied equal access to the Website, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. Defendant denies the deaf and hard of hearing access to goods, services, and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely enjoying, interpreting, and understanding the content on the Website. 34. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as reading news, watching videos, etc., for deaf and hard-of-hearing persons. 35. The deaf and hard of hearing access videos through closed captioning, which is a transcription or translation of the audio portion of a video as it occurs, sometimes including description of non-speech elements. Except for a deaf or hard-of-hearing person whose residual hearing is still sufficient to apprehend the audio portion of the video, closed captioning provides the only method by which a deaf or hard-of-hearing person can independently access the video. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, deaf and hard-of-hearing persons are unable to fully access the service provided through the videos on the Website. 37. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing persons, including but not limited to the lack of closed captioning. This barrier is in violation of WCAG 2.1 Guideline 1.2.2, which mandates that video content contain captioning. 38. Due to the Website’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing individuals must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to apprehend the audio portion of the videos offered by Defendant. Some deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals may require an interpreter to apprehend the audio portion of the video or require assistance from their friends or family. By contrast, if the Website was accessible, a deaf or hard-of-hearing person could independently watch the videos and enjoy the services provided by Defendant as hearing individuals can and do. 39. The Website thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Website and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of the Website in New York State. 41. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing the Website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 42. These access barriers have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits, and services of Defendant and the Website. 43. Defendant engages in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard- of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructing and maintaining a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obviously inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failing to take actions to correct access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 44. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria, and methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 45. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 47. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by Title III of ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (“place of exhibition and entertainment,” “place of recreation,” and “service establishments”). 48. Defendant has failed to make its videos accessible to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing by failing to provide closed captioning for videos displayed on the Website. 49. Discrimination under Title III includes the denial of an opportunity for the person who is deaf or hard of hearing to participate in programs or services, or providing a service that is not as effective as what is provided to others. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I-III). 50. Discrimination specifically includes the failure to provide “effective communication” to deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals through auxiliary aids and services, such as captioning, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(III); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(C). 51. Discrimination also includes the failure to maintain accessible features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disability. 64. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 65. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 66. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 67. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 68. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the videos displayed on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 69. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 71. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exc. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard- of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 72. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 74. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 75. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 76. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 77. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 78. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 79. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 81. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 82. The Website is a public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 83. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 84. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing videos on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 85. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . . .” 87. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 88. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 89. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 90. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 91. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 92. The Website is a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 94. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 95. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard- of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 97. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 98. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 99. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 100. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 101. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.

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22. Estee Lauder is liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and other Representatives. 23. There are many similarly-situated current and former Representatives who have been underpaid in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of a court- supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it. Thus, notice should be sent to the Collective Action Members pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 24. The similarly situated employees are known to Estee Lauder, are readily identifiable and can be located through Estee Lauder’s records. 25. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiff seeks to prosecute her NYLL claims as a class action on behalf of all persons who are or were formerly employed by Estee Lauder in New York State as Representatives (collectively, the “NY Class Action Members”) at any time from six years from the date of filing this Complaint until entry of judgment in this case (the “Class Action Period”). 26. The persons in the NY Class are so numerous that their joinder is impracticable. 28. A class action in superior to other methods of adjudicating the NYLL claims set forth in this case. 29. Estee Lauder employed Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective, and the New York Rule 23 Class as Representatives. 31. Consistent with Estee Lauder’s policy, pattern and practice, Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective, and the New York Class regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek without being paid premium overtime wages, in violation of the FLSA and/or the NYLL. 32. Plaintiff worked 41.5 to 58 hours per week for which she was not paid proper wages or overtime premium wages. For example, during the weeks of June 29, 2015 and November 21, 2016, Plaintiff worked 58 hours and 48 hours, respectively, for which she was not paid overtime compensation. 33. Furthermore, Defendants instructed Plaintiff to work, and Plaintiff routinely worked outside, her scheduled shift (e.g., to prepare and setup the store before opening and after closing) without compensation. 34. Estee Lauder assigned the work Representatives performed and is aware of the work that they have performed. 36. During the Collective Action Period, upon information and belief, Estee Lauder failed to post or keep posted a notice explaining the minimum wage and overtime wage requirements, as required by the FLSA. This failure to post or keep posted a notice explaining the minimum wage and overtime wages was willful and in reckless disregard of the Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated Representatives’’ rights under the FLSA. 37. Due to the foregoing, Estee Lauder’s failure to pay overtime wages for work performed by the Collective and the New York Rule 23 Class in excess of 40 hours per workweek was willful and reckless, and has been widespread, repeated and consistent. 38. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference allegations in paragraphs 1-37. 39. Estee Lauder has engaged in a widespread pattern, policy, and practice of violating the FLSA, as detailed in this Class Action Complaint. 40. At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 42. Estee Lauder is an employer engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 43. At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have been employees within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e) and 207(a). 44. Estee Lauder has failed to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective the overtime wages to which they are entitled under the FLSA. 45. Estee Lauder’s violations of the FLSA, as described in this Complaint, have been willful and intentional within the meaning of the FLSA.87 46. Estee Lauder has not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to its compensation of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. 46. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1- 47. Because Estee Lauder’s violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 47. Estee Lauder has engaged in a widespread pattern, policy, and practice of violating the NYLL, as detailed in this Complaint. 48. At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class have been employees and Estee Lauder has been an employer within the meaning of the NYLL. 48. As a result of Estee Lauder’s violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have suffered damages by being denied overtime wages in accordance with the FLSA. 49. The overtime wage provisions of Article 19 of the NYLL and its supporting regulations apply to Estee Lauder and protect Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class. 49. As a result of the unlawful acts of Estee Lauder, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have been deprived of overtime compensation and other wages in amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, costs, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 50. Estee Lauder has failed to pay Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class the overtime wages to which they are entitled under the NYLL. 51. By Estee Lauder’s knowing and intentional failure to pay Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, it has willfully violated the NYLL 19, §§ 650 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations, including but not limited to the regulations in 12 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 142. 52. Due to Estee Lauder’s violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class are entitled to recover from Estee Lauder their unpaid overtime wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. 53. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1- 54. The provisions of NYLL Article 6 §§ 190 et seq. of the NYLL and its supporting regulations apply to Estee Lauder and protect Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class. 55. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class have been employees and Estee Lauder has been an employer within the meaning of the NYLL §§ 190, 651(5). 56. Estee Lauder has engaged in a pattern, practice, and policy of failing to compensate the Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class at their agreed regular rates of pay for all hours either worked or required to be compensated by the terms of Estee Lauder’s employment agreements with Plaintiff and the Class members. 57. Estee Lauder’s failure to pay Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class their wages at their agreed hourly regular and overtime pay rates for all hours worked or required to be compensated by law violates the NYLL Article 6, §§ 190 et seq. 58. Due to Estee Lauder’s violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class are entitled to recover from Estee Lauder their unpaid overtime wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. Fair Labor Standard Act – Unpaid Overtime Wages On Behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective NYLL – Unpaid Overtime Wages On Behalf of Plaintiff and the New York Rule 23 Class New York Labor Law Article 6 – Unpaid Regular Wages (Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class)

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11. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 12. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New Jersey; b. to whom Defendant AR sent an initial letter; c. attempting to collect a consumer debt; d. that states the recipient must notify the Defendant in writing within 30 days to dispute the validity of the debt; e. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (21) days after the filing of this action. 13. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect and/or has purchased debts. 14. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 16. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 18. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 19. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 20. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 22. The alleged debt arose from a financial obligation that was primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, specifically medical services. 23. RMA is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (4). 24. Upon information and belief, RMA contracted with the Defendant AR to collect the alleged debt. 25. AR collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of itself or other creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation – October 21, 2020 Collection Letter 26. On or about October 21, 2020, Defendant sent Plaintiff an initial collection letter. A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit A. 27. The letter states: Unless you notify this office in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt, or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid. 28. However, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g requires that an initial collection letter must include a written notice containing - ... (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector 29. Defendant improperly stated that the dispute must be in writing which is untrue. 31. These actions by Defendant deceive the consumer since he cannot properly evaluate the actions required to dispute the debt. 32. Had Plaintiff known a phone call would have sufficed to dispute the debt she may have done so. 33. Defendant’s letter created an appreciable risk to Plaintiff of being unable to properly assert her rights. 34. Plaintiff would have pursued a different course of action were it not for Defendants’ statutory violations. 35. Because of this, Plaintiff expended time, money, and effort in determining the proper course of action. 36. These violations by Defendants were knowing, willful, negligent and/or intentional, and Defendants did not maintain procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such violations. 37. Defendants’ collection efforts with respect to this alleged debt from Plaintiff caused Plaintiff to suffer concrete and particularized harm, inter alia, because the FDCPA provides Plaintiff with the legally protected right to be not to be misled or treated unfairly with respect to any action for the collection of any consumer debt. 38. Defendants’ deceptive, misleading, and unfair representations with respect to its collection efforts were material misrepresentations that affected and frustrated Plaintiff's ability to intelligently respond to Defendants’ collection efforts because Plaintiff could not adequately respond to Defendants’ demand for payment of this debt. 40. Plaintiff was confused and misled to her detriment by the statements in the dunning letter, and relied on the contents of the letter to her detriment. 41. As a result of Defendants’ deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 42. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 43. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 44. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 45. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e: a. By requiring a dispute of the debt be made in writing or the debt would be assumed valid, in violation of § 1692e (5); b. By falsely requiring a dispute of the debt be made in writing in violation of §§ §1692e and 1692e (10). 46. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 48. In the alternative, Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 49. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 50. Defendant violated this section by requiring that a dispute of the debt be made in writing. 51. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 52. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 53. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 55. Defendant violated this section by adding the false requirement that the dispute be in writing. 56. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.

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14. Confide was incorporated in 2013 to develop, market, and sell communications applications. Confide’s main product is its Confide App that it markets as a confidential messaging platform. Using the Confide App, which is available for Android, iOS, Windows, and macOS devices, consumers can communicate to others who are also using App and transmit text, video, audio, and various file types. 15. Confide offers a “basic” version of the App for free and a “plus” (i.e., premium) version for a monthly fee. Both versions promise, inter alia, (1) ephemeral messages, (2) end-to- end encryption, and (3) screenshot protection.5 For instance, Confide represents that messages sent through the App are ephemeral. Specifically, that after a message is “read once, [it is] gone…[n]o forwarding, no printing, no saving…no nothing.”6 17. In line with this, Confide purports to “prevent[] screenshots on most of [its] platforms[,]” and, “[w]here prevention is not technically feasible, [its] patent-pending reading experience ensures that only a sliver of the message is unveiled at a time and that the sender’s name is not visible.”8 (See Figure 1.) 19. When the messages are viewed through Confide’s desktop applications (e.g., Windows and macOS), Confide seemingly modifies its application’s user interface so that any screenshot taken is returned as a gray or black screen. (See Figure 2.) (Figure 2.)9 20. Beyond blocking screenshots, Confide represents the App will purportedly alert both the sender and recipient of a message if the recipient has attempted to take a screenshot, and then kick the offender out of the message. (See Figure 1.) 21. As acknowledged by Confide through its representations, preserving the confidentiality of any message requires the combination of encryption, ephemerality, and screenshot protection. If the messaging platform fails to provide any one of these factors, messages sent through that platform are not truly confidential. Confide Does Not Provide Its Advertised Features 23. As introduced above, Confide represents, in no uncertain terms, that its App blocks screenshots. But that isn’t true. Any Confide user accessing the platform through the Windows App can take screenshots of any and all received messages. Those screenshots can include the entire content of the message as well as the identity of the sending party, despite Confide’s explicit claims that such information would not be visible at the same time (i.e., only a “sliver” of the text would be visible). 24. As Figure 3 shows, it is possible to take screenshots that capture the name of the sender (Sending Party), as well as the full content of the message sent by the Sending Party: (Figure 3, a screenshot taken of a message received on the Windows desktop version of the App after deactivating “enable desktop composition.”) 26. To make matters worse, many of the other security features that Confide claims protect its messages also fail to operate on the desktop versions of the App. Confide represents that even if a party can somehow take a screenshot, it would alert the sender and remove the offender from the message. By alerting the sender, Confide is putting them on notice that their messages can no longer be considered confidential (and the sender will undoubtedly stop sending confidential communications). 27. In reality, Confide does not notify anyone when a screenshot is taken when the recipient uses the macOS or Windows App. Worse, the offending party taking the screenshot is never removed from the message, ensuring that the sender continues sending confidential or otherwise sensitive information, pictures, or videos. 29. Ultimately, and despite Confide’s promises, the App does not prevent screenshots of messages (or pictures or videos) sent through the App—whether taken via an operating system’s internal screenshot mechanism or camera photography. As a result, Confide’s promises of ephemerality are rendered false. Message recipients can easily create permanent records of the purportedly secured messages. 31. Confide deceived consumers into believing that its messaging platform would allow them to send and receive messages with screenshot protection even when it didn’t design Apps to provide those protections. Consumers relied on Confide’s representations, sent secretive, confidential, and intimate messages, and even paid for additional features, all under false pretenses. Each of which was exposed to potential duplication, storage, and exploitation, and none of which featured Confide’s self-professed elements of “confidentiality.” 32. Plaintiff Jeremy Auman purchased a monthly subscription to Confide’s App on or around January 13, 2017 for $6.99 a month. 33. Auman purchased his subscription to the App based on Confide’s representations that it provided a “confidential” messaging platform and its representations that his messages would be secure from any potential duplication or preservation due to its repeated promises of message ephemerality and screenshot protection. 35. As discussed above, the messages Auman sent through the App did not feature the security measures expressly promised by Confide in its marketing materials. Each of the messages sent by Auman through the App were subject to duplication and permanent storage. 36. Had Auman known that Confide did not offer the confidentiality and security features that it marketed to consumers, he would not have downloaded or used the App or paid for a subscription to the App. 37. Plaintiff ceased using the App to send confidential and secure messages and cancelled his subscription after finding out that Confide did not offer the confidentiality and security features as represented in its marketing materials. 38. Class Definition: Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals, defined as follows: Class: All persons in the United States who (1) paid Confide for a subscription; (2) after August 2015. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Confide, Confide’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Confide or its parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Confide’s counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 40. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not limited to the following: a) Whether Confide’s representations were designed to mislead consumers into subscribing to the App; b) Whether Confide’s conduct described herein violates New York’s Deceptive Practices Law (N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349); c) Whether Confide’s conduct described herein violates New York’s False Advertising Law (N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 350 et seq.); and d) Whether Confide’s conduct described herein constitutes fraudulent inducement. 41. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages as a result of Confide’s uniform wrongful conduct during transactions with Plaintiff and the Class. 42. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex litigation and class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Confide has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 44. Superiority: This case is appropriate for certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The injuries suffered by the individual members of the Class are likely to have been relatively small compared to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the litigation necessitated by Confide’s actions. Absent a class action, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Confide. Even if members of the Class themselves could sustain such individual litigation, it would not be preferable to a class action because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties and the Court and require duplicative consideration of the legal and factual issues presented herein. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court. Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered, and uniformity of decisions will be ensured. 45. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 47. Confide’s corporate headquarters are in New York, New York. It made the App in New York, New York. The marketing representations and advertisements at issue were developed in New York, and the internal approval for their use in commerce occurred in New York. 48. Confide directs consumer inquiries and comments to support@getconfide.com, which, upon information and belief, is accessed and managed by Confide’s staff in New York. 49. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class members’ subscription payments were all processed electronically and received by Confide in New York. 50. New York’s Deceptive Practices Law, Gen. Bus. Law § 349, protects consumers against “deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service” in the state of New York. 51. As described herein, Confide engaged in deceptive business practices by, among other things, misrepresenting that the App possessed confidentiality features that it did not possess and using those misrepresentations to induce consumers (like Plaintiff and the Class) into subscribing to the App. 53. Confide intentionally misrepresented the security features of the App and failed to correct those misrepresentations, because they knew those misrepresentations had induced consumers into purchasing subscriptions to the App, and the correction would have resulted in a loss of subscribers. 54. Confide’s deceptive statements regarding the security features of the App were materially untrue, misleading, and likely to deceive the public inasmuch as their advertisements and statements caused reasonable consumers, including Plaintiff, to mistakenly believe that the App had the security features that Confide advertised it as possessing. 55. Confide’s material misrepresentations regarding the security features of the App directly affected Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ choices to subscribe to the App. 56. Plaintiff and the Class chose to subscribe to Confide’s App specifically because of Confide’s promises that the App offered security features advertised and ensured the confidentiality of messages sent through the App. 57. Plaintiff and the Class reasonably viewed the representations made by Confide regarding the App as true, and as a direct and proximate result, subscribed to the App based on the representations that it offered specific security measures to ensure the confidentiality of messages sent through the App. 58. Had Confide corrected its misrepresentations and clarified that the App did not actually have the security features it advertised, or the ability to provide confidential messaging, Plaintiff and thousands of consumers would have chosen alternative products that provided additional security measures which the App did not. 60. Accordingly, had Plaintiff and the Class known that the App did not provide the security features that Confide represented it as possessing, they would not have been willing to use the App and pay for a monthly subscription. 61. Thus, as a direct and proximate result of Confide’s deceptive practices, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered actual injury in the form of payment to Confide and a loss of privacy. 62. Although the features provided to Confide subscribers (i.e., those who paid money to Confide beyond the free app) still have some utility, their utility has been greatly diminished as a result of Defendant's misrepresentations. If Defendant had provided the App as advertised (i.e., the App was actually secure and blocked screenshots), Plaintiff and members of the Class could use the subscription features at the level expected. But because Defendant did not provide the App as advertised, Plaintiff and members of the Class cannot use the subscription features in the way contemplated at the time they purchased the subscriptions (when they thought the App was secure). 64. By all of the above, Confide engaged in willful and knowing violations of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 by engaging in deceptive and materially misleading business practices directed at consumers, which caused consumers actual harm. 65. Therefore, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class, seeks an order pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h) awarding a minimum of $50 in damages to Plaintiff and each Class member who suffered injury as a result of Confide’s deceptive practices. 66. Because Confide’s conduct was willful and knowing, Plaintiff and the putative Class seek treble damages pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h). 67. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 68. Confide engaged in advertising and marketing to consumers throughout the United States, including in New York, that induced them to subscribe to the App by promising them that the App featured certain security features to ensure the confidentiality of messages sent through it. 69. As described herein, Confide engaged in false advertising by, among other things, misrepresenting that the App had security protections that prevented screenshots of the content of messages from being taken, as well as protections that would limit the amount of a message’s content displayed at the same time. 71. Confide also represented that the content of a message would not be simultaneously displayed in conjunction with the identity of the individual that sent the message. Those representations were false: both macOS and Windows versions of the App always show the full content of a message in conjunction with the identity of the sending party. 72. Confide further promised that its messages were ephemeral, and thus could not be saved, printed, or forwarded. That representation was also false: the Window’s desktop version of the App allows for screenshots to be taken. Additionally, both desktop versions of the App allow for photographs to be taken of full messages in conjunction with the identity of a message’s sender. 73. Confide made these representations with the intent to induce consumers into purchasing subscriptions to the App for its perceived—but non-existent—features that purportedly provided confidentiality of messages sent through the App. 74. Confide’s advertising and marketing statements regarding the features of the App were materially untrue, misleading, and likely to deceive the public inasmuch as their advertisements and statements caused consumers to mistakenly believe that the App contained the specific features represented in those statements (including screenshot protection, message ephemerality, and the confidentiality of any message sent through the App). 75. Plaintiff and members of the Class were exposed to and relied on Confide’s statements in deciding to subscribe to the App and paying the monthly subscription fee. 77. Accordingly, had Plaintiff and the Class known that the App did not provide the security features that Confide represented it as possessing, they would not have been willing to use and pay for a monthly subscription. 78. Thus, as a direct and proximate result of Confide’s deceptive practices, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered actual injury in the form of payment to Confide. 79. Although the features provided to Confide subscribers (i.e., those who paid money to Confide beyond the free app) still have some utility, their utility has been greatly diminished as a result of Defendant's misrepresentations. If Defendant had provided the App as advertised (i.e., the App was actually secure and blocked screenshots), Plaintiff and members of the Class could use the subscription features at the level expected. But because Defendant did not provide the App as advertised, Plaintiff and members of the Class cannot use the subscription features in the way contemplated at the time they purchased the subscriptions (when they thought the App was secure). 81. By all of the above, Confide engaged in willful and knowing violations of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 350 et seq., falsely advertising the features of the App, which materially misled consumers and caused them actual harm. 82. Therefore, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class, seeks an order pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 350 et seq. awarding a minimum of $500 in damages to Plaintiff and each Class member who suffered injury as a result of Confide’s false advertising. 83. Because Confide’s conduct was willful and knowing, Plaintiff and the putative Class members seek treble damages pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350-e(3). 84. Further, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and other members of the Class, seek an order under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350-e(3) enjoining Confide’s unlawful advertising practices described herein. 85. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 86. By representing that the App possessed screenshot protection and other features to ensure the ephemerality of any messages sent through the App, Confide falsely represented the App possessed security features that it did not, in fact, posses. Confide made these statements with knowledge of their falsity. 87. Confide misrepresented the security features of the App specifically with the intention of inducing consumers who would not otherwise subscribe to the App, or would otherwise have subscribed to its competitors, to do so. 89. Plaintiff was one such customer. After viewing Confide’s representations regarding the security features of the App, as well as its statements that messages sent through the App would be confidential because it possessed those features, Plaintiff subscribed to the App. Had Confide not misrepresented the actual features of the App, Plaintiff would not have paid to subscribe to the App. 90. In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff Auman seeks an order requiring Confide to pay actual and compensatory damages. 91. Plaintiff further requests that if the Court finds that Confide’s conduct and misrepresentations were made with malice and in conscious disregard for Plaintiff and the Class’s rights, they should be awarded punitive damages against Confide in an amount to deter such conduct in the future. Fraudulent Inducement (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Violation of New York’s Deceptive Practices Law N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Violation of New York’s False Advertising Law N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 350 et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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60. The persons in the New York Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although, the precise number of such persons is unknown, and facts upon which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of the Defendants, there are approximately more than 40 members of the New York Class. 61. There are questions of law and fact common to the New York Class that predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the New York Class, including but not limited to: a. Whether Defendants unlawfully failed to pay overtime compensation in violation of and within the meaning of the NYLL Article 6, §190 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations, 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 142 et seq.; b. Whether Defendants’ policy of failing to pay Crew Members overtime at the proper rate was instituted willfully or with reckless disregard of the law; c. Whether Defendants’ unlawfully failed to provide accurate and timely wage notice, pursuant to N.Y. Lab. Law § 195(1); d. Whether Defendants’ unlawfully failed to provide accurate wage statements, pursuant to N.Y. Lab. Law § 195(3); e. The proper measure of damages sustained by the New York Class Representative and the New York Class; and f. Whether Defendants should be enjoined from such violations in the future. 62. The New York Class Representative fairly and adequately protects the interests of the New York Class and has no interests antagonistic to the class. The Plaintiff is represented by attorneys who are experienced and competent in both class litigation and employment litigation. 64. Further, the New York Class Representative and the New York Class have been equally affected by Defendants’ failure to (1) pay overtime wages, (2) provide accurate wage notices, and (3) provide accurate wage statements. Moreover, members of the New York Class still employed by Defendants may be reluctant to raise individual claims for fear of retaliation. 65. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the New York Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class was a whole. 66. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the class. Plaintiff Brian Davis and the New York Class members were subjected to Defendants’ policies, practices, programs, procedures, protocols and plans alleged herein concerning the non-payment of overtime wages, the failure to provide accurate wage notices and statements, and the failure to keep adequate records. The job duties of Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. 67. The New York Class Representative intends to send notice to all members of the New York Class to the extent required by Rule 23. 69. All of the work performed by Class Members was assigned by Defendants and/or Defendants were aware of all the work that Plaintiff and the Class Members performed. 70. Upon information and belief, Defendants had a policy and pattern or practice to require Plaintiff and Class Members to work in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 71. Upon information and belief, Defendants agreed to pay each Class Member, including Plaintiff, a certain hourly rate of pay (“regular rate”). 72. Upon information and belief, Defendants paid each Class Member, including Plaintiff, at an hourly rate less than the regular rate for all hours worked under 40 in the workweek. 73. Upon information and belief, Defendants paid each Class Member, including Plaintiff, at an “overtime” rate of less than one and one-half times the regular rate for all hours worked over 40 in the workweek. 74. Upon information and belief, Defendants paid each Class Member including Plaintiff, after their employment with Defendants concluded for that particular Fashion Week, an additional “bonus” check that raised Plaintiffs’ average hourly rate to the regular rate. 75. Accordingly, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and Class Members one and one- half times their regular rate for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek in violation of the FLSA and NYLL. 77. Defendants were or should have been aware that the FLSA and NYLL required Defendants to pay Crew Members premium overtime pay at one and one-half time their respective regular rate for hours worked in excess of 40 per week. 78. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members proper overtime wages for their work in excess of 40 hours per week was willful, intentional, and in bad faith. 79. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff and members of the Wage Notice Class with accurate and proper wage notice pursuant to N.Y. Lab. Law § 195(1). 80. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff and members of the Wage Statement Class with accurate wage statements pursuant to N.Y. Lab. Law § 195(3). 81. Defendants’ unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent. 82. Plaintiff Brian Davis was an employee of Defendants, working under their direct supervision. 83. Plaintiff was employed by Defendants for approximately six weeks from late January through early March, from in or about 2007 through September 2014. 84. Beginning in 2007, Defendants paid Plaintiff a regular rate of $30 an hour. 86. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Plaintiff was required to be paid overtime pay at the statutory rate of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay after he had worked 40 hours in a workweek. 87. During most workweeks between August 2009 and March 2014, Plaintiff worked approximately between 60 and 110 hours per week. 88. Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff for time worked in excess of 40 hours per week at a rate of at least one and one-half times his regular rate, from approximately August 2009 through March 2014 during his employment for Defendants. 89. Throughout his employment with Defendants, Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff an accurate wage notice for new hires listing, inter alia, Plaintiff’s rate of pay and basis for that rate, Plaintiff’s overtime pay rate, the designated pay day, and such other information as the commissioner deems necessary. 90. During the relevant period, Defendants required Plaintiff to sign blank wage notices. 91. Throughout his employment with Defendants, Defendants failed to furnish Plaintiff with an accurate statement of wages listing hours worked, rates paid, gross wages, allowances and deductions taken, and net wages paid. 92. Defendants willfully disregarded and purposefully evaded record keeping requirements of the FLSA and the NYLL by failing to maintain accurate time sheets, payroll records and post compliance posters. 94. Defendants failed to post appropriate notices informing employees of federal and state laws regarding the requirement to pay overtime premium pay to their employees 95. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the FLSA Collective, realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 96. Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective are non-exempt employees entitled to be paid overtime compensation for all overtime hours worked. 97. Defendants employed Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective for workweeks longer than 40 hours and willfully failed to compensate the Plaintiff for the time worked in excess of 40 hours per week, at a rate of at least one and one-half times his regular hourly rate, in violation of the requirements of Section 7 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 98. Defendants failed to keep accurate records of time worked by Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective. ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND THE FLSA COLLECTIVE FOR FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME AN FLSA VIOLATION ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND THE WAGE NOTICE AND STATEMENT CLASSES FOR VIOLATION OF NOTICE AND RECORD-KEEPING REQUIREMENTS

win

CORPORATION, CANACCORD GENUITY INC., and FBR CAPITAL MARKETS & CO., Defendants. Case No.: 30. The Company purportedly provides diagnostics tailored to specific molecular profiles of patient tissues, integrating the molecular data with real-time biometric signal and phenotypic data to track patient outcomes and deliver precision medicine. The Company claims that it possesses a comprehensive set of advanced molecular diagnostics and decision support solutions that enable evidence-based clinical practice, including GPS Cancer. GPS Cancer purportedly enables diagnosis at the molecular level by measuring the whole genome and proteome of a patient— thereby potentially predicting the patient’s response and resistance to particular therapeutics. 43. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class, consisting of all those who purchased or otherwise acquired NantHealth securities: (1) pursuant and/or traceable to the Company’s Registration Statement issued in connection with the Company’s IPO on or about June 1, 2016, seeking to pursue remedies under the Securities Act; and/or (2) between June 1, 2016, and March 6, 2017, inclusive, seeking to pursue remedies under the Exchange Act; and were damaged thereby (collectively, the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 49. The market for NantHealth’s securities was open, well-developed and efficient at all relevant times. As a result of these materially false and/or misleading statements, and/or failures to disclose, NantHealth’s securities traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period. Plaintiff and other members of the Class purchased or otherwise acquired NantHealth’s securities relying upon the integrity of the market price of the Company’s securities and market information relating to NantHealth, and have been damaged thereby. 54. As alleged herein, Defendants acted with scienter in that Defendants knew that the public documents and statements issued or disseminated in the name of the Company were materially false and/or misleading; knew that such statements or documents would be issued or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and substantially participated or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of such statements or documents as primary violations of the federal securities laws. As set forth elsewhere herein in detail, Defendants, by virtue of their receipt of information reflecting the true facts regarding NantHealth, his/her control over, and/or receipt and/or modification of NantHealth’s allegedly materially misleading misstatements and/or their associations with the Company which made them privy to confidential proprietary information concerning NantHealth, participated in the fraudulent scheme alleged herein. 61. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein, except any allegation of fraud, recklessness or intentional misconduct. 62. This Count is brought pursuant to Section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, on behalf of the Class, against the Section 11 Defendants. 63. The Registration Statement for the IPO was inaccurate and misleading, contained untrue statements of material facts, omitted to state other facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading, and omitted to state material facts required to be stated therein. 70. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein, except any allegation of fraud, recklessness or intentional misconduct. 75. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. Background Violation of Section 15 of The Securities Act (Against the Section 11 Individual Defendants) Violation of Section 11 of The Securities Act (Against the Section 11 Defendants) Violation of Section 10(b) of The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder (Against the Company and the Individual Defendants)

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15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) 15 U.S.C. §g(a)(3)(A)(ii) 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(2) 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) 60. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though the same were set forth at length herein. 61. Plaintiff is a “consumer,” as defined by the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c). 62. The AppFolio report Defendant sold to Aspen Real Estate is a “consumer report” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d). 63. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and 1681o of the FCRA, Defendant is liable for failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the consumer reports it sold in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). 64. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though the same were set forth at length herein. 66. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though the same were set forth at length herein. 67. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and 1681o, Defendant is liable for failing to clearly and accurately disclose all information in the consumer’s file at the time of a consumer’s request, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1). 68. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though the same were set forth at length herein. 69. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and 1681o, Defendant is liable for failing to accurately and completely disclose, upon the request of a consumer, the identity of each person including end-users who have requested consumer file disclosures, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(3)(A)(ii). A. AppFolio Fails to Accurately Report Consumer Information

win

105. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 106. Prior to the filing of the action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam Index No. 169-2014, Debt Collectors had an obligation to conduct a 17 meaningful review including but not limited to a meaningful review to determine whether or not the statute of limitations had expired, whether or not the statute of limitations had been tolled under New York law, whether the owner of the debt had a right to file a lawsuit in New York, and whether or not each assignor of the debt notified the consumer of the assignment. 107. Prior and subsequent to the filing of the aforementioned action, there was no review of the original creditor and/or the statute of limitations applicable to the original creditor, whether or not there ever was a payment made by the consumer, the date of the last payment made by the consumer, the date on which the consumer ceased attending school on at least a half-time basis, the date on which the cause of action accrued, whether or not the statute of limitations had been tolled under New York law, whether the out-of- state owner of the debt had a right to file a lawsuit in New York, and/or whether or not each assignor of the debt notified the consumer of the assignment. 108. Prior and subsequent to the filing of the aforementioned action, F&G relied on and/or obtained nothing but a charge-off date to determine the statute of limitations accrual date and/or relied on nothing but a charge-off date to determine the statute of limitations accrual date. 109. As a result of the aforementioned failures and actions, Debt Collectors violated 15 USC 1692e. 110. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 111. Prior to the filing of the action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam Index No. 170-2014, Debt Collectors had an obligation to conduct a 18 meaningful review including but not limited to a meaningful review to determine whether or not the statute of limitations had expired, whether or not the statute of limitations had been tolled under New York law, whether the owner of the debt had a right to file a lawsuit in New York, and whether or not each assignor of the debt notified the consumer of the assignment. 112. Prior and subsequent to the filing of the aforementioned action, there was no review of the original creditor and the statute of limitations applicable to the original creditor, whether or not there ever was a payment made by the consumer, the date of the last payment made by the consumer, the date on which the consumer ceased attending school on at least a half-time basis, the date on which the cause of action accrued, whether or not the statute of limitations had been tolled under New York law, whether the out-of- state owner of the debt had a right to file a lawsuit in New York, and/or whether or not each assignor of the debt notified the consumer of the assignment. 113. Prior and subsequent to the filing of the aforementioned action, F&G relied on and/or obtained nothing but a charge-off date to determine the statute of limitations accrual date and/or relied on nothing but a charge-off date to determine the statute of limitations accrual date. 114. As a result of the aforementioned failures and actions, Debt Collectors violated 15 USC 1692e. 115. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 116. Prior to the filing of the action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam Index No. 171-2014, Debt Collectors had an obligation to conduct a 19 meaningful review including but not limited to a meaningful review to determine whether or not the statute of limitations had expired, whether or not the statute of limitations had been tolled under New York law, whether the owner of the debt had a right to file a lawsuit in New York, and whether or not each assignor of the debt notified the consumer of the assignment. 117. Prior and subsequent to the filing of the aforementioned action, there was no review of the original creditor and the statute of limitations applicable to the original creditor, whether or not there ever was a payment made by the consumer, the date of the last payment made by the consumer, the date on which the consumer ceased attending school on at least a half-time basis, the date on which the cause of action accrued, whether or not the statute of limitations had been tolled under New York law, whether the out-of- state owner of the debt had a right to file a lawsuit in New York, and/or whether or not each assignor of the debt notified the consumer of the assignment. 118. Prior and subsequent to the filing of the aforementioned action, F&G relied on and/or obtained nothing but a charge-off date to determine the statute of limitations accrual date and/or relied on nothing but a charge-off date to determine the statute of limitations accrual date. 119. As a result of the aforementioned failures and actions, Debt Collectors violated 15 USC 1692e. 120. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 121. Prior to the filing of the action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam Index No. 172-2014, Debt Collectors had an obligation to conduct a 20 meaningful review including but not limited to a meaningful review to determine whether or not the statute of limitations had expired, whether or not the statute of limitations had been tolled under New York law, whether the owner of the debt had a right to file a lawsuit in New York, and whether or not each assignor of the debt notified the consumer of the assignment. 122. Prior and subsequent to the filing of the aforementioned action, there was no review of the original creditor and the statute of limitations applicable to the original creditor, whether or not there ever was a payment made by the consumer, the date of the last payment made by the consumer, the date on which the consumer ceased attending school on at least a half-time basis, the date on which the cause of action accrued, whether or not the statute of limitations had been tolled under New York law, whether the out-of- state owner of the debt had a right to file a lawsuit in New York, and/or whether or not each assignor of the debt notified the consumer of the assignment. 123. Prior and subsequent to the filing of the aforementioned action, F&G relied on and/or obtained nothing but a charge-off date to determine the statute of limitations accrual date. 124. As a result of the aforementioned failures and actions, Debt Collectors violated 15 USC 1692e. 125. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 126. For the reasons set forth above and explained in the aforementioned motion to dismiss and reply, there is no arguable basis for the action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam Index No. 169-2014 not to have been voluntarily dismissed at some point between the date it was filed and the present. 21 127. As a result of the failure to voluntarily dismiss the aforementioned lawsuit, Debt Collectors have violated 15 USC § 1692f (1) and 15 USC § 1692e (5). 128. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 129. For the reasons set forth above and explained in the aforementioned motion to dismiss and reply, there is no arguable basis for the action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam Index No. 170-2014 not to have been voluntarily dismissed at some point between the date it was filed and the present. 130. As a result of the failure to voluntarily dismiss the aforementioned lawsuit, Debt Collectors have violated 15 USC § 1692f (1) and 15 USC § 1692e (5). 131. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 132. For the reasons set forth above and explained in the aforementioned motion to dismiss and reply, there is no arguable basis for the action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam Index No. 171-2014 not to have been voluntarily dismissed at some point between the date it was filed and the present. 133. As a result of the failure to voluntarily dismiss the aforementioned lawsuit, Debt Collectors have violated 15 USC § 1692f (1) and 15 USC § 1692e (5). 134. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 135. For the reasons set forth above and explained in the aforementioned motion to dismiss and reply, there is no arguable basis for the action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam Index No. 172-2014 not to have been 22 voluntarily dismissed at some point between the date it was filed and the present. 136. As a result of the failure to voluntarily dismiss the aforementioned lawsuit, Debt Collectors have violated 15 USC § 1692f (1) and 15 USC § 1692e (5). 137. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 138. Werner is a consumer. 139. Assignees retain attorneys to attempt to collect debts from New York consumers by filing lawsuits in New York against New York consumers in the name of plaintiffs who have no legal right to maintain an action in a New York state court; and these lawsuits allege that these plaintiffs are authorized to proceed with the lawsuit. 140. Prior to the aforementioned filing of the aforementioned lawsuits, Assignees provide to the attorneys retained to file these lawsuits nothing but a charge-off date to determine the statute of limitations accrual date. Assignees do not provide to the attorneys retained to file these lawsuits information as to whether there ever was a payment made by the consumer, the date of the last payment made by the consumer, the date on which the consumer ceased attending school on at least a half-time basis, the existence and nature of any agreement by the consumer regarding the forbearance of payments, and/or each assignor’s notification to the consumer of the assignment. 141. Assignees and/or Debt Collectors retain attorneys to file the aforementioned lawsuits without providing the aforementioned information, knowing that the consumer never made a payment, knowing that the consumer did not execute any agreement regarding the forbearance of payments, knowing that any agreement regarding the forbearance of payments did not toll the statute of limitations, knowing that the statute of limitations to 23 file a lawsuit in New York had expired, and/or knowing that each assignor of the debt did not notify the consumer of the assignment. 142. Assignees and/or Debt Collectors direct F&G to rely on the charge-off date to determine the statute of limitations accrual date and/or F&G purposefully relies on nothing but a charge-off date to determine the statute of limitations accrual date. 143. The above actions and omissions are consumer oriented for the following reasons: a. They were directed at Werner; b. Assignees and/or Debt Collectors regularly attempt to collect student loans and other consumer debts from hundreds of thousands of consumers. Upon information and belief, the same or similar actions, misrepresentations and violations of the FDCPA were directed at numerous numbers of these hundreds of thousands of consumers. 144. A consumer would receive a lawsuit indicating, from the name of the plaintiff, that it related to a student loan debt. The consumer knew they owed money on a student loan. The lawsuit would represent that the plaintiff was authorized to bring this lawsuit. The statute of limitations to bring this lawsuit would have expired prior to the bringing of this lawsuit making it illegal to bring the lawsuit or requiring the lawsuit to be dismissed and therefore eliminating the ability of the plaintiff to collect the debt via this lawsuit. Based on the method for calculating the statute of limitations and the knowledge required to determine the applicable statute of limitations, a consumer would have no ability to ascertain the statute of limitations had expired. 145. As a result of receiving a lawsuit which the consumer knew related to a student loan and which represented that the plaintiff was authorized to bring this lawsuit and knowing they owed money on a student loan, the consumer would believe that they had an 24 obligation to pay or all a portion of the debt or have a judgment against them despite the expiration of the statute of limitations. 146. As a result of the above, the aforementioned actions and omissions were deceptive or misleading. 147. Werner suffered injuries as a result of the deceptive or misleading acts including but not limited to the aforementioned violations of his rights under the FDCPA, the cost of retaining an attorney to defend him against four different lawsuits filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations, and the emotional distress of being sued without any legal basis. 148. In light of the facts set forth above, each of the actions, misrepresentations and violations of the FDCPA set forth above constitute a violation of General Business Law 349 by Assignees and Debt Collectors. 149. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 150. F&G, by virtue of their being attorneys and having the legal authority to file lawsuits, have a duty to take reasonable steps to ascertain their client’s legal right to sue and the existence of a legal right to prevail in the lawsuit both prior and after filing a lawsuit against a person. 151. Without excuse or justification, F&G negligently failed, both prior and after filing a lawsuit against Werner on four different occasions, to take the aforementioned reasonable steps including determining whether or not the statute of limitations had expired, whether or not the statute of limitations had been tolled under New York law, whether the owner of the debt had a right to file a lawsuit in New York, and whether or 25 not each assignor of the debt notified the consumer of the assignment. 152. The aforementioned failures by F&G, based on their experience as debt collection attorneys, amounts to gross negligence. 153. F&G is liable to Werner for the damages incurred as a result of this negligence 154. Since F&G was grossly negligent for the reasons described above, F&G also is liable for punitive damages. 155. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3). 156. The classes consist of I. (a) all consumers (b) sued by F&G (c) on or after January 28, 2014 through the date of the filing of this action (d) on behalf of an entity which is not authorized to do business in New York but which does business in New York (e) to collect a student loan debt; II. (a) all consumers (b) sued by F&G (c) on or after January 28, 2014 through the date of the filing of this action (d) to collect a student loan debt where under the terms of the loan agreement the consumer had chosen a “Full Deferral Repayment Option” (e) where prior to the filing of the lawsuit the consumer never had made a payment towards the student loan debt (f) where prior to filing a lawsuit, F&G possessed, obtained, or was provided nothing about (i) whether or not there ever was a payment made by the consumer, (ii) the date of the last payment made by the consumer, (iii) the date on which the consumer ceased attending school on at 26 least a half-time basis, and/or the existence of a written fully executed forbearance agreement which contained language regarding the statute of limitations (f) the loan agreement did not allow for any oral modifications and/or required a jointly signed agreement to effectuate any modifications and (g) under the terms of the loan agreement a forbearance of any payment due date did not automatically toll the statute of limitations, default date, “Deferment End Date”, or “Repayment Period”. 69. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 70. In an action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam, Index No. 169-2014: a. Debt Collectors sued Werner after the expiration of the statute of limitations; b. Debt Collectors sued Werner on behalf of a Plaintiff which had no legal right to bring an action in a court in New York state; c. Debt Collectors sued Werner on behalf of a Plaintiff who was not able to prove it had a legal right to collect the debt at issue since they were not able to prove that each prior assignor notified Werner of the assignment of the debt. 71. For one or more of the above reasons, by suing Werner in the above-identified lawsuit, Debt Collectors violated 15 USC 1692e, 15 USC 1692e(2)(A), 15 USC 1692e(5),15 USC 1692f , and/or 15 USC 1692f(1). 72. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 73. In an action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam, Index No. 170-2014: a. Debt Collectors sued Werner after the expiration of the statute of limitations; b. Debt Collectors sued Werner on behalf of a Plaintiff which had no legal right to bring an action in a court in New York state; 12 c. Debt Collectors sued Werner on behalf of a Plaintiff who was not able to prove it had a legal right to collect the debt at issue since they were not able to prove that each prior assignor notified Werner of the assignment of the debt. 74. For one or more of the above reasons, by suing Werner in the above-identified lawsuit, Debt Collectors violated 15 USC 1692e, 15 USC 1692e(2)(A), 15 USC 1692e(5),15 USC 1692f , and/or 15 USC 1692f(1). 75. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 76. In an action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam, Index No. 171-2014: a. Debt Collectors sued Werner after the expiration of the statute of limitations; b. Debt Collectors sued Werner on behalf of a Plaintiff which had no legal right to bring an action in a court in New York state; c. Debt Collectors sued Werner on behalf of a Plaintiff who was not able to prove it had a legal right to collect the debt at issue since they were not able to prove that each prior assignor notified Werner of the assignment of the debt. 77. For one or more of the above reasons, by suing Werner in the above-identified lawsuit, Debt Collectors violated 15 USC 1692e, 15 USC 1692e(2)(A), 15 USC 1692e(5),15 USC 1692f , and/or 15 USC 1692f(1). 78. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 79. In an action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam, Index No. 172-2014. 13 a. Debt Collectors sued Werner after the expiration of the statute of limitations; b. Debt Collectors sued Werner on behalf of a Plaintiff which had no legal right to bring an action in a court in New York state; c. Debt Collectors sued Werner on behalf of a Plaintiff who was not able to prove it had a legal right to collect the debt at issue since they were not able to prove that each prior assignor notified Werner of the assignment of the debt. 80. For one or more of the above reasons, by suing Werner in the above-identified lawsuit, Debt Collectors violated 15 USC 1692e, 15 USC 1692e(2)(A), 15 USC 1692e(5),15 USC 1692f , and/or 15 USC 1692f(1). 81. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 82. The Summons prepared by F&G in the action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam Index No. 169-2014 sets forth that F&G’s client’s address is in Massachusetts. 83. The Complaint prepared by F&G in the action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam Index No. 169-2014 sets forth in paragraph 2 the following statement of fact: “Plaintiff is authorized to proceed with this action” 84. As evidence by F&G’s admissions in the aforementioned opposition to the aforementioned motion to dismiss, the aforementioned Plaintiff was not authorized to do business in New York at the time the aforementioned lawsuit was filed or at any time thereafter. 14 85. As explained in the aforementioned motion to dismiss and reply, the aforementioned Plaintiff had no legal right to file the aforementioned lawsuit; and therefore the statement of fact in paragraph 2 of the aforementioned lawsuit is false. 86. The false statement in a lawsuit served upon a consumer could mislead a putative- debtor as to the legal status of the underlying debt; and therefore Debt Collectors violated 15 USC § 1692e, 15 USC § 1692e (10), 15 USC § 1692e (2) (A), 15 USC § 1692e (5) as a result of the false statement. 87. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 88. The Summons prepared by F&G in the action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam Index No. 170-2014 sets forth that F&G’s client’s address is in Massachusetts. 89. The Complaint prepared by F&G in the action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam Index No. 170-2014 sets forth in paragraph 2 the following statement of fact: “Plaintiff is authorized to proceed with this action” 90. As evidence by F&G’s admissions in the aforementioned opposition to the aforementioned motion to dismiss, the aforementioned Plaintiff was not authorized to do business in New York at the time the aforementioned lawsuit was filed or at any time thereafter. 91. As explained in the aforementioned motion to dismiss and reply, the aforementioned Plaintiff had no legal right to file the aforementioned lawsuit; and therefore the statement of fact in paragraph 2 of the aforementioned lawsuit is false. 92. The false statement in a lawsuit served upon a consumer could mislead a putative- 15 debtor as to the legal status of the underlying debt; and therefore Debt Collectors violated 15 USC § 1692e, 15 USC § 1692e (10), 15 USC § 1692e (2) (A), 15 USC § 1692e (5) as a result of the false statement. 93. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 94. The Summons prepared by F&G in the action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam Index No. 171-2014 sets forth that F&G’s client’s address is in Massachusetts. 95. The Complaint prepared by F&G in the action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam Index No. 171-2014 sets forth in paragraph 2 the following statement of fact: “Plaintiff is authorized to proceed with this action” 96. As evidence by F&G’s admissions in the aforementioned opposition to the aforementioned motion to dismiss, the aforementioned Plaintiff was not authorized to do business in New York at the time the aforementioned lawsuit was filed or at any time thereafter. 97. As explained in the aforementioned motion to dismiss and reply, the aforementioned Plaintiff had no legal right to file the aforementioned lawsuit; and therefore the statement of fact in paragraph 2 of the aforementioned lawsuit is false. 98. The false statement in a lawsuit served upon a consumer could mislead a putative- debtor as to the legal status of the underlying debt; and therefore Debt Collectors violated 15 USC § 1692e, 15 USC § 1692e (10), 15 USC § 1692e (2) (A), 15 USC § 1692e (5) as a result of the false statement. 16 99. Werner realleges paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint. 100. The Summons prepared by F&G in the action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam Index No. 172-2014 sets forth that F&G’s client’s address is in Massachusetts. 101. The Complaint prepared by F&G in the action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Putnam Index No. 172-2014 sets forth in paragraph 2 the following statement of fact: “Plaintiff is authorized to proceed with this action” 102. As evidence by F&G’s admissions in the aforementioned opposition to the aforementioned motion to dismiss, the aforementioned Plaintiff was not authorized to do business in New York at the time the aforementioned lawsuit was filed or at any time thereafter. 103. As explained in the aforementioned motion to dismiss and reply, the aforementioned Plaintiff had no legal right to file the aforementioned lawsuit; and therefore the statement of fact in paragraph 2 of the aforementioned lawsuit is false. 104. The false statement in a lawsuit served upon a consumer could mislead a putative- debtor as to the legal status of the underlying debt; and therefore Debt Collectors violated 15 USC § 1692e, 15 USC § 1692e (10), 15 USC § 1692e (2) (A), 15 USC § 1692e (5) as a result of the false statement. } FIRST MARBLEHEAD DATA SERVICES, INC. } } } Defendants. }

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LUKE CLARK Plaintiff/Petition CAVALRY PORTFOLIO SERVICES, LLC et al Defendant/Responde Index LUKE CLARK, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILIARLY SITUATED,

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12. On information and belief, Defendants are for-profit entities that are in the compounding pharmaceutical business and are licensed in 26 states. 13. On or about January 17, 2020, Defendants sent an unsolicited facsimile to Plaintiff using a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device. See Exhibit A. Plaintiff received the Fax on a stand-alone fax machine. 14. The first page of the Fax states in part the following: 24. Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the proposed Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 26. Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)): Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. Plaintiff received the same or similar fax as the faxes sent by or on behalf of Defendants advertising the commercially availability and/or quality of property, goods or services of Defendants during the Class Period. Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. Defendants have acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same or similar fax or faxes which did not contain compliant opt-out language or were sent without prior express invitation or permission. 29. The TCPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 30. The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 34. Defendants’ Other Violations. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendants have sent via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines faxes other than Exhibit A that constitute advertisements under the TCPA that were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission (and/or that Defendants are precluded from sustaining the established business relationship safe harbor due to their failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements). By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendants may be continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. 35. The TCPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 36. The TCPA is a strict liability statute, so Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and the other class members even if its actions were only negligent.

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(Collective Action under § 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act for Unpaid Overtime) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 Class Action under the Colorado Wage Act and Wage Order for Unpaid Overtime Against Defendants Interthinx and Verisk) 12. Interthinx promotes itself as a “provider of comprehensive risk mitigation solutions focusing on mortgage fraud, collateral risk and valuation, regulatory compliance, forensic loan audit services, loss mitigation, and loss forecasting.” See www.interthinx.com. 13. On October 12, 2007, Interthinx acquired NIA Consulting, Ltd. (“NIA”), which became a division of Interthinx. After the acquisition, NIA employees became employees of Interthinx. 14. Interthinx employed, and continues to employ, Fraud Auditors, Analysts, and Underwriters (collectively “Fraud Detection Employees”) throughout the United States. The primary job responsibilities of Fraud Detection Employees are verifying the accuracy of mortgage loan documents, processing defaulted mortgage loan files, and auditing defaulted mortgage loans. 16. The Fraud Detection Employees are nonexempt under the FLSA and the applicable Colorado Minimum Wage Order (“Wage Order”), 7 CCR § 1103, as well as other state wage and hour laws nationwide. 17. Interthinx pays its Fraud Detection Employees under the same or similar compensation structure. Interthinx pays its Fraud Detection Employees a salary and commissions/nondiscretionary bonuses which are calculated as a percentage of the total revenue derived from the employee’s review of mortgage loan files. 18. Defendants classified, and continue to classify, all Fraud Detection Employees as exempt and, thus, not entitled to receive overtime compensation. In particular, Interthinx functionally requires these employees to perform work well in excess of eight (8) hours per day and/or forty (40) hours per week but fails to pay them overtime by illegally classifying all such employees as exempt from overtime requirements. 19. In fact, Interthinx required, and continues to require, its Fraud Detection Employees to review a certain minimum number of mortgage files per week. Most Fraud Detection Employees must work in excess of forty (40) hours per week to meet this minimum production standard imposed by Interthinx, but they are not paid overtime for these hours. 21. Interthinx failed, and continues to fail, to accurately record the actual time worked by all Fraud Detection Employees. Interthinx could have, and can, easily and accurately record the actual time worked by all Fraud Detection Employees because, among other things, Fraud Detection Employees spent, and continue to spend, a significant amount of their work time at Interthinx’s offices. 22. In light of Interthinx’s failure to accurately record time worked by all Fraud Detection Employees, Interthinx failed to provide accurate wage statements to all Fraud Detection Employees. 23. Additionally, Interthinx has, on at least one occasion, retroactively changed the formula with which it calculates the Fraud Detection Employees’ commissions/non-discretionary bonuses, resulting in Fraud Detection Employees not receiving significant earned, vested, and determinable commissions/nondiscretionary bonuses. 24. Plaintiff Shaw is employed by Interthinx as a Fraud Detection Employee at its office in Colorado Springs, CO. Plaintiff Shaw has been employed by Interthinx since January 28, 2008. 25. Since she has been employed by Interthinx, Plaintiff Shaw routinely worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week and some weeks in excess of sixty (60) hours. 27. This retroactive change in the formula resulted in nonpayment of more than $1,200 in earned commissions/nondiscretionary bonuses which Plaintiff Shaw was entitled to receive. 28. Upon information and belief, Verisk exercised substantial control over the human resources and pay practices of Interthinx, along with its finances and operations, including, but not limited to, the formula and the manner with which Fraud Detection Employees were compensated by Interthinx. In fact, Interthinx’s employees received their pay checks from Verisk. As such, Verisk is a joint employer of the Fraud Detection Employees and liable for Interthinx’s illegal pay practices. 29. Upon information and belief, Moyer is responsible for Interthinx’s pay practices and exercises substantial control over its finances and operations. As such, Moyer is individually liable for Interthinx’s illegal pay practices. 30. Defendants’ illegal wage and hour practices are willful violations. Among other things, Interthinx was previously sued in 2009 for similar wage and hour violations in a case entitled Renata Gluzman, et al. v. Interthinx, Case No. BC419743, Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles (August 13, 2009). 32. Defendants have ignored the above lawsuit and complaints and failed to correct the manner in which Fraud Detection Employees are compensated, including refusing to pay them overtime compensation and their earned commissions/nondiscretionary bonuses. 33. Interthinx’s deliberate illegal classification of its Fraud Detection Employees as exempt from overtime requirements results in Interthinx willfully violating the FLSA, the Colorado Wage Act (“Wage Act”), Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 8-4-101, et seq., and the applicable Colorado Wage Order, as well as other state wage and hour laws nationwide. 34. Plaintiff Shaw hereby incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint. 35. The FLSA Named Plaintiff brings this Complaint as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA seeking to recover all unpaid overtime compensation and related penalties and damages pursuant to the FLSA. 37. The number and identities of other plaintiffs yet to opt-in and consent to be party plaintiffs are currently unknown but may be determined from Interthinx’s records. Potential class members may easily and quickly be notified of the pendency of this action. 38. Plaintiff Shaw consents in writing to be a party to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiff Shaw’s Consent to become a Party Plaintiff pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 226(b) is attached as an exhibit. 39. Two other Fraud Detection Employees have opted in this lawsuit and their Consents to become a Party Plaintiff are attached as exhibits. 40. At all relevant times, Defendants have been, and continue to be, “employer[s]” engaged in interstate “commerce” and/or in the production of “goods” for “commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA. At all relevant times, Defendants have employed, and/or continue to employ, “employee[s],” including Plaintiff Shaw and all other similarly situated current and former employees. At all relevant times, Defendants have had gross operating revenues in excess of $500,000 which is the threshold test for the “enterprise” requirement under the FLSA. 41. At all relevant times, Defendants have been, and continue to be, subject to the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA because their employees are engaged in interstate commerce, their employees are engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce, and they are an enterprise engaged in commerce and the production of goods for interstate commerce. 43. Like the FLSA Named Plaintiff, Defendants employ or employed numerous other Fraud Detection Employees at locations throughout the United States. This includes, but is not limited to, the following positions: Fraud Auditor, Fraud Analyst, Processor, and Underwriter. All such positions are hereby referred to as the “putative representative action plaintiffs.” 44. Defendants compensate or compensated the putative representative action plaintiffs as exempt employees under the FLSA and not entitled to receive overtime. Defendants compensate or compensated the putative representative action plaintiffs by paying them commissions/nondiscretionary bonuses and/or draws against commissions/nondiscretionary bonuses. 45. FLSA Named Plaintiff and putative representative action plaintiffs do not or did not perform job duties or tasks which permit them to be exempt from overtime compensation as required under the FLSA. 46. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and putative representative action plaintiffs have been entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under the FLSA. 48. Furthermore, all putative representative action plaintiffs are similarly situated in that they are or were all subject to Defendants’ same compensation policy, plan, or procedure which requires or required them to perform work and/or requires or required them to be present at work while compensating them, at least in part, on a commission/non-discretionary bonus structure and/or draw against commission/non-discretionary bonus structure without paying them overtime. This denies the putative representative action plaintiffs’ compensation for services performed, and denies them their overtime compensation. 49. Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff and the putative representative action plaintiffs at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek, and therefore, Defendants have violated, and continue to violate, the FLSA, including 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 50. The foregoing conduct, as alleged herein including but not limited to being previously sued for the same violations alleged in this Complaint and ignoring complaints by employees regarding a failure to be paid overtime premiums, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all similarly situated employees of Defendants who comprise putative representative action plaintiffs, seeks recovery of all attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses of this action, to be paid by Defendants, as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 54. Plaintiff Shaw hereby incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint. 56. The members of one above class shall be referred to as the “Colorado Overtime Class Members.” 57. The Named Colorado Overtime Class Representative, individually and on behalf of the above Colorado Overtime Class Members, brings a class action based on the Colorado Wage Act and Wage Order. These state law claims, if certified for class wide treatment, may be pursued by all similarly situated persons who do not opt-out of the class. 58. At all relevant times, Defendants Interthinx and Verisk have been, and continue to be, “employer[s]” as defined under the Wage Act and Wage Order. At all relevant times, Defendants Interthinx and Verisk have employed, and/or continue to employ, “employee[s],” including Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former employees. 59. The Named Colorado Overtime Class Representative and the Colorado Overtime Class Members are all similarly situated in that they shared common job duties and descriptions, and all were all subject to Defendants’ policy which classified them as exempt and denied them overtime for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, which violates the Colorado Wage Act and Wage Order. 61. In particular, the Colorado Minimum Wage Order requires that Defendants pay their non-exempt, hourly employees time and one-half their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, all hours worked in excess of twelve (12) hours in any workday, and all hours worked more than twelve (12) consecutive hours regardless of the work day, whichever calculation results in the greater payment of wages. 62. The Named Colorado Overtime Class Representative and the Colorado Overtime Class Members are non-exempt employees entitled to be paid overtime compensation for all hours which qualify under the Wage Order. 63. Interthinx’s conduct denies such persons overtime pay and is a direct violation of the Colorado Wage Act and Wage Order. 64. Because Defendants failed to properly pay overtime as required by Colorado law, the Named Colorado Overtime Class Representative and the Colorado Overtime Class Members are entitled to all overtime compensation due to them at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all overtime hours worked in the past three years and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 65. Defendant Verisk is individually liable for the illegal pay practices of Interthinx. 67. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint. 68. The Named Colorado Bonus Class Representative brings this claim as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), seeking to recover damages and related penalties pursuant to the Colorado Wage Act, on behalf of herself and the following class of persons: All current and former Fraud Auditors, Fraud Analysts, Processors, and Underwriter employees of Defendants who will, are, or have worked at Interthinx’s office location in Colorado at any time during the last three years, who were subject to Defendants’ unlawful compensation policies of failing to pay all earned, vested, and determinable commissions/nondiscretionary bonuses. 69. The members of the above class shall be referred to as the “Colorado Bonus Class Members.” 70. The Named Colorado Bonus Class Representative, individually and on behalf of the above Colorado Bonus Class Members, brings a class action against Defendants Interthinx and Verisk based on the Colorado Wage Act. This state law claim, if certified for class wide treatment, may be pursued by all similarly situated persons who do not opt-out of the class. 72. Defendants failed to pay all earned, vested, and determinable commissions/nondiscretionary bonuses to the Named Colorado Bonus Class Representative and the Colorado Bonus Class Members. 73. Interthinx’s deliberate and illegal retroactive change to its commissions/non- discretionary bonuses structure resulted in Defendants Interthinx and Verisk violation of the Wage Act, as well as other state labor laws nationwide. 74. Because Defendants Interthinx and Verisk failed to properly pay all earned, vested, and determinable commissions/nondiscretionary bonuses, the Named Colorado Bonus Class Representative and the Colorado Bonus Class Members are entitled to all due commissions/nondiscretionary bonuses plus reasonable attorneys’ fees.

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10. Plaintiff's alleged debt was primarily for personal, family or household purposes and is therefore a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 11. Sometime after the incurrence of the debt, but before the initiation of this action, Plaintiff is alleged to have fallen behind on payments allegedly owed on the alleged debt. 12. At a time known only to Defendant, Plaintiff's alleged debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 13. In its efforts to collect the alleged debt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by written correspondence. (“Exhibit 1.”) 14. Defendant's written correspondence to Plaintiff is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 16. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 17. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f provides a debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 18. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8) limits the language and symbols that a debt collector may place on envelopes it sends to consumers. 19. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8) prohibits a debt collector from using any language or symbols on the envelope, other than the debt collector’s address, when communicating with a consumer by mail, except that a debt collector may place its business name on the envelope if such name does not indicate that the debt collector is in the debt collection business. 20. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8)’s prohibition applies to language and symbols both on the envelope, and language and symbols visible through any glassine window of the envelope. See, Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing,
 765 F.3d 299
 (3rd Cir 2014). 21. Defendant assigned Plaintiff account number XXXX4648. 22. Plaintiff’s original account number is XXXX8192. 23. Visible through the glassine window of the envelope sent to Plaintiff was a Quick Response Code, or QR code, which when scanned reveals Plaintiff’s account number and account information. 24. The QR code visible through the glassine window can be easily scanned by anyone with a smartphone, as QR code scanning applications are easily accessible to the public free of charge. 25. Defendant disclosed Plaintiff’s account information in its mailing to Plaintiff by placing such QR code on the envelope, or making such visible through the glassine window of the envelope. 26. Defendant used language other than Defendant’s address and business name, on the envelope it sent to Plaintiff. 27. Defendant has violated § 1692f by using language other than Defendant’s address and business name, on the envelope it sent to Plaintiff. 29. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 30. Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff to effect its collection of Plaintiff's alleged debt with reasonable care. 31. Defendant's conduct as described herein shows a lack of exercise of reasonable care in Defendant's collection of the alleged debt. 32. Defendant breached its duty to collect Plaintiff's alleged debt with reasonable care. 33. Defendant's conduct was committed by Defendant in the conduct of a business, trade or commerce or the furnishing of a service in New York State and constitutes a violation of NY GBL § 349(a). 34. Defendant's conduct was consumer-orientated in that the letter was sent in an effort to collect an alleged consumer debt. 35. Defendant's conduct has a broader impact on consumers at large as, upon information and belief, Defendant has sent the subject form letter to hundreds of consumers. 36. Plaintiff is a reasonable consumer. 37. Defendant's conduct would mislead a reasonable consumer. 38. Defendant engaged in a material deceptive act or practice as described herein. 39. Defendant's conduct caused plaintiff to suffer injury. 40. Defendant violated NY GBL § 349(a) and is liable to Plaintiff pursuant to NY GBL § 349(h). Violation of New York General Business Law § 349 Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f Disclosure of Plaintiff's Account Information

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23. Defendants have been attempting to collect from plaintiff an alleged credit card debt, incurred (if at all) for personal, family or household purposes and not for business purposes. 24. On or about June 15, 2018, defendant Central Credit Services, LLC, acting on behalf of defendant JHPDE, as its authorized agent, sent plaintiff the letter attached as Exhibit A. 25. Exhibit A is the first letter plaintiff received from defendant Central Credit Services, LLC regarding the alleged debt described therein. 26. Exhibit A is a form letter, filled out by computer in a standardized manner. 27. On information and belief, based on its contents, Exhibit A is a form intended for use as the first letter defendant Central Credit Services, LLC sends to a consumer regarding the debt described therein. 28. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-27. 29. The form letter attached as Exhibit A violates 15 U.S.C. §1692e, 1692e(2), 1692e(10) and 1692g. It fails to coherently state the amount of the debt, as required, and is confusing and misleading as to the amount of the debt, in that: a. The front of the letter states that the balance due is $5,674.35; b. At the top of the reverse side of the letter is an itemization which describes the same $5,674.35 number as the total due as of charge-off, and which 4 further states that the debt has increased subsequent to charge-off by $431.43 interest and $212 non-interest fees and charges, and that there have been no payments or credits since charge-off. 30. This is mathematically nonsensical: $5,674.35 + $431.43 + $212 - $0 is not $5,674.35. 31. In addition, the letter is ambiguous and inconsistent as to whether interest, fees and other charges are continually being added to the debt. 32. Section 1692g provides: § 1692g. Validation of debts (a) Notice of debt; contents. Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing-- (1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and (5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. (b) Disputed debts. If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt 5 collector. Collection activities and communications that do not otherwise violate this title may continue during the 30-day period referred to in subsection (a) unless the consumer has notified the debt collector in writing that the debt, or any portion of the debt, is disputed or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor. Any collection activities and communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor. (c) Admission of liability. The failure of a consumer to dispute the validity of a debt under this section may not be construed by any court as an admission of liability by the consumer. (d) Legal pleadings. A communication in the form of a formal pleading in a civil action shall not be treated as an initial communication for purposes of subsection (a). (e) Notice provisions. The sending or delivery of any form or notice which does not relate to the collection of a debt and is expressly required by the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.], title V of Gramm- Leach-Bliley Act [15 USCS §§ 6801 et seq.], or any provision of Federal or State law relating to notice of data security breach or privacy, or any regulation prescribed under any such provision of law, shall not be treated as an initial communication in connection with debt collection for purposes of this section. 33. Section 1692e provides: A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: . . . (2) The false representation of— (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or (B) any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt. . . . (10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer. . . . 34. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 35. The class consists of (a) all individuals (b) with New York addresses, (c) to 6 whom defendant Central Credit Services, LLC sent a letter in the form represented by Exhibit A (d) on behalf of defendant JHP, (e) where the amount listed for the debt as of the date of the letter does not equal the amount listed for the debt as of chargeoff plus any interest, charges and fees accrued since chargeoff minus any payments and credits since chargeoff, (f) which letter was sent any time during a period beginning one year prior to the filing of this action and ending 21 days after the filing of this action. 36. On information and belief, based on defendants’ size and the use of a form letter, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is not practicable. 37. There are questions of law and fact common to the class members, which common questions predominate over any questions relating to individual class members. The predominant common question is whether Exhibit A violates the FDCPA. 38. Plaintiff’s claim is typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 39. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in class actions and FDCPA litigation. 40. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter, in that: c. Individual actions are not economically feasible. d. Members of the class are likely to be unaware of their rights; e. Congress intended class actions to be the principal enforcement mechanism under the FDCPA. WHEREFORE, the Court should enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and the class members and against defendants for: i. Statutory damages; ii. Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit; iii. Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 7 s/Tiffany N. Hardy Tiffany N. Hardy Tiffany N. Hardy

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20. Defendant is a clothing manufacturer and retail company, and owns and operates the website, www.atmcollection.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.atmcollection.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse clothing for purchase and delivery, view stores, obtain defendant’s contact information, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in September 2020, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website. 26. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: 28. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen- reader users; 29. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and 30. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those various clothing for purchase and delivery, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 34. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 35. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 39. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 40. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 41. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 42. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 43. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 47. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 49. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 50. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 51. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 54. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 55. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 56. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 57. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 60. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 61. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 62. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 64. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 65. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 66. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 68. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 70. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 75. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 79. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 80. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 81. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 82. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 85. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 86. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 87. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 88. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 89. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 92. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 93. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 95. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 96. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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10. As an example of the Defendants’ abhorrent conduct, Defendants have violated several laws to take advantage of Plaintiff, an 87 year-old widow living on social security in East Texas who allegedly owed $8200 on a Chase Bank debt. Defendants Debt Choice and Iniguez Firm solicited her in order to help her reduce the debt. In exchange for paying them over $1750 in fees, the sole “services” provided were two one-paragraph form letters to Plaintiff’s creditors that were computer generated with electronic signatures. Debt Choice 11. One or more of the Defendants placed advertisements to be seen on television in many states, including Texas, concerning the consolidation of debts and giving the contact number for Defendant Debt Choice. 12. Plaintiff saw one such advertisement while watching television in Henderson County, Texas. Plaintiff called Debt Choice to seek help with her consumer debts. Debt Choice presented, simultaneously, two contracts to Plaintiff for execution: a form contract for PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL CLASS COMPLAINT AND JURY TRIAL DEMAND – Page 5 Debt Choice’s services and a form contract for Defendant Iniguez Firm’s services. After repeated calls from Debt Choice, Plaintiff signed both form contracts on April 1, 2009. 13. The sole “consideration” provided by Debt Choice was the referral to the Iniguez Firm. However, at the time Plaintiff signed the contract with Debt Choice, Debt Choice had already referred Plaintiff to Iniguez Firm as can be seen from the presentation to her of the Iniguez Firm’s form contract. Thus the sole “consideration” provided by Debt Choice – the referral to the Iniguez Firm – occurred before she contracted with Debt Choice. 14. Debt Choice’s referral to the Iniguez Firm was a referral to a lawyer. The contract between Plaintiff and Debt Choice provides that Plaintiff’s first payment to Iniguez Firm will be paid to Debt Choice as a referral fee. “I understand that making a payment, (sic) equal to the first program payment is paid to Debt Choice and is not paid to my creditors.” The “program payment” was set out in the alleged contract between Plaintiff and Iniguez Firm. Under Texas law, Debt Choice was prohibited by law from accepting money or anything of value to solicit employment for the Iniguez Firm. TEX. PENAL 59. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiff brings this suit individually and as representative of a class of similarly situated persons. The court should enter an order to certify a plaintiff class all individuals: (1) who have either (a) signed a “Legal Service Agreement” with the Iniguez Law Firm, P.C.; or (b) signed a “Debt Choice Client Agreement” with Debt Choice, Inc.; or (c) Lexxiom has access to a “Client Data File” for the individual; and PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL CLASS COMPLAINT AND JURY TRIAL DEMAND – Page 14 (2) whose address at the time of the contract or creation of the “Client Data File” was in Texas according to the records of any one of the Defendants. 60. Specifically excluded from the class are all Federal judges and members of their families within the first degree of consanguinity, and the officers, directors and counsel of record of Defendants, and all employees of any Defendant. 61. The proposed Plaintiff class meets the prerequisites of a class. 62. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is unable to state the exact number of the members of the class without the discovery of information available to Defendants, but upon information and belief, aver that there are hundreds or thousands of class members. The number of the members of the class makes it impracticable to bring them all before the court. 63. There are questions of law and fact common to the class. These questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the class. The questions of fact and law affecting the class as a whole, include, but are not limited to:  whether the contract between Debt Choice and each class member is void for lack of consideration;  whether the contract between Debt Choice and each class member is void for failure of consideration;  whether the Defendant Iniguez Firm was required to register with the Texas Office of Consumer Credit commissioner under the TDAA.  whether Defendant Iniguez Firm’s failure to meet the requirements of the TDAA render the contract between Defendant and class members void. PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL CLASS COMPLAINT AND JURY TRIAL DEMAND – Page 15  whether the Defendant Lexxiom was required to register with the Texas Office of Consumer Credit commissioner under the TDAA.  whether Defendants’ violations of the TDAA entitle the consumers to recover from Defendants all amounts paid by the consumers;  whether Defendants’ violations of the TDAA entitle the consumers to recover from Defendants all costs paid by the consumers;  whether Defendants’ violations of the TDAA entitle the class to recover from Defendants attorney’s fees,  whether Defendants’ violations of the TDAA entitle the class to recover punitive damages;  whether Defendants’ violation of the TDAA entitle the class to injunctive relief;  whether Defendants were unjustly enriched by class members;  whether Defendants hold money that belongs to class members in equity and good conscience;  whether the Defendants engaged in a conspiracy;  whether Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all class members for all payments made to Defendants as a result of the conspiracy; and  whether class members are entitled to punitive and exemplary damages against any or all Defendants. 64. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class. The claims have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the members of the class as a whole and are PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL CLASS COMPLAINT AND JURY TRIAL DEMAND – Page 16 based upon identical legal theories. It is the same course of conduct that serves as the gravamen of the claims against Defendants. The members of the class have suffered the same type of injury and possess the same interests as Plaintiff. The single resolution of these claims would be preferable to a multiplicity of similar actions. 65. Plaintiff, as the representative party, will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The counsel representing Plaintiff and the class are qualified, experienced and able. 66. This suit is maintainable as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(2) because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole. 67. This suit is maintainable as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 68. Predominance. The questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The facts that are disputed will be resolved without the participation of individual class members. Plaintiff’s claims do not present individual questions of causation or reliance. The facts of Defendants’ practices are common to all members. 69. Superiority. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Given the large size of the class, individual adjudication of the claims would require hundreds of lawsuits. Moreover, intervention and joinder PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL CLASS COMPLAINT AND JURY TRIAL DEMAND – Page 17 would require the intervention or joinder of hundreds of parties. Individual adjudication, intervention, and joinder, therefore, are not reasonable options. Class treatment is superior to all other methods of adjudicating the claims of the putative class. 70. Individual control. The interests of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions do not outweigh the benefits of class treatment. Members of the class possess claims for economic damages that in most instances do not exceed a few thousand dollars. Thus, no individual class member possesses an overriding interest in the right to retain counsel and litigate to conclusion an individual claim. In fact, individual adjudication of these claims remains wholly impractical. The class members would be compelled to spend substantially more money on attorney’s fees and case costs to prosecute their individual claim than the amount of each individual claim. The interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions, therefore, does not outweigh the benefits of class treatment. 71. Other factors. On information and belief, there are few if any other cases pending by or against members of the class raising the claims asserted herein. This Court is the desirable forum for this controversy because the Defendants transact business in this District. No significant difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. Plaintiff will be able to identify class members through discovery of Defendants’ extensive computer databases storing information regarding past and present consumer clients. Thus, no difficulties exist regarding the identification of class members. PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL CLASS COMPLAINT AND JURY TRIAL DEMAND – Page 18 72. Under Texas law, past consideration will not support a contract. Franks v. Brookshire Bros., Inc., 986 S.W.2d 375, 378 (Tex. App. – Beaumont 1999, no pet.)(“past consideration will not support a subsequent promise because “consideration” is a present exchange bargained in return for a promise.”); Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 659 (Tex. 2006) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring) (noting that “ ‘past consideration’ is not consideration”); Roark v. Stallworth Oil and Gas, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 492, 495 -496 (Tex. 1991)(“Consideration is a present exchange bargained for in return for a promise.”). 73. “If anything in the classical law of contracts is clear, it is that past consideration is not good consideration. Any exchange has to be contemporaneous by definition, because the promise and the consideration for that promise must serve as reciprocal conventional inducements.” Trilogy Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software, Inc., 143 S.W.3d 452, 463 (Tex. App. – Austin 2004, pet. den.), quoting Jordan Leibman & Richard Nathan, The Enforceability of Post-employment Noncompetition Agreements Formed After At-Will Employment Has Commenced: the “Afterthought” Agreement, 60 S. Cal. L.Rev. 1465, 1528-29 (1987). 74. The sole alleged consideration for the Debt Choice contract is the past “referral” to the Iniguez Firm. As this “referral” was made when Debt Choice presented the Iniguez Firm contract to Plaintiff, this alleged consideration was made before the contract with PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL CLASS COMPLAINT AND JURY TRIAL DEMAND – Page 19 Debt Choice was entered. 75. Since past consideration will not support a contract, there was no consideration for the contract between Plaintiff and Debt Choice. Similarly, there was no consideration for the contract between each class member and Debt Choice. 76. Plaintiff and each class member are entitled to recover from Debt Choice all sums they paid to Debt Choice either directly or through another Defendant or third party. 77. If the Court finds that there is a valid and enforceable contract between Defendant Debt Choice and class members, then Plaintiff pleads in the alternative that there has been a failure of consideration. 78. The Iniguez Firm is not licensed in the State of Texas to provide debt management services. Thus, the consideration for the contract has failed and/or Debt Choice breached the contract. 79. Plaintiff and each class member are entitled to recover from Debt Choice all sums they paid to Debt Choice either directly or through another Defendant or third party. PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL CLASS COMPLAINT AND JURY TRIAL DEMAND – Page 20 8. This case is about a scheme and conspiracy by Defendants to take advantage of some of the most vulnerable members of society – those who are facing a personal economic crisis and have few options available to them. Defendants prey on consumers who are unable to pay their debts by offering “services” to help reduce the debts. In reality, PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL CLASS COMPLAINT AND JURY TRIAL DEMAND – Page 4 Defendants provide virtually no services and charge unconscionable amounts to victims like Plaintiff and the class members – all in violation of Texas law. 80. Plaintiff is a consumer as defined by the TDAA because she is an individual who resides in this state and entered a debt management service agreement with Iniguez Firm. TEX. 9. The Texas Legislature has deemed it necessary to protect debtors from unscrupulous sellers of debt management services. See, Chapter 394 of the TEXAS FINANCE CODE (The Debtor Assistance Act, hereinafter the “TDAA”). “The purpose of [the TDAA] is to protect consumers who contract for services with debt management services providers.” TEX. FIN. CODE § 394.201 (a). Defendants have wholly failed to comply with that statute and have denied Plaintiff and class members the very protections the Texas Legislature mandated in passing that law. 91. Defendant Iniguez is a “debt management service” provider as defined by the TDAA and subject to that Act because he is arranging or assisting a consumer to arrange for the distribution of one or more payments to or among one or more creditors of the consumer in full or partial payment of the consumer's obligations. TEX. FIN. CODE § 394.202 99. Defendant Lexxiom is a “debt management service” provider as defined by the TDAA and subject to that Act because it is arranging or assisting a consumer to arrange for the distribution of one or more payments to or among one or more creditors of the consumer in full or partial payment of the consumer's obligations. TEX. FIN. CODE § 394.202 CLAIM FOR DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS FINANCE CODE CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION. CLAIM FOR DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS FINANCE CODE CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 121. As outlined above, the “contracts” entered into by Debt Choice and Iniguez Firm are void. As such, the Defendants were unjustly enriched when they received monies under these void contracts. 122. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the class, seeks to recover all monies that Defendants received as a result of the void contracts. CLAIM FOR DAMAGES FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED. 117. As a result of the void contracts between Plaintiff and class members with Debt Choice and Plaintiff and class members with Iniguez Firm, Defendants came to hold sums of money which, in equity and good conscience, belong to Plaintiff and the class members. 118. The contracts between Plaintiff/class members and Debt Choice are void, as detailed above, and therefore any monies that Defendant Debt Choice received should be returned to Plaintiff and the class members. 119. The contracts Plaintiff/class members and Iniguez Firm are void. Therefore, any monies received by Defendants as a result of that void contract should be returned to Plaintiff and the class members. 120. Plaintiff seeks recovery of all such sums of money received by Defendants on behalf of herself and the class. PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL CLASS COMPLAINT AND JURY TRIAL DEMAND – Page 28 CLAIM FOR DAMAGES FOR CONSPIRACY 112. Defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy to obtain money from consumers, including Plaintiff, for debt management services without the provider of such services being licensed as required by Texas law. 113. Each Defendant was aware that one or more of the other Defendants sought to obtain money from consumers, including Plaintiff, for debt management services without the provider of such services being licensed as required by Texas law. 114. Each Defendant formed the specific intent to assist one or more of the other Defendants to obtain money from consumers, including Plaintiff, for debt management services without the provider of such services being licensed as required by Texas law. PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL CLASS COMPLAINT AND JURY TRIAL DEMAND – Page 27 115. Each of the actions by Defendants alleged above were made in furtherance of the Defendants’ conspiracy to obtain money from consumers, including Plaintiff, for debt management services without the provider of such services being licensed as required by Texas law. 116. Plaintiff and each class member are entitled to recover as actual damages from Defendants, jointly and severally, all sums they paid to any Defendant either directly or through another Defendant or third party. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES 123. Exemplary damages should be awarded against Defendants because the harm with respect to which the Plaintiff seeks recovery of exemplary damages resulted from gross negligence (which means that the Defendants’ acts and/or omissions (i) when viewed objectively from the Defendants’ standpoint at the time of the acts and/or omissions involved an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of potential harm to others and (ii) were such that the Defendants had an actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceeded with conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others). INJUNCTION AGAINST VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS FINANCE CODE 109. Defendant Lexxiom’s violations of the TDAA entitle Plaintiff and the class to injunctive relief. The TDAA provides for the following relief: PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL CLASS COMPLAINT AND JURY TRIAL DEMAND – Page 26 An aggrieved consumer may sue for injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief to stop a person from violating this subchapter. TEX. FIN. CODE § 394.215 (d). 110. Plaintiff, individually and as representative of the class, asks the Court to enter a permanent injunction against Lexxiom prohibiting if from entering any contract for debt management services with a person located in Texas, performing any debt management services regarding a person located in Texas, or assisting any other person or entity in performing any debt management services regarding a person located in Texas. 111. Plaintiff, individually and as representative of the class, has been forced to retain counsel to assist in bringing this action. As such, Defendant Iniguez Firm is liable to the Plaintiff and the class for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of this action. INJUNCTION AGAINST VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS FINANCE CODE

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4.1 Coinstar does business in the State of Washington and throughout the United States. The services Coinstar offers to consumers include converting coins into cash vouchers and free coin counting when consumers use their coins to purchase Coin to Card gift certificates for Coinstar’s retail and service partners. 4.2 Coinstar sells gift certificates to consumers from its Coinstar kiosks located throughout Washington and the United States. 4.3 To stimulate consumer interest and a sense of urgency in consumers to purchase gift certificates from Coinstar, Coinstar does not charge the typical fee for its coin counting service (9.8 cents per U.S. dollar) if a customer elects to purchase a gift certificate instead of receiving a cash voucher, thereby inducing its customers to buy Case 2:13-cv-00316-RHW Document 1 Filed 08/27/13 Jeffers, Danielson, Sonn & Aylward, P.S. Attorneys at Law 2600 Chester Kimm Road / P.O. Box 1688 Wenatchee, WA 98807-1688 5.1 Request for Certification. Lair seeks certification of the above-described Class. 5.2 Numerosity (CR 23(a)(1)). The exact number of Class members is unknown to Lair at this time. According to Coinstar’s website, Coinstar has kiosk machines in nearly 19,000 locations. On information and belief, Coinstar has contracted with thousands of Class members throughout the State of Washington, making joinder of each individual Class member impracticable. The exact number of Class members may be discerned from Coinstar’s records of gift certificate sales in Washington, and such persons may be identified with particularity through appropriate judicial notice and discovery procedures, such that it would be possible to give such persons actual notice of these proceedings, if required. 5.3 Commonality and Predominance. Common questions of law and fact exist Case 2:13-cv-00316-RHW Document 1 Filed 08/27/13 Jeffers, Danielson, Sonn & Aylward, P.S. Attorneys at Law 2600 Chester Kimm Road / P.O. Box 1688 Wenatchee, WA 98807-1688 7.1 There exists an actual controversy between Lair and the Class on one hand, and Coinstar on the other, to the extent Coinstar’s practicing relative to its sale and issuance of gift certificates are contrary to Washington law and public policy. 7.2 As described above, Coinstar’s transactions with Lair and the Class violate the Consumer Protection Act and the Gift Card Act in that Coinstar is selling gift certificates to consumers with undisclosed, effective expiration dates, and Coinstar unlawfully restricts redemption when a consumer makes a purchase for less than the full value of the gift certificate and unlawfully restricts redemption to only “eligible” products of Coinstar’s retail and service partners, which are not disclosed in advance to consumers. 7.3 Coinstar’s sales of gift certificates with expiration dates and redemption restrictions to Lair and the Class are contrary to applicable Washington law and are therefore void under RCW 19.240.110. Case 2:13-cv-00316-RHW Document 1 Filed 08/27/13 Jeffers, Danielson, Sonn & Aylward, P.S. Attorneys at Law 2600 Chester Kimm Road / P.O. Box 1688 Wenatchee, WA 98807-1688 8.1 Coinstar’s and/or its agents’ actions in: (a) Marketing and selling gift certificates that are subject to effective expiration dates which violate Washington state law; Case 2:13-cv-00316-RHW Document 1 Filed 08/27/13 Jeffers, Danielson, Sonn & Aylward, P.S. Attorneys at Law 2600 Chester Kimm Road / P.O. Box 1688 Wenatchee, WA 98807-1688 9.1 Coinstar knowingly received and retained benefits from Lair and the Class under circumstances that would render it unjust to allow Coinstar to retain such benefits. 9.2 Under principles of equity and good conscience, Coinstar should not be permitted to retain the monies belonging to Lair and the Class that Coinstar was paid in Case 2:13-cv-00316-RHW Document 1 Filed 08/27/13 Jeffers, Danielson, Sonn & Aylward, P.S. Attorneys at Law 2600 Chester Kimm Road / P.O. Box 1688 Wenatchee, WA 98807-1688 CLASS ACTION PROSECUTION DECLARATORY RELIEF PURSUANT TO RCW 7.24 et seq. RESTITUTION/UNJUST ENRICHMENT VIOLATION OF THE WASHINGTON CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a skincare product manufacturer and retail company, and owns and operates the website, www.artnaturals.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.artnaturals.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse skincare products for purchase and delivery, view a blog, obtain defendant’s contact information, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in September 2020, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website. 26. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: 28. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen- reader users; 29. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and 30. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those various skincare products for purchase and delivery, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 35. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 36. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 39. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 40. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 42. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 43. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 47. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 50. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 51. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 56. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 57. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 60. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 61. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 62. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 63. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 64. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 66. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 67. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 70. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 71. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 79. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 80. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 82. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 83. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 86. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 87. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 88. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 89. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 90. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 93. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 96. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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(Conduct Justified) Defendant's conduct is justified because it substantively furthers one or more 24 countervailing interests, including but not limited the need to ensure a healthy, safe workplace and 25 conduct an exam within the parameters of industry standard, barring Plaintiffs purported causes of 26 action. 27 / / / (Estoppel) Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs Complaint and each purported cause of action 21 therein is barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of estoppel. 22 (Failure to State a Cause of Action) The complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Statute of Limitations) Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs Complaint and each purported cause of action 17 therein are barred, by the applicable statutes of limitation. 18 19 20 (No Disclosure) No disclosure by Defendant constituted medical information barring Plaintiffs 4 purported causes of action. 5 6 7 (Plaintiff Consented To Release) Plaintiff consented to the disclosure of information complained of in her complaint, 20 and therefore waived her right to privacy barring her purported causes of action. 21 22 23 22. 24. 3. CENTRAL DIVISION 12 KRISTINA RAINES, Case No. 37-2018-00053708-CU-CR-CTL

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22. At no point has Plaintiff Tiefenthaler sought out or solicited information regarding Defendant Target’s “Circle” program. 23. Plaintiff Tiefenthaler’s telephone number, (608) 239-XXXX, is registered to a cellular telephone service. 25. The plain text of the text message received by Plaintiff (cited in the paragraph above) demonstrates that the message was sent for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services as it seeks to have him sign up for Target’s loyalty program, which is a service. This message therefore qualified as telemarketing. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12). 26. The SMS “short code” of 59569 is associated with Defendant Target, and is identified by Target as its primary contact number with regard to text messages.1 27. A text message containing an SMS short code is characteristic of a message sent using an ATDS that dials a large volume of telephone numbers from a prepared list. 28. The fact that a SMS code was used to send the text message is evident that it was sent using an ATDS, as SMS codes are reserved for automatically made text messages. 29. As a result, the system that sent text messages to Plaintiff Tiefenthaler qualifies as an ATDS pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(a)(1)(A). 30. This is further supported by the non-personalized generic nature of the text message advertisements. 31. Moreover, since December 18, 2014, the Plaintiff Tiefenthaler’s cellular telephone number has been listed on the NDNC list. Plaintiff Tiefenthaler’s number is used exclusively for residential, non-commerical purposes. 33. Defendant Target is a “person” as the term is defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 34. Target had the ability to prevent unauthorized texts in violation of the TCPA from being placed by automated calling/texting operations conducted by itself or by its vendors or marketing partners. 35. The calls were not necessitated by an emergency. 36. Plaintiff’s privacy has been violated by the above-described telemarketing robocalls from Defendant. The calls were an annoying, harassing nuisance. 37. Plaintiff and all members of the Class, defined below, have been harmed by the acts of Defendant because their privacy has been violated, they were annoyed and harassed, and, in some instances, they were charged for incoming calls. Plaintiff and the Class Members were also harmed by use of their cell phone battery and the intrusion on their cellular telephone that occupied it from receiving legitimate communications. 38. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 39. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and the following classes (the “Classes”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 41. Plaintiff Tiefenthaler is a member of and will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of, these Classes as he has no interests that conflict with any of the class members. 42. Excluded from the Classes are counsel, the Defendants, and any entities in which the Defendants have a controlling interest, the Defendants’ agents and employees, any judge to whom this action is assigned, and any member of such judge’s staff and immediate family. 43. Plaintiff and all members of the Classes have been harmed by the acts of the Defendant, including, but not limited to, the invasion of their privacy, annoyance, waste of time, the use of their cell phone battery, and the intrusion on their cellular telephone that occupied it from receiving legitimate communications. 44. This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages. 45. The Classes as defined above are identifiable through the Defendants’ dialer records, other phone records, and phone number databases. 46. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Classes, but Plaintiff reasonably believes Class members number, at minimum, in the hundreds in each class. 47. The joinder of all Class members is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. 49. There are well defined, nearly identical, questions of law and fact affecting all parties. The questions of law and fact, referred to above, involving the class claims predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members. 50. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to Plaintiff and to the proposed Classes, including but not limited to the following: (a) whether Defendant utilized an automatic telephone dialing system to send its texts to the members of the Robotext Class; (b) Whether agents operating on behalf of Defendant utilized an automatic telephone dialing system in sending text messages to members of the Robotext Class; (c) whether Defendant systematically made multiple telephone calls to members of the National Do Not Call Registry Class; (d) whether Defendant made calls to Plaintiff and members of the Classes without first obtaining prior express written consent to make the calls; (e) whether Defendant’s conduct constitutes a violation of the TCPA; and (f) whether members of the Classes are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendant’s conduct. 51. As a person who received non-emergency telephone calls using an automatic telephone dialing system without his prior express consent within the meaning of the TCPA, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each Class member who also received such phone calls. 52. As a person whose telephone number was placed on the National Do Not Call List and who received more than one text message in a twelve month period, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of the National Do Not Call Registry Class. 54. Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting complex litigation and class actions, and especially TCPA class actions. Plaintiff and his counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the other members of the Classes, and have the financial resources to do so. 55. Common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and a class action is the superior method for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The only individual question concerns identification of class members, which will be ascertainable from records maintained by Defendant and/or its agents. 56. The likelihood that individual members of the Classes will prosecute separate actions is remote due to the time and expense necessary to prosecute an individual case. 57. Plaintiff is not aware of any litigation concerning this controversy already commenced by others who meet the criteria for class membership described above. 58. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 59. Target violated the TCPA by sending, or causing to be sent via an agent, text messages to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and members of the Robotext Class using an automated dialer without their prior express written consent. 61. Plaintiff and Robotext Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendant from advertising their goods or services, except for emergency purposes, using an ATDS or pre-recorded voice in the future. 62. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 63. Target violated the TCPA by sending, or causing to be sent via an agent, text messages to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and members of the Robotext Class using an automated dialer without their prior express written consent. 64. As a result of the Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each member of the Robotext Class is entitled to treble damages of $1,500 for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 65. Plaintiff and Robotext Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendant from advertising their goods or services, except for emergency purposes, using an ATDS or pre-recorded voice in the future. 66. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 68. As a result of the Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and National Do Not Call Registry Class members are entitled to an award of up to $500 in statutory damages for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 69. Plaintiff and National Do Not Call Registry Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendant from advertising their goods or services, except for emergency purposes, to any number on the National Do Not Call Registry in the future. 70. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 71. Target knowingly and/or willingly violated the TCPA and the Regulations by making, or having its agent make, two or more telemarketing text messages within a 12-month period on Target’s behalf to Plaintiff and the members of the National Do Not Call Registry Class while those persons’ phone numbers were registered on the National Do Not Call Registry. 73. Plaintiff and National Do Not Call Registry Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendant from advertising their goods or services, except for emergency purposes, to any number on the National Do Not Call Registry in the future. Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. 227, et seq. and 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1200(d)) on behalf of the National Do Not Call Registry Class Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. 227, et seq.) on behalf of Robotext Class Statutory Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. 227, et seq.) on behalf of the Robotext Class Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. 227, et seq. and 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1200(d)) on behalf of the National Do Not Call Registry Class

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(Declaratory Relief) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 102. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 103. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website contains access barriers denying deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals the full and equal access to the goods and services of the Website, which Defendant owns, operates, and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the deaf and hard of hearing. 104. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) 19. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website during the relevant statutory period.” 20. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website, during the relevant statutory period.” 22. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying deaf and hard-of-hearing persons access to the goods and services of the Website. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, deaf and hard-of-hearing persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse and watch videos on the Website. 23. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: a. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; c. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the laws of New York. 24. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are deaf or hard of hearing, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the Class of people who are legally deaf or hard of hearing. 26. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 27. Judicial efficiency will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it will avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with hearing disabilities throughout the United States. 28. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 29. Defendant operates the Website, which provides information, products, and services on health, fitness, wellness, and their multiple gym locations across the United States. It delivers information and sells to tens of millions of people across the United States. 31. The Website allows the user to browse videos, information, pictures, and products. Defendant’s videos are available with the click of a mouse and are played through the Internet on computers, cell phones, and other electronic devices. 32. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the deaf and hard of hearing access to the Website, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Website. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals have been and are being denied equal access to the Website, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. Defendant denies the deaf and hard of hearing access to goods, services, and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely enjoying, interpreting, and understanding the content on the Website. 34. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as reading news, watching videos, etc., for deaf and hard-of-hearing persons. 36. There are well established guidelines for making websites accessible to disabled people. These guidelines have been in place for several years and have been followed successfully by other large business entities in making their websites accessible. The Web Accessibility Initiative (“WAI”), a project of the World Wide Web Consortium which is the leading standards organization of the Web, has developed guidelines for website accessibility, called the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (“WCAG”). The federal government has also promulgated website accessibility standards under Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act. These guidelines are readily available via the Internet, so that a business designing a website can easily access them. These guidelines recommend several basic components for making websites accessible, including but not limited to adding closed captioning to video content. 37. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing persons, including but not limited to the lack of closed captioning. This barrier is in violation of WCAG 2.1 Guideline 1.2.2, which mandates that video content contain captioning. 39. The Website thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Website and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of the Website in New York State. 40. Plaintiff attempted to watch the video the “Personal Training at Life Time” on the Website in March 2018 but was unable to do so independently because of the lack of closed captioning on the Website, causing it to be inaccessible and not independently usable by deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 41. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing the Website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 42. These access barriers have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits, and services of Defendant and the Website. 43. Defendant engages in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard- of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructing and maintaining a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obviously inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failing to take actions to correct access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 45. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 46. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 47. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by Title III of ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (“place of exhibition and entertainment,” “place of recreation,” and “service establishments”). 48. Defendant has failed to make its videos accessible to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing by failing to provide closed captioning for videos displayed on the Website. 49. Discrimination under Title III includes the denial of an opportunity for the person who is deaf or hard of hearing to participate in programs or services, or providing a service that is not as effective as what is provided to others. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I-III). 50. Discrimination specifically includes the failure to provide “effective communication” to deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals through auxiliary aids and services, such as captioning, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(III); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(C). 64. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 65. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 66. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 67. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 68. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the videos displayed on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 70. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 71. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exc. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard- of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 73. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 74. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 75. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 76. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 77. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 78. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 79. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 81. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 82. The Website is a public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 83. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 84. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing videos on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 86. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . . .” 87. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 88. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 89. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 90. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 92. The Website is a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 93. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 94. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 96. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 97. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 98. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination.

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10. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 11. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and a “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 12. At all times relevant Defendant conducted business in the State of California and in the County of San Diego, within this judicial district. 13. Plaintiff did not provide Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers to Defendant through any medium at any time. 14. Defendant obtained Plaintiff’s contact information through unknown means. 37. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 38. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 39. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 41. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 42. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 43. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 44. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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18. At all relevant times, Plaintiff STEWART and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs have been and are similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and have been and continue to be subjected to Defendants’ decisions, policies, plans, programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and rules—all of which have culminated in a willful failure and refusal to pay them for all hours worked and to pay them overtime compensation at the rate of one and one half times the regular rate for work performed in excess of forty (40) hours per week. The claims of Plaintiff STEWART stated herein are essentially the same as those of the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. 19. The claims for relief are properly brought under and maintained as an opt-in collective action pursuant to FLSA §216(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from the Defendants. Notice can be provided to the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to the last address known to Defendants. 20. Plaintiff STEWART brings claims for relief pursuant to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) 23, on behalf of all current and former non-exempt employees, including but not limited cooks, food preparers, cashiers, counter persons, butchers, cleaners, dishwashers, porters, bussers, and food runners employed by Defendants on or after the date that is six (6) years before the filing of the Complaint (the “Class” or “Class Members”). 28. In or around March 2019, Defendants hired Plaintiff STEWART to work as a cook for Defendants’ Leña Restaurant located inside MERCADO LITTLE SPAIN at 10 Hudson Yards, New York, NY 10001. In or around June 2019, Plaintiff STEWART was transferred by Defendants to work at the Spanish Diner Restaurant inside MERCADO LITTLE SPAIN. In or around June 2019, Plaintiff STEWART additionally worked approximately four shifts at the Frutas & Verduras Kiosk inside MERCADO LITTLE SPAIN. Plaintiff STEWART worked primarily at the Spanish Diner Restaurant for the remainder of his employment with Defendants. Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants terminated in September 2019. 29. From approximately March 2019 to June 2019, Plaintiff worked five (5) days per week for seven (7) hours per day, for a total of thirty-five (35) hours each week at an hourly rate of $17.00. From approximately June 2019 to September 2019, Plaintiff worked five (5) days per week for nine (9) hours per day, for a total of forty-five (45) hours each week at an hourly rate of $17.00. During Plaintiff STEWART’s employment with Defendants, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and Class members worked similar hours and were paid at similar rates. 31. Furthermore, at all times relevant to this action, Defendants maintained a policy of requiring a manager’s approval to clock-in an employee five (5) minutes or more either prior to or after the beginning of the employee’s scheduled shift. Due to this limited window of time in which Plaintiff was able to clock-in for each of his shifts, Plaintiff would periodically require a manager’s approval to clock-in, though Plaintiff would begin working as soon as he arrived. However, despite Plaintiff STEWART’s efforts to timely have a manager clock him in for work, Defendants’ managers were routinely derelict in clocking Plaintiff in for his scheduled shifts. Just as often, Defendants’ managers did not clock Plaintiff STEWART in at the time he actually arrived for his scheduled shift and began working, but rather the time at which the manager was ultimately called over to clock-in Plaintiff. Plaintiff STEWART was not paid for this off-the-clock work. Similarly, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members performed off-the-clock work due to Defendants’ managers’ routine failure to timely clock-in employees, and were not compensated for this off- the-clock work. 33. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff STEWART with wage notices, as required by the NYLL. Similarly, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members were never provided with any wage notices. 34. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff STEWART with proper wage statements at all relevant times. Similarly, the Class members also did not receive proper wage statements, in violation of the NYLL. 35. Plaintiff STEWART, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class members were required by Defendants to perform unpaid off-the-clock work, resulting in unpaid wages and overtime premium. 36. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not providing proper wage statements to Plaintiff STEWART and Class members, in violation of the 39. Plaintiff STEWART realleges by reference all allegations in the preceding paragraphs of this collective action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 40. At all relevant times, Defendants were and continue to be employers engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207 (a). Further, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are covered individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207 (a). 41. At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs within the meaning of the FLSA. 42. At all relevant times, Defendants had gross annual revenues in excess of $500,000.00. 43. At all relevant times, Defendants had a policy and practice of failing to pay wages for all hours worked. 44. At all relevant times, Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs’ rights by failing to pay them wages in the lawful amount for all hours worked, including those in excess of forty (40) hours worked each week, due to time-shaving. 46. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs of their rights under the FLSA. 47. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ willful disregard of the FLSA, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated (i.e., double) damages pursuant to the FLSA. 48. Due to the intentional, willful, and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount not presently ascertainable of unpaid overtime premium, and an equal amount as liquidated damages. 49. Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the FLSA. 50. Plaintiff STEWART realleges by reference all allegations in the preceding paragraphs of this collective action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 51. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the Class members were employed by the Defendants within the meaning of the New York Labor Law §§ 2 and 651. 52. At all relevant times, Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members for all hours worked, including at the statutory rate of time and one-half the regular rate for overtime hours worked, due to Defendants’ policy of time-shaving. 53. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff and the Class members’ rights by refusing to compensate them for off-the-clock hours during which they were required to work. 55. Defendants failed to provide a proper wage and hour notice, on the date of hiring and annually, to all non-exempt employees, in direct violation of the New York Labor Law. 56. Defendants failed to provide proper wage statements with every payment issued to Plaintiff and the Class members, as required by New York Labor Law § 195(3). 57. Due to Defendants’ New York Labor Law violations, Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid overtime premium, compensation for unpaid off-the-clock hours worked, damages for unreasonably delayed payments, reasonable attorneys’ fees, liquidated damages, statutory penalties, and costs and disbursements of this action. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND CLASS MEMBERS VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND FLSA COLLECTIVE PLAINTIFFS

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10. The allegations of paragraphs 1 – 9 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. 11. The language in Defendants’ letter set forth in paragraph 8, above violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a). 12. Defendant Jeremy M. Cohen formulated, approved, and/or ratified said language. 14. There are issues of law and fact common to the class, which issues predominate over any questions particular to individual class members. Common issues include whether Defendants are debt collectors under the FDCPA and whether the subject letter violates the FDCPA as alleged. 15. Plaintiff’s claim is typical in that it arises from the same unlawful conduct as the claims of class members. Plaintiff and class members seek, and are entitled to, similar relief. 16. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of class members. Plaintiff is committed to a thorough and vigorous prosecution of this action, and has selected counsel with substantial experience in consumer class action litigation. Neither Plaintiff nor counsel have any conflicts which would interfere with the successful prosecution of this case. 18. The allegations of paragraphs 1 – 9 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. 19. The language in Defendants’ letter set forth in paragraph 9, above violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a). 20. Defendant Jeremy M. Cohen formulated, approved, and/or ratified said language. 21. Plaintiff brings count II of this complaint on behalf of herself and a class of persons similarly situated. Class members are all persons to whom either defendant sent an initial letter concerning a consumer debt within one year prior to the filing of this complaint, which letter contained the language set forth in paragraph 9, above, and was not returned or otherwise confirmed as undeliverable. Excluded from each class are Defendants and their current and former officers, directors, employees, and agents. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ standard business practice entailed sending unlawful collection leters to consumers, as described herein, and therefore Plaintiff further alleges that the members of the class are sufficiently numerous such that joinder is impracticable. 23. Plaintiff’s claim is typical in that it arises from the same unlawful conduct as the claims of class members. Plaintiff and class members seek, and are entitled to, similar relief. 24. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of class members. Plaintiff is committed to a thorough and vigorous prosecution of this action, and has selected counsel with substantial experience in consumer class action litigation. Neither Plaintiff nor counsel have any conflicts which would interfere with the successful prosecution of this case.

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19. LDR operates various web sites through which it offers to pay for people’s used electronic products (the “LDR Web Sites”). 20. The LDR Web Sites (each of which begins with “www” and is followed by “.com”) include cashforapples, cashforberrys, cashforipads, cashforiphones, cashforlaptops, and ecyclebest. 22. By sending a Product to LDR, a Potential Seller agrees to be bound by LDR’s Terms and Conditions; and, therefore, a contract, in the form of LDR’s Terms and Conditions, is formed between LDR and the Potential Seller. 23. Before LDR receives a Product, LDR sends at least two e-mails to the Potential Seller. 25. With respect to thousands of Potential Sellers, LDR, more than three days after sending the Confirmation-of-Receipt E-Mail, sends an e-mail to a Potential Seller that states, “Your check has been printed and will be on its way to you in no time!” or contains materially similar language (the “Check E-Mail”). 26. The Check E-Mail does not inform the Potential Seller of the amount of the check. 27. A Potential Seller learns that the check is for the payment of a Lower Amount (the “Lower-Amount Payment Check”) upon the earlier of the following events: logging on to the Potential Seller’s account on the LDR Web Site or receiving the Lower-Amount Payment Check. 28. When a Potential Seller informs LDR that he had never received a Lower-Amount E-Mail Offer, LDR sends him an e-mail that purports to contain a copy of the Lower-Amount E-Mail Offer (the “Purported Copy”). 29. The Purported Copy is not in the form of a forwarded e-mail but merely purports to contain the information that was in a Lower-Amount E-Mail Offer. 30. LDR claims that the Purported Copy had been sent more than three days before the Potential Seller attempted to reject the purported Lower-Amount E-Mail Offer, as a result of which that attempt is too late under LDR’s Terms and Conditions. 31. No Lower-Amount E-Mail Offer had been sent to the Potential Seller. 32. The Lower Amount is a fraction of the Initial Quote. 34. With respect to thousands of Potential Sellers to whom LDR has sent a Lower- Amount E-Mail Offer and who have, in accordance with LDR’s Terms and Conditions, e-mailed a rejection of that offer, LDR, in breach of LDR’s Terms and Conditions, instructs such potential sellers to call LDR. 35. When a Potential Seller calls LDR in response to the instruction described in the preceding paragraph, LRS’s telephone lines are either busy or the hold times are exorbitant. 36. When an LDR employee is connected to a Potential Seller who makes the telephone call to LDR as described in paragraph “34,” the employee tells the Potential Seller that the Potential Seller must to speak to “purchasing,” upon which LDR transfers the call and either ultimately disconnects the call or has an employee tell the Potential Seller, without regard to the truth, that the Product is no longer in LDR’s possession and therefore cannot be returned. 37. Regardless of whether LDR inspects a Product, and regardless of the results of any such inspection, LDR, at all relevant times, intends not to pay more than a fraction of the Initial Quote for the Product. 38. LDR knowingly, and with the intent to defraud and deceive Potential Sellers, carries out the above-described practices for the purpose of forcefully acquiring Products for a fraction of the amount of the Initial Quote. 39. Prior to the creation of a contract between LDR and a Potential Seller, LDR has the intention of breaching that contract by engaging in the above-described practices. 40. LDR breaches its contracts with Potential Sellers by engaging in the above-described practices. 42. On October 5, 2014, Bank entered, on cashforiphones, the Product Information with respect to three Products (“Bank’s Products”). 43. Instantly following the entry of the information as described in the preceding paragraph, two of Bank’s Products were given an Initial Quote of $307, and the other Product was given an Initial Quote of $230. 44. On October 5, 2014, Bank received an e-mail from LDR whose subject line was “Here is your Pre-Paid Label, Ship your Apple today!,” and whose body stated, in relevant part, that “You can follow [a] link [provided in this e-mail] and re-print your prepaid shipping label.” 45. On October 5, 2014, Bank received, several minutes after having received the e-mail described in the preceding paragraph, three identical e-mails from LDR whose subject line was “Reset Password Request,” and whose body stated, in relevant part, “You requested a link to reset your password. Please set a new password by clicking the link provided below.” 46. On October 7, 2014, Bank received, with respect to each of Bank’s Products, an e- mail from LDR whose subject line was “Order [xxxxx6,or xxxxx7, or xxxxx8] Status: Thank You For Shipping Your Apple iPhone 5 16GB Verizon,” and whose body stated, in relevant part, “Your package should arrive at our processing center within the next 5-7 business days. The USPS tracking number for your device is . . . . You will also receive a notification email once we have received your package.” 47. On or about October 8, 2014, Bank, using the prepaid shipping label to which paragraph “44” refers, sent Bank’s Products to LDR. 49. On October 19, 2014, Bank received an e-mail from LDR whose subject line was “Order [xxxxx8] Status: Your Device Has Been Received,” and whose body, in relevant part, was the same as that described in the preceding paragraph. 51. On October 24, 2014, Bank received, several minutes after having received the e-mail described in the preceding paragraph, two identical e-mails from LDR whose subject line was “Reset Password Request” and whose body stated, in relevant part: “You requested a link to reset your password. Please set a new password by clicking the link provided below.” 52. On October 24, 2014, Bank logged onto his LDR account and learned that the LDR Checks were in the amounts of $23, 45, and $47. 53. On October 24, 2014, Bank, after learning the amounts of the LDR Checks, called LDR’s customer-service telephone number and was told by LDR’s customer-service personnel that LDR had sent him three Lower-Amount E-Mail Offers, that is, one for each of Bank’s Products, and that LDR deemed Bank to have accepted each offer by not responding to it within three days. 54. No Lower-Amount E-Mail Offer had been sent to Bank. 55. On October 24, 2014, Bank, after his conversation with LDR’s customer-service personnel, received three identical e-mails from LDR whose subject line was “Copy of payment email.” 59. On October 31, 2014, LDR, in response to a complaint that Bank filed with the Better Business Bureau, called Bank and told him that LDR would send him an additional check so that the total amount of payment to Bank would be equal to the total amount of the Initial Quotes that had been given to him. 60. On or about November 5, 2014, Bank received a Lower-Amount Payment Check for $115, and on or about November 12, 2014, Bank received the check to which the preceding paragraph refers. 62. LDR has engaged in fraud upon Bank and the other Members of the Class, thereby wrongfully depriving them of their property. 63. As a result of LDR’s fraud, Bank and the other Members of the Class are entitled to compensatory damages, punitive damages, and other appropriate relief under the laws of each of the fifty States and the District of Columbia. 64. Bank incorporates herein each and every allegation contained in paragraphs “1” through “60.” 65. LDR has breached its contracts with Bank and the other Members of the Class, thereby wrongfully depriving them of their property. 66. As a result of LDR’s breaches, Bank and the other Members of the Class are entitled to compensatory damages and other appropriate relief under the laws of each of the fifty States and the District of Columbia. 67. Bank incorporates herein each and every allegation contained in paragraphs “1” through “60.” 68. LDR has breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in engaging in a contractual relationship with Bank and the other Members of the Class, thereby wrongfully depriving them of their property. 70. Bank incorporates herein each and every allegation contained in paragraphs “1” through “60.” 71. LDR is liable to the Class Members under the following laws of the respectively listed states and the District of Columbia: Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ala. Code §§ 8-19-1 - 8-19-15 72. LDR has violated Ala. Code § 8-19-5(27), entitling class members to $100 per violation under Ala. Code § 8-19-10(a)(1). Alaska Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, Alaska Stat. §§ 45.50.471 - 45.50.561 73. LDR has violated Alaska Stat. §§ 45.50.471(a), (b)(11), and (b)(12), entitling class members to $500 per violation under Alaska Stat. § 45.50.531(a). Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-1521 - 44-1534 74. LDR has violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1522(A), entitling class members to actual damages under Freeway Mobile Homes Sales, Inc., 521 P.2d 1119 (Ariz. 1974). Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-88-101 - 4-88-503 76. LDR has violated Calif. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500, entitling class members to restitution and injunctive relief under Calif. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203. Colorado Colorado Consumer Protection Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 6-1-101 - 6-1-115 77. LDR has violated Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-105(1)(e), entitling class members to the greater of actual damages, $500 per violation, or three times the amount of actual damages if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that LDR engaged in bad-faith conduct, under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-113(2)(a). Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 42-110a - 42-110q 78. LDR has violated Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110b(a), entitling class members to actual damages, punitive damages in the discretion of the Court, and, as the Court deems necessary or proper, equitable relief, under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(a). Delaware Consumer Fraud Act, 6 Del. C. §§ 2511-2527 79. LDR has violated 6 Del. C. § 2513(a), entitling class members to actual damages under 6 Del. C. § 2525(a). District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code §§ 28-3901 - 28-3913 81. LDR has violated Fla. Stat. § 501.204(1), entitling class members to actual damages under Fla. Stat. § 501.211(2). Georgia Fair Business Practices Act of 1975, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-390 - 10-1-407 82. LDR has violated Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-393(a), entitling class members, who comprise natural persons who made their purchases primarily for personal, family, or household purposes as provided by Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-392(a)(6) and (10), to general damages, exemplary damages if the violations were committed intentionally, and equitable injunctive relief under Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-399(a), and three times actual damages Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-399(c). Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 480-2 83. LDR has violated Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-2(a), entitling class members, who comprise natural persons who made their purchases primarily for personal, family, or household purposes as provided by Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-1, $1,000 per violation under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-13(b)(1) and injunctive relief under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-13(b)(2). Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 - 815 ILCS 505/12 84. LDR has violated 815 ILCS 505/2, entitling class members to actual economic damages or any other relief that the Court deems proper under 815 ILCS 505/10a(a). Kansas Consumer Protection Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-617 - 50-6,115 86. LDR has violated Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.170(1), entitling class members, who comprise persons and entities that made their purchases primarily for personal, family, or household purposes as provided by Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.220(1), to actual damages in the discretion of the Court, and equitable relief as the Court deems necessary or proper, in the discretion of the Court under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.220(1). Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, La. Rev. Stat. §§ 51:1401 - 51:1418 87. LDR has violated La. Rev. Stat. § 51:1405(A), entitling class members to actual damages under La. Rev. Stat. § 51:1409(A). Maine Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 205-A - 214 88. LDR has violated 5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 207, entitling class members, who comprise persons and entities that made their purchases primarily for personal, family, or household purposes as provided by 5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 213(1), to actual damages, restitution, and such other equitable relief, including an injunction, as the Court determines to be necessary and proper under 5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 213(1). Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code Ann. §§ 13-101 to 13-501 90. LDR has violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 2(a), entitling class members to $25 per violation, and between $50 and $75 per violation if such violations were committed willfully or knowingly under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, §§ 9(1) and 9(3), and such equitable relief, including an injunction, as the Court deems to be necessary and proper under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(1). Michigan Michigan Consumer Protection Act, Mich Comp. Laws §§ 445.901 - 445.922 91. LDR has violated Mich Comp. Laws § 445.903(bb), entitling class members, who comprise persons and entities that made their purchases primarily for personal, family, or household purposes as provided by Mich Comp. Laws § 445.902(d), to $250 per violation under Mich Comp. Laws § 445.911 and injunctive relief under Mich Comp. Laws § 445.911(1)(b). Minnesota Minnesota Unlawful Trade Practices Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 325D.09 - 325D.16 92. LDR has violated Minn. Stat. §§ 325D.44(13), entitling class members to actual damages and other equitable relief as determined by the Court under Minn. Stat. § 8.31(3a). Mississippi Mississippi Consumer Protection Act, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 75-24-1 - 75-24-27 93. LDR has violated Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-5(1), entitling class members, who comprise persons and entities that made their purchases primarily for personal, family, or household purposes as provided by Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-15(1), to actual damages under Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-15(1). Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 407.010 - 407.1500 95. LDR has violated Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-103, entitling class members, who comprise persons and entities that made their purchases primarily for personal, family, or household purposes as provided by Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-102(1), to $500 per violation and any other equitable relief that the Court considers necessary or proper under Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-133(1). Nebraska Consumer Protection Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 59-1601 - 59-1622 96. LDR has violated Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-1602, entitling class members to actual damages; additional damages, in the discretion of the Court up to$1,000, of an amount that bears a reasonable relation to the actual damages that have been sustained and which are not susceptible to measurement by ordinary pecuniary standards; injunctive relief, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-1609. Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 598.0903 - 598.0999 97. LDR has violated Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598.0915(15), entitling class members to actual damages under Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 41.600(1), (2)(e), and (3)(a). New Hampshire Regulation of Business Practices for Consumer Protection law, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 358-A:1 - 358-A:13 A. Defendant’s Scheme [Breach of Contract] [Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing] [Consumer-Protection Laws] [Fraud]

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(Brought Individually and on Behalf of the Rule 23 Illinois Class to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23) FAILURE TO REIMBURSE EXPENSES § 820 ILCS 115/9.5 (Brought Individually and on Behalf of the Rule 23 Illinois Class to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23) FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME § 820 ILCS 105/4a 11 (Brought Individually and on Behalf of the FLSA Collective Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)) FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME 29 U.S.C. § 207((a)(1) (Brought Individually and on Behalf of the Rule 23 Illinois Class to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23) FAILURE TO PAY EARNED WAGES § 820 ILCS 115/4 19. Defendants operate Early Intervention Consulting, a provider of ABA therapy services to children and teens with autism. 20. Defendants’ therapy services are performed by “tutors,” who work remotely in states throughout the country and attend to Defendants’ patients. 21. While Defendants classified Plaintiff and other tutors as independent contractors, tutors were in fact treated like employees, in that tutors: a. Played in integral role in Defendants’ business; b. Worked consistent schedules for Defendants for significant periods of time; c. Were subject to substantial control by Defendants; d. Did not possess any special skills and had no opportunity for profit or loss; and e. Made minimal investments in their work in comparison to the substantial investments Defendants made in their business. 22. Defendants paid tutors on an hourly basis and did not provide them with any 5 guaranteed, predetermined amount of pay per week. 23. Tutors regularly worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek. 24. Defendants required tutors to use a mobile application called “TSheets” to enter notes from sessions with Defendants’ clients and to record their time for payroll purposes. 25. Defendants had an implied agreement with tutors to pay them at their agreed-upon hourly rates for all hours worked. 26. Defendants only permitted tutors to report time spent on clients’ sessions into TSheets, notwithstanding the fact that they performed additional work including travelling between clients’ homes and/or other locations at which sessions took place and performing work outside of their scheduled client sessions, such as completing paperwork, preparing lesson plans, coordinating session times, purchasing supplies, and meeting with managers. 27. Defendants failed to pay tutors for all hours worked, including: a. Time spent recruiting colleagues and acquaintances to work as tutors; b. Time spent training; c. Time spent in sessions with clients that was not paid due to technical glitches with TSheets; d. Time spent travelling between clients’ homes and/or other locations at which sessions took place; e. Time spent waiting for clients to appear at sessions that were cancelled; and f. Time spent performing work outside of their scheduled client sessions. 28. In many weeks, the unpaid work tutors performed was in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek, for which they should have been compensated at 1.5x their regular rates of pay, but instead received no compensation. 6 29. To the extent Defendants did pay tutors for hours worked in excess of 40 in a week, such hours were paid at their regular hourly rates, rather than the required rate of 1.5x their regular rates of pay. 30. Defendants failed to reimburse tutors for reasonable expenditures or losses required of the employees in the discharge of employment duties and that inured to the primary benefit of Defendants, including: a. Driving their personal vehicles between work locations; b. Use of their personal mobile devices to communicate with Defendants’ management, staff, and clients, and access TSheets; and c. Supplies needed for tutors’ home offices and for sessions with clients. 31. Defendants were aware of, or alternatively, recklessly indifferent to the possibility that tutors were working uncompensated hours in excess of 40 in a workweek, and that such hours should have been compensated at 1.5x their regular rates of pay in accordance with the FLSA and 33. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on his own behalf and on behalf of: All current and former tutors who worked for Early Intervention Consulting in the United States at any time within the three years preceding the commencement of this action and the date of judgment. 7 (hereinafter referred to as the “FLSA Collective”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary. 34. Excluded from the FLSA Collective are Defendants’ executives, administrative and professional employees, including computer professionals and outside sales persons. 35. With respect to the claims set forth in this action, a collective action under the FLSA is appropriate because the members of the FLSA Collective are “similarly situated” to Plaintiff under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) because (a) they have been or are employed in the same or similar positions; (b) they were or are subject to the same or similar unlawful practice, policy, or plan; and (c) their claims are based upon the same factual and legal theories. 36. The employment relationships between Defendants and every FLSA Collective member are the same and differ only in name, location, and rate of pay. The key issues – whether Defendants knowingly failed to pay overtime compensation for all hours worked – do not vary substantially from Collective member to Collective member. 37. Plaintiff estimates that the FLSA Collective, including both current and former employees over the relevant period, will include hundreds of members. The precise number of Collective members should be readily available from a review of Defendants’ personnel and payroll records. 38. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on his own behalf and on behalf of: All current and former tutors who worked for Early Intervention Consulting in Illinois at any time within the applicable statutory period. (hereinafter referred to as the “Rule 23 Illinois Class”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary. 8 39. The members of the Rule 23 Illinois Class are so numerous that joinder of all Rule 23 Illinois Class members in this case would be impractical. Plaintiff reasonably estimates that there are hundreds of Rule 23 Illinois Class members. Rule 23 Illinois Class members should be easy to identify from Defendants’ computer systems and electronic payroll and personnel records. 40. There is a well-defined community of interest among Rule 23 Illinois Class members and common questions of law and fact predominate in this action over any questions affecting individual members of the Rule 23 Illinois Class. These common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether Defendants knowingly failed to pay overtime compensation for all hours worked; and b. Whether Defendants knowingly failed to pay earned wages and/or reimburse work- related expenses. 41. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Rule 23 Illinois Class in that he and all other Rule 23 Illinois Class members suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ common and systemic payroll policies and practices. Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same policies, practices, promises and course of conduct as all other Rule 23 Illinois Class members’ claims and his legal theories are based on the same legal theories as all other Rule 23 Illinois Class members. 42. Plaintiff will fully and adequately protect the interests of the Rule 23 Illinois Class and he has retained counsel who are qualified and experienced in the prosecution of Illinois wage and hour class actions. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel have interests that are contrary to, or conflicting with, the interests of the Rule 23 Illinois Class. 43. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, because, inter alia, it is economically infeasible for Rule 23 9 Illinois Class members to prosecute individual actions of their own given the relatively small amount of damages at stake for each individual along with the fear of reprisal by their employer. Prosecution of this case as a Rule 23 Class action will also eliminate the possibility of duplicative lawsuits being filed in state and federal courts throughout the nation. 44. This case will be manageable as a Rule 23 Class action. Plaintiff and his counsel know of no unusual difficulties in this case and Defendant and its corporate clients all have advanced, networked computer and payroll systems that will allow the class, wage, and damages issues in this case to be resolved with relative ease. 45. Because the elements of Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied in this case, class certification is appropriate. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393; 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010) (“[b]y its terms [Rule 23] creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action”). 46. Because Defendants acted and refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Rule 23 Illinois Class and declaratory relief is appropriate in this case with respect to the Rule 23 Illinois Class as a whole, class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) is also appropriate. 47. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein and further allege as follows. 48. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) provides: [N]o employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer 10 than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 49. Defendants are an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done exceeds $500,000. 50. Defendants are an enterprise that has had employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, and handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce. 51. At all times relevant to the action, Defendants were an employer covered by the mandates of the FLSA, and Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were employees entitled to the FLSA’s protections. 52. Plaintiff and other putative FLSA Collective members regularly worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek. 53. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and other putative FLSA Collective members for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 54. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1) and 216(b), Plaintiff and other putative FLSA Collective members are entitled to recover the full amount of unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, interest thereon, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit. 55. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Because Defendants willfully violated the FLSA, a three-year state of limitations applies to such violations. 56. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein and further alleges as follows. 57. At all times relevant to the action, Defendants were an employer covered by the mandates of the IMWL, and Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Illinois Class were employees entitled to the IMWL’s protections. 58. The IMWL requires employers to pay their employees overtime at time-and-a-half their regular rate of pay of hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. See § 820 ILCS 105/4a. 59. Plaintiff and other putative Rule 23 Illinois Class members regularly worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek. 60. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and other putative Rule 23 Illinois Class members for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 61. Pursuant to §§ 820 ILCS 105/4a and 820 ILCS 105/12, Plaintiff and other putative Rule 23 Illinois Class members are entitled to recover the full amount of unpaid overtime compensation, statutory penalties, liquidated damages, interest thereon, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit. 62. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein and further alleges as follows. 63. At all times relevant to the action, Defendants were an employer covered by the mandates of the IWPCA, and Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Illinois Class were employees entitled to the IWPCA’s protections. 12 64. The IWPCA requires that “[a]ll wages earned by any employee … shall be paid.” 71. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein and further 13 alleges as follows. 72. The IWPCA requires an employer to “reimburse an employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee within the employee’s scope of employment and directly related to services performed for the employer.” § 820 ILCS 115/9.5(a). 73. The IWPCA defines “necessary expenditures” as “all reasonable expenditures or losses required of the employee in the discharge of employment duties and that inure to the primary benefit of the employer.” Id. 74. Defendants failed to reimburse Plaintiff and other putative Rule 23 Illinois Class members for reasonable expenditures or losses required of the employees in the discharge of employment duties and that inured to the primary benefit of Defendants. 75. Pursuant to §§ § 820 ILCS 115/4 and 820 ILCS 115/14, Plaintiff and other putative Rule 23 Illinois Class members are entitled to reimbursement for all such expenditures, statutory penalties, liquidated damages, interest thereon, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit.

win

44. As set forth above, HealthPort specializes in the provision of inedical records throughout the United States, including the State of Illinois and the State of Missouri. 46. HealthPort charges attorneys and law firms, such as Plaintiff and the Class members, a"Basic Fee" of $20.00 in connection with every request for medical records (i) that the attorneys and law firms make to health care provides located in the State of Illinois and (ii) that HealthPort services for the attorneys and/or law firms—even if HealthPort does not, in fact, copy any medical records. 47. As set forth above, 735 ILCS 5/8-2001(d) does not allow facilities such as HealthPort to charge fees in connection with copying medical records when the facilities do not, in fact, copy any medical records. 48. Furthermore, HealthPort charges attorneys and law firms, such as Plaintiff and the Class members, a"Basic Fee" of $22.82 in connection with every request for medical records (i) that the attorneys and law firms make to health care provides located in the State of Missouri and (ii) that HealthPort services for the attorneys and/or law firms—even if HealthPort does not, in fact, retrieve or furnish any medical records. 49. As set forth above, section 191.227 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri does not allow facilities such as HealthPort to charge fees for searching for and retrieving medical records when the facilities do not, in fact, retrieve or furnish any medical records. 51. � Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and a proposed class (the "Class") defined as follows: ' The Class. All attorneys or law firms: (i) that requested, on behalf of the attorneys' or law firms' clients, for health care providers located in the State of Illinois or the State of Missouri to provide medical records and (ii) that HealthPort charged a"Basic Fee" when HealthPort did not retrieve any medical records, at any time during the applicable liability period. � 52. � Additionally, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and a proposed subclass (the "Illinois Subclass") defined as follows: The Illinois Subclass. All attorneys or law firms: (i) that, while residing in the State of Illinois, requested, on behalf of the attorneys' or law firms' clients, for health care providers located in the State of Illinois to provide medical records and (ii) that HealthPort charged a"Basic Fee" when HealthPort did not copy any medical records, at any time during the applicable liability period. � 54. Excluded from the Class are: (a) Defendant's board members, executive-level officers, and attorneys, and immediately family members of any of the foregoing persons; (b) governmental entities; (c) the Court, the Court's immediate family, and the Court staff; and (d) any person that timely and properly excludes himself or herself from the Class in accordance with the procedures the Court will approve. Numerosity 55. At this time, Plaintiff does not know the exact number of inembers of the Class; however, given the nature of the claims and Defendant's widespread charging of legally prohibited fees when it searches for but does not retrieve, copy, or furnish medical records, Plaintiff believes the members of the Class are so numerous that joinder is impracticable. 735 ILCS 5/2-801(1). Common Questions of Fact or Law 56. There are questions of fact or law common to the Class that predominate over questions that may affect individual Class members, including the following: a. whether HealthPort charged Plaintiff and the Class members a"Basic Fee" in connection with a request for a copy of their clients' medical records, even though HealthPort did not retrieve, copy, or furnish any medical records; b. whether HealthPort's actions, as set forth herein, violate 735 60. � Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of the Class for violation of the 70. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the above paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as if set forth herein. 71. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of the Class for violation of the 89. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the above paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as if set forth herein. 90. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of the Illinois Subclass for violation of the ICFA. 91. Under the ICFA, "the term `person' includes any natural person or his legal representative, partnership, corporation (domestic and foreign), company, trust, business entity or association, and any agent, employee, salesman, partner, officer, director, member, stockholder, associate, trustee or cestui que trust thereof." 815 ILCS 505/1(c). 92. Plaintiff is a"person" under the ICFA. Id. 93. Defendant is a"person" under the ICFA. Id. 94. Under the ICFA, the "term `merchandise' includes any objects, wares, goods, commodities, intangibles, real estate situated outside the State of Illinois, or services." 815 ILCS 505/1(b). 96. � Under the ICFA, "the term `sale' includes any sale, offer for sale, or attempt to sell any merchandise for cash or on credit." 815 ILCS 505/1(d). 97. HealthPort's actions at issue constitute "sales" under the ICFA. Id. 98. Under the ICFA, the terms "trade" and "commerce" mean "the advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State." 815 ICLS 505/1(f). LAW OFFICE OF BRENT GAINES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, r t i+L-- ST. CLA1R Ct~~NTY Violation of Georgia's Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ga. Code § 10-1-370 et seq. (On Behalf of the Class) Violation of Illinois's Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (On Behalf of the Illinois Subclass) Violation of Georgia's Fair Business Practices Act of 1975, Ga. Code § 10-1-390 et seq. (On Behalf of the Class)

lose

28. Defendant’s text message constitutes telemarketing/advertising because it promotes Defendant’s business, goods and services. 29. Specifically, Defendant asks Plaintiff to list a property with Defendant, so that Defendant can help sell it. 30. Defendant collects a commission for every home it sells or helps to sell. 31. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused similar text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 32. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express consent to be contacted by text messages using an ATDS. 33. Plaintiff is the sole user of the 4254 Number. 34. The number used by or on behalf of Defendant (833-778-2774) is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 35. Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code. 36. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message, demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. 38. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 39. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 40. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 41. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 42. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 43. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement. 45. The above execution these instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Platform is capable of transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less. 46. Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words, the platform controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function. 48. Defendant’s unsolicited text message caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text message also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life. 49. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 50. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the below defined Class: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text message using the same type of equipment used to text message Plaintiff, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number. 51. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 54. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet their burden of showing that they obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 55. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 60. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 62. The TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system” (hereinafter “ATDS”) as “equipment which has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” Id. at § 227(a)(1). 63. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to store telephone numbers, using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers and/or to dial numbers from a list automatically, without human intervention, to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 64. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 65. Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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