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38. Within the applicable limitations period, in the spring of 2019, Plaintiff patronized Defendant’s property located at 380 Beaver Valley Mall Blvd #655, Monaca, PA 15061 (the “Subject Property"). 40. Plaintiff has shopped at Defendant’s stores in the past, including within the past month. During his visits to Defendant’s stores, he has repeatedly encountered interior access barriers which have precluded him equal access to Defendant’s goods and services in violation of the ADA’s equal access mandate. Plaintiff would shop at Defendant’s stores more often, and with less difficulty, if the interior access barriers are removed. 43. The barriers depicted above illustrate some, but not all, of the types of interior access barriers at Defendant’s stores. Collectively, these barriers impeded Plaintiff’s access to goods and services at Defendant’s stores. 44. As a result of Defendant’s non-compliance with the ADA, Plaintiff’s rights to full and equal, non-discriminatory, and safe access to Defendant’s goods and facilities has been denied. 45. Plaintiff will be deterred from returning to and fully and safely accessing Defendant’s facilities so long as Defendant’s facilities remain non-compliant, and so long as Defendant continues to employ the same policies and practices that have led, and in the future will lead, to inaccessibility at Defendant’s facilities. 46. Nonetheless, Plaintiff will continue to visit Defendant’s stores that are close to his home, both to attempt to access goods and services in those stores and to survey the stores for compliance with the ADA. 47. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff will continue to be unable to fully and safely access Defendant’s facilities in violation of his rights under the ADA. 48. As an individual with a mobility disability who is dependent upon a wheelchair, Plaintiff is directly interested in whether public accommodations, like Defendant’s facilities, have access barriers that impede full accessibility to those accommodations by individuals with mobility-related disabilities. II. Defendant Denies Individuals With Disabilities Full and Equal Access to its Facilities. 50. As the owner, operator, and/or manager of its properties, Defendant employs centralized policies, practices, and procedures with regard to the design, construction, alteration, maintenance, and operation of its facilities. 51. However, as set forth herein, these policies, practices, and procedures are inadequate in that Defendant’s facilities are operated and maintained in violation of the accessibility requirements of Title III of the ADA. 52. As evidenced by the widespread inaccessibility of Defendant’s stores visited by Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Investigator, absent a change in Defendant’s corporate policies and practices, access barriers are likely to reoccur in Defendant’s facilities even after they have been remediated in the first instance. 53. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks an injunction to remove the barriers currently present at Defendant’s facilities and an injunction to modify the policies and practices that have created or allowed, and will create or allow, access barriers in Defendant’s stores. 54. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2), individually and on behalf of the following classes: a. All persons with qualified mobility disabilities who have attempted, or will attempt, to access the interior of any store owned or operated by Defendant within the United States and have, or will have, experienced access barriers in interior paths of travel. b. All persons with qualified mobility disabilities who have attempted, or will attempt, to access the interior of any store owned or operated by Defendant within Pennsylvania and have, or will have, experienced access barrier in interior paths of travel. 56. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 57. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class in that they all have been and/or are being denied their civil rights to full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment of, Defendant’s facilities and/or services due to Defendant’s failure to make its facilities fully accessible and independently usable as above described. The questions of law and fact that are common to the class include: a. Whether Defendant operates places of public accommodation and are subject to Title III of the ADA and its implementing regulations; b. Whether storing merchandise in interior aisles of the stores makes the stores inaccessible to Plaintiff and putative class members; and, c. Whether Defendant’s storage, stocking and setup policies and practices discriminate against Plaintiff and putative class members in violation of Title III of the ADA and its implementing regulations. 59. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the class as a whole. 60. Defendant has failed, and continues to fail, to provide individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters with full and equal enjoyment of its facilities. 61. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and the class in that Defendant has failed to make Defendant’s facilities fully accessible to, and independently usable by, individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) as described above; Section 403.5.1 of the 2010 Standards. 62. Defendant’s conduct is ongoing and continuous, and Plaintiff has been harmed by Defendant’s conduct. 63. Unless Defendant is restrained from continuing its ongoing and continuous course of conduct, Defendant will continue to violate the ADA and will continue to inflict injury upon Plaintiff and the class. I. Plaintiff Has Been Denied Full and Equal Access to Defendant’s Facilities.

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19. Sanofi is a pharmaceutical group engaged in the research, development, manufacture and marketing of healthcare products. The Company's business includes two main activities: pharmaceuticals and human vaccines. In its pharmaceutical activity, the Company specializes in six therapeutic areas: thrombosis, cardiovascular, metabolic disorders, oncology, central nervous system and internal medicine. In the human vaccines activity, the Company offers vaccines in five areas: pediatric combination vaccines, influenza vaccines, adult and adolescent booster vaccines, meningitis vaccines and travel vaccines. Materially False and Misleading Statements Issued During the Class Period 20. The Class Period begins on February 17, 2006. On this day, the Company issued a press release entitled "Sanofi-aventis received from the FDA an approvable letter for rimonabant for weight management and a non approvable letter for smoking cessation." Therein, the Company, in relevant part, stated: Sanofi-aventis announced today that it has received from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Division of Metabolism and Endocrinology Products an approvable letter for rimonabant for weight management, and from the Division of Anesthesia, Analgesia and Rheumathology Products a non approvable letter for smoking cessation. Sanofi-aventis will continue to work in close collaboration with the 33. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a Class, consisting of all those who purchased Sanofi's securities between February 17, 2006 and June 13, 2007, inclusive (the "Class Period") and who were damaged thereby. Excluded from the Class are defendants, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which defendants have or had a controlling interest. 34. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, Sanofi's securities were actively traded on the NYSE. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are hundreds or thousands of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by Sanofi or, its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. 36. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. 37. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (a) whether the federal securities laws were violated by defendants' acts as alleged herein; (b) whether statements made by defendants to the investing public during the Class Period misrepresented material facts about the business, operations and management of Sanofi; and (c) to what extent the members of the Class have sustained damages and the proper measure of damages. 38. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 40. During the Class Period, defendants materially misled the investing public, thereby inflating the price of Sanofi's securities, by publicly issuing false and misleading statements and omitting to disclose material facts necessary to make defendants' statements, as set forth herein, not false and misleading. Said statements and omissions were materially false and misleading in that they failed to disclose material adverse information and misrepresented the truth about the Company, its business and operations, as alleged herein. 41. At all relevant times, the material misrepresentations and omissions particularized in this Complaint directly or proximately caused or were a substantial contributing cause of the damages sustained by Plaintiff and other members of the Class. As described herein, during the Class Period, defendants made or caused to be made a series of materially false or misleading statements about Sanofi's financial well-being and prospects. These material misstatements and omissions had the cause and effect of creating in the market an unrealistically positive assessment of Sanofi and its financial well-being and prospects, thus causing the Company's securities to be overvalued and artificially inflated at all relevant times. Defendants' materially false and misleading statements during the Class Period resulted in Plaintiff and other members of the Class purchasing the Company's securities at artificially inflated prices, thus causing the damages complained of herein. 44. As alleged herein, defendants acted with scienter in that defendants knew that the public documents and statements issued or disseminated in the name of the Company were materially false and misleading; knew that such statements or documents would be issued or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and substantially participated or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of such statements or documents as primary violations of the federal securities laws. As set forth elsewhere herein in detail, defendants, by virtue of their receipt of information reflecting the true facts regarding Sanofi, their control over, and/or receipt and/or modification of Sanofi's allegedly materially misleading misstatements and/or their associations with the Company which made them privy to confidential proprietary information concerning Sanofi, participated in the fraudulent scheme alleged herein. Applicability of Presumption of Reliance: Fraud On The Market Doctrine 46. As a result of the foregoing, the market for Sanofi's securities promptly digested current information regarding Sanofi from all publicly-available sources and reflected such information in the price of Sanofi's securities. Under these circumstances, all purchasers of Sanofi's securities during the Class Period suffered similar injury through their purchase of Sanofi's securities at artificially inflated prices and a presumption of reliance applies. 48. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 49. During the Class Period, defendants carried out a plan, scheme and course of conduct which was intended to and, throughout the Class Period, did: (i) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiff and other Class members, as alleged herein; and (ii) cause Plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase Sanofi's securities at artificially inflated prices. In furtherance of this unlawful scheme, plan and course of conduct, defendants, and each of them, took the actions set forth herein. 51. Defendants, individually and in concert, directly and indirectly, by the use, means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or of the mails, engaged and participated in a continuous course of conduct to conceal adverse material information about Sanofi's financial well-being and prospects, as specified herein. 52. These defendants employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud, while in possession of material adverse non-public information and engaged in acts, practices, and a course of conduct as alleged herein in an effort to assure investors of Sanofi's value and performance and continued substantial growth, which included the making of, or the participation in the making of, untrue statements of material facts and omitting to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made about Sanofi and its business operations and future prospects in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, as set forth more particularly herein, and engaged in transactions, practices and a course of business which operated as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers of Sanofi's securities during the Class Period. 54. The defendants had actual knowledge of the misrepresentations and omissions of material facts set forth herein, or acted with reckless disregard for the truth in that they failed to ascertain and to disclose such facts, even though such facts were available to them. Such defendants' material misrepresentations and/or omissions were done knowingly or recklessly and for the purpose and effect of concealing Sanofi's financial well-being and prospects from the investing public and supporting the artificially inflated price of its securities. As demonstrated by defendants' overstatements and misstatements of the Company's financial well-being and prospects throughout the Class Period, defendants, if they did not have actual knowledge of the misrepresentations and omissions alleged, were reckless in failing to obtain such knowledge by deliberately refraining from taking those steps necessary to discover whether those statements were false or misleading. 56. At the time of said misrepresentations and omissions, Plaintiff and other members of the Class were ignorant of their falsity, and believed them to be true. Had Plaintiff and the other members of the Class and the marketplace known the truth regarding the problems that Sanofi was experiencing, which were not disclosed by defendants, Plaintiff and other members of the Class would not have purchased or otherwise acquired their Sanofi securities, or, if they had acquired such securities during the Class Period, they would not have done so at the artificially inflated prices which they paid. 57. By virtue of the foregoing, defendants have violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 58. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases and sales of the Company's securities during the Class Period. 59. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 61. In particular, each of these defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company and, therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the securities violations as alleged herein, and exercised the same. Background Violation of Section 10(b) of The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants Violation of Section 20(a) of The Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants

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14. Sometime prior to December 19, 2017, Plaintiff allegedly incurred financial obligations (the “Debt”) to a creditor. 15. Subsequently the Debt was assigned, placed, or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 16. Prior to December 19, 2017, Plaintiff obtained representation from Attorney, Daniel G. Shay (“Mr. Shay”). 17. On or about December 19, 2017, Mr. Shay sent a cease and desist letter to all of Plaintiff’s creditors by facsimile advising the creditors of Plaintiff’s representation and demanding them to cease all communications with Plaintiff. 26. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 38. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 39. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 40. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 42. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 43. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 44. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each member of the Class is entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 45. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. FOR KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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12. Defendants employed Plaintiff and class members as group fitness instructors. Group fitness instructors teach fitness classes to Defendants’ members, such as spinning, aerobics, and yoga. 13. Plaintiff worked as a group fitness instructor at Defendants’ Bloomington, Minnesota location as a group fitness instructor, where she taught yoga classes. 15. In addition to teaching 60 minutes of class time, Plaintiff’s job as group fitness instructor required her to perform work that preceded and followed each of her yoga classes. All group fitness instructors are similarly required to perform pre- and post- class work. 16. Unpaid post-class time is a matter of course among class members because Defendants’ Group Fitness Instructor Manual specifically requires unpaid pre-class work for every class taught: Every Class, Every Time - You are expected to be in the studio, ready to teach, 15 minutes before your class with music playing. A 15-minute transition time between classes exists for you to connect with the members and set the stage and environment for your class. Exhibit A at 7. 17. Defendants also required Plaintiff and class members to spend their own unpaid time compiling current playlists of music for their classes, refusing to compensate them for the time and downloads required to do so. Indeed, with respect to “Your Music in Class” and the necessity to compile and pay for such playlists, Defendants’ Manual instructs that “Your music is your ‘auditory signature’. You are expected to keep it and change it often,” again, with no regard for the significant time or cost associated with doing so. Id. at 8. 19. Taken together, Plaintiff and class members’ unpaid and required pre- and post-class work included: a. Preparing the rooms where classes were held, which preparation included replacing, arranging, and cleaning any equipment, mats, or props; b. Cleaning rooms after classes, which clean up included wiping down any equipment, replacing props and mats, and gathering up sweaty towels and taking them to the laundry, despite the presence of cleaning personnel on staff; and c. Attending and participating in various training and corporate initiative events and meetings taking place at Defendants’ fitness centers. 21. Because Defendants received an uncompensated benefit from the Plaintiff and class members, Defendants were unjustly enriched in that they failed to pay wages for the time employees were required to work. 22. Plaintiff “conferred the benefit of performing unpaid work duties and structuring the employment relationship in this way could be considered unjust— meaning fraudulent, illegal, or a moral wrongdoing similar in nature to fraud.” Roth v. Life Time Fitness, Inc., 16-cv-02476 (JRT/HB), 2017 WL 1628877, at *3 (D. Minn. May 1, 2017). 36. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), Plaintiff defines her proposed, alternate classes as follows: Multistate class under Minnesota law All of Defendants’ group fitness instructors, except for Ohio group fitness instructors, who performed uncompensated services for Defendants’ benefit during the maximum period of time permitted by law. Minnesota class under Minnesota law All of Defendants’ group fitness instructors in Minnesota who performed uncompensated services for Defendants’ benefit during the maximum period of time permitted by law. 37. The classes are so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of class members is presently unknown, research conducted by Plaintiff’s counsel indicates that there are over 150 Life Time Fitness centers, each employing numerous group fitness instructors. 39. Common questions of law or fact relate to and affect the rights of members of the alternate classes, including: a. Whether Defendants failed to pay class members for time they were required to work, or attend various operational meetings and corporate initiative trainings; b. Whether class members conferred benefits upon Defendants; c. Whether it would be unjust for Defendants to retain the benefits that class members conferred upon them; d. Whether Defendants owe Plaintiff and the class members restitution; and e. Whether Plaintiff and class members are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees, interest, and costs. 40. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of class members’ claims. Plaintiff is situated similarly, if not identically, to all class members, as Plaintiff and all class members were Defendants’ employees and suffered similar types of loss. Plaintiff does not expect that the amount of unpaid wages claimed by each class member will vary widely. Plaintiff’s claims are based on the same fundamental factual allegations and legal theories as class members’ claims. 41. Plaintiff will adequately represent and protect class members’ interests and has no interests that conflict with, or are antagonistic to, class members’ interests. 43. Class certification is the superior procedural vehicle for fairly and efficiently adjudicating Plaintiff’s claims because: a. Common questions of law or fact predominate over any individual questions that exist within the class and, consequently, efficiencies to the Court and the parties exist in litigating these common issues on a classwide basis instead of on a repetitive, individual basis; b. Each class member’s damage claim is too small to make individual litigation an economically viable possibility, and few class members have any interest in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions; c. Class treatment is required for optimal deterrence and compensation and for limiting the Court-awarded, reasonable legal expenses incurred by class members; d. Despite the relatively small size of each class member’s claim, the aggregate volume of their claims—coupled with the economies of scale inherent in litigating similar claims on a common basis—will enable class counsel to litigate this case on a cost-effective basis; and e. Plaintiff anticipates no unusual difficulties in this class action’s management in that all legal and factual questions are common to the class.

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28. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered thereby. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 29. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 32. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually-impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 33. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non-existent or empty webpage. For the visually-impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. Defendant Must Remove Barriers To Its Website 34. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 36. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 37. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired persons. 38. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is not sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 40. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 42. Web-based technologies have features and content that are modified on a daily, and in some instances an hourly, basis, and a one time “fix” to an inaccessible website will not cause the website to remain accessible without a corresponding change in corporate policies related to those web-based technologies. To evaluate whether an inaccessible website has been rendered accessible, and whether corporate policies related to web-based technologies have been changed in a meaningful manner that will cause the website to remain accessible, the website must be reviewed on a periodic basis using both automated accessibility screening tools and end user testing by visually-impaired persons. 43. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired persons could independently shop for and otherwise research the Defendant’s products via the Website. 44. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 45. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually-impaired consumers. 46. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 51. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class and Sub-Classes. The Class, and Sub-Classes, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind persons, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class and/or the Sub-Classes. 52. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, including ADA litigation and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 54. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by visually-impaired persons throughout the United States. 55. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 56. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 57. Defendant’s online retail store is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s online retail store 59. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 60. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 62. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 63. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 64. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 65. Defendant’s Website operates in the State of New York and constitutes an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant’s online retail establishment. 66. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and/or operates its Website in the State of New York. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 69. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 70. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 72. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 73. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate, against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) ​et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 74. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 75. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) ​et seq​. for each and every offense. 76. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 78. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 79. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 80. Defendant’s website is an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its online sales establishment. 81. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and/or operates its Website in the City of New York, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 82. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated therewith to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind consumers full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 84. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 85. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 87. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 88. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 89. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 90. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 91. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 92. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods and services of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, ​et seq.​, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, ​et seq.​, and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, ​et seq​. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 93. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 ​et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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(Breach of Fiduciary Duty) Against B&P and Chaitman LLP (Breach of Contract) Against B&P and Chaitman LLP (Unjust Enrichment) Against B&P and Chaitman LLP 20. FSPT brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of all persons who were represented by and paid legal fees to B&P and/or Chaitman LLP in connection with the BLMIS liquidation litigation. Excluded from the class are defendants, members of the immediate family of each defendant, any firm, trust, or corporation in which defendants or any of their officers, directors, managers, or employees have a controlling interest or which is related or affiliated with any defendant, and the legal representatives, assigns, agents, affiliates, and heirs of any such excluded party. 22. FSPT will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of proposed class members. FSPT has retained competent counsel experienced in class action litigation to further such protection and to prosecute this action in the best interest of the class. 23. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of those held by other proposed class members because Plaintiff’s and class members’ damages and entitlement to equitable relief arise from and were caused by the course of conduct complained of herein. FSPT does not have any interests adverse to, or in conflict with, members of the proposed class with respect to the instant action. 25. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. FSPT knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 26. In late 2008, as the global financial crisis began to shake the foundations of the world economy, a fraud of unfathomable scope was uncovered. Bernard L. Madoff, the principal of BLMIS, revealed that his company’s long run of apparent investment success was, in fact, a gargantuan Ponzi scheme. That revelation set off a chain of events leading to the actions described in this complaint. 27. For several years prior to the discovery of the fraud, BLMIS attracted numerous investors and billions of dollars of assets, primarily due to its apparent success. That success was fictional. Rather than invest customer funds in his purported “split-strike conversion” investment scheme, Madoff simply used funds from new investors to pay off old ones, generating fraudulent account statements and trading documents along the way. 29. Meanwhile, BLMIS clients, including Plaintiff and members of the proposed class, suddenly found their life savings embroiled in litigation designed to clean up the mess. B. BLMIS Liquidation Proceedings and Litigation 30. Shortly after the revelation of Madoff’s fraud, the government stepped in, appointing Irving Picard as the trustee for the liquidation of BLMIS pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”). Among other things, Mr. Picard was charged with determining each customer’s “net equity” in BLMIS as required by SIPA—in other words, the amount of the liquidated BLMIS assets to which each customer was entitled. 31. Mr. Picard determined that BLMIS clients' net equity by the "net investment method" by which each customer's deposits were assessed against that customer's withdrawals. That method created two classes of customers. On one hand were "net winners," or those who had received more from BLMIS then they had invested. On the other were "net losers," or those who had invested more than they had received. The Second Circuit approved of the trustee's methodology in 2011. See In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Securities LLC, 654 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2011). 32. On determination of “net equity” vis-à-vis BLMIS set the stage for Mr. Picard’s next stage of litigation: attempting to make all BLMIS customers as close to whole as possible. That process necessitated seeking money from “net winners” to provide payments to “net losers” such that the two groups would equalize as close as possible to whole. 34. In addition, some investors in BLMIS argue that, with respect to at least some of their profits, they are neither “net winners” nor “net losers” because their investments occurred before Madoff converted BLMIS to a Ponzi scheme. These “early investors” claim that Mr. Madoff’s scheme operated as a legitimate trading operation at the time they invested, and only later became a Ponzi scheme. Thus, the “early investors” assert that their pre-Ponzi profits are not part of the BLMIS liquidation proceedings and not subject to clawbacks by the trustee. C. Defendants’ Representation of FSPT and Members of the Proposed Class 35. From the time of Madoff’s arrest until 2015, Chaitman agreed to represent, and in fact did represent, both net winners and net losers at B&P. During this time, Chaitman represented net winners on an hourly-fee basis and she represented net losers on a contingency fee basis. 36. In 2015, Chaitman formed Chaitman LLP. Since then, she has continued to agree to represent, and in fact has represented, both net winners and net losers. She has continued to represent net winners on an hourly-fee basis and net losers on a contingency fee basis. 37. On information and belief, from the time of Madoff’s arrest until 2015, while at B&P, Chaitman agreed to represent, and in fact did represent, early investors on an hourly basis. 38. On information and belief, since founding Chaitman LLP and leaving B&P, Chaitman agreed to represent, and in fact did represent, early investors on an hourly basis. 39. FSPT first retained Chaitman at B&P in or around February 2011. FSPT reaffirmed Chaitman’s representation in 2015 when Chaitman left B&P and formed Chaitman LLP. At all times, Chaitman charged FSPT hourly fees for her services. 41. Chaitman similarly represented, and continues to represent, members of the Proposed Class while at Chaitman LLP from 2015 to date. 42. FSPT restates and incorporates by reference each of the foregoing paragraphs. 43. This count states a claim for breach of contract by FSPT and members of the proposed class against Defendants. 44. As lawyers for FSPT and members of the proposed class, Defendants owed them fiduciary duties, including the duty of loyalty. 45. Defendants breached their duty of loyalty to FSPT and members of the proposed class because Chaitman simultaneously represented other clients with interests directly adverse to FSPT and members of the proposed class. 46. Defendants further breached their duty of loyalty to FSPT and members of the proposed class because Chaitman herself was a net loser and therefore stood to benefit in an amount directly correlated to the amount Mr. Picard clawed back from her net winner clients. 47. FSPT and the members of the proposed class therefore are entitled to recover from B&P and Chaitman LLP all compensatory damages caused by Defendants’ breaches of their fiduciary duty. 49. FSPT restates and incorporates by reference each of the foregoing paragraphs. 50. This count states a claim for breach of contract by FSPT and members of the proposed class against Defendants. 51. As alleged herein, FSPT and each of the members of the proposed class engaged Defendants pursuant to an agreement whereby FSPT and each of the members of the proposed class promised to pay Defendants an hourly fee in exchange for Chaitman performing services that were necessary and in the best interests of FSPT and members of the proposed class. 52. Defendants breached their contracts with FSPT and members of proposed class by billing them for services that were not necessary or in their best interests. 53. FSPT and the members of the proposed class therefore pray that the Court order disgorgement and restitution of any and all attorneys’ fees paid to B&P and Chaitman LLP by FSPT or members of the proposed class. 55. This count states a claim for unjust enrichment by FSPT and members of the proposed class against Defendants. 56. As alleged herein, Defendants were enriched by FSPT and members of the proposed class in the form of fees paid for legal services, including, but not limited to, hourly fees, retainers, and contingency fees. 57. The enrichment of Defendants as alleged was at the expense of FSPT and members of the proposed class. 58. Equity and good conscience do not permit Defendants to retain the enrichment they received at the expense of FSPT and members of the proposed class. As alleged herein, the attorney-client relationships formed between FSPT and members of the proposed class on the one hand and Defendants on the other were improperly and irrevocably tainted by non-waivable conflicts. 59. Defendants also, as alleged herein, billed and were paid for needless and quixotic legal work, ostensibly for the benefit of FSPT and members of the proposed class, but which in reality only benefitted Defendants in the form of increased fees. 60. FSPT and the members of the proposed class therefore pray that the Court order disgorgement and restitution of any and all attorneys’ fees paid to B&P and Chaitman LLP by FSPT or members of the proposed class. A. Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi Scheme and Its Collapse

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10. Plaintiff's alleged debt was primarily for personal, family or household purposes and is therefore a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 11. Sometime after the incurrence of the debt, but before the initiation of this action, Plaintiff is alleged to have fallen behind on payments allegedly owed on the alleged debt. 12. At a time known only to Defendant, Plaintiff's alleged debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 13. In its efforts to collect the alleged debt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by letter. (“Exhibit 1.”) 14. The letter was the initial communication to Plaintiff from Defendant. 15. Defendant's letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 16. As set forth in the following Counts, Defendant's letter violated the FDCPA. 3 17. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 18. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 19. One such requirement is that the debt collector provide “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 20. A debt collector has the obligation not just to convey the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed, but also to convey such clearly. 21. A debt collector has the obligation not just to convey the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed, but also to state such explicitly. 22. Merely naming the creditor without specifically identifying the entity as the current creditor to whom the debt is owed is not sufficient to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 23. Even if a debt collector conveys the required information, the debt collector nonetheless violates the FDCPA if it conveys that information in a confusing or contradictory fashion so as to cloud the required message with uncertainty. 24. When determining whether the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed has been conveyed clearly, an objective standard, measured by how the “least sophisticated consumer” would interpret the notice, is applied. 25. Defendant's letter fails to explicitly identify the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 26. Defendant’s letter states, “Current Creditor: American Express.” 27. There is no entity named “American Express” registered with the New York State Department of State, Division of Corporations. 28. Conversely, there are sixty-one (61) disparate entities registered in New York that begin their legal name with “American Express.” 29. The least sophisticated consumer would likely be confused as to which of the 4 36. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 37. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 38. While § 1692e specifically prohibits certain practices, the list is non-exhaustive, and does not preclude a claim of falsity or deception based on any non-enumerated practice. 39. Collection notices are deceptive if they can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate. 40. The question of whether a collection letter is deceptive is determined from the perspective of the “least sophisticated consumer.” 41. For purposes of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, the failure to clearly and accurately identify the creditor to whom the debt is owed is unfair and deceptive to the least sophisticated consumer. 42. Because the collection letter in the instant case is reasonably susceptible to an 5 46. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the state of New York from whom Defendants attempted to collect a delinquent consumer debt using the same unlawful conduct described herein, from one year before the date of this Complaint to the present. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s conduct violates the FDCPA, and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by § 1692k(a)(2) of the FDCPA. 47. Defendants regularly engages in debt collection, using the same tactics described herein, in their attempts to collect delinquent consumer debts from other persons. 48. The Class consists of more than 35 persons from whom Defendants attempted to collect delinquent consumer debts. 49. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this class action complaint affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. This class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 50. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendants have acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 6 Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g Validation of Debts Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e False or Misleading Representations as to the Name of the Creditor to Whom the Debt is Owed

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10. The alleged charges for repair consumed Plaintiff’s security deposit and more, leaving Plaintiff with an alleged and disputed debt owing to her former landlord. 11. The landlord apparently turned over to Defendant for collection the disputed charges. 12. As its initial communication with Plaintiff, Defendant sent to Plaintiff the letter which is copied and attached hereto as Exbibit 1, redacted per Rule 5.2 FRCP. 22. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of those natural persons to whom Defendant sent letters without notifying them of their right to dispute in writing the alleged debt sought to be collected, together with a class of persons whom were sent a letter containing the words “Your balance may reflect a one-time agency collection fee”. 23. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant. 27. Defendant is a debt collector as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (6). 28. The debt is a debt as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (5). 5. Plaintiff Sadie Hackler is an enlisted member of the United States Air Force. 6. While Stationed in San Antonio, Plaintiff leased a home. At move-in, she noted on the rental agreement several problems with the property. 7. In 2017, the Plaintiff received military orders for a permanent change of duty station from the Air Force. She was assigned to Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton Ohio. 8. When Plaintiff moved out of the rental property, she made sure the property was in better condition than when she moved in. 9. Plaintiff’s former landlord claimed that the same damage Plaintiff noted when she moved in was caused by Plaintiff and charged Plaintiff for fixing the damages.

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21. The language on the aforesaid website reads as follows: 31. This action is brought on behalf of a class consisting of: All persons in the United States who unsubscribed to receive text messages from Domino’s Pizza and were subsequently sent text message advertisements from Defendant (or any party on behalf of Defendant) to their cellular telephone wherein said text messages were sent using an automatic telephone dialing system or device which has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator during the four year period prior to the filing of the complaint in this action through the date of certification.4 33. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief based upon the Defendant’s use of mass text messages that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members of the class is impractical. There are in all likelihood several thousand individuals in the Class as previously defined herein. 34. There are questions of law or fact common to the class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The common factual and/or legal issues common to each class member are as follows: (a) Whether Defendant’s conduct is governed by the TCPA? (b) Whether the text message advertisements sent by Defendant after Plaintiff unsubscribed violated the TCPA? (c) Are the class members entitled to treble damages based upon the willfulness of Defendant’s conduct? (d) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future? 36. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. She has retained counsel experienced in handling actions involving unlawful practices under the TCPA and class actions. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 37. Certification of the class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that: (1) The questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member. (2) A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 38. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the class thereby making appropriate relief with respect to the class as a whole. 40. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 39. 41. Defendant sent unwanted text messages to Plaintiff and the members of the putative class using an automatic telephone dialing system or device which has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator. 42. The unwanted calls (i.e. text messages sent after opting out of the Domino’s text message alert service) were made without the prior express consent of the parties. 44. Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 39. 45. Defendant sent unwanted text messages to Plaintiff and the members of the putative class using an automatic telephone dialing system or device which has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator. 46. The unwanted calls (i.e. text messages sent after opting out of the Domino’s text message alert service) were made without the prior express consent of the parties. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

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4.1 Ryland Homes is a developer and new home builder with operations throughout the United States. In the past 3 years, Defendants have employed thousands of individuals throughout the country as salespersons, including Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated. 4.11 Defendants’ business operations, and the wages and compensation of Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated are substantially similar, if not identical, at all of Defendants’ locations throughout the country. 4.13 Defendants’ conduct has been willful and in bad faith. Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated are entitled to liquidated damages for such conduct. 4.12 Defendants knowingly failed to pay overtime to Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated in violation of the FLSA. 4.10 Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated worked in excess of 40 hours per week without any overtime compensation. 4.2 Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated performed inside sales work and were not paid time and one-half for hours they worked over 40 in a week (“overtime compensation”) and/or minimum wages. 4.3 Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated frequently worked over 40 hours in a week while employed by Defendants. 4.5 Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated are non-exempt current and/or former employees of Defendants, one or more of them, who worked overtime hours as salespersons and were misclassified as exempt. 4.6 Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated were compensated on a commission basis as salespersons. 4.7 Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated at times worked for Defendants without receiving any compensation in some pay periods. 4.8 Plaintiffs and all others situated were not paid a salary or hourly rate for work performed as salespersons. 4.9 Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated were falsely classified as exempt for purposes of overtime and were paid on a commission basis without any overtime compensation. 5.10 Those individuals who choose to opt in will be listed on subsequent pleadings and copies of the written consents to sue will be incorporated herein by reference. 5.1 Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re-alleged as if fully rewritten herein. 5.11 Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of those who are similarly situated. 5.2 Other employees have been victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy of the Defendants that is in violation of the FLSA. Plaintiffs are aware that the illegal practices and policies of Defendants have been imposed on other workers. 5.3 The collective action, or those who are similarly situated, consists of current and former individuals who worked for Defendants or their subsidiaries or divisions, who in the three years preceding the filing of this suit were misclassified as exempt and were not paid minimum wages and/or overtime compensation at time and one half for hours they worked over 40 in a week in violation of the FLSA and whose job duties included performing sales of newly constructed homes from a sales office. The collective action includes, without limitation, those individuals with the job title of sales counselor, sales manager, sales associate, or with any title who performed similar duties of the named Plaintiffs and were paid as commissioned, exempt employees (referred to herein as “salespersons”). 5.4 Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated shared common job duties and responsibilities as salespersons. Thus, Plaintiffs’ experiences are typical of the experience of Defendants’ other salespersons. 5.5 Plaintiffs file this case as an “opt-in” collective action as specifically allowed by 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 5.7 Plaintiffs and those similarly situated frequently performed work unrelated to sales of newly constructed homes for which they were not compensated. 5.8 Plaintiffs request that Defendants fully identify all others similarly situated in order that proper notice of their right to consent to participation in this collective action may be distributed, including immediately providing the name, last known address, telephone number dates of employment, and job title(s) of all those similarly situated so that notice may be sent to those persons immediately. 5.9 Plaintiffs seek to represent those similarly situated who have provided consent in writing to join this action as required by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 6.1 Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re-alleged as if fully rewritten herein. 6.2 Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated are lawfully non-exempt employees and were improperly classified as exempt employees. 6.3 Defendants have violated the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated salespersons minimum wages and/or overtime compensation at a rate of one and one half for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 6.4 Defendants have not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA. 6.6 In further violation of the FLSA, Defendants have failed to maintain accurate employee pay records, including the number of hours worked per work week, by Plaintiffs and by all other similarly situated employees. 6.7 Defendants deliberately misclassified Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated as exempt employees to avoid paying them overtime compensation. 6.8 No exemption excused the Defendants from paying Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated minimum wages and/or overtime compensation. 6.9 Defendants knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out their illegal pattern or practice regarding overtime compensation owed to Plaintiffs and to all other similarly situated employees.

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Background a. Publications Targeted by Defendants

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16. Defendants are flooring contractors, specializing in installing tile for businesses across the United States. Defendants have flown their employees to install tile at various jobsites throughout the United States, including in New Mexico, Arizona, Texas, Kansas, Utah, Colorado, Massachusetts, Virginia, Indiana, Nevada, New York, Florida, Washington and Oklahoma. 17. Named Plaintiff Hawthorn has been an Installer for Defendants from September 1, 2017 through the present. Named Plaintiff Bush has been a Helper for Defendants from July 1, 2017 through July 1, 2018. 18. Named Plaintiff Hawthorn was employed by Defendants as an Installer for tile installation jobs across the United States, including in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The Class Members are and have been employed in some or all of the states listed above, including New Mexico, Arizona, Texas, Kansas, Utah, Colorado, Massachusetts, Virginia, Indiana, Nevada, New York, Florida, Washington and Oklahoma. 19. Defendants employ Installers and Helpers in each of their jobsites throughout the United States, including in New Mexico. 20. In the performance of their work, Plaintiffs handle tools, equipment, and other materials that were manufactured outside of any state in which they have performed. A. Thomas Thompson is individually liable for Defendants’ violations. 21. As the Owner/Manager of Fiesta Flooring, LLC, Thomas Thompson independently exercised control over the work performed by Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated. 22. Thomas Thompson is responsible for running the day-to-day operations of Fiesta Flooring, LLC. 24. Thomas Thompson, acting directly in the interest of Fiesta Flooring, LLC, determined the work to be performed by Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated. 25. Thomas Thompson, acting directly in the interest of Fiesta Flooring, LLC, determined the locations where Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated would work. 26. Thomas Thompson, acting directly in the interest of Fiesta Flooring, LLC, determined the conditions of employment for Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated. 27. Thomas Thompson, acting directly in the interest of Fiesta Flooring, LLC, maintained employment records on Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated. 28. Thomas Thompson, acting directly in the interest of Fiesta Flooring, LLC, possessed and, in fact, exercised the power to hire, fire and discipline Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated. B. The Class Members were misclassified. 29. Defendants classified Plaintiffs and the Class Members as “exempt” from the overtime protections of the FLSA and NM Wage Act. 30. As an Installer, Plaintiff Hawthorn as well as other Installers were paid on a piece rate basis during tile installation. Once all tile had been installed, Plaintiff Hawthorn as well as other Installers were paid a day rate. Helpers, such as Plaintiff Charles Bush, were always paid on a day rate. Neither Installers nor Helpers were paid any additional compensation for hours worked in excess of forty in a week, despite the fact that they were both clearly non-exempt employees. 31. The Class Member Installers were paid just as Plaintiff Hawthorn was paid, and the Class Member Helpers were paid just as Plaintiff Bush was paid. None were paid any additional compensation for hours worked in excess of forty in a week. 33. Rather, Plaintiffs spend most of their time performing manual tasks associated with laying tile at jobsites throughout the United States. The job duties of the Installers and Helpers at each of the Defendants’ jobsites was and is essentially the same. As a result, each Installer and Helper performed the same or similar job duties throughout the Defendants’ operations. The job functions of Plaintiffs required little to no official training, and they did not require a college education or other advanced degree. 34. The daily and weekly activities of Plaintiffs were routine and largely governed by standardized plans, procedures, and checklists created by Defendants. Virtually every job function was predetermined by Defendants, including the location and dates of the job, the crew members to be utilized for a specific job, and what kind of tile would be installed. Plaintiffs were prohibited from varying their job duties outside of the predetermined parameters. 35. Plaintiffs were not paid on a salary basis. 36. Plaintiffs did not direct the work of two or more employees at any time during their employment. Plaintiffs did not have the authority to hire or fire other employees, and their suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion, or any other change of status of other employees were not given particular weight. 37. Plaintiffs did not perform work that required knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction; and they do not perform work in a recognized field of artistic or creative endeavor. 39. Although they worked very long hours, Plaintiffs were misclassified or otherwise treated as exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act and those Plaintiffs who are also NM Class Members were misclassified or otherwise treated as exempt under the NM Wage Act. Defendants required the Plaintiffs to work the long hours described above, and thus knew that Named Plaintiffs and Class Members regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week. Nonetheless, Defendants failed and refused to compensate the Named Plaintiffs and Class Members at a rate that is not less than time- and-one-half their regular rates of pay for the hours they worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 40. Defendants have employed and are employing other individuals as Installers and Helpers who have performed the same job duties under the same pay provisions as Named Plaintiffs, in that they have performed, or are performing, the same job duties, have been misclassified as “exempt” employees, have consistently worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek and have been denied overtime compensation at a rate of not less than one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay. 41. Upon information and belief, in late 2018, Defendants consulted with the Department of Labor, who notified Defendants that Defendants’ Helpers and Installers should all be paid overtime if they worked over forty hours per week. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ response to this news was to attempt to force its Installers and Helpers to sign arbitration agreements. 43. Named Plaintiffs seeks conditional certification pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the following class (the “FLSA Class Members”): All current and former Installers and Helpers of Defendants who were not paid overtime in at least one workweek in the last three years. 44. Named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members performed the same or similar job duties as one another in that they worked as, and performed the duties of, non-exempt employees on Defendants’ worksites, including worksites in New Mexico, Arizona, Texas, Kansas, Utah, Colorado, Massachusetts, Virginia, Indiana, Nevada, New York, Florida, Washington and Oklahoma. Further, Named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members were subjected to the same pay provisions in that they were all paid a day rate or a piece rate and a day rate but were not compensated at the rate of at least one and one-half their regular rates of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek, as specifically discussed above. 45. Defendants’ failure to compensate employees for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek as required by the FLSA results from a policy or practice of misclassifying its Installers and Helpers as exempt from the overtime protections of the FLSA. This policy or practice is applicable to the Named Plaintiffs and all FLSA Class Members. Application of this policy or practice does not depend on the personal circumstances of the Named Plaintiffs or those joining this lawsuit. Rather, the same policy or practice that resulted in the non-payment of overtime compensation to Named Plaintiffs also applied to all FLSA Class Members. 47. Named Plaintiff Hawthorn seeks certification of a class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “NM Class Members”) as follows: All current and former Installers and Helpers of Defendants who were not paid overtime in at least one workweek in the last three years and who worked for Defendants in New Mexico in at least one workweek. 48. Named Plaintiff Hawthorn, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated employees, seeks relief on a class basis challenging Defendants practice misclassifying the NM Class Members as exempt from the overtime protections of the NM Wage Act and therefore failing to pay Named Plaintiff Hawthorn and other similarly situated employees one and one-half times their regular hourly rate of pay for all hours worked over forty in a week. 49. Named Plaintiff Hawthorn and the NM Class Members performed the same or similar job duties as one another in that they worked as, and performed the duties of, non-exempt employees on Defendants’ worksites in New Mexico. Further, Named Plaintiff Hawthorn and the NM Class Members were subjected to the same pay provisions in that they were all classified as exempt employees, were paid piece rate and/or day rate, and were not paid any additional compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek, as specifically discussed above. 51. Therefore, throughout the relevant period, Defendants knew that Named Plaintiff Hawthorn and NM Class Members were not being properly compensated for all of their hours worked. 52. Defendants maintained common work, time, and pay policies and procedures for their Installers and Helpers based out of New Mexico. As a result, Named Plaintiff Hawthorn and NM Class Members are similarly situated and have been regularly deprived of pay for workweeks during which they worked more than forty hours. 53. Plaintiff Hawthorn’s NM Wage Act claims against Defendants satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, and superiority requirements for the certification of a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 54. Numerosity. The class satisfies the numerosity standard as it is believed that there are at least fifteen NM Class Members. Consequently, joinder of all NM Class Members in a single action is impracticable. The data required to calculate the size of the class is within the sole control of Defendants. 56. Typicality. Named Plaintiff Hawthorn’s claims are typical of those of the class because Named Plaintiff Hawthorn’s claims arise from the same course of conduct and legal theories as the claims of the prospective NM Class Members. Like the NM Class Members, Named Plaintiff Hawthorn worked as a non-exempt employee on Defendants’ New Mexico jobsites. Like the NM Class Members, Named Plaintiff Hawthorn regularly worked in excess of forty hours per week. Like the NM Class Members, Named Plaintiff Hawthorn was misclassified as exempt and was not compensated at proper overtime rates for all overtime hours worked. The other facts outlined above likewise apply equally to both Named Plaintiff Hawthorn and the NM Class Members. 57. Adequacy. Named Plaintiff Hawthorn is an adequate representative of the class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the NM Class Members he seeks to represent. The interests of the members of the class will be fairly and adequately protected by Named Plaintiff Hawthorn and the undersigned counsel, who have experience in employment and class action lawsuits. 59. During the relevant period, Defendants violated Section 7 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, and 215(a)(2), by employing employees, including Named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members, in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA as stated herein above, for workweeks longer than 40 hours without compensating such employees for their work in excess of forty hours per week at rates no less than one-and-one- half times their regular rates for which they were employed. Defendants have acted willfully in failing to pay Named Plaintiffs and the Class Members in accordance with applicable law. 60. During the relevant period, Defendants violated the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act, N.M. STAT. § 50-4-22 (West 2018), by employing employees, including Named Plaintiff Hawthorn and the NM Class Members, for workweeks longer than 40 hours without compensating such employees for their work in excess of forty hours per week at rates no less than one-and-one-half times their regular hourly rate. Defendants’ violation of New Mexico Minimum Wage Act occurred as part of a continuing course of conduct. ACCORDANCE WITH NEW MEXICO MINIMUM WAGE ACT ACCORDANCE WITH THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

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15. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23, FRCivP, as a class action for himself and as representative of and for, and on behalf of, all other similarly situated persons ("Class Members"). The Class Members are defined as participants in EMSA’s Utility Fee Program from 2008 through 2013 who were detrimentally affected by Defendants’ fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and violations of other State and Federal laws which Defendants engaged in in furtherance of their conspiracy to defraud, as alleged herein. The Class excludes officers or employees of Defendants and any person or entity whom Plaintiffs' counsel is prohibited from representing under the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct. 17. Plaintiff has been informed and believes, and on such information and belief allege, that the individual loss and potential recovery of each Class Member is such that each is precluded from individually litigating the claims asserted herein by reason of the burdens, costs and expenses involved and that many Class Members will never have their day in court unless this action proceeds as a class action. 18. This action is governed by Federal law. 19. There are substantial questions of law and fact common to the claims of the Class Members against defendants. 20. The claims of Class Plaintiff is typical of the claims of each and all of the Class Members and are based upon and arise out of the identical facts concerning the conduct of the defendants. 21. Plaintiff is situated to, capable of, and will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class Members. Because of the similarity and identity of claims of Plaintiff and the individual Class Members, the successful assertion of Plaintiffs' claims herein will result in the determination of law and facts adequate to prove the liability of defendants to each Class Member. 22. The prosecution of separate actions by the individual Class Members, even if possible, would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications or verdicts that may establish incompatible standards of conduct for defendants. 23. Defendants’ acts alleged herein are applicable to all Class Members, making the relief sought generally applicable to all of the Class Members. 25. A class action is superior to other available methods, if in fact any such other methods are available (which Plaintiffs deny), for the fair and efficient adjudication of the matters alleged herein. 26. EMSA was established in 1977, and operates a Public Utility Model of ambulance services in Tulsa and Oklahoma City. 27. As a public trust, EMSA does not provide the ambulance services, but contracts with a private contractor to provide ambulance services in Tulsa and Oklahoma City. 28. From 1994 to 1998, EMSA’s private contractor was American Medical Response 59. Plaintiff has been a resident of the City of Tulsa during the relevant time period and paid the TotalCare Fee on his monthly water bill. 60. Plaintiff relied on the representation from Defendants that the amount of the TotalCare fee was an accurate representation of the cost of the program. 61. Plaintiff relied on Defendants to protect his interests and accurately represent the costs of providing ambulance services. 62. In paying the TotalCare fee, Plaintiff did not consent to the scheme orchestrated by Defendants. 63. Plaintiff did not consent to being overcharged for the TotalCare program, and does not consent to the money received from the TotalCare program being used as kickbacks and for various expenses. 64. Plaintiff did not consent to the TotalCare fees being used, in part, to contribute to political campaigns. 65. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations set forth above. 66. Count I is for fraud and arises under the common law of Oklahoma. 68. Defendants, and each of them, intentionally misrepresented to Plaintiffs that the charges being paid for emergency ambulance services were being paid pursuant to a legal contract, and not an illegal kickback scheme. 69. Throughout the Claim Period, Defendants, and each of them, made at least one false material misrepresentation to Plaintiffs through solicitations of Plaintiffs to pay to participate in the EMSA TotalCare Program; which misrepresentation was made as a positive assertion which was known by Defendants to be false when made; which misrepresentation was made with the intention that Plaintiffs would act on it and participate in the EMSA TotalCare Program; and which Plaintiffs relied on to their detriment in enrolling (and continuing to enroll) in the EMSA TotalCare Program; and which caused Plaintiffs actual hard and damages. 70. Plaintiffs did not know, and could not have known of the illegal acts of the defendants herein alleged until the Qui Tam Complaint had been unsealed, on January 17, 2017. 71. Each class member has suffered actual damages because the illegal and fraudulent kickback scheme alleged herein directly caused the cost of the TotalCare charged to each Class Member to be higher than it otherwise would have been. 72. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all prior allegations set forth above. 73. Count II is for conspiracy to defraud and arises under the common law of Oklahoma. 74. Defendants Williamson, Torrence, EMSA, ETMC System and ETMC Services all conspired together to do an unlawful act, that is, violate the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b (the “AKS”) 76. Each class member has suffered actual damages because the illegal and fraudulent kickback scheme alleged herein directly caused the cost of the TotalCare charged to each Class Member to be higher than it otherwise would have been. 77. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all prior allegations set forth above. 78. Count III is for violation of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. Section 1962, et seq (the “RICO” statute). RICO provides a private right of action in federal court for individuals injured in their business or property through fraudulent conduct. 79. Here, Defendants Williamson, Torrence, ETMC System, ETMC Services and EMSA, through a conspiracy to defraud, did: actively and intentionally defraud Plaintiffs and others; through a criminal enterprise to violate the AKS, succeed in having EMSA award an over-cost contract to EMTC, in violation of the Federal kickback statute, and to renew that illegal contract through additional criminal conduct which was also in violation of the criminal anti-kickback statute; and, all of which conduct constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. 80. Each class member has suffered actual damages because the illegal and fraudulent kickback scheme alleged herein directly caused the cost of the Utility Fee Program charged to each Class Member to be higher than it otherwise would have been. 82. Defendant EMSA’s inadequate policies, practices and procedures oversight of its officers and employees resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ well established Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 83. Defendant EMSA’s failure to supervise its officers and employees amounts to deliberate indifference. 84. Defendant EMSA made a conscious choice by failing to adequately supervise its officers and employees which resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ well established Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 85. Defendant EMSA’s policy, practices, customs and procedures are nonexistent or wholly inadequate given the great power, authority and deference given to its officers and/or employees. 86. Defendant EMSA knew or should have known that Defendants Williamson and/or Torrence were likely to engage in the acts set forth above. 87. Defendant EMSA authorized or ratified the actions of Defendants Williamson and/or Torrence 88. As a result of Defendant EMSA’s actions, policies, procedures and customs, Plaintiffs suffered damages. 89. Defendant Williamson is the Chief Executive Officer of Defendant EMSA. 90. As Chief Executive Officer of Defendant EMSA, Defendant Williamson acted under color of state law. 92. Defendant Williamson’s actions led to a violation of Plaintiffs’ well established Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 93. Defendant Williamson’s actions are in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983. 94. Defendant Torrence is the Chief Financial Officer of Defendant EMSA. 95. As Chief Financial Officer of Defendant EMSA, Defendant Torrence acted under color of state law. 96. Defendant Torrence’s actions were in violation of the policies and procedures of Defendant EMSA. 97. Defendant Torrence’s actions led to a violation of Plaintiffs’ well established Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 98. Defendant Torrence’s actions are in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983. CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD FRAUD VIOLATION OF THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED CORRUP ORGANIZATIONS ACT Violation of Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Rights by Defendant EMSA (42 U.S.C. §1983) Violation of Plaintiffs Constitutional Rights by Defendant Williamson (42 U.S.C. §1983) Violation of Plaintiffs Constitutional Rights by Defendant Torrence (42 U.S.C. §1983)

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28. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered thereby. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 29. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 32. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually-impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 33. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non-existent or empty webpage. For the visually-impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. Defendant Must Remove Barriers To Its Website 34. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 36. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 37. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired persons. 38. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is not sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 39. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 43. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired persons could independently shop for and otherwise research the Defendant’s products via the Website. 44. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 45. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually-impaired consumers. 46. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 51. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class and Sub-Classes. The Class, and Sub-Classes, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind persons, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class and/or the Sub-Classes. 52. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, including ADA litigation and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 53. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions are common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 54. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by visually-impaired persons throughout the United States. 56. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 57. Defendant’s online retail store is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s online retail store 58. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 59. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 61. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 62. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 63. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 65. Defendant’s Website operates in the State of New York and constitutes an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant’s online retail establishment. 66. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and/or operates its Website in the State of New York. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 67. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated therewith to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 70. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 71. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 72. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 74. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 75. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 76. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 77. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 78. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 80. Defendant’s website is an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its online sales establishment. 81. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and/or operates its Website in the City of New York, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 82. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated therewith to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind consumers full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 83. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 85. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 86. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate, against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and Sub-Class on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8- 107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Sub-Class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 87. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 88. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 89. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 90. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 91. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 92. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods and services of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 93. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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10. Sometime prior to November 20, 2012, Plaintiff entered into a contractual relationship with Defendant for the purpose of utilizing a gym membership offered by Defendant. 11. On or about November 20, 2012, Defendant sent a text message to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in “4700.” 25. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (the “Class”). 26. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of: All persons within the United States of America who received a text message from Defendant or its agent/s and/or employee/s on said person’s cellular telephone that was sent using an automatic telephone dialing system. 27. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the tens of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 37. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 38. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 39. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 40. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 41. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 42. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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(Breach of Contract) (Breach of Warranty) (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code) (§17200 (Unfair Competition)) (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code) (§17500 and §17508 (False Advertising)) (Cal.Civ.Code § 1750 et seq.) 25. For example, Defendants’ Principal Display Panel on packaging of its L- Arginine-Ornithine stated a quantity of “2000 mg”, and that the package contained “300 capsules”. This package is designed to, and does lead an average reasonable consumer to conclude that the package contains 300 capsules each containing 2000 mg of L-Arginine-Ornithine, or a total of 600,000 mg. 26. Instead, the package contained 300 capsules that each provide only 1000 mg of L-Arginine-Ornithine, or a total of 300,000 mg. 27. In much smaller type the on “Supplemental Facts Panel”, located on the back of the bottle and shelved to face away from the consumer, Defendants indicated that “serving size” was two capsules. The 2000 mg representation on the Principal Display Panel was therefore based on this “serving size.” Nothing on the Principal Display Panel indicated that the 2000 mg dosage was predicated on consumption of more than one capsule, or that it was not an accurate representation of the quantity of L-Arginine-Ornithine per capsule. 28. Similarly, the Principal Display Panel on packaging for Defendant’s Calcium 1000 mg Carmel Chews represented that the package contained “Calcium 1000 mg Caramel Chews” and that “60 SOFT CHEWS” were inside the package. 33. Plaintiff / Oregon Sub-Class Representative WALTERS is an Oregon resident, who within the class period purchased one or more of the above Accused VSI Products from a VS store located within the state of Oregon. At the time of the purchase, WALTERS was unaware that the package he purchased misrepresented the amount of milligrams per unit of the product, or the overall amount of the supplement contained within the package. 36. Plaintiffs bring this action for themselves, and on behalf all similarly situated persons who purchased one or more of the Accused VSI Products within the United States, and within any Class State as the Court may determine appropriate for class certification treatment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b). 61. On behalf of themselves and the members of the National Class, Plaintiffs / Class Representatives reallege paragraphs 1 through 60, and further allege: 62. Representations made on the Principal Display Panel of the Accused VS Products created a warranty. 63. Defendants warranted that the package or container of the Accused VSI Product contained the stated number of units and that each of those would contain the stated number of milligrams of the ingredient represented on the Principal Display Panel. 64. Defendants further warranted that each package of Accused VSI Product contained the total number of milligrams of the ingredient represented on the Principal Display Panel. 65. Defendants breached the warranty because each of the units contained less than half of stated number of milligrams of the ingredient represented on the Principal Display Panel. 66. Defendants also breached the warranty because each package of Accused VSI Product contained half or less of the total number of milligrams of the ingredient represented on the Principal Display Panel. 72. On behalf of herself and the California Subclass, California Plaintiff ROE realleges paragraphs 1 through 67, and further alleges: 73. The CLRA applies to Defendants’ actions and conduct described herein because it extends to transactions which are intended to result, or which have resulted, in the sale of goods to consumers. 74. Plaintiff ROE and each member of the California Subclass is a “consumer” within the meaning of California Civil Code §1761(d). 84. On behalf of herself and the California Subclass, California Plaintiff ROE realleges paragraphs 1 through 67, and further alleges: 85. Defendants have engaged in and continues to engage in an unfair, unlawful and fraudulent business practice described herein. By engaging in the above- described practices, Defendants have committed one or more acts of false advertising within the meaning of California Business and Professions Code §17500 and §17508. 86. Defendants’ advertising was and is false and misleading because it consisted of one or more statements which were known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should have been known to be false or misleading. 87. Specifically, Defendants’ advertising is untrue and misleading because the true or accurate quantities / milligrams for each of the Accused VSI Products is not fully and adequately disclosed on the Principal Display Panel at the time purchase. COMPLAINT (1) Breach of Contract and Warranty (2) Fraud by Uniform Written Misrepresentation and Omission (3) State Unlawful Trade Practices (4) Unjust Enrichment (3) Injunctive Relief RICK KLINGBEIL, PC 2300 SW First Ave., #101 Portland, OR 97201 Ph: 503-473-8565 Fax: 503-427-9001 rick@klingbeil-law.com constituted an express warranty, was part of the basis of the bargain and a contract between Plaintiffs / Class Members, and Defendants.

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(Breach of Fiduciary Duty) (Breach of Contract) (Negligence and Gross Negligence) (Negligent Misrepresentations and Omissions) (Violation of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1171) 1. The Duties and Obligations Set Forth in the PSA 24. The vast majority of residential mortgage loans that Countrywide underwrote and originated between 2004 and 2008 were resold to investors in the secondary market, either through whole loan sales or through mortgage backed security securitizations. Mortgage securitizations involve the conversion of illiquid whole loans into bond-like instruments that trade in capital markets. Mortgage loan “pass-through” securities entitle the investor to payments from pools of mortgage loans. Accordingly, the value of a mortgage backed security depends primarily on the underlying mortgage borrowers’ ability to make principal and interest payments and, secondarily, on the adequacy of the collateral in the event of default. If the loans underlying a Certificate suffer defaults and delinquencies in excess of the assumptions built into the payment structure, or the underlying properties cannot be sold at sufficient value following default, Certificate holders suffer greater than expected losses. 26. The Depositors securitized the pool of mortgage loans in the Covered Trusts so that the rights to the cash flows from the loans could be sold to the Certificate holders. The securitization transactions were structured such that the risk of loss was divided among different levels of investment, or “tranches.” Tranches consist of multiple series of related mortgage backed securities offered as part of the same offering, each with a different level of risk and reward, including different levels of credit enhancement. One form of credit enhancement is overcollateralization, which means that the total principal balance of the mortgage loan in the pool for a securitization exceeds the aggregate amount of securities issued and sold in the securitization. Another example of credit enhancement is excess interest, which means that the amount of interest collected on the mortgage loans underlying a securitization for each payment period is expected to be greater than the interest distributable on the Certificates and fees and expenses payable by the covered trust for that period. 28. Because these tranches have different claims on the common cash flow generated by the pool of mortgages, credit rating agencies assign different ratings to them and issuers can price them differently. The most senior tranches of the Certificates received “AAA credit ratings or their equivalent from the three leading ratings agencies, which indicated the lowest risk and highest quality. 29. Once the mortgage loans were transferred to the Covered Trusts and the tranches were established, the Covered Trusts passed securities – the “Certificates” – back to the Depositors, who became the issuers of the Certificates. The Depositors then passed the Certificates to Countrywide Securities and one or more other underwriters, who in turn offered the Certificates to investors in exchange for cash that was then passed back to the Depositors, minus any fees owed to the underwriters. Following the sale of the Certificates, Countrywide Home Loan Servicing LP was responsible for the collection of borrower payments, which were then sent to BNY Mellon as trustee for the Covered Trusts so that they could be distributed to the Certificate holders in accordance with the tranche structure. B. BNY Mellon’s Role as Trustee for the Covered Trusts 31. The PSA provides in its “Preliminary Statement” that “The Depositor is the owner of the Trust Fund that is hereby conveyed to the Trustee [BNY Mellon] in return for the Certificates.” The PSA defines “Trust Fund” as: “The corpus of the trust created hereunder consisting of . . . the Mortgage Loans and all interest and principal received on or with respect thereto . . . .” The PSA defines “Mortgage Loans” as “the mortgage loans as from time to time are transferred and assigned to the Trustee [BNY Mellon] pursuant to the provisions hereof and any Supplemental Transfer Agreement, and that are held as a part of the Trust Fund.” a. The Conveyance of the Mortgage Loans to BNY Mellon and the Duty to Take Physical Possession of the Mortgage Loans 33. In addition, Section 2.02 of the PSA (“Acceptance by Trustee of the Mortgage Loans”) provides that BNY Mellon is required to take physical possession of the mortgage loans and the accompanying loan files for the exclusive use and benefit of all current and future Certificate holders. It provides: (a) The Trustee acknowledges receipt of the documents identified in the Initial Certification in the form annexed hereto as Exhibit F-1 and declares that it holds and will hold such documents and the other documents delivered to it constituting the Mortgage Files, and that it holds or will hold such other assets as are included in the Trust Fund, in trust for the exclusive use and benefit of all present and future Certificate holders. The Trustee acknowledges that it will maintain possession of the Mortgage Notes in the State of California, unless otherwise permitted by the Rating Agencies. [Emphasis added.] 35. BNY Mellon is required by the PSA to take physical possession of these key documents in the loan files – e.g., the original mortgage note with complete chain of endorsement from the originator to the BNY Mellon as trustee, the original recorded mortgage, the duly executed assignment of mortgage, the lender’s title policy, etc. – in order to transfer the ownership rights to the mortgage loans from Countrywide Home Loans to the Covered Trusts. This was one of BNY Mellon’s key contractual and fiduciary obligations under the PSA. b. The Duty to Review the Loan Files and Identify Files Where the Documentation Was Missing, Defective or Incomplete 37. The first step in the certification process was the preparation of the “Initial Mortgage Certification.” In the Initial Mortgage Certification, BNY Mellon was required to acknowledge that it had received and reviewed the two key documents for the mortgage loan: (1) the original mortgage note with a complete chain of endorsements from the originator to BNY Mellon as the trustee for the Covered Trusts; and (2) a duly executed assignment of mortgage. 38. BNY Mellon was then required to attach to the certification a “Mortgage Loan Schedule” indentifying those loans for which it had obtained the original mortgage note with endorsements and a duly executed assignment of mortgage, and a “Schedule A” identifying the mortgage loans for which it had not obtained the original mortgage note with endorsements or the assignment of mortgage. This is spelled out in Section 2.02 of the PSA, which provides: The Trustee agrees to execute and deliver on the Closing Date to the Depositor, the Master Servicer and Countrywide . . . an Initial Certification in the form annexed hereto as Exhibit F-1. Based on its review and examination, and only as to the documents identified in such Initial Certification, the Trustee acknowledges that such documents appear regular on their face and relate to such Initial Mortgage Loan. [Emphasis added.] 66. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained though appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are hundreds of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by BNY Mellon and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. 67. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as they all purchased Certificates based upon contracts substantially in the same form as the PSA in Exhibit C, and BNY Mellon’s misconduct was substantially the same with respect to all persons investing in the Covered Trusts, and all members suffered similar harm as a result. Thus, all members of the Class are similarly affected by BNY Mellon’s statutory, contractual and fiduciary breaches, negligence and negligent misrepresentations that are complained of herein. 68. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and mortgage backed securities litigation. 71. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 72. Congress enacted the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (“TIA”), 53 Stat. 1171, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa, et seq., to ensure, among other things, that investors in certificates, bonds, and similar instruments, have adequate rights against, and receive adequate performance from, the responsible trustees. 15 U.S.C. § 77bbb. The PSA underlying and establishing each of the covered trusts is an “indenture”, and BNY Mellon is an “indenture trustee”, under the TIA. 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa(7), (10). Moreover, the TIA applies to the PSA, and the related certificates. 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(a)(1). BNY Mellon violated multiple provisions of the TIA. 80. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 84. BNY Mellon’s breach of its ministerial duties set forth in the PSA as described above, reduced collections of the mortgage loans in the Covered Trusts in the collateral in the pools of loans supporting the Certificates, and caused Plaintiff’s losses on its Certificates, and diminished their value. 85. BNY Mellon’s failure, in good faith and with due care, to exercise its rights and powers under the PSA after there were events of default and Plaintiff’s ability to collect its full principal and interest became impaired also breached the PSA and caused Plaintiff’s losses. 86. BNY Mellon is liable to Plaintiff for the losses it suffered as a direct result of BNY Mellon’s failure to perform its contractual obligations under the PSA. 87. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 89. As set forth in detail above, BNY Mellon breached its fiduciary obligations by failing to perform these obligations. 90. The violations by BNY Mellon of its fiduciary obligations impaired Certificate holders’ ability to fully collect the principal and interest due on their Certificates and caused losses in the value of Plaintiff’s Certificates. 91. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 93. BNY Mellon’s negligence and gross negligence impaired Certificate holders’ ability to fully collect the principal and interest due on their Certificates and caused losses in the value of Plaintiff’s Certificates. 94. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 96. Because Plaintiff and the Class could not evaluate the loan files for the mortgage loans underlying the Certificates, and because Plaintiff and the Class could not examine whether those files contained complete and accurate documentation for the mortgage loans, they were heavily reliant on BNY Mellon’s unique and special knowledge regarding the mortgage loans and the loan files when determining whether or not to make each investment of Certificates, and whether or not to demand that BNY Mellon exercise its powers under the PSA to require the other parties to the PSA to satisfy their obligations, including to repurchase or substitute the defective loans. Plaintiff and the Class were entirely reliant on BNY Mellon to provide accurate information regarding the loans and loan files with respect to these matters. 97. Plaintiff and the Class necessarily relied on BNY Mellon’s unique and special knowledge regarding the mortgage loans and loan files for those loans in the covered trusts when determining whether to invest in the Certificates, or to timely exercise their rights to require parties to the PSA to perform their obligations. BNY Mellon’s status as the trustee for the Covered Trusts, coupled with its unique and special knowledge about the underlying loans and the loan files, created a special relationship of trust, confidence, and dependence between BNY Mellon and the Plaintiff and the Class. 98. BNY Mellon, in the exercise of due care, should have been aware that Plaintiff and the Class relied on its unique and special expertise and experience and depended upon BNY Mellon for accurate and truthful information. BNY Mellon also knew that the facts regarding the mortgage loans and the loan files were exclusively within its knowledge. A. The Securitization Process for the Countrywide Certificates

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10. Despite the satisfaction, Experian has continued to report the judgment as outstanding on Plaintiff’s credit report. 11. Experian, itself or through a third party, affirmatively seeks out and purchases public records data, including Arizona civil judgments, to report to the world about Arizonans when it sells their credit files. 12. Experian proactively gathers and disseminates this derogatory information even though there is nothing in the FCRA that affirmatively requires it to do so. The reporting of Arizona civil judgment primarily benefits Experian’s customer base who rely on the credit reporting of these judgments as a collection or credit decision tool. 15. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 16. The Class. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Brings this action for herself and on behalf of a class (the “Class”) initially defined as follows: All consumers (1) about whom Experian furnished a consumer report (2) in the five years preceding the date of class certification; (3) that contained a civil judgment in Arizona as unpaid, (4) but which was satisfied, set aside, vacated, appealed or dismissed with prejudice (5) prior to the date of the report. 7. In or around March 2017, Plaintiff obtained a copy of her credit report and discovered that Experian was reporting a judgment against Plaintiff in favor of A Speedy Cash Car Title Loans in Agua Fria Justice Court. 8. A judgment had been entered against Plaintiff in or around 2011. 9. Plaintiff made payments towards the judgment until the judgment was satisfied on or about March 24, 2016. CLASS ACTION CLAIM Violations of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) – Wendy Espinoza (Systematic failure to report satisfactions, dismissals, vacaturs and appeals of civil judgments in Arizona)

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14. Defendant Express Scripts is a pharmacy benefits manager. It acts as a third-party intermediary in the healthcare market, administering prescription claims on behalf of large health plans and corporate clients. It also owns and operates certain mail-order pharmacies. 6 15. Defendant Medco is also a pharmacy benefits manager. It was fully acquired by Express Scripts in 2012, acts at the direction of Express Scripts, and is under Express Scripts’ full control. Visits to “www.medco.com” automatically redirect to “www.express-scripts.com.” Medco identifies itself as “Express Scripts” during outgoing telephone calls. 16. Defendant Accredo is a specialty mail-order pharmacy fully owned and operated by Express Scripts. It acts at the direction of Express Scripts and is under Express Scripts’ full control. Accredo identifies itself as “Accredo, an Express Scripts company” during outgoing telephone calls. 17. Together, Defendants employ various “adherence” tools and other programs to encourage people to purchase drugs from Accredo and other Express Scripts pharmacies. These tools include, among other things, certain robocalling algorithms associated with a program called “ScreenRx.” 18. One of the patents associated with ScreenRx, entitled “Methods and systems for member messaging,” describes an “embodiment” that “utilizes an automated telephone calling system that communicates with a member using computer generated scripting and a voice recognition engine.”6 Similarly, another description of a ScreenRx embodiment states that “a member may be contacted with a fully automated electronic computer-to-human communication system, a highly sophisticated Interactive Voice Response (IVR) systems, utilizing a sophisticated computer generated automated attendant voice and voice/speech recognition and/or touch tone recognition, Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency (DTMF) signaling technology to communicate with the member . . . . [R]ather than utilizing a live attendant or consultant with a 6 Google Patents, ScreenRx, http://www.google.com/patents/US8799204 (last accessed September 1, 2015). 7 consultant user interface that prompts the consultant/attendant, the system may be fully automated with a fully automated attendant where the intelligence of the automated attendants questions and the responses, hints, or suggestions all stem from the logic tree.” Id. 19. Defendants recently completed a “multi-year pilot program that applied ScreenRx technology to assist more than 600,000 members.”7 Among other things, this application of “ScreenRx technology,” along with Defendants’ various other programs, involved sending robocalls to hundreds of thousands of individuals. 20. Unfortunately for consumers, Defendants’ robocalling systems frequently autodial wrong numbers, many of which are cellphone numbers. 21. Due to the multitude of complaints, Defendants have been aware of this continuing “wrong number” problem, yet they refuse to address it. 22. Consequently, Defendants, while using artificial or prerecorded voices, have knowingly and willfully robocalled the “wrong number” cellphones of untold thousands of individuals who never gave them consent to make such calls. 23. Consumer complaints against Defendants for robocalling wrong numbers are legion:8  “Robo call, and they got the wrong number besides.”  “I got a call during school and I listened to the message afterward, but I couldn't tell what they said. I'm 14 and I don't give my number to anyone but friends. Do you know how they might have gotten it?” 7 PR Newswire, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/express-scripts-launches- screenrxsm-industrys-first-solution-combining-early-detection-and-tailored-interventions-to- address-nations-317-billion-problem-of-medication-nonadherence-147554655.html (last accessed September 1, 2015). 8 See, e.g., 800notes.com, supra note 1 (querying 1-800-633-2662, 1-800-496-4910, 1-800- 803-2523, 1-800-282-2881, 978-236-7572, 978-775-6393, 901-381-7555, and 412-515-1241). 8  “Have gotten calls from this number for the past three days. I've called them once and talked to a very nice lady there. She looked up my name and birthday and found nothing for me in their system. We agreed it was an error and that the numbers were probably transposed by someone who had submitted an order. Problem is they still call.”  “They've been calling me once in a while asking for a person that isn't me. The one time I've picked up to tell them that I'm not who they want, nothing happened.”  “Keep getting automated calls and voicemails for Deborah something. The message says to call back at 1-800-705-2126 but when I finally called back (to tell them to stop calling me, they have the wrong number!) the automated system tells me to call the number 1-800-705-2126. [??] This IS the number I'm calling into, to get this message!”  “Receiving robo calls from this company. Have NEVER done business with them. This is illegal.”  “They call me-- I answer, they hang up. They are not my pharmacy, I have asked them to stop calling and they continue to call.”  “'I’ve been receiving calls from this number twice a day, every day for the past two weeks . . . I do not have an account. . . and would never have anything to do with a company that has harassed so many of us for so long.”  “I have absolutely no connection with Medco. . . . My employer doesn't use them nor do I have a personal health plan that uses them. I certainly won't ever use them because they won't stop calling no matter how many times I tell them to stop calling.”  “No one at this number has ever done business with this company.”  “Recorded message states that caller is Express Scripts -- never heard of them.”  “No matter how many times you explain to [Defendant] that you have never done business with them, they refuse to take me off their calling list.” 24. Defendants know they send robocalls to wrong numbers, yet willfully persists in making such calls anyways, even after, and often long after, being told to stop. 9 25. Plaintiff Jennifer Roberts owns a personal cellphone. 26. Like thousands of others, Plaintiff Jennifer Roberts is not and has never been a customer of any of Defendants and has never given any of Defendants permission to call her at any telephone number, much less her private cellphone number. 27. Nonetheless, after 8:00 PM on March 23, 2015, Defendant Accredo, acting both on its own and on behalf of Express Scripts, made an autodialed robocall to Plaintiff Jennifer’s private cellphone number, announcing itself as “Accredo, an Express Scripts company,” and requesting to speak with a “William.” 28. Plaintiff Jennifer is not and has never been known as “William,” a fact she explained to Accredo several times during its first call to her. 29. Specifically, after navigating through Accredo’s automated menus to reach a human representative, Plaintiff clearly and expressly explained that she is Jennifer, that “Jennifer” is not “William,” that she does not know “William,” that she cannot take any messages for some “William” whom she does not know, that the number Accredo called was her personal cellphone number (not “William’s”), that even if some unknown “William” had her number at some point in the past he did not have it anymore, that Accredo had the wrong number, and that she was officially instructing Accredo to place her number on its internal do- not-call list. This call went on for minutes. 30. Nonetheless, Accredo has inundated Plaintiff’s private cellphone number with at least 50 additional robocalls since being told it had the wrong number and being asked to stop. See, e.g., Figure 1, below (showing, 49 robocalls over 25 days from an “ACCREDO RX” to Plaintiff’s private cellphone number). 10 Figure 1 (depicting dozens of “ACCREDO RX” robocalls.) 31. These Accredo calls always show up on Plaintiff’s caller ID as “ACCREDO RX,” always start with the message “This is Accredo, an Express Scripts Company,” and always request that someone named “William” call “about an order” “since it is important to place this order soon." These robocalls come from the number 1-844-665-7345, offer a callback number, and do not present any opportunity to opt-out from receiving future calls. 32. Similarly, Medco, acting on behalf of Express Scripts, also sends wrong-number robocalls to Plaintiff’s private cellphone number. These calls show up as “MEDCO” on 11 Plaintiff’s caller ID, start with the message “This is Express Scripts,” and leave a message for someone named “Scotty.” As with Accredo’s “William” calls, Plaintiff Jennifer Roberts is not “Scotty” and has never been known as “Scotty.” The first such “MEDCO” robocall occurred on June 11, 2015. These robocalls come from the number 1-800-987-4902, do not offer any callback number, and do not present any opportunity to opt-out from receiving future calls. 33. Express Scripts owns, operates, and controls the conduct of both Accredo and Medco. Accredo and Medco both place robocalls at Express Scripts’ direction and for Express Scripts’ benefit, using Express Scripts’ ScreenRx program or otherwise following calling policies and practices established and imposed by Express Scripts. Both Accredo and Medco placed the robocalls at issue in this Complaint on behalf of Express Scripts while having actual or apparent authority to act on Express Scripts’ behalf. 34. Express Scripts, Accredo, and Medco are closely related companies, and both Accredo and Medco represent in their robocalls that they are calling either as “Express Scripts” or as “an Express Scripts company.” Due to this, call recipients (like Plaintiff Jennifer Roberts) reasonably expect that any wrong-number complaints and do-not-call requests made to either Accredo or Medco will be applied to Express Scripts itself as well as any affiliated Express Scripts-owned companies. 35. Judging by the volume of online complaints, Plaintiff’s experience is not isolated or even unusual. Rather, as they have done to thousands of others, each of the Defendants— Express Scripts, Medco, Accredo—have persistently and knowingly caused robocalls to be placed to Plaintiff’s private cellphone number, often several times per day, despite Plaintiff’s clear wrong-number complaint and do-not-call instructions. 12 36. Class Definition: Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on behalf of herself and a Class of similarly situated individuals, defined as follows: All persons in the United States who: (1) received more than one telephone call placed by or on behalf of Express Scripts, Accredo, or Medco; (2) on their cellular telephone; (3) placed using an artificial or prerecorded voice; and (4) that stated the call was being placed to a person different from the person who is the subscriber or customary user of the cellular telephone number that received the call. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’ counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 37. Numerosity: The exact number of members of the Class is unknown and is not available to Plaintiff at this time, but individual joinder in this case is impracticable. The Class likely consists of thousands of individuals. Class members can be easily identified through cross- referencing Defendants’ records with telephone databases. 38. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include but are not limited to the following: a) whether the calls placed by Defendants used artificial or prerecorded 13 voices; b) whether Defendants’ calls were made, without consent, to wrong numbers; c) whether Defendants’ conduct violated the TCPA; and d) whether members of the Class are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendants’ conduct. 39. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages as a result of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct towards Plaintiff and the Class. 40. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex litigation and class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendants have no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interest adverse to those of the other members of the Class. 41. Superiority: This case is appropriate for certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The injuries suffered by the individual members of the Class are likely to have been relatively small compared to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the litigation necessitated by Defendants’ actions. Absent a class action, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendants. Even if members of the Class themselves could sustain such individual litigation, it would not be preferable to a class action because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to 14 all parties and the Court and require duplicative consideration of the legal and factual issues presented herein. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court. Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered, and uniformity of decisions will be ensured. 42. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the foregoing “Class Allegations” and “Class Definition” based on facts learned through additional investigation and in discovery. 43. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 44. Defendants Accredo and Medco, without having prior express consent, made more than one telephone call to cellphone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 45. Defendants Accredo and Medco made these calls while using artificial or prerecorded voices. 46. Defendants Accredo and Medco made these calls at the direction of, for the benefit of, and on behalf of their parent company, Express Scripts, all while acting with actual or apparent authority as agents of Express Scripts. 47. By making telephone calls to Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ cellular telephones numbers while using artificial or prerecorded voices, and/or by having such calls made on their behalf, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 48. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Class suffered actual damages and, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter 15 alia, a minimum of $500 in damages for each such violation. 49. To the extent Defendants’ misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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16. Founded in Australia in 2016, Afterpay has expanded to become one of the largest buy now, pay later services in the U.S. 17. The concept of "buy now, pay later" has existed since the birth of credit cards. Afterpay has expanded this concept to offer point-of-sale loans for online and in-store purchases through its mobile app, allowing users to avoid paying in full for products at hundreds of online and in-person stores by breaking up payments into four installments—allowing users to pay off a purchase over the next six weeks. 56. Plaintiff repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference each of the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 57. California Business & Professions Code § 17200 prohibits acts of “unfair competition,” including any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Afterpay’s conduct related to its misrepresentations and omissions about the true nature of using its “buy now, pay later” service violates the statute’s “unfair” and “fraudulent” prongs. 58. The UCL imposes strict liability. Plaintiff need not prove that Afterpay intentionally or negligently engaged in unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices—but only that such practices occurred. 59. A business act or practice is “unfair” under the UCL if it offends an established public policy or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers, and that unfairness is determined by weighing the reasons, justifications, and motives of the practice against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victims. 60. A business act or practice is “fraudulent” under the UCL if it is likely to deceive members of the public. A. Overview Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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(INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE LAW § 296, subd. 1(a) – GENDER DISCRIMINATION 285. This Cause of Action is brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and all members of the class 286. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiffs and all members of the class in violation of Section 296, subdivision 1(a) of the New York Executive Law, by subjecting them to different treatment on the basis of their gender. 287. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiffs and members of the class by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated employees of the male dominated TED. 288. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiffs and the members of the class have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not limited to lost earnings. Lost benefits, other financial loss, and non-economic damages. 289. By reason of Defendant’s discrimination, Plaintiffs and all members of the class are entitled to all remedies available for violations of the New York Executive Law. (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK EQUAL PAY LAW – DENIAL OF EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK (INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAIMS) VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938, AS AMENDED BY THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963 - Disparate Pay 235. NYC employs individuals classified as School Crossing Guards to ensure the safe transit of child pedestrians to and from school. 236. School Crossing Guard positions are predominately staffed by females. 237. School Crossing Guards are limited to 5 hour workdays. See Executed Contract: School Crossing Guards, March 3, 2008 to March 2, 2010 (“Crossing Guard CBA”), attached hereto as Exhibit A. 238. School Crossing Guards are uniformed employees of the NYC Police Department

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11. On or about July 20, 2016, Greenspoon sent LaPan a letter containing a "NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND ELECTION TO SELL UNDER DEED OF TRUST" ("Default Notice"), an insert titled "FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT DISCLOSURE" ("FDCPA Notice") and an "EXHIBIT A" (the "List"). The Default Notice was pro-forma, containing repeated references to the List. Exhibit 1.1 12. The Notice of Default, FDCPA Notice and List alleged that Plaintiff owed $41,805.00 to "ELDORADO DEVELOPMENT CORP." Exhibit 1, page 5. 14. The List alleged that LaPan, together with Francis Brooks, had defaulted on 5/19/2014 and owed $41,805.00. Exhibit 1, page 7. 15. Plaintiff demanded validation of the debt from Greenspoon on August 2, 2016. Exhibit 2. 16. Greenspoon replied on August 13, 2016, and attached a printout showing a current balance less than $8,000.00. Greenspoon offered no explanation or justification for the $41,805.00 amount. Exhibit 3. 17. Defendant sent .substantially the same letter again in October 2016, again attaching the same list of debtors. 18. The alleged debt related to a Timeshare that Plaintiff and Brooks purchased in 2013 for the purpose of taking vacations there. 19. On information and belief, Greenspoon is engaged in the collection of consumer debts relating to timeshares. 21. On information and belief, Greenspoon has, or had, a policy or practice of mailing to alleged debtors, as an attempt to collect a debt, a Default Notice, FDCPA Notice and List similar to those sent to Plaintiff, containing un-redacted lists of debtors, dates and amounts of alleged debts. 22. On information and belief,. Greenspoon has recorded many such pro- forma Notices of Default or Notices of Default and Election to Sell in the land records of Clark County Nevada, in the past year. For the property parcel to which the Default Notice and List naming Plaintiff was related, those filings included: a. Document Number 201701110002120, a Notice of Default containing the names of 123 individuals, filed on January 11, 2017. b. Document Number 201612220000629, a Notice of Default containing the names of 497 individuals, filed on December 22, 2016. c. Document Number 201607130001965, a Notice of Default & Election to Sell containing the names of 425 individuals, filed on July 13, 2016. 23. Greenspoon has therefore told hundreds of consumers about the debts of hundreds of other consumers. 24. Plaintiff, and the Class, have suffered concrete and particularized injuries as a result of Defendant's illegal behavior. The harm they have suffered is actual, not hypothetical. The harm consists of invasion of privacy in a form - publication of debtors lists - which is explicitly outlawed by federal and state law. 26. Invasion of privacy is a concrete injury traditionally actionable at common law. Invasion of privacy is actionable in most states and under the Restatement of Torts analysis. Further, even if invasion of privacy were not a well-established cause of action at common law, part of the express purpose of the FDCP A was to protect the privacy of alleged debtors. 27. Invasion of privacy is identified explicitly by Congress as an injury: "Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy." 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a); "Existing laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect consumers." 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b). Thus, as one court concluded that a violation of 15 U.S.C. , "both history and the judgment of Congress demonstrate that the unlawful disclosure of legally protected information is a concrete harm that is sufficient to confer standing." Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, No. 3:15-CV-00718, 2016 WL 4245560, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2016) citing In Re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 274 (3d Cir. 2016). 28. The injury suffered by Plaintiff and Class is particularized, in that it is personal to them and not an injury suffered by the body politic. Strubel v. Co"!enity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 188 (2d Cir. 2016). 29. The injury suffered by Plaintiff and the Class is actual and not hypothetical because their privacy has actually been harmed by Defendant's illegal disclosure of information to third parties. 30. This action is brought as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 23(b)(3). 32. The named Plaintiff falls within the Class definition and is a Class Member. 33. The particular members of the Class are capable of being described without managerial or administrative problems. The members of the Class are readily identifiable from the information and records in the possession, custody or control of the Defendant, since Defendant sent the offending communications. 34. Upon information and belief, the Class is sufficiently numerous such that individual joinder of all members is impractical. The three Notices identified above listed the names of over 1,000 individuals in total. 36. The Plaintiffs claims are the same as each member of the Class and are based on the same legal and factual theories. There is nothing unusual about the Plaintiff to warrant a material difference between her claims and the claims of the members of the class. 37. Defendant's likely defenses are and will be typical of and the same or identical for each of the Class Members and will be based on the same legal and factual 0 theories. There are no valid unique defenses. 38. The named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. The named Plaintiff has retained counsel that is experienced in consumer litigation. The named Plaintiffs co-counsel is also experienced in consumer cases including having been appointed as class counsel in a number of class actions asserting claims under consumer protection laws. 39. The named Plaintiff does not have any interests antagonistic to the members of the Class. 40. The Defendant acted on grounds that apply uniformly across the Class, so that the statutory relief afforded pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k is appropriate to the Class as a whole. 41. Common questions predominate over any individual questions and a class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 42. A class action will cause an orderly and expeditious administration of Class members' claims, and economies of time, effort, and expenses will be fostered and uniformity of decisions will be ensured. 43. Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the class members. 45. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs by reference. 46. Plaintiff is a "consumer" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 47. The alleged debt at issue in this case is a "debt" within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 48. The Defendant is a "debt collector" within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The Defendant regularly engages in collection efforts through the mails and interstate commerce on behalf of third-parties. 49. The Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) by communicating in connection with the collection of the alleged debt with a third party. The communication was not with the permission of Plaintiff, a court of competent jurisdiction, did not relate to post-judgment enforcement and was not with a consumer reporting agency or other person authorized by law to receive such communications. 50. The Defendant's communication with third parties was not an attempt to obtain location information for Plaintiff pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692b. 51. The Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(3) by publishing a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts, to persons other than a credit reporting agency or those meeting the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) or 1681b(3). 53. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs by reference. 54. The Vermont Consumer Fraud Act, 9 V.S.A. § 2451 et seq. prohibits unfair or deceptive trade practices. 55. The Vermont Attorney General's regulations at Vt. Admin. Code 3-2-103: CP 104 apply the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act to debt collection. 56. Consumers are authorized to bring private actions by 9 V.S.A. § 2461(b). 57. Plaintiff is a consumer within the meaning of 9 V.S.A. § 245ia(a) because she purchased the timeshare to which the underlying debt related for private and household purposes and not for use in connection with her trade or business. 59. Defendant did not communicate the information to the third parties at their request and the third parties had no legitimate business need for the information. 60. The defendant did not communicate the information to the third parties in order to obtain location information concerning Plaintiff. 61. On information and belief, no judgment had been obtained against Plaintiff. 62. Defendant acted maliciously, with reckless or wanton disregard for the rights of Plaintiff and Class because it knew that communicating the details of a person's debt was a violation of the FDCP A and Vermont law, but nevertheless communicated Plaintiff and Class members private information to third parties. 63. The Plaintiff suffered an injury-in-fact as a result of Defendant's violation, in that her right to privacy established under CP 104.03 was violated and her personal information revealed to many other individuals. Wherefore, Plaintiff and Class ask for the following relief from the court: A. Certify the Class and appoint the Named Plaintiff as the class representative and her lawyers as class counsel; B. Award Plaintiff and the Class an am~mnt to be determined by the jury for compensatory damages in an amount in excess of $75,000; C. Award of costs, including reasonable attorney's fees. D. Such other and further relief the nature of the Plaintiffs cause may require. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act - Third Party Disclosure Vermont Consumer Fraud Act

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40. Plaintiffs and those similarly situated as part of a collective pursuant to the FLSA incorporate herein by this reference the allegations contained in this Complaint as if set forth verbatim. 41. Plaintiffs bring their First Claim for Relief, the FLSA claim, as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 42. The FLSA claims may be pursued by those who opt-in to this case, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 43. Plaintiffs individually and on behalf of other similarly-situated employees (hereinafter also referred to as Opt-in Plaintiffs) seek relief on a collective basis challenging, among other FLSA violations, Defendants’ practice of failing to accurately record all hours worked and failing to pay for all hours worked, including overtime compensation. Plaintiffs also seek relief on a collective basis for any and all retaliation for asserting their rights. The number and identity of other Opt-in Plaintiffs will be determined from the records of Defendants, and potential members may easily and quickly be notified of the pendency of this action. 44. Plaintiffs and those similarly situated as part of a collective pursuant to the FLSA incorporate herein by this reference the allegations contained in this Complaint as if set forth verbatim. Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and Failure to Maintain Records (PLAINTIFFS, INDIVIDUALLY) Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and Failure to Maintain Records (ALL COLLECTIVE MEMBERS)

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16. Allied announces on its website that it has offices in 17 states and places employees in more than 30 states. 17. Upon information and belief, Allied has purchased consumer reports from consumer reporting agencies for the last five (5) years, which are used as a basis to take adverse action against job applicants. 18. Allied purchases these consumer reports after hiring applicants and determining that applicants are otherwise qualified for employment. 19. Uniformly, Allied does not provide pre-adverse action notice to job applicants, including a copy of the applicants’ consumer report and a statement of the applicants’ rights as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3) before making a decision regarding their employment. 20. Allied’s violations of the FCRA have been willful, wanton and reckless in that Allied knew, or reasonably should have known, that it was failing to comply with the 4 requirements of the FCRA. 21. The specific requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3) have been the subject of numerous federal district court, circuit court and Supreme Court decisions. Moreover, these requirements have been the subject of numerous FTC staff opinions authored over the last 15 years. 22. More importantly, upon information and belief, Allied’s obligations under the FCRA, including obligations under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3) are made available by the consumer reporting agency it uses to procure consumer reports. 23. Moreover, Allied had actual knowledge that the FCRA required a reasonable time period for applicants to dispute or explain information contained in a consumer report before making a final hiring decision. 24. Regulatory guidance provided by the FTC has explained the FCRA’s requirement that employers like Allied must wait a “reasonable time” after providing notice under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3) to provide final adverse action notice to applicants. 25. Such FTC staff opinions originate in 1997 and were publically available to Allied. 26. Title 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a) permits a consumer to recover statutory and punitive damages, along with attorney fees and costs for willful violations of the FCRA. 27. Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23, Robertson brings this action on behalf of the Class initially defined below: All natural persons residing in the United States who applied for employment with Allied during the Class Period and against whom Allied made an adverse hiring decision based in whole or in part on information contained in the consumer report without first providing the applicant with a copy of the report and a written 5 summary of rights under the FCRA. 28. Upon information and belief, the putative Class exceeds 1,000 members. Information concerning the exact size of the putative class is within the exclusive possession of Allied. 29. The Class members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 30. Robertson’s claims are typical of the claims of the other Class members as all Class members were similarly affected by Allied’s unlawful conduct in violation of the FCRA. 31. Robertson will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the Class members and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class-action litigation. Robertson is a member of the Class and does not have any interests antagonistic to or in conflict with the members of the Class. Further, Robertson’s claims are the same as those of the Class, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based upon the same legal theories. 32. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all Class members and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual Class members, including: a. Whether Allied provided a copy of the consumer report to the applicant or employee before making a decision to decline, delay, withdraw employment or discharge the applicant or employee based on the results thereof as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i); and b. Whether Allied provided a written summary of the applicant or employee’s rights under the FCRA before making a decision to decline, delay, withdraw employment or discharge the applicant or employee as required by 15 U.S.C § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii). 32. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because the membership of the Class is so numerous and involves claims that, taken individually, may not justify the costs and effort of bringing suit. 33. Further, the prosecution of several actions by individual members of the Class 6 would create a risk of varying adjudications with respect to members of the Class, as well as create inconsistent standards of conduct for those opposing the Class. Additionally, individual actions by members of the Class may be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the adjudication of the claim, which would impair or impede the ability of those individuals to protect their interests. 34. Robertson re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding allegations of law and fact. 35. Allied willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i) by failing to provide a copy of the consumer report used to make an employment decision to Robertson and the Class members before taking adverse action that was based in whole or in part on that report. 36. Allied willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii) by failing to provide a copy of the summary of rights required by this section to Robertson and the Class members before taking adverse action that was based in whole or in part on a consumer report. 37. Robertson and the Class members seek statutory damages for these violations pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A). 38. Robertson and the Class members also seek punitive damages for these violations pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2). 39. Further Robertson and the Class members seek attorney fees and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(3). WHEREFORE, Robertson and the putative class respectfully pray for the following relief: A. An order certifying the proposed class herein pursuant to FED. R. CIV. 7 P. 23 and appointing the undersigned counsel to represent same; B. The creation of a common fund available to provide notice of and remedy Allied’s unlawful conduct; C. Statutory and punitive damages for all class claims; and D. Attorneys’ fees, expenses and costs. FAILURE TO PROVIDE PRE-ADVERSE ACTION NOTICE

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19. Collective and Class: Plaintiff bring this action on behalf of himself and an ascertainable nationwide collective and statewide class consisting of: FLSA Collective All persons currently or formerly employed by Tesla, Inc. throughout the United States as an Owner Advisor, Sales Advisor, or any other similar sales position at any time since three years preceding the filing of this complaint. California Class All persons currently or formerly employed by Tesla, Inc. throughout California as an Owner Advisor, Sales Advisor, or any other similar sales position at any time since four years preceding the filing of this complaint. 20. Ascertainablity: The class and collective are ascertainable in that each member can be identified using information contained in Tesla’s payroll and personnel records. 27. Wilson re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs. 28. Under Title 29 U.S.C. § 207, Wilson and the FLSA Collective were entitled to receive overtime at a rate of 1.5 times their regular rate for any hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a week. During their employment for Tesla, Wilson and the FLSA collective worked over 40 hours in a week. 29. Tesla had a policy and practice of willfully not paying Wilson and the FLSA Collective overtime wages for overtime hours worked. Wilson and the FLSA Collective worked overtime without compensation. Their unpaid overtime work included the time spent in mandatory training sessions, as well as in the discharge of their regular work duties. 30. As a result, Wilson and the FLSA Collective suffered damages in an amount, subject to proof, to the extent they were not paid a proper overtime rate for all hours they worked over 40 hours in a week. 31. Wilson seek class-wide compensation for Tesla’s unlawful conduct and will take the appropriate steps to notify and join the FLSA Class under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) via written joinder consents. 32. Under Title 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 216(b), Wilson is entitled to recover the full amount of unpaid overtime wages, interest thereon, liquidated damages, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of suit. 33. Wilson re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs. 34. Throughout the class period, Wilson and the California Class were misclassified as exempt employees and thereby were not compensated for all hours worked. 38. Wilson re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs. 39. Pursuant to Section 1194 of the California Labor Code, Wilson may bring a civil action for overtime wages directly against the employer on behalf of himself and the class without first filing a claim with the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement. Further, such private actions have the support and approval of the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement. Failure To Pay Overtime Wages Under FLSA (By Wilson and the FLSA Collective Against Tesla) Failure to Pay Minimum Wage (By Wilson and the California Class Against Tesla) Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation (By Wilson and the California Class Against Tesla)

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(Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class (Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class 14. Robocalls Outlawed: Enacted in 1991, the TCPA makes it unlawful “to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any telephone number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone service.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). Calls made by an ATDS or with a prerecorded or artificial voice are referred to as “robocalls” by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) and herein. Encouraging people to hold robocallers accountable on behalf on their fellow Americans, the TCPA provides a private cause of action to persons who receive such calls. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 15. Rationale: In enacting the TCPA, Congress found: “Evidence compiled by the Congress indicates that residential telephone subscribers consider automated or prerecorded telephone calls, regardless of the content or the initiator of the message, to be a nuisance and an invasion of privacy.” Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 § 2(10). Congress continued: “Banning such automated or prerecorded telephone calls to the home, except when the receiving party consents to receiving the call or when such calls are necessary in an emergency situation affecting the health and safety of the consumer, is the only effective means of protecting telephone consumers from this nuisance and privacy invasion.” Id. § 2(12). 16. The TCPA’s sponsor described unwanted robocalls as “the scourge of modern civilization. They wake us up in the morning; they interrupt our dinner at night; they force the sick and elderly out of bed; they hound us until we want to rip the telephone out of the wall.” 137 Cong. Rec. 30,821 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings). 64. Class Definition: Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a class defined as follows: All persons in the United States to whom: a. Defendant and/or a third party acting on its behalf made a call or sent a text message; b. to a cellular telephone number; c. using an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice; d. between the date four years before the filing of the original complaint in this case and the first day of trial. 65. Plaintiff is a member and proposed representative of the class. 80. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 81. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully violated the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), by placing non-emergency calls to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the class using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice without prior express written consent. 82. Plaintiff and class members are entitled to an award of up to $1,500 in damages for each such knowing and/or willful violation. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). A. The Enactment of the TCPA and the FCC’s Regulations Thereunder

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17. Defendants STAMATIS BILLILIS and JOANN BILLILIS actively participate in the day-to-day operation of the Restaurant. For instance, STAMATIS BILLILIS and JOANN BILLILIS personally supervise and direct the work of the employees, instruct the employees how to perform their jobs, and correct and/or reprimand the employees for any errors made. 18. Defendants ST AMA TIS BILLILIS and JOANN BILLILIS jointly create, approve, and implement all crucial business policies, including decisions concerning the number of hours the employees work, the amount of pay that the employees are entitled to receive, and the manner and method by which the employees are paid. 19. In or about August 2014, Defendants hired Plaintiff to work as a non- exempt kitchen worker/food preparer, porter, and food delivery worker for Defendants' 4 restaurant known as Stamatis Restaurant, located at 29-09 23rd Avenue, Astoria, New York. 20. Neither at the time of his hire nor anytime thereafter did Defendants provide Plaintiff with a written wage notice setting forth, among other things, his regular hourly rate of pay and corresponding regular overtime rate of pay. 21. Plaintiff worked continuously for the Defendants m those capacities through in or about May 2017. 22. Plaintiff worked over forty (40) hours per week. 23. Throughout the entirety of his employment, Plaintiff worked six (6) days per week (Thursday off), and his work schedule consisted of nine (9) hours per day on from 4:30 p.m. until 1 :30 a.m. 24. Plaintiff occasionally worked more than ten (10) hours in a day. 25. From the beginning of his employment and continuing through in or about February 2015, Plaintiff was not paid proper overtime compensation. During this period, Plaintiff was paid, in cash, at the rate of $450 per week straight time for all hours worked, and worked fifty-four (54) hours per week (and sometimes in excess thereof). Work performed above forty ( 40) hours per week was not paid at the statutory rate of time and one-half as required by state and federal law. 26. Beginning in or about March 2015 and continuing through in or about February 2016, Plaintiff was not paid proper minimum wages or overtime compensation. During this period, Plaintiff was paid, in cash, at the rate of $480 per week straight time for all hours worked, and worked fifty-four (54) hours per week (and sometimes in 5 excess thereof). Work performed above forty (40) hours per week was not paid at the statutory rate of time and one-half as required by state and federal law. 27. Beginning in or about March 2016 and continuing through the remainder of his employment in or about May 2017, Plaintiff was not paid proper minimum wages or overtime compensation. During this period, Plaintiff was paid, partly by check and the rest in cash, at the rate of $550 per week straight time for all hours worked, and worked fifty-four (54) hours per week (and sometimes in excess thereof). Work performed above forty ( 40) hours per week was not paid at the statutory rate of time and one-half as required by state and federal law. 28. Upon paying Plaintiff his wages each week, Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with proper wage statements setting forth, among other things, Plaintiff's gross wages, deductions, and net wages. 29. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying either the FLSA minimum wage or the New York State minimum wage to Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees. 30. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees either the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half), or the New York State overtime rate (of time and one-half), in direct violation of the FLSA and New York Labor Law and the supporting federal and New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 31. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees "spread of hours" premium for each day that they worked a shift in excess of ten (10) hours, in direct violation of the 6 New York Labor Law and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 32. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, and during the course of Plaintiff's employment, the Defendants failed to maintain accurate and sufficient time and pay records. 33. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as class representative on behalf of himself and all other current and former non-exempt employees who have been or were employed by Defendants between June 26, 2014 through the date that the opt-in period expires as ultimately set by the Court (the "Collective Action Period"), and who were compensated at rates less than the statutory minimum wage and/or less than the statutory rate of time and one-half for all hours worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours per workweek (the "Collective Action Members"). 34. The collective action class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts upon which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of the Defendants, upon information and belief, there are more than forty ( 40) Collective Action Members who worked for Defendants during the Collective Action Period, most of whom would not be likely to file individual suits because they lack adequate financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. Therefore, Plaintiff submits that this matter should be certified as a collective action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 7 35. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Members and has retained counsel that is experienced and competent in the fields of employment law and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 36. This action should be certified as a collective action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of either inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class, or adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 3 7. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a collective action. 38. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the collective action predominate over questions that may affect only individual members because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to all members. Among the common questions of law and fact common to Plaintiff and other Collective Action Members are: a. Whether Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members within the meaning of the FLSA; 8 b. Whether Defendants failed to keep true and accurate wage and hour records for all hours worked by Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members; c. What proof of hours worked is sufficient where the employer fails in its duty to maintain time records; d. Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members statutory minimum wages; e. Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours per workweek, in violation of the FLSA and the regulations promulgated thereunder; f. Whether Defendants' violations of the FLSA are willful as that terms is used within the context of the FLSA; and, g. Whether Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory, liquidated and statutory damages, interest, attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements. 39. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 40. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have been substantially damaged by Defendants' wrongful conduct. 9 41. Plaintiff sues on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 42. Plaintiff brings his New York Labor Law claims on behalf of all persons who were employed by Defendants at any time since June 26, 2011 (the "Class Period") who were non-exempt employees within the meaning of the New York Labor Law and have not been paid statutory minimum wages, overtime compensation, and/or "spread of hours" premium in violation of the New York Labor Law (the "Class"). 43. The persons in the Class identified herein are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the identity and precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts upon which the calculation of that number may be ascertained are presently within the sole control of the Defendants, the Class consists of all non- managerial current and former employees and, therefore, is so numerous that joinder is impracticable and most of whom would not be likely to file individual suits because they lack financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. 44. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation, where individuals lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against a corporate defendant. 45. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 10 46. Plaintiff has committed himself to pursuing this action and has retained counsel experienced in employment law and class action litigation. 4 7. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the NY Class members. Plaintiff understands that, as class representative, he assumes a fiduciary responsibility to the Class members to represent their interests fairly and adequately, and that he must consider the interests of the Class members just as he would represent and consider his own interests, and that he may not favor his own interests over those of the Class members. 48. Plaintiff recognizes that any resolution of a class action lawsuit, including any settlement or dismissal thereof, must be in the best interests of the Class. Plaintiff understands that in order to provide adequate representation, he must remain informed of litigation developments and he understands that he may be called upon to testify in depositions and at trial. 49. Plaintiff has the same interests in this matter as all other members of the Class and Plaintiff's claims are typical of the Class. 50. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions solely affecting the individual members of the Class, including but not limited to: a. Whether Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Class members within the meaning of the New York Labor Law; b. Whether Defendants failed to keep true and accurate wage and hour records for all hours worked by Plaintiff and the Class members; 11 c. What proof of hours worked is sufficient where the employer fails in its duty to maintain time records; d. Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Class members statutory minimum wages; e. Whether Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff and the Class members overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours per workweek, in violation of the New York Labor Law and the regulations promulgated thereunder; f. Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class members "spread of hours" premium for each day they worked a shift in excess of ten (10) hours, in violation of the New York Labor Law and the regulations promulgated thereunder; g. Whether Defendants' violations of the New York Labor Law are willful as that terms is used within the context of the New York Labor Law; and, h. Whether Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory, liquidated and statutory damages, interest, costs, attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements. 51. Plaintiff re-alleges and re-avers each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs "1" through "50" of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 12 52. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants were and continue to be an employer engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). Further, Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members are covered individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 53. At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members within the meaning of the FLSA. 54. Upon information and belief, at least within each of the three (3) most recent years, ST AMA TIS RESTAURANT has had annual gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 55. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members worked hours for which they were not paid the statutory minimum wage. 56. Defendants had, and continue to have, a policy and practice of refusing to pay the statutory minimum wage to Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members for hours worked. 57. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members minimum wages in the lawful amount for hours worked. 58. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members were entitled to be paid at the rate of time and one-half for all hours worked in excess of the maximum hours provided for in the FLSA. 59. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members overtime compensation in the lawful amount for all hours worked in excess of the maximum hours provided for in the FLSA. 13 60. At all relevant times, Defendants had, and continue to have a policy and practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time and one- half to Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members for all hours worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours per work week, which violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(l) and 215(a). 61. Defendants knowingly and willfully disregarded the prov1s10ns of the FLSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members at the statutory minimum wage rate and the statutory overtime rate of time and one-half for all hours worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours per week, when they knew or should have known such was due and that non-payment of minimum wages and overtime compensation would financially injure Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members. 62. As a result of Defendants' failure to properly record, report, credit and/or compensate its employees, including Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members, Defendants have failed to make, keep and preserve records with respect to each of its employees sufficient to determine the wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.A. §§ 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 21 l(c) and 215(a). 63. Defendants failed to properly disclose or appnse Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members of their rights under the FLSA. 64. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' violation of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members are entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to the FLSA. 14 65. Due to the reckless, willful and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members suffered damages in an amount not presently ascertainable of unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation, an equal amount as liquidated damages, and prejudgment interest thereon. 66. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 67. Plaintiff re-alleges and re-avers each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs "1" through "66" of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 68. Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Class members within the meaning of New York Labor Law§§ 2 and 651. 69. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated the rights of Plaintiff and the Class members by failing to pay Plaintiff and Class members minimum wages in the lawful amount for hours worked. 70. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated the rights of Plaintiff and the Class members by failing to pay Plaintiff and Class members overtime compensation at the rate of time and one-half for each hour worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours in a workweek. 71. Employers are required to pay a "spread of hours" premium of one (1) additional hour's pay at the statutory minimum hourly wage rate for each day where the spread of hours in an employee's workday exceeds ten (10) hours. New York State Department of Labor Regulations § 146-1.6. 15 72. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated the rights of Plaintiff and the Class members by failing to pay "spread of hours" premium to Plaintiff and Class members for each day they worked a shift in excess of ten (10) hours pursuant to New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 73. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff and the Class members of their rights under the New York Labor Law. 74. Defendants failed to furnish Plaintiff and the Class members with a statement with every payment of wages listing gross wages, deductions and net wages, in contravention of New York Labor Law § 195(3) and New York State Department of Labor Regulations§ 146-2.3. 7 5. Defendants failed to keep true and accurate records of hours worked by each employee covered by an hourly minimum wage rate, the wages paid to all employees, and other similar information in contravention of New York Labor Law § 661. 76. Defendants failed to establish, maintain, and preserve for not less than six (6) years payroll records showing the hours worked, gross wages, deductions, and net wages for each employee, in contravention of the New York Labor Law § 194(4), and New York State Department of Labor Regulations§ 146-2.1. 77. Defendants failed to notify Plaintiff and the Class members at the time of hire or thereafter of their rates of pay and their regularly designated payday, in contravention of New York Labor Law§ 195(1). 78. Due to Defendants' New York Labor Law violations, Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid minimum wages, 16 unpaid overtime compensation, and unpaid "spread of hours" premmm, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to New York Labor Law§§ 663(1), 198. 79. Plaintiff and the Class members are also entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to New York Labor Law § 663(1 ), as well as civil penalties and/or liquidated damages pursuant to the New York State Wage Theft Prevention Act. [Violation of the New York Labor Law] [Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act]

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11. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 12. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of Texas; b. to whom Defendant SG&B sent an initial collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. that deceptively implied that Defendant could bring legal action to collect a debt in the State of Texas; d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. 13. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 14. Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 15. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Classes, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant's collection actions such as the referenced letters attached as Exhibit A and B, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e. 16. The Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Classes defined in this complaint. The Plaintiffs have retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiffs nor their attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 17. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that the Plaintiff Classes defined above are so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Classes and those questions predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A and B violate 15 U.S.C. l692e. c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiffs and all members of the Plaintiff Classes have claims arising out of the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiffs have no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiffs are committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiffs have also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiffs nor their counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 18. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Classes predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 19. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiffs may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 20. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 21. On or before July 10, 2019 the Plaintiff incurred an obligation. 22. The Schumacher Clinical Partners obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 23. The Schumacher Clinical Partners obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a (5). 24. Schumacher Clinical Partners is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 25. Schumacher Clinical Partners contracted the Defendant SG&B to collect the alleged debt. 26. Defendants collect and attempt to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation I –July 10, 2019 Collection Letter 27. On or around July 10, 2019 Defendant SG&B sent the Plaintiff an initial contact notice (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed to Schumacher Clinical Partners. A true and correct copy of the Letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 28. The letter contains a Letterhead at the top of the page stating: “Law offices of Scheer, Green, & Burke, Co. L.P.A. 29. The letter further states: “The above-mentioned account has been referred to this office for collection. The amount stated above is the current balance due.” 30. The letter ends stating: “Although we are a law firm, at this time, no attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the particular circumstances of your account, evaluated your case or made any recommendations concerning the validity of the creditor’s claims.” 31. Finally, the letter is signed by the “Law Offices of Scheer, Green, & Burke, Co. 39. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 40. Defendants debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 41. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 42. Defendants violated § 1692e: a. As the Letter it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. b. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). 43. By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’ conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, and Plaintiff is entitled to an award of actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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) F.N.B. CORP; ) ) HONAT BANCORP; ) 16. On January 21, 2020, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) confirmed the first U.S. case of a new coronavirus, also known as COVID-19. 18. On March 11, 2020, the WHO declared that the spread of COVID-19 had become a pandemic. 19. On March 13, 2020, President Trump issued the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID- 19) Emergency Declaration applicable to the United States, which declared that the pandemic was of “sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant an emergency declaration for all states, territories and the District of Columbia.” 20. The Administration expressly recognized that with the COVID-19 emergency, “many small businesses nationwide are experiencing economic hardship as a direct result of the Federal, State, and local public health measures that are being taken to minimize the public’s exposure to the virus.” See Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 13 CFR Part 120, Interim Final Rule (the “SBA PPP Final Rule”). 21. On March 25, 2020, in response to the economic damage caused by the COVID-19 crisis, the United States Senate passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136). The CARES Act was passed by the House of Representatives the following day and signed into law by President Trump on March 27, 2020. This legislation included $377 billion in federally-funded loans to small businesses and a $500 billion governmental lending program, administered by the United States Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) and its Small Business Administration (“SBA”), a United States government agency that provides support to entrepreneurs and small businesses. 23. Without the work performed by Plaintiff and Class Members, the CARES Act violates the United States Senate’s legislative intent. The Senate requested Treasury to “issue guidance to lenders and agents to ensure that the … loans prioritizes small business concerns and entities in underserved and rural markets, including veterans and members of the military community, small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals…, women, and businesses in operation for less than 2 years.”1 24. The Treasury announced on April 3, 2020, that small businesses and sole proprietors could apply and receive loans to cover their payroll and other expenses through approved SBA Lenders. Beginning on April 10, 2020, independent contractors and self-employed individuals could apply as well. 2 25. On April 24, 2020, President Trump signed the Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act (“PPPEA”). The PPPEA added $310 billion in PPP funding, bringing the total PPP funds available to lend to $659 billion. 27. The SBA Regulations not only include compensation for Lenders, but also agents. Under the PPP ISL, “[a]n ‘Agent’ is an authorized representative and can be: • An attorney; • An accountant; • A consultant; • Someone who prepares an applicant’s application for financial assistance and is employed and compensated by the applicant; • Someone who assists a lender with originating, disbursing, servicing, liquidating, or litigating SBA loans; • A loan broker; or, • Any other individual or entity representing an applicant by conducting business with the SBA.”6 28. Additionally, the SBA Regulations provide that “Agent fees will be paid out of the fees the lender receives from the SBA.”7 This mandatory language makes it patently clear that the lender will pay the agent. 29. Further, Agents may not collect any fees from the applicant.8 31. The SBA Regulations establish limits on Agent Fees. The SBA Regulations and Treasury Guidance determined that the Agent Fees set forth above are reasonable given the application requirements and the fees that Lenders receive for making PPP loans. 32. Within this context, Defendants served as the intermediary between small businesses and federal funds. Plaintiff served as the Agent for the small businesses applying for the PPP loans to be lent by the Defendants and backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government. 33. Based on information and belief, Defendants received approval from the SBA and funded loans for numerous businesses. However, Defendants failed to pay the required compensation to Plaintiff (the “Agents”), that facilitated the loan process between Lenders and applicants as required by the SBA Regulations. 34. Defendants have either failed and refused to pay, or are willing to pay only a partial percentage of the monies owed to Plaintiff. B. Plaintiff Assists Clients With Applying for PPP Loans Under the CARES ACT 35. On or about March 25, 2020, Plaintiff became aware that the CARES Act had been signed into law. Plaintiff, knowing that the COVID-19 crisis would significantly impact its clients’ businesses, sought to obtain PPP loans through various Lenders on behalf of its clients. 36. In or about April 2020, Plaintiff assisted clients in the gathering and analysis of their documents, as well as the calculation and preparation of loan applications. 37. Based on the SBA Regulations, Plaintiff understood that it was not allowed to charge its clients a fee relating to the application process. The Agents were only permitted to receive compensation from the Agents’ share of the $20 billion in fees the Federal Government paid the Lenders for originating the PPP loans. 39. Plaintiff believed in good faith that it would receive the Agent Fees from the Lenders upon funding of each of its clients’ loans under the PPP, as required by the SBA Regulations. 40. Plaintiff demanded Agent Fees from Defendants for assisting clients with PPP loans. Plaintiff was denied payment of Agent Fees from Defendants. 42. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, Plaintiff has suffered financial harm by being deprived of the statutorily mandated compensation for the professional services it provided in connection with its clients’ PPP loan applications. 43. As noted above, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated as a state and nationwide Class, defined below. 44. Plaintiff seeks to represent a Class composed of and defined as follows: a. All Agents as that term is defined by the SBA Regulations that facilitated small businesses to receive a loan under the PPP, i.e., met the criteria for eligibility and were not otherwise ineligible, between February 15, 2020, and June 30, 2020, who timely applied for a PPP loan through various Lenders and were processed and approved for funding. 45. Numerosity: The Class is composed of thousands of Agents (the “Class Members”), whose joinder in this action would be impracticable. The disposition of their claims through this class action will benefit all Class Members, the parties, and the courts. 47. Superiority: In engaging in the conduct described herein, Defendants have acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and other Class Members. Such conduct requires the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward Class Members. A class action is superior to all other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ claims. Few, if any, Class Members could afford to seek legal redress of the wrongs complained herein on an individual basis. Absent class action, Class Members and the general public would not likely recover, or have the chance to recover, damages or restitution, and Defendants would be permitted to retain the proceeds of their misdeeds. 49. Adequacy: Plaintiff is an adequate representatives of the Class because it is a member of the Class, and Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the other Class Members that Plaintiff seeks to represent. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the other Class Members. Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in litigating complex cases, including consumer fraud and class actions. Plaintiff and its counsel will vigorously prosecute this action on behalf of the Class and have the financial ability to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor counsel have any interest adverse to other Class Members. 50. Ascertainability: Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendants keep extensive computerized records of their loan applications through, inter alia, computerized loan application systems, and federally-mandated recordkeeping practices. Defendants have one or more databases through which all of the borrowers may be identified and ascertained, and it maintains contact information, including email and mailing addresses. From this information, the existence of the Class Members (i.e., the Agent for the borrower) can be determined, and thereafter, a notice of this action can be disseminated in accordance with due process requirements. 56. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations contained in all paragraphs above, as though set forth verbatim herein at this point. 57. The purpose of a declaratory judgment is to declare the rights of litigants. 58. Plaintiff assisted its clients with the application process. Defendants failed to pay Agent Fees owed to Plaintiff as required by the SBA Regulations. Instead, they kept all of the origination and processing fees for themselves, in direct violation of the SBA Regulations. 59. An actual controversy has arisen between Plaintiff and Defendants regarding payment of the Agent Fees. Upon information and belief, Defendants either deny that any Agent Fees are owed to Plaintiff or claim that only a percentage of the Agent Fees are owed. 60. Plaintiff and Class Members seek a declaration that: (i) Plaintiff is entitled to its Agent Fees as outlined in the SBA Regulations; and, (ii) Defendants are and were required to pay Plaintiff its Agent Fees out of the fees Defendants received from the SBA. 61. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations contained in all paragraphs above, as though set forth verbatim herein at this point. 62. Conversion under Pennsylvania law is the deprivation of another's right of property in, or use or possession of, a chattel without the owner's consent and without lawful justification. 63. Plaintiff has an immediate right to possession of its agent fees, which has been denied by Defendants. Accordingly, conversion has occurred. 64. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations contained in all paragraphs above, as though set forth verbatim herein at this point. 65. A misappropriation of property claim refers to the application of another’s property or money dishonestly to one’s own use. 66. In Pennsylvania, a misappropriation claim requires that: (1) the plaintiff has made a substantial investment of time, effort and money into creating the thing misappropriated such that the court can characterize that thing as a kind of property right; (2) the defendant has appropriated the thing at little or no cost, such that the court can characterize defendant's own actions as reaping where it has not sown; and (3) the defendant injured plaintiff by the misappropriation. 67. This is exactly what has happened to Plaintiff here. Plaintiff invested time, effort, and money, which have been wrongfully appropriated by Defendants. 68. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations contained in all paragraphs above, as though set forth verbatim herein at this point. 69. Under Pennsylvania law, a claim of unjust enrichment must allege the following elements: (1) plaintiff conferred a benefit on the defendant; (2) the defendant appreciated the benefit; and (3) acceptance and retention by the defendant of the benefits, under the circumstances, would make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for the value of the benefit. 71. Defendants have been conferred a benefit by Plaintiff, which Defendants appreciated while accepting the benefits. Accordingly it is inequitable for Defendants to retain the benefit rightfully belonging to Plaintiff. 72. Defendants have unjustly benefitted through the unlawful and wrongful collection of money from the federal government through the SBA funding PPP loan applications and continue to benefit to the detriment and at the expense of Plaintiff and Class Members. 73. Accordingly, Defendants should not be allowed to retain the proceeds from the benefits conferred upon it by Plaintiff. 74. Therefore, Plaintiff seeks disgorgement of Defendants’ unjustly acquired profits and other monetary benefits resulting from Defendants’ unlawful conduct, and seeks restitution for the benefit of the Plaintiff and Class Members, in a manner to be determined by the Court. 75. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations contained in all paragraphs above, as though set forth verbatim herein at this point. 76. Quantum meruit is an equitable remedy to provide restitution for unjust enrichment in the amount of the reasonable value of services. 77. Where unjust enrichment is found, the law implies a contract, which requires the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the value of the benefit conferred. 78. In this instance there can be no doubt that Plaintiff provided valuable services for which restitution is owed. Accordingly, the law implies a contract therefor. A. Background Conversion Declaratory Relief Quantum Meruit Unjust Enrichment

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Defendant. Plaintiff LORIANN MILLER (hereinafter, “Plaintiff”), a New Jersey resident, brings this amended class action complaint by and through the undersigned attorneys, against Defendant CAPITAL ACCOUNTS, LLC (hereinafter “Defendant”), individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, based upon information and belief of Plaintiff’s counsel, except for allegations specifically pertaining to Plaintiff, which are based upon Plaintiff’s personal knowledge. 12. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 13. Some time prior to November 5, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to KIDDIE 30. Plaintiff brings claims, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”) Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the following consumer class. 31. The Class consists of: a) All consumers with addresses in the State of New Jersey b) who were sent a collection letter or email from the Defendant c) attempting to collect a consumer debt owed to KIDDIE ACADEMY CHILD CARE LRNG, d) that states “Because of interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on the day you pay may be greater. Hence, if you pay the amount shown above, an adjustment may be necessary after we receive your payment” (e) when no interest or other charges were added or intended to be added (f) which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date 21 days after the filing of this action. 33. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 34. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e and 1692g. 35. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 36. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 39. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 40. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 41. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 42. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, misleading and/or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer. 43. The Defendant violated said section in its letter to the Plaintiff by: a. Using a false, deceptive, and misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of a debt; b. Falsely representing the amount of the alleged debt in violation of 1692e(2)(A); c. Making a false representation or using deceptive means to collect a debt in violation of 1692e(10). 45. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 46. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 47. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, a debt collector must within five days of the initial communication notify the consumer of his or her validation rights. 48. The Defendant violated said section in its letter to the Plaintiff by failing to accurately state the amount of the debt in violation of 1692g(a)(1). 49. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys' fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq.

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a home products company that owns and operates www.sklhome.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in September of 2020, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.sklhome.com, to make a purchase. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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14. You Select Health markets and sells health insurance plans for individuals, families, and small businesses. 15. In order to boost sales and increase its revenues, You Select Health sends numerous faxes advertising its health insurance plans. 16. You Select Health sends these fax advertisements to individuals and businesses with which it has no prior relationship, and without their permission or consent, in violation of the JFPA. 17. The faxes sent by You Select Health constitute advertisements because they promote the commercial availability and quality of You Select Health’s health insurance plans. 18. The faxes sent by You Select Health did not have a clear and conspicuous notice on the first page of the transmission that contains information regarding a recipient’s right to not 5 receive faxed advertisements and informing recipients of the sender’s obligation to comply with opt-out requests within a reasonable time. 19. You Select Health used a telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send the fax advertisements at issue. 20. Starting at least as early as December 6, 2017 and continuing through at least July 24, 2018, You Select Health used a telephone facsimile machine to send at least eight unsolicited fax advertisements to Plaintiff City Plating. 21. You Select Health sent substantially identical faxes to Plaintiff City Plating on December 6, 2017, December 6, 2017 (again), February 13, 2018, March 15, 2018, March 27, 2018, May 22, 2018, July 18, 2018, and July 24, 2018 (A true and accurate copy of the December 6, 2017, December 6, 2017, February 13, 2018, March 15, 2018, March 27, 2018, May 22, 2018, July 18, 2018, and July 24, 2018 fax advertisements are attached hereto as Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H). 22. You Select Health’s faxes promoted its health insurance plans. (See Ex. A - H.) 23. Plaintiff City Plating had no prior business relationship with You Select Health and had never provided it with consent to receive advertisements through any medium, let alone facsimiles. 24. You Select Health created the content of the fax advertisements and transmitted them to Plaintiff and members of the Classes with the intention of generating sales and increasing its revenues. 25. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) 6 and 23(b)(3) individually, and on behalf of, two classes defined as follows: No Consent Class: All persons and entities who (i) in the four years preceding the filing of this action, (ii) received a telephone facsimile advertisement, (iii) sent by, or on behalf of, You Select Health, (iv) for whom You Select Health did not have a record of prior express consent to send the facsimile advertisements at the time they were sent. Opt-Out Class: All persons and entities who (i) in the four years preceding the filing of this action, (ii) received an unsolicited telephone facsimile advertisement, (iii) sent by, or on behalf of, You Select Health, (iv) for whom You Select Health did not have a record of prior express consent to send the facsimile advertisements at the time they were sent, (v) where such facsimile advertisement failed to contain the required opt-out notice. 26. The following people are excluded from the Classes: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) You Select Health, You Select Health’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which You Select Health or its parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Classes; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and You Select Health’s counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 27. Numerosity: The exact size of the Classes is unknown and unavailable to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, You Select Health faxed unsolicited advertisements to hundreds or thousands of individuals and entities who fall into the definition of the Classes. Class membership can be easily determined from You Select Health’s records. 28. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Classes. Plaintiff is a member of the Classes, and if You Select Health violated the JFPA with 7 respect to Plaintiff, then it violated the JFPA with respect to the other members of the Classes. Plaintiff and members of the Classes sustained damages as a result of You Select Health’s uniform wrongful conduct. 29. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Classes, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Classes. Common questions for the Classes include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: No Consent Class: a. How You Select Health gathered, compiled, or obtained the fax numbers of Plaintiff and the No Consent Class; b. Whether You Select Health’s faxes advertised the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services; c. Whether You Select Health sent the fax advertisements without first obtaining Plaintiff and the No Consent Class’s prior express consent to do so; d. Whether You Select Health sent the fax advertisements without first obtaining Plaintiff and the No Consent Class’s prior permission or invitation to do so; and e. Whether You Select Health’s conduct was willful such that Plaintiff and the No Consent Class are entitled to treble damages. Opt-Out Class: a. Whether You Select Health’s faxes advertised the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services; b. Whether You Select Health’s faxes complied with the opt-out notice requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(iii), and the regulations promulgated thereunder; and 8 c. Whether You Select Health’s conduct was willful such that Plaintiff and the Opt- Out Class are entitled to treble damages. 30. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to those of the Classes, and You Select Health has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 31. Policies Generally Applicable to the Classes: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Classes as wholes, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Classes and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Classes as a whole. Defendant’s practices challenged herein apply to and affect the members of the Classes uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Classes as wholes, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. 32. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy given that joinder of all parties is impracticable. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Classes will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by You Select Health’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Classes to obtain effective relief from You Select Health’s misconduct. Even if members of the Classes could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal 9 and factual controversies presented in this case. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. 33. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 34. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement. . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 35. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5). 36. The faxes sent by You Select Health advertised the commercial availability and quality of its goods and services and were commercial in nature. Therefore, You Select Health’s faxes are advertisements under the JFPA. 37. You Select Health sent the facsimile advertisements at issue to Plaintiff and members of the No Consent Class without their prior express invitation or consent, and despite the lack of any prior business relationship between it and members of the No Consent Class. 38. By sending the unsolicited advertisement faxes at issue to Plaintiff and members of the No Consent Class without their prior express consent, You Select Health violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 10 39. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 39. As a result of You Select Health’s conduct, Plaintiff and members of the No Consent Class suffered actual damages, including the conversion or loss of paper and toner consumed in the printing of the faxes, the loss of use of the recipients’ fax machines during the time required to receive, review and route the unauthorized faxes, as well as increased labor expenses. 40. Plaintiff and the No Consent Class are therefore entitled to a minimum of $500 in damages for each violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). To the extent You Select Health’s misconduct is determined to be willful, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The standard for finding willful “intent for treble damages does not require any malicious or wanton conduct, but rather is satisfied by merely ‘knowing’ conduct.” Alea London Ltd. v. Am. Home Servs., Inc., 638 F.3d 768, 776 (11 Cir. 2011). 40. The JFPA mandates that senders of faxed advertisements place a clear and conspicuous notice on the first page of the transmission that contains information regarding a recipient’s right to not receive faxed advertisements, as well as instructions on how to opt out of future transmissions. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii). 41. Additionally, as a result of You Select Health’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the No Consent Class are entitled to an injunction under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), to ensure that You Select Health’s violations of the JFPA do not continue into the future. 41. The faxes sent by You Select Health advertised the commercial availability and 11 quality of its goods and services and were commercial in nature. Therefore, You Select Health’s faxes are advertisements under the JFPA. 42. You Select Health sent facsimile advertisements to Plaintiff and the Opt-Out Class that failed to contain the requisite opt-out notices. Specifically, the faxes failed to contain language that: (i) informed fax recipients of their legal right to opt out of receiving future facsimile advertisements; (ii) identified a facsimile number for fax recipients to transmit their opt-out requests to You Select Health; and (iii) informed recipients of You Select Health’s own obligation to comply with opt-out requests within a reasonable time. 43. You Select Health’s failure to include the opt-out notice information required by the JFPA deprived Plaintiff and members of the Opt-Out Class of the ability to make informed decisions with respect to their legal right to not receive faxed advertisements and denied them of the information necessary to opt out of receiving future fax advertisements. 44. By sending the advertisement faxes at issue to Plaintiff and members of the Opt- Out Class without the opt-out information required by the JFPA, You Select Health violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4). 45. Plaintiff and the Opt-Out Class are therefore entitled to a minimum of $500 in damages for each violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). To the extent You Select Health’s misconduct is determined to be willful, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The standard for finding willful “intent for treble damages does not require any malicious or wanton conduct, but rather is satisfied by merely ‘knowing’ conduct.” Alea London Ltd. v. Am. Home Servs., Inc., 638 F.3d 768, 776 (11 Cir. 2011). 46. Additionally, as a result of You Select Health’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Opt-Out Class are entitled to an injunction under 47 U.S.C. § 12 227(b)(3)(A), to ensure that You Select Health’s violations of the JFPA do not continue into the future. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the No Consent Class) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Opt-Out Class)

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(Disparate Treatment Pregnancy Discrimination in Violation of the NYCHRL – Individual and Class Claims) 209. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Proposed Disparate Treatment Class, hereby repeats, reiterates and re-alleges each and every previous allegation as if fully set forth herein. 210. As described above, Deloitte has committed violations of the NYCHRL against Plaintiff and the members of the Proposed Disparate Treatment Class by, inter alia, discriminating against Plaintiff and the members of the Proposed Disparate Treatment Class on the basis of pregnancy. 211. As a direct and proximate result of Deloitte’s unlawful discrimination in violation of the NYCHRL, Plaintiff and the members of the Proposed Disparate Treatment Class have suffered, and continue to suffer, economic damages, mental anguish and emotional distress for which they are entitled to an award of damages. 212. Deloitte’s unlawful conduct in violation of the NYCHRL was willful and/or wanton and/or in reckless disregard for the rights of Plaintiff and the members of the Proposed Disparate Treatment Class and, therefore, Plaintiff and the members of the Disparate Treatment Class are entitled to an award of punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial. (Retaliation in Violation of the FMLA – Individual and Class Claims) 193. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Proposed FMLA Class, hereby repeats, reiterates and re-alleges each and every previous allegation as if fully set forth herein. 194. As described above, Deloitte has committed violations of the FMLA against Plaintiff and the members of the Proposed FMLA Class by, inter alia, retaliating against Plaintiff and the members of the Proposed FMLA Class for their assertion of rights protected by the (Retaliation in Violation of the NYSHRL – Individual Claims) 221. Plaintiff hereby repeats, reiterates and re-alleges each and every previous allegation as if fully set forth herein. 222. As described above, Deloitte has retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the NYSHRL by, inter alia, terminating her employment because she engaged in activity protected under the NYSHRL. 223. As a direct and proximate result of Deloitte’s unlawful retaliation in violation of the NYSHRL, Plaintiff has suffered, and continue to suffer, economic damages, mental anguish and emotional distress for which she is entitled to an award of damages. 224. Deloitte’s unlawful retaliatory conduct in violation of the NYSHRL was willful and/or wanton and/or in reckless disregard for the rights of Plaintiff and, therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 13. Ms. Knight had a lengthy and successful professional career before joining Deloitte in the U.K. in August 2016. 14. She began her career as a Bureau of Intelligence and Research Analyst at the U.S. State Department, after which she worked for three years as an Energy Security and Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 15. She followed this experience with a role at the U.S. Department of Energy, where she worked as an International Energy Security & Infrastructure Resiliency Intelligence Analyst. 17. In 2016, Ms. Knight was recruited to join Deloitte U.K. as a Director within the Risk Advisory division. 18. After a successful stint in the U.K., in February 2018, Ms. Knight joined the U.S. firm as a Senior Manager at the urging of Advisory Partner Adnan Amjad. II. TO MS. KNIGHT’S INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS I. BACKGROUND

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23. Plaintiff has visited Defendant’s facilities located at 9999 W 38th Ave., Wheat Ridge, Colorado, including within the last year, where he experienced unnecessary difficulty and risk due to excessive slopes in a purportedly accessible parking area and other ADA accessibility violations as set forth in more detail below. 24. Despite this difficulty and risk, Plaintiff plans to return to Defendant’s facilities, at least six times a year. It is convenient for him to stop by regularly to continue to test Defendant’s facilities’ compliance with the ADA because Plaintiff and his wife regularly drive near Defendant’s facilities. Furthermore, Plaintiff intends to return to Defendant’s facilities to ascertain whether those facilities remain in violation of the ADA. 26. Plaintiff will be deterred from returning to and fully and safely accessing Defendant’s facilities, however, so long as Defendant’s facilities remain non-compliant, and so long as Defendant continues to employ the same policies and practices that have led, and in the future will lead, to inaccessibility at Defendant’s facilities. 27. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff will continue to be unable to fully and safely access Defendant’s facilities in violation of his rights under the ADA. 28. As an individual with a mobility disability who uses a wheelchair, Plaintiff is directly interested in whether public accommodations, like Defendant’s facilities, have architectural barriers that impede full accessibility to those accommodations by individuals with mobility-related disabilities. II. Defendants Repeatedly Deny Individuals With Disabilities Full and Equal Access to Defendant’s Facilities 29. As the owner and manager of their properties, Defendant employs centralized policies, practices, and procedures with regard to the design, construction, alteration, maintenance, and operation of their facilities. 30. To date, Defendant’s centralized design, construction, alteration, maintenance, and operational policies and practices have systematically and routinely violated the ADA by designing, constructing, and altering facilities so that they are not readily accessible and are usable, by failing to remove architectural barriers, and by failing to maintain and operate facilities so that the accessible features of Defendants’ facilities are maintained. 32. The fact that individuals with mobility-related disabilities are denied full and equal access to numerous of Defendant’s facilities, and the fact that each of these facilities deny access by way of inaccessible parking facilities, is evidence that the inaccessibility Plaintiff experienced is not isolated, but rather, is caused by Defendant’s systemic disregard for the rights of individuals with disabilities. 33. Defendant’s systemic access violations demonstrate that Defendant either employs policies and practices that fail to design, construct, and alter its facilities so that they are readily accessible and usable and/or that Defendant employs maintenance and operational policies and practices that are unable to maintain accessibility. 35. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks an injunction to remove the barriers currently present at Defendant’s facilities and an injunction to modify the policies and practices that have created or allowed, and will create or allow, inaccessibility to affect Defendants’ network of facilities. I. Plaintiff Has Been Denied Full and Equal Access to Defendant’s Facilities

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12. On information and belief, Defendant is a for-profit company which provides offsite clinical laboratory testing services. 13. On or about June 9, 2020 and June 11, 2020, Defendant sent two unsolicited facsimiles to Plaintiff using a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device. See Exhibit A. 14. The June 9, 2020 Fax states in part the following: 4 “Has your clinic moved to TELEMEDICINE? What are you doing for your DRUG TESTING? Let us perform all the collections for your clinic offsite! We make it easy as 1-2-3! 21. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the TCPA, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendant, (3) from whom Defendant did not obtain “prior express invitation or permission” to send fax advertisements, or (4) with whom Defendant did not have an established business relationship, and (5) where the fax advertisements did not include an opt-out notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4). Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its officers, directors, shareholders, employees and agents, and members of the Judiciary. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class which includes but is not limited to the fax advertisements sent to Plaintiff. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class certification discovery. 22. Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. The precise number of class members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff but will be obtained from Defendant’s records or the records of third parties. 23. Commonality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)): Common questions of law and fact apply to the claims of all class members. Common material questions of fact and law include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) Whether the Faxes and other faxes sent during the class period constitute advertisements under the TCPA and its implementing regulations; 6 (b) Whether Defendant meets the definition of “sender” for direct TCPA liability; (c) Whether Defendant had prior express invitation or permission to send Plaintiff and the class fax advertisements; (d) Whether the Faxes and other faxes sent during the class period contain an “opt-out notice” that complies with the requirements of § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and the effect of the failure to comply with such requirements; (e) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from faxing advertisements in the future; (f) Whether Plaintiff and the other members of the class are entitled to statutory damages; and (g) Whether the Court should award treble damages. 24. Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)): Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. Plaintiff received the same or other faxes as the fax advertisements sent by or on behalf of Defendant during the Class Period. Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. Defendant has acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same or other faxes or faxes which did not contain the proper opt-out language or were sent without prior express invitation or permission. 25. Fair and Adequate Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)): Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff is interested in this matter, has no conflicts, and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 7 26. Predominance and Superiority (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)): Common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy because: (a) Proof of Plaintiff’s claims will also prove the claims of the class without the need for separate or individualized proceedings; (b) Evidence regarding defenses or any exceptions to liability that Defendant may assert and attempt to prove will come from Defendant’s records and will not require individualized or separate inquiries or proceedings; (c) Defendant has acted and are continuing to act pursuant to common policies or practices in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members; (d) The amount likely to be recovered by individual class members does not support individual litigation. A class action will permit a large number of relatively small claims involving virtually identical facts and legal issues to be resolved efficiently in one proceeding based upon common proofs; and (e) This case is inherently manageable as a class action in that: (i) Defendant identified persons to receive the fax transmissions and it is believed that Defendant’s and/or Defendant’s agents’ business records will enable Plaintiff to readily identify class members and establish liability and damages; (ii) Liability and damages can be established for Plaintiff and the class with the same common proofs; 8 (iii) Statutory damages are provided for in the statute and are the same for all class members and can be calculated in the same or a similar manner; (iv) A class action will result in an orderly and expeditious administration of claims and it will foster economics of time, effort and expense; (v) A class action will contribute to uniformity of decisions concerning Defendant’s practices; and (vi) As a practical matter, the claims of the class are likely to go unaddressed absent class certification. Claim for Relief for Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 27. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of himself and a class of similarly-situated persons. 28. The TCPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 29. The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 30. Opt-Out Notice Requirements. The TCPA as amended by the JFPA strengthened the prohibitions against the sending of unsolicited advertisements by requiring, in § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, that senders of faxed advertisements place a clear and conspicuous notice on the first page of the transmission that contains the following among other things (hereinafter collectively the “Opt-Out Notice Requirements”): 9 (1) A statement that the recipient is legally entitled to opt-out of receiving future faxed advertisements – knowing that he or she has the legal right to request an opt- out gives impetus for recipients to make such a request, if desired; (2) A statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within 30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful – thereby encouraging recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”; (3) A statement advising the recipient that he or she may opt-out with respect to all of his or her facsimile telephone numbers and not just the ones that receive a faxed advertisement from the sender – thereby instructing a recipient on how to make a valid opt-out request for all of his or her fax machines; (4) The opt-out language must be conspicuous. The requirement of (1) above is incorporated from § (b)(D)(ii) of the Act. The requirement of (2) above is incorporated from § (b)(D)(ii) of the Act and the rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) in ¶ 31 of its 2006 Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 3787, 2006 WL 901720, which rules and regulations took effect on August 1, 2006). The requirements of (3) above are contained in § (b)(2)(E) of the Act and incorporated into the Opt-Out Notice Requirements via § (b)(2)(D)(ii). Compliance with the Opt- Out Notice Requirements is neither difficult nor costly. The Opt-Out Notice Requirements are important consumer protections bestowed by Congress upon consumers and businesses, giving them the right, and means, to stop unwanted fax advertisements. 31. 2006 FCC Report and Order. The TCPA, in § (b)(2) of the Act, directed the FCC to implement regulations regarding the TCPA, including the TCPA’s Opt-Out Notice 10 Requirements and the FCC did so in its 2006 Report and Order, which in addition provides among other things: A. The definition of, and the requirements for, an established business relationship (EBR) for purposes of the first of the three prongs of an exemption to liability under § (b)(1)(C)(i) of the Act and provides that the lack of an “established business relationship” precludes the ability to invoke the exemption contained in § (b)(1)(C) of the Act (See 2006 Report and Order ¶¶ 8-12 and 17-20); B. The required means by which a recipient’s facsimile telephone number must be obtained for purposes of the second of the three prongs of the exemption under § (b)(1)(C)(ii) of the Act, and provides that the failure to comply with these requirements precludes the ability to invoke the exemption contained in § (b)(1)(C) of the Act (See 2006 Report and Order ¶¶ 13-16); and C. The things that must be done in order to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements for the purposes of the third of the three prongs of the exemption under § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, and provides that the failure to comply with these requirements precludes the ability to invoke the exemption contained in § (b)(1)(C) of the Act (See 2006 Report and Order ¶¶ 24-34). As a result thereof, a sender of a faxed advertisement who fails to comply with the Opt- Out Notice Requirements cannot claim the exemption from liability contained in § (b)(C)(1) of the Act. 32. The Faxes. On or about June 9, 2020, and June 11, 2020 Defendant sent the Faxes via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class. The 11 Faxes constituted advertisements under the Act and the regulations implementing the Act. Defendant failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Faxes. The Faxes were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission and Defendant is precluded from sustaining the EBR safe harbor with Plaintiff and other members of the class, because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, Defendant violated the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Fax via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class which includes these Faxes and all others sent during the four years prior to the filing of this case through the present. 33. Defendant’s Other Violations. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendant has sent via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines of members of the Plaintiff Class other faxes that constitute advertisements under the TCPA and its implementing regulations that were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission and without complying with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, Defendant violated the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendant may be continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. 34. The TCPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendant’s violations of the Act and provides for 12 statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 35. Although the TCPA is a strict liability statute, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the other class members even if its actions were only negligent. 36. Defendant knew or should have known that (a) Plaintiff and the other class members had not given prior express invitation or permission for Defendant or anybody else to fax advertisements promoting goods or services to be bought or sold; (b) Defendant transmitted advertisements; and (c) the Faxes and other faxes sent by Defendant did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice. 37. Defendant’s actions caused damages to Plaintiff and the other class members. Receiving Defendant’s junk faxes caused Plaintiff and the other recipients to lose paper and toner consumed in the printing of Defendant’s faxes. Moreover, Defendant’s faxes occupied Plaintiff's and the other class members’ telephone lines and fax machines. Defendant’s faxes cost Plaintiff and the other class members time, as Plaintiff and the other class members and their employees wasted their time receiving, reviewing, and routing Defendant’s unauthorized faxes. That time otherwise would have been spent on Plaintiff's and the other class members’ business or personal activities. Defendant’s faxes intruded into Plaintiff’s and other class members’ seclusion and violated their right to privacy, including their interests in being left alone. Finally, the injury and property damage sustained by Plaintiff and the other class members from the sending of Defendant’s advertisements occurred outside of Defendant’s premises. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, FRED J. DE LA COTERA, D.D.S., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, demands judgment in his favor and against Defendant, NOAH ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED, as follows: 13 A. That the Court adjudge and decree that the present case may be properly maintained as a class action, appoint Plaintiff as the representative of the class, and appoint Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the class; B. That the Court award actual monetary loss from such violations or the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00) for each violation, whichever is greater, and that the Court award treble damages of $1,500.00 if the violations are deemed “willful or knowing”; C. That Court enjoin Defendant from additional violations; and D. That the Court award pre-judgment interest, costs, and such further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. Respectfully submitted, FRED J. DE LA COTERA, D.D.S., individually and as the representative of a class of similarly- situated persons By: /s/ Ryan M. Kelly Ryan M. Kelly

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10. On November 22,2016, Business Health Solutions received the unsolicited fax advertisement attached as Exhibit A on its facsimile machine. The fax offered to purchase participation in a survey in exchange for a payment of $10.00. 11. Such faxes are advertisements subject to the TCPA. Fischbein v. Olson Research Grp., Inc., No. 19-3018, 2020 WL 2505178 (3d Cir. May 15, 2020). 12. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well. 13. Defendants are responsible for sending or causing the sending of the fax. 14. Defendants derived economic benefit from the sending of the fax. 15. Defendants either negligently or wilfully violated the rights of Plaintiff and other recipients in sending the fax. 16. Plaintiff had no prior relationship with Defendants and had not authorized the sending of fax advertisements to Plaintiff. 17. On information and belief, the fax attached hereto was sent as part of a mass broadcasting of faxes. 18. On information and belief, Defendants have transmitted similar unsolicited fax advertisements to at least 40 other persons in Michigan. 20. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-19. 21. The TCPA makes unlawful the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ...” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). 22. The TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3), provides: Private right of action. A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State– (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the Court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under the subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. 24. Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages. 25. Defendants violated the TCPA even if their actions were only negligent. 26. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 27. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons (b) who, on or after a date four years prior to the filing of this action (28 U.S.C. §1658), (c) were sent faxes by or on behalf of Research Now Group, LLC and/or E-Rewards Services, Inc. offering payment in exchange for participation in a survey. 28. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that there are more than 40 members of the class. 30. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff's counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 31. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 32. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendants is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions.

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11. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 12. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York; b. to whom Defendant EOS sent an initial collection letter; c. attempting to collect a consumer debt; d. that states conflicting itemizations of the balance due; e. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (21) days after the filing of this action. 13. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 14. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 16. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 18. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 19. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 21. Some time prior to June 5, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred by Plaintiff to non-party Verizon Wireless. 22. The obligation arose out of a transaction in which money, property, insurance or services of the subject transactions were incurred for personal purposes, specifically personal credit card purchases. 23. The alleged Verizon Wireless obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (5). 24. Verizon Wireless is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (4). 25. According to Defendant’s letter, Verizon Wireless placed the debt with Defendant EOS for collection. 26. Defendant EOS collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation - June 5, 2020 Collection Letter 27. On or about June 5, 2020, Defendant sent Plaintiff an initial collection letter regarding the alleged debt. See Letter attached as Exhibit A. 28. The collection letter states: 53. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 54. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 55. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 56. Defendant violated said section by: a. Making a false and misleading representation in violation of §§ 1692e, 1692e (10) by providing conflicting itemizations of the balance due; b. Falsely representing the character, amount or legal status of the debt in violation of §1692e (2). 57. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692e, et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 59. Alternatively, Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 60. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 61. Defendant violated this section by unfairly stating conflicting itemizations of the balance due . 62. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692f, et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 63. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 64. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 65. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g an initial communication with a debtor regarding a debt must identify the amount of the debt. 66. Defendant violated this section by failing to clearly state the amount of the debt. 67. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. CLIENT ACCOUNT # PRINCIPAL INTEREST FEE VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.

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17. Plaintiffs bring Count I of this Complaint as a collective action, alleging violations of the FLSA on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals. This “Federal Collective Group” is defined as: all individuals who, through a contract with Defendants or otherwise, distribute or distributed for Defendants under agreements with Flowers Baking Company of Lafayette, L.L.C.; or Flowers Baking Company of Baton Rouge, L.L.C.; or Flowers Baking Company of Alexandria, L.L.C.; or Flowers Baking Company of New Orleans, L.L.C., and who were classified by Defendants as “independent contractors” (collectively “Covered Positions”) anywhere at any time in the United States from the date that is three years preceding the commencement of this action through the close of the Court-determined opt-in period and who file a consent to join this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The “Federal Collective Group” includes the named Plaintiffs in this action. Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify this definition prior to conditional certification of the collective group. 6 #323127 18. Plaintiffs, along with current and former employees of Defendants in Covered Positions, are similarly situated in that they have substantially similar job requirements, pay provisions, and are subject to Defendants’ common practice, policy, or plan of controlling their daily job functions. 19. Defendants regularly permitted, required and encouraged Plaintiffs and members of the Federal Collective Group to work more than 40 hours per week without overtime compensation. 20. Upon information and belief, Defendants knew that Plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals performed work that required overtime pay. 21. Defendants have therefore operated under a scheme to deprive these employees of overtime compensation by failing to properly compensate them for all time worked. 22. Defendants’ conduct, as set forth in this Complaint, was willful and has caused significant damages to Plaintiff and all similarly situated individuals. 23. Count I of this Complaint for violations of the FLSA may be brought and maintained as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) because the claims of the Plaintiffs are similar to the claims of current and former “independent contractors” who worked for Defendants. 24. Defendants are liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals, and notice of this lawsuit should be sent to them. Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants’ records. 7 #323127 32. Defendant Flowers Foods is a corporation whose business consists of manufacturing, selling and distributing bakery and snack food products to retail customers. Flowers Foods’s bakeries and warehouses are operated in Louisiana by Defendants Flowers Baking Company of Lafayette, L.L.C.; Flowers Baking Company of Baton Rouge, L.L.C.; Flowers Baking Company of Alexandria, L.L.C.; and Flowers Baking Company of New Orleans, 58. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding Paragraphs. 16 #323127 59. Section 206(a)(1) of the FLSA provides in pertinent part: Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any of his employees who in any work week is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a work week longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 60. There are no exemptions applicable to Plaintiffs or to other members of the Federal Collective Group. 61. For purposes of the FLSA, the employment practices of Defendants were and are uniform in all respects material to the claims asserted in this Complaint throughout the portions of United States in which Defendants conduct business. 62. Plaintiffs and the other members of the Federal Collective Group, either regularly or from time to time, worked more than 40 hours per week, but did not receive overtime pay. 63. At all relevant times, Defendants have had gross operating revenues in excess of $500,000. 64. In committing the wrongful acts alleged to be in violation of the FLSA, Defendants acted willfully in that they knowingly, deliberately, and intentionally failed to pay overtime premium wages to Plaintiffs and other members of the Federal Collective Group. 65. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay overtime premium wages, Plaintiffs and the other members of the Federal Collective Group were damaged in an amount to be proved at trial. 66. Therefore, Plaintiffs demand that they and the other members of the Federal Collective Group be paid overtime compensation as required by the FLSA for every hour of 17 #323127 overtime worked in any work week for which they were not compensated, plus interest, damages, penalties, and attorneys’ fees as provided by law. 67. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding Paragraphs. 68. It is unlawful under Louisiana law for an employer to require or permit an employee to work without paying compensation for all hours worked. 69. It is unlawful under Louisiana law for an employer to require or permit a non- exempt employee to work in excess of 40 hours per week without paying overtime. Kidder v. Statewide Transp., Inc., 2013-594 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/18/13), 129 So. 3d 875. 70. It is unlawful under Louisiana law for an employer to make deductions from employee wages except “in cases where the employees willfully or negligently damage goods or works, or in cases where the employees willfully or negligently damage or break the property of the employer, or in cases where the employee is convicted or has pled guilty to the crime of theft of employer funds”. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 23:635. 71. Defendants, through their policies and practices described above, willfully violated La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 23:631-635 throughout the Louisiana Class Period, and continuing through the present, as follows: a. By failing to pay Plaintiffs and other members of the Class their earned wages for all hours worked; b. By failing to pay Plaintiffs and other members of the Class overtime pay; 18 #323127 c. By making deductions from wages in violation of La. RS 23:635; d. By failing to make, keep, and preserve accurate time records with respect to the Plaintiffs and other members of the Class sufficient to determine their wages and hours; and e. By other practices. 72. Defendants’ actions, described above, constitute continuing willful violations of La. R.S. 23:631-635, et seq. 73. As set forth above, Plaintiffs and other members of the Louisiana Class have sustained losses in compensation as a proximate result of defendants’ violations of law. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Louisiana Class members, seek damages in the amount of their unpaid earned compensation, plus liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees and costs as provided by La. R.S. 23:631-635. 74. Plaintiffs request a jury trial on all issues of all claims. FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME TO THE FEDERAL COLLECTIVE GROUP FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (on behalf of the named Plaintiffs and the Federal Collective Group) VIOLATION OF THE LOUISIANA PAYMENT OF EMPLOYEES LAW Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:631, et seq. (Brought by Plaintiffs Richard, Richard, Meche, Doucet, Rabeaux and Louviere on behalf of themselves and the Louisiana Class)

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40. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 52. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 53. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 54. The TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system” (hereinafter “ATDS”) as “equipment which has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” Id. at § 227(a)(1). PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and Do Not Consent Class)

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(Count I: 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(1)) 16. Congress has imposed a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the reporting and use of information concerning consumers’ backgrounds in the employment context. A key component of Congress’s oversight is giving consumers the right to control the dissemination of their private information in consumer reports used for employment purposes. 17. To ensure that consumer reporting agencies have “a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy,” Congress required that before furnishing a consumer report about an individual for employment purposes, a consumer reporting agency must obtain a certification from the user certifying that the consumer has authorized the consumer reporting agency to furnish the report. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b). 19. Thus, according to 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b), a consumer reporting agency may not furnish to a user a consumer report for employment purposes unless the user has certified to the consumer reporting agency that it has complied with paragraph (2) of Section 1681b(b) with respect to the consumer report, and that it will comply with paragraph (3) of Section 1681b(b) with respect to the consumer report. 21. On a systemic and nationwide basis, Defendant undermined Congress’s carefully- designed requirements for protecting consumers’ rights to privacy, unlawfully furnishing consumer reports without obtaining certifications that the individual consumers had authorized it to do so. Defendant unlawfully placed its business interests above the rights of consumers, thereby depriving consumers of their right to control the dissemination of their personal information under the FCRA. 22. Based on Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff asserts FCRA claims on behalf of himself and the Class defined below. Plaintiff seeks statutory damages, punitive damages, equitable relief, attorneys’ fees, expenses, costs, and all other appropriate relief. Background Reports Furnished by Defendant 23. In July 2014, Stevenson Automotive, Inc. ordered a consumer report regarding Plaintiff from Defendant for employment purposes. 24. Shortly thereafter, Defendant furnished Plaintiff’s consumer report to Stevenson Automotive, Inc. 25. Upon information and belief, at the time it furnished Plaintiff’s consumer report to Stevenson Automotive, Inc., Defendant had not obtained from Stevenson Automotive, Inc. a certification that Stevenson Automotive, Inc. “has complied with paragraph (2) [of Section 1681b(b)] with respect to the consumer report, and the person will comply with paragraph (3) with respect to the consumer report if paragraph (3) [of Section 1681b(b)] becomes applicable.” 27. Upon information and belief, and at all times relevant to this action, Defendant has required the users to whom it furnishes consumer reports for employment purposes sign service agreements, which require that the users prospectively certify that they will comply with the Fair Credit Reporting Act, including Section 1681b(b)(1). 28. Defendant has violated Section 1681b(b)(1) by furnishing consumer reports regarding Plaintiff and other class members for employment purposes without first obtaining from the persons who obtained such report a certification that such person “has complied with paragraph (2) [of Section 1681b(b)] with respect to the consumer report, and the person will comply with paragraph (3) with respect to the consumer report if paragraph (3) [of Section 1681b(b)] becomes applicable.” 29. Defendant knew or should have known about its legal obligations under the FCRA. The language of Section 1681b(b)(1) is plain and clearly ascertainable. According to Section 1681b(b)(1)(A), a “consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report for employment purposes only if -- (A) the person who obtains such report from the agency certifies to the agency that-- (i) the person has complied with paragraph (2) with respect to the consumer report, and the person will comply with paragraph (3) with respect to the consumer report if paragraph (3) becomes applicable; and (ii) information from the consumer report will not be used in violation of any applicable Federal or State equal employment opportunity law or regulation.” (Emphasis added.) 31. Despite knowing of these legal obligations, Defendant intentionally or recklessly acted consciously in breaching its known duties and depriving Plaintiff and other Class members of their rights under the FCRA. Plaintiff believes that Defendant did not obtain proper and valid certifications before furnishing consumer reports to its clients because Defendant did not want to incur the expenses associated with obtaining such certifications as to each consumer as to whom a consumer report was generated and provided by Defendant. 32. As a result of these FCRA violations, Defendant is liable for statutory damages from $100 to $1,000 for each violation pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A), punitive damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2), equitable relief, and attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Section 1681n and Section 1681o. Defendant Acted Willfully 33. Defendant knew or should have known that it is a consumer reporting agency subject to the FCRA. 34. As a nationwide CRA, Defendant was well aware that it was subject to the mandates and requirements of the FCRA and knew or should have known about its legal obligations under the FCRA. These obligations are well-established in the plain language of the FCRA and in case law applying those provisions. 36. Despite at least constructive knowledge of these legal obligations, Defendant acted consciously in breaching its known duties and depriving Plaintiff, and similarly situated individuals, of their rights under the FCRA. 37. Defendant’s conduct was at least reckless in failing to appropriately and effectively ascertain the FCRA provisions governing its conduct and implementing procedures designed to comply with the FCRA’s mandates. 38. Plaintiff asserts his claims in Count I on behalf of a putative Class defined as follows: Proposed Class: All persons residing in the United States (including all territories and other political subdivisions of the United States) as to whom IntelliCorp Records, Inc. furnished a consumer report for employment purposes within the period prescribed by FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681p, without first obtaining from the user of the report a certification that such user had complied with its obligations under Section 1681b(b)(2) as to the subject of the consumer report. 39. Numerosity: The members of the Class are believed to be in excess of 100,000 and are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. The names and addresses of the Class members are identifiable through documents maintained by the Defendant, and the Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by published and/or mailed notice. 40. Typicality: Plaintiff’s class claims are typical of the claims of Class members. Plaintiff for class certification purposes seeks only statutory and punitive damages. In addition, Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the class claims as the other members of the Class. 42. Commonality: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class. These questions predominate over the questions affecting only individual members. These common legal and factual questions include, among other things: a. Whether Defendant violated Section 1681b(b)(1) by furnishing consumer reports for employment purposes without first obtaining from persons to whom it furnished such report a certification by such person as to each consumer report it furnished that such person “has complied with paragraph (2) [of Section 1681b(b)] with respect to the consumer report, and the person will comply with paragraph (3) with respect to the consumer report if paragraph (3) [of Section 1681b(b)] becomes applicable.” b. Whether Defendant’s violations were willful. 44. Plaintiff realleges Paragraph Nos. 1-43 as if fully set forth herein. 45. According to Section 1681b(b)(1)(A), a “consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report for employment purposes only if -- (A) the person who obtains such report from the agency certifies to the agency that-- (i) the person has complied with paragraph (2) with respect to the consumer report, and the person will comply with paragraph (3) with respect to the consumer report if paragraph (3) becomes applicable; and (ii) information from the consumer report will not be used in violation of any applicable Federal or State equal employment opportunity law or regulation.” 46. By failing to obtain the required specific certification from persons to whom Defendant furnished consumer reports as to each consumer report provided before providing the specific consumer report that was the subject of the certification, Defendant violated the express requirement of Section 1681b(b)(1). 48. Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000 for each and every one of these violations, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 49. Plaintiff and the Class members are also entitled to recover their costs and attorneys’ fees, as well as appropriate equitable relief in an amount to be determined by the Court. . The Statutory Landscape

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12. Plaintiffs files this case an “opt-in” class action as specifically allowed by 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 13. The class that the Plaintiffs seeks to represent may be described as follows: 1) All current and former employees of the above-named Defendants who worked as “cleaning and sanitation” workers at HEB warehouse and distribution center at 4625 Windfern Road, Houston, Texas 77041, during the three year period before the date of this lawsuit and 2) who claim they were not paid for overtime hours worked and 3) seek payment for such hours. 14. Plaintiffs seeks to represent only those members of the above-described group who, after appropriate notice of their ability to opt-in to this action, have provided consent in writing to be represented by Plaintiff’s counsel as required by 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 15. Those persons who choose to opt in, hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiffs Class” will be listed on subsequent pleadings and copies of the written consents to sue will be incorporated here by reference. 17. The members of the Plaintiffs’ Class are similarly-situated to Plaintiffs and are owed overtime wages for the same reasons as the Plaintiffs. These employees should be notified of this case and given the opportunity to joint this suit. VI. 18. Defendant HEB owns and/or operates more than 300 warehouse across the state of Texas, and engages Defendant Frio Nevada to clean displays and rearrange products and produce in HEB's warehouse. 18. Plaintiffs worked full-time and exclusively inside of HEB stores, under the supervision of HEB managers, who provided constant supervision of their production and the cleanliness of their worksite, using fruit, produce, tools and materials supplied by HEB. 19. During the relevant period, Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants to clean displays and rearrange products and produce in HEB's warehouse. 19. Not all HEB managers, freezer department managers, and produce managers complied with the independent contractor agreement between HEB and Frio Nevada. 20. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant has been subject to the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. 21. For purposes of this action, the “relevant period” is defined as such period commencing on the date that is three years prior to the filing of this action, and continuing thereafter. 27. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re-alleged as if fully re-written herein. 28. Other employees have been victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy of the Defendant 29. Other, similarly-situated employees are being denied their lawful wages. 30. Upon information and belief other, similarly-situated employees are having less than their full work hours recorded by Defendants. 31. Accordingly, Defendants’ pattern or practice of failing to pay the employees’ overtime pay (at time and one-half) as required by the FLSA results from Defendants’ general application of policies and practices, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of the members of the Plaintiffs’ Class. 32. Thus, Plaintiffs’ experience as cleaners are typical of the experience of the Plaintiffs’ Class. 33. The specific job titles or job requirements of the various members of the Plaintiffs Class do not prevent collective treatment. 34. All employees, regardless of their job requirements or rates of pay, who are denied overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week, are similarly- situated. 35. Although the issue of damages may be individual in character, the facts related to liability are common to the Plaintiffs’ Class. 37. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re-alleged as if fully re-written herein. 38. Defendants’ failure to pay overtime wages, to the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs’ Class, was and is in violation of the FLSA. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to overtime in an amount equal to one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for each hour worked over forty in each workweek. 39. Additionally, the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs Class are entitled to an amount equal to all their unpaid wages as liquidated damages. 40. Defendant has been sued in the past for overtime violation by managers and hourly employees, for failing to pay for all hours worked. 41. Previous suits by managers put Defendants on notice of the limited scope of exemptions to the FLSA. Previous suits by hourly employees put defendants on notice that such employees must be paid for all hours actually worked. 42. These prior lawsuits made Defendants aware that their payroll practices violated the FLSA, and put Defendant on notice that it needed to re-evaluate its manner of paying its store employees. 43. Even after the conclusion of these prior lawsuits, which encompassed many of Defendants’ employees nationwide, Defendant failed to bring its timekeeping and compensation policies into compliance with the FLSA. 44. Based on the prior lawsuits, and Defendants alteration of employee time records, Plaintiffs alleges that Defendants knew and/or should have known that its sanitation workers were entitled to be paid for their overtime hours of work. 46. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re- alleged as if fully re-written herein. 47. Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs’ Class are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs of this action as provided by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §216(b). X.

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(Individually And On Behalf Of The Class) (Individually And On Behalf Of The Class) (On Behalf Of Plaintiff and on behalf of the Class) 1. Compensatory damages in an amount according to proof; 1. A declaration that Apple’s sales practices as described herein are wrongful, unfair, unconscionable and in violation of California law; 1. Declaration that Apple’s sales practices as described herein are wrongful, unfair, unconscionable and in violation of California law; 2. Prejudgment interest at the maximum rate permitted by applicable law; and 2. Enjoining Apple from further use of misrepresentative descriptions and claims in its advertising in violation of California law; 2. Enjoining Apple from further use of misrepresentative descriptions and claims in the advertising in violation of California law; 3. Restitution and disgorgement of profits; 3. Such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. 3. Costs and disbursements assessed by Plaintiff in connection with this action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, pursuant to applicable law; and 4. Costs and disbursements assessed by Plaintiff in connection with this action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, pursuant to applicable law; and 4. Such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. 5. Such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. 62. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 63. Apple entered into a contract with the Plaintiff and each member of the putative Class when Plaintiff and Class members purchased Season 5 of “Breaking Bad” through Apple’s iTunes service. 64. That contract provided that in exchange for a fixed sum, $21.99 in the case of the Plaintiff, Apple would provide the purchaser with access to “all future and current episodes” of Season 5 of Breaking Bad. 65. “Season 5” of Breaking Bad consists of the 16 episodes airing over the course of 2012 and 2013. It is so defined by the individuals writing, producing and airing the program and has been advertised as such. 66. Prior to their purchase of the Season 5 Season Pass, Apple never informed Plaintiff or Class members that when Apple referred to “Season 5,” unlike the producers, writers, and directors of the show and the network on which it airs, it meant something other than all 16 episodes of Season 5. Case5:13-cv-04145-EJD Document1 Filed09/06/13 Page13 of 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14 67. Thus, when Apple failed to make the final 8 episodes of Season 5 of Breaking Bad available to the Plaintiff and the putative Class, pursuant to the terms of the contract, Apple breached that contract. 68. Because the Plaintiff and each member of the putative Class were deprived the benefit of the bargain and either forced to pay an additional $22.99 for those episodes or simply not allowed to view them, they were damaged by the breach. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the Class demand judgment as follows: 69. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 70. Pursuant to § 1770 of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act: (a) The following unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer are unlawful: (5) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities which they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation or connection which he or she does not have…. (9) Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised…. (14) Representing that a transaction confers or involves rights, remedies or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law…. 71. The Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by California Civil Code § 1761(d). Case5:13-cv-04145-EJD Document1 Filed09/06/13 Page14 of 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15 72. Similarly, all members of the putative Class are U.S. residents and each is a “consumer” as defined by California Civil Code § 1761(d). 73. Each putative Class member’s purchase of Season 5 of Breaking Bad from Apple was a “transaction” as defined by California Civil Code § 1761. 74. Apple represented to the Plaintiff and the putative Class that the service Plaintiff was purchasing – electronic access to Season 5 of Breaking Bad through the Defendant’s iTunes service – contained a greater quantity of episodes (16) than were in fact provided, in violation of § 1770(a)(5). 75. Apple represented to the Plaintiff and the putative Class that the service Plaintiff was purchasing – electronic access to Season 5 of Breaking Bad through the Defendant’s iTunes service – had a characteristic of being the complete Season 5 of Breaking Bad when, in fact, it was not. This was done in violation of § 1770(a)(5). 76. Apple advertised that in exchange for a fixed fee, the Plaintiff and the putative Class would receive “all current and future episodes” of Breaking Bad: Season 5. Apple had no intention of providing those episodes. This was done in violation of § 1770(a)(9). 77. Apple represented to the Plaintiff and the putative Class that it would have the right to download all current and future episodes of Breaking Bad, Season 5. But Apple never intended to grant Plaintiff the right to download all 16 episodes of Season 5, in violation of § 1770(a)(14). 78. § 1781 of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act indicates that: (a) Any consumer entitled to bring an action under Section 1780 may, if the unlawful method, act, or practice has caused damage to other consumers similarly situated, bring an action on behalf of himself and such other consumers to recover damages or obtain other relief as provided for in Section 1780. (b) The court shall permit the suit to be maintained on behalf of all members of the represented class if all of the following conditions exist: Case5:13-cv-04145-EJD Document1 Filed09/06/13 Page15 of 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16 (1) It is impracticable to bring all members of the class before the court. (2) The questions of law or fact common to the class are substantially similar and predominate over the questions affecting the individual members. (3) The claims or defenses of the representative plaintiff are typical of the claims or defenses of the class. (4) The representative plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 79. Thus, the General Assembly has specifically provided for class treatment of cases of this nature. 80. Plaintiff explicitly seeks only equitable relief under the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the Class demand judgment as follows: 81. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 82. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 states, in relevant part, that: [U]nfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code. Case5:13-cv-04145-EJD Document1 Filed09/06/13 Page16 of 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 17 83. Apple’s acts, conduct and practices, as alleged herein, were unlawful in that Apple’s conduct violated the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §§ 1750, et seq., as specified and alleged in Count II of this Complaint. 84. Apple’s acts, conduct and practices, as alleged herein, were unfair in that Apple affirmatively misrepresented at all times to Plaintiff and Class members that a Season Pass to Season 5 of Breaking Bad would entitle the consumer to all 16 of the Season 5 episodes when, in fact, the 8 episodes aired in 2013 would be available only after purchasing a new Season Pass. This misrepresentation and/or omission offends established public policy and/or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous and/or substantially injurious to Plaintiff and Class members in that they were led to believe that the Season Pass for Season 5 of Breaking Bad had qualities and benefits that it does not have. 85. The injury to Plaintiff and Class members greatly outweighs any alleged countervailing benefit to consumers or competition under all of the circumstances, and served no purpose but to mislead the public and line Apple’s pockets. 86. There were reasonably available alternatives to further Apple’s legitimate business interests, other than the conduct described herein. 87. Apple’s statements regarding the sale of Season 5 of Breaking Bad on its iTunes service were also fraudulent in that they deceived and/or likely to have deceived Plaintiff and Class members. Specifically, Apple intentionally and misleadingly advertised that the Season Pass for Season 5 of Breaking Bad would entitle customers to the entire 16-episode season, when that was not the case. 88. Because Apple has violated the unfair competition law, Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., an action under Bus. & Prof. Code § 17206 is proper and necessary Case5:13-cv-04145-EJD Document1 Filed09/06/13 Page17 of 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 18 to prevent Apple from continuing to engage in deceptive advertising practices and preying on consumers. 89. As a result of Apple’s unlawful, unfair and fraudulent business practices, Plaintiff and Class members have suffered injury in fact and have lost money or property. Pursuant to California Bus. and Prof. Code § 17203, Plaintiff and Class members are therefore entitled to equitable relief, including restitution of all monies paid to and/or received by Apple; disgorgement of all profits accruing to Apple because of its unfair and improper business practices; a permanent injunction enjoining Apple from its unfair business activities; and any other equitable relief the Court deems proper. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the Class demand judgment as follows:

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27. Despite this difficulty and risk, Plaintiff plans to return to Defendants’ facilities. Plaintiff likes Arby’s and enjoys eating there several times a year. Plaintiff would like to return to this Arby’s in the future, but is deterred from doing so given the limitations of the facility. Furthermore, Plaintiff intends to return to Defendants’ facilities to ascertain whether those facilities remain in violation of the ADA. 28. As a result of Defendants’ non-compliance with the ADA, Plaintiff’s ability to access and safely use Defendants’ facilities has been significantly impeded. 29. Plaintiff will be deterred from returning to and fully and safely accessing Defendants’ facilities, however, so long as Defendants’ facilities remain non-compliant, and so long as Defendants continue to employ the same policies and practices that have led, and in the future will lead, to inaccessibility at Defendants’ facilities. 30. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff will continue to be unable to fully and safely access Defendants’ facilities in violation of his rights under the ADA. 31. As an individual with mobility disabilities who uses a wheelchair, Plaintiff is directly interested in whether public accommodations, like Defendants’ facilities, have architectural barriers that impede full accessibility to those accommodations by individuals with mobility-related disabilities. II. Defendants Repeatedly Deny Individuals With Disabilities Full and Equal Access to Defendants’ Facilities. 32. As the owner and manager of their properties, Defendants employ centralized policies, practices, and procedures with regard to the design, construction, alteration, maintenance, and operation of their facilities. 35. The fact that individuals with mobility-related disabilities are denied full and equal access to numerous of Defendants’ facilities, and the fact that each of these facilities deny access by way of inaccessible parking facilities, is evidence that the inaccessibility Plaintiff experienced is not isolated, but rather, is caused by Defendants’ systemic disregard for the rights of individuals with disabilities. 37. As evidenced by the widespread inaccessibility of Defendants’ parking facilities, absent a change in Defendants’ corporate policies and practices, access barriers are likely to reoccur in Defendants’ facilities even after they have been remediated. 38. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks an injunction to remove the barriers currently present at Defendants’ facilities and an injunction to modify the policies and practices that have created or allowed, and will create or allow, inaccessibility to affect Defendants’ network of facilities. I. Plaintiff Has Been Denied Full and Equal Access to Defendants’ Facilities

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22. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”). 23. The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 24. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. 25. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 26. At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 27. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. 5 28. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant caused correspondence, including a collection letter dated February 21, 2020, to be sent to Plaintiff. (A true and accurate copy of that collection letter (the “Letter”) is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”) 29. The Letter was the initial written communication Plaintiff received from Defendant concerning the alleged Debt. 30. The Letter conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt. 31. The Letter is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g protects Plaintiff’s concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest and right to receive clear, accurate and unambiguous collection letters from Defendant that would allow Plaintiff to identify the source of the alleged Debt and confirm that the alleged Debt was actually owed. As set forth herein, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of these rights. 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e protects Plaintiff’s concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest and right to be free from deceptive and/or misleading communications from Defendant. As set forth herein, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of these rights. 34. Plaintiff’s injury is “particularized” and “actual” in that the Letter that deprived Plaintiff of the aforementioned rights was addressed and sent to Plaintiff specifically. 35. Plaintiff’s injury is directly traceable to Defendant’s conduct because Defendant sent the Letter, and but for Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff would not have been deprived of the aforementioned rights. 36. Plaintiff has been misled by Defendant’s conduct. 37. Defendant’s conduct as described in this Complaint was willful, with the purpose to either harm Plaintiff or with reckless disregard for the harm to Plaintiff that could result from Defendant’s conduct. 6 38. Plaintiff justifiably fears that, absent this Court’s intervention, Defendant will continue to use abusive, deceptive, unfair and unlawful means in its attempts to collect the alleged Debt and other alleged debts. 39. Plaintiff justifiably fears that, absent this Court’s intervention, Defendant will ultimately cause Plaintiff unwarranted economic harm. 40. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff wasted time, was caused to be confused and unsure as to Plaintiff’s rights, and ultimately sought counsel and advice causing Plaintiff the risk of incurring damages including reasonable attorneys’ fees in reviewing Plaintiff’s rights under the law and prosecuting this claim. 41. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff’s counsel was caused to expend time, energy, and money to investigate Plaintiff’s rights under the law and the legitimacy of the alleged Debt. 42. The deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights will be redressed by a favorable decision herein. 43. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 44. A favorable decision herein would redress Plaintiff’s injury with money damages. 45. A favorable decision herein would serve to deter Defendant from further similar conduct. 46. § 1692e(2)(A) prohibits the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. 47. § 1692e(2)(B) prohibits the false representation of any services rendered or compensation that may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt. 7 48. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) specifically prohibits threatening “to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.” 49. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) specifically prohibits the “use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 50. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f provides a debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 51. §1692f(1) limits prohibits the collection of any amount, including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the debt, unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. 52. The Letter sets forth that non-interest charges or fees of $266.00 accrued on the alleged Debt after charge-off. 53. There is no legal basis to add non-interest charges or fees to the alleged Debt after charge-off. 54. Such post charge-off non-interest charges or fees are neither expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt, nor permitted by law. 55. The Letter falsely implies that there was a legal basis to add charges or fees to the alleged Debt after charge-off. 56. The Letter sets forth that interest of $212.00 accrued on the alleged Debt after charge-off. 57. There is no legal basis to add interest to the alleged Debt after charge-off. 58. Such post charge-off interest charges or fees are neither expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt, nor permitted by law. 59. The Letter falsely implies that there was a legal basis to add interest to the alleged 8 Debt after charge-off. 60. Defendant’s conduct, as described, violates §§ 1692e and § 1692f. 61. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 62. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 63. As relevant here, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) requires the written notice provide “the amount of the debt.” 64. To comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), a statement of the amount of the debt must clearly, accurate and without ambiguity convey, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the actual amount of the debt. 65. To comply with the FDCPA, the statement of an amount due, without notice that the amount is already increasing due to accruing interest or other charges, can mislead the least sophisticated consumer into believing that payment of the amount stated will pay the account in full and therefore the FDCPA requires debt collectors, when they notify consumers of their account balance, to disclose that the balance may increase due to interest and fees. Avila v. Riexinger & Associates, LLC, 817 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2016) 66. To comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), a statement of the amount of the debt must contain an explanation, understandable by the least sophisticated consumer, of any fees or interest that may cause the amount of the debt to increase. 9 67. The failure to include the foregoing information renders an otherwise accurate statement of the “amount of the debt” violative of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 68. The amount of the alleged Debt was increasing at the time it was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 69. The amount of the alleged Debt was increasing at the time Defendant sent Plaintiff the Letter. 70. The amount of the alleged Debt was increasing at the time Plaintiff received the Letter. 71. The Letter fails to advise Plaintiff that the amount of the alleged Debt was increasing or the Avila disclaimer. 72. As a result of such failure, Defendant did not clearly, accurately, and without ambiguity convey, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, that the amount of the alleged Debt may increase. 73. As a result of such failure, Defendant did not clearly, accurate, and without ambiguity convey, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the actual amount of the alleged Debt as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 74. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides, generally, that a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 75. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) prohibits the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. 76. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 10 77. A debt collection practice can be a “false, deceptive, or misleading” practice in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e even if it does not fall within any of the subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 78. A collection letter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if, in the eyes of the least sophisticated consumer, it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. 79. A collection letter also violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if it is reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading by the least sophisticated consumer. 80. For this reason, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e requires debt collectors, when they notify consumers of their account balance, to disclose that the balance may increase or to state that payment of a sum certain by a specified date will fully satisfy the debt. 81. The failure to provide the aforementioned disclosures makes the collection letter deceptive under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 82. The amount of the alleged Debt was increasing at the time it was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 83. The amount of the alleged Debt was increasing at the time Defendant sent Plaintiff the Letter. 84. The amount of the alleged Debt was increasing at the time Plaintiff received the Letter. 85. The Letter fails to advise Plaintiff that the amount of the alleged Debt was increasing. 86. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant also violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a)(1), 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 11 87. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all consumers similarly situated in the State of New York. 88. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of: All consumers to whom Defendant sent a collection letter substantially and materially similar to the letter sent to Plaintiff, which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. 89. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s conduct violates the FDCPA, and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 90. The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons. 91. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 92. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 93. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s 12 conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws. Violation of 15 U.S.C. §§1692e and 1692f Violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a)(1), 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10)

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20. Sandia maintains uniform employment, compensation, performance review, and promotion policies throughout the United States. Sandia also cultivates and promotes a common corporate culture. These policies and this culture originate in Sandia headquarters in the State of New Mexico, and are disseminated to its offices in the rest of the country. 21. Sandia’s laboratories and offices throughout the U.S. use a common organizational structure, organizing employees by common job titles. 22. While Sandia does not publish diversity figures, it has been reported in the popular press that women make up only 32 percent of Sandia employees.1 24. Sandia uses common, unvalidated, unreliable, and discriminatory procedures for evaluating employee performance that systematically undervalue female employees relative to their similarly situated male peers. This has been true throughout the class period. 25. Sandia uses a companywide “stack ranking” system for evaluating employee performance, which requires supervisors to rank employees from worst to best using a performance rating from 1 through 5, with 1 being worst, and 5 being best. Only a certain percentage of employees in a defined peer group may be assigned certain ranks—for example, only a certain percentage of employees may receive a 5. 26. This process is an invalid performance measurement system, as it sets arbitrary cutoffs among performers with similar performance. The stack ranking process forces a distribution of performance ratings outcomes (from 1 through 5) regardless of whether there are meaningful performance differences between individual employees within a particular peer group. 27. Worse still, an employee’s rank is not based on valid and reliable performance measures. Sandia instructs managers to evaluate employees, in part, based on four “personality” or “behavior” factors: Strategic Thinking, Adapting to Meet Demands, Teaming with Others, and Modeling Personal Accountability. These criteria are invalid and unreliable and disadvantage women. Supervisors were instructed to use the four unreliable qualitative assessments of employees’ performance (that is, Strategic Thinking, Adapting to Meet Demands, Teaming with Others, and Modeling Personal Accountability) in assigning the employees in their review group a recommended ranking from worst to best (1 through 5). 29. This forced ranking process takes place annually, and performance review scores are used for compensation and promotion decisions. 30. In this system, female employees are systematically undervalued compared to their male peers because female employees receive, on average, lower rankings despite equal or better performance. Upon information and belief, female employees are particularly adversely impacted by “Center” meetings, where the vast majority of attending managers are men. The proportion of men in management roles only increases at higher levels of the organization. 31. Predictably, performance management systems that include unreliable and invalid criteria create inaccurate and biased outcomes, especially when they operate within a culture of bias towards women, as is true at Sandia. 32. Upon information and belief, Sandia’s stack ranking system has had an adverse impact upon female employees. Compensation 33. Sandia employs common, unvalidated, unreliable, and discriminatory procedures for determining employees’ compensation that disparately impact female employees. 34. Gender inequity in compensation compounds over time because every annual compensation decision, such as the amount of salary increase, is affected by an employee’s current salary and salary band. 36. Sandia’s uniform employment practices of salary setting and performance evaluation cause a disparate impact on female employees’ compensation at Sandia. Promotions 37. Sandia also employs common, unvalidated, unreliable, and discriminatory procedures for selecting employees for promotion. Because promotions are tied to the performance review process, female employees are adversely impacted in promotions as well. Promotions are not determined by objective, valid, and/or reliable performance measures. 38. In order to be eligible for promotion at Sandia, an employee must be at the higher end of a salary band for his or her job title. Because women earn less than similarly situated men, men are placed more highly in the salary band and are therefore more likely to eligible for promotion based on this factor. 39. Additionally, to be eligible for promotion, employees must also have demonstrated “leadership,” an unreliable, poorly defined, and tainted criterion, especially because women often do not receive leadership opportunities in light of a culture of gender bias. 40. Overall, upon information and belief, Sandia promotes an overwhelmingly disproportionate number of men, and passes over equally or more qualified women. 42. Plaintiffs are members of the Class they seek to represent. 43. The members of the Class identified herein are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Sandia had a headcount of approximately 11,700 employees in 2015. Although Plaintiffs do not know the precise number of female employees at Sandia nationwide, the number is far greater than can be feasibly addressed through joinder. 45. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class they seek to represent. 46. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class they seek to represent. 47. Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions and employment discrimination litigation. 48. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) because Sandia has acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiffs and the Class they seek to represent. The Class Members are entitled to injunctive relief to end Sandia’s common, uniform, unfair, and discriminatory policies and practices. 77. This claim is brought by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the Class they seek to represent. Plaintiffs Kennicott, Garcia, and Phelps have filed timely charges with the EEOC on behalf of themselves and the Class Members. 78. Sandia has engaged in an intentional, company-wide, and systematic policy, pattern, and/or practice of discrimination against its female employees. Sandia has intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs and the Class in violation of Title VII by, among other things: a. Utilizing a biased performance rating system; b. Utilizing a biased compensation system; c. Utilizing a biased promotion system; and d. Failing to take reasonable and adequate steps to prevent and correct the use of unreliable, unvalidated, and/or illegitimate criteria to determine the terms and conditions of employment. 79. These company-wide policies are intended to and do have the effect of: a. Denying Plaintiffs and Class Members business opportunities because of their gender; b. Compensating them less because of their gender; c. Failing to promote them because of their gender; d. Evaluating their performance more negatively because of their gender; and e. Providing them with inferior terms and conditions of employment as a result of discriminatory performance measures that systematically disadvantaged them because of their gender. 81. As a direct result of Sandia’s discriminatory policies and/or practices as described above, Plaintiffs and the Class have suffered damages including, but not limited to, lost past and future income, compensation, and benefits. 82. The foregoing conduct constitutes illegal, intentional discrimination and unjustified disparate treatment prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 83. Plaintiffs request relief as hereinafter described. 84. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 85. This claim is brought by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the Class they seek to represent. Plaintiffs Kennicott, Garcia, and Phelps have filed timely charges with the EEOC on behalf of themselves and the Class Members. 86. Sandia’s reliance on illegitimate and unvalidated systems and criteria to evaluate employee performance, set compensation, select individuals for promotion, and determine other terms and conditions of employment, have an adverse impact on female employees in violation of Title VII and are not, and cannot be, justified by business necessity. Even if such system and/or policies could be justified by business necessity, less discriminatory alternatives exist and would equally serve any alleged necessity. 87. Sandia has maintained these discriminatory policies, patterns, and/or practices both within and outside the liability period in this case. 89. The foregoing policies, patterns, and/or practices have an unlawful disparate impact on women in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 90. Plaintiffs request relief as hereinafter described. 91. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 92. This claim is brought by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the Class they seek to represent. Plaintiffs Kennicott, Garcia, and Phelps have filed timely charges with the New Mexico Human Rights Bureau on behalf of themselves and the Class Members. 93. Sandia has engaged in an intentional, company-wide, and systematic policy, pattern, and/or practice of discrimination against its female employees. Sandia has intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs and the Class in violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act by, among other things: a. Utilizing a biased performance rating system; b. Utilizing a biased compensation system; c. Utilizing a biased promotion system; and d. Failing to take reasonable and adequate steps to prevent and correct the use of unreliable, unvalidated, and/or illegitimate criteria to determine the terms and conditions of employment. 95. The discriminatory acts that constitute Sandia’s pattern and/or practice of discrimination have been based in and emanated from within the State of New Mexico, and have occurred both within and outside the liability period in this case. The discriminatory policies, patterns, and practices have had a discriminatory impact on the female employees of Sandia nationwide. 96. As a direct result of Sandia’s discriminatory policies and/or practices as described above, Plaintiffs and the Class have suffered damages including, but not limited to, lost past and future income, compensation, and benefits. 97. The foregoing conduct constitutes illegal, intentional discrimination and unjustified disparate treatment prohibited by the New Mexico Human Rights Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. 1978, § 28-1-1 et seq. 98. Plaintiffs request relief as hereinafter described. Disparate Impact Discrimination (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended by the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009) (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class) Intentional Discrimination (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended by the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009) (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class) Intentional Discrimination (New Mexico Human Rights Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. 1978, § 28-1-1 et seq.) (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)

lose

27. During the relevant time period, the Defendant was an “employer” as defined in 29 U.S.C. §2611(4). 28. Plaintiff was an “eligible employee,” as defined in 29 U.S.C. §2611(2), because she had worked in excess of 1,250 hours during the twelve-month period preceding her June 2020 leave request. 29. Plaintiff’s medical condition and continuing treatment from early Spring 2020 through June 2020 constituted a “serious health condition” as defined in 29 U.S.C. §2611(11). 30. Immediately preceding her June 2020 leave, the Plaintiff was entitled to at least four (4) weeks of FMLA leave pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §2612(a)(1)(D). 32. Plaintiff clearly expressed her desire to use her PTO benefits concurrently with her extended FMLA leave. 33. Both Defendant’s policy of not allowing PTO to be used in conjunction with medical leave, and Defendant’s specific denial of Plaintiff’s request to use her PTO benefits in conjunction with her extended FMLA leave, are violations of the Family & Medical Leave Act. 35. Plaintiff restates and realleges paragraphs four (4) through seventeen (17). 36. Defendant’s termination of Plaintiff’s employment immediately following her request for FMLA leave constitutes a violation of 29 U.S.C. §2614(a)(1) (job restoration rights), and impermissible retaliation in violation of 29 U.S.C. §2615(a)(2). Plaintiff is entitled to recover her lost wages, liquidated damages in an equal amount, her reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and to be reinstated to the same or equivalent position. 29 U.S.C. §2617(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. §2617(a)(3) and 29 C.F.R. §825.400(c). Prayer for Relief Interference with Plaintiff’s Rights under the FMLA – Refusal to Allow Plaintiff to use Paid Time Off Retaliation Claim under the FMLA – Defendant’s Termination of Plaintiff Constitutes Unlawful Retaliation

win

(FLSA – COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME) (R.C. § 4113.5 – RULE 23 CLASS ACTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE OHIO PROMPT PAY ACT) (R.C. § 4111.03 – RULE 23 CLASS ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME) 23. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff was jointly employed by Defendants as an inside insurance sales agent. 24. As an inside insurance sales agent, Plaintiff was an hourly, non-exempt employee of Defendants as defined in the FLSA and the Ohio Acts. 26. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees frequently worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 27. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were compensated on an hourly, not a salary or fee basis. 28. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees received compensation for their work at an hourly rate for all hours worked, plus a bonus or bonuses based on their performance. 29. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees routinely earned additional remuneration to their hourly compensation because of their performance for additional bonus payments. 30. The FLSA and Ohio Wage Act required Defendants to pay overtime compensation to their employees at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rate for the hours they worked in excess of forty. 29 U.S.C. § 207; O.R.C. §§ 4111.03, 4111.10. 31. Defendants did not pay overtime compensation to Plaintiff and/or similarly situated employees at the time-and-a-half regular rate required. The FLSA and Ohio Wage Act required Defendants to pay overtime compensation to their hourly employees at one and one-half times their “regular rate” of pay, and to include in the calculation of their regular rates “all remunerations for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee,” including commissions. 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(3); 29 C.F.R. 778.117; O.R.C. § 4111.03(A) (incorporating FLSA standards). 33. At all times relevant herein, the Named Plaintiff was an employee of Defendants as defined in the FLSA and the Ohio Wage Act. 34. Defendants are each jointly an “employer” as that term is defined by the FLSA and the Ohio Wage Act. 35. Upon information and belief, Defendants, at all times relevant hereto, were fully aware of the fact that they were legally required to comply with the wage and overtime payment laws of the United States and of the State of Ohio. 36. During relevant times, Defendants had knowledge of and acted willfully regarding their joint conduct described herein. 37. Defendants are in possession and control of necessary documents and information from which Plaintiff would be able to precisely calculate damages. 38. Plaintiff neither primarily performed managerial duties nor supervised two or more employees. Plaintiff could not hire, fire, or discipline employees. 39. Plaintiff’s primary job duties did not consist of the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. 40. At all times, Plaintiff was employed as a non-exempt hourly employee entitled to overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in any workweek. 41. During the relevant time period, Defendants applied the same pay practices and policies to all hourly, non-exempt inside insurance sales agents, including Plaintiff. 43. Defendants knew or should have been aware that Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek and were entitled to be paid an overtime rate based on the correct regular rate of pay, but they willfully elected not to fully compensate its employees during all times relevant. 44. Defendants’ joint failure to fully and properly pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees resulted in unpaid overtime wages. 45. Named Plaintiff brings his FLSA claims pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a representative action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated employees of the opt-in class, consisting of: All current and former hourly, non-exempt inside insurance sales agents of Defendants, individually or jointly, who received a bonus or commission payment and worked over 40 hours in any workweek covered by the bonus or commission payment beginning three years preceding the filing date of this Complaint and continuing through the date of final disposition of this case (the “§216(b) Class” or the “§216(b) Class Members”). 47. The identity of the putative 216(b) Class Members are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants’ payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action, and allowed to opt into it pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and costs under the FLSA. 48. The net effect of Defendants’ policies and practices is that Defendants jointly and willfully failed to fully and properly pay Named Plaintiff and §216(b) Class Members overtime wages. Thus, Defendants jointly enjoyed substantial ill-gained profits at the expense of the Named Plaintiff and §216(b) Class Members. B. Fed.R.Civ. P. 23 Class Action for Unpaid Overtime Wages. 49. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 50. Named Plaintiff brings his Ohio Wage Act claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 as a class action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated of the following class, consisting of: All current and former hourly, non-exempt inside insurance sales agents of Defendants, individually or jointly, who received a bonus or commission payment and worked over 40 hours in any workweek covered by the bonus or commission payment beginning three years preceding the filing date of this Complaint and continuing through the date of final disposition of this case (the “Ohio Rule 23 Class,” the “Rule 23 Class,” or the “Ohio Rule 23 Class Members”). 52. The Ohio Rule 23 Class, as defined above, is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 53. Named Plaintiff is a member of the Ohio Rule 23 Class and his claims for unpaid wages are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class. 54. Named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Ohio Rule 23 Class and the interests of all members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class. 55. Named Plaintiff has no interests that are antagonistic to or in conflict with those interests of the Ohio Rule 23 Class that he has undertaken to represent. 56. Named Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced class action counsel who can ably represent the interests of the entire Ohio Rule 23 Class. 57. Questions of law and fact are common to the Ohio Rule 23 Class. 58. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because individual actions would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants with respect to their non-exempt employees. 59. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) as Defendants acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Ohio Rule 23 Class, making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class as a whole. 61. Questions of law and fact that are common to the Ohio Rule 23 Class include, but are not limited to: (a) whether Defendants violated the Ohio Wage Act by failing to pay the Ohio Rule 23 Class their correct overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per week as a result of Defendants’ failure to properly calculate the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members’ regular rate of pay when they received additional remuneration in the form of bonus or commission payments; (b) whether Defendants kept accurate records of the amount of time the Ohio Rule 23 Class was working each day; (c) whether Defendants’ violations of the Ohio Wage Act were knowing and willful; (d) what amount of unpaid and/or withheld overtime compensation is due to the Named Plaintiff and other members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class on account of Defendants' violations of the Ohio Wage Act; and (e) what amount of prejudgment interest is due to Ohio Rule 23 Class members on the overtime or other compensation which was withheld or not paid to them. 63. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 64. This claim is brought as part of a collective action by the Named Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the §216(b) Class. 65. During the relevant time period preceding this Complaint, Defendants jointly employed the Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Class Members. 66. Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Class Members were paid on an hourly basis when working in non-exempt positions. 67. Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Class Members worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 68. The FLSA requires that covered employees be compensated for every hour worked in a workweek. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(b). 69. The FLSA requires that non-exempt employees receive overtime compensation of their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 70. Under 29 U.S.C. § 207(e), “regular rate” of pay shall be broadly deemed to include all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee like the type of Named Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(e); see also 29 C.F.R. § 79. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 80. This claim is brought under Ohio Law. 81. The Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have been jointly employed by Defendants, and Defendants are each an employer covered by the overtime requirements under Ohio law. 82. Ohio Law requires that employees receive overtime compensation “not less than one and one-half times” (1.5) the employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) in one workweek, “in the manner and methods provided in and subject to the exemptions of section 7 and section 13 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937.” See O.R.C. § 4111.03(A); see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 83. The Named Plaintiff and Ohio Rule 23 Class worked in excess of the maximum weekly hours permitted under O.R.C. § 4111.03, but were not correctly paid their overtime rate for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek in workweeks covered by bonuses or commissions. 84. Defendants’ company-wide corporate policy and/or practice of not properly paying their hourly, non-exempt employees the correct overtime rate for each hour worked over forty (40) hours in workweeks covered by bonus or commission payments resulted in unpaid overtime wages for the Named Plaintiff and Ohio Rule 23 Class. 86. Defendants violated the Ohio Wage Act with respect to Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class by, inter alia, failing to compensate them at time-and-one-half times their correct regular rates for hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek because Defendants did not properly calculate their employees’ overtime rate when they received additional remuneration in the form of bonus or commission payments. 87. The Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class were not exempt from the wage protections of Ohio law. Indeed, during relevant times, the Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members were not exempt from receiving overtime because, inter alia, they were not “executive,” “administrative,” “professional,” “outside sales” or “computer” employees, as those terms are defined under the FLSA. See O.R.C. § 4111.03(A); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.0, et seq. 88. Defendants’ repeated and knowing failure to pay overtime wages to the Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated Ohioans were violations of R.C. §4111.03, and as such, Defendants jointly acted willfully. 89. For Defendants’ violations of R.C. §4111.03, by which the Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated Ohioans have suffered and continue to suffer damages; the Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated Ohioans seek unpaid overtime and other compensation, liquidated damages, interest and attorneys’ fees, and all other remedies available. 90. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 92. During relevant times, Defendants were each an entity covered by the OPPA and the Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have been jointly employed by Defendants within the meaning of the OPPA. 93. The OPPA requires Defendants to pay Named Plaintiff and Ohio Rule 23 Class all wages, including unpaid overtime, on or before the first day of each month, for wages earned by them during the first half of the preceding month ending with the fifteenth day thereof, and on or before the fifteenth day of each month, for wages earned by them during the last half of the preceding calendar month. See O.R.C. § 4113.15(A). 94. During relevant times, Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class were not paid all wages, including overtime wages at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay within thirty (30) days of performing the work. See O.R.C. § 4113.15(B). 95. The Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members’ unpaid wages remain unpaid for more than thirty (30) days beyond their regularly scheduled payday. 96. The Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have been harmed and continue to be harmed by such unpaid wages. 97. In violating the OPPA, Defendants jointly acted willfully, without a good faith basis and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable Ohio law. A. 216(b) Collective Action for Unpaid Overtime Wages.

win

(Against SquareTrade and Allstate for Violation of New York General Business Law §349) (Against Costco for Violation of the New York General Business Law §349) (Against Costco for Violation of New York GBL §350) (Against SquareTrade and Allstate for Violation of New York GBL §350) (Breach of Contract against SquareTrade, CE Care Plan Corp. and Allstate) (Unjust Enrichment against all Defendants) 103. Plaintiff incorporates and re-alleges all of the foregoing paragraphs. 104. Plaintiff pleads, in the alternative to Count V, a claim for unjust enrichment. 105. Defendants’ false advertising and deceptive practices have caused Plaintiff and Class members to purchase a Protection Plan. 106. Defendants were enriched by their deceptive acts and practices, at the expense of Plaintiff and the Class. 107. It would be inequitable for Defendants to be allowed to retain the benefits conferred on them by Plaintiff and Class members. 23. SquareTrade markets, sells and administers extended warranties, accident protection and service plans for consumer products, such as smartphones, kitchen appliances, televisions and other electronics. SquareTrade sells its Protection Plans through a number of major retailers, including Amazon, Costco, Sam’s Club, Target and Staples. 24. According to SquareTrade’s website, www.squaretrade.com, Allstate and SquareTrade have over 70 million active policies. 26. Once a consumer purchases a Protection Plan from Costco, SquareTrade is supposed to send an email to the customer regarding the plan and provides a link or other access to the Terms and Conditions of the Protection Plan. According to Costco’s website, SquareTrade is to send plan purchasers an email also detailing the process to register the Protection Plan. 27. Costco’s website provides a link to the Terms and Conditions on its website that purchasers can view prior to purchase, but those Terms and Conditions are clearly marketed as a sample, and the first page of the document informs consumers that the Terms and Conditions will be sent to them after they purchase a Protection Plan. 28. Customer complaints and online reviews make clear that SquareTrade does not always provide purchasers of Protection Plans an email with the plan’s relevant Terms and Conditions. Costco’s Concierge Program 30. Through its Concierge Services, Costco also provide members who buy certain products an extended manufacturer’s warranty for up to two years from the date of purchase at no additional charge. The second-year warranty is offered on the following items: televisions, tuner- free displays, projectors, computers and major appliances. Thus, Costco essentially mirrors the manufacturer’s warranty one-year warranty for the second year. Defendants Employ Deceptive Practices and False Advertising to Sell Protection Plans 31. Costco is a membership warehouse club that is based on the concept of offering its members low prices on a limited selection of branded and private-label products in a wide range of categories. A person must be a member to shop at Costco, and memberships can be purchased in-store or online. Costco annual membership fees range from $60 (for Standard Gold Star) to $120 (for Gold Star Executive, which offers various benefits over the lower-priced membership). 32. Costco offers for purchase to its members who buy eligible products a Protection Plan administered by SquareTrade. The Protection Plan can be purchased either in-store or online and is marketed as an extended warranty for years 3, 4 and 5, with years 1 and 2 covered by Costco Concierge. The Protection Plans are priced according to the underlying price of the eligible electronic device or appliance (a Covered Item). For instance, a 3-year Protection Plan for a television that costs more than $1,000 is $99.99. A Protection Plan for televisions that cost between $500 and $1,000 is $64.99. A Protection Plan for televisions that cost less than $500 is $34.99. 34. While a Costco member typically purchases a Protection Plan at the time he or she buys the underlying Covered Item at a Costco warehouse or online, a member can purchase a protection plan up to 90-days after buying an eligible product from Costco. 38. In store, Costco advertises and sells the Protection Plans by providing Brochures with summary information and by sales representatives’ tactics. The Brochure does not include the full Terms and Conditions and the sales representatives do not have full knowledge of the Terms and Conditions. Instead, the Brochure clearly states that members who purchase a Protection Plan get “5 total years of protection,” and states that years one and two are covered by the manufacturer or Costco Concierge Services, and years three through five are covered by SquareTrade. The Brochure does not include any additional information concerning variations in coverage by SquareTrade, such as if a manufacturer’s warranty is five years. Also, Costco sales representatives encourage members to purchase a Protection Plan, but the sales associates are not aware of the details of the Terms and Conditions. For these reasons, Costco members are unable to determine what, if any, benefit they will receive by purchasing a Protection Plan. 40. While Costco and/or SquareTrade state that the relevant Terms and Conditions for the Protection Plan will be provided to the consumer later, based on customer reviews of the plans on Costco’s website, many purchasers never receive a copy of the terms and conditions for the specific Protection Plan they purchase. 41. When SquareTrade does provide the Terms and Conditions to Costco members who purchase a Protection Plan, it does so only after the plan is purchased. SquareTrade typically provides the Terms and Conditions to purchasers by email, and the Terms and Conditions are set forth in the body of the email and a url link to the same information is also included in the email. 43. Defendants’ standardized process for selling the Protection Plans is deceptive in that the Protection Plans marketed and sold to customers fails to provide access to the Terms and Conditions prior to, upon, or in some cases even after, sale of the plan. 66. Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(1), and (b)(3) on behalf of the following consumer class (the “Class”): All purchasers of a SquareTrade Protection Plan from Costco for a Covered Item that has a manufacturer’s warranty of more than two-years in New York State from February 19, 2017 to the present (the “Class Period”). Excluded from the Class are defendants, their parents, subsidiaries and affiliates, their directors and officers and members of their immediate families; also excluded are any federal, state or local governmental entities, any judicial officers presiding over this action and the members of their immediate family and judicial staff, and any juror assigned to this action. 67. Members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable. Plaintiff estimates that there are thousands of members of the Class. 69. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendants have no defenses unique to the Plaintiff. 70. Plaintiff will protect the interests of the Class fairly and adequately, and Plaintiff has retained attorneys experienced in complex class action litigation. 72. Plaintiff incorporates and re-alleges all of the foregoing paragraphs. 73. At all times relevant herein, the New York General Business Law (“GBL”) was in effect. GBL §349 prohibits materially misleading, consumer-oriented business acts that cause injury to the Plaintiff. The deceptive practice must be likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances. 74. Costco was and is doing business in the State of New York and thus is subject to New York law for the incidents described in this action. 75. Costco’s deceptive practices have caused consumers, including Plaintiff, to purchase the Protection Plans. 77. As a result of Costco’s acts, Plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to their restitution interest of the monies paid to and/or received by Costco, appropriate injunctive relief and other relief, as described herein 78. Costco thus violated GBL §349 through its actions described above. 79. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class were damaged when they paid for the misrepresented Protection Plans. 80. Plaintiff incorporates and re-alleges all of the foregoing paragraphs. 81. The GBL was in effect at all times relevant herein. GBL §349 prohibits materially misleading, consumer-oriented business acts that cause injury to the Plaintiff. The deceptive practice must be likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances. 82. SquareTrade and Allstate were and are doing business in the State of New York and thus is subject to New York law for the incidents described in this action. 83. SquareTrade and Allstate’s deceptive practices have caused consumers, including Plaintiff, to purchase the Protection Plans. 84. SquareTrade and Allstate’s acts and omissions of material fact in selling the Protection Plans were misleading. 86. SquareTrade and/or Allstate have thus violated GBL §349 through their actions described above. 87. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class were damaged when they paid for the misrepresented Protection Plans. 88. Plaintiff incorporates and re-alleges all of the foregoing paragraphs. 89. The GBL was in effect at all times relevant herein. GBL §350 prohibits materially misleading, consumer-oriented business acts that cause injury to the Plaintiff. The deceptive practice must be likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances. 90. Costco was and is doing business in the State of New York and thus is subject to New York law for the incidents described in this action. 91. Costco’s advertisements were false and misleading in a material respect and thus Costco has violated GBL §350. 92. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have been injured by Costco’s false advertising. 93. Plaintiff incorporates and re-alleges all of the foregoing paragraphs. 95. SquareTrade and Allstate were and are doing business in the State of New York and thus is subject to New York law for the incidents described in this action. 96. SquareTrade and Allstate’s advertisements were false and misleading in a material respect and thus SquareTrade and Allstate have violated GBL §350. 97. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have been injured by SquareTrade’s false advertising. 98. Plaintiff incorporates and re-alleges all of the foregoing paragraphs. SquareTrade’s Products are a Lucrative Business

lose

(Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations) A. FLSA COVERAGE (Class Action Alleging Violations of Texas Common Law) A. VIOLATIONS OF TEXAS COMMON LAW 21. Sagora Senior Living, Inc. (“Sagora”) “provides customized lifestyles and care for independent senior living, assisted living, and memory care in Texas, Oklahoma, Florida, [and] Alabama.”2 22. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ job duties consisted of providing care for Sagora’s residents, including feeding and showering some of the residents, and assisting Sagora’s nurses. 24. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are non-exempt employees that were (and continue to be) paid by the hour. Specifically, Plaintiff Mickle was paid $13.25 per hour for her work as a nursing assistant. 25. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, but were not paid overtime of at least one and one-half their regular rates for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 26. Nor were Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members paid for all hours worked. 27. When calculating Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members’ hours each pay period, Sagora systematically deducted (and continues to deduct) time from Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ daily on-the-clock hours in violation of the FLSA and Texas common law. 28. Specifically, many of Plaintiff Mikle’s time cards reflected that they had been “edited”—always reducing her hours worked—often by as much as ten (10) hours in a pay period. 29. Sagora intentionally deducted hours worked from Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members in order to not pay the full and correct amount of overtime. 30. Sagora’s systematic deduction of time from Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ hours worked, which is commonly referred to as “time-shaving,” resulted (and continues to result) in Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ working hours for which they were (and are) not compensated in violation of the FLSA. 31. As a result of Sagora’s company-wide policy and practice of intentionally deducting their hours, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members have not been compensated for all hours worked, including all worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek at the rates required by the FLSA. 33. Sagora is aware of its obligation to pay for all hours worked and to pay the proper amount of overtime for all hours worked over forty (40) each week, but has failed to do so. 34. Because Sagora did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for all hours worked and time and a half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, Sagora’s pay policies and practices violate the FLSA. 35. Because Sagora did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for all hours they worked on behalf of Sagora, Sagora’s pay policies and practices also violate Texas common law. V. 36. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members incorporate by reference all paragraphs and allegations set forth in the statement of facts of this complaint as though fully and completely set forth herein. 37. The FLSA Collective is defined as: 54. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 55. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this collective claim is made on behalf of all of Sagora’s employees who have been similarly situated to Plaintiff with regard to the work they performed and the manner in which they have not been paid. 56. Other similarly situated employees have been victimized by Sagora’s patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. 58. Sagora’s failure to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members for all hours worked and overtime compensation at the rates required from the FLSA, results from generally applicable policies and practices of Sagora and does not depend on the personal circumstances of Plaintiff or the individual FLSA Collective Members. 59. Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective Members. 60. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective Members does not prevent collective treatment. 61. All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be properly compensated for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 62. Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 63. Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Sagora will retain the proceeds of its rampant violations. 64. Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 65. Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as defined as in Paragraph 37 and notice should be promptly sent. 67. Plaintiff Mickle further brings this action pursuant to the equitable theory of quantum meruit. See Artemis Seafood, Inc. v. Butcher’s Choice, Inc. No. CIV. A. 3:98-0282, 1999 WL 608853, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 1999) (citing Schuchart & Assocs. V. Solo Serve Corp., 1983 WL 1147, at *23 (W.D. Tex. June 29, 1983)). 68. The Texas Common-Law Class is defined as: 68. VI. 74. Plaintiff Mickle brings her Texas Common-Law Claims as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all similarly situated individuals employed by Sagora to work in Texas since January 28, 2015. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004. 75. Class action treatment of the Texas Common Law Class Members is appropriate because, as alleged below, all of Rule 23’s class action requisites are satisfied. 76. The number of Texas Common-Law Class Members is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. 77. Plaintiff Mickle is a member of the Texas Common-Law Class, her claims are typical of the claims of the other Texas Common Law Class Members, and she has no interests that are antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of the other Texas Common Law Class Members. 78. Plaintiff Mickle and her counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Texas Common Law Class Members and their interests. 79. Class certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 80. Accordingly, the Texas Common Law Class should be certified as defined in Paragraph

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1. (773) 717-5652; j. (361) 271-4092; and k. (310) 773-5113. 14. In March of 2015, Plaintiff began receiving phone calls on his cellular phone from a phone number that was unknown to him - (469) 619-6420 - that appeared to have been initiated by an automatic telephone dialing system. 15. Plaintiff believes that an automatic telephone dialing system was used, because of the customary delay at the beginning of each call before Plaintiff was able to speak with a live operator or before a live operator was able to leave a message in Plaintiffs voice mail. 16. Each of the phone calls solicited Plaintiff for a "business funding" or a loan. 18. After Plaintiff began receiving these calls, he immediately advised the callers that he was not interested in any funding. 19. Plaintiff also advised the callers that they were calling his cell phone line and that they should immediately cease all such solicitation calls. 20. Nonetheless, the calls continued. r- 21. After receiving additional calls, on June 19, 2015, Plaintiff registered his cell phone number with the national "Do Not Call" list. 22. However, the calls still continued and were now generated from different phone numbers, including: a. ( 646) 873-6264 b. (404) 537-1730; c. (512) 640-6225; d. (513) 898-3804; e. (239) 307-6112; f. (239) 307-6113; g. (404) 382-5273; h. (305) 424-8441; 24. However, the calls persisted. 25. Although the phone numbers used to call Plaintiff varied, they were all a part of a single, coordinated solicitation effort, because they were referenced and used by the callers interchangeably. 26. Indeed, when Plaintiff began receiving phone calls from phone numbers other than (469) 619-6420, the subsequent voice mails asked Plaintiff to nonetheless call back that number. 27. For instance on August 21, 2015, and, again, on August 28, 2015, Plaintiff received a call and a subsequent voice mail from "Michael Ward," who appeared to have been calling from (646) 873-6264. 28. The voice mails left by "Michael Ward" were identical in content (i.e., Plaintiff was asked about "eligibility for additional funding") and, on each occasion, Plaintiff was asked to call back (469) 619-6420 -the original number that was used to call Plaintiff in the Spring of 2015. 29. In similpr fashion, a voice mail left by "Lou," following a call of December 29, 2015, that appeared to have originated from (646) 873-6264 - a phone number used to call Plaintiff in August of 2015, now asked Plaintiff to call back (404) 537-1730-'- a different phone number that was used to call Plaintiff and leave a similar voice mail on December 22, 2015. 31. Although the callers provided different names - "Michael Ward," "Jason," "Justin," "Jimmy," "Portia," "Philip," "Stella," "Larry," "Kyle," "Lou;" "Miles," "Theo," "Carl," "Bruce Parker," "Jim Carson," "Jenny," "Tom," "Jonathan," "Samantha," "Jeremy," "Chad," "Lucas," "Jane," "Janie," "Jake," "Ethan," "Elliot," "Tom Walters," "Josh Greenberg," "Frank Staley," "Patrick," "Carl," "Mark," "Tyler," "Roy," and "Shane" - the substance of the calls and/or voice messages was always the same; namely, Plaintiff was being solicited for a loan. 32. During some of these calls, the callers disclosed that they were calling on behalf of "Fast Capital." 33. For instance, on January 12, 2017, Plaintiff received the following messagej from (51~) 898-3804, in his voice mail box: Hello this is Patrick calling from Fast Capital. My company helps businesses grow by providing flexible funding when you need it. Please give me a call when you have a moment to discuss some options that you might have. Once again Pat here from Fast Capital. Thank you and have a great day. 34. In sum, since March of 2015, Plaintiff received a total of - at least - 115 such phone calls from Defendants to his cellular phone, including: a. More than 100 calls after Plaintiff repeatedly asked not to be called; b. No less tha,n 112 calls after Plaintiff registered his cell phone with the national "Do Not Call" list; and c. No less than 105 calls after Plaintiff re-registered his cell phone with the national "Do Not Call" list. 36. On February 1, 2017, after receiving yet another phone call and a voice message, Plaintiff decided to call back the phone number (646) 873-6264 to determine where the phone calls were coming from. 37. During a brief conversation, Plaintiff was explicitly told that he was being called by "Fast Capital 360" to solicit him for a loan. 38. Plaintiff was then invited to review Defendants' profile and rating on www.trustpilot.com. See https://www.trustpilot.com/review/fastcapital360.com, last visited on March 1, 2017. 39. Before he began receiving calls from Defendants in the Spring of 2015, Plaintiff has never had any interactions or dealings with them. 40. Defendants knew or should have known that their actions violated the TCP A. 41. Defendants could have taken the steps necessary to bring their actions into compliance with the TCP A, but Defendants neglected to do so and failed to adequately review those actions to insure compliance with the law. 42. Defendants' conduct, as alleged herein, is (and was) deliberate, intentional, reckless, willful, and wanton. 43. Defendants' conduct, as alleged herein, violated the TCPA in that they initiated numerous telemarketing telephone calls to Plaintiffs cellular telephone, using an automatic telephone dialing system, for non-emergency purposes, without Plaintiffs consent (and, in fact, after Plaintiff requested that these calls cease). 45. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have been (and will continue to be) damaged due to Defendants' violations of the TCP A, as set forth herein . . 46. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have suffered and will continue to suffer actual damages due to Defendants' conduct, as set forth herein. 4 7. Left unabated, Defendants will continue to disregard the protections afforded by the TCPA. 48. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and similarly-situated individuals pursuant to F ed.R. Civ .P. 23. 49. Plaintiff brings this action as a nationwide class action for Defendants' violations ., of the TCP A on behalf of the following class of individuals: All persons and entities throughout the United States, to whpm Defenf}ants placed, or caused to be placed, a telephone call, directed to a number assigned to a cellular telephone service, by using an automatic telephone dialing system, within four years preceding the date of this complaint (hereinafter "Class"). 51. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel that is experienced and competent in class action and consumer litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to, or in conflict with, members of the Class. 52. A class action suit, such as the instant one, is superior to other available means for fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit. The damages suffered by individual members of the Class may be relatively small when compared to the expense and burden of litigation, making it virtually impossible for members of the Class to.individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. 53. A class action is, therefore, superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Further, absent these actions, members of the Class likely will not obtain redress of their injuries, and Defendants will retain the proceeds of their violations of the TCP A. In addition, Defendants are likely to continue to violate this statute. 54. Furthermore, even if any member of the Class could afford individual litigation against Defendants, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating this litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of individual members of the Class and provide for judicial consistency. 56. Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of members of the Class. Plaintiff and members of the Class have sustained damages arising out the same wrongful and uniform practices of Defendants. 57. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its continued maintenance. 58. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all facts and allegations of this document by reference, as if fully set forth at length herein. 59. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants used, controlled and or operated an "automatic telephone dialing systems," as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(l). 60. Defendants initiated multiple telephone calls to Plaintiff and Class members' cellular telephone lines using an automatic telephone dialing system. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(l)(A)(iii). These calls were made without the prior express consent by Plaintiff and Class members to receive such calls. 62. The acts and or omissions of Defendants were done willfully and knowingly, absent bona fide error, lawful right, legal defense, justification, or legal excuse. 63. In relevant part, the TCPA provides: A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State- (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this- subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500.00 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. 47 u.s.c. § 227(b)(3). 64. As a result of the above violations of the TCP A, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and the members of the Class in the sum of statutory damages, actual damages, and treble damages. Violation of the TCPA

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20. On or about February 9, 2018, Defendant sent an initial written communication to Plaintiff in connection with the collection of the Debt. 21. A true and correct copy of the February 9, 2018 written communication is attached as Exhibit A. 22. The February 9, 2018 communication was the first communication Plaintiff received from Defendant in connection with the Debt. 23. Plaintiff did not receive any additional written communications from Defendant within five days of the February 9, 2018 communication. 24. The February 9, 2018 communication advised Plaintiff that Defendant represented Relocation Reps LLC (the “Relocation Reps”). See Ex. A. 26. Critically, while the communication provides a principal balance, the February 9, 2018 communication omits the amount of money due or allegedly due. Id. 27. In fact, the February 9, 2018 communication states: “Please be advised that your delinquency in the amount of $ which is owed to our client, RELOCATION REPS LLC, is outstanding. This debt has been referred to us for collection. Accordingly, demand is hereby made for full payment of our past due account.” Id. 28. The February 9, 2018 communication then advised Plaintiff that “[i]n order to resolve this matter, please remit payment in full” without identifying the amount that Plaintiff is required to pay to resolve the matter. Id. 29. The February 9, 2018 communication also contained an “Amount Due” box that is blank. 30. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of a class consisting of: All persons (a) with an Illinois address, (b) to whom Hunter Warfield, Inc., (c) within one year before the date of this complaint, (d) in connection with the collection of a consumer debt, (e) mailed an initial debt collection communication not returned to Hunter Warfield, Inc. as undeliverable (f) that (1) did not state the amount of the debt that is due or allegedly due, or (2) stated “[p]lease be advised that your delinquency in the amount of $ which is owed to our client….” but omitted an amount after the dollar sign. 32. The proposed class satisfies Rule 23(a)(1) because, upon information and belief, it is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 33. The exact number of class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be determined through appropriate discovery. 34. The proposed class is ascertainable because it is defined by reference to objective criteria. 35. In addition, and upon information and belief, the names and addresses of all members of the proposed class can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant. 36. The proposed class satisfies Rules 23(a)(2) and 23(a)(3) because Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. 37. To be sure, the claims of Plaintiff and all members of the class originate from the same conduct, practice and procedure on the part of Defendant, and Plaintiff possesses the same interests and has suffered the same injuries as each member of the proposed class. 38. Plaintiff satisfies Rule 23(a)(4) because he will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the class and has retained counsel experienced and competent in class action litigation. 39. Plaintiff has no interests that are irrevocably contrary to or in conflict with the members of the class that he seeks to represent. 41. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual members of the class may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impracticable for the members of the class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. 42. There will be no unordinary difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 43. Issues of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions that may affect only individual members, in that Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the class. 44. Among the issues of law and fact common to the class are: a. Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA as alleged herein; b. Whether Defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA; c. the availability of statutory penalties; and d. the availability of attorneys’ fees and costs. 45. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 44. 47. The February 9, 2018 communication does not set forth the amount of the Debt. See Ex. A. 48. Therefore, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). See, e.g., Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, and Clark, LLC, 214 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The statement does not comply with the Act (again we can find no case on the question). The unpaid principal balance is not the debt; it is only a part of the debt; the Act requires statement of the debt.”). 49. The harm suffered by Plaintiff is particularized in that the violative February 9, 2018 communication was sent to him personally, regarded his personal obligation, and failed to give him statutorily-mandated disclosures to which he was entitled. 51. And the content of the February 9, 2018 communication created a material risk of harm to the concrete interest Congress was trying to protect in enacting the FDCPA. See, e.g., Zirogiannis v. Seterus, Inc., No. 17-140-cv, 2017 WL 4005008, at *2 (2d Cir. Sep. 12, 2017) (concluding “that the specific procedural violation alleged in the amended complaint presents a material risk of harm to the underlying concrete interest Congress sought to protect with the FDCPA”). 52. Specifically, where a consumer is not told the amount of the Debt, he has no way to assess whether the amount the debt collector says is owed is actually owed. Dechert v. Cadle Co., No. IP01-880-C(B/G), 2003 WL 23008969, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 11, 2003) (“Consequently, with respect to the issue of its failure to identify the total amount of the debt due and owing, the letter violates the FDCPA.”). 53. In addition, Defendant’s actions invaded a specific private right created by Congress, and the invasion of said right creates the risk of real harm. See Haddad v. Midland Funding, LLC, 255 F. Supp. 3d 735, 739 (N.D. Ill. 2017). PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)

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13. Defendant ACF is a merchant processing account company for small to medium sized businesses. 15. On information and belief, Defendant Blake Zinke personally controlled and maintained the dialing equipment 3CLogic that was used in the telemarketing campaign and oversaw and set the company’s policies with respect to telemarketing in general. 16. In Defendants’ overzealous attempts to market its services, Defendants placed (and continue to place) phone calls to consumers that never provided consent to be called and to consumers with whom they have had no prior dealings or relationship. Worse yet, Defendants placed (and continue to place) repeated and unwanted calls to consumers whose phone numbers are listed on the National Do Not Call Registry. Consumers place their cellphone numbers on the Do Not Call Registry for the express purpose of avoiding unwanted telemarketing calls like those alleged here. 17. Defendants seek to generate leads for its merchant processing accounts for small and medium sized businesses. However, Defendants have failed to appropriately segment ACF’s call list between landline and cell phone numbers. As a result, Defendants have called cell phone numbers with ACF’s auto-dialer equipment, which is expressly prohibited by the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). 19. The FCC has specifically addressed such dual-purpose calls. The Commission has ruled that “if the call notwithstanding its free offer or other information, is intended to offer property, goods, or services for sale either during the call, or in the future, that call is an advertisement.”2 20. Defendants, or their agents acting on their behalf, use a variety of local phone numbers to make these unlawful sales calls to consumers. 23. Specifically, the hardware and software used by Defendants (or their agent) has the capacity to store, produce, and dial random or sequential numbers, and/or receive and store lists of telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. Defendants’ automated dialing equipment includes features as a predictive dialer, inasmuch as it is capable of making numerous calls simultaneously (all without human intervention). 24. Defendants knowingly made (and continue to make) telemarketing calls without the prior express consent of the call recipients and knowingly continues to call them after requests to stop. As such, Defendants not only invaded the personal privacy of Plaintiff and members of the putative Class, but also intentionally and repeatedly violated the TCPA. 25. On July 2, 2003 Plaintiff Christian registered his cellular phone number on the national do not call registry to avoid receiving unsolicited telemarketing calls on his cellular phone. 27. On November 11, 2015 Plaintiff received two calls from 602-892- 0653. Plaintiff answered the calls, and he heard a pause before being connected to a live operator. 28. Plaintiff has received these same calls over the past year soliciting him for a credit card processing account. Plaintiff has no need for a payment processing account and has asked this caller to stop calling him. 29. Plaintiff does not have a relationship with Defendants, has never provided his telephone number directly to Defendants, and has never requested that Defendants place calls to his or offer him ACF’s services. Plaintiff does not have any business for which he uses his cellphone. Simply put, Plaintiff has never provided any form of prior express written consent to Defendants to place calls to him and has no business relationship with Defendants. 30. Defendants at all times are and were aware that the above- described telephone calls were and are being made to consumers like Plaintiff who had not consented to receive them and whose telephone numbers were registered with the National Do Not Call Registry. 34. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Classes. Plaintiff and the Classes sustained damages as a result of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct during transactions with Plaintiff and the Classes. 35. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendants has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 36. Policies Generally Applicable to the Classes: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Classes as respective wholes, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class members, and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Classes as respective wholes. Defendants’ practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Class members uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendants’ conduct with respect to the Classes as respective wholes, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. 38. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 40. Defendants made the telephone calls using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse. 41. Defendants utilized equipment that made the telephone calls to Plaintiff and other members of the Class simultaneously and without human intervention. 42. By making unsolicited telephone calls to Plaintiff and members of the Class’s cellular telephones without prior express consent, and by utilizing an ATDS, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 43. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Class suffered actual damages in the form of monies paid to receive the unsolicited telephone calls on their cellular phones and, under Section 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 45. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 46. Defendants made unsolicited and unwanted telemarketing calls to telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class on their cellular telephone in an effort to sell its products and services after the person informed Defendants that s/he no longer wished to receive calls from Defendants. 47. Defendants made the telephone calls using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse. 48. Defendants utilized equipment that made the telephone calls to Plaintiff and other members of the Class simultaneously and without human intervention. 49. By making unsolicited telephone calls to Plaintiff and members of the Class’s cellular telephones after they requested to no longer receive calls, Defendants’ violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by continuing to call them without prior express consent. 51. Should the Court determine that Defendants’ conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to Section 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 52. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 53. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 54. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 58. Defendants also violated § 64.1200(d) by failing to have a written policy of dealing with do not call requests, by failing to inform or train its personnel regarding any do not call list, and by failing to record and honor do not call requests. 59. Defendants made more than one unsolicited telephone call to Plaintiff and members of the Do Not Call Registry class within a 12-month period without their prior express consent to receive such calls. Plaintiff and members of the Do Not Call Registry class never provided any form of consent to receive telephone calls from Defendants, and/or Defendants do not have a current record of consent to place telemarketing calls to them. 60. Defendants violated § 64.1200(d) by initiating calls for telemarketing purposes to residential and wireless telephone subscribers, such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry class, without instituting procedures that comply with the regulatory minimum standards for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls from them. 62. To the extent Defendants’ misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry class. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodialed Do Not Call Class) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff and Do Not Call Registry Class) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodialed No Consent Class)

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10. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Defendant employed two or more employees which handled goods, materials and supplies which had travelled in interstate commerce. 11. Included in such goods, materials and supplies were computers, telephones, office equipment and furniture, as well as numerous other goods, materials and supplies which had been carried in interstate commerce. 12. Therefore, Defendant is considered an enterprise covered by the FLSA, and as defined by 29 U.S.C. §203(r) and 203(s). 13. Additionally, Plaintiff and other special investigators are individually covered by the FLSA as a result of routine e-mails and telephone calls which transact business in interstate commerce. 2. Plaintiff has worked for Defendant since 2005. 26. During their employment with Defendant, special investigators, including Plaintiff, worked numerous overtime hours for Defendant. 27. During their employment with Defendant, special investigators were all paid a salary. 28. Even though Plaintiff and these similarly situated employees worked overtime hours, they were not paid any additional compensation in addition to their weekly salary by Defendant. 3. Plaintiff worked for Defendant based out of Land O’ Lakes, Florida. 30. Based on information and belief, Defendant classifies Plaintiff and other special investigators as exempt under the administrative exemption. 31. Defendant does nor rely on any other exemption as a basis not to pay Plaintiff and other special investigators overtime pay. 32. Plaintiff and other special investigators are not exempt because their primary job duties did not entail the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. 33. Typically, investigative employees do not meet the duties section of the administrative exemption. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(j). 34. As such, Defendant cannot meet its burden to prove that these employees are exempt from overtime compensation under the FLSA. 35. The additional persons who may become plaintiffs in this action are employees who held positions similarly to Plaintiff and who worked in excess of forty (40) hours during one or more work weeks during the relevant time periods but who did not receive pay at one and one-half times their regular rate for their hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours. 37. Upon information and belief, the records, to the extent any exist and are accurate, concerning the number of hours worked and amounts paid to Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees are in the possession and custody of Defendant. 4. Defendant is a Florida Corporation that operates under the Assurant umbrella. 5. Assurant is a global provider of risk management procedures and services. 6. As part of the insurance offerings provided by Assurant and its subsidiaries, Defendant employs special investigators throughout the company whose primary duties include conducting investigations of suspected claims. 7. This action is brought under the FLSA to recover from Defendant overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. This action is intended to include each and every special investigator who was classified as exempt and who worked for Defendant at any time within the past three (3) years. 8. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 and the FLSA and the authority to grant declaratory relief under the FLSA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2201 et seq.

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11. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 27. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 40. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 41. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et news., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B). 42. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 47. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 277(b)(3)(C). 48. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 49. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 50. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 277(b)(3)(C). KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 277 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems and require that any third party vendors who participate on its Website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with WCAG 2.0 criteria. 28. Defendant offers the commercial website, WWW.DESALES.EDU, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. 30. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 31. Plaintiff, Jason Camacho, attended the NACAC college fair at Javits on Nov. 5, 2018 in order to obtain information from the college exhibitors presenting and marketing at the fair including the Defendant’s school. 32. Soon after attending the Javits fair, Mr. Camacho attempted to access the Defendant’s website in order to obtain additional information about the Defendant’s school but was thwarted in his efforts to do so due to the inaccessibility of the Defendant’s website as set forth herein. 35. The stated principles of NACAC members include “They strive to eliminate bias within the educational system based on …disability.”1 36. By its failure to provide a website that is accessible to the blind or vision impaired, Defendant, that is a member of NACAC, intentionally violated NACAC’s basic principles to eliminate bias toward the disabled as well as federal, state and city statutes and regulations designed to protect those members of society who are in need of protection by those various laws. 37. NACAC maintains a business relationship with the New York Daily News newspaper which publishes full page advertisements for the NACAC college fairs at Javits and an onsite guide to the exhibitors which is distributed free of charge to attendees at the college fairs. Exhibitors, such as the Defendant, may participate in the New York Daily News advertisements and/or advertise in the onsite guide. 39. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 40. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s school and enjoying the services offered by the Defendant equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant's school in the near future if he could access their website. 41. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 42. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 44. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 45. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 47. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s school, shop for and otherwise research related services available via the Website such as curriculum, financial aids, campus tours and other vital information. 48. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 50. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 53. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 55. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, RA, NYSHRL and NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 56. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 58. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 59. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 61. Defendant’s school and it’s exhibits at Javits are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s school. The Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 63. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 64. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 66. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 67. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 68. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 69. Defendant’s physical exhibit locations are located in the State of New York and constitutes a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 70. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 73. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 75. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the State Sub-class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the State Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 78. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 84. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 85. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 87. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 90. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 92. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 93. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 94. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 95. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) provides “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States … shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance….” 96. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) defines “program or activity” as “all operations of…(2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of education; or (B) a local educational agency…, system of career and technical education, or other school system.” 97. Defendant receives Federal financial assistance. 98. Defendant’s operations, including its website, is a program or activity within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 794. DECLARATORY RELIEF 116. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 117. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. and The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 118. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE REHABILITATION ACT of 1973, §504

win

28. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs as though set forth herein in their entirety. 29. According to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, this Court has the power to adjudicate a dispute between the Plaintiff and the Defendants involving any issue involving federal law. 30. The Plaintiff is aggrieved by the above-described conduct of the Defendants. 31. The Defendants are subject to the law established by the United States Constitution. 33. The Plaintiff has an expectation of privacy in the above-described private information and electronic communciations being collected by the Defendants. 34. The Defendants have unlawfully collected such information in violationof the 4th Amendment, without obtaining a warrant and without probable cause. 35. As of this date, the Defendants have refused to provide any public explanation of the legal authority that purports to authorize their intrusion into the affairs of the Plaintiff. 36. The Plaintiff respectfully submits that any such purported authority, when ultimately disclosed by the Defendants, is unlawful as a violation of the 4th Amendment of the United States Constitution. 38. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs as though set forth herein in their entirety. 39. The Defendants have invaded the privacy of the Plaintiff -- and have intruded upon the private affairs of the Plaintiff -- in violation of Pennsylvania law. 40. It is unclear whether monetary damages will be sufficient to compensate the Plaintiff. 41. The Defendants have already compromised, or caused the termination of, all secure e-mail communication services based in the United States. This includes the e- mail service, Lavabit, which previously sought to keep its communications safe and private from the Defendants. 42. Upon information and belief, the Defendants have also compromised the security of the cloud storage service, Dropbox. 44. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs as though set forth herein in their entirety. 45. According to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, this Court has the power to adjudicate a dispute between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants involving any issue involving federal law. 46. The Plaintiff is aggrieved by the above-described conduct of the Defendants. 47. If the Defendants are purporting to act pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, then it appears that the Defendants are in violation of such act. 48. According to 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B), the Defendants are required to utilize “minimization procedures” with respect to information that is inadvertently obtained concerning an “unconsenting United States person” during an investigation relating to international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. 49. On July 29, 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder adopted minimization procedures that allowed the Defendants to retain the Plaintiff's confidential and valuable information for a period of up to five years, and possibly longer. 50. Such minimization procedures were kept secret from the Plaintiff until recently. 52. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act does not contemplate, or authorize, the retention of the Plaintiff's confidential information for a period of five years. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter an order determining that the maximum duration of the minimization procedures under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as it applies to the Plaintiffs’ confidential information, is substantially less than five years. Respectfully submitted, By: /s/ Elliott J. Schuchardt Elliott Schuchardt Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Violation of the Fourth Amendment Injunctive Relief Intrusion / Invasion of Privacy

lose

(Declaratory Relief) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 105. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 106. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website contains access barriers denying deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals the full and equal access to the goods and services of the Website, which Defendant owns, operates, and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the deaf and hard of hearing. 107. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) 81. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 21. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website during the relevant statutory period.” 22. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website, during the relevant statutory period.” 23. There are hundreds of thousands of deaf or hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State. There are approximately 36 million people in the United States who are deaf or hard of hearing. Thus, the persons in the Class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 24. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying deaf and hard-of-hearing persons access to the goods and services of the Website. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, deaf and hard-of-hearing persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse and watch videos on the Website. 25. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: a. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; c. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the laws of New York. 26. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are deaf or hard of hearing, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the Class of people who are legally deaf or hard of hearing. 27. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 28. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 29. Judicial efficiency will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it will avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with hearing disabilities throughout the United States. 30. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 31. Defendant operates the Website, which is an online information and sales website concerning luxury hair care products and salons. The Website allows visitors to learn about the different hair products sold by Defendant and used by Defendant in salons and see videos in order to learn about the benefits and advantages of the hair care products, amongst other features. The Website also offers a salon academy where visitors to the Website can enroll in hair education classes for a fee. Millions of people across the United States visit the Website and view the videos on the website. 32. The Website is a service and benefit offered by Defendant throughout the United States, including New York State. The Website is owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant. 33. The Website allows users to learn about the various luxury hair care products, learn about the benefits and advantages of the products and how to use and apply the products, and watch videos about the products. Defendant’s videos are available with the click of a mouse and are played through the Internet on computers, cell phones, and other electronic devices. 34. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the deaf and hard of hearing full and equal access to the Website, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Website. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals have been and are being denied equal access to the Website, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 35. Defendant denies the deaf and hard of hearing access to goods, services, and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely enjoying, interpreting, and understanding the content on the Website. 36. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as reading news, watching videos, etc., for deaf and hard-of-hearing persons. 37. The deaf and hard of hearing access videos through closed captioning, which is a transcription or translation of the audio portion of a video as it occurs, sometimes including description of non-speech elements. Except for a deaf or hard-of-hearing person whose residual hearing is still sufficient to apprehend the audio portion of the video, closed captioning provides the only method by which a deaf or hard-of-hearing person can independently access the video. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, deaf and hard-of-hearing persons are unable to fully access the service provided through the videos on the Website. 38. There are well-established guidelines for making websites accessible to disabled people. These guidelines have been in place for several years and have been followed successfully by other large business entities in making their websites accessible. The Web Accessibility Initiative (“WAI”), a project of the World Wide Web Consortium which is the leading standards organization of the Web, has developed guidelines for website accessibility, called the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (“WCAG”). The federal government has also promulgated website accessibility standards under Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act. These guidelines are readily available via the Internet, so that a business designing a website can easily access them. These guidelines recommend several basic components for making websites accessible, including but not limited to adding closed captioning to video content. 39. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing persons, including but not limited to the lack of closed captioning. This barrier is in violation of WCAG 2.1 Guideline 1.2.2, which mandates that video content contain captioning. 40. The Website contains important and useful videos that lack captioning. The videos contain important and useful information about specific products such as how long the products lasts, the number of washes, how to us, and the availability of the products. The first video that Plaintiff attempted to listen to was about the hair care product Kerasilk. The video contained important information about the product, narrated by Mark Leeson, Goldwell Global Creative Ambassador. The information provided in this video is not available anywhere else on the Website. This video did not contain closed captioning as can be seen from the screenshot taken on August 6, 2020: The second video that Plaintiff attempted to watch was about the hair care product DualSenses. The video provides important product information including the benefits of the product and how to take care of hair using the product, and is narrated by three Goldwell International Artists, Shane Bennett, Rebecca Hiele, and Agnes Westerman. The information provided in this video is not provided elsewhere. This video did not contain closed captioning as can be seen from the screenshot taken on August 6, 2020: The third video that Plaintiff attempted to watch on the Website was about Defendant’s color system and related color system products. The video, narrated by Rebecca Hiele, Goldwell International Artist, provides information about the company’s salons’ hair color services and how the hair color system products work. The information provided in this video is not available anywhere else on the Website. This video did not contain closed captioning as can be seen from the screenshot taken on August 6, 2020: The fourth video that Plaintiff attempted to watch on the Website was about Defendant’s hair color product called @Pure Pigments. The video, narrated by Goldwell International Artist, Rebecca Hiele, Rodica Hristu, and William Wilson, provides information about how @Pure Pigments works, the benefits of the product, and the technology behind the product. The information provided in this video is not available anywhere else on the Website. This video did not contain closed captioning as can be seen from the screenshot taken on August 6, 2020: These videos do not contain closed captioning. The lack of captioning prevents Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing people from understanding the content of the videos, thus preventing them from learning about Defendant’s product and how to use them properly and safely. 41. Due to the Website’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing individuals must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to apprehend the audio portion of the videos offered by Defendant. Some deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals may require an interpreter to apprehend the audio portion of the video or require assistance from their friends or family. By contrast, if the Website was accessible, a deaf or hard-of-hearing person could independently watch the videos and enjoy the services provided by Defendant as hearing individuals can and do. 42. The Website thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Website and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of the Website in New York State. 43. Plaintiff attempted to watch the videos listed above, amongst other videos on the Website, most recently on August 5, 2020 but was unable to do so independently because of the lack of closed captioning on the Website, causing it to be inaccessible and not independently usable by deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 44. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing the Website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 45. These access barriers have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits, and services of Defendant and the Website. 46. Defendant engages in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructing and maintaining a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obviously inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failing to take actions to correct access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 47. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria, and methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 48. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 49. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 50. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by Title III of ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7), a “place of education,” a “place of exhibition or entertainment,” a “place of recreation,” and “service establishments.” 51. Defendant has failed to make its videos accessible to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing by failing to provide closed captioning for videos displayed on the Website. 52. Discrimination under Title III includes the denial of an opportunity for the person who is deaf or hard of hearing to participate in programs or services or providing a service that is not as effective as what is provided to others. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I-III). 53. Discrimination specifically includes the failure to provide “effective communication” to deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals through auxiliary aids and services, such as captioning, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(III); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(C). 54. Discrimination also includes the failure to maintain accessible features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. §36.211. 55. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 56. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities and the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 57. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 58. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 59. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Individuals who are deaf and hard of hearing have been denied full and equal access to the Website have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 60. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 61. Modifying its policies, practices, and services by providing closed captions to make its videos accessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals would not fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business, nor would it pose an undue burden to this flourishing company. 62. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 63. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 64. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA and therefore Plaintiff invokes her statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 65. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 66. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 67. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 68. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 69. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 70. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 71. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the videos displayed on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 72. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 73. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 74. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exc. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 75. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 76. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 77. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 78. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 80. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 83. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . . . ” 84. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 85. The Website is a public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 86. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 87. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing videos on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . . . ” 89. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . . . ” 90. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 91. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 92. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 93. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 94. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person who is the owner, franchisor, franchisee, lessor, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation . . . [b]ecause of any person’s . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly . . . [t]o refuse, withhold from or deny to such person the full and equal enjoyment, on equal terms and conditions, of any of the accommodations, advantages, services, facilities or privileges of the place or provider of public accommodation.” 95. The Website is a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102. 96. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102. 97. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf. This inaccessibility denies deaf patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability not to provide a reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 98. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 99. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 100. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 101. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 102. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 103. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 104. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.

win

21. Defendants are a theater and restaurant that operates their theater and restaurant as well as the Website to the public. The theater and restaurant is located at 12 East 94th St., New York, New York. Defendants’ theater and restaurant constitutes a place of public accommodation. Defendants’ theater and restaurant provides to the public important goods and services. Defendants’ Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services which allow consumers to find information about the theater and restaurant location and hours, information about shows, food, events, and artistic programs, to inquire about pricing and other products available online and in the theater and restaurant for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by the Defendants. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen- reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 24. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in July, 2019, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Defendants’ physical location in New York by being unable to learn more information on the location and hours of the theater, information about shows, food, events, artistic programs, inquiries about pricing and other products available online and in the theater for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by Defendants. 26. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendants’ Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendants offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 28. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 29. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 30. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually- impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is not sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 31. Defendants therefore use standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 33. Because Defendants’ Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendants lack a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendants to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendants to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendants’ Website. Plaintiff seeks that their permanent injunction requires Defendants to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendants’ employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendants’ Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendants’ Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 35. Although Defendants may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendants lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 36. Defendants have, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 37. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendants’ Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendants’ physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendants’ Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendants’ physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendants’ Website is a “public accommodation” under the 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 47. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 49. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 51. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 53. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 55. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 56. Defendants’ physical location is located in the State of New York and constitute a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendants’ Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendants. Defendants’ Website is a service that is by and integrated with this physical location. 58. Defendants are violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendants’ physical location to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendants make available to the non-disabled public. 59. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 62. Defendants’ actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendants has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendants have failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Defendants discriminate and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendants’ Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendants from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendants’ actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 71. Defendants’ location is a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishment. 72. Defendants are subject to NYCHRL because they owns and operate their physical location in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 74. Defendants are required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 75. Defendants’ actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendants has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 76. Defendants have failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 78. Defendants’ actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendants deny, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical location, which Defendants owns, operate and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 84. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendants’ Barriers on Their Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

win

17. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges all paragraphs previously alleged herein. 18. At all times relevant, Defendant made and continues to make automatic renewal offers and continuous service offers, as those terms are defined by Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17600, et seq. (“California’s Automatic Purchase Renewal Statute”) to Plaintiff and other consumers similarly situated. 19. On or about August 13, 2012, in a good faith effort to protect his financial credit and financial information, Plaintiff purchased a subscription from LifeLock, a company that represents to consumers that it assists in the protection of consumer financial identity. 20. With this goal in mind, Plaintiff purchased an annual subscription to the service Defendant offered. 22. At the time Plaintiff purchased this subscription Defendant charged, and continues to charge, Plaintiff for this automatic renewal offer without first obtaining the affirmative consent to the agreement containing the automatic renewal offer terms or continuous service offer terms. 23. At the time Plaintiff subscribed to Defendant’s services, Plaintiff was subjected to Defendant’s unlawful policies and/or practices as set forth herein, in violation of California’s Automatic Purchase Renewal Statute. 24. The material circumstances surrounding this experience by Plaintiff were the same, or nearly the same, as the other class members Plaintiff proposes to represent, and Plaintiff and all class members were required to pay, and did pay, money for this service by Defendant. 25. Plaintiff brings this action, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 26. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of: All persons within California who purchased products and/or services from Defendant via Defendant’s website as part of an automatic renewal plan or continuous service offer, within four years prior to the filing of the Complaint in this action. 29. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 30. At a date presently unknown to Plaintiff, but at least four years prior to the filing of this action, and as set forth above, Defendant has engaged in the practice of making automatic renewal offers and continuous service offers, as those terms are defined by Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17600, et seq. (“California’s Automatic Purchase Renewal Statute”), to California consumers and the general public. 32. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s aforementioned conduct and representations, Defendant received and continues to hold monies rightfully belonging to Plaintiff and other similarly situated consumers 33. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17600, et seq., Plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to a declaration that Defendant violated the California Automatic Purchase Renewal Statute. 35. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 36. Plaintiff and Defendant are each “person[s]” as defined by California Business & Professions Code § 17201. California Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204 authorizes a private right of action on both an individual and representative basis. 37. “Unfair competition” is defined by Business and Professions Code Section § 17200 as encompassing several types of business “wrongs,” two of which are at issue here: (1) an “unlawful” business act or practice, (2) an “unfair” business act or practice, (3) a “fraudulent” business act or practice, and (4) “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” The definitions in § 17200 are drafted in the disjunctive, meaning that each of these “wrongs” operates independently from the others. 38. By and through Defendant’s conduct alleged in further detail above and herein, Defendant engaged in conduct which constitutes (a) unlawful and (b) unfair business practices prohibited by Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. (a) Unlawful” Prong 40. Defendant had other reasonably available alternatives to further its legitimate business interest, other than the conduct described herein, such as adequately disclosing the terms of Defendant’s automatic renewal offers and continuous service offers, as set forth by Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17600, et seq. 41. Plaintiff and the putative class members reserve the right to allege other violations of law, which constitute other unlawful business practices or acts, as such conduct is ongoing and continues to this date. (b) “Unfair” Prong 42. Defendant’s actions and representations constitute an “unfair” business act or practice under § 17200 in that Defendant’s conduct is substantially injurious to consumers, offends public policy, and is immoral, unethical, oppressive, and unscrupulous as the gravity of the conduct outweighs any alleged benefits attributable to such conduct. Without limitation, it is an unfair business act or practice for Defendant to knowingly or negligently fail to adequately disclose the terms of Defendant’s automatic renewal offers and continuous service offers, as set forth by Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17600, et seq. 43. At a date presently unknown to Plaintiff, but at least four years prior to the filing of this action, and as set forth above, Defendant has committed acts of unfair competition as defined by Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq., as alleged further detail above and herein. 45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 46. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17535, et seq. (the “UCL”) allows “any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property” to prosecute a civil action for violation of the UCL. Such a person may bring such an action on behalf of himself and others similarly situated who are affected by the unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice. 47. Beginning at an exact date unknown to Plaintiff, but prior to January 16, 2013, and continuing to the present, Defendant has committed unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent business acts and practices as defined by the UCL, by violating Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17602. 48. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent acts and practices described herein, Defendant has received and continues to hold unlawfully obtained property and money belonging to Plaintiff and class members in the form of payments made for subscription agreements by Plaintiff and class members. Defendant has profited from its unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent acts and practices in the amount of those business expenses and interest accrued thereon. 50. In prosecuting this action for the enforcement of important rights affecting the public interest, Plaintiff seeks the recovery of attorneys’ fees, which is available to a prevailing plaintiff in class action cases such as this matter. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and similarly situated class members, request relief as described below. VIOLATION OF CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, ET SEQ. [CALIFORNIA’S UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW] VIOLATION OF CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17535, ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17600, ET SEQ. [CALIFORNIA’S AUTOMATIC PURCHASE RENEWAL STATUTE]

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66. Ms. Tolton graduated from Harvard Law School, where she was selected as the Commencement 2010 Class Day Student Speaker. At Harvard, Ms. Tolton served on the Graduate Council, the 2010 Class Committee, the Harvard Law School Student Government, and the Executive Board of the Harvard Law California Club. She joined Jones Day’s Irvine office directly from Harvard in 2010. 67. Ms. Tolton initially excelled at Jones Day. For most of her tenure at the Firm, Ms. Tolton worked almost exclusively with Partner Paul Rafferty, who was considered very difficult to work with, particularly for women. Ms. Tolton’s superb performance, however, made her indispensable, and she was awarded deposition and court appearance opportunities early in her career. She also played a critical role in a five-month trial, achieving a full defense verdict to avoid millions of dollars in liability for the client. In recognition of Ms. Tolton’s significant role, during a post-trial hearing on fees and costs, Partner Rafferty argued that Jones Day’s fees were justified in part because Ms. Tolton was a superstar attorney from Harvard Law. 68. The year before she went on maternity leave for the first time, Ms. Tolton played the primary role in obtaining the vacatur of an interim arbitration award for fraud, along with an award of sanctions for the Firm’s client. 70. Ms. Tolton was also a role model and mentor to many of the Irvine office’s junior associates, and particularly women. The Firm recognized Ms. Tolton’s value in this regard and entrusted her with heading the Irvine office’s summer program in 2012—when it was unheard of for a junior (second year) associate to do so. The Firm’s confidence in Ms. Tolton was rewarded: Firm management repeatedly praised her program as the best in office history. 71. Soon, the Firm was sending Ms. Tolton to recruiting events and on campus interviews (“OCI”), which she conducted alongside the then-Firmwide Recruiting Partner, Kevyn Orr. In recognition of Ms. Tolton’s stellar performance, the hiring partner of the Los Angeles office at the time, Erik Swanholt, told Ms. Tolton that he would try to have her sent to Harvard for OCI to supplement or replace the partners who were slated to attend. 72. Partner Cary Sullivan often asked Ms. Tolton to provide formal training sessions for new associates in her office, including one on best practices for successful associates. Ms. Tolton also accompanied a class of summer associates from her office to the nationwide orientation and training program at Jones Day’s Washington, DC office, a role usually filled by the office’s hiring partner. ii. Despite Her Exemplary Performance, Ms. Tolton’s Gender Was An Obstacle to Her Success at Jones Day 73. Ms. Tolton’s superb performance did not, however, insulate her from sexist and sexualized conduct and commentary. For example, then-Partner Eric Landau, who was trying to recruit Ms. Tolton to his practice group, regularly commented on her clothes and high heels. After a deposition preparation session, he remarked that partners at his former firm kept asking him why his female associates all looked like volleyball players. Shortly after Ms. Tolton got married, however, Partner Landau seemed to abruptly lose interest in working with her. 75. Male associates in Irvine and elsewhere took their cues from the misconduct of male partners. During a limo ride to a summer associate event, male attorneys from the office initiated a game of “Fuck, Marry, Kill” in which they named coworkers from the office and proposed to whom they would do each of these things. Ms. Tolton avoided this event the following year, but learned from attendees that a male associate who attended had called several of his female colleagues “cunts.” That male associate remains at the Firm today. 76. This casual misogyny inevitably bled into the Firm’s view of Ms. Tolton as an attorney. Ms. Tolton often found herself assigned secretarial-type work and denied professional opportunities extended to her male peers. In one case, Partner Rafferty designated her as his chauffeur for a hearing on a contested arbitration award. Even though Ms. Tolton drafted the lion’s share of the briefing, Partner Rafferty conducted the argument himself. He tasked her only with maneuvering demonstrative exhibits on an easel for the court to view. This assignment was particularly obtuse because Ms. Tolton was significantly pregnant at the time, making it difficult for her to move the exhibits—so much so that the opposing counsel ultimately assisted Ms. Tolton. 77. As if to emphasize Ms. Tolton’s role as human easel, when the male Chief Executive Officer and male General Counsel of the client departed with Ms. Tolton and Partner Rafferty to have lunch at a restaurant, Partner Rafferty turned Ms. Tolton away at the door, denying her the client interaction. 79. Despite her proven track record and superior performance, Ms. Tolton’s star began to fade when she asked questions about Firm policies concerning parenting—ironically, at a firm- sponsored event addressing the advancement of female attorneys. In 2014, the Partner-in-Charge of the San Diego office, Karen Hewitt, visited the Irvine office with a then recently elevated Los Angeles Partner, Erica Reilley. Their visit was intended to model female success at the Firm and to address the Firm’s reputation for being inhospitable to female attorneys who were also mothers. During the presentation, Partners Hewitt and Reilley highlighted the fact that Partner Reilley had been promoted to partner while on a reduced-time, “flex” schedule. 80. When the event opened for questions, Ms. Tolton asked about the Firm protocols for requesting a reduced-time schedule and notifying the Firm about one’s pregnancy. The presenters, however, did not respond and instead deflected the question by navigating their presentation to the Firm’s mission statement and reciting platitudes about Firm values. 82. Ms. Tolton became pregnant in 2015 and took maternity leave in January 2016. Near the end of that leave, in June 2016, the Firm informed her that her salary had been frozen. This was known at Jones Day as a punitive measure, as where a male associate had his salary frozen after he got drunk at a summer associate event and called several female associates “cunts.” 83. Ms. Tolton’s performance over the prior year, as noted above, had been stellar. Accordingly, Ms. Tolton could only conclude that the salary freeze was a result of her pregnancy and maternity leave. 84. Ms. Tolton contacted the then-Administrative Partner in the office, Partner Darren Cottriel, who suggested that she come in for her performance review. Ms. Tolton then met with Administrative Partner Cottriel and Irvine Partner-in-Charge Richard Grabowski. Both partners initially gave Ms. Tolton vague but positive feedback, saying that she had done a good job and was on the right track. 85. Ms. Tolton then asked why her salary had been frozen if her performance was good. Partners Cottriel and Grabowski then attempted to backtrack, asserting that they had received complaints about her work. Ms. Tolton, however, had brought to the meeting a binder of emails and documents in which clients and colleagues praised her work. She presented this binder of positive feedback to Partners Cottriel and Grabowski and pressed them for specific complaints. The partners admitted that they could not cite to any negative reviews, and suggested that Ms. Tolton speak with her reviewers. 87. After obtaining her personnel files from the Firm under California law in 2018, Ms. Tolton was able to confirm that the reviews on which her 2016 compensation was supposedly based had, in fact, been overwhelmingly positive, a fact certainly not reflected in her compensation for that year. 88. After her 2016 review, Ms. Tolton worked to draft an email memorializing and expanding upon her reasons for believing that Jones Day had given her a negative review and frozen her salary in response to her gender and pregnancy rather than because of any performance deficiencies on her part. While she was drafting the email, however, Ms. Tolton discovered that she was pregnant with her second child. 89. Terrified that she was already facing possible termination for having had her first child, Ms. Tolton went to Administrative Partner Cottriel’s office and disclosed both her pregnancy and her fear that Jones Day would not permit her to take another leave. Partner Cottriel assured Ms. Tolton that she would be able to take a second leave. He also expressed understanding that returning from parental leave was challenging and asked her to let him know if she needed to limit her capacity at all. This instruction that Ms. Tolton did not need to work to capacity was seconded by Of Counsel Michelle Blum. 91. Around this time, Ms. Tolton’s doctor informed her that she could not keep up this work schedule and wrote a note to that effect, which she submitted to Administrative Partner Cottriel. Ms. Tolton sought out projects that would permit her to work to capacity while accommodating her pregnancy-related limitations. Partner Cottriel, however, despite his earlier assurances that he would help Ms. Tolton limit her work if necessary, now summoned Ms. Tolton to a conference room to chastise her for not working hard enough and accuse her of misstating her capacity. Partner O’Connor, who was also present, sat in silence. 92. Even facing down this criticism, Ms. Tolton delivered exceptional results, settling several of Partner O’Connor’s cases, including negotiating global settlements of cases assigned to other Jones Day attorneys, rather than passing them off for unnecessary trials. In the following months, from December 2016 through March 2017, Ms. Tolton continued to work hard for the Firm, billing approximately 200 hours per month on an important matter for another major Firm client. 93. In March 2017, Ms. Tolton went on her second parental leave. Jones Day informed her in June that, once again, it was freezing her salary. In her first days back from leave, in October 2017, Ms. Tolton was again called in for her annual review. Partners Grabowski and Cottriel then told Ms. Tolton that she “should look for other opportunities outside the Firm,” adding that she had six months to leave. As pretext for her abrupt termination, Partners Grabowski and Cottriel falsely accused Ms. Tolton of having misstated her work capacity when she had been physically incapacitated due to her pregnancy. 95. Ms. Tolton had served as a mentor to several female attorneys in her office. After she gave notice that she was leaving the Firm, a number of these attorneys approached her with questions about her departure. She told them the truth: that Jones Day had made it clear to her through its compensation decisions and performance evaluations that she no longer had a future at the Firm. 96. The Firm swiftly retaliated. A few days before her scheduled last day, Ms. Tolton found herself locked out of her Jones Day email. Partner-in-Charge Grabowski and Administrative Partner Cottriel then called Ms. Tolton at home in the middle of her son’s first birthday party. They told her that they would ship her belongings to her and barred her from returning to the office. 97. In response to this abrupt and retaliatory termination, Ms. Tolton wrote a follow- up email to these partners, noting that she was being terminated for honestly sharing her experience at Jones Day with her coworkers. 98. As a result of the discrimination that she experienced at Jones Day, Ms. Tolton suffered from and continues to suffer from significant emotional distress. B. A. NILAB RAHYAR TOLTON COUNT 1 VIOLATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq. VIOLATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq., as amended by the PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978 VIOLATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), et seq., WRONGFUL TERMINATION On Behalf of Plaintiffs Tolton, Jane Doe 2, and Jane Doe 4 434. Plaintiffs Tolton, Jane Doe 2, and Jane Doe 4 re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 435. Plaintiffs Tolton, Jane Doe 2, and Jane Doe 4 each filed a timely charge with the EEOC on behalf of herself and the Class Members. Plaintiffs Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 4 may “piggyback” off the first-in-time filing of Plaintiff Tolton because Plaintiff Tolton’s EEOC charge relates to the same claims that Plaintiff Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 4 assert. 436. Jones Day terminated the employment of Plaintiffs Tolton, Jane Doe 2, and Jane Doe 4 due to gender and/or pregnancy and maternity discrimination. Jones Day’s discharge of Plaintiffs Tolton, Jane Doe 2, and Jane Doe 4 was an adverse employment action that materially and adversely changed the overall terms and conditions of their employment in violation of Title VIOLATION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT D.C. Code §§ 2-1401, et seq. WRONGFUL TERMINATION On behalf of Plaintiffs Tolton, Jane Doe 2, and Jane Doe 4 447. Plaintiffs Tolton, Jane Doe 2, and Jane Doe 4 re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 448. Jones Day, an employer within the meaning of the DCHRA, wrongfully terminated the employment of Plaintiffs Tolton, Jane Doe 2, and Jane Doe 4 due to gender and/or pregnancy and maternity discrimination, acting through decision-maker Managing Partner Stephen J. Brogan, working out of the Firm’s District of Columbia office. Jones Day’s termination was an adverse employment action that materially and adversely affected the employment of Plaintiffs Tolton, Jane Doe 2, and Jane Doe 4 in violation of the DCHRA. 449. Jones Day’s conduct was intentional, deliberate, willful, malicious, and reckless, and was conducted in callous disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs Tolton, Jane Doe 2, and Jane Doe

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12. Defendant Integrated Media Solutions, LLC is a media and marketing company that owns and operates magazines, websites, direct mail programs, database marketing operations, and service programs for dental professionals and dental products suppliers. 13. On information and belief, Defendant Integrated Media is the 4 publisher of Dental Product Shopper magazine and is responsible for the content of the magazine. 14. On information and belief, Defendant Integrated Media owns and operates the website www.dentalproductshopper.com. 15. Dental Product Shopper is a publication that reviews and evaluates products for dental professionals to purchase. 16. On information and belief, Defendants earn revenue for products advertised in their publications. 17. Dental Product Shopper’s companion website connects dental professionals with product retailers to complete purchases. 18. On information and belief, Defendants earn a fee for commercial transactions occurring via Defendants’ companion Dental Product Shopper website. 19. Defendants sent advertisements by facsimile to Plaintiff and a class of similarly-situated persons. Whether Defendants did so directly or with the assistance of a third party (yet unknown to Plaintiff), Defendants are directly liable for violating the TCPA. 20. Plaintiff has received at least one of Defendants’ advertisements by facsimile. A true and correct copy of the fax received on or about September 29, 2016 is attached as Exhibit A. 21. Exhibit A is a one-page document Defendants sent by fax promoting Defendants’ Dental Product Shopper publication. The fax advertises the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services. Exhibit A provides Defendants’ 5 fax information to contact Defendants to order Defendants’ publication. Exhibit A. 22. Defendants’ fax promotes its commercially available marketing publication. 23. Defendants’ free subscription offer is a pretext to advertise the commercial products promoted in Defendants’ publication and which are available through Defendants’ companion website. 24. Exhibit A creates the impression that Plaintiff has a current subscription to Defendants’ publication. However, Exhibit A does not include Plaintiff’s practice name or address. Further, Exhibit A does not indicate that Plaintiff requested or received express permission to send Defendants’ advertisement to Plaintiff. 25. Plaintiff did not expressly invite or give permission to anyone to send Exhibit A or any other advertisement from Defendants to Plaintiff’s fax machine. 26. Exhibit A does not include a opt-out notice as required by the TCPA. See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (2) (D) & (E) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4) (iii) & (v). 27. On information and belief, Defendants sent advertisements by facsimile to Plaintiff and more than 39 other persons in violation of the TCPA. 28. Plaintiff and the other class members owe no obligation to protect their fax machines from Defendants. Their fax machines are ready to send and receive their urgent communications, or private communications about patients’ medical needs, not to receive Defendants’ unlawful advertisements. 6 29. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated as members of a class, initially defined as follows: Each person or entity that was sent one or more telephone facsimile messages after August 7, 2013 offering the Dental Product Shopper publication. Plaintiff anticipates modifying the proposed class definition, including proposing subclasses where appropriate, after discovery about the scope and breadth of Defendant’s fax advertising program and will do so through an amended motion for class certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 3. Private right of action. A person may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a state, bring in an appropriate court of that state: (A) An action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) An action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) Both such actions. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 30. Excluded from the class are Defendants, Defendants’ officers, directors, legal representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns, any entity in which any Defendant has a controlling interest, any parent, subsidiary or affiliated company of any Defendant, and any Judge assigned to this action, including his or her immediate family. 31. In this action, Plaintiff intends to discover, include, and resolve the merits of claims about all advertisements Defendants sent by fax. Exhibit B, a Demand for Preservation of All Tangible Documents Including Electronically Stored Information. 32. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. This action satisfies Rule 23 (a)’s numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements. Furthermore, the questions of law or fact that are common in this action predominate over any individual questions of law or fact making class representation the superior method to 7 adjudicate this controversy under Rule 23 (b) (3). 33. Numerosity/impracticality of joinder. On information and belief, the class consists of more than 39 persons and, thus, is so numerous that individual joinder of each member is impracticable. The precise number of class members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff, but will be obtained from Defendants’ records or the records of third parties. 34. Commonality and predominance. There is a well-defined community of interest and there are common questions of law and fact that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the class. These common legal and factual questions, which do not vary from one class member to another, and which may be determined without reference to the individual circumstances of any class member, include, but are not limited to the following: a. Whether Exhibit A and other yet-to-be-discovered facsimiles sent by or on behalf of Defendants advertised the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods or services; b. Whether Defendants were the senders of advertisements by facsimile promoting the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services; c. The manner and method used to compile or obtain the list(s) of fax numbers to which Defendants sent fax advertisements; d. Whether the Court should award statutory damages to Plaintiff and the other class members; 8 e. If the Court finds that Defendants willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA, whether the Court should exercise its discretion to increase the amount of the statutory damages award to an amount equal to not more than three times the amount; f. Whether the Court should enjoin Defendants from faxing advertisements in the future; and g. Whether Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein constituted conversion. 35. Typicality of claims. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other class members, because Plaintiff and all class members were injured by the same wrongful practices. Plaintiff and the members of the class received Defendants’ advertisements by facsimile and those advertisements did not contain the opt-out notice required by the TCPA. Under the facts of this case, because the focus is upon Defendants’ conduct, if Plaintiff prevails on its claims, then the other putative class members will prevail as well. 36. Adequacy of representation. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because its interests do not conflict with the interests of the class its seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and TCPA litigation in particular, and Plaintiff intends to vigorously prosecute this action. Plaintiff and its counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interest of members of the class. 37. Prosecution of separate claims would yield inconsistent results. Even 9 though the questions of fact and law in this action are predominantly common to Plaintiff and the putative class members, separate adjudication of each class member’s claims would yield inconsistent and varying adjudications. Such inconsistent rulings would create incompatible standards for Defendants to operate under if/when class members bring additional lawsuits concerning the same unsolicited fax advertisements or if Defendants choose to advertise by fax again in the future. 38. A class action is the superior method of adjudicating the common questions of law or fact that predominate over individual questions. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the claims of all class members is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. The likelihood of individual class members prosecuting separate claims is remote, and even if every class member could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. Relief concerning Plaintiff’s rights under the laws herein alleged and with respect to the class would be proper. Plaintiff envisions no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 39. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 10 40. Plaintiff brings Count I on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated persons against Defendants. 41. The TCPA prohibits the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine….” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1). 42. The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s express invitation or permission.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (4). 43. The TCPA provides a private right of action as follows: 44. The Court, in its discretion, may treble the statutory damages if it determines that a violation was knowing or willful. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 45. The TCPA requires that every advertisement sent by facsimile must include an opt-out notice clearly and conspicuously displayed on the bottom of its 11 first page. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (2) (D) and (E); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 46. Here, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1) (C) by sending an advertisement by facsimile (such as Exhibit A) to Plaintiff and the other class members without their prior express invitation or permission. 47. Here, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (2) (D) and (E) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4) (iii) & (v) by failing to include a compliant opt-out notice. Exhibit A. 48. Facsimile advertising imposes burdens on recipients that are distinct from the burdens imposed by other types of advertising. The required opt-out notice provides recipients the necessary information to opt-out of future fax transmissions, including a notice that the sender’s failure to comply with the opt-out request will be unlawful. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4) (iii). 49. Exhibit A does not state that Defendants’ failure to comply with an opt-out request within 30 days is unlawful. 50. Exhibit A does not inform the recipient that he/she/it has a legal right to request that Defendants not send any future fax. 51. Exhibit A does not inform the recipient that an opt-out request will be valid only unless and until the person making the request subsequently provides express invitation or permission to the sender, in writing or otherwise, to send such advertisement to such person at such telephone facsimile machine. 52. The TCPA is a strict liability statute and Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and the other class members even if Defendants’ actions were negligent. 47 12 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 53. Even if Defendants did not intend to injure Plaintiff and the other class members, did not intend to violate their privacy, and did not intend to waste their valuable time with Defendants’ advertisements, those facts are irrelevant because the TCPA is a strict liability statute. 54. If Defendants’ actions were knowing or willful, then the Court has the discretion to increase the statutory damages up to three times the amount. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 55. Defendant Dental Product Shopper is liable for the fax advertisements at issue because it sent the faxes, caused the faxes to be sent, participated in the activity giving rise to or constituting the violation, the faxes advertise Defendant’s good, products, or services, Defendant created the faxes to be sent or approved the faxes to be sent, Defendant paid a fax broadcaster to send its faxes, the faxes were sent on Defendant’s behalf, or under general principles of vicarious liability, including actual authority, apparent authority and ratification. 56. Defendant Integrated Media is liable for the fax advertisements at issue because it sent the faxes, caused the faxes to be sent, participated in the activity giving rise to or constituting the violation, the faxes advertise Defendant’s good, products, or services, Defendant created the faxes to be sent or approved the faxes to be sent, Defendant paid a fax broadcaster to send its faxes, the faxes were sent on Defendant’s behalf, or under general principles of vicarious liability, including actual authority, apparent authority and ratification. 13 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, demands judgment in its favor and against Defendants, jointly and severally, as follows: A. That the Court adjudge and decree that the present case may be properly maintained as a class action, appoint Plaintiff as the representative of the class, and appoint Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the class; B. That the Court award $500.00 in statutory damages for each of Defendants’ violations of the TCPA; C. That, if it finds Defendants willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA, the Court exercise its discretion to increase the amount of the statutory damages award to an amount equal to not more than three times the amount (Plaintiff requests trebling); D. That the Court enter an injunction prohibiting Defendants from violating the TCPA; and E. That the Court award costs and such further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 57. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 58. Plaintiff brings Count II on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated persons and against Defendants. 59. By sending advertisements to their fax machines, Defendants 14 improperly and unlawfully converted the class’s fax machines to Defendants’ own use. Where printed (as in Plaintiff’s case), Defendants also improperly and unlawfully converted the class members’ paper and toner to Defendants’ own use. Defendant also converted Plaintiff’s time to Defendants’ own use, as they did with the valuable time of the other class members. 60. Immediately prior to the sending of the unsolicited faxes, Plaintiff and the other class members each owned an unqualified and immediate right to possession of their fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time. 61. By sending them unsolicited faxes, Defendants permanently misappropriated the class members’ fax machines, toner, paper, and employee time to their own use. Such misappropriation was wrongful and without authorization. 62. Defendants knew or should have known that their misappropriation of paper, toner, and employee time was wrongful and without authorization. 63. Plaintiff and the other class members were deprived of the use of the fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time, which could no longer be used for any other purpose. Plaintiff and each class member thereby suffered damages as a result of their receipt of unsolicited fax advertisements from Defendants. 64. Defendants’ unsolicited faxes effectively stole Plaintiff’s employees’ time because persons employed by Plaintiff were involved in receiving, routing, and reviewing Defendants’ illegal faxes. Defendants knew or should have known employees’ time is valuable to Plaintiff. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly 15 situated, demands judgment in its favor and against Defendants, jointly and severally, as follows: A. That the Court adjudge and decree that the present case may be properly maintained as a class action, appoint Plaintiff as the representative of the class, and appoint Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the class; B. That the Court award damages; C. That the Court award punitive damages; D. That the Court award attorney’s fees; E. That the Court award costs of suit; and F. That the Court award such further relief as it may deem just and proper under the circumstances. Respectfully submitted, CONVERSION TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227

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10. This public ruse is maintained by the defendants in order to impose and collect fines and costs from citizens, and is accomplished by allowing JCS to determine how much each municipal court defendant will be charged for the collection “services” of JCS each month, how much of the public money paid will be kept by JCS and how much it will rebate to Childersburg. Plaintiffs aver that Childersburg has unlawfully entered into the business arrangement with JCS whereby the private entity has been given control and access over public funds and the ability to take such funds. This is in violation of state law and of the Alabama Constitution. Further, defendants have allowed JCS to increase its monthly probation fee from the $35.00 once imposed and listed on the printed probation sheets to $45.00 per month, doing so without legal authority of proper basis or authorization. 11. Defendants have operated the system without concern for protecting the rights of indigent persons in plaintiffs’ class, having no due process protections or procedures to ensure that constitutional rights are violated. The operation and structure of the system run by JCS is such that the Court should declare it to be unlawful and unconstitutional, with any continued operation enjoined and prohibited. 20. The Class which the named Plaintiffs seek to represent consists of those people listed in the above paragraph, being persons adversely affected by the actions of defendants as noted herein. Plaintiffs seek monetary damages and equitable relief, including injunctive relief as well as directing the defendant municipality to credit any and all outstanding balances owed by class members appropriately. 21. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of this time, the exact number in the Class is unknown but would be more than one thousand. 22. Plaintiffs' treatment by the Defendants is typical of the members of the Class. While there might be factual differences in the treatment of individual members of the class, the harm flows from similar policies and practices by defendant. 25. Plaintiffs know of no difficulty which will be encountered in the management of this litigation which would preclude its maintenance as a Class Action. The data concerning the Class members and the transaction details and amounts involved is largely computerized by the town and JCS. Other paper records should be readily available for use in the court. 26. The names and addresses of the Class members are a matter of public record and notice can be provided to the Class members via First Class U. S. mail or other appropriate means as may be directed by the Court. 39. The Defendants, acting under color of state law, systematically deprived the Plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, of their rights and immunities secured by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Alabama Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 41. The Plaintiffs aver that Defendants, acting under color of state law, violated their Constitutional rights to equal protection as guaranteed by the United States Constitution by automatically imposing incarceration upon those unable to pay fines and costs without a hearing to determine indigency, as well as the other conduct more fully described in this Complaint. Further, defendants coerced payment of fines, costs and fees by threat of incarceration, when such was illegal and improper, whereas persons with financial means were not subject to such punishment and discrimination. As a proximate consequence of these Constitutional and other violations, the Plaintiffs suffered injuries and damage. 42. The Plaintiffs aver that Defendants acting under color of state law violated their constitutional rights to due process by effectively imposing terms of incarceration and other costs and fines beyond the statutory maximum allowed under Alabama law. As a proximate consequence of these Constitutional and other violations, the Plaintiffs suffered injuries. 43. Defendants have violated the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs and their class by prosecuting persons where there is no jurisdiction or authority for such under Alabama law, doing so intentionally in an effort to coerce payment of fines and costs. These efforts have resulted in the illegal prosecution and incarceration of Plaintiffs and their class for offenses such as “failure to obey a court order”. Further Defendants have added enhancements and other fines and costs where there is no jurisdiction or authority for such under Alabama law. These efforts have also resulted in the illegal prosecution and incarceration of Plaintiffs and their class, causing such persons to pay amounts not due and owing. As a proximate consequence of these Constitutional and other violations, the Plaintiffs suffered injuries and damages as alleged. 44. The Defendants are liable for false imprisonment for unlawfully detaining the Plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, thereby depriving them of their personal liberty in violation of the United States Constitution, the Alabama Constitution, Alabama Code Section 6-5-170, and Alabama common law. As a proximate consequence of these Constitutional and other violations, the Plaintiffs suffered injuries and damages as alleged. 45. The Defendants falsely arrested Plaintiffs and those similarly situated, doing so without probable cause, and doing so illegally to coerce payment. Said action was done intentionally and/or recklessly with knowledge that the Plaintiffs would be harmed and in violation of the United States Constitution, the Alabama Constitution, Alabama law, and Alabama common law. As a proximate consequence of these Constitutional and other violations, the Plaintiffs suffered damage and injuries as alleged. 46. The Defendants maliciously prosecuted Plaintiffs and those similarly situated, doing so without probable cause, and doing so illegally to coerce payment. Said action was done intentionally and/or recklessly with knowledge that the Plaintiffs would be harmed and in violation of the United States Constitution, the Alabama Constitution, Alabama law, and Alabama common law. As a proximate consequence of these Constitutional and other violations, the Plaintiffs suffered damage and injuries as alleged. 47. Defendants committed the tort of abuse of process by intentionally and/or recklessly using and misusing the criminal legal process to harass and intimidate Plaintiffs and those similarly situated for improper and illegal reasons. As part of the defendants’ system, the defendants routinely threaten criminal fines, imprisonment, and probation revocation to collect fines and private fees, doing so in part to financially benefit defendant JCS. As a proximate consequence of these actions, the Plaintiffs suffered damage as alleged. 48. These defendants through their joint action have systematically applied § 15-18-62 of the Code of Alabama in an unconstitutional fashion denying the plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent constitutionally protected rights. Section 15-18-62 provides for the imprisonment for the failure to pay fines and costs in limited circumstances and only upon the finding of a willful failure to comply. Defendants have ignored these requirements of law, causing damage to plaintiffs and their class. 8. The Plaintiffs bring this action because of the operation of the municipal courts under these defendants has violated and continues to violate the plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional rights and those of persons similarly situated. Defendants have imposed a system whereby the clerical and quasi-judicial functions of the municipal court have been unlawfully contracted to a private business, using the color of state law for the collection of private fees and allowing public money to be collected and kept by the private business, in violation of Alabama law and of the Constitution. ENTERPRISE IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFFS’ CLASS OVERVIEW Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof. UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION OF ALABAMA CODE SECTION 15-18-62 Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs and make them a part hereof.

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10. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 11. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York; b. to whom CCC sent a collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. after the consumer’s bankruptcy discharge; d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. 12. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 13. Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 14. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Classes, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant's collection actions such as the referenced letter attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e, and 1692f. 15. The Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Classes defined in this complaint. The Plaintiffs have retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiffs nor their attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 16. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that the Plaintiff Classes defined above are so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Classes and those questions predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A violate 15 U.S.C. § l692e, and §1692f. c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiffs and all members of the Plaintiff Classes have claims arising out of the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiffs have no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiffs are committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiffs have also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiffs nor their counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be imCCCcticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 17. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Classes predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 18. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiffs may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 19. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 20. On a date better known to the creditor Bank of America, N.A., the Plaintiff incurred an obligation. 21. The Bank of America obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes, specifically a computer purchase. 22. The Bank of America obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). 23. Bank of America is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 24. Bank of America contracted the Defendant to collect the alleged debt. 25. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation I – March 6, 2020 Collection Letter 26. Plaintiff filed a Voluntary Petition for Relief under Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United States Code on April 4, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as the “Petition Date”), invoking the protection of the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §362. 27. Said Petition was filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York and was assigned Case No. 19-42046. 28. The Petition filed by the Plaintiff listed Bank of Amrica, N.A. (“Original Creditor”) as an unsecured creditor for a debt (“subject debt”) on her Schedule F. 29. Plaintiff’s 341(a) meeting of creditors was held on May 16, 2019. 30. No representative of the Original Creditor attended the meeting of creditors. 31. On July 17, 2019, the Plaintiff received and Order of Discharge of all debts included in his bankruptcy petition pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727, including the “subject debt”. 32. This discharge order effectuated a discharge of the debt to the Original Creditor, Providing as follows: The discharge prohibits any attempt to collect from the debtor a debt that has been discharged. For example, a creditor is not permitted to contact a debtor by mail, phone, or otherwise…to collect a discharged debt for the debtor 33. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524, the Order of Discharge invoked the protections of the discharge injunction, prohibiting any acts to collect upon the subject debtor. 34. The Bankruptcy Noticing Center sent out the Discharge Certificate of Notice on or around July 19, 2019 alerting all listed creditors of the discharge. 35. Upon receipt of this notice the creditors were required to cease all collection efforts and close the account. 36. Despite the Plaintiff receiving her discharge the original creditor Bank of America assigned the account to Defendant CCC to collect. 37. Defendant CCC failed to perform a proper bankruptcy check and sent collection notices to the Plaintiff. 38. The collection notice specifically demanded payment for a discharged debt. 39. The Defendant should have had systems in place to detect if this account has been included in a bankruptcy filing. 40. Defendant’s attempt to collect a debt from the Plaintiff, was an illegal practice. 41. Defendant’s attempt to collect a debt from the Plaintiff, constitute the threat to take an action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken because Defendant cannot collect a discharged debt. 42. Defendant’s attempt to collect a debt from the Plaintiff, constitutes harassment and the unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt. 43. Defendant’s attempt to collect a debt from Plaintiff, were deceptive and misleading and caused the Plaintiff to be upset and confused about the status of the debt. 44. As a result of Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 45. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 46. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 47. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 48. Defendant violated §1692e : a. As the Letter was attempt collection a debt no longer owed by Plaintiff in violation of §1692e(2), and §1692e(5). b. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). 49. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 50. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 51. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 52. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 53. Defendant violated this section by falsely threatening the Plaintiff that this debt was still owed. 54. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION CCCCTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION CCCCTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.

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1. Occurrence. .................................................................................. 14  1. 2004 National Athletic Trainers’ Association 1. 2. Two Forces. ................................................................................. 14  3. Subconcussive Hits. ..................................................................... 15  4. Pathological Changes. .................................................................. 16  45. The word concussion derives from the Latin concutere for “to shake violently.” Concussions are just that – a shaking of the brain inside the skull that changes the alertness of the injured person. That change can be relatively mild (“She was slightly dazed.”) or profound (“She was unconscious.”). Both situations fall within the definition of concussion. Concussions are often classified as a form of mild traumatic brain injury. 5. Metabolic Changes. ..................................................................... 17  6. Symptoms. ................................................................................... 18  7. Why Water Polo Players – Particularly Youth 8. Players – Are Vulnerable. ............................................................ 18  On the Sidelines. .......................................................................... 20  9. B.  Consensus Best Practices for the Treatment of Concussion for the Period 2002-Present ................................................ 21  Vienna Protocol. .......................................................................... 21  A. A Primer on Concussions Introduction. A.  A Primer on Concussions ....................................................................... 13  Introduction. ................................................................................. 13  Behalf of the Class) .......................................................................................... 71  COUNT III MEDICAL MONITORING (On Behalf of the Class) ........................... 73  COUNT IV GROSS NEGLIGENCE (On Behalf of Minor H.C.) ............................ 75  VI.  CLAIMS ALLEGED ....................................................................................... 69  COUNT I NEGLIGENCE (On Behalf of the Class) .................................................. 69 

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14. Sony’s PlayStation 4 (“PS4”) is a home video game console designed, developed, marketed, and sold by Defendants. The PS4 was released in North America on November 15, 2013, and retailed for approximately $400.00. 15. The PS4 was a massive success for Sony and, as of May 22, 2016, 40 million PS4s have been sold worldwide.1 17. Instead of using a standard mechanical button to eject the contents of the disc drive, the user is required to touch a capacitive touch button located on the front of the PS4, pictured below: 18. Capacitive buttons are based on capacitive coupling and rely on electrical currents from the human body to detect inputs. When an individual places his or her finger on the capacitive button, it causes a change in the capacitance and causes the preset command to be executed. 19. Capacitive sensors rely on capacitors on a circuit board to measure the overall capacitance and any changes to the total capacitance. Here, an individual uses their finger to touch the capacitive eject button and the sensor converts the change in capacitance from the touch into a command instructing the PS4 to eject the contents of the disc drive. 21. The PS4s contain a small circuit board located directly beneath the eject button that contains a gold plated chip. This chip is responsible for converting the capacitive touch inputs into a software command that ejects the contents of the disc drive. A picture of this chip is located below: 22. Unbeknownst to consumers, the gold plated chip suffers from a manufacturing defect that causes it to misread static electricity in the air as capacitance changes that causes the disc drive to attempt to eject the contents of the disc drive in a continuous loop. 23. The disc drive attempts to eject the contents of the disc drive regardless of whether a disc is in the drive. In addition, even if a disc is successfully ejected, the disc drive still continuously attempts to eject the contents of the empty drive because the chip is misinterpreting static electricity in the air as a change in capacitance. 24. As noted above, when the disc drive attempts to eject the contents of the disc driver, it is accompanied by a repeated loop of audible beeps. Since the defect causes the disc drive to eject in a continuous loop, the audible beeping continues until the PS4 is manually shut down. 26. Plaintiff’s experience is by no means an isolated or outlying occurrence. Indeed, the internet is replete with examples of blogs and other websites where consumers have complained of the exact same Disc Drive Defect. 27. For instance, in September 2014, one of the most popular video game websites, IGN, posted an article that “addresses the common problems of a console ejecting discs on its own or the system beeping repeatedly even when no disc is present.”2 The article includes a link to a video created and disseminated by Defendants that purports to outline a fix for the problem, which consists of power- cycling the PS4. A similar article was posted by Engadget, one of the world’s leading technology blogs, that contains similar information and a link to the video.3 Unsurprisingly, power-cycling fails to remedy the defectively manufactured hardware in the PS4. 28. On Defendants’ own website, there are numerous posts complaining of the Disc Drive Defect, that date as far back as November 15, 2013, the date upon which they began selling the PS4.4 29. Through pre-release testing that evaluated the PlayStation’s durability, Defendants knew or should have known of the Disc Drive Defect. The Disc Drive Defect is a manufacturing defect that did or should have alerted Defendants to the fact that the capacitive sensor on the eject button suffered from a manufacturing defect. 31. In response to growing reports of the Disc Drive Defect, Defendants re-designed the capacitive touch buttons and replaced them with traditional mechanical switches in subsequent versions of the PS4. Upon information and belief, this change was implemented on the CUH-12XXX series PS4 and later versions. 32. In the Netherlands, Sony extended the one-year warranty on the PS4s to two years for the Disc Drive Defect.5 The warranty extension was initiated after a famous YouTube blogger experienced the Disc Drive Defect, contacted Sony’s customer support after the expiration of the one-year warranty, and was informed by Sony’s customer service representative that this was a common problem with the first generation PS4, but that his only option was to pay out-of-pocket for the necessary repair. 33. Despite its actions in the Netherlands, Defendants have refused to extend the warranty in the United States. 34. In many instances, consumers have incurred and will continue to incur expenses for the diagnosis of the Disc Drive Defect and repair and replacement of their PS4s, despite such defect having been contained in the PS4s when manufactured by Defendants. 35. Consumers were without access to the information concealed by Sony as described herein, and therefore reasonably relied on Sony’s representations and warranties regarding the quality, durability, and other material characteristics of the PS4s. Had consumers known of the defect, they would have paid less for the PS4 than the amounts they actually paid, or would not have purchased the PS4 at all. C. Sony’s One-Year Warranty Period is Unconscionable 37. As stated above, there is ample evidence that Defendants have been aware of the Disc Drive Defect from widespread complaints since, at the very least, November 15, 2013; the day Sony began selling the PS4. 38. Many PS4 owners have discovered an informal “fix” that lessens the severity and occurrence of the Disc Drive Defect. This requires individuals to open the casing of the PS4, expose the internal circuitry, and scratch the gold plate using a knife to reduce its sensitivity. There are numerous videos on YouTube and other websites instructing users how to complete this process.7 39. Many individuals are hesitant to even open the casing of the PS4 because Sony contends this voids any warranties on the PS4, despite the legality of such a position being contrary to the text of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Indeed, the PS4 warranties state: “THIS WARRANTY DOES NOT 42. Plaintiff brings this suit as a class action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance and superiority requirements of the provisions of Rule 23. 43. Plaintiff seeks to represent the following “Nationwide Class”: All persons or entities in the United States that purchased a Sony PlayStation 4. 44. In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks to represent the following state sub-class: All persons or entities in California that purchased a Sony PlayStation 4 for primarily personal, family or household purposes, as defined by California Civil Code § 1791(a) (the “California Class”). 45. The Nationwide Class and California Class will be referred to collectively as the “Class.” 46. Numerosity: Members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of Class members remains unknown at this time, upon information and belief, there are hundreds of thousands of putative Class members throughout the United States who are generally ascertainable by appropriate discovery. 48. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the other Class members because, inter alia, all members of the Class were injured through the common misconduct described above and were subject to Defendants’ unfair and unlawful conduct. Plaintiff is advancing the same claims and legal theories on behalf of himself and all members of the Class. 49. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that he has no disabling conflicts of interest that would be antagonistic to those of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff seeks no relief that is antagonistic or adverse to the members of the Class and the infringement of the rights and the damages they have suffered are typical of other Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in complex consumer class action litigation, and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously. 51. The nature of this action and the nature of laws available to Plaintiff and the Class make the use of the class action device a particularly efficient and appropriate procedure to afford relief to Plaintiff and the Class for the wrongs alleged because Defendants would necessarily gain an unconscionable advantage since they would be able to exploit and overwhelm the limited resources of each individual Class member with superior financial and legal resources; the costs of individual suits could unreasonably consume the amounts that would be recovered; proof of a common course of conduct to which Plaintiff were exposed is representative of that experienced by the Class and will establish the right of each member of the Class to recover on the cause of action alleged; and individual actions would create a risk of inconsistent results and would be unnecessary and duplicative of this litigation. 52. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed class and subclasses before the Court determines whether certification is appropriate and as the parties engage in discovery. 53. The class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Because of the number and nature of common questions of fact and law, multiple separate lawsuits would not serve the interest of judicial economy. 55. Notice of a certified class action and of any result or resolution of the litigation can be provided to Class members by first-class mail, email, or publication, or such other methods of notice as deemed appropriate by the Court. 56. Plaintiff does not anticipate any difficulty in the management of this litigation. 57. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 58. Defendants are persons as that term is defined in California Civil Code § 1761(c). 59. Plaintiff and the Class are “consumers” as that term is defined in California Civil Code § 1761(d). 61. Defendants’ unfair or deceptive acts or practices occurred repeatedly in Defendants’ trade or business and were capable of deceiving a substantial portion of the purchasing public. 62. Defendants knew that the PS4 was defective, prone to failing for its essential purpose, and would become useless as a result of reasonable and foreseeable use by consumers. 63. Defendants were under a duty to Plaintiff and the Class members to disclose the defective nature of the PS4 because: a. Defendants were in a superior position to know the true state of facts about the Disc Drive Defect in the PS4; b. Plaintiff and the Class members could not reasonably have been expected to learn or discover that the PS4 was defective and not in accordance with Defendants’ advertisements and representations; c. Defendants knew that Plaintiff and the Class members could not reasonably have been expected to learn or discover the Disc Drive Defect in the PS4; and d. Defendants actively concealed and failed to disclose the Disc Drive Defect from Plaintiff and the Class. 64. In failing to disclose the Disc Drive Defect at the time of sale, Defendants have knowingly and intentionally concealed material facts and breached their duty not to do so. 65. The facts concealed or not disclosed by Defendants to Plaintiff and the Class members are material in that a reasonable consumer would have considered them to be important in deciding whether to purchase Defendants’ PS4 or pay a lesser price. Had Plaintiff and the Class known about the Disc Drive Defect in the PS4, they would not have purchased the PS4 or would have paid less for it. 67. Plaintiff and the other Class members’ injuries were proximately caused by Sony’s fraudulent and deceptive business practices. 68. Therefore, Plaintiff and the other Class members are entitled to equitable relief under the 69. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 70. The California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits acts of “unfair competition,” including any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice” and “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. 71. Defendants have engaged in unfair competition and unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent business practices by the conduct, statements, and omissions described above, and by knowingly and intentionally concealing from Plaintiff and the Class members the Disc Drive Defect (and the costs and diminished value of the PS4 as a result of Defendants’ conduct). Defendants should have disclosed this information because they were in a superior position to know the true facts related to the Disc Drive Defect, and Plaintiff and Class members could not reasonably be expected to learn or discover the true facts related to the Disc Drive Defect. 73. The injuries suffered by Plaintiff and the Class members are greatly outweighed by any potential countervailing benefit to consumers or to competition, nor are they injuries that Plaintiff and the Class members should have reasonably avoided. 74. Defendants’ acts and practices are unlawful because they violate California Civil Code §§ 1668, 1709, 1710, and 1750 et seq., and California Commercial Code § 2313. 75. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin further unlawful, unfair and/or fraudulent acts or practices by Defendants, to obtain restitutionary disgorgement of all monies and revenues generated as a result of such practices, and all other relief allowed under California Business & Professions Code § 17200. 76. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 77. California Business & Professions Code § 17500 states: “It is unlawful for any . . . corporation . . . with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal property . . . to induce the public to enter into any obligation relating thereto, to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated . . . from this state before the public in any state, in any newspaper or other publication, or any advertising device, . . . or in any other manner or means whatever, including over the Internet, any statement . . . which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.” 79. Defendants have violated section 17500 because the misrepresentations and omissions regarding the functionality of their PS4, as set forth in this Complaint, were material and likely to deceive a reasonable consumer. 80. Plaintiff and the other Class members have suffered an injury in fact, including the loss of money or property, as a result of Defendants’ unfair, unlawful, and/or deceptive practices. In purchasing the PS4, Plaintiff and the other Class members relied on the misrepresentations and/or omissions of Defendants with respect to the reliability of the PS4. Defendants’ representations were untrue because the PS4 was manufactured and sold with the Disc Drive Defect. Had Plaintiff and the other Class members known this, they would not have purchased their PS4s and/or not paid as much for them. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the other Class members overpaid for the PS4 and did not receive the benefit of their bargain. 81. All of the wrongful conduct alleged herein occurred in the conduct of Defendants’ business. 82. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the other Class members, requests that this Court enter such orders or judgments as may be necessary to restore to Plaintiff and the other Class members any money Defendants acquired by unfair competition, including restitution and/or restitutionary disgorgement, and for such other relief set forth below. A. Sony’s PlayStation 4 and the Disc Drive Defect VIOLATIONS OF CALIFORNIA’S CONSUMER LEGAL REMEDIES ACT (“CLRA”) (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, on Behalf of the California Class) (Against All Defendants) VIOLATIONS OF CALIFORNIA FALSE ADVERTISING LAW (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, on Behalf of the California Class) (Against All Defendants) VIOLATIONS OF CALIFORNIA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200 (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, on Behalf of the California Class) (Against All Defendants) purposes of this Limited Hardware Warranty and Liability, "factory recertified" means a product that has been returned to its original specifications.6

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10. Plaintiff Morgan entered into one or more consumer transactions with “ATI Physical Therapy” (“ATI”) or an affiliate or predecessor corporation. 11. Each consumer transaction was incurred for personal medical services. 12. Further, each consumer transaction involved agreements to render services and defer payment. Plaintiff Morgan was not expected to pay at the time medical services were rendered, but was billed at a later date. 13. On or about October 21, 2016, Transworld mailed a debt collection letter to Plaintiff regarding an alleged debt owed to ATI. A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit A. 15. Exhibit A is a form letter that does not require an envelope because it is a “folded self-mailer.” See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 134 F. Supp. 3d 365, 370 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2015) (“a folded self-mailer is formed from a single sheet of cardstock that is folded once on the right side (the leading edge), addressed on the front, and sealed to make a letter-sized mailpiece.”). 16. Folded self-mailers like Exhibit A are eligible for special low postage rates because of the ease of automated processing. Sears, 134 F. Supp. 3d at 371. 17. Folded self-mailers like Exhibit A usually use a gumming agent like glue to seal the mailer, which “prevent[s] the open edges from fanning out and jamming high-speed processing equipment.” Sears, 134 F. Supp. 3d at 371. 18. Where a self-folded mailer is used for a debt collection letter, the letter also must remain sealed to prevents disclosure of the debt and comply with the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). 19. Exhibit A lists a “CURRENT BALANCE DUE.” 20. The amount of the “CURRENT BALANCE DUE” and other information specific to the alleged debt in question were disclosed in the location on the self-folded mailer where the gumming agent was used to seal the mailer. 21. As a result of the coincident placement of this information and the gumming agent within Exhibit A, it became impossible to determine the amount that was due once the letter was opened because this information was attached to the gumming agent when it became separated from the face of the letter. 23. Sending letters that make it impossible for the debtor to determine the amount of the debt and other critical information specific to the debt is communication in a manner that can reasonably be expected to harass the customer. 24. The unsophisticated consumer would be confused by Exhibit A. 25. Plaintiff Morgan had to spend time and money investigating Exhibit A. 26. Plaintiff Morgan had to take time to obtain and meet with counsel, including traveling to counsel’s office by car and its related expenses, including but not limited to the cost of gasoline and mileage, to advise Plaintiff on the consequences of Exhibit A. Facts Relating to Plaintiff Al 27. On or about February 13, 2017, Transworld mailed a debt collection letter to Plaintiff Al regarding an alleged debt owed to “ATI PHYSICAL THERAPY” (“ATI”). A copy of this letter is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit B. 28. Each consumer transaction was for personal medical services. 29. Further, each consumer transaction involved agreements to render services and defer payment. PLaintiff Al was never expected to pay at the time medical services were rendered. ATI mailed bills to Plaintiff Al at a later date. 30. Upon information and belief, Exhibit B is a form letter, generated by computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiff Al inserted by computer. 31. Upon information and belief, Exhibit B is a form debt collection letter used by Transworld to attempt to collect alleged debts. 33. Exhibit B also contains three payment options that purport to offer Plaintiff Al the opportunity to “pay the debt in full.” 34. Exhibit B explains the payment options as follows: Exhibit B. 35. However, Exhibit B also states: Exhibit B. 36. The representation in Exhibit B that the payment options will “resolve” the account and “pay the account in full” are false, misleading, and confusing to the unsophisticated consumer as the language above states that interest or other charges may be periodically added to the account balance. 37. Thus, it is unclear whether the “consecutive monthly payment” amounts listed in Options 1, 2, and 3 will actually resolve the alleged debt. 39. Exhibit B fails to state the terms of the payment options in a non-confusing manner. 40. Neither the unsophisticated consumer nor the “competent attorney” could determine from Exhibit B whether the payment options would resolve the alleged debt. 41. Exhibit B is ambiguous and capable of at least two meanings. It is unclear whether completing the “paid in full” payment plans, which will not add up to the actual amount of the debt if interest and other charges are added, would be treated as settlements or as a partial payment against Plaintiff’s full balance. Exhibit B. 42. Transworld’s language leaves open the possibility that the consumer will make the monthly payments, only to have the entire payment applied to the actual “full balance” resulting in the consumer still owing a portion of the debt. 43. Treating the payments as being short of the actual full amount of the debt would permit ATI or third-party debt collectors hired by ATI to continue to try to collect on the same debt. 44. An alleged debtor could pay the monthly payments and not know whether he or she has resolved the alleged account. Exhibit B. The language is confusing to the unsophisticated consumer. 45. Moreover, the unsophisticated consumer could not determine whether timely making all payments under the proposed plan would result in ATI representing to credit reporting agencies that the account is paid in full, settled in full, or partially paid with outstanding balance. 47. The consequences of misleading a consumer with respect to settling a debt are material and misleading statements are material false statements under the FDCPA. 48. An account reported to a credit reporting agency as “settled in full” has a greater negative effect on a consumer’s credit score than an account reported as “paid in full.” Thus, consumers who are able to pay off a balance may wish to pay the entire amount instead of “settle” for pennies less than the full amount of the debt in order to effect an improvement in their credit score. 49. The unsophisticated consumer would be confused by Exhibit B. 50. Plaintiff had to spend time and money investigating Exhibit B. 51. Plaintiff had to take time to obtain and meet with counsel, including traveling to counsel’s office by car and its related expenses, including but not limited to the cost of gasoline and mileage, to advise Plaintiff on the consequences of Exhibit B. 73. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 74. Count I is brought on behalf of Plaintiff Morgan. 75. In Exhibit A, Defendant placed critical information specific to the alleged debt in a location where that information would become attached to the self-folded mailer’s gumming agent, making it impossible for the debtor to read that information once the letter was opened. 76. Defendant placed this information in this location with the purpose of inducing alleged debtors to contact Defendant, whereupon Defendant would engage in high-pressure tactics in order to induce alleged debtors to pay debts that Defendant was collecting, possibly at the expense of payment to other debt collectors who were not engaging in such deceptive conduct. 77. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(10), and 1692f. 78. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 79. Count II is brought on behalf of Plaintiff Al. 81. If a consumer chooses to mail in payments in an attempt to take advantage of one of the “Paid in Full” monthly installment plans listed on the letter, Defendant could, under one interpretation of Exhibit B, apply the payments toward the actual “full balance” instead of settling the debt. 82. It is unclear whether the creditor or Transworld would continue to collect any interest or other charges added to the debt if the consumer paid the full amount of a “paid in full” payment plan. 83. It is also unclear whether completing the “paid in full” payment plans, which will not add up to the actual amount of the debt if interest and other charges are added, would be treated as “settlements for less than the full balance” for credit reporting purposes because the payments would be short of the actual balance. 84. Exhibit B misleads the unsophisticated consumer and encourages payments that do not actually settle the alleged debt, allowing ATI or third-party debt collectors hired by ATI to continue collecting the remaining balance. 85. Exhibit B also confuses the consumer as to whether an account would be reported to credit reporting agencies as “settled in full” or “paid in full” after completing of the payment plans, as the payments are short of the balances. 86. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(10), and 1692f. 87. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 89. The statements in Exhibit B that Transworld will consider the debt paid in full if Plaintiff Al completes one of the monthly payment plans, which fail to add up to the full amount of the debt after the addition of interest and other charges, is inherently or apparently contradictory. 90. The unsophisticated consumer would have no idea how a debt could be paid in full when the full balance was not actually paid. 91. The language is intended to make the consumer call Transworld, subjecting him or her to additional collection efforts and high-pressure collection tactics. 92. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(10), and 1692f. 93. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 94. Count IV is brought on behalf of Plaintiff Morgan. 95. In Exhibit A, Defendant placed critical information specific to the alleged debt in a location where that information would become attached to the self-folded mailer’s gumming agent, making it impossible for the debtor to read that information once the letter was opened. 96. Defendant placed this information in this location with the purpose of inducing alleged debtors to contact Defendant, whereupon Defendant would engage in high-pressure tactics in order to induce alleged debtors to pay debts that Defendant was collecting, possibly at the expense of payment to other debt collectors who were not engaging in such deceptive conduct. 98. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 99. Count V is brought on behalf of Plaintiff Morgan. 100. In Exhibit A, Defendant placed critical information specific to the alleged debt in a location where that information would become attached to the self-folded mailer’s gumming agent, making it impossible for the debtor to read that information once the letter was opened. 101. Defendant placed this information in this location with the purpose of inducing alleged debtors to contact Defendant, whereupon Defendant would engage in high-pressure tactics in order to induce alleged debtors to pay debts that Defendant was collecting, possibly at the expense of payment to other debt collectors who were not engaging in such deceptive conduct. 102. Defendant violated Wis. Stat. § 426.110(2)(c). Facts Relating to Plaintiff Morgan

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23. Defendant offers the https://www.nine-ten.com/ website to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with its physical location. The goods and services offered by Defendant include but are not limited to the following: a handpicked wine list, dinner menu, lunch menu, breakfast menu, and a weekend brunch menu. Defendant’s website also details the executive chef’s story and accomplishments; the plethora of awards and accolades received by the restaurant; positive press coverage; the myriad of rooms and packages available for special events and private dining experiences, contact information, directions, and hours of operation. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a Nationwide Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2), the Nationwide Class is initially defined as follows: all legally blind individuals who have attempted to access Defendant’s website by the use of a screen reading software during the applicable limitations period up to and including final judgment in this action. 43. The California Class is initially defined as follows: all legally blind individuals in the State of California who have attempted to access Defendant’s website by the use of a screen reading software during the applicable limitations period up to and including final judgment in this action. 44. Excluded from each of the above Classes is Defendant, including any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, is a parent or subsidiary, or which is controlled by Defendant, as well as the officers, directors, affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, predecessors, successors, and assigns of Defendant. Also excluded are the judge and court personnel in this case and any members of their immediate families. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class definitions if discovery and further investigation reveal that the Classes should be expanded or otherwise modified. 55. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 54, inclusive, of this Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 56. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq., provides: “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 61. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 60, inclusive, of this Complaint as if set forth fully herein. VIOLATIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 ET SEQ. (On Behalf of Plaintiff, the Nationwide Class and the California Class) VIOLATIONS OF THE UNRUH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE § 51 ET SEQ. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the California Class)

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11. This Court has personal jurisdiction over NAP because NAP maintains its headquarters in Connecticut and because NAP has tens of thousands of customers in Connecticut and thereby conducts business in this state. 13. In the late 90s and early 2000s, many states moved to deregulate at least part of the electricity supply services then performed by large public utilities. Delivery of electricity to a consumer requires both the creation of electricity and the transmission of that electricity from the power plant to the consumer. The typical pattern was to require the public utilities to divest their power generation assets such as coal, gas and nuclear power plants. But, the regulated utilities continued distributing power from these power plants to consumers through transmission lines. 14. When deregulation occurred, the business of power supply was opened to competition and consumers were allowed to select the companies from whom they would purchase their power. However, states generally set a "standard offer," available to all customers in each public utility's service area. In some states, such as Connecticut, the standard offer is a single, flat rate which is fixed for a period of months, while other states such as Rhode Island have both a fixed rate standard offer and a standard offer rate that varies each month. controversy exceeds $5,000,000 and there are members of the Class who are citizens of a different state than Defendant NAP. 15. As a result of the deregulation of power supply, several different parties are now involved in the supply of electric power to residential consumers. Certain companies, such as Dominion, produce electric power ("Generation Companies"). Other companies, such as Connecticut Light & Power ("CL&P") in Connecticut, distribute electricity from Generation Companies to the end user ("Distribution Companies"). Although some Generation Companies have sold power directly to consumers, including residential customers, most sell the power they generate on the wholesale market to companies that market to retail customers ("Electric Suppliers"). 16. The market for wholesale power in the New England States is under the administration of an independent, not-for-profit corporation formed in accordance with the recommendations of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, called ISO New England (for "Independent System Operator"). ISO New England coordinates and directs the generation and flow of electricity throughout the region, ensuring that electric supply exactly meets demand throughout the network. The wholesale market managed by ISO New England determines where and when electricity will be made by Generation Companies and the wholesale prices that will be paid for that electricity through competitive bids. "More than 500 companies participate in these markets, buying and selling between $6-$14 billion of electric power and related products annually." http://www.iso-ne.com/about/what-we-do/three-roles/administering-markets. The bid process determines the Generation Company that will make each unit of electricity and the wholesale price each Energy Supplier will pay to each Generator for each unit of energy delivered to specific locations throughout the region. 18. Like other Electric Suppliers, NAP purchases power on the wholesale market and sells it to consumers. The rates that NAP charges are not approved by states' regulatory authorities such as Connecticut's Public Utility Regulatory Authority ("PURA") or the Public Utilities Commissions ("PUC's") of Rhode Island, Maine or New Hampshire. Rather, NAP and other Suppliers are free to set their own rates for supplying electricity to consumers. And NAP, like all other suppliers, relies upon the Distribution Companies to deliver the electricity it purchases on the wholesale market to its customers. The Distribution Companies charge separately for their distribution-related services, using rates that are reviewed and approved by the states' regulatory agencies. 19. Electric Suppliers may contract with consumers to supply electricity on either a "Fixed" or "Variable" rate basis. Under a Fixed contract, the Supplier agrees to supply electricity at a set rate for a certain number of months. 22. Throughout its contracts, marketing materials and required disclosures, NAP automatically rolling into a Variable rate plan. charge a low promotional "teaser" rate which is fixed for a set number of months before 23. For example, NAP directs its sales representatives to explain the relative benefits entire hook by which NAP attracts consumers to Variable rate plans. represents that its Variable rate plan is based upon the wholesale market rate. Indeed, that is the 24. NAP confirms that its rates are market-based in follow-up confirmatory phone OCC-22, on March 21, 2014, at pp. 46-47) (emphasis added). ("Frequently Asked Questions" Chart filed by NAP in PURA Docket No. 13-07-18, Document A variable rate is subject to change with market pricing, which means when market prices go down, so does the variable rate. . . . A fixed rate means that the price per unit remains steady for a specific period of time, regardless of market price fluctuations. The benefit of that is that you are protected in the event market prices rise. . . . A variable rate is subject to change with market pricing, which means when market prices go down, so does the variable rate. That enables you to take advantage of market lows, which isn't necessarily the case when you 're locked into a fixed-rate. of Variable and Fixed rate plans as follows: 25. Most importantly, NAP's Variable rate "Terms of Service" also make this express link between the Variable rate charged by the company and the underlying wholesale market rates from ISO New England charged by Generation Companies, stating "[tjhe variable rate may increase or decrease to reflect the changes in the wholesale power market." (Contracts filed by NAP in PURA Docket No. 09-10-21 and in Docket No. 13-07-18, Document No. OCC-37, on March 21, 2014, at p. 1.) 26. Accordingly, a reasonable consumer would understand that NAP's Variable rates fluctuate in a manner correlated with the underlying wholesale market rate, and that, although prices would go up when wholesale prices rose, they would also go down when wholesale prices decreased, enabling consumers to take advantage of market lows. 27. Instead, and contrary to reasonable consumer expectation, NAP used its Variable rates as a pure profit center, increasing the rates charged to class members when wholesale prices rose, but staying at a level as much as double, triple or quadruple the wholesale market rates when the wholesale prices fell. 29. The extreme divergence between the wholesale price paid by NAP and the retail 42. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because he is a member of the adjudication of this controversy. economy, efficiency, fairness and equity to other available methods for the fair and efficient individual persons, and a class action is superior with respect to considerations of consistency, 43. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class because they arise out of the action litigation. Plaintiff and his undersigned counsel, who have extensive experience prosecuting complex class represent. The interests of the members of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by Class and his interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class he seeks to 44. Maintenance of this action as a class action is a fair and efficient method for the of any other putative class member. practices. Plaintiff has suffered the harm alleged and has no interests antagonistic to the interests same conduct, policies, and practices of NAP with respect to its Variable electric rate policies and 46. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding and subsequent paragraphs as though set forth herein. 47. Plaintiff brings this count individually and as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and the Class. adjudications, while a single class action can determine, with judicial economy, the rights of all class members. 48. NAP is engaged in "trade" and "commerce" as it offers electricity for sale to 49. NAP's conduct as alleged above constitutes unfair practices: a. NAP's contracts do not accurately describe the rates the customer will be paying or the circumstances under which the rates may change. b. NAP's acts and practices with regard to its exorbitant Variable electric rates as alleged above are immoral, unethical, oppressive and unscrupulous. c. NAP's conduct is substantially injurious to consumers. Such conduct has caused, and continues to cause, substantial injury to consumers because consumers would not have paid such a high price for electricity but for NAP's immoral, unethical, oppressive and unscrupulous practices and procedures. Consumers have thus overpaid for their electricity and such injury is not consumers. 50. NAP's conduct as alleged above also constitutes a deceptive act or practice. NAP's Variable electric rate representations as set forth above were and are likely to mislead consumers and NAP intended that consumers rely upon those representations. Plaintiff and other reasonable consumers reasonably interpreted Defendant's representations to mean that NAP's Variable rates track the underlying wholesale power rates (when in fact they do not). NAP' s representations were material to a reasonable consumer and likely to affect consumer decisions and conduct, including purchases of power from NAP pursuant to Variable rate contracts. 51. The foregoing unfair and deceptive practices directly, foreseeably and proximately caused Plaintiff and the Class to suffer an ascertainable loss and substantial injury when they paid an exorbitant premium for electricity over wholesale market rates. 52. The foregoing actions constitute unfair and deceptive practices in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-11 Oa et seq., the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5, § 205-A et seq., the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:l et seq., and the Rhode Island Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, R.I. Gen. Laws§ 6-13.1-1 et seq. 54. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding and subsequent paragraphs as though set forth herein. 55. All contracts contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, including Plaintiffs and Class members' contracts with NAP. 56. NAP's Terms of Service with customers gives NAP discretion concerning the monthly rates charged under Variable rate contracts and any "increase[s] or decrease[s]" to the rate "to reflect the changes in the wholesale power market." 58. NAP's performance of its discretionary functions under the Terms of Service as alleged herein to maximize its revenue from Variable electric rates impedes the right of Plaintiff and other Class Members to receive benefits that they reasonably expected to receive under the contract. 59. On information and belief, NAP's actions as alleged herein were performed in bad faith, in that the purpose behind the practices and policies alleged herein was to maximize NAP's revenue at the expense of its customers and in contravention of their reasonable expectations as customers of NAP. 60. NAP has breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Terms of Service through its Variable electric rate policies and practices as alleged herein. 62. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding and subsequent paragraphs as though set forth herein. 63. NAP has been, and continues to be, unjustly enriched as a result of its wrongful conduct alleged herein to the detriment of Plaintiff and the Class. 64. NAP has been enriched by a benefit in the form of payment of exorbitant Variable electric rates. 65. NAP's enrichment was at the expense of Plaintiff and the Class. 66. It would be unjust to allow NAP to retain the benefit. 67. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to disgorgement and restitution of all wrongfully- obtained gains received by NAP as a result of its wrongful conduct alleged herein. 68. Plaintiff and members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. A. Energy Deregulation and the Role of Electric Suppliers BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING UNJUST ENRICHMENT VIOLATION OF STATE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACTS,

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19. Artech provides staffing services for many industries worldwide, including information technology and project management. 20. Haynes worked for Artech from approximately June 2019 until February 2020. 21. Haynes performed work for Artech’s customer at the Tennessee Valley Authority Gallatin Fossil Plant in Sumner County, Tennessee. 22. Haynes was a Start-Up Specialist for Artech. 23. As a Start-Up Specialist, Haynes assisted the start-up and commissioning of a dry bottom ash handling system at the Gallatin Fossil Plant. 24. Haynes reported the hours he works to Artech on a regular basis. 25. Haynes was not guaranteed a salary. 26. If Haynes worked fewer than 40 hours in a week, he is only paid for the hours worked. 27. Haynes regularly worked over 40 hours in a week. 28. Although he often worked 50 to 60 hours per workweek, Artech never paid Haynes any overtime but, rather, paid him straight-time-for-overtime. 30. The hours Haynes and the Straight Time Workers (defined above) work are reflected in Artech’s records. 31. Rather than receiving time and half as required by the FLSA, Haynes only received “straight time” pay for overtime hours worked. 32. Artech’s “straight time for overtime” payment scheme violates the FLSA. 33. Artech was and is aware of the overtime requirements of the FLSA. 34. Artech nonetheless fails to pay certain employees, such as Haynes, overtime. 35. Artech did not guarantee Haynes and Straight Time Workers a salary. 36. Artech’s failure to pay overtime to these workers was, and is, a willful violation of the 37. Artech’s illegal “straight time for overtime” policy extends beyond Haynes. 38. It is the “straight time for overtime” payment plan that is the “policy that is alleged to violate the FLSA” in this FLSA collective action. Bursell v. Tommy’s Seafood Steakhouse, No. CIV.A. H- 06-0386, 2006 WL 3227334, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2006); Wellman v. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc., No. CIV.A. 14-831, 2014 WL 5810529, at *5 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 2014) (certifying “straight time for overtime” claim for collective treatment). 40. Any differences in job duties do not detract from the fact that these workers were entitled to overtime pay. 41. The workers impacted by Artech’s “straight time for overtime” scheme should be notified of this action and given the chance to join pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

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11. Sugar Leaf is, and was at all times relevant herein, in the business of, among other things, making and selling foodstuffs both at its retail location, for catering outside events, for shipment nationwide through its internet sales website. 12. Plaintiff was employed by Sugar Leaf in its bakery. The principal job duty of Plaintiff was to bake and deliver food. 13. Plaintiff, and the other bakery employees, were paid on an hourly basis. 14. Sugar Leaf recorded the hours worked by Plaintiff and the other bakery employees but did not pay an overtime premium when those employees worked more than 40 hours in a workweek. 15. Plaintiff and the other bakery employees regularly worked more than forty hours per week for Sugar Leaf. 16. Upon information and belief, all technicians employed by Sugar Leaf in its Branson, Missouri facility are, and were at all times relevant herein, subjected to the same policies and practices as described above. 18. The net effect of Sugar Leaf’s policies and practices, instituted and approved by company managers, is that Sugar Leaf willfully fails to pay correctly calculated overtime compensation to its technicians and willfully fails to keep accurate time records in order to save payroll costs. Sugar Leaf enjoys ill-gained profits at the expense of their employees. 19. Sugar Leaf failed to post employees’ notice of the overtime requirements of the FLSA and MMWL as required by 29 U.S.C. § 218b and/or Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.522. 20. Further, Sugar Leaf’s managers told Plaintiff, and other employees, that Sugar Leaf was not required to pay overtime and that the employees were not covered by the FLSA and/or the MMWL. 21. Sugar Leaf’s managers, including Defendants Todd Jansen and Lori Jansen, knew or, through the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that its statements regarding its employees’ FLSA and MMWL coverage were incorrect. Upon information and belief, Sugar Leaf’s manager’s made these incorrect statements in an effort to prevent employees from questioning Sugar Leaf’s pay practices and/or to prevent employees from pursuing their rights under the FSLA and/or MMWL. Such actions were sufficient to toll the applicable statutes of limitations under the doctrine of equitable tolling and/or under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.280. 23. Plaintiff brings Count I, the FLSA claim, as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of themselves and the following subclasses: Persons who (1) filed a consent to join this lawsuit; (2) are currently working or previously worked for Sugar Leaf as an hourly employee for any period of time within three years of the date of consenting to join the suit (plus any time allowed by the court for tolling of the statute of limitations); and (3) worked more than 40 hours in a week. 24. The FLSA claim may be pursued by those who opt-in to this case, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 25. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated employees, seeks relief on a collective basis challenging, among other FLSA violations, Sugar Leaf’s practice of failing to accurately record all hours worked and failing to pay employees for all hours worked, and failing to properly pay overtime compensation. The number and identity of other Plaintiffs yet to opt-in and consent to be party plaintiff may be determined from the records of Sugar Leaf, and potential class members may easily and quickly be notified of the pendency of this action. 26. Plaintiff brings Count II as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on their own behalf and as the Class Representatives on behalf of the following: Persons who (1) are currently working or previously worked for Sugar Leaf as an hourly employee for any period of time within two years of the date of consenting to join the suit (plus any time allowed by the court for tolling of the statute of limitations); and (2) worked more than 40 hours in a week. 28. This class is believed to number approximately 50 persons. As a result, joinder of all class members in a single action is impracticable. Class members may be informed of the pendency of this class action through direct mail. 29. There are questions of fact and law common to the class that, under Missouri state law, predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The questions of law and fact common to the class arising from Sugar Leaf’s actions include, without limitation, the following: a. Whether Sugar Leaf violated Missouri law when it failed to pay overtime premium pay; b. Whether Sugar Leaf had a policy and practice of failing to compensate technicians for all hours worked; c. Whether Sugar Leaf failed to pay technicians an overtime premium for work performed beyond 40 hours in a workweek. d. Whether Sugar Leaf committed improper acts to prevent the commencement of an action to recover unpaid overtime by class member such that would toll the otherwise applicable statutes of limitations. 30. The questions set forth above predominate over any questions affecting only individual persons, and a class action is superior with respect to considerations of consistency, economy, efficiency, fairness, and equity to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the state law claims. 31. Plaintiff’s claims under Missouri state law are typical of those of the class in that class members have been employed in the same or similar positions as Plaintiff and were subject to the same or similar practices as Plaintiff. 33. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Missouri class because he is a member of the class and his interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class he seeks to represent. The interests of the members of the class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and his undersigned counsel. Counsel are experienced in the litigation of civil matters, including the prosecution of complex wage and hour, employment, and class action cases. 34. Maintenance of this action as a class action is a fair and efficient method for adjudication of this controversy. It would be impracticable and undesirable for each member of the class who suffered harm to bring a separate action. In addition, the maintenance of separate actions would place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the courts and could result in inconsistent adjudications, while a single class action can determine, with judicial economy, the rights of all class members. 35. Plaintiff re-alleges the allegations set forth above. 37. The FLSA regulates, among other things, the payment of overtime pay by employers whose employees are engaged in interstate commerce, or engaged in the production of goods for commerce, or employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 38. Sugar Leaf is, and at all time relevant has been, subject to the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA because it is an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce and its employees are engaged in commerce. 39. Sugar Leaf violated the FLSA by failing to pay overtime. 40. Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees are victims of a common compensation policy. 41. Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees are entitled to damages equal to the mandated overtime premium pay within the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint, plus periods of equitable tolling, because Sugar Leaf acted willfully and knew or showed reckless disregard in its violation of the requirements of the FLSA. 43. As a result of these violations of the FLSA’s overtime pay provisions, compensation has been unlawfully withheld by Sugar Leaf from Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees. Accordingly, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Sugar Leaf is liable for the unpaid overtime premium pay along with an additional amount as liquidated damages, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs of this action. 44. Plaintiff re-alleges the allegations set forth above. 45. Sugar Leaf violated Missouri law, in relevant part, by failing to pay overtime premium pay to Plaintiff and similarly situated employees as required by Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.502 and § 290.505. Violation of the Missouri Minimum Wage Law (Brought Against Sugar Leaf by Plaintiff Individually and in their Capacity as the Class Representatives on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated) Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Brought Against Sugar Leaf by Plaintiff Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated)

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14. On or around August 19, 2013, Lowery mailed a debt collection letter to Plaintiff regarding an alleged debt allegedly owed to CACH and allegedly previously owed to “Bank of America, N.A.” A copy of this letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit A. 15. The alleged debt identified in Exhibit A was for an alleged personal credit card, used only for personal, family or household purposes. 16. Upon information and belief, Exhibit A is a form letter, generated by a computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiff inserted by the computer. 17. Exhibit A contains the following text: Exhibit A. 18. The letter purports to offer a “one-time settlement” of Plaintiff’s account. 19. Exhibit A falsely states or implies that the settlement offer is valid “for a limited time only.” 21. Such false statements are material false statements, as they impart in the unsophisticated consumer, a false belief that he or she must hurry to take advantage of a limited- time opportunity, when in reality, there is no such time limit. 22. Further, the “limited time offer” language is merely a tactic to get consumers to pay anything on old debts that CACH purchased for pennies on the dollar, especially when an alleged debt has been sold to a debt buyer like CACH. See FTC, The Structure and Practices of the Debt Buying Industry, January, 2013 at 23 (available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/reports/structure-and-practices-debt-buying-industry/debtbuyingreport.pdf (Average purchase price for consumer credit card debt is 4.0 cents on the dollar). 23. The Seventh Circuit has established “safe harbor” language regarding settlement offers in collection letters: As in previous cases in which we have created safe-harbor language for use in cases under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, we think the present concern can be adequately addressed yet the unsophisticated consumer still be protected against receiving a false impression of his options by the debt collector's including with the offer the following language: “We are not obligated to renew this offer.” The word “obligated” is strong and even the unsophisticated consumer will realize that there is a renewal possibility but that it is not assured. Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 775-76 (7th Cir. 2007). 24. Defendant did not use the safe harbor language in Exhibit A. 25. Upon information and belief, the deadline in Exhibit A to respond to the settlement offer is a sham. There is no actual deadline. The sole purpose of the purported deadline is to impart in the consumer a false sense of urgency. 27. Exhibit A includes false statements to the effect that the settlement offer is only available for a limited time. 28. Upon information and belief, Lowery and CACH would settle Plaintiff’s and class members’ debts at any time, regardless of the supposed deadline. 29. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) specifically prohibits the “use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 30. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f generally prohibits “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 31. Lowery violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(10) and 1692f. 32. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a Class, consisting of (a) all natural persons in the State of Wisconsin (b) who were sent a collection letter in the form represented by Exhibit A, (c) seeking to collect a debt for personal, family or household purposes, (d) on or after June 3, 2013, (e) that was not returned by the postal service. 33. The Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, there are more than 50 members of the Class. 34. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class, which common questions predominate over any questions that affect only individual class members. The predominant common question is whether the Defendants complied with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f. 36. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in consumer credit and debt collection abuse cases. 37. A class action is superior to other alternative methods of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible.

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23. Defendant offers the https://www.loewshotels.com/ website to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with its physical locations. The goods and services offered by Defendant include but are not limited to the following: information on the various Loew’s Hotels destinations; information regarding Wi-Fi, concierge services, Luxury spa, and the ability to text message the front desk; how to find the right venue for social events; special offers; the MVP loyalty program; businesses perks in the vicinity of each respective hotel; how to book reservations online; career opportunities; investor development information; Defendant’s blog; and press coverage. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a Nationwide Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2), the Nationwide Class is initially defined as follows: all legally blind individuals who have attempted to access Defendant’s website by the use of a screen reading software during the applicable limitations period up to and including final judgment in this action. 43. The California Class is initially defined as follows: all legally blind individuals in the State of California who have attempted to access Defendant’s website by the use of a screen reading software during the applicable limitations period up to and including final judgment in this action. 44. Excluded from each of the above Classes is Defendant, including any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, is a parent or subsidiary, or which is controlled by Defendant, as well as the officers, directors, affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, predecessors, successors, and assigns of Defendant. Also excluded are the judge and court personnel in this case and any members of their immediate families. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class definitions if discovery and further investigation reveal that the Classes should be expanded or otherwise modified. 55. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 54, inclusive, of this Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 56. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq., provides: “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 61. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 60, inclusive, of this Complaint as if set forth fully herein. VIOLATIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 ET SEQ. (On Behalf of Plaintiff, the Nationwide Class and the California Class) VIOLATIONS OF THE UNRUH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE § 51 ET SEQ. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the California Class)

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19. Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a tool pusher from approximately March of 2014 to April of 2016. 20. As a tool pusher, Plaintiff’s primary duty involved manual labor at oil well sites. He performed physical labor tasks at the well sites and worked outdoors, exposed to the elements. He also acted as a liaison between companies providing services at the well sites and the owner of the well site. 21. Plaintiff is one of hundreds of tool pushers employed by Defendant in the last three years. 22. Defendant violated the FLSA by misclassifying its tool pusher workforce as independent contractors and paying them only a day rate without overtime. 23. That is, Defendant made the company wide decision to classify all of its tool pushers as independent contractors. 24. Defendant’s tool pushers typically work a 12 hour shift at well sites. They also commonly work at well sites for several weeks at a time. 25. For compensation, Defendant pays its tool pushers a day rate for each day spent working. 26. Defendant paid Plaintiff a day rate. 27. Defendant paid the Class Members a day rate. 28. Defendant classified Plaintiff as an independent contractor. 29. Defendant classified the Class Members as independent contractors. 31. Defendant hired/fired, issued pay, supervised, directed, disciplined, scheduled and performed all other duties generally associated with that of an employer with regard to Plaintiff and the Class Members. 32. Defendant set the schedule to be worked by Plaintiff and the Class Members and controlled their work including their work locations, the hours worked, and safety on the job site. 33. Defendant tracked the days worked by Plaintiff and Class Members just as is common for typical employer-employee relationships. 35. Furthermore, the degree of investment Plaintiff and Class Members made to perform their work was minimal. Plaintiff and the Class Members were not required to supply tools of any kind. On the other hand, Defendant assumed all the costs typically associated with running a business and owned all tools and equipment Plaintiff and the Class Members were assigned. 36. A substantial portion of Defendant’s annual revenue is derived from the work performed by Plaintiff and Class Members. 37. Despite these facts, Defendant improperly classified Plaintiff and Class the Members as independent contractors and not employees. 39. However, at all times Plaintiff and the Class Members were economically dependent on Defendant and were not in business for themselves. They were employees under the FLSA, not independent contractors and they should have been paid overtime. 40. No exemption under the FLSA shelters Defendant from paying the Plaintiff and Class Members overtime. 41. Defendant knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether Plaintiff and the Class Members were entitled to overtime pay under the law. In fact, Defendant knew the requirement to pay overtime to Plaintiff and Class Members but intentionally chose not to do so. 42. Plaintiff brings this suit as an FLSA collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of all current and former tool pushers classified as independent contractors who performed work for Defendant for at least one week during the three-year period before the filing of this Complaint up to the date the Court authorizes notice. 43. Plaintiff has first-hand personal knowledge, through his personal work experience and communications with other workers of the Defendant, that a class of similarly- situated employees exists who have been denied the FLSA’s overtime premium by being subjected to the same illegal pay practices described above. 44. Defendant uses the same compensation structure regardless of the location of employment of a particular Class Member. 46. All tool pushers perform the same essential job functions regardless of branch location. 47. Defendant has a common job description that applies to all tool pushers. 48. As such, Class Members are similar to Plaintiff in terms of relevant job duties, pay structure, misclassification, and the denial of overtime pay. 49. The names and address of the Class Members of the collective action are available from Defendant’s records. The Class Members should be allowed to receive notice via First Class Mail, email and via a website with basic information about the lawsuit or by use of techniques and a form of notice similar to those customarily used in representative actions. 50. Although the exact amount of damages may vary among individual Class Members, the damages for each individual can be easily calculated. 51. The Class may be properly defined as follows: All current and former tool pushers classified as independent contractors who performed work for Defendant for at least one week during the three-year period before the filing of this Complaint up to the date the Court authorizes notice. 52. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs by reference. 54. Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek because it misclassified those workers as independent contractors. 55. Defendant cannot satisfy its burden to show that any exemption applies. Tool pushers were not paid on a salary or fee basis and did not perform the type of work to satisfy the duties tests for any of the white collar exemption. 56. Defendant has, therefore, violated and continues to violate the FLSA by not paying Plaintiff and the Class Members consistent with the FLSA for their overtime hours. 57. Defendant’s failure to pay overtime in accordance with the FLSA was willful and not based on a good faith belief that its conduct did not violate the FLSA. 58. As such, the foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation within the meaning of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 59. Plaintiff will seek to certify this class as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). DAMAGES SOUGHT PURSUANT TO 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) 60. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to recover their unpaid overtime compensation for all time worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a single week. 61. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to recover an equal amount of their unpaid overtime premiums as liquidated damages. Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act Failure to Pay Overtime (Collective Action)

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21. Swift is a multinational corporation that operates an international trucking terminal network, and provides long-haul transportation services and other logistics services throughout the continental United States, Mexico, and Canada, and in this Judicial District. 22. Swift operates nearly 18,000 trucks, and its terminal network includes over 40 full-service facilities. 23. Swift currently employs hundreds of Trainees in the United States. Trainees are assigned to drive a truck with a “mentor” trucker for 4-6 weeks. All Trainees have shared a common job description. The principal job duties of Plaintiff and the other Trainees has been to drive a truck, assist their mentors with navigation and operation of the truck, conduct pre- and post-trip inspections, communicate and conduct business with short-haul and local delivery agents, and load and unload cargo, among other things. Trainees also must learn how to operate the truck’s controls, learn safe driving practices, how to log hours of service and how to conduct pre- and post-trip inspections, among other things. 24. The mentors also have typically instructed the Trainees regarding the driving of the truck, operating the truck’s controls, the logging of hours of service for regulatory purposes, loading and unloading, and communicating with short-haul and local delivery agents, among other things. The mentor has also been responsible for tracking the hours worked by the Trainees, and inputting that information into the computer timekeeping system located on the truck. 25. Swift has paid its Trainees by the hour and has classified them as “non- exempt” employees who are entitled to minimum wage and overtime compensation as defined by the FLSA. 40. Plaintiffs bring all counts herein as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of herself and a proposed Collective of similarly situated employees defined as: “All individuals currently or formerly employed by Swift as a Trainee or other equivalent hourly position in the United States at any time from three years before the filing of this Complaint and/or the filing of consents to become party plaintiffs, plus additional time for periods of equitable tolling, through resolution of this action.” 41. Plaintiff, individually, and on behalf of other similarly situated employees defined above, seeks relief on a collective basis challenging Swift’s policy and practice of failing to compensate its hourly, non-exempt Trainees for work Swift suffers and permits them to perform for its own benefit, including overtime compensation. The number and identity of other similarly situated persons yet to opt- in and consent to be party-plaintiffs may be determined from the records of Swift, and potential opt-ins may be easily and quickly notified of the pendency of this action. 42. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-39. 43. At all times relevant to this action, Swift has been an “employer” under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), subject to the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 44. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and the other Trainees have been “employees” of Swift within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). 63. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-60. 80. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-77. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. FAILURE TO PAY MINIMUM WAGES VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. FAILURE TO COMPENSATE FOR ALL HOURS WORKED VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES

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46. Plaintiffs were hourly employees of NYHMC, many of whom worked at NYHMC for over 20 years in all facets of the management of the New Yorker Hotel. Plaintiffs included maintenance/repair staff, housekeeping, frontdesk and all other non-exempt hourly paid employees. 47. However, in or around December 2018, management of the New Yorker Hotel was to be transferred to MCR beginning February 2019. At this time there were over 100 employees working at the New Yorker Hotel. 60. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. 61. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and as a class action pursuant to CAFA on behalf of the aforementioned Class. 62. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors, or any individual who has or had a controlling interest in NYHMC and MCR. Also excluded are persons and entities who submit timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion from the Class. 71. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs by reference as if fully set forth herein. 72. In connection with NYHMC’s termination of Plaintiffs on December 31, 2018, Plaintiffs executed valid and enforceable Severance Agreements, which were binding on NYHMC and its successors and assigns. 73. Pursuant to the express and unambiguous terms of the Severance Agreements, NYHMC was required to pay Plaintiffs sums ranging from $40,000 to over $200,000. BREACH OF CONTRACT (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class) Defendants’ Failure to Pay Plaintiffs’ Severance

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10. Beginning in or around February 2016, Defendants contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -1554, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendants’ services. 11. Defendants used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. 12. Defendants contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone number (415) 550-6970 at least once on or around February 3, 2016 and at least once on March 9, 2016. 13. Defendants’ calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 14. Defendants’ calls were placed to telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 15. During all relevant times, Defendants did not possess Plaintiff’s “prior express consent” to receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice on his cellular telephone pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 16. Further, Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -1554 was added to the National Do-Not-Call Registry on or about December 16, 2004. 17. Despite this, Defendants continued to call Plaintiff in an attempt to solicit its services and in violation of the National Do-Not-Call provisions of the 22. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the two proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). The class concerning the ATDS claim for no prior express consent (hereafter “The ATDS Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 54. Pursuant to the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, Plaintiff is entitled to, and demands, a trial by jury. Respectfully Submitted this 21st Day of October, 2016. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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10. Upon information and belief, Defendant utilizes third party vendors to market its services. 11. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s vendors are essential to their telemarketing activities. 12. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s ability to increase revenues depends significantly on their access to high-quality vendors. 13. Defendant is subject to liability under the TCPA for actions of their third party vendors who are engaging in outbound telemarketing efforts on their behalf. 14. Defendant’s third party vendors identify themselves as representatives of “Total Home Protection.” 15. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s outbound telemarketing efforts include the use of an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) to solicit consumers nationwide. 17. The technology employed by Defendant has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers. 18. An ATDS allows its telemarketing agents to only communicate with consumers who answer their phone. 19. Consequently, Defendant shifts the burden of wasted time to consumers with unsolicited calls and messages. 20. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was the sole operator, possessor, and subscriber of the cellular telephone number ending in 1890. 21. At all times relevant, Plaintiff’s number ending in 1890 was assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 22. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was financially responsible for his cellular telephone equipment and services. 23. In February of 2020, Plaintiff started to receive phone calls from Defendant. 24. On no less than five (5) occasions, Plaintiff answered. 25. Each time Plaintiff answered, he was met by noticeable pause prior to being connected to Defendant’s representative. 26. Each time, Defendant sought to market Defendant’s service(s). 27. Each time, Plaintiff politely informed Defendant that was not interested, before asking Defendant to stop calling. 29. Nonetheless, these phone calls continued. 30. Defendant used caller ID spoofing to make it appear that Defendant’s phone calls were placed from local phone numbers – including (313) 217-5501 and (855) 940-0978. 31. At no time did the Defendant have Plaintiff’s written consent to place these phone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 32. Defendant’s unwanted solicitation phone calls have caused Plaintiff actual harm, including but not limited to, aggravation that accompanies unsolicited telemarketing phone calls, anxiety, emotional distress, increased risk of personal injury resulting from the distraction caused by the phone calls, wear and tear to Plaintiff’s cellular phone, intrusion upon and occupation of Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, temporary loss of use of Plaintiff’s cellular phone, invasion of privacy, loss of battery charge, loss of concentration, mental anguish, nuisance, the per-kilowatt electricity costs required to recharge Plaintiff’s cellular telephone as a result of increased usage of Plaintiff’s telephone services, and wasting Plaintiff’s time. 33. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. 35. The following individuals are excluded from the Putative Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or their parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Putative Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such executed persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. A. Numerosity 36. The exact number of members of the Putative Class are unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. 37. On information and belief, Defendant made phone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Putative Class. 38. Members of the Putative Class can be objectively identified from records of Defendant and any affiliated marketers to be gained in discovery. B. Commonality and Predominance 39. There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Putative Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Putative Class. C. Typicality 41. This case is also appropriate for class certification as class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the efficient and fair adjudication of this controversy. 42. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Putative Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense required for individual prosecution. 43. By contrast, a class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 44. Economies of effort, expense, and time will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. E. Adequate Representation 45. Plaintiff will adequately and fairly represent and protect the interests of the Putative Class. 46. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Putative Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 47. Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced counsel in consumer class action litigation. 48. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. 50. Under the TCPA consent rules, some types of calls require prior express written consent, while other types of calls do not require that the consent be in writing. 51. “Prior express written consent” is required for (a) all telemarketing/promotional calls/texts made using an ATDS placed to wireless numbers, and (b) all artificial or prerecorded telemarketing/promotional voice calls to wireless and residential numbers.1 52. The TCPA consent rules define “prior express written consent” as “an agreement, in writing, bearing the signature of the person called that clearly authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the person called advertisements or telemarketing messages using an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice, and the telephone number to which the signatory authorizes such advertisements or telemarketing messages to be delivered.” 53. Defendant placed or caused to be placed no less than 10 telemarketing/promotional phone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 1890 utilizing an ATDS without Plaintiff’s prior express written consent in violation of 47 U.S.C. §227 (b)(1)(A)(iii). 54. Upon information and belief, based on the noticeable pause Plaintiff experienced, Defendant employed an ATDS to place calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 55. Upon information and belief, the ATDS employed by Defendant transfers the call to a live representative once a human voice is detected, hence the clear pause. 57. Upon information and belief, the system employed by Defendant to place phone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers. 58. Upon information and belief, Defendant has no database to maintain and update consumers’ contact preferences and consent to call them. 59. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the members of the Putative Class are entitled to receive $500.00 in damages for each such violation. 9. Upon information and belief, Defendant develops marketing campaigns using a combination of sales channels, with an emphasis on outbound telemarketing. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Members of Putative Class)

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(Violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1 & 75-2) (Violation of the Sherman Act, § 1) 13. Plaintiff does not, as yet, know the exact size of the Proposed Class because such information is in the exclusive control of Duke and UNC. Based upon publically available information, there are at least thousands of Class members. Joinder of all members of the Class, therefore, is not practicable. 15. These and other questions of law and fact are common to the Proposed Class, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Proposed Class. 16. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Proposed Class. 17. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Proposed Class and has no conflict with the interests of the Proposed Class. 18. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in antitrust and class action litigation to represent herself and the Proposed Class. 19. This class action is superior to the alternatives, if any, for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Prosecution as a class action will eliminate the possibility of repetitive litigation. There will be no material difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. By contrast, prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Proposed Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, and be inefficient and burdensome to the parties and the Court. V. 20. During the Class Period, Duke and UNC employed members of the Proposed Class in North Carolina, including in this judicial district. 21. The No-Poach Understanding has substantially affected interstate commerce throughout North Carolina and the United States, and has caused antitrust injury throughout North Carolina and the United States. B. Competition For Academic Faculty Between Duke and UNC 23. In a properly functioning and lawfully competitive labor market, Duke and UNC would compete for faculty members by recruiting and hiring from each other, particularly because Duke and UNC are only about 14 miles apart, well-within commuting distance. The consequence of this proximity on competition for faculty is profound. Any other potential employer with similar prestige, research support, and quality of academic culture would require a faculty member to move to a distant city. This involves significant costs, such as uprooting a family, finding new schools for children, finding new places of worship, and finding alternative employment for a spouse. None of these costs would occur if a faculty member switched between Duke and UNC. As a result, but for the No-Poach Understanding, Duke and UNC would have been very important competitors for faculty, and their competition would have driven up faculty pay. 24. Duke and UNC hired junior faculty immediately after the new hires received their relevant graduate degrees, but these hires require training, and have no track record as a faculty member from which Duke and UNC could accurately and confidently predict job performance. Such junior hires also require supervision, particularly as they seek to attain tenure. Further, tenure reviews themselves are labor- intensive and costly for the hiring institution to conduct. Hiring experienced faculty, by contrast, results in a faculty member with a proven track record of success. Faculty hired directly into a tenured position require far less supervision and training than junior faculty hired directly from their graduate program. But for the No-Poach Understanding, therefore, Duke and UNC would have recruited and hired experienced faculty from each other. 26. Second, the availability of desirable positions at competing employers forces employers to reactively increase compensation to retain faculty who are likely to join a competitor institution. This can occur both when a particular faculty member or group of faculty become interested in switching employers and the current employer responds by offering a compensation increase to retain them, or when an employer responds to overall attrition rates among its faculty by increasing compensation levels. In the former case, even a targeted increase designed to retain specific faculty members will put upward pressure on the entire faculty compensation structure. 27. The positive compensation effects of hiring faculty from competitors are not limited to the particular individuals who seek new employment, or to the particular individuals who would have pursued new positions but for the No-Poach Understanding. Instead, the effects of recruiting and hiring from competitors (and the effects of suppressing recruiting and hiring, pursuant to agreement) commonly impact all faculty of the participating institutions. 29. To accomplish these objectives, Duke and UNC set compensation levels for different faculty categories that apply to all faculty within those categories. Duke and UNC also compared compensation levels across different faculty categories to ensure equity as between categories. Duke and UNC also analyze and update their faculty compensation structures annually, in a process that involves the very senior administrators who entered into, implemented, and enforced the No-Poach Understanding. 30. While Duke and UNC sometimes engaged in negotiations regarding compensation levels with individual faculty members, these negotiations occurred from a starting point of the pre-existing and pre-determined compensation level. The eventual compensation any particular faculty receives is either entirely determined by the preset level, or is profoundly influenced by it. 32. Duke senior administrators discussed the No-Poach Understanding at a Dean’s Cabinet meeting on October 1, 2001. Attendees included Kate Bartlett (then Dean of Duke Law School), Doug Breeden (then Dean of Duke School of Business), Bill Chafe (then Dean of the Duke Faculty of Arts and Sciences and Vice-Provost for Undergraduate Education), Rob Clark (then Dean of the Duke School of Engineering), Greg Jones (then Dean of the Duke Divinity School), Nannerl Keohane (then President of Duke), Peter Lange (then Duke Provost), Bill Schlesinger (then Dean of the Duke School of the Environment), Lew Siegel (then Dean of the Duke Graduate School), and Tallman Trask (then Duke’s Executive Vice President and Treasurer). The first item of business at the meeting was to discuss “Agreements Between Duke/UNC Regarding Recruiting”, and the minutes confirm: “There has been a casual understanding between Duke and UNC that no recruiting would take place between the two institutions.” The minutes further explain: “It is mutually advantageous to both schools to adhere to this practice.” 33. The No-Poach Understanding continued well past 2001, and was enforced by many of the same senior administrators who attended the October 1, 2001 Dean’s Cabinet meeting. For example, in 2011, Duke’s Lange discussed the matter in-person with UNC’s Chancellor, Holden Thorpe. Thorpe testified that Lange told him: “we [UNC] should not be trying to move Duke faculty to UNC because if we did, Duke had a lot more money than we did and we were going to come out on the losing end of that deal.” Internal UNC emails exchanged with Thorpe thereafter referenced the No-Poach Understanding. 35. At the time, Keller also confirmed to Keohane that the No-Poach Understanding had been in place for decades. He wrote to her: “I can say that I have been informed, ever since I’ve been the Dean, we have an agreement with UNC that we will not aggressively seek faculty or staff between our institutions.” Keller had been the Dean of Duke School of Business since 1974. D. Duke and UNC Concealed The No-Poach Understanding From the Class, Including Plaintiff 37. But for discovery made public from the Seaman case, Plaintiff would have remained unaware that the No-Poach Understanding occurred. Because of the secrecy of the No-Poach Understanding and Duke and UNC’s acts of concealment, Plaintiff and the proposed Class did not and could not have known that UNC and Duke were engaged in an illegal conspiracy to suppress faculty wages by restraining recruitment and hiring of one another’s faculty prior to August 25, 2017. Further, the secrecy of the No-Poach Understanding and Defendants’ acts of concealment would have thwarted any reasonable effort to discover the No-Poach Understanding prior to August 25, 2017. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, realleges and incorporates herein by reference each of the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, and further allege against Duke as follows. 39. Duke and UNC entered into and engaged in unlawful agreements in restraint of the trade and commerce described above in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Beginning no later than 2001 and continuing until approximately February 5, 2018, Duke and UNC engaged in continuing trusts in restraint of trade and commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 41. As a direct and proximate result of Duke and UNC’s No-Poach Understanding, members of the Proposed Class have suffered injury to their property and have been deprived of the benefits of free and fair competition on the merits. 42. The unlawful No-Poach Understanding had the following effects, among others: a. competition between Duke and UNC for faculty was suppressed, restrained, or eliminated; and b. Plaintiff and members of the Proposed Class have received lower compensation from Duke and UNC than they otherwise would have received in the absence of the No-Poach Understanding, and, as a result, have been injured in their property and have suffered damages in an amount according to proof at trial. 43. The acts done by Duke and UNC as part of, and in furtherance of, their contracts, combinations or conspiracies were authorized, ordered, or done by their respective administrators while actively engaged in the management of Duke and UNC’s affairs. 44. The No-Poach Understanding is a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, realleges and incorporates herein by reference each of the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, and further allege against Defendant Duke as follows. 47. Duke and UNC entered into and engaged in unlawful agreements in restraint of the trade and commerce described above in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1 and 75-2. 48. Duke and UNC’s agreements have included concerted action and undertakings among them with the purpose and effect of: (a) fixing the compensation of Plaintiff and the Class at artificially low levels; and (b) eliminating, to a substantial degree, competition between Duke and UNC for faculty. 49. As a direct and proximate result of Duke and UNC’s No-Poach Understanding, members of the Proposed Class have suffered injury to their property and have been deprived of the benefits of free and fair competition on the merits. 50. The unlawful No-Poach Understanding had the following effects, among others: a. competition between Duke and UNC for faculty was suppressed, restrained, or eliminated; and b. Plaintiff and members of the Proposed Class have received lower compensation from Duke and UNC than they otherwise would have received in the absence of the No-Poach Understanding, and, as a result, have been injured in their property and have suffered damages in an amount according to proof at trial. 52. The No-Poach Understanding is a per se violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1 and 75-2. 53. Accordingly, Plaintiff and members of the Class seek three times their damages caused by Duke and UNC’s violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1 and 75-2, the costs of bringing suit, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and a declaration that such agreement is unlawful. A. Trade and Commerce V. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ..............................................................................................5 A. Trade and Commerce ...............................................................................................5 B. Competition For Academic Faculty Between Duke and UNC ................................5 C. Duke And UNC Had A Decades-Long Understanding Not To Compete For Each Other’s Faculty .........................................................................................9 D. Duke and UNC Concealed The No-Poach Understanding From the Class, Including Plaintiff ..................................................................................................10

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(Class Action Alleging Violations of the Arizona Wage Laws) A. VIOLATIONS OF ARIZONA LAW (Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations) A. FLSA COVERAGE 23. Web.com provides website development and marketing services to its clients at its call centers.3 24. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members’ job duties consisted of making calls to potential clients in order to sell them Web.com’s suite of website services, including services relating to website creation and maintenance and increasing client exposure on popular search engines like Google.com and Bing.com. 25. Plaintiff Howard was employed by Web.com as a Sales Associate in Scottsdale, Arizona from approximately January 2018 through July 2018. 27. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members are non-exempt call-center employees who were (and are) paid by the hour, plus commissions received from sales. 28. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members typically worked approximately forty (40) “on-the-clock” hours per week. 29. In addition to their forty (40) “on-the-clock” hours, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members often worked more than two (2) hours “off-the-clock” per week and have not been compensated for that time. 30. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members have not been compensated for all the hours they worked for Web.com as a result of Web.com’s corporate policy and practice of requiring its hourly call-center employees to clock-in only when ready to take their first call. 31. Specifically, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members were required to start and log in to their computers, open and log in to the Web.com portal, and then open and log in to the ADP application that Web.com’s employees use to clock in for work— all of which can take up to twenty-five minutes—before they are able to make their first phone call at the official start of their shift. 32. During this start up time, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members were not compensated although they were expected to have completed this process in advance of their official start times. 34. In addition, Web.com failed to include all commission payments in Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members’ regular rates of pay before applying any overtime multipliers, in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 778.117. 35. As a result of Web.com’s corporate policies and practices requiring Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members to perform their computer start up tasks before clocking in for work and failing to account for their commission payments in its calculations of Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members’ regular rates, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members have not been compensated for all hours worked, including all worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek at the rates required by the FLSA. 36. Web.com has employed other individuals who perform(ed) the same or similar job duties under the same pay provisions as Plaintiffs. 37. Web.com is aware of its obligation to pay overtime for all hours worked and the proper amount of overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) each week, but has failed to do so. 38. Because Web.com did not pay Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members for all hours worked and did not include all compensation into Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Member’s regular rate of pay to determine the correct overtime premium to be applied to all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, Web.com’s pay policies and practices violate the FLSA. 40. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all paragraphs and allegations set forth in the statement of facts of this complaint as though fully and completely set forth herein. 41. The FLSA Collective is defined as: 57. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 58. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this is a collective action filed on behalf of all of Web.com’s employees who have been similarly situated to Plaintiffs with regard to the work they performed and the manner in which they have not been paid. 59. Other similarly situated employees of Web.com have been victimized by Web.com’s patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. 60. The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 41. 61. Web.com’s failure to pay Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members for all hours worked and overtime compensation at the rates required by the FLSA, results from generally applicable policies and practices of Web.com and does not depend on the personal circumstances of Plaintiffs or the FLSA Collective Members. 62. Thus, Plaintiff Howard’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective Members. 63. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective Members do not prevent collective treatment. 64. All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job requirements, rates of pay, or job locations— are entitled to be paid for all hours worked and at the proper overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 66. Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Web.com will retain the proceeds of its rampant violations. 67. Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 68. Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as defined as in Paragraph 41 and notice should be promptly sent. 69. Plaintiffs incorporates by reference all paragraphs and allegations set forth in the statement of facts of this complaint as though fully and completely set forth herein. 70. The Arizona Class is defined as: 70. VI. 82. Plaintiff Howard brings his Arizona claims as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 on behalf of all similarly situated individuals employed by Web.com to work in Arizona at any time since January 30, 2018. 83. Class action treatment of Plaintiff Howard and the Arizona Class Members’ claims is appropriate because, as alleged below, all of Rule 23’s class action requisites are satisfied. 84. The number of Arizona Class Members is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. 86. Plaintiff Howard and his counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Arizona Class Members and their interests. 87. Class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 88. Accordingly, the Arizona Class should be certified as defined in Paragraph

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15. Plaintiff is, and has been at all times relevant to this action, the regular and sole user of his cellular telephone number—(802) 238-XXXX. 16. Plaintiff is not a customer of Defendant, nor has Plaintiff ever done business with Defendant. Plaintiff never sought Defendant’s business and did not authorize any pre-recorded or automated robotic calls or text messages to his cellular number. 17. Nonetheless, on or about July 13, 2020 at approximately 1:35 PM, Defendant contacted Plaintiff through an unsolicited, automated phone call to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number from the number (802) 318-4993. 18. Defendant called Plaintiff again the next day, July 14, 2020, at 4:06 PM from the same cellular telephone number. 20. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s call history log is reproduced below: 21. Defendant initiated telephonic communications to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. Plaintiff found these communications excessive, inconvenient, harassing, and placed in complete disregard of Plaintiff’s privacy. 22. Plaintiff did not give Defendant prior express written consent to call his cellphone using an automatic telephone dialing system. 23. In fact, Plaintiff registered his cellular number with the National Do Not Call Registry since November 4, 2004. 25. The phone calls Defendant placed to Plaintiff solicited home project services through Defendant. 26. Defendant utilized (and continues to utilize) a sophisticated telephone dialing system to call cellular telephone users en masse for the purpose of promoting its services and products, often calling consumers on their cellular phones. 27. The telephone system Defendant used to place the automated robocall constitutes an ATDS as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 28. Upon information and good faith belief, and in light of the nature and character of the phone calls at issue—standardized, impersonal, and consistent in structure and format—the advertisement and marketing phone calls at issue were sent by using “equipment which has the capacity—(1) to store numbers to be called or (2) to produce numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator—and to dial such numbers automatically (even if the system must be turned on or triggered by a person).” Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041, 1053 (9th Cir. 2018). 29. Upon information and belief, no human placed the multiple phone calls to Plaintiff’s number. 30. In addition, upon information and belief, the hardware and software combination utilized by Defendant has the capacity to store and dial sequentially generated numbers, randomly generated numbers or numbers from a database of numbers. 31. Defendant did not have Plaintiff’s prior express consent to place automated phone calls to Plaintiff on his cellular telephone. 32. Receipt of Defendant’s unauthorized phone call drained Plaintiff’s phone battery and caused Plaintiff additional electricity expenses and wear and tear on his phone and battery. Additionally, the receipt of the unauthorized call caused Plaintiff annoyance, aggravation, and invasion of Plaintiff’s privacy. 34. Through the aforementioned conduct, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 45. Excluded from the class are Defendant, its officers and directors, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity in which Defendant has or had a controlling interest. 46. Plaintiff reserves the right to redefine the classes and to add subclasses as appropriate based on discovery and specific theories of liability. 47. Numerosity: Upon information and belief, the members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all of them is impracticable. 48. The exact number of the members of the classes are unknown to Plaintiff at this time but can (and will) be determined through appropriate discovery. However, given that, on information and belief, Defendant called thousands of class members nationwide during the class period, it is reasonable to presume that the members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefits to the parties and the Court. 49. Ascertainability: The members of the class are ascertainable because the class is defined by reference to objective criteria. 50. In addition, the members of the class are identifiable in that, upon information and belief, their cellular telephone numbers, names and addresses can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant and by third parties. 52. Plaintiff’s claims, and the claims of the members of the class, originate from the same conduct, practice and procedure on the part of Defendant. 53. Plaintiff’s claims are based on the same theories, as are the claims of the members of the class. 54. Plaintiff and the class members were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant harassed Plaintiff and the class members by illegally calling their cellular phones using an ATDS. Plaintiff and the class were damaged thereby. 55. Adequacy: Plaintiff is qualified to, and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the class with whom he is similarly situated, as demonstrated herein. Plaintiff acknowledges that he has an obligation to make known to the Court any relationships, conflicts, or differences with any class member. 56. Plaintiff’s interests in this matter are not directly or irrevocably antagonistic to the interests of the members of the class. 57. Plaintiff will vigorously pursue the claims of the members of the class. 58. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced and competent in class action litigation. Plaintiff’s attorneys, the proposed class counsel, are versed in the rules governing class action discovery, certification, and settlement. In addition, the proposed class counsel is experienced in handling clams involving consumer actions and violations of the TCPA. 59. Plaintiff’s counsel will vigorously pursue this matter. 61. Plaintiff has incurred, and throughout the duration of this action, will continue to incur costs and attorneys’ fees that have been, are, and will be, necessarily expended for the prosecution of this action for the substantial benefit of each class member. 62. Predominance: The questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate over questions that may affect individual members of the class. The elements of the legal claims brought by Plaintiff and the class members are capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class rather than to its individual members. 63. Commonality: There are common questions of law and fact as to all members of the class, including but not limited to the following: a. What is Defendant’s conduct, pattern, and practice as it pertains to placing unsolicited advertisement and telemarketing calls; b. Whether Defendant places calls to the telephone numbers listed on the Do-Not-Call Registry; b. Whether, within the statutory period, Defendant used an ATDS as defined by the TCPA to call the cellular numbers of Plaintiff and the class members; c. Whether Defendant’s conduct violated the TCPA; d. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future; and e. The availability of statutory penalties. 65. Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the members of the class, making final declaratory or injunctive relief appropriate. 66. Plaintiff and the class members have all suffered and will continue to suffer harm and damages as a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct. 68. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 69. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 70. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., Plaintiff and the class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 71. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 72. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 73. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 74. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., Plaintiff and the class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 76. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 77. Plaintiff and members of the DNC class received more than one telephone call within a 12-month period, by or on behalf of Defendant, for the express purpose of marketing Defendant’s goods and/or services without their written prior express consent. 78. Defendant’s call caused Plaintiff and members of the DNC class actual harm including, but not limited to, invasion of their personal privacy, aggravation, nuisance and disruption in their daily lives, reduction in cellular telephone battery life, data, and loss of use of their cellular telephones. 79. As a result of the aforementioned violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the DNC class are entitled to an award of up to $1,500.00 for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 80. Additionally, Plaintiff and members of the DNC class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such future conduct. Do Not Call Registry 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227 Et Seq. Negligent Violations of the TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227 Et Seq.

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone numbers (813) 295-2840, (646) 813-2670, and (617) 581-0895, confirmed to belong to Defendant. 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 12. Defendant’s calls were placed to telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 18. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereinafter, “The Class”), defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 8. Beginning in or around July of 2018, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s home telephone number ending in -6241, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and The Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and The Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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10. Upon information and belief, Exhibit A is a form letter, generated by computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiff inserted by computer. 11. Exhibit A is the first letter that Plaintiff received from Life Line regarding the alleged debt referenced in Exhibit A. 12. In Exhibit A, Life Line identifies itself as a debt collector: 14. Exhibit A does not include the 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) notice, which requires: (5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty- day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) (emphasis added). 15. Exhibit A fails to inform the unsophisticated consumer that, in order to invoke his or her right to require the debt collector to cease most collection activities until it provides the name of the original creditor, the consumer must make the request in writing. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5). 16. By omitting the words “in writing,” Life Line did not effectively convey to the consumer his FDCPA rights. See McCabe v. Crawford & Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 736, 743 (N.D. Ill. 2003); see also Desantis v. Computer Credit, Inc., 269 F.3d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 2001) (a “debt collector violates the Act if it fails to convey the information required by the Act.”). 17. Failure to provide the correct notice pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) is a material violation of the FDCPA. 18. The notice informs the consumer of his or her right to demand that the debt collector provide the name of the original creditor, during which process many debt collection activities must stop. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 19. Further, as debts are generally freely assignable, and creditors frequently change names and addresses, the § 1692g(a)(5) provides the consumer with a method of determining whether, and to whom, he or she actually owes a particular debt. 21. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 22. Life Line failed to include the required notice pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) on Exhibit A. 23. Life Line has thus failed to comply with the debt validation notice requirements pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 24. Exhibit A fails to inform the consumer that, in order to invoke his or her right to obtain the name and address of the original creditor, the consumer must make the request in writing. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5). 25. Failure to provide the 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) notice is also a false representation or deceptive means to collect a debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 26. The Defendant has violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a), 1692g(a)(5) and 1692e(10). 27. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a Class, consisting of (a) all natural persons in the State of Wisconsin (b) who were sent a collection letter in the form represented by Exhibit A, (c) seeking to collect a debt for personal, family or household purposes, (d) on or after October 12, 2014, (e) that was not returned by the postal service. 28. The Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are more than 50 members of the Class. 30. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 31. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in consumer credit and debt collection abuse cases. 32. A class action is superior to other alternative methods of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible. 8. On or about February 23, 2015, Life Line (under the name LifeQuest) mailed a debt collection letter to Plaintiff regarding an alleged debt owed to “CITY-CUDAHY FIRE DEPARTMENT.” Upon information and belief, this was the first letter Life Line sent Plaintiff regarding the alleged debt to which the letter refers. A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit A. 9. Upon information and belief, the alleged debt referenced in Exhibit A was allegedly incurred for personal medical services and ambulance transportation.

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39. Plaintiffs re-allege and re-aver each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs above of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 40. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants were and continue to be an employer engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). Further, Plaintiffs and the Proposed FLSA Collective members are covered individuals within the meaning of the 53. Plaintiffs re-allege and re-aver each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs above of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 54. Defendants employed Plaintiffs within the meaning of New York Labor Law §§ 2 and 651. 55. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated the rights of by failing to pay Plaintiffs the applicable minimum wage for all straight time hours worked and required overtime compensation at the rate of time and one-half for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 56. Employers are required to pay a "spread of hours" premium of one (1) additional hour' s pay at the statutory minimum hourly wage rate for each day where the spread of hours in an employee's workday exceeds ten (10) hours. New York State Department of Labor Regulations § 146-1.6. 58. Defendants failed to furnish Plaintiffs with a statement with every payment of wages listing gross wages, deductions and net wages, in contravention of New York Labor Law § 195(3) and New York State Department of Labor Regulations § 146-2.3. 59. Defendants failed to keep true and accurate records of hours worked by each employee covered by an hourly minimum wage rate, the wages paid to all employees, and other similar information in contravention of New York Labor Law § 661. 60. Defendants failed to establish, maintain, and preserve for not less than six (6) years payroll records showing the hours worked, gross wages, deductions, and net wages for each employee, in contravention of the New York Labor Law § 194(4), and New York State Department of Labor Regulations § 146-2.1. 61. At the time of their hiring, Defendants failed to notify Plaintiffs of their rates of pay and their regularly designated payday, in contravention of New York Labor Law § 195(1). 62. Due to the Defendants' New York Labor Law violations, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from Defendants the difference between their actual wages and the amounts that were owed under the New York Labor law. The deficiency accounts for minimum wage for all straight time hours, overtime compensation for all overtime hours, "spread of hours" premium, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to New York Labor Law§§ 663(1), 198. 63. Plaintiffs are also entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to New York Labor Law§ 663(1), as well as civil penalties and/or liquidated damages pursuant to the New York State Wage Theft Prevention Act. 64. Plaintiffs re-allege and re-aver each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs above of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 65. Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiffs with wage notices, as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), in English or in the language identified by Plaintiffs as their primary language, containing Plaintiffs’ rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the regular pay day designated by the employer in accordance with NYLL, Article 6, § 191; the name of the employer; any "doing business as" names used by the employer; the physical address of the employer's main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer; plus such other information as the commissioner deems material and necessary. 66. Through their knowing or intentional failure to provide Plaintiffs with the wage notices required by the NYLL, Defendants have willfully violated NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 67. Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiffs with accurate statements of wages as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), containing the dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the number of hours worked, including overtime hours worked if applicable; deductions; and net wages. 69. Due to Defendants' willful violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), are entitled to statutory penalties of fifty dollars each day that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs with wage notices, or a total of five thousand dollars each, reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and injunctive and declaratory relief, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198(1-b). 70. Due to Defendants’ willful violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), Plaintiffs are entitled to statutory penalties of two hundred fifty dollars for each workweek that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs with accurate wage statements, or a total of five thousand dollars each, reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and injunctive and declaratory relief, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198(1-d).

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1. An order certifying that Count I may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and appointing Plaintiffs and the undersigned counsel to represent the class as previously set forth and defined above; 15. On February 29, 2012, Jonbu Tunji Adebo allegedly incurred a financial obligation to the State of New Jersey (the “Adebo Debt”). 16. The Adebo Debt arose out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance or services which were the subject of the transaction were primarily for personal, family or household purposes, namely fees emanating from medical services rendered to Jonbu Tunji Adebo at certain state hospitals. 17. Jonbu Tunji Adebo’s medical debt to the State of New Jersey is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). 18. Sometime after the incurrence of the Adebo Debt, but before the initiation of this action, Jonbu Tunji Adebo was alleged to have fallen behind on payments owed on the Adebo Debt. 20. FAMS contends that the Adebo Debt is past-due and in default. 21. At the time the Adebo Debt was referred to FAMS, the Adebo Debt was past-due. 22. At the time the Adebo Debt was referred to FAMS, the Adebo Debt was in default. 23. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant acted in an attempt to collect the Adebo Debt. 24. On or about August 8, 2016, FAMS mailed or caused to be mailed a letter to Jonbu Tunji Adebo. (Annexed and attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true copy of the letter dated August 8, 2016 sent by FAMS to Jonbu Tunji Adebo, except the undersigned counsel has in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 redacted the financial account numbers and Jonbu Tunji Adebo’s street address to protect his privacy). 25. FAMS mailed the August 8, 2016 letter attached as Exhibit A as a part of their efforts to collect the Adebo Debt. 26. Jonbu Tunji Adebo received the letter attached as Exhibit A in the mail. 27. Jonbu Tunji Adebo read the letter attached as Exhibit A upon receipt of the letter in the mail. 28. Exhibit A was sent in connection with the collection of the Adebo Debt. 29. Exhibit A seeks to collect the Adebo Debt. 3. An award of statutory damages for Jonbu Tunji Adebo, Emmanuella Philippe, and the class pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k; 30. Exhibit A conveyed information regarding the Adebo Debt including the Balance Owed, FAMS reference number, and a demand for payment. 31. The letter attached as Exhibit A is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 33. The letter attached as Exhibit A is the first written communication Defendant sent to Jonbu Tunji Adebo regarding the Adebo Debt. 34. Exhibit A represents FAMS’s initial collection “communication” with Jonbu Tunji Adebo as “communication” is defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 35. Besides the letter attached as Exhibit A, Jonbu Tunji Adebo did not receive any other document from FAMS purporting to contain the initial disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. §1692g. 36. The letter attached as Exhibit A states in relevant part: 4. Attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k; and 51. On October 22, 2011, Emmanuella Philippe allegedly incurred a financial obligation to the State of New Jersey (the “Philippe Debt”). 52. The Philippe Debt arose out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance or services which were the subject of the transaction were primarily for personal, family or household purposes, namely fees emanating from medical services rendered to Emmanuella Philippe at certain state hospitals. 53. Emmanuella Philippe’s medical debt to the State of New Jersey is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). 54. Sometime after the incurrence of the Philippe Debt, but before the initiation of this action, Emmanuella Philippe was alleged to have fallen behind on payments owed on the Philippe Debt. 55. On or before August 8, 2016, the Philippe Debt was referred by Emmanuella Philippe’s creditor to FAMS for the purpose of collections. 57. At the time the Philippe Debt was referred to FAMS, the Philippe Debt was past-due. 58. At the time the Philippe Debt was referred to FAMS, the Philippe Debt was in default. 59. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant acted in an attempt to collect the Philippe Debt. 60. On or about August 8, 2016, FAMS mailed or caused to be mailed a letter to Emmanuella Philippe. (Annexed and attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true copy of the letter dated August 8, 2016 sent by FAMS to Emmanuella Philippe, except the undersigned counsel has in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 redacted the financial account numbers and Emmanuella Philippe’s street address to protect her privacy). 61. FAMS mailed the August 8, 2016 letter attached as Exhibit C as a part of their efforts to collect the Philippe Debt. 62. Emmanuella Philippe received the letter attached as Exhibit C in the mail. 63. Emmanuella Philippe read the letter attached as Exhibit C upon receipt of the letter in the mail. 64. Exhibit C was sent in connection with the collection of the Philippe Debt. 65. Exhibit C seeks to collect the Philippe Debt. 66. Exhibit C conveyed information regarding the Philippe Debt including the Balance Owed, FAMS reference number, and a demand for payment. 67. The letter attached as Exhibit C is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 68. The letter attached as Exhibit C is the first written communication Emmanuella Philippe received from Defendant. 70. Exhibit C represents FAMS’s initial collection “communication” with Emmanuella Philippe as “communication” is defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 71. Besides the letter attached as Exhibit C, Emmanuella Philippe did not receive any other document from FAMS purporting to contain the initial disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. §1692g. 72. The letter attached as Exhibit C states in relevant part: 87. Plaintiffs incorporates by reference all the above paragraphs as though fully stated herein. 88. In sending the letters attached as Exhibit A and Exhibit C, FAMS violated 15 U.S.C. §§1692, 1692e(2)(A), 1692(e)(10), and 1692g(a)(1). 89. 15 U.S.C. §1692e provides: §1692e. False or Misleading Representations A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: (2) The false representation of -- (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; (10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer; 91. FAMS violated §1692g(a)(1) by asserting flatly in Exhibits A & C, which were the notices required by §1692g, that the Balance Owed on both the Adebo Debt and Philippe Debt was a sum certain and failing to inform either of the Plaintiffs in its initial communication with them that the Balance Owed on their respective debts would increase due to interest and/or fees. 92. A least sophisticated consumer could read Exhibit A and Exhibit C and be misled into believing that they could pay their debt in full by paying the “Balance Owed” listed on the detachable payment coupon. In fact, however, if interest and/or fees are accumulating on the debt, a consumer who pays the "Balanced Owed" stated on the notice and payment coupon will not know whether the debt has been paid in full. FAMS could still seek the interest and/or fees that accumulated after the initial notice was sent but before the balance was paid. In Jonbu Tunji Adebo’s case, FAMS did in fact seek interest and/or fees that had accumulated as evidenced by Exhibit B, which that shows a “Current Balance” of $12,160.00, which is $697.00 higher than the “Balance Owed” listed in Exhibit A. In Emmanuella Philipps’ case, FAMS did in fact seek interest and/or fees that had accumulated as evidenced by Exhibit D, which that shows a “Current Balance” of $4,571.00, which is $655.00 higher than the “Balance Owed” listed in Exhibit C. 94. Nondisclosure of the amount of the debt, where the debt will increase over the course of the collection, is a well recognized violation. See, e.g., Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Patrick, Cobb, Nichols & Clark, LLC, 214 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2000). 95. Courts in this district and others have recognized that an initial communication validation notice, like the one attached as Exhibit A and Exhibit C violates the FDCPA unless it states the total amount due as of the date the letter is sent and discloses whether the amount of the debt will increase because of interest or fees accruing on the unpaid principal. See, e.g. Marucci v. Cawley & Bergmann, LLP, 2014 WL 7140496 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2014); Smith v. Lyons, Doughty & Veldhuius, P.C., 2008 WL 2885887 (D.N.J. July 23, 2008); Avila v. Riexinger & Associates, LLC, 817 F. 3d 72 (2d. Cir. 2016). 96. FAMS violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a) by failing to disclose in the letter attached as Exhibit A, or within five days thereafter, the correct amount of the Adebo Debt as required by 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(1). Exhibit B clearly shows that the amount listed in Exhibit A was either not correct or in the alternative, that FAMS failed to disclose that the amount of the Adebo Debt disclosed in Exhibit A would increase because of interest and/or fees. 98. FAMS violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A) because the letter attached as Exhibit A made a false representation as to the amount of the Adebo Debt, misrepresented its character (as fixed), and misrepresented its legal status (not disclosing that it was continuing to accrue interest). VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

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(Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68]) ................................................. 41  By Plaintiffs against All Defendants .................................................................... 41  (Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68]) ................................................. 38  By Plaintiffs against All Defendants .................................................................... 38  A. Plaintiffs A.  Plaintiffs ..................................................................................................... 2  B.  Defendants .................................................................................................. 3 

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ARISING OUT OF, THIS AGREEMENT OR ANY ACCOUNT OR THE DEALINGS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN YOU OR US, OR (B) SEEK TO CONSOLIDATE ANY SUCH ACTION IN WHICH A JURY CONTROL, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ACTS OF BANKING AUTHORITIES, NATIONAL EMERGENCIES, ACTS OF GOD, FAILURE OF TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATION OR POWER SUPPLY,

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& REPRESENTATIVE ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, RESTITUTION AND OTHER RELIEF 1. Failure to Compensate Piece Rate Employees for Rest and Recovery Periods and Other Non-Productive Time (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.2); 15. Defendant MNG publishes and distributes newspapers of general circulation. Many of MNG’s customers receive home delivery of newspapers on a daily basis. 16. Defendant organized the distribution of newspapers by maintaining a distribution facility in Redwood City, California and San Carlos, California. 17. Newspaper delivery is an integral part of the business enterprise of MNG. Plaintiff and the Class Members perform an integral part of MNG’s operations, which include distributing newspapers. 18. MNG has, at all relevant times, had the right to control Plaintiff and the Class Members’ performance of their work as Newspaper Carriers and/or Newspaper Dealers. B. Defendant’s Control over Plaintiff and the Class Members and Their Work 2. Failure To Provide Meal Periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512 & 1198); 3. Failure To Provide Rest Periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512 & 1198); 4. Failure To Pay Minimum and Overtime Wages (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510, 1194, 1194.2 & 1198); 49. Plaintiff incorporates each of the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint by reference as if fully set forth herein. 5. Failure to Maintain Accurate and Complete Employment Records (Cal. Labor Code §§ 1174.5); 50. As alleged herein, Defendant has maintained a policy and/or practice whereby Plaintiff and Class Members have not been compensated for rest and recovery periods and other non-productive time in accordance with Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2. 51. Defendant MNG did not avail itself to the California Labor Code § 226.2 Safe Harbor Provision and is required to compensate Plaintiff and Class Members for meal and rest breaks not included in their Piece Rates, and nonproductive time based on their average hourly rate, along with interest. 6. Failure To Provide Accurate, Itemized Wage Statements (Cal. Lab. Code § 226); 67. Plaintiff incorporates all of the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 68. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and Class Members have been non-exempt employees of Defendant entitled to the full protections of the California Labor Code and Wage Order 1-2001. 69. Cal. Labor Code § 1198 makes it unlawful for an employer to employ any person under conditions of employment that violate Wage Order 1-2001. 7. Waiting Time Penalties (Cal. Labor Code §§ 201-203) 70. Section 2(K) of Wage Order 1-2001 defines “hours worked” as “the time during which an employee is subject to the control of the employer, [which] includes all the time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so.” 71. Cal. Labor Code §§ 510 and 1194, and Section 3 of Wage Order 1-2001, require employers to pay overtime wages to their non-exempt employees at no less than one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked in excess of eight hours in one workday, all hours worked in excess of forty hours in one workweek, and for the first eight hours worked on a seventh consecutive day. 72. Cal. Labor Code §§ 510 and 1194, and Section 3 of Wage Ordre 1-2001, also require employers to pay overtime wages to their non-exempt employees at no less than two times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked in excess of twelve hours in one workday, and for all hours worked in excess of eight hours on a seventh consecutive workday. 73. During the entirety of the employment period, Defendant had a consistent policy of requiring Plaintiff and Class Members to work without compensating Plaintiff and Class Members at a rate of one and one-half of their regular rate of pay for overtime work performed, in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §1194. 75. Plaintiff incorporates all of the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 76. Cal. Labor Code § 1174 (d) requires an employer to keep at a central location in California or at the plant or establishment at which employees are employed, payroll records showing the hours worked daily by, and the wages paid to, each employee, and the number of piece-rate units earned by and any applicable piece rate paid to each employee. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendant willfully failed to make and keep such records for Plaintiff and Class Members. 77. IWC Wage Order No. 1-2001, paragraph (7)(A) requires that every employer keep accurate employee information, including time records showing when each employee begins and ends each work period, and applicable rates of pay. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendant failed to make and keep such records for Plaintiff and Class Members. 78. Plaintiff is informed and believe that Defendant’s failure to keep payroll records and accurate employee information, as described above, violated Cal. Lab. Code § 1174 (d) and IWC Wage Order No. 1-2001 (7)(A). Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to penalties of $100 for the initial violation and $200 for each subsequent violation for every pay period during which these records and information were not kept by Defendant. 79. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and Class Members, is informed and believes that Defendant’s failure to keep and maintain records and information, as described above, was willful, and Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to a civil penalty of $500, pursuant to Cal. Lab. Code § 1174.5. 84. Plaintiff incorporates all of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 85. Labor Code § 201 provides that all of the earned and unpaid wages of an employee who is discharged become due and payable immediately at the time of discharge. 93. Plaintiff incorporates all of the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 97. Plaintiff incorporates each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint by references as if fully set forth herein. A. Defendant’s Operation Failure to Provide Meal Periods (Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512, and 1198) Failure to Maintain Accurate and Complete Employment Records (Cal. Labor Code §§ 1174.5) Failure to Reimburse Business Expenses (Cal. Labor Code § 2802) Failure to Compensate Piece Rate Employees for Rest and Recovery Periods and Other Non- Productive Time (Lab. Code §§ 226.2) Failure to Pay Minimum and Overtime Wages (Lab. Code § 510, 1194, 1194.2, and 1198) Unfair Competition (Cal. Labor Code § 17200 et seq.) Waiting Time Penalties (Labor Code §§ 201–203)

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1. whether Defendant National Recall & Data Services Inc. and Defendant Charles Holley obtained, re-disclosed, and/or resold Plaintiffs and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 2. whether Defendant Naviss obtained, re-disclosed, and/or resold Plaintiffs and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 3. whether Defendant National Recall & Data Services Inc. and Defendant Charles Holley had a DPPA permissible use to obtain, re-disclose, and/or resell Plaintiffs and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 4. whether Defendant Naviss had a DPPA permissible use to obtain, re-disclose, and/or resell Plaintiffs and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 5. whether Defendant National Recall & Data Services Inc. and Defendant Charles Holley obtained the written express consent of Plaintiffs and Class Members to obtain, re-disclose, and/or resell Plaintiffs and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 58. Proof of such DPPA violations by the Defendants, the basis of their class action, evidencing a pattern across the United States, was the result of a covert investigation conducted by the State of Texas Department of Motor Vehicle Department which “seeded” motor vehicle records sold to “Bulk Requestors”, referencing persons and/or entities that obtain the entire database of state motor vehicle records and/or obtain all periodic updates. “Emma Lusk, 2213 Buffalo Gap, Leander Tx. 78641-888” was seeded data provided by the State of Texas Department of Motor Vehicle Department to Defendant National Recall & Data Services Inc. and Defendant Charles Holley, which was then re-disclosed and/or re-sold to Defendant Naviss and National Affiliates, and used for direct marketing, a violation of the DPPA. 6. whether Defendant Naviss obtained the written express consent of Plaintiffs and Class Members to obtain, re-disclose, and/or resell Plaintiffs and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 60. The unauthorized access to State Motor Vehicle Records exists at the “cost” of the Plaintiffs and Class Member’s privacy and security, creating a reasonable fear of present and future injury, compelling individuals to take costly and burdensome measures to protect their privileged information from risk of access and probable harm. Kristi Dyroff, an advocate with the National Organization for Victim Assistance, discussed the consequences from the improper access to motor vehicle records: Kristy Dyroff, National Organization for Victim Assistance, “DPPA fails to provide protection for crime victims”, October 30, 2013, (last accessed June 3, 2016), online: http://www.trynova.org/category/nove-blog. B. Defendants’ Business Practices and Associations 62. There are at least six (6) principal participants in a VSC Industry: (1) the consumer who purchases the VSC (the “Consumer”), (2) the dealer that markets the VSC to the consumer (the “Dealer”), (3) the administrator that develops and administers the VSC itself and is the party obligated to reimburse the cost of covered repairs (the “Administrator”), (4) the risk retention group that guarantees to pay covered claims if the Administrator does not satisfy its obligation to the Consumer (the “Insurer”), (5) the financing organization that enables the Consumer to pay for the VSC (the “Financing Organization”), and (6) “the supplier,” referencing individuals and entities that supply the leads originating from sources that include obtaining state motor vehicle records. 64. Defendant National Recall & Data Services Inc. is a corporation involved in the Direct Marketing Industry, acting as a Direct Market Provider assisting Direct Marketing persons and entities. Defendant Charles Holley is an individual involved in the Direct Marketing Industry, acting as a Direct Market Provider assisting Direct Marketing entities. Defendant National Recall & Data Services Inc. obtains state motor vehicle records from many state DMVs. 65. Defendant Naviss is a corporation involved in the Direct Marketing Industry, acting as a Direct Market Provider assisting Direct Marketing persons and entities. Defendants Logomasini and Chrisco are individuals involved in the Direct Marketing Industry. 66. The VSC Industry is the poster child for marketing abuses, illegal telemarketing, and deceptive mailers. It is a complex financial infrastructure, funded by a multitude of financial institutions. The core of their industry is “fueled” by illegally obtaining millions of motor vehicle records from State Motor Vehicle Departments, the “grease” to create and send the VSC marketing letters. C. The Texas Department of Motor Vehicles conducted a covert investigation which found undeniable proof that Defendants National Recall LLC. and NAVISS violated 7. whether Defendant National Recall & Data Services Inc. and Defendant Charles Holley acted knowingly when it obtained, re-disclosed, and/or resold Plaintiffs and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 8. whether Defendant Naviss acted knowingly when it obtained, re-disclosed, and/or resold Plaintiffs and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 9. whether Defendant National Recall & Data Services Inc. and Defendant Charles Holley's conduct described herein violates the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18

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10. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to sell or solicit its business services. 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 12. Defendant’s calls were placed to telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 14. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 15. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of All persons within the United States who received any telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously not provided their cellular telephone number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 16. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 8. Beginning in or around May of 2018, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on his cellular telephone, (615) 212-9191, in an effort to sell or solicit its services. 9. Defendant called Plaintiff on its cellular telephone from phone numbers confirmed to belong to Defendant, including without limitation (702) 551-6089 and (702) 943-8954 Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.  As a result of Defendants’ willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C);  An order for injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendants in the future; and  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Respectfully Submitted this 21st of September, 2018. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.  As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B);  An order for injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendants in the future; and  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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35. Plaintiff has repeatedly visited Defendant’s stores including Defendant’s store located at 2011 Route 19, Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania (the “Subject Property”) and encountered unlawful and discriminatory interior access barriers including, but not necessarily limited to, merchandise displays, boxes, and ladders positioned so that they block or narrow the aisle pathways in violation of the requirements of the 2010 Standards Section 403.5.1. 37. As a result of Defendant’s non-compliance with the ADA, Plaintiff’s right to full and equal, non-discriminatory, and safe access to Defendant’s goods and facilities has been denied. 39. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff will continue to be unable to fully and safely access Defendant’s facilities in violation of his rights under the ADA. 40. As an individual with a mobility disability who is dependent upon a wheelchair, Plaintiff is directly interested in whether public accommodations, like Defendant’s facilities, have access barriers that impede full accessibility to those accommodations by individuals with mobility-related disabilities. II. Defendant Denies Individuals With Disabilities Full and Equal Access to its Facilities. 41. Defendant is engaged in the ownership, management, operation, and development of retail stores throughout the United States, including, upon information and belief, approximately 1550 stores in the United States, of which there are, upon information and belief, 31 in Pennsylvania. 42. As the owner and manager of its properties, Defendant employs centralized policies, practices, and procedures with regard to the design, construction, alteration, maintenance, and operation of its facilities. 43. However, as set forth herein, these policies, practices, and procedures are inadequate in that Defendant’s facilities are operated and maintained in violation of the accessibility requirements of Title III of the ADA. 45. As evidenced by the widespread inaccessibility of Defendant’s stores, absent a change in Defendant’s corporate policies and practices, access barriers are likely to reoccur in Defendant’s facilities even after they have been remediated in the first instance. 46. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks an injunction to remove the barriers currently present at Defendant’s facilities and an injunction to modify the policies and practices that have created or allowed, and will create or allow, access barriers in Defendant’s stores. 47. Plaintiff brings this action under Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the federal rules of civil procedure individually and on behalf of the following classes: All persons with qualified mobility disabilities who have attempted, or will attempt, to access the interior of any store owned or operated by Defendant in Pennsylvania and have, or will have, experienced discriminatory access to Defendant goods due to Defendant failure to comply with the ADA’s prohibition against access barriers in interior paths of travel. 49. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 50. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class in that they all have been and/or are being denied their civil rights to full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment of, Defendant’s facilities and/or services due to Defendant’s failure to make its facilities fully accessible and independently usable as above described. The questions of law and fact that are common to the class include: a. Whether Defendant operates places of public accommodation and are subject to Title III of the ADA and its implementing regulations; b. Whether storing merchandise in interior aisles of the stores makes the stores inaccessible to Plaintiff and putative class members; and, c. Whether Defendant’s storage, stocking and setup policies and practices discriminate against Plaintiff and putative class members in violation of Title III of the ADA and its implementing regulations. 52. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the class as a whole. 53. Defendant has failed, and continues to fail, to provide individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters with full and equal enjoyment of its facilities. 54. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and the class in that Defendant has failed to make Defendant’s facilities fully accessible to, and independently usable by, individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) as described above; Section 403.5.1 of the 210 Standards. 55. Defendant’s conduct is ongoing and continuous, and Plaintiff has been harmed by Defendant’s conduct. 56. Unless Defendant is restrained from continuing its ongoing and continuous course of conduct, Defendant will continue to violate the ADA and will continue to inflict injury upon Plaintiff and the class. 57. Given that Defendant has not complied with the ADA’s requirements to make Defendant’s facilities fully accessible to, and independently usable by, individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters, Plaintiff invokes his statutory rights to declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as costs and attorneys’ fees. I. Plaintiff Has Been Denied Full and Equal Access to Defendant’s Facilities.

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14. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Florida, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (39). 15. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and “persons,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (39). 16. At all times relevant Defendant conducted business in the State of Florida and in Palm Beach County, within this judicial district. 17. Defendant utilizes prerecorded telemarketing calls (ie: calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice) to market and advertise Defendant’s business and services, including at least four (4) calls to Plaintiff, on January 1, 5 and 15, 2021. 19. On January 5, 2021 at 9:33 AM, Kimberly DeSocio, called Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in “4600”. Plaintiff answered this call and spoke with Ms. DeSocio, who inquired if Plaintiff wanted to sell his house. Plaintiff advised Ms. DeSocio that his telephone number was on the DNC list. Ms. DeSocio apologized. Ms. DeSocio is a Coldwell Banker real estate agent. 20. On January 15, 2021, at 9:37 AM and 9:38 AM, Kimberly DeSocio, called Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in “4600.” One call went to voicemail, but Ms. DeSocio did not leave a message. Ms. DeSocio then sent an email to Plaintiff’s work email address, introducing herself as a Coldwell Banker agent. She attached her Coldwell Banker Bio and a flyer for 2019 Total Sales Volume, identifying Coldwell Banker as “#1 in $1 Million+ Sales in Florida”. 21. The calls that Plaintiff received from or on behalf of Defendant, resulted in Plaintiff’s telephone being unavailable to place or receive other calls and depleted the phone’s battery. Plaintiff also spent time investigating the source of the calls.  22. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff received additional telephone calls to his cellular telephone which he believes were made by Defendant. The telemarketing calls were made to Plaintiff’s 4600 Number, and within the time period that is relevant to this action. 23. At no time did Plaintiff provide Plaintiff’s cellular number to Defendant through any medium, nor did Plaintiff consent to receive such unsolicited calls. 25. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 4600 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 4600 Number, including the cellular costs and data usage incurred as a result of the unlawful calls made to Plaintiff by Defendant. 26. Additionally, Plaintiff’s 4600 Number has been registered on the National Do Not Call Registry since February 7, 2008. 27. The content of the calls made to Plaintiff and the Class Members show that they were for the purpose of marketing, advertising, and promoting Defendant’s business and services to Plaintiff as part of an overall telemarketing strategy. 28. These calls were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i). 29. Plaintiff did not provide Defendant or its agents prior express consent to receive calls, including unsolicited calls, to his cellular telephone, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 30. The unsolicited calls by Defendant, or its agents, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 31. Defendant is and was aware that it is placing unsolicited robocalls to Plaintiff and other consumers without their prior express consent. 33. Plaintiff brings this class action under rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) & (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of itself and of a similarly situated “Class” or “Class Members” defined as: Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) were called by or on behalf of Defendant; (2) more than one time within any 12-month period; (3) where the person’s telephone number had been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days; (4) for the purpose of selling Defendant’s products and/or services; and (5) for whom Defendant claims (a) it did not obtain prior express written consent, or (b) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff. 34. Excluded from the Class are: any Defendant, and any subsidiary or affiliate of that Defendant, and the directors, officers and employees of that Defendant or its subsidiaries or affiliates, and members of the federal judiciary. 35. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action against Defendant pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community of interest in the litigation and the proposed Class is easily ascertainable. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class definition if discovery and further investigation reveal that any Class should be expanded or otherwise modified. 37. Upon information and belief, a more precise Class size and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records, including, but not limited to Defendant’s calls and marketing records. 38. Members of the Class may additionally or alternatively be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in class actions, such as by published notice, e-mail notice, website notice, fax notice, first class mail, or combinations thereof, or by other methods suitable to this class and deemed necessary and/or appropriate by the Court. 40. One or more questions or issues of law and/or fact regarding Defendant’s liability are common to all Class Members and predominate over any individual issues that may exist and may serve as a basis for class certification under Rule 23(c)(4). 41. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the Class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same course of conduct that violates the TCPA. 42. Plaintiff and members of the Class each received at least two telephone calls within a twelve month period, promoting the Defendant’s real estate broker services, which Defendant placed or caused to be placed to Plaintiff and the members of the Class. 44. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of the Class. While the aggregate damages which may be awarded to the members of the Class are likely to be substantial, the damages suffered by individual members of the Class are relatively small. As a result, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it economically infeasible and procedurally impracticable for each member of the Class to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. Plaintiff does not know of any other litigation concerning this controversy already commenced against Defendant by any member of the Class. The likelihood of the individual members of the Class prosecuting separate claims is remote. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and would increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same factual issues. In contrast, the conduct of this matter as a class action presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and would protect the rights of each member of the Class. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 46. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the allegations contained in all of the above paragraphs 1 through 45 of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 47. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 48. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.” 2 49. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.” 50. Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were 51. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. 52. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class received more than one telephone call in a 12-month period made by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are entitled, inter alia, to receive up to $500 in damages for such violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 53. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court grant Plaintiff and the Class relief against Defendant, individually and jointly, as set forth in the Prayer for Relief below. VIOLATION OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227 On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class

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13. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “12” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 14. Some time prior to March 23, 2015, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Nellie Mae. 15. The Nellie Mae obligation arose out of a transaction in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 16. The alleged Nellie Mae obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 17. Nellie Mae is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 18. Defendant contends that the Nellie Mae debt is past due. 19. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and Internet. 20. Nellie Mae directly or through an intermediary contracted the Defendant to collect the alleged debt. 21. On or about March 23, 2015, the Defendant caused to be delivered to the Plaintiff a letter in an attempt to collect the alleged Nellie Mae debt. See Exhibit A. 23. The March 23, 2015 letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 24. The March 23, 2015 letter was sent in an envelope that contained a glassine window. 25. Visible through the glassine window underneath the Plaintiff’s address was the Plaintiff’s original account number with Nellie Mae. 26. The account number constitutes personal identifying information. 27. The account number is not meaningless – it is a piece of information capable of identifying [the consumer] as a debtor, and its disclosure has the potential to cause harm to a consumer that the FDCPA was enacted to address. Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F. 3d 299 (Third Cir. 2014). 28. Defendant’s actions as described herein are part of a pattern and practice used to collect consumer debts. 29. Defendant could have taken the steps necessary to bring its actions within compliance with the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to ensure compliance with the law. 30. On information and belief, Defendant sent a written communication, in the form annexed hereto as Exhibit A to at least 50 natural persons in the State of New Jersey within one year of the date of this Complaint. 32. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 33. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f(8), a debt collector is prohibited from using any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on any envelope when communicating with the consumer by use of mails. 34. The Defendant violated said section by putting the Plaintiff’s original account number visible on the March 23, 2015 letter. 35. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.

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11. Plaintiff and those he seeks to represent in this action are current and former servers and bartenders at Defendants’ Local Gastropub restaurants in Memphis, Tennessee. 12. Defendants pay Plaintiff and other servers and bartenders at their Local Gastropub restaurants an hourly wage below $7.25. For example, Defendants paid Plaintiff $2.13 per hour.1 13. In seeking to comply with the FLSA mandate that employees receive a minimum wage of $7.25 per hour, Defendants purport to utilize a “tip credit” for each hour worked by Plaintiff and other servers and bartenders at their Local Gastropub restaurants. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). For example, the “tip credit” for Plaintiff was $5.12 for each hour worked. 15. Such non-tip-producing work includes, but is not limited to, cleaning and degreasing floor and bar mats, washing glasses and dishes, rolling silverware, sweeping, moping, cleaning the bathroom, scrubbing baseboard, cleaning light fixtures, stocking drinks, cleaning the ice machine, cleaning tables, cutting fruit, and stocking condiments and other food supplies. 16. Defendants also require bartenders to spend significant time each day handling “to go” orders that are submitted by customers via third-party services, such as Uber Eats and Door Dash. 17. Bartenders are required to retrieve “to go” orders that are submitted electronically by these services, and then submit them manually through Defendants’ customer ordering system. 18. Then, once Defendants’ kitchen has prepared the food that is ordered “to go” through third-party services, bartenders prepare the order in a takeout container. 19. Once the delivery person arrives at Defendants’ restaurant, bartenders are responsible for providing the order to the delivery person. 20. Customers are unable to tip the bartenders for this work, and only the delivery person (who is not employed by Defendant) receives any customer tip associated with these orders. 21. Defendants require Plaintiff and other servers and bartenders to perform these and other non-tip-producing work tasks at the beginning of their shifts prior to beginning their tip- producing tasks, throughout their shifts, and at the end of their shifts after finishing their tip- producing tasks. 22. On a routine basis, customers “walk out” of Defendants’ restaurants without paying. 24. As a result, Defendants’ tipped employees are required to share their tips with Defendants. 25. Defendants also require Plaintiff and other servers and bartenders to share tips with non-tipped employees who have no customer interaction. For example, as a bartender, Plaintiff was required to share tips with barbacks, who are paid more than minimum wage and who do not interact with customers. 26. Plaintiff asserts their FLSA claims pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action on behalf of the following individuals: All current and former servers and bartenders employed by Defendants at their Local Gastropub restaurants at any time since August 12, 2017. 27. Plaintiff’s claims should proceed as a collective action because Plaintiff and other servers and bartenders, having worked pursuant to the common policies described herein, are “similarly situated” as that term is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and the associated decisional law.

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1. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 10. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 14. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New Jersey; b. to whom Defendant sent a collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. that used threatening and harassing language threatening legal review; d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. 15. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 16. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 17. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e and 1692f. 18. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 2. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 20. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 21. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 22. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 23. Some time prior to January 21, 20121, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Citibank, N.A. by the Plaintiff. 24. The Citibank, N.A. obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transactions were primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 25. The alleged Citibank, N.A. obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). 27. Defendant Halsted, a debt collector, was contracted by Defendant Cavalry, the current owner of the debt and also a debt collector, to collect the alleged debt which originated with Citibank, N.A. 28. Defendants collect and attempt to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation I – January 21,2021, 2019 Collection Letter 29. On or about January 21, 2021, Defendant Halsted sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt currently owed to Defendant Citibank, N.A. See Exhibit A. 3. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 30. The letter states: “This account meets our client’s guidelines for placement with a law firm. However, if we can resolve this account, it will not be placed with a law firm. I am not an attorney and I cannot provide you with legal advice. As of today, no attorney has reviewed the particular circumstances of your account to determine whether a lawsuit should be filed against you. However, if a lawsuit is filed, the law firm will ask the court to enter a judgment against you for the full amount that is owed on this account. If a judgment is entered, the law firm will be authorized to take further action to satisfy the balance owed on the judgment. We are committed to working with our customers to resolve their accounts. Please let me know if this account can be resolved before our client proceeds with law firm placement.” 32. Moreover, the letter goes into a detailed description about the legal process, attempting to intimidate the Plaintiff, predicting the actions of a hypothetical law firm and the legal process when Defendant is not a law firm and has no place discussing or predicting the legal possibilities in such detail. 33. Moreover, Defendant portrays the legal system in an inaccurate fashion to intimidate the Plaintiff, in its statement that “if a lawsuit is filed, the law firm will ask the court to enter a judgment against you for the full amount that is owed on this account.” 34. This statement implies that immediately upon the filing of a lawsuit, the law firm can simply “ask” for a judgment which it seems by the next sentence of Defendant would be entered simply allowing the law firm “to take further action to satisfy the balance owed on the judgment.” 35. The description of the legal system in such a simplistic, frightening manner can only serve to harass and intimidate the Plaintiff. 36. Defendant Halsted is not a law firm and cannot bring a legal action and to threaten the Plaintiff with legal action is deceptive, misleading and harassing because Defendant Halsted cannot bring any legal action. 37. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive misleading and false debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 4. Defendant violated said section a. by making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10); b. by falsely representing the character, amount of legal status of the debt in violation of §1692e(2)(A); c. my making the threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken in violation of §1692e(5). 5. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 6. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 7. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 9. Defendant violated this section by falsely threatening and harassing Plaintiff with the letter containing false threats. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.

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18. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Members are and have been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are and have been subject to Defendants’ common policies, practices, procedures and patterns with regards to their compensation, including their willful and repeated failure to pay Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Members overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. Plaintiff’s claims stated herein are essentially the same as those of the other FLSA Collective Members. 19. All of the work that Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Members have performed have been assigned by Defendants, and/or Defendants have been aware of all of the work that Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Members have performed. 20. Defendants are aware or should have been aware that federal law required them to pay employees minimum wage and overtime wages for all of the hours they work. 21. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this collective action, the names and contact information of FLSA Collective Members are readily available from Defendants’ records. 23. Excluded from the Class are Defendants’ legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors, or any individual who has, or who at any time during the class period has had, a controlling interest in Defendants; and all persons who will submit timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion from the Class. 24. The members of the Class are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Class Members are determinable from Defendants’ payroll and personnel records. The hours assigned and worked, the positions held, and the rates of pay for each Class Member are also determinable from Defendants’ records. For the purpose of notice and other purposes related to this class action, their names and contact information are readily available from Defendants’ records. Notice can be provided by means permissible under Rule 23. 25. The potential number of Class Members is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims through this class action will benefit both the parties and the Court. Although the precise number of Class Members is unknown because the facts on which the calculation of that number rests presently within the sole control of Defendants, there is little doubt that there are far more than forty (40) members of the Class. 26. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those claims which could be alleged by any Class Member, and the relief sought is typical of the relief which would be sought by each Class Member in separate actions. 28. Plaintiff and Class Members have all been injured in that they have been uncompensated or under-compensated due to Defendants’ common policies, practices and patterns of conduct. Defendants’ corporate-wide policies and practices affected all Class Members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each Class Member. 29. Plaintiff and Class Members have all sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures under the NYLL. 30. Plaintiff is able and willing to fairly and adequately protect the interests of Class Members and have no interests antagonistic to Class Members. 31. Plaintiff is represented by attorneys who are competent, skilled, and experienced in both class action litigation and employment litigation and have previously represented many plaintiffs and classes in wage and hour cases. 33. On the other hand, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of judicial and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant saving of these costs. If appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 34. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class Members would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to each Class Member, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and resulting in the impairment of Class Members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. 35. Defendants and other employers throughout the state violate the NYLL. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. Class actions provide class members who are not named in the complaint a degree of anonymity, which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 37. Plaintiff was employed by Avis as a rental sales agent, or counter person, from on or around July 25, 2015, until the termination of her employment on August 2, 2020. 38. Throughout her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff worked at various Avis rental car office locations throughout New York City. In fact, Plaintiff generally worked at a different rental office each day of the week. On Sundays and Mondays, Plaintiff typically worked at the East 64th Street location; on Tuesday she was assigned to work at the E 43rd Street location, but would often float to various other locations; on Wednesday she would work at the East 90th Street location; and on Saturday she generally worked at the West 43rd Street location. In total, Plaintiff regularly worked in at least nine different Avis rental locations. 40. Throughout the relevant period, Defendants utilized a punch clock to record Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Members, and Class Members’ hours worked. 41. During her employment with Avis, Plaintiff was paid on an hourly basis. For the first six months of her employment Plaintiff was paid $10.00 per hour. After the first six months, Plaintiff’s pay was increased to $10.60. Thereafter, Plaintiff received a $1.00 raise at the start of each year so that by the time of her termination in 2020, she was being paid $15.60 per hour. 42. Plaintiff was required to perform multiple varied duties for Defendants. In addition to working at the counter, Plaintiff, and other rental sales agents, were further required to help prepare, clean and move cars. Due to the constant demands of the job, and the fact that Plaintiff, and other rental sales agents were required to be available to assist customers at any time, Plaintiff was not able to take an uninterrupted meal break lasting longer than fifteen minutes. Despite being completely unable to take an uninterrupted meal break, Defendants automatically deducted a thirty-minute meal break from her, and other rental sales agents, pay each day. 43. Furthermore, from the start of her employment until March 2020, Defendants only paid Plaintiff for around forty hours worked each week despite working well in excess of forty hours. After March 2020, Plaintiff was only paid for around thirty-three (33) hours per week, despite the fact that her hours worked were unchanged. 45. Throughout her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Members, and Class Members did not receive any notices of pay rate or pay day from Defendants, as required under the NYLL. 46. Throughout her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Members, and Class Members did not receive proper wage statements from Defendants, as required under the NYLL. 47. Based on Plaintiff’s observations and conversations with her co-workers at Avis, Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Members and Class Members were subject to the same unlawful wage and hour policies. 48. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of failing to pay Plaintiff and Class Members for all regular hours worked, in violation of the 58. The minimum wage and overtime provisions set forth in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and the supporting federal regulations, apply to Defendants and protect Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Members. 59. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Members overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek, to which they are entitled under the 65. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 66. Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the FLSA by adversely altering the terms and conditions of her employment, and ultimately terminating her because she complained of Defendants’ unlawful employment practices under the FLSA. 67. In addition to any lost wages resulting from her discharge, as a direct and proximate result of the unlawful discriminatory conduct in violation of the FLSA, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish and emotional distress, including but limited to, depression, humiliation, embarrassment, stress and anxiety, loss of self-esteem, and emotional pain and suffering for which she is entitled to an award of monetary damages and other relief. 68. The foregoing conduct of Defendants constitutes willful violations of the FLSA for which Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive and/or liquidated damages. 69. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 71. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff Class Members for all hours worked, including overtime wages for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week, to which they were entitled under the NYLL and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 72. Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class the spread-of-hours premium for each day that the length of the interval between the beginning and end of their workday was greater than ten (10) hours. 73. Defendants failed to furnish Plaintiff and the Class with proper wage notices as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), in English or in the language identified by each employee as their primary language, a notice containing: the rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage, the regular pay day; the name of the employer; any “doing business as” names used by the employer; the physical address of the employer's main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer. 75. Defendants failed to keep, make, preserve, maintain, and furnish accurate records of time worked by Plaintiff and the Class as required by the NYLL and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 76. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff and the Class of their rights under the NYLL and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 77. As a result of Defendants’ willful violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid overtime wages, unpaid minimum wages, unpaid spread-of-hours premium, improperly deducted wages, liquidated damages, including liquidated damages for the late payment of wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, interests, and other compensation in accordance with the NYLL. 78. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 79. Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the NYLL by adversely altering the terms and conditions of her employment, and ultimately terminating her because she complained of Defendants’ unlawful employment practices under the NYLL 81. The foregoing conduct of Defendants constitutes willful violations of the NYLL for which Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive and/or liquidated damages, in addition to compensatory damages. RETALIATION UNDER THE NYLL RETALIATION UNDER THE FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 215 VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW

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(New York Labor Law: Unpaid Overtime Premium Hourly Wages) 117. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth in all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 118. At times relevant to this action, Plaintiffs were employees and Defendants have been employers within the meaning of the New York Labor Law §§ 190, 651(2). 119. Defendants have willfully failed to record, credit, or properly compensate Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members for work performed in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 120. Defendants have willfully failed to record or compensate Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members for “off the clock” hours worked in addition to their scheduled shifts. 121. Defendants failed to pay employees an extra hour of pay at the basic minimum hourly wage rate for each day when an employee’s shifts exceeded 10 hours, in violation of 12 (Suretyship) 125. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all allegations set forth in all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 126. By issuing Bonds (“the Bonds”) to each of the Defendants, John Doe Bonding Companies assumed joint and several liability with Defendants to pay Plaintiffs any and all wages due and owing to them which Defendants failed to pay. 127. Pursuant to the terms of each labor and material payment bond issued in connection with each construction project, each John Doe Bonding Company is required to make payment to Plaintiffs in an amount not yet determined, plus interest. 27. Plaintiffs bring FLSA claims on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated persons who work or have worked for Defendants as hourly employees, between July 29, 2007 and the filing of this Complaint (the “FLSA Class”). 28. Defendants are liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate plaintiffs, and as such, notice should be sent to the FLSA Class. Upon information and belief, there are many similarly situated current and former employees of Defendants who have been underpaid in violation of the FLSA who would benefit from the issuance of a court supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join in the present lawsuit. Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable and can be located through Defendants’ records. 29. Plaintiffs also bring New York Labor Law claims on behalf of themselves and a class of persons under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure consisting of all similarly situated persons who work or have worked for Defendants as hourly employees between July 29, 2004 and the filing of this Complaint (the “Rule 23 Class”). 31. The claims of the Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Rule 23 Class they seek to represent. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class work or have worked for Defendants at their construction sites and have not been fully compensated for all of the work that they have performed for the benefit of Defendants. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class have not been paid a premium for the hours that they have worked in excess of 40 hours per week. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class have suffered damages, including but not limited to lost regular, overtime, and “spread of hours” compensation, resulting from Defendants’ wrongful conduct. Defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Rule 23 Class, thereby making declaratory relief with respect to the Rule 23 Class appropriate. 32. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Rule 23 Class. 33. Defendants have acted or have refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Rule 23 Class, thereby making appropriate declaratory relief with respect to the Rule 23 Class as a whole. 35. Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in class action and complex labor and employment litigation. 37. Furthermore, upon information and belief, a class action gives both current and former employees a vehicle for the vindication of rights they would otherwise be too afraid to assert. Current employees fear direct or indirect retaliation at their current job. Former employees fear that bringing claims could harm their employment and potential for future employment. A class action provides class members who are not named in the complaint a degree of anonymity which reduces these risks. 38. All of the work that Plaintiffs, the members of the Rule 23 Class, and the members of the FLSA Class (collectively, “Class Members”) have performed has been assigned by Defendants and/or Defendants have been aware of all of the work that Plaintiffs and the Class Members have performed. 40. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ unlawful conduct described in this Complaint is pursuant to a corporate policy or practice of attempting to minimize labor costs by violating the FLSA and the New York Labor Law. 41. Defendants’ unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent. 42. Defendants John Doe Bonding Companies 1-20 furnished a Labor and Material Payment Bond(s) to Defendants in furtherance of one or more of Defendants’ construction projects, the terms of which insured that John Doe Bonding Companies 1-20 would pay unpaid wages to the Plaintiffs and the putative class members in the event Defendants failed to pay these wages. 43. Plaintiff Moises Sandoval was hired by Defendants in approximately April 2000 as a security guard for a site in Far Rockaway, New York. 45. Moises has worked as a security guard for Denfendants’ construction sites in Far Rockaway, Staten Island, and the Bronx, including 168th St and Franklin Ave., 1022 Rev. James A. Polite Ave., Franklin and Prospect Ave., Stephanie Ave. and Southern Blvd., and 167th St. and 3rd Ave, and Serviam Gardens at 323 East 198th St. 46. Since July 29, 2004, Moises has usually worked from approximately 3:00 or 3:30 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., Monday through Friday, then 3:30 p.m. Saturday through 7:00 a.m. Monday. He is not supposed to leave the site for the duration of his shift. As a result, Moises generally works 117 to 120 hours per week. 47. In 2000, when Moises began working at the Rockaway site, there were no bathroom facilities. He complained to his bosses, but they ignored him. He continued to work there for approximately one year without bathroom facilities. 48. For working his scheduled hours, Moises was paid $600 per week. His pay stubs did not contain an hourly rate, nor did they record the number of hours he worked. 49. In addition to Moises’s scheduled hours, he has sometimes had to wait up to an hour past the scheduled end of his shift for his relief to arrive. He has not been given any extra compensation for working these extra unscheduled hours. 50. In fact, upon information and belief, Defendants have not recorded Moises’s hours at all. Moises has not been given a timesheet to fill in or a clock to punch. 51. Defendants have not given Moises any extra compensation for exceeding a spread of ten hours worked per day. 53. Defendants’ pattern or practice of violating the FLSA and the New York Labor Law, as described in this complaint, affected Moises at each site where he worked. 54. When building or state inspectors visited the site during the day, Moises’s supervisors would tell him to go to a nearby store to buy something, so as to stay out of the inspectors’ sight. 55. Defendants’ failure to pay Moises for all his hours worked has been willful. 56. Defendants’ failure to pay Moises an overtime premium for his work in excess of 40 hours per week has been willful. 57. Defendants’ failure to pay Moises for exceeding a spread of ten hours per day has been willful. B. Manuel Sandoval 58. Plaintiff Manuel Sandoval was hired by Defendants in approximately 1990 or 1991 as a building superintendant. 59. Manuel worked for Defendants from approximately 1990 or 1991 through September 10, 2008. 60. From no later than July 29, 2004 until he left his employment with Defendants, Manuel worked as a security guard for Defendants at construction sites in the New York metropolitan area, including at 141st St. and 130th St. and 7th Ave. in Manhattan, and 167th St. and 3rd Ave., 195th St. and Grand Concourse, and Webster Ave. and East 180th St. in the Bronx. He was supervised by, among other people, a man named Tazo [surname unknown]. 62. For working his scheduled hours Monday through Friday, Manuel was paid $420 per week. His pay stubs did not contain an hourly rate, nor did they record the number of hours he worked. 63. From approximately 2002 until approximately May 2008, for working his scheduled hours on Saturday through Monday, Manuel received a separate personal check of $280. 64. From approximately May 2008 through the end of Manuel’s employment with Defendants, Defendants paid him only $480 per week for all his hours, including his weekend work. 65. Manuel and other workers repeatedly complained to their supervisors, including Tazo, that their paychecks did not record the number of hours worked. 66. In addition to Manuel’s scheduled hours, on a number of occasions each month he had to wait up to an hour past the scheduled end of his shift for his relief to arrive. He was not given any extra compensation for working these extra unscheduled hours. 67. In fact, upon information and belief, Defendants did not record Manuel’s hours at all. Manuel was not told to record his hours, nor given a mechanism with which to record them. 68. Defendants did not give Manuel any extra compensation for exceeding a spread of ten hours worked per day. 70. Defendants’ pattern or practice of violating the FLSA and the New York Labor Law, as described in this complaint, affected Manuel at each site where he worked. 71. Around 2008, when building or state inspectors visited the site, Manuel’s supervisors would hide him, allegedly because Defendants lacked a license to employ security personnel. 72. Defendants’ failure to pay Manuel for all his hours worked was willful. 73. Defendants’ failure to pay Manuel an overtime premium for his work in excess of 40 hours per week was willful. 74. Defendants’ failure to pay Manuel for exceeding a spread of ten hours per day was willful. C. Saleh Aldailam 75. Plaintiff Saleh Aldailam was hired by Defendants in 1987 as a security guard. 76. Saleh worked for Defendants from approximately 1987 through January 2010, taking several three- or four-month breaks to return to his native Yemen. 77. Saleh worked as a security guard for Defendants at various construction sites throughout the New York metropolitan area, including, among others, West 153rd St. and 8th Ave., and Serviam Gardens at East 198th St., and 1st Ave. and 168th St. 79. At approximately noon or 1 p.m. on around July 7, 2008, a dog owned by one of Galaxy’s managers attacked Saleh and bit him around the right thigh and buttocks. Saleh was hospitalized for two days and required 21 stitches to close the wounds. 80. Many of the sites Saleh worked had no heat, including 153rd St. and 8th Ave. 81. In the past several years, Saleh’s health has deteriorated. He has begun taking heart medication and medications to regulate his blood pressure and blood-sugar level. 82. Saleh often asked Mr. Zervoudis for a day off due to his deteriorating health. Mr. Zervoudis, however, told Saleh that if he took a day off he would lose his job. 83. For example, sometime in 2006, 19 years after beginning his work with Defendants, Saleh asked Mr. Zervoudis for a day off. Mr. Zervoudis refused, saying, “This is our way of working. If you are not interested, go home.” 84. Finally, as a response to Saleh’s heart condition, beginning sometime in 2009 through January 2010, Saleh was given Fridays off. He still worked approximately 104 hours per week. 85. For working his scheduled hours, Saleh was paid $600 per week in gross salary plus $200 per week in “expenses.” His pay stubs did not contain an hourly rate, nor did they record the number of hours he worked. 87. In fact, upon information and belief, Defendants did not record Saleh’s hours at all. Saleh was not told to record his hours, nor given a mechanism with which to record them.. 88. Defendants did not give Saleh any extra compensation for exceeding a spread of ten hours worked per day. 89. Defendants’ pattern or practice of violating the FLSA and the New York Labor Law, as described in this complaint, affected Saleh at each site where he worked. 90. Within the last several years, Saleh’s supervisors told him that if anyone asked him about his hours and wages, he should respond that he worked 8 hours per day and was paid $10 per hour. 91. Defendants’ failure to pay Saleh for all his hours worked was willful. 92. Defendants’ failure to pay Saleh an overtime premium for his work in excess of 40 hours per week was willful. 93. Defendants’ failure to pay Saleh for exceeding a spread of ten hours per day was willful. D. Emilio Torres 94. Plaintiff Emilio Torres was hired by Defendants in 2006 as a machine operator. 95. Torres worked for Defendants from approximately 2006 through April 14, 2010, at which point he was injured on the job. 97. Though Torres’s hours varied from site to site, he was usually scheduled to work from approximately 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., Monday through Saturday. At certain sites, Torres would work until 5:00 or 7:00 p.m. several times a week. In addition, Torres would sometimes work 10:00 a.m. through 3:00 p.m. on Sundays. 98. For working his scheduled hours each day, Torres was, at first paid, $150 per day, then later $175 and, finally, $200 per day. A. Moises Sandoval

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant operates a commercial website, www.moshi.com which serves as a manufacturer of cell phone accessories. Defendant offers chargers, adapters, cables, various styles and forms of earphones and its own styled backpacks for carry. Defendant’s website also offers accessories such as, screen protectors, magnetic cases, cables, adapters and belt clips. Defendant’s website offers potential consumers the option to purchase cell phone accessories such as battery packs and cases for their electronic devices through its website and various retailers around the country. Defendant’s website also offers exclusive deals and sale discounts through its website. 21. Defendant’s website offers consumers the ability to purchase products and goods through its website or search for a retail store location within a distance of the consumers zip code. 22. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. -8- 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 24. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in March of 2019, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website, by being unable to learn more information about Defendant’s website and products and services it offers, the ability to browse various models of cases and goods, and related services available online. Plaintiff was unable to browse and proceed with the ordering process due to accessibility barriers. 25. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Lack of Alternative Text (“alt-text”), or a text equivalent. Alt-text is an invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that screen- reading software can speak the alt-text where a sighted user sees pictures, which includes captcha prompts. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation, but instead a text box shows when the mouse moves over the picture. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from -9- accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics. As a result, visually- impaired prospective customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse, look for Store locations and hours, the ability to browse the products, find information on promotions and coupons, and related goods and services available both in Stores and online. b. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen-reader users; c. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and d. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 26. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 27. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those specific goods and services available for purchase and delivery, -10- because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 28. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 29. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 30. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 31. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 32. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: -11- In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . .42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 33. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 34. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. -12- 35. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 36. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 37. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s -13- Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 42. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 43. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused -14- to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 44. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 45. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 47. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 48. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 49. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from -15- the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 51. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 52. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled -16- persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 53. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 55. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 56. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 57. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 58. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 59. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, -17- practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 61. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or -18- b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. -19- 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 71. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 72. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 73. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. -20- 74. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 75. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 76. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 77. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 78. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 79. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are -21- being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 80. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 81. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 82. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 83. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 84. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 85. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This -22- inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 86. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 87. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 88. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 89. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under -23- § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 90. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 91. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 92. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 93. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 94. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 95. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. -24- Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 96. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq.

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21. Defendant is an art studio that operates art studios as well as the Website to the public. Defendant operates an art studio located at 9714 Metropolitan Avenue, Forest Hills, New York. Defendant’s art studio constitutes a place of public accommodation. Defendant’s art studio provides to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services which allow consumers to find information about the art studio location and hours, information about artists, events, inquire about pricing and other products available online and in the art studio for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by the Defendant. 22. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s Website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s art studio. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s art studio and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 24. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring on September 2, 2019, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s physical location in New York by being unable to learn more information on the location and hours of the art studio, information about artists, events, inquiries about pricing and other products available online and in the art studio for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by Defendant. 26. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 27. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical location, and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical art studio on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the location to attend events. 28. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 30. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually- impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is not sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 31. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 32. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . their title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 34. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently locate Defendant’s art studio’s locations and hours of operation, attend events, shop for and otherwise research related products and services via the Website. 35. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 37. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 47. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 48. Defendant’s art studio is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s art studio. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 49. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 51. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 52. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 55. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 56. Defendant’s physical location is located in the State of New York and constitute a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with this physical location. 57. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical location and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 58. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical location to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 61. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes him right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. Defendant’s location is a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishment. 72. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical location in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 73. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical location to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 74. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 78. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes him right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical location, which Defendant owns, operate and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 84. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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24. Defendant operates the NAVA REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT, LLC Residential Complex and Leasing Office as well as its website, www.lakehouse17.com, and offers it to the public and offers features that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that Defendant offers regarding its physical locations. 25. Defendant operates in Colorado, with an address of 4200 W 17th Ave, Denver, CO 80204. 26. Defendant offers its Website in connection with its physical location. The facilities and services offered by Defendant through its Website include but are not limited to the following: Leasing Office location and hours, contact information, the ability to view the Gallery and related services. 27. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually impaired users, access to Defendant’s Website, and to therefore specifically deny the services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Residential Complex. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Residential Complex and Leasing Office and the numerous services and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 28. Plaintiff is a visually impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen- reader user and uses it to access the Internet. 30. Due to Defendant’s failure to build its Website in a manner that is compatible with screen reader programs, Plaintiff is and was unable to understand, and thus is denied the benefit of, much of the content and services he wishes to access or use. For example: a. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what was on the screen due to failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. b. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. c. The Website also contains a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non-existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s Leasing Office on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to take advantage of the services that it provides to the public. 34. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. In fact, Plaintiff intends to return to the Website when it is equally accessible for visually-impaired consumers in order to complete his intended transaction, as it is more convenient for Plaintiff to access the Website to make a purchase than to travel to a physical location to make the same purchase. However, as long as the Access Barriers continue to exist on the Website, Plaintiff is prevented from making such a purchase. 35. These barriers, and others, deny Plaintiff full and equal access to all of the services the Website offers, and now deter him from attempting to use the Website and/or visit Defendant Leasing Office. Still, Plaintiff would like to, and intends to, attempt to access Defendant’s Website in the future to research the services the Website offers, or to test the Website for compliance with the ADA. 37. If the Website were accessible, i.e. if Defendant removed the access barriers described above, Plaintiff could independently research the Website’s offerings, including locations and hours and promotions available at the its physical locations. 38. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually impaired people. 39. Though Defendant may have centralized policies regarding the maintenance and operation of its Website, upon and information and belief, Defendant has never had a plan or policy that is reasonably calculated to make its Website fully accessible to, and independently usable by, individuals with vision related disabilities. As a result, the complained of access barriers are permanent in nature and likely to persist. 40. The law requires that Defendant reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disabilities by removing these existing access barriers. Removal of the barriers identified above is readily achievable and may be carried out without much difficulty or expense. 41. Plaintiff’s above request for injunctive relief is consistent with the work performed by the United States Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, and U.S. Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (the “Access Board”), all of whom have relied upon or mandated that the public-facing pages of website complies with an international compliance standard known as Web Content Accessibility Guidelines version 42. Plaintiff and the Class have been, and in the absence of an injunction will continue to be, injured by Defendant’s failure to provide its online content and services in a manner that is compatible with screen reader technology. 43. Defendant has long known that screen reader technology is necessary for individuals with visual disabilities to access its online content and services, and that it is legally responsible for providing the same in a manner that is compatible with these auxiliary aids. 44. Indeed, the Disability Rights Section of the DOJ reaffirmed in a 2015 Statement of Interest before the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts that it has been a “longstanding position” of the Department of Justice “that the ADA applies to website of public accommodations.” See National Association of the Deaf v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, No. 3:15-cv-300024-MGM, DOJ Statement of Interest in Opp. To Motion to Dismiss or Stay, Doc. 34, p. 4 (D. Mass. Jun. 25, 2015) (“MIT Statement of Interest”); see also National Association of the Deaf. v. Harvard University, No. 3:15-cv-30023- MGM, DOJ Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Doc. 33, p.4 (D. Mass. Jun. 25, 2015) (“Harvard Statement of Interest”). 45. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 47. While DOJ has rulemaking authority and can bring enforcement actions in court, Congress has not authorized it to provide an adjudicative administrative process to provide Plaintiff with relief. 48. Plaintiff alleges violations of existing and longstanding statutory and regulatory requirements to provide auxiliary aids or services necessary to ensure effective communication, and courts routinely decide these types of matters. 49. Resolution of Plaintiff’s claims does not require the Court to unravel intricate, technical facts, but rather involves consideration of facts within the conventional competence of the courts, e.g. (a) whether Defendant offers content and services on its Website, and (b) whether Plaintiff can access the content and services. 50. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, thereby violating their rights. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services, during the relevant statutory period. 53. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, like Plaintiff, are visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA by failing to remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 54. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. 55. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 56. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 57. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits throughout the United States. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. Defendant’s physical locations are a public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 61. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 62. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 63. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 65. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 66. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 67. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 68. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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14. Beginning in or around August of 2014, Defendant repeatedly placed automated calls and text messages to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone 270-XXX-9408. 15. The telephone number that Defendant used to contact Plaintiff was and is assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 16. Upon information and belief, DriveTime utilized a predictive dialer manufactured by Aspect corporation in calls to the Plaintiff. 17. The dialing system would dial the Plaintiff’s number and, if he answered the phone, then connect him to a live agent. 18. The agent him or herself was not dialing the phone. 27. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 44. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 45. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed multiple automated calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent. 46. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a knowing and/or willful violation of the TCPA. A. The Class Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.

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