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hu	wikipedia	N/A	Fenyő János (Budapest, 1954. április 19. – Budapest, 1998. február 11.) fotóművész, üzletember. Élete Budapesten született 1954-ben, apja Fenyő Imre volt, a Magyar Fotóművészek Szövetségenek ügyvezető titkára, így már gyermekkorában lelkes fotóssá vált. Kezdetben Pajtás, majd Flexaret VI fényképezőgéppel dolgozott, 12 évesen már saját, mindennel felszerelt házi fotólabort kapott. Családja orvosi vagy jogi pályára szánta, de nem ment egyetemre. Az érettségi után a Magyar Távirati Irodába került, világosítóként dolgozott. Az ott dolgozó fotográfusok közül Gink Károly és Féner Tamás voltak a mentorai. Különböző lapoknál dolgozott. Az Tükör, a Képes Sport és az Ország-világ után az akkor egyeduralkodó divatlapnál, az Ez a Divatnál. Fabulon plakátja, Sütő Enikő manökennel, egyik jelentős alkotása, ami négy országos pályázatot nyert, hozzá számos külföldi díjat. Fenyő János az akkori modellek, 1970-80-as évek, szinte mindegyikével dolgozott. 1974-ben fotós szakvizsgát szerzett, 1976–77-ben a MÚOSZ újságíró iskolát végezte el. 1977-ben a Fiatal Fotóművészek Stúdiójának, 1978-tól a Magyar Fotóművészek Szövetségének volt tagja. 1976-ban A martinászok egy napja fotósorozatával Az év legjobb képe pályázaton I. díjat nyert. A Magyar Távirati Iroda filmarchívumában helyezkedett el műszaki segédmunkatársként. Fényképészként több díjat nyert, és olyan országos lapok foglalkoztatták, mint a Képes Sport, Új Tükör Magazin, Ország-Világ. Bár sikeresen indult hazai pályája, az akkor csak nyugati országokban elérhető ismertségre és a vele járó pénzügyi elismertségre vágyva az 1980-as évek elején külföldön dolgozott. Kezdetben a francia Lui magazinnak fényképezett művészi módon ábrázolt félmeztelen lányokat, majd az Amerikai Egyesült Államokban, Kaliforniában időzött hosszabb ideig, filmproduceri álmai voltak, és a Los Angeles-i pornóiparban dolgozott fotósként. 1987-ben tért haza, amerikai állampolgárként kb. 70 ezer dolláros bankszámlával. Ez az összeg Fenyő János saját bevallása volt, a ténylegest ennek tízszeresére teszik. Felesége Kristyán Judit volt, akitől két gyermeke született, illetve ismert két házasságon kívüli kapcsolata, amelyek meggyilkolása ügyében folyó nyomozásakor is többször szóba kerültek. Üzletei Hazatérése után elkezdte üzleti tevékenységét, sikeres külföldi mozifilmek videókazettán történő forgalmazását, kölcsönzését. 1988-ban alapította meg a Vico céget, amely a hazai videókazetta-terjesztés és ‐kölcsönzés birodalma lett. Fenyő az itt szerzett pénzeken kezdte sajtóbirodalma kiépítését. Először a legsikeresebb hetilapot, a Nők Lapját, majd a Rádió és Televízióújságot szerezte meg. Ezután következett a Vasárnapi Hirek, a Buci Maci, a Családi Lap, a Tina, a Bravo-lapcsalád és 1994-től a Népszava. A Vico Rt. által kiadott újságok példányszáma 1994 végére havi 12 millióra nőtt. A Vico 1992-ben 600 millió forintos alaptőkével alakult részvénytársasággá, de a videóüzletnek lassan vége lett, mert az amerikai filmstúdiók nem nézték el tovább, hogy alkotásaikat Magyarországon mindenféle engedély nélkül forgalmazzák. Beperelték a Vicót, és három évi pereskedés után 100 000 dolláros fájdalomdíj kifizetésére, és a jogtalan kazettaforgalmazás abbahagyására kötelezték. Fenyő János ezután az elektronikus médiára vetette ki a hálóját, megalapította a Stáb TV-t, ezen keresztül szerkesztői jogokat szerezve a Gyárfás Tamás érdekkörébe tartozó Nap TV-ben is. VICO-hoz tartozott: a Földgömb Kft. ügyvezető igazgatója, Fenyő János felesége és többszörös cégtársa, Kristyán Judit. Az akkori címe a különféle VICO-alapítású és érdekeltségű cégek irataiban szerepel: Bimbó út 31., Fenyőék egykori lakhelye. A külföldi tulajdonlású magyar társaság fő tevékenysége lakásszövetkezeti lakások, garázs stb. építtető közösségének megszervezése volt, saját célra. Halála és a nyomozás 1998. február 12-én este hat előtt 10 perccel ölték meg Vico-sajtóbirodalom elnökét. A Vico székházból Mercedesével hazafelé tartott, a Margit körút és a Margit utca kereszteződésében lévő lámpánál piros jelzést kapott. A mögötte lévő világos színű Mitsubishi Galantból kiszállt egy férfi, és egy hangtompítós Agram 2000 típusú géppisztolyból kb. 20-25 lövést adott le a vállalkozóra. Tucatnyi lövedék találta el a fején, nyakán és mellkasán, azonnal meghalt. A tettes ezután egy közeli autó alá dobta a géppisztolyt, gyalog elsietett a Széna tér felé, sapkáját és kabátját egy kapualjba dobva eltűnt a helyszínről. Fenyő Jánost a fején, a nyakán és a felsőtestén érték a gyilkos golyók. Azonnal meghalt. A nyomozásban nemcsak a Központi Bűnüldözési Igazgatóság vett részt, hanem a titkosszolgálatok és a Nemzetbiztonsági Hivatal is. Először egy Salihi Mead nevű koszovói albánt, majd egy másik albánt, Afici Nijazit gyanúsították meg, de a DNS-vizsgálat kizárta bűnösségüket. Ezt követően egy harmadik albánt, Sefedini Gvint neveztek meg tettesként, de róla is kiderült, hogy ártatlan. A nyomozást 2002-ben felfüggesztették, majd 2004 őszén újra elővették. 2013 áprilisában Jozef Roháč szlovák férfit vádolták meg a Fenyő-gyilkossággal; őt már megvádolták korábban az Aranykéz utcai és a Seres Zoltán elleni sikertelen robbantással is, ám egyik ügyben sem sikerült elítéltetniük. Roháč DNS-ét megtalálták a gyilkosság helyszínén hagyott sapkában és fegyveren. 2017-ben Roháč másodfokon jogerősen életfogytiglant kapott Fenyő meggyilkolásáért. Kiállításai 1978 • Első, Fiatal Fotóművészek Stúdiója kiállítása, Budavári Palota A épület, Budapest 1987 • Magyar Fotográfia, '87, Műcsarnok, Budapest. Kincses Károly Jegyzetek Források Fotózáson szeretett bele Juditba Fenyő János, blikk.hu A legtehetősebb magyar nők, deluxe.hu Magyarország-A magyar maffia, magyarmaffia.eoldal.hu Ami biztos, Fenyő Jánost meggyilkolták, Népszabadság 2013. március 20., nol.hu Magyar fotográfusok Magyar üzletemberek Meggyilkolt személyek 1954-ben született személyek 1998-ban elhunyt személyek Budapesten született személyek
en	caselaw	US	Case 1:19-cv-01209-RGA Document 1 Filed 06/26/19 Page 1 of 13 PageID #: 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE PFIZER INC., PF PRISM C.V., PFIZER PFE ) IRELAND PHARMACEUTICALS ) HOLDING 1 B.V., PF PRISM IMB B.V. and ) PFIZER MANUFACTURING HOLDINGS ) LLC, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) C.A. No. ________________ v. ) ) GLENMARK PHARMACEUTICALS ) LIMITED and GLENMARK ) PHARMACEUTICALS INC., USA, ) ) Defendants. ) COMPLAINT Plaintiffs Pfizer Inc., PF PRISM C.V., Pfizer PFE Ireland Pharmaceuticals Holding 1 B.V., PF PRISM IMB B.V., and Pfizer Manufacturing Holdings LLC (collectively “Pfizer”), file this Complaint for patent infringement against Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited and Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA (collectively, “Defendants” or “Glenmark”), and by their attorneys, hereby allege as follows: NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. This is an action for patent infringement under the patent laws of the United States, Title 35, United States Code, that arises out of the submission of Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) No. 213235 submitted to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) in the name of Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited seeking approval to manufacture and sell a generic version of Pfizer’s Inlyta® (axitinib) tablets, 1 mg and 5 mg, (“Inlyta®”) prior to the expiration of U.S. Patent No. 8,791,140 (“the ’140 patent”). Case 1:19-cv-01209-RGA Document 1 Filed 06/26/19 Page 2 of 13 PageID #: 2 2. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited notified Pfizer by letter dated May 13, 2019 (“Glenmark’s Notice Letter”) that it had submitted to the FDA ANDA No. 213235 (“Glenmark’s ANDA”), with a Paragraph IV certification, seeking approval from the FDA to engage in the commercial manufacture, use and/or sale of generic axitinib tablets, 1 mg and 5 mg (“Glenmark’s ANDA Product”), prior to the expiration of the ’140 patent. PARTIES 3. Plaintiff Pfizer Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware and having a place of business at 235 East 42nd Street, New York, New York 10017. 4. Plaintiff PF PRISM C.V. is a limited partnership (commanditaire vennootschap) organized under the laws of the Netherlands, having its registered seat in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, that for all purposes is represented by and acting through its general partner Pfizer Manufacturing Holdings LLC, a limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of Delaware, and having its address at 235 East 42nd Street, New York, New York 10017. PF PRISM C.V. is the holder of New Drug Application (“NDA”) No. 202324 for the manufacture and sale of axitinib tablets, 1 mg and 5 mg, which has been approved by the FDA. 5. Plaintiff Pfizer PFE Ireland Pharmaceuticals Holding 1 B.V. is a private limited liability company (besloten vennootschap) organized under the laws of the Netherlands, having its registered seat in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and having its business address at Rivium Westlaan 142, 2909 LD, Capelle aan den IJssel, the Netherlands. 6. Plaintiff PF PRISM IMB B.V. is a private limited liability company (besloten vennootschap) organized under the laws of the Netherlands, having its registered seat in 2 Case 1:19-cv-01209-RGA Document 1 Filed 06/26/19 Page 3 of 13 PageID #: 3 Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and having its business address at Rivium Westlaan 142, 2909 LD, Capelle aan den IJssel, the Netherlands 7. Plaintiff Pfizer Manufacturing Holdings LLC is a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware and having a place of business at 235 East 42nd Street, New York, New York 10017. Pfizer Manufacturing Holdings LLC is a general partner of PF PRISM C.V. 8. Upon information and belief, defendant Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited is a company organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of India with a place of business at Plot No. B-25, MIDC Shendra Five Star, Aurangabad, Maharashtra 431001, India. 9. Upon information and belief, defendant Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited is a generic pharmaceutical company that develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic pharmaceutical products for sale in the State of Delaware and throughout the United States in concert with its subsidiary Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA. 10. Upon information and belief, defendant Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal place of business 750 Corporate Drive, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430. 11. Upon information and belief, Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA is in the business of, among other things, manufacturing and selling generic versions of branded pharmaceutical products for the U.S. market. 12. Upon information and belief, the acts of Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited complained of herein were done with the cooperation, participation, and assistance of Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA. Upon information and belief, Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., 3 Case 1:19-cv-01209-RGA Document 1 Filed 06/26/19 Page 4 of 13 PageID #: 4 USA is a wholly owned subsidiary of Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited, and is controlled and/or dominated by Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited. 13. Upon information and belief, and consistent with their practice with respect to other generic products, following any FDA approval of ANDA No. 213235, Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited and Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA will act in concert to distribute and sell the generic product described in ANDA No. 213235 throughout the United States and within Delaware. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 14. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a). 15. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited is subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware because, among other things, Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited, itself and through its wholly- owned subsidiary Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA, has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of Delaware’s laws such that it should reasonably anticipate being haled into court here. Upon information and belief, Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited, itself and through its wholly-owned subsidiary Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA, develops, manufactures, imports, markets, offers to sell, and/or sells generic drugs throughout the United States, including in the State of Delaware, and therefore transacts business within the State of Delaware, and/or has engaged in systematic and continuous business contacts within the State of Delaware. In addition, Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited is subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware because, upon information and belief, it controls Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA and therefore the activities of Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA in this jurisdiction are attributed to Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited. 16. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA is subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware because, among other things, it has purposely availed itself of the benefits and 4 Case 1:19-cv-01209-RGA Document 1 Filed 06/26/19 Page 5 of 13 PageID #: 5 protections of Delaware’s laws such that it should reasonably anticipate being haled into court here. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, is qualified to do business in Delaware, and has appointed a registered agent for service of process in Delaware. It therefore has consented to general jurisdiction in Delaware. In addition, upon information and belief, Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA develops, manufactures, imports, markets, offers to sell, and/or sells generic drugs throughout the United States, including in the State of Delaware and therefore transacts business within the State of Delaware related to Pfizer’s claims, and/or has engaged in systematic and continuous business contacts within the State of Delaware. 17. Glenmark has previously used the process contemplated by the Hatch-Waxman Act to challenge branded pharmaceutical companies’ patents by filing a certification of the type described in Section 505(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV), serving a notice letter on those companies, and engaging in patent litigation arising from the process contemplated by the Hatch-Waxman Act. 18. Upon information and belief, Glenmark, with knowledge of the Hatch-Waxman Act process, directed Glenmark’s Notice Letter to, inter alia, Pfizer Inc., an entity incorporated in Delaware, and alleged in Glenmark’s Notice Letter that Glenmark’s ANDA Product will not infringe Pfizer’s ’140 patent. Upon information and belief, Glenmark knowingly and deliberately challenged Pfizer’s patent rights, and knew when it did so that it was triggering the forty-five day period for Pfizer to bring an action for patent infringement under the Hatch- Waxman Act. 19. Because Pfizer is incorporated in Delaware, Pfizer suffers injury and consequences from Glenmark’s filing of Glenmark’s ANDA, challenging Pfizer’s patent rights, 5 Case 1:19-cv-01209-RGA Document 1 Filed 06/26/19 Page 6 of 13 PageID #: 6 in Delaware. Upon information and belief, Glenmark knew that it was deliberately challenging the patent rights of a Delaware entity and seeking to invalidate intellectual property held in Delaware. Glenmark has been a litigant in connection with other infringement actions under the Hatch-Waxman Act, and reasonably should have anticipated that by sending Glenmark’s Notice Letter to Pfizer Inc., a Delaware corporation, that it would be sued in Delaware for patent infringement. 20. Upon information and belief, if Glenmark’s ANDA is approved, Glenmark will directly or indirectly manufacture, market, sell, and/or distribute Glenmark’s ANDA Product within the United States, including in Delaware, consistently with Glenmark’s practices for the marketing and distribution of other generic pharmaceutical products. Upon information and belief, Glenmark regularly does business in Delaware, and its practices with other generic pharmaceutical products have involved placing those products into the stream of commerce for distribution throughout the United States, including in Delaware. Upon information and belief, Glenmark’s generic pharmaceutical products are used and/or consumed within and throughout the United States, including in Delaware. Upon information and belief, Glenmark’s ANDA Product will be prescribed by physicians practicing in Delaware, dispensed by pharmacies located within Delaware, and used by patients in Delaware. Each of these activities would have a substantial effect within Delaware and would constitute infringement of Pfizer’s patents in the event that Glenmark’s ANDA Product is approved before the patents expire. 21. Upon information and belief, Glenmark derives substantial revenue from generic pharmaceutical products that are used and/or consumed within Delaware, and which are manufactured by Glenmark and/or for which Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited or Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA is the named applicant on approved ANDAs. Upon information and 6 Case 1:19-cv-01209-RGA Document 1 Filed 06/26/19 Page 7 of 13 PageID #: 7 belief, various products for which Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited or Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA is the named applicant on approved ANDAs are available at retail pharmacies in Delaware. 22. Venue is proper in this district for Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 and 1400(b) because, inter alia, Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Limited is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of India and is subject to personal jurisdiction in this judicial district. 23. Venue is proper in this district for Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 and 1400(b) because, inter alia, Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware and is subject to personal jurisdiction in this judicial district. BACKGROUND 24. Pfizer is the holder of approved NDA No. 202324 for the manufacture and sale of axitinib tablets, 1 mg and 5 mg, approved by the FDA for the treatment of advanced renal cell carcinoma after failure of one prior systemic therapy. Pfizer markets and sells axitinib tablets, 1 mg and 5 mg, under the trade name Inlyta®. Inlyta® was approved by the FDA on January 27, 2012. 25. The ’140 patent, entitled “Crystalline Forms of 6-[2- (methylcarbamoyl)phenylsulfanyl]-3-E-[2-(pyridin-2-yl)ethenyondazole Suitable for the Treatment of Abnormal Cell Growth in Mammals” (Exhibit A hereto), and owned by Pfizer Inc., was duly and legally issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) on July 29, 2014. The ’140 patent is listed in the FDA’s publication, Approved Drug Products 7 Case 1:19-cv-01209-RGA Document 1 Filed 06/26/19 Page 8 of 13 PageID #: 8 with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (commonly known as “the Orange Book”) in connection with Inlyta®. 26. In 2011, PF PRISM C.V. took an exclusive license to, inter alia, patent application no. 12/594,575 (which later issued as the ’140 patent). Thereafter, on March 28, 2017, PF PRISM C.V. contributed its rights under the exclusive license to Pfizer PFE Ireland Pharmaceuticals Holding 1 B.V. On May 27, 2019, Pfizer PFE Ireland Pharmaceuticals Holding 1 B.V. contributed its rights under the exclusive license to PF PRISM IMB B.V. 27. Pfizer has all right, title, and interest in the ’140 patent, including the right to sue for infringement thereof. 28. Upon information and belief, Glenmark filed or caused to be filed with the FDA ANDA No. 213235 under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) to obtain approval for the commercial manufacture, use, and sale of Axitinib tablets, 1 mg and 5 mg (“Glenmark’s ANDA Product”) in the United States before the expiration of the ’140 patent. 29. Upon information and belief, Glenmark’s ANDA No. 213235 contains a certification pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (“paragraph IV certification”), alleging that the claims of the ’140 patent would not be infringed by Glenmark’s ANDA Product. 30. Glenmark sent or caused to be sent to Pfizer a letter dated May 13, 2019 (“Notice Letter”), received by Pfizer on May 14, 2019, notifying Pfizer that Glenmark’s ANDA No. 213235 includes a paragraph IV certification to obtain approval to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of Glenmark’s ANDA Product before the expiration of the ’140 patent and providing information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B). Glenmark’s Notice Letter states that “the FDA has received an [ANDA] from Glenmark for Glenmark’s axitinib tablets, 8 Case 1:19-cv-01209-RGA Document 1 Filed 06/26/19 Page 9 of 13 PageID #: 9 1 mg and 5 mg.” Glenmark’s Notice Letter further states “[t]he ANDA was submitted under 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(l) and (2)(A), and contains a paragraph IV certification to obtain approval to engage in the commercial manufacture, use or sale of Axitinib Tablets, 1 mg and 5 mg, before the expiration of the '140 patent . . . .” 31. The purpose of Glenmark’s submission of ANDA No. 213235 was to obtain approval under the FDA to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, offer for sale, sale, and/or importation of Glenmark’s ANDA Product prior to the expiration of the ’140 patent. 32. Upon information and belief, Glenmark’s ANDA Product is covered by one or more claims of the ’140 patent. 33. The submission of ANDA No. 213235 to the FDA constituted infringement by Glenmark of the ’140 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2). Moreover, any commercial manufacture, use, sale, offer for sale, or importation of Glenmark’s ANDA Product would infringe the ’140 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (b) and/or (c). 34. An actual case or controversy exists between Pfizer and Glenmark with respect to infringement of the ’140 patent. 35. This action is being commenced before the expiration of forty-five days from the date of the receipt of the Notice Letter. CLAIM FOR RELIEF – INFRINGEMENT OF U.S. PATENT NO. 8,791,140 36. Pfizer incorporates each of the preceding paragraphs 1–35 as if fully set forth herein. 37. Upon information and belief, Glenmark’s ANDA Product infringes one or more claims of the ’140 patent either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. 9 Case 1:19-cv-01209-RGA Document 1 Filed 06/26/19 Page 10 of 13 PageID #: 10 38. As an example, claim 1 of the ’140 patent recites a compound comprising: “[a] crystalline form of 6-[2-(methylcarbamoyl)phenylsulfanyl]-3-E-[2-(pyridin-2-yl)ethenyl] indazole, wherein said crystalline form has a powder X-ray diffraction pattern comprising a peak at diffraction angle (2θ) of 6.0±0.1 and further comprising at least one peak at diffraction angle (2θ) selected from 11.5±0.1, 21.0±0.1 and 26.9±0.1.” 39. Upon information and belief, Glenmark’s ANDA Product infringes claims 1–6 of the ’140 patent literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. 40. Glenmark’s submission of ANDA No. 213235 for the purpose of obtaining approval to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, offer for sale, sale, and/or importation of Glenmark’s ANDA Product prior to the expiration of the ’140 patent infringed the ’140 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A). 41. Upon information and belief, Glenmark will engage in the manufacture, use, offer for sale, sale, marketing, distribution, and/or importation of Glenmark’s ANDA Product immediately and imminently upon approval of ANDA No. 213235. 42. Upon information and belief, the manufacture, use, offer for sale, marketing, distribution, and/or importation of Glenmark’s ANDA Product would infringe one or more claims of the ’140 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271. 43. Upon information and belief, Glenmark plans and intends to, and will, actively induce infringement of the ’140 patent when ANDA No. 213235 is approved, and plans and intends to, and will, do so immediately and imminently upon approval. 44. Glenmark has knowledge of the ’140 patent. 10 Case 1:19-cv-01209-RGA Document 1 Filed 06/26/19 Page 11 of 13 PageID #: 11 45. Upon FDA approval of ANDA No. 213235, Glenmark will intentionally encourage acts of direct infringement of one of more claims of the ’140 patent by others, with knowledge that their acts are encouraging infringement. 46. The foregoing actions by Glenmark constitute and/or will constitute infringement of the ’140 patent, active inducement of infringement of the ’140 patent, and/or contribution to the infringement by others of the ’140 patent. 47. Upon information and belief, Glenmark has acted with full knowledge of the ’140 patent and without a reasonable basis for believing that Glenmark would not be liable for infringing the ’140 patent, actively inducing infringement of the ’140 patent, and/or contributing to the infringement by others of the ’140 patent. 48. Unless Glenmark is enjoined from infringing the ’140 patent, actively inducing infringement of the ’140 patent, and/or contributing to the infringement by others of the ’140 patent, Pfizer will suffer irreparable injury. Pfizer has no adequate remedy at law. 49. Glenmark’s submission of ANDA No. 213235 with knowledge of the ’140 patent and its infringement of that patent makes this case exceptional. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Pfizer requests the following relief: (a) A judgment that Glenmark has infringed the ’140 patent; (b) A judgment ordering that the effective date of any FDA approval for Defendants to make, use, offer for sale, sell, market, distribute, or import Glenmark’s ANDA Product, or any product or compound the making, using, offering for sale, sale, marketing, distributing, or importation of which infringes the ’140 patent be not earlier than the expiration date of the ’140 patent, inclusive of any extension(s) and additional period(s) of exclusivity; 11 Case 1:19-cv-01209-RGA Document 1 Filed 06/26/19 Page 12 of 13 PageID #: 12 (c) A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and all persons acting in concert with them, from making, using, selling, offering for sale, marketing, distributing, or importing Glenmark’s ANDA Product, or any product or compound the making, using, offering for sale, sale, marketing, distributing, or importation of which infringes the ’140 patent, or the inducement of or the contribution to any of the foregoing, prior to the expiration date of the ’140 patent, inclusive of any extension(s) and additional period(s) of exclusivity; (d) A judgment declaring that making, using, selling, offering for sale, marketing, distributing, or importing Glenmark’s ANDA Product, or any product or compound the making, using, offering for sale, sale, marketing, distributing, or importation of which infringes the ’140 patent prior to the expiration date of the ’140 patent, will infringe, actively induce infringement of, and/or contribute to the infringement by others of the ’140 patent; (e) A declaration that this is an exceptional case and an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 285; (f) An award of Pfizer’s costs and expenses in this action; and (g) Such further and other relief as this Court may deem just and proper. 12 Case 1:19-cv-01209-RGA Document 1 Filed 06/26/19 Page 13 of 13 PageID #: 13 MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP /s/ Jack B. Blumenfeld Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014) Megan E. Dellinger (#5739) 1201 North Market Street OF COUNSEL: P.O. Box 1347 Wilmington, DE 19899 Thomas H.L. Selby (302) 658-9200 Stanley E. Fisher jblumenfeld@mnat.com Omid G. Banuelos mdellinger@mnat.com Michael Xun Liu WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs 725 Twelfth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 (202) 434-5000 June 26, 2019 13
en	wikipedia	N/A	Colin Beck is a Solomon Islands diplomat. He is the Solomons' current permanent representative to the United Nations and current ambassador to the United States. He also served a one-year term from 2008 to 2009 as vice-president-elect of the 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly. As his country's representative in the United Nations, he spearheaded the motion which led to the United Nations General Assembly re-inscribing French Polynesia on the United Nations list of non-self-governing territories in May 2013. References Solomon Islands diplomats Ambassadors of the Solomon Islands to the United States Permanent Representatives of the Solomon Islands to the United Nations Living people 1964 births
lv	wikipedia	N/A	Citi Zēni ir latviešu hiphopa un poprepa grupa, kura plašāku atpazīstamību ieguva 2020. gada nogalē ar dziesmu "Vienmēr kavēju". Grupa ar dziesmu "Limuzīns uz krīta" ieguvusi 2. vietu Latvijas Radio 2 rīkotajā dziesmu konkursā "Muzikālā banka 2021". Grupa piedalījās arī Latvijas Televīzijas rīkotajā dziesmu konkursā "Supernova 2022" ar dziesmu Eat Your Salad, kurā ieguva 1. vietu un iespēju pārstāvēt Latviju 2022. gada Eirovīzijas dziesmu konkursā. Grupas sastāvā muzicē Jānis Pētersons (vokāls), Dagnis Roziņš (vokāls, saksofons), Reinis Višķeris (taustiņinstrumenti), Krišjānis Ozols (ģitāra), Roberts Memmēns (bass) un Toms Kagainis (bungas). Atsauces Ārējās saites Facebook lapa Youtube kanāls Supernovas dalībnieki 2020. gadu mūzikas grupas Latvijas Eirovīzijas dziesmu konkursa dalībnieki 2022. gada Eirovīzijas dziesmu konkursa dalībnieki
it	wikipedia	N/A	Caserta (IPA: , ; localmente: ) è un comune italiano di abitanti, capoluogo dell'omonima provincia in Campania. È tra le città decorate al valor militare per la guerra di liberazione, insignita della medaglia d'oro al merito civile e della medaglia di bronzo al valor militare per i sacrifici delle sue popolazioni e per l'attività nella lotta partigiana durante la seconda guerra mondiale. È nota soprattutto per la sua imponente Reggia Borbonica, che, insieme al Belvedere Reale di San Leucio e all'Acquedotto Carolino, è inserita dal 1997 nel patrimonio dell'umanità dell'UNESCO. Geografia fisica Territorio Il comune di Caserta comprende, oltre al capoluogo, anche 23 frazioni o casali storici. Tra questi di maggiore rilevanza per il patrimonio artistico e architettonico conservato sono: Casertavecchia, con il suo borgo medievale, il castello e il Duomo, del 1113, in stile romanico, e la chiesa d'Annunziata; Piedimonte (erroneamente citata da un quarantennio come Piedimonte di Casolla), in cui sono importanti monumenti medievali: l'abbazia benedettina di san Pietro ad Montes, la chiesa parrocchiale di san Rufo martire e il palazzo Orfitelli; San Leucio, comune a parte aggregato a Caserta sotto il fascismo, famoso per il Real Belvedere e i setifici Il territorio comunale si estende per una area della superficie totale di 56 km2. La città è legata senza soluzione di continuità dal punto di vista urbanistico con altri importanti centri della provincia, in particolare con Marcianise a sud, dove si concentra la gran parte di industrie del territorio casertano e con Santa Maria Capua Vetere a nord, dove sono presenti il Tribunale e i resti di un anfiteatro romano. Da alcuni anni il comune di Caserta è capofila di alcune iniziative, di cui fanno parte vari comuni tra loro confinanti per una popolazione complessiva di circa quattrocentomila abitanti, che hanno la finalità di concordare un unico e omogeneo piano di sviluppo territoriale. Caserta è situata in una posizione strategica rispetto ai grandi assi stradari. In particolare, è servita da due uscite dell'A1, una denominata "Caserta sud", situata nel territorio del vicino comune di Marcianise, e l'altra denominata "Caserta nord", situata al confine tra i comuni di Casapulla e Casagiove. Nella classifica dell'ecosistema urbano 2013 stilata da Legambiente, il comune di Caserta risulta al 34o posto su 45 capoluoghi di provincia con popolazione inferiore a 80.000 abitanti e, nel complesso, riporta un indice (38,23%) inferiore a quello di tutti gli altri capoluoghi di provincia campani. Clima Nella provincia di Caserta si trova la zona pianeggiante più estesa della regione e di ciò risente anche il clima. La parte che va dalla costa sino ai primi monti che circondano il capoluogo, risente dei benefici influssi del mare, che si fanno sentire soprattutto in inverno con temperature miti e maggiore umidità (e conseguente clima moderatamente o anche intensamente afoso nei mesi estivi). L'estate è molto lunga e calda, con una forte accentuazione che si è avuta a partire dal 1998, come in tutta l'Italia peninsulare, sebbene un secondo step si sia avuto con la storica estate del 2003. Da record l'ondata di caldo dell'agosto 2007, con oltre 40° registrati presso la stazione meteorologica di Caserta, in questo caso però con un basso tasso di umidità dovuto ai venti di caduta ma valori non dissimili si erano registrati anche all'inizio della seconda decade di agosto 2003 e nuovamente nel luglio 2015 e nell'agosto 2017, nell'ultimo caso con un dew point più alto rispetto alle precedenti occasioni ed estremo disagio fisico. L'inverno nella piana casertana nel complesso è mite (la stazione meteo di Caserta, situata nel centro cittadino ed influenzata dall'isola di calore, fa registrare circa 13° nella media delle temperature massime di gennaio, contro i circa 12° della media 1981/2010 della stazione dell'aeroporto militare di Grazzanise), ma non sono da escludere periodi (difficilmente lunghi, stante il trend rialzista delle temperature in corso negli ultimi decenni) di freddo intenso (per citare qualche esempio recente, relativamente rigido risultò il bimestre dicembre 2001-gennaio 2002, con un breve episodio nevoso, come anche il periodo compreso fra la seconda metà di gennaio e l'inizio di marzo 2005, dopo il mite dicembre 2004, mentre l'inverno 2003-2004 è ricordato per le sei ondate di freddo, alternate a periodi miti), con minime sporadicamente pari a zero anche nel capoluogo e massime sotto i 7 gradi, nonostante l'isola di calore propria della conurbazione urbana a nord di Napoli, che condiziona molto le medie termiche. L'indice di nevosità è comunque uno dei più bassi d'Italia e persino d'Europa, assai più trascurabile che in città italiane situate alla medesima latitudine, come ad esempio Bari, peraltro meno piovose (il versante tirrenico si trova sottovento rispetto alle incursioni di aria continentale da est rispetto al versante adriatico). Nel presente secolo, l'episodio nevoso più rilevante si è verificato fra il 26 ed il 27 febbraio 2018 ma non trascurabile quello avvenuto fra il 30 ed il 31 dicembre 2014 (per accumuli più significativi bisogna risalire al biennio 1985-86, sebbene episodi minori ci siano stati anche nel gennaio 2019 (accumuli di 3 cm nella notte fra il 3 ed il 4), marzo 2002 (fiocchi senza accumulo, nel giorno della domenica delle Palme), nel marzo 2005limitatamente alle zone collinarie nel dicembre 2010, mentre fra il 16 ed il 17 dicembre 2010 si sono registrate temperature minime inferiori ai -4° nel centro città (valore peraltro replicato nelle notti del 6 e del 7 gennaio 2017) e addirittura prossimi ai -7° nel vicino aeroporto militare di Grazzanise. Nelle frazioni collinari le temperature medie sono leggermente più basse, specie nei valori massimi e le nevicate un po’ meno rare (Casertavecchia, per rimanere al secolo in corso, fu interessata da precipitazioni nevose, ad esempio, nel gennaio 2004 e nel marzo 2005, che non coinvolsero la città pianeggiante o in altri casi la coinvolsero marginalmente, come nel febbraio 2012 e nel febbraio 2013). Assai diverso rispetto alla costa ed alla pianura casertana è il microclima dell'area matesina. La zona interna della provincia è infatti caratterizzata da numerosi rilievi sia collinari che montuosi, che hanno un clima tipicamente appenninico. Origini del nome Il nome deriva dal latino medievale Casa Irta, toponimo che viene fatto derivare dalla circostanza che l'antico centro urbano della città (l'odierna frazione di Casertavecchia) sorgesse, durante il Medioevo e fino al XVIII secolo, in posizione elevata rispetto alla pianura circostante. Storia L'età antica ed il primo nucleo Le origini della città si fanno risalire le sue origini agli Osci, altri ai Sanniti. Nonostante tutto, dai reperti che sono stati ritrovati, persino nelle varie frazioni cittadina, vi è una testimonianza di un passato insediamento ancor più retrodatabile, poiché nel 1990 furono ritrovate, nei sotterranei della Reggia, alcune tombe di epoca Sannita; si trattò dunque di una necropoli del V secolo a.C.. Intorno al 423 a.C. venne completamente popolata dai Sanniti che le diedero il nome di Calatia. Nel 211 a.C. si schierò contro i Romani e a favore di Annibale. Venne condannata all'esproprio e alla centuriazione, il che significa frammentazione del territorio in grandi appezzamenti. Lo sviluppo medievale Il monaco Erchemperto, nellHistoria Langobardorum Beneventanorum, parla di Caserta come di una realtà già esistente quando, nel IX secolo, gli abitanti di Calatia sono costretti a scappare per la distruzione di Pandone il Rapace, a capo dei Longobardi di Capua. Lo stesso Pandone fece costruire, nell'863, una torre come simbolo di conquista. Durante il regno longobardo, il nucleo urbano si formò attorno alla torre di avvistamento e di difesa; l'attuale centro cittadino, situato intorno a piazza Vanvitelli, allora piazza del mercato, era chiamato Torre, proprio per la presenza della costruzione longobarda che si situa nell'angolo nord-occidentale della stessa, e la città era inoltre sede di cattedra vescovile. Il nucleo cittadino si era ivi trasferito nel XVI secolo, in quello che era chiamato la Torre, spostandosi da Casertavecchia; dopo qualche secolo seguì l'esempio anche il vescovo, che prese dimora nel borgo di Falciano, in un edificio poi adibito a caserma. Dal 1407 iniziò a svolgersi il mercato cittadino in pianura nella piazza omonima. Sulla piazza ancora oggi è il palazzo vecchio, già dei della Ratta poi degli Acquaviva, conti di Caserta. Gli Acquaviva ampliarono e decorarono l'edificio e il suo giardino in età rinascimentale. La città fu a lungo contesa dai principati vicini di Napoli, Salerno e Capua, restando a quest'ultima nell'879, sotto Pandulfo di Capua che ne fu il primo conte. Fino al IX secolo Casertavecchia vide un notevole incremento della sua popolazione: l'inizio delle incursioni saracene spingeva, infatti, gli abitanti della pianura a cercare rifugio in luoghi montani più sicuri e difendibili, il che portò al trasferimento della sede vescovile nel borgo montano. Fino al XII secolo la storia di Casa Hirta si confonde con quella della contea di Capua, inserendosi nelle lotte interne tra i signori Longobardi, Bizantini e Napoletani. Quando i Normanni la conquistarono nel 1057, Riccardo I, conte di Aversa, la eresse in contea per Roberto di Lauro nel 1062. Passò nel 1183 al figlio Guglielmo ed alla sua morte, nel 1199, al figlio Roberto. I nuovi conquistatori, pur nella loro durezza, portarono un po' d'ordine e di autorità. Accanto ad un maggiore sviluppo della popolazione e della vita urbana, sorsero la cattedrale, voluta dal vescovo Rainulfo, il palazzo vescovile ed altri importanti edifici pubblici. Il borgo, passato agli Svevi, conobbe il suo momento di maggiore importanza, anche nel campo politico, sotto il conte Riccardo di Lauro, del casato dei Sanseverino, valido consigliere e fiduciario di Federico II di Svevia. In questo periodo iniziarono i lavori del campanile e si aggiunse al castello la grande torre cilindrica, detta «Maschio», coeva delle architetture federiciane di Capua (1224-1239). Con la conquista angioina (1266) la contea fu affidata temporaneamente a Federico di Laisalto. Successivamente, re Carlo D'Angiò la confiscò per assegnarla a Guglielmo de Beaumont (italianizzato in Belmonte), l'ammiraglio francese che lo aveva salvato con la sua nave. Nel 1269, alla morte di Belmonte, la contea venne affidata a Bertrando del Balzo e nel 1283 passò a Ludovico Roheriis, già giustiziere di Calabria e poi di Terra di Lavoro. Nel 1294 la città ebbe un nuovo feudatario, Goffredo Caetani di Sermoneta, fratello del papa Bonifacio VIII. Quindi, nel 1310 passò al catalano Diego de Lahart (italianizzato in Della Ratta), di cui parla il Boccaccio nella sesta giornata del Decameron, giunto in Italia al seguito di donna Violante d'Aragona. Il più famoso dei conti Della Ratta fu Francesco, il cui mausoleo venne situato nel duomo di Casertavecchia. L'età moderna e la reggia borbonica Nel 1508 Caterina della Ratta, andò in sposa ad Andrea Matteo III Acquasveva d'Aragona, da cui attraverso il ramo primogenito, la contea divenuta principato giunse in eredità ad Anna, ultima erede degli Acquasveva, la quale sposando nel 1618 Francesco Caetani 8o duca di Sermoneta, lo stato di Caserta rimase in questa famiglia fino a quando, indebitatisi enormemente, furono costretti a vendere i possedimenti ai Borbone di Napoli. Questi, in particolare il suo re Carlo III, pensarono di costruirvi la reggia borbonica, a partire dal 1750. L'esigenza del re di Napoli di costruirsi una nuova reggia aveva un triplice motivo. In primis il re aveva la necessità di costruirsi una residenza che fosse più lontana dal mare rispetto al Palazzo Reale di Napoli, per mettersi in salvo in caso di attacco da parte della flotta francese. In secondo luogo, il re coltivava da tempo il desiderio di costruirsi una residenza estiva per il riposo. Inoltre, come terza motivazione, era mosso da un impeto di orgoglio e infatti ordinò al Vanvitelli di costruirgli una residenza che per bellezza, imponenza e maestosità, fosse superiore a tutte le altre europee. Il vecchio giardino degli Acquaviva diventò poi il nucleo principale dell'attuale parco della Reggia. Sul finire del XVIII secolo, il re Ferdinando IV fece costruire in località San Leucio una residenza reale con annessa una fabbrica adibita alla produzione della seta. Accanto al Palazzo del Belvedere, con sul retro un affascinante giardino all'italiana e con davanti la vista sulla piana di Caserta e sul golfo di Napoli, il re fece costruire i quartieri San Carlo e San Ferdinando, destinati agli operai della fabbrica della seta. Il re emise anche un editto nel quale in pratica sanciva la costituzione (da qui l'utopia ferdinandesca) di una sorta di società perfetta, chiedendo ai cittadini di San Leucio l'abolizione di ogni forma di lusso e assoluta uguaglianza economica. Una società che, nella mente del monarca, avrebbe dovuto essere autosufficiente, vivendo della produzione di seta. Dal XIX secolo ad oggi Dopo la proclamazione del Regno d'Italia divenne sede amministrativa del circondario di Caserta della provincia di Terra di Lavoro, quest'ultima soppressa nel 1927 dal governo Mussolini ed il territorio suddiviso nelle province limitrofe. Dopo la resa di Caserta e la fine campagna d'Italia della seconda guerra mondiale nel 1945 divenne di nuovo capoluogo di provincia, ma risultò parecchio devastata; con il boom edilizio soprattutto negli anni 1980 nacquero i quartieri residenziali con grazie ad una edificazione di tipo estensivo, ma al contempo vennero create zone eccessivamente abitate e con pochi spazi verdi, come nel caso dell'ex area Macrico, area utilizzata dall'esercito italiano e dismessa nel 1984. All'inizio degli anni 1990 divenne sede della Seconda Università degli Studi di Napoli, e nel luglio del 1994 la città fu sede della cena di gala in occasione del G7; parallelamente durante la crisi dei rifiuti in Campania ospitò una discarica in località Lo Uttaro. A gennaio del 2007 si svolse presso la sede della Scuola Superiore della Pubblica Amministrazione cittadina ed in particolare nei cortili della reggia borbonica, per la prima volta nella storia della Repubblica Italiana, un Consiglio dei ministri lontano da Roma. Simboli Lo stemma di Caserta è stato riconosciuto con decreto del capo del governo del 18 luglio 1931 e successivamente modificato con il D.P.R. di concessione del 16 gennaio 1995. Le cornucopie d'oro legate dalla corona marchionale in campo d'azzurro sono simbolo della Provincia di Caserta. Il gonfalone, concesso con regio decreto del 20 novembre 1930 e modificato con il D.P.R. del 16 gennaio 1995, è costituito da un drappo partito d'azzurro e di rosso. Onorificenze Monumenti e luoghi d'interesse Oltre alla città di Caserta con la Reggia di Caserta e gli altri monumenti cittadini, il patrimonio artistico ricoprende anche il Belvedere di San Leucio (inserito con la Reggia nel patrimonio dell'umanità) e il borgo medioevale di Casertavecchia ma anche il monumento dei caduti sito nel centro della città. Arco Borbonico (o Porta del Belvedere): situato nella frazione di San Leucio, risale al 1600 circa quando era l'ingresso della proprietà feudale dei principi Acquaviva, ed è alto 13 metri e largo 9, caratterizzato da un unico fornice, scandito dal bugnato rettangolare in travertino e sottolineato da due paraste. L'architrave è sormontato dallo stemma borbonico che troneggia con ai lati due leoni dello scultore Brunelli. Monumento ai caduti in guerra (o Arco di Trionfo): è un arco di trionfo in marmo bianco fatto costruire in epoca fascista per celebrare gli eroi della prima guerra mondiale. Sulla cima è presente una statua che rappresenta la Libertà e la Vittoria. Si trova all'imbocco di corso Trieste. Statua dell'Agricoltura: posta su una base di pietra rappresentante l'agricoltura, per secoli la principale attività di quella che una volta veniva chiamata la Campania Felix. Si trova in Piazza Gramsci davanti all'ingresso dei Giardini della Flora. Monumento a Luigi Vanvitelli: raffigurante l'architetto Luigi Vanvitelli, progettista della Reggia di Caserta. Il Vanvitelli è raffigurato con la mano destra ad indicare il Palazzo Reale e con la sinistra a stringere i suoi progetti. È stata fatta costruire dallo scultore Onofrio Buccini ed inaugurata nel 1879. Si trova nella piazza omonima, una delle principali della città di Caserta. Monumento ai Caduti sul Lavoro: una scultura in pietra inaugurata pochi anni fa e realizzata dall'INAIL proprio di fronte alla sede stessa in piazzale Maiorana ed è dedicata a tutte le persone che hanno perso la vita sul posto di lavoro. Monumento a Ferdinando II: si tratta di una statua di bronzo, realizzata dallo scultore Battista Marello, e posta all'ingresso della frazione di San Leucio, dedicata al re Ferdinando che proprio a San Leucio ebbe la sua dimora e il suo trono. Architetture religiose Cattedrale di San Michele Arcangelo Duomo di Casertavecchia Abbazia di San Pietro ad Montes Complesso medievale di San Vitaliano. Il complesso medievale dell'Eremo di San Vitaliano si trova in frazione Casola, ai piedi del borgo di Casertavecchia. L'eremo è riportato nella Bolla del 1113 con cui l'Arcivescovo di Capua Senne conferma Rainulfo vescovo di Caserta elencandone tutte le chiese di competenza. L'Eremo è stato da poco restaurato e ricondotto alle sue linee architettoniche, sono state risanate le mura e recuperata tutta la copertura a capriata tipica dell'alto Medioevo. Lungo la stretta strada che porta all'Eremo, numerose cappelle dedicate a San Vitaliano. La Chiesa è preceduta da un portico a tre archi, quello centrale dà l'accesso alla chiesa, quelli laterali alle celle dei monaci. È a pianta rettangolare con presbiterio e cantoria molto spaziosi. La Cappella a sinistra conserva un antichissimo affresco di Madonna col Bambino scarsamente leggibile. Ad esaltare lo stile semplice e austero tipico delle strutture religiose medioevali c'è il campanile. Architetture civili Di assoluto rilievo culturale è il castello medievale di Casertavecchia, oggi visibile in resti parzialmente funzionalizzati che hanno salvaguardato le strutture normanne e sveve. Parte del castello è la grande torre cilindrica sorta come mastio in età sveva (forse verso il 1246). Villa Giaquinto: spazio recuperato e gestito da un gruppo di cittadini volontari. Parco del Corso: situato lungo il corso Trieste. Piazza Carlo di Borbone: situata all'ingresso della città, provenendo dalla via Nazionale Appia, è intitolata al re di Napoli che fece costruire la Reggia. . È costituita da un'immensa area verde che si trova davanti alla Reggia, con ai lati i due emicicli destinati alla servitù. Negli ultimi anni la piazza, che prima era intersecata da strade aperte alla circolazione veicolare, è stata sottoposta ad un lungo restauro, allo scopo di farla tornare al progetto del Vanvitelli. C'è stata una risistemazione del verde, dell'impianto di illuminazione e la piantumazione di decine di arbusti e alberi e la piazza è stata completamente pedonalizzata. Alla fine del 2009, con una solenne cerimonia, è stata inaugurata nella sua nuova veste. Piazza Matteotti (o piazza Mercato): una delle principali e più antiche piazze cittadine Piazza Vanvitelli: è una delle principali piazze della città, dove si trovava il palazzo Castropignano, sostituito nei primi anni sessanta da un anonimo palazzo moderno, e dove oggi si trovano l'attuale sede del comune di Caserta, il cinquecentesco Palazzo Acquaviva che ospita gli uffici di questura e prefettura, e il Palazzo della Banca d'Italia. Sono presenti nella piazza anche negozi, caffetterie, chalet, alberghi e banche. È una piazza costituita per lo più da una grande villa comunale con al centro di essa un monumento a Luigi Vanvitelli e una grande fontana. Fino a due secoli fa era la piazza del Mercato, poi trasformata in giardino pubblico. Piazza Dante: una delle piazze più antiche di Caserta. Ha una forma simmetrica ed è costituita da quattro palazzi con bei porticati tutti uguali che ospitano un antico caffè e le sedi del Circolo Sociale e del Circolo Nazionale. In passato si è chiamata prima piazza dei Quattro Canti, in riferimento appunto ai quattro palazzi che la perimetrano e poi piazza Margherita. Congiunge il primo tratto di corso Trieste con gli ultimi trecento metri dello stesso, quelli che conducono prima a piazza Gramsci, sede dei Giardini della Flora e poi a piazza Carlo Terzo, ovvero davanti alla Reggia di Caserta. Piazza Duomo: una delle piazze principali del centro storico della città. Ha una forma irregolare ed è caratterizzata dalla imponente mole della cattedrale. La chiesa, che è in stile tardo barocco-neoclassico, è a tre navate e conserva al suo interno diverse tele del Seicento. Nella stessa piazza Duomo si trova anche la chiesetta di San Giovanni, con un prezioso altare in marmo di Carrara del Seicento. Nella piazza affaccia poi il Palazzo delle Poste, costruito ad inizio del Novecento in stile neoclassico. Piazza Sant'Anna: segna il confine tra il centro storico e la zona sud della città, è così chiamata per via della presenza del santuario di Sant'Anna (patrona della città). Il santuario ha la facciata risalente al 1600 e gli interni divisi tra il barocco-neoclassico dell'ingresso e il moderno del resto della struttura, e fu colpita dai bombardamenti durante la Seconda guerra mondiale. Nella stessa piazza, di forma rettangolare, è presente l'ex ospedale di Caserta. Dalla parte opposta del santuario si trova il monumento alla Madonna, eretto nell'anno mariano 1956, costruito in pietra e marmo su una base di piccola scalinata. Piazza della Seta: si trova nella frazione di San Leucio ed è la via principale d'ingresso al Reale Belvedere. Il suo nome fa proprio riferimento all'attività serica che si svolgeva nel Belvedere. Dalla piazza si accede alla residenza reale attraverso l'Arco Borbonico risalente al 1600 circa. Casa del fascio o littorio, l’edificio fu progettato nel 1937 e destinato, all’inizio, ad ospitare la Confederazione Fascista dei Lavoratori dell’Agricoltura. Fu poi modificato per diventare Casa del Fascio. Corso Trieste Reggia di Caserta La Reggia di Caserta, o Palazzo Reale di Caserta, è una dimora storica appartenuta alla famiglia reale della dinastia Borbone di Napoli, proclamata Patrimonio dell'umanità dall'UNESCO. Situata nel comune di Caserta, è circondata da un vasto parco nel quale si individuano due settori: il giardino all'italiana ed il giardino all'inglese. Il complesso del palazzo reale, con i suoi giardini lunghi circa 2,5 km, è uno dei più grandi d'Europa, ed ha conseguito il titolo di Parco più bello d'Italia nel 2009. Sul lato ovest della reggia sorge la chiesa di San Francesco di Paola che fa parte di un complesso un tempo convento dei Frati Minimi, fondato nel 1605 da Andrea Matteo Acquaviva, oggi ospedale militare. Complesso Monumentale del Belvedere di San Leucio L'utopia di re Ferdinando di dar vita ad una comunità autonoma (chiamata appunto Ferdinandopoli) lascia a Caserta il Belvedere di San Leucio, i suoi appartamenti reali, il giardino all'italiana e l'annesso Museo della Seta, dov'è possibile visitare i macchinari del Settecento con cui si tesseva la seta diventata famosa in tutto il mondo, tanto da arrivare ad arredare la Casa Bianca, Buckingham Palace e il Palazzo del Quirinale. Borgo Medievale di Casertavecchia A 401 metri di altezza c'è l'antica Caserta, attuale Casertavecchia, un borgo interamente medioevale dal quale si ammira una vista dell'intero comune di Caserta. Di pregevole interesse sono il Duomo dedicato a San Michele Arcangelo (proprio come la cattedrale nella Caserta nuova) dell'XI secolo, la contigua chiesa dell'Annunziata, e il castello medioevale con la torre. Nel borgo si tiene da quasi 40 anni il settembre al Borgo, manifestazione culturale di rilievo nazionale. Siti archeologici Necropoli sannitica: ritrovata nel 1990 ed è costituita da sette tombe a cassa di tufo di epoca sannitica, della seconda metà del IV secolo a.C. Aree naturali Parco della Reggia di Caserta Nonostante la speculazione edilizia, per le aree verdi Caserta risulta, con 13,06 m2/ab., al 21o posto (su 45) nella classifica dei capoluoghi di provincia italiani con meno di 80.000 abitanti per verde urbano fruibile, secondo il Rapporto 2013 sull'Ecosistema Urbano stilato da Legambiente. Ciò è dovuto principalmente all'enorme Parco della Reggia, lungo 2,5 km. All'interno del parco vi è la Peschiera Grande della Reggia di Caserta. Si tratta di un lago artificiale costruito nel Parco della Reggia nell'anno 1769 dall'architetto Collecini. Il lago, con un isolotto al centro, è lungo 270 metri, largo 105 e profondo 3,50. Tra il 1769 e il 1773, progettato per il divertimento del re Ferdinando IV, vi si svolgevano finte battaglie terrestri e marittime con modelli di navi in scala ridotta. Vennero anche insediati in alcune abitazioni nei pressi della vasca dei marinai con le loro famiglie; "Liparoti" per poter organizzare i giochi nautici. Dal 2002 si svolgono ogni anno i Giochi Sportivi Studenteschi di Vela Radiocomandata "Radio Sailing". Oasi Bosco di San Silvestro La Reale Tenuta di San Silvestro faceva parte, insieme a San Leucio, al Parco Reale ed al Giardino all'Inglese delle "Reali Delizie" annesse alla Reggia di Caserta. Situata a nord del complesso monumentale, si estende sulle due colline contigue di Montemaiulo e Montebriano. L'area, di circa 76 ettari, venne scelta in quanto particolarmente idonea a creare una naturale scenografia alla cascata che anima, con le sue acque, le fontane del parco vanvitelliano. I territori che la compongono furono acquistati dopo il 1750 in momenti diversi e riuniti poi in un unico tenimento che venne delimitato con un muro perimetrale. La tenuta di San Silvestro, così come gli altri siti reali, fu destinata ad attività agricole e venatorie sull'esempio delle nuove mode di vita agreste diffuse nelle altri corti europee. In quest'area furono conservate, e in alcuni casi incrementate, le coltivazioni già esistenti come vigne, uliveti, frutteti, orti e giardini. Tra il 1797 e il 1801, in località "Parito", venne costruito, sotto la direzione del Collecini, già collaboratore di Luigi Vanvitelli, il Real Casino per dar ristoro al Re ed al suo seguito durante la caccia nei boschi vicini e per disporre di locali idonei alle diverse necessità dell'azienda agricola. Il 13 maggio 1922 la tenuta di San Silvestro, che faceva parte dei beni immobili della Corona, passò al demanio dello Stato e fu consegnata al Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione. Nel dopoguerra, fino al 1970, il Real Casino ospitò una colonia antitracomatosa e nel 1983 l'intero sito, gestito dall'Amministrazione provinciale, passò per competenza alla Soprintendenza ai Beni AA.AAAA.SS. per le province di Caserta (CE) e Benevento (BN). In quest'ultimo ventennio il Real Casino, che già in passato era stato sottoposto a varie trasformazioni e interventi di "abbellimento", ha subito continui atti vandalici; sono state rubate statue, divelti e trafugati marmi del caminetto, asportati parati, distrutti servizi, ecc. Il 6 febbraio 1993 il WWF Italia, dopo un lungo periodo di collaborazione con la Soprintendenza per la salvaguardia del sito, ha ottenuto dal Ministero per i Beni Culturali e dal Ministero delle Finanze la gestione del "bosco di San Silvestro" che è così diventato la prima "oasi del WWF" della provincia di Caserta. Il 10 aprile 1994 l'oasi è stata inaugurata ed il giorno successivo aperta al pubblico mediante visite guidate. Giardino Inglese Confinante con piazza Carlo di Borbone e ubicato di fronte alla sede delle facoltà di Psicologia e Studi politici della Università degli Studi della Campania 'Luigi Vanvitelli'. L'area, prima di proprietà dell'Aeronautica Militare, è stata acquisita dal comune di Caserta, che l'ha trasformata in un grande parco verde. È stato intitolato a Maria Carolina d'Asburgo, che volle la realizzazione del Giardino Inglese della Reggia e scrisse il codice delle leggi leuciane. Alimentato dall’Acquedotto Carolino, il Giardino Inglese è un fenomeno che ebbe inizio attorno al XVIII secolo, conducendo al superamento dei vecchi schemi geometrici (giardino all'italiana) all'interno dei nuovi giardini nobiliari. Fu realizzato da John Andrea Graefer e voluto dalla regina Maria Carolina d'Asburgo-Lorena, moglie di Ferdinando IV, secondo i dettami dell'epoca che videro prevalere il giardino detto "di paesaggio" o "all'inglese", sottolineatura dell'origine britannica di spazi il più possibile fedeli alla natura. L'opera di John Andrea Graefer cominciò nel 1786 e consentì al giardino di formarsi, di anno in anno. Tra scorci selvaggi e architetture oniriche, ospita un’eccezionale varietà di piante esotiche e sementi individuate a Capri, Maiori, Vietri, Salerno, Cava de' Tirreni, Agnano, Solfatara, Gaeta. Successivamente fu seguito dai suoi figli – che si occuparono della proprietà negli anni dell’occupazione francese – Graefer si fece personalmente carico della selezione delle specie botaniche, effettuando numerosi sopralluoghi sulle coste campane, e attivando una fiorente attività d’importazione: le prime specie estere arrivarono dall’Olanda nel 1793. Altre aree naturali Giardini della Flora, situati alla fine di Corso Trieste, sul lato est della Reggia Giardini di piazza Padre Pio, situati nel centro della città Giardini di piazza Cattaneo-Piteşti Giardini di piazza Vanvitelli Giardini di piazza Carlo III, situati di fronte alla Reggia Giardini di Villa Giaquinto, in pieno centro Società Evoluzione demografica Etnie e minoranze straniere Al 31 dicembre 2020 gli stranieri residenti in città erano , pari al 5,4% della popolazione. I gruppi più numerosi sono quelli di: Ucraina, Senegal, 334 Romania, 299 Filippine, 288 Polonia, 243 Nigeria, 118 Brasile, 114 Russia, 110 Istituzioni, enti e associazioni La città ospita una sede della Scuola nazionale dell'amministrazione, ubicata in un'ala della Reggia a cui si accede tramite lo scalone monumentale. Nelle immediate vicinanze della Reggia, nell'emiciclo destro, ha sede il Centro Residenziale e Studi, struttura logistica di accoglienza annessa alla Scuola. È inoltre sede degli uffici territoriali dell'INPS, di una sezione distaccata del tribunale ordinario di Santa Maria Capua Vetere, del giudice di pace e della sezione di Caserta dell'Ordine forense, nonché di una delegazione dell'Automobile Club d'Italia e di una sede dell'archivio di Stato. Tra le strutture militari, vi è la Scuola truppe corazzate dell'Esercito Italiano e di stanza presso la stessa la Brigata bersaglieri "Garibaldi", una delle maggiori unità delle forze armate italiane. Inoltre è presente la "Scuola specialisti dell'Aeronautica Militare". La più importante struttura sanitaria della città è l'azienda ospedaliera "Sant'Anna e San Sebastiano". Inoltre, nella zona est cittadia è in costruzione il policlinico universitario che sarà gestito dall'Università degli Studi della Campania Luigi Vanvitelli. Tra le associazioni cittadine si annovera l'associazione culturale Liberalibri, fondata nel 2002 e che è stata considerata dalla trasmissione radiofonica RadioTre Fahrenheit, del 5 agosto 2013, la maggiore associazione di bookcrossing in Italia senza fini di lucro. Qualità della vita Cultura Istruzione Biblioteche La principale biblioteca cittadina è la Biblioteca Comunale "Giuseppe Tescione", ospitata nel complesso di Sant'Agostino, che possiede un patrimonio librario di circa 25.000 volumi, donato al comune di Caserta dal prof. Giuseppe Tescione (1914-2002), al quale la biblioteca è intitolata. Oltre alla Biblioteca "Giuseppe Tescione", la città è servita da altre strutture: La Biblioteca Comunale Alfonso Ruggiero, fondata nel 1946 e situata nell'ex macello di via Laviano. Possiede un patrimonio librario di oltre 34.000 volumi, tra cui edizioni del Cinquecento, Seicento, Settecento, Ottocento. La Biblioteca del Seminario vescovile di Caserta, situata nel centro città, in piazza Duomo. Dal 2018 chiusa al pubblico. Scuole Le scuole di secondo grado (superiore) comprendono: quattro licei di vari indirizzi, due istituti professionali e tre istituti tecnici. Inoltre, presso tre aule dell'Istituto I.T.C. "Terra di Lavoro", sono attivi due corsi del Conservatorio di Avellino (flauto e pianoforte) per un numero massimo di 60 allievi. L'inaugurazione della sezione del Conservatorio di Caserta è avvenuta alla fine di settembre 2009 con un concerto di musiche di Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart al Teatro di Corte della Reggia di Caserta. Università Caserta è la città in cui si trova la sede legale dell'Università degli Studi della Campania "Luigi Vanvitelli", nonché alcuni dipartimenti universitari, in particolare: Dipartimento di Matematica e Fisica; Dipartimento di Psicologia; Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche; Dipartimento di Scienze e Tecnologie Ambientali Biologiche e Farmaceutiche. Inoltre, presso il Centro Direzionale situato nella frazione San Benedetto vi è una sede del corso di laurea in Medicina e Chirurgia Musei Il principale polo museale cittadino è sicuramente quello del Complesso museale della Reggia di Caserta. Oltre che gli appartamenti reali e la pinacoteca reale, è possibile anche visitare sempre all'interno della Reggia il Museo dell'Opera e del Territorio dedicato alla realizzazione della Reggia stessa e la mostra permanente Terrae Motus con una raccolta di opere contemporanee. Sono presenti poi altri musei come il Museo della Seta di San Leucio, il Museo delle Cere "Le Muse", il Museo Diocesano di Caserta, il Museo Michelangelo (scienze, mineralogia, topografia, disegno), il Museo Dinamico della Tecnologia Adriano Olivetti (attualmente chiuso, 2021) e il Planetario di Caserta. Infine sono sorte varie Gallerie d'arte contemporanea pubbliche e private per tutta la città che accolgono spesso mostre d'arte anche internazionale. Media Emittenti televisive e radiofoniche Radio Prima Rete TelePrima Lunaset 2 Luna Sport ItaliaMia Stampa Il Mattino (redazione di Caserta) - quotidiano Cronache di Caserta - quotidiano Corriere del Mezzogiorno (redazione di Caserta) - quotidiano Gazzetta di Caserta - Quotidiano online di Caserta e provincia CasertaFocus - settimanale gratuito La nuova Gazzetta di Caserta - quotidiano Tuttiinpiazza - quotidiano on line Il Caffè - Settimanale indipendente Teatro Negli ultimi dieci anni a Caserta si è assistito alla proliferazione di teatri e sale cinematografiche che sono andati a compensare il vuoto che c'era stato fino agli inizi degli anni novanta, quando le vecchie strutture chiuse non erano state rimpiazzate da altre impoverendo molto l'offerta culturale della città. Teatro Comunale "Costantino Parravano". Sul fronte teatro, la prima struttura cittadina è il Teatro Comunale, situato nella centralissima via Mazzini. Si tratta di un teatro moderno dislocato su due piani con circa 500 posti: vi si svolge la stagione principale della città con spettacoli di livello nazionale oltre ad una serie di rassegne di musica da camera e concerti di musica classica. Teatro "Civico 14". Storicamente situato in vicolo Della Ratta, traversa della centralissima via Vico, era uno spazio di circa sessanta posti, con una stagione teatrale ricca di nomi nazionali e compagnie emergenti, caratterizzato dal forte e costante impegno rivolto alle tematiche sociali e civili, e quindi civiche. Attualmente è ospitato da un nuovo spazio, di circa 80 posti, denominato hub creativo "Spazio X", in via Petrarca. Teatro "Don Bosco". Altra struttura importante è il Teatro Don Bosco, di proprietà dei Salesiani di Caserta, un teatro di 400 posti tutto in marmo con una stagione nazionale grazie alla collaborazione con alcuni teatri di Roma. Teatro "Izzo". Nella zona sud della città, precisamente nel rione Acquaviva, c'è il Teatro Izzo, vero e proprio teatro di quartiere, 350 posti per una stagione soprattutto basata su spettacoli comici ispirati alla commedia napoletana. Teatro "Caserta Città di Pace". Nel quartiere Puccianiello vicino all'Ospedale Civile, il Teatro Caserta Città di Pace offre il proprio palco e la propria platea di quasi 400 posti a tutte le compagnie amatoriali ma spesso vi si tengono anche spettacoli di livello nazionale. Officina Teatro. A San Leucio nei locali di una vecchia fabbrica l'Officina Teatro, con una platea di cento posti circa, offre una stagione di teatro singolare e diversa dalle solite con una grande attenzione ai temi sociali che vengono spesso affrontati in commedie quasi di nicchia, riservate ad un pubblico particolare. Teatro di Corte della Reggia di Caserta. Centro Teatro Studi. La piccola sala del Centro Teatro Studi (C.T.S.) ospita gruppi di teatro amatoriali che coltivano il sogno di calcare i palchi più importanti d'Italia. Bottega del Teatro. Finalità simile per la Bottega del Teatro, altra piccola sala teatrale del capoluogo situata nel quartiere Acquaviva, zona sud della città. Anche qui spazio all'avanspettacolo e al teatro comico con grande spazio per le compagnie amatoriali. Teatro Fabbrica Wojtyla. Unico e particolare nel suo genere resta il Teatro Fabbrica Wojtyla, vera fucina di giovanissimi artisti casertani che produce spettacoli originali con finalità altamente sociali. Auditorium Provinciale, in via Ceccano, in pieno centro cittadino, dove si sono svolti a lungo incontri, dibattiti culturali, convegni, esibizioni teatrali e concerti di musica da sala. Tuttavia risulta attualmente in disuso a causa del dissesto dell'ente Provincia, che non può provvedere alla messa in sicurezza dello stabile. A queste strutture al chiuso bisogna aggiungere le due all'aperto che vengono allestite in occasione di particolari rassegne: Teatro dei Serici. Nel Belvedere di San Leucio, che ospita gli spettacoli del Leuciana Festival. Teatro della Torre. All'interno dei resti del castello Medioevale di Casertavecchia, che ospita alcuni spettacoli del settembre al Borgo. Cinema Il Duel Village, inaugurato nel 2000, è stato il primo multisala della Campania. Possiede 6 sale per un totale di 1.300 posti.9. In pieno centro storico, ha invece sede lo storico Cinema San Marco, chiuso a lungo negli anni 2000 e riaperto nel 2015, poi sfortunatamente richiuso nel 2018 Prima della riapertura di quest'ultimo, il Teatro Don Bosco e il Teatro Comunale venivano spesso adibiti a cinema. Location cinematografiche La città ha ospitato diverse produzioni cinematografiche, specialmente nelle sue location della Reggia e del parco: I due papi (2019) Impepata di nozze (2012) Mozzarella Stories (2011) Angeli e demoni (2009) Lascia perdere, Johnny! (2007) Mission: Impossible 3 (2006) Star Wars: Episodio II - L'attacco dei cloni (2002) Li chiamarono... briganti! (1999) Star Wars: Episodio I - La minaccia fantasma (1999) Ferdinando e Carolina (1999) Io speriamo che me la cavo (1992) Cenerentola '80 (1984) Sing Sing (1983) Il mondo nuovo (1982) Il Pap'occhio (1980) Waterloo (1970) Lo sbarco di Anzio (1968) Le calde notti di Lady Hamilton (1968) Madame Sans-Gêne (film 1961) (1961) Ferdinando I° re di Napoli (1959) I 3 aquilotti (1942) Cucina La cucina casertana è caratterizzata da piatti tradizionali come le "salsicce di polmone", condite con i piccanti peperoncini locali. Molto buone sono le acciughe sotto sale, dissalate, in vasetto sott'olio, i fagioli "alla carrettiera" e le zite ripiene. Tipica è anche la mozzarella di bufala, visto che la provincia di Caserta è la zona dove è presente il maggior numero di bufale d'Italia. Tra i dolci c'è il casatiello dolce chiamato pigna, immancabile sulle tavole dei casertani nel periodo pasquale. Tra i vini cittadini vi sono il casavecchia, il falerno e il pallagrello. Eventi Premio internazionale di giornalismo "Le Buone Notizie - Civitas Casertana", noto anche come "Premio Buone Notizie". Stagione Teatrale Città di Caserta (ottobre-maggio). Premi Nazionali Letterari Caserta. Inaugurazione in Piazza Carlo di Borbone Inaugurazione il 30 dicembre 2001 dell'opera d'arte Plus Ultra realizzata dall'artista italiano "Mafonso" antistante Palazzo Reale quale indice di riflessione per gli attentati dell'11 settembre 2001 alle torri gemelle di New York 2001. Torneo Internazionale Femminile di Tennis presso Tennis Club Caserta (maggio). Festival del Cinema Indipendente (maggio). Geografia antropica Frazioni Aldifreda, Briano, Casertavecchia, Casola, Casolla, Centurano, Ercole, Falciano, Garzano, Lo Uttaro, Mezzano, Piedimonte di Casolla, Pozzovetere, Puccianiello, San Benedetto, Sala, San Clemente, San Leucio, Santa Barbara, Sommana, Staturano, Tredici, Tuoro, Vaccheria. Delle 23 frazioni di Caserta, alcune hanno caratteristiche peculiari: Casolla, ai piedi dei Colli Tifatini. Architetture importanti: palazzo Cocozza di Montanara, nel quale nel 1970 Pier Paolo Pasolini girò alcune scene del Decameron, e le "collere", ambienti alti e sfinestrati che un tempo servivano come luogo di essiccazione della colla. La frazione di Aldifreda è nota per l’antica chiesa di San Pietro Apostolo, in cui sono stati ritrovati reperti storici antecedenti all’anno 1000 Piedimonte di Casolla, ai piedi dei Colli Tifatini, sede di un'antichissima abbazia benedettina, un tempo tempio romano dedicato a Giove Tifatino. Sala e Briano, alcune delle più antiche frazioni del comune, incastonate tra il Parco Reale, l'Oasi di San Silvestro e il real sito di San Leucio. Casertavecchia, antico centro del comune, sede di un borgo antico rimasto intatto con un castello molto conosciuto e un duomo romanico. San Leucio, sede del palazzo del Reale Belvedere e di famose seterie reali. Vaccheria, sede delle vaccherie reali per la produzione di cuoio e di mucche da latte. Falciano, antica sede vescovile dal XVIII secolo e di un palazzo della cavallerizza nel XVI secolo. San Clemente, nata dall'antico villaggio di Macerata citato dalle fonti già intorno all'anno Mille, ma esistente in epoca longobarda e che comprendeva tre villaggi di capanne con al centro rispettivamente la chiesa di San Clemente, di Santa Maria e di Santo Stefano. Rioni Fanno parte del tessuto urbano di Caserta anche molti popolosi rioni tra cui: Acquaviva, Cerasola (anche detto Cerasole), Cappiello, Falcone, Michelangelo, San Clemente, Parco Degli Aranci, Paschi, Petrarelle, Primavera, Santa Rosalia, Tescione, Vanvitelli, Volturno, Trento, 167, ISES. Economia Negli ultimi anni, l'economia industriale casertana ha visto il ridimensionamento o la chiusura di molte fabbriche "storiche" dell'area. Tra queste è doveroso ricordare quelle relative alla famosa seta di San Leucio, anche se ancora oggi sono attive delle fabbriche che continuano a lavorare la seta. A Caserta vi è la sede del Banco delle opere di carità, un'istituzione benefica ivi nata e diffusasi in gran parte d'Italia. La città di Caserta, specie negli ultimi anni, ha visto la nascita nel suo territorio di diversi alberghi importanti che hanno aumentato di molto la capacità ricettiva del capoluogo e hanno permesso lo sviluppo anche di un turismo congressuale. Infrastrutture e trasporti Strade Caserta è collegata alla rete autostradale tramite i caselli Caserta nord e Caserta sud dell'Autostrada A1 Milano-Napoli, nonché il casello Caserta dell'Autostrada A30 Caserta-Salerno. Caserta è altresì situata al centro della via Sannitica. Strade provinciali Strada provinciale 167 Caserta - Ponti della Valle Strada provinciale 208 Ponteselice Strada provinciale 210 del Bosco di San Silvestro Strada provinciale 213 Caserta - Castel Morrone Strada provinciale 336-II Sannitica ex SS 87 Strada provinciale 336dir Cirumvallazione di Briano-Sala ex SP 211 Strade comunali Strada comunale via Cima (Variante di Garzano) Strada comunale "Variante di San Leucio" (in costruzione) Variante di Caserta Nel 2008 è stata inaugurata tra la Strada statale 265 dei Ponti della Valle e la Strada statale 7 Via Appia classificata dall'ANAS, che la gestisce interamente, come Strada statale 700 della Reggia di Caserta. Ferrovie La stazione di Caserta, realizzata nel 1843, è una stazione di transito sulla linea Roma-Napoli via Cassino. La stazione è altresì collegata con una diramazione secondaria a quella di Aversa, con la quale è possibile effettuare interscambi per immettersi sulla linea principale Roma-Napoli via Formia. La stazione è collegata con Foggia ed è attualmente un nodo di interscambio fondamentale per raggiungere la Puglia dalla Campania. Offre inoltre collegamenti diretti con la città di Salerno attraverso la tratta Caserta-Salerno via Sarno. Mobilità urbana Precedentemente svolto dalle società ACMS e CLP (fallite nel 2012 e nel 2021), dal 1o settembre 2021 il servizio di mobilità urbana è regolarmente svolto dalla società AIR che effettua sia il trasporto ordinario che quello scolastico. Operano anche società come la CTP (fallita nel 2022) e operatori privati. Amministrazione Gemellaggi Sport Hanno sede nel comune le società sportive Juvecaserta Basket, Casertana Football Club, VolAlto Caserta e Caserta Softball vincitore del titolo nazionale, dal 2009 al 2012. Caserta è stata in più di un'occasione sede di arrivo di una tappa del Giro d'Italia (1964, 1982, 1994, 2002) ed ha ospitato la Formula 3 italiana di automobilismo fino al 1967, quando in una tragedia morirono i piloti Beat Fehr, Romano Perdomi, detto "Tiger" e "Geki" Russo. Caserta fu teatro, nel settembre 1969, della rivolta del pallone, un evento di cronaca che ha interessato la città in seguito alla penalizzazione per illecito sportivo inflitto alla società di calcio Casertana. Note Bibliografia Salvatore Abita (a cura di), Caserta e la sua Reggia: il Museo dell'opera e del territorio, Electa Napoli. Architettura Varia ISBN 8843552236, 9788843552238 Rosanna Cioffi (a cura di), Casa di re: un secolo di storia alla Reggia di Caserta, 1752-1860, Skira, 2004. Rosario De Simone (a cura di), Complotto contro Carlo di Borbone Rosario De Simone (a cura di), Garibaldi è stato ucciso a Caserta e altri racconti Antonio Pascale (a cura di), La città distratta Ferdinando Patturelli (a cura di), Caserta e San Leucio, Napoli, 1826. Crescenzio Esperti (a cura di), Memorie istoriche ed ecclesiastiche, Napoli, 1773. Giovanni de Silva (a cura di), Memoria di particolari fatti operati da taluni contadi di Caserta, Napoli 1800. Voci correlate Agro aversano Casertavecchia Casertana Football Club Cattedrale di San Michele Arcangelo (Caserta) Chiese di Caserta Conti di Caserta Diocesi di Caserta Filovia Capua-Caserta-Maddaloni Juvecaserta Musei di Caserta Palazzi di Caserta Provincia di Caserta Reggia di Caserta Resa di Caserta Rivolta del pallone San Leucio (Caserta) Sport a Caserta Sindaci di Caserta Stazione di Caserta Stadio Alberto Pinto Stazione meteorologica di Caserta Strada statale 700 della Reggia di Caserta Università degli Studi della Campania Luigi Vanvitelli Terra di Lavoro Altri progetti Collegamenti esterni
en	caselaw	US	481 S.W.2d 801 (1972) John BRAZZEL, Petitioner, v. Sid MURRAY et al., Respondents. No. B-3103. Supreme Court of Texas. April 12, 1972. Rehearing Denied June 7, 1972. William Emerson Wright, Houston, for petitioner. Wood, Burney, Nesbitt & Ryan, Allen Wood, Corpus Christi, for respondents. 802 McGEE, Justice. This case involves the effect of the erroneous issuance of a mandate by the Clerk of the Court of Civil Appeals, the costs of court having not been paid at the time and subsequent dismissal of the cause purportedly under Rule 445, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (T.R.C.P.). The original suit was filed by John Brazzel on January 4, 1964, against Sid Murray and others. The trial court rendered judgment upon the jury verdict for Brazzel on July 28, 1967. The Court of Civil Appeals (Waco Court) reversed the trial court judgment and remanded the cause for new trial with costs assessed against Brazzel on February 6, 1969. 438 S.W.2d 382. Judgment became final November 26, 1969 when Brazzel's application for writ of error was overruled by this Court. The Clerk of the Waco Court issued the mandate to the trial court on December 4, 1969, although Brazzel had failed to pay the costs at that time as ordered by the judgment of the Waco Court and as required by Rule 443, T.R.C.P., which provides: "On the rendition of a final judgment or decree in the Court of Civil Appeals, the clerk of said court shall not issue and deliver the mandate of the court nor certify the proceedings to the lower court until all costs accruing in the case in such appellate court have been paid, subject to the provisions of Rule 444." Rule 444, T.R.C.P., provides for the filing of affidavits of inability to pay the costs as required in Rule 443, T.R.C.P. Murray subsequently filed a motion in the Waco Court to recall the mandate because of the non-payment of the costs. This motion was granted, and the mandate was recalled on January 22, 1971, and returned to the Waco Court, whereupon the Clerk issued a certificate on February 18, 1971, which stated: "Except for the Mandate of this Court issued December 4, 1969, no mandate in the above has been taken out." Murray filed a motion to dismiss the cause in the trial court on February 17, 1971. On March 4, 1971 the trial court entered its order of dismissal relying upon Rule 445, T.R.C.P., which provides as follows: "In cases which have been reversed and remanded by a Court of Civil Appeals, if no mandate shall have been taken out and filed in the court where the cause originated within one year after the motion for rehearing is overruled or final judgment rendered, then upon the filing in the court below of a certificate of the clerk of the Court of Civil Appeals where the cause was pending that no mandate has been taken out, the case shall be dismissed from the docket." [Emphasis added] On appeal from the order of dismissal, the Court of Civil Appeals (Corpus Christi Court) held that the original mandate, having been mistakenly issued by the Waco Court, was void ab initio and the wording of the Clerk's certificate need not state that "no mandate has been taken out" within one year of final judgment and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 472 S.W.2d 814. With these holdings we disagree. Petitioner's application for writ of error was granted on the following points: "1. The Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding, that the mandate, `having been mistakenly issued,' was void ab initio. "2. The Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming dismissal under Rule 445, T. R.C.P., as a valid mandate was on file with the trial court from final remand until dismissal. "3. The Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming dismissal in the absence of compliance with the requirements of Rule 445, T.R.C.P., that the Clerk certify 803 that `no mandate has been taken out' within one year of final judgment." Points one and two will be treated together and are considered controlling; thus, point three is not discussed. The distinction between a void and voidable judicial act is clearly set out in Murchison v. White, 54 Tex. 78 (1880) as follows: "A void act is one entirely null within itself, not binding on either party, and which is not susceptible of ratification or confirmation. Its nullity cannot be waived. "A voidable act is one which is not absolutely void within itself, but which is binding until disaffirmed, and which may be made finally valid by failure within the proper time to have it annulled, or by subsequent ratification or confirmation." In Murchison, the Court found the judgment fraudulently obtained in the probate proceedings to be voidable, not void, holding the judgment of a court having jurisdiction, if so irregularly or erroneously rendered as to make it liable to be vacated by a direct proceeding for this purpose, or to be reversed on appeal or writ of error, is nevertheless valid until thus vacated or reversed. Other early Texas cases which uphold this distinction stated in Murchison are Wheeler v. Ahrenbeak, 54 Tex. 535 (1881); Cummings v. Powell, 8 Tex. 80 (1852); Burditt v. Howth, 45 Tex. 466 (1876); Fitch v. Boyer, 51 Tex. 336 at 344 (1879); Simmons v. Arnim, 110 Tex. 309, 220 S.W. 66 (1920). In similar situations in which a collateral attack is brought against a judgment, the judgment has been held to be voidable and not void. Moore v. Hanscom, 101 Tex. 293, 108 S.W. 150 (1908); White v. White, 142 Tex. 499, 179 S.W.2d 503 (1944). In Ex Parte Coffee, 160 Tex. 224, 328 S.W.2d 283 (1959), this Court held that judgments which are rendered without observance of statutory requirements which are purely procedural are not void, however irregular or erroneous they may be. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with the issuance and return of the mandate subsequent to judgment of remand in the Court of Civil Appeals are procedural and not necessary to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Continental Casualty Company v. Street, 364 S.W.2d 184 (Tex.1963). In Continental, the case had been retried and judgment entered before the mandate was taken out. This second judgment of the trial court upon remand was held not to be a void judgment. From December 4, 1969, the date of the original mandate, until February 12, 1971, the date the original mandate was recalled, a mandate was on file with the trial court in this cause. It was an unauthorized mandate, but was valid until recalled. In any event, Petitioner still had an additional year to pay the costs and obtain the issuance of a mandate after the date of recall of the mandate. At no time has there been a period of twelve months in which no mandate has been filed with the trial court, as required by Rule 445, T.R.C.P., as a basis for dismissal. The Corpus Court erred in holding that the mandate was void ab initio. Until the mandate was recalled by the Waco Court which had issued it erroneously before collection of appellate costs, the mandate was a lawful order of the Court upon which all parties could rely. Murchison v. White, supra. The judgments of the courts below are reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for new trial.
it	legislation	EU	Avis juridique important \| 31980R3466 Regolamento (CEE) n. 3466/80 della Commissione, del 30 dicembre 1980, che modifica, in seguito all' adesione della Grecia, il regolamento (CEE) n. 2374/79 relativo alla vendita a prezzo ridotto di taluni prodotti del settore delle carni bovine detenuti dagli organismi d' intervento a determinate istituzioni ed enti di carattere sociale Gazzetta ufficiale n. L 363 del 31/12/1980 pag. 0022 - 0024 edizione speciale greca: capitolo 03 tomo 32 pag. 0148 REGOLAMENTO (CEE) N. 3466/80 DELLA COMMISSIONE del 30 dicembre 1980 che modifica, in seguito all'adesione della Grecia, il regolamento (CEE) n. 2374/79 relativo alla vendita a prezzo ridotto di taluni prodotti del settore delle carni bovine detenuti dagli organismi d'intervento a determinate istituzioni ed enti di carattere sociale LA COMMISSIONE DELLE COMUNITÀ EUROPEE, visto il trattato che istituisce la Comunità economica europea, visto l'atto di adesione della Grecia (1), in particolare l'articolo 146, considerando che a norma dell'articolo 22 dell'atto di adesione, gli adattamenti degli atti indicati nell'elenco che figura nell'allegato II dell'atto di adesione sono effettuati conformemente agli orientamenti enunciati in detto allegato; considerando che il regolamento (CEE) n. 2374/79 della Commissione (2), relativo alla vendita a prezzo ridotto di taluni prodotti del settore delle carni bovine detenuti dagli organismi d'intervento a determinate istituzioni ed enti di carattere sociale, modificato da ultimo dal regolamento (CEE) n. 2468/80 (3), che è stato adottato dopo la firma del trattato di adesione e la cui validità si estende oltre il 1o gennaio 1981, deve essere adattato ai fini della sua concordanza con le disposizioni dell'atto d'adesione, HA ADOTTATO IL PRESENTE REGOLAMENTO: Articolo 1 L'allegato del regolamento (CEE) n. 2374/79 è sostituito dall'allegato del presente regolamento. Articolo 2 Il presente regolamento entra in vigore il 1o gennaio 1981. Il presente regolamento è obbligatorio in tutti i suoi elementi e direttamente applicabile in ciascuno degli Stati membri. Fatto a Bruxelles, il 30 dicembre 1980. Per la Commissione Finn GUNDELACH Vicepresidente (1) GU n. L 291 del 19.11.1979, pag. 17. (2) GU n. L 272 del 30.10.1979, pag. 16. (3) GU n. L 254 del 27.9.1980, pag. 16. >PIC FILE= "T0017754"> >PIC FILE= "T0017755">
nl	wikipedia	N/A	De Duitse herder is een herdershond die van oorsprong uit Duitsland komt. Het is een gebruikshond voor diverse doeleinden, maar ook geschikt als gezinshond. Uiterlijk De Duitse herder is doorgaans middelgroot, licht gestrekt en krachtig. Belangrijke verhoudingen in maat: de schofthoogte is volgens de rasstandaard tussen de 60 en 65 cm voor reuen, bij een teef is dit tussen de 55 en 60 cm. In de praktijk zijn er, voornamelijk in de showlijn, veel Duitse herders groter dan de rasstandaard voorschrijft. Reuen worden veelal gemeten tussen de 60 en 70 cm schofthoogte, en teven tussen de 55 en 63 cm schofthoogte. De romplengte overtreft de maat van de schofthoogte met ongeveer 10 tot 17%. Een reu weegt gemiddeld 30 tot 40 kg en een teef 22 tot 32 kg. De vachtkleur is overwegend zwart en (licht)bruin of (wolfs)grauw. Er zijn ook compleet zwarte Duitse herdershonden. Qua uiterlijk is er een groot verschil tussen de zogenaamde 'showlijnen' (kynologische lijn) en de meer oorspronkelijke 'werklijnen' (africhtingslijn). De showlijnen zijn bijna altijd zwart-rood met een aflopende rug, ze zijn ook groter en zwaarder. De werklijnen zijn meestal wat compacter en zijn in veel gevallen grauw of zwart van kleur. Aard De Duitse herdershond moet in zijn karakterbeeld evenwichtig, niet nerveus, zelfverzekerd, absoluut onbevangen en (zonder prikkeltoestand) volkomen goedaardig zijn. Daarbij is hij opmerkzaam en handelbaar. Hij moet moed, strijddrift en hardheid bezitten om als geleide-, waak-, verdedigings-, dienst-, en herdershond geschikt te zijn. Hij is echter wel dominant en moet daarom goed getraind worden. De hond is trouw aan zijn baas en kan meestal goed omgaan met kinderen. Training De Duitse herder wordt vaak gebruikt als blindengeleidehond, speurhond, waakhond en politiehond. Zij hebben behoefte aan uitdaging en in die behoefte wordt voorzien bij het vervullen van dergelijke rollen. Omdat de Duitse herders zo goed kunnen leren en gehoorzaam zijn, zijn ze ook voor de trainer tijdens de training een plezier om mee te werken. De Duitse herder kan prima overweg met soortgenoten, andere dieren en kinderen. Hij is trouw en heeft niet de neiging om weg te lopen. Een Duitse herder was de eerste hond die blindegeleidenhond werd. Ze heette Buddy en werd door een Zwitserse vrouw opgeleid met een hondentrainer. Beweging De hond heeft veel beweging nodig. Zo'n drie keer per dag uitlaten is genoeg, maar het kan ook vaker. Net als bijna alle andere door mensen gehouden dieren mogen ze tijdens de groei niet overbelast worden door te zware werkzaamheden. Duitse herders zijn doorgaans dol op spelen. Erfelijke ziekten In dit hondenras komt vaak de erfelijke ziekte heupdysplasie voor, waardoor de dieren spontaan letsels rond de heupkop (caput femoris) en het heupgewricht (acetabulum) ontwikkelen. Hierdoor gaan deze honden al op jonge leeftijd manken, waardoor dierenartsen ontstekingsremmers moeten voorschrijven. In een poging deze erfelijke ziekte weg te selecteren, worden röntgenfoto's gemaakt van de heupgewrichten van die dieren die als fokdier ingeschreven worden in een stamboek. De landelijke rasvereniging kent dan ook de fokgeschiktheidskeuring; dit is het belangrijkste evenement binnen de V.D.H. (Vereniging van Fokkers en Liefhebbers van Duitse Herdershonden). Hier worden de honden, door speciaal opgeleide keurmeesters, beoordeeld op onder meer karakter, exterieur, onbevangenheid etc. Alvorens men de hond op een fokgeschiktheidskeuring voor kan brengen moet deze aan een aantal toelatingseisen voldoen. Het is de taak van de rasvereniging zorgvuldig te waken tegen alle overdrijvingen in de fokkerij, africhting en het omgaan met Duitse herdershonden als het gaat om het gedrag en de aard en het karakter van deze dieren. Alle keurmeesters die met dit ras te maken hebben, hebben een verantwoordelijkheid; a. naar het ras b. naar de vereniging en leden c. naar de maatschappij. Dit geldt in grotere mate voor de verenigingen zelf. Een speciale verantwoordelijkheid hebben ook de fokkers. In alle gevallen waarin het beeld dat de Duitse herdershond een volkomen goedaardige, absoluut onbevangen, handelbare en opmerkzame hond is geweld wordt aangedaan dient ingegrepen te worden. Hierbij dienen alle verantwoordelijken: verenigingen, keurmeesters, fokkers, instructeurs en helpers, africhters en eigenaren zich bewust te zijn van de zorgvuldigheid die hen in het maatschappelijke verkeer betaamt. Zo moet de hond met goed gevolg geröntgend zijn, een uithoudingsvermogen diploma bezitten, een africhtingskenteken hebben (bijvoorbeeld IPO 1) en in het bezit zijn van minimaal de exterieur kwalificatie goed. Voldoet de hond aan deze eisen dan kan de keurmeester de hond in keurklasse l (aanbevolen voor de fok) of keurklasse II (geschikt voor de fok) plaatsen. Ook kan de keurmeester de hond ongeschikt vinden. Galerij Externe links Rasvereniging België Rasvereniging Nederland Hondenras Herdershond
it	other	N/A	Circolare con un'auto sottoposta a fermo amministrativo: quali rischi? - Polizialocale Questo articolo è stato letto 10.403 volte Circolare con un’auto sottoposta a fermo amministrativo: quali rischi? La Corte di Cassazione si occupa del caso di un uomo sorpreso alla guida di un autoveicolo che era sottoposto a sequestro amministrativo. Il fatto contestato, la circolazione con veicolo sottoposto a fermo amministrativo, integra l’illecito amministrativo di cui all’art. 213 C.d.S., e non anche la violazione di cui all’art. 334 C.P. Si può circolare con un’auto sottoposta a fermo amministrativo? Chi circola abusivamente con un veicolo sottoposto a sequestro amministrativo, ai sensi dell’art. 213 C.d.S., integra esclusivamente l’illecito amministrativo previsto dal quarto comma dello stesso articolo e non anche il delitto di “sottrazione di cose sottoposte a sequestro” di cui all’art. 334 C. P.. La norma sanzionatoria amministrativa risulta speciale rispetto a quella penale, con la conseguenza che il concorso tra le stesse deve essere ritenuto solo apparente. Secondo la giurisprudenza costante della Corte di Cassazione, non integra il reato di cui all’art. 334 C.P la condotta di chi circola abusivamente con il veicolo sottoposto a sequestro amministrativo, ai sensi dell’art. 213 C.d.S., integrando esclusivamente l’illecito amministrativo previsto dal quarto comma dello stesso articolo. Le pene per chi circola con un mezzo sottoposto a sequestro Chi circola con un veicolo durante il periodo in cui questo è sottoposto a sequestro amministrativo è punito con la sanzione amministrativa del pagamento di una somma da €2.006 a €8.025. Inoltre vedrà la sua patente sospesa per un periodo compreso fra gli uno e i tre mesi. Consulta la Sentenza n. 8851/2017, Corte di Cassazione
fr	legislation	EU	19 . 10 . 83 Journal officiel des Communautés européennes N0 L 286/ 17 REGLEMENT (CEE) N° 2901 /83 DE LA COMMISSION du 18 octobre 1983 fixant le montant de l'aide dans le secteur des graines oléagineuses LA COMMISSION DES COMMUNAUTÉS la Commission a connaissance conduit à modifier le EUROPÉENNES, montant de l'aide, actuellement en vigueur, conformé vu le traité instituant la Communauté économique ment à l'annexe du présent règlement, européenne, vu le règlement n0 136/66/CEE du Conseil, du A ARRÊTÉ LE PRÉSENT RÈGLEMENT : 22 septembre 1966, portant établissement d'une orga nisation commune des marchés dans le secteur des Article premier matières grasses ('), modifié en dernier lieu par le règlement (CEE) n0 1413/82 (2), et notamment son Le montant de l'aide visée à l'article 27 du règlement article 27 paragraphe 4, n0 136/66/ CEE est fixé à l'annexe . considérant que le montant de l'aide visée à l'article 27 du règlement n0 136/66/CEE a été fixé par le règle ment (CEE) n0 2866/83 (3) ; Article 2 considérant que l'application des modalités rappelées Le présent règlement entre en vigueur le 19 octobre dans le règlement (CEE) n0 2866/83 aux données dont 1983 . Le présent règlement est obligatoire dans tous ses éléments et directement applicable dans tout État membre . Fait à Bruxelles, le 18 octobre 1983 . Par la Commission Poul DALSAGER Membre de la Commission (! ) JO n° 172 du 30. 9. 1966, p. 3025/66. (2) JO n" L 162 du 12. 6 . 1982, p. 6 . M JO n° L 282 du 14. 10. 1983, p. 33. ---pagebreak--- N° L 286/ 18 Journal officiel des Communautés européennes 19 . 10 . 83 ANNEXE du règlement de la Commission , du 18 octobre 1983 , fixant le montant de l'aide dans le secteur des graines oléagineuses (en Écus / 100 kg) Numéro du tarif douanier Désignation des marchandises Montants de l'aide commun ex 12.01 Graines de colza et de navette 5,888 ex 12.01 Graines de tournesol 13,910 (en Écus / 100 kg) Montants de l'aide en cas de fixation à l'avance Numéro du pour le mois de tarif douanier Désignation des marchandises commun octobre novembre décembre janvier février mars 1983 1983 1983 1984 1984 1984 ex 12.01 Graines de colza et de navette 5,888 6,119 6,639 7,159 6,929 7,449 ex 12.01 Graines de tournesol 13,910 14,525 15,140 15,270 14,903
es	wikipedia	N/A	Las elecciones federales de Suiza de 2011 se celebraron el 23 de octubre. Se eligieron todos los miembros de la Asamblea Federal de Suiza, divididos en 200 representantes en el Consejo Nacional y 46 legisladores en el Consejo de los Estados. Sistema electoral Los 200 miembros del Consejo Nacional, fueron elegidos por mayoría en cinco circunscripciones uninominales, y por representación proporcional en 21 distritos electorales con múltiples miembros. Las 26 circunscripciones y distritos se asignaron de forma coincidente con los 26 cantones del país. Las elecciones se llevaron a cabo utilizando el sistema de listas abiertas, donde los votantes podían elegir los nombres presentes en las listas de partidos, los electores también pudieron repartir su voto entre varios candidatos de diferentes organizaciones (en un sistema conocido como panachage) o elaborar su propia lista en una boleta en blanco. Los asientos se asignan utilizando el sistema Hagenbach-Bischoff. Los 46 miembros del Consejo de los Estados fueron elegidos en 20 circunscripciones con dos representantes (representando a los 20 cantones) y seis circunscripciones de un solo miembro (representando a los seis semicantones). En el Jura y en Neuchâtel las elecciones se realizaron mediante representación proporcional, mientras que las 24 restantes utilizan el sistema mayoritario. Consejo Nacional Las elecciones para el consejo nacional fueron ganadas por la Unión Democrática de Centro (UDC), que obtuvo el 26.6% de los votos. En segundo lugar se colocó el Partido Socialista Suizo (PSS) con el 18.7%, mientras que el tercer sitio fue para el Partido Liberal Radical Suizo (PLR) que consiguió el 15.1% de los sufragios emitidos. Algunas fuentes interpretaron los resultados como un giro hacia el centro político después de una legislatura que estuvo marcada por el dominio de la derecha. En esta votación debutaron dos partidos: el Partido Burgués Democrático (PBD), escindido de la UDC, y los Verdes Liberales (VLib), ambas organizaciones políticas obtuvieron un porcentaje de votación del 5.4%. Lo que les permitió crear su propio grupo parlamentario. Se destacó además una pérdida de votos en los tres partidos más importantes del panorama político suizo, la Unión Democrática de Centro cayó del 28.9 al 26.6%, lo que significó una pérdida de 2.3 puntos porcentuales. Los socialistas suizos pasaron del 19.5 al 18.7%, lo que representó un decrecimiento de ocho décimas porcentuales. Mientras que los liberales radicales pasaron del 15.8 al 15.1%, una caída de siete décimas respecto a las elecciones de 2007. En el caso de los partidos pequeños, es decir, aquellos que consiguen menos de cinco escaños, se destacaron el Partido Popular Evangélico (PPE), que consiguió un 2.0% de las votaciones; la Liga de Tesino recibió el 0.8% de los votos y consiguió su primer asiento en la cámara baja. El Partido Social Cristiano perdió un escaño, pero ganó otro para permanecer en el Consejo Nacional, mientras que la Unión Democrática Federal y el Partido Suizo del Trabajo perdieron sus escaños. Otros grupos minoritarios que reunieron más del 0,1% del voto popular fueron: el Partido Pirata Suizo (0,48%), los Demócratas suizos (0,20%), Parteifrei.ch (0,19%) y Tierpartei Schweiz (Partido Animalista) (0,15%). Resultados Consejo de los Estados Las elecciones del Consejo de los Estados se realizaron mediante un sistema plural de votaciones. 27 de los 46 escaños se determinaron en la primera votación, celebrada el 23 de octubre; los restantes 19 escaños se decidieron en una segunda votación en noviembre. Referencias Elecciones en Suiza Suiza Suiza en 2011
cs	wikipedia	N/A	Camille Pissarro (rodným jménem Jacob Abraham Camille Pissarro; 10. července 1830 Charlotte Amalie – 13. listopadu 1903 Le Havre) byl francouzský impresionistický malíř. Jeho význam není jen v jeho vlastním přínosu pro umění, ale také v jeho patronském přístupu k dalším umělcům kolem něj, zvláště k Paulu Cézannovi. Život a dílo Dětství Narodil se na Ostrově svatého Tomáše v Malých Antilách v Karibském moři, východně od Portorika. Ostrov patřil Dánsku, od něhož jej roku 1860 koupily Spojené státy americké. Dnes tvoří součást Panenských ostrovů (Virgin Islands). Jeho otec Frederick Pissarro byl francouzský Žid, zatímco matka Rachel, rozená Manzano-Pomié, byla rodilá Kreolka. Jejich sňatek způsobil rozruch v místní židovské komunitě, jednak proto, že Rachel nebyla židovka, ale také proto, že byla dříve vdaná za Frederickova strýce. Mladý Camille Pissarro proto nesměl studovat v židovské škole a byl nucen navštěvovat školu pro černošské děti, což později ovlivnilo jeho ranou tvorbu. Rodina Pissarrových provozovala v hlavním městě ostrova Charlotte Amalie galanterii. Dům, ve kterém se rodinný obchod nacházel, byl později pojmenován The Pissarro Building a je v ulici Dronnigens Gade 14. Rodina žila v rozlehlém apartmá ve vrchním patře budovy s výhledem na hlavní ulici městečka. Pro malé přístavní městečko Charlotte Amelie byla tato doba plná vzruchu. Tucty obchodních lodí zde zastavovaly každý týden se zbožím na prodej. Město v té době mělo status „svobodného přístavu“. Díky tomu a příznivým povětrnostním podmínkám se Ostrov sv. Tomáše stal významným překladištěm mezi Amerikami, Evropou a Afrikou. Tak jako byly rozdílné trasy obchodních lodí, byly rozdílní lidé a kultury, které se na ostrově setkávaly. Doma v rodině mluvil Camille jako dítě francouzsky, zatímco s černošským obyvatelstvem ostrova španělsky či anglicky. Internátní škola v Paříži Rodiče jej ve věku 12 let poslali do internátní školy v Paříži. Zdejší ředitel si povšiml jeho zájmu o umění a poradil mu, ať využije života v tropech ke kreslení kokosových palem. Když se Camille v roce 1847 vrátil na Ostrov sv. Tomáše, vzal si tuto radu k srdci. Věnoval svůj veškerý volný čas skicování - a to nejen palem a dalších exotických rostlin, ale i všedního života, který ho obklopoval. Zas a znova kreslil povozy, které po slunných cestách tahali osli, či černošské ženy, které na plážích praly prádlo. V těchto kresbách se poprvé objevila jeho povaha prostého a upřímného pozorovatele.Kdykoli ho otec poslal do přístavu, aby dohlížel na příjezdy obchodních lodí, bral si mladý Camille svůj skicář s sebou. Mezitím, co zapisoval počty beden se zbožím, které byly z lodí vykládány, kreslil skici barvitého života v přístavu a lodí, proplouvajících kolem dánských pevností na pobřeží. Celých pět let se nadějný umělec snažil najít rovnováhu mezi každodenními povinnostmi a svým koníčkem. Protože se mu nepodařilo získat od rodičů požehnání k tomu, aby svůj život zasvětil umění, utekl z domova a za sebou zanechal pouze vzkaz pro rodiče. Ve společnosti Fritze Melbeye, dánského malíře z Kodaně, se kterým se Camille potkal v přístavu, odplul do Venezuely. Jak později sám řekl: "Dal jsem se na útěk do Caracasu, abych se zbavil předsudků pramenících z buržoazního života." Útěk z domova a cesta do Venezuely Člověk si může lehce představit potěšení, které Camille pociťoval ve svých třiadvaceti letech z náhle nabyté svobody. Pro mladého umělce to byl čas snění, objevování a růstu. Pod Melbeyovým dohledem tvořil vodovými barvami, tužkou a tuší; mnoho děl z této doby je popsáno ve španělštině a podepsáno Pizzarro. Rodiče se nakonec smířili s jeho ambicemi a přislíbili mu podporu do roku 1852. Camille se vrátil na Ostrov sv. Tomáše, ale hned nato opět svůj domov opustil. Odjel do Paříže za dalším vzděláním a také, aby konečně šel za svým snem. Začátky v Paříži Protože na přednáškách akademicky uznávaných učitelů nenacházel žádnou inspiraci, přitahovaly ho okrajové umělecké směry a umělci, jejichž díla se neshodovala se styly přijímanými širokou veřejností. V jejich dílech začal vidět výjevy, které vystihují umělce stejně výmluvně jako jeho dílo. Jeho zrak byl veden způsobem, jakým se scenérie a předměty odrážely v mysli. Každou stránku předlohy zaznamenával ve svém díle věrně, zvláště světelné podmínky. Pissarro chápal světlo jako neoddělitelné od předmětů, které osvětluje. Většina odborníků na umění té doby nepochopila význam těchto změn a výrazné odlišnosti od tehdejší klasiky. Zastánci takzvané „staré školy“ zkoumali nové směry pouze z technického hlediska – zrnitost, kterou se nová díla vyznačovala, označovali za chybu malíře. Nalezení svého osobního vyjádření bylo pro mladého umělce velmi složité. Během období, kdy byl Camille ke svým dílům velmi kritický, se záměrně distancoval od svých učitelů Melbeye a Camille Corota, aby se oprostil od jejich vlivu na vlastní tvorbu. Poté nastala náhlá změna. Náhodná setkání s Monetem a Cézannem, jejichž prostřednictvím získal mnoho nových známostí, přinesla do jeho tvorby nový vhled a povzbuzení.Několik let poté, co Camille přijel do Paříže, svěřili rodiče rodinný podnik správci a usadili se také v Paříži, kde si najali služku jménem Julie Vellay, která se později stala umělcovým největším obdivovatelem a celoživotní partnerkou. Snaha o nezávislost Znechuceni marnými pokusy vypořádat se s nevlídnou kritikou organizátorů oficiálních výstav, rozhodli se Pissarro a Monet v roce 1874 organizovat nezávislé výstavy, kterých se později účastnili i umělci jako Auguste Renoir, Alfred Sisley, Armand Guillaumin, Edgar Degas, Paul Cézanne a Berthe Morisot. Umělečtí kritikové se někdy zaměřují na nové a neznámé jako na něco škodlivého, a tak se i Pissarro a jeho kolegové setkali s bouřlivou opozicí. Umělecká společnost, která si v tomto období vážila technických detailů a fotografické přesnosti, očekávala od umělců, že budou své náměty idealizovat. Proto byly první výstavy doprovázeny ostře kritickými články, které poprvé uvedly termín „impresionista“ (od impression, dojem) jako urážku. Přijetí těchto umělců širokou veřejností bylo velmi pozvolné, stěží dosažené za jejich života. Pissarro ve středu impresionistického hnutí V Rewaldově knize můžeme najít fascinující záznam těchto let. Výzvy v Pissarrově životě byly stejně náročné jako ty, se kterými se setkávalo hnutí, soustředěné kolem jeho osoby. Byl to muž, který se postavil překážkám se silou a důstojností. Mnoho let impresionisté, i přes materiální nouzi, usilovali o získání uznání ve společnosti a ve světě. Pissarro, jako jejich vlajkonoš, zůstával věrný i svým vlastním vizím. Umělecké experimenty Experimentoval s teoriemi umění, studoval vlivy světla, klimatu a ročních období a přinesl nové techniky do umění. Tyto poznatky spojil v nový styl, který si i v rámci impresionismu zachoval svoji originalitu a svébytnost. Pissarro byl mimořádně uznávaný jako učitel. Stal se středem skupiny malířů – Auguste Renoir, Claude Monet, Edgar Degas, Paul Cézanne –, kteří si všichni vážili jeho umění a často se k němu obraceli pro inspiraci. Pissarro se díky této velkorysosti ducha významně zasloužil o věhlas impresionistů. Uznání na sklonku života V 62 letech konečně získal vážnost, která se mu po celý život vyhýbala. Jeho obrazy postupně začaly získávat větší ceny na aukcích a nová generace umělců velmi obdivovala jeho dílo. Pissarro nikdy neztratil svou schopnost udržet si nadšení, lásku k přírodě a schopnost zachytit zářivý život kolem na plátno s nezapomenutelnou jasností a půvabem. Camille Pissaro zůstal aktivním a produktivním malířem až do konce svého života. Zemřel 13. listopadu 1903 v Paříži. Pochován je zde na hřbitově Père-Lachaise. Přežili ho synové Lucien, Georges, Ludovic-Rodolphe, Paul Emile a dcera Jeanne. Základní životopisná data 1842–1847 navštěvoval školu v Passy u Paříže, začínal kreslit. 1847–1852 pracoval v rodinném obchodě na Ostrově sv. Tomáše. 1852–1854 spolu s dánským malířem Fritzem Melby pobýval v Caracasu. 1855 vrátil se domů a v říjnu odjel do Paříže, kde maloval krajiny ovlivněné tvorbou Camille Corota. 1859–1861 navštěvoval soukromou školu Académie Suisse v Paříži, kde poznal Moneta a Cézanna. 1860 seznámil se s Julií Velleyovou, s níž se oženil 1871. Měli spolu 7 dětí. 1863 narodil se jeho nejstarší syn Lucien, později rovněž malíř. 1866 přestěhoval se do Pontoise, dnes severozápadní předměstí Paříže. 1869 přestěhoval se do Louveciennes na západním předměstí Paříže. 1870–1871 během prusko-francouzské války žil v Londýně. Po návratu domů zjistil, že se z 1500 jeho a Monetových obrazů dochovalo jen 40. Prusové, kteří Louveciennes okupovali, plátna používali jako řeznické zástěry. 1872–1878 žil opět v Pontoise, maloval společně s Cézannem a Armandem Guillauminem. 1874–1877 zajížděl malovat ke svému příteli, malíři Ludovicu Piette, do Bretaně. 1877 spolupráce s Gauguinem. 1882–1884 žil v Osny na severozápadním předměstí Paříže. 1884 přestěhoval se do Éragny-sur-Epte v Normandii, kde pobýval až do konce života. Narodil se jeho nejmladší syn Paul-Emile. 1885 poznal Signaca a Seurata. Pod jejich vlivem až do roku 1891 maloval ve stylu pointilismu. Příklon k anarchismu. 1888 počátek oční choroby. 1890 v Londýně navštívil syna Luciena, pak ještě 1892 a 1897. 1894 odjel do Belgie ze strachu před pronásledováním anarchisty. 1894–1903 maloval urbánní motivy v Rouenu, Paříži, Dieppe a Le Havre, vzhledem k oční nemoci zpravidla z oken hotelových apartmánů. 1903 zemřel a byl pohřben na Hřbitově Père-Lachaise v Paříži. Výstavy Kolektivní Na Salony byly jeho obrazy přijaty v letech 1859, 1864, 1865, 1866, 1868, 1869 a 1870. Roku 1863 vystavoval na Salónu odmítnutých. Jako jediný umělec se zúčastnil všech osmi kolektivních výstav impresionistů v letech 1874, 1876, 1877, 1879, 1880, 1881, 1882 a 1886. V roce 1889 zastoupen na stoleté přehlídce francouzského umění na světové výstavě v Paříži a vystavoval s avantgardní skupinou Dvacet v Bruselu. Samostatné 1883 první samostatná výstava v Galerii Durand-Ruel v Paříži. 1886 v Galerii Durand-Ruel v New Yorku. 1892 v Galerii Durand-Ruel v Paříži. Retrospektiva, vystaveno 70 obrazů. Velký úspěch, zlom v přijímání Pissarrova díla veřejností i kritikou. Zastoupení v České republice Národní galerie v Praze vystavuje ve Sbírce moderního a současného umění ve Veletržním paláci tři Pissarovy olejomalby: Pontoise (1867), Zahrada ve Val Hermeil (1880) a V zelinářské zahradě (1881). Galerie Odkazy Reference Literatura Pissarro, Ludovic Rodo, Pissarro: son Art – son Oeuvre. Catalogue Raisonné, 2 díly, P. Rosenberg, Paris 1931 Doma ani sou. Camille Pissarro: Dopisy synu Lucienovi, přel. Smetanová, Věra, Obelisk, Praha 1970 Rewald, John, Camille Pissarro. Letters to his son Lucien, Mamaroneck, New York 1972, Adler, Kathleen, Camille Pissarro: a Biography, St. Martin’s Press, London 1978, Protiva, Josef (ed.), Otec Pissarro: Autoportrét z dopisů, Dilia, Praha 1978 Shikes, Ralph – Harper, Paula, Camille Pissarro. His life and Work, Horizon Press, New York 1980, Camille Pissarro 1830–1903, Hayward Gallery London, Grand Palais Paris, Museum of Fine Arts Boston 1981 (výstavní katalog), Brettell, Richard, Pissarro and Pontoise: the Painter in a Landscape, Yale University Press, New Haven 1990, Thomson, Richard, Camille Pissarro. Impressionism, Landscape and Rural Labour, South Bank Centre, London 1990 (výstavní katalog), Bernard, Bruce (red.), Velcí impresionisté. Praha: Grafoprint-Neubert, 1997 - 269 s. : Související články Impresionismus Postimpresionismus Externí odkazy Kolekce obrazů Porovnání obrazů Cézanna a Pissarra Stránka věnovaná Pissarrovi s údajně kompletním dílem Další stránka věnovaná Pissarrovi Pissarro na české stránce Artmuseum.cz Životopis v angličtině Reprodukce obrazů na české stránce Stránka s fotografiemi Pissarra Narození 1830 Úmrtí 1903 Francouzští malíři Impresionističtí malíři Židovští malíři Muži Anarchističtí výtvarníci Narození 10. července Pohřbení na Père Lachaise Dánové francouzského původu
fi	other	N/A	⭐Nuorten parlamentin toiminta Raportti EDUSKUNTA HELSINKI Nuorten parlamentin toiminta Raportti EDUSKUNTA HELSINKI Download "Nuorten parlamentin toiminta 2013-2014 Raportti EDUSKUNTA HELSINKI" 1 Nuorten parlamentin toiminta Raportti EDUSKUNTA HELSINKI2 Nuorten parlamentin toiminta Raportti EDUSKUNTA HELSINKI 20153 4 Sisältö Johdanto 5 Nuorten parlamentin toiminnan koordinointi 5 Toiminta vuonna Nuorten parlamentin kerhotilaisuus Nuorten parlamentin kerhotilaisuus Politiikkaa ruohonjuuritasolla -kerhomateriaali 9 Act now! -pelin kehittäminen 9 Nuorteneduskunta.fi -sivuston uudistus 10 Toiminta vuonna Kansanedustajat kouluissa -teemaviikon järjestelyihin osallistuminen 11 Nuorten parlamentin istuntopäivä Nuorten parlamentin toiminnan esittely Seminaari Pietarissa Nuorten parlamentti -esite 21 Nuorten parlamentin toiminnan tiedotus 22 Nuorten parlamentin toiminnan arviointi 23 Summary 28 LIITE 1 Nuorten parlamentin mainos koulun käyttöön LIITE 2 Nuorten parlamenttiin 2014 ilmoittautuneet koulut vaalipiireittäin LIITE 3 Nuorten parlamentin istuntopäivän ohjelma5 TEKSTI: Kristiina Hakala & Tiina Karhuvirta KANNEN KUVA: Hanne Salonen/Eduskunta Taulukoiden koonti: Tiina Karhuvirta Summary: Notaatio Oy ISSN (verkkojulkaisu)6 Johdanto Nuorten parlamentti on peruskoulun yläluokkien oppilaille tarkoitettua toimintaa. Nuorten parlamentin tavoitteet ovat: tukea lasten ja nuorten osallistumista ja osallisuutta edistää lasten ja nuorten kiinnostusta yhteiskunnalliseen toimintaan, erityisesti eduskuntaan kehittää toimintoja nuorten kuulemis- ja vaikutusmahdollisuuksien pa rantamiseksi Nuorten parlamentti toteutetaan eduskunnan ja Kehittämiskeskus Opinkirjon yhteistyönä. Vuosittain järjestetään kerholaistilaisuuksia ajankohtaisista yhteiskunnallisista aiheista. Toiminta huipentuu joka toinen vuosi eduskunnassa järjestettävään Nuorten parlamentin täysistuntoon, joka toteutetaan suullisena kyselytuntina. Istuntopäivään osallistuu noin 300 nuorta ja 100 kerhonohjaajaa. Tämä raportti kokoaa Nuorten parlamentti -toiminnan tapahtumat vuosina Raporttiin on kirjattu tilaisuudet, tapahtumat ja muu toiminta pääpiirteittäin ja Nuorten parlamentin täysistunnon kulku keväällä Raporttiin sisältyy myös Nuorten parlamentin istuntoa 2014 varten lähetettyjen suullisten kysymysten koonti ja arviointi, istunnon ja muun Nuorten parlamentti -toiminnan kokonaisarvioinnin tulosten läpikäynti sekä kooste tiedotustoiminnasta. Nuorten parlamentin toiminnan koordinointi Nuorten parlamentti -toimintaa koordinoidaan yhteistyössä eduskunnan ja Kehittämiskeskus Opinkirjon kesken. Koordinointi on tapahtunut joustavasti ja hyvässä yhteishengessä. Keskeisimpinä toimintamuotoina ovat olleet edelleen yläkoulujen parlamenttikerhot 8.- ja 9.-luokkalaisille, kerholaistilaisuudet, erilaiset muut tapahtumat ja joka toinen vuosi järjestettävä Nuorten parlamentin täysistunto. Toimintaa kehitetään ja suunnitellaan Nuorten parlamentti -työryhmässä. Työnjako ja vastuut on sovittu erikseen. Kehittämishankkeita varten on voitu kutsua koolle erillisiä työpajoja. 57 Nykyiseen, vuosiksi nimettyyn Nuorten parlamentti työryhmään kuuluvat johtava tietoasiantuntija Kristiina Hakala, Eduskunnan kirjasto, puheenjohtaja, varahenkilönä johtava tietoasiantuntija Timo Turja, Eduskunnan kirjasto erityisasiantuntija Tiina Karhuvirta, Kehittämiskeskus Opinkirjo, sihteeri tiedottaja Aki Asola, eduskuntatiedotus, jäsen tutkija Joni Krekola, Eduskunnan kirjasto, jäsen erityissuunnittelija Tiina Rytkölä, Kehittämiskeskus Opinkirjo, jäsen, asti erityisasiantuntija Marjo Kenttälä, Kehittämiskeskus Opinkirjo, jäsen, alkaen Kristiina Hakala Kuva: Hanne Salonen/Eduskunta Tiina Karhuvirta Marjo Kenttälä Kuva: Heidi-Hanna Karhu Aki Asola Kuva: Hanne Salonen/Eduskunta Tiina Rytkölä Kuva: Heidi-Hanna Karhu Marjo Kenttälä Kuva: Heidi-Hanna Karhu Joni Krekola Kuva: Hanne Salonen/Eduskunta 68 Toiminta vuonna 2013 Nuorten parlamentin kerholaistilaisuus Eduskunta, Kehittämiskeskus Opinkirjo (aikaisemmin Kerhokeskus - koulutyön tuki ry) ja Valtikka järjestivät eduskunnan Pikkuparlamentin auditoriossa keskustelutilaisuuden nuorille ja eduskunnan sivistysvaliokunnan jäsenille. Käytössä oli Learning cafe -menetelmä. Keskusteluteemat koottiin tälläkin kertaa nuorten itse ehdottamista aiheista. Learning cafe -kierroksilla käsiteltiin seuraavia teemoja: koulu ja opetus syrjäytymisen ehkäisy ihmisoikeudet ympäristö nuorisotakuu lähidemokratia koulussa ja kunnassa Pöytäryhmien kirjurit olivat Opinkirjosta ja Allianssista. Kansanedustajista mukana olivat Raija Vahasalo (kok), Leena Harkimo (kok), Kimmo Kivelä (ps), Aino- Kaisa Pehkonen (vas), Simo Rundgren (kesk), Kike Elomaa (ps), Outi Alanko- Kahiluoto (vihr) ja Inkeri Kerola (kesk). Keskustelujen tulos koottiin tilaisuuden päätteeksi ja julkaistiin Nuorteneduskunta.fi verkkosivustolla. Tilaisuuteen osallistui kaikkiaan luokkalaista opettajineen. Tilaisuudesta koottiin oppilaspalaute lomakkeilla ja opettajapalaute sähköisesti. Oppilaspalautteen mukaan tilaisuus oli kiinnostava, aiheet mielenkiintoisia sekä kansanedustajien ja nuorten välinen keskustelu onnistunutta. Opettajapalautteissa harmiteltiin kansanedustajien vähäistä määrää ja sitoutumisen vähäisyyttä. Eräs palautteen antaja totesi kuitenkin, että vaikka hän on ollut useasti mukana, nyt oppilaiden innostus oli ennenkuulumaton. Nähtävästi työryhmissä oli ollut tosi hyvä tunnelma. Kerholaistilaisuudessa Kuva: Tiina Karhuvirta 79 Nuorten parlamentin kerholaistilaisuus Jyväskylässä toteutettiin työpaja Nuorten parlamentin kerholaistilaisuutena yhdessä Keski-Suomen Nuorisofoorumin (NÄKS) ja Nuorten Keski-Suomi ry:n kanssa. Se liittyi valmisteilla olleeseen demokratiapoliittiseen selontekoon, jonka työstämiseen osallistui myös Kansalaisyhteiskunnan neuvottelukunnan osallisuusjaosto. Ryhmätyö toteutettiin unelmointitekniikalla tuottamalla kollaasi aiheesta. Työpajan aikana työstettiin kolmea teemaa: kuntapäätöksentekoon vaikuttaminen virallisen järjestelmän kautta (lasten parlamentit, nuorisovaltuustot ja muut tämänkaltaiset toiminnot) nuorten vaikuttaminen lautakunnissa kunnan asioihin vaikuttaminen muiden keinojen avulla Työpajojen koonti toimitettiin oikeusministeriön KANEn jaoston pu heenjohtajalle ja julkaistiin Nuorten parlamentin facebook-sivulla. Osallistujia oli 53. Työpajassa Kuva: Mia Harja 810 Politiikkaa ruohonjuuritasolla -kerhomateriaali Nuorten parlamentin kerhotoiminnan tueksi Kehittämiskeskus Opinkirjo tuotti materiaalin Politiikkaa ruohonjuuritasolla. Materiaali työstettiin yhdessä Maija Hirvosen, Mika Matilaisen, Tommi Eränpalon ja Aloitekanavan henkilöiden kanssa. Kerhomateriaali koostui kahdesta teemasta. Politiikan virtuaalivarjostaminen on ajateltu toteutettavaksi Nuorten parlamenttiin valmistauduttaessa ja Politiikan nuuskinta taas niinä lukuvuosina, kun kerho ei valmistaudu täysistuntoon. Aloitekanava-osion tavoitteena on rohkaista kerhoja vaikuttamaan haluamiensa asioiden puolesta omassa kunnassaan. Kerhoille ideoitiin myös lämppäriharjoituksia, joiden tavoite oli erottaa kerhotunnit normaaleista oppitunneista. Materiaalissa muistutettiin ohjaajia myös lapsen oikeuksista osana ihmisoikeuskasvatusta. Materiaalin osana julkaistiin mainos kerhonohjaajien käyttöön (liite 1). Materiaali julkaistiin sähköisenä. Act now! -pelin kehittäminen Rehtori Tommi Eränpalo Moision koulusta on ideoinut Nuorten parlamentti -toiminnan osana yhteiskunnalliseen vaikuttamiseen liittyvän pelin. Pelin kehittäminen oli osa kansainvälistä projektitoimintaa. Pelaamisesta tehtiin tutkimusta, jonka tuloksista julkaistiin kaksi tieteellistä artikkelia. Pelin tavoitteena on tukea nuoria keskustelemaan yhteiskunnallisista teemoista omista lähtökohdistaan käsin. Opinkirjo tuotteisti pelin suomeksi, ruotsiksi ja norjaksi yhteispohjoismaisella rahoituksella. Moision koulussa kehitettiin peli yhteiskunnallisesta vaikuttamisesta Kuva: Riikka Kuusisto-Kajander 911 Nuorteneduskunta.fi -sivuston uudistus Nuorteneduskunta.fi -verkkosivusto osoitteessa uudistettiin vuonna Sivuston kautta voi tutustua lakien säätämiseen ja eduskunnan muihin tehtäviin. Näkyvimmät sivuston muutokset koskivat visuaalisuutta, mutta myös sisältöjä muokattiin ja järjestettiin uudelleen. Tarkoituksena oli saada sivustosta yhtenäisempi ja helppokäyttöisempi. Uudella alustalla oli myös mahdollista julkaista nuorillekin hyödyllistä säännöllisen valtiopäivätoiminnan 150-juhlavuoteen liittyvää aineistoa. Verkkosivustolla on julkaistu mm. Alla armahan lakimme - Valtiopäivät verkkonäyttely sekä Demokratian polku - lyhytelokuvia edustuksellisesta kansanvallasta. Sivusto toimi jälleen myös Nuorten parlamentti verkkosivustona. Sen kautta jaettiin istuntopäivään liittyvää tietoa, ohjeistusta ja aineistoja. 1012 Toiminta vuonna 2014 Kansanedustajat kouluissa -teemaviikon järjestelyihin osallistuminen Nuorten parlamentti -toiminnan aktiivikouluille ja ohjaajille tiedotettiin aktiivisesti Opetushallituksen koordinoima Kansanedustajat kouluissa -teemaviikko. Parlamenttikerhoja kannustettiin toimimaan mukana koulun teemaviikon järjestelyissä ja tuomaan esille nuorten toiveita kansanedustajatapaamisten toteuttamiseksi. Otalammen koulun kerho kirjoitti järjestelyistä ja tilaisuudesta blogikirjoitukset Nuorten parlamentti -blogiin. Teemaviikko oli esillä myös Nuorten parlamentin facebook-sivulla. Otalammen koulun oppilaita valmistautumassa kansanedustajatapaamiseen Kuva: Katri Tanskanen Nuorten parlamentin istuntopäivä Valmistautuminen Nuorten parlamentin istuntopäivää varten Nuorten parlamentin istuntopäivän valmistelu yhteistyössä eduskunnan ja Opinkirjon kesken tapahtuu paljolti Nuorten parlamentin työryhmässä, mutta lisäksi eduskunnasta ovat mukana tieto- ja viestintäyksikkö, keskuskanslia, valiokuntasihteeristö, turvallisuusyksikkö ja virastopalvelut. Valmistautuminen Nuorten parlamentin vuoden 2014 istuntopäivään aloitettiin jo keväällä Tuolloin eduskunnan puhemiesneuvosto teki päätöksen istunnon ajankohdasta. Elokuussa 2013 postitettiin kaikille Suomen yläkouluille Ahvenanmaa mukaan lukien eduskunnan puhemiehen kutsukirje tulevaan istuntoon. Ilmoittautumisaika istuntoon alkoi elokuussa Varsinainen tiiviimpi valmistautuminen työryhmässä ja eduskunnan yksiköiden kanssa aloitettiin syksyllä Valiokuntien kanssa neuvoteltiin oppilasedustajille suunnattavan tilaisuuden luonteesta ja sisällöstä. Sovittiin myös mukaan tulevista seitsemästä valiokunnasta. 1113 Nuorten parlamentin työryhmässä suunniteltiin sisällöt muihin tilaisuuksiin ja hiottiin päivän kulkua. Marraskuussa työryhmä päätti edustajapaikkajaosta. Koska ilmoittautuneita kouluja oli yli sata, vain yhden edustajapaikan saaneet koulut arvottiin. Kun edustajapaikkatiedot ilmoitettiin kouluille, niihin lähti samalla myös ensimmäinen laajempi tietopaketti. Koulujen osallistujien nimet ilmoitettiin helmikuun alkuun 2014 mennessä. Koulut ja parlamenttikerhot päättävät itse edustajiensa valintatavan istuntoon. Istuntoon lähetettävien suullisten kysymysten viimeinen jättöaika oli myös helmikuun alussa. Suullisten kysymysten läpikäynti, alustava valinta, äänestysjärjestelyt ja lopullisen päiväjärjestyksen laatiminen olivat istuntoa valmistelevien osalta ajallisesti ja sisällöllisesti haastavimmat tehtävät. Jokaisella oppilasedustajalla oli mahdollisuus lähettää etukäteen yksi kysymys istunnossa vastattavaksi. Kaikista saaduista 166 kysymyksestä valittiin 35 päiväjärjestykseen. Kysymysten valintaan osallistettiin myös nuoret itse verkkoäänestyksen avulla. Lisäksi kysymysten valinnassa käytetään aina tiettyjä kriteerejä: kysymyksiä valitaan eri ministerien toimialoilta huomioidaan kysymysten alueellinen jakautuminen, jokaisesta edustettu na olevasta vaalipiiristä valitaan vähintään yksi kysymys kummankin sukupuolen kysymyksiä mukaan mukaan otetaan sekä suomen- että ruotsinkielisiä kysymyksiä Viimeisen tietopaketin osallistuvat koulut saivat kahta viikkoa ennen istuntopäivää. Myös tiedotusta lisättiin helmi-maaliskuussa. Istuntopäivä Nuorten parlamentti kokoontui 9. kerran perjantaina klo eduskunnan täysistuntosalissa. Nuorten parlamentin istuntopäivään osallistui 199 oppilasedustajan lisäksi 111 toimittajaoppilasta ja 120 opettajaa 120 yläkoulusta ympäri Suomen (liite 2). Istuntopäivä oli täynnä ohjelmaa (liite 3), mutta sen kohokohta oli Nuorten parlamentin täysistunto, joka toteutettiin perinteisesti suullisena kyselytuntina. Täysituntosalin täytti 199 koulujen parlamenttikerhojen keskuudestaan valitsemaa oppilasedustajaa. Oppilasedustajat istuivat kansanedustajien paikoilla. Puhetta johti eduskunnan puhemies Eero Heinäluoma. Suomen hallituksen 19 ministeristä 14 oli paikalla vastaamassa nuorten kysymyksiin. 35 päiväjärjestyksen kysymyksestä istunnossa ehdittiin käsitellä 23 kysymystä. Uutta tällä kertaa oli, että äänestyksiä oli yhden sijaan neljä. Seuraavista kysymyksistä äänestettiin: euro-valuutassa pysyminen, historian opetuksen pakollisuus lukioissa, mopoautojen nopeusrajoituksen nostaminen sekä kesä- ja talviajan tarpeellisuus. Äänestykset toivat istuntoon elävyyttä, ja tällä tavalla kaikki saivat osallistua aiempaa enemmän, vaikka kaikki eivät voineetkaan ajan rajallisuuden vuoksi esittää omaa kysymystään. Istunto oli kaiken kaikkiaan hyvin asiapitoinen, mutta toisaalta elävä ja rento tilaisuus. 1214 Istunnon jälkeen siirryttiin vastaanotolle, jonka eduskunnan puhemies tarjosi kaikille osallistujille ja kutsuvieraille. Vastaanotolla nuoret jatkoivat aktiivisesti keskusteluja kansanedustajien ja ministereiden kanssa. Vastaanoton jälkeen osallistujille oli lisäksi varattu aikaa ja tiloja erillisiin tapaamisiin kansanedustajien kanssa. Tapaamiset on aina koettu hyvin tärkeiksi. Saadussa palautteessa toivottiin myös yhä useamman kansanedustajan osallistuvan Nuorten parlamentin istuntopäivään. Aamupäivän aikana pidettiin myös erilliset tilaisuudet eri osallistujaryhmille. Oppilasedustajat tutustuivat valiokuntiin, seitsemän eduskunnan valiokuntaa oli ilmoittautunut mukaan. Osa valiokunnista oli samoja kuin vuonna 2012, mutta osa uusia. Mukana olivat suuri valiokunta, valtiovarainvaliokunta, hallintovaliokunta, puolustusvaliokunta, sivistysvaliokunta, sosiaali- ja terveysvaliokunta ja tulevaisuusvaliokunta. Valiokunnista olivat paikalla valiokunnan puheenjohtajana toimiva kansanedustaja ja valiokunnan virkamiessihteeri. Nuorille kerrottiin valiokuntien tehtävistä ja roolista eduskuntatyössä. Osassa valiokuntia mukailtiin oikeaa valiokuntakokousta, toisissa keskityttiin keskusteluun ja nuorten kysymyksiin. Suuren valiokunnan, eduskunnan EU-valiokunnan, osalta tarjoutui mainio mahdollisuus, kun tilaisuuteen saatiin mukaan Suomessa tuolloin vieraillut Euroopan parlamentin puhemies Martin Schulz. Nuoret haastoivat ihailtavan aktiivisesti Schulzia erilaisilla kysymyksillä. Euroopan parlamentin puhemies Martin Schulz Kuva: Hanne Salonen/Eduskunta 1315 Valiokunnat Valiokunnat Oppilaita Suuri valiokunta SuV 59 puheenjohtaja Miapetra Kumpula-Natri Valtiovarainvaliokunta VaV 40 puheenjohtaja Kimmo Sasi Hallintovaliokunta HaV 20 valiokunnan jäsen Tapani Mäkinen Puolustusvaliokunta PuV 20 puheenjohtaja Jussi Niinistö Sivistysvaliokunta SiV 20 puheenjohtaja Raija Vahasalo Sosiaali- ja terveysvaliokunta StV 20 puheenjohtaja Juha Rehula Tulevaisuusvaliokunta TuV 20 puheenjohtaja Päivi Lipponen 199 Lähes jokaisesta osallistuvasta koulusta oli mukana myös yksi toimittajaoppilas. Hänen tehtävänään oli tallentaa, kuvata ja raportoida päivän tapahtumia ja tuottaa aineistosta juttuja tapahtuman jälkeen. Useat nuoret kirjoittivat mm. oman paikkakuntansa lehteen tai johonkin koulunsa foorumiin. Toimittajaoppilaat kokoontuivat aamupäivällä Poliitikko nonstopiin, jossa kansanedustajat vastasivat toimittajaoppilaiden kysymyksiin. Vastaamassa olivat Antti Lindtman (sd), Aino- Kaisa Pekonen (vas), Tuomo Puumala (kesk) ja Sofia Vikman (kok). Vastaamaan valittiin tällä kerralla Nuorten kansanedustajien verkoston edustajia. Kaikkien toimittajaoppilaiden kysymyksiä ei ehditty käsitellä. Myös Poliitikko nontopissa haasteena oli aika, eikä kysymysten ja vastausten käsittely aina etene nopeatahtisena, kuten tavoitteena oli. Toimittajaoppilaat kokoontuivat Poliitikko nonstop -tilaisuuteen Kuva: STT-Lehtikuva/Heikki Saukkomaa/Eduskunta 1416 Opettajille järjestetyssä tilaisuudessa eduskunnan varapuhemies Pekka Ravi alusti aiheesta Nuorten poliittinen aktivointi. Keskustelua syntyi myös tässä tilaisuudessa runsaasti. Nuorten parlamentin istuntopäivä oli jälleen kerran erittäin antoisa ja hieno päivä sekä osallistujille että järjestävälle taholle. Täysistuntoa oli kenen tahansa mahdollista seurata televisiosta ja verkosta, joten jokainen halukas pääsi mukaan päivän kohokohtaan. Lehtereillä istuntoa seurasi kansanedustajia ja muita kutsuvieraita. Päivästä on saatu hyvää palautetta sekä osallistujilta että eduskunnan väeltä. Palautteen mukaan nuoret ja opettajat ovat ilahtuneita siitä, että tällainen päivä järjestetään ja se koetaan upeaksi kokemukseksi. Arvioinnista tarkemmin raportin myöhemmässä luvussa. Nuorten parlamentin täysistunnon 2014 päiväjärjestys ja pöytäkirja ovat luettavissa Nuorten eduskunta.fi -verkkosivustolla. Listaus kaikista istuntoa varten lähetetyistä suullisista kysymyksistä on myös luettavissa ao. verkkosivuilla. Nuorten parlamentin istuntoon osallistuneiden määrät vaalipiireittäin 2014 Vaalipiiri Kerhoja Edustajia Toimittajaoppilaita Kerhonohjaajia Helsingin Uudenmaan Varsinais-Suomen Satakunnan Ahvenanmaan Hämeen Pirkanmaan Kymen Etelä-Savon Pohjois-Savon Pohjois-Karjalan Vaasan Keski-Suomen Oulun Lapin Yhteensä Kansanedustajia17 Nuorten parlamentin istuntoa 2014 varten lähetetyt suulliset kysymykset Määräaikaan mennessä kysymyksiä saapui 165 ja yksi vielä määräajan umpeuduttua. Vaalipiiri Kysymyksiä Edustajia Kerhoja Päiväjärjestys Kysyttiin Helsingin Uudenmaan Varsinais-Suomen Satakunnan Ahvenanmaan Hämeen Pirkanmaan Kymen Etelä-Savon Pohjois-Savon Pohjois-Karjalan Vaasan Keski-Suomen Oulun Lapin Yhteensä Kysymykset jakautuivat eri hallinnonaloille 1 seuraavasti Valtioneuvoston kanslia 5 Ulkoasiainministeriö 3 Oikeusministeriö 13 Sisäministeriö 9 Puolustusministeriö 7 Valtiovarainministeriö 16 Opetus- ja kulttuuriministeriö 55 Maa- ja metsätalousministeriö 3 Liikenne- ja viestintäministeriö 18 Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö 24 Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriö 12 Ympäristöministeriö 1 Yhteensä 166 Noin puolet kysymyksistä valittiin nuorten äänestyksen perusteella Määräaikaan mennessä saapuneista suullisista kysymyksistä tehtiin sähköinen äänestyslomake. Parlamenttikerholaisille ja muille halukkaille annettiin mahdollisuus kysymysten valikointiin päiväjärjestykseen ja siten esitettäväksi valtioneuvoston jäsenille. Kysymyksistä saattoi valita korkeintaan kymmenen. Äänestysaikaa oli Äänestyksen perusteella valittiin noin puo- 1 Kysymykset on jaoteltu eri hallinnonaloille sisällöllisesti. 1618 let päiväjärjestykseen tulevista kysymyksistä. Äänestykseen osallistui yhteen sä 1504 äänestäjää, lomake avattiin yli 2000 kertaa ja kysymyksille annettiin yhteensä 6851 ääntä. Äänestyksessä jokainen kysymys sai kannatusta. Oppilasedustaja Arttu Lahtinen esittämässä kysymystään hallitukselle Kuva: Hanne Salonen/Eduskunta Nettiäänestyksen perusteella nuorten tärkeiksi yhteiskunnallisiksi teemoiksi nousivat opiskelu 2, liikkuminen 3, talous ja toimeentulo 4 ja väestön keskittyminen 5. Nuoret halusivat opiskelusta nostaa esille niin opintojen sisällöllisiä kysymyksiä kuin yksittäisen huolen koulutusalan vaihtamisen hankaluudesta tulevaisuudessa. Nuorten liikkumisen ongelmiin haettiin ratkaisua ajokortti-ikärajan alentamisesta, nostettiin esille ajokortin hinnakkuus ja julkisen liikenteen hinnat. Talouteen ja toimeentuloon liittyneet kysymykset käsittelivät kesätyöpaikkoja, ruoan arvonlisäveroa, valtion velkaantumista ja Suomen eurokriisiin liittyviä takausvastuita. Väestön keskittyminen suuriin keskuksiin nostettiin esille erityisesti maaseudun nykyisten palvelujen karsimisen osalta. Mitä valtioneuvosto aikoo tehdä? Aivan tarkkaa tietoa ei ole siitä, millaisen prosessin tuotoksena Nuorten parlamenttiin lähettävän kysymyksen aihepiiri valitaan, miten kysymykseen liittyvät taustatiedot etsitään ja kuinka kysymys muotoillaan valtioneuvostolle esitettävään muotoon. Kerholaisten oletetaan tekevän kysymykset yhteistyössä keskus- 2 Ilari Salmi, Sompion koulu, Kerava; Lotta Tikkala, Padasjoen yhtenäiskoulu, Padasjoki 3 Viivi Mäkelä, Nöykkiön koulu, Espoo; Jonni Mansikkavuori, Karjaan yhteiskoulu, Raasepori; Emma Jääskeläi nen, Mainingin koulu, Espoo 4 Robin Mäki, Ounasvaran yläaste, Rovaniemi; Sini Tuunanen, Kontiolahden koulu, Kontiolahti; Olivia Eckstein, Karakallion koulu, Espoo; Sini Tervamäki, Jussinpekan koulu, Sievi 5 Valma Välimäki, Iittalan yhtenäiskoulu, Hämeenlinna 1719 tellen ja pohtien samalla ajankohtaisia yhteiskunnallisia asioita. Kysymyksen valmisteluprosessin voi kuitenkin olettaa olevan melko perusteellinen, koska istuntoon osallistuvalla oppilasedustajalla on mahdollisuus ehdottaa vain yhtä kysymystä käsiteltäväksi. Luultavaa on, että kaikki saapuneet kysymykset olivat huolellisesti punnittuja ja sisälsivät kerholaisille merkityksellisiä ajatuksia ja teemoja, jotka he halusivat tuoda esille valtakunnan politiikan huipulle saakka. Saapuneet kysymykset on teemoitettu kysymystä kuvaavan otsikon mukaan. Tähän tarkasteluun on valittu ne teemat, joihin oli esitetty useampia kysymyksiä. Osa kysymyksistä oli lähes identtisiä toisensa kanssa. Näin yläteemoista hahmottuu aikaulottuvuudeltaan kaksi mielenkiintoista akselia. Nuoret olivat huolissaan tulevaisuuteen kohdentuvista velvoitteista ja toimenpiteistä kuten valtion velka, kuntauudistus, työttömyys, maanpuolustus ja oppivelvollisuusiän nostaminen. Toinen laajempi yläteema hahmottuu nuorten ajalliseen lähitulevaisuuteen liittyvistä asioista kuten lukiouudistus, yksittäisten oppiaineiden asema ja opintojen tukeminen. Kysymykset, jotka koskivat koulujen sisäilmaongelmia, sosiaali- ja terveyspalveluja ja tähän liittyvää lastensairaalan rahoitusta voisi tulkita aika-akselilla tässä ja nyt käsillä oleviksi teemoiksi. Ajankohtainen ja julkisuudessakin paljon esillä olleet teema tuotti kysymyksiä tasa-arvoisesta avioliittolaista ja tähän kytkeytyvästä adoptio-oikeudesta. Valtionvelkaan liittyviä kysymyksiä yhdisti huoli siitä, että salissa istuva sukupolvi joutuu hoitamaan velan maksamisen. Nuoret nähtiin laskun maksajina 6. Valtioneuvostolta tivattiin tiukoin sanakääntein velkaantumisen pysäyttämistä ja velan maksamista, ettei koko velkataakka kaadu tulevien sukupolvien niskaan 7. Riittävätkö keväisessä kehysriihessä sovitut sopeutustoimet taittamaan Suomen velkaantumisen niin, että meidän sukupolvemme ei jää valtaisan velan maksumiehiksi 8. Kuntarakenneuudistus oli yksi suosikkiteemoista. Nuoret halusivat tietää kuntaliitosten vaikutuksesta vähemmistökielen asemaan 9, asukkaiden vastustamien pakkoliitosten vaikutuksesta nuoriin ja heidän arkeensa (koulut ja terveydenhoitopalvelut) 10, sosiaali-, terveys- ja koulutuspalveluiden siirtymisestä yhä kauemmas asukkaista 11, peruspalveluiden takaamisesta kaikille kuntalaisille 12 sekä palvelujen huonontumisesta ja koulujen lakkauttamisesta 13. Kuntaliitoksen kokenut nuori nosti esille tarpeensa saada tutkittua tietoa kuntaliitosten hyödyistä tai haitoista Anna Rentola, Seinäjoen lyseo, Seinäjoki; Ida Kupari, Merenojan koulu, Kalajoki; Sofia Norrbacka, Nurmon yläaste, Seinäjoki 7 Annika Anttila, Porin suomalaisen yhteislyseon koulu, Pori 8 Olivia Eckstein, Karakallion koulu, Espoo 9 Riikka Räsänen, Myllyharjun koulu, Loviisa 10 Jesse Heiskanen, Hollolan yläaste, Hollola 11 Amanda Randell, Valkeavuoren koulu, Kaarina 12 Kristian Hägg, Kempeleen kirkonkylän yhtenäiskoulu, Kempele 13 Andreas Aalto, Hagelstamska skolan, Grangulla 14 Taru Jalkanen, Kesälahden koulu, Kitee 1820 Hallituksen 19 ministeristä 14 oli paikalla vastaamassa nuorten kysymyksiin Työllisyyteen ja työttömyyteen liittyvistä kysymyksistä löytyy monipuolisia näkemyksiä. Kysymyksissä nostetaan esille työpaikkojen epätasainen jakautuminen alueellisesti 15, tulevaisuudessa työllistävistä ammateista 16, eläköitymiseen ja eläkeiän nostoon liittyvä pelko samanaikaisesta työvoimapulasta ja korkeasta työttömyydestä 17, epäily työvoimapulan todellisuudesta rakennemuutoksen lakkauttaessa ison osan eläkkeelle siirtymisen johdosta vapautuvista työpaikoista 18, maahanmuuttajien tehokkaammasta työllistämisestä 19 ja koulutettujen maahanmuuttajien lisääminen työmarkkinoilla eläkeiän nostamisen sijaa, jotta tulevilla sukupolvilla on sama oikeus olla eläkkeellä kuin tämän päivän vanhuksilla 20. Nuorten kesätyöt 21 ja paheneva nuorisotyöttömyys 22 ja siihen liittyvä nuorten syrjäytyminen 23 nousivat myös esille nuorten kysymyksissä työhön liittyen. Sosiaali- ja terveyspalveluista nuoret nostivat esille erityisesti terveyspalvelujen yhdenvertaisen saatavuuden asuinalueesta riippumatta 24. Alkoholia tarkasteltiin silmälläpitäen alkoholiverotuksen vaikutusta kansanterveyteen ja Kuva: Hanne Salonen /Eduskunta 15 Yannick Dunlop, Neulamäen koulu, Kuopio; Tia Koskinen, Kaakkurin koulu, Oulu 16 Kristian Hägg, Kempeleen kirkonkylän koulu, Kempele 17 Maiju Laine, Valkeavuoren koulu, Kaarina 18 Tony Raitanen, Moision koulu, Salo 19 Kalevi Hämäläinen, Savonlinnan normaalikoulu, Savonlinna 20 Jagdeep Singh, Aurinkolahden peruskoulu, Helsinki 21 Robin Mäki, Ounasvaaran yläaste, Rovaniemi; Mattias Carlsson, Godby högstadieskola, Norra Åland, Landskapet Ålands valkrets 22 Ville Rikkonen, Humppilan yläaste, Humppila; Katariina Lehtonen, Raumanmeren peruskoulu, Rauma; Lassi Ruohonen, Kasavuoren koulu, Kauniainen 23 Oskari Ruohonen, Espoon yhteislyseon koulu, Espoo 24 Mari Luukkanen, Mertalan koulu, Savonlinna; Niko Tuovila, Rukan koulu, Kuusamo; Emma Halla-aho, Raumankarin koulu, Kalajoki. 1921 työllisyyteen 25 ja alkoholin saatavuuteen 26. Lastensairaalan rahoitusta ja valtion osuutta siinä kysyttiin tiukasti peräten valtion vastuuta rahoittamisessa 27. Nuorten tekemät kysymykset avioliittolain muuttamisesta tukivat seksuaalivähemmistöjen mahdollisuutta solmia tasa-arvoinen avioliitto 28 ja yksinäisten miesten 29 ja homoparien adoptio-oikeutta. Maanpuolustukseen liittyvät kysymykset käsittelivät Nato-yhteistyötä 30, asevelvollisuuden muutoksia 31, puolustusmateriaalien hankintaa 32, Suomen ja EU:n mahdollisuutta vähentää ydinasetuotantoa maailmanlaajuisesti 33 ja kyberturvallisuutta 34. Kouluihin kohdistuneiden säästöjen aiheuttama huoli perusopetuksen laadusta 35 kirvoitti kysymyksiä valtioneuvoston jäsenille. Nuoret nostivat esille oppivelvollisuuden pidentämisessä seitsemääntoista ikävuoteen esille toimenpiteen rahoittamisen. Vastakkain asetettiin puolustusvoimien hankinnat ja nuorten syrjäytymisen ehkäisy 36, opetukseen kohdistuvat säästöt, etäopetus eli yritä oppia omin avuin, valtion velka 37 ja oppivelvollisuusiän nostaminen osana rakenneuudistusta. Toimenpiteitä yrittäjyyden ja yrittämisen 38 opettamiseen toivottiin valtioneuvostolta. Yksittäisistä oppiaineista eniten kysymyksiä kirvoitti uskonnon opetuksen korvaaminen kaikille yhteisellä uskonto- ja kulttuuritiedolla 39 tai elämänkatsomustiedon valinnan salliminen myös evankelisluterilaiseen kirkkoon kuuluville 40. Nuorten elämänpiiriä lähellä oleva lukion tuntijakouudistus kirvoitti kysymyksiä yleissivistyksen luonteesta ja siihen liittyvästä historianopetuksesta 41. Nuoret nostivat esille myös mahdolliset epäkohdat sähköisessä ylioppilastutkinnossa 42, kuntien välisen epätasa-arvon tietotekniikan hankkimisessa opetuskäyttöön Kiri Huhtanen, Emäkosken koulu, Nokia 26 Markus Ahonen, Sydän-Laukaan koulu, Laukaa; Niilo Pirttijärvi, Tiistilän koulu, Espoo 27 Aapo Grönroos, Kilonpuiston koulu, Espoo; Ronja Taipale, Leppävaaran koulu, Espoo; Eerika Hammer, Peltolan koulu, Vantaa 28 Aino Rautio, Turengin yhteiskoulu, Janakkala; Anni Karhu, Puolankajärven koulu, Puolanka; Johannes Öst, Oxhamns skola, Jakobstad 29 Pinja Heinonen, Harjunrinteen koulu, Riihimäki; Arttu Lehtinen, Kiviniityn koulu, Kokkola 30 Carita Frangén, Vesilahden yläaste, Vesilahti; Victor Eklund, Oxhamns skola, Jakobstad 31 Lassi Koski, Keskuskoulu, Forssa; Ossi Pöyhtäri, Raumankarin koulu, Kalajoki 32 Sahan Gelik, Virolahden yläaste, Virolahti 33 Samu Mänttäri, Kesämäenrinteen koulu, Lappeenranta 34 Kimmo Niinimäki, Laihian keskuskoulu, Laihia 35 Otso Tirkkonen, Hakkarin koulu, Lempäälä; Faisa Kahiye, Länsimäen koulu, Vantaa; Lyydia Tuominen, Meri- Porin koulu, Pori 36 Aki Särkiniemi, Porolahden peruskoulu, Helsinki 37 Alli-Maija Mattila, Klaukkalan yläaste, Nurmijärvi 38 Valtteri Uotila, Ylistaron yläaste, Seinäjoki; Jussi Järvinen, Otalammen koulu, Vihti; Pietu Heiskanen, Pielisjoen koulu, Joensuu; Ilari Salmi, Sompion koulu, Kerava 39 Aleksanteri Vuoristo, Klaukkalan yläaste, Nurmijärvi; Iina Vahteri, Nokianvirran koulu, Nokia; Aino Porola, Helsingin yliopiston Viikin normaalikoulu, Helsinki 40 Janne Yrjö-Koskinen, Harjunrinteen koulu, Riihimäki 41 Riikka Hellgren, Nissnikun koulu, Kirkkonummi; Erika Puhto, Jussinpekan koulu, Sievi; Mirka Nieminen, Arppen koulu, Kitee; Anniina Kaari, Pielisjoen koulu, Joensuu 42 Nanna Karsikas, Hämeenlinnan yhteiskoulu, Hämeenlinna 43 Kaisa Mäki-Mantila, Opintien koulu, Loimaa; Juho Petrell, Vinkkilän koulu, Vehmaa; Noora Kyyrö, Keravanjoen koulu, Kerava 2022 Koulujen sisäilmaongelmiin viitattiin joidenkin kysymysten perusteluissa, mutta sisäilmaongelmat olivat myös kysymysten varsinaisena sisältönä useammassakin kysymyksessä. Kysyjien mukaan sisäilmaongelmat olivat terveydellinen riski: opetuksen ja oppimisen laatu kärsii ja kouluviihtyvyys huonontuu 44. Yksittäisiä, mutta mielenkiintoisia nykyisiä rakenteita haastavia kysymyksiä olivat kysymykset kansanedustajien määrästä 45 ja äänioikeusikärajan laskemisesta kunnallisvaaleissa 16 ikävuoteen 46. Yhtenä kysymyksenä esille nousi Nuorten parlamentin toimintatavan muuttaminen tai nimen vaihtaminen 47. Nuorten parlamentin toiminnan esittely Rainer Hindsberg, Kristiina Hakala ja Tiina Karhuvirta esittelivät eduskunnan Pikkuparlamentissa Nuorten parlamentin toimintaa meksikolaiselle opettajaryhmälle. Tilaisuudessa esiteltiin myös muita eduskunnan tarjoamia palveluja nuorille. Seminaari Pietarissa Pietarin alueparlamentissa järjestettiin seminaari, jossa esiteltiin pohjoismaiden ja Viron parlamenttien palveluja nuorille. Eduskunnasta seminaariin osallistui Kristiina Hakala. Esityksissä kuultiin Norjan, Tanskan, Suomen, Ruotsin ja Viron parlamenttien nuorille suunnatuista palveluista. Esityksissä kuultiin myös eri maiden Nuorten parlamentti -toiminnasta. Mukana olleilla parlamenteilla on lisäksi erilaisia palveluja ja projekteja nuorille ja kouluille. Nuorten parlamentti -esite Nuorten parlamentin toimintaa tiiviisti esittelevän esitteen tarve oli ollut esillä jo pidempään. Suomen käytännöistä kysellään aika ajoin, myös ulkomailta. Syksyn 2014 aikana tehtiin lyhyt pdf-esite, joka käännettiin myös ruotsiksi ja englanniksi. Esite on saatavilla mm. Nuorteneduskunta.fi -verkkosivustolla. 44 Arthur Rinne, Simonkylän koulu, Vantaa; Carita Helminen, Lahden yhteiskoulu, Lahti; Nora Simanainen, Lintumetsän koulu, Espoo; Venla Ailasmäki, Tapiolan koulu, Espoo 45 Perttu Vasikkaniemi, Ähtärin yhteiskoulu, Ähtäri 46 Eero Petrell, Nanun koulu, Rauma 47 Lilli Koskinen, Jyväskylän normaalikoulu, Jyväskylä 21 Näytä lisää Raportti Nuorten parlamentin toiminnasta 2011-2012 Raportti Nuorten parlamentin toiminnasta 2011-2012 EDUSKUNTA HELSINKI Raportti Nuorten parlamentin toiminnasta 2011-2012 EDUSKUNTA HELSINKI 2013 TEKSTI: Kristiina Hakala & Tiina Karhuvirta KANNEN KUVA: Lisätiedot Julkaistu Helsingissä 13 päivänä kesäkuuta 2012. 279/2012 Liikenne- ja viestintäministeriön asetus N:o 6 27 TAAJUUKSIEN KÄYTTÖSUUNNITELMA Liite 2.2 Analoginen radiotoiminta: valtakunnallinen toimiluvanvarainen käyttö Taajuuskokonaisuus 1 105,7 Anjalankoski 106,2 Espoo 106,0 Eurajoki 104,1 Haapavesi Lisätiedot 3. 4.5.2011/18. Liite Virallisen lehden numeroon 55/13.5.2011. Toimittanut eduskuntatiedotus 3. 4.5.2011/18 Liite Virallisen lehden numeroon 55/13.5.2011 EDUSKUNNAN VIIKKO Toimittanut eduskuntatiedotus SISÄLLYSLUETTELO Muuta.................... 41 MUUTA Tiistai 3.5.2011 Valiokuntien vaaleissa Lisätiedot Raportti Nuorten parlamentin toiminnasta 2009-2010 Raportti Nuorten parlamentin toiminnasta 2009-2010 EDUSKUNTA HELSINKI 1 Raportti Nuorten parlamentin toiminnasta 2009-2010 EDUSKUNTA HELSINKI TEKSTI: Kristiina Hakala & Tiina Karhuvirta KANNEN KUVA: Lehtikuva/Markku Lisätiedot Indeksitalon kiinteistöverot ja maksut 2015 / yli 30000 asukkaan kaupungit LUONNOS Valtioneuvoston asetus televisio- ja radiotoimintaan sekä toimiluvanvaraiseen teletoimintaan määrättyjen taajuusalueiden käyttösuunnitelmasta annetun valtioneuvoston asetuksen muuttamisesta Annettu Lisätiedot Puoluekokousedustajiin. EdustajiaErityistä Puoluekokousedustajat 2009 (päivitetty 20.4.) Yhdistys EdustajiaErityistä Puoluekokousedustajat 009 (päivitetty 0.4.) Etelä-Savo Mikkelin Seudun Vihreät ry 3 Pieksämäen seudun vihreät ry Rantasalmen vihreät ry Ristiinan vihreät ry Savonlinnan Seudun Lisätiedot 13.11.2010 klo 9 16 oopperatalossa Helsingissä Taikahuilu 12.1.2011 klo 19 Albert Edelfeltin koulu n yhteislyseon koulu Helsingin Kristillinen koulu Humppilan yläaste Jokivarren koulu Kuoppanummen koulukeskus Mussalon koulu Männistön koulu Vähänkyrön Lisätiedot OKM 1.11.2010 Sivu 1/8. Mom. 29.10.34. UUDENMAAN elinkeino-, liikenne- ja ympäristökeskus/ Närings-, trafik- och miljöcentralen i NYLAND Sivu 1/8 UUDENMAAN elinkeino-, liikenne- ja ympäristökeskus/ Närings-, trafik- och miljöcentralen i NYLAND Kouvola Inkeroisten yhteiskoulu, laajennus 704a 8 6 750 1 810 887 J Kouvola Kaipaisten koulu, Lisätiedot KRUUNUPYY 44 600 SVT 4706 N:o 119 Liite TAAJUUKSIEN KÄYTTÖSUUNNITELMA 1 Televisio- ja radiotoiminnasta annetun lain mukainen televisiotoiminta 1.1 Analoginen televisiotoiminta: Yleisradio Oy Paikkakunta Kanava ERP Huom. (kw) Lisätiedot Hyvä vapaaehtoistoiminnan kehittäjä ja aktiivi, lämmin kiitos hyvästä yhteistyöstä kuluneena vuonna! Hyvä vapaaehtoistoiminnan kehittäjä ja aktiivi, lämmin kiitos hyvästä yhteistyöstä kuluneena vuonna! Ensi vuotta käynnistämme innolla vapaaehtoistoiminnan juhlavuotena. Kutsumme sinutkin mukaan yhteiseen Lisätiedot 1 Televisio- ja radiotoiminnasta annetun lain mukainen televisiotoiminta 8 N:o 1 Liite TAAJUUKSIEN KÄYTTÖSUUNNITELMA 1 Televisio- ja radiotoiminnasta annetun lain mukainen televisiotoiminta 1.1 Analoginen televisiotoiminta: Yleisradio Oy Paikkakunta Kanava ERP Huom. (kw) ANJALANKOSKI Lisätiedot 651 523 Loviisanseudun Jyty ry, Lovisanejdens Jyty rf 1,26% 651 524 JYTY Naantalin seutu ry 1,35% 651 525 Jyty Nurmes ry 1,2% 651 526 Jyty Sakky ry Liittotunnus yhdistysnumero Yhdistyksen nimi prosentti 2016 374 021 Jyty Espoo ry, Jyty Esbo rf 1,26% 374 022 Jyty Etelä-Pirkanmaa ry 1,19% 374 036 Jyty Hangö Hanko rf 1,3% 374 066 Jyty Hämeenlinna ry Lisätiedot 2 Televisio- ja radiotoiminnasta annetun lain mukainen radiotoiminta N:o 434 1269 Liite TAAJUUKSIEN KÄYTTÖSUUNNITELMA 1 Televisio- ja radiotoiminnasta annetun lain mukainen televisiotoiminta 1.3 Digitaalinen televisiotoiminta Aseman nimi Kanava MAX ERP Nippu A Nippu B Nippu Lisätiedot Nuorten parlamentti vieraana Nuorisofoorumissa Jyväskylässä 7.10.2013 kokoamassa nuorten näkemyksiä vaikuttamisesta ja demokratiasta Nuorten parlamentti vieraana Nuorisofoorumissa Jyväskylässä 7.10.2013 kokoamassa nuorten näkemyksiä vaikuttamisesta ja demokratiasta Nuorten parlamentti on tarkoitettu peruskoulun päättöluokkien oppilaille. Lisätiedot KLL MAASTOT VIERUMÄELLÄ 24.5.2012 KLL MAASTOT VIERUMÄELLÄ 24.5.2012 Koulu Kunta Aika Vääksyn koulu Asikkala 05:24,0 Takalo-Raasakka Kannus 05:27,0 Cygnaeus Turku 05:31,0 Jokelan koulu Valkeala 05:45,0 Kirkonkylän koulu Miehikkälä 05:47,0 Lisätiedot Kuntien yritysilmasto 2012. Vaasan seutukunta Kuntien yritysilmasto 2012 Vaasan seutukunta EK:n kuntien yritysilmastotutkimus Mitataan yrittäjien ja yritysten näkökulmasta kunnan toimintakykyä, yrittäjyyden esiintyvyyttä ja yrittäjyysaktiivisuutta Lisätiedot Liite TAAJUUKSIEN KÄYTTÖSUUNNITELMA. 1 Televisio- ja radiotoiminnasta annetun lain mukainen televisiotoiminta Kuntien yritysilmasto 2012 Kuopion seutukunta EK:n kuntien yritysilmastotutkimus Mitataan yrittäjien ja yritysten näkökulmasta kunnan toimintakykyä, yrittäjyyden esiintyvyyttä ja yrittäjyysaktiivisuutta Lisätiedot iliitu LIIKENNETURVALLISUUSPALVELU 18.11.2014 iliitu LIIKENNETURVALLISUUSPALVELU 18.11.2014 Ohjelma 18.11.2014 12.00 Avaus 12.05 Poliisin onnettomuustilastointi Kari Onninen, Poliisi Onnettomuustietojen käsittely Tilastokeskuksessa Mari Niemi, Tilastokeskus Lisätiedot Network to Get Work. Tehtäviä opiskelijoille Assignments for students. www.laurea.fi Network to Get Work Tehtäviä opiskelijoille Assignments for students www.laurea.fi Ohje henkilöstölle Instructions for Staff Seuraavassa on esitetty joukko tehtäviä, joista voit valita opiskelijaryhmällesi Lisätiedot Kuntien yritysilmasto 2012. Lahden seutukunta Kuntien yritysilmasto 2012 Lahden seutukunta EK:n kuntien yritysilmastotutkimus Mitataan yrittäjien ja yritysten näkökulmasta kunnan toimintakykyä, yrittäjyyden esiintyvyyttä ja yrittäjyysaktiivisuutta Lisätiedot Asiakasraadit kuntalaisten osallisuutta vahvistamassa 15.5.2014. Kuntalaiset keskiöön projektiverkosto 15.5.2014 Projektipäällikkö Tuula Tuominen Asiakasraadit kuntalaisten osallisuutta vahvistamassa 15.5.2014 Kuntalaiset keskiöön projektiverkosto 15.5.2014 Projektipäällikkö Tuula Tuominen SOS hanke SOS I 2011-2013 SOS II 2013-2015 (31.10.2015 asti) Lisätiedot Työllistymistä edistävä monialainen yhteispalvelu - Missä mennään TYP? Työllistymistä edistävä monialainen yhteispalvelu - Missä mennään TYP? Työllisyysseminaari, Kuntamarkkinat 9.9.2015 Erityisasiantuntija Tommi Eskonen Työllistymistä edistävällä monialainen yhteispalvelu Lisätiedot Puoluetta edustavat yhdistykset kunnissa Puoluetta edustavat yhdistykset kunnissa Ehdokasasetteluoikeudet vahvistettu puoluehallituksen kokouksessa 31.10.2015 (muutoksia: Oulun piiri 16.11.2015&12.3.&15.4.2016, Lappi 12.2.2016, Varsinais-Suomi Lisätiedot Eduskuntavaaliehdokkaat ja valitut kansanedustajat kunnanvaltuutettuina 2015 Kuntaliiton tiedote 20.4.2015 Tiedotteen liiteosio Eduskuntavaaliehdokkaat ja valitut kansanedustajat kunnanvaltuutettuina 2015 Kuntaliiton tiedote 20.4.2015 Tiedotteen liiteosio Marianne Pekola-Sjöblom, tutkimuspäällikkö, p. 050 337 5634 Sirkka-Liisa Lisätiedot Puoluetta edustavat yhdistykset kunnissa Puoluetta edustavat yhdistykset kunnissa Ehdokasasetteluoikeudet vahvistettu puoluehallituksen kokouksessa 31.10.2015 (Oulun piirin osalta 16.11.2015, Lapin piiriin muutoksia 12.2.2016) Luetteloa tarkistetaan Lisätiedot HYVÄN MIELEN KOULU KOULUTUKSIIN OSALLISTUNEET KOULUT V. 2010 2011 HYVÄN MIELEN KOULU KOULUTUKSIIN OSALLISTUNEET KOULUT V. 2010 2011 Ahmon yläkoulu, Kuopio Alahärmän kirkonkylän koulu 0 6 lk, Kauhana Alahärmän yläkoulu, Kauhava Alajärven yläkoulu, Alajärvi Alakylän koulu, Lisätiedot RAUMAN KASVIHUONEKAASUPÄÄSTÖT 2008 2013 ENNAKKOTIETO VUODELTA 2014 RAUMAN KASVIHUONEKAASUPÄÄSTÖT 2008 2013 ENNAKKOTIETO VUODELTA 2014 Päästölaskennan sektorit Rakennusten lämmitys (kaukolämpö, erillislämmitys, sähkölämmitys, maalämpö) Kuluttajien sähkönkulutus Tieliikenne Lisätiedot Maaseudun uusi aika -yhdistyksen jäsenkirje 3/2015 Maaseudun uusi aika -yhdistyksen jäsenkirje 3/2015 15.12.2015 Jouluinen tervehdys kaikille MUAn jäsenille! Tässä vuoden viimeisessä jäsenkirjeessä on tietoa Maaseudun uusi aika -yhdistyksen ajankohtaisista Lisätiedot Millaiset mahdollisuudet avautuvat KODUpeliohjelmoinnilla. Lehtori Jarkko Sievi 3.12.2012 Virtuaaliopetuksen päivät Millaiset mahdollisuudet avautuvat KODUpeliohjelmoinnilla Lehtori Jarkko Sievi 3.12.2012 Virtuaaliopetuksen päivät Työpajan sisältö Oppimisympäristönä peliohjelmointi hanke Hankkeen esittely Hankkeen tavoitteet Lisätiedot Makukoulun konseptin levittäminen koulun kerhotoiminnassa Makukoulun konseptin levittäminen koulun kerhotoiminnassa 2009 2010 Loppuraportti Kerhokeskus Erityissuunnittelija Merike Kesler Sisällys: * Hankkeen tausta ja tavoitteet * Tuotettu materiaali * Muu toiminta Lisätiedot Linja-autoliikenteen järjestäminen ja rooli tulevaisuudessa. Liikenne- ja viestintävaliokunta kuuleminen 8.3.2013 Linja-autoliikenteen järjestäminen ja rooli tulevaisuudessa Liikenne- ja viestintävaliokunta kuuleminen 8.3.2013 Joukkoliikenteen rooli tulevaisuudessa Joukkoliikenne on osa valtion, seutujen ja kuntien Lisätiedot KARKKILAN KASVIHUONEKAASUPÄÄSTÖT 2010 2013 ENNAKKOTIETO VUODELTA 2014 KARKKILAN KASVIHUONEKAASUPÄÄSTÖT 2010 2013 ENNAKKOTIETO VUODELTA 2014 Päästölaskennan sektorit Rakennusten lämmitys (kaukolämpö, erillislämmitys, sähkölämmitys, maalämpö) Kuluttajien sähkönkulutus Tieliikenne Lisätiedot Kuntien yritysilmasto 2012. Jyväskylän seutukunta Kuntien yritysilmasto 2012 Jyväskylän seutukunta EK:n kuntien yritysilmastotutkimus Mitataan yrittäjien ja yritysten näkökulmasta kunnan toimintakykyä, yrittäjyyden esiintyvyyttä ja yrittäjyysaktiivisuutta Lisätiedot Juankosken kaupunki 27 700,00 Juuan kunta 18 000,00 Juvan kunta 27 700,00 Jyväskyläm kristillisen koulun yhdistys ry 17 000,00 Jyväskylän kaupunki 1 Viestintävirasto 70/2014 M 1 (27) Määräys televisio- ja radiotoimintaan tarkoitettujen taajuuksien käytöstä Annettu Helsingissä 30 päivänä joulukuuta 2014 Viestintävirasto määrää 7 päivänä marraskuuta Lisätiedot Operaattorivertailu SELVITYS LTE VERKKOJEN KUULUVUUDESTA Operaattorivertailu SELVITYS LTE VERKKOJEN KUULUVUUDESTA SISÄLLYSLUETTELO TIIVISTELMÄ... 3 YLEISTÄ... 4 TAVOITE... 5 PAIKKAKUNNAT... 5 MITATUT SUUREET JA MITTAUSJÄRJESTELMÄ... 6 MITATUT SUUREET... 6 MITTAUSJÄRJESTELMÄ... Lisätiedot Hoitoonpääsy terveyskeskuksissa Hoitoonpääsy terveyskeskuksissa Kysely terveyskeskusten johtaville lääkäreille lokakuu 2009 10.12.2009 Tieto/PATI 1 Tiedonkeruu syksyllä 2009 Hoitotakuukysely terveyskeskusten johtaville lääkäreille toteutettiin Lisätiedot Kuntien yritysilmasto 2012. Helsingin seutukunta Kuntien yritysilmasto 2012 Helsingin seutukunta EK:n kuntien yritysilmastotutkimus Mitataan yrittäjien ja yritysten näkökulmasta kunnan toimintakykyä, yrittäjyyden esiintyvyyttä ja yrittäjyysaktiivisuutta Lisätiedot kouluyhteisössä Helsinki 24.- 25.11.2008 Pirjo Immonen-Oikkonen Osaamisen ja sivistyksen asialla Monikulttuurisuustaitojen kehittäminen kouluyhteisössä Helsinki 24.- 25.11.2008 Pirjo Immonen-Oikkonen Osaamisen ja sivistyksen asialla Euroopan unionissa vietetään vuonna 2008 Euroopan kulttuurienvälisen Lisätiedot Kuntien yritysilmasto 2012. Helsinki 20.9.2012 Asiantuntija Jari Huovinen Kuntien yritysilmasto 2012 Helsinki 20.9.2012 Asiantuntija Jari Huovinen EK:n kuntien yritysilmastotutkimus Mitataan yrittäjien ja yritysten näkökulmasta kunnan toimintakykyä, yrittäjyyden esiintyvyyttä Lisätiedot Keski-Suomen TE-toimisto Keski-Suomen TE-toimisto Administrative structure Ministry of Employment and the Economy (TEM) Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment (ELY Centre) 15 Employment and Economic Development Lisätiedot Perusopetuksen vieraiden kielten opetuksen kehittäminen Perusopetuksen vieraiden kielten opetuksen kehittäminen Koordinaattorien tapaaminen Helsingissä 18.5.2009 Anna-Kaisa Mustaparta Toiminnan tavoitteet Tarjota nykyistä useammalle oppilaalle mahdollisuus Lisätiedot VIHDIN KASVIHUONEKAASUPÄÄSTÖT 2008 2013 ENNAKKOTIETO VUODELTA 2014 KARKKILAN KASVIHUONEKAASUPÄÄSTÖT 2010-2012 ENNAKKOTIETO VUODELTA 2013 Päästölaskennan sektorit Rakennusten lämmitys (kaukolämpö, erillislämmitys, sähkölämmitys, maalämpö) Kuluttajien sähkönkulutus Tieliikenne Lisätiedot Kulttuuristen alojen rooli keskisuurissa kaupungeissa.docx 1(5) Kulttuuristen alojen rooli keskisuurissa kaupungeissa Keskisuurilla kaupungeilla tarkoitetaan muistiossa kahta asiaa: niiden väkilukua sekä niiden epävirallista asemaa maakunnan keskuksena. Poikkeus Lisätiedot Eväitä hankkeesta tiedottamiselle. Kenelle, mitä, miksi ja miten? Aino Kivelä / CIMO 2015 Eväitä hankkeesta tiedottamiselle Kenelle, mitä, miksi ja miten? Aino Kivelä / CIMO 2015 Miksi tiedottaa (median kautta)? Tulosten levittäminen on osa hanketta Hankkeen tulokset saadaan nopeasti ja tasapuolisesti Lisätiedot Perustietoa hankkeesta / Basic facts about the project. Koulutuksen järjestäjät oppilaitoksineen. Oppilaitokset Suomessa: Partners in Finland: Perustietoa hankkeesta / Basic facts about the project Kam oon China- verkostoon kuuluu kaksitoista (12) koulutuksen järjestäjää eri puolilta Suomea. Verkosto on perustettu 1998 alkaen. Hankkeen hallinnoijana Lisätiedot Kuntakohtainen yleisen asumistuen tilasto, helmikuu 2015, kaikki asunnot Yhteensä: Manner-Suomi 87 200 334,6 10,9 58,4 97 008 300,0 11,7 51,0 Pääkaupunkiseutu Espoo 4 735 399,7 12,2 63,6 3 745 380,1 14,4 56,3 Helsinki 14 957 399,2 12,1 62,4 13 921 349,0 16,7 44,0 Vantaa 5 652 Lisätiedot Yhdistyksen jäsenkysely 2013 Yhdistyksen jäsenkysely 13 Yhdistys järjesti jäsenkyselyn loka marraskuussa 13. Kysely toteutettiin Googlella ja linkki välitettiin Uutiskirjeen kautta. Kysely toteutettiin myös ruotsinkielisenä. Ensimmäisen Lisätiedot VUOSIKERTOMUS 2014 Diabeteshoitajat ry VUOSIKERTOMUS 2014 Diabeteshoitajat ry S i v u 2 DIABETESHOITAJAT RY VUOSIKERTOMUS 2014 SISÄLTÖ 1.YHDISTYS... 2 3.HALLINTO... 3 5.2. Yhteistyö... 4 5.3. Tiedotus... 4 5.4. Toimikuntatyöskentely... 5 6.1. Lisätiedot Maakunnallisen aluemielikuvakartoituksen tulokset Maakunnallisen aluemielikuvakartoituksen tulokset Brändiseminaari 7.11.2012 Hotelli Savonia, Kuopio Mielikuvatutkimus, vaihe 1 Tutkimuksen toteutti Innolink Research Oy. Tavoitteena oli selvittää sekä Lisätiedot Kuntien yritysilmasto 2012. Oulun seutukunta Kuntien yritysilmasto 2012 Oulun seutukunta EK:n kuntien yritysilmastotutkimus Mitataan yrittäjien ja yritysten näkökulmasta kunnan toimintakykyä, yrittäjyyden esiintyvyyttä ja yrittäjyysaktiivisuutta Lisätiedot Liite IV: Toimitetun talousveden laatu (aritmeettinen keskiarvo). Keskiarvo on nolla, jos kaikki tulokset ovat olleet alle määritysrajan. 1 Liite IV: Toimitetun talousveden laatu (aritmeettinen keskiarvo). Keskiarvo on nolla, jos kaikki tulokset ovat olleet alle määritysrajan. Etelä-Suomi Altia Oyj A sikkalan kunnan vesilaito s Espoon Vesi Lisätiedot kouluyhteisössä Jyväskylä 4-5.9.2008 Pirjo Immonen-Oikkonen Osaamisen ja sivistyksen asialla Monikulttuurisuustaitojen kehittäminen kouluyhteisössä Jyväskylä 4-5.9.2008 Pirjo Immonen-Oikkonen Osaamisen ja sivistyksen asialla Mukana olevat kunnat v. 2008-09 Espoo Hamina Helsinki Hämeenlinna Iisalmi Lisätiedot VIHDIN KASVIHUONEKAASUPÄÄSTÖT 2008-2011 ENNAKKOTIETO VUODELTA 2012 KARKKILAN KASVIHUONEKAASUPÄÄSTÖT 2010-2011 ENNAKKOTIETO VUODELTA 2012 Päästölaskennan sektorit Rakennusten lämmitys (kaukolämpö, erillislämmitys, sähkölämmitys, maalämpö) Kuluttajien sähkönkulutus Tieliikenne Lisätiedot Otsikko Sivu 1 KOKOUKSEN LAILLISUUDEN JA PÄÄTÖSVALTAISUUDEN TOTEAMINEN 3 3 PÖYTÄKIRJAN TARKASTUS 4 4 TUTUSTUMISMATKA SYKSYLLÄ 2013 4 Vesilahden nuorisovaltuusto 1 Nuorisovaltuusto 25.09.2013 AIKA 25.09.2013 klo 17.00 PAIKKA Nuorisotila Nurkka KÄSITELLYT ASIAT Otsikko Sivu 1 KOKOUKSEN LAILLISUUDEN JA PÄÄTÖSVALTAISUUDEN TOTEAMINEN 3 2 Lisätiedot Iin kuntaviestintäkyselyn tulokset Iin kuntaviestintäkyselyn tulokset 21.10.-11.11.2014 208 vastausta 66% vastaajista 41-65 v. Vastaajista 69 % kuntalaisia (sis. luottamushenkilöt) Muut: Oulunkaaren työntekijä 3. Kuinka usein käytät seuraavia Lisätiedot Espoon kaupunki Pöytäkirja 39. Nuorisovaltuusto 09.04.2014 Sivu 1 / 1 Nuorisovaltuusto 09.04.2014 Sivu 1 / 1 39 Toimintasuunnitelma 2014 ESPOON NUORISOVALTUUSTO TOIMINTASUUNNITELMA VUODELLE 2014 VAIKUTTAMINEN Espoon nuorisovaltuusto on espoolaisnuorista koostuva edunvalvontaelin Lisätiedot Kyselyllä tietoa Kumppanuuskeskuksesta ja vapaaehtoistoiminnasta Kyselyllä tietoa Kumppanuuskeskuksesta ja vapaaehtoistoiminnasta Haastattelukysely 12.9.2011 Lanun aukiolla SOSIAALIALAN OSAAMISKESKUS VERSO 11. marraskuuta 2011 Kyselyllä tietoa Kumppanuuskeskuksesta Lisätiedot JOHDATKO TYÖHYVINVOINTIA VAI JAHTAATKO TULOSTA? Pohjois-Savon verkostotapaaminen 2.10.2014. Jaana Lerssi-Uskelin. Työterveyslaitos www.ttl. JOHDATKO TYÖHYVINVOINTIA VAI JAHTAATKO TULOSTA? Pohjois-Savon verkostotapaaminen 2.10.2014 Jaana Lerssi-Uskelin 9.10.2014 Ohjelma Klo 12.00 Tervetuloa ja kahvi Klo 12.30 Verkostokuulumisia valtakunnallisesti Lisätiedot TOIMILUVAT ANALOGISEN RADIOTOIMINNAN HARJOITTAMISEKSI Valtakunnallinen ja siihen rinnastettava toiminta TOIMILUVAT ANALOGISEN RADIOTOIMINNAN HARJOITTAMISEKSI Valtakunnallinen ja siihen rinnastettava toiminta Kristillinen Media Oy Taajuuskokonaisuus 9 Metroradio Finland Oy Taajuuskokonaisuus 5 Metroradio Lisätiedot Seinäjoen Uimarit -58 päivitetty 27.5.2013 Miehet mukana 20 parasta uinti aikaa ajalta 27.05.2013-01.01.2003 Seinäjoen Uimarit -58 päivitetty 27.5.2013 Miehet mukana 20 parasta uinti aikaa ajalta 27.05.2013-01.01.2003 Lajit Sija Aika Nimi SV Seura pvm Paikka Miehet 25 m VU ( uimakoulut ) Miehet 50 m VU 1 18,18 Lisätiedot Helsingin kaupungin opetusvirasto 913 09-3108 6879 OPETUSHALLITUS Rahoitus PERUSTIEDOT/Ammatillinen peruskoulutus Käyttömenojen valtionosuuksien laskenta Opiskelijamäärä 1.Yhteystiedot Koulutuksen järjestäjä Koulutuksen järjestäjän numero Yhteyshenkilön Lisätiedot Espoon kaupunki Pöytäkirja 174. 174 Perusopetuksen lukuvuoden 2016-2017 oppilaaksiottoa koskevat ennakoivat päätökset 21.10.2015 Sivu 1 / 1 4433/12.01.02/2015 174 Perusopetuksen lukuvuoden 2016-2017 oppilaaksiottoa koskevat ennakoivat päätökset Valmistelijat / lisätiedot: Juha Nurmi, puh. 050 372 5852 etunimi.sukunimi@espoo.fi Lisätiedot Sustainability in Tourism -osahanke 25.3.2013 Päivi Lappalainen Matkailun ja elämystuotannon osaamiskeskus Osaprojektin tavoitteet Osaprojektin tavoitteena oli työpajojen ja tilaisuuksien kautta koota yritysten näkemyksiä ja tarvetta vastuullisen Lisätiedot SISÄLLYS. N:o 834. Valtioneuvoston asetus. valtionosuuden perusteena käytettävistä opetus- ja kirjastotoimen keskimääräisistä yksikköhinnoista SUOMEN SÄÄDÖSKOKOELMA 2001 Julkaistu Helsingissä 5 päivänä lokakuuta 2001 N:o 834 839 SISÄLLYS N:o Sivu 834 Valtioneuvoston asetus valtionosuuden perusteena käytettävistä opetus- ja kirjastotoimen keskimääräisistä Lisätiedot KYLÄT JA KOULUT -HANKE TUTKII, KEHITTÄÄ JA TUKEE KOULUJEN JA PAIKALLISYHDISTYSTEN YHTEISTYÖTÄ. Hanke on käynnissä 1.1.2014-30.6. KYLÄT JA KOULUT -HANKE TUTKII, KEHITTÄÄ JA TUKEE KOULUJEN JA PAIKALLISYHDISTYSTEN YHTEISTYÖTÄ Hanke on käynnissä 1.1.2014-30.6.2016 MITÄ Humanistinen ammattikorkeakoulu (Humak) ja Suomen Kylätoiminta ry. Lisätiedot Työpaikkojen työhyvinvointiverkosto, Tyhy-verkosto Työpaikkojen työhyvinvointiverkosto, Tyhy-verkosto Jaana Lerssi-Uskelin 23.4.2015 Verkosto työpaikkojen työhyvinvointitoimijoille toiminnan lähtökohtana on työpaikkojen / yritysten tarve alueellisesti Lisätiedot Kuntakohtainen yleisen asumistuen tilasto (Kela), kaikki asunnot, helmikuu 2016 Kuntakohtainen yleisen asumistuen tilasto (Kela), kaikki asunnot, helmikuu 2016 Yhteensä: Manner-Suomi 101 405 363,59 11,10 59,0 115 631 335,39 11,83 52,0 Pääkaupunkiseutu Espoo 6 115 429,83 12,46 63,7 Lisätiedot Ajankohtaista perusopetuksen aamu- ja iltapäivätoiminnassa ja koulun kerhotoiminnassa ja toiminnan tulevaisuus 7.2.2013 Ajankohtaista perusopetuksen aamu- ja iltapäivätoiminnassa ja koulun kerhotoiminnassa ja toiminnan tulevaisuus 7.2.2013 Erityisasiantuntija Riitta Rajala, Opetushallitus JOUSTAVA KOULUPÄIVÄ SEMINAARI 23.1.2013 Lisätiedot TOIMINTAKERTOMUS 2009-10. Äänekosken nuorisovaltuusto SISÄLLYS: 1. Yleistä. 2. Nuorisovaltuuston kokoonpano. 3. Kokoukset. 4. Työryhmät. 5. TOIMINTAKERTOMUS 2009-10 Äänekosken nuorisovaltuusto SISÄLLYS: 1. Yleistä 2. Nuorisovaltuuston kokoonpano 3. Kokoukset 4. Työryhmät 5. Lausunnot 6. Viestintä ja markkinointi 7. Retket, koulutukset ja virkistäytyminen Lisätiedot Tutkimukseen perustuva OSKE-toiminta Tutkimukseen perustuva OSKE-toiminta Metsätalouden edistämisorganisaatioiden kehittämishanke Tutkimustiedon siirto -työryhmä 10.9.2009 Uusiutuva metsäteollisuus -klusteriohjelma 2007-2013 Teija Meuronen Lisätiedot KAARINAN KASVIHUONEKAASUPÄÄSTÖT 2004, 2008-2010 ENNAKKOTIETO VUODELTA 2011 KAARINAN KASVIHUONEKAASUPÄÄSTÖT 2004, 2008-2010 ENNAKKOTIETO VUODELTA 2011 Päästölaskennan sektorit Rakennusten lämmitys (kaukolämpö, erillislämmitys, sähkölämmitys, maalämpö) Kuluttajien sähkönkulutus Lisätiedot VAIKUTTAMINEN. Yleiskokoukset ESPOON NUORISOVALTUUSTON TOIMINTASUUNNITELMA KAUDELLE 2016 2017 VAIKUTTAMINEN Espoon nuorisovaltuusto on espoolaisnuorista koostuva edunvalvontaelin ja päätäntävaltaa nuorisovaltuustossa käyttävät valitut Lisätiedot Helsingin kansainvälisen koulun kannatusyhdistys ry 1500,00 Helsingin kaupunki 217600,00 Helsingin Normaalilyseo 1500,00 Valtion erityisavustus pedagogisten ICTohjaukseen Statligt specialunderstöd för pedagogisk ICT-handledning Koulutuksen järjestäjä Myönnettävä summa ( ) Akaan kaupunki 10900,00 Alajärven kaupunki 9800,00 Lisätiedot Päivi Lipponen /sd (6 osittain, 7 12 ) Jari Myllykoski /vas (1 7 ) Sirpa Paatero /sd Arto Pirttilahti /kesk Juha Sipilä /kesk TALOUSVALIOKUNTA PÖYTÄKIRJA 42/2011 vp Torstai 3.11.2011 kello 12.00-13.40 Läsnä pj. Mauri Pekkarinen /kesk vpj. Marjo Matikainen-Kallström /kok (1 8 ) jäs. Lars Erik Gästgivars /r (1 8 ) James Hirvisaari Lisätiedot VASTUUTA OTTAVA PAIKALLISYHTEISÖ KYLÄTOIMINNAN JA LEADER-RYHMIEN VALTAKUNNALLISEN OHJELMAN 2008-2013 ROAD SHOW LEADER-RYHMIEN VALTAKUNNALLISEN OHJELMAN 2008-2013 ROAD SHOW Suomen Kylätoiminta ry, Maaseutuverkostoyksikkö ja Maaseudun Sivistysliitto järjestävät syksyn 2008 aikana Vastuuta ottavan paikallisyhteisö Lisätiedot Haluatko tarjota oppilaillesi mahdollisuuden kansainvälistyä omassa koulussaan ja ulkomaiselle vaihto-opiskelijalle mahdollisuuden tutustua ERASMUS KOULUISSA Haluatko tarjota oppilaillesi mahdollisuuden kansainvälistyä omassa koulussaan ja ulkomaiselle vaihto-opiskelijalle mahdollisuuden tutustua suomalaiseen kouluun? Erasmus kouluissa Erasmus Lisätiedot 2. VIESTINTÄRYHMÄ JA KREODIN TOIMITUSKUNTA 2013 2014. AMKIT-konsortio on päättänyt 9.1.2013 viestintäryhmän ja Kreodin toimituskunnan kokoonpanosta. AMKIT-KONSORTIO MUISTIO Viestintäryhmä ja Kreodin toimituskunta 29.1.2013 AIKA 14.1.2013 klo 10.10-15 PAIKKA Tikkurila, Ratatie 22, tila A406 Kutsutut Hanna Lahtinen, pj Hanna-Riina Aho, etäyhteydellä, Lisätiedot Comenius -opetushenkilöstön täydennyskoulutus Vuonna 2008 31.1., 31.3. 30.6. ja 30.9. päättyneillä hakukierroksilla tuen saaneet oppilaitokset Comenius -opetushenkilöstön täydennyskoulutus CIMO /6.11.2008 Vuonna 2008 31.1., 31.3. 30.6. ja 30.9. päättyneillä hakukierroksilla tuen saaneet oppilaitokset Tuen saanut oppilaitos Kunta Tuki 1 Alhaisten Lisätiedot Esityslistaa muokattiin. Ops-asiat lisättiin kohtaan 6. Tämän jälkeen esityslista hyväksyttiin. Nefa-Jyväskylä Ry. Esityslista Historian ja etnologian laitos 6/2014 Historica PL 35 40014 Jyväskylän yliopisto nefa-hallitus@lists.jyu.fi 7.5.2014 Hallituksen kokous Aika: 7.5.2014 Klo 16.00 Paikka: Yliopiston Lisätiedot HEVOSYRITYS HUIPPUKUNTOON KIERTUE 2010-2013 ALUEELLINEN KOULUTUSKALENTERI (tilanne 24.6.2010) Teemapäivät on suunnattu toimiville hevosyrityksille; ravi-, ratsastus-, kasvatus-, siittola-, ym. yrittäjille. Aiheet soveltuvat hyvin myös toimintaa Lisätiedot 2 Televisio- ja radiotoiminnasta annetun lain mukainen radiotoiminta. Taajuus (MHz) ERP (kw) 382 Liite TAAJUUSALUEIDEN KÄYTTÖSUUNNITELMA 2 Televisio- ja radiotoiminnasta annetun lain mukainen radiotoiminta 2.1 Analoginen radiotoiminta: Yleisradio Oy Paikkakunta Taajuus (MHz) ERP (kw) Anjalankoski, Lisätiedot 1. Yleistä tutkimuksesta 2. Tutkimuksen tulokset 3. Yhteenveto. Sisällys
it	wikipedia	N/A	Enyo boisduvali () è un lepidottero appartenente alla famiglia Sphingidae, endemico di Cuba. Descrizione Adulto È la specie più simile a E. lugubris lugubris, ma è possibile distinguerla da quest'ultima per la presenza delle linee postmediane sulla pagina inferiore di entrambe le paia di ali, che sono ben sviluppate e fortemente dentellate. Inoltre, a differenza di quanto si osserva in E. lugubris lugubris, il centro del torace è di un grigio più pallido rispetto alle tegulae, e rivela una macchia mediana molto scura a forma di Y rovesciata. Sull'addome è presente un'ampia linea dorsale grigio-pallida. La pagina superiore dell'ala anteriore mostra un'area postmediana piuttosto scura, con campiture color arancio, che contrasta alquanto con la lunula grigio-pallida del margine esterno, a livello dell'apice. Al contrario, sulla pagina inferiore, si notano tre nette linee trasversali postmediane, come sull'ala posteriore; di queste, le due più distali sono decisamente dentellate; infine a livello subapicale è presente una macchia poco differenziata, simile a quanto si osserva in E. latipennis. Larva Dati non disponibili. Pupa Le crisalidi si rinvengono entro bozzoli posti a scarsa profondità nel sottobosco. Biologia Durante l'accoppiamento, le femmine richiamano i maschi grazie ad un feromone rilasciato da una ghiandola, posta all'estremità addominale. Periodo di volo La specie è multivoltina, probabilmente trivoltina. Alimentazione Gli adulti suggono il nettare di fiori di varie specie. I bruchi si alimentano su foglie di membri della famiglia Rubiaceae. Distribuzione e habitat La specie rappresenta un endemismo in quanto l'areale è limitato esclusivamente all'isola di Cuba (locus typicus). L'habitat è rappresentato da foreste e zone boscose più o meno aperte. Tassonomia Sottospecie Non sono state descritte sottospecie. Sinonimi È stato riportato un solo sinonimo: Epistor boisduvali 1904 - Bull. Soc. ent. Fr.. 1904: 77 (Sinonimo omotipico, basionimo) Bibliografia Cary, C.R., 1970 - A new sphinx moth from the West Indies (Sphingidae). J. Lepid. Soc., 24, 267-270 D'Abrera, Bernard, 1986 - Sphingidae mundi; Hawk Moths of the World. 226 pp.; E.W. Classey, Faringdon; ISBN 086096-022-6 Druce in Godman & Salvin, 1881; Godman & Salvin, 1881 - Biologia Centrali-Americana; or Contributions to the Knowledge of the Fauna of Mexico and Central America. Zoology. Lepidoptera. Heterocera Biol. centr.-amer., Lep. Heterocera 1: 1-490 3: pl. 1-101 Kitching & Cadiou, 2000 - Hawkmoths of the World; An annotated and illustrated revisionary checklist (Lepidoptera: Sphingidae). 256 PP.; Comstock Publishing Associates; ISBN 978-0-8014-3734-2 Landman Wijbren, 2001 - The Complete Encyclopedia of Moths. 272 pp.; Grange Books; ISBN 1-84013-409-7 Lewis, H. L., 1974 - Butterflies of the World; ISBN 0-245-52097-X Oberthür, Charles, 1904 - Descriptions de nouveaux Sphingides [Lép.]. Bull. Soc. ent. Fr., 1904, 76-79. Tuttle, James P., 2007 - The Hawkmoths of North America, A Natural History Study of the Sphingidae of the United States and Canada. The Wedge Entomological Research Foundation, Washington, DC; ISBN 978-0-9796633-0-7. Voci correlate Enyo bathus Enyo cavifer Enyo gorgon Enyo latipennis Enyo lugubris Enyo ocypete Enyo taedium Altri progetti Collegamenti esterni Sphingidae Fauna endemica di Cuba
nl	wikipedia	N/A	De pelottentherapie is een techniek die soms gebruikt wordt bij de behandeling van vaginisme. In de pelottentherapie gaat men ervan uit dat vaginistische vrouwen bang zijn voor iets in hun vagina. Met behulp van pelotten, plastic staafjes die in dikte verschillen, leren deze vrouwen geleidelijk die angst te verminderen. De dikste pelotte heeft de omvang van een penis in erectie. Meerdere keren per dag wordt dan het verwijdingsinstrument met glijmiddel ingesmeerd en voorzichtig in de vagina gebracht. Daar blijft hij gedurende 10 tot 15 minuten zitten. Pas wanneer een verwijdingsinstrument ter grootte van een penis kan worden ingebracht, mag het koppel terug proberen seksuele betrekkingen te hebben. Geneeskundige behandeling
en	caselaw	EU	Avis juridique important \| 61999J0133 Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 6 June 2002. - Kingdom of the Netherlands v Commission of the European Communities. - EAGGF - Clearance of accounts - 1995 financial year - Aid for processing of skimmed milk into casein and caseinates. - Case C-133/99. European Court reports 2002 Page I-04943 SummaryPartiesGroundsDecision on costsOperative part Keywords 1. Agriculture - Approximation of laws - Directive 83/417 - Rules concerning the placing on the market within the Community of certain lactoproteins (caseins and caseinates) intended for human consumption - Absolute prohibition - Absence(Council Directive 83/417, Art. 2)2. Community law - Principles - Interpretation - Conception of Community law as a coherent whole3. Agriculture - Common organisation of markets - Milk and milk products - Aid for processing of skimmed milk into casein and caseinates - Concept of finished product - Residues of finished products - Exclusion(Commission Regulation No 2921/90, Arts 1(1) and (3)) Summary $$1. It follows from Article 2, first indent, of Directive 83/417 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to certain lactoproteins (caseins and caseinates) intended for human consumption, that those lactoproteins may only be marketed within the Community if they conform to the definitions and rules laid down in that directive and its annexes. Nevertheless, Article 2 provides, in its second indent, that where products do not satisfy the criteria laid down in the annexes. Member States are to take all the necessary steps to ensure that those products are named and labelled in such a way that the buyer is not misled as to their nature, quality or use. It therefore follows from the wording of Article 2 of Directive 83/417 that that provision does not lay down an absolute prohibition on the marketing within the Community of caseins and caseinates that do not meet the requirements of that directive, but rather is limited to indicating certain criteria as well as an alternative solution for the case where those criteria have not been satisfied.( see paras 27-29 )2. Article 2 of Directive 83/417 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to certain lactoproteins (caseins and caseinates) intended for human consumption cannot serve as a basis for a legal prohibition which, given the conception of Community law as a coherent whole, would influence the common organisation of agricultural markets.( see para. 30 )3. It is clear from the wording of Article 1(1) and (3) of Regulation No 2921/90 on aid for the production of casein and caseinates from skimmed milk that aid is granted for the production of a finished product from certain basic products, the processing of which took place on a single day. The accumulation over several days and the reprocessing of residues of an already finished product clearly does not meet that definition, since it does not constitute production from basic products.That interpretation is supported by the method of calculating the amount of aid, which already takes account of the existence of a certain percentage of residues and under which aid could not be granted a second time for the reprocessing of residues.( see paras 41-42 ) Parties In Case C-133/99,Kingdom of the Netherlands, represented by M.A. Fierstra and N. Wijmenga, acting as Agents,applicant,supported byFrench Republic, represented by R. Abraham and C. Vasak, acting as Agents,intervener,vCommission of the European Communities, represented by T. van Rijn, K.-D. Borchard and C. van der Hauwaert, acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg,defendant,APPLICATION for partial annulment of Commission Decision 1999/187/EC of 3 February 1999 on the clearance of the accounts presented by the Member States in respect of the expenditure for 1995 of the Guarantee Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (OJ 1999 L 61, p. 37), in so far as it excludes the applicant Member State from Community financing in the sum of NLG 39 182 606 by way of aid for the processing of skimmed milk into casein and caseinates,THE COURT (Fifth Chamber),composed of: P. Jann (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, D.A.O. Edward, A. La Pergola, M. Wathelet and C.W.A. Timmermans, Judges,Advocate General: J. Mischo,Registrar: H.A. Rühl, Principal Administrator,having regard to the Report for the Hearing,after hearing oral argument from the parties at the hearing on 22 November 2001, at which the Kingdom of the Netherlands was represented by J.S. van den Oosterkamp, acting as Agent, and the Commission by T. van Rijn,after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 15 January 2002,gives the followingJudgment Grounds 1 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 17 April 1999, the Kingdom of the Netherlands brought an action under the first subparagraph of Article 173 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, the first subparagraph of Article 230 EC) for the partial annulment of Commission Decision 1999/187/EC of 3 February 1999 on the clearance of the accounts presented by the Member States in respect of the expenditure for 1995 of the Guarantee Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (OJ 1999 L 61, p. 37, hereinafter the contested decision), in so far as it excludes the applicant Member State from Community financing in the sum of NLG 39 182 606 by way of aid for the processing of skimmed milk into casein and caseinates.2 By order of the President of the Court of 20 January 2000, the French Republic was granted leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the Kingdom of the Netherlands.The legal framework3 Council Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 of 21 April 1970 on the financing of the common agricultural policy (OJ, English Special Edition 1970 (I), p. 218) determines the expenditure incurred by the Member States chargeable to the Guarantee section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and the conditions for granting such financing. Under Article 5(2) of that regulation:The Commission, after consulting the Fund Committee referred to in Article 11,(a) shall decide:- at the beginning of the year, on the basis of the documents referred to in paragraph 1(a), on an advance payment for the authorities and bodies not exceeding one third of the credits entered in the budget;- during the year, on additional payments intended to cover expenditure to be borne by an authority or body;(b) shall, before the end of the following year, on the basis of the documents referred to in paragraph 1(b), make up the accounts of the authorities and bodies.4 Regulation No 729/70 was amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1287/95 of 22 May 1995 (OJ 1995 L 125, p. 1). Its Article 5, as amended, now provides:1. Member States shall at regular intervals transmit to the Commission the following information concerning the accredited paying agencies and coordinating bodies referred to in Article 4 and relating to transactions financed by the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF:(a) statements of expenditure and estimates of financial needs;(b) annual accounts, accompanied by the information required for clearance and an attestation regarding the integrality, exactitude and veracity of the accounts transmitted.2. The Commission, after consulting the Fund Committee:(a) shall decide on monthly advances against the allocations of expenditure effected by the accredited paying agencies. Expenditure for October shall be attributed to October if it is effected from 1 to 15 October and to November if it is effected from 16 to 31 October. Advance payments shall be made to the Member State not later than the third working day of the second month following that in which the expenditure is effected.Additional advances may be made, the Fund Committee being informed at the next consultation;(b) shall, before 30 April of the year following the financial year concerned, on the basis of the information referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1, clear the accounts of the paying agencies.The accounts clearance decision shall cover the integrality, exactitude and veracity of the accounts submitted.The decision shall not prejudice the adoption of a subsequent decision pursuant to point (c);(c) shall decide on the expenditure to be excluded from the Community financing referred to in Articles 2 and 3 where it finds that expenditure has not been effected in compliance with Community rules.Before a decision to refuse financing is taken, the results of the Commission's checks and the replies of the Member State concerned shall be notified in writing, after which the two parties shall endeavour to reach agreement on the action to be taken.If no agreement is reached, the Member State may ask for a procedure to be initiated with a view to mediating between the respective positions within a period of four months, the results of which shall be set out in a report sent to and examined by the Commission, before a decision to refuse financing is taken.The Commission shall evaluate the amounts to be excluded having regard in particular to the degree of non-compliance found. The Commission shall take into account the nature and gravity of the infringement and the financial loss suffered by the Community.A refusal to finance may not involve expenditure effected prior to twenty-four months preceding the Commission's written communication of the results of those checks to the Member State concerned. However, this provision shall not apply to the financial consequences:- of irregularities as referred to in Article 8(2);- concerning national aids, or infringements, for which the procedures referred to in Articles 93 and 169 of the Treaty have been initiated.3. Detailed rules for the application of this Article shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 13. Those rules shall cover in particular the attestation of the accounts referred to in paragraph 1 and the procedures relating to the decisions referred to in paragraph 2.5 The general rules for granting aid for skimmed milk processed into casein and caseinates were laid down in Article 11 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 of 27 June 1968 on the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products (OJ, English Special Edition 1968 (I), p. 176), as well as Council Regulation (EEC) No 987/68 of 15 July 1968 laying down general rules for granting aid for skimmed milk processed into casein or caseinates (OJ, English Special Edition 1968 (I), p. 262). The detailed rules for the application of those provisions were laid down in Commission Regulation (EEC) No 756/70 of 24 April 1970 on granting aid for skimmed milk processed into casein and caseinates (OJ, English Special Edition 1970 (I), p. 201), repealed and replaced by Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2921/90 of 10 October 1990 on aid for the production of casein and caseinates from skimmed milk (OJ 1990 L 279, p. 22).6 Article 1 of Regulation No 2921/90 provides:1. Aid shall be granted to producers of casein and caseinates only if these products- have been produced from skimmed milk of Community origin or raw casein extracted from milk of Community origin,- meet the composition requirements of Annex I, II or III,- are packaged as stipulated in Article 3.2. Aid shall be paid on the basis of a written application to the competent authority stating:(i) the producer's name and address,(ii) the quantity of casein or caseinates covered by the application and its quality,(iii) the relevant production batch numbers.3. For the purposes of this Regulation a production batch must consist of products of identical quality made on the same day. However, where the total production of casein and caseinates of the establishment concerned during the previous calendar year did not exceed 1 000 tonnes, the production batch may consist of products made during the same calendar week.7 Article 2(3) of Regulation No 2921/90 provides:3. Aid shall be granted at the rate applicable on the day of production of the casein or caseinates.8 In the light of the disparities between the laws of the Member States as regards the composition and manufacture of caseins and caseinates intended for human consumption, which are such as to hinder the free movement of those products, the Community legislature established certain rules regarding the composition of those products and their labelling. On the basis of Article 100 of the EEC Treaty (following amendment, Article 100 of the EC Treaty, which in turn became Article 94 EC), Council Directive 83/417/EEC of 25 July 1983 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to certain lactoproteins (caseins and caseinates) intended for human consumption (OJ 1983 L 237, p. 25) was adopted.9 Article 2 of Directive 83/417 provides that:The Member States shall take all the necessary steps to ensure that:- the products defined in the Annexes may be marketed only if they conform to the definitions and rules laid down in this Directive and the Annexes thereto, and- products which do not satisfy the criteria laid down in the Annexes are named and labelled in such a way that the buyer is not misled as to their nature, quality or use.10 In Annexes I and II to Directive 83/417, the standards applicable to the elements making up, respectively, edible caseins and caseinates are laid down in detail. No reference is made to aluminium ammonium sulphate (AAS) in those Annexes.The procedure for clearing accounts11 In October 1995, following consultation with the competent Netherlands authorities, the Commission's Unité de coordination de la lutte antifraude (Unit for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention, UCLAF) carried out inspections of the Netherlands undertaking DMV Campina in connection with the manufacture and sale of certain types of caseinates eligible for production aid under Regulation No 2921/90.12 As a result of those inspections, UCLAF found that, since, first, certain caseinates contained AAS and, second, a caseinate called EMST had not been produced in accordance with the conditions laid down by Regulation No 2921/90, the aid relating to those caseinates had been paid unlawfully. UCLAF pointed out, in particular, that the use of AAS was prohibited by Directive 83/417.13 In the consultations which then took place between the parties, the Netherlands authorities maintained that Regulation No 2921/90 did not prohibit the use of AAS in the production of caseinates, since Directive 83/417 was not applicable in that context, and that the production of EMST had been carried out in accordance with Regulation No 2921/90.14 Since it was not satisfied with those explanations, the Commission informed the Netherlands Government, by letter of 21 January 1998, that it intended to propose corrections to the expenditures declared in that connection.15 The Kingdom of the Netherlands then made an application for formal conciliation. The Conciliation Body stated, in its report of 16 July 1998, that it was not entirely clear that the legal arguments of the Commission's services regarding the use of AAS were well founded. As regards the production of EMST, the Conciliation Body stated that it had some difficulty in understanding the concern of the Commission services that the payment of aid for that caseinate would create serious risks of speculation and fraud for much greater quantities of casein and caseinates. It recorded that, in the end, it had not found it possible to reconcile the divergent positions of the parties in the case.16 On 12 January 1999, the Commission adopted its summary report on the results of audits for the clearance of accounts for the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF for 1995 (hereinafter the summary report). It noted two irregularities, the first relating to the unauthorised use of AAS in the production of caseinates and the second relating to the production of EMST from casein production residues. On those grounds, the Commission, in the contested decision, imposed corrections for 1995 of NLG 32 746 529 in respect of the production of caseinates containing AAS and NLG 6 436 077 in respect of the production of EMST.The correction of NLG 32 746 529 in respect of the production of caseinates containing AAS17 As regards the contested correction relating to the use of AAS in the production of caseinates, the Netherlands Government put forward four pleas in support of its application to annul the contested decision in part. In its first plea, it claimed that the Commission acted in breach of Regulation No 2921/90 in basing the correction on failure to meet requirements under Directive 83/417 which are not provided for by that regulation. In the alternative, it contended that the requirements of Directive 83/417 had also been met. By its second plea, the Netherlands Government alleged an infringement of Article 5(2)(c) of Regulation No 729/70, as amended by Regulation No 1287/95, as well as of the principles of cooperation in good faith, consultation and the preventive approach agreed between the Commission and the Member States. By its third plea, it alleged a failure to observe the principle of legal certainty in so far as, according to it, the national authorities could reasonably consider that it was not necessary to comply with the terms of Directive 83/417 in order to implement Regulation No 2921/90. By its fourth plea, it claimed a failure to observe the requirement to provide a statement of reasons.The first plea18 By its first plea, the Netherlands Government claimed that, by requiring that the terms of Directive 83/417 be met in order for the aid in question to be granted, the Commission acted in breach of Regulation No 2921/90.19 According to that government, supported on this point by the French Government, Regulation No 2921/90 does not require reference to Directive 83/417. The legal basis and purpose of the two pieces of legislation are different: while Regulation No 2921/90, based on Article 43 of the EEC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 37 EC), seeks to achieve objectives defined within the context of the common agricultural policy, in particular the stabilisation of the price of lactoproteins with a view to their export to third countries, Directive 83/417, based on Article 100 of the EEC Treaty, seeks to approximate the national laws relating to the conditions for marketing, within the Community, caseins and caseinates intended for human consumption, in order to remove barriers to trade. Directive 83/417 therefore cannot limit the scope of Regulation No 2921/90.20 Moreover, the Commission has itself admitted that Regulation No 2921/90 has no connection with Directive 83/417. In fact, in 1997 it presented a proposal to amend that regulation, by which it sought to bring its provisions and those of Directive 83/417 into line, for the future, by linking the allocation of aid to the express condition of compliance with the requirements of that directive. That proposal was then superseded, in 1998, by a contrary proposal which required that, for purposes of technical monitoring, the granting of aid should not be linked to the condition that the requirements of Directive 83/417 be satisfied. Both those proposals met with objections from the Member States, and the Commission finally withdrew them.21 According to the Commission, that plea is unfounded. The connection between Regulation No 2921/90 and Directive 83/417 is necessary, because the unity of Community law requires that a product which may not be marketed within the common market may not be granted production aid either.22 That interpretation follows from the very purpose of the system of aid, which seeks to make the competitive position of Community producers comparable to that of producers in third countries. And where a product cannot be marketed within the Community, there can be no inequality of competitive position as against producers in third countries and there is thus no reason to make a grant of aid.23 The Commission confirms that it presented two proposals in turn for amending Regulation No 2921/90, but it maintains that the first proposal, the object of which was to link the granting of aid to the express condition that the terms of Directive 83/417 be met, did not aim to create a new obligation but merely to clarify the obligation already in the legislation. That was confirmed by the second proposal, which laid down a derogation from the provisions of Directive 83/417 as regards the grant of aid.24 In that regard, it should be pointed out, first, that Regulation No 2921/90 subjects the grant of the aid in question to a number of conditions. Those conditions are set out in Article 1(1) of that regulation and concern production using products of Community origin, certain composition requirements and packaging. With respect to the composition requirements, Article 1(1), second indent, of Regulation No 2921/90 refers to Annexes I, II and III to the same regulation. Those annexes set maximum or minimum content or prohibit the presence of certain elements in the products in question. It is common ground that AAS is not referred to, either to require or to prohibit its presence in caseins and caseinates.25 Second, Regulation No 2921/90 does not refer to Directive 83/417 and does not even mention it. It is therefore necessary to consider whether that directive nevertheless lays down, for the reasons given by the Commission, additional obligations for the granting of the aids at issue.26 The Commission argues, in particular, that Directive 83/417 prohibits the addition of AAS to caseins and caseinates marketed within the Community and that that express statutory prohibition influences all the other fields of Community law, so that aid for the production of caseins and caseinates containing AAS must be considered unlawful. The Commission is thus relying on a view that Community law forms a coherent whole, regardless of the field of law involved, and regardless of the specific objectives of each of the laws concerned.27 In that connection, it is true that it follows from Article 2, first indent, of Directive 83/417 that caseins and caseinates intended for human consumption may only be marketed within the Community if they conform to the definitions and rules laid down in that directive and its annexes. AAS is not among the components and additives authorised by the annexes to that directive.28 Nevertheless, Article 2 of Directive 83/417 provides, in its second indent, that where products do not satisfy the criteria laid down in the annexes, Member States are to take all the necessary steps to ensure that those products are named and labelled in such a way that the buyer is not misled as to their nature, quality or use.29 It therefore follows from the wording of Article 2 of Directive 83/417 that that provision does not lay down an absolute prohibition on the marketing within the Community of caseins and caseinates that do not meet the requirements of that directive, but rather is limited to indicating certain criteria as well as an alternative solution for the case where those criteria have not been satisfied.30 In those circumstances, Article 2 of Directive 83/417 cannot serve as a basis for a legal prohibition which, given the conception of Community law as a coherent whole, would influence the common organisation of agricultural markets.31 As the Advocate General made clear in paragraphs 56 and 57 of his Opinion, even if it were determined that the undertaking DMV Campina used the designation edible caseinate in breach of Article 2, second indent, of Directive 83/417, such an infringement, although it should be subject to penalties by the Member States, would not have repercussions on the eligibility of the product at issue for production aid.32 As to the statement by the Commission that the first proposal to amend Regulation No 2921/90 in order to link the granting of aid to the express condition that the terms of Directive 83/417 be met merely confirms an already existing rule of law, suffice it to note that, even if the as yet unrealised intentions of the legislature were an admissible basis for the interpretation of an existing provision, such a proposal rather suggests that there was previously no such link between Regulation No 2921/90 and Directive 83/417. The second proposed amendment, which, in contrast, envisages an express derogation from the terms of Directive 83/417, cannot be considered a confirmation of such a legal position either.33 The plea by the Netherlands Government alleging that the Commission infringed Regulation No 2921/90 in basing its decision on requirements that were not laid down by that regulation, must therefore be upheld. Consequently, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it has imposed a correction of NLG 32 746 529 in respect of the production of caseinates containing AAS.The second, third and fourth pleas34 Since the Court has upheld the first plea of the Netherlands Government, it is no longer necessary to examine the other pleas of that government.The correction of NLG 6 436 077 in respect of the production of EMST35 As regards the contested correction in respect of the methods of production of EMST, the Netherlands Government has put forward four pleas in support of its application to declare void parts of the contested decision. By its first plea, it alleges that the Commission disregarded the fact that the EMST had been produced in compliance with the provisions of Regulation No 2921/90. By its second plea, it states that the Commission failed to observe the principles of cooperation in good faith, consultation and the preventive approach agreed between the Commission and the Member States. By its third plea, it alleges a failure to observe the principle of legal certainty. Finally, by its fourth plea, it alleges a failure to observe the requirement to provide a statement of reasons.The first plea36 In its first plea, the Netherlands Government contends that the Commission disregarded the fact that the EMST was produced in compliance with the requirements of Article 1(1) and (3) of Regulation No 2921/90.37 Article 1(1) of that regulation provides that, in order to be granted aid, caseinates must be produced from skimmed milk or raw casein. That was the case in this instance, since the EMST was produced from residues formed during the production of caseinates, which are collected over several days or several weeks and which constitute semi-finished products. Before being transformed into EMST, those residues have to go through the entire production process for caseinates. At the time of their collection, they therefore do not yet constitute finished caseinate.38 As regards Article 1(3) of Regulation No 2921/90, which requires that a production batch must consist of products of identical quality made on the same day, that condition is also satisfied even if the residues are collected over several days before being processed into caseinates on a given day. In fact, the verb made used in Article 1(3) should be understood in the sense of prepared. The idea underlying that provision is merely to define clearly the day of production within the meaning of Article 2(3) of that regulation, since that article lays down that the rate of aid will vary daily, and thus to avoid one batch being made up of products to which differing rates of aid apply. However, the definition of the day of production is not the problem in this instance.39 According to the Commission, the applicable legislation was infringed because the residues formed during the production of caseinate already constitute the finished product and not a semi-finished product. The method used by DMV Campina, which consists in accumulating residues over several days or several weeks, in order to reprocess them and put them forward as caseinate eligible for aid, does not comply with Article 1(1) and (3) of Regulation No 2921/90. In those circumstances, a production batch is not produced from skimmed milk or raw casein, but rather from caseinate, and it is not composed of products of identical quality made on the same day.40 Moreover, according to the Commission the existence of residues during the production of caseinates is already taken into account in advance when calculating the amount of the aid. In fact, 5% of the aid is in respect of residues, which is very generous given that, in modern plants such as those of DMV Campina, the true percentage does not normally exceed 2%. It follows that the undertaking concerned has in fact received aid twice for the same product.41 As to those submissions, it is clear from the wording of Article 1(1) and (3) of Regulation No 2921/90 that aid is granted for the production of a finished product from certain basic products, the processing of which took place on a single day. The accumulation over several days and the reprocessing of residues of an already finished product clearly does not meet that definition, since it does not constitute production from basic products.42 That interpretation is supported by the method of calculating the amount of aid, which already takes account of the existence of a certain percentage of residues. As the Advocate General pointed out in paragraph 104 of his Opinion, it would not be consistent with that approach to grant aid a second time for the reprocessing of residues.43 It follows from this that the first plea of the Netherlands Government, relating to the conformity of the production process for EMST with Article 1(1) and (3) of Regulation No 2921/90, is not well founded and cannot, therefore, be upheld.The second, third and fourth pleas44 By its second plea, the Netherlands Government claims that the Commission, by refusing to consider EMST eligible for aid, failed to observe the principles of cooperation in good faith, consultation and the preventive approach agreed between the Commission and the Member States. Those principles follow from Article 5(2)(c) of Regulation No 729/70, as amended by Regulation No 1287/95. Although that provision is not applicable to 1995 but only to the following financial years, it merely gives concrete expression to the principles already previously applicable. The Commission, it claims, has acted in breach of those principles by not taking account of the critical report by the Conciliation Body and by not seeking to enter into a dialogue in good faith with the Netherlands authorities, but remaining silent on the arguments put forward by those authorities.45 By its third plea, alleging a violation of the principle of legal certainty, the Netherlands Government also claims that the Commission failed to enter into any dialogue, pointing out that the competent Netherlands authorities had already informed the Commission, in particular by letter of 2 Feburary 1993, of their interpretation of Regulation No 2921/90 as regards the production of EMST and that the Commission had not, at the time, put forward any objections in that regard.46 By its fourth plea, the Netherlands Government submits that the Commission acted in breach of the requirement to provide a statement of reasons for the contested decision, inasmuch as it was impossible to determine, on the basis of the grounds of that decision, what reasons had led the Commission to adopt its decision or to understand its reasoning.47 The Commission disputes the charge of a lack of cooperation in good faith and of consultation. It maintains that, throughout the procedure, which lasted three and a half years, it responded to all the main points raised by the Netherlands authorities, as evidenced by the voluminous correspondance which was exchanged and the summary report. The allegation of breach of the requirement to provide a statement of reasons is therefore unfounded. On the contrary, the Netherlands authorities had been closely involved in the preparation of the contested decision. The agreed preventive approach, which exists to deal with irregularities in inspections, is not intended for a case such as that in question, where aid was paid in breach of the applicable provisions. It cannot therefore be claimed that the Commission has refused a dialogue in good faith on the ground that it reached the conclusion that the criticisms of the Conciliation Body were not justified and that it therefore decided to retain its view of the matter.48 As regards the preliminary information on the method of production of EMST, the letter from the Netherlands authorities of 2 February 1993 described the production process in only a very general manner, without specifying that the product was collected over several days or several weeks before being reprocessed. As soon as it was informed of how that process actually functioned, the Commission contacted those authorities.49 As regards those pleas, which it is appropriate to consider jointly, the importance of the correspondance exchanged and the recourse to the conciliation procedure show that the parties had been properly informed of their respective positions and that they had attempted to reconcile their differences of view. The fact that no consensus emerged as a result cannot be blamed on the Commission, since referral to the Conciliation Body does not deprive the Commission of the right to adopt a definitive decision relating to the clearance of accounts.50 On that ground, and for the reasons set out in detail in paragraphs 119 to 121 and 123 to 127 of the Opinion of the Advocate General, the Commission cannot be charged with having failed to observe the principles of cooperation in good faith, consultation, the agreed preventive approach and legal certainty, as well as the requirement to provide a statement of reasons. It follows that the second, third and fourth pleas concerning EMST must also be dismissed. Decision on costs Costs51 Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs, if they have been applied for in the successful party's pleadings. Each party asked that the other be ordered to pay the costs. Since the Commission was unsuccessful in its submission with respect to the sum of NLG 32 746 529 and the Kingdom of the Netherlands was unsuccessful in its plea with respect to the sum of NLG 6 436 077, the Commission must be ordered to pay five sixths of the costs and the Kingdom of the Netherlands one sixth of the costs. Under the first subparagraph of Article 69(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the French Republic, which intervened in these proceedings, is to bear its own costs. Operative part On those grounds,THE COURT (Fifth Chamber)hereby:1. Annuls Commission Decision 1999/187/EC of 3 February 1999 on the clearance of the accounts presented by the Member States in respect of the expenditure for 1995 of the Guarantee Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, in so far as it excludes the Kingdom of the Netherlands from Community financing in the sum of NLG 32 746 529 by way of aid for the processing of skimmed milk into casein and caseinates;2. Dismisses the remainder of the action by the Kingdom of the Netherlands;3. Orders the Commission of the European Communities to pay five sixths of the costs and the Kingdom of the Netherlands to pay one sixth of the cost;4. Orders the French Republic to bear its own costs.
pl	other	N/A	SPRAWOZDANIE w sprawie wniosku dotyczącego rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady dotyczącego praw pasażerów w transporcie autobusowym i autokarowym oraz zmieniającego rozporządzenie (WE) nr 2006/2004 w sprawie współpracy między organami krajowymi odpowiedzialnymi za egzekwowanie przepisów prawa w zakresie ochrony konsumentów - A6-0250/2009 Procedura : 2008/0237(COD)Przebieg prac nad dokumentem podczas sesjiDokument w ramach procedury : A6-0250/2009Teksty złożone : 362k 510k 6 kwietnia 2009PE 418.207v02-00 A6-0250/2009 w sprawie wniosku dotyczącego rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady dotyczącego praw pasażerów w transporcie autobusowym i autokarowym oraz zmieniającego rozporządzenie (WE) nr 2006/2004 w sprawie współpracy między organami krajowymi odpowiedzialnymi za egzekwowanie przepisów prawa w zakresie ochrony konsumentów Sprawozdawca: Gabriele Albertini – uwzględniając wniosek Komisji przedstawiony Parlamentowi Europejskiemu i Radzie (COM(2008)0817), – uwzględniając art. 251 ust. 2 oraz art. 71 ust. 1 traktatu WE, zgodnie z którymi wniosek został przedstawiony przez Komisję Parlamentowi (C6-0469/2008), – uwzględniając sprawozdanie Komisji Transportu i Turystyki (A6-0250/2009), (2a) Państwa członkowskie powinny mieć możliwość wyłączenia z zakresu niniejszego rozporządzenia transportu miejskiego, podmiejskiego i regionalnego, jeżeli zapewnią porównywalny poziom praw pasażerów dzięki alternatywnym środkom regulacyjnym. Środki te powinny uwzględniać karty praw pasażerów dotyczące multimodalnych sieci transportu publicznego, które obejmują kwestie wymienione w art. 1 niniejszego rozporządzenia. Komisja powinna zbadać możliwość ustanowienia pakietu wspólnych praw pasażerów w transporcie miejskim, podmiejskim i regionalnym, który obejmie wszystkie środki transportu, a także przedstawić Parlamentowi sprawozdanie wraz z ewentualnym wnioskiem legislacyjnym. Karty praw pasażerów dotyczące transportu lokalnego obejmują wszystkie różne środki transportu w multimodalnych sieciach transportu publicznego. Miejskie, podmiejskie i regionalne usługi autobusowe bardzo często wchodzą w skład tych sieci. Komisja Europejska powinna traktować transport autobusowy, krajowy transport kolejowy (tzw. lekki transport szynowy – metro, tramwaj itp.) oraz inne lokalne środki transportu jako całość (jeden bilet na wszystkie środki transportu, wykorzystanie wspólnej przestrzeni itd.). (2b) Państwa członkowskie powinny zachęcać do opracowania kart praw pasażerów dotyczących autobusowych i/lub autokarowych usług transportu miejskiego, podmiejskiego i regionalnego, określających zobowiązania przedsiębiorstw autobusowych i/lub autokarowych do podniesienia jakości usług i pełniejszego zaspokojenia potrzeb swoich pasażerów. Należy zachęcać przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe do podejmowania dobrowolnych zobowiązań oraz opracowania kart praw pasażerów (deklaracje intencji) przy uwzględnieniu specyfiki usług transportu miejskiego, podmiejskiego i regionalnego w miejscu ich świadczenia. (2c) Działania UE zmierzające do poprawy praw pasażerów w transporcie autobusowym powinny uwzględniać specyfikę sektora transportu, zdominowanego przez małe i średnie przedsiębiorstwa. Europejski sektor transportu autobusowego jest zdominowany przez małe i średnie prywatne przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe. Wymagają one dużego zaangażowania osobistego i finansowego, a także znajdują się pod ciągłą presją wyników, ponieważ przedsiębiorca ręczy swoim nazwiskiem, jest rozpoznawalny i musi osobiście odpowiadać za błędne decyzje. Średnie przedsiębiorstwa z reguły działają na rynku blisko konsumenta końcowego. Mają codziennie bezpośredni kontakt z klientem i wyraźnie lokalny charakter. Procedury podejmowania decyzji są krótkie. (4a) Pasażerowie, którzy doznali szkody w wyniku wypadku objętego ubezpieczeniem, powinni w pierwszej kolejności złożyć wniosek o odszkodowanie do przedsiębiorstwa autobusowego i/lub autokarowego, o którym mowa w niniejszym rozporządzeniu, a jedynie w wypadku niepodjęcia działań przez to przedsiębiorstwo mogą zgłosić się do firmy ubezpieczeniowej. Ten punkt preambuły ma na celu zapobieżenie podwójnym wnioskom o odszkodowanie, jako że w niektórych przypadkach wnioski mogą być jednocześnie wysyłane zarówno do przedsiębiorstwa transportowego, jak i do firmy ubezpieczającej to przedsiębiorstwo. (7a) Operatorzy autobusowi i autokarowi powinni zapewnić swojemu personelowi konkretne szkolenie umożliwiające udzielenie właściwej pomocy osobom niepełnosprawnym i osobom o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej. Szkolenie takie powinno być zapewnione w ramach dyrektywy 2003/59/WE w sprawie wstępnej kwalifikacji i okresowego szkolenia kierowców niektórych pojazdów drogowych do przewozu rzeczy lub osób. Państwa członkowskie powinny w jak największym stopniu wspierać przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i autokarowe w opracowywaniu i realizowaniu właściwych programów szkoleniowych. W odniesieniu do szkoleń należy zawrzeć odniesienie do dyrektywy 2003/59/WE. Ponadto państwa członkowskie powinny wspierać przemysł autobusowy i autokarowy w tworzeniu właściwych programów szkoleniowych. (8) Decydując o budowie nowych terminali oraz w związku z poważnymi remontami, podmioty zarządzające powinny, w miarę możliwości, brać pod uwagę potrzeby osób niepełnosprawnych oraz osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej. W każdym razie podmioty zarządzające terminalami autobusowymi i autokarowymi powinny wyznaczyć punkty, w których osoby takie mogą zgłosić przybycie i potrzebę pomocy. (8) Decydując o budowie nowych terminali oraz w związku z poważnymi remontami, podmioty zarządzające powinny bez wyjątku brać pod uwagę potrzeby osób niepełnosprawnych oraz osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej. W każdym razie podmioty zarządzające terminalami autobusowymi i autokarowymi powinny wyznaczyć punkty, w których osoby takie mogą zgłosić przybycie i potrzebę pomocy. Aby zapewnić równe prawa i uniknąć dyskryminacji osób niepełnosprawnych, w przypadku budowy nowych dworców oraz wszelkich poważnych remontów należy przestrzegać zasad projektowania dla wszystkich. Jest to zgodne z przepisami zawartymi w Konwencji ONZ o prawach osób niepełnosprawnych, której sygnatariuszem jest Wspólnota Europejska. (8a) Podobnie, przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe powinny uwzględnić tego rodzaju potrzeby przy podejmowaniu decyzji w sprawie projektowania nowych i nowo remontowanych pojazdów. (8b) W razie potrzeby państwa członkowskie powinny poprawić istniejącą infrastrukturę, aby umożliwić przedsiębiorstwom autobusowym i autokarowym zapewnienie dostępu osobom niepełnosprawnym i osobom o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej oraz świadczenie właściwej pomocy. Nadal brakuje właściwej infrastruktury dla osób niepełnosprawnych i osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, zarówno na dworcach autobusowych, jak i na przystankach na trasach świadczenia usług. Punkt 8c preambuły (nowy) (8c) Działania UE zmierzające do poprawy nieograniczonej mobilności powinny przede wszystkim wspierać pozbawiony barier dostęp do dworców autobusowych i przystanków pośrednich. W ramach projektu Unii Europejskiej COST 349 stwierdzono braki w infrastrukturze przystosowanej dla niepełnosprawnych na dworcach autobusowych, parkingach dla podróżnych i przystankach pośrednich. Dopóki nie zapewni się infrastruktury przystosowanej dla niepełnosprawnych i pozbawionej barier na całym obszarze, pozbawiony barier dostęp do autobusów jest bezużyteczny. Punkt 8d preambuły (nowy) (8d) Zgodnie z wnioskami płynącymi z projektu COST 349 Komisja powinna zaproponować działania na rzecz dostępnej i interoperacyjnej w całej UE infrastruktury na dworcach autobusowych oraz przystankach. (3) niedyskryminacja i obowiązkowa pomoc dla osób niepełnosprawnych i osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, podróżujących autobusem lub autokarem; (3) brak barier oraz niedyskryminacja i obowiązkowa pomoc dla osób niepełnosprawnych i osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, podróżujących autobusem lub autokarem; 2. Państwa członkowskie mogą wyłączyć z zakresu rozporządzenia transport miejski, podmiejski i regionalny objęty zamówieniami publicznymi na usługi, jeżeli zamówienia takie zapewniają poziom praw pasażerów porównywalny do poziomu wymaganego w niniejszym rozporządzeniu. 2. Państwa członkowskie mogą wyłączyć z zakresu rozporządzenia transport miejski, podmiejski i regionalny, jeżeli zagwarantują, że przepisy rozporządzenia są przestrzegane za pośrednictwem alternatywnych środków regulacyjnych z uwzględnieniem obiektywnych szczególnych cech transportu miejskiego, podmiejskiego i regionalnego i przy jednoczesnym zagwarantowaniu poziomu praw pasażerów porównywalnego do poziomu wymaganego w niniejszym rozporządzeniu. Transport miejski, podmiejski i regionalny ma bardzo specyficzny charakter (brak wcześniejszych rezerwacji, korzystanie z biletów dziennych, tygodniowych, miesięcznych i rocznych, liczne przystanki, różne rodzaje bagażu). Dlatego państwa członkowskie muszą mieć możliwość wyłączenia tych rodzajów transportu z konkretnych wymogów tego rozporządzenia, jeśli podejmą alternatywne środki zapewniające pasażerom podobny poziom praw. (4) „umowa transportowa” oznacza umowę przewozu między przedsiębiorstwem autobusowym i/lub autokarowym bądź jego upoważnionym sprzedawcą biletów a pasażerem, dotyczącą świadczenia jednej lub więcej usług transportowych; (4) „umowa transportowa” oznacza umowę przewozu między przedsiębiorstwem autobusowym i/lub autokarowym a pasażerem, dotyczącą świadczenia jednej lub więcej usług transportowych, niezależnie od tego, czy bilet został zakupiony u przewoźnika, organizatora wycieczek czy sprzedawcy biletów; Sprzedawcy biletów i sprzedawcy detaliczni nie zawierają umowy dotyczącej przewozu ani nie sprzedają biletów na własny rachunek. Aranżują oni jedynie umowę dotyczącą przewozu między klientem a organizatorem/przedsiębiorstwem transportowym. (6) „sprzedawca biletów” oznacza każdego detalicznego sprzedawcę usług transportu autobusowego i autokarowego zawierającego umowy transportowe i sprzedającego bilety w imieniu przedsiębiorstwa autobusowego i/lub autokarowego bądź na własny rachunek; (6) „sprzedawca biletów” oznacza każdego pośrednika sprzedającego usługi transportu autobusowego lub autokarowego w imieniu przedsiębiorstwa autobusowego i/lub autokarowego bądź organizatora wycieczek, w tym usługi sprzedawane w pakiecie; (7) „organizator wycieczek” oznacza organizatora lub punkt sprzedaży detalicznej w rozumieniu art.2 ust.2 i 3 dyrektywy 90/314/EWG; (7) „organizator wycieczek” oznacza organizatora w rozumieniu art. 2 ust. 2 dyrektywy 90/314/EWG; Organizatorzy i sprzedawcy detaliczni to dwie odrębne jednostki. Operatorów wycieczek określa się jako organizatorów, którzy sprzedają klientom pakiety występując we własnym imieniu, zarówno bezpośrednio, jak i za pośrednictwem sprzedawcy detalicznego. Z kolei sprzedawca detaliczny jest pośrednikiem, tj. jedynie aranżuje umowę zawieraną między organizatorem a klientem, lecz nie jest stroną tej umowy. Artykuł 3 – punkt 11 (11) „odwołanie” oznacza niewykonanie usługi, która została uprzednio zaplanowana i na którą dokonano co najmniej jednej rezerwacji; (11) „odwołanie” oznacza niewykonanie określonej usługi, która została uprzednio zaplanowana i na którą dokonano co najmniej jednej konkretnej rezerwacji; Należy wyjaśnić i skonkretyzować definicję, tak aby zapobiec nadużyciom przez pasażerów posiadających bilety dzienne, miesięczne lub roczne. Artykuł 3 – punkt 12a (nowy) (12a) „przystępne formaty” oznaczają formaty, dzięki którym wszyscy pasażerowie mają dostęp do tych samych informacji, między innymi za pośrednictwem tekstu, alfabetu Braille’a, formatów audio, wideo i/lub formatów elektronicznych. Uzasadnienie Należy podać definicję „przystępnych formatów”, ponieważ termin ten jest stosowany w całym tekście. 1. Zgodnie z niniejszym rozdziałem przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe ponoszą odpowiedzialność za straty lub szkody powstałe w wyniku śmierci pasażerów bądź odniesionych przez nich obrażeń ciała lub szkód psychicznych, spowodowanych wypadkami wynikającymi ze świadczenia usług transportu autobusowego i autokarowego, mającymi miejsce, gdy pasażer znajduje się w pojeździe, wsiada do niego lub wysiada. 1. Zgodnie z niniejszym rozdziałem przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe ponoszą odpowiedzialność za straty lub szkody powstałe w wyniku śmierci pasażerów bądź odniesionych przez nich obrażeń ciała, spowodowanych wypadkami wynikającymi ze świadczenia usług transportu autobusowego i autokarowego, mającymi miejsce, gdy pasażer znajduje się w pojeździe, wsiada do niego lub wysiada. 2. Odpowiedzialność przedsiębiorstw autobusowych i/lub autokarowych za szkody nie podlega żadnym ograniczeniom finansowym, czy to zdefiniowanym przepisami prawa, konwencją czy umową. 2. Odpowiedzialność deliktowa przedsiębiorstw autobusowych i/lub autokarowych za szkody nie podlega żadnym ograniczeniom finansowym, czy to zdefiniowanym przepisami prawa, konwencją czy umową. Celem poprawki jest uniknięcie nieporozumień i wyjaśnienie, że ograniczeniom powinna podlegać odpowiedzialność obiektywna (siła wyższa), a nie odpowiedzialność deliktowa. 3. W przypadku wszelkich szkód na kwotę do 220 000 EUR, przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe nie może wyłączyć ani ograniczyć swojej odpowiedzialności wykazując, że zapewnił wymaganą opiekę zgodnie z ust.4 lit.a). 3. Bez uszczerbku dla krajowych systemów odpowiedzialności, które są korzystniejsze dla pasażerów, w przypadku wszelkich szkód na kwotę do 220 000 EUR, przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe nie może wyłączyć ani ograniczyć swojej odpowiedzialności wykazując, że zapewniło wymaganą opiekę zgodnie z ust. 4 lit. a). Uzasadnienie Zgodnie z dyrektywą 2005/14/WE limit ten wynosi 5 milionów euro. Rozporządzenie nie może pogarszać warunków dla pasażerów w żadnym państwie członkowskim. a) jeżeli wypadek spowodowany został przez okoliczności, które nie były związane ze świadczeniem usług transportu autobusowego i autokarowego oraz których przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe nie mogło uniknąć, mimo zapewnienia opieki wymaganej w szczególnych okolicznościach sprawy, a także którego następstwom nie mogło zapobiec; a) jeżeli wypadek spowodowany został przez okoliczności, które nie były związane ze świadczeniem usług transportu autobusowego i autokarowego ani których przewoźnik nie mógł uniknąć, mimo zapewnienia opieki wymaganej w szczególnych okolicznościach sprawy, bądź którego następstwom nie mogło zapobiec; Obecne sformułowanie stanowi przeszkodę prawie nie do pokonania. Przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe nie może generalnie zostać pociągnięte do odpowiedzialności za okoliczności, za które nie odpowiada i na które nie ma wpływu. Dlatego należy przyjąć możliwość wyłączenia odpowiedzialności w przypadku winy osób trzecich. 1. W przypadku śmierci pasażerów lub odniesienia przez nich obrażeń ciała bądź innych szkód fizycznych lub psychicznych, spowodowanych wypadkiem wynikającym ze świadczenia usług transportu autobusowego i autokarowego, przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe bezzwłocznie, a w każdym razie nie później niż piętnaście dni po ustaleniu tożsamości osoby fizycznej uprawnionej do otrzymania rekompensaty, dokonuje płatności zaliczkowych, jakie mogą być wymagane na pokrycie natychmiastowych potrzeb ekonomicznych proporcjonalnie do poniesionych szkód. 1. W przypadku śmierci pasażerów lub odniesienia przez nich wszelkich obrażeń ciała spowodowanych wypadkiem wynikającym ze świadczenia usług transportu autobusowego i autokarowego, oraz w przypadku, gdy pasażer nie zawarł innego ubezpieczenia podróżnego, przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe bezzwłocznie, a w każdym razie w ciągu piętnastu dni od ustalenia tożsamości osoby fizycznej uprawnionej do otrzymania rekompensaty, dokonuje płatności zaliczkowych, jakie mogą być wymagane na pokrycie natychmiastowych potrzeb ekonomicznych proporcjonalnie do poniesionych szkód, w przypadku gdy istnieją oparte na domniemaniu faktycznym dowody, że wina leży po stronie przedsiębiorstwa transportowego. W razie wypadku pierwsze płatności są pokrywane na szczeblu krajowym przez polisy ubezpieczenia podróżnego. Niesprawiedliwe byłoby zobowiązać w sposób automatyczny przedsiębiorstwo transportowe do podejmowania natychmiastowych środków naprawczych przed ustaleniem, na kim spoczywa odpowiedzialność, chyba że istnieją dowody umożliwiające określenie bezpośredniej odpowiedzialności. Poprawka 23 3. Płatność zaliczkowa nie jest równoznaczna z uznaniem odpowiedzialności i może być potrącona z wszelkich płatności dokonywanych następnie na podstawie niniejszego rozporządzenia, nie podlega jednak zwrotowi, z wyjątkiem przypadków, w których szkoda powstała wskutek niedbalstwa pasażera lub z jego winy bądź w których płatność zaliczkową otrzymała osoba niebędąca osobą uprawnioną do rekompensaty. 3. Płatność zaliczkowa nie jest równoznaczna z uznaniem odpowiedzialności i może być potrącona z wszelkich płatności dokonywanych następnie na podstawie niniejszego rozporządzenia, nie podlega jednak zwrotowi, z wyjątkiem przypadków, w których szkoda powstała wskutek niedbalstwa pasażera lub z jego winy bądź w których płatność zaliczkową otrzymała osoba niebędąca osobą uprawnioną do rekompensaty, lub w przypadku gdy rzeczywiste poniesione szkody opiewały na kwotę niższą niż wartość zaliczki. 3. Jeżeli przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe wykaże, że szkoda wynikła z winy pasażera lub wskutek jego niedbalstwa bądź jego wina lub niedbalstwo przyczyniło się do powstania szkody, przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe jest całkowicie lub częściowo zwolnione z odpowiedzialności w stosunku do występującego z roszczeniem w zakresie, w jakim taka wina lub niedbalstwo spowodowało szkodę bądź przyczyniło się do niej. 3. Przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe nie odpowiada za szkody, o których mowa w ust. 1 i 2, jeżeli: a) wypadek został spowodowany przez okoliczności, które nie były związane ze świadczeniem usług transportu autobusowego i autokarowego i których przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe mimo zachowania nakazanej sytuacją staranności nie mogło uniknąć, ani nie mogło zapobiec ich skutkom; b) szkoda nastąpiła z winy pasażera lub w wyniku jego niedbalstwa. Przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe nie może generalnie zostać pociągnięte do odpowiedzialności za okoliczności, za które nie odpowiada i na które nie ma wpływu. Dlatego należy przyjąć możliwość wyłączenia odpowiedzialności w przypadku działania siły wyższej. a) w celu spełnienia właściwych wymogów bezpieczeństwa ustanowionych przepisami prawa międzynarodowego, wspólnotowego lub krajowego bądź w celu spełnienia wymogów bezpieczeństwa ustanowionych przez organ, który wydał upoważnienie danemu przedsiębiorstwu autobusowemu i/lub autokarowemu, Żadne obowiązujące przepisy nie wymagają od operatora autobusu ograniczenia przewozu osób niepełnosprawnych ze względów bezpieczeństwa. Niebezpieczne byłoby zatem otwarcie się na przyjęcie takiego prawodawstwa, ponieważ stworzyłoby ono możliwość nowej dyskryminacji i byłoby sprzeczne z celem tego rozporządzenia. b) jeżeli ze względu na wielkość pojazdu wejście osoby niepełnosprawnej lub osoby o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej do pojazdu lub przewóz takiej osoby są fizycznie niemożliwe. b) jeżeli ze względu na konstrukcję pojazdu wejście osoby niepełnosprawnej lub osoby o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej do pojazdu lub przewóz takiej osoby są fizycznie lub faktycznie niemożliwe. Dworce autobusowe, a przede wszystkim przystanki pośrednie, są obecnie jeszcze często nieprzystosowane dla niepełnosprawnych. Ponadto – inaczej niż w przypadku transportu lotniczego lub kolejowego – załoga autobusu składa się z reguły tylko z samego kierowcy, który choćby ze względów bezpieczeństwa nie może zaoferować pomocy w czasie jazdy. Zatrudnienie drugiego kierowcy lub dodatkowego personelu pokładowego jest zbyt dużym obciążeniem dla europejskiego transportu autobusowego, zdominowanego przez małe i średnie przedsiębiorstwa. Artykuł 11 – ustęp 1 – litera ba) (nowa) i akapit drugi (ba) jeżeli pojazd lub infrastruktura w miejscu odjazdu lub przyjazdu lub też na trasie nie jest wystarczająco wyposażona, aby zapewnić bezpieczny transport osób niepełnosprawnych oraz osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej. W przypadku odmowy przyjęcia rezerwacji ze względów, o których mowa w lit.a) lub b) ustępu pierwszego, przedsiębiorstwa, sprzedawcy biletów lub organizatorzy wycieczek podejmują zasadny wysiłek w celu zaproponowania danej osobie możliwej do przyjęcia alternatywy. W przypadku odmowy przyjęcia rezerwacji ze względów, o których mowa w lit.b) lub ba) ustępu pierwszego, przedsiębiorstwa, sprzedawcy biletów lub organizatorzy wycieczek podejmują zasadny wysiłek w celu zaproponowania danej osobie możliwej do przyjęcia alternatywy. 2. Osobie niepełnosprawnej lub osobie o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, której nie wpuszczono do pojazdu ze względu na jej niepełnosprawność lub ograniczoną sprawność ruchową, oferuje się prawo do zwrotu kosztów oraz zasadne alternatywne usługi transportu do miejsca przeznaczenia w porównywalnych ramach czasowych. 2. Osobie niepełnosprawnej lub osobie o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, której nie wpuszczono do pojazdu ze względu na jej niepełnosprawność lub ograniczoną sprawność ruchową, oferuje się prawo do zwrotu kosztów lub zasadne alternatywne usługi transportu do miejsca przeznaczenia w porównywalnych ramach czasowych. W brzmieniu wniosku Komisji Europejskiej najwidoczniej wystąpiła pomyłka. Nie należy zapewniać prawa do zwrotu kosztów, jeśli zagwarantowano alternatywny transport. Poprawka zbliża brzmienie przepisu do wniosku w sprawie praw pasażerów w transporcie morskim. 3. Na takich samych warunkach, o jakich mowa w ust.1 lit.a), przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe, sprzedawcy biletów lub organizatorzy wycieczek mogą wymagać, aby osobom niepełnosprawnym lub osobom o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej towarzyszyła inna osoba, będąca w stanie udzielić pomocy osobie niepełnosprawnej lub osobie o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, jeśli jest to konieczne. 3. W razie bezwzględnej konieczności przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe, sprzedawcy biletów lub organizatorzy wycieczek mogą wymagać, aby osobom niepełnosprawnym lub osobom o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej towarzyszyła inna osoba, będąca w stanie udzielić pomocy osobie niepełnosprawnej lub osobie o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, jeżeli: a) zachodzą warunki, o jakich mowa w ust. 1 lit. a) lub ba), lub b) załoga danego pojazdu składa się tylko z jednej osoby, która prowadzi pojazd i nie jest w stanie udzielić osobie niepełnosprawnej lub osobie o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej pomocy określonej w załączniku 1. Uzasadnienie Inaczej niż w przypadku transportu lotniczego lub kolejowego załoga autobusu składa się z reguły tylko z samego kierowcy, który choćby ze względów bezpieczeństwa nie może zaoferować pomocy w czasie jazdy. Zatrudnienie drugiego kierowcy lub dodatkowego personelu pokładowego jest zbyt dużym obciążeniem dla europejskiego transportu autobusowego, zdominowanego przez małe i średnie przedsiębiorstwa. 4. Gdy przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe, sprzedawcy biletów lub organizatorzy wycieczek dokonują odstępstwa, o którym mowa w ust.1, natychmiast informują osobę niepełnosprawną lub osobę o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej o powodach lub, na żądanie, informują ją na piśmie w ciągu pięciu dni roboczych od odmowy przyjęcia rezerwacji. 4. Gdy przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe, sprzedawcy biletów lub organizatorzy wycieczek dokonują odstępstwa, o którym mowa w ust. 1, natychmiast informują osobę niepełnosprawną lub osobę o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej o powodach lub, na żądanie, informują ją na piśmie w ciągu pięciu dni roboczych od złożenia wniosku. Poprawka zbliża brzmienie przepisu do rozporządzenia dotyczącego praw osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej podróżujących drogą lotniczą (rozporządzenie 1107/2006/WE) oraz do wniosku w sprawie rozporządzenia dotyczącego praw pasażerów w transporcie morskim. 1. Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe ustanawiają, przy czynnym zaangażowaniu przedstawicieli organizacji osób niepełnosprawnych oraz osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, a także organów wykonawczych, o których mowa w art.27, niedyskryminacyjne zasady dostępu dotyczące transportu osób niepełnosprawnych oraz osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, w celu spełnienia właściwych wymogów bezpieczeństwa. Zasady takie obejmują wszelkie warunki dostępu do danej usługi transportu autobusowego i autokarowego, w tym dostępności używanych pojazdów i znajdującego się w nich wyposażenia. 1. Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe ustanawiają, we współpracy z reprezentatywnymi organizacjami osób niepełnosprawnych oraz osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, a także organów wykonawczych, o których mowa w art. 27, niedyskryminacyjne zasady dostępu dotyczące transportu osób niepełnosprawnych oraz osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, a także osób im towarzyszących, w celu spełnienia właściwych wymogów bezpieczeństwa. Zasady takie obejmują wszelkie warunki dostępu do danej usługi transportu autobusowego i autokarowego, w tym dostępności używanych pojazdów i znajdującego się w nich wyposażenia oraz zamontowanego sprzętu pomocniczego. Przepisy powinny zostać sformułowane we współpracy z organizacjami przedstawicielskimi. 2. Zasady, o których mowa w ust.1 są udostępnione publicznie przez przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe bądź sprzedawców biletów najpóźniej w momencie dokonania rezerwacji, w odpowiedni sposób oraz w tych samych językach, w których informacje są zwykle udostępniane wszystkim pasażerom. Przy zapewnianiu informacji szczególną uwagę należy zwracać na potrzeby osób niepełnosprawnych i osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej. 2. Zasady, o których mowa w ust. 1 są udostępnione publicznie przez przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe bądź sprzedawców biletów najpóźniej w momencie dokonania rezerwacji, w przystępnych formatach oraz w tych samych językach, w których informacje są zwykle udostępniane wszystkim pasażerom. Przy zapewnianiu informacji szczególną uwagę należy zwracać na potrzeby osób niepełnosprawnych i osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej. Ważne jest, aby informacje udzielane były w przystępnych formatach. Ta terminologia powinna być stosowana w całym tekście. 3. Na żądanie przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i autokarowe udostępniają przepisy prawa międzynarodowego, wspólnotowego lub krajowego ustanawiające wymogi bezpieczeństwa, na których bazują niedyskryminacyjne zasady dostępu. 3. Na żądanie przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i autokarowe niezwłocznie udostępniają przepisy prawa międzynarodowego, wspólnotowego lub krajowego ustanawiające wymogi bezpieczeństwa, na których bazują niedyskryminacyjne zasady dostępu. Należy je udostępniać w przystępnych formatach. Należy dopilnować, by przepisy te były udostępniane w formatach przystępnych dla osób niepełnosprawnych i/lub osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej oraz bez zwłoki, jeżeli pojawi się takie żądanie. 5. Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe, ich sprzedawcy biletów lub organizatorzy wycieczek zapewniają, aby wszelkie istotne informacje dotyczące warunków podróży, informacje o podróży oraz informacje o dostępności usług dostępne były w formatach właściwych i przystępnych dla osób niepełnosprawnych oraz osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, włącznie z rezerwacją i informacją przez Internet. 5. Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe, ich sprzedawcy biletów lub organizatorzy wycieczek zapewniają, aby wszelkie istotne informacje dotyczące warunków podróży, informacje o podróży oraz informacje o dostępności usług, w tym rezerwacji i informacji przez Internet, dostępne były w formatach właściwych i przystępnych dla osób niepełnosprawnych oraz osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, a także dla osób niezdolnych do samodzielnej podróży ze względu na podeszły lub młody wiek oraz osób im towarzyszących. Z myślą o przejrzystości i spójności w całym rozporządzeniu należy używać tej samej terminologii dotyczącej przystępnych formatów. 1. Podmioty zarządzające terminalami oraz przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe zapewniają właściwą pomoc osobom niepełnosprawnym lub osobom o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, określoną w załączniku I, nieodpłatnie, w czasie podróży i po niej. 1. Podmioty zarządzające terminalami oraz przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe zapewniają właściwą pomoc osobom niepełnosprawnym lub osobom o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, określoną w załączniku I, nieodpłatnie, przed podróżą, po niej i w miarę możliwości w czasie podróży. Pomoc dostosowana jest do indywidualnych potrzeb osoby niepełnosprawnej lub osoby o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej. Dla godności i niezależności każdego pasażera zasadnicze znaczenie ma fakt, by otrzymana pomoc dokładnie odpowiadała jego konkretnym potrzebom. Decyzja o rodzaju pomocy powinna należeć do pasażera. 1. Nie później niż sześć miesięcy po wejściu w życie niniejszego rozporządzenia państwa członkowskie wyznaczają terminale autobusowe i autokarowe, w których powinna być udzielana pomoc dla osób niepełnosprawnych i osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, z uwzględnieniem potrzeby zapewnienia dostępności usług w większości lokalizacji geograficznych. Państwa członkowskie informują o tym Komisję. Łatwo dostępna operatorom scentralizowana informacja na temat dworców jest koniecznym warunkiem skutecznego wdrożenia przepisów w przyszłości. 2a. Gdy konieczna jest pomoc certyfikowanego psa towarzyszącego, należy na nią zezwolić, pod warunkiem że przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe lub autokarowe, sprzedawca biletów bądź organizator wycieczek zostali o tym zawiadomieni zgodnie z obowiązującymi krajowymi przepisami obejmującymi przewóz psów towarzyszących. Poprawka ta upodabnia ten projekt sprawozdania do projektu obejmującego przepisy w zakresie praw pasażerów podróżujących drogą lotniczą. Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe nieodpłatnie zapewniają co najmniej pomoc określoną w części b) załącznika I osobom niepełnosprawnym oraz osobom o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej znajdującym się w autokarze lub w autobusie oraz podczas wsiadania i wysiadania z autokaru lub autobusu, pod warunkiem, że dana osoba spełnia warunki określone w art.16. Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe nieodpłatnie zapewniają co najmniej pomoc określoną w części b) załącznika I osobom niepełnosprawnym oraz osobom o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej podczas wsiadania i wysiadania z autokaru lub autobusu, pod warunkiem, że dana osoba spełnia warunki określone w art. 16. W przeciwieństwie do transportu kolejowego i lotniczego załoga autobusu i autokaru przeważnie składa się z jednego kierowcy, który nie może świadczyć pomocy pokładzie pojeździe podczas kierowania nim, nie narażając pasażerów na niebezpieczeństwo. Należy zatem jasno zaznaczyć, że obowiązek świadczenia pomocy dotyczy wsiadania i wysiadania z pojazdu, zgodnie ze wskazaniami zawartymi w części b) załącznika I. 1. Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe, podmioty zarządzające terminalami, sprzedawcy biletów i organizatorzy wycieczek współpracują w celu udzielania pomocy osobom niepełnosprawnym i osobom o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej pod warunkiem, że potrzeba pomocy ze strony takiej osoby zostanie zgłoszona przedsiębiorstwu autobusowemu i/lub autokarowemu, podmiotowi zarządzającemu terminalem, sprzedawcy biletów lub organizatorowi wycieczek co najmniej 48 godzin przed momentem, w którym potrzebna będzie pomoc. 1. Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe, podmioty zarządzające terminalami, sprzedawcy biletów i organizatorzy wycieczek współpracują w celu udzielania pomocy osobom niepełnosprawnym i osobom o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej pod warunkiem, że potrzeba pomocy ze strony takiej osoby zostanie zgłoszona przedsiębiorstwu autobusowemu i/lub autokarowemu, podmiotowi zarządzającemu terminalem, sprzedawcy biletów lub organizatorowi wycieczek co najmniej 24 godzin przed momentem, w którym potrzebna będzie pomoc, chyba że udzielający pomocy proponuje wprowadzenie krótszego okresu powiadomienia lub dzieje się to na zasadzie porozumienia pomiędzy udzielającym pomocy a pasażerem. W przypadku osoby regularnie korzystającej z tych samych usług lub z usług miejskiego transportu autobusowego, nie ma sensu, by za każdym razem powiadamiała ona o potrzebie pomocy. Należy więc dopuścić pewną elastyczność w systemie zawiadamiania. Nierozsądne byłoby także wymaganie od przewoźników wprowadzania systemu powiadomień, chyba że ma to dla nich rzeczywiste znaczenie. 2. Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe, sprzedawcy biletów i organizatorzy wycieczek podejmują wszelkie środki niezbędne do ułatwienia przyjmowania zgłoszeń potrzeby pomocy od osób niepełnosprawnych lub osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej. Obowiązek ten ma zastosowanie we wszystkich ich punktach sprzedaży, włącznie ze sprzedażą telefoniczną i przez Internet. 2. Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe, sprzedawcy biletów i organizatorzy wycieczek podejmują wszelkie środki niezbędne do ułatwienia przyjmowania zgłoszeń potrzeby pomocy od osób niepełnosprawnych lub osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej. Pasażer otrzymuje potwierdzenie zgłoszenia potrzeby pomocy. Obowiązki te mają zastosowanie we wszystkich ich punktach sprzedaży, włącznie ze sprzedażą telefoniczną i przez Internet. Dla pasażera istotna jest możliwość wykazania, że rzeczywiście powiadomił o potrzebie pomocy, na wypadek gdyby zawiodła komunikacja między przedsiębiorstwem autobusowym i/lub autokarowym, sprzedawcą biletów, organizatorem wycieczki itp. Artykuł 16 – ustęp 4 – odniesienie drugie – jeśli nie zostanie wskazany czas, nie później niż 30 minut przed opublikowanym czasem odjazdu. – jeśli nie zostanie wskazany czas, nie później niż 30 minut przed opublikowanym czasem odjazdu, chyba że udzielający pomocy zaproponuje inaczej lub pasażer i udzielający pomocy uzgodnią inaczej. W niektórych przypadkach, np. przy korzystaniu z autobusów miejskich, dla udzielającego pomocy i niepełnosprawnego pasażera lub pasażera o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej bardziej dogodne byłoby bezpośrednie spotkanie w chwili odjazdu (np. gdy autobus zatrzymuje się na przystanku). 6. Punkty, o których mowa w ust.5 są wyraźnie oznakowane i zapewniają podstawowe informacje w przystępnych formatach o terminalu i udzielanej pomocy. 6. Wyznaczone punkty, o których mowa w ust. 5 są wyraźnie oznakowane, dostępne i rozpoznawalne dla osób niepełnosprawnych i osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej i zapewniają konieczne informacje w przystępnych formatach o terminalu i udzielanej pomocy. Należy zapewnić, by te wyznaczone punkty i przekazywane w nich informacje były całkowicie rozpoznawalne i dostępne dla osób niepełnosprawnych i osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej. 1. Jeżeli udzielanie pomocy zostało podzlecone, a przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe, sprzedawca biletów bądź organizator wycieczek otrzyma zgłoszenie potrzeby pomocy co najmniej 48 godzin przed opublikowanym czasem odjazdu dla danej podróży, przekazuje on podwykonawcy właściwe informacje co najmniej 36 godzin przed opublikowanym czasem odjazdu dla danej podróży. 1. Jeżeli udzielanie pomocy zostało podzlecone, a przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe, sprzedawca biletów bądź organizator wycieczek otrzyma zgłoszenie potrzeby pomocy co najmniej 48 godzin przed opublikowanym czasem odjazdu dla danej podróży, przekazuje on właściwe informacje, tak aby podwykonawca otrzymał zawiadomienie co najmniej 36 godzin przed opublikowanym czasem odjazdu dla danej podróży. Zazwyczaj operatorzy wycieczek i sprzedawcy biletów nie posiadają danych kontaktowych podwykonawcy i dlatego przepływ informacji jest utrudniony. Informacje powinny zatem zawsze przechodzić przez jednostkę, która posiada dane kontaktowe podwykonawcy. 2. Jeżeli udzielanie pomocy zostało podzlecone, a przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe, sprzedawca biletów bądź organizator wycieczek nie otrzyma zgłoszenia potrzeby pomocy co najmniej 48 godzin przed opublikowanym czasem odjazdu dla danej podróży, przekazuje on właściwe informacje podwykonawcy w najwcześniejszym możliwym terminie. 2. Jeżeli udzielanie pomocy zostało podzlecone, a przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe, sprzedawca biletów bądź organizator wycieczek nie otrzyma zgłoszenia potrzeby pomocy co najmniej 48 godzin przed opublikowanym czasem odjazdu dla danej podróży, przekazuje on właściwe informacje, tak aby podwykonawca otrzymał zawiadomienie w najwcześniejszym możliwym terminie. Artykuł 18 – wprowadzenie Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe: Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe i podmioty zarządzające dworcami: Zobowiązania w zakresie szkoleń proponowane w tym artykule powinny mieć także zastosowanie do podmiotów zarządzających w celu zapewnienia najwłaściwszej pomocy osobom niepełnosprawnym i osobom o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej. W razie potrzeby podejmuje się wszelkie niezbędne działania mające na celu natychmiastowe zapewnienie sprzętu zastępczego. W razie potrzeby podejmuje się wszelkie niezbędne działania mające na celu natychmiastowe zapewnienie sprzętu zastępczego, zbliżonego pod względem technicznym i funkcjonalnym do zgubionego lub uszkodzonego sprzętu. 1a. Przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe nie ponosi odpowiedzialności zgodnie z ust. 1: Przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe nie może zostać pociągnięte do odpowiedzialności za okoliczności, za które nie odpowiada i na które nie ma wpływu. Analogicznie do przepisów dotyczących odpowiedzialności w przypadku śmierci lub uszkodzenia ciała również tu nie ma obowiązku odszkodowania, jeżeli utrata lub uszkodzenie nastąpiły w wyniku działania siły wyższej. Tak samo w przypadku współwiny poszkodowanego obowiązek odszkodowania powinien zostać odpowiednio pomniejszony o udział współwinnego. 2. Nie ma ograniczenia kwoty rekompensaty płatnej na mocy niniejszego artykułu. 2. Kwota rekompensaty płatna na mocy niniejszego artykułu odpowiada rzeczywiście poniesionej stracie. Sektor autobusowy i autokarowy gotowy jest zapłacić za straty, które rzeczywiście poniesiono. Artykuł 20 – wprowadzenie Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe ponoszą odpowiedzialność za odwołania oraz, jeżeli planowy czas trwania podróży przekracza trzy godziny, opóźnienia odjazdu o więcej niż dwie godziny. W takich przypadkach odnośnym pasażerom co najmniej: Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe ponoszą odpowiedzialność za odwołania, nadkomplet oraz opóźnienia odjazdu o więcej niż dwie godziny. Odpowiedzialność spoczywa na przedsiębiorstwie autobusowym i/lub autokarowym tylko w przypadku zaistnienia okoliczności, na które przedsiębiorstwo ma wpływ; nie obejmuje opóźnień spowodowanych korkami, kontrolami granicznymi i/lub drogowymi. We wszystkich przypadkach związanych z odpowiedzialnością odnośnym pasażerom co najmniej: Wprowadzenie trzygodzinnego ograniczenia trwania podróży do przepisów dotyczących opóźnień nie ma sensu, gdyż w ten sposób ogromna liczba przedsiębiorstw autobusowych i autokarowych nie musiałaby ponosić konsekwencji opóźnień. Przepisami należy objąć także przypadki sprzedaży większej liczby biletów niż liczba miejsc, tak aby zrównać te postanowienia z prawami w zakresie odpowiedzialności przysługującymi pasażerom innych środków transportu. W przeciwieństwie do transportu kolejowego lub lotniczego transport autobusowy nie dysponuje własną siecią i nie jest priorytetowo odprawiany w międzynarodowym ruchu granicznym. Artykuł 20 – litera a) a) oferuje się alternatywne usługi transportowe na zasadnych warunkach lub, jeżeli jest to niemożliwe, informuje się ich o odpowiednich alternatywnych usługach transportowych świadczonych przez inne przedsiębiorstwa; a) oferuje się alternatywne usługi transportowe bez dodatkowych kosztów i na zasadnych warunkach lub, jeżeli jest to niemożliwe, informuje się ich o odpowiednich alternatywnych usługach transportowych świadczonych przez inne przedsiębiorstwa; Uzasadnienie W wypadku odwołania przejazdu i znacznych opóźnień alternatywne usługi powinny być oferowanie nieodpłatnie. Artykuł 20 – litera c) c) przysługuje prawo do rekompensaty w wysokości 100 % ceny biletu, jeżeli przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe nie zapewni usług alternatywnych lub informacji, o których mowa w lit.a). Rekompensata wypłacana jest w ciągu miesiąca od złożenia wniosku o rekompensatę. c) oprócz zwrotu ceny biletu, o którym mowa w lit. b) przysługuje prawo do rekompensaty w wysokości 50% ceny biletu, jeżeli przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe nie zapewni usług alternatywnych lub informacji, o których mowa w lit. a). Rekompensata wypłacana jest w ciągu miesiąca od złożenia wniosku o rekompensatę. Należy wyraźnie zaznaczyć, że oprócz zwrotu ceny biletu wypłacana jest rekompensata. W przeciwnym razie przepis może zostać błędnie zinterpretowany jako oznaczający, że w wypadku opóźnienia lub odwołania przejazdu pasażer nie otrzyma zwrotu ceny biletu jedynie dlatego, że przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe zapewniło informacje na temat alternatywnych usług transportowych. Rekompensata (jako dodatek do zwrotu pełnej ceny biletu) nie powinna przekraczać 50% ceny biletu. Artykuł 20 – litera ca) (nowa) ca) w przypadku gdy pasażer zgodzi się skorzystać z alternatywnych usług przewozowych, przysługuje prawo do rekompensaty w wysokości 50% ceny biletu bez utraty prawa do przewozu. Cena biletu winna równać się pełnej kwocie uiszczonej przez pasażera za część podróży, w której nastąpiło opóźnienie. Rekompensata wypłacana jest w ciągu miesiąca od złożenia wniosku o rekompensatę. Pasażerowi przysługuje prawo do odszkodowania, nawet gdy wyrazi zgodę na kontynuowanie podróży przy wykorzystaniu innego środka transportu zapewnionego w miarę możliwości jak najszybciej przez przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe. Artykuł 20 – litera cb) (nowa) cb) oferuje się posiłki i napoje, proporcjonalnie do czasu oczekiwania, jeśli możliwe jest ich zapewnienie; Pasażerom zapewnia się dodatkową pomoc (tzw. pomoc rzeczową) w przypadku przedłużających się opóźnień i w miarę rzeczywistych możliwości. Pomoc rzeczowa obejmuje posiłki, napoje, a nawet nocleg w hotelu lub inne schronienie w przypadku gdy oczekiwanie na dalszą część podróży wymaga noclegu, zgodnie z prawami pasażerów zawartymi w prawodawstwie odnoszącym się do innych środków transportu. W przypadku awarii pojazdu pasażerowie mają prawo do transportu do odpowiedniego miejsca oczekiwania i/lub dworca, z którego możliwe jest kontynuowanie podróży. Artykuł 20 – litera cd) (nowa) cd) oferuje się zakwaterowanie w hotelu lub innym miejscu oraz transport między dworcem a miejscem zakwaterowania na wypadek konieczności noclegu przed kontynuowaniem podróży; Artykuł 20 – litera ce ) (nowa) ce) w przypadku awarii autobusu i/lub autokaru oferuje się transport z miejsca wystąpienia awarii do odpowiedniego miejsca oczekiwania i/lub dworca, z którego możliwe będzie kontynuowanie podróży. Artykuł 20 – ustęp 1a (nowy) 1a. W przypadkach innych niż te, o których mowa w ust. 1, przedsiębiorstwo autokarowe i/lub autobusowe ponosi odpowiedzialność za opóźnienia przekraczające dwie godziny od godziny przyjazdu, jeżeli opóźnienie spowodowane jest: – zaniedbaniem lub błędem kierowcy lub – usterką techniczną pojazdu. a) prawo do odszkodowania w wysokości 50% ceny biletu. Cena biletu winna równać się pełnej kwocie uiszczonej przez pasażera za część podróży, w której nastąpiło opóźnienie. Wypłata odszkodowania następuje w ciągu miesiąca od złożenia wniosku o odszkodowanie. b) pomoc, o której mowa w lit. e), f) i g) ust. 1 niniejszego artykułu. W popularnym rozumieniu opóźnienie oznacza różnicę między rzeczywistym czasem przyjazdu a wyznaczonym czasem przyjazdu; nawet autobus wyjeżdżający punktualnie może mieć opóźnienie w stosunku do rozkładu jazdy z przyczyn zależnych od przedsiębiorstwa autokarowego i/lub autobusowego. Przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe nie ponosi odpowiedzialności za opóźnienie spowodowane warunkami pogodowymi i/lub ruchem drogowym (tzw. działaniem siły wyższej), nie można jednak wykluczyć odpowiedzialności za usterki techniczne pojazdu i/lub umiejętności kierowcy. Poprawka 57 Artykuł 20 – ustęp 1b (nowy) 1b. Przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe jest zwolnione od tej odpowiedzialności, jeżeli odwołanie przejazdu lub opóźnienie są spowodowane jedną z następujących przyczyn: a) okolicznościami, które nie były związane ze świadczeniem usług transportu autobusowego i autokarowego i których przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe mimo zachowania nakazanej sytuacją staranności nie mogło uniknąć, ani nie mogło zapobiec ich skutkom, b) winą pasażera lub c) działaniem osoby trzeciej, którego przedsiębiorstwo autobusowe i/lub autokarowe mimo zachowania nakazanej sytuacją staranności nie mogło uniknąć, ani nie mogło zapobiec jego skutkom. 1. W przypadku opóźnienia, przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe bądź, zależnie od sytuacji, podmioty zarządzające terminalami informują pasażerów o szacowanym czasie odjazdu i przyjazdu, kiedy tylko informacja taka stanie się dostępna, ale nie później niż 30 minut po planowanym odjeździe lub godzinę przed planowanym przyjazdem. 1. W przypadku opóźnienia, przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe bądź, zależnie od sytuacji, podmioty zarządzające terminalami informują pasażerów o szacowanym czasie odjazdu i przyjazdu, kiedy tylko informacja taka stanie się dostępna, ale nie później niż 30 minut po planowanym odjeździe lub godzinę przed planowanym przyjazdem. Takie informacje należy także podać w przystępnych formatach osobom niepełnosprawnym i osobom o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej. Należy zapewnić, by osoby niepełnosprawne miały taki sam dostęp do istotnych informacji, jak wszyscy pozostali pasażerowie. Żaden z przepisów niniejszego rozporządzenia nie uniemożliwia pasażerom dochodzenia przed sądami krajowymi odszkodowania z tytułu strat wynikających z odwołania lub opóźnienia usług transportowych. Sformułowanie powyższego artykułu jest niewłaściwe. Należy je dostosować do rozporządzenia 261/2004/WE, tak aby zawierało zastrzeżenie, że odszkodowanie przyznane na podstawie niniejszego rozporządzenia może zostać potrącone z dalszego odszkodowania. Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i autokarowe współpracują w celu przyjęcia uzgodnień na poziomie krajowym lub europejskim, przy zaangażowaniu zainteresowanych stron, zrzeszeń zawodowych oraz stowarzyszeń konsumentów, pasażerów i osób niepełnosprawnych. Środki te powinny mieć na celu poprawę opieki nad pasażerami, zwłaszcza w przypadku dużych opóźnień oraz przerwania lub odwołania podróży. Przewoźnicy współpracują w celu przyjęcia uzgodnień na poziomie krajowym lub europejskim, przy zaangażowaniu zainteresowanych stron, zrzeszeń zawodowych oraz stowarzyszeń konsumentów, pasażerów i osób niepełnosprawnych. Środki te powinny mieć na celu poprawę opieki nad pasażerami, zwłaszcza w przypadku dużych opóźnień oraz przerwania lub odwołania podróży ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem pasażerów o specjalnych potrzebach związanych z niepełnosprawnością, ograniczoną sprawnością ruchową, chorobą, podeszłym wiekiem, ciążą, a także małe dzieci i osoby towarzyszące. Przez cały czas trwania podróży podmioty zarządzające terminalami oraz przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe zapewniają pasażerom odpowiednie informacje w najbardziej właściwym formacie. Szczególną uwagę należy zwracać na potrzeby osób niepełnosprawnych i osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej. Przez cały czas trwania podróży podmioty zarządzające terminalami oraz przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe zapewniają pasażerom odpowiednie informacje w przystępnych formatach. Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe oraz podmioty zarządzające dworcami zapewniają, aby nie później niż w momencie odjazdu, jak również w trakcie podróży, pasażerom zostały zapewnione właściwe i zrozumiałe informacje dotyczące praw przysługujących im na podstawie niniejszego rozporządzenia. Informacje takie zapewniane są w najbardziej właściwym formacie. Przy zapewnianiu informacji szczególną uwagę należy zwracać na potrzeby osób niepełnosprawnych i osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej. Informacje takie obejmują dane kontaktowe organu wykonawczego wyznaczonego przez państwo członkowskie zgodnie z art. 27 ust. 1. Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe oraz podmioty zarządzające dworcami zapewniają, aby nie później niż w momencie odjazdu, jak również w trakcie podróży, pasażerom zostały zapewnione właściwe i zrozumiałe informacje dotyczące praw przysługujących im na podstawie niniejszego rozporządzenia. Informacje takie zapewniane są w przystępnych formatach. Informacje takie obejmują dane kontaktowe organu wykonawczego wyznaczonego przez państwo członkowskie zgodnie z art. 27 ust. 1. 1. Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe ustanawiają system rozpatrywania skarg dotyczących praw i obowiązków objętych niniejszym rozporządzeniem. 1. Jeżeli taki mechanizm jeszcze nie istnieje, przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe ustanawiają dostępny dla wszystkich pasażerów, w tym pasażerów niepełnosprawnych i o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, system rozpatrywania skarg dotyczących praw i obowiązków objętych niniejszym rozporządzeniem. Z myślą o zapewnieniu równych szans i zgodnie z zasadą niedyskryminacji konieczne jest umożliwienie wszystkim pasażerom korzystania z prawa do złożenia skargi. Artykuł 26 – ustęp 3a (nowy) 3a. Przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i/lub autokarowe sporządzają roczne sprawozdanie zawierające liczbę i przedmiot otrzymanych skarg, średnią liczbę dni potrzebnych na udzielenie odpowiedzi oraz podjęte działania naprawcze. Wymóg sporządzania sprawozdania ma na celu nadanie przejrzystości sposobom rozpatrywania skarg przez przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i autokarowe, a przez to stworzenie dla tych przedsiębiorstw zachęt do wydajnego i skutecznego rozpatrywania skarg. Przedsiębiorstwa kolejowe również muszą publikować takie sprawozdania. 1. Każde państwo członkowskie wyznacza organ lub organy odpowiedzialne za wykonanie niniejszego rozporządzenia. Każdy organ podejmuje środki niezbędne do zapewnienia poszanowania praw pasażerów, w tym przestrzegania zasad dostępności, o których mowa w art. 12. Każdy taki organ pod względem organizacji, decyzji dotyczących finansowania, struktury prawnej i procesów decyzyjnych, niezależny jest od przedsiębiorstw autobusowych i/lub autokarowych. 1. Każde państwo członkowskie wyznacza organ lub organy odpowiedzialne za wykonanie niniejszego rozporządzenia. Każdy organ podejmuje środki niezbędne do zapewnienia poszanowania praw pasażerów, w tym przestrzegania zasad dostępności, o których mowa w art. 12. Każdy taki organ pod względem organizacji, decyzji dotyczących finansowania, struktury prawnej i procesów decyzyjnych jest niezależny. Krajowe organy odpowiedzialne za wykonanie rozporządzenia powinny być całkowicie niezależne, tj. nie tylko od przedsiębiorstw autobusowych i autokarowych. Artykuł 27 – ustęp 2a (nowy) 2a. Organy te powinny współpracować z organizacjami reprezentującymi przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i autokarowe oraz ich klientów, w tym z reprezentatywnymi organizacjami osób niepełnosprawnych i osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej. Współpraca krajowych organów odpowiedzialnych za wykonanie rozporządzenia z tymi organizacjami ułatwi wdrożenie i wykonania rozporządzenia. Artykuł 28 – ustęp 1 – litera d) d) zagregowane dane o skargach, d) zagregowane dane o skargach, w tym o decyzjach podejmowanych w ich sprawie i terminach rozpatrywania; Państwa członkowskie ustanawiają zasady dotyczące sankcji mających zastosowanie w przypadku naruszenia niniejszego rozporządzenia i podejmują wszelkie środki niezbędne do zapewnienia wdrożenia wszystkich tych zasad. Przewidziane sankcje muszą być skuteczne, proporcjonalne i odstraszające. Państwa członkowskie powiadamiają o takich przepisach Komisję oraz informują ją bezzwłocznie o wszelkich późniejszych zmianach mających na nie wpływ. Państwa członkowskie ustanawiają zasady dotyczące sankcji mających zastosowanie w przypadku naruszenia niniejszego rozporządzenia i podejmują wszelkie środki niezbędne do zapewnienia wdrożenia wszystkich tych zasad. Przewidziane sankcje – które mogłyby obejmować nakaz wypłaty odszkodowania poszkodowanym osobom – muszą być skuteczne, proporcjonalne i odstraszające. Państwa członkowskie powiadamiają o takich przepisach Komisję oraz informują ją bezzwłocznie o wszelkich późniejszych zmianach mających na nie wpływ. Rekompensata wypłacana osobie poszkodowanej jest jednym z najskuteczniejszych narzędzi zapewniania zgodności z rozporządzeniem, a także sposobem zachęcenia pasażerów do składania skarg, w przypadku gdy padną ofiara dyskryminacji lub pogwałcenia przysługujących im praw. 2. Niniejsze rozporządzenie stosuje się od dnia [rok po jego wejściu w życie]. 2. Niniejsze rozporządzenie stosuje się od dnia [dwa lata po jego wejściu w życie]. Flota autokarowa i autobusowa potrzebuje więcej czasu na dostosowanie się do wymogów tego rozporządzenia (zwłaszcza do tych, które dotyczą przewozu osób niepełnosprawnych i osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej). Załącznik I – litera b) – tiret piąte – w razie potrzeby skorzystania z toalety; – w miarę możliwości skorzystania z toalety; W przeciwieństwie do transportu kolejowego i lotniczego załoga autobusu i autokaru przeważnie składa się z jednego kierowcy, który nie może świadczyć pomocy pokładzie pojeździe podczas kierowania nim, nie narażając pasażerów na niebezpieczeństwo. Załącznik I – litera b) – tiret szóste – przewożenia ze sobą w autobusie lub autokarze certyfikowanego psa przewodnika; – w miarę możliwości przewożenia ze sobą w autobusie lub autokarze certyfikowanego psa przewodnika; Mogą pojawić się obawy o bezpieczeństwo, a niektóre państwa członkowskie nakładają ograniczenia na przepływ zwierząt (w tym psów przewodników) przez swoje granice. Załącznik II – część B – odniesienie trzecie – techniki pomagania osobom niewidomym i niedowidzącym oraz obchodzenia się z certyfikowanymi zwierzętami przewodnikami i ich przewóz; – techniki pomagania osobom niewidomym i niedowidzącym oraz obchodzenia się z certyfikowanymi zwierzętami przewodnikami i ich przewozu, pamiętając o tym, że psy towarzyszące są szkolone, by przyjmować komendy wyłącznie od swojego właściciela i nie powinien zajmować się nimi personel wypełniający swoje obowiązki; Należy zezwolić psom towarzyszącym na podróżowanie wraz z właścicielem, lecz personel wypełniający swoje obowiązki nie powinien się nimi zajmować. Psy towarzyszące są szkolone, by przyjmować komendy jedynie od swojego właściciela. Rozporządzenie (EWG) nr 684/92 (zmienione rozporządzeniem (WE) nr 11/98) wraz z rozporządzeniem (WE) nr 12/98 utworzyły jednolity rynek dla międzynarodowego przewozu pasażerów autobusami i autokarami. Ta liberalizacja przyniosła Europejczykom istotne korzyści, takie jak większy wybór miejsc przeznaczenia oraz atrakcyjne ceny. Przyczyniła się również do stabilnego wzrostu tego sektora od połowy lat 90. Obecnie zgodnie z szacunkami Komisji roczna liczba pasażerów w międzynarodowym transporcie autobusowym i autokarowym wynosi 72,8 mln. Liberalizacji usług transportowych i wzrostowi liczby podróżujących nie zawsze towarzyszyły jednak odpowiednie środki mające na celu ochronę praw pasażerów. W miarę wzrostu ich liczby pasażerowie napotykali trudności, w tym związane z odwołaniami, nadkompletem rezerwacji, utratą bagażu i opóźnieniami. Pasażerom autobusów i autokarów w szczególności wciąż nie przysługują jednakowe prawa, jak w przypadku innych środków transportu, zwłaszcza transportu lotniczego. Prawa pasażerów autokarów nie zostały jeszcze objęte wspólnotowym prawodawstwem i klienci muszą w związku z tym polegać na krajowych systemach odpowiedzialności. Niemniej ochrona pasażerów autobusów i autokarów (na przykład w zakresie odpowiedzialności operatora, rekompensaty w przypadku opóźnień i odwołań, obowiązku udzielenia informacji, rozpatrywania skarg, pomocy dla osób niepełnosprawnych itp.) znacząco różni się w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich. Ponadto transport autobusowy i autokarowy znajduje się w niekorzystnym położeniu w porównaniu z pozostałymi środkami transportu, zwłaszcza lotniczego i kolejowego, w przypadku których pasażerowie już odnoszą lub będą odnosić korzyści dzięki wysokiemu i jednolitemu stopniowi ochrony określonemu na szczeblu UE. Wniosek Komisji W świetle powyższego podstawowym celem wniosku jest określenie praw pasażerów w transporcie autobusowym i autokarowym w celu zwiększenia atrakcyjności tego sektora, a także zapewnienia równych zasad gry dla przewoźników z różnych państw członkowskich i różnych rodzajów transportu. W skrócie wniosek przewiduje, co następuje: - odpowiedzialność za śmierć i obrażenia: proponuje się ustanowienie nieograniczonej odpowiedzialności przedsiębiorstw autobusowych. Ponadto w pewnych okolicznościach w razie wypadku przedsiębiorstwa nie mogą kwestionować odszkodowań do określonej kwoty (odpowiedzialność obiektywna). Pasażerowie uprawnieni są do płatności zaliczkowej pozwalającej przezwyciężyć trudności finansowe, w jakich oni lub ich rodziny mogą się znaleźć wskutek poniesienia przez nich śmierci lub odniesienia obrażeń; - rekompensata i pomoc w przypadku odwołań lub opóźnień: zgodnie z wnioskiem przedsiębiorstwa miałyby obowiązek udzielenia pasażerom stosownych informacji oraz zapewnienia zasadnej usługi zastępczej lub w przeciwnym razie wypłacenia rekompensaty. - prawa osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej: wniosek zakazuje wszelkiej dyskryminacji ze względu na niepełnosprawność i ograniczoną sprawność ruchową w odniesieniu do rezerwacji podróży i wstępu do pojazdu, a także przedstawia zasady zobowiązujące przedsiębiorstwa do udzielenia nieodpłatnej pomocy. Ponadto są one zobowiązane do zapewniania swoim pracownikom odpowiedniego szkolenia; - skargi i środki odwoławcze: państwa członkowskie będą musiały ustanowić organy wykonawcze odpowiedzialne za zagwarantowanie wdrożenia przedmiotowego rozporządzenia. Jeżeli pasażer stwierdzi, że jego prawa zostały naruszone, może skierować skargę do danego przedsiębiorstwa. Jeżeli odpowiedź okaże się niezadowalająca, może wówczas skierować skargę do krajowego organu wykonawczego. Sprawozdawca z zadowoleniem przyjmuje wniosek i popiera zasadę zakładającą, że pasażerom powinny przysługiwać równoważne prawa niezależnie od rodzaju transportu, jakim podróżują. Istotne jest zatem zagwarantowanie maksymalnej spójności z istniejącym prawodawstwem w dziedzinie transportu lotniczego i kolejowego, jak i z wnioskiem dotyczącym praw pasażerów w transporcie morskim. Konieczne jest jednak również uwzględnienie szczególnych cech transportu autobusowego i autokarowego oraz należyte dostosowanie określonych wymogów. Zaproponowane zmiany dążą do zachowania równowagi pomiędzy tymi (niekiedy ze sobą konkurującymi) celami. Sprawozdawca uważa ponadto, że niektóre postanowienia zawarte we wniosku wymagają wyjaśnienia. Biorąc pod uwagę napięty harmonogram pierwszego czytania pod koniec obecnej kadencji, sprawozdawca będzie kontynuował szczegółową analizę wniosku i w razie potrzeby zaproponuje dalsze zmiany na późniejszym etapie. Mając na względzie powyższe uwagi, sprawozdawca proponuje między innymi wprowadzenie we wniosku Komisji następujących zmian: - transport miejski, podmiejski i regionalny: szereg zawartych we wniosku wymogów nie odpowiada szczególnym potrzebom i specyfice transportu miejskiego, podmiejskiego i regionalnego, gdyż wymogi te ukierunkowane są głównie na podróże długodystansowe i międzynarodowe. Z tego względu państwa członkowskie powinny mieć możliwość wyłączenia ich spod obowiązywania przepisów rozporządzenia, pod warunkiem podjęcia innych środków regulacyjnych, gwarantujących porównywalny zakres praw pasażerów; - odpowiedzialność obiektywna: sprawozdawca uważa, że pułap powinien być porównywalny do pułapu w przypadku pozostałych rodzajów transportu, w związku z czym popiera – co do zasady – zaproponowaną kwotę 220 tys. euro. Niemniej niezbędne byłoby dostosowanie tego przepisu do art. 2 dyrektywy 2005/14/WE dotyczącej ubezpieczenia w zakresie odpowiedzialności cywilnej za szkody powstałe w związku z ruchem pojazdów mechanicznych, w którym to artykule ogranicza się odpowiedzialność na zasadzie ryzyka do 5 mln euro na jeden wypadek. Tym samym pozwala to uniknąć przesadnej odpowiedzialności wynikającej z kumulacji szkód poniesionych przez dużą liczbę pasażerów; - prawa osób niepełnosprawnych i osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej: w przeciwieństwie do transportu lotniczego nie wydaje się konieczne zagwarantowanie przedsiębiorstwom autobusowym możliwości odmowy rezerwacji w przypadku osób niepełnosprawnych ze względu na wymogi bezpieczeństwa. W związku z tym proponuje się usunięcie art. 11 ust. 1 lit. a). Pozostałe postanowienia określone w art. 11 (ust. 1 lit. b) oraz ust. 2 i ust. 4) wymagają dostosowania do brzmienia wniosku dotyczącego praw pasażerów w transporcie morskim. Stosowne ponadto wydaje się zagwarantowanie, aby zasady w zakresie dostępności zostały określone we współpracy z reprezentatywnymi organizacjami osób niepełnosprawnych i osób o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej. Kolejny szereg zmian zaproponowanych przez sprawozdawcę uwzględnia fakt, iż załogę autobusu w większości przypadków stanowi jedynie kierowca, który nie zawsze może być w stanie udzielić pomocy podczas podróży, na przykład w czasie prowadzenia pojazdu; - zwrot kosztów i rekompensata: proponuje się sprecyzowanie tego artykułu. W przypadku odwołania i dużych opóźnień przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe powinny być zobowiązane do zwrotu ceny biletu, o ile klient nie zaakceptuje zastępczej usługi transportowej oferowanej nieodpłatnie. W sytuacji, gdy przedsiębiorstwo nie zapewnia zastępczych usług lub stosownych informacji, wymagana rekompensata powinna wynosić 50% (a nie 100%) ceny biletu, gdyż byłaby wypłacana jako dodatek do zwrotu kosztów biletu; - informacja dla pasażerów i rozpatrywanie skarg: sprawozdawca podkreśla konieczność udzielania informacji w przystępnej formie. Ponadto proponuje wprowadzenie wymogu zobowiązującego przedsiębiorstwa autobusowe i autokarowe do publikowania rocznego sprawozdania dotyczącego rozpatrywania skarg. Dla przedsiębiorstw tych stanowiłoby to zachętę do skutecznego i sprawnego rozpatrywania skarg; - wejście w życie: spełnienie wymogów przedmiotowego rozporządzenia będzie wyzwaniem dla sektora transportu autobusowego i autokarowego, zwłaszcza w kwestii udzielania należytej pomocy osobom niepełnosprawnym i osobom o ograniczonej sprawności ruchowej, jak i zapewnienia odpowiedniego szkolenia pracowników. W związku z tym sprawozdawca proponuje przyznanie sektorowi dodatkowego roku na dostosowanie przed wejściem w życie przedmiotowego rozporządzenia; - dodatkowe wyjaśnienia: odnoszą się między innymi do niektórych definicji (umowy transportowej, sprzedawcy biletów i organizatora wycieczek), jak i niezależności organów wykonawczych oraz ich współpracy zarówno z przedsiębiorstwami autobusowymi, jak i organizacjami konsumenckimi.
en	contracts	US	Exhibit 31.1 SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION I, Mel G. Riggs, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-Q of Southwest Oil & Gas Income Fund X-A, L.P.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles; c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. Date:March 29, 2011 /s/ Mel G. Riggs Mel G. Riggs President and Chief Executive Officer of Southwest Royalties, Inc., the Managing General Partner of Southwest Oil & Gas Income Fund X-A, L.P.
en	caselaw	US	DENIS J. FARIS AND CAROLYN M. FARIS, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RespondentFaris v. Comm'rNo. 9542-05L United States Tax CourtT.C. Memo 2006-254; 2006 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 258; 92 T.C.M. 451; November 27, 2006, Filed 2006 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 258">258 Denis J. Faris and Carolyn M. Faris, pro sese.Kelley A. Blaine, for respondent. Vasquez, Juan F.JUAN F. VASQUEZMEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINIONVASQUEZ, Judge: Pursuant to section 6330(d), 1 petitioners seek review of respondent's determination to proceed with collection of their 1997 and 1998 income tax liabilities. The issues for decision are: (1) Whether respondent may proceed with collection of petitioners' 1997 and 1998 income tax liabilities; and (2) whether petitioners are liable for a penalty pursuant to section 6673. FINDINGS OF FACTNone of the facts have been stipulated. At the time they filed the petition, petitioners resided in Portland, Oregon.Petitioners timely filed Federal income tax returns for 1997 and 1998.Respondent sent notices of deficiency for 1997 and2006 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 258">259 1998 to petitioners. 2 Petitioners did not petition the Court for a redetermination of the 1997 or 1998 deficiencies. On January 1 and July 23, 2001, respondent assessed the 1997 and 1998 deficiencies, respectively.On September 1, 2004, respondent sent petitioners a Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing (collection notice) with respect to petitioners' 1997 and 1998 taxable years. The collection notice showed unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties for 1997 and 1998 of $ 9,696.48.On September 20, 2004, petitioners timely filed a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing. Petitioners attached to their Form 12153 an "Affidavit of Material Facts" containing frivolous and2006 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 258">260 groundless arguments, questions and statements regarding, inter alia, their underlying liability for income taxes, the legality of imposing income taxes on individuals, and respondent's authority to collect income taxes.Settlement Officer John Malone was assigned to petitioners' case. In a letter dated February 4, 2005, the settlement officer acknowledged receipt of petitioners' Form 12153 and other materials. In that letter, the settlement officer informed petitioners that the arguments they advanced were frivolous, groundless, or arguments that Appeals Office employees may not consider. The letter also informed petitioners of the Appeals Office policy of not granting face-to-face hearings if the only items a taxpayer wishes to discuss are frivolous, groundless, or arguments that Appeals Office employees may not consider. In the letter, the settlement officer scheduled a phone conference with petitioners for March 10, 2005.On February 16, 2005, petitioners mailed a letter to the settlement officer again requesting a face-to-face hearing and stating that they would not be available for a phone conference on March 10, 2005. On the same day and on February 18, 2005, petitioners submitted2006 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 258">261 several "Freedom of Information Request[s]" asking for extensive (and, in many cases, irrelevant) documentation relating to their 1997 and 1998 tax years.On February 20, 2005, petitioners mailed another letter to the settlement officer. In that letter, petitioners again advanced frivolous and groundless arguments. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that they are not required to file a tax return without having been personally served with notice of such requirement by the Secretary of the Treasury, that "there is no statute that makes [us] liable for income tax", that the income tax applies only to Federal Government employees, and that respondent lacks authority to assess or collect income taxes.On March 11, 2005, the settlement officer mailed a letter to petitioners. He noted that petitioners had not called him for the March 10, 2005, hearing and that petitioners, at that point, still had failed to raise an issue that could be considered by the Appeals Office. The letter advised petitioners to contact the settlement officer by March 28, 2005, if they wished to submit additional materials for his consideration or to reschedule the phone conference. The letter informed petitioners2006 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 258">262 that if the Appeals Office did not receive any further information from petitioners, their case would be reviewed based on the information in petitioners' file.Petitioners replied in a letter dated March 19, 2005. In this letter, petitioners made several demands. They demanded that the settlement officer grant them a face-to-face hearing, that, at the hearing, the settlement officer produce a multitude of documents (many of which were, once again, irrelevant to the section 6330 hearing), and that the settlement officer be prepared to discuss at the hearing petitioners' frivolous and groundless arguments. Petitioners did not offer a collection alternative at any point in their correspondence with the settlement officer.On April 21, 2005, respondent issued a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Sections 6320 and/or 6330 (notice of determination) regarding petitioners' unpaid 1997 and 1998 income tax liabilities. In the notice of determination, respondent determined that the proposed levy should be sustained because petitioners had "failed to provide [respondent] with an alternative collection that satisfies [petitioners'] liabilities."On May 23, 2005, petitioners2006 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 258">263 timely filed a petition for lien or levy action under section 6320(c) or 6330(d) appealing respondent's determination to proceed with collection of petitioners' 1997 and 1998 tax liabilities. Petitioners asserted that they had been denied a section 6330 hearing and repeated several frivolous and groundless arguments they had raised in their correspondence with the settlement officer. OPINIONI. Determination To Proceed With CollectionSection 6330(a) provides that the Secretary shall furnish taxpayers with written notice of their right to a hearing before any property is levied upon. Section 6330 further provides that the taxpayer may request administrative review of the matter (in the form of a hearing) within a prescribed 30-day period. Sec. 6330(a) and (b).Pursuant to section 6330(c)(2)(A), a taxpayer may raise at the section 6330 hearing any relevant issue with regard to the Commissioner's collection activities, including spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of the Commissioner's intended collection action, and alternative means of collection. Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604">114 T.C. 604, 114 T.C. 604">609 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176">114 T.C. 176, 114 T.C. 176">180 (2000).2006 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 258">264 If a taxpayer received a statutory notice of deficiency for the year in issue or otherwise had the opportunity to dispute the underlying tax liability, the taxpayer is precluded from challenging the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B); 114 T.C. 604">Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 610-611; 114 T.C. 176">Goza v. Commissioner, supra at 182-183.Aside from raising frivolous arguments regarding the validity of the notices they received, petitioners admit that they received notices of deficiency for 1997 and 1998. Thus, petitioners are precluded from challenging the existence or amount of the underlying tax liabilities for 1997 and 1998. See sec. 6330(c)(2)(B); 114 T.C. 604">Sego v. Commissioner, supra; 114 T.C. 176">Goza v. Commissioner, supra.We review respondent's determination for abuse of discretion. See 114 T.C. 604">Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 610.Petitioners state in their petition that they were denied their right to a face-to-face hearing as provided in section 6330. We have held that it would be unproductive and thus unnecessary to remand a case for a face-to-face hearing if petitioners merely want to advance frivolous arguments. See Lunsford v. Comm'r, 117 T.C. 183">117 T.C. 183, 117 T.C. 183">189 (2001);2006 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 258">265 Stephens v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2005-183; Balice v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2005-161.In numerous letters to respondent, in their petition and in their briefs, petitioners advanced shopworn arguments characteristic of tax-protester rhetoric that has been universally rejected by this and other courts. Wilcox v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 1007">848 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1988), affg. T.C. Memo. 1987-225; Carter v. Commissioner, 784 F.2d 1006">784 F.2d 1006, 784 F.2d 1006">1009 (9th Cir. 1986); Charczuk v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 471">771 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1985), affg. T.C. Memo. 1983-433; Michael v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2003-26; Knelman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-268, affd. 33 Fed. Appx. 346">33 Fed. Appx. 346 (9th Cir. 2002). We shall not painstakingly address petitioners' assertions "with somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent; to do so might suggest that these arguments have some colorable merit." Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417">737 F.2d 1417, 737 F.2d 1417">1417 (5th Cir. 1984).Petitioners have failed to make a valid challenge to the appropriateness of respondent's intended collection action, offer alternative means2006 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 258">266 of collection, or offer any spousal defenses. These issues are now deemed conceded. Rule 331(b)(4).Accordingly, we conclude that respondent did not abuse his discretion, and we sustain respondent's determination to proceed with collection for 1997 and 1998.II. Section 6673(a)Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes this Court to require a taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty not to exceed $ 25,000 if the taxpayer took frivolous positions in the proceedings or instituted the proceedings primarily for delay. A position maintained by the taxpayer is "frivolous" if it is "contrary to established law and unsupported by a reasoned, colorable argument for change in the law." Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68">791 F.2d 68, 791 F.2d 68">71 (7th Cir. 1986).In his correspondence with petitioners, the settlement officer advised petitioners to read an IRS publication entitled "The Truth About Frivolous Tax Arguments", which explains the defects in several of petitioners' arguments. The settlement officer also sent petitioners a copy of Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576">115 T.C. 576 (2000), in which this Court issued an unequivocal warning to taxpayers concerning the imposition of penalties pursuant2006 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 258">267 to section 6673(a) on those taxpayers who abuse the protections afforded by sections 6320 and 6330 by instituting or maintaining actions under those sections primarily for delay or by taking frivolous or groundless positions in such actions. At trial, the Court advised petitioners that the arguments they were advancing had been universally rejected by the courts that have considered them. Petitioners' positions, based on stale and meritless contentions, are manifestly frivolous and groundless. This has caused the Court to waste limited resources. Accordingly, we shall impose a penalty of $ 2,500 pursuant to section 6673.To reflect the foregoing,Decision will be entered for respondent. Footnotes1. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. ↩2. The notice of deficiency for 1998 was issued on Dec. 22, 2000. At trial, respondent was unable to produce a copy of the notice of deficiency for 1997. However, petitioners admitted that they received "a document entitled 'Notice of Deficiency'" from the Internal Revenue Service regarding 1997.↩
it	other	N/A	BGE-102-IA-533 - 1976-03-17 - BGE - Verfassungsrecht - 1. Art. 84 OG. Voraussetzungen dafür, dass ein von einer Behörde ausgehendes an eine ihr nicht... 1. Art. 84 OG. Voraussetzungen dafür, dass ein von einer Behörde ausgehendes an eine ihr nicht direkt unterstellte öffentliche Körperschaft gerichtetes Rundschreiben, das eine Empfehlung zum Inhalt hat, einem mit staatsrechtlicher Beschwerde anfechtbaren Hoheitsakt gleichzustellen ist (E. 1). 2. Kant. Bestimmung betr. Ausschluss der Vergebung öffentlicher Arbeiten an Bewerber, die sich nicht verpflichten, auf das mit ihren Angestellten bestehende Vertragsverhältnis die Bestimmungen des für diese Kategorie geltenden Gesamtarbeitsvertrages anzuwenden. Eine solche Vorschrift kann vom Kanton erlassen werden, obwohl der Bund Bestimmungen über die Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung von Gesamtarbeitsverträgen erlassen hat - Art. 34ter BV -, und bedeutet weder eine Verletzung der derogatorischen Kraft des Bundesrechts - Art. 2 ÜbBest. BV - (E. 7) noch der Handels- und Gewerbefreiheit - Art. 31 BV (E. 10 und 11). 3. Handels- und Gewerbefreiheit. a) Verhältnis zur Vertragsfreiheit (E. 10a). b) Sie verleiht dem Privaten kein Recht auf Leistungen des Staates (E. 10b). c) Der Vorbehalt zugunsten des kant. Rechts (Art. 31 Abs. 2 BV) umfasst ausser Polizeibestimmungen im engen Sinn auch sozialpolitische Massnahmen, sofern diese nicht in die freie Konkurrenz eingreifen oder deren Wirkung abschwächen und im übrigen nicht gegen die andern Verfassungsgrundsätze verstossen, deren Beachtung jede Beschränkung der verfassungsmässigen Rechte voraussetzt (E. 10e). d) Die Tessiner Gesetzgebung über die Vergebung öffentlicher Arbeiten geht nicht über den Vorbehalt des Art. 31 Abs. 2 BV hinaus (E. 10f), entspricht einem öffentlichen Interesse (E. 11c), verletzt die Grundsätze der Verhältnismässigkeit (E. 11d) und der rechtsgleichen Behandlung der Berufsgenossen nicht (E. 11e). 1. Art. 84 OJ. Recommandation contenue dans une circulaire adressée par une autorité cantonale à une corporation de droit public qui ne lui est pas directement subordonnée: conditions auxquelles elle peut être assimilée à un acte d'autorité attaquable par la voie du recours de droit public (consid. 1). 2. Règles cantonales excluant l'adjudication de travaux publics aux soumissionnaires qui ne s'engagent pas à appliquer à leur personnel les conditions prévues par les conventions collectives de travail des diverses branches intéressées. L'adoption de telles règles: - n'est pas interdite aux cantons, alors même que la Confédération a légiféré en matière de force obligatoire générale de conventions collectives de travail, art. 34ter Cst.; - ne constitue pas une violation de la force dérogatoire du droit fédéral, art. 2 Disp.trans.Cst. (consid. 7); - n'est pas incompatible en principe avec la liberté du commerce et de l'industrie, art. 31 Cst. (consid. 10 et 11). 3. Liberté du commerce et de l'industrie: a) Rapport avec le principe de la liberté des contrats (consid. 10a); b) la liberté du commerce et de l'industrie ne confère pas aux particuliers le droit à des prestations de l'Etat (consid. 10b); c) rentrent dans les prescriptions cantonales réservées par l'art. 31 al. 2 Cst. non seulement les mesures de police au sens étroit, mais également les mesures de politique sociale, pourvu qu'elles n'aient pas pour objectif d'intervenir dans le jeu de la libre concurrence ou d'en atténuer les effets et qu'elles se conforment aux principes constitutionnels auxquels est soumise toute restriction d'un droit constitutionnel (confirmation de la jurisprudence) (consid. 10e); d) la législation tessinoise sur les adjudications ne dépasse pas le cadre des compétences réservées aux cantons par l'art. 31 al. 2 Cst. (consid. 10f), se justifie par un intérêt public (consid. 11c) et ne viole pas les principes constitutionnels de la proportionnalité (consid. 11d) et de l'égalité de traitement entre concurrents (consid. 11e). 1. Art. 84 OG. Condizioni alle quali una circolare dell'autorità statale ad un ente pubblico non direttamente sottopostole, e che contiene una raccomandazione, dev'essere assimilata ad un atto d'imperio impugnabile col ricorso di diritto pubblico (consid. 1). 2. Norme cantonali in materia di appalti che escludono dall'aggiudicazione di lavori pubblici i concorrenti che non si impegnano ad applicare ai loro dipendenti le condizioni previste dai contratti collettivi di lavoro esistenti nelle singole categorie. L'adozione di tali norme non è inibita ai Cantoni per il fatto che la Confederazione ha legiferato in materia di conferimento del carattere obbligatorio generale ai contratti collettivi di lavoro - art. 34ter Cost. - non consacra una violazione del primato del diritto federale - art. 2 disp.trans.Cost. - (consid. 7) ed è per principio compatibile con la libertà di commercio e d'industria - art. 31 Cost. (consid. 10 e 11). 3. Libertà di commercio e d'industria: a) Rapporti con l'autonomia contrattuale (consid. 10a); b) la libertà di commercio e d'industria non conferisce ai privati diritto a prestazioni dello Stato (consid. 10b); c) la riserva del diritto cantonale stabilita dall'art. 31 cpv. 2 Cost. comprende, oltre alle disposizioni di polizia in senso stretto, anche le misure di politica sociale purché non siano intese ad intervenire nel gioco della libera concorrenza o ad attenuarne gli effetti e siano per il resto conformi agli ulteriori precetti costituzionali generalmente esatti per la restrizione di un diritto costituzionale - conferma della giurisprudenza - (consid. 10e); d) la legislazione ticinese sugli appalti non esula dall'ambito riservato al cantone dall'art. 31 cpv. 2 Cost. (consid. 10f), risponde ad un interesse pubblico (consid. 11c) ed è conforme ai precetti costituzionali della proporzionalità (consid. 11d) e dell'uguaglianza di trattamento dei concorrenti (consid. 11e). Il 1o giugno 1973 l'Associazione dei datori di lavoro delle arti tecniche (ADLAT), da una parte, e la Federazione svizzera dei lavoratori edili e del legno (FLEL), la Camera del lavoro del Cantone Ticino nonché l'Organizzazione Cristiano-sociale, dall'altra, stipularono un contratto collettivo di lavoro per i disegnatori degli uffici di architettura, di urbanistica, di ingegneria e di progettazione e direzione dei lavori delle arti tecniche in genere (edilizia, genio civile, geologia, economia forestale, impianti elettrici, sanitari e di riscaldamento) (art. 1 CCL). Un gruppo di datori di lavoro, segnatamente la maggioranza degli ingegneri attivi nel Cantone Ticino, che allora apparteneva all'ADLAT, votò contro l'adozione del nuovo CCL. Le discordanze manifestatesi indussero gli ingegneri dissenzienti, venutisi a trovare in minoranza in occasione del voto sul CCL, a uscire dall'ADLAT e a costituirsi in associazione: venne così costituita l'Unione Studi d'Ingegneria Ticinese (USIT), i cui membri non applicano le norme del CCL nei confronti dei disegnatori da essi impiegati. L'USIT propose un suo contratto collettivo di lavoro, essenzialmente meno favorevole di quello dell'ADLAT per i prestatori d'opera, che rimase però allo stadio di progetto. In data 4 marzo 1975 il Consiglio di Stato del Cantone Ticino indirizzò a tutti i Comuni del Cantone la seguente lettera: "Il Consiglio di Stato ha deciso il 31.1.73 ed ha ribadito il 28.2.1975 di conferire mandati per progetti ed opere di architettura ed ingegneria solo ai titolari degli studi che hanno aderito al Contratto Collettivo di Lavoro (CCL) pattuito tra le organizzazioni della Camera del lavoro e Cristiano Sociale da una parte e l'Associazione dei Datori di lavoro delle Arti Tecniche del Cantone Ticino (ADLAT) dall'altra parte. Questa decisione si fonda sull'interpretazione in via analogica di quanto previsto dalla legge cantonale sugli appalti. La decisione del Consiglio di Stato vale anche per tutti i lavori sussidiati dallo Stato (scuole, depurazione delle acque, strade, raggruppamenti terreni, case per anziani, ospedali, colonie, istituti minorili e così via), per cui la progettazione e l'esecuzione delle relative opere non possono essere affidate dai Comuni a professionisti che non abbiano aderito al CCL pattuito tra l'ADLAT e le organizzazioni sindacali. Qualora i Comuni non rispettassero questa decisione e affidassero comunque la progettazione o l'esecuzione di opere sussidiate a professionisti non firmatari del CCL, il Consiglio di Stato potrà negare i sussidi di sua competenza." Contro questa circolare l'USIT ha formato un ricorso di diritto pubblico. Il Tribunale federale ha respinto il ricorso. (cfr. BIRCHMEIER, Bundesrechtspflege, pag. 313 segg.; MARTI, Probleme der staatsrechtlichen Beschwerde, pag. 42; BONNARD, Problèmes relatifs au recours de droit public pag. 396 segg.). Alla luce di questa definizione generale si pone pertanto la questione se la circolare impugnata costituisca o meno un atto impugnabile ai sensi dell'art. 84 OG. a) La prima parte della circolare è costituita di una semplice comunicazione e contiene, in particolare, il richiamo a due precedenti decisioni governative del 31 luglio 1973 e del 28 febbraio 1975, con cui il Consiglio di Stato risolveva di conferire mandati professionali esclusivamente agli studi tecnici i cui titolari avessero aderito al contratto collettivo di lavoro per i disegnatori. In secondo luogo l'atto impugnato sottolinea che questo principio si applica anche ai lavori pubblici sussidiati dallo Stato (scuole, impianti di depurazione delle acque, strade, raggruppamenti terreni, case per anziani, colonie, istituti minorili ecc.) e ciò nel senso che il Consiglio di Stato si riserva di negare i sussidi di sua competenza qualora i Comuni affidassero la progettazione o l'esecuzione di opere a professionisti non aderenti al contratto collettivo di lavoro. b) Stando al testo, la circolare non tocca le competenze decisionali dei Comuni in materia di assegnazione di mandati di progettazione: questi possono tuttora conferire incarichi di tal sorta agli studi tecnici di loro scelta. In questa misura la circolare impugnata non crea a carico dei Comuni nessun obbligo di fare, omettere o tollerare. Quanto poi ai mandati per opere integralmente finanziate dai Comuni, il Consiglio di Stato non interviene minimamente negli affari comunali. Tuttavia per i lavori sussidiati dallo Stato con contributi di competenza del Governo, la querelata circolare comporta una certa coercizione a carico dei Comuni. Pur essendo solo relativa (nel senso che i pregiudizi che potrebbe subire un Comune in concreto dipendono dalle circostanze del singolo caso) e indiretta (nel senso che il Consiglio di Stato si limita a render noto il proprio probabile atteggiamento senza prescrivere quello dei Comuni) tale coercizione sussiste. Ininfluente è da questo profilo che la sanzione comminata abbia carattere eventuale: un Comune non può infatti permettersi, quando conferisce un mandato, di disattendere la comminatoria della perdita di sussidi, sia pur espressa in forma attenuata. c) Ancor più indirettamente la circolare tocca gli ingegneri non aderenti al contratto collettivo di lavoro, che vedono posto in forse l'ottenimento di incarichi da parte dei Comuni. La circolare non li obbliga di per sé né a fare né a tralasciare o tollerare alcunché; purtuttavia essa costituisce un'innegabile pressione di ordine economico nei loro confronti. d) La classificazione della circolare impugnata in una delle categorie stabilite da dottrina e giurisprudenza non è agevole. Nella sua prima parte, essa presenta caratteri di semplice comunicazione, rispettivamente, nella seconda parte, di mera raccomandazione. Atti di tal sorta non sono di regola impugnabili in quanto è carente un interesse degno di protezione (cfr. GYGI, Verwaltungsrechtspflege, pag. 98; BIRCHMEIER, Bundesrechtspflege, pag. 318). Pur non trattandosi di istruzioni di servizio, in quanto il Comune non dipende dallo Stato, la circolare impugnata presenta tuttavia una certa analogia con tale tipo di ordinanza amministrativa. Le "istruzioni di servizio", con le quali l'amministrazione impone un determinato comportamento agli uffici subordinati, non sono di regola impugnabili. La giurisprudenza più recente ha però formulato riserve a tale principio. In particolare venne precisato che le cosiddette istruzioni di servizio sono impugnabili con ricorso di diritto pubblico nella misura in cui le regole in esse contenute non si esauriscono in semplici istruzioni all'attenzione dei funzionari, ma delineano direttamente o indirettamente la situazione giuridica dei privati, intervenendo in tal modo nella sfera di interessi giuridicamente protetti (cfr. DTF 98 Ia 511). La possibilità di impugnare ordinanze di carattere generale quale quella contenuta nella circolare impugnata deve essere facilitata soprattutto nei casi in cui chi è toccato non potrebbe altrimenti mai difendere i propri diritti garantiti dalla Costituzione. Nel caso concreto i tecnici che, per un motivo qualsiasi, compreso il timore del Comune di incorrere in una perdita di sussidi, non ottenessero incarichi da quell'ente, non potrebbero impugnare in questa sede il conferimento dei mandati ad altri professionisti. Nessuno, e in particolare nessuno dei membri della ricorrente, può infatti vantare una qualsiasi pretesa giuridica alla conclusione di un contratto con il Comune: la mancata scelta per il conferimento di tali incarichi non comporta pertanto la lesione di alcun diritto. 7. L'art. 34ter Cost. conferisce alla Confederazione il diritto di emanare disposizioni sulla protezione dei lavoratori. Nei limiti in cui la Confederazione ha fatto uso di tale diritto decade di regola la competenza dei Cantoni di legiferare in materia, in quanto deve presumersi che la Confederazione abbia inteso dare alla sua regolamentazione un carattere esclusivo. La Confederazione ha legiferato, tra l'altro, in materia di lavoro nelle fabbriche, di contratto di lavoro e di conferimento del carattere obbligatorio generale al contratto collettivo di lavoro. La nuova legislazione in materia di diritto del lavoro limita senza dubbio in modo essenziale le competenze cantonali. Ciò non toglie che il diritto cantonale mantiene vigore quantomeno nella misura in cui la competenza del cantone è espressamente riservata dalla legislazione federale (cfr. per es. art. 329a cpv. 2 CO). Nell'art. 358 CO il legislatore federale ha previsto espressamente che "il diritto imperativo federale e cantonale prevale sul contratto collettivo" di lavoro. Norme cantonali intese a regolare, fuori dell'ambito delle competenze espressamente riservate, una materia già esaustivamente disciplinata dalla Confederazione sarebbero indubbiamente non valide. Né la circolare governativa impugnata né la legge ticinese sugli appalti (LApp.) regolano però rapporti fondati sul diritto del lavoro. Sia la legge che la circolare non influenzano né vogliono influenzare il contenuto del contratto collettivo di lavoro dell'ADLAT o i contratti singolarmente stipulati dai membri della ricorrente con i propri disegnatori. Né d'altro canto vengono create nuove norme, generali o speciali, del diritto del lavoro. Col suo intervento lo Stato si limita a favorire quei datori di lavoro che, a mente sua, offrono ai loro dipendenti condizioni di lavoro socialmente adeguate, rispettivamente ancorate in un contratto collettivo di lavoro. Un'influenza indiretta di tale natura è suscettibile di ledere il diritto federale, e in particolare i principi sanciti dall'art. 2 disp.trans.Cost. e art. 6 CC, solo se e nella misura in cui risultassero vanificati gli scopi perseguiti dalla legislazione federale. D'altronde i Cantoni non possono adottare disposizioni atte a frustrare gli scopi della legislazione federale neppure nelle materie in cui la competenza legislativa è loro riservata (cfr. DTF 100 Ia 108; DTF 98 Ia 495; DTF 91 I 198; HUBER, Commentario n. 174, 209 segg., 213 e 214 ad art. 6 CC; A. GRISEL, Des rapports entre le droit civil fédéral et le droit public cantonal, ZSR 70 pag. 296 segg.). La censura di violazione del diritto federale potrebbe, per esempio, esser mossa a una legge cantonale sugli appalti, che imponesse indiscriminatamente l'aggiudicazione di lavori pubblici al minor offerente, e favorisse per questo una pressione negativa sulle condizioni di lavoro, ponendosi in contrasto insanabile con la ratio della legislazione federale. Simile rimprovero non può però essere mosso ad una legislazione che, concretizzando l'opposta tendenza come la legge ticinese sugli appalti, sostiene i fini della legislazione federale prevedendo l'aggiudicazione di pubblici lavori solo a concorrenti che assicurino sufficienti condizioni al 10. La libertà di commercio e di industria garantisce, contro ingerenze statali, ad ogni persona il diritto di esercitare un'attività tendente al conseguimento di un guadagno (MARTI, Handels- und Gewerbefreiheit, Berna 1950, pag. 31). a) La cosiddetta autonomia contrattuale, cioè la libertà di concludere o meno un determinato contratto, di scegliere il proprio cocontraente e, a certe condizioni, di rompere un contratto, sgorga direttamente dalla libertà di industria e commercio e ha radice anche nella libertà personale (A. GRISEL, Droit Administratif suisse, pag. 222; SALADIN, Grundrechte im Wandel, pag. 272). In materia economica la libertà contrattuale soffre delle limitazioni proprie della libertà di commercio e di industria. La censura di violazione della libertà contrattuale dei propri membri sollevata dalla ricorrente contro la LApp. e la circolare governativa non ha pertanto una portata propria ma si identifica con la censura di violazione della libertà di commercio e di industria. b) La libertà di commercio e di industria non conferisce ai privati alcun diritto a prestazioni dello Stato. Lo Stato non è tenuto a creare occasioni di attività lucrative o a concludere contratti con cittadini attivi nel campo economico. Il commerciante o l'imprenditore la cui offerta non è tenuta in considerazione in sede di aggiudicazione di acquisti o lavori pubblici non è leso nella sua libertà di commercio e d'industria (MARTI, op.cit., pag. 32). È quindi perlomeno dubbio che la circolare del Consiglio di Stato, rispettivamente la LApp., possano comportare una qualsivoglia lesione della libertà di commercio e di industria dei membri della ricorrente. c) Con riferimento alla dichiarazione del Governo cantonale, consegnata nel primo capoverso della circolare, la ricorrente, a ragione, non lamenta la violazione della libertà di commercio e di industria dei propri membri. Se quindi lo Stato non lede la libertà di commercio quando scarta un concorrente dall'aggiudicazione di un lavoro, ancor meno può violare tale libertà per il solo fatto di manifestare preventivamente l'intenzione di non tener conto di determinate offerte. d) In altri termini si pone la questione di sapere se lo Stato, accordando o negando sussidi, violi la libertà di commercio e di industria di terzi che, a dipendenza di particolari condizioni cui soggiace il sussidiamento, vengono esclusi dall'aggiudicazione di pubblici incarichi. Da particolari condizioni poste al sussidiamento sarebbe naturalmente leso in prima linea colui che al sussidio può far valere un diritto fondato sulla legge o su di un'eventuale garanzia o promessa di sussidi. Entrambe le ipotesi non si verificano nella fattispecie in esame o, quantomeno, nel ricorso non è preteso che la circolare abbia privato un qualsiasi Comune di sussidi cui avesse incondizionatamente e direttamente diritto ope legis. Quand'anche ciò fosse, mal si vede come il rifiuto di sussidi ai Comuni possa perfezionare una lesione della libertà di commercio e di industria dei membri della ricorrente, puranche nell'ipotesi che in tale rifiuto si scorgesse una specie di boicotto. La questione può tuttavia restare indecisa in quanto la censura di violazione della libertà di commercio e di industria si rivela comunque infondata. e) La libertà di commercio e di industria è garantita dall'art. 31 cpv. 1 Cost. Tale garanzia è però relativizzata, nella norma stessa, con la riserva delle disposizioni restrittive della Costituzione e della legislazione che ne deriva. Gli art. da 31bis a 34ter Cost. prevedono già sul piano costituzionale tutto un sistema di limitazioni della libertà di commercio. Altre limitazioni trovano fondamento nella legislazione federale. Essenziale si rivela però, nell'ambito della fattispecie in esame, che l'art. 31 cpv. 2 Cost. conferisce espressamente ai Cantoni il diritto di emanare disposizioni circa l'esercizio del commercio e dell'industria ("le disposizioni cantonali sull'esercizio... del commercio e dell'industria rimangono riservate...") nei limiti in cui queste non ledano la libertà di commercio e di industria (..."esse non possono tuttavia portare pregiudizio alla libertà di commercio e di industria..."). La norma costituzionale citata si limita a proibire le misure di politica economica, le misure cioè che intervengono nel gioco della libera concorrenza per favorire certi rami dell'attività lucrativa e per dirigere l'attività economica secondo un certo piano prestabilito; essa vieta quindi, in sostanza, unicamente le norme intese ad ostacolare la libera concorrenza o ad attenuarne gli effetti. Il Tribunale federale e la dottrina ne avevano dedotto che l'ambito in cui i Cantoni possono legiferare fosse limitato alle sole prescrizioni di polizia. La nozione di simili prescrizioni di polizia fu nel corso degli anni progressivamente allargata nella giurisprudenza oltre i limiti tradizionali del concetto, che ne usciva snaturato. Per questo, nella più recente giurisprudenza, il Tribunale federale - rilevato come il testo costituzionale non impieghi il termine di "prescrizioni di polizia", ma si limiti a circoscrivere negativamente l'ambito della riserva del diritto cantonale - è da un canto rivenuto alla nozione tradizionale e ristretta di prescrizioni di polizia, ma ha nel contempo ammesso che la riserva a favore del diritto cantonale, oltre le predette misure di polizia, si estende anche ad altre misure - dette sociali o di politica sociale -, sempreché esse non abbiano per fine di ostacolare il gioco della libera concorrenza o di attenuarne gli effetti, e si conformino per il resto agli altri principi costituzionali cui la restrizione di ogni diritto costituzionalmente garantito soggiace (DTF 97 I 499 segg., in particolare 506; DTF 98 Ia 395 segg.). f) La norma di cui all'art. 1 par. 1 LApp., in quanto prescrive, per l'ottenimento della delibera di lavori per conto dello Stato o sussidiati dallo Stato, l'accettazione e il rispetto degli esistenti contratti collettivi di lavoro, rientra senza dubbio nel novero delle disposizioni sociali o di politica sociale. Di natura sociale sono infatti le disposizioni concernenti la durata del lavoro, le vacanze e i salari minimi (SALADIN, Grundrechte im Wandel pag. 241 segg.). Sia la LApp. che la circolare impugnata sono quindi atti che non esorbitano in principio dall'ambito riservato dall'art. 31 cpv. 2 Cost. al Cantone. promuovere la sicurezza sociale e favorire la pace del lavoro, entrambi presupposti essenziali del benessere generale. Mal s'addice all'ente pubblico - tenuto ad ordinare in modo socialmente soddisfacente le condizioni di lavoro dei propri dipendenti - di trar profitto negli appalti dai prezzi minimi consentiti a taluni concorrenti dal rifiuto di aderire ad un contratto collettivo di lavoro vincolante per altri (cfr. art. 1 cpv. 2 lett. b LCSl). Nell'interesse del benessere generale l'ente pubblico deve poter tenere in considerazione eventualmente anche offerte più alte. Né si può seriamente porre in dubbio che tale sacrificio non sia nel complesso per finire ripagato, così come non si può negare che l'incentivo in tal guisa fornito ai contratti collettivi di lavoro contribuisca in modo non trascurabile al mantenimento della pace del lavoro in Svizzera e con essa del benessere generale (cfr. SCHWEINGRUBER, Das Arbeitsrecht pag. 224). b) L'applicazione dell'art. 1 par. 1 LApp. ai mandati di progettazione affidati a studi tecnici non tradisce codeste finalità. Al contrario: Stato e Comuni hanno un innegabile interesse a che i dipendenti degli studi tecnici accedano ad un certo livello sociale, e che siano loro garantite condizioni di lavoro su una base di uguaglianza, qual è quella assicurata da un contratto collettivo di lavoro. Né le tensioni sociali, né il perturbamento del clima del lavoro ed ancor meno aperti conflitti giovano alla comunità. E neppure è seriamente da temere il pericolo di una spinta inflazionistica, adombrato dalla ricorrente. Gli onorari percepiti dagli ingegneri e architetti sono regolati dalla tariffa SIA, e quindi non variano da uno studio tecnico all'altro. Il rispetto delle disposizioni del contratto collettivo di lavoro non dovrebbe quindi trar seco un gonfiamento del prezzo globale di una determinata opera, ma comportare unicamente un diverso riparto interno del reddito del lavoro. c) Né d'altro canto può ammettersi che la circolare impugnata sia suscettibile di compromettere interessi pubblici. L'opinione espressa in sede ricorsuale secondo cui all'USIT avrebbero aderito in modo preponderante i migliori studi di ingegneria ticinese riflette verosimilmente una valutazione meramente soggettiva. Anche se ciò rispondesse in una certa misura al vero e da tale circostanza dovessero sorgere difficoltà, tali difficoltà non potrebbero essere che di natura transitoria e comunque non giustificherebbero una capitolazione dello Stato chiamato a tutelare l'interesse preponderante della pace sociale. La circostanza, da ultimo, che il numero dei disegnatori favoriti dall'accettazione del contratto collettivo sarebbe esiguo, è priva di rilevanza. Scopo della misura è infatti il mantenimento in genere della pace del lavoro e la tutela dei contratti collettivi di lavoro e non la protezione di singoli gruppi, grandi o piccoli che siano, di prestatori d'opera. d) La ricorrente tenta di dimostrare che le misure annunciate dall'impugnata circolare colpirebbero duramente e in modo contrario ai principi della proporzionalità i suoi membri e ciò in considerazione del fatto che l'USIT è formata preponderantemente di studi di ingegneria. La circostanza che per tali studi le commesse dell'ente pubblico rivestano una notevole importanza è pacifica. Essa è però irrilevante. Lo Stato non impone a questi studi tecnici di rinunciare a lavori per lo Stato o sussidiati dallo Stato, ma si limita ad esigere ch'essi adeguino le condizioni di lavoro dei loro disegnatori a quelle offerte ai disegnatori dei membri dell'ADLAT. Trattasi in sostanza di pretendere dai membri dell'USIT lo stesso sacrificio che i titolari degli studi tecnici rimasti membri dell'ADLAT (la maggioranza degli architetti e una minoranza degli ingegneri) già si sono contrattualmente assunti. La stessa USIT rileva a tal proposito di essere stata e di esser tuttora disposta a fare rilevanti concessioni e che, attualmente, più non sussisterebbero notevoli differenze. Ne consegue che, in tali circostanze, nulla permette di far ritenere che la pretesa di far rispettare le condizioni del contratto collettivo da parte dei membri dell'USIT possa per questi comportare un aggravio assolutamente insopportabile. Il contratto collettivo di lavoro per i disegnatori è il risultato di lunghe trattative condotte tra l'ADLAT, all'epoca in cui gli attuali membri dell'USIT vi aderivano, e le associazioni sindacali e professionali dei disegnatori. È ben vero che gli attuali membri dell'USIT avevano formulato proprie proposte in sede di discussione. Compito dello Stato non è però quello di analizzare se anche tale "offerta" adempia o meno le condizioni dell'art. 1 par. 1 LApp. (d'altro canto la legge non offre lo spunto per una tale verifica), ma solo quello di prendere atto dell'esistenza di un contratto collettivo di lavoro in un determinato ramo e di pretenderne il rispetto ai fini della delibera di incarichi professionali relativi all'esecuzione di opere pubbliche per lo Stato o da questo sussidiate. e) I concorrenti (Gewerbegenossen), coloro cioè che esplicano la propria attività nell'ambito della libertà di commercio e di industria, hanno diritto all'uguaglianza di trattamento tanto da parte del legislatore, quanto nell'applicazione della legge. Ciò non significa però che sul piano legislativo sia proscritta ogni distinzione; occorre unicamente che questa si giustifichi oggettivamente (MARTI, op.cit., pag. 105). La legge sugli appalti consta di norme intese a stabilire una graduatoria, dunque un'ineguaglianza, ai fini dell'aggiudicazione dei lavori di progettazione e di esecuzione di opere pubbliche. L'art. 1 par. 1 costituisce solo uno dei casi in cui nella legge vengono stabiliti criteri di scelta, quindi di ineguaglianza, tra i concorrenti. Ben oltre va l'art. 18 che stabilisce, tra imprese ugualmente qualificate, criteri preferenziali quali, per esempio, quelli tratti dalla residenza in un determinato luogo o dal fatto della regolare formazione di apprendisti o ancora della maggiore o minore occupazione delle differenti ditte concorrenti, sia nel settore pubblico che nel settore privato. In questa sede non occorre esaminare se tali criteri di differenziazione siano o meno conformi ai precetti costituzionali: l'esame in questa sede deve ridursi ad accertare se l'adesione o la non adesione ad un contratto collettivo di lavoro costituisca di per sé un valido criterio oggettivo di differenziazione o, più precisamente, se l'esclusione di ditte non aderenti a tale contratto comporti o meno un trattamento ineguale di cose uguali. Per essere ammissibili, tali differenziazioni devono giustificarsi con oggettivi motivi di polizia o di politica sociale. Il fatto di preferire, in sede di pubblici appalti, concorrenti che praticano nei confronti dei loro dipendenti le condizioni di lavoro previste dai contratti collettivi si giustifica con validissimi motivi, come dimostrato nei considerandi precedenti. Proprio il precetto dell'uguaglianza di trattamento impone anzi di privilegiare quei concorrenti che fanno integralmente beneficiare i loro dipendenti dei vantaggi sociali derivanti dai contratti collettivi di lavoro. Sarebbe inammissibile che anche nell'aggiudicazione di lavori pubblici gli imprenditori meno socialmente aperti traessero vantaggio dalla Decisione : 102 IA 533 Data : 17. März 1976 Stato : 102 IA 533 Regesto : 1. Art. 84 OG. Voraussetzungen dafür, dass ein von einer Behörde ausgehendes an eine ihr nicht... contratto collettivo di lavoro • questio • federalismo • leso • consiglio di stato • ricorrente • cio • condizioni di lavoro • uguaglianza di trattamento • diritto cantonale • ricorso di diritto pubblico • datore di lavoro • diritto del lavoro • analogia • pace del lavoro • dubbio • opera pubblica • ordinanza amministrativa • interesse pubblico • ripartizione dei compiti 100-IA-106 • 102-IA-533 • 91-I-197 • 97-I-499 • 98-IA-395 • 98-IA-491 • 98-IA-508 CO: 329a, 358 Cost.: 31, 34ter LCSl: 1
sl	wikipedia	N/A	Anton Terbovec, slovenski pisatelj, publicist in urednik, * 12. december 1882, Žirovnica pri Sevnici, † 23. september 1962, Miami. Življenjepis Terbovec se je leta 1906 odselil v ZDA, kjer se je preživljal kot tovarniški delavec in vrtnar v Clevelandu ter kot rudar v Pensilvaniji in Utahu. Od leta 1909 do 1915 in 1920 do 1925 je krošnjaril po Ameriki in pomagal zbirati fotografsko gradivo publicistuTrunku za knjigo Amerika in Amerikanci. Od 1910 je bil član SNPJ, 1912 do 1915 predsednik njenega glavnega nadzornega odbora , ter od leta 1915 do 1920 njen glavni blagajnik. Od leta 1915 do 1918 je sourejal Prosveto. Nato je bil urednik revij The Slovenian Review in The Jugo-Slov Review (1917 do 1919) ter Nove dobe (1925 do 1957). Literarno delo Terbovec je potopisne, avtobiografske in spominske pripovedi objavljal v Novi dobi, Glasu naroda, Prosveti, Glasu svobode in drugih revijah. Pisal je tudi kratke ljubezenske zgodbe in črtice za otroke. Glej tudi seznam slovenskih pisateljev Viri Enciklopedija Slovenije; knjiga 13, Mladinska knjiga, Ljubljana, 1999 Zunanje povezave Slovenski pisatelji Slovenski publicisti Slovenski uredniki Ameriški Slovenci
fr	caselaw	Switzerland	Bundesgericht Tribunal fédéral Tribunale federale Tribunal federal {T 0/2} 8C_355/2010 Urteil vom 21. Oktober 2010 I. sozialrechtliche Abteilung Besetzung Bundesrichter Ursprung, Präsident, Bundesrichterin Leuzinger, Bundesrichter Maillard, Gerichtsschreiberin Berger Götz. Verfahrensbeteiligte Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft, Direktion, Arbeitsmarkt/Arbeitslosenversicherung, TCRV, Effingerstrasse 31, 3003 Bern, Beschwerdeführer, gegen F._, vertreten durch Rechtsanwältin Sabine Renker, Beschwerdegegnerin, Unia Arbeitslosenkasse, Werdstrasse 36, 8036 Zürich. Gegenstand Arbeitslosenversicherung (Arbeitslosenentschädigung, Rückerstattung), Beschwerde gegen den Entscheid des Verwaltungsgerichts des Kantons Bern, Sozialversicherungsrechtliche Abteilung, vom 10. März 2010. Sachverhalt: A. Die 1960 geborene F._ war ab Januar 2005 als stellvertretende Geschäftsführerin für den Betrieb E._ in N._ tätig. Als Inhaber der Einzelfirma war ihr Ehemann, E._, im Handelsregister eingetragen. Am 24. Januar 2007 kündigte die Y._ GmbH den Franchisevertrag mit dem Betriebsinhaber auf den 31. August 2007. In der Folge löste E._ das Arbeitsverhältnis mit F._ am 29. Juni 2007 durch schriftliche Kündigung per 30. September 2007 auf. Bereits am 7. Juni 2007 hatte er im Handelsregister eine Sitzverlegung der Einzelfirma nach S._ und eine Zweckänderung (Betreiben eines .... - Geschäfts) eintragen lassen. Am 26. September 2007 stellte F._ für die Zeit ab 1. Oktober 2007 Antrag auf Arbeitslosenentschädigung. Die Unia Arbeitslosenkasse richtete in der Folge Arbeitslosentaggelder aus. Dabei wurde der Lohn aus der ab 1. Dezember 2007 im neuen Betrieb des Ehemannes ausgeübten 50%igen Erwerbstätigkeit und aus der weiteren, am 1. Mai 2008 aufgenommenen Teilzeittätigkeit für die L._ AG als Zwischenverdienst angerechnet. Per 31. Juli 2008 wurde F._ vom Regionalen Arbeitsvermittlungszentrum von der Arbeitsvermittlung abgemeldet und es wurde vermerkt, dass sie ab August 2008 auf Leistungen der Arbeitslosenversicherung verzichte. Nachdem anlässlich einer vom Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (SECO) am 6. Mai 2009 durchgeführten Revision festgestellt worden war, dass die Arbeitslosenversicherung F._ zu Unrecht Arbeitslosenentschädigung ausgerichtet habe, forderte die Unia Leistungen im Umfang von Fr. 53'308.- zurück (Verfügung vom 15. Juli 2009). Daran hielt sie auf Einsprache hin fest (Einspracheentscheid vom 14. August 2009). B. Das Verwaltungsgericht des Kantons Bern hob den Einspracheentscheid in Gutheissung der dagegen erhobenen Beschwerde auf (Entscheid vom 10. März 2010). C. Das SECO führt Beschwerde in öffentlich-rechtlichen Angelegenheiten mit dem Rechtsbegehren, der Entscheid des kantonalen Gerichts sei aufzuheben. F._ lässt auf Abweisung der Beschwerde schliessen; eventuell sei die Angelegenheit an die Vorinstanz zurückzuweisen; subeventuell sei der Einspracheentscheid, "soweit einen Rückforderungsbetrag von Fr. 4'360.75 übersteigend", aufzuheben. Die Unia verzichtet auf eine Stellungnahme. Erwägungen: 1. Die Beschwerde in öffentlich-rechtlichen Angelegenheiten (Art. 82 ff. BGG) kann wegen Rechtsverletzung gemäss Art. 95 f. BGG erhoben werden. Das Bundesgericht legt seinem Urteil den Sachverhalt zugrunde, den die Vorinstanz festgestellt hat (Art. 105 Abs. 1 BGG), und kann deren Sachverhaltsfeststellung von Amtes wegen nur berichtigen oder ergänzen, wenn sie offensichtlich unrichtig ist oder auf einer Rechtsverletzung im Sinne von Art. 95 BGG beruht (Art. 105 Abs. 2 BGG). 2. Das kantonale Gericht hat die Bestimmungen und Grundsätze zum Ausschluss arbeitgeberähnlicher Personen und im Betrieb mitarbeitender Ehegatten vom Anspruch auf Kurzarbeitsentschädigung (Art. 31 Abs. 3 lit. c AVIG), die Rechtsprechung zur analogen Anwendung dieser Bestimmung auf arbeitgeberähnliche Personen und ihre Ehegatten, die Arbeitslosenentschädigung verlangen (BGE 123 V 234 E. 7 S. 236), sowie die Bestimmungen und Grundsätze über die Rückforderung zu Unrecht ausgerichteter Leistungen der Arbeitslosenversicherung (Art. 95 Abs. 1 AVIG in Verbindung mit Art. 25 Abs. 1 und 2 ATSG) und die dazu notwendigen Voraussetzungen für ein wiedererwägungsweises Zurückkommen auf die formell rechtskräftig verfügte oder formlos erfolgte Leistungszusprechung (Art. 53 Abs. 2 ATSG; vgl. BGE 126 V 23 E. 4b, 42 E. 2b S. 46, 399 E. 2b S. 400; 122 V 367 E. 3 S. 268 mit Hinweisen) zutreffend dargelegt. Darauf wird verwiesen. 3. Streitig und zu prüfen ist, ob die Arbeitslosenkasse die Anspruchsberechtigung der Beschwerdegegnerin zu Recht rückwirkend ab 1. Oktober 2007 verneint hat und ob sie demzufolge die bereits erbrachten Arbeitslosentaggelder für die Zeit vom 1. Oktober 2007 bis 31. Juli 2008 zurückfordern durfte. 4. 4.1 Es besteht unter den Verfahrensbeteiligten Einigkeit darüber, dass die Beschwerdegegnerin in ihrer Eigenschaft als Ehefrau des Betriebsinhabers zweifellos keinen Anspruch auf Arbeitslosenentschädigung gehabt hätte, wenn der Betrieb in N._ nach Auflösung des Arbeitsverhältnisses weitergeführt worden wäre. Hingegen müsste ein Anspruch auf Taggelder der Arbeitslosenversicherung bejaht werden, wenn E._ unmittelbar nach der Kündigung des Arbeitsverhältnisses mit der Ehefrau kein neues Geschäft aufgebaut hätte. 4.2 Für die Vorinstanz bleibt das Eröffnungsdatum des neuen Betriebs in S._ aufgrund der vorhandenen Akten zwar unklar. Aus dem Handelsregisterauszug ergebe sich lediglich, dass der Franchisevertrag mit der neuen Franchisegeberin K._ bereits vor dem 7. Juni 2007 abgeschlossen worden sei. Es sei möglich, dass der Ehemann die beiden Geschäfte für kurze Zeit gleichzeitig betrieben habe. Denkbar sei aber ebenso, dass er sie nacheinander - allenfalls mit einem kurzen Unterbruch - geführt habe. Dies sei aber nicht entscheidend. Massgebend sei vielmehr, dass es nicht bloss um eine Sitzverlegung des gleichen Betriebes gegangen sei. Der Ehemann habe den alten Betrieb aufgeben und einen neuen übernehmen müssen. Aufgrund dieses Umstandes könne von einer rechtsmissbräuchlichen Kündigung des Arbeitsverhältnisses mit der Beschwerdegegnerin keine Rede sein. Das Ausscheiden aus dem Betrieb sei für die Ehefrau endgültig gewesen. Daran ändere nichts, dass der bisherige Handelsregistereintrag nach Aufgabe des früheren und Übernahme des neuen Betriebs nicht gelöscht, sondern lediglich hinsichtlich Adresse und Zweck der Firma modifiziert worden sei. Unter diesen Umständen sei der Bezug von Arbeitslosentaggeldern durch die Beschwerdegegnerin nicht offensichtlich unrichtig gewesen. Die Voraussetzungen einer Wiedererwägung seien folglich nicht erfüllt und Revisionsgründe seien nicht ersichtlich, weshalb die Rückforderung der bezogenen Taggelder zu Unrecht erfolgt sei. 5. 5.1 Die Beweiswürdigung im Allgemeinen einschliesslich die Würdigung von Indizien und fallbezogene Wahrscheinlichkeitsüberlegungen betreffen Tatfragen (Urteil 8C_831/2008 vom 29. Mai 2009 E. 2.3; ULRICH MEYER, in: Basler Kommentar, Bundesgerichtsgesetz, 2008, N. 34 zu Art. 105 BGG, und MARKUS SCHOTT, in: Basler Kommentar, Bundesgerichtsgesetz, 2008, N. 29 zu Art. 95 BGG, je mit Hinweisen), die das Bundesgericht lediglich auf offensichtliche Unrichtigkeit und Rechtsfehlerhaftigkeit hin zu überprüfen befugt ist (Art. 105 Abs. 2 BGG; vgl. E. 1 hiervor). Blosse Zweifel an der Richtigkeit der vorinstanzlichen Sachverhaltsfeststellung ändern an deren Verbindlichkeitswirkung gemäss Art. 105 Abs. 1 BGG nichts (vgl. die Hinweise in Urteil 9C_539/2007 vom 31. Januar 2008 E. 2.2.2). 5. 5.1 Die Beweiswürdigung im Allgemeinen einschliesslich die Würdigung von Indizien und fallbezogene Wahrscheinlichkeitsüberlegungen betreffen Tatfragen (Urteil 8C_831/2008 vom 29. Mai 2009 E. 2.3; ULRICH MEYER, in: Basler Kommentar, Bundesgerichtsgesetz, 2008, N. 34 zu Art. 105 BGG, und MARKUS SCHOTT, in: Basler Kommentar, Bundesgerichtsgesetz, 2008, N. 29 zu Art. 95 BGG, je mit Hinweisen), die das Bundesgericht lediglich auf offensichtliche Unrichtigkeit und Rechtsfehlerhaftigkeit hin zu überprüfen befugt ist (Art. 105 Abs. 2 BGG; vgl. E. 1 hiervor). Blosse Zweifel an der Richtigkeit der vorinstanzlichen Sachverhaltsfeststellung ändern an deren Verbindlichkeitswirkung gemäss Art. 105 Abs. 1 BGG nichts (vgl. die Hinweise in Urteil 9C_539/2007 vom 31. Januar 2008 E. 2.2.2). 5.2 5.2.1 Das SECO wendet gegen die Sachverhaltsdarstellung des kantonalen Gerichts ein, der Ehemann der Beschwerdegegnerin habe bereits am 13. Juni 2007, noch vor der Kündigung des Anstellungsverhältnisses mit seiner Ehefrau vom 29. Juni 2007, gewusst, dass er das neue Geschäft in S._ führen werde. Die Abfolge in der Beendigung des Franchise- und des Arbeitsvertrages lege die Vermutung nahe, dass zunächst die Absicht bestanden habe, die Beschwerdegegnerin von Anfang an im neuen Betrieb weiterzubeschäftigen. Offensichtlich sei dies aber für den Ehemann doch zu riskant gewesen, weshalb er die Kündigung ausgesprochen habe. Die Vertreterin der Beschwerdegegnerin habe im vorinstanzlichen Prozess angegeben, dass der Ehemann die Versicherte vorerst nicht habe anstellen können, weil er den Betrieb neu habe aufbauen müssen und nicht gewusst habe, ob er seiner Ehefrau einen Lohn hätte zahlen können. Ab 1. Dezember 2007 habe die Beschwerdegegnerin wieder für ihren Ehemann gearbeitet, dieses Mal in einem 50%igen Pensum. Das kantonale Gericht verkenne, dass die Versicherte nicht etwa mit der Y._ GmbH, sondern mit der Einzelfirma E._ einen Anstellungsvertrag abgeschlossen habe. Diese Einzelfirma sei aber keineswegs endgültig aufgegeben worden. Gemäss Handelsregisterauszug seien einzig der Sitz und der Zweck abgeändert worden. Die Kündigung des Franchisevertrages durch die Y._ GmbH habe denn auch keinen Einfluss auf das Anstellungsverhältnis zwischen der Einzelfirma E._ und der Versicherten gehabt. Dies werde durch den Umstand untermauert, dass die Endtermine des Franchise- und des Arbeitsvertrages nicht aufeinander abgestimmt gewesen seien. Vielmehr sei der Versicherten von ihrem Ehemann erst per Ende September 2007 gekündigt worden, obwohl der Franchisevertrag bereits Ende August 2007 ausgelaufen sei, was der Betreiber der Einzelfirma schon seit Januar 2007 gewusst habe. Dies zeige mit aller Deutlichkeit, dass E._ die arbeitgeberähnliche Stellung nie endgültig aufgegeben, sondern vielmehr sämtliche Dispositionsfreiheiten betreffend Anstellungsverhältnis der Versicherten beibehalten habe. Die Missbrauchsgefahr habe weiterhin bestanden, weshalb die ursprüngliche Ausrichtung von Leistungen der Arbeitslosenversicherung an die Beschwerdegegnerin zweifellos unrichtig gewesen sei. 5.2.2 Diese Vorbringen des Beschwerdeführers lassen die für das Bundesgericht grundsätzlich verbindlichen vorinstanzlichen Sachverhaltsfeststellungen (vgl. E. 1 hiervor) in casu nicht als offensichtlich unrichtig im Sinne von Art. 105 Abs. 2 BGG erscheinen. Das SECO äussert lediglich Vermutungen zum Hergang der Ereignisse und vermag nicht darzulegen, welche - entscheidrelevanten - Tatsachen das kantonale Gericht allenfalls falsch wiedergegeben haben könnte. Der vorinstanzlichen Darlegung, wonach der Ehemann der Beschwerdegegnerin seinen alten Betrieb zufolge Kündigung des Franchisevertrages durch die Y._ GmbH ganz habe aufgeben müssen, sämtlicher damit verbundener Dispositionsfreiheiten verlustig gegangen sei und evidentermassen keine Möglichkeit mehr gehabt habe, seine Ehefrau in N._ weiter zu beschäftigen, kann der Beschwerdeführer nichts entgegenhalten. Es ist unstreitig, dass die Y._ GmbH den alten Betrieb im September 2007 übernommen hat, um ihn selber weiterzuführen. Der Hinweis des SECO auf den Umstand, dass der Arbeitsvertrag zwischen der Beschwerdegegnerin und E._ und nicht zwischen ihr und der Y._ GmbH bestanden habe, bekräftigt nur, dass es nicht in der Macht des Ehemannes gestanden hatte, seine Ehefrau nach Auflösung des Franchisevertrages im alten Betrieb weiterzubeschäftigen. 5.2.3 Die Beschwerdegegnerin macht letztinstanzlich geltend, der Franchisevertrag sei zwar durch die Y._ GmbH auf den 31. August 2007 gekündigt worden. In der (letztinstanzlich erstmals ins Recht gelegten) Zusatzvereinbarung zwischen der Y._ GmbH und E._ vom 15./30. Januar 2007 habe sich die Y._ GmbH aber ausbedungen, den Übergabetermin selber zu bestimmen. Dem Schreiben der Y._ GmbH vom 6. November 2007, welches im Verfahren vor Bundesgericht - zulässigerweise - erstmals aufgelegt werde, sei zu entnehmen, dass sie den Betrieb schliesslich erst am 10. September 2007 übernommen habe. E._ habe mit der Kündigung des Franchisevertrages durch die Y._ GmbH den Betrieb aufgeben und sich nach einer neuen Tätigkeit umsehen müssen. Zu jenem Zeitpunkt sei unklar gewesen, wie sich seine berufliche Laufbahn entwickeln würde. Den Franchisevertrag mit der Firma K._ zum Aufbau eines Geschäfts in S._ habe er erst ganz kurzfristig abschliessen können. Diesen Betrieb habe er neu aufbauen müssen. Die Beschwerdegegnerin habe nicht die Absicht gehabt, wieder für ihren Ehemann zu arbeiten. Erst als sie keine neue Stelle in ihrem angestammten Beruf als Grafikerin habe finden können und es ihrem Ehemann mit Blick auf den Geschäftsgang möglich geworden sei, eine Mitarbeiterin in einem 50%igen Pensum anzustellen, habe sie diese Stelle angenommen. Sie habe aber weiterhin eine Beschäftigung als Grafikerin gesucht und schliesslich - ebenfalls in einem Teilzeitpensum zu 50 % - auch gefunden. Wie es sich mit diesen präzisierenden Angaben verhält, kann offen bleiben, so dass sich weitere Erörterungen zur Frage der Zulässigkeit (Art. 99 Abs. 1 BGG; BGE 135 V 194) der erst mit Beschwerde ans Bundesgericht eingereichten Unterlagen zur Geschäftsübernahme durch die Y._ GmbH erübrigen. Auch ohne diese neu ins Verfahren eingebrachten Akten steht mit Blick auf die durch die Kündigung des Franchisevertrags erzwungene Aufgabe des alten Betriebs in N._ fest, dass sich die Annahme des Beschwerdeführers einer nahtlosen Weiterführung des Betriebs (an einem anderen Ort) mit durchwegs erhaltener Dispositionsfreiheit des Ehemannes als Arbeitgeber weder auf den Handelsregistereintrag über die Einzelfirma des E._ noch auf die übrigen Umstände stützen lässt. Das Bundesgericht ist an die Sachverhaltsfeststellung der Vorinstanz gebunden (E. 1 und 5.2.2 hiervor). 5.3 Wird mit dem kantonalen Gericht von einem Verlust der Dispositionsfreiheit des ehemaligen Arbeitgebers durch die unfreiwillige Aufgabe seines Betriebs in N._ ausgegangen, so war die Ausrichtung von Arbeitslosentaggeldern an die Beschwerdegegnerin jedenfalls nicht zweifellos unrichtig im Sinne von Art. 53 Abs. 2 ATSG (zur Überprüfungsbefugnis des Bundesgerichts: ULRICH MEYER, a.a.O., N. 35f zu Art. 105 BGG). Daher sind die Voraussetzung für ein wiedererwägungsweises Zurückkommen auf die Taggeldzahlungen nicht erfüllt. Die Vorinstanz hat demgemäss den die Rückforderungsverfügung bestätigenden Einspracheentscheid der Arbeitslosenkasse vom 14. August 2009 zu Recht aufgehoben. 6. Bei diesem Ausgang des Verfahrens hat das Beschwerde führende SECO der Beschwerdegegnerin eine Parteientschädigung zu leisten (Art. 68 Abs. 2 BGG). Gerichtskosten sind dagegen keine zu erheben (Art. 66 Abs. 1 und Abs. 4 BGG). Demnach erkennt das Bundesgericht: 1. Die Beschwerde wird abgewiesen. 2. Es werden keine Gerichtskosten erhoben. 3. Der Beschwerdeführer hat die Beschwerdegegnerin für das bundesgerichtliche Verfahren mit Fr. 2800.- zu entschädigen. 4. Dieses Urteil wird den Parteien, dem Verwaltungsgericht des Kantons Bern, Sozialversicherungsrechtliche Abteilung, und dem beco Berner Wirtschaft, Abteilung Arbeitsvermittlung, Rechtsdienst, schriftlich mitgeteilt. Luzern, 21. Oktober 2010 Im Namen der I. sozialrechtlichen Abteilung des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts Der Präsident: Die Gerichtsschreiberin: Ursprung Berger Götz
en	other	N/A	<div class="placeholder placeholder-double-brackets" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22double-brackets%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BChapter%20Box%5Cn%7C%20title%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7C%20image%20%3D%20%5Cn%7C%20jname%20%3D%20%7B%7BRuby%7CULTIMATE%7C%5Cu30a2%5Cu30eb%5Cu30c6%5Cu30a3%5Cu30e1%5Cu30c3%5Cu30c8%7D%7D%5Cn%7C%20rname%20%3D%20Arutimetto%5Cn%7C%20ename%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7D%7D%22%2C%22lineStart%22%3A%22%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22Chapter%20Box%5Cn%22%2C%22placeholder%22%3A1%2C%22spacesafter%22%3A%22%22%7D" contenteditable="false"> <aside class="portable-infobox pi-background pi-theme-ChapterBox pi-layout-default"> <h2 class="pi-item pi-item-spacing pi-title" data-source="title">Ultimate</h2> <figure class="pi-item pi-image" data-source="image"> <a href="https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/onepiece/images/7/7b/Chapter_957.png/revision/latest?cb=20190930162045" class="image image-thumbnail" title="Chapter 957"> <img src="https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/onepiece/images/7/7b/Chapter_957.png/revision/latest/scale-to-width-down/350?cb=20190930162045" srcset="https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/onepiece/images/7/7b/Chapter_957.png/revision/latest/scale-to-width-down/350?cb=20190930162045 1x, https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/onepiece/images/7/7b/Chapter_957.png/revision/latest/scale-to-width-down/700?cb=20190930162045 2x" class="pi-image-thumbnail" alt="Chapter 957" width="270" height="197" data-image-key="Chapter_957.png" data-image-name="Chapter 957.png"/> </a> </figure> <section class="pi-item pi-group pi-border-color"> <h2 class="pi-item pi-header pi-secondary-font pi-item-spacing pi-secondary-background">Chapter Info</h2> <div class="pi-item pi-data pi-item-spacing pi-border-color" data-source="vol"> <h3 class="pi-data-label pi-secondary-font">Volume:</h3> <div class="pi-data-value pi-font">95</div> </div> <div class="pi-item pi-data pi-item-spacing pi-border-color" data-source="chapter"> <h3 class="pi-data-label pi-secondary-font">Chapter:</h3> <div class="pi-data-value pi-font">957</div> </div> <div class="pi-item pi-data pi-item-spacing pi-border-color" data-source="jname"> <h3 class="pi-data-label pi-secondary-font">Japanese Title:</h3> <div class="pi-data-value pi-font"><ruby lang="ja"><rb>ULTIMATE</rb><rp>(</rp><rt>アルティメット</rt><rp>)</rp></ruby></div> </div> <div class="pi-item pi-data pi-item-spacing pi-border-color" data-source="rname"> <h3 class="pi-data-label pi-secondary-font">Romanized Title:</h3> <div class="pi-data-value pi-font">Arutimetto</div> </div> <div class="pi-item pi-data pi-item-spacing pi-border-color" data-source="ename"> <h3 class="pi-data-label pi-secondary-font">Viz Title:</h3> <div class="pi-data-value pi-font">Ultimate</div> </div> <div class="pi-item pi-data pi-item-spacing pi-border-color" data-source="page"> <h3 class="pi-data-label pi-secondary-font">Pages:</h3> <div class="pi-data-value pi-font">19</div> </div> <div class="pi-item pi-data pi-item-spacing pi-border-color" data-source="date2"> <h3 class="pi-data-label pi-secondary-font">Release Date:</h3> <div class="pi-data-value pi-font">September 30, 2019</div> </div> </section> <section class="pi-item pi-group pi-border-color"> <table class="pi-horizontal-group pi-horizontal-group-no-labels"> <caption class="pi-header pi-secondary-font pi-secondary-background pi-item-spacing">Chapter Chronology</caption> <tbody> <tr> <td class="pi-horizontal-group-item pi-data-value pi-font pi-border-color pi-item-spacing">← <a href="/wiki/Chapter_956" title="Chapter 956">Previous</a></td> <td class="pi-horizontal-group-item pi-data-value pi-font pi-border-color pi-item-spacing"><a href="/wiki/Chapter_958" title="Chapter 958">Next</a> →</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </section> </aside> <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22ca%3ACap%5Cu00edtol%20957%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22ca%3ACap%5Cu00edtol%20957%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="https://onepiece.fandom.com/ca/wiki/Cap%C3%ADtol_957" class="extiw" title="ca:Capítol 957">ca:Capítol 957</a><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22es%3ACap%5Cu00edtulo%20957%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22es%3ACap%5Cu00edtulo%20957%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="https://onepiece.fandom.com/es/wiki/Cap%C3%ADtulo_957" class="extiw" title="es:Capítulo 957">es:Capítulo 957</a><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22pt-br%3ACap%5Cu00edtulo%20957%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22pt-br%3ACap%5Cu00edtulo%20957%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="https://onepiece.fandom.com/pt/wiki/Cap%C3%ADtulo_957" class="extiw" title="pt-br:Capítulo 957">pt-br:Capítulo 957</a><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22fr%3AChapitre%20957%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22fr%3AChapitre%20957%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="https://onepiece.fandom.com/fr/wiki/Chapitre_957" class="extiw" title="fr:Chapitre 957">fr:Chapitre 957</a><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22it%3ACapitolo%20957%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22it%3ACapitolo%20957%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="https://onepiece.fandom.com/it/wiki/Capitolo_957" class="extiw" title="it:Capitolo 957">it:Capitolo 957</a><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22ru%3A%5Cu0413%5Cu043b%5Cu0430%5Cu0432%5Cu0430%20957%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22ru%3A%5Cu0413%5Cu043b%5Cu0430%5Cu0432%5Cu0430%20957%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="https://onepiece.fandom.com/ru/wiki/%D0%93%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B0_957" class="extiw" title="ru:Глава 957">ru:Глава 957</a><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22pl%3ARozdzia%5Cu0142%20957%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22pl%3ARozdzia%5Cu0142%20957%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="https://onepiece.fandom.com/pl/wiki/Rozdzia%C5%82_957" class="extiw" title="pl:Rozdział 957">pl:Rozdział 957</a><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22zh%3A957%5Cu8a71%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22zh%3A957%5Cu8a71%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="https://onepiece.fandom.com/zh/wiki/957%E8%A9%B1" class="extiw" title="zh:957話">zh:957話</a></div> <p data-rte-fromparser="true"><b>Chapter 957</b> is titled "Ultimate". </p> <h2 data-rte-empty-lines-before="1">Cover Page</h2> <p data-rte-fromparser="true"><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Color%20Spread%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Color%20Spread%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BColor%20Spread%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Color_Spread" title="Color Spread" class="mw-redirect">Color Spread</a> - The <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Straw%20Hat%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Straw%20Hat%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BStraw%20Hat%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Straw_Hat_Pirates" title="Straw Hat Pirates">Straw Hat Pirates</a> are racing a duck speed boat with some turtles. </p> <h2 data-rte-empty-lines-before="1">Short Summary</h2> <p data-rte-fromparser="true"><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Sakazuki%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Sakazuki%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BSakazuki%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Sakazuki" title="Sakazuki">Sakazuki</a> and <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Fujitora%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Issho%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BIssho%7CFujitora%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Issho" title="Issho">Fujitora</a> talk about the fate of the recently-ousted <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Shichibukai%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Shichibukai%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BShichibukai%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Shichibukai" title="Shichibukai">Shichibukai</a> while the other <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Marines%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Marines%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BMarines%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Marines" title="Marines">Marines</a> discuss the recently-formed alliance between <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Kaido%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Kaido%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BKaido%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Kaido" title="Kaido">Kaido</a> and <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Big%20Mom%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Charlotte%20Linlin%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BCharlotte%20Linlin%7CBig%20Mom%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Charlotte_Linlin" title="Charlotte Linlin">Big Mom</a>, with some worrying that <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Rocks%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Rocks%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BRocks%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Rocks" title="Rocks" class="mw-redirect">Rocks</a> has returned. Afterwards, they discuss Rocks and his crew, the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Rocks%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Rocks%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BRocks%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Rocks_Pirates" title="Rocks Pirates">Rocks Pirates</a>, in which three of the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Yonko%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Yonko%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BYonko%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Yonko" title="Yonko">Yonko</a> have been members as well as a team-up between <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Garp%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Monkey%20D.%20Garp%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BMonkey%20D.%20Garp%7CGarp%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Monkey_D._Garp" title="Monkey D. Garp">Garp</a> and <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Roger%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Gol%20D.%20Roger%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BGol%20D.%20Roger%7CRoger%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Gol_D._Roger" title="Gol D. Roger">Roger</a> to defeat them. Afterwards, Roger's and all the Yonko's bounties have been revealed. </p> <h2 data-rte-empty-lines-before="1">Long Summary</h2> <p data-rte-fromparser="true">The chapter begins at <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Marine%20Headquarters%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Marine%20Headquarters%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BMarine%20Headquarters%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Marine_Headquarters" title="Marine Headquarters">Marine Headquarters</a>. Fleet Admiral <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Sakazuki%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Sakazuki%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BSakazuki%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Sakazuki" title="Sakazuki">Sakazuki</a> is talking with Admiral <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Fujitora%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Issho%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BIssho%7CFujitora%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Issho" title="Issho">Fujitora</a> on the radio, remarking how pleased the latter must be with the abolition of the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Shichibukai%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Shichibukai%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BShichibukai%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Shichibukai" title="Shichibukai">Shichibukai</a> system. Sakazuki was against it, but was powerless to do anything in the face of world's <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22royalty%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Royal%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BRoyal%7Croyalty%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Royal" title="Royal">royalty</a>. Fujitora retorts that the good far outweighs the bad and how Sakazuki fails to see that. He tells Sakazuki to put his faith in the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22SSG%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22SSG%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BSSG%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/SSG" title="SSG">SSG</a> and how the balance of power in the world will now change dramatically. Sakazuki agrees, and changes the subject to <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Wano%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Wano%20Country%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BWano%20Country%7CWano%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Wano_Country" title="Wano Country">Wano</a> and the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Yonko%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Yonko%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BYonko%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Yonko" title="Yonko">Yonko</a>, going on about <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Big%20Mom%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Charlotte%20Linlin%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BCharlotte%20Linlin%7CBig%20Mom%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Charlotte_Linlin" title="Charlotte Linlin">Big Mom</a> and <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Kaido%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Kaido%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BKaido%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Kaido" title="Kaido">Kaido</a>'s tentative <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22alliance%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Pirate%20Alliance%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BPirate%20Alliance%7Calliance%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Pirate_Alliance" title="Pirate Alliance">alliance</a>. This startles Issho, who calls it <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Rocks%27s%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Rocks%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BRocks%20Pirates%7CRocks%27s%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Rocks_Pirates" title="Rocks Pirates">Rocks's</a> second coming. Sakazuki tells him not to be so dramatic, saying how this is all real and when it rains, it pours. </p><p data-rte-fromparser="true" data-rte-empty-lines-before="1">Elsewhere inside Marine HQ, <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Brannew%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Brannew%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BBrannew%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Brannew" title="Brannew">Brannew</a> and <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Sengoku%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Sengoku%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BSengoku%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Sengoku" title="Sengoku">Sengoku</a> are briefing a group of <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Marines%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Marines%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BMarines%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Marines" title="Marines">Marines</a> about the Yonko alliance. Brannew clarifies that Kaido and Big Mom are planning to form an alliance and have not done so yet. The pair has yet to make a move, but their goals and intentions remain unclear, thus combatting them will be difficult. Information about the Rocks Pirates is still scarce. Sengoku likens the two Yonko as cat and dog, so their alliance is certainly surprising, and he comments how most Marines today don't know who Rocks was. He then goes on to tell the Marines present in the room about Rocks. </p><p data-rte-fromparser="true" data-rte-empty-lines-before="1">The Rocks Pirates, as they were called, formed when a group gathered on the pirate island <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Hachinosu%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Hachinosu%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BHachinosu%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Hachinosu" title="Hachinosu">Hachinosu</a>. They were a violent bunch who would kill each other regularly, even on the same ship. Kaido, Big Mom and <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Whitebeard%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Edward%20Newgate%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BEdward%20Newgate%7CWhitebeard%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Edward_Newgate" title="Edward Newgate">Whitebeard</a> were members of this crew, along with many other pirates who made a name for themselves such as "<a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22The%20Golden%20Lion%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Shiki%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BShiki%7CThe%20Golden%20Lion%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Shiki" title="Shiki">The Golden Lion</a>", "<a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Captain%20John%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22John%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BJohn%7CCaptain%20John%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/John" title="John">Captain John</a>", "Silver Axe" and "Ochoku". The Marines present are shocked that so many famous pirates are connected and so few people knew. Sengoku explains that one reason is due to the unfriendly relationship among the crew, not many lived to tell about it. Rocks wanted to be the King of the World, and he wielded his crew akin to a terrorist organization. The other reason is that the World Government erased most of the crew's acts from history. Their infamy reached people at the time, however. </p><p data-rte-fromparser="true" data-rte-empty-lines-before="1">Events came to a head 38 years ago, on an island known as <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22God%20Valley%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22God%20Valley%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BGod%20Valley%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/God_Valley" title="God Valley">God Valley</a>. News of the Rocks Pirates' defeat spread world-wide. On that day, <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Monkey%20D.%20Garp%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Monkey%20D.%20Garp%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BMonkey%20D.%20Garp%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Monkey_D._Garp" title="Monkey D. Garp">Monkey D. Garp</a> defeated the crew, earning him the title of "Hero of the Marines". The Marines listening to Sengoku talk about how they never knew which of Garp's heroic feats gave him that title. Sengoku adds that Garp tends to keep mum about the whole ordeal aside from the known historical facts. The scene changes briefly to Garp on his ship, ascending from <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Fish-Man%20Island%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Fish-Man%20Island%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BFish-Man%20Island%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Fish-Man_Island" title="Fish-Man Island">Fish-Man Island</a>, making a vague comment Big Mom and Kaido's alliance. </p><p data-rte-fromparser="true" data-rte-empty-lines-before="1">The first reason Garp likes to keep quiet about the battle is one that never made it into the public record. Garp had to fight alongside a pirate. The other reason is that Garp fought to protect the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Celestial%20Dragons%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22World%20Nobles%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BWorld%20Nobles%7CCelestial%20Dragons%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/World_Nobles" title="World Nobles" class="mw-redirect">Celestial Dragons</a>. The introduction of Celestial Dragons into the story and Garp's secrecy about protecting them surprise and confuse the present Marines. Sengoku explains that Garp's moral code does not allow him to protect Celestial Dragons. It's also the reason he never accepted the rank of Admiral, because he would be directly under their control. The true story of the event known as the "<a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22God%20Valley%20Incident%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22God%20Valley%20Incident%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BGod%20Valley%20Incident%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/God_Valley_Incident" title="God Valley Incident">God Valley Incident</a>" is that Garp and <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Gol%20D.%20Roger%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Gol%20D.%20Roger%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BGol%20D.%20Roger%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Gol_D._Roger" title="Gol D. Roger">Gol D. Roger</a> met there by chance, teamed up, and defeated the Rocks Pirates. This revelation surprises the Marines most of all. Sengoku goes on to say that God Valley is no longer found on any maps. In reality, the entire island disappeared without explanation as if it never existed. Sengoku rephrased his description, saying that an island the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22World%20Government%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22World%20Government%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BWorld%20Government%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/World_Government" title="World Government">World Government</a> wanted to keep secret disappeared, and asked if they still wanted to ask questions. Sengoku caps the story off summarily by saying that once a man named <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Rocks%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Rocks%20D.%20Xebec%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BRocks%20D.%20Xebec%7CRocks%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Rocks_D._Xebec" title="Rocks D. Xebec">Rocks</a> wanted to be the King of the World. Rocks, who is no longer alive, stepped into some parts of history that he shouldn't have, and as a result little to no information about the Rocks Pirates survives, save for the memories of some of the older Marines. The Marines are stunned to think that there was once a man who commanded three people who would later become Yonko. </p><p data-rte-fromparser="true" data-rte-empty-lines-before="1">Sengoku goes on to talk about how Rocks was Roger's first and possibly greatest enemy. Everyone called him Captain Rocks, but his full name was Rocks D. Xebec, another pirate to bear the initial <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22D%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Will%20of%20D.%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BWill%20of%20D.%7CD%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Will_of_D." title="Will of D.">D</a>. Sengoku ends his story as the inspector general concludes that Big Mom and Kaido as they are now are far greater threats than they were under Rocks, and their alliance is far more dangerous than the Rocks Pirates. He then turns the floor over to Commodore Brannew as he asks for Kaido and Big Mom's current bounties. Brannew explains that the members of the recently dissolved Shichibukai need new bounty figures. He then turns everyone's attention to the Yonko. </p><p data-rte-fromparser="true" data-rte-empty-lines-before="1"><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Blackbeard%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Marshall%20D.%20Teach%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BMarshall%20D.%20Teach%7CBlackbeard%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Marshall_D._Teach" title="Marshall D. Teach">Blackbeard</a> became a Yonko about a year ago. His attack on <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Impel%20Down%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Impel%20Down%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BImpel%20Down%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Impel_Down" title="Impel Down">Impel Down</a> gave him powerful new subordinates and he is presently the de facto don of the pirate island Hachinosu. Boss of the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Blackbeard%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Blackbeard%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BBlackbeard%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Blackbeard_Pirates" title="Blackbeard Pirates">Blackbeard Pirates</a>, Admiral Marshall D. Teach, with a bounty of <span class="placeholder placeholder-double-brackets" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22double-brackets%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BB%7D%7D%22%2C%22lineStart%22%3A%22%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22B%22%2C%22placeholder%22%3A1%7D" contenteditable="false"><span data-rte-washtml="1" data-rte-style="white-space:nowrap;" style="white-space:nowrap;" data-rte-attribs=" style=white-space:nowrap;"><img data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22image%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BChapter%20Box%5Cn%7C%20title%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7C%20image%20%3D%20%5Cn%7C%20jname%20%3D%20%7B%7BRuby%7CULTIMATE%7C%5Cu30a2%5Cu30eb%5Cu30c6%5Cu30a3%5Cu30e1%5Cu30c3%5Cu30c8%7D%7D%5Cn%7C%20rname%20%3D%20Arutimetto%5Cn%7C%20ename%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7D%7D%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22Beli.png%22%2C%22params%22%3A%7B%22alt%22%3A%22Beli%22%2C%22caption%22%3A%22%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Belly%22%7D%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" alt="" src="https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/onepiece/images/d/de/Beli.png/revision/latest?cb=20141206091723" width="12" height="20" class="image" data-image-name="Beli.png" data-image-key="Beli.png" type="image" /></span></span>2,247,600,000. </p><p data-rte-fromparser="true" data-rte-empty-lines-before="1">The next man became a Yonko about six years ago. He is the youngest of the group and has the trust of those under him. His executives, <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Lucky%20Roux%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Lucky%20Roux%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BLucky%20Roux%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Lucky_Roux" title="Lucky Roux">Lucky Roux</a>, <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Yasopp%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Yasopp%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BYasopp%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Yasopp" title="Yasopp">Yasopp</a>, and <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Benn%20Beckman%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Benn%20Beckman%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BBenn%20Beckman%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Benn_Beckman" title="Benn Beckman">Benn Beckman</a>, are all famous in their own right. His crew has a high average bounty and Brannew considers this crew the most balanced of the four. Leader of the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Red%20Hair%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Red%20Hair%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BRed%20Hair%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Red_Hair_Pirates" title="Red Hair Pirates">Red Hair Pirates</a>, Captain "Red Hair" <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Shanks%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Shanks%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BShanks%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Shanks" title="Shanks">Shanks</a>, with a bounty of <span class="placeholder placeholder-double-brackets" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22double-brackets%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BB%7D%7D%22%2C%22lineStart%22%3A%22%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22B%22%2C%22placeholder%22%3A1%7D" contenteditable="false"><span data-rte-washtml="1" data-rte-style="white-space:nowrap;" style="white-space:nowrap;" data-rte-attribs=" style=white-space:nowrap;"><img data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22image%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BChapter%20Box%5Cn%7C%20title%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7C%20image%20%3D%20%5Cn%7C%20jname%20%3D%20%7B%7BRuby%7CULTIMATE%7C%5Cu30a2%5Cu30eb%5Cu30c6%5Cu30a3%5Cu30e1%5Cu30c3%5Cu30c8%7D%7D%5Cn%7C%20rname%20%3D%20Arutimetto%5Cn%7C%20ename%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7D%7D%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22Beli.png%22%2C%22params%22%3A%7B%22alt%22%3A%22Beli%22%2C%22caption%22%3A%22%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Belly%22%7D%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" alt="" src="https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/onepiece/images/d/de/Beli.png/revision/latest?cb=20141206091723" width="12" height="20" class="image" data-image-name="Beli.png" data-image-key="Beli.png" type="image" /></span></span>4,048,900,000. </p><p data-rte-fromparser="true" data-rte-empty-lines-before="1">Third on the docket, this pirate allegedly attacked <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Elbaf%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Elbaf%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BElbaf%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Elbaf" title="Elbaf">Elbaf</a> while still only a child. She doesn't trust anyone she's not related to. The 85 offspring serving under her created the country of <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Totto%20Land%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Totto%20Land%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BTotto%20Land%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Totto_Land" title="Totto Land">Totto Land</a>. Captain of the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Big%20Mom%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Big%20Mom%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BBig%20Mom%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Big_Mom_Pirates" title="Big Mom Pirates">Big Mom Pirates</a>, Charlotte Linlin, with a bounty of <span class="placeholder placeholder-double-brackets" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22double-brackets%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BB%7D%7D%22%2C%22lineStart%22%3A%22%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22B%22%2C%22placeholder%22%3A1%7D" contenteditable="false"><span data-rte-washtml="1" data-rte-style="white-space:nowrap;" style="white-space:nowrap;" data-rte-attribs=" style=white-space:nowrap;"><img data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22image%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BChapter%20Box%5Cn%7C%20title%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7C%20image%20%3D%20%5Cn%7C%20jname%20%3D%20%7B%7BRuby%7CULTIMATE%7C%5Cu30a2%5Cu30eb%5Cu30c6%5Cu30a3%5Cu30e1%5Cu30c3%5Cu30c8%7D%7D%5Cn%7C%20rname%20%3D%20Arutimetto%5Cn%7C%20ename%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7D%7D%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22Beli.png%22%2C%22params%22%3A%7B%22alt%22%3A%22Beli%22%2C%22caption%22%3A%22%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Belly%22%7D%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" alt="" src="https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/onepiece/images/d/de/Beli.png/revision/latest?cb=20141206091723" width="12" height="20" class="image" data-image-name="Beli.png" data-image-key="Beli.png" type="image" /></span></span>4,388,000,000. </p><p data-rte-fromparser="true" data-rte-empty-lines-before="1">Following Big Mom, the next pirate was but an <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22apprentice%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Pirate%20Apprentice%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BPirate%20Apprentice%7Capprentice%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Pirate_Apprentice" title="Pirate Apprentice">apprentice</a> during his time with the Rocks Pirates. Using only his raw strength, he gained the admiration of many pirates, and in doing so, came to be a Yonko. The Governor-General of the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Beasts%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Beasts%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BBeasts%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Beasts_Pirates" title="Beasts Pirates">Beasts Pirates</a>, Kaido "of the Beasts", with a bounty of <span class="placeholder placeholder-double-brackets" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22double-brackets%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BB%7D%7D%22%2C%22lineStart%22%3A%22%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22B%22%2C%22placeholder%22%3A1%7D" contenteditable="false"><span data-rte-washtml="1" data-rte-style="white-space:nowrap;" style="white-space:nowrap;" data-rte-attribs=" style=white-space:nowrap;"><img data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22image%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BChapter%20Box%5Cn%7C%20title%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7C%20image%20%3D%20%5Cn%7C%20jname%20%3D%20%7B%7BRuby%7CULTIMATE%7C%5Cu30a2%5Cu30eb%5Cu30c6%5Cu30a3%5Cu30e1%5Cu30c3%5Cu30c8%7D%7D%5Cn%7C%20rname%20%3D%20Arutimetto%5Cn%7C%20ename%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7D%7D%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22Beli.png%22%2C%22params%22%3A%7B%22alt%22%3A%22Beli%22%2C%22caption%22%3A%22%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Belly%22%7D%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" alt="" src="https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/onepiece/images/d/de/Beli.png/revision/latest?cb=20141206091723" width="12" height="20" class="image" data-image-name="Beli.png" data-image-key="Beli.png" type="image" /></span></span>4,611,100,000. The Marines are in shock from seeing so many high bounties. </p><p data-rte-fromparser="true" data-rte-empty-lines-before="1">Brannew states that they can no longer rely on the Shichibukai to keep the Yonko in check and whether or not it was a good idea will be decided later by the Special Science Group, or SSG. Brannew then puts up two more wanted posters as a means of comparison. The captain of the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Whitebeard%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Whitebeard%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BWhitebeard%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Whitebeard_Pirates" title="Whitebeard Pirates">Whitebeard Pirates</a>, Edward Newgate, with a bounty of <span class="placeholder placeholder-double-brackets" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22double-brackets%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BB%7D%7D%22%2C%22lineStart%22%3A%22%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22B%22%2C%22placeholder%22%3A1%7D" contenteditable="false"><span data-rte-washtml="1" data-rte-style="white-space:nowrap;" style="white-space:nowrap;" data-rte-attribs=" style=white-space:nowrap;"><img data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22image%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BChapter%20Box%5Cn%7C%20title%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7C%20image%20%3D%20%5Cn%7C%20jname%20%3D%20%7B%7BRuby%7CULTIMATE%7C%5Cu30a2%5Cu30eb%5Cu30c6%5Cu30a3%5Cu30e1%5Cu30c3%5Cu30c8%7D%7D%5Cn%7C%20rname%20%3D%20Arutimetto%5Cn%7C%20ename%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7D%7D%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22Beli.png%22%2C%22params%22%3A%7B%22alt%22%3A%22Beli%22%2C%22caption%22%3A%22%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Belly%22%7D%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" alt="" src="https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/onepiece/images/d/de/Beli.png/revision/latest?cb=20141206091723" width="12" height="20" class="image" data-image-name="Beli.png" data-image-key="Beli.png" type="image" /></span></span>5,046,000,000 and the captain of the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Roger%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Roger%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BRoger%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Roger_Pirates" title="Roger Pirates">Roger Pirates</a>, none other than Pirate King Gol D. Roger, with a bounty of <span class="placeholder placeholder-double-brackets" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22double-brackets%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BB%7D%7D%22%2C%22lineStart%22%3A%22%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22B%22%2C%22placeholder%22%3A1%7D" contenteditable="false"><span data-rte-washtml="1" data-rte-style="white-space:nowrap;" style="white-space:nowrap;" data-rte-attribs=" style=white-space:nowrap;"><img data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22image%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BChapter%20Box%5Cn%7C%20title%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7C%20image%20%3D%20%5Cn%7C%20jname%20%3D%20%7B%7BRuby%7CULTIMATE%7C%5Cu30a2%5Cu30eb%5Cu30c6%5Cu30a3%5Cu30e1%5Cu30c3%5Cu30c8%7D%7D%5Cn%7C%20rname%20%3D%20Arutimetto%5Cn%7C%20ename%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7D%7D%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22Beli.png%22%2C%22params%22%3A%7B%22alt%22%3A%22Beli%22%2C%22caption%22%3A%22%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Belly%22%7D%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" alt="" src="https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/onepiece/images/d/de/Beli.png/revision/latest?cb=20141206091723" width="12" height="20" class="image" data-image-name="Beli.png" data-image-key="Beli.png" type="image" /></span></span>5,564,800,000. Brannew explains how Roger and Whitebeard have the two highest bounties in history but should an alliance between Kaido and Big Mom happen, their combined bounties would surpass either Roger or Newgate's alone, and that is exactly what is about to happen in Wano. Before Brannew can continue, he is interrupted by Sakazuki, who enters the briefing room. Sakazuki tells Brannew to leave Wano alone for now as they don't have the resources to deal with two Yonko at once. </p><p data-rte-fromparser="true" data-rte-empty-lines-before="1">He then addresses Sengoku, who has no intention of getting involved but was simply sharing his knowledge and wisdom with the younger generation, understanding relationships is key, and not knowing the past will lead to a dark future. Sengoku then recalls that Roger, Shanks, and Newgate all took a liking to a pirate from Wano. Sakazuki presumes Sengoku means <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Kozuki%20Oden%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Kozuki%20Oden%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BKozuki%20Oden%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Kozuki_Oden" title="Kozuki Oden">Kozuki Oden</a>, who was a division commander in the Whitebeard Pirates. Sengoku reminds him that Oden was later recruited by Roger to go on his famed last voyage. The chapter ends with Sengoku asking Sakazuki why so many powerful individuals have ties to Wano. </p> <h2 data-rte-empty-lines-before="1">Quick References</h2> <p data-rte-fromparser="true" data-rte-filler="true"></p><h3>Chapter Notes</h3> <ul><li>The <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Marine%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Marines%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BMarines%7CMarine%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Marines" title="Marines">Marine</a> science unit are working on a project known as <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22SSG%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22SSG%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BSSG%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/SSG" title="SSG">SSG</a> that is intended to replace the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Shichibukai%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Shichibukai%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BShichibukai%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Shichibukai" title="Shichibukai">Shichibukai</a> system. </li><li>Information on <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Rocks%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Rocks%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BRocks%20Pirates%7CRocks%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Rocks_Pirates" title="Rocks Pirates">Rocks</a> is revealed. <ul><li>It was a powerful pirate crew called the Rocks Pirates. Their captain was <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Rocks%20D.%20Xebec%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Rocks%20D.%20Xebec%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BRocks%20D.%20Xebec%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Rocks_D._Xebec" title="Rocks D. Xebec">Rocks D. Xebec</a> who was considered <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Gol%20D.%20Roger%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Gol%20D.%20Roger%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BGol%20D.%20Roger%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Gol_D._Roger" title="Gol D. Roger">Gol D. Roger</a>'s first and greatest enemy. </li><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Whitebeard%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Edward%20Newgate%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BEdward%20Newgate%7CWhitebeard%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Edward_Newgate" title="Edward Newgate">Whitebeard</a>, <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Kaido%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Kaido%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BKaido%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Kaido" title="Kaido">Kaido</a>, and <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Big%20Mom%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Charlotte%20Linlin%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BCharlotte%20Linlin%7CBig%20Mom%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Charlotte_Linlin" title="Charlotte Linlin">Big Mom</a> were once members in the crew, as were <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Shiki%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Shiki%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BShiki%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Shiki" title="Shiki">Shiki</a> and <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22John%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22John%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BJohn%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/John" title="John">John</a>. </li><li>Kaido was an <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22apprentice%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Pirate%20Apprentice%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BPirate%20Apprentice%7Capprentice%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Pirate_Apprentice" title="Pirate Apprentice">apprentice</a> during his time with the Rocks Pirates. </li><li>Two other members with the epithets "<a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Silver%20Axe%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Silver%20Axe%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BSilver%20Axe%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Silver_Axe" title="Silver Axe" class="mw-redirect">Silver Axe</a>" and "<a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Ochoku%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Ochoku%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BOchoku%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Ochoku" title="Ochoku" class="mw-redirect">Ochoku</a>" are mentioned for the first time. </li></ul> </li><li>38 years ago, the Rocks Pirates attacked several <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22World%20Nobles%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22World%20Nobles%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BWorld%20Nobles%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/World_Nobles" title="World Nobles" class="mw-redirect">World Nobles</a> and their <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22slaves%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Slavery%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BSlavery%7Cslaves%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Slavery" title="Slavery">slaves</a> on a island known as <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22God%20Valley%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22God%20Valley%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BGod%20Valley%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/God_Valley" title="God Valley">God Valley</a>. <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Garp%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Monkey%20D.%20Garp%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BMonkey%20D.%20Garp%7CGarp%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Monkey_D._Garp" title="Monkey D. Garp">Garp</a> and Roger worked together to defeat the crew. This event, in which Rocks lost his life, is known as the "<a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22God%20Valley%20Incident%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22God%20Valley%20Incident%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BGod%20Valley%20Incident%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/God_Valley_Incident" title="God Valley Incident">God Valley Incident</a>". <ul><li>After the incident, God Valley mysteriously vanished, leaving no trace of its existence behind and no longer showing up on maps of the world. </li><li>The information about the alliance between Garp and Roger was covered up by the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22World%20Government%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22World%20Government%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BWorld%20Government%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/World_Government" title="World Government">World Government</a>. In addition, any information about the Rocks Pirates was suppressed by the government since Rocks knew too much about subjects that the government tried to hide. Because of this, according to <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Sengoku%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Sengoku%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BSengoku%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Sengoku" title="Sengoku">Sengoku</a>, the existence of the crew is mostly unknown to the current generation of Marines. </li></ul> </li><li>The main reason Garp has refused a promotion to <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22admiral%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Admiral%20%28Marine%20Rank%29%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BAdmiral%20%28Marine%20Rank%29%7Cadmiral%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Admiral_(Marine_Rank)" title="Admiral (Marine Rank)">admiral</a> several times is because he does not want to become a direct subordinate of the World Nobles. </li><li>The Marines are working on updating the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22bounties%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22bounties%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5Bbounties%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Bounties" title="Bounties">bounties</a> of those who just lost their Shichibukai title. </li><li>The bounties of all the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Yonko%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Yonko%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BYonko%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Yonko" title="Yonko">Yonko</a> as well as Whitebeard and Roger are revealed. <ul><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Shanks%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Shanks%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BShanks%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Shanks" title="Shanks">Shanks</a>' bounty is <span class="placeholder placeholder-double-brackets" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22double-brackets%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BB%7D%7D%22%2C%22lineStart%22%3A%22%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22B%22%2C%22placeholder%22%3A1%7D" contenteditable="false"><span data-rte-washtml="1" data-rte-style="white-space:nowrap;" style="white-space:nowrap;" data-rte-attribs=" style=white-space:nowrap;"><img data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22image%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BChapter%20Box%5Cn%7C%20title%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7C%20image%20%3D%20%5Cn%7C%20jname%20%3D%20%7B%7BRuby%7CULTIMATE%7C%5Cu30a2%5Cu30eb%5Cu30c6%5Cu30a3%5Cu30e1%5Cu30c3%5Cu30c8%7D%7D%5Cn%7C%20rname%20%3D%20Arutimetto%5Cn%7C%20ename%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7D%7D%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22Beli.png%22%2C%22params%22%3A%7B%22alt%22%3A%22Beli%22%2C%22caption%22%3A%22%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Belly%22%7D%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" alt="" src="https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/onepiece/images/d/de/Beli.png/revision/latest?cb=20141206091723" width="12" height="20" class="image" data-image-name="Beli.png" data-image-key="Beli.png" type="image" /></span></span>4,048,900,000. </li><li>Big Mom's bounty is <span class="placeholder placeholder-double-brackets" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22double-brackets%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BB%7D%7D%22%2C%22lineStart%22%3A%22%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22B%22%2C%22placeholder%22%3A1%7D" contenteditable="false"><span data-rte-washtml="1" data-rte-style="white-space:nowrap;" style="white-space:nowrap;" data-rte-attribs=" style=white-space:nowrap;"><img data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22image%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BChapter%20Box%5Cn%7C%20title%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7C%20image%20%3D%20%5Cn%7C%20jname%20%3D%20%7B%7BRuby%7CULTIMATE%7C%5Cu30a2%5Cu30eb%5Cu30c6%5Cu30a3%5Cu30e1%5Cu30c3%5Cu30c8%7D%7D%5Cn%7C%20rname%20%3D%20Arutimetto%5Cn%7C%20ename%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7D%7D%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22Beli.png%22%2C%22params%22%3A%7B%22alt%22%3A%22Beli%22%2C%22caption%22%3A%22%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Belly%22%7D%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" alt="" src="https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/onepiece/images/d/de/Beli.png/revision/latest?cb=20141206091723" width="12" height="20" class="image" data-image-name="Beli.png" data-image-key="Beli.png" type="image" /></span></span>4,388,000,000. </li><li>Kaido's bounty is <span class="placeholder placeholder-double-brackets" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22double-brackets%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BB%7D%7D%22%2C%22lineStart%22%3A%22%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22B%22%2C%22placeholder%22%3A1%7D" contenteditable="false"><span data-rte-washtml="1" data-rte-style="white-space:nowrap;" style="white-space:nowrap;" data-rte-attribs=" style=white-space:nowrap;"><img data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22image%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BChapter%20Box%5Cn%7C%20title%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7C%20image%20%3D%20%5Cn%7C%20jname%20%3D%20%7B%7BRuby%7CULTIMATE%7C%5Cu30a2%5Cu30eb%5Cu30c6%5Cu30a3%5Cu30e1%5Cu30c3%5Cu30c8%7D%7D%5Cn%7C%20rname%20%3D%20Arutimetto%5Cn%7C%20ename%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7D%7D%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22Beli.png%22%2C%22params%22%3A%7B%22alt%22%3A%22Beli%22%2C%22caption%22%3A%22%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Belly%22%7D%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" alt="" src="https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/onepiece/images/d/de/Beli.png/revision/latest?cb=20141206091723" width="12" height="20" class="image" data-image-name="Beli.png" data-image-key="Beli.png" type="image" /></span></span>4,611,100,000. </li><li>Whitebeard's bounty was <span class="placeholder placeholder-double-brackets" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22double-brackets%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BB%7D%7D%22%2C%22lineStart%22%3A%22%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22B%22%2C%22placeholder%22%3A1%7D" contenteditable="false"><span data-rte-washtml="1" data-rte-style="white-space:nowrap;" style="white-space:nowrap;" data-rte-attribs=" style=white-space:nowrap;"><img data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22image%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BChapter%20Box%5Cn%7C%20title%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7C%20image%20%3D%20%5Cn%7C%20jname%20%3D%20%7B%7BRuby%7CULTIMATE%7C%5Cu30a2%5Cu30eb%5Cu30c6%5Cu30a3%5Cu30e1%5Cu30c3%5Cu30c8%7D%7D%5Cn%7C%20rname%20%3D%20Arutimetto%5Cn%7C%20ename%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7D%7D%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22Beli.png%22%2C%22params%22%3A%7B%22alt%22%3A%22Beli%22%2C%22caption%22%3A%22%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Belly%22%7D%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" alt="" src="https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/onepiece/images/d/de/Beli.png/revision/latest?cb=20141206091723" width="12" height="20" class="image" data-image-name="Beli.png" data-image-key="Beli.png" type="image" /></span></span>5,046,000,000. </li><li>Roger's bounty was <span class="placeholder placeholder-double-brackets" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22double-brackets%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BB%7D%7D%22%2C%22lineStart%22%3A%22%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22B%22%2C%22placeholder%22%3A1%7D" contenteditable="false"><span data-rte-washtml="1" data-rte-style="white-space:nowrap;" style="white-space:nowrap;" data-rte-attribs=" style=white-space:nowrap;"><img data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22image%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BChapter%20Box%5Cn%7C%20title%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7C%20image%20%3D%20%5Cn%7C%20jname%20%3D%20%7B%7BRuby%7CULTIMATE%7C%5Cu30a2%5Cu30eb%5Cu30c6%5Cu30a3%5Cu30e1%5Cu30c3%5Cu30c8%7D%7D%5Cn%7C%20rname%20%3D%20Arutimetto%5Cn%7C%20ename%20%3D%20Ultimate%5Cn%7D%7D%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22Beli.png%22%2C%22params%22%3A%7B%22alt%22%3A%22Beli%22%2C%22caption%22%3A%22%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Belly%22%7D%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" alt="" src="https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/onepiece/images/d/de/Beli.png/revision/latest?cb=20141206091723" width="12" height="20" class="image" data-image-name="Beli.png" data-image-key="Beli.png" type="image" /></span></span>5,564,800,000. </li><li>Their wanted posters (current in Big Mom's case) are shown for the first time. </li><li>According to <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Brannew%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Brannew%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BBrannew%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Brannew" title="Brannew">Brannew</a>, Roger and Whitebeard have the two highest pirate bounties in history. </li></ul> </li><li>Shanks has been a Yonko for six years. <ul><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Benn%20Beckman%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Benn%20Beckman%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BBenn%20Beckman%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Benn_Beckman" title="Benn Beckman">Benn Beckman</a>, <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Yasopp%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Yasopp%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BYasopp%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Yasopp" title="Yasopp">Yasopp</a>, and <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Lucky%20Roux%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Lucky%20Roux%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BLucky%20Roux%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Lucky_Roux" title="Lucky Roux">Lucky Roux</a> are executives in the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Red%20Hair%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Red%20Hair%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BRed%20Hair%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Red_Hair_Pirates" title="Red Hair Pirates">Red Hair Pirates</a>. </li></ul> </li><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Kozuki%20Oden%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Kozuki%20Oden%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BKozuki%20Oden%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Kozuki_Oden" title="Kozuki Oden">Kozuki Oden</a> was a division commander when he was still a member of the <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Whitebeard%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Whitebeard%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BWhitebeard%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Whitebeard_Pirates" title="Whitebeard Pirates">Whitebeard Pirates</a>. </li><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Sakazuki%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Sakazuki%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BSakazuki%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Sakazuki" title="Sakazuki">Sakazuki</a> refrains from sending Marines to <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Wano%20Country%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Wano%20Country%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BWano%20Country%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Wano_Country" title="Wano Country">Wano Country</a> due to the lack of manpower. </li><li>Sengoku states that many powerful individuals have a connection to Wano Country. </li></ul> <h3 data-rte-empty-lines-before="1">Characters</h3> <table class="CharTable" data-rte-attribs=" class=CharTable"> <tr> <th colspan="2" data-rte-attribs=" colspan=2"><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BPirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Pirates" title="Pirates" class="mw-redirect">Pirates</a> </th><th data-rte-spaces-before="1"><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Marines%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Marines%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BMarines%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Marines" title="Marines">Marines</a> </th></tr> <tr> <td> <dl><dt><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Straw%20Hat%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Straw%20Hat%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BStraw%20Hat%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Straw_Hat_Pirates" title="Straw Hat Pirates">Straw Hat Pirates</a> </dt></dl> <ul><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Monkey%20D.%20Luffy%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Monkey%20D.%20Luffy%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BMonkey%20D.%20Luffy%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Monkey_D._Luffy" title="Monkey D. Luffy">Monkey D. Luffy</a> <i>(cover)</i> </li><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Roronoa%20Zoro%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Roronoa%20Zoro%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BRoronoa%20Zoro%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Roronoa_Zoro" title="Roronoa Zoro">Roronoa Zoro</a> <i>(cover)</i> </li><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Nami%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Nami%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BNami%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Nami" title="Nami">Nami</a> <i>(cover)</i> </li><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Usopp%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Usopp%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BUsopp%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Usopp" title="Usopp">Usopp</a> <i>(cover)</i> </li><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Sanji%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Sanji%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BSanji%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Sanji" title="Sanji">Sanji</a> <i>(cover)</i> </li><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Tony%20Tony%20Chopper%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Tony%20Tony%20Chopper%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BTony%20Tony%20Chopper%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Tony_Tony_Chopper" title="Tony Tony Chopper">Tony Tony Chopper</a> <i>(cover)</i> </li><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Nico%20Robin%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Nico%20Robin%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BNico%20Robin%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Nico_Robin" title="Nico Robin">Nico Robin</a> <i>(cover)</i> </li><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Franky%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Franky%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BFranky%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Franky" title="Franky">Franky</a> <i>(cover)</i> </li><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Brook%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Brook%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BBrook%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Brook" title="Brook">Brook</a> <i>(cover)</i> </li></ul> <hr /> <dl><dt><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Roger%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Roger%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BRoger%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Roger_Pirates" title="Roger Pirates">Roger Pirates</a> </dt></dl> <ul><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Gol%20D.%20Roger%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Gol%20D.%20Roger%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BGol%20D.%20Roger%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Gol_D._Roger" title="Gol D. Roger">Gol D. Roger</a> <i>(flashback)</i> </li></ul> <hr /> <dl><dt><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Rocks%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Rocks%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BRocks%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Rocks_Pirates" title="Rocks Pirates">Rocks Pirates</a> </dt></dl> <ul><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Rocks%20D.%20Xebec%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Rocks%20D.%20Xebec%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BRocks%20D.%20Xebec%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Rocks_D._Xebec" title="Rocks D. Xebec">Rocks D. Xebec</a> <i>(flashback)</i> </li></ul> </td><td> <dl><dt><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Whitebeard%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Whitebeard%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BWhitebeard%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Whitebeard_Pirates" title="Whitebeard Pirates">Whitebeard Pirates</a> </dt></dl> <ul><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Edward%20Newgate%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Edward%20Newgate%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BEdward%20Newgate%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Edward_Newgate" title="Edward Newgate">Edward Newgate</a> <i>(flashback; image)</i> </li></ul> <hr /> <dl><dt><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Beasts%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Beasts%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BBeasts%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Beasts_Pirates" title="Beasts Pirates">Beasts Pirates</a> </dt></dl> <ul><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Kaido%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Kaido%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BKaido%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Kaido" title="Kaido">Kaido</a> <i>(flashback; image)</i> </li></ul> <hr /> <dl><dt><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Big%20Mom%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Big%20Mom%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BBig%20Mom%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Big_Mom_Pirates" title="Big Mom Pirates">Big Mom Pirates</a> </dt></dl> <ul><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Charlotte%20Linlin%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Charlotte%20Linlin%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BCharlotte%20Linlin%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Charlotte_Linlin" title="Charlotte Linlin">Charlotte Linlin</a> <i>(flashback; image)</i> </li><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Napoleon%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Napoleon%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BNapoleon%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Napoleon" title="Napoleon">Napoleon</a> <i>(image)</i> </li></ul> <hr /> <dl><dt><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Red%20Hair%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Red%20Hair%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BRed%20Hair%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Red_Hair_Pirates" title="Red Hair Pirates">Red Hair Pirates</a> </dt></dl> <ul><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Shanks%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Shanks%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BShanks%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Shanks" title="Shanks">Shanks</a> <i>(image)</i> </li></ul> <hr /> <dl><dt><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Blackbeard%20Pirates%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Blackbeard%20Pirates%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BBlackbeard%20Pirates%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Blackbeard_Pirates" title="Blackbeard Pirates">Blackbeard Pirates</a> </dt></dl> <ul><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Marshall%20D.%20Teach%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Marshall%20D.%20Teach%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BMarshall%20D.%20Teach%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Marshall_D._Teach" title="Marshall D. Teach">Marshall D. Teach</a> <i>(image)</i> </li></ul> </td><td> <dl><dt>Fleet Admiral </dt></dl> <ul><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Sakazuki%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Sakazuki%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BSakazuki%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Sakazuki" title="Sakazuki">Sakazuki</a> </li></ul> <hr /> <dl><dt><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Admiral%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Admiral%20%28Marine%20Rank%29%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BAdmiral%20%28Marine%20Rank%29%7CAdmiral%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Admiral_(Marine_Rank)" title="Admiral (Marine Rank)">Admiral</a> </dt></dl> <ul><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Issho%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Issho%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BIssho%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Issho" title="Issho">Issho</a> </li></ul> <hr /> <dl><dt><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Vice%20Admiral%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Vice%20Admiral%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BVice%20Admiral%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Vice_Admiral" title="Vice Admiral">Vice Admiral</a> </dt></dl> <ul><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Monkey%20D.%20Garp%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Monkey%20D.%20Garp%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BMonkey%20D.%20Garp%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Monkey_D._Garp" title="Monkey D. Garp">Monkey D. Garp</a> </li></ul> <hr /> <dl><dt>Commodores </dt></dl> <ul><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Brannew%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Brannew%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BBrannew%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Brannew" title="Brannew">Brannew</a> </li></ul> <hr /> <dl><dt>Inspector General </dt></dl> <ul><li><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22Sengoku%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Sengoku%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%5B%5BSengoku%5D%5D%22%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Sengoku" title="Sengoku">Sengoku</a> </li></ul> </td></tr></table> <h2 data-rte-empty-lines-before="1">Arc Navigation</h2> <div class="placeholder placeholder-double-brackets" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22double-brackets%22%2C%22wikitext%22%3A%22%7B%7BWano%20Country%20Arc%7D%7D%22%2C%22lineStart%22%3A%221%22%2C%22title%22%3A%22Wano%20Country%20Arc%22%2C%22placeholder%22%3A1%7D" contenteditable="false"> <table class="toccolours" data-rte-style="margin:auto; text-align:center; width:80%;" style="margin:auto; text-align:center; width:80%;" data-rte-attribs=" class=toccolours style=margin:auto; text-align:center; width:80%;" data-rte-empty-lines-before="1"> <tr data-rte-empty-lines-before="1"> <td data-rte-style="text-align:left;" style="text-align:left;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:left; "> <p data-rte-fromparser="true"><b>← <a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22Previous%20Chapter%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20956%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_956" title="Chapter 956">Previous Chapter</a></b> </p> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:right;" style="text-align:right;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:right; "> <p data-rte-fromparser="true"><b><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22Next%20Chapter%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20958%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_958" title="Chapter 958">Next Chapter</a> →</b> </p> </td></tr></table> <table class="toccolours" data-rte-style="margin:auto; font-size:90%; clear:both; text-align:center; width:80%;" style="margin:auto; font-size:90%; clear:both; text-align:center; width:80%;" data-rte-attribs=" class=toccolours style=margin:auto; font-size:90%; clear:both; text-align:center; width:80%;" data-rte-empty-lines-before="1"> <tr data-rte-empty-lines-before="1"> <th class="cs YonkoSagaColors" data-rte-style="" style="" colspan="12" data-rte-attribs=" class=cs YonkoSagaColors style= colspan=12 "> <p data-rte-fromparser="true"><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22Wano%20Country%20Arc%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Wano%20Country%20Arc%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Atrue%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Wano_Country_Arc" title="Wano Country Arc">Wano Country Arc</a> </p> </th></tr> <tr> <th class="cs YonkoSagaColors" data-rte-style="" style="" colspan="12" data-rte-attribs=" class=cs YonkoSagaColors style= colspan=12 " data-rte-spaces-before="1"><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22Manga%20Chapters%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapters%20and%20Volumes%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapters_and_Volumes" title="Chapters and Volumes">Manga Chapters</a> </th></tr> <tr> <td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22909%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20909%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_909" title="Chapter 909">909</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22910%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20910%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_910" title="Chapter 910">910</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22911%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20911%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_911" title="Chapter 911">911</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22912%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20912%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_912" title="Chapter 912">912</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22913%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20913%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_913" title="Chapter 913">913</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22914%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20914%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_914" title="Chapter 914">914</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22915%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20915%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_915" title="Chapter 915">915</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22916%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20916%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_916" title="Chapter 916">916</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22917%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20917%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_917" title="Chapter 917">917</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22918%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20918%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_918" title="Chapter 918">918</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22919%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20919%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_919" title="Chapter 919">919</a> </td></tr> <tr> <td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22920%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20920%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_920" title="Chapter 920">920</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22921%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20921%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_921" title="Chapter 921">921</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22922%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20922%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_922" title="Chapter 922">922</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22923%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20923%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_923" title="Chapter 923">923</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22924%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20924%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_924" title="Chapter 924">924</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22925%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20925%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_925" title="Chapter 925">925</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22926%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20926%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_926" title="Chapter 926">926</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22927%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20927%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_927" title="Chapter 927">927</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22928%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20928%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_928" title="Chapter 928">928</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22929%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20929%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_929" title="Chapter 929">929</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22930%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20930%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_930" title="Chapter 930">930</a> </td></tr> <tr> <td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22931%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20931%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_931" title="Chapter 931">931</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22932%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20932%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_932" title="Chapter 932">932</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22933%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20933%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_933" title="Chapter 933">933</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22934%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20934%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_934" title="Chapter 934">934</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22935%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20935%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_935" title="Chapter 935">935</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22936%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20936%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_936" title="Chapter 936">936</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22937%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20937%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_937" title="Chapter 937">937</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22938%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20938%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_938" title="Chapter 938">938</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22939%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20939%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_939" title="Chapter 939">939</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22940%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20940%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_940" title="Chapter 940">940</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22941%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20941%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_941" title="Chapter 941">941</a> </td></tr> <tr> <td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22942%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20942%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_942" title="Chapter 942">942</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22943%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20943%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_943" title="Chapter 943">943</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22944%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20944%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_944" title="Chapter 944">944</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22945%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20945%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_945" title="Chapter 945">945</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22946%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20946%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_946" title="Chapter 946">946</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22947%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20947%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_947" title="Chapter 947">947</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22948%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20948%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_948" title="Chapter 948">948</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22949%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20949%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_949" title="Chapter 949">949</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22950%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20950%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_950" title="Chapter 950">950</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22951%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20951%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_951" title="Chapter 951">951</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22952%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20952%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_952" title="Chapter 952">952</a> </td></tr> <tr> <td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22953%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20953%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_953" title="Chapter 953">953</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22954%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20954%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_954" title="Chapter 954">954</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22955%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20955%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_955" title="Chapter 955">955</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22956%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20956%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_956" title="Chapter 956">956</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22957%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20957%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_957" title="Chapter 957">957</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22958%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20958%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_958" title="Chapter 958">958</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22959%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20959%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_959" title="Chapter 959">959</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22960%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20960%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_960" title="Chapter 960">960</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22961%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20961%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_961" title="Chapter 961">961</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22962%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20962%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_962" title="Chapter 962">962</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22963%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20963%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_963" title="Chapter 963">963</a> </td></tr> <tr> <td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22964%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20964%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_964" title="Chapter 964">964</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22965%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20965%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_965" title="Chapter 965">965</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22966%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20966%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_966" title="Chapter 966">966</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22967%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20967%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_967" title="Chapter 967">967</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22968%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20968%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_968" title="Chapter 968">968</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22969%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20969%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_969" title="Chapter 969">969</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22970%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20970%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_970" title="Chapter 970">970</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22971%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20971%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_971" title="Chapter 971">971</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22972%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20972%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_972" title="Chapter 972">972</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22973%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20973%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_973" title="Chapter 973">973</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22974%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20974%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_974" title="Chapter 974">974</a> </td></tr> <tr> <td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22975%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20975%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_975" title="Chapter 975">975</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22976%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapter%20976%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapter_976" title="Chapter 976">976</a> </td></tr> <tr> <th class="cs YonkoSagaColors" data-rte-style="" style="" colspan="12" data-rte-attribs=" class=cs YonkoSagaColors style= colspan=12 " data-rte-spaces-before="1"><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22Manga%20Volumes%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Chapters%20and%20Volumes%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Chapters_and_Volumes" title="Chapters and Volumes">Manga Volumes</a> </th></tr> <tr> <td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%2290%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Volume%2090%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Volume_90" title="Volume 90">90</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%2291%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Volume%2091%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Volume_91" title="Volume 91">91</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%2292%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Volume%2092%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Volume_92" title="Volume 92">92</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%2293%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Volume%2093%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Volume_93" title="Volume 93">93</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%2294%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Volume%2094%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Volume_94" title="Volume 94">94</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%2295%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Volume%2095%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Volume_95" title="Volume 95">95</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%2296%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Volume%2096%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Volume_96" title="Volume 96">96</a> </td></tr> <tr data-rte-empty-lines-before="1"> <th class="cs YonkoSagaColors" data-rte-style="" style="" colspan="12" data-rte-attribs=" class=cs YonkoSagaColors style= colspan=12 " data-rte-spaces-before="1"><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22Anime%20Episodes%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Episode%20Guide%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_Guide" title="Episode Guide">Anime Episodes</a> </th></tr> <tr> <td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22890%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Episode%20890%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_890" title="Episode 890">890</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22891%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Episode%20891%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_891" title="Episode 891">891</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22892%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Episode%20892%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_892" title="Episode 892">892</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22893%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Episode%20893%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_893" title="Episode 893">893</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22894%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Episode%20894%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_894" title="Episode 894">894</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22897%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Episode%20897%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_897" title="Episode 897">897</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22898%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Episode%20898%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_898" title="Episode 898">898</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22899%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Episode%20899%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_899" title="Episode 899">899</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22900%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Episode%20900%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_900" title="Episode 900">900</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22901%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Episode%20901%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_901" title="Episode 901">901</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22902%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Episode%20902%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_902" title="Episode 902">902</a> </td></tr> <tr> <td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22903%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Episode%20903%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_903" title="Episode 903">903</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22904%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Episode%20904%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_904" title="Episode 904">904</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22905%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Episode%20905%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_905" title="Episode 905">905</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22906%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22Episode%20906%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_906" title="Episode 906">906</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22908%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20908%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_908" title="Episode 908">908</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22909%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20909%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_909" title="Episode 909">909</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22910%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20910%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_910" title="Episode 910">910</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22911%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20911%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_911" title="Episode 911">911</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22912%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20912%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_912" title="Episode 912">912</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22913%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20913%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_913" title="Episode 913">913</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22914%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20914%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_914" title="Episode 914">914</a> </td></tr> <tr> <td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22915%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20915%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_915" title="Episode 915">915</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22916%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20916%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_916" title="Episode 916">916</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22917%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20917%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_917" title="Episode 917">917</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22918%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20918%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_918" title="Episode 918">918</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22919%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20919%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_919" title="Episode 919">919</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22920%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20920%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_920" title="Episode 920">920</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22921%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20921%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_921" title="Episode 921">921</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22922%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20922%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_922" title="Episode 922">922</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22923%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20923%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_923" title="Episode 923">923</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22924%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20924%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_924" title="Episode 924">924</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22925%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20925%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_925" title="Episode 925">925</a> </td></tr> <tr> <td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; "><a data-rte-meta="%7B%22type%22%3A%22internal%22%2C%22wikitextIdx%22%3Anull%2C%22text%22%3A%22926%22%2C%22link%22%3A%22episode%20926%22%2C%22wasblank%22%3Afalse%2C%22noforce%22%3Atrue%7D" data-rte-instance="1081-21241617375e7f1965cfffe" href="/wiki/Episode_926" title="Episode 926">926</a> </td><td data-rte-style="text-align:center;" style="text-align:center;" data-rte-attribs=" style=text-align:center; 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sv	wikipedia	N/A	Rosenstavssläktet (Liatris) är ett växtsläkte med omkring 30 fleråriga arter i familjen korgblommiga växter. Rosenstavarna härstammar från östra och centrala Nordamerikas prärier. Bladen är mycket smala och sitter strödda längs stjälkarna. De små blomkorgarna sitter i ax och börjar slå ut uppifrån. Odling och användning Flera rosenstavsarter används som trädgårdsväxter och snittblommor, men den vanligaste i det fallet är rosenstav. De vanligaste arterna förekommer i flera namnsorter som varierar något i växtsätt och blomfärg, även vitblommande sorter finns. Rosenstavar växer bäst i full sol och i fuktig men väldränerad jord, till exempel vid diken och bäckar. Däremot vill de inte ha alltför hög luftfuktighet. Förökning sker genom delning av äldre plantor. Även fröförökning är möjlig. Dottertaxa till Rosenstavar, i alfabetisk ordning Liatris acidota Liatris aestivalis Liatris angustifolia Liatris aspera Liatris borealis Liatris boykinii Liatris bracteata Liatris chapmanii Liatris cokeri Liatris creditonensis Liatris cylindracea Liatris cymosa Liatris deamii Liatris densispicata Liatris elegans Liatris elegantula Liatris fallacior Liatris frostii Liatris garberi Liatris gholsonii Liatris gladewitzii Liatris glandulosa Liatris gracilis Liatris helleri Liatris laevigata Liatris lancifolia Liatris ligulistylis Liatris macdanieliana Liatris microcephala Liatris mucronata Liatris nieuwlandii Liatris ohlingerae Liatris oligocephala Liatris patens Liatris pauciflora Liatris pilosa Liatris platylepis Liatris provincialis Liatris punctata Liatris pycnostachya Liatris regimontis Liatris ridgwayi Liatris savannensis Liatris scariosa Liatris serotina Liatris spheroidea Liatris spicata Liatris squarrosa Liatris squarrulosa Liatris steelei Liatris stellei Liatris tenuifolia Liatris tenuis Liatris weaveri Källor Externa länkar Flora of North America - Liatris Korgblommiga växter
it	wikipedia	N/A	Il genere Selaginella comprende circa 700 specie di Licofite, piante vascolari crittogame d'aspetto erbaceo, in molti casi striscianti o incrostanti, lontanamente imparentate con le felci e i muschi, con le quali hanno una superficiale somiglianza. Specie Selaginella apoda America del Nord) Selaginella bifida (Rodrigues Island) Selaginella braunii (Cina) Selaginella bryopteris (India) Selaginella canaliculata ( sud-est asiatico, Molucche) Selaginella densa (occidentale del Nord America) Selaginella eclipes (orientale del Nord America) Selaginella kraussiana (Africa, Azzorre) Selaginella lepidophylla (Deserto di Chihuahua di America del Nord) Selaginella martensii (Messico) Selaginella moellendorffii''' Selaginella rupestris (orientale del Nord America) Selaginella selaginoides (Europa, Asia e America del Nord) Selaginella uncinata Selaginella willdenowii'' Altri progetti Collegamenti esterni Licofite
en	wikipedia	N/A	This is a list of atheists in music. It documents atheists who have composed and/or performed music. Living persons in this list include those whose non-religiosity is relevant to their notable activities and public life, and who have publicly identified themselves as atheists. A Larry Adler (1914–2001): American harmonica player. Mikael Åkerfeldt (1974–): Swedish musician, prominently known as the lead vocalist, guitarist, and primary songwriter of progressive death metal band Opeth. Javed Akhtar (1945–): Indian lyricist, poet and scriptwriter. Steve Albini (1962–): American singer, songwriter, guitarist, audio engineer, and music journalist. He was a member of Big Black, Rapeman, and Flour, and is currently a member of Shellac. Phil Anselmo (1968–): American musician and lead singer for the bands Pantera, Down, and Superjoint Ritual. Eric Avery (1965–): American musician and the bass player for the rock band Jane's Addiction. B Roy Bailey (1935–2018): British socialist folk singer. Brian Baker (1965–): American guitarist and bassist for punk bands such as Bad Religion, Minor Threat, Dag Nasty, Samhain, Junkyard, The Meatmen and Government Issue. H.P. Baxxter (1964–): German singer, rapper and producer, member of Scooter Jack Black (1969–): American actor, comedian, musician and producer. Georges Bizet (1838–1875): French composer. His final work, the opera Carmen, became one of the most popular and frequently performed works in the entire opera repertory. Björk (1965–): Icelandic singer-songwriter, producer, fashion model, and actress. Paul Brady (1947–): Irish singer-songwriter and musician. Jacques Brel (1929–1978): Belgian singer-songwriter. Isaac Brock (1975–): American singer, guitarist, banjoist, and songwriter for the indie rock band Modest Mouse. Chico Buarque (1941–): Brazilian singer, composer, poet and writer, one of the most famous of MPB. Peter Buck (1956–): Lead guitarist and member of American rock band R.E.M. Geoffrey Burgon (1941–2010): British composer notable for his television and film themes. Mike Burkett (1967–): (a.k.a. Fat Mike) American bassist and vocalist for the punk rock band NOFX. Many of their lyrics include atheist views. Henry Burstow (1826–1916): English shoemaker, singer and bellringer from Horsham, Sussex, best known for his vast repertoire of songs, many of which were collected in the folksong revival of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Ferruccio Busoni (1866–1924): Italian composer, pianist, teacher of piano and composition, and conductor. C Vic Chesnutt (1964–2009): American singer-songwriter. Eddie Collins (1981–): (a.k.a. Greydon Square) African-American hip hop artist. Chris Corner (1974–): English musician, co-founder and former lead singer of 90s trip-hop group Sneaker Pimps. Now performing as IAMX. Wayne Coyne (1961–): American rock musician, lead singer of The Flaming Lips. Jonny Craig (1986–): Post-hardcore singer-songwriter, poet, lead vocalist for Emarosa and co-leader for Isles & Glaciers. D Kim Deal (1961–): American singer, songwriter and musician, best known as the bassist and backup vocalist of the alternative rock band the Pixies, and the lead vocalist and rhythm guitarist for The Breeders. Frederick Delius CH (1862–1934): Noted English composer. G. Devarajan (1927-2006): Noted Indian (Malayalam) film and non-film music director, made numerous popular songs. King Diamond (1956–): Danish heavy metal singer. Ian "Dicko" Dickson (1963–): English-born music industry and television personality in Australia, best known as a judge on the television shows Australian Idol and The Next Great American Band. Ani DiFranco (1970–): Singer, guitarist, and songwriter. Marina Diamandis (1985–): British singer-songwriter E Electroboy (1974–): Swiss musician and model. Brian Eno (1948–): English electronic musician, music theorist and record producer, known as the father of modern ambient music. Barney Greenway (1969–): British extreme metal vocalist, who has been a member of Napalm Death, Extreme Noise Terror, and Benediction. Gom Jabbar (1978–): eclectic, humorous, outspokenly humanist Bulgarian-American singer-songwriter. H Kathleen Hanna (1968–): Lead singer of Le Tigre and Bikini Kill. Jeff Hanneman (1964–2013): American guitarist, a founding member of the thrash metal band Slayer. Roy Harper (1941–): English rock / folk singer-songwriter and guitarist, known for his longtime associations with Jimmy Page and Robert Plant and for his guest lead vocals on Pink Floyd's song "Have a Cigar". Angel Haze (1991–) American rapper and singer Paul Heaton (1962–): English singer-songwriter, leading member of The Housemartins and The Beautiful South. Anthony Heilbut (1940–): American record producer of gospel music and writer, a Grammy Award winner and noted for his biography of Thomas Mann. Gary Holt (1964–): American guitarist, main songwriter, and the bandleader of the thrash metal band Exodus, from 2011 to 2019 guitarist of the thrash metal band Slayer. Chris Holmes (1958–): heavy metal guitarist, best known as founding member of WASP. George Hrab (1971–): American rock & funk musician & podcaster. J Leoš Janáček (1854–1928): Czech composer, musical theorist, folklorist, publicist and teacher. He is considered to be one of the most important Czech composers, along with Antonín Dvořák and Bedřich Smetana . Steve Jansen (1959–): English drummer, percussionist, musician, composer, and founding member of new wave band Japan. Billy Joel (1949–): American pianist, singer-songwriter and composer. Heri Joensen (1973–): Faroese musician, lead singer of the metal band Týr. K Alex Kapranos (1972–): Lead singer of Scottish band Franz Ferdinand. Howard Kaylan (1947–): American rock and roll musician, best known as a founding member and lead singer of the 1960s band The Turtles, and as "Eddie" in the 1970s rock band Flo & Eddie. Paul Kelly (1955–): Australian rock music singer-songwriter, guitarist and harmonica player. Aram Khachaturian (1903–1978): Soviet Armenian composer. Kerry King (1964–): American guitarist, best known as one of the founding members of the thrash metal band Slayer. Seun Kuti (1983–): Nigerian Afrobeat musician. Linton Kwesi Johnson (1952–): British-based dub poet. L Todd La Torre (1974–): American lead singer for the progressive metal band Queensrÿche. Hugh Laurie (1959–): English actor, director, singer, musician, comedian and author. Simon Le Bon (1958–): English lead singer and lyricist of the band Duran Duran and its offshoot, Arcadia. Geddy Lee (1953–): Canadian singer, bassist and keyboardist of the progressive rock band Rush. Tom Lehrer (1928–): American singer-songwriter, satirist, pianist, and mathematician. György Ligeti (1923–2006): Composer of contemporary classical music. Till Lindemann (1963–): Lead singer of the German industrial metal band Rammstein. Dave Lombardo (1965–): Cuban-American drummer. Best known as a founding member of Slayer. John Lydon (1956–): British singer-songwriter and television presenter. Best known as the lead singer of the punk rock band Sex Pistols and post-punk band Public Image Ltd. M Shirley Manson (1966–): Lead singer of the British-American alternative rock band, Garbage. George Marshall-Hall (1862–1915): English-born Australian composer, conductor and professor of music. Nick Mason (1944–): English drummer for Pink Floyd. Sir Peter Maxwell Davies CBE (1934–2016): English composer and conductor; Master of the Queen's Music. Andy McKee (1979–): American composer and guitarist. George Melly (1926–2007): English jazz and blues singer, critic, writer and lecturer. James Mercer (1970–): American singer-songwriter, guitarist, and musician, best known as the founder, vocalist, lead singer-songwriter, and sole remaining original member of the indie rock group The Shins. Tim Minchin (1975–): British-Australian comedian, actor, and musician. Many of his songs and beat poems involve Tim's thoughts on his own atheism and organised religion. Edvard Mirzoyan (1921-2012), Armenian composer. Self-described atheist. Vinicius de Moraes (1913–1980): Brazilian composer and poet, best known as one of the first songwriters of bossa nova. N Simon Napier-Bell (1939–): English music producer, songwriter, journalist and author, best known as manager of (among others) The Yardbirds, Marc Bolan, T. Rex and Wham!. Necrobutcher (1968–): Norwegian bassist and founder of the black metal band Mayhem. Randy Newman (1943–): American singer-songwriter, who is known for his distinctive voice, mordant (and often satirical) pop songs and for film scores. Gary Numan (1958–): English new wave, synthpop and industrial rock musician. Alice Nutter (1962–): British singer and percussionist for Chumbawamba. Meshell Ndegeocello (1968–): American musician known for influencing the Neo soul movement. P Charlie Parker (1920–1955): American jazz saxophonist and composer. He is widely considered one of the most influential jazz musicians of his time. Richard Patrick (1968–): American singer, songwriter for the band Filter. Andy Partridge (1953–): English singer, songwriter, and guitarist for the pop/new wave band XTC. Porta (1988–): Spanish rapper. Sergei Prokofiev (1891–1953): Russian composer, pianist and conductor who mastered numerous musical genres and is regarded as one of the major composers of the 20th century. R Maurice Ravel (1875–1937): French composer. Jim Reid (1961–): Scottish singer, songwriter and vocalist of the alternative rock band The Jesus and Mary Chain. Marc Riley (1961–): British musician, alternative rock critic and radio DJ. Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov (1844–1908): Russian Nationalist composer, member of "The Five", best known for the symphonic suite Scheherazade. Ed Robertson (1970–): Canadian guitarist and lead singer of the Barenaked Ladies. Richard Rodgers (1902–1979): American composer of the music for more than 900 songs and 40 Broadway musicals, best known for his songwriting partnerships with the lyricists Lorenz Hart and Oscar Hammerstein II. Henry Rollins (1961–): American musician. Lead singer of Black Flag. Linda Ronstadt: singer and author of Simple Dreams: a Musical Memoir (2013). Ned Rorem (1923–2022): American composer. Harold Rubin, (1932–2020) South African visual artist, musician Anton Rubinstein: Russian pianist, composer and conductor who became a pivotal figure in Russian culture when he founded the Saint Petersburg Conservatory. RM (1994–): South Korean rapper, songwriter, and record producer. Member of South Korean boy band BTS. S Camille Saint-Saëns (1835–1921): French composer, organist, conductor, and pianist of the Romantic era. Eric Sams (1926–2004): British musicologist and Shakespeare scholar. Fazıl Say (1970–): Turkish pianist and composer. Shelley Segal (1987–): Australian singer-songwriter known for her 2011 album, An Atheist Album Anton Seidl (1850–1898): Hungarian conductor. Captain Sensible (1955–): singer, songwriter, musician and co-founded the punk rock band The Damned. Dmitri Shostakovich (1906–1975): Russian composer and pianist, considered to be one of the most influential composers of the 20th century. Labi Siffre (1945–): British singer, songwriter, musician and poet. Robert Smith (1959–): British musician, songwriter, singer and guitarist of the band The Cure. Donita Sparks (1963–): American vocalist, guitarist and song-writer with her band Donita Sparks and the Stellar Moments and co-founder of grunge band L7. Britney Spears (1981–): singer and dancer; former teen pop idol. Wayne Static (1965–2014): frontman for industrial metal band Static-X. Jonathan Steingard (1983–): American vocalist, former lead singer of Hawk Nelson. Earl Sweatshirt (1994–): American rapper and producer. Oliver Sykes (1986–): vocalist of British metalcore band Bring Me the Horizon. T Corey Taylor (1974–): American musician, Lead singer of Slipknot and Stone Sour. Hans Teeuwen (1967–) Dutch comedian and singer. Richard Thomas (1964–): British musician, writer, and comedy actor, best known for composing and scoring the award-winning Jerry Springer: The Opera. Tracey Thorn (1962–): English pop singer and songwriter, best known as one half of the duo Everything but the Girl. Sir Michael Tippett OM (1905–1998): English composer, regarded as one of the greatest of the 20th century. Lennie Tristano (1919–1978): American jazz pianist, composer, arranger, and teacher of jazz improvisation. Frank Turner (1981–): English folk/punk singer-songwriter. Tyler, The Creator (1991–):American rapper, singer, songwriter, record producer, music video director, actor, comedian, and fashion designer. U Brendon Urie (1987–): American singer, songwriter, and musician, lead vocalist of Panic! at the Disco. V Ville Valo (1976–): Finnish singer, songwriter and musician. Edgard Varèse (1883–1965): Franco-American composer and pioneer of electroacoustic music. Eddie Vedder (1964–): lead singer and lyricist of the band Pearl Jam. Giuseppe Verdi (1813–1901): Italian composer. Caetano Veloso (1942–): Brazilian singer-songwriter, musician. Best known for his participation in the tropicalia movement. W Roger Waters (1943–): English rock musician; singer, bassist, guitarist, songwriter and composer, best known for his career with Pink Floyd. Pete Wentz (1979–): American pop punk musician; singer, bassist and principle lyricist of Fall Out Boy. Pete Wernick (1946–): American bluegrass banjo player and songwriter. Jerry Wexler (1917–2008): American music journalist and producer, regarded as one of the major record industry players behind music from the 1950s through the 1980s, coiner of the term rhythm and blues. Mark White (1961–): Bassist of the American alternative rock band Spin Doctors. Alissa White-Gluz (1985–): Canadian vocalist; lead vocalist of the Swedish melodic death metal band Arch Enemy. Earl Wild (1915–2010): American classical pianist, considered a leading virtuoso of his generation. Steven Wilson (1967–): English musician and record producer, most associated with the progressive rock genre. X Iannis Xenakis (1922–2001): Greek composer, music theorist, and architect-engineer. He pioneered the use of mathematical models in music such as applications of set theory, stochastic processes and game theory and was also an important influence on the development of electronic music. Z Frank Zappa (1940–1993): American composer, singer-songwriter, electric guitarist, record producer, and film director. Zucchero (1955–): Italian singer-songwriter and multi-instrumentalist. Notes and references Music Atheists
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Espen J. Aarseth, né en 1965 à Bergen en Norvège, est un chercheur en littérature et ludologie. Il a accompli son doctorat au Department of Comparative Literature à l'université de Bergen et cofondé le Department of Humanistic Informatics au sein duquel il enseigne depuis 2003 en tant que professeur. Il est actuellement le chercheur référent du Center of Computer Games Research à l'université de Copenhague et cofondateur de la revue en ligne Game Studies : the International Journal of Computer Game Research. Il est considéré comme une figure importante du domaine émergent des études sur le jeu vidéo. C'est la figure la plus importante du groupe des « ludologistes », un groupe de chercheurs dont les travaux se caractérisent par leur insistance à traiter les jeux vidéo non pas comme une forme de récit, ou comme un texte, mais simplement comme un jeu. Aarseth fonde son approche sur une critique du modèle « narratif » sans toutefois renoncer à la notion de texte, qu'il se propose d'enrichir au regard du renouvellement des formes littéraires depuis l'émergence des technologies de l'information et de la communication. En étudiant un corpus de jeux d'aventure textuels (MUD), il développe une approche du jeu vidéo comme un type de littérature informatique, qu'il distingue toutefois de l'hypertexte, nécessitant une série d'actions spécifiques pour être lu, c'est-à-dire joué, qu'il qualifie à l'aide du concept d'effort non-trivial de participation ou "texte ergodique" (du grec ergon, signifiant "travail", et hodos, signifiant "chemin/voie"). En d'autres termes, la position du joueur et la dynamique de la partie, son interaction, sont la part la plus importante du jeu. Les idées des ludologistes sont contrastées par la présence des théories dites « narrativistes » telles que défendues par Janet Murray. Toutefois, selon Gonzalo Frasca, le dualisme ludologie/narratologie est tout à fait artificiel, car la ludologie ne conteste pas l'existence du récit comme mode d'explication de l'expérience ludique. La notion de cybertexte Dans son livre Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature (1997), et plusieurs articles parus dans des revues internationales, Aarseth introduit le concept de cybertexte. Il s'agit d'un type de , un texte qui requiert un effort non-trivial pour être parcouru. Selon l'auteur, les jeux vidéo fonctionnent selon ce régime textuel. Le mot "Cybertexte" est un néologisme dérivé du livre "Cybernetics" de Norbert Wiener sur lequel Aarseth va baser son travail. Le mot "Ergodique", est également un néologisme, qui découle du grec "ergon" et "hodos", respectivement "travail" et "chemin". Selon Espen J. Aarseth, les cybertextes ne se résument pas aux "textes électroniques" dont le fonctionnement ne diffère pas de la littérature classique à part via le support. Pour lui, ce sont des textes qui vont mobiliser un effort chez le lecteur afin de les parcourir, expliquant l'origine du néologisme "ergodique". Dans les cybertextes, la forme vient agrémenter le fond, transcendant sa qualité de simple support. L'auteur le formulera de cette manière : « Le concept de cybertexte se concentre sur l'organisation mécanique du texte, plaçant les intrications du médium comme part intégrale de l'échange littéraire ». Il cite, entre autres, les Caligrammes d'Apollinaire comme exemple de cybertexte. Dans ses oeuvres concernant le champ des Game Studies, Aarseth considère le médium du Jeu Vidéo comme un cybertexte. Le joueur parcourt un texte électronique complexe, dont la forme (composé de signes visuels) lui demande un effort et une interactivité plus importante que "le choix arbitraire de tourner des pages". Jeux vidéo et narratologie Le domaine de la ludologie pose un cadre théorique autour du jeu avec une approche centrée sur le système de jeu (Game-centric). Cette vision contraste avec celle des narratologues, centrée sur le joueur et son expérience (Play-centric). Les travaux de Aarseth et de Gonzalo Frasca sont les fondements du lien qui va nouer ces deux approches. Dans son blog Gamestudies.org, Aarseth écrira un article intitulé "Des jeux qui racontent des histoires ?" en 2001. Dans cet article, il soutiendra la théorie que « tout peut être exprimé en tant que narration ». Cette approche vient faire écho à la notion de cybertexte qu'il avait établi précédemment, soulignant l'aspect littéraire et donc narratif des jeux vidéo. Une typologie ouverte des jeux Le livre contient aussi une théorie — pré-ludologique — bien connue, la « typologie du cybertexte » qui permet de classifier les textes ergodiques selon leurs qualités fonctionnelles. Dans ses travaux avec Solveig Smedstad et Lise Sunnanå, il établit une typologie des jeux appelée « typologie multidimensionnelle des jeux » (2003). Dans ses travaux les plus récents avec Christian Elverdam de l'Université de Copenhague, il développe une "Typologie ouverte des jeux" ("An Open-Ended Game Typology"). Notes et références Annexes Articles connexes Littérature postmoderne Hypertexte Lecture sur écran Liens externes Department of Humanistic Informatics Center of Computer Games Research Extraint du livre Cybertext Game Studies, un journal international co-fondé par Espen J. Aarseth Naissance en 1965 Naissance à Bergen (Norvège) Théoricien du jeu vidéo Étudiant de l'université de Copenhague Étudiant de l'université de Bergen Professeur à l'université de Bergen Game studies
fr	caselaw	EU	CONCLUSIONS DE L’AVOCAT GÉNÉRAL MME JULIANE KOKOTT présentées le 25 janvier 2018 (1)(i) Affaire C‐160/17 Raoul Thybaut, Johnny De Coster, Frédéric Romain contre Région wallonne, en présence de Commune d’Orp-Jauche, Bodymat SA [demande de décision préjudicielle formée par le Conseil d’État (Belgique)] « Renvoi préjudiciel – Environnement – Directive 2001/42/CE – Évaluation des incidences de certains plans et programmes sur l’environnement – Plans et programmes – Définition – Périmètre de remembrement urbain – Dérogation plus aisée aux prescriptions urbanistiques » I. Introduction 1. La double notion de « plans et programmes » est capitale pour déterminer le champ d’application de la directive 2001/42/CE (2) relative à l’évaluation stratégique des incidences sur l’environnement (ci-après la « directive ESIE »). La Cour en a certes précisé récemment l’interprétation (3) mais, comme en atteste également l’affaire Inter‐environnement Bruxelles e.a. (C‐671/16), dans laquelle nous présentons aussi des conclusions ce jour, il reste encore des questions à résoudre sur ce point. 2. C’est ainsi que, dans le présent renvoi préjudiciel, il y a lieu de préciser si la détermination d’un « périmètre de remembrement urbain » par le gouvernement wallon doit déjà être qualifiée de plan ou de programme et requiert, de ce fait, éventuellement une évaluation environnementale. Cette détermination se borne à délimiter la zone géographique, mais elle permet surtout de déroger plus aisément, à l’intérieur de celle‐ci, à certaines prescriptions urbanistiques. 3. C’est pourquoi la Cour est également appelée à considérer sa jurisprudence voulant que l’abrogation de plans et de programmes puisse requérir à son tour une évaluation environnementale en tant que plan ou programme (4). 4. Dans la réponse à la présente demande de décision préjudicielle, il convient enfin de considérer que la nécessité d’une évaluation stratégique des incidences sur l’environnement dépend également des types de projets portés par l’acte juridique en question. La directive ESIE prévoit en effet une évaluation environnementale non seulement lorsque le plan ou le programme établit un cadre pour des projets relevant de la directive 2011/92/UE (5) (ci-après la « directive EIE ») [article 3, paragraphe 2, sous a)], mais également lorsqu’un cadre est défini pour d’autres projets susceptibles d’avoir des incidences notables sur l’environnement (article 3, paragraphe 4) ainsi que pour les plans et programmes soumis à l’évaluation spécialement requise par l’article 6, paragraphe 3, de la directive 92/43/CEE (6) [article 3, paragraphe 2, sous b)]. II. Cadre juridique A. Droit de l’Union 5. Les objectifs de la directive ESIE découlent notamment de son article 1er : « La présente directive a pour objet d’assurer un niveau élevé de protection de l’environnement, et de contribuer à l’intégration de considérations environnementales dans l’élaboration et l’adoption de plans et de programmes en vue de promouvoir un développement durable en prévoyant que, conformément à la présente directive, certains plans et programmes susceptibles d’avoir des incidences notables sur l’environnement soient soumis à une évaluation environnementale. » 6. Les plans et programmes sont définis à l’article 2, sous a), de la directive ESIE : « Aux fins de la présente directive, on entend par : a) “plans et programmes” : les plans et programmes, y compris ceux qui sont cofinancés par [l’Union européenne], ainsi que leurs modifications : – élaborés et/ou adoptés par une autorité au niveau national, régional ou local ou élaborés par une autorité en vue de leur adoption par le parlement ou par le gouvernement, par le biais d’une procédure législative, et – exigés par des dispositions législatives, réglementaires ou administratives ». 7. Ce sont en particulier les évaluations stratégiques des incidences sur l’environnement requises à l’article 3, paragraphes 2, 4 et 5, de la directive ESIE qui nous intéressent en l’espèce : « 2. Sous réserve du paragraphe 3, une évaluation environnementale est effectuée pour tous les plans et programmes : a) qui sont élaborés pour les secteurs de l’agriculture, de la sylviculture, de la pêche, de l’énergie, de l’industrie, des transports, de la gestion des déchets, de la gestion de l’eau, des télécommunications, du tourisme, de l’aménagement du territoire urbain et rural ou l’affectation des sols et qui définissent le cadre dans lequel la mise en œuvre des projets énumérés aux annexes I et II de la directive 85/337/CEE pourra être autorisée à l’avenir ; ou b) pour lesquels, étant donné les incidences qu’ils sont susceptibles d’avoir sur des sites, une évaluation est requise en vertu des articles 6 et 7 de la directive 92/43/CEE. [...] 4. Pour les plans et programmes, autres que ceux visés au paragraphe 2, qui définissent le cadre dans lequel la mise en œuvre des projets pourra être autorisée à l’avenir, les États membres déterminent s’ils sont susceptibles d’avoir des incidences notables sur l’environnement. 5. Les États membres déterminent si les plans ou programmes visés aux paragraphes 3 et 4 sont susceptibles d’avoir des incidences notables sur l’environnement, soit en procédant à un examen au cas par cas, soit en déterminant des types de plans et programmes ou en combinant ces deux approches. À cette fin, les États membres tiennent compte, en tout état de cause, des critères pertinents fixés à l’annexe II, afin de faire en sorte que les plans et programmes susceptibles d’avoir des incidences notables sur l’environnement soient couverts par la présente directive. » B. Droit interne 8. L’article 127 du Code wallon de l’aménagement du territoire, de l’urbanisme et du patrimoine régit le lien entre périmètre de remembrement urbain et permis d’urbanisme : « § 1er. Par dérogation aux articles 88, 89, 107 et 109, le permis [d’urbanisme] est délivré par le Gouvernement [...] : [...] 8° lorsqu’il concerne des actes et travaux situés dans un périmètre de remembrement urbain ; le périmètre est arrêté par le Gouvernement ; [...] le périmètre vise tout projet d’urbanisme de requalification et de développement de fonctions urbaines qui nécessite la création, la modification, l’élargissement, la suppression ou le surplomb de la voirie par terre et d’espaces publics ; [...] § 3. [...] le permis peut être accordé en s’écartant du plan de secteur, d’un plan communal d’aménagement, d’un règlement communal d’urbanisme ou d’un plan d’alignement. » 9. L’article 181 du Code wallon de l’aménagement du territoire, de l’urbanisme et du patrimoine permet d’exproprier des biens immobiliers situés dans un périmètre de remembrement urbain : « Le Gouvernement peut décréter d’utilité publique l’expropriation de biens immobiliers compris : [...] 5° dans un périmètre de remembrement urbain. » III. Faits et demande de décision préjudicielle 10. M. Raoul Thybaut et consorts ont saisi le Conseil d’État (Belgique) d’un recours en annulation de l’arrêté du gouvernement wallon, du 3 mai 2012, définissant, dans le village d’Orp Jauche (Brabant wallon, Belgique), un « périmètre de remembrement urbain » d’une superficie de plus de 4 hectares comportant notamment les hangars de l’ancienne usine de matériels agricoles Ed. de Saint-Hubert. 11. Les projets situés dans un tel périmètre bénéficient d’une procédure simplifiée de délivrance de permis d’urbanisme, pouvant déroger aux prescriptions urbanistiques en vigueur, et d’une procédure simplifiée d’expropriation, l’utilité publique étant présumée. Ce n’est alors plus la Commune qui est habilitée à délivrer le permis d’urbanisme mais le gouvernement wallon. 12. La demande de « périmètre de remembrement urbain » doit être assortie d’un « projet d’urbanisme » concret (démolition et construction de bâtiments, aménagement de voiries, d’espaces ouverts, etc.) lequel fera, le cas échéant, l’objet d’un permis d’urbanisme ultérieur distinct. Le périmètre de remembrement urbain ayant valeur réglementaire sans limitation dans le temps, tout projet futur, même non lié au projet d’urbanisme concret initial, bénéficiera des procédures simplifiées. 13. En l’espèce, le « périmètre de remembrement urbain » a été demandé par la société anonyme Bodymat qui projette de « reconditionner les bâtiments industriels autour d’un commerce de bricolage, d’un commerce alimentaire et d’autres petits commerces complémentaires [...] [ainsi que] de logements [...] [et] d’une nouvelle voirie reliée au réseau existant ». 14. Une étude d’incidences sur l’environnement du projet d’urbanisme de Bodymat a été réalisée par un bureau d’études et de conseils en environnement. 15. Les requérants dans la procédure au principal sont des particuliers habitant à proximité du périmètre de remembrement urbain. Ils invoquent la directive ESIE et soutiennent que l’étude réalisée en l’espèce ne répond pas aux conditions requises par la directive en ce qu’elle est incomplète, erronée et irrégulière. 16. Le gouvernement wallon estime que ce n’est pas le périmètre de remembrement urbain qui requiert une évaluation des incidences mais bien le projet d’urbanisme. En l’espèce, le projet d’urbanisme est assorti d’une évaluation des incidences. L’autorité administrative a jugé à juste titre que cette évaluation est complète et de nature à donner les éléments nécessaires pour statuer sur la demande. 17. Après avoir adressé une demande de décision préjudicielle à la Cour constitutionnelle de Belgique sur la constitutionnalité du régime du périmètre de remembrement urbain, le Conseil d’État pose à présent la question suivante à la Cour de justice : « L’article 2, sous a), de la directive ESIE s’interprète-t-il comme intégrant dans la notion de “plan et programme” un périmètre prévu par une disposition de nature législative et adopté par une autorité régionale : – qui a pour seul objet de déterminer le contour d’une zone géographique susceptible de voir se réaliser un projet d’urbanisme, étant entendu que ce projet, qui doit poursuivre un objectif déterminé – en l’occurrence, porter sur la requalification et le développement de fonctions urbaines et qui nécessite la création, la modification, l’élargissement, la suppression ou le surplomb de la voirie par terre et d’espaces publics –, fonde l’adoption du périmètre, qui emporte donc l’acceptation de son principe, mais qu’il doit encore faire l’objet de permis qui nécessitent une évaluation des incidences ; – qui a pour effet, du point de vue procédural, de faire bénéficier les demandes de permis pour des actes ou des travaux situés dans ce périmètre d’une procédure dérogatoire, étant entendu que les prescriptions urbanistiques applicables pour les sols concernés avant l’adoption du périmètre demeurent d’application, mais que le bénéfice de cette procédure peut permettre d’obtenir plus aisément une dérogation à ces prescriptions, et – qui bénéficie d’une présomption d’utilité publique pour la réalisation d’expropriations dans le cadre du plan d’expropriation y annexé ? » 18. M. Thybaut et consorts, la société Bodymat, le gouvernement belge et la Commission européenne ont présenté des observations écrites et orales à l’audience de plaidoiries du 30 novembre 2017 consacrée à la fois à la présente procédure et à l’affaire C‐671/16, Inter‐environnement Bruxelles e.a. Le gouvernement danois était également présent à cette audience. IV. Appréciation en droit 19. Pour répondre à la demande de décision préjudicielle, il convient d’examiner tout d’abord succinctement la « définition » que l’article 2, sous a), de la directive ESIE donne des plans et programmes et ensuite l’interprétation qu’en fait la Cour. A. Sur la définition donnée par l’article 2, sous a), de la directive ESIE 20. Aux termes de l’article 2, sous a), de la directive ESIE, on entend par « plans et programmes » les plans et programmes, ainsi que leurs modifications, premièrement élaborés ou adoptés par une autorité au niveau national, régional ou local ou élaborés par une autorité en vue de leur adoption par le parlement ou par le gouvernement, par le biais d’une procédure législative, et deuxièmement exigés par des dispositions législatives, réglementaires ou administratives. 21. L’énoncé même de sa question montre que ces deux conditions ne suscitent aucun doute pour le Conseil d’État. On y lit en effet que la détermination de la zone géographique en cause a été arrêtée par un pouvoir régional, à savoir la Région wallonne (Belgique), en sorte que la première condition est remplie. En ce qui concerne la seconde condition, on n’aperçoit certes aucune obligation de déterminer la zone géographique en cause, mais il suffit qu’une mesure soit encadrée par des dispositions législatives ou réglementaires nationales, lesquelles déterminent les autorités compétentes pour l’adopter ainsi que sa procédure d’élaboration(7). D’après la question préjudicielle, la détermination de la zone géographique est prévue par la loi. Et cette disposition, étant l’article 127, paragraphe 1, point 8, du Code wallon de l’aménagement du territoire, de l’urbanisme et du patrimoine, détermine également l’autorité compétente à cet effet ainsi que la procédure d’élaboration. B. Sur les conditions de fond requises des plans et programmes 22. Ce qui importe en réalité pour le Conseil d’État c’est de savoir si les effets juridiques de la détermination d’un périmètre de remembrement urbain suffisent pour le qualifier de plan ou de programme visé par la directive ESIE. Cette question donne à la Cour l’occasion d’appliquer dans un nouveau cas de figure l’interprétation qu’elle a donnée récemment de la double notion de « plans et programmes ». 23. Dans cette interprétation, la double notion de « plans et programmes » se rapporte « à tout acte qui établit, en définissant des règles et des procédures de contrôle applicables au secteur concerné, un ensemble significatif de critères et de modalités pour l’autorisation et la mise en œuvre d’un ou de plusieurs projets susceptibles d’avoir des incidences notables sur l’environnement » (8). 24. Dans les conclusions annoncées aujourd’hui dans l’affaire C‐671/16, Inter‐Environnement Bruxelles, nous exposons à l’endroit de cette interprétation, que, pour vérifier l’existence d’un plan ou d’un programme visé à l’article 2, sous a), de la directive ESIE, il faut rechercher si ce que détermine la mesure en cause est susceptible d’avoir des incidences notables sur l’environnement (9). 25. Dans l’affaire au principal, il appartiendrait au Conseil d’État d’examiner si le périmètre de remembrement urbain répond à ces critères. 26. Ce qui importe à première vue dans cet examen c’est que la détermination d’un périmètre de remembrement urbain ne comporte pas expressément de critères positifs ni de modalités pour l’autorisation et la mise en œuvre d’un ou de plusieurs projets, mais se borne à définir une zone géographique. Cela pourrait écarter l’idée que cette détermination soit susceptible d’avoir des incidences notables sur l’environnement. 27. Il se trouve aussi que deux des trois régimes particuliers applicables à une telle zone géographique, à savoir le changement de l’autorité habilitée à délivrer des permis et la faculté d’exproprier des terrains ne sont pas en eux-mêmes susceptibles d’avoir des incidences notables sur l’environnement. 28. Le troisième régime particulier induit par le périmètre de remembrement urbain a cependant une autre nature. Aux termes de l’article 127, paragraphe 3, du Code wallon de l’aménagement du territoire, de l’urbanisme et du patrimoine, le permis peut être accordé dans ce périmètre en s’écartant de règles urbanistiques en vigueur. Cette disposition vise sur ce point les plans de secteur, les plans communaux d’aménagement, les règlements communaux d’urbanisme et les plans d’alignement. 29. L’habilitation à s’écarter de règles en vigueur s’apparente à leur abrogation. En effet, la détermination d’un périmètre de remembrement urbain permet en principe d’y réaliser des projets aux incidences notables sur l’environnement, auxquels s’opposaient auparavant les règles urbanistiques en vigueur. On songera notamment à des restrictions aux dimensions des bâtiments ou à l’utilisation de superficies, qui ne doivent plus être observées. 30. Elle comporte tout de même indirectement une détermination, qui peut être décisive, de critères et de modalités pour l’autorisation et la mise en œuvre de projets : les superficies concernées peuvent attirer tous les types de projets tributaires de dérogations aux règles urbanistiques en vigueur. 31. La Cour a déjà jugé à l’endroit de l’abrogation de plans et programmes que, compte tenu des caractéristiques et des effets des actes d’abrogation dudit plan ou dudit programme, il serait contraire aux objectifs poursuivis par le législateur de l’Union, et de nature à porter atteinte, en partie, à l’effet utile de la directive ISIE, de considérer ces actes comme exclus du champ d’application de celle-ci (10). L’abrogation des règles d’un plan ou d’un programme influerait nettement sur le cadre dans lequel des projets devront être autorisés à l’avenir (11). Ces considérations valent tout autant pour l’habilitation à écarter des règles urbanistiques en vigueur. 32. Il est vrai que la seule détermination d’un périmètre de remembrement urbain ne signifie pas encore qu’y seront effectivement réalisés des projets qui tirent parti des réelles possibilités d’altérer l’environnement. Ce n’est que dans l’autorisation de projets ultérieurs que l’on pourra évaluer concrètement des incidences sur l’environnement. Mais cette considération vaut finalement pour toutes les prescriptions de plans et programmes : ils n’ouvrent que la possibilité d’incidences sur l’environnement susceptibles d’être créées par des projets concrets. Le législateur a manifestement considéré que cette potentialité, par nature, des prescriptions de plans et programmes ne s’oppose pas à une évaluation environnementale. 33. C’est la raison pour laquelle le Royaume de Belgique et Bodymat ne sont pas convaincants quand ils observent que l’on ne sait pas encore quelles sont les incidences sur l’environnement qui devraient être évaluées. 34. Il est exact qu’une évaluation environnementale de la détermination d’un périmètre de remembrement urbain ne peut pas garantir de couvrir rigoureusement les incidences sur l’environnement qui se produiront effectivement ultérieurement. La possibilité de s’écarter de règles urbanistiques ne se limite en effet justement pas à un projet spécifique dont les incidences pourraient déjà être évaluées, mais vaut pour tous les projets qui seront réalisés ultérieurement dans cette zone géographique en ce compris pour ceux qui ne sont même pas encore prévisibles. 35. Mais une évaluation environnementale peut à tout le moins tenter de décrire dans une approche réaliste fondée sur les données de la zone géographique et les conditions techniques, les incidences éventuelles sur l’environnement dans le cas où seraient réalisés des projets qui ne seraient plus limités par les règles urbanistiques en vigueur. Cette méthode contribuerait grandement à la transparence en ce qu’elle contraindrait les autorités à préciser les développements ultérieurs qu’elles rendent possibles en déterminant un périmètre de remembrement urbain. 36. Enfin, la circonstance qu’il serait en principe possible de prendre pleinement en compte la dérogation éventuelle aux règles urbanistiques en vigueur dans l’évaluation de projets ultérieurs au titre de la directive EIE n’empêche pas non plus de qualifier un périmètre de remembrement urbain de plan ou de programme. 37. Il est vrai que l’initiative de faire adopter la directive ESIE procède de l’idée que, au moment de l’évaluation réalisée au titre de la directive EIE, certaines incidences sur l’environnement sont déjà figées en raison de plans arrêtés en amont et ne peuvent plus être remises en cause quelles que soient les conclusions que l’évaluation tire sur la décision d’adopter ou non le projet (12). On ne peut cependant pas en conclure que l’évaluation environnementale au titre de la directive ESIE serait superflue si tout ce qui a été déterminé pouvait être évalué et apprécié par application de la directive EIE. 38. En effet, premièrement le droit de l’Union à tout le moins ne garantit pas que tout projet imaginable soit évalué au titre de la directive EIE. Seuls les types de projets visés aux annexes I et II de cette directive relèvent de son champ d’application. En revanche, la directive ESIE prévoit également à son article 3, paragraphe 2, sous b), et paragraphe 4, l’évaluation de plans et programmes qui ne présentent pas nécessairement de lien avec des projets relevant de la directive EIE. 39. Deuxièmement, l’évaluation environnementale est censée être réalisée aussi tôt que possible afin que ses conclusions puissent encore influer sur d’éventuelles décisions. Cet objectif n’est pas seulement inscrit à l’article 6, paragraphe 2, de la directive ESIE mais aussi à l’article 8, paragraphe 1, et à l’article 9, paragraphe 2, du protocole de Kiev (13), au considérant 7 du préambule et à l’article 3, paragraphe 1, de la convention d’Espoo (14), à l’article 6, paragraphe 4, de la convention d’Aarhus (15), ainsi qu’au considérant 2 de la directive EIE (16). 40. Et troisièmement, la coexistence éventuelle d’évaluations au titre des deux directives ne signifie pas qu’il soit nécessaire de réaliser des doubles évaluations superflues. Au contraire, conformément à l’article 11, paragraphe 2, de la directive ESIE, les conclusions de la première évaluation peuvent (et doivent) être réutilisées dans la seconde évaluation, en tout cas dans la mesure où elles présentent (encore) un intérêt pour cette seconde évaluation (17). 41. La détermination d’un périmètre de remembrement urbain devra effectivement être qualifiée ou non de significative au sens de l’arrêt du 27 octobre 2016, D’Oultremont e.a. (C‐290/15, EU:C:2016:816), selon les prescriptions inscrites dans les règles urbanistiques en vigueur auxquelles il peut être dérogé. Plus ces prescriptions seront importantes, plus significative sera l’habilitation à s’en écarter. 42. Il appartient dès lors au juge national d’examiner si les règles urbanistiques en vigueur, auxquelles il peut être dérogé, s’opposent, compte tenu des données locales concrètes, à des projets susceptibles d’avoir des incidences notables sur l’environnement. V. Conclusion 43. Nous proposons donc à la Cour de statuer comme suit : Un acte juridique qui permet, dans une zone géographique déterminée, d’autoriser des projets en s’écartant des prescriptions de certaines règles urbanistiques, doit être qualifié de plan ou de programme au sens de l’article 2, sous a), de la directive 2001/42/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 27 juin 2001, relative à l’évaluation des incidences de certains plans et programmes sur l’environnement, lorsque les règles urbanistiques en vigueur, auxquelles il peut être dérogé, s’opposent, compte tenu des données locales concrètes, à des projets susceptibles d’avoir des incidences notables sur l’environnement. 1 Langue originale : l’allemand. i « La page de garde du présent texte a fait l’objet d’une modification d’ordre linguistique, postérieurement à sa première mise en ligne ». 2 Directive du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 27 juin 2001 relative à l’évaluation des incidences de certains plans et programmes sur l’environnement (JO 2001, L 197, p. 30). 3 Arrêt du 27 octobre 2016, D’Oultremont e.a. (C‐290/15, EU:C:2016:816, point 49). 4 Arrêt du 22 mars 2012, Inter-Environnement Bruxelles e.a. (C‐567/10, EU:C:2012:159, points 39 et suiv.). 5 Directive du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 13 décembre 2011 concernant l’évaluation des incidences de certains projets publics et privés sur l’environnement (JO 2011, L 26, p. 1), telle que modifiée par la directive 2014/52/UE du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 16 avril 2014 (JO 2014, L 124, p. 1). 6 Directive du Conseil du 21 mai 1992 concernant la conservation des habitats naturels ainsi que de la faune et de la flore sauvages (JO 1992, L 206, p. 7), telle que modifiée par la directive 2013/17/UE du Conseil, du 13 mai 2013 (JO 2013, L 158, p. 193). 7 Arrêt du 22 mars 2012, Inter-Environnement Bruxelles e.a. (C‐567/10, EU:C:2012:159, point 31). 8 Arrêt du 27 octobre 2016, D’Oultremont e.a. (C‐290/15, EU:C:2016:816, point 49). 9 Voir points 18 à 27 de nos conclusions dans l’affaire Inter‐Environnement Bruxelles e.a. (C‐671/16, EU:C:2018:39). 10 Arrêt du 22 mars 2012, Inter-Environnement Bruxelles e.a. (C‐567/10, EU:C:2012:159, point 41). 11 Arrêt du 22 mars 2012, Inter-Environnement Bruxelles e.a. (C-567/10, EU:C:2012:159, point 39). 12 Proposition de directive du Conseil relative à l’évaluation des incidences de certains plans et programmes sur l’environnement [COM(96) 511 final, p. 6]. Voir à cet égard les conclusions que nous avons présentées dans les affaires jointes Terre wallonne et Inter-Environnement Wallonie (C‐105/09 et C‐110/09, EU:C:2010:120, points 31 et 32) ainsi que celles que nous présentons ce jour dans l’affaire Inter-Environnement Bruxelles e.a. (C‐671/16, EU:C:2018:39, points 43 et 44). 13 Protocole de 2003 relatif à l’évaluation stratégique environnementale à la convention de la CEE‐ONU sur l’évaluation de l’impact sur l’environnement dans un contexte transfrontière signée à Espoo en 1991 (JO 2008, L 308, p. 35), adopté par la décision 2008/871/CE du Conseil, du 20 octobre 2008 (JO 2008, L 308, p. 33). 14 Convention de 1991 sur l’évaluation de l’impact sur l’environnement dans un contexte transfrontière (JO 1992, C 104, p. 7) ; d’après la proposition de décision du Conseil concernant l’approbation, au nom de la Communauté européenne, des premier et deuxième amendements à la convention d’Espoo de la CEE-ONU sur l’évaluation de l’impact sur l’environnement dans un contexte transfrontière [COM (2007) 470 final], la Communauté a approuvé cette convention le 27 juin 1997 par une décision non publiée du Conseil, datant apparemment du 15 octobre 1996 (voir la proposition de première décision du Conseil dans le JO 1992, C 104, p. 5). 15 Convention de 1998 sur l’accès à l’information, la participation du public au processus décisionnel et l’accès à la justice en matière d’environnement (JO 2005, L 124, p. 4), approuvée par décision 2005/370/CE du Conseil, du 17 février 2005 (JO 2005, L 124, p. 1). 16 Voir également les conclusions que nous avons présentées dans les affaires jointes Comune di Corridonia e.a. (C‐196/16 et C‐197/16, EU:C:2017:249, points 25 et 26). 17 Voir arrêts du 22 septembre 2011, Valčiukienė e.a. (C‐295/10, EU:C:2011:608, points 61 et 62), ainsi que du 10 septembre 2015, Dimos Kropias Attikis (C‐473/14, EU:C:2015:582, point 58).
en	wikipedia	N/A	The 1980 WCT Tournament of Champions was a men's tennis tournament played on outdoor clay courts at the West Side Tennis Club in Forest Hills, Queens, New York City in the United States and part of the 1980 Grand Prix circuit. It was the fourth edition of the tournament and was held from May 5 through May 11, 1980. Third-seeded Vitas Gerulaitis won the singles title. Finals Singles Vitas Gerulaitis defeated John McEnroe 2–6, 6–2, 6–0 It was Gerulaitis' first singles title of the year and the 16th of his career. Doubles Peter Fleming / John McEnroe defeated Peter McNamara/ Paul McNamee 6–2, 5–7, 6–2 References External links ITF tournament edition details 1980 Grand Prix (tennis) World Championship Tennis Tournament of Champions WCT Tournament of Champions WCT Tournament of Champions
ro	wikipedia	N/A	Aceasta este o listă de romane și serii de romane fantastice în ordine alfabetică de la S la Z. Pentru o listă de romane fantastice de la A la H vezi Listă de romane fantastice (A–H), pentru o listă de fantastice de la I la R vezi Listă de romane fantastice (I–R). S Sangreal Trilogy de Jan Siegel The Scarlet Fig de Avram Davidson The Sea of Trolls (Marea Trolilor) de Nancy Farmer Senlin Ascends de Josiah Bancroft Septimus Heap serie de Angie Sage The Shadow Campaigns de Django Wexler The Shadow of What Was Lost de James Islington Shadow Warrior serie de Chris Bunch Shadowmarch de Tad Williams Shadowplay de Tad Williams Shadowslayers by Charlie Martin Shannara (Sabia lui Shannara) serie de Terry Brooks (The Sword of Shannara, The Elfstones of Shannara și The Wishsong of Shannara) The Shape-Changer's Wife de Sharon Shinn The Shapeshifter serie de Ali Sparkes Shardik de Richard Adams The Shattered Goddess de Darrell Schweitzer Shattered Sea (Marea sfărâmată) serie de Joe Abercrombie Jumătate de rege (Half a King), 2014 Half the World, 2015 Half a War, 2015 The Shaving of Shagpat de George Meredith Shrek! de William Steig The Silmarillion de J. R. R. Tolkien Silver John serie de Manly Wade Wellman Silverlock de John Myers Myers Snow White and Rose Red de Patricia C. Wrede Snow White and the Seven Samurai de Tom Holt Solstice Wood de Patricia A. McKillip Something Rich and Strange de Patricia A. McKillip Song for the Basilisk de Patricia A. McKillip Song of Ice and Fire (Cântec de gheață și foc) serie de George R. R. Martin Urzeala tronurilor (1996) Încleștarea regilor (1998) Iureșul săbiilor (2000) Festinul ciorilor (2005) Dansul dragonilor (2011) The Winds of Winter (TBA) A Dream of Spring (TBA) The Song of the Lioness serie de Tamora Pierce The Song of the Shattered Sands serie de Bradley Beaulieu The Sorcerer's Ship de Hannes Bok The Sorceress and the Cygnet de Patricia A. McKillip The Spiderwick Chronicles de Holly Black Spindle's End de Robin McKinley The Stand (Apocalipsa) de Stephen King The Starcatchers serie de Dave Barry și Ridley Pearson Stardust (Pulbere de stele) de Neil Gaiman The Steerswoman de Rosemary Kirstein Stone and Sky trilogie de Graham Edwards Stone of Farewell de Tad Williams The Stormlight Archive serie de Brandon Sanderson Stravaganza serie de Mary Hoffman The Stress of Her Regard de Tim Powers Stuart Little de E. B. White The Sundering Flood de William Morris The Switchers Trilogy de Kate Thompson The Sword of Truth serie de Terry Goodkind The Sword Smith de Eleanor Arnason Swordbird de Nancy Yi Fan Swords Against the Shadowland de Robin Wayne Bailey The Swords of Lankhmar de Fritz Leiber Swordspoint de Ellen Kushner Symphony of Ages serie de Elizabeth Haydon T The Secrets of the Immortal Nicholas Flamel serie de Michael Scott Tales From The Flat Earth serie de Tanith Lee The Tales of Alvin Maker, vezi Listă de romane fantastice (A–H) The Tales Of Beedle The Bard (Poveștile bardului Beedle) de J.K. Rowling The Kane Chronicles de Rick Riordan Tales of the Otori (Legendele clanului Otori) de Lian Hearn Să nu trezești podeaua-privighetoare (2002) Sub cerul liber, având drept pernă iarba (2003) Strălucirea lunii, adierea vântului (2004) The Harsh Cry of the Heron (2006) Heaven's Net is Wide (2007) Talking Man de Terry Bisson Tam Lin de Pamela Dean Seria Tamuli de David EddingsTara of the Twilight de Lin Carter Seria Tarzan de Edgar Rice BurroughsA Taste of Honey de Kai Ashante WilsonTen Silver Coins de Andrew KoomanThe Thief of Always de Clive BarkerThe Thief Lord (Stăpânul hoților) de Cornelia FunkeThieves' World serie literară editată de Robert Asprin și Lynn Abbey (scrieri de Poul Anderson, John Brunner, Andrew J. Offutt, C. J. Cherryh, Janet Morris, Chris Morris, etc)The Third Policeman de Flann O'BrienThongor Against the Gods de Lin CarterThongor at the End of Time de Lin CarterThongor Fights the Pirates of Tarakus de Lin CarterThongor in the City of Magicians de Lin CarterThongor of Lemuria de Lin CarterThe Three Impostors de Arthur MachenThe Three Worlds Cycle de Ian IrvineThe Chronicles of Thomas Covenant serie de Stephen R. DonaldsonThree Hearts and Three Lions de Poul AndersonThree to See the King de Magnus MillsThe Throme of the Erril of Sherill de Patricia A. McKillipThrough the Looking-Glass (Alice în Țara Oglinzilor) de Lewis Carroll, vezi și Listă de romane fantastice (A–H)Thunder on the Left de Christopher MorleyTigana de Guy Gavriel KayTithe: A Modern Faerie Tale de Holly Black Seria Titus (aka Gormenghast) de Mervyn PeakeTitus Groan (1946)Gormenghast (1950)Titus Alone (1959)Titus Awakes (2009)Boy in Darkness (1956)}To Green Angel Tower de Tad Williams Seria Tomoe Gozen de Jessica Amanda Salmonson Seria Topper de Thorne Smith (2 romane)The Touch of Evil de John RackhamThe Tower at Stony Wood de Patricia McKillipTraitor's Blade de Sebastien de Castell Seria Traitor Son Cycle de Miles CameronThe Traitor Baru Cormorant de Seth Dickinson Seria Twilight (Amurg) de Stephenie Meyer The Tea Master and the Detective de Aliette de Bodard UThe Underland Chronicles de Suzanne CollinsUnfinished Tales (Povești neterminate) de J. R. R. Tolkien (Narn i Chîn Húrin, În căutarea Ereborului)The Unicorn Series de Tanith LeeThe Unicorns of Balinor de Mary StantonUn Lun Dun de China Miéville VVampire Academy (Academia vampirilor) de Richelle MeadValhalla de Tom HoltVelgarth serie de Mercedes LackeyVillains by Necessity de Eve Forward ciclul Viriconium de M. John Harrison seria cu Vlad Taltos de Steven Brust seriaVon Bek de Michael MoorcockA Voyage to Arcturus de David Lindsay WThe Wardstone Chronicles (Cronicile Wardstone ) de Joseph Delaney Ucenicul Vraciului, 2004 (2006) Blestemul Vraciului, 2005 (2006) Secretul Vraciului, 2006 (2007) Bătălia Vraciului, 2007 Greșeala Vraciului, 2008 Sacrificiul Vraciului, 2009 Coșmarul Vraciului, 2010 Destinul Vraciului, 2011 (2012) Aliata Vraciului: Eu sunt Grimalkin, 2011 (2012) Sângele Vraciului, 2012 (2013) Povestea Târâtorului, 2012 (2013) Aliata Vraciului: Eu sunt Alice, 2013 (2014) Cartea a treisprezecea, 2013 (2014)War in Heaven de Charles WilliamsThe War of Dreams (aka The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman) de Angela CarterThe War of the Flowers de Tad WilliamsWarbreaker de Brandon SandersonThe Warrior of World's End de Lin CarterWarriors Series by Erin HunterThe Water-Babies, A Fairy Tale for a Land Baby de Charles KingsleyThe Water of the Wondrous Isles de William MorrisWatership Down de Richard AdamsWeaveworld de Clive BarkerThe Well at the World's End de William MorrisThe Well of the Unicorn de Fletcher PrattWheel of Time (Roata timpului) serie de Robert Jordan 0. New Spring 1. Ochiul lumii 2. În căutarea cornului 3. Dragonul renăscut 4. Umbra se întinde 5. Focurile cerului 6. Seniorul haosului 7. Coroana de săbii 8. Calea pumnalelor 9. Winter's Heart 10. Crossroads of Twilight 11. Knife of Dreams 12. The Gathering Storm 13. Towers of Midnight 14. A Memory of LightWhen the Birds Fly South de Stanton A. CoblentzWhen the Idols Walked de John JakesThe Whitby Witches de Robin JarvisThe White Isle de Darrell SchweitzerWho's Afraid of Beowulf? de Tom HoltWho Censored Roger Rabbit? de Gary K. WolfThe Wind in the Willows de Kenneth Grahame ''''Wings of Fire serie de Tui T. Sutherland Winnie-The-Pooh de A.A. Milne Winter Rose de Patricia McKillip Winter's Tale de Mark Helprin Winternight trilogy de Katherine Arden Wish You Were Here de Tom Holt Witch of the Four Winds de John JakesThe Witcher serie de Andrzej SapkowskiThe Wish Giver de Bill BrittainThe Wizard of Lemuria de Lin CarterWizard of the Pigeons de Megan LindholmThe Wizard of Zao de Lin CarterThe Wolf Leader de Alexandre DumasThe Wolves in the Walls de Neil GaimanWomen of the Otherworld (Femei din lumea de dincolo) serie de Kelley Armstrong. Lună plină, A doua lună plină, Magie de doi bani!, Magie industrială, Niciun om implicat, Trăind cu morții etc.The Wonderful Wizard of Oz (Vrăjitorul din Oz) de Frank L. Baum.The Wood Beyond the World de William MorrisThe World According to Novikoff de Andrei GusevThe Worldbreaker Saga de Kameron HurleyThe Worm Ouroboros de E. R. EddisonA Wrinkle in Time (Călătorie în a cincea dimensiune) de Madeleine L'EngleWizard and Glass de Stephen King - Turnul întunecat IV – Vrăjitorul și globul de cristalXXanth serie de Piers Anthony YYamada Monogatari: The Emperor in Shadow de Richard ParksYamada Monogatari: The War God's Son de Richard ParksYamada Monogatari: To Break the Demon Gate de Richard ParksYoung Wizards serie de Diane Duane ZZimiamvia serie de E. R. EddisonZoo City'' de Lauren Beukes Note * Listă S–Z Listă S–Z
en	wikipedia	N/A	The National Association for the Dually Diagnosed (NADD) is a non-profit membership organisation founded in 1983 by Dr Robert Fletcher. It provided services and advocation for people who have a dual diagnosis of mental health disorders and developmental disabilities. Among other publications, the NADD produces the Diagnostic Manual for Intellectual Disability, which has become an important resource for mental health clinicians. It also hosts an annual international congress on dual diagnosis. References Medical and health organizations based in New York (state)
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Jonathan « Jon » Albon, né le à Harlow, est un coureur de fond britannique spécialisé en course à obstacles, skyrunning et en trail. Il est décuple champion du monde de course à obstacles, champion du monde d'Ultra SkyMarathon 2018, champion du monde de trail 2019 et a remporté le classement général de la Skyrunner World Series 2017. Biographie Débuts en compétition et premiers succès Pratiquant le roller hockey avec son frère durant sa jeunesse, Jonathan ne commence la course à pied qu'à l'âge de 20 ans. Ayant arrêté la pratique du roller hockey, il souhaite continuer à pratiquer une activité physique et trouve dans la course à pied en nature une activité qu'il apprécie. Il découvre la course à obstacles par hasard en s'inscrivant à la Tough Guy Competition. Parvenant à terminer la course à son premier essai, il se pique au jeu de la compétition. Il participe ensuite à la Wolf Run avec sa femme et remporte la course avec une grande marge d'avance. Il remporte par la suite d'autres victoires en course à obstacles et s'étonne lui-même, se prétextant qu'aucun de ses adversaires n'est à la hauteur. En 2014, il déménage à Bergen en Norvège avec sa femme qui y poursuit ses études. Ne maîtrisant pas le norvégien, il n'y trouve pas de travail et décide de devenir sportif professionnel bien que ne faisant pas partie d'un club d'athlétisme et n'ayant pas d'entraîneur. Le , il se rend à Killington aux États-Unis pour participer aux championnats du monde de et se confronter aux meilleurs spécialistes de la discipline. Il profite d'une erreur du Canadien Ryan Atkins au lancer du javelot pour s'emparer de la tête et remporter son premier titre mondial. Le , il fait ses débuts dans la discipline du skyrunning en participant à la Limone Extreme. Le , il se rend à nouveau aux États-Unis pour participer à l'édition inaugurale des championnats du monde de course à obstacles à Cincinnati. Il fait à nouveau face au Canadien Ryan Atkins et prend la tête de course sur un rythme élevé pour remporter le titre. Après s'être essayé à plusieurs formats de course de skyrunning, il se découvre un talent pour les épreuves « Extreme ». Le , il crée la surprise à la Hamperokken SkyRace. Courant dans le groupe de poursuivants, il profite d'une faiblesse du favori Luis Alberto Hernando à mi-parcours pour s'emparer de la tête et remporter sa première victoire en skyrunning. Il confirme ses bonnes performances sur les parcours Extreme en 2016. Après une deuxième place à la Hamperokken SkyRace et une septième place au Trophée Kima, il conclut sa saison en remportant la victoire au Glen Coe Skyline devant son compatriote Tom Owens. Cette victoire lui permet de remporter le classement Sky Extreme de la Skyrunner World Series également devant Tom Owens. Titres en skyrunning et trail Il connaît une excellente saison 2017. Le , il survole littéralement l'Ultra SkyMarathon Madeira, battant le record du parcours de quinze minutes et terminant dix minutes devant le Français Aurélien Dunand-Pallaz. En juillet, il prend part à la deuxième édition des championnats d'Europe de course à obstacles à Biddinghuizen. Il assume son rôle de favori et remporte les titres sur parcours court et sur parcours long. Le , il mène la Hamperokken SkyRace sur un rythme soutenu et parvient à garder à distance le Népalais Bhim Gurung pour remporter sa deuxième victoire. Il termine finalement deuxième de la Glen Coe Skyline derrière Kílian Jornet et remporte le classement Sky Extreme de la Skyrunner World Series. Ayant effectué une solide saison, il s'adjuge de plus le classement général, notamment grâce à ses trois podiums. En octobre, il prend part aux championnats du monde de course à . Faisant à nouveau face à Ryan Atkins, Jonathan domine le parcours court pour remporter le titre. Sur l'épreuve du parcours long, il fait étalage de son talent pour également s'imposer devant Ryan Atkins et remporter son quatrième titre d'affilée. Le , il fait ses débuts en trail en rejoignant la sélection nationale aux championnats du monde de trail à Vistabella del Maestrat. Pas habitué à courir une distance aussi longue, il souffre en course mais parvient à rallier la ligne d'arrivée en quatrième position et remporte la médaille d'argent au classement par équipes avec Tom Evans et Ryan Smith. Le , il prend part aux championnats du monde de skyrunning sur l'épreuve d'Ultra SkyMarathon courue dans le cadre du Ben Nevis Ultra sur un parcours raccourci à en raison des conditions météorologiques hivernales. Annoncé comme favori, Jonathan tire avantage d'une section boueuse au kilomètre 10 pour prendre l'avantage et larguer ses adversaires. Il mène la course en solitaire et s'impose avec douze minutes d'avance sur le Suédois André Jonsson pour remporter le titre. Une semaine plus tard, il participe aux championnats du monde de à Black Diamond et remporte le titre. Il enchaîne avec les championnats du monde de Spartan Race à Squaw Valley la semaine suivante. Il démontre son talent et remporte son deuxième titre de champion du monde de Spartan Race en battant son grand rival Ryan Atkins. Fort de sa prestation en 2018, il est à nouveau reconduit dans l'équipe nationale pour les championnats du monde de trail 2019 à Miranda do Corvo. Il prend un départ prudent puis hausse le rythme pour rattraper le groupe de poursuivants à mi-parcours. Dans la montée finale, il parvient à rattraper le Suisse Christian Mathys puis le double pour s'envoler en tête, franchissant la ligne d'arrivée avec deux minutes d'avance sur le Français Julien Rancon pour remporter le titre. Il décroche de plus à nouveau la médaille d'argent par équipes avec Carl Bell et Andrew Davies. Le , il prend part aux championnats du monde de course en montagne longue distance courus dans le cadre du K42 Adventure Marathon à Villa La Angostura. Il termine meilleur Britannique en quatrième position. En 2021, il se concentre sur le trail. , il prend le départ de l'OCC. Courant en tête aux côtés de son compatriote Robbie Simpson, les deux hommes s'échangent la tête à plusieurs reprises. Jonathan tire avantage de la descente finale pour prendre l'avantage et s'offrir la victoire. Le , il prend le départ du Grand Trail des Templiers. Après une lutte serrée avec le favori Sébastien Spehler, Jonathan hausse le rythme au vingtième kilomètre et se détache en tête. Menant le reste de la course, il s'impose en avec sept minutes d'avance sur le Français. Le , il participe pour la première fois à une manche de la Golden Trail World Series en prenant le départ du marathon du Mont-Blanc. Annoncé comme l'un des favoris, il suit de près la tête de course et prend la tête de course à mi-parcours. Imposant son rythme, il parvient à distancier ses adversaires et s'impose en , devançant de quatre minutes l'Italien Davide Magnini, auteur d'une grosse remontée en fin de course. Le , il prend le départ de l'épreuve de trail court des championnats du monde de course en montagne et trail à Chiang Mai. Formant un groupe de tête avec Stian Angermund, Francesco Puppi et Max King durant la première moitié de course, il voit le Norvégien accélérer à mi-parcours pour filer vers le titre. Il assure la troisième place sur le podium et réalise le doublé au classement par équipes. Palmarès Course à obstacles 2014 Championnats du monde de Spartan Race Championnats du monde de course à obstacles 2015 Championnats d'Europe de Spartan Race Championnats du monde de course à obstacles 2016 Championnats d'Europe de Spartan Race Championnats du monde de course à obstacles Championnats du monde de course à obstacles (parcours court) 2017 Championnats du monde de Spartan Race Championnats du monde de course à obstacles Championnats du monde de course à obstacles (parcours court) Championnats d'Europe de course à obstacles Championnats d'Europe de course à obstacles (parcours court) 2018 Championnats du monde de Spartan Race Championnats du monde de course à obstacles Championnats du monde de course à obstacles (parcours court) Championnats du monde de Tough Mudder Championnats d'Europe de course à obstacles Championnats d'Europe de Tough Mudder 2019 Championnats du monde de Spartan Race Championnats du monde de course à obstacles Championnats du monde de course à obstacles (parcours court) Championnats d'Europe de Spartan Race 2021 Championnats d'Europe de Spartan Race Championnats du monde de Spartan Race Skyrunning Trail Records Notes et références Liens externes Naissance en avril 1989 Naissance à Harlow Coureur de fond britannique Traileur Athlète anglais Champion du monde de skyrunning Champion du monde de trail Étudiant de l'université Anglia Ruskin
en	contracts	US	Exhibit (a)(2) FORM N-CSR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION -OXLEY ACT I, Stephen Coyle, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this report on Form N-CSR of the AFL-CIO Housing Investment Trust; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations, changes in net assets, and cash flows (if the financial statements are required to include a statement of cash flows) of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Rule 30a-3(c) under the Investment Company Act of 1940) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Rule 30a-3(d) under the Investment Company Act of 1940) for the registrant and have: a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; b. Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles; c. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this report based on such evaluation; and d. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal half-year (or the registrant’s second fiscal half-year in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of trustees (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. /s/ Stephen Coyle Stephen Coyle Chief Executive Officer AFL-CIO Housing Investment Trust Date: March 6, 2014 Exhibit (a)(2) FORM N-CSR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION -OXLEY ACT I, Erica Khatchadourian, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this report on Form N-CSR of the AFL-CIO Housing Investment Trust; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations, changes in net assets, and cash flows (if the financial statements are required to include a statement of cash flows) of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Rule 30a-3(c) under the Investment Company Act of 1940) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Rule 30a-3(d) under the Investment Company Act of 1940) for the registrant and have: a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; b. Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles; c. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this report based on such evaluation; and d. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal half-year (or the registrant’s second fiscal half-year in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of trustees (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. /s/ Erica Khatchadourian Erica Khatchadourian Chief Financial Officer AFL-CIO Housing Investment Trust Date: March 6, 2014
nl	wikipedia	N/A	Mainvilliers is een gemeente in het Franse departement Eure-et-Loir (regio Centre-Val de Loire). De plaats maakt deel uit van het arrondissement Chartres. Geografie De oppervlakte van Mainvilliers bedraagt 11,92 km2, de bevolkingsdichtheid is 933 inwoners per km2 (per 1 januari 2019). De onderstaande kaart toont de ligging van Mainvilliers met de belangrijkste infrastructuur en aangrenzende gemeenten. Demografie Onderstaande figuur toont het verloop van het inwonertal (bron: INSEE-tellingen). Externe links Gemeente in Eure-et-Loir
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Double est un groupe suisse fondé en 1981 par (batterie, claviers) et (guitare, chant). Son plus grand succès est en 1985. Le groupe se sépare en 1989. Prononciation La prononciation du nom du groupe est (doublé), et non pas comme en anglais. Biographie Avant leur rencontre, les deux musiciens nés à Zurich poursuivent des chemins musicaux différents. Kurt Maloo, ancien peintre du Performance Art Group MAEZ, commence à se produire en musique dans les années 1970 lors de vernissages et d'expositions de peinture à Zurich. En 1976, il fait partie du groupe de musique expérimentale Troppo. En 1979 il enregistre en solo "Giant Lady", et l'année suivante "Luna + 7 Notorious Maloo Home Works", un disque de démonstration qui présente sept chansons sur une face en 33 tours, et un Maxi 45 tours sur l'autre face. Felix Haug dans les années 1970 parcourt l'Europe, l'Asie et les États-Unis. En 1977 il intègre le Lipschitz Orchestra, un big-band expérimental. En 1979, il participe avec le groupe Yello à l'enregistrement de l'album Solid Pleasure. À l'occasion de leur rencontre en 1981, ils s'associent avec le bassiste Hazel Pazzi pour former le trio Ping Pong. Certaines pistes enregistrées avec Phil Manzanera, le guitariste de Roxy Music, ne seront jamais publiées à cause de problèmes juridiques. Le groupe se produit dans divers festivals européens dont le Montreux Jazz Festival. En 1983, Haug et Maloo décident de continuer en duo, et fondent le groupe "Double". Ils enregistrent le single dans un style post-punk, suivi en 1984 par Rangoon Moon et Woman of the World, repris à l'automne 1985 sur leur premier album , bien connu grâce au morceau The Captain of Her Heart. Participent à cet album Christian Ostermeier (saxophone, flûte), Bob Morgan (trombone), Liz McComb (voix), Thomas Jordi (contrebasse). The Captain of Her Heart se hisse aux États-Unis à la 16e place du Billboard Hot 100 à la fin de l'année 1986. En 1987, Kurt Maloo et Felix Haug enregistrent un deuxième album, Dou3le (qui se prononce double three), avec Herb Alpert (trompette) et Michael Urbaniak (violon). Pendant les séances d'enregistrement d'un troisième album, Maloo et Haug décident de se séparer provisoirement. Haug compose quelques musiques de film pendant que Maloo enregistre deux albums en solo : Single en 1990, et Soul and Echo en 1995. Ils décident en 2000 de reformer le groupe pour son vingtième anniversaire, et commencent de nouvelles compositions. Mais Felix Haug décède brutalement d'une crise cardiaque le . En 2006, Kurt Maloo enregistre un disque en hommage à Double avec leurs dernières compositions et quelques reprises des années 1980 et 1990, Kurt Maloo vs. Double - Loopy Avenue. Il continue maintenant sa carrière sous son nom et vit à Hambourg. Discographie Albums : 1983: Naningo, Polydor 1985: Blue, Polydor 1987: Dou3le, PolydorSingles :' 1984: Rangoon Moon (Maxi Single), Metronome Records 1984: Woman of The World (Maxi Single), Metronome Records 1985: The Captain of Her Heart (Single), A&M Records 1987: Devils Ball (Single), Polydor 1987: Gliding (Single)'', Metronome Records Références Groupe suisse de pop rock Groupe musical des années 1980 Duo musical suisse Artiste de Polydor Records Artiste d'A&M Records
it	wikipedia	N/A	Biografia Laureato in Giurisprudenza all'Università di Palermo con il massimo dei voti e la lode. Ha conseguito il baccalaureato in Scienze Sociali presso la Pontificia Università San Tommaso d'Aquino di Roma. Sposato e padre di sei figli. Nel 1987 viene chiamato a far parte della segreteria particolare del Ministro per il rapporti con il Parlamento Sergio Mattarella con Collabora contemporaneamente con il quotidiano della DC Il Popolo e a inizio degli anni '90 viene chiamato come corrispondente dalla Sicilia dal quotidiano Avvenire. Nel 1991 è nominato componente del Comitato Consultivo Industria della Regione Siciliana. Giornalista professionista dal 26 gennaio 1993, è stato il corrispondente da Palermo de Il Sole 24 Ore. Assunto nella redazione siciliana della Rai nel 1997. Sua l'unica intervista della RAI a don Giuseppe Puglisi, il sacerdote ucciso dalla mafia a Palermo nel 1993 e proclamato Beato della Chiesa nel 2013. Viene distaccato a Roma nel 1999 come vaticanista del T3 per seguire gli eventi del Giubileo del 2000 ed è nominato inviato speciale nel 2000. Nominato capo redattore responsabile della redazione siciliana della TGR nell'ottobre 2003 da Angela Buttiglione. Durante la sua gestione l'Ordine dei Giornalisti di Sicilia ha assegnato alla redazione Siciliana della TGR, nell'ambito del "Premio Mario Francese", un riconoscimento per "l'alta qualità di informazione sui fatti di mafia" e nel 2012 per i servizi realizzati per ventennale delle stragi di mafia del '92. Su È docente di Dottrina sociale della Chiesa presso la Pontificia facoltà teologica di Sicilia. Ha insegnato Teoria e Tecniche del Linguaggio Radiotelevisivo presso l'università di Palermo. Il 17 ottobre 2013 il CDA della Rai all'unanimità lo nomina direttore della TGR su proposta del direttore generale Luigi Gubitosi. Il suo piano editoriale è stato approvato dai giornalisti della TGR ottenendo quasi l'82% dei consensi. È stato componente, nel 2013, della commissione per la selezione interna di nuovi giornalisti RAI. Sotto la sua direzione la TGR ha avviato il processo di digitalizzazione delle redazioni regionali. Dal giugno 2016 al settembre 2018, consigliere d'amministrazione di San Marino RTV in rappresentanza del socio Rai. È cittadino onorario del comune di Racalmuto, il paese dello scrittore Leonardo Sciascia. Presiede la giuria del premio giornalistico "Marco Lucchetta". Sotto la sua direzione alla TGR è stato attribuito il premio giornalistico Biagio Agnes 2016 per la televisione. Il 6 ottobre 2016 è confermato all'unanimità, dal Cda Rai, alla guida della TGR. Il 23 luglio 2018 viene nominato direttore di rete di TV2000 e Radio InBlu in sostituzione di Paolo Ruffini; assume l'incarico a partire dal 1o ottobre successivo. Dal 1o febbraio 2019 ha assunto anche l'incarico di direttore delle testate giornalistiche di entrambe le emittenti, subentrando a Lucio Brunelli. Note Direttori di telegiornale Morgante
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Les Tireux d'Roches est le nom d'un groupe musical québécois fondé en 1998, issu de la région de la Mauricie. Ils explorent les sonorités laissant libre cours à une expression nouvelle issue du folklore traditionnel québécois. Conteurs-musiciens-chansonniers, ils jouent d'un grand nombre d'instruments (violoncelle, bouzouki, guitare, banjo, saxophones, clarinettes, accordéon, flûte, harmonica). Membres actuels: Denis Massé Dominic Lemieux Pascal Per Veillette Luc Jason Murphy David Robert Anciens membres : Francis d'Octobre - Mario Giroux - Anne Tessier - Fred Pellerin - Jeannot Bournival Discographie Tapiskwan Sipi (2021) Tarmacadam (2017) Live au Trou du Diable (2015) XO 15 ans d'âge (2014) Cé qu’essé ? Roche, Papier, Ciseaux La Boite à Silence J’joue mon air Voir aussi Liens externes Site du groupe Page sur Québec Info Musique Groupe québécois de musique folk Groupe musical formé en 1998
fr	wikipedia	N/A	La Nef des fous est un tableau du peintre néerlandais Jérôme Bosch (v. 1450-1516). Huile sur panneau de , réalisé vers 1500 (date conjecturale), il est actuellement exposé au Musée du Louvre, à Paris. Il faisait jadis partie, avec La Mort de l'avare et Allégorie de la débauche et du plaisir, respectivement à la National Gallery of Art (Washington) et à la Yale University Art Gallery (New Haven), du Triptyque du vagabond, dont le panneau central a disparu. Le Musée du Louvre est entré en possession de La Nef des fous à la suite d'un don de l'un de ses conservateurs, Camille Benoit, en 1918. Le musée possède en outre un dessin préparatoire ayant servi à l'élaboration de l’œuvre. Le revers du panneau, en grisaille, représente Le Colporteur. Il se raccorde exactement au revers du fragment conservé à Yale. Se répondent ainsi avarice et excès, deux aspects de la même folie pécheresse qui éloigne de Dieu, l'excès étant incarné par une assemblée de gloutons et d'ivrognes voguant à leur perte comme des insensés. Contexte Artiste Jérôme Bosch est un peintre néerlandais dont l'œuvre se situe au tournant du et du , à l'époque où les conflits sociaux étaient à leur apogée et que la religion vivait une crise profonde. La peinture flamande est fidèle à la tradition religieuse. La réussite de l'œuvre de Bosch n'a sans doute été possible que par la conjoncture du moment alors que les principes modernistes de la Renaissance tels que la découverte de la perspective, la connaissance de l'anatomie, émergeaient à Rome et que la tradition des peintres médiévaux aux Pays-Bas était encore dans l'actualité, comme le démontre Jérôme Bosch dans son éternelle lutte du Bien contre le Mal. Thème de la « Nef des fous » Le thème de la « Nef des fous » est connu dans la littérature contemporaine de Bosch et dans les traditions des Flandres au . On a fait le rapprochement avec Das Narrenschiff ou La Nef des fous de Sébastien Brant, dont la première édition paraît en 1494 à Bâle, et est rapidement traduite dans plusieurs langues, notamment en néerlandais. Une édition de cet ouvrage paraît à Bois-le-Duc vers 1500. L'auteur accueille, dans sa nef symbolique, des fous de toutes catégories et fait défiler les faiblesses humaines. L'une de ses strophes dit : « Mieux vaut rester laïc que de mal se conduire en étant dans les ordres ». Beaucoup de similitudes existent entre ce livre et la représentation faite par Bosch. De nombreux autres textes rappellent les fêtes des fous en honneur au bas Moyen Âge. Ces textes stigmatisent la folie à Satan. L'atmosphère du temps était à la dérision du comportement du bas clergé. Les carnavals allemands se sont inspirés de ces textes et faisaient défiler des chars représentant la « Nef du Mal » que la foule finalement incendiait. Bosch est un homme de la fin du Moyen Âge, la Réforme n'est pas très loin. Tant l'Église catholique que les réformateurs veulent freiner les débordements des carnavals ; le pouvoir lui aussi craint pour l'ordre public. On réprime le rire de la foule ou à tout le moins on veut le contrôler. C'est le pouvoir qui bientôt organisera les fêtes. Bosch n'est pas sans doute très éloigné de son contemporain Érasme qui « ne raille pas les individus mais les vices : le rire est mis au service de la morale ». Érasme ironise aussi à propos des concitoyens de Bosch. Dans L'Éloge de la folie, il a dit à propos des Brabançons : « Au lieu que chez les autres hommes l'âge apporte la prudence, plus ceux-ci approchent de la vieillesse, plus ils sont gais ». Et George Minois commente « la folie est utilisée comme un repoussoir : il s'agit de montrer l'absurdité d'un monde privé de codes et d'interdits, d'un monde qui renie ses valeurs. Ce monde est fou, et l'on en rit, mais d'un rire qui n'est pas joyeux ». Le lien entre les textes littéraires, tels ceux de Sébastien Brant, et le tableau n'est pas admis par tous les historiens. Cependant, même si Bosch n'en a pas eu connaissance, ces textes et le tableau illustrent bien un même état d'esprit qui est celui du moment. De plus, la métaphore de la barque était l'une des plus fréquentes au Moyen Âge. On la retrouve aussi dans La Barque bleue de Jacques van Oestvoren. Description Un groupe de dix personnages sont réunis dans une barque, la « nef ». Le groupe principal se compose d’un moine franciscain et d’une religieuse jouant du luth, assis face à face. Ils ont la bouche grande ouverte comme pour chanter mais semblent aussi essayer de mordre, comme leurs compagnons, une crêpe pendue au centre de la petite embarcation, allusion à une coutume folklorique qui consiste à manger une galette suspendue sans les mains. Derrière eux sont assis les deux nautoniers. L’un d’entre eux a, en guise de rame, une louche géante. L’autre tient en équilibre sur la tête un verre et brandit au bout de sa rame une cruche cassée. Aux extrémités, une femme, d’un côté, s’apprête à frapper avec une cruche un jeune homme retenant une gourde qui trempe dans l’eau. Certains historiens préfèrent y voir un entonnoir renversé, symbole de la folie. De l’autre, sur un gouvernail de fortune, un petit homme en habit de fou boit dans une coupe. À côté de ce dernier, un autre se penche pour vomir. L’assemblée est dominée par un mât de cocagne surmonté d’un bouquet de fleurs au centre duquel est représentée une chouette ou une tête de mort. Une dinde ou une oie rôtie est suspendue au mât, un homme essaye de l'atteindre avec son long couteau. Il se rend ainsi coupable des péchés de gourmandise et de l'envie. La joyeuse compagnie semble à la dérive, un vaste paysage, au fond, s’étend à l’infini. La Nef des fous est généralement interprétée comme l'illustration de la folie qui a gagné tous les personnages. Il n'y a ni trompeurs ni trompés, seulement des fous ou des hommes assez insensés pour s'embarquer sur un navire sans voile ni gouvernail et dont une cuiller énorme qui pourrait faire office de rame ou de godille est abandonnée. Le mal semble avoir atteint toute la compagnie, prêtre, moine, religieuse... le plus fou n'étant peut-être pas celui qui en porte l'habit et qui, perché sur une branche, un peu à l'écart, savoure sa victoire et déguste son vin. Ces hommes et ces femmes embarqués ensemble ne vont nulle part, ils n'en savent rien et ne s'en soucient pas le moindre du monde. Leur navire sans guide bat pavillon infidèle : la longue oriflamme rose accrochée au mât porte un croissant de lune. Croissant des musulmans. Le croissant de lune renvoie à l'hérésie des Mécréants, mais aussi à la folie, au lunatisme. Certains auteurs ont suggéré que le navire voguait de droite à gauche, ce qui est logiquement en contradiction avec la direction vers laquelle flotte cette oriflamme. Mais tout est possible au pays des fous. Il pourrait tout aussi bien ne pas avancer. Pour les passagers, seul compte le moment présent passé à chanter, à boire, à jouer. Le Franciscain chante, la religieuse l'accompagne et joue du luth. Certains historiens de l'art ont vu dans le luth et dans l'assiette de cerises, posées devant les religieux, des références à l'érotisme. Les personnages ont déjà bu — la cruche est retournée — peut-être beaucoup, car l'un des hommes vomit par-dessus bord. Le récipient mis à rafraîchir dans l'eau et le tonneau permettront sans doute de continuer. Analyse de l'œuvre À l'époque de Jérôme Bosch, les conflits sociaux étaient à leur apogée et la religion vivait une crise profonde. Au moment où la peinture florentine crée l'esthétique de la Renaissance, la peinture flamande reste fidèle à la tradition religieuse. Mais celle-ci, par le déclin du Moyen Âge, va subir une crise fondamentale dont Bosch est le reflet. La représentation du moine et de la religieuse renvoie à l'anticléricalisme de Bosch, influencé par les courants religieux pré-réformistes qui se développent à l'époque en Flandres, comme la devotio moderna, qui défendaient la communion directe avec Dieu sans l'intervention de l'Église, en réponse à la conduite amorale de certains ecclésiastiques. Le thème de la complicité entre l’Église et les charlatans qui volent le peuple apparaît également dans L'Escamoteur, dans lequel un frère dominicain subtilise la bourse d'un spectateur, pendant que l'attention de celui-ci est attirée par un bateleur ; ainsi que dans La Lithotomie, dans lequel le moine et la religieuse sont les complices du charlatan qui prétend extraire la « pierre de folie » (qui est en réalité une fleur) de la tête du gros bourgeois assis. Le clergé dissolu laisse ainsi la barque de l’Église à la dérive, négligeant le salut des âmes. Cet aspect, représentatif des critiques formulées par la Réforme, paraît trouver une illustration dans l’homme qui s’accroche au bateau sans que personne ne s’en soucie. La Nef des fous, en allant plus loin que l'aspect burlesque qu'elle dégage au premier abord, est une critique de la folie des hommes qui vivent à l'envers et perdent leurs repères religieux. Le monde qu'il peint est un monde renversé tel qu'on le retrouve dans la vie à l'époque (mis à part les interventions d'origine imaginaire de l'artiste). Ce n'est pas la tête qui règne ici mais le ventre. Si la tête ne règne pas, c'est qu'elle est folle. Sa folie est d'adorer le ventre, sa folie est le péché. Le péché de la gourmandise ainsi que celui de la luxure étaient des vices très répandus depuis longtemps dans les monastères. Bosch nous montre donc son regard sur le monde de l'époque en critiquant les mœurs dissolues du clergé, la débauche de la vie monastique et la folie humaine cédant aux vices. Il dénonce les vices par la folie en les attribuant à des personnages appartenant apparemment aux classes inférieures de la société. Ainsi le convive qui vomit montre la débauche de celui qui succombe aux effets de l'alcool, une cruche serait le symbole du sexe féminin ou du diable, le poisson mort sans écaille est le péché, le masque de chouette regardant la scène symbolise le démon... Ainsi, la relation qu'établit Bosch entre « vice » et « folie » est caractéristique de la littérature du . Avec ce tableau, il met en garde d'une manière burlesque contre la perte des valeurs ecclésiastiques, la négligence ou la folie des hommes vis-à-vis de la religion, enfin tout ce qui règne à la fin du , à l'heure de la fin du Moyen Âge. Reconstitution du triptyque de Bosch Notes et références Annexes Articles connexes Liste des œuvres de Jérôme Bosch Brabant-Septentrional Estampe de vieux maître Liens externes Notice de La Nef des fous sur le site du musée du Louvre Le thème de la folie et de la Nef des fous au Moyen Âge « Exposition Jérôme Bosch : les 3 mystères de "La nef des fous" », L'Obs, Bibliographie Michel Foucault, Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique, 1961 Jean de Bosschère, Jérôme Bosch et le fantastique, Albin Michel, 1962, - 250 pages Jacques Chailley, Jérôme Bosch et ses symboles : essai de décryptage, Palais des Académies, 1978, - 313 pages Tableau de Jérôme Bosch Tableau des années 1500 Folie dans la peinture Bateau dans la peinture Luth dans la peinture Collection de peintures germaniques et flamandes du Louvre
en	caselaw	US	Case 3:21-cv-00035-NJR Document 1 Filed 01/12/21 Page 1 of 10 Page ID #1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS JANIS SHUMWAY, Individually, : : Plaintiff, : : v. : Case No. : ANUP PATEL d/b/a WELCOME SUITES, : Individually, : : Defendant. : _______________________________________/ : : : COMPLAINT (Injunctive Relief Demanded) Plaintiff, JANIS SHUMWAY, Individually, on her behalf and on behalf of all other individuals similarly situated, (sometimes referred to as “Plaintiff”), hereby sues the Defendant, ANUP PATEL d/b/a WELCOME SUITES, Individually, (sometimes referred to as “Defendant”), for Injunctive Relief, and attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. (“ADA”). 1. Plaintiff is a resident of Tennessee, is sui juris, and qualifies as an individual with disabilities as defined by the ADA. Plaintiff is unable to engage in the major life activity of walking more than a few steps and primarily relies on a wheelchair when ambulating. Plaintiff requires accessible handicap parking spaces located closest to the entrances of a facility. The handicap and access aisles must be of sufficient width so that she can embark and disembark from a ramp into her vehicle. Routes connecting the handicap spaces and all features, goods and services of a facility must be level, properly sloped, sufficiently wide and without cracks, holes or other hazards Case 3:21-cv-00035-NJR Document 1 Filed 01/12/21 Page 2 of 10 Page ID #2 that can pose a danger of tipping, catching wheels or falling. These areas must be free of obstructions or unsecured carpeting that make passage either more difficult or impossible. Amenities must be sufficiently lowered so that Plaintiff can reach them. She has difficulty operating door knobs, sink faucets, or other operating mechanisms that tight grasping, twisting of the wrist or pinching. She is hesitant to use sinks that have unwrapped pipes, as such pose a danger of scraping or burning her legs. Sinks must be at the proper height so that she can put her legs underneath to wash her hands. She requires grab bars both behind and beside a commode so that she can safely transfer and she has difficulty reaching the flush control if it is on the wrong side. She has difficulty getting through doorways if they lack the proper clearance. 2. Plaintiff is an advocate of the rights of similarly situated disabled persons and is a "tester" for the purpose of asserting her civil rights and monitoring, ensuring, and determining whether places of public accommodation and their websites are in compliance with the ADA. 3. According to the public property records, Defendant owns a place of public accommodation as defined by the ADA and the regulations implementing the ADA, 28 CFR 36.201(a) and 36.104. The place of public accommodation that the Defendant owns is a place of lodging known as WELCOME SUITES148 Regency Park, O'Fallon, IL 62269, and is located in the County of St. Clair , (hereinafter "Property"). 4. Venue is properly located in this District because the subject property is located in this district. 2 Case 3:21-cv-00035-NJR Document 1 Filed 01/12/21 Page 3 of 10 Page ID #3 5. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, this Court has been given original jurisdiction over actions which arise from the Defendant’s violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and § 2202. 6. As the owner of the subject place of lodging, Defendant is required to comply with the ADA. As such, Defendant is required to ensure that it's place of lodging is in compliance with the standards applicable to places of public accommodation, as set forth in the regulations promulgated by the Department Of Justice. Said regulations are set forth in the Code Of Federal Regulations, the Americans With Disabilities Act Architectural Guidelines ("ADAAGs"), and the 2010 ADA Standards, incorporated by reference into the ADA. These regulations impose requirements pertaining to places of public accommodation, including places of lodging, to ensure that they are accessible to disabled individuals. 7. More specifically, 28 C.F.R. Section 36.302(e)(1) imposes the following requirement: Reservations made by places of lodging. A public accommodation that owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of lodging shall, with respect to reservations made by any means, including by telephone, in-person, or through a third party - (i) Modify its policies, practices, or procedures to ensure that individuals with disabilities can make reservations for accessible guest rooms during the same hours and in the same manner as individuals who do not need accessible rooms; (ii) Identify and describe accessible features in the hotels and guest rooms offered through its reservations service in enough detail to reasonably permit individuals with disabilities to assess independently whether a given hotel or guest room meets his or her accessibility needs; 3 Case 3:21-cv-00035-NJR Document 1 Filed 01/12/21 Page 4 of 10 Page ID #4 (iii) Ensure that accessible guest rooms are held for use by individuals with disabilities until all other guest rooms of that type have been rented and the accessible room requested is the only remaining room of that type; (iv) Reserve, upon request, accessible guest rooms or specific types of guest rooms and ensure that the guest rooms requested are blocked and removed from all reservations systems; and (v) Guarantee that the specific accessible guest room reserved through its reservations service is held for the reserving customer, regardless of whether a specific room is held in response to reservations made by others. 8. These regulations became effective March 15, 2012. 9. Defendant, either itself or by and through a third party, accepts reservations for its hotel online through one or more websites. The purpose of these websites is so that members of the public may reserve guest accommodations and review information pertaining to the goods, services, features, facilities, benefits, advantages, and accommodations of the Property. As such, these websites are subject to the requirements of 28 C.F.R. Section 36.302(e). 10. Prior to the commencement of this lawsuit, Plaintiff visited the websites on multiple occasions for the purpose of reviewing and assessing the accessible features at the Property and ascertain whether they meet the requirements of 28 C.F.R. Section 36.302(e) and her accessibility needs. However, Plaintiff was unable to do so because Defendant failed to comply with the requirements set forth in 28 C.F.R. Section 36.302(e). As a result, Plaintiff was deprived the same goods, services, features, facilities, benefits, advantages, and accommodations of the Property available to the general public. Specifically, expedia.com did not identify accessible rooms, did not allow for booking of accessible rooms and provided insufficient information as to whether the rooms or features at the hotel are accessible; hotel amenities, room types 4 Case 3:21-cv-00035-NJR Document 1 Filed 01/12/21 Page 5 of 10 Page ID #5 and amenities are all listed in detail; no information was given about accessibility in the hotel other than the statements "Accessible bathroom", "Grab bar near toilet", "Handrails in stairways", "In-room accessibility", "Lever door handles", "Stair-free path to entrance", "Wheelchair-accessible parking", "Wheelchair-accessible path of travel", "Wheelchair-accessible path to elevator", "Wheelchair-accessible public washroom", "Wheelchair-accessible van parking", and "Wheelchair-width doorways". Booking.com did not identify accessible rooms, did not allow for booking of accessible rooms and provided insufficient information as to whether the rooms or features at the hotel are accessible; hotel amenities, room types and amenities are all listed in detail; no information was given about accessibility in the hotel other than the statements "Facilities for disabled guests", "Wheelchair accessible", "Toilet with grab rails", and "Accessible parking". Agoda.com did not identify accessible rooms, did not allow for booking of accessible rooms and provided insufficient information as to whether the rooms or features at the hotel are accessible; hotel amenities, room types and amenities are all listed in detail; no information was given about accessibility in the hotel other than the statement "Facilities for disabled guests". Cheaptickets.com did not identify accessible rooms, did not allow for booking of accessible rooms and provided insufficient information as to whether the rooms or features at the hotel are accessible; hotel amenities, room types and amenities are all listed in detail; no information was given about accessibility in the hotel other than the statements "Accessible bathroom", "Grab bar near toilet", "Handrails in stairways", "In-room accessibility", "Lever door handles", 5 Case 3:21-cv-00035-NJR Document 1 Filed 01/12/21 Page 6 of 10 Page ID #6 "Stair-free path to entrance", "Wheelchair-accessible parking", "Wheelchair-accessible path of travel", "Wheelchair-accessible path to elevator", "Wheelchair-accessible public washroom", "Wheelchair-accessible van parking", and "Wheelchair-width doorways". Travelocity.com did not identify accessible rooms, did not allow for booking of accessible rooms and provided insufficient information as to whether the rooms or features at the hotel are accessible; hotel amenities, room types and amenities are all listed in detail; no information was given about accessibility in the hotel other than the statements "Accessible bathroom", "Grab bar near toilet", "Handrails in stairways", "In-room accessibility", "Lever door handles", "Stair-free path to entrance", "Wheelchair-accessible parking", "Wheelchair-accessible path of travel", "Wheelchair-accessible path to elevator", "Wheelchair-accessible public washroom", "Wheelchair-accessible van parking", and "Wheelchair-width doorways". 11. In the near future, Plaintiff intends to revisit Defendant's online reservations system in order to test it for compliance with 28 C.F.R. Section 36.302(e). In this respect, Plaintiff maintains a system to ensure that she revisits the online reservations system of every hotel she sues. By this system, Plaintiff maintains a list of all hotels she has sued with several columns following each. She continually updates this list by, among other things, entering the dates she did visit and plans to again visit the hotel's online reservations system. With respect to each hotel, she visits the online reservations system multiple times prior to the complaint being filed, then visits again shortly after the complaint is filed. Once a judgment is obtained or settlement 6 Case 3:21-cv-00035-NJR Document 1 Filed 01/12/21 Page 7 of 10 Page ID #7 agreement reached, she records the date by which the hotel's online reservations system must be compliant and revisits when that date arrives. 12. Plaintiff is continuously aware that the subject websites remain non-compliant and that it would be a futile gesture to revisit the websites as long as those violations exist unless she is willing to suffer additional discrimination. 13. The violations present at Defendant's websites infringe Plaintiff's right to travel free of discrimination and deprive her of the information required to make meaningful choices for travel. Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, frustration and humiliation as the result of the discriminatory conditions present at Defendant's website. By continuing to operate the websites with discriminatory conditions, Defendant contributes to Plaintiff's sense of isolation and segregation and deprives Plaintiff the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges and/or accommodations available to the general public. By encountering the discriminatory conditions at Defendant's website, and knowing that it would be a futile gesture to return to the websitesunless she is willing to endure additional discrimination, Plaintiff is deprived of the same advantages, privileges, goods, services and benefits readily available to the general public. By maintaining a websiteswith violations, Defendant deprives Plaintiff the equality of opportunity offered to the general public. Defendant's online reservations system serves as a gateway to its hotel. Because this online reservations system discriminates against Plaintiff, it is thereby more difficult to book a room at the hotel or make an informed decision as to whether the facilities at the hotel are accessible. 7 Case 3:21-cv-00035-NJR Document 1 Filed 01/12/21 Page 8 of 10 Page ID #8 14. Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer direct and indirect injury as a result of the Defendant’s discrimination until the Defendant is compelled to modify its websitesto comply with the requirements of the ADA and to continually monitor and ensure that the subject websitesremains in compliance. 15. Plaintiff has a realistic, credible, existing and continuing threat of discrimination from the Defendant’s non-compliance with the ADA with respect to these websites. Plaintiff has reasonable grounds to believe that she will continue to be subjected to discrimination in violation of the ADA by the Defendant. 16. The Defendant has discriminated against the Plaintiff by denying her access to, and full and equal enjoyment of, the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and/or accommodations of the subject website. 17. The Plaintiff and all others similarly situated will continue to suffer such discrimination, injury and damage without the immediate relief provided by the ADA as requested herein. 18. Defendant has discriminated against the Plaintiff by denying her access to full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and/or accommodations of its place of public accommodation or commercial facility in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. and 28 CFR 36.302(e). Furthermore, the Defendant continues to discriminate against the Plaintiff, and all those similarly situated by failing to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford all offered goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with 8 Case 3:21-cv-00035-NJR Document 1 Filed 01/12/21 Page 9 of 10 Page ID #9 disabilities; and by failing to take such efforts that may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services. 19. Plaintiff is without adequate remedy at law and is suffering irreparable harm. Plaintiff has retained the undersigned counsel and is entitled to recover attorney’s fees, costs and litigation expenses from the Defendant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205 and 28 CFR 36.505. 20. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188, this Court is provided with authority to grant Plaintiff Injunctive Relief, including an order to require the Defendant to alter the subject websites to make them readily accessible and useable to the Plaintiff and all other persons with disabilities as defined by the ADAand 28 C.F.R. Section 36.302(e); or by closing the websites until such time as the Defendant cures its violations of the ADA. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests: a. The Court issue a Declaratory Judgment that determines that the Defendant at the commencement of the subject lawsuit is in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. and 28 C.F.R. Section 36.302(e). b. Injunctive relief against the Defendant including an order to revise its websites to comply with 28 C.F.R. Section 36.302(e) and to implement a policy to monitor and maintain the websites to ensure that it remains in compliance with said requirement. 9 Case 3:21-cv-00035-NJR Document 1 Filed 01/12/21 Page 10 of 10 Page ID #10 c. An award of attorney’s fees, costs and litigation expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205. d. Such other relief as the Court deems just and proper, and/or is allowable under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Respectfully Submitted, By: /s/ Kimberly A. Corkill, Esq. Kimberly A. Corkill, Of Counsel Thomas B. Bacon, P.A. 7 N. Coyle Street Pensacola, FL 32502 ph. 850-375-3475 fx 877-828-4446 kimberlyatlaw@gmail.com Florida Bar Id. No. 84942 Thomas B. Bacon, Esq. Thomas B. Bacon, P.A. 644 North Mc Donald St. Mt. Dora, FL 32757 ph. (850)375-3475 kimberlyatlaw@gmail.com Florida Bar. Id. No. 139262
de	other	N/A	AG Wedding, 21a C 128/07: AG Wedding: aufhebung der beschlagnahme, zwangsverwaltung, grundeigentum, eigentümer, betriebskosten, kaution, prozessführungsbefugnis, rückzahlung, zwangsversteigerung, grundstück Urteil des AG Wedding vom 13.03.2017, 21a C 128/07 21a C 128/07 AG Wedding: aufhebung der beschlagnahme, zwangsverwaltung, grundeigentum, eigentümer, betriebskosten, kaution, prozessführungsbefugnis, rückzahlung, zwangsversteigerung, grundstück Aufhebung der beschlagnahme, Zwangsverwaltung, Grundeigentum, Eigentümer, Betriebskosten, Kaution, Prozessführungsbefugnis, Rückzahlung, Zwangsversteigerung, Grundstück Entscheidungsdatum: 16.08.2007 Normen: § 51 ZPO, § 152 Abs 2 ZVG, § 161 ZVG Aktenzeichen: 21a C 128/07 Prozessführungsbefugnis des ehemaligen Zwangsverwalters: Zulässigkeit einer Mieterklage auf Rückzahlung von Betriebskostenvorschüssen und Mietkaution Den Klägern wird nachgelassen, die Zwangsvollstreckung durch Sicherheitsleistung in Höhe von 105% des aus dem Urteil vollstreckbaren Betrages abzuwenden, soweit nicht der Beklagte vor der Vollstreckung Sicherheit in Höhe von 105 % des beizutreibenden Betrages leistet. 1Die Kläger sind seit dem 13. Januar 1984 Mieter der Wohnung Nr. 14 im 2. OG halbrechts im Hause ... Der Beklagte wurde durch Beschluss des Amtsgerichts Wedding vom 16. Januar 2002 – ... – als Zwangsverwalter für das Grundstück ... bestellt. Das Grundstück ist im Wege der Zwangsversteigerung mittlerweile an einen neuen Eigentümer, ... übergegangen. Die Zwangsverwaltung ist durch Beschluss vom 15. November 2005 – ... – aufgehoben worden. Die Kläger haben eine Mietkaution am 28. März 2002 in Höhe von 1.638,92 Euro an die damalige Hausverwaltung überwiesen. 2Mit der am 06. Juli 2007 zugestellten Klage begehren die Kläger Rückzahlung ihrer monatlichen Betriebskostenvorschüsse für Heizkosten und Betriebskosten von 180,93 Euro, insgesamt 8.684,64 Euro und der Mietkaution sowie vorgerichtlicher Anwaltsgebühren. 3Der Beklagte habe zu keinem Zeitpunkt eine Abrechnung über die Heiz- und Betriebskosten erteilt. Da der neue Eigentümer hierüber nicht abrechnen müsse, sei der Beklagte hierzu verpflichtet. Der neue Eigentümer habe auch keinen Nachweis für die Einzahlung der Kaution bzw. Weiterleitung durch den Beklagten erhalten und müsse daher die Kaution an die Kläger zahlen. 5den Beklagten zu verurteilen, an sie 61. 8.684,64 Euro Betriebs- und Heizkosten für den Zeitraum 2002 bis 2005 zu zahlen nebst Zinsen in Höhe von 5 Prozentpunkten über dem Basiszinssatz seit dem 06. Juli 2007, 72. 1.638,92 Euro Mietkaution nebst Zinsen in Höhe von 5 Prozentpunkten über dem Basiszinssatz seit dem 06. Juli 2007 zu zahlen, 83. nicht anrechenbare Rechtsanwaltsgebühren in Höhe von 555,85 Euro nebst Zinsen in Höhe von 5 Prozentpunkten über dem Basiszinssatz seit dem 06. Juli 2007 zu zahlen. 11 Die Klage sei als unzulässig abzuweisen, weil infolge der Aufhebung der Zwangsverwaltung infolge Zuschlages eine passive Prozessbefugnis des Beklagten nicht mehr bestehe. Mit Beendigung der Zwangsverwaltung sei die Verpflichtung des mehr bestehe. Mit Beendigung der Zwangsverwaltung sei die Verpflichtung des Beklagten erloschen, Nebenkostenabrechnungen zu erstellen. Ansprüche auf Mietkaution könnten nur gegen den Erwerber geltend gemacht werden, allerdings nur dann, wenn das Mietverhältnis beendet sei, was die Kläger nicht vorgetragen hätten. 12 Wegen der weiteren Einzelheiten des Sach- und Streitstandes wird auf die zwischen den Parteien gewechselten Schriftsätze nebst Anlagen Bezug genommen. 13 Die Klage ist als unzulässig abzuweisen, weil die nach § 51 Abs. 1 ZPO erforderliche Prozessführungsbefugnis des Beklagten nicht gegeben ist. Die Prozessführungsbefugnis des Beklagten als Zwangsverwalter ist mit dem Zeitpunkt der Aufhebung der Zwangsverwaltung durch Beschluss vom 15. November 2005 entfallen, weil sie aufgrund einer Zwangsversteigerung des beschlagnahmten Grundstückes aufgehoben worden ist. Wenn die Kläger, wie im vorliegenden Sachverhalt, nach Aufhebung der Zwangsverwaltung erst zeitlich später die Klage einreichen, ist diese unzulässig (Amtsgericht Charlottenburg Grundeigentum 2000, 1333, BGH Grundeigentum 2005, 1419). Die Pflicht des Beklagten als Zwangsverwalter zur Erteilung von Betriebskostenabrechnungen endet mit Aufhebung der Zwangsverwaltung, selbst wenn er Vorschüsse erhalten hat. Für die Betriebskostenvorschüsse ist dann der jeweilige Eigentümer zuständig, der zum Zeitpunkt des Ablaufes der Nebenkostenabrechnung Eigentümer war (BGH Grundeigentum 2004, 292, Landgericht Berlin Grundeigentum 2004, 691). 14 Was die Mietkaution betrifft, so geht auf den Erwerber des Grundstückes mit Erteilung des Zuschlages das Eigentum kraft Gesetzes gemäß §§ 146 Abs. 1, 90 Abs. 1 ZVG über. Dieser kann bei bestehendem Mietverhältnissen zum Zeitpunkt der rechtskräftigen Aufhebung der Beschlagnahme an alle Rechte als Vermieter wahrnehmen und seine Pflichten aus dem Mietverhältnis erfüllen. Dies gilt auch für Ansprüche des Mieters, die vom Zwangsverwalter nicht erfüllt worden sind und die gegen Erwerber nach Maßgabe der §§ 57 ZVG, 566 a BGB gerichtet werden können. Demgegenüber erfordert es die Pflicht des Zwangsverwalters, nach dem Ende der Zwangsverwaltung seine Geschäfte ordnungsgemäß abzuwickeln nicht, ihn in diesen Fällen noch nachwirkend als Partei kraft Amtes anzusehen. Ebenso wenig besteht ein praktisches Bedürfnis, neben dem Erwerber oder dem Zwangsvollstreckungsschuldner auch den ehemaligen Zwangsverwalter gerichtlich in Anspruch nehmen zu können (BGH Grundeigentum 2005, 1419). 15 Unabhängig von der Unzulässigkeit der Klage sei darauf hingewiesen, dass der Beklagte zu Recht darauf hinweist, dass die Kläger die Fälligkeit des Rückzahlungsanspruches hinsichtlich der Mietkaution nicht dargelegt haben, weil sie Anhaltspunkte dafür, dass das Mietverhältnis etwa beendet worden ist, nicht vorgetragen haben. 16 Da die Ansprüche nicht begründet sind, können die Kläger aus dem Gesichtspunkt des Verzugsschadens auch keine vorgerichtlichen Rechtsanwaltsgebühren geltend machen. 17 Die Nebenentscheidungen beruhen auf §§ 91, 708 Nr. 11, 711 ZPO.
fi	wikipedia	N/A	Jeldos Bakytbajuly Smetov (, s. 9. syyskuuta 1992 Taraz) on kazakstanilainen judon maailmanmestari. Smetov kilpailee alle 60-kiloisten sarjassa. Smetov voitti maailmanmestaruuden kotiyleisönsä edessä vuonna 2015. Hän sai hopeaa Rio de Janeiron olympialaisissa 2016 ja pronssia vuonna 2021 järjestetyissä Tokion olympialaisissa. MM-pronssia hän saavutti Tokiossa 2019 ja Taškentissa 2022. Aasian kisoista Incheonista 2014 hän voitti kultaa 60-kiloisista ja sai hopeaa joukkuekilpailusta. Smetovilla on myös yksi kulta ja yksi pronssi Aasian-mestaruuskilpailuissa. Vuonna 2010 hän voitti alle 20-vuotiaiden maailman- ja Aasian-mestaruuden 55-kiloisissa ja sai 2011 saman ikäluokan MM-pronssia 60-kiloisissa. Sotilaiden MM-kilpailuista Smetovilla on yksi hopea vuodelta 2011. Hän on saavuttanut IJF World Tourin kilpailuissa seitsemän turnausvoittoa, viisi kakkossijaa ja kolme kolmossijaa. Maailmancupeissa / Continental Open -kilpailuissa hänellä on kaksi voittoa ja yksi kakkossija. Lähteet Kazakstanilaiset judokat Kazakstanilaiset olympiamitalistit Vuonna 1992 syntyneet Elävät henkilöt
fi	caselaw	EU	21.2.2022 FI Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti C 84/49 Kanne 5.1.2022 – Puma v. EUIPO – Brooks Sports (kulmaa esittävä kuva) (Asia T-5/22) (2022/C 84/68) Oikeudenkäyntikieli: englanti Asianosaiset ja muut osapuolet Kantaja: Puma SE (Herzogenaurach, Saksa) (edustaja: asianajaja P. González-Bueno Catalán de Ocón) Vastaaja: Euroopan unionin teollisoikeuksien virasto (EUIPO) Muu osapuoli valituslautakunnassa: Brooks Sports, Inc. (Seattle, Washington, Yhdysvallat) Menettely EUIPO:ssa Riidanalaisen tavaramerkin haltija: Muu osapuoli valituslautakunnassa Riidanalainen tavaramerkki: Kuviomerkin (kulmaa esittävä kuva) Euroopan unionin nimeävä kansainvälinen rekisteröinti – Euroopan unionin nimeävä kansainvälinen rekisteröinti nro 1 441 912 EUIPO:ssa käyty menettely: Väitemenettely Riidanalainen päätös: EUIPO:n neljännen valituslautakunnan 29.10.2021 asiassa R 910/2021-4 tekemä päätös Vaatimukset Kantaja vaatii, että unionin yleinen tuomioistuin — kumoaa riidanalaisen päätöksen ja — velvoittaa EUIPO:n ja muun osapuolen valituslautakunnassa korvaamaan oikeudenkäyntikulut. Kanneperusteet — Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston asetuksen (EU) 2017/1001 8 artiklan 1 kohdan b alakohtaa on rikottu. — Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston asetuksen (EU) 2017/1001 8 artiklan 5 kohtaa on rikottu.
es	wikipedia	N/A	La línea 51 es una línea regular diurna de Avanza Zaragoza. Realiza el recorrido comprendido entre el Pabellón Príncipe Felipe y la Estación Intermodal de Zaragoza-Delicias en la ciudad de Zaragoza (España). Tiene una frecuencia media de 10 minutos. Plano de recorrido Recorrido Sentido Estación Delicias Cesáreo Alierta, Paseo de la Constitución, Paseo Pamplona, Paseo María Agustín, Plaza del Portillo, Avenida Madrid, Avenida Navarra, Estación Delicias, Avenida Navarra, Estación Delicias Sentido Príncipe Felipe Estación Delicias, Avenida Navarra, Avenida Madrid, Paseo María Agustín, Paseo Pamplona, Paseo de la Constitución, Cesáreo Alierta Referencias Enlaces externos TUZSA (web) Esquema con el recorrido y las paradas de todas las líneas de la red de transporte. TUZSA (web) Plano de la línea 51. Líneas diurnas de Avanza Zaragoza
es	wikipedia	N/A	El condado de Zadar () es un condado croata. La población del condado era de 162.045 habitantes en 2001. Su centro administrativo es la ciudad de Zadar. Ciudades y municipios El condado de Zadar está dividido en 6 ciudades y 28 municipios: Ciudades Zadar Benkovac Biograd na Moru Nin Obrovac Pag Municipios Bibinje Galovac Gračac Jasenice Kali Kolan Kukljica Lišane Ostrovičke Novigrad Pakoštane Pašman Polača Poličnik Posedarje Povljana Preko Privlaka Ražanac Sali Stankovci Starigrad Sukošan Sveti Filip i Jakov Škabrnja Tkon Vir Vrsi Zemunik Donji Enlaces externos Condado de Zadar Dalmacia Zadar Zadar
en	contracts	US	CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C SECTION 1350AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION -OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of PRINCIPLE SECURITY INTERNATIONAL, INC. (the “Company”) for the period endedFebruary 28, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Charles Payne, Chief Executive Officerand Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: a) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and b) The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material aspects, the financial condition and results of operations of all the Company. Dated: March 26, 2009 /s/ Charles Payne By: Charles Payne, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
es	other	N/A	Fecha de disposición: 17/06/11 Título: ORDEN de 17 de junio de 2011, de la Consejera de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, por la que se regula la expedición en la Comunidad Autónoma de Aragón del certificado de nivel avanzado de las enseñanzas de idiomas de régimen especial establecidas en la Ley Orgánica 2/2006, de 3 de mayo, de Educación. La Ley Orgánica 2/2006, de 3 de mayo, de Educación, establece en el artículo 6.2 que el Gobierno fijará los aspectos básicos del currículo que constituyen las enseñanzas mínimas con el fin de asegurar una formación común y garantizar la validez de los títulos y certificados de las enseñanzas, correspondiendo a las Administraciones educativas competentes, de acuerdo con el apartado 4 de ese mismo artículo, el establecimiento del currículo de las distintas enseñanzas reguladas en ella. El Real Decreto 1629/2006, de 29 de diciembre, fija los aspectos básicos del currículo de las enseñanzas de idiomas de régimen especial, en sus niveles básico, intermedio y avanzado. Este último será desarrollado por la Comunidad Autónoma de Aragón en la Orden de 7 de julio de 2008, de la Consejera de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, por la que se establece el currículo del nivel avanzado de las enseñanzas de idiomas de régimen especial reguladas por la Ley Orgánica 2/2006, de 3 de mayo, de Educación, que se imparten en la Comunidad Autónoma de Aragón y en la Orden de 11 de julio de 2008, de la Consejera de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, por la que se establece el currículo de los niveles básico, intermedio y avanzado de las enseñanzas de idiomas de régimen especial de chino reguladas por la Ley Orgánica 2/2006, de 3 de mayo de Educación, que se imparten en la Comunidad Autónoma de Aragón. De acuerdo con lo establecido por el Real Decreto 806/2006, de 30 de junio, por el que se establece el calendario de aplicación de la ordenación del sistema educativo establecido por la Ley orgánica de Educación, el nivel avanzado se implantó en el curso 2008-2009. La Ley Orgánica 2/2006, de 3 de mayo, de Educación, establece en el artículo 61 que las Administraciones educativas regularán las pruebas terminales para la obtención de los certificados oficiales de las enseñanzas de idiomas, entre los que se encuentra el nivel avanzado. La Orden de 28 de enero de 2009 de la Consejera de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, regula la obtención de los certificados de los distintos niveles de las enseñanzas de idiomas de régimen especial reguladas por la Ley Orgánica 2/2006, de 3 de mayo, de Educación, que se imparten en la Comunidad Autónoma de Aragón. Las precitadas órdenes de 7 de julio de 2008, por la que se establece el currículo del nivel avanzado, y de 11 de julio de 2008, por la que se establece el currículo de nivel avanzado de chino, regulan respectivamente en su artículo 8 que el certificado de nivel avanzado será expedido por el Departamento de Educación, Cultura y Deporte a propuesta de la escuela oficial de idiomas correspondiente. La Orden de 30 de abril de 1996, desarrolla el artículo 4.3. Registros de las Administraciones públicas y artículo 5. Registro central de títulos, del Real Decreto 733/1995, de 5 mayo, sobre expedición de títulos académicos y profesionales correspondientes a las enseñanzas establecidas por la Ley Orgánica 1/1990, de 3 de octubre, de Ordenación General del Sistema Educativo. El Decreto 162/1999, de 3 de septiembre, del Gobierno de Aragón, crea y regula el Registro y regula el procedimiento de expedición de Títulos Académicos y Profesionales de la Comunidad Autónoma de Aragón, correspondientes a las enseñanzas establecidas por la Ley Orgánica 1/1990, de 3 de octubre, de Ordenación General del Sistema Educativo, modificado por el Decreto 95/2008, de 27 de mayo del Gobierno de Aragón. En el ejercicio de las competencias atribuidas por el Decreto 18/2009, de 10 de febrero, del Gobierno de Aragón, por el que se aprueba la estructura orgánica del Departamento de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, corresponde a la Consejería de Educación, Cultura y Deporte la competencia en materia de expedición y registro de los títulos académicos y certificados del sistema educativo vigente. 1. La presente orden tiene por objeto regular el modelo, contenido y especificaciones técnicas, así como la expedición y registro, del certificado de nivel avanzado de las enseñanzas de idiomas de régimen especial reguladas en el capítulo VII de la Ley Orgánica 2/2006, de 3 de mayo, de Educación, y desarrolladas mediante el Real Decreto 1629/2006, de 29 de diciembre, por el que se fijan los aspectos básicos del currículo de las enseñanzas de idiomas de régimen especial, la Orden de 7 de julio de 2008, de la Consejera de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, por la que se establece el currículo del nivel avanzado de las enseñanzas de idiomas de régimen especial reguladas por la Ley Orgánica 2/2006, de 3 de mayo, de Educación, que se imparten en la Comunidad Autónoma de Aragón y la Orden de 11 de julio de 2008, de la Consejera de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, por la que se establece el currículo de los niveles básico, intermedio y avanzado de las enseñanzas de idiomas de régimen especial de chino reguladas por la Ley Orgánica 2/2006, de 3 de mayo de Educación, que se imparten en la Comunidad Autónoma de Aragón. 2. Esta Orden será de aplicación en la Comunidad Autónoma de Aragón tal como establece la Orden de 28 de enero de 2009 que regula la obtención de los certificados de los distintos niveles de las enseñanzas de idiomas de régimen especial. Artículo 2. Administración educativa competente El certificado acreditativo de nivel avanzado de las enseñanzas de idiomas de régimen especial será expedido por el Departamento de Educación, Cultura y Deporte al alumnado de las Escuelas Oficiales de Idiomas de la Comunidad Autónoma de Aragón que haya superado dichas enseñanzas. Artículo 3. Modelo de certificado 1. Los certificados se expedirán por el titular del Departamento de educación, Cultura y Deporte de la Comunidad Autónoma de Aragón, en nombre del Rey, con las especificaciones y diligencias que correspondan, previa adopción de las medidas técnicas precisas para garantizar su autenticidad, de acuerdo con las características que figuran en los Anexos II y III de la presente orden. 2. El contenido de los certificados será el establecido en el anexo I de la presente orden y recogerá, en el anverso, las firmas impresas del interesado, del titular del Departamento de Educación, Cultura y Deporte y de la Directora General de Administración educativa. Estas dos últimas firmas irán impresas. 3. Las especificaciones materiales y características mínimas de seguridad de los certificados de nivel avanzado serán las que se establecen en los Anexos II y III de la presente orden. 4. Cada certificado recogerá una clave identificativa registral que irá impresa en el anverso del mismo. 5. La denominación del certificado será la establecida en el Real Decreto 1629/2006, de 29 de diciembre, por el que se fijan los aspectos básicos del currículo de las enseñanzas de idiomas de régimen especial reguladas por la Ley Orgánica 2/2006 de 3 de mayo, de Educación. 1. El procedimiento de expedición de certificados de nivel avanzado se iniciará a solicitud del interesado y previo pago de las tasas correspondientes. 2. La propuesta de expedición del nivel avanzado sólo podrá efectuarse si el interesado ha cumplido previamente los requisitos que para su obtención exigen las norma vigentes y ha abonado, en su caso, las correspondientes tasas. 3. El Departamento de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, establecerá el procedimiento de tramitación de las solicitudes, así como las plazos para resolver la expedición de los certificados, a los efectos del procedimiento de tramitación de las solicitudes de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en la Ley 30/1992, de 26 de noviembre, de Régimen Jurídico de las Administraciones Públicas y del Procedimiento Administrativo Común y el Decreto 162/1999 de 3 de septiembre por el que se crea el Registro y se regula el procedimiento de expedición de Títulos Académicos y Profesionales de la Comunidad Autónoma de Aragón. Artículo 5. Registro de certificados de nivel avanzado de enseñanzas de idiomas 1. La expedición y registro de certificados de nivel avanzado de las enseñanzas de idiomas reguladas por la Ley Orgánica 2/2006, dependen del Departamento de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, a través de la Dirección General de Política Educativa, encargada de la organización, gestión y custodia del Registro de Títulos Académicos y Profesionales de Aragón en la educación no universitaria. 2. Los certificados de nivel avanzado de enseñanzas de idiomas quedarán inscritos en el Registro de Títulos Académicos y Profesionales de Aragón, creado por el Decreto 162/1999, de 3 de septiembre, del Gobierno de Aragón, modificado por el Decreto 95/2008, de 27 de mayo, del Gobierno de Aragón. 3. Cada certificado llevará asignado una clave identificativa que se imprimirá en el mismo como medida de seguridad. El contenido de dicha clave será idéntica a la prevista para los títulos derivados de la Ley Orgánica 1/1990, y que viene determinado en el anexo I de la Orden de 30 de abril de 1996 por la que se desarrollan los artículos 4.3 y 5 del Real Decreto 733/1995, de 5 de mayo, sobre expedición de títulos académicos y profesionales correspondientes a las enseñanzas establecidas por la Ley Orgánica 1/1990, de 3 de octubre, de Ordenación General del Sistema Educativo y en el Decreto 162/1999, de 3 de septiembre, del Gobierno de Aragón, modificado por el Decreto 95/2008, de 27 de mayo, del Gobierno de Aragón. 4. Para cada certificado, y en el plazo de un mes contado desde la fecha del correspondiente asiento registral, la Dirección General de Política Educativa enviará al Registro Central de Títulos del Ministerio de Educación, los datos correspondientes a los mismos para su integración en dicho Registro Central. Las tasas que hayan de abonar los interesados, en los casos y por los conceptos que procedan, constituirán ingresos exigibles por la Comunidad autónoma de Aragón y se regirá por lo establecido por el artículo 20 del Decreto 162/1999, de 3 de septiembre, así como por su normativa específica. Artículo 7. Procedimiento de reexpedición 1. El certificado cuya expedición se regula en la presente orden es un documento público. Cualquier modificación, alteración o enmienda que legalmente proceda efectuar en su contenido exigirá su reexpedición material mediante procedimiento análogo al seguido para su expedición. 2. Procederá la expedición de duplicado de un certificado de nivel avanzado en los casos de extravío, destrucción total o parcial o rectificación del original que comporte la pérdida de su identificación. Cuando la expedición de un duplicado se deba a causas atribuibles al interesado, correrá a su cargo el abono de las correspondientes tasas. 3. En el duplicado que se expida deberán figurar impresas las mismas claves registrales que en original respectivo. En la obtención de los datos personales del alumno se estará a lo dispuesto en la legislación vigente en materia de protección de datos de carácter personal y a lo establecido en la disposición adicional vigesimotercera de la Ley Orgánica 2/2006 de 3 de mayo, de Educación. Segunda. Certificados anteriores a la Ley Orgánica 2/2006, de 3 de mayo, de Educación De acuerdo con lo establecido en la disposición adicional segunda del Real Decreto 1850/2009, de 4 de diciembre, sobre expedición de títulos académicos y profesionales correspondientes a las enseñanzas establecidas por la Ley Orgánica 2/2006, de 3 de mayo, de Educación, la expedición de los títulos, diplomas y certificados correspondientes a los sistemas educativos anteriores al establecido por la Ley Orgánica 2/2006, de 3 de mayo, seguirá rigiéndose por el Real Decreto 1564/1982, de 18 de junio y Real Decreto 733/1995, de 5 de mayo, así como por sus normas complementarias. Primera. Facultades de aplicación Se faculta a los órganos directivos del Departamento de Educación, Cultura y Deporte para dictar, en el ámbito de sus respectivas competencias, cuantas resoluciones sean necesarias para la aplicación y ejecución de lo establecido en la presente orden. Segunda. Publicación y entrada en vigor
sk	legislation	Slovakia	661 VYHLÁŠKA Národnej banky Slovenska a Ministerstva financií Slovenskej republiky z 12. novembra 2004, ktorou sa mení a dopĺňa vyhláška Národnej banky Slovenska a Ministerstva financií Slovenskej republiky č. 600/2001 Z. z. o registri hypoték a podrobnostiach o postavení a činnosti hypotekárneho správcu a jeho zástupcu Národná banka Slovenska a Ministerstvo financií Slovenskej republiky podľa § 76 ods. 4 zákona č. 483/2001 Z. z. o bankách a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov ustanovujú: Čl. I Vyhláška Národnej banky Slovenska a Ministerstva financií Slovenskej republiky č. 600/2001 Z. z. o registri hypoték a podrobnostiach o postavení a činnosti hypotekárneho správcu a jeho zástupcu sa mení a dopĺňa takto: 1. V § 2 ods. 1 sa za písmeno e) vkladá nové písmeno f), ktoré znie: "f) mená a podpisy oprávnených zástupcov banky,". Doterajšie písmeno f) sa označuje ako písmeno g). 2. V § 2 odsek 2 znie: "(2) Údaje podľa odseku 1 písm. c) sú tieto: a) poradové číslo a identifikačné číslo úverovej zmluvy, b) dátum a lehota splatnosti úveru, c) schválená výška poskytnutého úveru a výška jeho čerpania, d) výška úrokovej sadzby úveru, e) účel poskytnutia úveru, f) označenie založenej nehnuteľnosti podľa údajov katastra nehnuteľností, 1 ) a to 1. katastrálne územie, 2. číslo listu vlastníctva, 3. súpisné číslo stavby, 4. parcelné číslo pozemku, 5. druh nehnuteľnosti, g) hodnota založenej nehnuteľnosti určená hypotekárnou bankou, h) dátum a číslo právoplatného rozhodnutia o povolení vkladu záložného práva do katastra nehnuteľností, i) aktuálna výška nesplatenej istiny.". 3. V § 2 ods. 3 sa za písmeno g) vkladá nové písmeno h), ktoré znie: "h) celková menovitá hodnota predaných hypotekárnych záložných listov a komunálnych obligácií,". Doterajšie písmeno h) sa označuje ako písmeno i). 4. V § 3 odsek 1 znie: "(1) Informácia podľa § 76 ods. 3 zákona obsahuje údaje za obdobie predchádzajúcich šiestich mesiacov, dátum jej vyhotovenia, mená, priezviská a podpisy oprávnených zástupcov hypotekárnej banky a hypotekárneho správcu; vzor informácie je uvedený v prílohe č. 4.". 5. Za § 5 sa vkladá § 5a, ktorý znie: "§ 5a Informácia podľa § 3 ods. 1 sa v januári 2005 predloží podľa doterajších predpisov.". 6. Prílohy č. 1 až 4 sa nahrádzajú prílohami č. 1 až 4 k tejto vyhláške a prílohy č. 5 a 6 sa vypúšťajú. Čl. II Táto vyhláška nadobúda účinnosť 1. januára 2005. Marián Jusko v. r. Ivan Mikloš v. r.
pt	other	N/A	DJSP 18/06/2018 - Pg. 1625 - Judicial - 1a instância - capital \| Diário de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo \| Diários Jusbrasil Página 1625 da Judicial - 1a Instância - Capital do Diário de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo (DJSP) de 18 de Junho de 2018 DOTTA (OAB 155456/SP) Processo 1024265-60.2018.8.26.0053 - Procedimento Comum - Anulação de Débito Fiscal - BV Financeira S/A Crédito, Financiamento e Investimento - Vistos.Diante da contestação ofertada, manifeste-se a parte autora em réplica.Prazo de 15 (quinze) dias.Int. - ADV: MARCELO DE CARVALHO (OAB 117364/SP), EDUARDO MONTENEGRO DOTTA (OAB 155456/SP), DOTTA, DONEGATTI, LACERDA E TORRES SOCIEDADE DE ADVOGADOS (OAB 12086/SP) Processo 1025171-50.2018.8.26.0053 - Mandado de Segurança - CNH - Carteira Nacional de Habilitação - NILSON SILVA DE JESUS - Vistos. A liminar no mandado de segurança deve ser concedida diante da presença de dois requisitos, quais sejam, relevância dos motivos em que se fundamenta o pedido e possibilidade de lesão irreparável ao direito do impetrante. Na espécie, não verifico a presença dos citados requisitos, pois os documentos não são suficientes para convencer este juízo acerca de eventual ilegalidade praticada pela autora coatora, vez que existindo suspeita de fraude na emissão da CNH ou da permissão para dirigir é possível o bloqueio cautelar, medida administrativa não punitiva, necessária até a apuração dos fatos. Nesse sentido: APELAÇÃO - Ação Declaratória - Bloqueio da CNH doautor pela Corregedoria da DETRAN/SP, decorrente dedenúncias de fraudes envolvendo a obtenção dehabilitações - Alegação de prescrição da pretensãopunitiva - Processo administrativo no 276345-1/2007 instaurado em 2007 -Inadmissibilidade - Exercício deautocontrole de legalidade dos atos administrativos-Sentença mantida - Recurso desprovido. (ApelaçãoCível no 0052876.50.2012.8.26.0053, Rel. Des. AnaLiarte, j. 28/04/2014, 4a Câmara de Direito Público). Sendo assim, indefiro a liminar. Para a concessão da gratuidade processual, junte o impetrante cópias das 3 últimas declarações de imposto de renda. Intime-se. - ADV: JOAO DALBERTO DE FARIA (OAB 49438/SP) Processo 1025352-51.2018.8.26.0053 - Procedimento Comum - Indenização por Dano Moral - Agda Maria dos Santos Pereira e outros - Vistos.Defiro os benefícios da AJG ao (s) autor (es). Anote-se.Deixo de designar audiência de conciliação ou mediação, nos termos do artigo 334, § 4o, II do Código de Processo Civil, tendo em vista que os Procuradores do Estado e do Município não detêm poderes para transigir, mormente se considerado o interesse indisponível por eles defendido. Servindo esta decisão como mandado, cite-se a (s) ré(s), para que no prazo legal, contado nos termos do artigo 231, do CPC, querendo, apresente (m) defesa. Consignando-se que, não contestada a ação, presumir-se-ão verdadeiras as alegações de fato formuladas pelo (s) autor (es) (artigo 344, do CPC). As audiências realizam-se no Fórum, situado no Viaduto Dona Paulina, no 80, 8o andar, sala 805, Centro/São Paulo, Capital. Servirá a presente, por cópia digitada, como mandado. Cumpra-se na forma e sob as penas da Lei. Considerando que este feito tramita digitalmente, a íntegra da inicial e de todos os documentos que instruem o processo podem ser acessados por meio do endereço eletrônico do Tribunal de Justiça (http://esaj.tjsp.jus.br/cpo/pg/open.do), acessando o link: “este processo é digital. Clique aqui para informar a senha e acessar os autos”. Por esse motivo, o mandado não é instruído com cópias de documentos. A senha para acesso ao processo digital está anexada a esta decisão.Intime-se. - ADV: CLAUDIA MOREIRA DA SILVA (OAB 176773/SP) Processo 1025361-13.2018.8.26.0053 - Mandado de Segurança - Extinção do Crédito Tributário - Luiz Fernando de Matteis e outro - Vistos. A liminar no mandado de segurança deve ser concedida diante da presença de dois requisitos, quais sejam, relevância dos motivos em que se fundamenta o pedido e possibilidade de lesão irreparável ao direito do impetrante. No caso, verifico a relevância dos fundamentos invocados, pois a Lei Municipal no 14.256/06 estabeleceu novo conceito de valor venal, em total afronta ao art. 38 do CTN, valendo-se de parâmetros diferenciados, contrariando a segurança jurídica e o princípio do contraditório, ferindo também a legalidade. Ademais, sobre o tema, o Colendo Órgão Especial do E. Tribunal de Justiça inconstitucionais os artigos 7o-A e 7o-B, da Lei Municipal no 11.154/1991: INCIDENTE DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDADE - Artigo 7o da Lei no 11.154, de 30 de dezembro de 1991, com a redação dada pelas Leis nos 14.125, de 29 de dezembro de 2005, e 14.256, de 29 de dezembro de 2006, todas do Município de São Paulo, que estabelece o valor pelo qual o bem ou direito é negociado à vista, em condições normais de mercado, como a base de cálculo do Imposto sobre Transmissão de Bens Imóveis (ITBI) - Acórdão que, a despeito de não manifestar de forma expressa, implicitamente também questionou as disposições dos artigos 7o-A, 7o-B e 12 da mesma legislação municipal Valor venal atribuído ao imóvel para apuração do ITBI que não se confunde necessariamente com aquele utilizado para lançamento do IPTU Precedentes do STJ - Previsão contida no aludido artigo 7o que, nessa linha, não representa afronta ao princípio da legalidade, haja vista que, como regra, arealizado, tendo em consideração as declarações prestadas pelo próprio contribuinte, o que, em princípio, espelharia o “real valor de mercado do imóvel” - “Valor venal de referência”, todavia, que deve servir ao Município apenas como parâmetro de verificação da compatibilidade do preço declarado de venda, não podendo se prestar para a prévia fixação da base de cálculo do ITBI - Impossibilidade, outrossim, de se impor ao sujeito passivo do imposto, desde logo, a adoção da tabela realizada pelo Município - Imposto municipal em causa que está sujeito ao lançamento por homologação, cabendo ao próprio contribuinte antecipar o recolhimento - Arbitramento administrativo que é providência excepcional, da qual o Município somente pode lançar mão na hipótese de ser constatada a incorreção ou falsidade na documentação comprobatória do negócio jurídico tributável - Providência que, de toda sorte, depende sempre da prévia instauração do pertinente procedimento administrativo, na forma do artigo 148 do Código Tributário Nacional, sob pena de restar caracterizado o lançamento de ofício da exação, ao qual o ITBI não se submete - Artigos 7o-A e 7o-B que, nesse passo, subvertem o procedimento estabelecido na legislação complementar tributária, em afronta ao princípio da legalidade estrita, inserido no artigo 150, inciso I, da Constituição Federal - Inadmissibilidade, ainda, de se exigir o recolhimento antecipado do tributo, nos moldes estabelecidos no artigo 12 da Lei Municipal no 11.154/91, por representar violação ao preceito do artigo 156, inciso II, da Constituição Federal - Registro imobiliário que é constitutivo da propriedade, não tendo efeito meramente regularizador e publicitário, razão pela qual deve ser tomado como fato gerador do ITBI - Regime constitucional da substituição tributária, previsto no artigo 150, § 7o, da Constituição Federal, que nem tem lugar na espécie, haja vista que não se cuida de norma que autoriza a antecipação da exigibilidade do imposto de forma irrestrita - Arguição acolhida para o fim de pronunciar a inconstitucionalidade dos artigos 7o-A, 7o-B e 12, da Lei no 11.154/91, do Município de São Paulo. (TJ/SP, Órgão Especial, Arguição de Inconstitucionalidade no 0056693-19.2014.8.26.0000, Rel. Paulo Dimas Mascaretti, J. 25/03/2015) (grifo nosso) Sendo assim, DEFIRO a liminar para assegurar aos impetrantes o recolhimento do ITBI, do imóvel descrito na inicial, com base no valor do IPTU ou o valor da negociação (o maior valor), conforme postulado, bem como para suspender a exigibilidade do crédito tributário, nos termos do art. 151, IV do CTN. Notifique-se e dê-se ciência. Após, ao Ministério Público e conclusos. Servirá o presente como mandado e/ou ofício, que poderá ser entregue diretamente pelos impetrantes e/ou seus advogados. Int. - ADV: SERGIO EDUARDO TOMAZ (OAB 352504/SP), HENRI MATARASSO FILHO (OAB 316181/SP) Processo 1025421-83.2018.8.26.0053 - Procedimento Comum - Isonomia/Equivalência Salarial - Wilson Roberto das Neves - Vistos.Tendo em vista o valor dado à causa, bem como a não complexidade da matéria, que afasta realização de provas, determino a remessa a uma das Varas do Juizado Especial da Fazenda Pública, nos termos da Lei no 12.153, de 22 de dezembro de 2009 e Provimentos do Conselho Superior da Magistratura no 1768/10 e 1769/10.Comunique-se ao Distribuidor.Int. - ADV: CARLOS EDUARDO FERRARI (OAB 98598/SP), WENIO DOS SANTOS TEIXEIRA (OAB 377921/SP) Processo 1025535-22.2018.8.26.0053 - Procedimento Comum - Adicional por Tempo de Serviço - Antonio Tornich Junior - Vistos.Defiro os benefícios da AJG ao (s) autor (es). Anote-se.Deixo de designar audiência de conciliação ou mediação, nos Andamento do Processo n. 1024265-60.2018.8.26.0053 - Procedimento Comum - Anulação de Débito Fiscal - 18/06/2018 do TJSP Andamento do Processo n. 1025171-50.2018.8.26.0053 - Mandado de Segurança - Cnh - 18/06/2018 do TJSP Andamento do Processo n. 1025352-51.2018.8.26.0053 - Procedimento Comum - Indenização por Dano Moral - 18/06/2018 do TJSP Andamento do Processo n. 1025361-13.2018.8.26.0053 - Mandado de Segurança - Extinção do Crédito Tributário - 18/06/2018 do TJSP Andamento do Processo n. 1025421-83.2018.8.26.0053 - Procedimento Comum - Isonomia/equivalência Salarial - 18/06/2018 do TJSP Andamento do Processo n. 1025535-22.2018.8.26.0053 - Procedimento Comum - Adicional por Tempo de Serviço - 18/06/2018 do TJSP
pt	wikipedia	N/A	Ozegia Adi Obanseriqui ou Ozegya Adi Obanseriki foi um ozana/osana (rei) de Queana na segunda metade do . Vida Na década de 1750, quando já era ozana, Ozegia recrutou soldados tives do sul do rio Benué na tentativa de centralizar a confederação alagô centrada em Queana e assentou-os nas cercanias da cidade, talvez para proteção. Ele também recrutou agricultores tives para desenvolver a economia de seu Estado. Ele obteve sucesso nessa política, e tal sucesso pode ser explicado por concentrar a produção e distribuição de sal, o principal produto produzido pelos alagôs, enquanto a subsistência era suprida pelos tives. Como a produção de sal na região é essencialmente uma tarefa feminina, ele pôde influenciar a economia ao casar-se com muitas esposas que, junto de seus filhos, foram encorajadas ou coagidas a produzir e isso influenciou outras a fazerem o mesmo. O Reino de Queana provavelmente formou-se após 1775 e entre 1781-1814 eclodiu a Guerra Civil de Queana. Quando estava em Api com o acu (título), Ozegia foi até lá solicitar sua intervenção na resolução do conflito entre ele e certo Ainsse Oiegefu que aliou-o com alguns chefes de Queana e expulsou-o do país. O acu prontamente interveio, restaurou-o como ozana e prendeu Ainsse Oiegefu. Acu também solicitou que Dunoma escoltasse Ozegia para Queana. Os habitantes de Queana não ficaram contentes com seu retorno, mas nada fizeram pois retornou com fortes aliados. O filho de Ainsse Oiegefu, Ogboxi, tentou inúmeras vezes matar Ozegia, mas o rei, ciente do perigo, convocou Dunoma, que prendeu e matou Ogboxi. Isso permitiu que a paz fosse instaurada e como recompensa por sua ajuda, Ozegia concedeu a Dunoma o prestigioso título de "macama". Bibliografia Reino de Queana
en	wikipedia	N/A	The Macedonian Anti-Fascist Organization was a Macedonian political organization formed in 1941 in the Voden region at the initiative of the Communist Party of Greece. The organization was headed by Vangel Ajanovski-Oče, Angel Gacev, Risto Kordalov, Dini Papayankov and others. The aim of the organization was, in alliance with the Greek EAM-ELAS, to fight the fascist forces. It was dissolved in 1943. References Organizations established in 1941 Organizations disestablished in 1943 Greek Resistance Greek Macedonia in World War II Communist Party of Greece Left-wing militant groups in Greece
en	contracts	US	EX-10.5.1 4 exh1051.htm EXHIBIT-AMENDMENT TO LEASES 06302002 Form 10-Q Exhbit 10.5.1 Exhibit 10.5.1 SECOND AMENDMENT OF LEASE This Second Amendment of Lease is made and entered into this 19th day of March, 1997, by and between Crossroads Associates and Clocktower Associates (Landlord), and Siebel Systems, Inc. a California Corporation (Tenant). RECITALS A. WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant entered into a Lease dated June 4th, 1996, (the Lease) for the lease of approximately 66,426 gross square feet of space located in the five story Building located at 1855 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California; and B. WHEREAS, by letter dated October 30th, 1996 Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the fourth floor of 1875 South Grant Street, and by letter dated December 17th, 1996, Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the tenth floor of the 1875 South Grant Street Building; and C. WHEREAS, by First Amendment of Lease dated March 17, 1997 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 12,926 rentable square feet of space located on the first floor of 1875 South Grant Street, commencing April 1st, 1997, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with California Federal Bank, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the First Amendment of Lease void; D. WHEREAS, Tenant desires to lease an additional 12,926 gross square feet of space (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of Building common areas) located on the first floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 114,756 rentable square feet (66,426 s.f. + 35,404 s.f. + 12,926 s.f.). NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Landlord and Tenant agree as follows: 1. The Premises to be leased hereunder shall hereinafter be referred to as the First Floor 1875 Space" and is described as follows: 12,926 rentable square feet of space, which includes Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the first floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California and as further outlined in red on Exhibit "A". 2. Effective Date and Termination Date The "Effective Date" shall hereinafter be defined as April 1st, 1998. The Lease Termination Date for the First Floor 1875 Space shall be co-terminus with the space leased by Tenant at 1855 South Grant Street and therefore shall be August 7th, 2006. Landlord and Tenant further agree Tenant's Lease of the First Floor 1875 Space shall be subject to the options to extend the Lease per paragraph 48 of the Lease. 3. Upon the Effective Date, Landlord agrees to lease to Tenant and Tenant agrees to lease and hire from Landlord the First Floor 1875 Space as defined above. 4. Tenant agrees to lease the First Floor 1875 Space in an as-is condition, and any alteration or modifications to the Premises shall be made in accordance with paragraphs 8 & 9 of the Lease and shall not delay the commencement of Lease for the First Floor 1875 Space nor delay the payment of rent and all such modifications shall be at Tenant's sole cost and expense. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, Landlord agrees to provide Tenant an allowance equal to the cost to recarpet the First Floor 1875 Space with building standard carpet and building standard base and to repaint the First Floor 1875 Space. The allowance to be provided herein shall be in the form of a credit against Basic Rent due and owing from Tenant to Landlord, and said allowance shall be credited to Tenant in the month succeeding the installation of new carpet, base, and paint for the applicable areas. 5. Basic Rent Commencing on the Effective Date, Tenant's monthly Basic Rent for the First Floor 1875 Space shall be l2,926s.f. x $2.30 = $29,729.80 per month. This amount shall be adjusted on August 7th, 1998 and annually thereafter per the terms and limitations described in paragraph 38 of the Lease. For example, if effective August 7th, 1998 the annual rent adjustment described in paragraph 38 of the Lease is 2.4% then Effective August 7th, 1998 Tenant's Basic Rent for the First Floor 1875 Space will be adjusted as follows: $29,729.80 x 1.04 = $30,918.99. This amount will be adjusted annually thereafter according to paragraph 38. 6. Additional Rent Upon the Effective Date, Tenant's Additional Rent as described in paragraph 4D of the Lease shall be increased by the then current rate being charged to tenants occupying Building 1875 and shall continue to be adjusted per the terms and conditions of paragraph 4D. For example if the Additional Rent per square foot per month for space in the 1875 Building as of the Effective Date was $0.62/square foot/month, commencing upon the Effective Date, Tenant's Additional Rent would be increased by the following amount: 12,926 s.f. x $0.62 per square foot per month = $8,014 per month. 7. Parking Upon the Effective Date, Tenant's allocated number of parking spaces in the Complex shall be increased by 40 spaces. 8. Landlord and Tenant mutually acknowledge and agree that neither Landlord nor Tenant have had any dealings with any real estate brokers or agents in connection with the negotiation of this First Amendment of Lease which has resulted in any obligation to pay a leasing commission. Except as herein modified the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this First Amendment of Lease, which for reference purposes shall be deemed to have been dated as the day above written. LANDLORD: TENANT: CROSSROADS ASSOCIATES, and CLOCKTOWER ASSOCIATES SIEBEL SYSTEMS, Inc., a California Corporation /s/ Boyd Smith Title Partner /s/ Howard H. Graham Title Senior Vice President and CFO -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- THIRD AMENDMENT OF LEASE This Third Amendment of Lease is made and entered into this 1st day of September, 1997, by and between Crossroads Associates and Clocktower Associates (Landlord), and Siebel Systems, Inc. a California Corporation (Tenant). RECITALS A. WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant entered into a Lease dated June 4th, 1996, (the Lease) for the lease of approximately 66,426 gross square feet of space located in the five story Building located at 1855 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California; and B. WHEREAS, by letter dated October 30th, 1996 Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the fourth floor of 1875 South Grant Street, and by letter dated December 17th, 1996, Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the tenth floor of the 1875 South Grant Street Building; and. C. WHEREAS, by First Amendment of Lease dated March 17, 1997 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 12,926 rentable square feet of space located on the first floor of 1875 South Grant Street, commencing April 1st, 1997, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with California Federal Bank, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the First Amendment of Lease void; D. WHEREAS, by Second Amendment of Lease dated March 19, 1997 Tenant leased an additional 12,926 gross square feet of space (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of Building common areas) located on the first floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California (the "First Floor 1875 Space"); and E. WHEREAS, by letter dated May 23, 1997, Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the ninth floor of 1875 South Grant Street, and by letter dated July 28th, 1997 Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the Eighth floor of 1875 South Grant Street, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area (subject to the Ninth floor becoming available) 150,160 gross square feet of space. F. WHEREAS, Tenant wishes to lease directly from Landlord Suite 130, 1875 South Grant Street, which Suite 130 is included in and is a part of the First Floor 1875 space as referred to above and as is defined in paragraph 1 of the Second Amendment of Lease. Tenant's direct lease of Suite 130 is to commence prior to the commencement of lease date for the First Floor 1875 space of April 1st, 1998 as is currently provided for. In order to allow Tenant to do so, California Federal Bank, has agreed to modify its May 18, 1990 lease with Landlord (the "Cal Fed Lease") to eliminate Suite 130 from the Cal Fed Lease premises. In addition, California Federal Bank and InCOMMON, LLC have agreed to modify the February 21, 1997 Sublease between CalFed and inCommon (the inCommon Sublease") to eliminate Suite 130 from the inCommon subleased premises. NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Landlord and Tenant agree as follows; 1. Suite 130. The Premises tube leased hereunder shall hereinafter be referred to as "Suite 130" and is described as follows: 4,114 rentable square feet of space, which includes Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the First Floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California and as further outlined in red on Exhibit "A." Suite 130 is a part of the First Floor 1875 Space as referred to above. 2. Effective Date and Termination Date. The "Effective Date" shall hereinafter be defined as September 1, 1997. The Lease Termination Date for Suite 130 shall be co-terminus with the space leased by Tenant at 1855 South Grant Street and therefore shall be August 7, 2006. Landlord and Tenant further agree Tenant's lease of Suite 130 shall be subject to the options to extend the Lease per paragraph 48 of the Lease. 3. Agreement to Lease. Upon the Effective Date, Landlord agrees to lease Tenant and Tenant agrees to lease and hire from Landlord Suite 130 as defined above. 4. Premises As-Is. Tenant agrees to lease Suite 130 in an "as-is" condition, and any alteration or modifications to the Premises shall be made in accordance with paragraphs 8 & 9 of the Lease and shall not delay the commencement of Lease for Suite 130 nor delay the payment of rent and all such modifications shall be at Tenant's sole cost and expense. 5. Basic Rent. Commencing on the Effective Date, Tenant's monthly Basic Rent for Suite 130 shall be 4,114 s.f. x $1.35 = $5,553.90 per month. This amount shall be adjusted on April 1st, 1998, which is the Effective Date for the First Floor 1875 Space. From and after April 1st, 1998, the Basic Rent for Suite 130 shall be as described in paragraph 5 of the Second Amendment of Lease. 6. Additional Rent Upon the Effective Date, Tenant's Additional Rent for Suite 130 shall be $2,550.68 per month. This amount shall be increased on April 1st, 1998 to the then current rate being charged to tenants occupying Building 1875 and shall continue to be adjusted per the terms and conditions of paragraph 4D of the Lease. 7. Parking Upon the Effective Date, Tenant's allocated number of parking spaces in the Complex shall be increased by 13 spaces. 8. No Brokers. Landlord and Tenant mutually acknowledge and agree that neither Landlord nor Tenant have had any dealings with any real estate brokers or agents in connection with the negotiation of this Third Amendment of Lease which has resulted in any obligation to pay a leasing commission. 9. Lease in Full Force and Effect. Except as herein modified the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this Third Amendment of Lease, which for reference purposes shall be deemed to have been dated as the day above written. LANDLORD: TENANT: CROSSROADS ASSOCIATES, and CLOCKTOWER ASSOCIATES SIEBEL SYSTEMS, Inc., a California Corporation /s/ Boyd Smith Title ___________ /s/ Howard H. Graham Title Senior Vice President and CFO -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- FOURTH AMENDMENT OF LEASE This Fourth Amendment of Lease is made and entered into this 2nd day of April, 1998, by and between Crossroads Associates and Clocktower Associates (Landlord), and Siebel Systems, Inc. a California Corporation (Tenant). RECITALS A. WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant entered into a Lease dated June 4th, 1996, (the Lease) for the lease of approximately 66,426 gross square feet of space located in the five story Building located at 1855 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California; and B. WHEREAS, by letter dated October 30th, 1996 Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the fourth floor of 1875 South Grant Street, and by letter dated December 17th, 1996, Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the tenth floor of the 1875 South Grant Street Building; and C. WHEREAS, by First Amendment of Lease dated March 17, 1997 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 12,926 rentable square feet of space located on the first floor of 1875 South Grant Street, commencing April 1st, 1997, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with California Federal Bank, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the First Amendment of Lease void; and D. WHEREAS, by Second Amendment of Lease dated March 19, 1997 Tenant leased an additional 12,926 gross square feet of space (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of Building common areas) located on the first floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California (the First Floor 1875 Space); and E. WHEREAS, by letter dated May 23, 1997, Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the ninth floor of 1875 South Grant Street, and by letter dated July 28th, 1997 Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the Eighth floor of 1875 South Grant Street, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area (subject to the Ninth floor becoming available) to 150,160 gross square feet of space. F. WHEREAS, by Third Amendment of Lease dated September 1st, 1997 Landlord and Tenant agreed to an early commencement of lease for Suite 130, 1875 South Grant Street, such that the Suite 130 Lease commenced September 1st, 1997. G. WHEREAS, Tenant desires to make certain modifications to Tenant's Leased Premises in the Building at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, which Tenant improvements will result in an increased need for parking over and above the amount of parking spaces allocated to Tenant under the Lease and Landlord has agreed to allocate to Tenant additional parking. NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Landlord and Tenant agree as follows: 1. The total number of parking spaces allocated to Tenant under the Lease is summarized as follows: Location of Premises Square Footage Parking Spaces 1855 1875 1st Floor 4th Floor 8th Floor 10th Floor Total 66,426 12,926 17,702 17,702 17,702 132,458 200 40 52 52 52 396 In addition to the number of parking spaces granted to Tenant for the Leased Premises as summarized above, Landlord hereby agrees to provide and grant Tenant an additional 45 parking spaces throughout the term of Tenant's Lease or any extension thereof thereby bringing Tenant's total parking allocation to 396 + 45 = 441. If during Tenant's tenancy Landlord, in Landlord's sole opinion, deems it necessary to specifically designate an area in which the additional 45 spaces referred to herein shall be located, Landlord reserves the right to so designate a specific area and Tenant agrees to use Tenant's best efforts to encourage Tenant's employees to so park in the designated area. The designated area may be within the parking area of the Complex, or may be upon an adjacent parcel or parcels immediately to the north of the Complex. 2. Compensation. As compensation to Landlord for the additional parking allocation of 45 spaces Tenant agrees to pay Landlord, in addition to all other Basic and Additional Rent due under the lease, the following amounts: Commencing upon the completion of Tenant's improvements for the 10th floor (1875) Premises, Tenant shall pay landlord $6,250.00 per month, with partial months prorated. Upon completion of Tenant's improvements for the 8th floor (1875) Premises, the $6,25000 monthly amount shall be increased to $12,500.00 per month. This shall be paid and adjusted as indicated in the table below: Time Period Monthly Amount (per above) - 12/31/2002 $ 12,500.00 1/1/2003 - 08/07/2006(1) 8/8/2006 - 08/07/2011(2) 8/8/2011 - 08/07/2016(3) $ 13,000.00 $ 13,500.00 $ 14,000.00 __________ (1)(end of original lease term) (2)(provided that the Lease is extended per Tenant's first option). (3)(provided Tenant exercises its second option to extend). 3. Restoration. Tenant has submitted to Landlord a tentative schematic plan which reflects Tenant's intentions to reconfigure the eighth and tenth floors in the Building at 1875 South Grant Street. This preliminary plan is dated November 7, 1997 and is attached as Exhibit "A" to this Fourth Amendment of Lease. Landlord hereby approves Tenant's preliminary plans subject to Landlord's final review of the actual p1ans, finish schedules, and specifications which are to plans subject to Landlord's final review of the actual p1ans, finish schedules, and specifications which are to be submitted from Tenant to Landlord per paragraph 8 & 9 of the Lease. Pursuant to Paragraphs 8 & 9 of the Lease, should Tenant make the modifications as indicated, Tenant's restoration requirements for each of the floors so modified will be as follows: a) Construct seven private offices at each "side" of each floor. b) Reinstall the entire 1oop corridor on each floor. c) Add two 15 x 15 rooms on each side of each floor. d) Make all necessary mechanical, electrical, fire sprinkler and other modifications necessary to achieve the above including compliance with any building code requirements then in effect at the time such restoration is to be performed. e) With respect to finishes and other building standard materials, Tenant will restore all materials and finishes to the building standard unless unless otherwise approved and accepted in writing by Landlord. A preliminary drawing of the configuration of the Premises after the restoration is performed is attached as Exhibit "B" to this Fourth Amendment of Lease. All restoration required hereunder shall be at Tenant's sole cost and expense and shall be performed in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Lease. 4. Lease in full force and effect. Except as herein modified the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this Fourth Amendment of Lease, which for reference purposes shall be deemed to have been dated as the day above written. LANDLORD: TENANT: CROSSROADS ASSOCIATES, and CLOCKTOWER ASSOCIATES SIEBEL SYSTEMS, Inc., a California Corporation /s/ Boyd Smith Title Partner /s/ Kevin A. Johnson Title Vice President, Legal Affairs -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- FIFTH AMENDMENT TO LEASE This Fifth Amendment of Lease is made and entered into this 8th day of May, 1998, by and between Crossroads Associates and Clocktower Associates (Landlord), and Siebel Systems, Inc. a California Corporation (Tenant). RECITALS A. WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant entered into a Lease dated June 4th, 1996, (the Lease) for the lease of approximately 66,426 gross square feet of space located in the five story Building located at 1855 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California; and B. WHEREAS, by letter dated October 30th, 1996 Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the fourth floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California (and hereinafter referred to as the 1875 Building) and by letter dated December 17th, 1996, Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the tenth floor of the 1875 Building; and C. WHEREAS, by First Amendment of Lease dated March 17, 1997 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 12,926 rentable square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building, commencing April 1st, 1997, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with California Federal Bank, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the First Amendment of Lease void; and D. WHEREAS, by Second Amendment of Lease dated March 19, 1997 Tenant leased an additional 12,926 gross square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building; and E. WHEREAS, by letter dated May 23, 1997, Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, and by letter dated July 28th, 1997 Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the Eighth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area (subject to the Ninth floor becoming available) to 150,160 gross square feet of space; and F. WHEREAS, by Third Amendment of Lease dated September 1st, 1997 Landlord and Tenant agreed to an early commencement of lease for Suite 130, in the 1875 Building, such that the Suite 130 Lease commenced September 1st, 1997. G. WHEREAS, by Fourth Amendment of Lease dated April 2nd, 1998, Landlord and Tenant agreed that Landlord will allow Tenant to make certain improvements to Tenant's Premises in the 1875 Building and Tenant further agreed to additional compensation for additional parking. H. WHEREAS, Bay Networks exercised its option to extend its lease on the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby making Tenant's exercise of option to lease the ninth floor void and therefore bringing Tenant's total leased area to 132,458 square feet. I. WHEREAS, in the 1875 Building Tenant now desires to lease an additional 9,453 square feet on the second floor and 6,973 square feet on the third floor (which include Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 148,884 square feet. NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Landlord and Tenant agree as follows: 1. The areas to be leased hereunder are all located in the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California and are further described as follows: a) Suite 200 Comprising 8,007 square feet of rentable space, including Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the second floor and as further described in red on Exhibit "Al". b) Suite 220 Comprising 1,376 gross square feet of space, which includes Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the second floor and as further outlined in red on Exhibit "Al". c) Suite 350 Comprising 6,973 rentable square feet of space, which includes Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the third floor and as further outlined in red on Exhibit "A2". Tenant hereby acknowledges that all three suites to be leased hereunder, Suite 200, 220 and 350, are currently leased to other tenants. Tenant's Lease of Suite 200 and Suite 350 are each contingent upon Landlord entering into, in Landlord's sole opinion, an acceptable Lease Termination Agreement, specifying the date upon which such leases shall terminate (each a "Lease Termination Date"), with each of the respective tenants that lease and occupy Suites 200 & 350. In the event Landlord does not enter into such a lease termination agreement with respect to the tenants leasing suite 200 or 350, then the provisions of this Fifth Amendment of Lease applicable to the suite for which Landlord does not enter such lease termination agreement shall be void and of no force and effect between the parties and neither Landlord nor Tenant shall be liable to one another for having entered into this Fifth Amendment of Lease with respect to such space. All other terms and conditions of the Lease, including the other terms and conditions of this Fifth Amendment of Lease, shall remain in full force and effect. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE The "Effective Date" for the commencement of Lease for Suites 200 and 350 shall be the calendar date immediately succeeding the Lease Termination Date for Suite 200 and 350 respectively. The Effective Date for Suite 220 shall be the later of September 1st, 1998 or the date Landlord delivers possession of Suite 220 to Tenant. It is anticipated by Landlord and Tenant that the Effective Date for Suite 200 shall be June 16, 1998 and for Suite 350 August 1st, 1998. 3. TERM The Term of Lease for Suite 200, 220, and 350, shall each commence upon the Effective Date for each of the respective Suites and shall terminate August 31st, 2008. Landlord and Tenant each acknowledge that the expiration date of the term of Lease for Suites 200, 220, and 350 leased hereunder is different from the expiration date of the term of lease for the 1855 Building and Tenant's lease for the 1st, 4th, 8th and 10th floor spaces in the 1875 Building, (hereinafter referred to for purposes of this Fifth Amendment of Lease as the "Core Space"). In the event the term of Tenant's lease for the Core Space expires and Tenant vacates the Core Space, nevertheless, the term of lease for Suites 200, 220 and 350 leased hereunder shall expire August 31st, 2008 and all the terms and conditions of the Lease shall remain in full force and effect and shall pertain to the space leased under this Fifth Amendment of Lease. Furthermore, it is hereby agreed that the Lease for Suite 200, 220 and 350 shall be subject to the Option to Extend granted to Tenant per paragraph 48 of the Lease. In the event that Tenant exercises its option to extend the Lease on the Core Space (as defined above) such that the Lease for the Core Space is extended to July 31st, 2011, then the Lease for Suites 200, 220 and 350 shall automatically be extended from August 31st, 2008 to July 31st, 2011. The Basic and Additional Rent on Suites 200, 220, and 350, for the period September 1st, 2008 to July 31st, 2011 (provided Tenant has exercised its option per paragraph 48 of the Lease) shall be at the same rate as Tenant is then paying on the Core Space. 4. BASIC RENT The Basic Rent, commencing upon the Effective Date for each of the respective suites, shall be $2.75 per square foot per month multiplied by the square footage leased, as follows: Suite Square Footage Basic Rent/Sq. Ft. Total monthly Basic Rent 200 220 350 8,007 1,376 6,973 $2.75 2.75 2.75 $22,019.25 3,784.00 19,175.75 The Basic Rent described above shall be adjusted August 8th, 1998 and annually thereafter, in the same manner and upon the same date and with the same limitations as described in paragraph 38 of the Lease. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, for each of the Suites 200, 220, and 350, Landlord hereby grants Tenant two months Basic Rent abatement on such suite. Such Basic Rent Abatement shall be granted to Tenant irrespective whether Tenant occupies the Premises or not during the two month period immediately following the Effective Date for each Suite. For example, if the Effective Date for Suite 200 were June 16th, 1998, Tenant's lease on Suite 200 would commence June 16th, 1998, and the Basic Rent described above for Suite 200 would commence August 16th, 1998. 5. ADDITIONAL RENT For calendar year 1998, commencing upon the Effective Date for each Suite, Tenant shall pay $0.62 per square foot per month as payment for Tenant's proportionate share of the expenses of operation, management, and maintenance of Tenant's Premises. Therefore upon the Effective Date for each suite Tenant's Additional Rent is as follows: Suite Square Footage Monthly Additional Rent 200 220 350 8,007 1,376 6,973 $4,964.34 853.12 4,323.26 6. AS-IS Tenant agrees to lease each suite hereunder in an "as- is" condition, and any alteration or modification to the Premises shall be made in accordance with paragraphs 8 & 9 of the Lease at Tenant's sole cost and expense and shall not delay the commencement of Lease for each of the Suites nor delay the payments of rent. 7. PARKING On the Effective Date for each Suite, Tenant's total parking allocation shall be increased as follows: Suite 200 25 spaces Suite 220 4 spaces Suite 350 22 spaces 8. NO BROKERS Landlord and Tenant mutually acknowledge that neither Landlord nor Tenant have had any dealings with any real estate brokers or agents in connection with the negotiation of this Fifth Amendment of Lease which has resulted in any obligation to pay a leasing commission. 9. LEASE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT Except as herein and modified the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this Fifth Amendment of Lease, which for reference purposes shall be deemed to have been dated as the date above written. LANDLORD: TENANT: CROSSROADS ASSOCIATES, and CLOCKTOWER ASSOCIATES SIEBEL SYSTEMS, Inc., a California Corporation /s/ Boyd Smith Title Partner /s/ Kevin A. Johnson Title Vice President, Legal Affairs -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [Crossroads Logo] 1875 SOUTH GRANT STREET SUITE 100 SAN MATEO, CALIFORNIA 94402 (415) 571-5433 August 25, 1998 Ms. Linda Jansen Siebel Systems, Inc. 1855 South Grant Street San Mateo, CA 94402 RE: SIEBEL SYSTEM, INC. - LEASE AGREEMENT Dear Ms. Jansen: As you know, there are several typographical errors in the Fifth Amendment of Lease. While the total square footage is correct, clarification is necessary with respect to Suite 200. Therefore, Landlord and Tenant do herein agree to the following corrections: PARAGRAPH 1.(a) Suite 200 Comprising 8,077 square feet of rentable space, including Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the second floor and as further described in red on Exhibit "A". PARAGRAPH 4. BASIC RENT This paragraph remains unchanged, except for the following change to the Basic Rent Schedule: Suite Square Footage Basic Rent/Sq. Ft. Total monthly Basic Rent 200 8,007 $2.75 $22,211.75 PARAGRAPH 5. ADDITIONAL RENT This paragraph remains unchanged, except for the following change to the Additional Rent Schedule: Suite Square Footage Monthly Additional Rent 200 8,007 $5,007.74 Sincerely, /s/ Peter Klayman Peter Klayman -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SIXTH AMENDMENT OF LEASE This Sixth Amendment of Lease is made and entered into this 16th day of September, 1998, by and between Crossroads Associates and Clocktower Associates (Landlord), and Siebel Systems, Inc. a California Corporation (Tenant). RECITALS A. WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant entered into a Lease dated June 4th, 1996, (the Lease) for the lease of approximately 66,426 gross square feet of space located in the five story Building located at 1855 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California; and B. WHEREAS, by letter dated October 30th, 1996 Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the fourth floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California (and hereinafter referred to as the 1875 Building) and by letter dated December 17th, 1996, Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the tenth floor of the 1875 Building; and C. WHEREAS, by First Amendment of Lease dated March 17, 1997 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 12,926 rentable square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building, commencing April 1st, 1997, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with California Federal Bank, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the First Amendment of Lease void; and D. WHEREAS, by Second Amendment of Lease dated March 19, 1997 Tenant leased an additional 12,926 gross square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building; and E. WHEREAS, by letter dated May 23, 1997, Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, and by letter dated July 28th, 1997 Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the Eighth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area (subject to the Ninth floor becoming available) to 150,160 gross square feet of space; and F. WHEREAS, by Third Amendment of Lease dated September 1st, 1997 Landlord and Tenant agreed to an early commencement of lease for Suite 130, in the 1875 Building, such that the Suite 130 Lease commenced September 1st, 1997. G. WHEREAS, by Fourth Amendment of Lease dated April 2nd, 1998, Landlord and Tenant agreed that Landlord will allow Tenant to make certain improvements to Tenant's Premises in the 1875 Building and Tenant further agreed to additional compensation for additional parking. H. WHEREAS, Bay Networks exercised its option to extend its lease on the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby making Tenant's exercise of option to lease the ninth floor void and therefore bringing Tenant's total leased area to 132,458 square feet. I. WHEREAS, by Fifth Amendment of Lease dated May 8, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 9,453 square feet on the second floor and 6,973 square feet on the third floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 148,884 square feet. J. WHEREAS, in the 1875 Building, Tenant now desires to lease an additional 7,113 square feet on the fifth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 155,997 square feet. NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Landlord and Tenant agree as follows: 1. The area to be leased hereunder shall hereinafter be referred to as "Suite 500" and is described as follows: 7,113 rentable square feet of space, which includes Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the fifth floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California and as further outlined in red on Exhibit "A". 2. EFFECTIVE DATE The "Effective Date" for the commencement of Lease for Suite 500 shall hereinafter be defined as March 1, 1999. 3. TERM The Term of Lease for Suite 500 shall commence upon the Effective Date and shall terminate August 31st, 2008. Landlord and Tenant each acknowledge that the expiration date of the term of Lease for Suite 500 is different from the expiration date of the term of lease for the 1855 Building and The "Core Space" (as defined in Paragraph 3 of the Fifth Amendment of Lease). In the event the term of Tenant's lease for the Core Space expires and Tenant vacates the Core Space, nevertheless, the term of lease for Suite 500 leased hereunder shall expire August 31st, 2008 and all the terms and conditions of the Lease shall remain in full force and effect and shall pertain to the space leased under this Sixth Amendment of Lease. Furthermore, it is hereby agreed that the Lease for Suite 500 shall be subject to the Option to Extend granted to Tenant per paragraph 48 of the Lease. In the event that Tenant exercises its option to extend the Lease on the Core Space such that the Lease for the Core Space is extended to July 31st, 2011, then the Lease for Suite 500 shall automatically be extended from August 31st, 2008 to July 31st, 2011. The Basic and Additional Rent on Suite 500 for the period September 1st, 2008 to July 31st, 2011 (provided Tenant has exercised its option per paragraph 48 of the Lease) shall be at the same rate as Tenant is then paying on the Core Space. 4. BASIC RENT Commencing upon the Effective Date, Tenant's monthly Basic Rent for Suite 500 shall be 7,113 s.f. x $2.90 = $20,627.70 per month. This amount shall be adjusted August 8th, 1999 and annually thereafter, in the same manner and upon the same date and with the same limitations as described in Paragraph 38 of the Lease. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, for Suite 500, Landlord hereby grants Tenant two months Basic Rent abatement on such suite. Such Basic Rent Abatement shall be granted to Tenant irrespective whether Tenant occupies the Premises or not during the two month period immediately following the Effective Date. For example, the Effective Date for Suite 500 is March 1st, 1999, Tenant's lease on Suite 500 will commence March 1st, 1999, and the Basic Rent described above for Suite 500 will commence May 1st, 1999. 5. ADDITIONAL RENT Commencing upon the Effective Date, Tenant's Additional Rent as described in Paragraph 4D of the Lease shall be the then current rate being charged to tenants occupying Building 1875 and shall continue to be adjusted per the terms and conditions of Paragraph 4D. 6. AS-IS Tenant agrees to lease suite 500 hereunder in an "as-is" condition, and any alteration or modification to the Premises shall be made in accordance with paragraphs 8 & 9 of the Lease at Tenant's sole cost and expense and shall not delay the commencement of Lease for Suite 500 nor delay the payment of rent. 7. PARKING Upon the Effective Date for Suite 500, Tenant's total parking allocation shall be increased by 22 spaces. 8. NO BROKERS Landlord and Tenant mutually acknowledge that neither Landlord nor Tenant have had any dealings with any real estate brokers or agents in connection with the negotiation of this Sixth Amendment of Lease which has resulted in any obligation to pay a leasing commission. 9. LEASE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT Except as herein and modified the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this Fifth Amendment of Lease, which for reference purposes shall be deemed to have been dated as the date above written. LANDLORD: TENANT: CROSSROADS ASSOCIATES, and CLOCKTOWER ASSOCIATES SIEBEL SYSTEMS, Inc., a Delaware Corporation /s/ Boyd Smith Title Partner /s/ Jeffrey T. Amann Title Director, Legal Affairs -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SEVENTH AMENDMENT OF LEASE This Seventh Amendment of Lease is made and entered into this 1st day of December, 1998, by and between Crossroads Associates and Clocktower Associates (Landlord), and Siebel Systems, Inc. a California Corporation (Tenant). RECITALS A. WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant entered into a Lease dated June 4th, 1996, (the Lease) for the lease of approximately 66,426 gross square feet of space located in the five story Building located at 1855 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California; and B. WHEREAS, by letter dated October 30th, 1996 Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the fourth floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California (and hereinafter referred to as the 1875 Building) and by letter dated December 17th, 1996, Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the tenth floor of the 1875 Building; and C. WHEREAS, by First Amendment of Lease dated March 17, 1997 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 12,926 rentable square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building, commencing April 1st, 1997, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with California Federal Bank, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the First Amendment of Lease void; and D. WHEREAS, by Second Amendment of Lease dated March 19, 1997 Tenant leased an additional 12,926 gross square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building; and E. WHEREAS, by letter dated May 23, 1997, Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, and by letter dated July 28th, 1997 Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the Eighth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby bringing Tenants total leased area (subject to the Ninth floor becoming available) to 150,160 gross square feet of space; and F. WHEREAS, by Third Amendment of Lease dated September 1st, 1997 Landlord and Tenant agreed to an early commencement of lease for Suite 130, in the 1875 Building, such that the Suite 130 Lease commenced September 1st, 1997. G. WHEREAS, by Fourth Amendment of Lease dated April 2nd, 1998, Landlord and Tenant agreed that Landlord will allow Tenant to make certain improvements to Tenant's Premises in the 1875 Building and Tenant further agreed to additional compensation for additional parking. H. WHEREAS, Bay Networks exercised its option to extend its lease on the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby making Tenant's exercise of option to lease the ninth floor void and therefore bringing Tenant's total leased area to 132,458 square feet. I. WHEREAS, by Fifth Amendment of Lease dated May 8, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 9,453 square feet on the second floor and 6,973 square feet on the third floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 148,884 square feet. J. WHEREAS, by Sixth Amendment of Lease dated September 16, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 7,113 square feet on the fifth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas) and which space was further identified as Suite 500, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 155,997 square feet. K. WHEREAS, Tenant's lease of Suite 500 has an "Effective Date" for the commencement of Lease of March 1, 1999, and Tenant now desires to commence the Lease for Suite 500 at an earlier "Effective Date" as provided for herein. NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Landlord and Tenant agree as follows: 1. Tenant hereby acknowledges that Suite 500 is currently leased to HCIA Inc., as successor-in-interest to Datis Corporation, A California Corporation ("HCIA") with a lease expiration date of February 28, 1999. Landlord's ability to provide Tenant an earlier "Effective Date" for Suite 500 is contingent upon Landlord entering into, in Landlord's sole opinion, an acceptable Early Lease Termination Agreement with HCIA. In the event Landlord does not enter into such an Early Lease Termination Agreement with respect to Suite 500, then the provisions of this Seventh Amendment of Lease shall be void and of no force and effect between the parties and neither Landlord nor Tenant shall be liable to one another for having entered into this Seventh Amendment of Lease. All other terms and conditions of the Lease shall remain in full force and effect and Tenant's "Effective Date" for Suite 500 shall be as provided for in the Sixth Amendment of Lease, and therefore shall be March 1, 1999. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE The "Effective Date" for the commencement of Tenant's Lease for Suite 500 shall hereinafter be defined as the date which is one day immediately following the Termination Date of the HCIA Lease for Suite 500, but in no event shall the Effective Date be later than March 1, 1999. Except for the commencement date of Lease, all other terms and conditions of Tenant's lease of Suite 500 shall be as provided in the Sixth Amendment. 3. BASIC RENT Commencing upon the Effective Date, Tenant's monthly Basic Rent for Suite 500 shall be 7,113 s.f. x $2.90 = $20,627.70 per month. This amount shall be adjusted August 8th, 1999 and annually thereafter, in the same manner and upon the same date and with the same limitations as described in Paragraph 38 of the Lease. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, for Suite 500, Landlord hereby grants Tenant two months Basic Rent abatement on such suite. Such Basic Rent Abatement shall be granted to Tenant irrespective whether Tenant occupies the Premises or not during the two month period immediately following the Effective Date. For example, if the "Effective Date" as provided for herein becomes December 15, 1998, Tenant's lease on Suite 500 will commence December 15, 1998 and the Basic Rent described above for Suite 500 will commence February 15, 1999. 4. ADDITIONAL RENT Commencing upon the Effective Date, Tenant's Additional Rent as described in Paragraph 4D of the Lease shall be the then current rate being charged to tenants occupying Building 1875 and shall continue to be adjusted per the terms and conditions of Paragraph 4D. 5. LEASE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT Except as herein and modified, the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this Seventh Amendment of Lease, which for reference purposes shall be deemed to have been dated as the date above written. LANDLORD: TENANT: CROSSROADS ASSOCIATES, and CLOCKTOWER ASSOCIATES SIEBEL SYSTEMS, Inc., a Delaware Corporation /s/ Boyd Smith Title Partner /s/ Jeffrey T. Amann Title Director, Legal Affairs -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- EIGHTH AMENDMENT OF LEASE This Eighth Amendment of Lease is made and entered into this 15th day of January, 1999, by and between Crossroads Associates and Clocktower Associates (Landlord), and Siebel Systems, Inc. a Delaware Corporation (Tenant). RECITALS A. WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant entered into a Lease dated June 4th, 1996, (the Lease) for the lease of approximately 66,426 gross square feet of space located in the five story Building located at 1855 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California; and B. WHEREAS, by letter dated October 30th, 1996 Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the fourth floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California (and hereinafter referred to as the 1875 Building) and by letter dated December 17th, 1996, Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the tenth floor of the 1875 Building; and C. WHEREAS, by First Amendment of Lease dated March 17, 1997 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 12,926 rentable square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building, commencing April 1st, 1997, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with California Federal Bank, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the First Amendment of Lease void; and D. WHEREAS, by Second Amendment of Lease dated March 19, 1997 Tenant leased an additional 12,926 gross square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building; and E. WHEREAS, by letter dated May 23, 1997, Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, and by letter dated July 28th, 1997 Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the Eighth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area (subject to the Ninth floor becoming available) to 150,160 gross square feet of space; and F. WHEREAS, by Third Amendment of Lease dated September 1st, 1997 Landlord and Tenant agreed to an early commencement of lease for Suite 130, in the 1875 Building, such that the Suite 130 Lease commenced September 1st, 1997. G. WHEREAS, by Fourth Amendment of Lease dated April 2nd, 1998, Landlord and Tenant agreed that Landlord will allow Tenant to make certain improvements to Tenant's Premises in the 1875 Building and Tenant further agreed to additional compensation for additional parking. H. WHEREAS, Bay Networks exercised its option to extend its lease on the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby making Tenant's exercise of option to lease the ninth floor void and therefore bringing Tenant's total leased area to 132,458 square feet. I. WHEREAS, by Fifth Amendment of Lease dated May 8, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 9,453 square feet on the second floor and 6,973 square feet on the third floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 148,884 square feet. J. WHEREAS, by Sixth Amendment of Lease dated September 16, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 7,113 square feet on the fifth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas) and which space was further identified as Suite 500, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 155,997 square feet. K. WHEREAS, by Seventh Amendment of Lease dated December 1, 1998, Tenant agreed to lease Suite 500 prior to March 1, 1999 in the event it became available and Tenant's lease of Suite 500 commenced December 29, 1998. L. WHEREAS, in the 1875 Building Tenant now desires to lease an additional 810 square feet on the second floor, an additional 3104 square feet on the third floor (which square footage includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), and convert and include Tenant's separate Lease of 1184 square feet on the third floor into this Lease, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 161,095 square feet. NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Landlord and Tenant agree as follows: 1. The areas to be leased hereunder are all located in the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California and are further described as follows: a) Suite 250 Comprising 810 gross square feet of space, including Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the second floor and as further described in red on Exhibit "Al". b) Suite 310A&B Comprising 1,184 gross square feet of space, which includes Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the third floor and as further outlined in red on Exhibit "A2". c) Suite 320 Comprising 3,104 gross square feet of space, which includes Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the third floor and as further outlined in red on Exhibit "A3". Tenant hereby acknowledges that under a separate lease agreement Suite 310A&B is currently leased by Tenant through March 31, 1999. The other two suites to be leased hereunder, Suites 250 and 320, are currently leased to RAC Enterprises. Tenant's Lease of Suite 250 and Suite 320 are contingent upon Landlord entering into, in Landlord's sole opinion, an acceptable Lease Termination Agreement with RAC Enterprises. In the event Landlord does not enter into such a lease termination agreement then the provisions of this Eighth Amendment of Lease applicable to Suites 250 and 320 shall be void and of no force and effect between the parties and neither Landlord nor Tenant shall be liable to one another for having entered into this Eighth Amendment of Lease with respect to such space. All other terms and conditions of the Lease, including the other terms and conditions of this Eighth Amendment of Lease, shall remain in full force and effect. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE Subject to the contingency in paragraph 1 above, the "Effective Date" for the commencement of Lease for Suites 250, 310A&B and 320 shall hereinafter be defined as April 1, 1999. 3. TERM Subject to the contingency in paragraph 1 above, commencing upon the Effective Date Landlord agrees to lease to Tenant and Tenant agrees to lease and hire from Landlord Suites 310 A & B, 250, and 320. The Term of Lease for Suites 250, 310A&B and 320 shall terminate August 31st, 2008. Landlord and Tenant each acknowledge that the expiration date of the term of Lease for Suites 250, 310A&B, and 320 leased hereunder is different from the expiration date of the term of lease for the 1855. Building and The "Core Space" (as defined in Paragraph 3 of the Fifth Amendment of Lease). In the event the term of Tenant's lease for the Core Space expires and Tenant vacates the Core Space, nevertheless, the term of lease for Suites 250, 310A&B, and 320 leased hereunder shall expire August 31st, 2008 and all the terms and conditions of the Lease shall remain in full force and effect and shall pertain to the space leased under this Eighth Amendment of Lease. Furthermore, it is hereby agreed that the Lease for Suites 250, 310A&B, and 320 shall be subject to the Option to Extend granted to Tenant per paragraph 48 of the Lease. In the event that Tenant exercises its option to extend the Lease on the Core Space such that the Lease for the Core Space is extended to July 31st, 2011, then the Lease for Suites 250, 310A&B, and 320 shall automatically be extended from August 31st, 2008 to July 31st, 2011. The Basic and Additional Rent on Suites 250, 310A&B, and 320 for the period September 1st, 2008 to July 31st, 2011 (provided Tenant has exercised its option per paragraph 48 of the Lease) shall be at the same rate as Tenant is then paying on the Core Space. 4. BASIC RENT The Basic Rent, commencing upon the Effective Date for each of the respective suites, shall be $2.90 per square foot per month multiplied by the square footage leased, as follows: Suite Square Footage Basic Rent/Sq. Ft. Total monthly Basic Rent 250 310A&B 320 810 1,184 3,104 $2.90 2.90 2.90 $2,349.00 3,433.60 9,001.60 The Basic Rent described above shall be adjusted August 8th, 1999 and annually thereafter, in the same manner and upon the same date and with the same limitations as described in paragraph 38 of the Lease. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, for Suites 250 and 320, Landlord hereby grants Tenant two months Basic Rent abatement for each suite. Such Basic Rent Abatement shall be granted to Tenant irrespective whether Tenant occupies the Premises or not during the two month period immediately following the Effective Date for each Suite. For example, the Effective Date for Suites 250 and 320 is April 1st, 1999, Tenant's lease on Suites 250 and 320 will commence April 1st, 1999, and the Basic Rent described above for Suites 250 and 320 will commence June 1st, 1999. 5. ADDITIONAL RENT Commencing upon the Effective Date, Tenant's Additional Rent for each suite, as described in Paragraph 4D of the Lease, shall be the then current rate per square foot per month being charged to tenants occupying Building 1875 multiplied by the respective square footages and shall continue to be adjusted per the terms and conditions of Paragraph 4D. 6. AS-IS Tenant agrees to lease each suite hereunder in an "as-is" condition, and any alteration or modification to the Premises shall be made in accordance with paragraphs 8 & 9 of the Lease at Tenant's sole cost and expense and shall not delay the commencement of Lease for each of the Suites nor delay the payments of rent. 7. PARKING On the Effective Date for each Suite, Tenant's total parking allocation shall be increased as follows: Suite 250 2 spaces Suite 310A&B 3 spaces Suite 320 10 spaces 8. NO BROKERS Landlord and Tenant mutually acknowledge that neither Landlord nor Tenant have had any dealings with any real estate brokers or agents in connection with the negotiation of this Eighth Amendment of Lease which has resulted in any obligation to pay a leasing commission. 9. LEASE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT Except as herein and modified the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this Eighth Amendment of Lease, which for reference purposes shall be deemed to have been dated as the date above written. LANDLORD: TENANT: CROSSROADS ASSOCIATES, and CLOCKTOWER ASSOCIATES SIEBEL SYSTEMS, Inc., a Delaware Corporation /s/ Boyd Smith Title Partner /s/ Jeffrey T. Amann Title Director, Legal Affairs -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NINTH AMENDMENT OF LEASE This Ninth Amendment of Lease is made and entered into this 26th day of January, 1999, by and between Crossroads Associates and Clocktower Associates (Landlord), and Siebel Systems, Inc. a Delaware Corporation (Tenant). RECITALS A. WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant entered into a Lease dated June 4th, 1996, (the Lease) for the lease of approximately 66,426 gross square feet of space located in the five story Building located at 1855 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California; and B. WHEREAS, by letter dated October 30th, 1996 Tenant exercised Tenants option to lease the fourth floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California (and hereinafter referred to as the 1875 Building) and by letter dated December 17th, 1996, Tenant exercised Tenants option to lease the tenth floor of the 1875 Building; and C. WHEREAS, by First Amendment of Lease dated March 17, 1997 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 12,926 rentable square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building, commencing April 1st, 1997, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with California Federal Bank, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the First Amendment of Lease void; and D. WHEREAS, by Second Amendment of Lease dated March 19, 1997 Tenant leased an additional 12,926 gross square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building; and E. WHEREAS, by letter dated May 23, 1997, Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, and by letter dated July 28th, 1997 Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the Eighth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area (subject to the Ninth floor becoming available) to 150,160 gross square feet of space; and F. WHEREAS, by Third Amendment of Lease dated September 1st, 1997 Landlord and Tenant agreed to an early commencement of lease for Suite 130, in the 1875 Building, such that the Suite 130 Lease commenced September 1st, 1997. G. WHEREAS, by Fourth Amendment of Lease dated April 2nd, 1998, Landlord and Tenant agreed that Landlord will allow Tenant to make certain improvements to Tenant's Premises in the 1875 Building and Tenant further agreed to additional compensation for additional parking. H. WHEREAS, Bay Networks exercised its option to extend its lease on the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby making Tenant's exercise of option to lease the ninth floor void and therefore bringing Tenant's total leased area to 132,458 square feet. I. WHEREAS, by Fifth Amendment of Lease dated May 8, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 9,453 square feet on the second floor and 6,973 square feet on the third floor which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 148,884 square feet. J. WHEREAS, by Sixth Amendment of Lease dated September 16, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 7,113 square feet on the fifth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas) and which space was further identified as Suite 500, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 155,997 square feet. K. WHEREAS, by Seventh Amendment of Lease dated December 1, 1998, Tenant agreed to lease Suite 500 prior to March 1, 1999 in the event it became available and Tenant's lease of Suite 500 commenced December 29, 1998. L. WHEREAS, by Eighth Amendment of Lease dated January 15, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 810 square feet on the second floor and 4,288 square feet on the third floor(which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 161,095 square feet. M. WHEREAS, in the 1875 Building Tenant now desires to lease an additional 5,221 square feet on the sixth floor, an additional 2,695 square feet on the seventh floor (which square footage includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 169,011 square feet. NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Landlord and Tenant agree as follows: 1. The areas to be leased hereunder are all located in the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California and are further described as follows: a) Suite 650 Comprising 5,221 gross square feet of space, including Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the fifth floor and as further described in red on Exhibit "Al". b) Suite 770 Comprising 2,695 gross square feet of space, which includes Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the seventh floor and as further outlined in red on Exhibit "A2". Tenant hereby acknowledges that the two suites to be leased hereunder, Suites 650 and 770, are currently leased to SUNTERRA CORPORATION. Tenant's Lease of Suite 650 and Suite 770 is contingent upon Landlord entering into, in Landlord's sole opinion, an acceptable Lease Termination Agreement with SUNTERRA CORPORATION by February 20, 1999. In the event Landlord does not enter into such a lease termination agreement then this Ninth Amendment of Lease shall be void and of no force and effect between the parties and neither Landlord nor Tenant shall be liable to one another for having entered into this Ninth Amendment of Lease and the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE Subject to Paragraph 1 above, the Effective Dates shall be as follows: (a) Suite 650 - March 1, 1999 (b) Suite 770 - April 1, 1999 3. TERM Subject to the contingency in paragraph 1 above, commencing upon the respective Effective Dates Landlord agrees to lease to Tenant and Tenant agrees to lease and hire from Landlord Suites 650 and 770. The Term of Lease for Suites 650 and 770 shall terminate August 31st, 2008. Landlord and Tenant each acknowledge that the expiration date of the term of Lease for Suites 650 and 770 leased hereunder is different from the expiration date of the term of lease for the 1855 Building and The "Core Space" (as defined in Paragraph 3 of the Fifth Amendment of Lease). In the event the term of Tenant's lease for the Core Space expires and Tenant vacates the Core Space, nevertheless, the term of lease for Suites 650 and 770 leased hereunder shall expire August 31st, 2008 and all the terms and conditions of the Lease shall remain in full force and effect and shall pertain to the space leased under this Ninth Amendment of Lease. Furthermore, it is hereby agreed that the Lease for Suites 650 and 770 shall be subject to the Option to Extend granted to Tenant per paragraph 48 of the Lease. In the event that Tenant exercises its option to extend the Lease on the Core Space such that the Lease for the Core Space is extended to July 31st, 2011, then the Lease for Suites 650 and 770 shall automatically be extended from August 31st, 2008 to July 31st, 2011. The Basic and Additional Rent on Suites 650 and 770 for the period September 1st, 2008 to July 31st, 2011 (provided Tenant has exercised its option per paragraph 48 of the Lease) shall be at the same rate as Tenant is then paying on the Core Space. 4. BASIC RENT The Basic Rent, commencing upon the Effective Date for each of the respective suites, shall be $2.90 per square foot per month multiplied by the square footage leased, as follows: Suite Square Footage Basic Rent/Sq. Ft. Total monthly Basic Rent 650 770 5,221 2,695 $2.90 2.90 $15,140.90 7,815.50 The Basic Rent described above shall be adjusted August 8th, 1999 and annually thereafter, in the same manner and upon the same date and with the same limitations as described in paragraph 38 of the Lease. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, for Suites 650 and 770, Landlord hereby grants Tenant two months Basic Rent abatement for each suite. Such Basic Rent Abatement shall be granted to Tenant irrespective whether Tenant occupies the Premises or not during the two month period immediately following the Effective Date for each Suite. For example, the Effective Date for Suite 650 is March 1st, 1999, Tenant's lease on Suite 650 will commence March 1st, 1999, and the Basic Rent described above for Suite 650 will commence May 1st, 1999. 5. ADDITIONAL RENT Commencing upon the respective Effective Dates, Tenant's Additional Rent for each suite, as described in Paragraph 4D of the Lease, shall be the then current rate per square foot per month being charged to tenants occupying Building 1875 multiplied by the respective square footages and shall continue to be adjusted per the terms and conditions of Paragraph 4D. 6. AS-IS Tenant agrees to lease each suite hereunder in an "as- is" condition, and any alteration or modification to the Premises shall be made in accordance with paragraphs 8 & 9 of the Lease at Tenant's sole cost and expense and shall not delay the commencement of Lease for each of the Suites nor delay the payments of rent. 7. PARKING On the Effective Date for each Suite, Tenant's total parking allocation shall be increased as follows: Suite 650 16 spaces Suite 770 8 spaces 8. NO BROKERS Landlord and Tenant mutually acknowledge that neither Landlord nor Tenant have had any dealings with any real estate brokers or agents in connection with the negotiation of this Ninth Amendment of Lease which has resulted in any obligation to pay a leasing commission. 9. LEASE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT Except as herein and modified the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this Ninth Amendment of Lease, which for reference purposes shall be deemed to have been dated as the date above written. LANDLORD: TENANT: CROSSROADS ASSOCIATES, and CLOCKTOWER ASSOCIATES SIEBEL SYSTEMS, Inc., a Delaware Corporation /s/ Boyd Smith Title Partner /s/ Jeffrey T. Amann Title Director, Legal Affairs -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TENTH AMENDMENT OF LEASE This Tenth Amendment of Lease is made and entered into this 25th day of February, 1999, by and between Crossroads Associates and Clocktower Associates (Landlord), and Siebel Systems, Inc. a Delaware Corporation (Tenant). RECITALS A. WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant entered into a Lease dated June 4th, 1996, (the Lease) for the lease of approximately 66,426 gross square feet of space located in the five story Building located at 1855 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California; and B. WHEREAS, by letter dated October 30th, 1996 Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the fourth floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California (and hereinafter referred to as the 1875 Building) and by letter dated December 17th, 1996, Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the tenth floor of the 1875 Building; and C. WHEREAS, by First Amendment of Lease dated March 17, 1997 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 12,926 rentable square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building, commencing April 1st, 1997, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with California Federal Bank, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the First Amendment of Lease void; and D. WHEREAS, by Second Amendment of Lease dated March 19, 1997 Tenant leased an additional 12,926 gross square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building; and E. WHEREAS, by letter dated May 23, 1997, Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, and by letter dated July 28th, 1997 Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the Eighth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area (subject to the Ninth floor becoming available) to 150,160 gross square feet of space; and F. WHEREAS, by Third Amendment of Lease dated September 1st, 1997 Landlord and Tenant agreed to an early commencement of lease for Suite 130, in the 1875 Building, such that the Suite 130 Lease commenced September 1st, 1997. G. WHEREAS, by Fourth Amendment of Lease dated April 2nd, 1998, Landlord and Tenant agreed that Landlord will allow Tenant to make certain improvements to Tenant's Premises in the 1875 Building and Tenant further agreed to additional compensation for additional parking. H. WHEREAS, Bay Networks exercised its option to extend its lease on the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby making Tenant's exercise of option to lease the ninth floor void and therefore bringing Tenant's total leased area to 132,458 square feet. I. WHEREAS, by Fifth Amendment of Lease dated May 8, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 9,453 square feet on the second floor and 6,973 square feet on the third floor(which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 148,884 square feet. J. WHEREAS, by Sixth Amendment of Lease dated September 16, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 7,113 square feet on the fifth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas) and which space was further identified as Suite 500, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 155,997 square feet. K. WHEREAS, by Seventh Amendment of Lease dated December 1,1998, Tenant agreed to lease Suite 500 prior to March 1, 1999 in the event it became available and Tenant's lease of Suite 500 commenced December 29, 1998. L. WHEREAS, by Eighth Amendment of Lease dated January 15, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 810 square feet on the second floor and 4,288 square feet on the third floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 161,095 square feet. M. WHEREAS, by Ninth Amendment of Lease dated January 25, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 5,221 square feet on the sixth floor and 2,695 square feet on the seventh floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 169,011 square feet. N. WHEREAS, in the 1875 Building Tenant now desires to lease an additional 4,319 square feet on the second floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 173,330 square feet. NOW, THERFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Landlord and Tenant agree as follows: 1. The area to be leased hereunder shall hereinafter be referred to as "Suite 240" and is described as follows: 4,319 gross square feet of space, which includes Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the second floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California and as further outlined in red on Exhibit "A". 2. EFFECTIVE DATE The "Effective Date" for the commencement of Lease for Suite 240 shall hereinafter be defined as July 1, 1999. 3. TERM The Term of Lease for Suite 240 shall commence upon the Effective Date and shall terminate August 31st, 2008. Landlord and Tenant each acknowledge that the expiration date of the term of Lease for Suite 240 is different from the expiration date of the term of lease for the 1855 Building and The "Core Space" (as defined in Paragraph 3 of the Fifth Amendment of Lease) . In the event the term of Tenant's lease for the Core Space expires and Tenant vacates the Core Space, nevertheless, the term of lease for Suite 240 leased hereunder shall expire August 31st, 2008 and all the terms and conditions of the Lease shall remain in full force and effect and shall pertain to the space leased under this Tenth Amendment of Lease. Furthermore, it is hereby agreed that the Lease for Suite 240 shall he subject to the Option to Extend granted to Tenant per paragraph 48 of the Lease. In the event that Tenant exercises its option to extend the Lease on the Core Space such that the Lease for the Core Space is extended to July 31st, 2011, then the Lease for Suite 240 shall automatically be extended from August 31st, 2008 to July 31st, 2011. The Basic and Additional Rent on Suite 240 for the period September 1st, 2008 to July 31st, 2011 (provided Tenant has exercised its option per paragraph 48 of the Lease) shall be at the same rate as Tenant is then paying on the Core Space. 4. BASIC RENT Commencing upon the Effective Date, Tenant's monthly Basic Rent for Suite 240 shall be 4,319 s.f. x $2.90 = $12,525.10 per month. This amount shall be adjusted August 8th, 1999 and annually thereafter, in the same manner and upon the same date and with the same limitations as described in Paragraph 38 of the Lease. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, for Suite 240, Landlord hereby grants tenant two months Basic Rent abatement on such suite. Such Basic Rent Abatement shall be granted to Tenant irrespective whether Tenant occupies the Premises or not during the two month period immediately following the Effective Date. For example, the Effective Date for Suite 240 is July 1st, 1999, Tenant's lease on Suite 240 will commence July 1st, 1999, and the Basic Rent described above for Suite 240 will commence September 1st, 1999. 5. ADDITIONAL RENT Commencing upon the Effective Date, Tenant's Additional Rent as described in Paragraph 4D of the Lease shall be the then current rate being charged to tenants occupying Building 1875 and shall continue to be adjusted per the terms and conditions of Paragraph 4D. 6. AS-IS Tenant agrees to lease each suite hereunder in an "as- is" condition, and any alteration or modification to the Premises shall be made in accordance with paragraphs 8 & 9 of the Lease at Tenant's sole cost and expense and shall not delay the commencement of Lease for each of the Suites nor delay the payments of rent. 7. EARLY OCCUPANCY In the event that Suite 240 becomes available prior to the applicable Effective Date, and in the event that Tenant desires to take possession of Suite 240 prior to the applicable Effective Date, then with Landlord's permission Tenant may do so. Tenant shall Suite 240 subject to the Early Occupancy provisions of this Paragraph 7 and Tenant's Early Occupancy shall be subject to all the terms and conditions of the Lease. In the event that Suite 240 is available and Tenant so chooses to occupy such space prior to the Effective Date, then the Basic Rent obligations shall be as stated in paragraph 4 herein with the exception that Tenant shall pay Basic and Additional Rent for the period of such Early Occupancy prior to the Effective Date. Such Basic and Additional Rent shall be calculated on a per diem basis for each day of the period commencing with the date of Early Occupancy to the Effective Date. The daily rate of Basic and Additional Rent is as indicated in the table below: EARLY OCCUPANCY TABLE Suite Square Footage Basic Rent per day Additional Rent per day Total Rent per day 240 4,319 $417.50 $89.26 $506.76 8. PARKING Upon the Effective Date for Suite 240, Tenant's total parking allocation shall be increased by 13 spaces. 9. NO BROKERS Landlord and Tenant mutually acknowledge that neither Landlord nor Tenant have had any dealings with any real estate brokers or agents in connection with the negotiation of this Tenth Amendment of Lease which has resulted in any obligation to pay a leasing commission. 10. LEASE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT Except as herein and modified the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this Tenth Amendment of Lease, which for reference purposes shall be deemed to have been dated as the date above written. LANDLORD: TENANT: CROSSROADS ASSOCIATES, and CLOCKTOWER ASSOCIATES SIEBEL SYSTEMS, Inc., a Delaware Corporation /s/ Boyd Smith Title Partner /s/ Jeffrey T. Amann Title Director, Legal Affairs -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ELEVENTH AMENDMENT OF LEASE This Eleventh Amendment of Lease is made and entered into this 7th day of April, 1999, by and between Crossroads Associates and Clocktower Associates (Landlord), and Siebel Systems, Inc. a Delaware Corporation (Tenant). RECITALS A. WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant entered into a Lease dated June 4th, 1996, (the Lease) for the lease of approximately 66,426 gross square feet of space located in the five story Building located at 1855 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California; and B. WHEREAS, by letter dated October 30th, 1996 Tenant exercised Tenants option to lease the fourth floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California (and hereinafter referred to as the 1875 Building) and by letter dated December 17th, 1996, Tenant exercised Tenants option to lease the tenth floor of the 1875 Building; and C. WHEREAS, by First Amendment of Lease dated March 17, 1997 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 12,926 rentable square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building, commencing April 1st, 1997, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with California Federal Bank, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the First Amendment of Lease void; and D. WHEREAS, by Second Amendment of Lease dated March 19,1997 Tenant leased an additional 12,926 gross square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building; and E. WHEREAS, by letter dated May 23, 1997, Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, and by letter dated July 28th, 1997 Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the Eighth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area (subject to the Ninth floor becoming available) to 150,160 gross square feet of space; and F. WHEREAS, by Third Amendment of Lease dated September 1st, 1997 Landlord and Tenant agreed to an early commencement of lease for Suite 130, in the 1875 Building, such that the Suite 130 Lease commenced September 1st, 1997. G. WHEREAS, by Fourth Amendment of Lease dated April 2nd,1998, Landlord and Tenant agreed that Landlord will allow Tenant to make certain improvements to Tenant's Premises in the 1875 Building and Tenant further agreed to additional compensation for additional parking. H. WHEREAS, Bay Networks exercised its option to extend its lease on the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby making Tenant's exercise of option to lease the ninth floor void and therefore bringing Tenant's total leased area to 132,458 square feet. I. WHEREAS, by Fifth Amendment of Lease dated May 8, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 9,453 square feet on the second floor and 6,973 square feet on the third floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 148,884 square feet. J. WHEREAS, by Sixth Amendment of Lease dated September 16, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 7,113 square feet on the fifth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas) and which space was further identified as Suite 500, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 155,997 square feet. K. WHEREAS, by Seventh Amendment of Lease dated December 1, 1998, Tenant agreed to lease Suite 500 prior to March 1, 1999 in the event it became available and Tenant's lease of Suite 500 commenced December 29, 1998. L. WHEREAS, by Eighth Amendment of Lease dated January 15, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 810 square feet on the second floor and 4,288 square feet on the third floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 161,095 square feet. M. WHEREAS, by Ninth Amendment of Lease dated January 25, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 5,221 square feet on the sixth floor and 2,695 square feet on the seventh floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 169,011 square feet. N. WHEREAS, subject to the execution of the Tenth Amendment of Lease dated February 25, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant upon execution will have leased an additional 4,319 square feet on the second floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 173,330 square feet. O. WHEREAS, in the 1825 Building Tenant now desires to lease an additional 7,509 square feet on the first floor, 11,417 square feet on the fifth floor, 17,702 on the eighth floor and 17,702 square feet on the ninth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 227,660 square feet. NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Landlord and Tenant agree as follows: 1. The areas to be leased hereunder are all located in the Building located at 1825 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California and are further described as follows: a) Suite 150 Comprising 7,509 gross square feet of space, which includes Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the first floor and as further described in red on Exhibit "Al". b) Suite 500 Comprising 11,417 gross square feet of space, which includes Tenant's prorate share of Building common areas, located on the fifth floor and as further outlined in red on Exhibit "A2". c) Suite 800 Comprising 17,702 gross square feet of space, which includes Tenant's prorate share of Building common areas, located on the eighth floor and as further outlined in red on Exhibit "A3". d) Suite 900 Comprising 17,702 gross square feet of space, which includes Tenant's prorate share of Building common areas, located on the ninth floor and as further outlined in red on Exhibit "A4". Tenant hereby acknowledges that all four suites to be leased hereunder, Suites 150, 500, 800 and 900, are currently leased to VISA. Tenant's Lease of Suites 150, 500, 800 and 900 is contingent upon Landlord entering into, in Landlord's sole opinion, an acceptable lease termination agreement with VISA for the referenced suites. Landlord and VISA have discussed such an acceptable lease termination agreement, and termination documents have been submitted to VISA for execution. In the event Landlord and VISA do not enter into such a lease termination agreement, then the provisions of this Eleventh Amendment of Lease shall be void and of no force and effect between the parties, neither Landlord nor Tenant shall be liable to one another for having entered into this Eleventh Amendment of Lease, and all other terms and conditions of the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE The Effective Date shall hereinafter be defined as that date which Landlord shall specify to Tenant in writing as the commencement date of the term of Lease for the Premises leased per this 11 Amendment. The Effective date shall not be earlier than November 1, 1999 nor later than January 1, 2000. On or before September 15, 1999, Landlord shall notify Tenant in writing the specific date that shall be the Effective date. 3. TERM The Term of Lease for Suites 150, 500, 800 and 900 shall commence upon the Effective Date and shall terminate October 31, 2009. Landlord and Tenant each acknowledge that the expiration date of the term of Lease for Suites 150, 500, 800 and 900 is different from the expiration date of the term of lease for other space leased by Tenant, including the expiration date of the term of lease for the 1855 Building and the "Core Space" (as defined in Paragraph 3 of the Fifth Amendment of Lease). In the event the term of Tenant's lease for the Core Space and/or the term of Tenant's lease for other space leased expires and Tenant vacates these spaces, nevertheless, the term of lease for Suites 150, 500, 800 and 900 leased hereunder shall expire October 31, 2009 and all the terms and conditions of the Lease shall remain in full force and effect and shall pertain to the space leased under this Eleventh Amendment of Lease. Furthermore, it is hereby agreed that the Lease for Suites 150, 500, 800 and 900 shall be subject to the Option to Extend granted to Tenant per paragraph 48 of the Lease such that in the event that Tenant exercises its option to extend the Lease on the Core Space such that the Lease for the Core Space is extended to July 31st, 2011, then the Lease for Suites 150, 500, 800 and 900 shall automatically be extended from October 31, 2009 to July 31st, 2011. The Basic and Additional Rent on Suites 150, 500, 800 and 900 for the period November 1st, 2009 to July 31st, 2011 (provided Tenant has exercised its option per paragraph 48 of the Lease) shall be at the same rate as Tenant is paying on the Core Space for that period. As is stated in Paragraph 48 (f), Tenant's second Option to Extend shall apply to all space then leased by Tenant as of the date of the exercise of the second option. 4. BASIC RENT The Basic Rent for the additional space leased per this Eleventh Amendment, commencing upon the Effective Date, shall be $2.90 per square foot per month multiplied by the square footage leased, as follows: Suite Square Footage Basic Rent/Sq. Ft. Total monthly Basic Rent 150 500 800 900 7,509 11,417 17,702 17,702 $2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 $ 21,776.10 33,109.30 51,335.80 51,335.80 The Basic Rent described above shall be adjusted August 8th, 2000 and annually thereafter, in the same manner and upon the same date and with the same limitations as described in paragraph 38 of the Lease. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, for Suites 150, 500, 800 and 900, Landlord hereby grants Tenant two months Basic Rent abatement for each suite. Such Basic Rent Abatement shall be granted to Tenant irrespective of whether Tenant occupies the Premises or not during the two month period immediately following the Effective Date. For example, if the Effective Date for Suites 150, 500, 800 and 900 is November 1, 1999, Tenant's lease on Suites 150, 500, 800 and 900 will commence November 1, 1999, and the Basic Rent described above for Suites 150, 500, 800 and 900 will commence January 1, 2000, irrespective of Tenant's occupancy. 5. ADDITIONAL RENT Commencing upon the Effective Date, Tenant's Additional Rent (as described in Paragraph 4D of the Lease) for each of the suites leased hereunder shall be the then current rate being charged to tenants occupying the Building 1825 multiplied by the square footage of each suite and shall continue to be adjusted per the terms and conditions of Paragraph 4D. 6. AS-IS Tenant agrees to lease each suite hereunder in an "as-is" condition, and any alteration or modification to the Premises shall be made in accordance with paragraphs 8 & 9 of the Lease at Tenant's sole cost and expense and shall not delay the commencement of Lease for each of the Suites nor delay the payment of rent. 7. PARKING On the Effective Date, Tenant's total parking allocation shall be increased as follows: Suite 150 23 spaces Suite 500 36 spaces Suite 800 56 spaces Suite 900 56 spaces 8. BROKERS Landlord has not been represented by any real estate broker(s) with respect to this transaction and shall not be responsible for any leasing commission in connection with the negotiation of this Eleventh Amendment of Lease. Tenant shall hold Landlord harmless from any leasing commission which may be due to a real estate broker or agent representing Tenant. 9. SIGNS Paragraph 41 (SIGNS) of the Original Lease is hereby agreed to be deleted, and the following paragraph is substituted in its entirety: Exhibit B-1 is a site plan of the Complex. For purposes of this paragraph the buildings shall be referred to as 1825 (Building One), 1875 (Building Two), and 1855 (Building Three). Within the perimeter outline of each of the three buildings shown on Exhibit B-1 various building surfaces have been further identified by Roman Numerals I-VI. An "east-facing sign" will mean a sign generally facing east toward highway 101, and a "west- facing" sign will mean a sign generally facing west in the direction of South Grant Street. Currently there are four building-mounted exterior lighted signs: one east facing (I) and one west facing (II) SIEBEL sign on building 3 (1855) and one east facing (III) and one west facing (IV) CROSSROADS sign on building 2 (1875). These existing signs are indicated on Exhibit B-2. Landlord's granting Tenant additional signage is subject to obtaining certain specific approvals from the City of San Mateo, and is subject to the further conditions as hereinafter described. Any additional Tenant sign(s) must be constructed and installed at Tenant's sole cost and expense, including the cost of any applications or fees that must be paid to the City of San Mateo. All signs must be approved by Landlord and are subject to the review and must be approved by the City of San Mateo. Any additional sign(s) must use a lettering size no larger than the existing CROSSROADS signs (III & IV) on building 2 (1875). Other than the manufacturing and installation costs of any additional sign(s), Landlord shall allow Tenant's additional sign(s) at no additional cost. Landlord and Tenant shall fully cooperate with one another in obtaining the approvals from the City of San Mateo for additional signage. The Lease and this Eleventh Amendment(subject to paragraph 1 above) are not contingent upon the obtaining from the City of San Mateo the right to place any additional signage at the Complex, and the Lease and this Eleventh Amendment (subject to paragraph 1 above) shall nevertheless remain in full force and effect without diminution of rent or other offsets. If at any time Tenant occupies less than 150,000 square feet of space in the Complex (herein defined as a Diminished Occupancy Condition), and it is determined with both parties acting in good faith that the Diminished Occupancy Condition will last more than two years, Landlord shall have the right to require Tenant to remove the additional sign(s) approved per this paragraph at Tenant's expense. If so required, or upon Lease termination, Tenant shall remove such sign(s) within 30 days of Landlord's request and Tenant shall make all required repairs to restore any damage to the Premises from Tenant's sign. It is Landlord and Tenant's intent to obtain approval to place two additional exterior building-mounted lighted signs on Building One (1825, locations V & VI) . This shall hereinafter be referred to as plan One. In the event the City of San Mateo does not approve Plan One, Landlord and Tenant shall attempt to obtain approval to place one additional exterior building-mounted lighted sign on Building One (1825, location V) . This shall hereinafter be referred to as Plan Two. In the event the City of San Mateo does not approve any additional exterior lighted signs, then Landlord and Tenant will attempt to get approval for the sign substitution as hereinafter described. This shall hereinafter be described as Plan Three. a. Plan One In this case Landlord and Tenant shall jointly and co-operatively apply to the City of San Mateo for approval to place two exterior building-mounted lighted signs on Building One (1825, locations V & VI). In the event the City of San Mateo approves this plan, then Landlord shall grant Tenant the right to place two exterior building- mounted lighted signs, one on Building One (1825) and one on Building Two (1875). One of Tenant's additional signs shall be east-facing (in locations V or III) and one of Tenant's additional signs shall be west-facing (in locations VI or IV). Landlord's exterior building-mounted lighted signs shall be in the reciprocal locations from Tenant's signs and shall require the relocation of one of Landlord's two existing signs. The following table outlines the alternatives: TENANT SIGN LOCATION LANDLORD SIGN LOCATION III & VI V & IV V & IV III & VI It shall be at Tenant's preference which of the above alternatives is implemented. In addition, at such time as Tenant places Tenant's signs on Buildings One (1825) and Two (1875), Tenant agrees to remove Tenant's west-facing sign on Building Three (1855, location II) . Tenant shall pay all costs associated with this sign removal including the cost to repair any damage to the Premises and any costs to repaint the area of the building from which the sign was removed so as to render the area uniform in appearance. b. Plan Two In the event The City of San Mateo denies approval for two additional exterior building-mounted lighted signs for Building One, then Landlord and Tenant shall apply for approval to place one additional exterior building-mounted lighted sign on Building One (1825, location V). In the event the City of San Mateo approves Plan Two, Landlord hereby grants Tenant the right to place one additional exterior-mounted lighted sign on either Building One (1825, location V) or Building Two (1875, location III) . The selection of Tenant's additional sign location shall be at Tenant's preference. In the event Tenant selects location III, Landlord, at landlord's expense, shall relocate Landlord's existing sign in location III to location V, and Tenant's additional sign shall be in location III. In the event Tenant selects location V, Landlord's sign shall remain in location III. Under this Plan Two, Tenant's existing signs on Building Three (1855, locations I and II), and Landlord's existing sign on Building Two (1875, location IV), shall remain in place. c. Plan Three In the event the City of San Mateo denies both Plan One and Plan Two, Landlord hereby grants Tenant the right to replace Landlord's existing sign on Building Two (1875, location IV) with Tenant's sign. In this event Landlord's other sign on Building Two (1875, location III) and Tenant's signs on Building Three (1855, locations I & II) shall remain in place. 10. LEASE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT Except as herein and modified the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this Eleventh Amendment of Lease, which for reference purposes shall be deemed to have been dated as the date above written. LANDLORD: TENANT: CROSSROADS ASSOCIATES, and CLOCKTOWER ASSOCIATES SIEBEL SYSTEMS, Inc., a Delaware Corporation /s/ Boyd Smith Title Partner /s/ Jeffrey T. Amann Title Director, Legal Affairs -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT OF LEASE This Thirteenth Amendment of Lease is made and entered into this 7th day of December, 1999, by and between Crossroads Associates and Clocktower Associates (Landlord), and Siebel Systems, Inc. a Delaware Corporation (Tenant). RECITALS A. WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant entered into a Lease dated June 4th, 1996, (the Lease) for the lease of approximately 66,426 gross square feet of space located in the five story Building located at 1855 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California; and B. WHEREAS, by letter dated October 30th, 1996 Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the fourth floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California (and hereinafter referred to as the 1875 Building) and by letter dated December 17th, 1996, Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the tenth floor of the 1875 Building; and C. WHEREAS, by First Amendment of Lease dated March 17, 1997 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 12,926 rentable square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building, commencing April 1st, 1997, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with California Federal Bank, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the First Amendment of Lease void; and D. WHEREAS, by Second Amendment of Lease dated March 19, 1997 Tenant leased an additional 12,926 gross square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building; and E. WHEREAS, by letter dated May 23, 1997, Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, and by letter dated July 28th, 1997 Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the Eighth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area (subject to the Ninth floor becoming available) to 150,160 gross square feet of space; and F. WHEREAS, by Third Amendment of Lease dated September 1st, 1997 Landlord and Tenant agreed to an early commencement of lease for Suite 130, in the 1875 Building, such that the Suite 130 Lease commenced September 1st, 1997. G. WHEREAS, by Fourth Amendment of Lease dated April 2nd, 1998, Landlord and Tenant agreed that Landlord will allow Tenant to make certain improvements to Tenant's Premises in the 1875 Building and Tenant further agreed to additional compensation for additional parking. H. WHEREAS, Bay Networks exercised its option to extend its lease on the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby making Tenant's exercise of option to lease the ninth floor void and therefore bringing Tenant's total leased area to 132,458 square feet. I. WHEREAS, by Fifth Amendment of Lease dated May 8, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 9,453 square feet on the second floor and 6,973 square feet on the third floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 148,884 square feet. J. WHEREAS, by Sixth Amendment of Lease dated September 16, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 7,113 square feet on the fifth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas) and which space was further identified as Suite 500, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 155,997 square feet. K. WHEREAS, by Seventh Amendment of Lease dated December 1, 1998, Tenant agreed to lease Suite 500 prior to March 1, 1999 in the event it became available and Tenant's lease of Suite 500 commenced December 29, 1998. L. WHEREAS, by Eighth Amendment of Lease dated January 15, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 810 square feet on the second floor and 4,288 square feet on the third floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 161,095 square feet. M. WHEREAS, by Ninth Amendment of Lease dated January 25, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 5,221 square feet on the sixth floor and 2,695 square feet on the seventh floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 169,011 square feet. N. WHEREAS, by Tenth Amendment of Lease dated February 25, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 4,319 square feet on the second floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 173,330 square feet. 0. WHEREAS, by Eleventh Amendment of Lease dated April 7, 1999 in the 1825 Building, Tenant leased an additional 7,509 square feet on the first floor, 11,417 square feet on the fifth floor, 17,702 on the eighth floor and 17,702 square feet on the ninth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 227,660 square feet. P. WHEREAS, by Twelfth Amendment of Lease dated May 26, 1999 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 1,657 of rentable square feet of space located on the third floor of the 1875 Building, effective July 1st, 1999, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with PRS International, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the Twelfth Amendment of Lease void; and Q. WHEREAS, in the 1875 Building, Tenant now desires to lease and additional 2,552 square feet on the second floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 230,212 square feet. NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Landlord and Tenant agree as follows: 1. The area to be leased hereunder shall hereinafter be referred to as "Suite 210" and is described as follows: 2,552 gross square feet of space, which includes Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the second floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California and as further outlined in red on Exhibit "A". Tenant hereby acknowledges that Suite 210 is currently leased to Websense. Tenant's Lease of Suite 210 is contingent upon Landlord entering into, in Landlord's sole opinion, an acceptable Lease Termination Agreement with Websense. In the event Landlord does not enter into such a lease termination agreement then this Thirteenth Amendment of Lease shall be void and of no force and effect between the parties and neither Landlord nor Tenant shall be liable to one another for having entered into this Thirteenth Amendment of Lease and the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE Subject to Paragraph 1 above, the Effective Date for Suite 210 shall be January 1, 2000. 3. TERM Subject to Paragraph 1 above, commencing upon the Effective Date Landlord agrees to lease to Tenant and Tenant agrees to lease and hire from Landlord Suite 210. The Term of Lease for Suite 210 shall terminate August 31, 2008. Landlord and Tenant each acknowledge that the expiration date of the term of Lease for Suite 210 is different from the expiration date of the term of lease for other space leased by Tenant, including the expiration date of the term of lease for the 1855 Building and the "Core Space" (as defined in Paragraph 3 of the Fifth Amendment of Lease). In the event the term of Tenant's lease for the Core Space expires and Tenant vacates the Core Space, nevertheless, the term of lease for Suite 210 leased hereunder shall expire August 31st, 2008 and all the terms and conditions of the Lease shall remain in full force and effect and shall pertain to the space leased under this Thirteenth Amendment of Lease. Furthermore, it is hereby agreed that the Lease for Suite 210 shall be subject to the Option to Extend granted to Tenant per paragraph 48 of the Lease such that in the event that Tenant exercises its option to extend the Lease on the Core Space such that the Lease for the Core Space is extended to July 31st, 2011, then the Lease for Suite 210 shall automatically be extended from August 31, 2008 to July 31st, 2011. The Basic and Additional Rent on Suite 210 for the period September 1st, 2008 to July 31st, 2011 (provided Tenant has exercised its option per paragraph 48 of the Lease) shall be at the same rate as Tenant is then paying on the Core Space. As is stated in Paragraph 48 (f), Tenant's second Option to Extend shall apply to all space then leased by Tenant as of the date of the exercise of the second option. 4. BASIC RENT Commencing upon the Effective Date, Tenant's monthly Basic Rent for Suite 210 shall be 2,552 s.f. x $3.40 = $8,676.80 per month. This amount shall be adjusted August 8th, 2000 and annually thereafter, in the same manner and upon the same date and with the same limitations as described in Paragraph 38 of the Lease. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, for Suite 210, Landlord hereby grants Tenant two months Basic Rent abatement on such suite. Such Basic Rent Abatement shall be granted to Tenant irrespective whether Tenant occupies the Premises or not during the two month period immediately following the Effective Date. For example, the Effective Date for Suite 210 is January 1st, 2000, Tenant's lease on Suite 210 will commence January 1st, 2000, and the Basic Rent described above for Suite 210 will commence March 1st, 2000. 5. ADDITIONAL RENT Commencing upon the Effective Date, Tenant's Additional Rent as described in Paragraph 4D of the Lease shall be the then current rate being charged to tenants occupying Building 1875 and shall continue to be adjusted per the terms and conditions of Paragraph 4D. 6. AS-IS Tenant agrees to lease suite 210 hereunder in an "as- is" condition, and any alteration or modification to the Premises shall be made in accordance with paragraphs 8 & 9 of the Lease at Tenant's sole cost and expense and shall not delay the commencement of Lease for Suite 210 nor delay the payment of rent. 7. PARKING Upon the Effective Date for Suite 210, Tenant's total parking allocation shall be increased by 8 spaces. 8. NO BROKERS Landlord and Tenant mutually acknowledge that neither Landlord nor Tenant have had any dealings with any real estate brokers or agents in connection with the negotiation of this Thirteenth Amendment of Lease which has resulted in any obligation to pay a leasing commission. 9. LEASE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT Except as herein and modified the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this Thirteenth Amendment of Lease, which for reference purposes shall be deemed to have been dated as the date above written. LANDLORD: TENANT: CROSSROADS ASSOCIATES SIEBEL SYSTEMS, Inc., a Delaware Corporation /s/ Boyd Smith Title Partner /s/ Jeffrey T. Amann Title Director, Legal Affairs CLOCKTOWER ASSOCIATES /s/ Boyd Smith Title Partner -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- FOURTEENTH AMENDNENT OF LEASE This Fourteenth Amendment of Lease is made and entered into this 17th day of December, 1999, by and between Crossroads Associates and Clocktower Associates (Landlord), and Siebel Systems, Inc. a Delaware Corporation (Tenant). RECITALS A. WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant entered into a Lease dated June 4th, 1996, (the Lease) for the lease of approximately 66,426 gross square feet of space located in the five story Building located at 1855 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California; and B. WHEREAS, by letter dated October 30th, 1996 Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the fourth floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California (and hereinafter referred to as the 1875 Building) and by letter dated December 17th, 1996, Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the tenth floor of the 1875 Building; and C. WHEREAS, by First Amendment of Lease dated March 17, 1997 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 12,926 rentable square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building, commencing April 1st, 1997, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with California Federal Bank, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the First Amendment of Lease void; and D. WHEREAS, by Second Amendment of Lease dated March 19, 1997 Tenant leased an additional 12,926 gross square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building; and E. WHEREAS, by letter dated May 23, 1997, Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, and by letter dated July 28th, 1997 Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the Eighth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area (subject to the Ninth floor becoming available) to 150,160 gross square feet of space; and F. WHEREAS, by Third Amendment of Lease dated September 1st, 1997 Landlord and Tenant agreed to an early commencement of lease for Suite 130, in the 1875 Building, such that the Suite 130 Lease commenced September 1st, 1997; and G. WHEREAS, by Fourth Amendment of Lease dated April 2nd, 1998, Landlord and Tenant agreed that Landlord will allow Tenant to make certain improvements to Tenant's Premises in the 1875 Building and Tenant further agreed to additional compensation for additional parking; and H. WHEREAS, Bay Networks exercised its option to extend its lease on the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby making Tenant's exercise of option to lease the ninth floor void and therefore bringing Tenant's total leased area to 132,458 square feet; and I. WHEREAS, by Fifth Amendment of Lease dated May 8, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 9,453 square feet on the second floor and 6,973 square feet on the third floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 148,884 square feet; and J. WHEREAS, by Sixth Amendment of Lease dated September 16, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 7,113 square feet on the fifth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas) and which space was further identified as Suite 500, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 155,997 square feet; and K. WHEREAS, by Seventh Amendment of Lease dated December 1, 1998, Tenant agreed to lease Suite 500 prior to March 1, 1999 in the event it became available and Tenant's lease of Suite 500 commenced December 29, 1998; and L. WHEREAS, by Eighth Amendment of Lease dated January 15, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 810 square feet on the second floor and 4,288 square feet on the third floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 161,095 square feet; and M. WHEREAS, by Ninth Amendment of Lease dated January 25, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 5,221 square feet on the sixth floor and 2,695 square feet on the seventh floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 169,011 square feet; and N. WHEREAS, by Tenth Amendment of Lease dated February 25, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 4,319 square feet on the second floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 173,330 square feet; and O. WHEREAS, by Eleventh Amendment of Lease dated April 7, 1999 in the 1825 Building, Tenant leased an additional 7,509 square feet on the first floor, 11,417 square feet on the fifth floor, 17,702 on the eighth floor and 17,702 square feet on the ninth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 227,660 square feet; and P. WHEREAS, by Twelfth Amendment of Lease dated May 26, 1999 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 1,657 of rentable square feet of space located on the third floor of the 1875 Building, effective July 1st, 1999, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with PRS International, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the Twelfth Amendment of Lease void; and Q. WHEREAS, by Thirteenth Amendment of Lease dated December 7, 1999, Tenant leased an additional 2,552 square feet on the second floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas) of the 1875 Building, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 230,212 square feet; and R. WHEREAS, in the 1875 Building, Tenant now desires to lease an additional 1,608 square feet on the fifth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 231,820 square feet. NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Landlord and Tenant agree as follows: 1. The area to be leased hereunder shall hereinafter be referred to as "Suite 540" and is described as follows: 1,608 rentable square feet of space, which includes Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the fifth floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California and as further outlined in red on Exhibit "A". 2. EFFECTIVE DATE The "Effective Date" for the commencement of Lease for Suite 540 shall hereinafter be defined as April 1, 2000. 3. TERM The term of Lease for Suite 540 shall commence upon the Effective Date and shall terminate August 31st, 2008. Landlord and Tenant each acknowledge that the expiration date of the term of Lease for Suite 540 is different from the expiration date of the term of lease for the 1855 Building and The "Core Space" (as defined in Paragraph 3 of the Fifth Amendment of Lease). In the event the term of Tenant's lease for the Core Space expires and Tenant vacates the Core Space, nevertheless, the term of lease for Suite 540 leased hereunder shall expire August 31st, 2008 and all the terms and conditions of the Lease shall remain in full force and effect and shall pertain to the space leased under this Fourteenth Amendment of Lease. Furthermore, it is hereby agreed that the Lease for Suite 540 shall be subject to the Option to Extend granted to Tenant per paragraph 48 of the Lease. In the event that Tenant exercises its option to extend the Lease on the Core Space such that the Lease for the Core Space is extended to July 31st, 2011, then the Lease for Suite 540 shall automatically be extended from August 31st, 2008 to July 31st, 2011. The Basic and Additional Rent on Suite 540 for the period September 1st, 2008 to July 31st, 2011 (provided Tenant has exercised its option per paragraph 48 of the Lease) shall be at the same rate as Tenant is then paying on the Core Space. As is stated in Paragraph 48 (f), Tenant's second Option to Extend shall apply to all space then leased by Tenant as of the date of the exercise of the second option. 4. BASIC RENT Commencing upon the Effective Date, Tenant's monthly Basic Rent for Suite 540 shall be 1,608 s.f. x $3.40 = $5,467.20 per month. This amount shall be adjusted August 8th, 2000 and annually thereafter, in the same manner and upon the same date and with the same limitations as described in Paragraph 38 of the Lease. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, for Suite 540, Landlord hereby grants Tenant two months Basic Rent abatement on such suite. Such Basic Rent Abatement shall be granted to Tenant irrespective whether Tenant occupies the Premises or not during the two month period immediately following the Effective Date. For example, the Effective Date for Suite 540 is April 1st, 2000, Tenant's lease on Suite 540 will commence April 1st, 2000, and the Basic Rent described above for Suite 540 will commence June 1st, 2000. 5. ADDITIONAL RENT Commencing upon the Effective Date, Tenant's Additional Rent as described in Paragraph 4D of the Lease shall be the then current rate being charged to tenants occupying Building 1875 and shall continue to be adjusted per the terms and conditions of Paragraph 4D. 6. AS-IS Tenant agrees to lease suite 540 hereunder in an "as-is" condition, and any alteration or modification to the Premises shall be made in accordance with paragraphs 8 & 9 of the Lease at Tenant's sole cost and expense and shall not delay the commencement of Lease for Suite 540 nor delay the payment of rent. 7. PARKING Upon the Effective Date for Suite 540, Tenant's total parking allocation shall be increased by 5 spaces. 8. NO BROKERS Landlord and Tenant mutually acknowledge that neither Landlord nor Tenant have had any dealings with any real estate brokers or agents in connection with the negotiation of this Fourteenth Amendment of Lease which has resulted in any obligation to pay a leasing commission. 9. LEASE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT Except as herein and modified the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this Fourteenth Amendment of tease, which for reference purposes shall be deemed to have been dated as the date above written. LANDLORD: TENANT: CROSSROADS ASSOCIATES SIEBEL SYSTEMS, Inc., a Delaware Corporation /s/ Dick Jacobson Title Partner /s/ Jeffrey T. Amann Title Director, Legal Affairs CLOCKTOWER ASSOCIATES /s/ Dick Jacobson Title Partner -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT OF LEASE This Fifteenth Amendment of Lease is made and entered into this 12th day of January, 2000, by and between Crossroads Associates and Clocktower Associates (Landlord), and Siebel Systems, Inc. a Delaware Corporation (Tenant). RECITALS A. WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant entered into a Lease dated June 4th, 1996, (the Lease) for the lease of approximately 66,426 gross square feet of space located in the five story Building located at 1855 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California; and B. WHEREAS, by letter dated October 30th, 1996 Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the fourth floor of the Building located at 1815 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California (and hereinafter referred to as the 1875 Building) and by letter dated December 17th, 1996, Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the tenth floor of the 1875 Building; and C. WHEREAS, by First Amendment of Lease dated March 17, 1997 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 12,926 rentable square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building, commencing April 1st, 1997, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with California Federal Bank, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the First Amendment of Lease void; and D. WHEREAS, by Second Amendment of Lease dated March 19, 1997 Tenant leased an additional 12,926 gross square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building; and E. WHEREAS, by letter dated May 23, 1997, Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, and by letter dated July 28th, 1997 Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the Eighth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area (subject to the Ninth floor becoming available) to 150,160 gross square feet of space; and F. WHEREAS, by Third Amendment of Lease dated September 1st, 1997 Landlord and Tenant agreed to an early commencement of lease for Suite 130, in the 1875 Building, such that the Suite 130 Lease commenced September 1st, 1997; and G. WHEREAS, by Fourth Amendment of Lease dated April 2nd, 1998, Landlord and Tenant agreed that Landlord will allow Tenant to make certain improvements to Tenant's Premises in the 1875 Building and Tenant further agreed to additional compensation for additional parking; and H. WHEREAS, Bay Networks exercised its option to extend its lease on the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby making Tenant's exercise of option to lease the ninth floor void and therefore bringing Tenant's total leased area to 132,458 square feet; and I. WHEREAS, by Fifth Amendment of Lease dated May 8, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 9,453 square feet on the second floor and 6,973 square feet on the third floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 148,884 square feet; and J. WHEREAS, by Sixth Amendment of Lease dated September 16, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 7,113 square feet on the fifth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas) and which space was further identified as Suite 500, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 155,997 square feet; and K. WHEREAS, by Seventh Amendment of Lease dated December 1, 1998, Tenant agreed to lease Suite 500 prior to March 1, 1999 in the event it became available and Tenant's lease of Suite 500 commenced December 29, 1998; and L. WHEREAS, by Eighth Amendment of Lease dated January 15, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 810 square feet on the second floor and 4,288 square feet on the third floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 161,095 square feet; and M. WHEREAS, by Ninth Amendment of Lease dated January 25, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 5,221 square feet on the sixth floor and 2,695 square feet on the seventh floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 169,011 square feet; and N. WHEREAS, by Tenth Amendment of Lease dated February 25, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 4,319 square feet on the second floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 173,330 square feet and O. WHEREAS, by Eleventh Amendment of Lease dated April 7,1999 in the 1825 Building, Tenant leased an additional 7,509 square feet on the first floor, 11,417 square feet on the fifth floor, 17,702 on the eighth floor and 17,702 square feet on the ninth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 227,660 square feet; and P. WHEREAS, by Twelfth Amendment of Lease dated May 26, 1999 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 1,657 of rentable square feet of space located on the third floor of the 1875 Building, effective July 1st, 1999, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with PRS International, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the Twelfth Amendment of Lease void; and Q. WHEREAS, by Thirteenth Amendment of Lease dated December 7, 1999, Tenant leased an additional 2,552 square feet on the second floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas) of the 1875 Building, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 230,212 square feet; and R. WHEREAS, by the still to be executed Fourteenth Amendment of Lease dated December 7, 1999, Tenant intends to lease an additional 1,608 square feet on the fifth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas) of the 1875 Building, which upon execution of the Fourteenth Amendment of Lease shall thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 231,820 square feet; and S. WHEREAS, in the 1875 Building, Tenant now desires to lease an additional 1,657 square feet on the third floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 233,477 square feet. NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Landlord and Tenant agree as follows: 1. The areas to be leased hereunder are all located in the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California and are further described as follows: a) Suite 31D-D,E (PRS International) Comprising 1,027 gross square feet of space, including Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the third floor and as further described in red on Exhibit "Al". b) Suite 310-C (Bowman Capital Management) Comprising 630 gross square feet of space, which includes Tenant's prorata share of Building common areas, located on the third floor and as further outlined in red on Exhibit "A2". Tenant hereby acknowledges that the two suites to be leased hereunder, Suites 310-D,E and 310-C are currently leased to PRS International, Inc. and Bowman Capital Management respectively. Tenant's Lease of Suite 310-D,E is contingent upon Landlord entering into, in Landlord's sole opinion, an acceptable lease termination agreement with PRS International for the referenced suite. In the event Landlord and PRS International do not enter into such a lease termination agreement, then the provisions of this Fifteenth Amendment of Lease shall be void and of no force and effect between the parties, neither Landlord nor Tenant shall be liable to one another for having entered into this Fifteenth Amendment of Lease, and all other terms and conditions of the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. Landlord's Lease Agreement with Bowman Capital Management is on a month-to-month basis, and at such time that both an acceptable lease termination agreement is executed by PRS International, and Landlord has received a fully executed copy of this Fifteenth Amendment of Lease, Landlord will provide written notification to Bowman Capital, terminating their lease on February 29, 2000. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE Subject to Paragraph 1 above, the Effective Dates shall be as follows: (a) Suite 310-D,E - March 1, 2000 (b) Suite 310-C - March 1, 2000 3. TERM Subject to Paragraph 1 above, commencing upon the respective Effective Dates Landlord agrees to lease to Tenant and Tenant agrees to lease and hire from Landlord Suites 310-D,E and 310-C. The Term of Lease for Suites 310-D,E and 310-C shall terminate August 31, 2008. Landlord and Tenant each acknowledge that the expiration date of the term of Lease for Suites 3l0-D,E and 310-C is different from the expiration date of the term of lease for other space leased by Tenant, including the expiration date of the term of lease for the 1855 Building and the "Core Space" (as defined in Paragraph 3 of the Fifth Amendment of Lease). In the event the term of Tenant's lease for the Core Space expires and Tenant vacates the Core Space, nevertheless, the term of lease for Suites 310-D,E and 310-C leased hereunder shall expire August 31st, 2008 and all the terms and conditions of the Lease shall remain in full force and effect and shall pertain to the space leased under this Fifteenth Amendment of Lease. Furthermore, it is hereby agreed that the Lease for Suites 3l0-D,E and 310-C shall be subject to the Option to Extend granted to Tenant per paragraph 48 of the Lease such that in the event that Tenant exercises its option to extend the Lease on the Core Space such that the Lease for the Core Space is extended to July 31st, 2011, then the Lease for Suites 310-D,E and 310-C shall automatically be extended from August 31, 2008 to July 31st, 2011. The Basic and Additional Rent on Suites 310-D,E and 310-C for the period September 1st, 2008 to July 31st, 2011 (provided Tenant has exercised its option per paragraph 48 of the Lease) shall be at the same rate as Tenant is then paying on the Core Space. As is stated in Paragraph 48(f), Tenant's second Option to Extend shall apply to all space then leased by Tenant as of the date of the exercise of the second option. 4. BASIC RENT The Basic Rent for the additional space leased per this Fifteenth Amendment, commencing upon the Effective Date, shall be $3.40 per square foot per month multiplied by the square footage leased, as follows: Suite Square Footage Basic Rent/Sq. Ft. Total monthly Basic Rent 310-D,E 310-C 1,027 630 $3.40 3.40 $3,491.80 2,142.00 The Basic Rent described above shall be adjusted August 8th, 2000 and annually thereafter, in the same manner and upon the same date and with the same limitations as described in paragraph 38 of the Lease. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, for Suites 310-D,E and 310-C, Landlord hereby grants Tenant two months Basic Rent abatement for each suite. Such Basic Rent Abatement shall be granted to Tenant irrespective of whether Tenant occupies the Premises or not during the two-month period immediately following the Effective Date. For example, if the Effective Date for Suites 310-D,E and 310-C is March 1, 2000, Tenant's lease on Suites 310-D,E and 310-C will commence March 1, 2000, and the Basic Rent described above for Suites 310-D,E and 310-C will commence May 1, 2000, irrespective of Tenant's occupancy. 5. ADDITIONAL RENT Commencing upon the Effective Date, Tenants Additional Rent for each suite, as described in Paragraph 4D of the Lease, shall be the then current rate per square foot per month being charged to tenants occupying Building 1875 multiplied by the respective square footages and shall continue to be adjusted per the terms and conditions of Paragraph 4D. 6. AS-IS Tenant agrees to lease each suite hereunder in an "as-is" condition, and any alteration or modification to the Premises shall be made in accordance with paragraphs 8 & 9 of the Lease at Tenant's sole cost and expense and shall not delay the commencement of Lease for each of the Suites nor delay the payment of rent. 7. PARKING On the Effective Date, Tenant's total parking allocation shall be increased as follows: Suite 310-D,E 3 spaces Suite 310-C 2 spaces 8. NO BROKERS Landlord and Tenant mutually acknowledge that neither Landlord nor Tenant have had any dealings with any real estate brokers or agents in connection with the negotiation of this Fifteenth Amendment of Lease which has resulted in any obligation to pay a leasing commission. 10. LEASE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT Except as herein and modified the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this Fifteen Amendment of Lease, which for reference purposes shall be deemed to have been dated as the date above written. LANDLORD: TENANT: CROSSROADS ASSOCIATES SIEBEL SYSTEMS, Inc., a Delaware Corporation /s/ Dick Jacobson Title Partner /s/ Jeffrey T. Amann Title Director, Legal Affairs CLOCKTOWER ASSOCIATES /s/ Dick Jacobson Title Partner -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT OF LEASE This Sixteenth Amendment of Lease is made and entered into this 12th day of September, 2000, by and between Crossroads Associates and Clocktower Associates (Landlord), and Siebel Systems, Inc. a Delaware Corporation (Tenant). RECITALS A. WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant entered into a Lease dated June 4th, 1996, (the Lease) for the lease of approximately 66,426 gross square feet of space located in the five story Building located at 1855 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California; and B. WHEREAS, by letter dated October 30th, 1996 Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the fourth floor of the Building located at 1875 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California (and hereinafter referred to as the 1875 Building) and by letter dated December 17th, 1996, Tenant exercised Tenant's option to lease the tenth floor of the 1875 Building; and C. WHEREAS, by First Amendment of Lease dated March 17, 1997 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 12,926 rentable square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building, commencing April 1st, 1997, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with California Federal Bank, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the First Amendment of Lease void; and D. WHEREAS, by Second Amendment of Lease dated March 19, 1997 Tenant leased an additional 12,926 gross square feet of space located on the first floor of the 1875 Building; and E. WHEREAS, by letter dated May 23, 1997, Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, and by letter dated July 28th, 1997 Tenant exercised Tenant's Option to lease the Eighth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area (subject to the Ninth floor becoming available) to 150,160 gross square feet of space; and F. WHEREAS, by Third Amendment of Lease dated September 1st, 1997 Landlord and Tenant agreed to an early commencement of lease for Suite 130, in the 1875 Building, such that the Suite 130 Lease commenced September 1st, 1997; and G. WHEREAS, by Fourth Amendment of Lease dated April 2nd, 1998, Landlord and Tenant agreed that Landlord will allow Tenant to make certain improvements to Tenant's Premises in the 1875 Building and Tenant further agreed to additional compensation for additional parking; and H. WHEREAS, Bay Networks exercised its option to extend its lease on the ninth floor of the 1875 Building, thereby making Tenant's exercise of option to lease the ninth floor void and therefore bringing Tenant's total leased area to 132,458 square feet; and I. WHEREAS, by Fifth Amendment of Lease dated May 8, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 9,453 square feet on the second floor and 6,973 square feet on the third floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 148,884 square feet; and J. WHEREAS, by Sixth Amendment of Lease dated September 16, 1998, in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 7,113 square feet on the fifth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas) and which space was further identified as Suite 500, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 155,997 square feet; and K. WHEREAS, by Seventh Amendment of Lease dated December 1, 1998, Tenant agreed to lease Suite 500 prior to March 1, 1999 in the event it became available and Tenant's lease of Suite 500 commenced December 29, 1998; and L. WHEREAS, by Eighth Amendment of Lease dated January 15, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 810 square feet on the second floor and 4,288 square feet on the third floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 161,095 square feet; and M. WHEREAS, by Ninth Amendment of Lease dated January 25, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 5,221 square feet on the sixth floor and 2,695 square feet on the seventh floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 169,011 square feet; and N. WHEREAS, by Tenth Amendment of Lease dated February 25, 1999 in the 1875 Building, Tenant leased an additional 4,319 square feet on the second floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 173,330 square feet; and O. WHEREAS, by Eleventh Amendment of Lease dated April 7, 1999 in the 1825 Building, Tenant leased an additional 7,509 square feet on the first floor, 11,417 square feet on the fifth floor, 17,702 on the eighth floor and 17,702 square feet on the ninth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 227,660 square feet; and P. WHEREAS, by Twelfth Amendment of Lease dated May 26, 1999 Landlord agreed to lease to Tenant and Tenant agreed to lease from Landlord 1,657 of rentable square feet of space located on the third floor of the 1875 Building, effective July 1st, 1999, contingent upon Landlord obtaining a lease termination agreement with PRS International, which lease termination agreement was not obtained thereby rendering the Twelfth Amendment of Lease void; and Q. WHEREAS, by Thirteenth Amendment of Lease dated December 7, 1999, Tenant leased an additional 2,552 square feet on the second floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas) of the 1875 Building, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 230,212 square feet; and R. WHEREAS, by Fourteenth Amendment of Lease dated December 7, 1999, Tenant leased an additional 1,608 square feet on the fifth floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas) of the 1875 Building, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 231,820 square feet; and S. WHEREAS, by Fifteenth Amendment of Lease dated January 12, 2000, Tenant leased an additional 1,657 square feet on the third floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas) of the 1875 Building, thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 233,477 square feet; and T. WHEREAS, in the 1825 Building, Tenant now desires to lease an additional 2,128 square feet on the second floor (which includes Tenant's proportionate share of building common areas), thereby bringing Tenant's total leased area to 235,605 square feet. NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Landlord and Tenant agree as follows: 1. The area to be leased hereunder shall hereinafter be referred to as "Suite 280" and is described as follows: 2,128 rentable square feet of space, which includes Tenant's prorate share of Building common areas, located on the second floor of the Building located at 1825 South Grant Street, San Mateo, San Mateo County, California and as further outlined in red on Exhibit "A". 2. EFFECTIVE DATE The "Effective Date" for the commencement of Lease for Suite 280 shall hereinafter be defined as October 15, 2000. 3. TERM The Term of Lease for Suite 280 shall commence upon the Effective Date and shall terminate April 30, 2005. 4. BASIC RENT Commencing upon the Effective Date, Tenant's monthly Basic Rent for Suite 280 shall be 2,128 s.f. x $7.00 = $14,896.00 per month. This amount shall be adjusted August 8th, 2001 and annually thereafter, in the same manner and upon the same date and with the same limitations as described in Paragraph 38 of the Lease. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, for Suite 280, Landlord hereby grants Tenant a Basic Rent abatement in the amount of $22,700.00 (the cost for building standard carpet, base, painting, ceiling tiles and light fixtures). Irrespective of whether Tenant occupies the Premises, such Basic Rent Abatement shall be granted to Tenant commencing upon the Effective Date. 5. ADDITIONAL RENT Commencing upon the Effective Date, Tenant's Additional Rent for Suite 280 as described in Paragraph 40 of the Lease shall be $1447.04 per month (2128 sq.ft. x $.68 = $1447.04) and shall continue to be adjusted per the terms and conditions of Paragraph 40. 6. AS-IS Tenant agrees to lease suite 280 hereunder in an "as-is" condition, and any alteration or modification to the Premises shall be made in accordance with paragraphs 8 & 9 of the Lease at Tenant's sole cost and expense (excepting that Landlord shall grant the Basic Rent Abatement in the amount of $22,700 as described in paragraph 4 above) and shall not delay the commencement of Lease for Suite 280 nor delay the payment of rent. 7. PARKING Upon the Effective Date for Suite 280, Tenant's total parking allocation shell be increased by 6 spaces. 8. NO BROKERS Tenant acknowledges that Tenant shall pay all commissions due real estate brokers or agents representing Tenant in connection with the negotiation of this Sixteenth Amendment of Lease, and Landlord shall not be obligated to pay any commissions to Tenant's brokers or agents. 9. LEASE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT Except as herein and modified the Lease shall remain in full force and effect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this Sixteenth Amendment of Lease, which for reference purposes shall be deemed to have been dated as the date above written. LANDLORD: TENANT: CROSSROADS ASSOCIATES SIEBEL SYSTEMS, Inc., a Delaware Corporation /s/ Dick Jacobson Title Partner /s/ Jeffrey T. Amann Title Senior Director, Legal Affairs CLOCKTOWER ASSOCIATES /s/ Dick Jacobson Title Partner --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cs	wikipedia	N/A	New Line Cinema je americké filmové studio. Založeno bylo roku 1967 jako filmový distributor, později se stalo nezávislým filmovým studiem. V roce 1993 získal nad společností kontrolu koncern Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. Od roku 1996 spadá pod Warner Bros., který patří mezi šest největších filmových producentů na světě. Hlavní evropské pobočky New Line Cinema v zastoupení Warner Bros. jsou ve Vídni a v Berlíně. Známým se New Line Cinema stala v 80. letech 20. století, kdy natočila hororovou sérii Noční můra v Elm Street. Na přelomu 20. a 21. století si New Line Cinema vybral režisér Peter Jackson jako studio, které bude financovat jeho film podle předlohy Tolkienova Pána prstenů. Vybral si jej proto, že to bylo jediné studio ze všech, které mu umožnilo natočit trilogii a ne pouze jeden film. Některé filmy New Line Cinema Noční můra v Elm Street (1984) Noční můra v Elm Street 2: Freddyho pomsta (1985) Noční můra v Elm Street 3: Bojovníci ze sna (1987) Noční můra v Elm Street 4: Vládce snu (1988) Noční můra v Elm Street 5: Dítě snu (1989) Freddyho smrt – Poslední noční můra (1991) Nová noční můra (1994) Rachot v Bronxu (1995) Sedm (1995) Vrtěti psem (1997) Ztraceni ve vesmíru (1998) Austin Powers: Špion, který mě vojel (1999) Malý Nicky – Satan Junior (2000) 15 minut (2001) Pán prstenů: Společenstvo Prstenu (2001) Jmenuji se Sam (2001) Pán prstenů: Dvě věže (2002) Zkurvená noc (2003) Freddy vs. Jason (2003) Texaský masakr motorovou pilou (2003) Pán prstenů: Návrat krále (2003) Zákon přitažlivosti (2004) Miluji tě k sežrání (2005) Okamžik zlomu (2007) Zlatý kompas (2007) Sex ve městě (2008) Cesta do středu země (2008) Bejvalek se nezbavíš (2009) Je to i můj život (2009) Na sv. Valentýna (2010) Noční můra v Elm Street (2010) Hobit: Neočekávaná cesta (2012) Hobit: Šmakova dračí poušť (2013) Hobit: Bitva pěti armád (2014) Filmová studia Firmy založené roku 1967 Warner Bros.
de	wikipedia	N/A	Hildegard Cancik-Lindemaier (* als Hildegard Lindemaier 13. März 1938 in Oppenheim) ist eine deutsche Klassische Philologin und Religionshistorikerin. Hildegard Cancik-Lindemaier wuchs in ihrer Geburtsstadt auf und studierte zunächst Katholische Theologie, Germanistik und Romanistik an der Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz. An der Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen studierte sie zudem Klassische Philologie. 1963 legte sie das Staatsexamen ab, 1965 erfolgte in Tübingen die Promotion mit einer Arbeit zum Thema Untersuchungen zu Senecas Epistulae morales. Cancik-Lindemaier lebte gemeinsam mit ihrem Mann Hubert Cancik – das Paar hat zwei Töchter, darunter die Altorientalistin Eva Cancik-Kirschbaum – lange Zeit in Tübingen, mittlerweile in Berlin. Anders als er forscht sie als freie Wissenschaftlerin und ist weder an einer Universität noch einem Gymnasium beschäftigt. Doch betätigt sie sich in der Lehrerfortbildung, an Volkshochschulen und anderen Institutionen der Erwachsenenbildung sowie für den Schulfunk, für den sie Sendereihen mit Bezug zur Antike und Religionsgeschichte bearbeitet hat. Cancik-Lindemaier bemüht sich vor allem um eine interdisziplinäre Forschungsweise. Gemeinsam mit ihrem Mann forscht sie zu Friedrich Nietzsche, zudem arbeitete sie an der Werkausgabe von Franz Overbeck mit. Schwerpunkte ihrer Forschung sind die antike Kulturwissenschaft, die römische Religionsgeschichte und die Geschichte des frühen Christentums. 1986 organisierte sie in Tübingen den Kongress Krieg und Kultur mit. Ein Schwerpunkt ihrer Arbeit war die Mitarbeit an der Konzeption und Durchführung des Handbuchs religionswissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe. Gemeinsam wurde das Ehepaar Cancik 2008 von der Universität Basel mit der Ehrendoktorwürde ausgezeichnet. Schriften Untersuchungen zu Senecas Epistulae morales (= Spudasmata Bd. 18). Olms, Hildesheim 1967. Philolog und Kultfigur. Friedrich Nietzsche und seine Antike in Deutschland (mit Hubert Cancik), Metzler, Stuttgart u. a. 1999, ISBN 3-476-01676-5. Von Atheismus bis Zensur. Römische Lektüren in kulturwissenschaftlicher Absicht. Königshausen und Neumann, Würzburg 2006, ISBN 3-8260-3204-7. Gesammelte Aufsätze. Hubert Cancik (Hrsg., 2 Bände), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2008, ISBN 3-16-149301-X und ISBN 3-16-149313-3. Literatur Christoph Auffarth und Jörg Rüpke (Hrsgg.): Epitomē tēs oikumenēs = Studien zur römischen Religion in Antike und Neuzeit. Für Hubert Cancik und Hildegard Cancik-Lindemaier (= Potsdamer Altertumswissenschaftliche Beiträge. Bd. 6). Steiner, Stuttgart 2002, ISBN 3-515-08210-7. Weblinks Würdigung zur Verleihung der Ehrendoktorwürde der Universität Basel Altphilologe (20. Jahrhundert) Altphilologe (21. Jahrhundert) Religionshistoriker Religionswissenschaftler (20. Jahrhundert) Religionswissenschaftler (21. Jahrhundert) Deutscher Geboren 1938 Frau Ehrendoktor der Universität Basel Absolvent der Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen
fi	wikipedia	N/A	Gabriele Gori (s. 10. lokakuuta 1987) on italialainen beachfutispelaaja. Hän edustaa Italian beachfutisliigan Viareggio Beach Socceria ja Italian beachfutismaajoukkuetta. Pelipaikaltaan 169 senttimetriä pitkä ja 69 kilogrammaa painava Gori on hyökkääjä. Gori pelasi Italian paidassa vuoden 2011 MM-kotikisoissa Ravennassa, jossa hän teki neljässä ottelussa yhden maalin. Gori saavutti Italian kanssa hopeaa vuoden 2015 Euroopan kisoista Bakusta, jossa Gori oli kisojen toiseksi paras maalintekijä seitsemällä osumallaan. Gori on edustanut koko uransa, vuodesta 2010 lähtien, kotimaansa pääsarjan Viareggio Beach Socceria. Hän on saavuttanut seuran kanssa Italian cupin voiton sekä kolme Italian pääsarjan maalikuninkuutta vuosina 2010, 2012 ja 2014. Lähteet Italialaiset beachfutispelaajat Vuonna 1987 syntyneet Elävät henkilöt
en	contracts	US	Exhibit 10.10(a) June 1, 2010 SandRidge Capital L.P. 1300 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 325 Houston, Texas 77056 Attention: Mr. Andrew M. Rowe Re: Management Agreement Renewal Dear Mr. Rowe: We are writing with respect to your management agreement concerning the commodity pool to which reference is made below (the “Management Agreement”). We are extending the term of the Management Agreement through June 30, 2011 and all other provisions of the Management Agreement will remain unchanged. • Bristol Energy Fund L.P. • CMF SandRidge Master Fund L.P. • Bohdan Mysko • CMF SandRidge Feeder (Cayman) Ltd. • UDC International • Energy Advisors Portfolio L.P. • Diversified 2000 Futures Fund L.P. • Tactical Diversified Futures fund L.P. • Diversified Multi-Advisor Futures Fund L.P. • Diversified Multi-Advisor Futures Fund L.P. II Please acknowledge receipt of this modification by signing one copy of this letter and returning it to the attention of Ms. Jennifer Magro at the address above or fax to 212-793-1986. If you have any questions I can be reached at 212-559-5046. Very truly yours, CERES MANAGED FUTURES LLC By: /s/ Jennifer Magro Jennifer Magro Chief Financial Officer & Director SANDRIDGE CAPITAL, L.P. By: /s/ Andrew M. Rowe Print Name: Andrew M. Rowe JM/sr
en	other	N/A	How To Create Online Course (Training video) • Tutorial-ebook « Drupal 7 Training: Reporting and Visualizing Data Software Version Control training videos » How To Create Online Course (Training video) Categories: Tutorial by nitiX June 21, 2013 Share & CommentLinkedIn0Twitter2Facebook0Google+1 Over 76 lectures and 6.5 hours of content \| Compressed to 1.3 GB Last year I made over $90,000 US selling one course alone (This One). In this course you’ll learn with all detail exactly how I made that happen so you can do the same. I will teach you how to create your own online course, make it look awesome, promote it, sell it, and make money with it. Creating a great course: I’ll teach you how to create a super cool presentation using Keynote Recording your course: once you create your presentation you need to record it. I’ll teach you how to use ScreenFlow for Mac to record your computer screen and yourself and how to edit it all together. How to promote your course: once you have created your course it is time world know it exists! I’ll teach you the most efficient ways to promote your course and find students. Making money selling your course: how much to charge for your course? I’ll teach you how to create a great sales page for your course, how to use PayPal to make money selling your course, finding affiliates, and much more! Just like you I have invested zillions of dollars and many years educating myself, learning new skills. It’s time to share that hard earned knowledge with the world and creating an online course is one of the best ways to do so, reach thousands of people and why not make some money on the side. Important!http://u19641041.letitbit.net/download/78027.74ad9656d0cd880a98115d7a7cee/Miguel_Hernandez__-_How_To_Create_an_Awesome_Online_Course.part1.rar.html http://u19641041.letitbit.net/download/36531.35cb77e74faacae7fba652163ed8/Miguel_Hernandez__-_How_To_Create_an_Awesome_Online_Course.part2.rar.html http://u19641041.letitbit.net/download/45643.40ad6b6e1787e0b0cd6c241c51cf/Miguel_Hernandez__-_How_To_Create_an_Awesome_Online_Course.part3.rar.html http://u19641041.letitbit.net/download/28734.26df7ac2c1f93c2f117e41dcb6f0/Miguel_Hernandez__-_How_To_Create_an_Awesome_Online_Course.part4.rar.html Important!Miguel Hernandez – How To Create an Awesome Online Course.part3.rar Miguel Hernandez – How To Create an Awesome Online Course.part4.rar Miguel Hernandez – How To Create an Awesome Online Course.part1.rar Miguel Hernandez – How To Create an Awesome Online Course.part2.rar How To Create A Successful WordPress Site (video Training) Get Seen: Online Video Secrets to Building Your Business YouTube for Business: Online Video Marketing for Any Business Investing Online For Dummies, 8th edition Mastering Online Sales Course with Derek Halpern (2013) – CreativeLive Creating an Awesome Demo Video for Your Business Tags: Awesome, Grumo Media, How to Create, Online Course Permanent link to this article: http://www.tutorial-ebook.com/how-to-create-online-course/ Mastering VMware vSphere 5.5 ePUB Eric Worre – GO Pro – Network Marketing English Grammar in Use with Answers, 4th edition + CD Operating System Concepts, 9th Edition Microsoft MTA Training Course ( MOC ) 42 Books on Drawing and Animation Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ( IEEE ) ebook Pack Beginning Visual C# 2010 C++ QT Tutorials Engineering Economy 7th Edition Become A Premium Member Monthly Premium Account Recommended
de	wikipedia	N/A	Die Rigal Motor Company war ein französischer Hersteller von Automobilen. Unternehmensgeschichte Das Unternehmen begann 1902 mit der Produktion von Automobilen. Der Markenname lautete Rigal. Es gab eine Verbindung zur British Germain Motor Car Company. Der Vertrieb in England erfolgte durch die English Motor Company, Hanover Court 3, Hanover Square in London, die auch das Oilmobile und den Lipscomb anboten. Präsentiert wurden die Fahrzeuge auf der Stanley Show 1902 und auf der Motor Show der Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) vom Januar bis Februar 1903. 1903 endete die Produktion. Fahrzeuge Das einzige Modell war mit einem Fahrgestell von Lacoste & Battmann ausgestattet. Für den Antrieb sorgte üblicherweise ein Einzylindermotor von De Dion-Bouton mit 6 PS Leistung. Alternativ stand ein Einbaumotor von Aster mit 7 PS Leistung zur Verfügung. Der Neupreis betrug 195 Pfund Sterling. Literatur George Nick Georgano (Chefredakteur): The Beaulieu Encyclopedia of the Automobile. Volume 3: P–Z. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, Chicago 2001, ISBN 1-57958-293-1. (englisch) George Nick Georgano: Autos. Encyclopédie complète. 1885 à nos jours. Courtille, Paris 1975. (französisch) Marián Šuman-Hreblay: Automobile Manufacturers Worldwide Registry. McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, London 2000, ISBN 0-7864-0972-X. (englisch) Weblinks Foto (abgerufen am 3. März 2013) Kleinwagen 1902 (englisch, abgerufen am 3. März 2013) Einzelnachweise Ehemaliger Pkw-Hersteller (Frankreich) Gegründet 1902
fr	caselaw	Switzerland	{"","A/725/2011 ATAS/1087/2011 du 21.11.2011 ( AI ) , REJETE En faitEn droit RÉPUBLIQUE ET CANTON DE GENÈVE POUVOIR JUDICIAIRE A/725/2011 ATAS/1087/2011 COUR DE JUSTICE Chambre des assurances sociales Arrêt du 21 novembre 2011 9ème Chambre En la cause Madame C_, domiciliée à Châtelaine, comparant avec élection de domicile en l'étude de Maître Suzette CHEVALIER recourante contre OFFICE DE L'ASSURANCE-INVALIDITÉ DU CANTON DE GENÈVE, sis rue de Lyon 97, 1203 Genève intimé","EN FAIT Madame C_, née en 1965, est mère d'un enfant né en 1991. Elle a exercé successivement des activités de fille de buffet, d'aide hospitalière, de vendeuse et de ménagère. Elle allègue souffrir depuis plusieurs années de douleurs lombaires. En septembre 2008, celles-ci l'ont contrainte à interrompre son travail. Jusqu'au 4 septembre 2008, respectivement 30 octobre 2008, elle a été employée de X_ SA à raison de 4 heures par jour et de Y_ SA pour qui elle effectuait deux heures de nettoyage par jour. Le 3 novembre 2008, elle a demandé à l'assurance-invalidité le bénéfice de moyens auxiliaires. Cette demande a été acceptée, l'Office cantonal de l'assurance-invalidité (OCAI), entre-temps devenu OFFICE DE L'ASSURANCE-INVALIDITÉ DU CANTON DE GENÈVE (OAI), prenant en charge les frais d'un corset fait sur mesure, destiné à soulager les douleurs dorsales liées à l'hernie discale gauche L5-S1. Le 30 mars 2009, l'OAI a reçu la demande de prestations de rente/mesures professionnelles de l'assurée. Selon les pièces médicales au dossier, l'assurée souffre de douleurs aiguës lombo-sacrées irradiant vers la jambe et le pied gauches. Le Dr L_ a mis en évidence, le 6 septembre 2008, une \"spondylolyse isthmique L5 bilatérale, une spondylolisthésis L, grade 1 selon Meyerding, une bascule du bassin de 8 mm, une scoliose à convexité G, à sommet L2, un angle scoliotique selon Cobb de 6°\". L'IRM pratiquée par la Dresse M_ le 20 octobre 2008 a montré un \"discret antélisthésis de L5 sur S1 sur lyse isthmique et petite hernie discale foraminale L5-S1 gauche\". Le Dr N_, spécialiste en neurologie, retient l'absence d'un déficit neurologique, le 24 novembre 2008, mais retient que les douleurs décrites sont compatibles avec les constatations de la Dresse M_.","Selon le médecin traitant, le Dr O_, la patiente présente, depuis septembre 2008, une discrète anthélisthésis L5 sur S1 sur lyse isthmique et une petite hernie discale foraminale L5-S1 gauche. Depuis octobre 2008, il a également observé un syndrome du tunnel carpien droit débutant. La patiente souffre, en outre, de lombosciatalgies et de lourdeurs au niveau postérieur de la cuisse et des mollets, de paresthésies épisodiques de la main droite, de jour et de nuit. Sa capacité de travail en tant que nettoyeuse est nulle depuis le 9 mars 2009; une reprise de l'activité n'était envisageable qu'à 50%. Elle ne pouvait porter de charges excédant 2 kg, ni travailler en position de \"porte-à-faux\" ni effectuer de flexions répétées du tronc. Le 20 avril 2009, le Dr P_ du Service de neurochirurgie des HUG a proposé une opération de fixation par voie postérieure, relevant cependant l'absence d'urgence d'y procéder. Il a, en outre, préconisé un traitement algique \"poussé\", laissant le soin au médecin traitant d'évaluer l'efficacité de celui-ci. Interpellé par l'OAI le 23 décembre 2009, le Dr O_ a considéré qu'il n'y avait pas de changement depuis l'établissement de son précédent rapport, à l'exception d'une épicondylite, présente depuis septembre 2009. Il estimait la capacité médico-théorique, dans son rapport du 22 décembre 2009 destiné à l'assureur maladie, à 4h par jour, précisant que cette activité n'était alors pas exigible. Dans le cadre de la procédure AI, l'assurée a suivi un stage d'orientation auprès des Établissements publics pour l'intégration (EPI) du 3 au 30 août 2009. Le rapport de stage relève que la collaboration de l'assurée a été \"très correcte\". Celle-ci était proactive et a répondu favorablement aux demandes des EPI. Elle avait montré une \"excellente continuité dans son travail, sans dispersion ni attentisme\". Elle rencontrait des limitations fonctionnelles importantes en position assise, ne pouvant rester assise plus de 10 à 15 minutes. Moyennant des aménagements concernant le port de charges et les positions de travail, elle pouvait cependant réintégrer le circuit économique ordinaire. Les cibles professionnelles visées étaient: patrouille scolaire, employée de cafétéria dans un EMS ou surveillante de vols dans un magasin. Les EPI demandaient à ce que l'assurée puisse enchaîner par un stage en entreprise, dans une cafétéria par exemple, mesure accordée par décision du 21 octobre 2009. A l'issue de ces stages, il est apparu que les activités proposées n'étaient soit pas compatibles avec les atteintes à la santé de l'assurée (aide en cafétéria, aide-lingère, surveillante vols), soit pas rémunérées (patrouilles scolaire). L'évaluation mentionnait à nouveau la bonne collaboration de l'assurée, son engagement étant jugé \"très bon\" et sa bonne volonté était soulignée. Au vu de l'échec des mesures de réadaptation d'ordre professionnel, l'OAI a informé l'assurée, le 5 novembre 2009, qu'il allait examiner son droit à des prestations de rente. Le 24 juin 2010, le Dr Q_, spécialiste en chirurgie orthopédique et traumatologie, a procédé à un examen clinique de l'assurée au Service médical régional (SMR). Au terme de celui-ci, il a retenu, comme diagnostic avec répercussion sur la capacité de travail, des lombo-sciatalgies chroniques, une spondylolyse L5 bilatérale, un spondylolisthésis L5-S1 au premier degré et une hernie discale foraminale L5-S1, M 43.1. Le traitement était \"largement susceptible d'être amélioré\" tant sur le plan antalgique que celui de la rééducation et du renforcement musculaire. En cas d'échec d'un traitement conservateur bien conduit, une spondylodèse par voie postérieure L5-S1 était indiquée. Dans une activité adaptée, l'assurée pouvait travailler à 100% depuis le 9 mars 2009. Dans sa note finale, le SMR a ainsi retenu une capacité de travail à 100% dans une activité évitant le maintien prolongé en toutes postures debout ou assise, les mouvements rapides, de la tête et du tronc ainsi que le port régulier de charges de plus de 5 kg ou occasionnel de plus de 10 kg sollicitant le dos et les mouvements répétitifs pro-supination du membre supérieur droit. Considérant que l'assurée avait travaillé à environ 75% comme nettoyeuse et qu'elle avait une capacité de travail de 100% dans une activité adaptée, l'OAI a estimé, dans une note du 27 septembre 2010, qu'il n'y avait pas d'invalidité dans la sphère professionnelle. Une enquête à domicile n'était ainsi pas indiquée. Même en admettant des empêchements de 100%, l'invalidité globale n'atteindrait pas 40%. Par décision du 8 février 2011, reçue par l'assurée à son domicile élu le lendemain, l'OAI a refusé toute rente et mesure d'ordre professionnel, maintenant ainsi son projet de décision, dûment communiqué à l'assurée. L'OAI a motivé son refus par le fait qu'il ressortait de la comparaison du revenu sans invalidité exercé à 68% et du revenu possible avec invalidité à 100% que le degré d'invalidité était de 0%. Par acte expédié le 8 mars 2011 à l'attention de la Cour de justice, l'assurée recourt contre cette décision, dont elle demande l'annulation. Préalablement, elle sollicite la mise sur pied d'une expertise pluridisciplinaire aux fins de déterminer sa capacité de travail et les limitations éventuelles en cas de capacité de travail partielle. Principalement, elle conclut à l'allocation d'une rente d'invalidité entière depuis le 5 septembre 2009, subsidiairement d'une rentre partielle depuis cette date et le bénéfice de mesures d'ordre professionnel. Elle annexe à son recours le courrier du Dr O_ du 10 janvier 2011, exposant qu'un changement fréquent de position durant huit heures par jour serait nocif. Par ailleurs, il conteste que le traitement algique ne soit pas approprié, relevant que le SMR ne précise pas lequel serait mieux adapté. Il réitère son appréciation selon laquelle la patiente ne peut exercer une activité adaptée à son état de santé que pendant quatre heures par jour. Est également joint un rapport du 27 décembre 2010 du Dr R_, psychiatre, indiquant suivre la recourante depuis le 15 février 2010 et posant le diagnostic de dépression sévère, la capacité de travail étant nulle dans toute activité. Il ressort du dossier que ces documents avaient déjà été soumis à l'intimé dont le service médical (Dr S_) a estimé, dans son avis du 24 janvier 2011, qu'ils n'étaient pas de nature à modifier son appréciation. Le diagnostic de dépression sévère n'était pas corroboré par les critères définis par la classification internationale OMS-CIM-10, ni par l'anamnèse faite en juin 2010, ni encore par la médication prescrite. En outre, l'appréciation du Dr O_ était imprécise et n'émanait pas d'un spécialiste de la médecine physique et de rééducation. Se référant à sa décision et aux déterminations du SMR, l'OAI a conclu au rejet du recours. Invité par la Cour à indiquer quelle activité adaptée à ses limitations fonctionnelles la recourante pourrait exercer, l'intimé a exposé qu'il pouvait s'agir d'une activité de conditionnement léger (petits objets à emballer) ou d'employée polyvalente en industrie (ébavurage, polissage/sablage, lavage de pièces) ainsi que de toute activité permettant des mesures classiques d'épargne du rachis. Par ailleurs, l'intimé a également mentionné les activités de contrôle dans le domaine pharmacologique ou de l'industrie, telles que l'activité de contrôleuse/visiteuse en salle blanche (vérification visuelle d'un objet fini tel une montre, un briquet, un stylo). L'assurée a relevé que selon les constatations médicales et le stage effectué sous l'égide du COPAI, un travail sur la journée entière est difficilement possible. Elle a annexé un nouveau certificat du Dr O_, selon lequel elle n'est pas en mesure de travailler plus de 4 heures par jour dans un travail adapté, et a maintenu ses conclusions. Dans sa détermination du 16 aout 2011, l'intimé souligne que le courrier du Dr O_ n'apporte aucun élément nouveau. Les rapports médicaux et les constats de l'EPI concordaient quant à la nature et l'étendue des limitations fonctionnelles. L'intimé a ainsi également persisté dans ses conclusions. 19. Les parties ont été informées, par courrier du 22 août 2011, que la cause était gardée à juger. EN DROIT 1. Conformément à l'art. 134 al. 1 let. a ch. 2 de la loi sur l'organisation judiciaire, du 26 septembre 2010 (LOJ; RS E 2 05) en vigueur dès le 1er janvier 2011, la Chambre des assurances sociales de la Cour de justice connaît, en instance unique, des contestations prévues à l'art. 56 de la loi fédérale sur la partie générale du droit des assurances sociales, du 6 octobre 2000 (LPGA; RS 830.1) relatives à la loi fédérale sur l’assurance-invalidité du 19 juin 1959 (LAI; RS 831.20). Sa compétence pour juger du cas d’espèce est ainsi établie. Formé dans le délai et la forme prescrits loi (art. 60 et 61 let. b LPGA), le recours est recevable. 2. La recourante soutient que la décision querellée ne tient pas suffisamment compte de ses atteintes tant physique que psychique. Elle considère, en effet, que ses problèmes lombaires ne lui permettent pas d'exercer une activité adaptée au-delà de quatre heures par jour. a) Est réputée incapacité de travail toute perte, totale ou partielle, de l’aptitude de l’assuré à accomplir dans sa profession ou son domaine d’activité le travail qui peut raisonnablement être exigé de lui, si cette perte résulte d’une atteinte à sa santé physique, mentale ou psychique. En cas d’incapacité de travail de longue durée, l’activité qui peut être exigée de lui peut aussi relever d’une autre profession ou d’un autre domaine d’activité (art. 6 LPGA). Est réputée incapacité de gain toute diminution de l’ensemble ou d’une partie des possibilités de gain de l’assuré sur un marché du travail équilibré dans son domaine d’activité, si cette diminution résulte d’une atteinte à sa santé physique, mentale ou psychique et qu’elle persiste après les traitements et les mesures de réadaptation exigibles (art. 7 LPGA). Est réputée invalidité l’incapacité de gain totale ou partielle qui est présumée permanente ou de longue durée (art. 8 al. 1 LPGA). L’invalidité est réputée survenue dès qu’elle est, par sa nature et sa gravité, propre à ouvrir droit aux prestations entrant en considération (art. 4 al. 2 LAI). Ce moment doit être déterminé objectivement sur la base de l’état de santé. Il ne coïncide pas forcément avec la date à laquelle une demande a été présentée, ni à celle à partir de laquelle une prestation a été requise ni avec le moment où l’assuré apprend, pour la première fois, que l’atteinte à sa santé peut ouvrir droit à des prestations d’assurance. S’agissant du droit à une rente, la survenance de l’invalidité correspond au moment où celui-ci prend naissance, en application de l’art. 29 al. 1 LAI, soit dès que l’assuré présente une incapacité de gain durable de 40% au moins ou dès qu’il a présenté, en moyenne, une incapacité de travail de 40% au moins pendant une année sans interruption notable, mais au plus tôt le 1er jour du mois qui suit le dix-huitième anniversaire de l’assuré (art. 29 al. 2 LAI ; ATF 126 V 5 9 consid. 2b et références y citées). En ce qui concerne la preuve, le juge des assurances sociales fonde sa décision, sauf dispositions contraires de la loi, sur les faits qui, faute d'être établis de manière irréfutable, apparaissent comme les plus vraisemblables, c'est-à-dire qui présentent un degré de vraisemblance prépondérante. Il ne suffit donc pas qu'un fait puisse être considéré seulement comme une hypothèse possible. Parmi tous les éléments de fait allégués ou envisageables, le juge doit, le cas échéant, retenir ceux qui lui paraissent les plus probables (ATF 126 V 360 consid. 5b; 125 V 195 consid. 2). Si l'administration ou le juge, se fondant sur une appréciation consciencieuse des preuves fournies par les investigations auxquelles ils doivent procéder d'office, sont convaincus que certains faits présentent un degré de vraisemblance prépondérante et que d'autres mesures probatoires ne pourraient plus modifier cette appréciation, il est superflu d'administrer d'autres preuves (appréciation anticipée des preuves; ATF 122 II 469 consid. 4a; 122 III 223 consid. 3c; 120 Ib 229 consid. 2b; 119 V 344 consid. 3c). Une telle manière de procéder ne viole pas le droit d'être entendu selon l'art. 29 al. 2 Cst. (ATF 124 V 94 consid. 4b; 122 V 162 consid. 1d). En cas de rapports médicaux contradictoires, le juge ne peut trancher l'affaire sans apprécier l'ensemble des preuves et sans indiquer les raisons pour lesquelles il se fonde sur une opinion médicale et non pas sur une autre. L'élément déterminant pour la valeur probante d'un rapport médical n'est ni son origine, ni sa désignation, mais son contenu. A cet égard, il importe que les points litigieux importants aient fait l'objet d'une étude fouillée, que le rapport se fonde sur des examens complets, qu'il prenne également en considération les plaintes exprimées, qu'il ait été établi en pleine connaissance du dossier (anamnèse), que la description des interférences médicales soit claire et enfin que les conclusions de l'expert soient bien motivées (ATF 125 V 352 consid. 3). Le juge peut accorder pleine valeur probante aux rapports et expertises établis par les médecins des assureurs aussi longtemps que ceux-ci aboutissent à des résultats convaincants, que leurs conclusions soient sérieusement motivées, que ces avis ne contiennent pas de contradictions et qu'aucun indice concret ne permette de mettre en cause leur bien-fondé. Le simple fait que le médecin consulté est lié à l'assureur par un rapport de travail ne permet pas encore de douter de l'objectivité de son appréciation ni de soupçonner une prévention à l'égard de l'assuré. Ce n'est qu'en présence de circonstances particulières que les doutes au sujet de l'impartialité d'une appréciation peuvent être considérés comme objectivement fondés. Étant donné l'importance conférée aux rapports médicaux dans le droit des assurances sociales, il y a lieu toutefois de poser des exigences sévères quant à l'impartialité de l'expert (ATF 125 V 353 consid. 3b/ee; ATF np du 13 mars 2000, I 592/99, consid. b/ee). En ce qui concerne les rapports établis par les médecins traitants, le juge peut et doit tenir compte du fait que, selon l'expérience, le médecin traitant est généralement enclin, en cas de doute, à prendre parti pour son patient en raison de la relation de confiance qui l'unit à ce dernier (ATF 125 V 351 consid. 3b/bb et cc). Les constatations médicales peuvent être complétées par des renseignements d'ordre professionnel, par exemple au terme d'un stage dans un centre d'observation professionnel de l'assurance-invalidité, en vue d'établir concrètement dans quelle mesure l'assuré est à même de mettre en valeur une capacité de travail et de gain sur le marché du travail. Il appartient alors au médecin de décrire les activités que l'on peut encore raisonnablement attendre de l'assuré compte tenu de ses atteintes à la santé (influence de ces atteintes sur sa capacité à travailler en position debout et à se déplacer; nécessité d'aménager des pauses ou de réduire le temps de travail en raison d'une moindre résistance à la fatigue, par exemple), en exposant les motifs qui le conduisent à retenir telle ou telle limitation de la capacité de travail. En revanche, il revient au conseiller en réadaptation, non au médecin, d'indiquer quelles sont les activités professionnelles concrètes entrant en considération sur la base des renseignements médicaux et compte tenu des aptitudes résiduelles de l'assuré (ATF 107 V 20 consid. 2b). L'administration doit en principe examiner quelles possibilités de réadaptation concrètes existent pour l'assuré, compte de l'ensemble des circonstances, en particulier de ses caractéristiques physiques et psychiques ainsi que de sa situation professionnelle et sociale, considérées de manière objective (ATF 113 V 28 consid. 4a; 109 V 28). b) En l'espèce, l'intimé a conclu à une capacité de travail entière dans une activité adaptée aux limitations fonctionnelles de l'assurée. Pour conclure de la sorte, l’intimé s’est basé sur le rapport du Dr Q_. Force est de constater que ce rapport doit se voir reconnaître pleine valeur probante au sens de la jurisprudence, quoi qu’en dise la recourante. En effet, ce médecin l'a établi sur la base des pièces médicales de la recourante, a tenu compte des plaintes exprimées par l'intéressée et a ausculté cette dernière. De plus, ce spécialiste en chirurgie orthopédique et traumatologie a clairement expliqué les diagnostics retenus dont on relèvera qu'ils correspondent parfaitement à ceux posés par les différents médecins consultés par la recourante. En outre, la Cour de céans ne met en exergue aucune circonstance particulière permettant de douter de l’indépendance du Dr Q_. Par ailleurs, le Dr O_ n'a avancé aucun élément permettant de mettre en doute les conclusions du Dr Q_ sur le plan purement somatique. Il ne diverge que sur la question de l'évaluation de la capacité de sa patiente à exercer une activité lucrative eu égard à son état de santé physique. Or, sur ce point, le Dr Q_ a bien motivé son avis. Il a préconisé - comme d'ailleurs le Dr O_ - d'alterner la position debout avec la position assise, d'éviter le port de charges, les travaux effectués en étant penchée en avant ou en porte-à-faux ainsi que les mouvements répétitifs en pro-supination du membre supérieur droit. Dans ces conditions et en suivant un traitement antalgique et de rééducation et de renforcement musculaire, la capacité de travail de l'assurée était entièrement préservée. Le Dr O_ ne critique pas cette appréciation. Il relève uniquement qu'un changement fréquent de position serait nocif. Cette remarque n'est pas contraire à l'appréciation du Dr Q_, qui n'a pas préconisé un changement fréquent, mais recommandé d'éviter le maintien prolongé dans l'une ou l'autre position. Par ailleurs, le médecin traitant affirme que le port d'un corset représente un traitement lourd et soutient qu'il n'est pas admissible de \"droguer massivement une personne pour pouvoir l'expédier au travail\". En outre, la physiothérapie n'apporterait pas d'amélioration. Or, un traitement antalgique plus poussé a également été proposé par le Dr P_, d'une part. D'autre part, il n'apparaît pas qu'un traitement de rééducation et de renforcement musculaire aurait été entrepris ni, a fortiori, que celui-ci aurait été inefficace. Dans ces conditions, il convient de se ranger à l'avis du Dr T_, sans qu'il soit besoin de mettre sur pied une expertise judiciaire ainsi que le demande la recourante. Il convient à cet égard de rappeler qu'au vu de la divergence consacrée par la jurisprudence entre mandat thérapeutique et mandat d'expertise (ATF 124 I 170 consid. 4; SVR 2008 IV Nr. 15 p. 43 consid. 2.2.1 et les références [arrêt I 514/06 du 25 mai 2007]), on ne saurait remettre en cause une expertise ordonnée par l'administration et procéder à de nouvelles investigations du seul fait qu'un ou plusieurs médecins traitants ont une opinion contradictoire. Il n'en va différemment que si ces médecins traitants font état d'éléments objectivement vérifiables ayant été ignorés dans le cadre de l'expertise et qui sont suffisamment pertinents pour remettre en cause les conclusions de l'expert, ce qui n'est pas le cas en l'espèce, ainsi qu'on l'a vu. La recourante s'appuie sur la remarque émise par les EPI selon laquelle \"un travail sur une journée serait difficilement tenu\" pour en déduire une capacité de travail réduite. Or, les deux stages organisés par les EPI d'aide en cafétéria et d'aide-lingère ne tenaient pas suffisamment compte des limitations fonctionnelles de la recourante, le premier comportant le port de charges ainsi que l'impossibilité de changer de position, et le second ne permettant pas non plus de changer de position. Ces deux stages n'ont fait que mettre en exergue les limitations fonctionnelles décrites par le Dr Q_ et ne contredisent nullement l'avis de ce dernier sur ce point. L'affirmation selon laquelle \"un travail sur une journée serait difficilement tenu\" semble d'ailleurs être mise, dans le rapport, en relation avec les limitations fonctionnelles constatées, à savoir la difficulté à rester plus de 10-15 minutes dans la position assise et le besoin de mobilité. Il ne ressort pas du rapport que moyennant la prise en compte des aménagements rendus nécessaires par les limitations fonctionnelles, la recourante ne pourrait pas travailler pendant toute une journée. Le rapport établi par les EPI conclut, au demeurant, que la recourante peut réintégrer le circuit économique normal, à condition que des aménagements concernant le port de charges et les positions de travail soient proposés. Il ne vient donc pas contredire l'appréciation médicale sur les limitations fonctionnelles. Il suit de ce qui précède que la Cour retiendra, conformément aux conclusions du rapport du Dr Q_, qu'en mars 2009, la recourante avait recouvré, sur le plan somatique, la capacité d'exercer à plein temps et plein rendement une activité adaptée. Sur le plan psychiatrique, la recourante a invoqué, peu avant que la décision litigeuse soit rendue, souffrir d'une dépression sévère et avoir consulté à plusieurs reprises le Dr R_, psychiatre, en 2010. Ces éléments justifiaient, d’après elle, qu’il soit procédé à une expertise psychiatrique. Il est vrai que le Dr Q_ a observé le 24 juin 2010 que la patiente souffrait d'angoisse et qu'elle était suivie depuis trois mois par le Dr R_ pour des entretiens à raison d'une fois par mois. Toutefois, le Dr O_, qui n'est certes pas psychiatre, mais suit la patiente de manière régulière, n’a jamais mis en exergue, dans ses nombreux rapports, l’existence d’un état dépressif. La recourante n'a pas non plus mentionné un tel état lors de l'examen par le Dr Q_. Par ailleurs, les séances avec le psychiatre n'ont lieu qu'une à deux fois par mois. Partant, la Cour de céans en conclut que l'épisode dépressif n'était pas d'une gravité telle qu'il avait une répercussion sur la capacité de travail au moment de la notification de la décision dont est recours. Il n'y a donc pas lieu de tenir compte d'une incapacité de travail sur le plan psychiatrique en février 2011, date de la décision, de sorte que la Cour de céans ne juge pas utile de mettre en œuvre une expertise psychiatrique. 3. Reste à se prononcer sur le calcul du degré d'invalidité de la recourante. a) L’art. 16 LPGA s’applique à l’évaluation de l’invalidité des assurés exerçant une activité lucrative. Cette disposition prévoit que, pour évaluer le taux d’invalidité, le revenu que l’assuré aurait pu obtenir s’il n’était pas invalide est comparé avec celui qu’il pourrait obtenir en exerçant l’activité qui peut raisonnablement être exigée de lui après les traitements et les mesures de réadaptation, sur un marché du travail équilibré. Pour ce faire, il convient en principe de se placer au moment de la naissance du droit à la rente (ATF 130 V 343 consid. 4). Les revenus avec et sans invalidité doivent être déterminés par rapport à un même moment et les modifications de ces revenus susceptibles d’influencer le droit à la rente, survenues jusqu’au moment où la décision est rendue (c’est-à-dire entre le projet de décision et la décision elle-même), doivent être prises en compte (cf. ATF 129 V 222 consid. 4.1, 128 V 174). Tant lors de l'examen initial du droit à la rente qu'à l'occasion d'une révision de celle-ci, il faut examiner quelle méthode d'évaluation de l'invalidité il convient d'appliquer. Le choix de l'une des trois méthodes considérées (méthode générale de comparaison des revenus, méthode mixte, méthode spécifique) dépendra du statut du bénéficiaire potentiel de la rente : assuré exerçant une activité lucrative à temps complet, assuré exerçant une activité lucrative à temps partiel, assuré non actif. On décidera que l'assuré appartient à l'une ou l'autre de ces trois catégories en fonction de ce qu'il aurait fait - les circonstances étant par ailleurs restées les mêmes - si l'atteinte à la santé n'était pas survenue. Pour savoir si un assuré doit être considéré comme une personne exerçant une activité à plein temps ou à temps partiel, respectivement pour déterminer la part de l'activité lucrative par rapport à celle consacrée aux travaux ménagers, ou s'il se consacrerait uniquement à ses travaux ménagers, il convient d'examiner ce que ferait l'assuré dans les mêmes circonstances s'il n'était pas atteint dans sa santé. Pour les assurés travaillant dans le ménage, il faut tenir compte de la situation familiale, sociale et professionnelle, ainsi que des tâches d'éducation et de soins à l'égard des enfants, de l'âge, des aptitudes professionnelles, de la formation, des dispositions et des prédispositions. Selon la pratique, la question du statut doit être tranchée sur la base de la situation telle qu'elle s'est développée jusqu'au moment où l'administration a pris sa décision, encore que, pour admettre l'éventualité selon laquelle l'assuré aurait exercé une activité lucrative s'il avait été en bonne santé, il faille que la force probatoire reconnue habituellement en droit des assurances sociales atteigne le degré de la vraisemblance prépondérante (ATF 125 V 150 consid. 2c; 117 V 194 ss consid. 3b). Aux termes de l’art. 27bis RAI, lorsque l’assuré n’exerce une activité lucrative qu’à temps partiel, l’invalidité pour cette part est évaluée selon la méthode générale qui vient d’être décrite. Quant à l’invalidité dans la part réservée aux travaux habituels au sens de l’art. 8 al. 3 LPGA - on entend par là l’activité usuelle dans le ménage, l’éducation des enfants ainsi que l’engagement caritatif non rémunéré -, elle est évaluée selon l’art. 27 RAI. Il faut donc en premier lieu déterminer la part respective de l’activité lucrative et celle de l’accomplissement des autres travaux habituels et calculer le degré d’invalidité d’après le handicap dont la personne est affectée dans les deux domaines d'activité en question (méthode mixte d’évaluation de l’invalidité). On évaluera ainsi le degré d’invalidité dans les travaux habituels par comparaison des activités (art. 27 RAI) et le degré d’invalidité dans la sphère professionnelle par comparaison des revenus (art. 16 LPGA) ; on pourra alors déterminer l’invalidité globale d’après le temps consacré à ces deux champs d’activités. La part de l’activité professionnelle dans l’ensemble des travaux de l’assuré est déterminée en comparant l’horaire de travail usuel dans la profession en question et l’horaire accompli par l’assuré valide; on calcule donc le rapport en pourcent entre ces deux valeurs. La part de l’autre travail habituel constitue le reste du pourcentage (ATF 104 V 136 = RCC 1979 p. 28 consid. 2a ; RCC 1980 p. 565 ; RCC 1992 p. 136 et VSI 1999 p. 231 et ss.). Chez les assurés actifs, le degré d'invalidité doit être évalué sur la base d'une comparaison des revenus. Pour cela, le revenu que l'assuré aurait pu obtenir s'il n'était pas invalide est comparé avec celui qu'il pourrait obtenir en exerçant l'activité qui peut raisonnablement être exigée de lui après les traitements et les mesures de réadaptation, sur un marché du travail équilibré. La comparaison des revenus s'effectue, en règle ordinaire, en chiffrant aussi exactement que possible les montants de ces deux revenus et en les confrontant l'un avec l'autre, la différence permettant de calculer le taux d'invalidité (méthode générale de comparaison des revenus; ATF 130 V 348 consid. 3.4; 128 V 30 consid. 1; 104 V 136 consid. 2a et 2b; art. 28 al. 2 LAI en corrélation avec l'art. 16 LPGA). Pour procéder à la comparaison des revenus, il convient de se placer au moment de la naissance du droit à la rente; les revenus avec et sans invalidité doivent être déterminés par rapport à un même moment et les modifications de ces revenus susceptibles d'influencer le droit à la rente, survenues jusqu'au moment où la décision est rendue, doivent être prises en compte (ATF 129 V 223 consid. 4.1; 128 V 174). Le revenu d'invalide doit être évalué avant tout en fonction de la situation professionnelle concrète de l'intéressé. En l'absence d'un revenu effectivement réalisé, il y a lieu de se référer aux données statistiques, telles qu'elles résultent des enquêtes sur la structure des salaires (ESS) de l'Office fédéral de la statistique (ATF 126 V 76 consid. 3b/aa et bb). La mesure dans laquelle les salaires ressortant des statistiques doivent être réduits, dépend de l'ensemble des circonstances personnelles et professionnelles du cas particulier (limitations liées au handicap, âge, années de service, nationalité/catégorie d'autorisation de séjour et taux d'occupation) et résulte d'une évaluation dans les limites du pouvoir d'appréciation. Une déduction globale maximum de 25 % sur le salaire statistique permet de tenir compte des différents éléments qui peuvent influencer le revenu d'une activité lucrative (cf. ATF 126 V 78 consid. 5). Le revenu de la personne valide se détermine en établissant au degré de la vraisemblance prépondérante ce qu'elle aurait effectivement pu réaliser au moment déterminant si elle était en bonne santé (ATF 129 V 224 consid. 4.3.1 et la référence). Il doit être évalué de manière aussi concrète que possible si bien qu'il convient, en règle générale, de se référer au dernier salaire que l'assuré a obtenu avant l'atteinte à la santé, en tenant compte de l'évolution des salaires intervenue jusqu'au moment du prononcé de la décision. On ne saurait s'écarter d'un tel revenu pour le seul motif que l'assuré disposait, avant la survenance de son invalidité, de meilleures possibilités de gain que celles qu'il mettait en valeur et qui lui permettaient d'obtenir un revenu modeste (ATF 125 V 157 consid. 5c/bb et les arrêts cités); il convient toutefois de renoncer à s'y référer lorsqu'il ressort de l'ensemble des circonstances du cas que l'assuré, sans invalidité, ne se serait pas contenté d'une telle rémunération de manière durable (cf. AJP 2002 1487; RCC 1992 p. 96 consid. 4a). b) En l'espèce, l'intimé a retenu que la recourante avait réalisé en 2008, en travaillant à 68%, un salaire annuel de 32'574 fr. Ce montant n'est pas contesté; il est, au demeurant, conforme aux indications fournies par les employeurs de la recourante et ses relevés de compte individuel de cotisations AVS. Quant au revenu après invalidité, étant rappelé que la recourante pourrait exercer à 100% une activité adaptée à ses limitations, il y a lieu, conformément à une jurisprudence bien établie, de se référer aux données statistiques (ESS) lorsque, comme en l’espèce, l’assurée n’a pas repris d’activité lucrative. Pour une activité simple et répétitive de 40 heures (ESS 2008 TA 1), le salaire annuel s’élevait pour les femmes à 4'116 fr. en 2008. Dans cette catégorie, l’on trouve des activités qui peuvent être adaptées aux limitations fonctionnelles de la recourante et qui ne demandent aucune formation professionnelle, telles que celles mentionnées par l'intimé, à savoir la manutention d'objets légers, l'ébavurage, le polissage, le lavage de pièces ou encore une activité de contrôleuse ou visiteuse. Compte tenu de l’horaire de travail de 41,7 heures habituelles dans les entreprises en 2008 (cf. Office fédéral de la statistique), cela équivaut à un revenu annuel de 51'491 fr. En l'absence d'éléments permettant de retenir que la recourante avait en vue de modifier son taux d'activité lucrative et compte tenu du fait qu'elle n'émet aucune critique à l'encontre de la décision attaquée en ce qui concerne l'exercice à temps partiel d'une activité professionnelle, le taux d'activité sera maintenu à 68%. Avec invalidité, le salaire serait ainsi de 35'014 fr. pour un taux d'occupation de 68%. Les limitations fonctionnelles de la recourante, soit alterner la position debout avec la position assise, éviter le port de charges, les travaux effectués en étant penchée en avant ou en porte-à-faux ainsi que les mouvements répétitifs en pro-supination du membre supérieur droit, ont également une répercussion sur le travail effectué par elle dans une activité adaptée et son manque de polyvalence. En outre, le critère du taux d’occupation partiel est réalisé. De ce fait, il se justifie de prendre en considération un abattement de 15%. Partant, le revenu d’invalide est de 29'762 fr. La comparaison des revenus laisse ainsi apparaître un degré d'invalidité de 8,64%. Au vu de ce taux d'invalidité dans l'activité professionnelle, il n'y a pas lieu de rechercher celui relatif à l'empêchement de l'activité ménagère de 32%, dès lors que, même s'il était de 100%, l'invalidité ainsi déterminée n'atteindrait pas le pourcentage de 40% ouvrant le droit à une rente. En effet, le taux de 8,64% qui entre à raison de 68% dans l'appréciation globale d'invalidité, est ajouté au taux d'empêchement dans la sphère ménagère (hypothétiquement arrêté à 100%), qui entre en compte à raison de 32%. Le degré d'invalidité global, en admettant un empêchement à 100% de l'activité de ménagère, serait alors de 37,87% [8,64 x 0,68] + [100 x 0,32]. Ainsi, même en admettant un empêchement total pour l'activité ménagère - ce qui ne paraît pas plausible en l'espèce - le degré d'invalidité de 40% ne serait pas atteint. Par ailleurs, la recourante ne peut bénéficier de mesures d'ordre professionnel, dès lors que celles-ci ne sont octroyées que lorsque le degré d'invalidité dans l'activité professionnelle est de 20% au minimum (ATF 130 V 488 consid. 4.2), seuil non atteint en l'espèce puisque ce taux n'est que de 8,64%. Compte tenu de ce qui précède, le recours doit être rejeté. 4. Conformément à l’art. 69 al. 1 bis LAI, un émolument de 300 fr. est mis à la charge de la recourante, qui succombe. * * *","PAR CES MOTIFS, LA CHAMBRE DES ASSURANCES SOCIALES : Statuant A la forme : Déclare le recours recevable. Au fond : Le rejette. Met un émolument de 300 fr. à la charge de la recourante. Informe les parties de ce qu’elles peuvent former recours contre le présent arrêt dans un délai de 30 jours dès sa notification auprès du Tribunal fédéral (Schweizerhofquai 6, 6004 LUCERNE), par la voie du recours en matière de droit public, conformément aux art. 82 ss de la loi fédérale sur le Tribunal fédéral, du 17 juin 2005 (LTF; RS 173.110); le mémoire de recours doit indiquer les conclusions, motifs et moyens de preuve et porter la signature du recourant ou de son mandataire; il doit être adressé au Tribunal fédéral par voie postale ou par voie électronique aux conditions de l'art. 42 LTF. Le présent arrêt et les pièces en possession du recourant, invoquées comme moyens de preuve, doivent être joints à l'envoi.","La greffière Maryse BRIAND La présidente Florence KRAUSKOPF Une copie conforme du présent arrêt est notifiée aux parties ainsi qu’à l’Office fédéral des assurances sociales par le greffe le"}
it	wikipedia	N/A	L'albatro reale del nord (Diomedea sanfordi Murphy, 1917) è un grosso uccello marino della famiglia dei Diomedeidi. Strettamente imparentato con l'albatro reale del sud, è stato separato da questa specie solo nel 1998, sebbene alcuni autori li considerino entrambi sottospecie dell'albatro reale. La specie del nord si differenzia da quella meridionale per avere la superficie superiore delle ali di colore completamente nero, rispetto all'altra che presenta su di essa alcune macchie bianche. Differisce da essa anche nel comportamento. L'albatro reale del nord è lungo circa 115 cm, pesa 6,2-8,2 kg ed ha un'apertura alare compresa tra i 270 e i 305 cm. Comportamento Nidifica sulle Isole Chatham, su quella di Enderby, appartenente alle Auckland, e a Capo Taiaroa, nella Penisola di Otago, in Nuova Zelanda. Le sue colonie sono più numerose di quelle di ogni altro grande albatro. Nel nido viene deposto un unico uovo incubato da entrambi i genitori per circa 80 giorni. Il pulcino viene covato fino all'età di un mese ed è pronto per volare dopo 240 giorni. L'albatro reale del nord ha un areale circumpolare, ma la maggior parte degli esemplari si nutre al largo della piattaforma patagonica. Si ciba soprattutto di calamari, che costituiscono l'85% della sua dieta, ma anche di alcune specie di pesci. Conservazione L'albatro reale del nord è una specie minacciata. I suoi terreni riproduttivi sulle Isole Chatham sono stati devastati da una serie di tempeste che hanno spazzato via quasi tutto il materiale utilizzato per la costruzione dei nidi. I pulcini e le uova degli esemplari che nidificano sull'Isola del Sud, invece, sono predati dalle specie introdotte dall'uomo. Note Bibliografia Brooke, R. (2004). Albatrosses And Petrels Across The World: Procellariidae. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK ISBN 0-19-850125-0 Voci correlate Uccelli della Nuova Zelanda Altri progetti Collegamenti esterni ARKive - images and movies of the northern royal albatross (Diomedea sanfordi) Diomedeidae
fr	other	N/A	Ultra Dive streaming HD & 4K, regarder la VOD. Plongez à la découverte des plus belles espèces et des plus beaux décors sous-marins. Dive Part 3 Dive Part 4 Dive Part 6 Dive Part 7 Dive Part 8 Dive Part 10 Dive Part 12 Dive Part 14 Dive Part 15 Dive Part 16 Dive Part 17 Dive Part 18 Dive Part 27 Dive Part 28 Dive Part 29
de	other	N/A	Die gerichtliche Zustimmung zu einer besonderen (erhöhten) Vergütung nach § 13 JVEG kann nur in Ausnahmefällen bei Vorliegen besonderer Gründe erteilt werden, die z. B. in der besonders großen Sachkunde und Kompetenz eines Sachverständigen oder einer besonders schwierigen Beweisfrage (sog. Seltenheitsfall) liegen können. Das mit Beweisanordnung vom 23. Januar 2018 beauftragte Gutachten in dem Verfahren Az: L 1 U 452/14 wird mit der Honorargruppe M 3 vergütet. I. In dem Kostenverfahren zugrunde liegenden Hauptsacheverfahren L 1 U 452/14 ist streitig, welche Gesundheitsstörungen im Sinne der wesentlichen Bedingung durch ein Ereignis vom 25. Oktober 2004 verursacht worden sind. Insbesondere ist zu prüfen, ob als Unfallfolge ein Knorpelschaden IV. Grades und ein Lumbalsyndrom im Bereich der unteren Lendenwirbel anzuerkennen sind. Darüber hinaus ist die Höhe der Minderung der Erwerbsfähigkeit (MdE) zu klären. Der Antragsteller, der aufgrund eines Antrages des Klägers nach § 109 des Sozialgerichtsgesetzes (SGG) mit der Erstellung eines Gutachtens beauftragt worden ist, hat mit Schreiben vom 15. Februar 2018 und 07. April 2018 gemäß § 13 des Justizvergütungs- und Entschädigungsgesetzes (JVEG) eine richterliche Zustimmung für eine spätere Abrechnung mit einem erhöhten Stundensatz von 130,00 Euro die Stunde beantragt und ausgeführt, es handele sich um eine Begutachtung mit einem deutlich erhöhtem Schwierigkeitsgrad wegen der Komplexität des Sachverhaltes. Der Antragsgegner hat Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme erhalten. Der Kläger in dem Verfahren L 1 U 452/14 hat sein Einverständnis mit diesem höheren Stundensatz erteilt. ... II. Der Antrag vom 15. Februar/7. April 2018 ist zulässig. Nach § 9 Abs. 1 JVEG bestimmt sich die Zuordnung der Leistungen zu einer Honorargruppe nach der Anlage 1 (Satz 2); § 4 JVEG gilt entsprechend mit der Maßgabe, dass die Beschwerde auch zulässig ist, wenn der Wert des Beschwerdegegenstandes 200,00 Euro nicht übersteigt (Satz 3). Nach § 4 Abs. 1 Satz 1 JVEG erfolgt die Festsetzung der Vergütung, der Entschädigung oder des Vorschusses durch gerichtlichen Beschluss, wenn der Berechtigte oder die Staatskasse die gerichtliche Festsetzung beantragt oder das Gericht dies für angemessen hält. Diese Voraussetzungen liegen vor. Die Regelung soll es einem Sachverständigen ermöglichen, schon sehr frühzeitig Klarheit über die kostenmäßige Bewertung der zu erwartenden Leistungen und über einen für seinen Gesamtanspruch wesentlichen Beurteilungsfaktor zu erlangen; gleichzeitig dient sie der Rechtsfortbildung (vgl. Thüringer Landessozialgericht, Beschluss vom 19. April 2007 – L 6 SF 11/07). Dasselbe gilt für den Fall, dass eine besondere Vergütung nach § 13 JVEG vereinbart werden soll. § 13 Abs. 1 S. 1 JVEG sieht eine besondere Vergütung vor, wenn sich die Parteien dem Gericht gegenüber mit einer bestimmten oder abweichend von der gesetzlichen Regelung zu bemessenden Vergütung einverstanden erklärt haben und ein ausreichender Betrag an die Staatskasse gezahlt worden ist. Es kann offen bleiben, inwieweit die Vorschrift des § 13 Abs. 1 JVEG überhaupt in einem sozialgerichtlichen Verfahren Anwendung findet. Hintergrund hierfür ist, dass im sozialgerichtlichen Verfahren bei Gutachten von Amts wegen in den Fällen, in denen sowohl Kläger als auch Beklagter zu dem Kreis des § 183 SGG gehören, die Entschädigung für den Gutachter immer durch die Staatskasse zu tragen ist. Vereinbarungen zwischen den Prozessbeteiligten zu Lasten der Staatskasse sind aber grundsätzlich unzulässig (vgl. hierzu LSG Baden-Württemberg vom 15. September 2004 – L 12 U 3685/04; Reyels, jurisPR-SozR 14/2007 Anm. 6 zu Thüringer Landessozialgericht, Beschluss vom 19. April 2007, L 6 SF 11/07). Allerdings könnte eine Abweichung bei einem Gutachten nach § 109 SGG möglich sein (vgl. dazu eingehend die Anmerkung von Reyels, a.a.O.), weil zwar im Anwendungsbereich des § 109 SGG die Kosten nachträglich auf die Staatskasse übernommen werden können, zugleich aber die Möglichkeit besteht, die Übernahme der Kosten von vorneherein auf eine reguläre Vergütung nach dem JVEG zu begrenzen. Dies bedarf im vorliegenden Fall aber keiner Klärung. Denn das Gutachten des Antragstellers ist nach der Honorargruppe M3 zu vergüten. In der Anlage 1 zu § 9 Abs. 1 JVEG werden die medizinischen Gutachten entsprechend ihrer Schwierigkeit in drei Honorargruppen (M 1 – M 3) eingeteilt. Die Honorargruppe M 3 ist danach zu vergeben bei der Begutachtung spezieller Kausalzusammenhänge insbesondere bei problematischen Verletzungsfolgen. Daraus folgt, dass im vorliegenden Fall wegen der Prüfung des Vorliegens weiterer Folgen aus dem Unfallereignis vom 25. Oktober 2004 die Honorargruppe M 3 angemessen ist. Der Antragsteller hat unter Beachtung der aktuellen Leitlinien und des wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisstandes darzulegen, welche Folgen der anerkannte Arbeitsunfall vom 25. Oktober 2004 verursacht hat. Ein solches Gutachten ist mit der höchsten Honorargruppe M 3 der Anlage 1 zu § 9 JVEG zu vergüten. Die Voraussetzungen für die Vereinbarung eines höheren Honorars nach § 13 Abs. 2 JVEG in Höhe von 130,00 Euro liegen nicht vor. Zwar hat der Kläger einem Stundenhonorar in Höhe von 130,00 Euro zugestimmt. Jedoch genügt nach § 13 Abs. 2 JVEG die Erklärung einer Partei nur, wenn das Gericht zustimmt. Die Zustimmung soll nach § 13 Abs. 2 Satz 2 JVEG nur erteilt werden, wenn sich zu dem gesetzlich bestimmten Honorar keine geeignete Person zur Übernahme der Tätigkeit bereit erklärt. Die Voraussetzungen für die Erteilung einer solchen Zustimmung liegen nicht vor. Sie kann grundsätzlich nur in Ausnahmefällen bei Vorliegen besonderer Gründe erteilt werden. Solche besonderen Gründe können in der besonders großen Sachkunde und Kompetenz eines Sachverständigen oder einer besonders schwierigen Beweisfrage (sog. Seltenheitsfall) zu sehen sein. Das Vorliegen dieser Voraussetzungen scheidet bereits deshalb aus, weil im gerichtlichen Verfahren von Amtswegen nach § 106 SGG bereits zwei Sachverständige (Dr. Sch., Gutachten vom 2. April 2015 und Dr. N., Gutachten vom 20. September 2017) ein orthopädisch-unfallchirurgisches Zusammenhangsgutachten zu einem Stundensatz von M 3 erstellt haben. Dies schließt es aus, von einem sogenannten Seltenheitsfall auszugehen. Insoweit kann für ein Gutachten nach § 109 SGG nichts anderes gelten. Abschließend weist der Senat noch darauf hin, dass für eine besondere Komplexität des Sachverhalts auch ansonsten nichts ersichtlich ist. Zu beurteilen sind bestimmte Kausalzusammenhänge im Bereich des unfallchirurgischen Fachgebiets. Soweit eine erhebliche Anzahl bildgebender Befunde und eine umfangreiche Verwaltungsakte auszuwerten sind, rechtfertigt dies ausschließlich einen höheren Zeitaufwand im Rahmen des Aktenstudiums bzw. der Begutachtung selbst. Das Verfahren ist gebührenfrei ... Staatskasse (36%) Seltenheitsfall (34%) Gutachten (29%)
es	other	N/A	SENTENCIA 2011-00117 DE 31 DE MAYO DE 2018 CONTENIDO:LA PROHIBICIÓN SEGÚN LA CUAL NINGÚN MUNICIPIO PODRÍA ASUMIR DIRECTAMENTE NUEVOS SERVICIOS DE SALUD NI AMPLIAR LOS EXISTENTES IMPLICABA, A SU VEZ, LA LIMITANTE PARA LA CREACIÓN DE EMPRESAS SOCIALES DEL ESTADO. SE DEMANDÓ LA NULIDAD DE UN ACUERDO MUNICIPAL MEDIANTE EL CUAL SE CREÓ UNA EMPRESA SOCIAL DEL ESTADO PARA LA PRESTACIÓN DE SERVICIOS DE SALUD. ASÍ, SE DECLARÓ LA NULIDAD DEL MISMO, POR CUANTO EL CONCEJO MUNICIPAL NO TENÍA LA COMPETENCIA PARA CREAR DICHA ENTIDAD TODA VEZ QUE SU OBJETO FUE LA PRESTACIÓN DE SERVICIOS DE SALUD, SIENDO QUE CONFORME A LAS NORMAS ESTABA OBLIGADO A ARTICULARSE A LA RED DEPARTAMENTAL. LO ANTERIOR, EN TANTO FRENTE AL RÉGIMEN DE LAS EMPRESAS SOCIALES DEL ESTADO, EL ARTÍCULO 194 DE LA LEY 100 DE 1993 ESTABLECE QUE LA PRESTACIÓN DE SERVICIOS DE SALUD EN FORMA DIRECTA POR LA NACIÓN O POR LAS ENTIDADES TERRITORIALES, SE HARÁ PRINCIPALMENTE A TRAVÉS DE DICHAS EMPRESAS, LAS CUALES CONSTITUYEN UNA CATEGORÍA ESPECIAL DE ENTIDAD PÚBLICA DESCENTRALIZADA, CON PERSONERÍA JURÍDICA, PATRIMONIO PROPIO Y AUTONOMÍA ADMINISTRATIVA, CREADAS POR LA LEY O POR LAS ASAMBLEAS O CONCEJOS, SEGÚN EL CASO, Y SOMETIDAS AL RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO PREVISTO EN ESE CAPÍTULO. ELLO POR CUANTO LA PROHIBICIÓN ESTABLECIDA EN EL PARÁGRAFO DEL ARTÍCULO 44 DE LA LEY 715 DE 2001, COMO LO ES QUE NINGÚN MUNICIPIO PODRÍA ASUMIR DIRECTAMENTE NUEVOS SERVICIOS DE SALUD NI AMPLIAR LOS EXISTENTES, IMPLICABA, A SU VEZ, LA LIMITANTE PARA LA CREACIÓN DE EMPRESAS SOCIALES DEL ESTADO, DADO QUE LA PRESTACIÓN DE SERVICIOS DE SALUD POR PARTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES PÚBLICAS SOLO SE PODÍA HACER A TRAVÉS DE ESTAS. EN OTRAS PALABRAS, TAL LIMITANTE DEVIENE DE UNA INTERPRETACIÓN SISTEMÁTICA DE LA MENCIONADA NORMA CON LO ESTABLECIDO EN LOS ARTÍCULOS 194 DE LA LEY 100 DE 1993 Y 26 DE LA LEY 1122 DE 2007, SEGÚN LA CUAL, SI NINGÚN MUNICIPIO PODÍA ASUMIR DIRECTAMENTE NUEVOS SERVICIOS DE SALUD NI AMPLIAR LOS EXISTENTES, ELLO NECESARIAMENTE RESTRINGÍA LA CREACIÓN DE LAS CITADAS EMPRESAS.NOTA: ESTA SENTENCIA HACE PARTE DEL PROCESO DESCONGESTIÓN SEGÚN EL ACUERDO 357 DEL 5 DE DICIEMBRE DE 2017, QUE FUE DECIDIDO(A) POR LA SECCIÓN QUINTA SIENDO COMPETENCIA DE LA SECCIÓN PRIMERA. TEMAS ESPECÍFICOS:CONCEJO MUNICIPAL, EMPRESA SOCIAL DEL ESTADO, COMPETENCIA DEL CONCEJO MUNICIPAL, PRESTACIÓN DEL SERVICIO DE SALUD, PRESTADORES DEL SERVICIO DE SALUD, ACCIÓN DE SIMPLE NULIDAD Sentencia 2011-00117 de mayo 31 de 2018 Bogotá, D.C., mayo treinta y uno (31) de dos mil dieciocho (2018). Rad.: 25000-23-24-000-2011-00117-01 Demandado: Alcaldía de Lenguazaque Asunto: Nulidad. Fallo Corresponde a la Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo, a través de esta Sección, conocer el recurso de apelación interpuesto por el apoderado de la parte demandante contra la sentencia dictada en primera instancia, en los términos del artículo 129 del Código Contencioso Administrativo, en concordancia con lo decidido en el Acuerdo de Descongestión 357 de 5 de diciembre de 2017, suscrito entre las secciones Primera y Quinta de esta corporación. Le corresponde a esta corporación resolver si la sentencia apelada debe ser revocada, luego de establecer si el Concejo Municipal de Lenguazaque tenía competencia para crear la Empresa social de estado Policlínico San Laureano a través del Acuerdo 017 del 21 de diciembre de 2009 y, además, si el referido acuerdo adolece de falsa motivación al desconocer lo previsto en los artículos 43, 44, 54 y 65 de la Ley 715 de 2001(20). La parte demandante considera que con el acto administrativo acusado, que corresponde al Acuerdo 017 del 21 de diciembre de 2009, fue expedido por el Concejo Municipal de Lenguazaque con violación directa de normas superiores, sin tener competencia para ello e incurrió en una falsa motivación. Por su parte, el a quo denegó las súplicas de la demanda, al considerar, principalmente que, el parágrafo del artículo 44 de la Ley 715 de 2001 no generaba una prohibición para la creación de empresas sociales del Estado, ya que esa facultad es un proceso de autonomía de los municipios. Asimismo, consideró que tampoco se presentaba alguna divergencia entre las situaciones fácticas y jurídicas que sustentaban el acto demandado. Con su apelación la parte demandante insistió en que tanto el Concejo Municipal de Lenguazaque como el alcalde de dicha entidad carecían de competencia para la creación de una empresa social del Estado, que con ello se transgredieron normas de rango superior, al desconocerse intencionalmente el direccionamiento legal del Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud y, se incurrió en una falsa motivación, pues el acto acusado se sustentó en una serie de normas que no le conferían la facultad de asumir directamente la prestación de los servicios de salud. Así las cosas, se encuentra que en el Acuerdo 017 del 21 de diciembre de 2009 «[p]or medio del cual se crea la empresa social del Estado ‘Policlínico San Laureano’ del Municipio de Lenguazaque y se dictan otras disposiciones» se dispuso: «ART. 1o—NATURALEZA JURIDICA (sic). Créese la EMPRESA SOCIAL DEL ESTADO POLICLINICO (sic) ‘SAN LAUREANO’ DEL MUNICIPIO DE LENGUAZAQUE; la cual tendrá la naturaleza de empresa social del Estado, como entidad de carácter público, descentralizada, del orden municipal, dotada de personería jurídica, patrimonio propio y autonomía administrativa, adscrita a la dirección municipal de salud e integrante del Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud, sometida al régimen previsto en el la (sic) constitución y la ley. ART. 2o—DENOMINACIÓN. Habrá una Institución Prestadora de los Servicios de Salud en el Municipio de Lenguazaque, que funcionará como empresa social del Estado (E.S.E.) del orden descentralizado, adscrita al Municipio de Lenguazaque, se denominará ‘EMPRESA SOCIAL DEL ESTADO POLICLINICO (sic) ‘SAN LAUREANO’ DEL MUNICIPIO DE LENGUAZAQUE’ y se distinguirá con la sigla E.S.E. POLICLINICO (sic) ‘SAN LAUREANO’ DEL MUNICIPIO DE LENGUAZAQUE, como en adelante a lo largo de este Acuerdo se designará. ART. 3o—FUNCIONES. La ESE POLICLINO (sic) ‘SAN LAUREANO’ DEL MUNICIPIO DE LENGUAZAQUE- cumplirá con las funciones, actividades y acciones inherentes a la prestación de servicios de salud definidos en el Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud...con arreglo a la Ley 10 de 1990, a la Ley 100 de 1993, a la Ley 715 de 2001, a la reglamentación vigente y las disposiciones del Ministerio de la Protección Social y del Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social en Salud... y a las normas que a posterioridad las sustituyan, modifiquen o adicionen la materia. ART. 4o—OBJETO. El Objeto (sic) de la ESE POLICLINICO (sic) ‘SAN LAUREANO’ DEL MUNICIPIO DE LENGUAZAQUE será la prestación de servicios de salud, entendidos como un servicio público a cargo del Estado, en tal sentido, en desarrollo de este objeto, adelantará acciones de promoción, prevención, tratamiento y rehabilitación en salud y todo lo demás que tenga que ver con el Primer Nivel de Atención Salud (sic).» Asimismo, se advierte que el referido acto lo expidió el Concejo Municipal de Lenguazaque en ejercicio de las facultades, en especial, las conferidas en el numeral 3o del artículo 313 de la Constitución Política, así como en el artículo 32 de la Ley 136 de 1994(21), en rigor de la Ley 10 de 1990(22) y cumplimiento de los artículos 194, 195 y 197 de la Ley 100 de 1993(23), del artículo 26 de la Ley 1122 de 2007(24) y del artículo 25 de la Ley 1176 de 2007(25). De igual manera, se observa que en dicha decisión administrativa también se hizo alusión a los artículos 1o, 2o, 48 y 287 superior, 153 de la Ley 100 de 1993 y el Decreto 1876 de 1994(26), aclarado por el Decreto 1621 de 1995(27), que reglamentó los artículos 194, 195 y 197 de la Ley 100 de 1993. Por tanto, para resolver el problema jurídico planteado se advierte que el sustento del cargo por la violación de normas superiores(28) se centró en la falta de competencia que también se invoca, de manera que, se procederá al análisis integral de este último vicio y de la falsa motivación alegada, en concordancia con el presunto desconocimiento de las normas de rango constitucional y legal, así: i) Falta de competencia: El artículo 44 de la Ley 715 de 2001, por la cual se dictan normas orgánicas en materia de recursos y competencias de conformidad con los artículos 151, 288, 356 y 357 (A. L. 01/2001) de la Constitución Política y se dictan otras disposiciones para organizar la prestación de los servicios de educación y salud, entre otros, estableció lo siguiente: «PAR.—Los municipios certificados a 31 de julio de 2001 que hayan asumido la prestación de los servicios de salud, podrán continuar haciéndolo, si cumplen con la reglamentación que se establezca dentro del año siguiente a la expedición de la presente ley. Ningún municipio podrá asumir directamente nuevos servicios de salud ni ampliar los existentes y están obligados a articularse a la red departamental». (Negrilla fuera del texto) Conforme a lo anterior, del contenido de la norma referida se pueden establecer dos supuestos o enunciados. El primero, que corresponde a una habilitación sujeta a una condición y, el segundo, una prohibición o limitante, a saber: a) Que los municipios certificados a 31 de julio de 2001, que hayan asumido la prestación de los servicios de salud, podían continuar haciéndolo, si cumplían con la reglamentación que se establezca dentro del año siguiente a la expedición de dicha ley. Para la Sala, el municipio demandado no se encontraba en tal situación, pues no acreditó encontrarse certificado para prestar dicho servicio ni fundamentó su decisión en ello, máxime que tal asistencia venía asumiéndola el departamento demandante a través de la ESE Hospital El Salvador de Ubaté (Cundinamarca)(29). b) Que ningún municipio podría asumir directamente nuevos servicios de salud ni ampliar los existentes, los cuales, además se encontraban obligados a articularse a la red departamental. Ahora bien, en cuanto al régimen de las empresas sociales del Estado, el artículo 194 de la Ley 100 de 1993 establece que la prestación de servicios de salud en forma directa por la nación o por las entidades territoriales, se hará principalmente a través de dichas empresas, las cuales constituyen una categoría especial de entidad pública descentralizada, con personería jurídica, patrimonio propio y autonomía administrativa, creadas por la ley o por las asambleas o concejos, según el caso, y sometidas al régimen jurídico previsto en ese capítulo. Por su parte, con el artículo 26 de la Ley 1122 de 2007 se dispuso que la prestación de servicios de salud por parte de las instituciones públicas solo se hará a través de empresas sociales del Estado (ESE), que podrán estar constituidas por una o varias sedes o unidades prestadoras de servicios de salud y que en todo caso, toda unidad prestadora de servicios de salud de carácter público deberá hacer parte de una empresa de tal naturaleza. A su vez, debe precisarse que el artículo 25 de la Ley 1176 de 2007, que modificó el artículo 45 de la Ley 715 de 2001(30), al regular las competencias en salud por parte de los distritos, contempló que tanto estos como los municipios que no hubiesen asumido la prestación de los servicios de salud, podrían hacerlo si cumplían con la reglamentación que para el efecto expida el Gobierno, cuyo plazo sería el definido por este. En efecto, tal facultad solo se reglamentó con el Decreto 4973 del 23 de diciembre de 2009 «[p]or el cual se establecen los requisitos y procedimientos para la certificación de la asunción de la prestación de los servicios de salud y se dictan otras disposiciones», el cual en su artículo segundo contempló: «ART. 2o—De la asunción de la prestación de los servicios de salud. Se entiende por asunción de la prestación de los servicios de salud por parte de los municipios certificados, la gestión de los recursos propios o asignados para garantizar la prestación de servicios de salud de baja complejidad requeridos por la población pobre en lo no cubierto con subsidios a la demanda, de manera oportuna y eficiente, a través de las empresas sociales del Estado debidamente habilitadas, atendiendo el diseño de la red de prestación de servicios de salud definida por el respectivo departamento y las normas relacionadas que regulan y controlan la oferta. Sin embargo, si en concepto del departamento se requiere la ampliación de los servicios en un municipio certificado para gestionar la prestación de servicios de salud, esta ampliación se realizará a través de las empresas sociales del Estado existentes que operen en el área de influencia del departamento. Estas modificaciones deben ser aprobadas por las autoridades nacionales correspondientes de acuerdo con la normatividad vigente sobre la materia». (Negrilla fuera del texto original). Al respecto, debe señalarse que la naturaleza de dicho decreto es el de acto reglamentario, en la medida de que fue expedido en ejercicio de las facultades legales, en especial, de las conferidas en el numeral 11 del artículo 189 de la Constitución Política(31), en el literal c) del artículo 154 de la Ley 100 de 1993 y en el artículo 45 de la Ley 715 de 2001 modificado por el artículo 25 de la Ley 1176 de 2007. De manera que, si el acto acusado se expidió con anterioridad a la mencionada reglamentación, esto es, el 21 de diciembre de 2009, la entidad territorial demandada no podía disponer la creación de la aludida ESE. Ello por cuanto la prohibición establecida en el parágrafo del artículo 44 de la Ley 715 de 2001, como lo es que ningún municipio podría asumir directamente nuevos servicios de salud ni ampliar los existentes, implicaba, a su vez, la limitante para la creación de empresas sociales del Estado, dado que la prestación de servicios de salud por parte de las instituciones públicas solo se podía hacer a través de estas. En otras palabras, tal limitante deviene de una interpretación sistemática de la mencionada norma con lo establecido en los artículos 194 de la Ley 100 de 1993 y 26 de la Ley 1122 de 2007, según la cual, si ningún municipio podía asumir directamente nuevos servicios de salud ni ampliar los existentes, ello necesariamente restringía la creación de las citadas empresas. Por tanto, el Concejo Municipal de Lenguazaque no contaba con la competencia para expedir el acto acusado, toda vez que su objeto fue la prestación de servicios de salud, siendo que conforme a la norma referida estaba obligado a articularse a la red departamental(32). En tal sentido, el cargo por falta de competencia prospera. ii) Falsa motivación: Para la entidad demandante con el acto demandado se incurrió en una falsa motivación, al sustentarse en normas que no le conferían ni al concejo municipal ni al alcalde de Lenguazaque la facultad de asumir directamente la prestación de los servicios de salud, conforme a lo señalado en el parágrafo del artículo 44 de la Ley 715 de 2001. Al respecto, debe precisarse que la seguridad social es un servicio público de carácter obligatorio que se prestará bajo dirección, coordinación y control del Estado(33), el cual también tiene a su cargo la organización, dirección y reglamentación de la atención de la salud y el saneamiento ambiental(34), por lo que dada su naturaleza, dichos servicios se encuentran sometidos al régimen jurídico que fije la ley(35). De manera que, si bien conforme lo consagra el artículo 311 superior(36), al municipio como entidad fundamental de la división político-administrativa del Estado le corresponde prestar los servicios públicos que determine la ley, es la misma norma la que fija una limitante para ejercer tal potestad, a saber: En primer lugar, se advierte que el referido acto lo expidió el Concejo Municipal de Lenguazaque en ejercicio de las facultades, en especial las conferidas en el numeral 3o del artículo 313 de la Constitución Política, así como en el artículo 32 de la Ley 136 de 1994(37), en rigor de la Ley 10 de 1990(38) y cumplimiento de los artículos 194, 195 y 197 de la Ley 100 de 1993(39), del artículo 26 de la Ley 1122 de 2007(40) y del artículo 25 de la Ley 1176 de 2007(41). En segundo lugar, se observa que en dicha decisión administrativa también se hizo alusión a los artículos 1o, 2o, 48 y 287 superior, 153 de la Ley 100 de 1993 y el Decreto 1876 de 1994(42), aclarado por el Decreto 1621 de 1995(43), que reglamentó los artículos 194, 195 y 197 de la Ley 100 de 1993. Por tanto, resulta relevante precisar que, si bien en la parte considerativa del acuerdo demandado se hizo referencia a la facultad consagrada en el artículo 25 de la Ley 1176 de 2007, tal reseña solo se efectuó de la siguiente manera: «i) Que el artículo 25 de la Ley 1176 de 2007, establece que los distritos y municipios que no hayan asumido la prestación de servicios de salud, podrán hacerlo.» No obstante, la citada norma contempla lo siguiente: «ART. 25.—PRESTACIÓN DE SERVICIOS DE SALUD. Modifíquese el artículo 45 de la Ley 715 de 2001 en los siguientes términos: ‘PAR.—Los distritos y municipios que no hayan asumido la prestación de los servicios de salud, podrán hacerlo si cumplen con la reglamentación que para el efecto expida el gobierno, y tendrán el plazo definido por este’». (Negrilla fuera del texto original). Por lo que, para la Sala el fundamento normativo sobre el cual se sustentó el acto administrativo acusado del 21 de diciembre de 2009, omitió hacer referencia a la condición que la misma norma establecía, al no indicar que tal facultad procedía si se cumplía con la reglamentación que para el efecto hiciera el gobierno, lo cual aconteció con posterioridad a su expedición con el Decreto 4973 del 23 de diciembre de 2009(44). Además, debe indicarse que el municipio demandado no acreditó que los servicios nivel I de baja complejidad no fueran prestados través de ESE del departamento. De manera que, con el acto acusado se incurrió en una falsa motivación, toda vez que, si bien en el acto acusado se hizo alusión a unas normas para acreditar la competencia del municipio, lo cierto es que desatendió las disposiciones consagradas en la Ley 715 de 2001 y su posterior reglamentación. En consecuencia, el precitado cargo también prospera, en la medida de que la entidad demandada debía esgrimir los motivos adecuados y suficientes, al mediar una limitante legal para la expedición de un acto de creación de una empresa social del Estado para la prestación de forma directa los servicios de salud, conforme a la normativa expuesta. En consecuencia, se revocará la sentencia apelada que denegó las súplicas de la demandada para, en su lugar, declarar la nulidad del acuerdo demandado, por las razones expuestas. Finalmente, a folio 7 del cuaderno 2 reposa el poder conferido por quien se encontraba facultada para ello, en representación de la parte demandante, a la abogada Lina Rocío Vera Sánchez, con los respectivos soportes, razón por la cual en la parte resolutiva de esta providencia les será reconocida personería para actuar en el proceso. PRIMERO: Revócase la sentencia del 28 de junio de 2012, emitida por la Subsección A de la Sección Primera del Tribunal Administrativo de Cundinamarca, que denegó las súplicas de la demanda, por las razones expuestas. SEGUNDO: Declárase la nulidad del Acuerdo 017 del 21 de diciembre de 2009 «[p]or medio del cual se crea la empresa social del Estado ‘Policlínico San Laureano’ del Municipio de Lenguazaque y se dictan otras disposiciones», expedido por el Concejo Municipal de Lenguazaque (Cundinamarca), por las razones expuestas en esta providencia. TERCERO: Reconócese personería para actuar como apoderada del departamento de Cundinamarca, a Lina Rocío Vera Sánchez, en los términos del poder que obra a folio 7 del cuaderno 2. Consejeros: Rocío Araújo Oñate, Presidente—Lucy Jeannette Bermúdez Bermúdez, aclaración de voto—Carlos Enrique Moreno Rubio—Alberto Yepes Barreiro». 20 Por la cual se dictan normas orgánicas en materia de recursos y competencias de conformidad con los artículos 151, 288, 356 y 357 (A.L. 01/2001) de la Constitución Política y se dictan otras disposiciones para organizar la prestación de los servicios de educación y salud, entre otros. 21 Por la cual se dictan normas tendientes a modernizar la organización y el funcionamiento de los municipios. 22 Por la cual se reorganiza el Sistema Nacional de Salud y se dictan otras disposiciones. 23 Por la cual se crea el sistema de seguridad social integral y se dictan otras disposiciones. 24 Por la cual se hacen algunas modificaciones en el Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud y se dictan otras disposiciones. 25 Por la cual se desarrollan los artículos 356 y 357 de la Constitución Política y se dictan otras disposiciones. 26 Por el cual se reglamentan los artículos 96, 97 y 98 del Decreto Ley 1298 de 1994 en lo relacionado con las empresas sociales del Estado. (El Decreto Nacional 1298 de 1994, fue declarado inexequible por la Corte Constitucional, mediante Sentencia C-255 de 1995, salvo el numeral 1o del artículo 674). 27 Con este decreto se dispuso: Artículo 1o: Aclárase el Decreto 1876 del 3 de agosto de 1994, por el cual se reglamentan los artículos 96, 97 y 98 del Decreto-ley 1298 de 1994, en lo relacionado con las empresas sociales del Estado, en el sentido que este acto administrativo reglamenta los artículos 194, 195 y 197 de la Ley 100 de 1993. 28 Lo cual sustentó especialmente en la vulneración del artículo 6o Superior, relacionado con la responsabilidad de los servidores públicos. 29 Tal como se reseñó en la demanda y se reiteró con la apelación presentada por la parte demandante. 30 «ART. 45.—Competencias en salud por parte de los distritos. Los distritos tendrán las mismas competencias que los municipios y departamentos, excepto aquellas que correspondan a la función de intermediación entre los municipios y la Nación. PAR.—<Parágrafo adicionado por el artículo 26 de la Ley 1176 de 2007. El nuevo texto es el siguiente:> Los distritos y municipios que no hayan asumido la prestación de los servicios de salud, podrán hacerlo si cumplen con la reglamentación que para el efecto expida el Gobierno, y tendrán el plazo definido por este». 31 Artículo 189. Corresponde al Presidente de la República como Jefe de Estado, Jefe del Gobierno y Suprema Autoridad Administrativa: ... 11. Ejercer la potestad reglamentaria, mediante la expedición de los decretos, resoluciones y órdenes necesarios para la cumplida ejecución de las leyes. 32 En consonancia con lo dispuesto en el artículo 43 de la Ley 715 de 2001. 33 Artículo 48 superior. 34 Artículo 49 ibídem. 35 Artículo 365 ibídem. 36 En concordancia con lo dispuesto en los artículos 287, 298, 300 (num. 10), 311 y 313 (num. 10) ibídem. 37 Por la cual se dictan normas tendientes a modernizar la organización y el funcionamiento de los municipios. 38 Por la cual se reorganiza el Sistema Nacional de Salud y se dictan otras disposiciones. 39 Por la cual se crea el sistema de seguridad social integral y se dictan otras disposiciones. 40 Por la cual se hacen algunas modificaciones en el Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud y se dictan otras disposiciones. 41 Por la cual se desarrollan los artículos 356 y 357 de la Constitución Política y se dictan otras disposiciones. 42 por el cual se reglamentan los artículos 96, 97 y 98 del Decreto Ley 1298 de 1994 en lo relacionado con las empresas sociales del Estado. (El Decreto Nacional 1298 de 1994, fue declarado inexequible por la Corte Constitucional, mediante Sentencia C-255 de 1995, salvo el numeral 1o del artículo 674). 43 Con este decreto se dispuso: Artículo 1o Aclárase el Decreto 1876 del 3 de agosto de 1994, por el cual se reglamentan los artículos 96, 97 y 98 del Decreto-ley 1298 de 1994, en lo relacionado con las empresas sociales del Estado, en el sentido que este acto administrativo reglamenta los artículos 194, 195 y 197 de la Ley 100 de 1993. 44 Por el cual se establecieron los requisitos y procedimientos para la certificación de la asunción de la prestación de los servicios de salud y se dictaron otras disposiciones.
en	caselaw	US	47 Cal. App. 2d 801 (1941) THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. LEROY JAMES JEFFRIES, Appellant. Crim. No. 3490. California Court of Appeals. Second Dist., Div. One. Nov. 19, 1941. Leroy James Jeffries, in pro. per., for Appellant. Earl Warren, Attorney General, and Gilbert F. Nelson, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. WHITE, J. Defendant was charged in count 1 of an amended information with the crime of grand theft and in count 2 with violating section 503 of the Vehicle Code. The amended information also charged the defendant with a prior felony conviction, which, before the commencement of the 803 trial, he admitted. Following trial by jury defendant was found guilty of grand theft and acquitted of the charge contained in count 2. This appeal is from the judgment and the order denying his motion for a new trial. Stating the evidence most favorably to the prosecution, as we are required to do following a guilty verdict, we find in the record testimony that late on the night of March 5, 1941, Mr. James Sturdivant and two friends were driving in an automobile south on Flower Street in the city of Los Angeles. As they approached the intersection of Flower and Sixth Streets an Oldsmobile sedan, which Mr. Sturdivant testified was driven by the defendant, made a wide swing around the intersection and struck Mr. Sturdivant's automobile. The driver of the Oldsmobile did not stop, but proceeded north on Flower Street to Fifth Street, where he made a right turn and proceeded about a half block, where he stopped the car and stepped out onto the curb. In the meantime Mr. Sturdivant hailed a passing automobile and rode to the point where appellant had parked. As this witness came up, according to his testimony, appellant was just getting out of the Oldsmobile. Sturdivant approached the defendant and asked him what he was going to do about the damage to the former's automobile, whereupon the defendant answered that he would take care of it and inquired how much he owed Mr. Sturdivant. Defendant then inquired where the automobile was parked, and after being told the defendant said, "Well, let's go down there," to which Mr. Sturdivant replied, "All right." Thereupon two police officers drove up and asked who was driving the Oldsmobile, to which Mr. Sturdivant replied, "This fellow here," but upon his turning round he discovered the defendant had fled. It appears from the record that the police officers had noticed the Oldsmobile at the intersection of Fifth and Flower, at which time they observed that the left front fender of the car was damaged and that the car was running on the rim, traveling at the rate of between 20 and 25 miles per hour as it turned on Fifth Street. The officers then noticed the complaining witness pursuing the Oldsmobile in another car. As the officers approached, they observed the defendant walk away, and subsequently break into a run. Officer Kleinfelt pursued him, but was unable to overtake him. In the meantime 804 Mr. Sturdivant, together with the other officer, drove around in the police car to Sixth Street, where Mr. Sturdivant saw the defendant walking. The officer parked the police car, walked over to the defendant and took hold of his arm, whereupon the defendant jerked away and again started to run. He was pursued and overtaken by Mr. Sturdivant, who held him until the officer came up. The evidence further indicates that the Oldsmobile car had been stolen from a parking lot earlier that evening. The two witnesses who were with Mr. Sturdivant were unable to identify the defendant, but Mr. Sturdivant was positive in his identification, as were the police officers who observed him while he was driving at the intersection of Fifth and Flower Streets. The defendant was the only defense witness. He testified that he had not been driving any automobile on the night in question and had not been in any accident; that he had just arrived in town and had started to walk to his brother's house in Beverly Hills, but discovered it was too far, and was on his way back to board a street car when he was arrested. [1a] Appellant first urges a reversal on the ground that the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting into evidence certain testimony of a police officer as to a conversation he had with appellant. In that connection the following is disclosed by the record: "Q. Will you tell us what was said relative to his driving the automobile? A. I asked the defendant what his story was regarding taking this Oldsmobile. He said, 'This is a bum beef.' He said, 'I don't even drive a car.' He said, 'I didn't steal this car.' I asked him how he came to break away from the police officers and run, and he stated when he saw the policemen it frightened him, and he broke away and ran from them. I asked him--I told him that the witnesses had stated that he was the driver, and he told me that he was too smart to steal an automobile, that he had just gotten in town the day before--the same day that he was picked up, and that he had did a rap in--" "MR. McPHERSON (Defendant's Counsel): Now, just a minute. I am going to object to that on the grounds it is calling for immaterial evidence and I will ask it be stricken, any of the conversation other than on this case." "THE COURT: The motion is denied. 805" "A. He stated that he was too smart to steal an automobile, and that he had just arrived in town, and that he had did a rap in Huntsville, Texas, that it was a bum beef that he got into that time, and that he did three years for armed robbery, too, on a bum beef for someone else, and that he had did time in the county jail for burglary, and that he was too smart to steal an automobile when he first got into town. He started--" "Q. BY MR. LOUCKS (Deputy District Attorney): Is that all that you can now recall? A. Well, yes. There was some other conversation regarding who he was in trouble with in Texas, but that would not be material." "MR. LOUCKS: That is all. You may cross-examine." The foregoing evidence was neither competent nor material, and should not have been admitted. The attorney general contends that the testimony was admissible because the conversation contained admissions by the defendant not amounting to a confession of guilt, in which event, as in the case of a defendant who remains mute in the face of accusatory statements, such evidence is competent as tending to show guilt. However, a reading of the testimony at once indicates that instead of remaining silent or making any admissions the defendant stoutly denied his guilt and maintained his innocence throughout the entire conversation with the officer. [2] True, where evidence is relevant and material to the issue on trial, it may be admissible notwithstanding that it may incidentally disclose the guilt of a defendant of some offense other than the one for which he is on trial. But in the instant case the challenged testimony had no relevancy or materiality to the issues before the court. When the defendant denied his guilt and made no admissions, the evidence lost its probative value. [3] The testimony was clearly violative of the provisions of subdivision 1 of section 1093 of the Penal Code. The clear intention of the foregoing provision of the Penal Code is that when the defendant admits a prior conviction charged in the information, knowledge of such charge shall be withheld from the jury and no evidence concerning the same shall be admitted. Noteworthy also is the fact that section 1158 of the Penal Code provides that whenever the fact of a previous conviction of another offense is charged in an indictment or information, the jury, if they find a verdict of guilty of the offense with which he is 806 charged, must also, unless the defendant admits the charge, find whether or not he has suffered such prior conviction. From these provisions it is clear that if upon arraignment the defendant denies the prior conviction alleged in the indictment or information, that issue, as well as the issue raised by his plea of not guilty to the principal charge, must be submitted to the jury; but if upon arraignment or prior to the commencement of the trial the defendant admits the previous conviction, all information concerning a prior conviction must be withheld from the jury. [4] It must be remembered that the object in view in charging a previous conviction is not for the purpose of evidence as to the commission of the offense upon which the defendant is to be tried, but for the information of the court in determining the punishment to be imposed in case of conviction. This is clearly shown by sections 666 and 667 of the Penal Code. In People v. Sansome, 84 Cal. 449 [24 P. 143], it was held that "The evident purpose of the provision of the code, above quoted," (Pen. Code, sec. 1093, subd. 1) "was to keep from the jurors all knowledge that the person on trial before them had been previously convicted of a criminal offense. And this is based upon well-settled and familiar principles of law and right." [1b] In the case now before us, the defendant having prior to his trial confessed the prior conviction or pleaded guilty thereto, there was no issue as to the prior conviction to which the testimony of the officer was applicable. It was not an admission tending to show that he had committed the offense upon which he was being tried and was wholly inadmissible as evidence tending to prove the commission of that offense, while it thwarted the very purpose of the code provision which requires the omission of all reference to the prior conviction when the defendant has admitted the same. [5] That the admission of the evidence objected to was not only erroneous, but highly prejudicial to the defendant, cannot be denied, but such prejudice was removed when, while the defendant was testifying as a witness in his own behalf, the following questions were properly asked him pursuant to the provisions of section 2051 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to which he gave the answers herein set forth: "Q. You have been convicted of a felony in Texas? A. Yes. Q. That was for burglary? A. It was for robbery with firearms and burglary. I was a juvenile at the time." 807 In view of appellant's decision voluntarily to become a witness in his own behalf, the prosecution was justified in eliciting from him on cross-examination, by way of impeachment, that he had suffered such prior felony conviction. Such being the case, he cannot now be heard to complain of any prejudice occurring from evidence of that fact having been presented to the jury. [6] Appellant next urges that the verdict finding him guilty of grand theft is contrary to law, for the reason that his acquittal on the charge of violating section 503 of the Vehicle Code operated as a finding by the jury that he was not guilty of the elements necessary to constitute the crime of grand theft. Appellant asserts that the offense charged in count 2 is one necessarily included in the crime charged in count 1; that, as appellant presents the matter in his brief, "one can be guilty of the charge in count 2 (the lesser offense) without having necessarily committed the offense charged in count 1, but the converse is not true, for if one were guilty of grand theft of an automobile, he is likewise guilty of violation of 503 Vehicle Code, for the same 'felonious taking', the essential element that must be proved and is the foundation of the charge of grand theft, will support a conviction of section 503 Vehicle Code. And in the same way, if one is not guilty of violating section 503 Vehicle Code, then he could not be guilty of grand theft for both charges involve the one act and depend on the same evidence for conviction." Appellant's contention that the verdicts in the instant case, finding him guilty of grand theft as charged in count 1 of the information and not guilty of violating section 503 of the Vehicle Code as set forth in count 2, are inconsistent, cannot be sustained. Both as to the ingredients necessary to constitute the separate offenses charged and as to the punishment provided upon conviction, the statutes are different and proscribe separate offenses. Under section 503 of the Vehicle Code, a person may be guilty thereunder if he takes an automobile though he intends only to temporarily deprive the owner of such automobile of the possession thereof, and whether the taking is "with or without intent to steal the same," whereas grand theft requires a felonious taking of the property of another. Both in substance and in form the offenses charged are distinctly different. The allegations of 808 the information in the instant case indicate that the district attorney was simply endeavoring to set forth the same transaction, viz., the taking of a single automobile, in different ways, so as to bring the case within the provisions of either section 487 of the Penal Code or section 503 of the Vehicle Code, as the evidence on the trial might show it to have been. Section 954 of the Penal Code provides that an indictment or information "may charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission. ..." That is exactly what was done in the case before us. The offenses charged were different offenses, and the acquittal of the charge on one does not operate to absolve the defendant of guilt on the other. [7] As a final ground of appeal, appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove a felonious intent upon his part in the taking of the automobile. This claim is without merit. Although defendant testified that he at no time took or was in possession of the automobile, there was positive and creditable testimony given by two witnesses that he was driving the automobile in question. The testimony of the owner of the stolen property was that she had parked her car in an auto park and had not given appellant or any one else permission to take the same therefrom. Consequently, the triers of fact were justified in inferring and concluding that appellant took the automobile without the owner's consent and with the felonious intent to deprive such owner of her property. [8] The intent with which an act is done is manifested by and may be inferred from, among other things, all the circumstances connected with the transaction or offense charged (Pen. Code, sec. 21), and whether there is evidence of felonious intent is for the jury to determine. It is only when the jury's determination violates the rule of reason that an appellate tribunal will substitute its conclusion for that arrived at by the "constitutional as well as the statutory arbiter thereof." (People v. Deininger, 36 Cal. App. 2d 649, 652 [98 PaCal.2d 526].) For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and the order appealed from are, and each is, affirmed. York, P. J., and Doran, J., concurred.
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Les Scouts et Guides de France (« SGDF ») sont la principale association française de scoutisme. Issue de la fusion des Scouts de France et des Guides de France réalisée en 2004, l'association « Scouts et Guides de France » est reconnue d'utilité publique. Mouvement catholique pluraliste, le mouvement est ouvert à tous les jeunes, sans distinction de religion, et agréé comme « Mouvement d’éducation populaire » par le ministère de la Jeunesse et des Sports. Dans le cadre de son engagement dans la vie sociale et de son projet éducatif, l’association peut participer à des activités d’intérêt général, notamment de solidarité, de sécurité civile et de protection de l’environnement. L’association compte en . Elle recense environ 860 implantations locales, réparties dans les départements de France métropolitaine et d’outre-mer. Les différentes réformes que les Scouts et Guides de France ont effectuées, se démarquant ainsi d'un scoutisme traditionnel marqué par la pédagogie de Baden-Powell et du Père Sevin, ont été l'objet de nombreuses critiques et sont à l'origine de différentes scissions qui ont vu naître les Scouts unitaires de France et qui ont permis l'essor d'autres mouvements promouvant un scoutisme traditionnel comme les Guides et Scouts d'Europe. L’association des Scouts et Guides de France est en France l'association de scoutisme reconnue pour la confession catholique par les instances mondiales de scoutisme (OMMS) et de guidisme (AMGE), à travers la Fédération du scoutisme français. Organisation En 2022, l'association « Les Scouts et Guides de France » est présidée par Tanguy Claquin (président) et dirigée par Anne-Claire Bellay-Huet (Déléguée Générale) depuis septembre 2021. En septembre 2020, Xavier de Verchère succède au Père Benoît Vandeputte, dominicain, en devenant le nouvel aumônier général des Scouts et Guides de France. L'assemblée générale de l'association est constituée de représentants élus par chaque implantation locale et territoriale. En 2014, 75 % des à l'AG avaient moins de 30 ans. L'association des Scouts et Guides de France se structure de la manière suivante: Un groupe de jeunes (généralement entre 15 et 30), d'une même tranche d'âge (6-8 ans, 8-11 ans, 11-14 ans ou 14-17 ans, les 17-21 ans sont en équipe de 4 à 8), et encadré par des adultes responsables (chefs et cheftaines, ou les parents pour les 6-8 ans) est appelé « unité ». Cette unité est sous la responsabilité d'un responsable d'unité. Plusieurs unités (de même tranche d'âge ou non) forment un « groupe local », sous la responsabilité d'un « responsable de groupe », chargé de l'ensemble des unités du groupe. Un groupe idéal rassemble l'ensemble des tranches d'âges. Pour les plus gros groupes, il peut y avoir plusieurs unités de chaque tranche d'âge. On trouve en général un groupe local par commune mais s'il y a beaucoup de jeunes sur une même commune (ou un même arrondissement), il n'est pas rare d'y trouver plusieurs groupes. L'ensemble des groupes d'un même lieu forme un « territoire » (chacun d'entre eux regroupait à l'heure de leur création environ scouts et guides). Certains territoires sont peu étendus et peuvent correspondre à un département (Somme...), voire la moitié d'un département (Paris Ouest, Paris Est, Hauts-de-Seine Nord et Hauts-de-Seine Sud, Lyon Levant...). D'autres sont beaucoup plus étendus et peuvent regrouper deux ou trois départements (Midi-Pyrénées, Normandie...). Ces territoires sont gérés par une équipe territoriale, composée généralement d'un pôle pédagogique, d'un pôle développement et d'un pôle administratif et financier. Les territoires sont coordonnés par un « délégué territorial », un aumônier territorial et les responsables de pôles, qui forment « l'équipe pilote » du territoire. Ces territoires sont soutenus par « l'échelon national », regroupant six départements. Chaque département est sous la responsabilité d'un « délégué national », et l'ensemble est coordonné par le « délégué général ». Les délégués nationaux et le délégué général sont nommés par le conseil d'administration. Une partie de l'équipe nationale est décentralisée en neuf « centres de ressources » (Île-de-France Est, Île-de-France Ouest, Nord, Ouest, Sud-Ouest, Nord-Est, Centre-Est, Méditerranée, et Outre-Mer Monde) qui assurent un soutien de proximité aux territoires. Si quelques personnes des instances dirigeantes du mouvement sont salariées (chaque responsable d'une équipe nationale de branche notamment), la responsabilité de l'animation auprès des plus jeunes sur le terrain est effectué par de jeunes adultes bénévoles (les « chefs » et « cheftaines »). Ceci permet aux communicants de parler des SGdF comme de «la plus belle école de management», puisque, comme tout mouvement scout, une formation adaptée à l'encadrement est dispensée, et les encadrants acquièrent l'expérience de la responsabilité, de gestion d'équipes, de ressources, d'organisation de projet. Depuis 2019 chaque groupe et chaque territoire a la possibilité de créer un conseil des jeunes. Chaque groupe élit un jeune pour chaque tranche d'âge, des farfadets aux compagnons. Les représentants siègent au conseil des jeunes de leur groupe et de leur territoire. Par ailleurs, les assemblées de groupe et les assemblées territoriales, qui préparent l'assemblée générale, sont composés de représentants des jeunes de 16 ans et plus, des membres associés, ainsi que des responsables légaux des jeunes de moins de 16 ans. En août 2021, l’association compte . Les enfants et jeunes membres de l'association sont à peu près répartis de la façon suivante : de 6-8 ans (Farfadets) de 8-11 ans (Louveteaux et Jeannettes) de 11-14 ans (Scouts et Guides) de 14-17 ans (Pionniers et Caravelles) de 17-21 ans (Compagnons) 140 salariés Historique Historique commun aux SDF et GDF Avant 1907 : Robert Baden-Powell, militaire en Afrique du Sud, alors colonie britannique se rend compte, en donnant des missions à de jeunes "éclaireurs" que certains principes et apprentissages peuvent être apportés par de simple choses. C'est pour lui un déclencheur, et en rentrant en métropole il décide de mettre en pratique ses idées, alors novatrices. Sa victoire à Mafeking, suscite l'enthousiasme des jeunes anglais. 1907 : Baden-Powell emmène camper une vingtaine de jeunes sur l'île de Brownsea, au large de l'Angleterre. Cette expérience est considérée comme fondatrice du scoutisme et comme le scout. L'idée révolutionnaire de Baden-Powell est de baser sa méthode sur la responsabilisation des jeunes, la confiance envers eux, le jeu. Rapidement des groupes scouts se forment en Angleterre (Boy Scouts et Girl Guides), mais également en France. : fondation des Scouts de France par le Père Jacques Sevin, le chanoine Cornette, Paul Coze et Édouard de Macedo, à la suite du succès en Grande-Bretagne du mouvement fondé par Lord Baden-Powell. Les Scouts de France -mouvement catholique dès leur création- fédèrent alors les unités scoutes qui s'étaient créées spontanément en France. Ils ne sont pas ouverts aux filles. : l'association des Guides de France est officiellement fondée. L'aumônier général des Scouts de France, le chanoine Cornette, en devient l'Aumônier Général. Le Cardinal Dubois reçoit la promesse de Albertine Duhamel le , et lui remet l'insigne des guides. 24, 25 et : sous l'occupation allemande, les mouvements de scoutisme sont interdits en zone occupée, mais cela ne les empêche pas de perdurer clandestinement. En zone libre le régime de Vichy tente de contrôler le mouvement. Les cinq mouvements de scoutisme existants réagissent et se réunissent à l'Oradou, près de Clermont-Ferrand, pour donner naissance à la Fédération du scoutisme français. La « Charte de L'Oradou » fédère ces associations féminines et masculines, tout en respectant l'identité de chacun. 1947 : le Scoutisme Français organise le dénommé Jamboree de la Paix. Il regroupe près de scouts provenant de 70 nations. Les SDF permettent en les camouflant la venue de scouts allemands. À partir de 1964, à la suite du Concile de Vatican II et de l'évolution des réflexions pédagogiques dans la société, on assiste à la « modernisation » progressive du mouvement sous la direction de François Lebouteux qui décide alors de rompre avec la ligne pédagogique traditionnelle du scoutisme qu'avait fixée Baden-Powell ou encore le Père Sevin : tenues plus colorées, assouplissement de la discipline et adaptation de la pédagogie. La branche « Eclaireurs » (12-17 ans) est scindée en deux tranches d'âges « Rangers » (12-14 ans), les « chemises bleues », et « Pionniers » (14-18 ans), les « chemises rouges ». Mais le mouvement conserve la séparation des branches féminines et masculines. L'évolution est profonde. Elle introduit notamment des pratiques démocratiques dans un modèle très hiérarchisé que ses détracteurs qualifiaient de militariste. Cette évolution est jugée trop progressiste par une fraction importante plus traditionnelle qui y voit une dénaturation du scoutisme et qui tente de conserver une pédagogie « unitaire » (référence à l'unicité de la branche 12-17 ans), en restant toutefois rattaché au Scouts de France et aux Guides de France. C'est sur cette volonté de continuité avec le projet initial de Baden-Powell et du père Sevin que se développent les Scouts d'Europe. 1971 : création du mouvement Scouts unitaires de France (SUF) à partir de groupes Scouts de France refusant la réforme. Le mouvement n'est pas intégré à la Fédération du scoutisme français et n'est pas reconnu par l'Organisation Mondiale du Scoutisme, mais reçoit l'agrément du ministère de la Jeunesse et des Sports et sont reconnus par l'Église. 1976 : les Scouts de France et les Guides de France se rapprochent et créent un groupe de travail commun, appelé « l'équipe de coordination scouts/guides », pour étudier les dossiers suivants : « l'inter-éducation », l'animation des unités (groupes) au niveau local, et la création d'une branche aînée commune. Mais les deux mouvements ne parviennent pas à se mettre d'accord sur le degré de souveraineté que chacun est prêt à abandonner. Les Scouts, supérieurs en nombre, souhaitent une fusion. Les Guides de France favorisent la création d'une confédération. Elles craignent la disparition de l'identité des Guides au profit des Scouts, ce qui leur est inacceptable après un siècle de lutte pour l'autonomie féminine. 1981 : incapables de se mettre d'accord, une rupture est amorcée entre les deux mouvements Scouts de France et Guides de France. 1982 : à la suite de l'échec du rapprochement Scouts/Guides, les Scouts de France votent la coéducation lors de l'Assemblée Générale, faisant ainsi directement concurrence aux Guides de France, ce qui provoque de nombreuses crises au niveau local. Les Guides de France, qui prônent la coresponsabilité homme-femme dans le respect des différences, décident de continuer à n'accueillir que des filles dans leurs unités, excepté les 6-9 ans, les 17-21 ans, et certaines propositions spécifiques, comme les unités soleil, destinées aux jeunes issus de l'immigration. L'encadrement y est mixte. Historique des SGdF 2000 : Les assemblées générales des Scouts de France (réunie à Jambville) et des Guides de France (réunie à Toulouse) votent une orientation visant à entamer des discussions pour un éventuel rapprochement. 2003 : Les assemblées générales des Scouts de France (réunie à Jambville) et des Guides de France (réunie à Lyon) votent respectivement à 91 % et à 85,5 % les processus de rapprochement des deux mouvements, et la création d'un nouveau mouvement : les Scouts et Guides de France. L'année 2003-2004 sera mise à profit pour réaliser les évaluations des deux mouvements, pour étudier les meilleurs montages juridiques permettant la création du nouveau mouvement, et les modes de travail sur les contenus pédagogiques du futur mouvement : Lors des assemblées générales simultanées des Scouts de France et Guides de France à Lourdes le , la fusion entre les deux mouvements est votée : l'association des Scouts de France est dissoute et celle des Guides de France devient « Scouts et Guides de France », en accueillant le patrimoine et les adhérents des Scouts de France. Contrairement à d'autres mouvements (tels que les Guides et Scouts d'Europe) l'ordre des mots est « Scouts et Guides » et non « Guides et Scouts », et ce pour répondre à une volonté des Guides -toujours dans l'optique de ne pas se faire « absorber » par les Scouts, supérieurs en nombre- de conserver l'expression « Guides de France » afin de limiter les risques d'« oubli » du mot « Guides ». 30 et : Première assemblée générale commune des Scouts et Guides de France, qui votera les statuts de l'association et définira quelques points techniques (l'emplacement du siège social) et technico-pédagogique (entre autres, la couleur de la chemise des cadres, alors vert uni chez les Scouts de France et rayée vert/blanc chez les Guides de France), et entame une réforme pédagogique sur 3 à 4 ans.9 : Mise en application de la décision des Assemblées Générales Ordinaires et Extraordinaires des 29, 30 et . Il n'existe alors plus qu'une seule association : les « Scouts et Guides de France ». 28 au : Quels Talents ! - Jamboree National de la branche Scouts/Guides pour la nouvelle association aout 2007 : Fête du centenaire du scoutisme dans le monde entier et un camp commémoratif sur l'Île de Brownsea au Royaume-Uni. : Cité Cap - national de la branche Pionniers/Caravelles au par Cap'O'Cent, centenaire du Scoutisme marin, rassemblement national inter-association SUF, EEUdF, SGDF, AGSE. 23 au : Rencontres Nationales « Génération responsable - Promesses d'Humanité » 27 au : Vis Tes Rêves! - national de la branche Scouts/Guides à Jambville. 5 et : De notre mieux! - national en territoire de la branche Louveteaux/Jeannettes. 16 au : You're Up! européen de la branche Pionniers/Caravelles. Une délégation de pionniers et caravelles en partira pour se rendre au 23° Jamboree mondial, au Japon. 3 au : Roverway 2016 - rassemblement européen des branches aînées des associations de scoutisme membre des deux organisations mondiales (l'Organisation Mondiale du Mouvement Scout et l'Association Mondiale des Guides et Éclaireuses). 22 au : Connecte! - rassemblement national de la branche Scouts-Guides à Jambville. Pédagogie Projet éducatif Le projet éducatif des Scouts et Guides de France propose « aux jeunes filles et garçons un espace de vie qui répond à leur besoin de rêver, d’agir, de réussir leurs projets, de vivre en communauté, de donner sens à leur vie », et les invite à devenir des « citoyens du monde, solidaires et responsables ». Ce projet propose quatre axes pour progresser. Le développement global de chaque jeune est orienté vers : construire sa personnalité ; éduquer des garçons et des filles ; vivre ensemble ; habiter autrement la planète. En substance, le projet éducatif rappelle les points suivants : chaque jeune est une personne unique, qui doit se construire à son rythme, avec des repères, ancré dans le monde d'aujourd'hui ; les Scouts et Guides de France se propose d'éduquer des garçons et des filles, dans le cadre d'une « mixité fondée sur une pédagogie tenant compte des différences et de l’altérité entre les sexes » ; on utilise le terme de coéducation, qui désigne l’éducation des jeunes des deux sexes ensemble. Il ne s’agit pas de mixité au sens classique, qui constitue une éducation commune : filles et garçons sont éduqués ensemble mais différemment, en tenant compte de leurs spécificités respectives ; le mouvement se veut une communauté ouverte (« mouvement est ouvert à tous, sans élitisme, sans distinction de culture, de croyance ou d’origine sociale »), au niveau local, sur la société, sur le monde. Dans son fonctionnement, la vie en équipe est la « cellule de base du scoutisme », composée uniquement de filles ou de garçons (sauf dans la branche compagnons ; répondant à l'appel de Baden-Powell (« Essayez de laisser ce monde un peu meilleur qu’il ne l’était quand vous y êtes venus»), les Scouts et Guides de France choisissent de vivre dans le monde réel, et affirment qu'il peut être changé, grâce et par l'Homme, pour la paix. Vie dans la nature, action locale, vision universelle sont complémentaires ; reconnu comme mouvement éducatif de l’Église catholique en France, le mouvement participe activement à la pastorale des jeunes dans les diocèses. De même pour la Conférence Internationale Catholique du Scoutisme (CICS) et la Conférence Internationale Catholique du Guidisme (CICG) dont les Scouts de France et les Guides de France étaient des associations fondatrices, lieux d’échanges, de rencontres, de partage et d’études dans le domaine de la pédagogie religieuse et de la vie en Église. Elles sont toutes deux reconnues à la fois par les deux associations mondiales du scoutisme et du guidisme et par le Saint-Siège comme Organisation Internationale Catholique. Loi La loi actuelle de référence des scouts et Guides de France, déposée auprès du scoutisme et du guidisme mondial, et qui est une réécriture de la loi que le père Sevin avait écrit pour le mouvement, est la suivante : la guide, le scout ; art.1 Parle en vérité et agit en cohérence ; art.2 Est digne de confiance et sait faire confiance aux autres ; art.3 Va au devant des autres et tisse des liens de fraternité avec les scouts et guides du monde entier ; art.4 Emploie ses ressources avec sagesse ; art.5 Affronte les difficultés avec optimisme ; art.6 Participe à la construction d'un monde de justice et de paix ; art.7 Aime et protège la Création ; art.8 Vit avec énergie et prend des initiatives ; art.9 Accueille la Bonne Nouvelle par ses actes au service des autres ; art.10 Est maître (responsable) de ses paroles, de ses actes et de ses pensées. Branches Héritage des réformes de 1964 chez les Scouts de France et les Guides de France, la pédagogie des SGdF comporte cinq branches, qui correspondent aux tranches d'âge des enfants : « 6-8 ans » : les « Farfadets » sont issus de la fusion des propositions Farandoles (GdF) et Sarabandes (SdF) et portent une chemise vert clair ; « 8-11 ans » : les « Louveteaux et Jeannettes » fusionnent les branches Jeannettes (GdF) et Louveteaux et louvettes (SdF). Ils portent une chemise orange. Les enfants vivant la proposition marine sont les « Moussaillons » ; ils portent la chemise orange, manches remontées, et un polo à manches longues rayé bleu marine et blanc ; « 11-14 ans » : les « Scouts et Guides » fusionnent les branches Guides (GdF) et Scouts et scoutes (SdF). Ils portent une chemise bleue. Les jeunes vivant la proposition marine sont les « Mousses » ; ils portent la chemise bleue, manches remontées, et un polo rayé bleu marine et blanc ; « 14-17 ans » : les « Pionniers et Caravelles » fusionnent les branches Caravelles (GdF) et Pionniers et pionnières (SdF). Ils portent une chemise rouge. Les jeunes vivant la proposition marine sont les « Marins » ; ils portent une chemise rouge avec un polo blanc rayé de bleu marine, abandonnant donc la chemise bleu marine des marins SdF ; « 17-20 ans » : les « Compagnons » fusionnent les branches Jeunes en marche (GdF) et Compagnons (SdF). Ils portent une chemise verte. Les équipes sont mixtes. Les unités louveteaux et jeannettes, scouts et guides et pionniers et caravelles peuvent être coéduquées ou homogènes (composée uniquement de garçons ou de filles). Ces unités sont encadrées par une « maîtrise », composée de « chefs » et « cheftaines », qui portent des chemises de la même couleur que les jeunes. Ce sont en général de jeunes adultes formés ou en cours de formation (le mouvement propose sa propre formation, qui ajoute au contenu du BAFA l'apprentissage de la pédagogie scoute). Les équipes Compagnons sont accompagnées par un ou deux adultes (souvent un couple), les « accompagnateurs compagnons ». Enfin les cadres du mouvement (responsables de groupes locaux, responsables territoriaux et nationaux) sont reconnaissables à leur chemise « bouton de violette » (indigo). Farfadets De 6 à 8 ans. Avec les Farfadets, les Scouts et Guides de France proposent aux enfants de vivre le scoutisme, autour des « Maîtres-Mots » (la loi) : accueillir et partager. Les farfadets portent un polo vert. L'équipe d’animation est composée des parents (les Parents Animateurs Farfadets), chargés de proposer le scoutisme aux enfants, et est coordonnée par un adulte formé, nommé par le groupe, garant des objectifs pédagogiques. Les six « axes de développement » du scoutisme chez les 6-8 ans sont : vivre avec son corps : découvrir ses 5 sens développer ses aptitudes physiques, expérimenter son autonomie ; vivre avec ses mains : comprendre les choses qui nous entourent et apprendre des gestes ; vivre avec sa tête : apprendre à se connaître, exprimer son avis, sens du bien et du mal sens des responsabilités ; vivre avec son cœur : exprimer ses émotions respecter les autres et être heureux ; vivre avec les autres : partager, jouer à plusieurs, connaître l’existence d’idées différentes des siennes, apprendre à faire la paix ; vivre avec Jésus : découvrir Jésus dans les actes de la vie, auprès des autres, apprendre à prier. Louveteaux et jeannettes De 8 à 11 ans. La pédagogie des Louveteaux et Jeannettes s'appuie sur les Sylphes, personnages mi-humains, mi-végétaux, qui sont les messagers de la nature et amis du Grand Arbre (dont les racines centenaires sont mères de la forêt), et qui sont présentés dans un conte : la Forêt des Escapades. L'ensemble de l'unité est appelée une « peuplade », et cette peuplade est subdivisée en « sizaines » de 6 enfants environ (d'où le nom de « sizaine ») qui se réunissent régulièrement à leur « cabane » pour le « conseil de cabane » où les enfants sont invités à s'exprimer et/ou prendre des décisions démocratiquement. Différents rôles (le "président" qui mène les débats, le "porte-parole" qui rapportera ce qui est dit, le "secrétaire" qui met par écrit ce qui est dit) sont alors endossés par les enfants pour assurer un bon déroulement des discussions. Le but de ce conseil est généralement de faire le point sur la vie de la sizaine, grâce à un « porte-parole » qui sera envoyé cette fois au « conseil des porte-paroles », constitué des porte-paroles et de chefs. La plupart des informations et des décisions qui concernent toute l'unité ont lieu pendant le « conseil de peuplade » qui réunit tous les enfants et tous les chefs. Peu importe si c'est avant ou après leur « promesse », les louveteaux et jeannettes progressent en acquérant des « atouts ». Celui de Blogane (une sylphe-fleur rouge, qui est solidaire), de Laline (une sylphe-feuille jaune, qui est dynamique), Théla (une sylphe-bogue de châtaigne bleue, qui est débrouillarde), Yzô (un sylphe-pierre vert, qui est sincère), Maÿls (un sylphe-nuage blanc, qui est curieux de Dieu) et Kawane (un sylphe-herbe violet, qui est sensible). Pour chaque sylphe - chacun associé à l'un des axes du scoutisme (par rapport au monde, à soi, à son corps, aux autres, à Dieu et à ses sentiments)-, l'enfant peut choisir chaque semestre environ, l'atout qu'il souhaite développer, par des actions ponctuelles mais surtout par une attitude au quotidien. Sa progression est suivie par un carnet et, lorsqu'il estime avoir rempli le contrat qu'il s'est lui-même fixé, il reçoit du sylphe l'insigne le représentant qui montre qu'il a grandi dans ce domaine. Des activités en lien avec les sylphes sont vécues tout au long de l'année afin de faire progresser collectivement les enfants sur des savoir-faire. Auparavant récompensée par des "graines", cette progression n'est plus représentée. La dernière année dans cette branche, l'enfant est invité à devenir « veilleur » : de paix, de nature, de bien-être ou de mémoire. Il s'agit d'améliorer la vie de la peuplade en veillant à la bonne-entente, au respect de l'environnement, au confort matériel ou à la mémoire du vécu de la peuplade (journal, photos...). Les louveteaux et jeannettes portent une chemise orange , mais qui était jaune jusqu'en 2011. Scouts et guides Il est nécessaire de prendre note du fait que la pédagogie des Scouts et Guides a été modifiée. La nouvelle pédagogie a pris effet en septembre 2021. Cette dernière présente de grandes similitudes avec l'ancienne pédagogie et consiste majoritairement en une simplification de celle-ci. La Tribu devient ainsi "Communauté", les équipages deviennent "Équipe", les rôles changent de nom, d'attribution et sont moins nombreux, etc... Pour les jeunes de 11 à 14 ans. L'ensemble de l'unité est la « Tribu ». Les jeunes se retrouvent en petites équipes appelées « équipages » où chacun a un rôle pour le faire fonctionner (Pilote, Coach, Témoin, Architecte, Intendant, Artiste). Le pilote, par exemple, coordonne et s'occupe de son équipe. Il est aussi l'interlocuteur premier avec la maîtrise. L'équipage a une durée de vie d'un an, chaque scout ou guide tient donc le même rôle sur un an, jusqu'à la fin du camp d'été. Certaines tribus changent d'équipes et de rôle pour le camp , les jeunes pouvant alors réaliser les six rôles pendant leurs trois années dans la tribu . Après un temps d'accueil ou chacun apprend à vivre en équipage, (soit à partir de décembre-Janvier) les Scouts et Guides choisissent de vivre un projet « L'Aventure » en traversant une « terre d'aventure », pendant laquelle les équipages se réunissent réaliseront des missions pour faire avancer le projet. En général les Tribus vivent 2 aventures pendant l'année, et une pendant le camp d'été. L'équipage est l'espace de vie central des scouts et guides afin de leur faire découvrir l'autonomie. L'autonomie des équipages est vécue de façon croissante pendant l'année : réunions d'équipage, service d'équipage, week-ends d'équipage. Le point culminant de la progression dans l'autonomie de l'équipage se vit pendant le camp, c'est « l'exploration ». Après une préparation (itinéraires, lieu de couchage, menus, etc.) sous le regard bienveillant des chefs et cheftaines, chaque équipage part du camp pendant environ 24 h (1 nuit) pour vivre une randonnée d'exploration dans les alentours du camp. Les scouts et les guides dans leur , vivent, entre mars et juin, un week-end « Brevet d'Éclaireur de Tribu » avec d'autres scouts et guides des territoires voisins. Au choix, une acquisition de compétences dans un des 3 parcours au choix : « Bosses et Bobos » (premiers soins), « Robinson » (construction fabrication) ou « 3 étoiles » (cuisine de camp) et depuis 2015 un parcours « Ces'arts » (création) a vu le jour . Ce week-end leur permet également de revenir sur le vécu au sein de leur Tribu et de vivre une veillée animée par des Pionniers et Caravelles. Les Éclaireurs de Tribu ont ensuite pour mission de transmettre leurs compétences pendant la fin de l'année et le camp, avant de rejoindre la Caravane des Pionniers et Caravelles. Les huit terres d'aventures sont : Pionniers et caravelles Pour les jeunes de 14 à 17 ans. Les pionniers et caravelles forment ensemble une « caravane », subdivisée en « équipes », avec un « chef d'équipe » en tête, chargé de faire le lien avec la maîtrise (l'équipe constituée par les chefs et cheftaines) et de représenter son équipe. Les pionniers et caravelles réalisent des « CAPs ». Cet acronyme signifie : « Concevoir, Agir, Partager ». C'est la base même de l'état d'esprit des pionniers et caravelles. Concrètement, les CAPs sont des projets que l'on mène tout au long de l'année dans des domaines très variés tels que : la solidarité ; l'international ; l'Évangile ; le sport ; la protection de l'environnement ; l'expression ; la communication ; la fabrication. Le projet est choisi et préparé par les jeunes, la présence des chefs permettant (outre l'encadrement légal et pédagogique) de donner de l'aide, de faire le point, etc. C'est avec les pionniers que de grands projets peuvent être réalisés : faire un camp « sports en eaux vives », réaliser des voitures à pédale pour 8, partir à la rencontre des scouts d'autres pays, faire un camp itinérant, participer à des fouilles archéologiques, etc. Lors du camp, un « chantier » est généralement réalisé (rejoignant sens du service) : participation à la reconstruction d'une maison, repeindre la barrière du propriétaire du lieu de camp, etc. Pour qu'un projet soit un « cap », conformément à la pédagogie, il doit remplir cinq critères : utilité, découverte, rencontre, dépassement et créativité. Sur une année, deux « caps » seront réalisés, le premier allant de septembre à janvier, le second de janvier au camp d'été. La progression du pionnier et de la caravelle se fait d'année en année. À son arrivée en première année, le jeune reçoit un insigne représentant un cairn. C'est au terme de sa première année que le jeune fait sa « promesse ». Il aura eu l'occasion de la préparer lors d'un temps de réflexion personnel appelé « source ». Au début de chaque année, le jeune choisit un rôle qu'il aura à tenir pendant l'année. Les dix rôles sont : chef d'équipe : coordonne les actions dans son équipe et suit la progression de chaque membre, fait le lien entre l'équipe et la maîtrise ; responsable intendance : prévoit les menus de manière équilibrée en fonction des activités et du lieu. Prépare une liste de courses et du matériel ; responsable budget : budgétise les activités et en déduit les actions à mener pour trouver de l'argent ; responsable matériel : inventorie, renouvelle et entretient le matériel. Il le prépare à chaque sortie ; responsable animation : propose des thèmes pour les activités et les veillées. Prépare et organise les veillées ; responsable Santé : prépare la trousse à pharmacie, veille à l'hygiène et & la santé de chacun ; responsable communication : crée l'annuaire de la caravane, transmet les informations, fait des reportages et les diffuse ; responsable vie spirituelle : Présente le désert (thème de réflexion d'année), se charge de la préparation des temps spirituels. responsable documentation : recherche les informations pratiques sur les projets, crée une base de données de documents ; responsable hébergement : recherche les détails pratiques concernant les lieux d'hébergement, recherche les cartes IGN. Ces rôles permettent de répartir les tâches pour la préparation d'un week-end ou d'un camp, et sensibilisent les jeunes à la notion de responsabilité. Parallèlement à ces rôles, chaque jeune choisit son cheminement personnel grâce aux « itinéraires ». Il y a en tout six itinéraires : vivre ensemble ; vivre avec des valeurs ; vivre avec énergie ; vivre avec son temps ; vivre avec espérance ; vivre avec rayonnement. Chaque jeune aura à réaliser quelques tâches ponctuelles, pour la caravane, en rapport avec l'itinéraire qu'il a choisi et à l'issue de ces actions, en signe d'un bon parcours d'« itinéraire », le jeune reçoit la « pierre » correspondante à placer sur son « cairn ». De cette façon, à raison de deux itinéraires par an, le jeune pourra avoir un insigne de cairn complet au bout de ses 3 ans chez les pionniers. La fin de sa deuxième année est marquée par une exploration. Traditionnellement les pionniers et caravelles partent en binôme pour un temps d'itinérance de 48 h (se dépasser : 24 h découverte et 24 h nature). L'itinéraire suivi et le lieu et moyen d'hébergement étant choisis à l'avance. Durant ces deux jours, ils prennent un temps de réflexion individuel symbolisé par une « source » durant lequel ils font le point sur leurs deux ans au sein de la « caravane ». À la fin de la progression chez les pionniers et caravelles, tous les jeunes en partent en exploration pour 36h. C'est pour eux l'occasion de préparer leur passage aux compagnons/JEM. Lors de ces 36 h, chaque jeune prend un temps de réflexion individuel ici aussi appelé « source », afin de retracer son itinéraire chez les pionniers et caravelles, puis pour se projeter dans le futur (Scout et non Scout). À l'issue des trois années chaque jeune aura les six pierres sur son insigne de « cairn ». C'est le signe qu'il a acquis suffisamment d'autonomie pour passer dans la branche supérieure. Compagnons Les membres d'une « équipe » Compagnons réalisent eux-mêmes leur projet. Les compagnons ont généralement entre 17 et 20 ans. Il s'agit de la branche aînée du mouvement. Bien que des adultes plus âgés (les accompagnateurs compagnons ou « AccoCo ») soient présents, leur aide n'est que ponctuelle (mise au point sur l'avancée du projet, etc.) et ils ne partent pas en camp avec les jeunes. Les projets se vivent en équipe uniquement. L'ensemble des équipes forment un « relais » compagnon, lieu d'échange et de vie entre les équipes. La pédagogie est basée sur trois temps : le premier concerne la fondation de l'équipe. Il s'agit de réaliser un premier projet, afin de permettre aux membres de l'équipe de mieux se connaitre, d'apprendre à fonctionner ensemble. Au terme de ce premier temps, les membres de l'équipe peuvent prononcer leur « adhésion » à l'équipe, soudée autour d'un « texte de fondation ». C'est au cours de cette cérémonie qu'ils reçoivent leur insigne (un médaillon) d'adhésion ; après avoir passé ce « cap de la fondation », les compagnons entrent alors en deuxième temps, au cours duquel ils « prennent le large ». Il s'agit alors pour eux de réaliser un projet « riche » : riche en rencontres, en dépaysement, en apprentissage, en amitié... Ce projet s'effectue dans une relation de partenariat, généralement avec une autre association ; après une relecture de ce projet, et le passage du « cap des appels », où les compagnons sont invités à vivre un projet personnel, ils entrent dans le troisième temps, un temps de « témoignage ». Ils achèvent alors pratiquement leur aventure scoute (en tant que jeune) et sont invités à réaliser un engagement: engagement au sein d'une association, de l'Église... Ou bien des Scouts et Guides de France (en devenant chef ou cheftaine par exemple). C'est au terme de cette (parfois longue) aventure scoute qu'ils passent le « cap de l'envoi » et peuvent s'ils le souhaitent prononcer leur engagement compagnon, durant lequel ils vont dire devant d'autres leur itinéraire, ainsi que leur désir pour l'avenir. Propositions spécifiques Handicap et inclusion Les Scouts et Guides de France accueillent des enfants et des adultes en situation de handicap. Pour les enfants et les jeunes, il est fait aux enfants et aux jeunes une proposition de scoutisme avec des jeunes valides de leur âge. Cette proposition vise à développer l’accessibilité du scoutisme, en considérant qu'avoir une déficience physique ou sensorielle, des difficultés intellectuelles ou relationnelles n’est pas forcément un handicap pour faire du scoutisme. C'est aux responsables locaux, en lien avec les familles, de définir les modalités d’accueil et d’intégration. Le mouvement propose également aux personnes handicapées mentales d'au moins 18 ans, filles ou garçons, de continuer à faire du scoutisme. C’est la proposition Audace. Elle est issue des Guides de France et existait jusqu'en 2021 sous le nom de Vent du large. Scoutisme marin Dès 1908, Baden-Powell fait l'expérience de faire vivre le scoutisme par la pratique des activités nautiques, principalement la pratique de la voile. À l'heure actuelle, une vingtaine de groupes Scouts et Guides de France sont labellisés marins. La proposition pédagogique marine comporte quatre domaines que les jeunes peuvent découvrir. Ils sont représentés par les 4 points cardinaux de la boussole : Tranche d'âge 8-11 ans : les moussaillons Les Moussaillons sont l'équivalent terrien des Louveteaux/Jeannettes. Ils pratiquent la voile lors de sorties encadrées et fondent leur aventures autour de la découverte du milieu marin. Le lexique utilisé pour les Louveteaux/Jeannettes est le même avec les Moussaillons. Pour se différencier des Louveteaux, les Moussaillons portent un rayé sous leurs chemises orange. Ils ont également un insigne de promesse légèrement différent, avec la croix marine. Tranche d'âge 11-14 ans : les mousses Les mousses sont scouts et guides. Ils suivent dont tout naturellement la même pédagogie que la branche, « Equipages » et « Tribus » sont donc les termes utilisés pour les équipes de vie et l'unité. Les rôles de fonctionnement de l'équipage sont les mêmes, avec quelques ajouts utiles aux activités marines. Les mousses ont toutefois deux labels d'équipage supplémentaires: PREPARATEUR et NAVIGATEUR. Les scouts et guides ayant de réelles compétences reconnues en navigation, gestion d'embarcation, et accompagnement d'équipiers, ont également la possibilité d'obtenir le label de Timonier (également remis dans la branche Pionniers-Caravelles). Tranche d'âge 14-17 ans : les marins Les marins et marines font partie intégrante de la branche « pionniers - caravelles » et de ce fait ils fonctionnent exactement sur le même modèle. Toutefois les dénominations changent par rapport aux pionniers, avec des termes plus « marins » : la « caravane » est appelée « flottille » ; l'« équipe » est appelée « équipage » ; le « chef d'équipe » est appelé « chef d'équipage ». En plus des rôles classiques des pionniers, chaque marin a une fonction à laquelle il se forme pendant l'année. Une fonction est un rôle spécifique à la conduite du bateau, telle que la connaissance des calculs de marée ou la capacité à faire une manœuvre d'accostage. Les activités des marins sont bien sûr plutôt orientées vers le milieu de la mer et le camp d'été a traditionnellement lieu à proximité d'une côte afin de pratiquer la voile. Avant de partir faire un camp en mer, les jeunes peuvent bénéficier de formations pour se familiariser avec le milieu nautique. Ces formations pratiques et théoriques sont généralement dispensées pendant l'année, soit sous forme de week-ends, soit au cours d'un SMATECH (stage marin technique) d'une semaine environ. La connaissance du milieu nautique ne se limite pas à la navigation. Proches de la nature par essence, les Scouts Marins ont également à cœur de découvrir tout ce qui touche à la mer, entre autres l'écosystème et les milieux professionnels. Pour l'entraînement à la partie pratique, cela peut se faire, pour des raisons de proximité géographique sur un plan d'eau intérieur. Le groupe scout peut prendre l'initiative de ces formations si celui-ci possède l'encadrement adéquat, ou en partenariat avec une école de voile dans le cas contraire. Le camp d'été comporte donc une grande partie de navigation, mais tout ce qui touche au monde de la mer peut y être découvert. Ainsi, les marins pourront partager l'expérience des sauveteurs en mer, rencontrer un gardien de phare, ou partir quelques heures sur un bateau de pêche. Encadrement Les activités nautiques sont considérées comme risquées. De ce fait, un simple BAFA ne suffit pas pour encadrer des jeunes en navigation. Le Scoutisme marin, auquel adhèrent les Scouts et Guides de France, propose différents stages de formation pour permettre à un adulte d'encadrer des jeunes en toute légalité et en toute sécurité. BAFA Qualification Voile (QV) : Peut encadrer une flottille de 10 dériveurs légers maximum ou 6 bateaux collectifs, dans une zone délimitée, à moins de 2 milles d'un abri et jusqu'à 4 Beaufort. Âge minimum requis : 18 ans. Patron d'Embarcation (PE) : Peut encadrer un bateau en autonomie hors d'une zone délimitée, à moins de 2 milles d'un abri et jusqu'à 5 Beaufort, si le titulaire est majeur, ou, diriger un bateau sous la responsabilité du CF. Âge minimum requis : 16 ans. Chef de Quart (CQ) : Idem que le BAFA QV et possibilité d'encadrer une flottille de 4 bateaux collectifs ou petits habitables à moins de 2 milles d'un abri et jusqu'à 5 Beaufort hors d'une zone délimitée. Peut également encadrer un bateau en autonomie (sans CF) a moins de 6 milles d'un abri et jusqu'à 5 Beaufort. Âge minimum requis : 18 ans. Chef de Flottille (CF) : Idem que le CQ et peut encadrer une flottille de 4 bateaux maximum, avec au moins un PE ou CQ par bateau à moins de 6 milles d'un abri et jusqu'à 5 Beaufort. Âge minimum requis : 19 ans. Scoutisme en quartier Depuis près de 20 ans, les Scouts et Guides de France proposent à des jeunes de quartiers, de vivre le scoutisme. Les enjeux de cette démarche sont de : proposer des activités régulières à des jeunes (8-15 ans) en leur donnant des responsabilités ; soutenir les parents dans l’éducation de leurs enfants ; prévenir la délinquance et œuvrer pour l’intégration des jeunes ; permettre à des jeunes adultes (17-25 ans) de se former et d’être acteurs de leurs quartiers. Ces enjeux sont mis en œuvre à travers plusieurs types de projets : des propositions de camps pendant l’été, en fonction des tranches d’âge ; des implantations de groupes dans les quartiers populaires ; des projets de solidarité menés par les scouts et les guides de 17-20 ans ; Proposition Patrouilles De 2009 à 2012, l'association a accueilli quelques unités pratiquant la méthode unitaire, également appelée « proposition Patrouilles » (une seule branche 12-17 ans au lieu d'une branche 11-14 ans et une branche 14-17 ans). La poursuite du développement de cette initiative a été rejetée lors de l'Assemblée Générale de 2012. À partir de , les groupes concernés pourront toutefois continuer leurs activités, en étant soutenus par une équipe de chargés de mission nationaux. Les grands rassemblements nationaux Louveteaux-Jeannettes 13 au à Jambville : Graines de diversité en lien avec la Journée de la Fraternité à Paris le , rassemblement national des chefs et cheftaines Louveteaux-Jeannettes 5 et : "De notre mieux", certains territoires ayant organisé des week-end groupés, 48 rassemblements différents regroupant 18 000 personnes ont eu lieu simultanément. Jamborees Scouts-Guides au 2006 à Jambville : Quels talents ! () 27 au à Jambville : Vis tes rêves ! () 22 au à Jambville : Connecte ! () Jamborees Pionniers-Caravelles 26 au à Cussac-Fort Médoc : CitéCap ( pionniers-caravelles) suivi par le centenaire du scoutisme marin Cap'O'Cent (-) 16 au à Strasbourg : You're up () Rassemblement Compagnons 22 au à Paris puis Jambville : Paris d'Avenir ( compagnons et rovers d'Europe et des pays du Sud) Rencontres nationales pour les cadres du mouvement 6 au à Jambville : Parole de liberté, paroles d'avenir, rencontres nationales pour les chefs et cheftaines, équipes de groupe, équipes territoriales et nationales, compagnons 23 au à Jambville : Génération Responsables, rencontres nationales rejointes par le rassemblement Paris d'Avenir dès le 24. 16 au à Jambville : A l'unisson, rencontres nationales pour les chefs et cheftaines, équipes de groupe, équipes territoriales et nationales, compagnons et représentants associatifs des 16 ans et +, en parallèle de l'assemblée générale. Les filiales L'association des Scouts et Guides de France développe un certain nombre d'activités à travers des filiales. La plus importante, Scoutik, a été entérinée en et regroupe plusieurs activités dont certaines étaient déjà sous la forme de filiales : La Boutique du scoutisme, les centres nationaux (Jambville, Mélan - les Feux Nouveaux...), les Presses d'Île-de-France... Cette filiale permet de consolider les modalités de gestion, de fiscalité et de développement ces activités. Nicolas Bertrand est le directeur de la structure Scoutik depuis le 2016. Notes et références Voir aussi Bibliographie Articles connexes Organisation mondiale du mouvement scout Association mondiale des guides et éclaireuses Liens externes Scouts et Guides de France Les presses d'Île-de-France, maison d'édition des Scouts et Guides de France Scoutopédia - Scouts et Guides de France Scoutisme en France Association ou organisme ayant son siège en France Organisme fondé en 2004 Association française reconnue d'utilité publique
el	wikipedia	N/A	Το πρωτάθλημα Α1 ́ Εθνικής κατηγορίας χάντμπολ ανδρών της περιόδου 1998–99 ήταν το δέκατο από την καθιέρωση της Α1 και συνολικά το 22ο πρωτάθλημα Ελλάδος στην ιστορία του χάντμπολ (μαζί με τα δυο πρωταθλήματα που είχε διοργανώσει ο ΣΕΓΑΣ). Πρωταθλητής αναδείχθηκε, για δέκατη φορά στην ιστορία του θεσμού, ο Ιωνικός Ν. Φιλαδέλφειας. Επικράτησε στους τελικούς των πλέι-οφ του Α.Σ.Ε. Δούκα με 2-1 νίκες, καταφέρνοντας στο τρίτο ματς να σπάσει το πλεονέκτημα έδρας του αντιπάλου του. Ο Ιωνικός Ν.Φ. κατέκτησε και το πρώτο Σούπερ Καπ που διοργάνωσε η Ομοσπονδία επικρατώντας και πάλι του ΑΣΕ Δούκα που είχε αναδειχθεί Κυπελλούχος Ελλάδος. Βαθμολογία κανονικής περιόδου ΓΕ Βέροιας και Τρίτων είχαν από ένα μηδενισμό και αφαίρεση ενός βαθμού. Πλέι οφ Ημιτελικοί Ο Ιωνικός επικράτησε με 2-0 του Πανελληνίου και ο Δούκας 2-1 του Κιλκίς 10/3/1999: Ιωνικός Ν.Φ.-Πανελλήνιος 18-17 10/3/1999: Δούκας-Κιλκίς 30-16 12/3/1999: Πανελλήνιος-Ιωνικός Ν.Φ. 22-24 12/3/1999: Κιλκίς-Δουκας 24-22 1/3/1999: Δούκας-Κιλκίς 19-16 Θέσεις 3-4 Ο Πανελλήνιος κατέκτησε την τρίτη θέση με 2-0 νίκες. 17/3/1999: Πανελλήνιος-Κιλκίς 25-17 19/3/1999: Κιλκίς-Πανελλήνιος 19-27 Τελικός Ζηρίνειο, 17/3/1999: Α.Σ.Ε. Δούκα - Ιωνικός Ν.Φ. 17-15. Ν. Φιλαδέλφεια, 19/3/1999: Ιωνικός Ν.Φ. - Α.Σ.Ε. Δούκα 19-18. Ζηρίνειο, 22/3/1999: Α.Σ.Ε. Δούκα - Ιωνικός Ν.Φ. 18-25. Κατάταξη Τελικός Σούπερ Καπ Κλειστό Πανελληνίου: Ιωνικός Ν. Φιλαδέλφειας – Α.Σ.Ε. Δούκα: 26-20. Πρωταθλητής Πηγές Ματιές στα σπορ, Ιανουάριος 2000 σελ. 80-81. "Το 10ο πρωτάθλημα του Ιωνικού Ν. Φιλαδέλφειας, τη σεζόν 1998-99" ιστότοπος greekhandball.com 1998 1999 Χειροσφαίριση το 1998 Χειροσφαίριση το 1999
en	caselaw	US	The Honorable R. Gunner DeLay Prosecuting Attorney Twelfth Judicial District Sebastian County Courthouse 36 South 6th Street Fort Smith, AR 72901 Dear Mr. DeLay: I am writing in response to your request for my opinion on the following questions concerning one of the cities in your jurisdiction: Is it against Arkansas law or the State Constitution for a mayor to expend city funds to upgrade a laptop computer that is used for official city business as well as personal use? Does it make any difference if the computer is donated to the city either before, or after, the upgrades have been made? You report that "[t]he computer was owned by the mayor prior to his taking office and the upgrades costs [sic] less than $500." RESPONSE In my opinion, the expenditure described by your first question could be suspect under various provisions of law, with the issue likely turning on the specific circumstances surrounding the "personal use" of the computer. If the question contemplates the use of city funds to upgrade a privately-owned computer, such expenditure in my opinion would be unlawful unless it was pursuant to a valid contractual agreement that primarily furthered a legitimate public purpose. I lack sufficient information to analyze this issue in further detail, and cannot in any event undertake the necessary factual inquiry to definitively decide the matter. I can only analyze the relevant legal issues. With regard to your second question, if the computer was donated to the city before the upgrades were made, and the "personal use" was only incidental to a public purpose, then in my opinion the upgrade expenditure would likely be permissible as long as it was not arbitrary or unreasonable. If, on the other hand, the computer was privately owned when the upgrades were made, then in my opinion it would only be by virtue of some contractual arrangement that such an expenditure of city funds might be justified. Your questions implicate several provisions of law, including A.C.A. § 14-58-303, the common law "public purpose doctrine," and Arkansas Constitution, Article 12, Section 5 and Article 16, Section 13. A.C.A. § 14-58-303 The mayor of a first class city is authorized by A.C.A. § 14-58-303(a) (Supp. 2005) "to make purchases of all supplies . . . and other things requisite for public purposes in and for the city[;]" and he or she may "make all necessary contracts . . . in carrying out any work or undertaking of a public nature in the city." (Emphasis added). This authorization is consistent in all respects with the common law "public purpose" doctrine, which restricts public funds to public purposes, see Chandler v. Board of Trustees, 236 Ark. 256, 365 S.W.2d 447 (1963), as well as the constitutional proscription against the appropriation of city funds "for . . . any corporation, association, institution or individual." Ark. Const. art. 12, § 5. The "public purpose" doctrine This doctrine was described in Chandler, supra, as follows: No principle of constitutional law is more fundamental or more firmly established than the rule that the State cannot, within the limits of due process, appropriate public funds to a private purpose. A century ago the basic doctrine was simply stated in the leading case of Brodhead v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624: "The legislature cannot create a public debt, or levy a tax, or authorize a municipal corporation to do so, in order to raise funds for a mere private purpose. It cannot in the form of a tax take the money of the citizens and give it to an individual, the public interest or welfare being in no way connected with the transaction. The objects for which money is raised by taxation must be public, and such as subserve the common interest and well being of the community required to contribute." 236 Ark. at 258, quoting Brodhead v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624. See also Holiday Island Suburban Improvement District #1 v. Williams,295 Ark. 442, 446, 749 S.W.2d 314 (1988) ("[I]t is clear that ad valorem taxes could not be lawfully imposed upon the general public to maintain the cost of construction or maintenance of facilities used for private purposes.") See also generally Rubin, Constitutional Aid Limitation Provisions and the Public Purpose Doctrine, 12 St. Louis U. Pub.L. Rev. 143 (1993). It has been stated as regards this doctrine that `"[n]o expenditure can be allowed legally except in a clear case where it appears that the welfare of the community and its inhabitants is involved and direct benefit results to the public."` Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. 91-410 (quoting McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 12, 190). "Public purpose" in the situation at hand involving city-funded computer upgrades should therefore be read as a "public purpose" that directly benefits the inhabitants of the city. Arkansas Constitution Article 12, Section 5 This constitutional provision specifically prohibits the appropriation of city funds to private individuals. It provides: § 5. Political subdivisions not to become stockholders in or lend credit No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall become a stockholder in any company, association or corporation; or obtain or appropriate money for, or loan its credit to, any corporation, association, institution or individual. Ark. Const. art. 12, § 5. This proscription memorializes with respect to local government the general principle that no government can use public resources for private purposes. See, e.g., Pogue v. Cooper, 284 Ark. 105, 679 S.W.2d 207 (1984); Cunningham v. Stockton, Judge, 235 Ark. 345, 359 S.W.2d 808 (1962); Needham v. Garner, County Judge, 233 Ark. 1006, 350 S.W.2d 194 (1961). See also Ark. Ops. Att'y Gen. Nos. 2000-222 (expending city funds to maintain a road that is accessible only to the residents of a "gated community" would run afoul of Ark. Const. art. 12, § 5) and 2000-243 (providing a private entity free county gravel, as well as access to county equipment and employees, offends art. 12, § 5). My immediate predecessor also observed as follows regarding art. 12, § 5: Because of its broad proscription against grants or loans "to any corporation, association, institution, or individual," Article 12, § 5 would appear to bar any and all donations to any entity or person, including a private, nonprofit corporation, regardless of how exalted its purpose. Op. Att'y Gen. 2005-205 (emphasis added). See also Halbert v. Helena-West Helena Industrial Development Corp., 226 Ark. 620, 625,291 S.W.2d 802 (1956) (striking down a municipality's contribution to a private, non-profit corporation, regardless of whether the corporation served a "public purpose.") Arkansas Constitution Article 16, Section 13 Any use of public property or funds in derogation of art. 12, § 5 or the "public purpose" doctrine would invite challenge under Arkansas Constitution Article 16, Section 13. This constitutional provision authorizes citizens of counties, cities and towns to institute suit to protect inhabitants from the enforcement of "illegal exactions" The Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized that an "illegal exaction," within the meaning of art. 16, § 13, can take two forms: (1) a misapplication of public resources; and (2) a wrongful taxation. See Williams v. City of Fayetteville, 348 Ark. 768, 76 S.W.3d 235 (2002); Villines v. Harris,340 Ark. 319, 11 S.W.3d 516 (2000). The use of public resources for a private purpose would constitute a misapplication of public resources. Depending upon the particular circumstances, such conduct might also violate the common law prohibition against conflicts of interest, which is founded upon the principle that "a public office is a public trust . . . and the holder thereof may not use it directly or indirectly for personal profit, or to further his own interest . . . ." Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. 2006-137. The Arkansas Code contains a similar conflict of interest provision applicable to public officials and state employees: No public official or state employee shall use or attempt to use his or her official position to secure special privileges or exemption for himself or herself or his or her spouse, child, parents, or other persons standing in the first degree of relationship, or for those with whom he or she has a substantial financial relationship, that is not available to others, except as may be otherwise provided by law. A.C.A. § 21-8-304(a) (Repl. 2004). While the circumstances would probably have to be particularly egregious to evidence criminal conduct, the application of public funds to a private purpose could conceivably implicate the crime of theft under the Arkansas Criminal Code. A.C.A. § 5-36-102; see Sitz v. State,23 Ark. App. 126, 743 S.W.2d 18 (1988); State v. Reeves, 264 Ark. 622,574 S.W.2d 647 (1978). The elements of theft of property are set forth at A.C.A. § 5-36-103: (a) A person commits theft of property if he: (1) Knowingly takes or exercises unauthorized control over, or makes an unauthorized transfer of an interest in, the property of another person, with the purpose of depriving the owner thereof; or (2) Knowingly obtains the property of another person, by deception or by threat, with the purpose of depriving the owner thereof. Additionally, in at least one jurisdiction, the misappropriation of public property has been deemed to amount to embezzlement. People v. Redondo, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143 (Cal App. 1993) (deputy sheriff's use of police vehicle to steal lawn mower amounted to embezzlement), citing People v. Harby, 125 P.2d 874 (Cal.App. 1942) (councilperson's use of city-owned vehicle to take 4,000-mile pleasure trip amounted to embezzlement). However, the challenged conduct in these cases was especially egregious. As one of my predecessors noted, the usual course in an instance where a public official has improperly channeled public property to a private purpose has been to seek recovery in a civil action alleging an illegal exaction in violation of Ark. Const. art. 16, § 13. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. 2000-243. The foregoing discussion outlines the general legal principles that bear on your questions concerning a mayor's expenditure of city funds to upgrade a laptop computer. It is difficult to draw any preliminary conclusions, let alone make any conclusive determination in response to your first question, without knowing the precise circumstances surrounding the "personal use" of the computer. As indicated above, it is well established that a county, city, or town generally cannot make improvements to private property. See Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. 99-331. Such a use of public funds offends many of the legal provisions discussed above. Most particularly, however, the use of public funds to improve private property ordinarily offends Ark. Const. art. 12, § 5's specific proscription against the appropriation of money to a corporation or an individual. As noted above with respect to art. 12, § 5, this provision bars any contribution to a private entity or person, no matter how exalted the motive for doing so. It should nevertheless be noted that while cities cannot gratuitously appropriate funds for private entities or individuals, they are not prohibited from entering into contracts that are supported by adequate consideration and that serve a legitimate public purpose. See Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. 2003-047 (and opinions cited therein). One of my predecessors offered the following analysis of this issue: [N]othing in the constitution precludes the county from contracting with a private nonprofit charity, so long as the contract is supported by adequate consideration and serves a proper governmental end. Cities and counties clearly can enter into contracts that are supported by valid consideration. See Ops. Att'y Gen. Nos. 1998-025 and 97-250; A.C.A. §14-54-101(2); City of Ft. Smith v. Bates, 260 Ark. 777, 544 S.W.2d 525 (1976); City of Harrison v. Boone County, 238 Ark. 113, 378 S.W.2d 665 (1964). Moreover, this authority includes the power to contract with nonprofit organizations. See Woodruff v. Shockey, 297 Ark. 595,764 S.W.2d 431 (1989). Such contracts have been upheld as not being in violation of Article 12, § 5. See Arkansas Uniform Linen Supply v. Institutional Services Corp., 287 Ark. 370, 700 S.W.2d 358 (1985). . . . [T]he decision to undertake such a contract would necessarily be based on factual considerations I am unprepared and unauthorized to review. I advise you to consult with local counsel regarding such matters. Op. Att'y Gen. 99-408. Consistent with these observations, this office has previously opined that a municipality may never transfer public funds to a private, nonprofit corporation, no matter how exalted the purpose, unless the transfer is pursuant to the terms of a valid contract. See Ops. Att'y Gen. Nos. 2006-207 (transfer of "hamburger tax" funds to a private non-profit for the purchase of a tourism promotion facility, if outside the terms of a contract, would violate art. 12, § 5, even if the transfer would benefit the public); 2005-205 (city cannot donate funds to a private non-profit that serves domestic abuse victims; but assuming the need exists, the city may enter into a contract to fulfill this need, subject to the condition that the consideration it pays under the contract must be reasonable); 2004-319 (city may lease a privately-owned building for a public library and make improvements to the building under the lease, assuming the reasonableness of the total expenditures.) I agree in all respects with my predecessors' analyses. Accordingly, if your first question contemplates the use of city funds to upgrade a computer that is privately-owned, such expenditure would be unlawful, in my opinion, absent some valid contractual arrangement that serves a proper governmental end. Because your question pertains to a mayor, reference should be made in this regard to A.C.A. § 14-42-107(b)(1) (Supp. 2003), which governs the issue of city council members having an interest in contracts with the city: No alderman, council member, official, or municipal employee shall be interested, directly or indirectly, in the profits of any contract for furnishing supplies, equipment, or services to the municipality unless the governing body of the city has enacted an ordinance specifically permitting aldermen, council members, officials, or municipal employees to conduct business with the city and prescribing the extent of this authority. A.C.A. § 14-42-107(b)(1) (Supp. 2005). I lack sufficient information to further analyze any issues that might arise concerning a contractual arrangement with respect to the computer in question; and I cannot in any event undertake the necessary factual inquiry to definitively decide any such issues. I will note generally that municipal officials are granted a significant measure of discretion in determining whether the taxpaying public directly benefits from the expenditure of public funds such that the expenditure satisfies the public purpose doctrine. It has been stated that: The court will give weight to a legislative determination of what is a municipal purpose. It has been laid down as a general rule that the question of whether the performance of an act or the accomplishment of a specific purpose constitutes a "public purpose" for which municipal funds may be lawfully disbursed rests in the judgment of the municipal authorities, and the courts will not assume to substitute their judgment for that of the authorities unless the latter's exercise of judgment or discretion is shown to have been unquestionably abused. 64A C.J.S. Municipal Corporations, § 1573(b), at 99 (footnotes omitted). Accord Turner v. Woodruff, 286 Ark. 66, 689 S.W.2d 527 (1985). It nevertheless bears repeating that the appropriation of public funds for a private corporation or individual cannot satisfy the public purpose doctrine in light of Ark. Const. art. 12, § 5, as interpreted by our court. See Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. 2005-205 (discussing the cases relative to art. 12, § 5.) With regard to the computer upgrades at issue, therefore, assuming the computer is privately owned, then in my opinion the above observations concerning the accomplishment of a public purpose must be understood to apply in the context of a valid contractual arrangement supporting the use of city funds for this expense. Your first question's reference to "personal use" of the computer also prompts me to note, as stated by one of my predecessors, the following regarding the public purpose test: A primary factor in determining whether public funds are being used impermissibly appears to be whether those who contributed tax money received the intended benefit therefrom, or whether, by contrast, the benefit was received by a private individual or entity. [Citing Chandler v. Board of Trustees, supra.] A determination of the question of who is receiving the primary benefit of the property will turn upon a consideration of all of the relevant facts . . . . Op. Att'y Gen. 1998-191. It has been further observed that a so-called "incidental private benefit" will not automatically invalidate an expenditure of public funds. See Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. 2004-319 (stating that "[a]n authorized use for a public purpose is not, however, invalid even though it involves an incidental private benefit," quoting Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No.1993-343 and citing 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1725 (1950). See also Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. 2000-243 (citing League of Women Voters of California v. Countywide Criminal Justice Coordination Committee, 203 Cal. App. 3d 529, 554 (1988) ("So long as a public interest is served, there is no unlawful expenditure of public funds even though there may be incidental benefits to private persons.")). The question is whether the expenditure is for a "primarily public purpose" or "directly benefit[s] those who were taxed to pay for the expenditure." Op. Att'y Gen. 2005-102 (citing Op. 2004-319 and Chandler, supra.) Only a finder of fact acquainted with all of the circumstances attending the "personal use" of the computer would be situated to determining whether the use of city funds for the upgrades fulfills a public purpose and whether any personal benefit is incidental. In response to your second question, and in conclusion, therefore, I believe it is clear from the foregoing discussion that a donation of the computer to the city before the upgrades have been made could make a difference as long as the public purpose test is met. This is particularly true if the alternative scenario (donation after upgrades are made) involves no contractual agreement that would support expending city funds to improve the private property. Assistant Attorney General Elisabeth A. Walker prepared the foregoing opinion, which I hereby approve. Sincerely,
it	wikipedia	N/A	Il Windows Phone 8X by HTC chiamato anche HTC 8X, è uno smartphone prodotto da HTC annunciato il 19 settembre 2012 e sarà messo in vendita a partire i primi di Novembre dello stesso anno. È il primo dispositivo top di gamma Windows Phone 8 di HTC ed il è successore di HTC Titan Note Voci correlate Windows Phone 8 Microsoft Telefonia mobile Telefono cellulare HTC HTC Titan Altri progetti Collegamenti esterni Cellulari HTC Smartphone Dispositivi Windows Phone Dispositivi Wi-Fi
et	caselaw	EU	10.11.2014 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja C 395/36 Üldkohtu 30. septembri 2014. aasta otsus – Scooters India versus Siseturu Ühtlustamise Amet – Brandconcern (LAMBRETTA) (Kohtuasi T-132/12) (1) ((Ühenduse kaubamärk - Tühistamismenetlus - Ühenduse sõnamärk LAMBRETTA - Kaubamärgi tegelik kasutamine - Määruse (EÜ) nr 207/2009 artikli 51 lõike 2 punkt a)) (2014/C 395/42) Kohtumenetluse keel: inglise Pooled Hageja: Scooters India Ltd (Lucknow, India) (esindaja: advokaat B. Brandreth) Kostja: Siseturu Ühtlustamise Amet (kaubamärgid ja tööstusdisainilahendused) (esindaja J. Crespo Carrillo) Teine menetluspool apellatsioonikojas, menetlusse astuja Üldkohtus: Brandconcern BV (Amsterdam, Madalmaad) (esindajad: advokaadid G. Casucci ja N. Ferretti) Ese Hagi Siseturu Ühtlustamise Ameti esimese apellatsioonikoja 12. jaanuari 2012. aasta otsuse (asi R 2308/2010-1) peale, mis käsitleb tühistamismenetlust Brandconcern BV ja Scooters India Ltd vahel. Resolutsioon 1. Tühistada Siseturu Ühtlustamise Ameti (kaubamärgid ja tööstusdisainilahendused) esimese apellatsioonikoja 12. jaanuari 2012. aasta otsus (asi R 2308/2010-1). 2. Jätta Siseturu Ühtlustamise Ameti kohtukulud tema enda kanda ja mõista temalt välja Scooters India Ltd kohtukulud, sh apellatsioonikojas kaetud kulud. 3. Brandconcern BV kannab ise oma kohtukulud. (1) ELT C 165, 9.6.2012.
sv	legislation	EU	13.4.2022 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning LI 115/1 KOMMISSIONENS DELEGERADE FÖRORDNING (EU) 2022/629 av den 12 januari 2022 om ändring av de tekniska tillsynsstandarderna i delegerad förordning (EU) 2017/583 vad gäller justering av likviditetströsklar och handelspercentil som används för att fastställa storlek som är specifik för instrumentet, för tillämpning på vissa icke-aktierelaterade instrument (Text av betydelse för EES) EUROPEISKA KOMMISSIONEN HAR ANTAGIT DENNA FÖRORDNING med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt, med beaktande av Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 600/2014 av den 15 maj 2014 om marknader för finansiella instrument och om ändring av förordning (EU) nr 648/2012 (1), särskilt artikel 9.5 tredje stycket, och av följande skäl: (1) I kommissionens delegerade förordning (EU) 2017/583 (2) fastställs de transparenskrav som är tillämpliga på obligationer, strukturerade finansiella produkter, utsläppsrätter och derivat. För att säkerställa ett smidigt genomförande infördes genom den delegerade förordningen en årlig infasning av tillämpningen av vissa tröskelvärden för transparenskraven under fyra år, med början 2019. Infasningen gör det möjligt att gradvis bredda tillämpningen av motsvarande transparenskrav. Detta gäller särskilt kriteriet ”genomsnittligt dagligt antal transaktioner” som används för att avgöra vilka obligationer som det finns en likvid marknad för, och de handelspercentiler som används för att fastställa storleken som är specifik för instrumentet (SSTI), vilket möjliggör undantag för kravet på transparens före handel. (2) Övergången till nästa steg sker inte automatiskt i infasningen. Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten (Esma) har i uppgift att lämna sin årliga bedömning till kommissionen med avseende på om det är lämpligt att gå över till nästa steg. Esma måste i sin bedömning analysera utvecklingen av handelsvolymerna för de berörda finansiella instrumenten i det nuvarande steget, och göra en prognos för de eventuella effekter som en övergång till nästa steg skulle kunna få på både tillgänglig likviditet och marknadsdeltagare. Om det är motiverat måste Esma, tillsammans med sin rapport, lägga fram en reviderad tillsynsstandard för att anpassa tröskelvärdet till nästa steg. (3) Esma överlämnade sin bedömning med reviderade tillsynsstandarder till kommissionen den 22 juli 2021. Esma kom fram till att mellan 1,57 % och 2,58 % av de obligationer som handlats mellan första och fjärde kvartalet 2020 var likvida enligt de kriterier som gäller i steg S2. En övergång till steg S3 innebär en ökning med cirka 40 %. (4) När det gäller SSTI har Esma kommit fram till att övergången från steg S2 till S3 främst kommer att påverka handeln med statsobligationer och andra offentliga obligationer, eftersom ökningen kommer att vara störst för dessa instrument. Handeln med dessa instrument ligger dock normalt mellan 3 miljoner euro och 6 miljoner euro. Esma anser därför att en övergång till steg S3 skulle hålla SSTI före handel tillräckligt låg för att skydda likviditetsgaranter från marknadseffekter till följd av stora order, samtidigt som man säkerställer att fler likvida obligationer omfattas av transparens före handel. (5) Med beaktande av Esmas bedömning och den begränsade transparensnivån på obligationsmarknaden, de begränsade effekterna på konkurrensen på marknaden och det faktum att tröskelvärdet fortfarande skulle vara tillräckligt lågt för att skydda likviditetsgaranter från potentiella marknadseffekter till följd av stora order, att det är lämpligt att gå över till steg S3 avseende obligationer för vilka det finns en likvid marknad och avseende SSTI för obligationer. Övergången till steg S3 bör öka transparensen på obligationsmarknaden utan att likviditeten påverkas negativt. (6) Delegerad förordning (EU) 2017/583 bör därför ändras i enlighet med detta. (7) Denna förordning bygger på det förslag till tekniska tillsynsstandarder som Esma har överlämnat till kommissionen. (8) Esma har genomfört öppna offentliga samråd om det förslag till tekniska tillsynsstandarder som denna förordning bygger på, analyserat möjliga kostnader och fördelar och begärt in ett yttrande från den intressentgrupp för värdepapper och marknader som inrättats i enlighet med artikel 37 i Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 1095/2010 (3). HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE. Artikel 1 Ändringar av delegerad förordning (EU) 2017/583 Artikel 17 i delegerad förordning (EU) 2017/583 ska ändras på följande sätt: a) Punkt 1 ska ersättas med följande: ”1. För fastställande av obligationer för vilka det saknas en likvid marknad för tillämpningen av artikel 6, och i enlighet med metoden i artikel 13.1 b, ska det tillämpade likviditetskriteriet ”genomsnittligt dagligt antal transaktioner” vara det ”genomsnittliga dagliga antal transaktioner” som motsvarar steg S3 (7 dagliga transaktioner).” b) Punkt 3 ska ersättas med följande: ”3. För fastställande av storlek som är specifik för det finansiella instrumentet för tillämpningen av artikel 5, och i enlighet med metoden i artikel 13.2 b i, ska den tillämpade handelspercentilen vara den handelspercentil som motsvarar steg S3 (50:e percentilen). För fastställande av storlek som är specifik för det finansiella instrumentet för tillämpningen av artikel 5, och i enlighet med metoden i artikel 13.2 b ii–iv, ska den tillämpade handelspercentilen vara den handelspercentil som motsvarar steg S1 (30:e percentilen).” Artikel 2 Ikraftträdande Denna förordning träder i kraft den tjugonde dagen efter det att den har offentliggjorts i Europeiska unionens officiella tidning. Denna förordning är till alla delar bindande och direkt tillämplig i alla medlemsstater. Utfärdad i Bryssel den 12 januari 2022. På kommissionens vägnar Ursula VON DER LEYEN Ordförande (1) EUT L 173, 12.6.2014, s. 84. (2) Kommissionens delegerade förordning (EU) 2017/583 av den 14 juli 2016 om komplettering av Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 600/2014 avseende tekniska tillsynsstandarder när det gäller krav på transparens för handelsplatser och värdepappersföretag för obligationer, strukturerade finansiella produkter, utsläppsrätter och derivat (EUT L 87, 31.3.2017, s. 229). (3) Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 1095/2010 av den 24 november 2010 om inrättande av en europeisk tillsynsmyndighet (Europeiska värdepappers- och marknadsmyndigheten), om ändring av beslut nr 716/2009/EG och om upphävande av kommissionens beslut 2009/77/EG (EUT L 331, 15.12.2010, s. 84).
en	wikipedia	N/A	The 1966 Miami Redskins football team was an American football team that represented Miami University during the 1966 NCAA University Division football season. In their fourth season under head coach Bo Schembechler, the Redskins won the Mid-American Conference (MAC) championship, compiled a 9–1 record (5–1 against MAC opponents), and outscored all opponents by a combined total of 229 to 76. The team's statistical leaders included quarterback Bruce Matte with 845 passing yards, Joe Kozar with 633 rushing yards, and John Erisman with 600 receiving yards. Schedule References Miami Miami RedHawks football seasons Mid-American Conference football champion seasons Miami Redskins football
de	other	N/A	Überlassung von Wochenmarkt-Standplätzen an Markthändler als einheitliche Vermietungsleistung / BFH / 2008 / Rechtsprechung / Rechtsprechung / Rechtsportal - Deubner Rechtsportal Grundstück; Umsatzsteuerbefreiung; Vermietung; Vorsteuer FG Rheinland-Pfalz (3 K 1555/17) \| Datum: 18.09.2019 Umsatzsteuer bei der Vermietung eines Apartment an Prostituierte; Vermietung zur kurzfristigen Beherbergung von Fremden FG Münster (5 K 2423/17 U) \| Datum: 04.07.2019 FG Münster (15 K 2858/15 U) \| Datum: 29.01.2019 BFH, Urteil vom 24.01.2008 - Aktenzeichen V R 12/05 DRsp Nr. 2008/5450 »Die Überlassung von Standplätzen durch den Veranstalter von Wochenmärkten an die Markthändler kann als einheitliche Vermietungsleistung anzusehen sein (Abgrenzung zu den BFH-Urteilen vom 7. April 1960 V 143/58 U, BFHE 71, 41, BStBl III 1960, 261, unter 2.; vom 25. April 1968 V 120/64, BFHE 93, 393, BStBl II 1969, 94).« UStG (1993) § 4 Nr. 12 lit. a ; Richtlinie 77/388/EWG Art. 13 Teil B lit. b ; I. Die Klägerin und Revisionsbeklagte (Klägerin) ist eine eingetragene Genossenschaft. Ihre Geschäftstätigkeit bestand darin, in Gemeinden Wochenmärkte zu organisieren und durchzuführen. Die Klägerin ging in den Umsatzsteuererklärungen für 1994 bis 1998 davon aus, dass 25 % der vereinnahmten Standgelder auf eine steuerpflichtige Leistung, 75 % der Standgelder allerdings auf eine nach § 4 Nr. 12 Buchst. a des Umsatzsteuergesetzes 1993 ( UStG 1993) steuerfreie Grundstücksvermietung entfielen. Nunmehr ist das FA der Ansicht, die Zulassung zum Markt gebe den Leistungen der Klägerin an die Händler "das Gepräge". Ebenso wie die Überlassung von Sportstätten nach dem Urteil des Senats vom 31. Mai 2001 V R 97/98 (BFHE 194, 555 , BStBl II 2001, 658 ) regelmäßig nicht unter die Steuerbefreiung nach § 4 Nr. 12 Buchst. a UStG falle, so seien hier weder die gesamten Leistungen der Klägerin an die Händler noch ein Teil davon nach § 4 Nr. 12 Buchst. a UStG 1993 steuerfrei. Entsprechend der danach gebotenen richtlinienkonformen Auslegung gilt als wesentliches Merkmal des gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Begriffs der "Vermietung", dass dem Mieter auf bestimmte Zeit gegen eine Vergütung das Recht eingeräumt wird, einen Gegenstand so in Besitz zu nehmen, als ob er dessen Eigentümer wäre, und jede andere Person von diesem Recht auszuschließen (Urteile des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften --EuGH-- vom 12. Juni 2003 Rs. C-275/01, Sinclair Collis Ltd., Slg. 2003, I-5965, BFH/NV Beilage 2003, 216 Rz 22, 25; vom 3. März 2005 Rs. C-428/02, Fonden Marselisborg Lystbadehavn, Slg. 2005, I-1527, BFH/NV Beilage 2005, 175 Rz 27, 30; Beschluss des Bundesfinanzhofs --BFH-- vom 1. April 2004 V B 108/03, BFH/NV 2004, 1301 ). Die Rechtsprechung des Senats (z.B. BFH-Urteile vom 7. April 1960 V 143/58 U, BFHE 71, 41, BStBl III 1960, 261, unter 2.; vom 25. April 1968 V 120/64, BFHE 93, 393, BStBl II 1969, 94), wonach bei Wochenmärkten, Jahrmärkten und ähnlichen Veranstaltungen unter Umständen eine Aufteilung in Betracht zu ziehen ist, ist mit dem Urteil des BFH in BFHE 194, 555 , BStBl II 2001, 658 , unter II.1. überholt. Wie das FA inzwischen selbst einräumt, gilt diese Entscheidung nicht nur für Sportstätten, sondern allgemein für die Beurteilung einer Steuerbefreiung nach § 4 Nr. 12 Buchst. a UStG 1993 (BFH-Beschluss vom 13. September 2002 V B 51/02, BFH/NV 2003, 212 , unter II.2.a). Danach ist für die Steuerbefreiung entscheidend, ob eine einheitliche Leistung vorliegt, und wenn dies zutrifft, ob die Vermietungsteilleistung prägend ist. b) Das FG ging von diesen Grundsätzen aus. Es würdigte den Sachverhalt dahingehend, dass die Überlassung der Standplätze das wesentliche Element der Leistungen der Klägerin an die Händler sei. Die darüber hinaus erbrachten Leistungen der Klägerin seien Nebenleistungen. Dem jeweiligen Händler komme es gerade darauf an, unter Ausschluss anderer Händler für die Dauer des Marktes eine Standfläche zu erhalten, von der aus er sein Warensortiment vertreiben könne. Die Organisationsleistung der Klägerin sowie die Bereitstellung von Strom und die Reinigung des Marktplatzes seien für die Händler nur im Hinblick auf die Verkaufsmöglichkeit im Rahmen ihres Standplatzes von Nutzen. Die besondere Bedeutung der Standplätze für die Händler sowie die Abhängigkeit der "Serviceleistungen" von dem Zur-Verfügung-Stellen der Standplätze rechtfertigten es, diese auch dann als Nebenleistung zu einer dann einheitlichen steuerfreien Leistung anzusehen, wenn die Attraktivität einzelner Wochenmärkte durch vereinzelte "Sonderveranstaltungen" gesteigert worden sei. bb) Soweit das FA vorträgt, die Zulassung zum Markt sei für die Leistungen der Klägerin an die Händler prägend, greift es lediglich die mögliche Würdigung des FG an. Verstöße gegen Denkgesetze und Erfahrungssätze hat das FA damit nicht vorgebracht. Das Urteil des Senats in BFHE 194, 555 , BStBl II 2001, 658 , wonach die Überlassung von Sportstätten regelmäßig nicht unter die Steuerbefreiung des § 4 Nr. 12 Buchst. a UStG fällt, steht der Würdigung des FG nicht entgegen. Denn im Streitfall führte die Klägerin keine derartigen Leistungen aus. a) Wären solche Leistungen als Lieferungen anzusehen, wäre die Verwendung der Fahrzeuge für Zwecke außerhalb des Unternehmens nicht steuerbar, weil der Vorsteuerabzug für die Lieferung ausgeschlossen wäre. Dass die Berechtigung zum Vorsteuerabzug Voraussetzung für die Steuerbarkeit nach § 1 Abs. 1 Nr. 3 UStG 1993 ist, ergibt sich zwar nicht aus dem (in den Streitjahren geltenden) nationalen Recht; die Klägerin kann sich aber insofern auf die günstigere gemeinschaftsrechtliche Bestimmung des Art. 6 Abs. 2 Buchst. a der Richtlinie 77/388/EWG berufen. Danach ist die Verwendung eines dem Unternehmen zugeordneten Gegenstandes nur dann einer Dienstleistung gegen Entgelt gleichgestellt, wenn dieser Gegenstand zum teilweisen oder vollständigen Abzug der Mehrwertsteuer berechtigt hat (BFH-Urteile vom 14. April 1994 V R 94/91, BFH/NV 1995, 452, unter II.1.b; vom 30. März 1995 V R 65/93, BFHE 177, 541 , Der Betrieb 1995, 1379). Nach § 15 Abs. 2 Nr. 1 UStG 1993 ist --im Einklang mit dem Gemeinschaftsrecht-- vom Vorsteuerabzug die Steuer für Lieferungen ausgeschlossen, die der Unternehmer für steuerfreie Umsätze verwendet, die --wie hier-- keine Umsätze i.S. des § 15 Abs. 3 UStG 1993 sind. Die Klägerin führte ausschließlich Umsätze aus, die nach § 4 Nr. 12 Buchst. a UStG 1993 steuerfrei waren, und verwendete hierfür die Fahrzeuge. b) Wären Leistungen aufgrund der Leasingverträge als sonstige Leistungen anzusehen, so wären diese Eingangsumsätze (Leasing der Fahrzeuge) bereits bei Leistungsbezug in einen unternehmerischen und einen nicht unternehmerischen Teil aufzuteilen (vgl. BFH-Urteil in BFH/NV 1995, 452, unter II.1. c bis e). Damit wäre die private Nutzung der Fahrzeuge keine für die Steuerbarkeit nach § 1 Abs. 1 Nr. 3 UStG 1993 erforderliche Leistung aus dem Unternehmen (vgl. BFH-Urteil vom 23. September 1993 V R 87/89, BFHE 172, 546, BStBl II 1994, 200 , unter II.2.). Vorinstanz: FG Hessen, vom 14.12.2004 - Vorinstanzaktenzeichen 6 K 1224/02 BFH/NV 2008, 909 BFHE 220, 310 Zitieren: BFH - Urteil vom 24.01.2008 (V R 12/05) - DRsp Nr. 2008/5450
en	caselaw	EU	Joined Cases T-122/07 to T-124/07 Siemens AG Österreich and Others v European Commission (Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Market in gas insulated switchgear projects – Decision finding an infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement – Market-sharing – Effects within the common market – Notion of continuous infringement – Duration of the infringement – Limitation period – Fines – Proportionality – Ceiling of 10% of turnover – Joint and several liability for payment of a fine – Mitigating circumstances – Cooperation – Rights of the defence) Summary of the Judgment 1. Competition – Administrative procedure – Commission decision finding an infringement – Burden of proving the infringement and its duration on the Commission – Scope of the burden of proof (Art. 81(1) EC; Council Regulation No 1/2003) 2. Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Adverse effect on competition – Criteria for assessment – Anti-competitive purpose – Sufficiency for a finding of infringement (Art. 81(1) EC) 3. Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Infringement – Single infringement – Criteria for assessment (Art. 81(1) EC; EEA Agreement, Art. 53) 4. Competition – Fines – Principle of the individualisation of sanctions – Reconciliation with the notion of undertaking (Art. 81(1) EC) 5. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Criteria – Turnover taken into consideration (Art. 81(1) EC) 6. Competition – Community rules – Infringement committed by a subsidiary – Attribution to the parent company – Burden of proof on the Commission – Limits (Art. 81(1) EC) 7. Competition – Community rules – Infringements – Attribution – Attribution to the parent company of responsibility for the infringement committed by a subsidiary – Limits (Art. 81(1) EC; EEA Agreement, Art. 53) 8. Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Undertaking – Concept – Economic entity – Attribution of infringements – Parent company and subsidiaries – Joint and several liability of the undertakings concerned (Art. 81(1) EC; EEA Agreement, Art. 53; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2)) 9. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Criteria – Taking account of global turnover made from sales of the goods which are the subject of the infringement – Admissibility – Conditions (Council Regulation No 17, Art. 15) 10. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Commission's margin of discretion (Art. 81(1) EC) 11. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Maximum amount – Calculation – Turnover to be taken into consideration – Cumulative turnover of all the companies constituting the economic unit acting as an undertaking (Art. 81(1) EC; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2) and (3)) 12. Competition – Community rules – Infringement committed by a subsidiary – Attribution to the parent company – Effects – Retaining the individual liability of the subsidiary (Art. 81(1) EC) 13. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Criteria – Mitigating circumstances – Commission's margin of discretion (Art. 81(1) EC; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23; Commission Communication 98/C 9/03, Section 3) 14. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Mitigating circumstances – Scope (Art. 81(1) EC; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23; Commission Communication 98/C 9/03) 15. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Non-imposition or reduction of the fine for cooperation of the undertaking concerned – Need for conduct which facilitated the Commission's finding of an infringement (Art. 81(1) EC; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23; Commission Communication 2002/C 45/03) 16. Competition – Administrative procedure – Observance of the rights of the defence – Scope of the principle – Limits – Right of the undertaking to cross-examine the witnesses – Not included (Art. 81(1) EC) 17. Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Discretion of the Commission – Judicial review – Finding of an illegality – Need for the Court to amend the decision under its unlimited jurisdiction (Art. 229 EC) 1. It is for the party or the authority alleging an infringement of the competition rules to prove its existence by establishing, to the requisite legal standard, the facts constituting an infringement, and it is for the undertaking invoking a defence against a finding of an infringement to demonstrate that the conditions for applying such a defence are satisfied, so that the authority will then have to resort to other evidence. The principle that the Commission is required to prove every constituent element of the infringement, including its duration, which is likely to have an effect on its definitive findings as to the gravity of that infringement is not called into question by the fact that the undertakings concerned raised a defence of limitation, the burden of proof for which is in principle borne by them. Reliance on such a defence necessarily requires that the duration of the infringement and the date on which it ceased be established. However, those circumstances alone cannot provide justification for transferring the burden of proof in this regard to those undertakings. The duration of the infringement, which requires that the date on which it ended be known, is one of the essential elements of the infringement, which must be proved by the Commission, irrespective of the fact that the disputing of those elements also forms part of the defence of limitation. That conclusion is also justified by the fact that a Commission proceeding, under Regulation No 1/2003 on limitation, is not time-barred and constitutes an objective legal criterion, which derives from the principle of legal certainty, and, thus, is a condition for the validity of any decision imposing a penalty. The Commission is required to comply with this condition even if the undertaking concerned has raised no defence in this regard. That apportionment of the burden of proof is likely to vary, however, inasmuch as the evidence on which a party relies may be of such a kind as to require the other party to provide an explanation or justification, failing which it is permissible to conclude that the burden of proof has been discharged. Where the Commission has adduced evidence of the existence of an agreement, it is for an undertaking which has taken part in that agreement to adduce evidence that it distanced itself from that agreement, evidence which must demonstrate a clear intention, brought to the notice of the other participating undertakings, to withdraw from that agreement. (see paras 52-55, 60) 2. It follows from the actual wording of Article 81(1) EC that agreements between undertakings are prohibited, regardless of their effect, where they have an anti-competitive object. Consequently, it is not necessary to show actual anti-competitive effects where the anti-competitive object of the conduct in question is proved. (see para. 75) 3. The Courts of the Union have identified several relevant criteria for assessing whether there is a single infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA), namely the identical nature of the objectives of the practices at issue, the identical nature of the goods or services concerned, the identical nature of the undertakings which participated in the infringement, and the identical nature of the detailed rules for its implementation. Other relevant criteria are whether the physical persons involved on behalf of the undertakings are identical and whether the geographical scope of the practices at issue is identical. (see para. 90) 4. According to the principle that penalties must be specific to the offender and the offence, a natural or legal person may be penalised only for acts imputed to him individually; that principle applies in any administrative procedure that may lead to the imposition of sanctions under Community competition law. However, that principle must be reconciled with the notion of undertaking for the purposes of Article 81 EC. In that regard, it should be noted that the notion of undertaking includes economic units which consist of a unitary organisation of personal, tangible and intangible elements which pursues a specific economic aim on a long-term basis and can contribute to the commission of an infringement of the kind referred to in that provision. Community competition law recognises that different companies belonging to the same group form an economic unit and therefore an undertaking within the meaning of Article 81 EC if the companies concerned do not determine independently their own conduct on the market. Consequently, it is necessary to reject the assertion that the fact that an undertaking involved in an infringement is made up of several different companies does not mean that they have to be treated as a single participant to the infringement. That assertion results from confusion of the notions of undertaking and company and is not supported by the case‐law. (see paras 122-123) 5. In competition matters, the retroactive application by the Commission, for the purposes of calculating the fine, of the concept of economic unit does not lead to a heavier penalty and, therefore, does not infringe Article 7(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, pursuant to which a heavier penalty is not to be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the offence was committed. The Commission’s practice of taking account, for the purposes of calculating fines, of the turnover of undertakings – and, therefore, where necessary, the cumulative turnover of all the companies which make up an undertaking – has always been consistent and should therefore be familiar to economic operators. In addition, the Commission’s consistent practice of taking account, for the purposes of determining the starting amount of fines, of turnover for the last full year of the infringement, has been implicitly accepted in the case‐law. In that regard, first, the deterrence of fines is one of the factors by reference to which the gravity of infringements must be determined. The dissuasive nature of a fine depends to a large extent on whether it is sufficiently material for the undertaking concerned. Therefore, in order to be able to measure the dissuasive effect of a fine in respect of a company which participated in an infringement, account needs to be taken of the situation as it stood at the end of the infringement and not the situation as it may have stood at an earlier point in time. Second, it would be impractical and completely excessive, in the light of the principle of good administration and the requirements of procedural economy, to require the Commission to take account of the evolution of the turnovers of the undertakings at issue throughout the entire duration of the cartel. Such an approach would involve calculating a separate starting amount of the fine for each year of participation in the cartel and, to that end, determining the respective market shares of the participants for each year of the infringement. (see paras 124-127) 6. In competition cases, the Commission may reasonably presume that a wholly-owned subsidiary carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by its parent company and that that presumption means that the Commission is not required to check whether the parent company has actually exercised that power. The attribution to the parent company of the conduct of a wholly‐owned subsidiary is thus not conditional on evidence that the parent company had knowledge of its subsidiary’s actions. On the contrary, it is for the parent company, when it considers that, despite the 100% shareholding in its subsidiary, the subsidiary determines its conduct independently on the market, to rebut that presumption by providing sufficient evidence. (see para. 130) 7. Legal entities which have participated in their own right in an infringement of Article 81 EC or Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and which have subsequently been acquired by another company continue to bear responsibility themselves for their unlawful conduct prior to their acquisition, where they have not been purely and simply absorbed by the acquiring undertaking, but continued their activities as subsidiaries. In such a case, the acquiring undertaking may be held responsible only for the conduct of its subsidiary with effect from its acquisition if the subsidiary continues the infringement and if the liability of the new parent company can be established. In addition, the same principle must apply, mutatis mutandis, in the case where, prior to its acquisition, the company acquired participated in the infringement not independently, but as a subsidiary of another group. (see paras 139, 141) 8. Joint and several liability between companies for the payment of fines due as a result of an infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement is a legal effect which follows as a matter of law from the substantive provisions of those articles. The unitary conduct of the undertaking on the market justifies, for the purposes of the application of competition law, that the companies or, more generally, the persons which can be held personally liable for it may be held liable jointly and severally. The joint and several liability for the payment of fines imposed for an infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, inasmuch as it contributes to the effective recovery of those fines, is part of the objective of deterrence which is pursued generally by competition law and respects the principle of non bis in idem, a fundamental principle of European Union law, also laid down in Article 4 of Protocol No 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which precludes penalising more than once, for the same infringement of competition law, the same conduct of the undertaking on the market through the persons which may be held personally liable for it. The fact that the personal liabilities incurred by a number of companies on account of the participation of the same undertaking in an infringement are not the same does not preclude those companies from being jointly and severally liable for a fine, where the joint and several liability for the payment of the fine covers only the period of the infringement during which they formed an economic unit and thus constituted an undertaking for the purposes of competition law. In that regard, it follows from the principle that penalties must be specific to the offender and to the offence concerned that each company must be able to discern from the decision imposing a fine on it to be paid jointly and severally with one or more other companies the amount which it is required to bear in relation to the other joint and several debtors, once payment has been made to the Commission. To that end, the Commission must, inter alia, specify the periods during which the companies concerned were jointly liable for the unlawful conduct of the undertakings which participated in the cartel and, where necessary, the degree of liability of those companies for that conduct. Thus, the decision by which the Commission imposes on several companies the payment of a fine jointly and severally necessarily produces all the effects which are inherent, by force of law, in the legal rules governing the payment of competition law fines, both in relations between creditors and joint and several debtors and in those between joint and several debtors. It is therefore exclusively for the Commission, in exercising its power to impose fines under Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, to determine the respective shares of the various companies of the fines imposed on them jointly and severally, in so far as they formed part of the same undertaking, and that task cannot be left to the national courts. In the absence of a contrary indication in the decision by which the Commission has imposed a fine jointly and severally on several companies for an infringement by an undertaking, that decision attributes that infringement to them in equal measure. Companies on which a fine has been imposed jointly and severally and which incur, unless otherwise specified in the decision imposing the fine, liability in equal measure for the infringement must, in principle, contribute in equal amounts to the payment of the fine imposed on account of that infringement. Although the decision imposing a fine on several companies jointly and severally does not make it possible to determine, from the outset, which of those companies will actually be called on to pay the amount of the fine to the Commission, it does not leave any doubt as to the shares of the fine for which they are personally liable, with the result that each of them will be able, where necessary, to bring an action against its joint and several codebtors for repayment of the sums which it might have paid in excess of that share. (see paras 149, 151-153, 156-158) 9. In the case where a worldwide cartel which, in addition to price fixing, also allocates markets, the Commission may legitimately rely on the global turnover from sales of the product concerned so that the starting amounts reflect the nature of the infringement, its actual impact on the market and the scope of the geographic market, having regard to the considerable disparity in size between the members of the cartel. Given that the United Kingdom and Ireland, taken together, make up a significant part of the common market, harm caused to competition on those markets cannot therefore be classed as minor. Since the infringement imputed to the applicants in the contested decision includes precisely the complaint that the undertakings concerned allocated different national markets at the European level, by means of a ‘home countries’ system, the fact that, under such an unlawful agreement, the applicant limited its business activities within the common market to its domestic markets cannot be regarded as a mitigating circumstance. Finally, while the participants to an unlawful cartel had themselves taken account of their global turnover when setting the individual quotas within the cartel, quotas which applied both at the European level – outside of ‘home countries’ – and at the global level, the Commission is also entitled to take account of their global turnover when assessing the specific weight of the various undertakings involved. (see paras 170-171) 10. Community law does not require that the fines imposed on various companies within the same undertaking be proportionate to the duration of the participation imputed to each of those companies. Consequently, a comparison between the amount in euros, per month of participation in the infringement, applied to several companies accused of participating for different periods of time cannot amount to unequal treatment. Therefore, it does not appear that the Commission’s practice of setting fines in a manner which is not strictly proportionate to the duration goes beyond the limits of its recognised discretion under the case‐law. (see paras 181-182) 11. The fact that several companies are held jointly and severally liable for a fine on the ground that they form an undertaking for the purposes of Article 81 EC does not mean, as regards the application of the maximum amount laid down by Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, that the obligation of each of them is limited to 10% of the turnover which it achieved during the last business year. The maximum amount of 10% of turnover within the meaning of that provision must be calculated on the basis of the total turnover of all the companies constituting the single economic entity acting as an undertaking for the purposes of Article 81 EC, since only the total turnover of the component companies can constitute an indication of the size and economic power of the undertaking in question. The concept of undertaking, for the purposes of Article 23(2) and (3) of Regulation No 1/2003, is thus not different from the concept of undertaking for the purposes of Article 81(1) EC. Therefore, it is also not necessary, in the case of the joint and several liability of several companies within a group forming an undertaking for the purposes of those provisions, to determine the ceiling in relation to the company with the lowest turnover. (see paras 186-187) 12. The fact that a parent company has the conduct of its subsidiary attributed to it for having determined the subsidiary’s commercial conduct does not mean that the parent company has to be regarded as having carried out that conduct instead of the subsidiary. In other words, the liability of a parent company for the conduct of its subsidiary in no way exonerates the subsidiary from its own liability as a legal person and the subsidiary thus remains individually liable for the anti‐competitive practices in which it participated. (see para. 196) 13. Section 3 of the Commission’s Guidelines for the calculation of fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty provides for a reduction in the basic amount of the fine for ‘special mitigating circumstances’ such as an exclusively passive or ‘follow-my-leader’ role in the carrying out of the infringement, and termination of the infringement as soon as the Commission intervenes. The Guidelines do not set out in mandatory terms the mitigating circumstances that the Commission is required to take into account. Consequently, the Commission retains a measure of discretion in making an overall assessment of the size of any reduction in the fines to reflect mitigating circumstances. In that regard, the Commission is under no obligation, in the exercise of its discretion, to reduce a fine because of the termination of a manifest infringement, whether that termination occurred before or after its intervention. Even if, in the past, the Commission has regarded voluntary termination of an infringement as an attenuating circumstance, it is entitled, when applying its Guidelines, to take account of the fact that, even though their illegality was established at the inception of Community competition policy, very serious manifest infringements are relatively frequent and, therefore, to take the view that it is appropriate to abandon that generous practice and no longer reward the termination of such an infringement by a reduction of the fine. (see paras 207-208, 211, 213) 14. The fact that an undertaking, whose participation in a cartel prohibited by the competition rules – an infringement characterised as very serious – was demonstrated by the Commission to the required legal standard, was deceived by the other participants to that cartel, which thereby attempted to obtain additional advantages to those which they obtained under the cartel, cannot render that undertaking’s conduct less serious. Therefore, such circumstances are not capable of constituting a mitigating circumstance and, in particular, do not show the exclusively passive or ‘follow-my-leader’ role of that undertaking within the cartel. (see para. 218) 15. The reduction of fines in cases where the undertakings which participated in infringements of Community competition law have offered cooperation is justified only where it is considered that the cooperation made it easier for the Commission to establish an infringement and, as the case may be, to put an end to it. As is stated in point 29 of the notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, the notice has created legitimate expectations on which undertakings may rely when disclosing the existence of a cartel to the Commission. In view of the legitimate expectation which undertakings intending to cooperate with the Commission are able to derive from the notice, the Commission must therefore adhere to the notice when, for the purpose of determining the fine to be imposed on an undertaking, it assesses their cooperation. Within the limits laid down by the Leniency Notice, the Commission has a broad discretion in assessing whether the evidence provided by an undertaking represents added value within the meaning of point 22 of that notice and, on that basis, whether it is appropriate to grant a reduction to an undertaking under that notice. That assessment is the subject of limited review by the Court. (see paras 219-221) 16. The fundamental principle of respect for the rights of the defence requires that the undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned be afforded the opportunity, from the stage of the administrative procedure, to make known their views on the truth and relevance of the facts, objections and circumstances put forward by the Commission. By contrast, that principle does not require that those undertakings be afforded, in the administrative procedure, the opportunity themselves to cross-examine the witnesses heard by the Commission. (see paras 233-234) 17. Where the examination of the pleas raised by an undertaking against the legality of a Commission decision imposing on it a fine for infringement of the Community competition rules has revealed an illegality, it is necessary for the Court to consider whether it must, under its unlimited jurisdiction, amend the contested decision. (see para. 238) JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber) 3 March 2011 () (Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Market in gas insulated switchgear projects – Decision finding an infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement – Market-sharing – Effects within the common market – Notion of continuous infringement – Duration of the infringement – Limitation period – Fines – Proportionality – Ceiling of 10% of turnover – Joint and several liability for payment of a fine – Mitigating circumstances – Cooperation – Rights of the defence) In Joined Cases T‐122/07 to T‐124/07, Siemens AG Österreich, established in Vienna (Austria), VA Tech Transmission & Distribution GmbH & Co. KEG, established in Vienna, applicants in Case T‐122/07, Siemens Transmission & Distribution Ltd, established in Manchester (United Kingdom), applicant in Case T‐123/07, Siemens Transmission & Distribution SA, established in Grenoble (France), Nuova Magrini Galileo SpA, established in Bergamo (Italy), applicants in Case T‐124/07, represented by H. Wollmann and F. Urlesberger, lawyers, v European Commission, represented initially by F. Arbault and O. Weber, and subsequently by X. Lewis and A. Antoniadis, and finally by A. Antoniadis and R. Sauer, acting as Agents, defendant, APPLICATION, primarily, for the partial annulment of Commission Decision C(2006) 6762 final of 24 January 2007 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/F/38.899 – Gas insulated switchgear) and, in the alternative, for a reduction of the fine imposed on the applicants, THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber), composed of I. Pelikánová (Rapporteur), President, K. Jürimäe and S. Soldevila Fragoso, Judges, Registrar: K. Andová, Administrator, having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 16 March 2010, gives the following Judgment Background to the dispute I – Applicants and the VA Tech Group 1 On 20 September 1998, VA Technologie AG acquired a subsidiary of Rolls‐Royce, namely Reyrolle Ltd, which became VA Tech Reyrolle Ltd then Siemens Transmission & Distribution Ltd, the applicant in Case T‐123/07 (‘Reyrolle’). On 13 March 2001, VA Technologie, through its wholly‐owned subsidiary VA Tech Transmission & Distribution GmbH & Co. KEG, the second applicant in Case T‐122/07 (‘KEG’), transferred Reyrolle into the newly created company VA Tech Schneider High Voltage GmbH (‘VAS’), in which it held 60% of the shares through its subsidiary, the remainder of which were held by Schneider Electric SA. Schneider’s transfer into VAS consisted of Schneider Electric High Voltage SA, which became VA Tech Transmission & Distribution SA, then Siemens Transmission & Distribution SA, the first applicant in Case T‐124/07 (‘SEHV’), and of Nuova Magrini Galileo SpA, the second applicant in Case T‐124/07 (‘Magrini’), which were previously wholly‐owned subsidiaries of it. Since 1999 SEHV has regrouped the former high-tension activities of several subsidiaries of Schneider Electric. 2 In October 2004, VA Technologie acquired, through KEG, all of Schneider Electric’s shares in VAS. 3 In 2005, Siemens AG acquired exclusive control of the group whose parent company was VA Technologie (‘the VA Tech Group’), via a public bid announced by a subsidiary, namely the first applicant in Case T‐122/07 Siemens AG Österreich (‘Siemens Österreich’). Following that take over, VA Technologie and, subsequently, VAS were merged with Siemens Österreich. II – GIS and the prelitigation procedure 4 Gas insulated switch gear (‘GIS’) is used to control energy flow in electricity grids. It is heavy electrical equipment, used as a major component for turnkey power sub-stations. Substations are auxiliary power stations where electrical current is converted. In addition to the transformer, other essential components for substations are control systems, relays, batteries, chargers and switchgear. The function of switchgear is to protect the transformer from overload and/or insulate the circuit and a faulty transformer. 5 Insulation of switchgear may be through gas, air or some combination of the two, namely hybrid switchgear. GIS is sold across the world either as part of turnkey power substations or as loose equipment which has to be integrated into a turnkey power substation. It accounts for 30% to 60% of the total price of those substations. 6 On 3 March 2004, ABB Ltd informed the Commission of anti‐competitive practices in the GIS sector and made an oral application for immunity from fines pursuant to the Commission Notice of 19 February 2002 on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ 2002 C 45, p. 3) (‘the Leniency Notice’). 7 The practices reported by ABB entailed coordination on a worldwide scale for the award of GIS projects, involving market sharing, allocation of quotas and maintenance of respective market shares, the allocation of GIS projects to designated producers and manipulation of the bidding procedure for those projects (bid-rigging) in order to ensure that the assigned producers were awarded the contract in question, the fixing of prices by means of complex price arrangements for GIS projects which were not allocated, the termination of licence agreements with non cartel members and the exchange of sensitive market information. 8 The oral application for immunity made by ABB was supplemented by oral statements and documentary evidence. On 25 April 2004, the Commission granted conditional immunity to ABB. 9 On the basis of ABB’s statements, the Commission launched an investigation and, on 11 and 12 May 2004, it carried out inspections at the premises of Areva T&D SA, Siemens AG, the VA Tech Group, Hitachi Ltd and Japan AE Power Systems Corp (‘JAEPS’). 10 On 30 July 2004, the VA Tech group provided the Commission with a memorandum and documents and, on 23 August 2004, additional explanations. 11 On 20 April 2006, the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections, which was notified to 20 companies including the applicants. III – Contested decision 12 On 24 January 2007, the Commission adopted Decision C(2006) 6762 final relating to a proceeding under Article 81 [EC] and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/F/38.899 – Gas insulated switchgear) (‘the contested decision’). That decision was notified to the applicants on 7 or 8 February 2007. 13 In addition to the applicants and Schneider Electric, the contested decision was addressed to ABB, Alstom, SA, Areva, SA, Areva T&D AG, Areva T&D Holding SA and Areva T&D SA (referred to collectively as ‘the companies in the Areva Group’), Fuji Electric Holdings Co., Ltd and Fuji Electric Systems Co., Ltd (referred to collectively as ‘Fuji’), Hitachi Ltd and Hitachi Europe Ltd (referred to collectively as ‘Hitachi’), JAEPS, Mitsubishi Electric System Corp. (‘Melco’), Siemens and Toshiba Corp. 14 In recitals 113 to 123 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that the various undertakings which participated in the cartel had coordinated the allocation of GIS projects worldwide – except for specific markets – according to agreed rules in order to maintain quotas largely reflecting estimated historic market shares. It pointed out that the allocation of GIS projects had been carried out on the basis of a joint ‘Japanese’ quota and a joint ‘European’ quota, which the Japanese and European producers then had to distribute among themselves. An agreement signed in Vienna on 15 April 1988 (‘the GQ Agreement’) established rules allowing the allocation of GIS projects to either Japanese producers or to European producers and to set their value against the corresponding quota. In addition, in recitals 124 to 132 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that the various undertakings which participated in the cartel had entered into an unwritten agreement (‘the common understanding’), under which GIS projects in Japan, on the one hand, and in the countries of European members of the cartel, on the other – together described as the ‘home countries’ for GIS projects – were reserved to Japanese members and European members of the cartel respectively. GIS projects located in the ‘home countries’ were not the subject of information exchanges between the two groups and were not charged to their respective quotas. 15 The GQ Agreement also contained rules relating to the exchange of information necessary for operation of the cartel between the two groups of producers, carried out in particular by their respective secretaries, and to the manipulation of the bidding procedures concerned and the fixing of prices for GIS projects which could not be allocated. Under the terms of Annex 2 to the GQ Agreement, the agreement applied worldwide, except in the United States, Canada, Japan and 17 Western European countries. Furthermore, under the common understanding, GIS projects in European countries, other than the ‘home countries’, were also reserved for the European group, as the Japanese producers had undertaken not to submit bids for GIS projects in Europe. 16 According to the Commission, the sharing of GIS projects between the European producers was governed by an agreement also signed in Vienna on 15 April 1988, entitled ‘E-Group Operation Agreement for GQ Agreement’ (‘the EQ Agreement’). It indicated that the distribution of GIS projects in Europe followed the same rules and procedures as those governing the distribution of GIS projects in other countries. In particular, GIS projects in Europe also had to be notified, recorded, allocated, arranged or have received a minimum price. 17 In recital 142 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that, in the GQ and EQ Agreements, and for the purpose of the organisation and good functioning of the cartel, different members of the cartel were identified by a code, consisting of numbers for the European members and letters for the Japanese members. The initial codes were replaced by just numbers from July 2002. 18 In Article 1(p) and (t) of the contested decision, the Commission found that Siemens Österreich and KEG had participated in the infringement from 20 September 1998 to 13 December 2000 and from 1 April 2002 to 11 May 2004. 19 In Article 1(m), (q) and (r) of the contested decision, the Commission found that Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini had participated in the infringement from 15 April 1988 to 13 December 2000 and from 1 April 2002 to 11 May 2004. 20 In Article 2(1) of the contested decision, in respect of the infringements contained in Article 1 of the contested decision, Siemens Österreich and KEG were fined EUR 12 600 000 jointly and severally with Reyrolle. 21 In Article 2(l) of the contested decision, in respect of the infringements contained in Article 1 of the contested decision, Reyrolle was fined EUR 22 050 000, for EUR 17 550 000 of which it was jointly and severally liable with SEHV and Magrini, and EUR 12 600 000 with Siemens Österreich and KEG. 22 In Article 2(k) and (1) of the contested decision, in respect of the infringements contained in Article 1 of the contested decision, SEHV and Magrini were fined EUR 22 050 000, for EUR 17 550 000 of which it was jointly and severally liable with Reyrolle, and EUR 4 500 000 with Schneider Electric. Procedure and forms of order sought by the parties 23 By applications lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 17 April 2007, the applicants brought the present actions. 24 On 27 August 2007, the Commission lodged its defences. 25 On 22 October 2007, the applicants lodged their replies. 26 On 14 December 2007, the Commission lodged its rejoinders. 27 By order of 20 January 2010, the General Court decided, after hearing the parties, to join the present cases for the purposes of the oral procedure and the judgment, in accordance with Article 50 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. 28 By way of measures of organisation of procedure provided for in Article 64 of the Rules of Procedure, the parties were invited to reply to written questions put by the Court. The applicants and the Commission replied to those questions within the period allowed. 29 The parties presented their oral arguments and their replies to oral questions put by the Court at the hearing on 16 March 2010. 30 At the hearing on 16 March 2010, SEHV and Magrini produced, at the Court’s request, a copy of the judgment of the tribunal de commerce de Grenoble (commercial court of Grenoble) (France) of 18 December 2009 in a case involving some of the applicants, on which the parties were given the opportunity to comment. At the Commission’s request, the Court granted it an additional deadline until 26 March 2010 to submit its written observations. Those observations, which were submitted within the period allowed, were taken into account by the Court only in so far as they related to the judgment of the tribunal de commerce de Grenoble of 18 December 2009. 31 The applicants claim that the General Court should: – annul Article 1 of the contested decision in so far as it finds that Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini infringed Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the Agreement establishing the European Economic Area (‘the EEA agreement’) during the period from 15 April 1988 to 13 December 2000 and that they all infringed those provisions during the periods from 1 April 2002 to 9 October 2002 and from 21 January 2004 to 11 May 2004; – annul Article 2 of the contested decision in so far as it concerns them; – if necessary, reduce the amount of the fines imposed on them to a maximum of EUR 1 980 000 for Siemens Österreich and KEG, EUR 1 100 000 for Reyrolle and Magrini and EUR 2 750 000 for SEHV; – order the Commission to pay the costs. 32 The Commission contends that the General Court should: – dismiss the actions; – order the applicants to pay the costs. Law I – The actions for annulment 33 In support of their claims for annulment the applicants raise two pleas in law. The first is based on an infringement of Article 81(1) EC, Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement, Article 23(2) and (3) and Article 25 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 [EC] and 82 [EC] (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1). The second plea is based on a breach of the right to be heard. A – The first plea, based on an infringement of Article 81 EC, Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement, and certain provisions of Regulation No 1/2003 34 Within the context of the first plea the applicants claim that, in setting the fine, the Commission infringed Article 81 EC, Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and certain provisions of Regulation No 1/2003 in several respects. That plea is divided into three parts, based, first, on a lack of evidence of the alleged infringement, second, on errors of assessment regarding the duration of the alleged infringement and, third, on the excessive amount of the fine imposed. In Cases T‐123/07 and T‐124/07 Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini further claim that the limitation period for the alleged infringement had expired for the period prior to 16 July 1998. 1. Lack of evidence of the alleged infringement a) Arguments of the parties 35 The applicants submit that the Commission did not provide sufficient evidence of an infringement of Article 81 EC during the period prior to 13 December 2000. They claim that it is clear from Annex 2 to the GQ Agreement that the European markets were excluded from the scope of that agreement. Thus, the Commission was not able to infer from that agreement the existence of a cartel for the purposes of Article 81 EC, that is to say an agreement which has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market. 36 In addition, the probative value of the list of GIS projects referred to in recital 164 of the contested decision is doubtful. First, the Commission does not state why that list was drawn up and does not state whether the GIS projects which are listed were the subject of agreements between the parties. Second, in so far as that list relates to only 11 GIS projects which concern the common market geographically, out of a total of some 1 620, it shows, above all, that such agreements did not have significant effects within the common market. 37 The Commission disputes the arguments raised by the applicants. b) Findings of the Court 38 It is apparent from the contested decision, in particular from recitals 124 to 163 thereof, that the Commission considered that the cartel which the applicants are accused of forming and for which it imposed a fine was based on the ‘common understanding’ that GIS projects in the ‘home countries’ were reserved to the Japanese and European members of the cartel, on the protection of the so-called ‘home’ markets in Europe, and on market sharing in ‘non‐home European countries’ between European producers by manipulating bidding procedures and fixing prices. According to the Commission, it is the implementation of the ‘common understanding’, of which the GQ Agreement constituted but one of the elements, which gave rise to a cartel affecting the common market. 39 In order to prove the existence and the scope of the ‘common understanding’, the Commission made reference to a number of factors in the contested decision, the most important of which being the statements of ABB, of the witness Mr M., of Fuji and Hitachi, and certain documents such as the GQ Agreement and the EQ Agreement and their annexes, a list of GIS projects discussed within the cartel, supplied by ABB, an undated document found during the Commission’s inspection of the VA Tech Group’s premises, entitled ‘Summary of discussions with JJC’, and an exchange of letters dated 18 January 1999 between Mr W., Mr J. and Mr B., all employed within the VA Tech Group. 40 In order to dispute the existence of an infringement of Article 81 EC and of Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, the applicants merely state that the object or effect of the GQ Agreement was not to prevent, reduce or distort competition within the common market and they dispute the probative value of the list of GIS projects in Europe set out in recital 164 of the contested decision. On the other hand, they challenge neither the existence of a ‘common understanding’, nor the probative value of the other elements referred to in paragraph 39 above, on which the Commission based its finding that the concerted practice had had such an effect. However, given the large number of factors on which the Commission based its findings in the present case, the applicants cannot dispute in a general manner the existence of an infringement of Article 81 EC without specifically calling into question the Commission’s preliminary findings and, in particular, stating in detail how the evidence relied on by the Commission is inadmissible, irrelevant or devoid of probative value. 41 It must be held that, even taking account of the fact that the wording of the GQ agreement excluded its application in the majority of European countries and disregarding the list of GIS projects in Europe in recital 164 of the contested decision, the evidence relied on by the Commission is sufficient to show the scope of the ‘common understanding’. 42 First, the Commission’s finding that the European members of the cartel discussed and allocated GIS projects within the common market and within the EEA is sufficient, in itself, to establish that the cartel affected competition in those territories. It is also apparent from the contested decision that the Commission also based its findings on ABB’s and Mr M.’s statements as well as on those of Fuji and Hitachi, Annex 2 to the EQ Agreement, the list of GIS projects in Europe set out in recital 164 of the contested decision, the document entitled ‘Summary of discussions with JJC’, and the exchange of letters of 18 January 1999. 43 Second, as is apparent from recitals 125 to 131 of the contested decision, the Commission’s finding that the European and Japanese producers divided the market at issue worldwide with the result that the GIS projects in Japan were reserved for Japanese producers and the GIS projects in Europe were, in principle, reserved for European producers, was based on ABB’s and Mr M.’s statements, those of Fuji and Hitachi, and Annex 2 to the EQ Agreement. 44 Third, as is apparent from recitals 133 to 138 of the contested decision, the Commission’s finding that ‘home’ markets in Europe were protected, with the result that, in the countries in which European producers were present historically, the GIS projects were reserved for them from the outset and did not count towards their quotas under the cartel, was based on ABB’s and Mr M.’s statements, on the document entitled ‘Summary of discussions with JJC’, and on the exchange of letters of 18 January 1999. 45 Therefore, even supposing that the applicants’ criticism relating to the two items of evidence which they call into question were founded, that would not then call into question the Commission’s finding that the cartel prevented, reduced or distorted competition within the common market and within the EEA. 46 Consequently, the first part of the first plea must be rejected. 2. Errors of assessment in respect of the duration of the alleged infringement 47 The applicants submit that the contested decision is vitiated by errors of assessment in respect of the duration of the infringement, which meant that it was unduly lengthened. Those errors concern, first, the date on which they discontinued their participation in the infringement, second, the date on which the undertaking formed by the companies belonging to the VA Tech Group (‘the undertaking VA Tech’) resumed its participation in the infringement and, third, the date the infringement was brought to an end. a) The date on which the applicants discontinued their participation in the infringement Arguments of the parties 48 The applicants submit, in the alternative, in relation to the first part of the first plea, based on a lack of evidence of the alleged infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, that the Commission erred in finding that they had discontinued their participation in the infringement on 13 December 2000, the date the event was organised at Ville-d’Avray (France) to celebrate what the applicants had been led to believe by the other participants to be the winding-up of the cartel, whereas the Commission should have determined that discontinuation to have taken place as of 16 July 1998, the date on which the final GIS project in Europe referred to in recital 164 of the contested decision was discussed or, at the latest, as of 12 October 2000, the date on which a meeting was held in Zurich (Switzerland) at which they were informed of the alleged winding-up of the cartel. 49 The Commission disputes the applicants’ arguments. Findings of the Court 50 It should be noted, at the outset, that it is not disputed that Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini actually discontinued their participation in the cartel. However, the parties are at odds as to the exact date of that discontinuation. The applicants dispute having participated in the cartel after 16 July 1998 or, at the latest, after 12 October 2000. The Commission submits that Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini did not discontinue their participation in the cartel until the ‘farewell party’ held on 13 December 2000. 51 That disagreement raises the question as to who has the burden of proof in that regard. The applicants consider that it was the Commission’s task to prove the duration of the infringement, whereas the Commission contends that, once it has shown that an unlawful cartel exists, that cartel is deemed to continue to exist until evidence is provided that it has been terminated, which must be provided by the undertaking which participated in it. 52 In that regard, it is appropriate to recall the settled case‐law that it is for the party or the authority alleging an infringement of the competition rules to prove its existence by establishing, to the requisite legal standard, the facts constituting an infringement, and it is for the undertaking invoking a defence against a finding of an infringement to demonstrate that the conditions for applying such a defence are satisfied, so that the authority will then have to resort to other evidence (Case T‐120/04 Peróxidos Orgánicos v Commission [2006] ECR II‐4441, paragraph 50; see also, to that effect, Case C‐185/95 P Baustahlgewerbe v Commission [1998] ECR I‐8417, paragraph 58; and Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C‐205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C‐217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission [2004] ECR I‐123, paragraph 78). 53 In the present case, the principle that the Commission is required to prove every constituent element of the infringement, including its duration (see, to that effect, Case T‐43/92 Dunlop Slazenger v Commission [1994] ECR II‐441, paragraph 79; Case T‐48/98 Acerinox v Commission [2001] ECR II‐3859, paragraph 55; and Case T‐62/02 Union Pigments v Commission [2005] ECR II‐5057, paragraph 36), which is likely to have an effect on its definitive findings as to the gravity of that infringement is not called into question by the fact that the applicants in Cases T‐123/07 and T‐124/07 raised a defence of limitation, the burden of proof for which is in principle borne by the applicants. 54 Reliance on such a defence necessarily requires that the duration of the infringement and the date on which it ceased be established. However, those circumstances alone cannot provide justification for transferring the burden of proof in this regard to the applicants. The duration of the infringement, which requires that the date on which it ended be known, is one of the essential elements of the infringement, which must be proved by the Commission, irrespective of the fact that the disputing of those elements also forms part of the defence of limitation. That conclusion is also justified by the fact that a Commission proceeding under Regulation No 1/2003 on limitation is not time-barred is the application of an objective legal criterion, which derives from the principle of legal certainty (see, to that effect, Joined Cases T‐22/02 and T‐23/02 Sumitomo Chemical and Sumika Fine Chemicals v Commission [2005] ECR II‐4065, paragraphs 80 to 82), and, thus, is a condition for the validity of any decision imposing a penalty. The Commission is required to comply with this condition even if the undertaking concerned has raised no defence in this regard (Peróxidos Orgánicos v Commission, paragraph 52 above, paragraph 52). 55 That apportionment of the burden of proof is likely to vary, however, inasmuch as the evidence on which a party relies may be of such a kind as to require the other party to provide an explanation or justification, failing which it is permissible to conclude that the burden of proof has been discharged (Peróxidos Orgánicos v Commission, cited in paragraph 52 above, paragraph 53; see also, to that effect, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, paragraph 52 above, paragraph 79). Where, as in this case, the Commission has adduced evidence of the existence of an agreement, it is for an undertaking which has taken part in that agreement to adduce evidence that it distanced itself from that agreement, evidence which must demonstrate a clear intention, brought to the notice of the other participating undertakings, to withdraw from that agreement (Case T‐168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission [2006] ECR II‐2969, paragraph 86; see also, to that effect, Joined Cases C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P BAI and Commission v Bayer [2004] ECR I‐23, paragraph 63; and Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, paragraph 52 above, paragraphs 81 to 84). 56 In the present case, the question whether the Commission was able to find that the applicants discontinued their participation in the cartel on 13 December 2000 must be assessed in the light of those principles. 57 It is apparent from recitals 188 to 190 and 297 of the contested decision that the Commission based its findings, in that regard, on ABB’s, Areva’s and Schneider Electric’s statements. Thus, ABB declared that it had decided, in a common understanding with Alstom, to exclude the applicants from the cartel as a result of their relatively high quota in relation to their production capacity. To that end, a meeting was organised on 13 December 2000 in Ville-d’Avray, allegedly putting an end to the cartel, which none the less continued between ABB, Alstom, Fuji, Melco and Toshiba. In addition, the Commission states that Areva and Schneider Electric confirmed that that meeting took place at the end of November or at the beginning of December 2000 but Areva denied that the purpose of that meeting was to exclude participants from the cartel. 58 The applicants dispute 13 December 2000 as the date they discontinued their participation in the cartel by raising two arguments. First, they submit that that date should be set as 16 July 1998, the date on which the final GIS project in Europe, referred to in recital 164 of the contested decision, was discussed. Second, they claim, as in the procedure before the Commission, that it was decided to bring the cartel to an end on 12 October 2000 at a meeting in Zurich, that the meeting of 13 December 2000 was merely a ‘farewell party’, and that the cartel did not continue between those two dates. 59 As regards the first argument, it should be noted that, as stated in paragraphs 41 to 45 above, the existence of the ‘common understanding’ imputed to the applicants in the contested decision must be regarded as sufficiently substantiated even if the list of GIS projects situated in Europe, referred to in recital 164 of the contested decision, were disregarded. Therefore, the fact that the last discussion relating to a GIS project on that list was held on 16 July 1998 cannot constitute evidence that the cartel ceased to exist as of that date, or that the applicants ceased to participate in it as of then. Therefore, that argument must be rejected. 60 As regards the second argument, it is apparent from the case‐law cited in paragraph 55 above that, where, as in this case, the Commission has adduced evidence of the existence of an agreement, it is for an undertaking which has taken part in that agreement to adduce evidence that it distanced itself from that agreement, evidence which must demonstrate a clear intention, brought to the notice of the other participating undertakings, to withdraw from that agreement. 61 The applicants’ argument that the situation in which a participant is ousted from a cartel as a result of collusion on the part of the other participants, under the pretext that the cartel had come to an end, must be assimilated to expressly distancing oneself from the cartel, must indeed be accepted. However, given that the Commission has furnished evidence of the existence of the ‘common understanding’, the onus is on the applicants to prove that the other participants led them to believe that the cartel had come to an end. In addition, even supposing that the termination of the cartel was not announced ‘by surprise’ at the meeting on 13 December 2000, but some time prior to that, the date of 12 October 2000, indicated by the applicants, is not substantiated by any evidence. In the absence of any evidence as to the actual date of their eviction from the cartel, the Commission was thus authorised to set 13 December 2000 as the date on which the applicants discontinued their participation and is not required to prove that unlawful agreements were concluded precisely on that date. 62 Consequently, the complaint relating to the date on which the applicants discontinued their participation in the infringement must be rejected. b) The date on which the undertaking VA Tech resumed its participation in the infringement Arguments of the parties 63 The applicants consider that the Commission wrongly found that the undertaking VA Tech had resumed its participation in the cartel, through VAS, from 1 April 2002. In their view, although that undertaking was already informed of the reconvening of the cartel as of the summer of 2002, it had not yet participated at that time. It did not participate until 9 October 2002, the date of the meeting in Paris (France) which some of its representatives attended. The applicants submit that their own statements were supported, in that regard, by other information in the file. In particular, the undertaking VA Tech was not represented at the meeting in Frankfurt (Germany) on 10 July 2002 nor did it participate in the agreements or concerted practices relating to GIS projects which were due to be completed in the period between April and October 2002. In any event, the Commission acted incoherently in identifying the time at which the cartel was resumed since, in the case of Hitachi, it decided to take account of the date on which it first participated in a multilateral meeting. 64 The Commission rejects the applicants’ arguments. Findings of the Court 65 As is apparent from recitals 199, 203, 204 and 441 of the contested decision, the Commission essentially based its conclusion that the undertaking VA Tech resumed its participation in the cartel, on 1 April 2002 at the latest, on the indications in ABB’s response to the Statement of Objections, in which ABB explained that witness Mr M. recalled that, after leaving the cartel in 2000, the undertaking VA Tech resumed its participation during the first three months of 2002. In the absence of a precise date, the Commission determined 1 April 2002 as being the most favourable date for that undertaking. According to the Commission, ABB’s statement is very credible since it is only as a result of it that it learned that the undertaking VA Tech had discontinued its participation in the cartel for a period of time. In the Statement of Objections, the Commission had supposed that the undertaking VA Tech had participated in the cartel without interruption. In addition, the Commission considers that that statement is substantiated by the handwritten notes of Mr Z., an employee of the VA Tech Group, which were found on the group’s premises during inspections carried out in April 2004. 66 As regards the notes of Mr Z., in recital 204 of the contested decision reference is made to three pages which, according to the Commission, contain questions raised in relation to the VA Tech Group’s interest in a GIS project in Ravenna (Italy), the possibility of fixing price levels, discussions with Japanese producers, a meeting planned for July to discuss GIS projects and the status of discussions at the end of August 2002. Those pages are reproduced on pages 2014, 2018 and 2024 of the procedural file before the Commission. 67 In that regard, it should be noted that Mr Z.’s notes do not, for the most part, contain any reference to the date on which they were taken or the date of the facts referred to therein. In addition, it is not possible to draw conclusions from the order in which the pages appear in the Commission’s file for the proceedings, since it is evident that the order of certain pages was changed in relation to the chronological order in which they were taken. In particular, the order of the pages reproduced on pages 2014 and 2015 of the procedural file before the Commission was reversed, as is apparent from page 2014 which is visible on the right of page 2015, and page 2016, which contains the minutes of a meeting of the board of directors of 27 June 2002 and could therefore provide dated information, could not have directly followed page 2014 since it is two pages further on. 68 Therefore, the only reliable information in terms of the date on which the notes of Mr Z. were taken is that which can be inferred from the rare references to dates, which are on the same page as the information to which the Commission refers. 69 First, it should be noted that neither the passages of the notes taken by Mr Z. which were cited in the contested decision, nor those indicated by the Commission in its response to the written questions of the Court, enable 1 April 2002 to be established as the date on which the undertaking VA Tech resumed its participation in the cartel. Although the applicants do not dispute that those notes were made in 2002, the date 1 April is not referred to expressly therein and can also not be inferred from the content of those notes. 70 Second, the file of the proceedings before the Commission contains, inter alia, the phrases ‘discuss package with Jap. They have taken a series of initiatives’ and ‘in practice, reserve a date in July 10 to discuss 1 package of projects Gd export with Japanese’. Those phrases enable the conclusion to be drawn that the note in which they are contained was made prior to 1 July 2002 and thus, at the latest, in June 2002. In the absence of a precise date it is therefore necessary, in accordance with the principle in dubio pro reo, to determine 1 July 2002 as the date on which the undertaking VA Tech resumed its participation in the cartel. 71 Third, as regards the subject of the concerted action between the producers, it should be noted that, in the contested decision, the Commission found that, during the second phase of the infringement, the GIS projects were no longer discussed individually, but in ‘packages’. The applicants have not disputed that. Similarly, the applicants have not disputed that, during that second phase, the cartel was involved with GIS projects within the EEA. The first part of the first plea in which the applicants dispute that the cartel had an effect within the common market applied only to the first phase of their participation. Therefore, the fact that the note referred to in paragraph 70 above does not mention a GIS project within the EEA is not as such to call into question the fact that the applicants participated, as of their return to the cartel in 2002, in discussions on GIS projects within the EEA. 72 It follows that the complaint alleging that the Commission wrongly found that the applicants had resumed their participation in the cartel from 1 April 2002 must be upheld. c) The end date of the infringement Arguments of the parties 73 The applicants submit that the Commission erred in considering that the infringement had ended definitively only as of 11 May 2004 and not as of 21 January 2004 at the very latest, the date of the last meeting at which GIS projects were discussed, without an agreement being reached. As the coordination system then began to collapse, the meetings served merely to discuss how the cartel was to continue and a few other issues unrelated to competition law. 74 The Commission disputes the claim that the cartel was brought to an end on 21 January 2004 at the latest and not on 11 May 2004. It claims that the cartel continued after 21 January 2004 and that ABB did not end its participation until February 2004. At the very least, the agreements had repercussions until the meeting which followed ABB’s departure. Findings of the Court 75 First, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, it follows from the actual wording of Article 81(1) EC that agreements between undertakings are prohibited, regardless of their effect, where they have an anti-competitive object (Case C‐49/92 P Commission v Anic Partecipazioni [1999] ECR I‐4125, paragraph 123, and Joined Cases T‐67/00, T‐68/00, T‐71/00 and T‐78/00 JFE Engineering v Commission [2004] ECR II‐2501, paragraph 181). Consequently, it is not necessary to show actual anti-competitive effects where the anti-competitive object of the conduct in question is proved (see Case T‐62/98 Volkswagen v Commission [2000] ECR II‐2707, paragraph 178 and the case‐law cited). 76 In the present case, the Commission relied primarily on the restrictive object, in terms of competition, of the agreements and concerted practices referred to in Article 1 of the contested decision. First of all, it found, in recitals 303 and 304 of the contested decision, that the object of complex of agreements and/or concerted practices described was to restrict competition within the meaning of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and that, in such circumstances, it was superfluous for the application of those provisions to take account of the concrete effects of an agreement, before adding, in recital 308, that, by its very nature, the implementation of an agreement of the type described leads to a significant distortion of competition. Similarly, as regards the setting of fines, the Commission expressly affirmed, in recital 477 of the contested decision, that it did not rely specifically on a particular impact when determining the gravity of the infringement. 77 Second, it should also be noted that, as the Commission pointed out in recital 215 of the contested decision, on the basis of the statements of the VA Tech Group, the communications and meetings within the cartel after ABB’s departure concerned, inter alia, the exchange of information relating to pending tender proceedings, outsiders’ positions, whether or not to continue the contacts, and security issues. Those subjects of discussion show that, even if the members remaining in the cartel after ABB’s departure did not manage to agree on specific projects, they intended to continue the cartel in the future or, at the very least, had not yet taken a decision to bring it to an end. 78 That interpretation of the facts is not called into question by Hitachi’s statements concerning the end of the cartel, referred to by the applicants. According to the applicants, Hitachi stated, in relation to the meeting of 21 January 2004, that ‘the parties had rejected all the proposals’ and that ‘the meeting was then adjourned’. That same company concluded from this, in another statement, that ‘the new system had started to collapse in January 2004, which is when the last working meeting took place which ABB had attended’. 79 First of all, the fact that no agreement on the GIS projects discussed was able to be concluded at the meeting on 21 January 2004 does not mean that the cartel ceased to exist as of then – even though, in Hitachi’s ex post assessment, that failure may have constituted the starting point of the ‘collapse of the cartel’. The subjects discussed at the subsequent meetings, which were not disputed by the applicants, bear witness to the will to pursue the cartel without ABB. Second, Hitachi’s assessment that the cartel had begun to collapse in January 2004 only confirms, as if it were necessary, that the cartel had not yet collapsed in January 2004. 80 Accordingly, it was not necessary for the Commission to prove the conclusion of new agreements on specific GIS projects at the meetings which took place after that of 21 January 2004 in order to be able to conclude that the cartel continued to exist after that date. 81 Therefore, the applicants have not shown that the Commission committed an error of assessment in determining 11 May 2004 as the date of the end of the cartel. It follows that the complaint alleging such an error of assessment must be rejected. 82 Accordingly, Article 1 of the contested decision must be annulled in so far as the Commission finds therein that the applicants committed an infringement between 1 April and 30 June 2002. For the rest, the part of the first plea based on errors of assessment relating to the duration of the infringement must be rejected. 3. The part alleging that the alleged infringement was time-barred for the period prior to 16 July 1998 a) Arguments of the parties 83 Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini consider that, for the period prior to 16 July 1998, the imposition of fines is time‐barred. In their view, the five-year limitation period must be calculated from 16 July 1998 and, since their participation in the new system was limited to one year and three months, the increase in the starting amount applied in accordance with the duration of the infringement should be reduced to 10%. 84 Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini add that the argument that there was a continuing infringement, defended by the Commission, is erroneous in so far as they are concerned, since the conditions laid down in the case‐law, namely that there be no interruption in the infringements and that the conduct of the undertakings at issue result from a general intention, are not satisfied. 85 The Commission contests those arguments. b) Findings of the Court 86 Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation No 1/2003 lays down a limitation period of five years for infringements of the type imputed to the applicants. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 25(3) of that regulation, the limitation period is interrupted by any action taken by the Commission for the purpose of the investigation or proceedings in respect of an infringement. 87 In the present case, the plea of limitation raised in respect of the first phase of the infringement imputed to Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini requires that two cumulative conditions be satisfied. First of all, that first phase has to have come to an end by 10 May 1999 at the latest, that is to say five years before the day preceding the inspections carried out by the Commission on 11 and 12 May 2004. Second, the two stages of the infringement imputed to them must not form part of a single and continuous infringement, for the purposes of Article 25(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, since, in such a case, time begins to run on the day on which the infringement ceases. 88 As set out in paragraphs 57 to 62 above, the Commission rightly found, in the contested decision, that the first phase of the infringement imputed to Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini did not end until 13 December 2000 and thus after 10 May 1999. Therefore, the plea of limitation must be rejected. 89 In any event, the second condition set out in paragraph 87 above has not been satisfied any more than the first. The Commission rightly found that the agreement in which Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini participated in 2002 was essentially the same as the one which they had participated in until 2000. 90 The Courts of the Union have identified several relevant criteria for assessing whether there is a single infringement, namely the identical nature of the objectives of the practices at issue (see, to that effect, Case C‐113/04 P Technische Unie v Commission [2006] ECR I‐8831, paragraphs 170 and 171; Case T‐21/99 Dansk Rørindustri v Commission [2002] ECR II‐1681, paragraph 67; and Case T‐43/02 Jungbunzlauer v Commission [2006] ECR II‐3435, paragraph 312), the identical nature of the goods or services concerned (see, to that effect, the judgment of 15 June 2005 in Joined Cases T‐71/03, T‐74/03, T‐87/03 and T‐91/03 Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraphs 118, 119 and 124, and Jungbunzlauer v Commission, paragraph 312), the identical nature of the undertakings which participated in the infringement (Jungbunzlauer v Commission, paragraph 312), and the identical nature of the detailed rules for its implementation (Dansk Rørindustri v Commission, paragraph 68). Other relevant criteria are whether the physical persons involved on behalf of the undertakings are identical and whether the geographical scope of the practices at issue is identical. 91 In the present case, it should be noted that all of the criteria referred to above enable it to be found that the cartel in which Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini participated in 2002 was essentially the same as the one in which they had participated until 2000. 92 First, the objective of stabilising the market shares of the members of the cartel, of sharing the global market between the Japanese and European producers – in particular by reserving the European markets for European producers – and of avoiding price erosion, was the same during the two periods at issue. 93 Second, the ways in which the cartel functioned remained unchanged overall, even though they evolved progressively over the years, in particular on the basis of the reduction in the number of participating undertakings following the consolidation of the sector and on the basis of the technical evolution of means of communication. However, as the Commission stated in recital 280 of the contested decision, those changes did not occur at a precise moment in time between 2000 and 2002, but as and when. In addition, those changes did not affect the essential principles of its functioning, namely the allocation of GIS projects between the members of the cartel on the basis of quotas set by them, by bid-rigging, and by fixing minimum prices for GIS projects which had not been allocated. 94 Those detailed findings of the Commission in relation to the functioning of the cartel, the detail of which is not disputed by the applicants, cannot be invalidated by the general and unsubstantiated claim that ‘the coordination as of 2002 was carried out in accordance with a completely new system’, as demonstrated, inter alia, by the statements of ABB’s employees. In the passages cited by the applicants in Cases T‐123/07 and T‐124/07 out of context, the employee at issue, Mr Wi., essentially recounts that, at the time of the facts, his superior had kept from him the real extent of the ‘cooperation’ with the other GIS producers and the fact that the cartel, as it stood as of 2002, continued as during the previous stage of the cartel. 95 Third, during the two periods at issue, the cartel concerned the same market, namely the market for GIS projects in the form of loose equipment or turnkey power sub-stations. 96 Fourth, the undertakings involved in the cartel and the various companies which constituted those undertakings essentially remained the same throughout the duration of the cartel between 1988 and 2004, taking into account the consolidation process in the GIS sector which took place during that period, the only exceptions being the temporary absence of Siemens, the undertaking VA Tech and Hitachi. 97 Fifth, the persons representing the various undertakings within the cartel were, to a very large extent, the same in 2000 and 2002, with the exception of normal fluctuations within each undertaking. The continuity of the representatives is demonstrated by the various lists of meetings which form part of the file and, in particular, the one set out in Annex I to the contested decision, and by the list of collaborators of the undertakings concerned which were active in the cartel, set out in Annex II to the contested decision. 98 Sixth, the geographical scope of the cartel was the same in 2000 and during the period 2002 to 2004. It grew slightly from 1988 as a result of the fact that the markets in Central and Eastern European countries had become accessible to the members of the cartel in the meantime. 99 In addition, the fact, pointed out by the Commission and which was not disputed by the applicants in Cases T‐123/07 and T‐124/07, that the cartel was continued by the other members without the undertakings which were temporarily absent and that the objective continuity of a single infringement was thus preserved also shows that that the cartel was one and the same. 100 Finally, as regards the subjective element, it is sufficient that, when the undertaking VA Tech resumed its participation in the cartel, Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini were aware that they were participating in the same cartel as before. It should be noted, in that regard, that certain employees who represented the undertaking VA Tech in the cartel from 2002 already had managerial functions within the companies which made up that group before those companies temporarily discontinued their participation in the cartel in 2000. Thus Mr Z., Mr V., Mr C., Mr B., and Mr W., who feature on the list of participants at the various meetings from October 2002 (see Annex I to the contested decision), had already worked for Reyrolle, SEHV, Magrini and Schneider Electric prior to 2000 (see Annex II to the contested decision). Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini must therefore have been aware of the factors indicating that the cartel was one and the same. Contrary to what the applicants in Cases T‐123/07 and T‐124/07 claim, the subjective element is thus not ruled out by the fact that they were tricked into believing in 2000, by the other participants to the cartel, that the cartel had been dissolved. It is not their level of knowledge in 2000 which is decisive in that regard, but their knowledge at the time they resumed their participation in the cartel. 101 Therefore, the plea of limitation raised by Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini must, in any event, be rejected on the basis that the two stages of the infringement in which they were accused of being involved formed part of a single and continuous infringement. 102 In conclusion, the part of the first plea based on the limitation of the first phase of the infringement imputed to Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini must be rejected. 4. The part alleging that the fines imposed are excessive 103 In support of that part, the applicants raise several complaints, alleging, first, that the threshold of 10% of the turnover of Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini was exceeded; second, a failure to take account of the individual situation of those companies; third, that the fine imposed on Siemens Österreich and KEG was excessive in relation to the one imposed on Reyrolle; fourth, an incomprehensible determination of the joint and several liability of the individual applicants; fifth, that the Commission erroneously held Reyrolle liable in addition to its parent company; sixth, infringement of the principle ne bis in idem in respect of Siemens Österreich and KEG; and, seventh, a failure to reduce the fine imposed on Siemens Österreich and KEG. 104 It should be noted that the first four complaints essentially allege an erroneous application by the Commission of the concept of undertaking for the purposes of Community competition law. In the arguments put forward in support of those complaints, the applicants criticise the fact that, in calculating their fines, the Commission applied a starting amount based on the total turnover of the VA TECH Group for 2005 and not on their individual turnovers, and the fact that the amounts which the individual companies in that group are required to pay jointly and severally were determined in an incomprehensible manner. Therefore, those four complaints need to be addressed together before examining the other complaints. a) The first four complaints alleging, in essence, an erroneous application by the Commission of the concept of undertaking for the purposes of Community competition law Arguments of the parties 105 Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini accuse the Commission of having applied, when calculating their fines, a starting amount based on the total turnover of the VA Tech Group, as it existed at the time of the contested decision, and not on their individual turnovers. 106 According to Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini, the Commission thereby manifestly contradicted the approach, adopted on several occasions in the contested decision, pursuant to which it intended to hold the subsidiaries of the VA Tech Group ‘individually liable’ for the infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini also claim that the method of calculation applied by the Commission led to Reyrolle’s being held responsible for the conduct of SEHV and Magrini and vice versa, even though they were not linked for the most part of the duration of the infringement, namely during the period from 15 April 1988 to 13 December 2000. Such ‘retroactive shared responsibility’ is contrary to the principle that the penalty must be proportionate to the offence committed, since the result is that the economic weight of those companies in the cartel is substantially exaggerated. 107 Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini also assert that, in the contested decision, the Commission did not respect the ceiling of 10% of turnover, laid down in Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003. For 2005, their global turnovers amounted to roughly EUR 118 953 000 for Reyrolle, EUR 222 034 242 for SEHV and EUR 103 047 112 for Magrini, with the result that the fines of EUR 22 050 000 imposed on them are excessive. 108 In addition, Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini consider that the method of calculation proposed by the Commission infringes Article 7(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘the ECHR’), signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, pursuant to which a heavier penalty is not to be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the offence was committed. In their view, the retroactive application by the Commission of the concept of economic unit, for the purposes of calculating the amount of the fine, led to a heavier penalty. 109 Reyrolle adds that the Commission should have taken account of its limited capacity to cause significant damage to competition within the common market, either by reducing the starting amount of its fine, or by taking account of mitigating circumstances. For technical reasons, its business activities within the EEA were limited to the United Kingdom and Ireland throughout the duration of the GQ Agreement. Therefore, as it exaggerates its competitive weight on the common market, its global turnover is not a relevant reflection of its capacity to harm other operators within the EEA. 110 Siemens Österreich and KEG submit that the amount of the fine imposed on them is disproportionate in relation to the fine incurred by Reyrolle as a result of the Commission’s choice to fine them as if they had been linked to SEHV and Magrini during the period from 1998 to 2000, thereby substantially exaggerating their economic weight within the cartel. 111 Siemens Österreich and KEG add that, in principle, the fines imposed on parent companies for infringements committed by their subsidiaries, based on the decisive influence which parent companies have over the commercial conduct of their subsidiaries, cannot be heavier than those incurred by the subsidiaries. However, they submit, in the present case, that, in the light of the duration of the infringements imputed to them, the amount of the fine imposed on them is twice that of Reyrolle, that is to say EUR 242 307 per month of infringement for them and EUR 124 576 per month of infringement for Reyrolle. 112 According to Siemens Österreich and KEG, the approach adopted by the Commission fails to take account of the principle that a fine should correspond to the individual contribution of a company to the matters complained of and the ‘principle of fault’ and, consequently, infringes Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 and Article 7(1) of the ECHR. Such an approach is also contrary to the Commission’s Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) [CS] (OJ 1998 C 9, p. 3) (‘the Guidelines’). In addition, in its defence, the Commission wrongly assumes, and without any evidence, that VA Technologie was aware or should have been aware, when Reyrolle was acquired and VAS was created, of Reyrolle’s participation in the cartel, even though VA Technologie ‘did not enter the GIS sector ... until after the acquisition of Reyrolle’ and that the due diligence carried out on that occasion did not reveal any collusive activity. 113 Siemens Österreich and KEG consider that the Commission first had to calculate the amount of the fines for each subsidiary of the VA Tech Group, before calculating, on a pro rata basis for the duration of the control exercised by that group over each of the subsidiaries, the amount of the fine to be paid jointly and severally by the parent companies. Pursuant to that method, the fines imposed by the Commission should have corresponded to EUR 720 000 for Reyrolle, EUR 900 000 for SEHV and EUR 360 000 for Magrini, that is a total of EUR 1 980 000. 114 SEHV and Magrini also submit that the total fine of EUR 22 050 000 imposed on them in the contested decision was wrongly divided up between, first, the group of which Schneider Electric is the parent company (‘the Schneider Group’) in the amount of EUR 4 500 000 and, second, the VA Tech Group in the amount of EUR 17 550 000. They state that the calculation which the Commission probably made results in Schneider Electric essentially assuming a very limited amount of liability, namely 40%, for the period during which it controlled them on its own. By contrast, the VA Tech Group and Reyrolle were manifestly disadvantaged. 115 SEHV and Magrini add that the Commission established the starting amount of the fine applied to Schneider Electric in the light of its shareholding in VAS. VA Technologie transferred into VAS various business activities which had nothing to do with the cartel. Therefore, the amount set in Article 2(l)(i) of the contested decision which SEHV, Magrini and Reyrolle are to pay jointly and severally is manifestly excessive. 116 The Commission contends that the setting of the amount of the fine in the contested decision is in line with the criteria established in the case‐law and takes account, as far as necessary, of the individual situations of Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini. 117 As regards Article 7 of the ECHR, the Commission notes that it is not directly applicable in the present case. In addition, it states that the contested decision does not infringe the prohibition of retroactivity nor the principle of ‘no punishment without law’. 118 The Commission also contests Reyrolle’s argument that the taking into account of the global turnover of that company leads to an excessive starting amount for the calculation of the amount of its fine. It considers itself entitled, when a cartel covers almost the entire global market, to base its findings on global turnover as an indicator of the gravity of the infringement. In addition, it submits that no provision of Community law provides that a fine must be proportionate to the duration of the infringement. 119 Furthermore, the Commission notes that Siemens Österreich and KEG do not claim that the sum of two hypothetically separate fines imposed on the VA Tech Group, one for Reyrolle’s conduct and the other for SEHV’s and Magrini’s conduct, would be lower than the single fine set in the contested decision. A decision can be annulled only if the alleged erroneous calculation actually caused harm to the applicant. 120 As regards the calculation of the amounts to be paid jointly and severally, the Commission submits that that complaint is inadmissible since SEHV and Magrini were not directly affected by that calculation and cannot assert the interests of the worldwide undertaking. The Commission also considers that it gave sufficient reasons for its calculation of the applicants’ fines. In addition, the Commission is of the view that the attribution of a larger share of the joint and several liability to Schneider Electric would be significantly less favourable to the VA Tech Group than the allocation which it made, since the overall liability of that group would be significantly greater. 121 Finally, the Commission essentially submits in its replies to the written questions put by the Court and also at the hearing, that it is free to determine the amounts to be paid jointly and severally, since joint and several liability is advantageous for the companies concerned. Consequently, there is nothing irregular about the fact that Reyrolle, on the one hand, and SEHV and Magrini, on the other, were held jointly and severally liable for a sum unrelated to the period of their common participation in the cartel in their capacity as subsidiaries of the VA Tech Group, that the participation of Reyrolle on an individual basis for 10 years before being purchased by VA Technologie does not result in it having to bear a sum on its own, or even that Siemens Österreich and KEG were not held jointly and severally liable for a part of SEHV’s and Magrini’s fine. In addition, in the Commission’s view, the information set out in recital 468 of the contested decision concerning the periods of joint and several liability must not be understood as constituting a definitive decision as to joint and several liability, in the sense of joint and several debts. When the Commission took a decision, in recital 468, on the personal liability of Reyrolle for the period from 15 April 1988 to 20 September 1988, it did not rule out that joint and several liability could be determined for reasons other than the existence of an economic entity; only joint and several liability with its parent companies was ruled out for that period. The Commission considers that, ultimately, those held liable jointly and severally are completely free to distribute the total amount of the fine among themselves, which constitutes an advantage for them. Findings of the Court – The principle that penalties must be specific to the offender and the offence 122 First of all, it should be recalled that, according to the principle that penalties must be specific to the offender and the offence, a natural or legal person may be penalised only for acts imputed to him individually (Joined Cases T-45/98 and T‐47/98 Krupp Thyssen Stainless and Acciai speciali Terni v Commission [2001] ECR II‐3757, paragraph 63); that principle applies in any administrative procedure that may lead to the imposition of sanctions under Community competition law (Case T‐304/02 Hoek Loos v Commission [2006] ECR II‐1887, paragraph 118). However, that principle must be reconciled with the notion of undertaking for the purposes of Article 81 EC, as interpreted by the case‐law. In that regard, it should be noted that the notion of undertaking, for the purposes of Article 81 EC, includes economic units which consist of a unitary organisation of personal, tangible and intangible elements which pursues a specific economic aim on a long-term basis and can contribute to the commission of an infringement of the kind referred to in that provision (see Case T‐9/99 HFB and Others v Commission [2002] ECR II‐1487, paragraph 54 and the case‐law cited). Community competition law recognises that different companies belonging to the same group form an economic unit and therefore an undertaking within the meaning of Article 81 EC if the companies concerned do not determine independently their own conduct on the market (see, to that effect, Case T‐203/01 Michelin v Commission [2003] ECR II‐4071, paragraph 290). 123 Consequently, it is necessary to reject the assertion made by Siemens Österreich and KEG that the fact that an undertaking involved in an infringement is made up of several different companies does not mean that they have to be treated as a single participant to the infringement. That assertion results from confusion of the notions of undertaking and company and is not supported by the case‐law cited by the applicants. 124 Similarly, it is also necessary to reject the argument raised by Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini, set out in paragraph 108 above, that the retroactive application by the Commission, for the purposes of calculating the fine, of the concept of economic unit leads to a heavier penalty and, therefore, infringes Article 7(1) of the ECHR, pursuant to which a heavier penalty is not to be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the offence was committed. The Commission’s practice of taking account, for the purposes of calculating fines, of the turnover of undertakings – and, therefore, where necessary, the cumulative turnover of all the companies which make up an undertaking – has always been consistent and should therefore be familiar to economic operators. In addition, the applicants had continued to participate in the infringement after a merger which led to an increase in the undertaking’s turnover. They cannot therefore call on the Commission to treat them as if the merger had never happened, given that the principle that it is the turnover of the undertaking and not the individual turnovers of the companies which make up the undertaking, taken individually, which is relevant for the purposes of calculating fines was applicable during the period in which the cartel was operational and was thus not applied retroactively. 125 It should also be added that the Commission’s consistent practice of taking account, for the purposes of determining the starting amount of fines, of turnover for the last full year of the infringement, has been implicitly accepted in the case‐law (see, to that effect, Case C‐291/98 P Sarrió v Commission [2000] ECR I‐9991, paragraphs 85 to 87). 126 In that regard, the case‐law should first be noted, according to which the deterrence of fines is one of the factors by reference to which the gravity of infringements must be determined (Case C‐219/95 P Ferriere Nord v Commission [1997] ECR I‐4411, paragraph 33, and Joined Cases T-101/05 and T-111/05 BASF and UCB v Commission [2007] ECR II‐4949, paragraph 45). The dissuasive nature of a fine depends to a large extent on whether it is sufficiently material for the undertaking concerned. Therefore, in order to be able to measure the dissuasive effect of a fine in respect of a company which participated in an infringement, account needs to be taken of the situation as it stood at the end of the infringement and not the situation as it may have stood at an earlier point in time. The taking into account of an earlier situation may result in a fine which is far too low to be sufficiently dissuasive, in the case where the turnover of the undertaking concerned has increased in the meantime, or in a fine which is higher than necessary to be dissuasive, in the case where the turnover of the undertaking concerned has decreased in the meantime. 127 Second, it would be impractical and completely excessive, in the light of the principle of good administration and the requirements of procedural economy, to require the Commission to take account of the evolution of the turnovers of the undertakings at issue throughout the entire duration of the cartel. Such an approach would involve, as the Commission rightly points out, calculating a separate starting amount of the fine for each year of participation in the cartel and, to that end, determining the respective market shares of the participants for each year of the infringement. 128 Therefore, it is also necessary to reject the argument of Siemens Österreich and KEG, set out in paragraph 110 above, that the approach adopted by the Commission, characterised by the imposition of a fine on them which takes account of the turnover of the VA Tech Group for 2003 and not the lower turnover prior to the acquisition of SEHV and Magrini, resulted in their economic weight in the cartel being exaggerated. 129 Similarly, it is necessary to reject the argument of Siemens Österreich and KEG, set out in paragraph 112 above, that that approach on the part of the Commission fails to take account of the principle that a penalty must correspond to the individual contribution of a company to the facts complained of and the principle of fault. It is apparent from the contested decision and, in particular recitals 468(c) and 507 thereof that those applicants were held liable only for the period during which they participated in the cartel, through their subsidiaries, namely Reyrolle, initially, and then also SEHV and Magrini as of 2001. 130 As regards the argument of Siemens Österreich and KEG, also set out in paragraph 112 above, that the Commission wrongly assumes that VA Technologie was aware or should have been aware, when Reyrolle was acquired and VAS was created, of Reyrolle’s participation in the cartel, it should be recalled that the Commission may reasonably presume that a wholly-owned subsidiary carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by its parent company and that that presumption means that the Commission is not required to check whether the parent company has actually exercised that power (see Case T‐330/01 Akzo Nobel v Commission [2006] ECR II‐3389, paragraph 83 and the case‐law cited). The attribution to the parent company of the conduct of a wholly‐owned subsidiary is thus not conditional on evidence that the parent company had knowledge of its subsidiary’s actions. On the contrary, it is for the parent company, when it considers that, despite the 100% shareholding in its subsidiary, the subsidiary determines its conduct independently on the market, to rebut that presumption by providing sufficient evidence (see Akzo Nobel v Commission, paragraph 83 and the case‐law cited). 131 In the present case, the fact whether, when Reyrolle was acquired in 1998, VA Technologie was aware of its participation in the cartel is irrelevant, since Siemens Österreich and KEG have not disputed, before the Court, the fact that Reyrolle, which has been a wholly‐owned subsidiary of the VA Tech Group since 1998, carried out its instructions in all material respects and did not determine its conduct independently on the market. Consequently, the fact that the Commission might have wrongly considered that VA Technologie was aware of such participation is not capable of invalidating the contested decision. 132 In addition, as regards the creation of VAS in 2001, the Commission was entitled to take the view that VA Technologie was aware at that time of the participation in the cartel of both its former subsidiary Reyrolle and its new subsidiaries SEHV and Magrini. The Commission stated, in recital 454 et seq. of the contested decision, that several persons representing the undertaking VA Tech at cartel meetings also occupied management posts, at the same time, both within its subsidiaries Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini and within their parent companies, namely VA Technologie and VAS – whose legal successor is Siemens Österreich – and KEG. Siemens Österreich and KEG have not disputed those findings before the Court. 133 That argument must therefore be rejected. 134 Finally, since the entity which committed the infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement is the undertaking for the purposes of competition law, which does not have legal personality as such, in its decision sanctioning that infringement and imposing fines, the Commission must determine the individual companies within the undertaking to which the decision is to be addressed and which will be liable for payment of fines on behalf of the undertaking. It follows that the individual fines imposed on the various companies which constitute the undertaking are to be calculated, except in exceptional circumstances, on the basis of the economic strength and thus the turnover of the undertaking and not on the basis of the economic strength of the individual companies. 135 In the present case, the Commission first explained, in recital 333 of the contested decision, that Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement applied to the undertaking for the purposes of Community law, a notion that was not identical with the notion of corporate legal personality in national commercial, company or fiscal law. However, since a decision sanctioning an infringement of those articles has to be addressed to legal persons, it was necessary for the Commission to identify, within the undertakings concerned, the legal persons to whom the decision was to be addressed. Next, in recital 335 of the contested decision, the Commission explained that parent companies exercising a decisive influence over a subsidiary’s commercial conduct could be held jointly and severally liable for the infringement committed by the subsidiary, although that did not exempt the subsidiary of its own liability. The liability of the parent company was thus additional to that of the subsidiary. Those considerations take full account of the principles set out in paragraphs 122 and 134 above. 136 Therefore, it is necessary to reject the argument of Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini, set out in paragraph 106 above, that the imposition of a fine based on the total turnover of the VA Tech Group is not in line with an approach of holding the various subsidiaries of that group individually liable for the infringement. – The various companies to which the conduct of the undertakings which participated in the cartel may be attributed and the application of the rules governing the joint and several liability for payment of fines 137 First of all, it is necessary to determine the various companies to which the conduct of the undertakings which participated in the cartel may be attributed. Secondly, it will be necessary to examine whether the Commission correctly calculated the amount of the fines to be imposed on the applicants and, in particular, whether it correctly determined the amounts which they are required to pay jointly and severally. Since that examination concerns the internal coherence of the contested decision, at this stage account needs to be taken of the duration of the infringement determined by the Commission in the contested decision and, in particular, of the date 1 April 2002 and not that of 1 July 2002 (see paragraphs 72 and 82 above) as the date on which the undertaking VA Tech resumed its participation in the cartel. 138 First, as regards the determination of the various companies to which the conduct of the undertakings having participated in the cartel may be imputed, it should be recalled, at the outset, that it is not disputed that Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini did not determine their conduct on the market autonomously with respect to the participation of the undertaking VA Tech in the cartel. As is apparent from paragraph 1 above, for Reyrolle, that is the period from 20 September 1998, namely the date it was acquired by VA Technologie and, for SEHV and Magrini, the period after 13 March 2001, namely the date on which VAS was created. The Commission inferred from this, in the contested decision, that, during those periods, Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini, together with VA Technologie and VAS (absorbed in 2006 by Siemens Österreich) and KEG formed one and the same undertaking for the purposes of Article 81 EC, which the applicants do not dispute. 139 Next, as the Commission pointed out in recital 337 of the contested decision, legal entities which have participated in their own right in an infringement and which have subsequently been acquired by another company continue to bear responsibility themselves for their unlawful conduct prior to their acquisition, where they have not been purely and simply absorbed by the acquiring undertaking, but continued their activities as subsidiaries (see, to that effect, Case C‐279/98 P Cascades v Commission [2000] ECR I‐9693, paragraphs 78 to 80). In such a case, the acquiring undertaking may be held responsible only for the conduct of its subsidiary with effect from its acquisition if the subsidiary continues the infringement and if the liability of the new parent company can be established (see, to that effect, Case C‐286/98 P Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v Commission [2000] ECR I‐9925, paragraphs 37 to 39). 140 In the present case, the situation of Reyrolle, on the one hand, and of Siemens Österreich and KEG, on the other, is similar to the second situation referred to in paragraph 139 above, since Reyrolle initially participated in the infringement independently and subsequently, from 20 September 1998, pursued its unlawful activity as a subsidiary of the VA Tech Group (see paragraph 1 above). 141 In addition, the same principle must apply, mutatis mutandis, in the case where, prior to its acquisition, the company acquired participated in the infringement not independently, but as a subsidiary of another group, as was the case for SEHV and Magrini, which, before belonging to the undertaking VA Tech, were part of the undertaking belonging to the Schneider Group (‘the undertaking Schneider’) until 13 March 2001. 142 In that regard, it is apparent from the file that 60% of Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini was held by the VA Tech Group from 13 March 2001, through VAS. The Commission set out, in recitals 454 and 455 of the contested decision, without being contradicted by the applicants, that it considered that VA Technologie and KEG were in a position to exercise decisive influence over the commercial conduct of Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini, through their 60% shareholding in VAS. It came to the conclusion that, between 13 March 2001, the date VAS was created, and 11 May 2004, the date the cartel was terminated, Siemens Österreich and KEG or their legal predecessors formed one and the same undertaking with the subsidiaries Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini. In particular, it is apparent from recitals 423, 424, 450 and 467 of the contested decision that the Commission considered that Schneider Electric’s liability for the participation of its former subsidiaries SEHV and Magrini had ended with the creation of VAS on 13 March 2001, in spite of the fact that it had held, until October 2004, a 40% shareholding in VAS. 143 It follows from the application of the principle set out in paragraph 139 above that SEHV and Magrini continue to bear responsibility themselves for their unlawful conduct prior to the takeover on 13 March 2001 by the VA Tech Group. In addition, since, prior to that date, those companies belonged to a different undertaking, with Schneider Electric, the latter must be held jointly and severally with them in respect of that period. 144 It is apparent from the above that four separate periods need to be distinguished: – first, during the period from 15 April 1998 to 20 September 1998, Reyrolle is solely liable for its participation in the cartel; as regards its parent company at the time, Rolls-Royce, the infringement is time-barred; – second, during the period from 15 April 1988 to 13 December 2000, SEHV and Magrini are liable for their participation in the cartel jointly and severally with Schneider Electric, which was their parent company at the time; – third, during the period from 20 September 1998 to 13 December 2000, Reyrolle is liable for its participation in the cartel jointly and severally with Siemens Österreich, the legal successor of VA Technologie, its parent company at that time; – fourth, during the period from 1 July 2002 (1 April 2002 according to the contested decision) and 11 May 2004, Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini are liable jointly and severally for their participation in the cartel with their parent companies KEG and Siemens Österreich, the legal successor of their former parent companies, namely VAS and VA Technologie. 145 In accordance with the principle set out in paragraphs 139 to 143 above, the Commission actually found, in recitals 449 to 451 of the contested decision, as regards Reyrolle’s participation in the infringement, that Reyrolle should be held solely liable for that participation for the period prior to its acquisition by the VA Tech Group, namely from 15 April 1988 to 20 September 1998, that Siemens Österreich and KEG should be held jointly and severally liable, with Reyrolle, for that participation as of its acquisition by the VA Tech Group, namely from 20 September 1998 to 13 December 2000 and from 1 April 2002 to 11 May 2004 and that SEHV and Magrini, other subsidiaries of the VA Tech Group which participated in the infringement, should be held jointly and severally liable for that participation for the period from 1 April 2002 to 11 May 2004. 146 As regards the participation of SEHV and Magrini, the Commission found, in recital 465 of the contested decision, that Schneider Electric should be held jointly and severally liable with them for that participation for the period from 15 April 1988 to 13 December 2000 and, in recital 467 of the contested decision, that Siemens Österreich and KEG should be held jointly and severally liable with them for that participation for the period from 1 April 2002 to 11 May 2004. 147 The Commission was thus rightly able to consider, in recital 468 of the contested decision, that: ‘Therefore, (a) [Reyrolle] should be held solely liable for its involvement in the infringement from 15 April 1988 to 20 September 1998; (b) [SEHV] and [Magrini] should be held jointly and severally liable with [Schneider Electric] from 15 April 1988 to 13 December 2000; and (c) [Siemens Österreich and KEG] should be held jointly and severally liable from 20 September 1998 to 13 December 2000 and from 1 April 2002 to 11 May 2004 (until 13 December 2000, jointly and severally with [Reyrolle], and from 1 April 2002 onwards, also jointly and severally with [SEHV] and [Magrini].’ 148 Second, as regards the calculation of the amount of the fines to be imposed on the various companies to which the conduct of the undertakings which participated in the cartel may be attributed and, in particular, the determination of the amounts to be paid jointly and severally, it needs to be examined whether, in recitals 122, 134, 139, 141 and 143 of the contested decision, and in the allocation which it determined in recital 468 of the contested decision, the Commission respected the principles referred to above. 149 In that regard, it needs to be pointed out that joint and several liability between companies for the payment of fines due as a result of an infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement is a legal effect which follows as a matter of law from the substantive provisions of those articles. 150 According to the case‐law, where several persons may be held personally liable for the participation in an infringement of one and the same undertaking for the purposes of competition law, they must be regarded as jointly and severally liable for that infringement (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v Commission [1974] ECR 223, paragraph 41; Case C‐294/98 P Metsä-Serla and Others v Commission [2000] ECR I‐10065, paragraphs 33 and 34; Joined Cases T-339/94, T-340/94, T‐341/94 and T-342/94 Metsä-Serla and Others v Commission [1998] ECR II‐1727, paragraphs 42 to 44; HFB and Others v Commission, paragraph 122 above, paragraphs 54, 524 and 525; Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission, paragraph 90 above, paragraph 62; and Case T‐112/05 Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission [2007] ECR II‐5049, paragraphs 57 to 62). 151 The unitary conduct of the conduct of the undertaking on the market justifies, for the purposes of the application of competition law, that the companies or, more generally, the persons which can be held personally liable for it may be held liable jointly and severally (see, to that effect, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v Commission, paragraph 150 above, paragraph 41; Case 52/69 Geigy v Commission [1972] ECR 787, paragraph 45; HFB and Others v Commission, paragraph 122 above, paragraphs 54, 524 and 525; and Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission, paragraph 150 above, paragraph 62). The joint and several liability for the payment of fines imposed for an infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, inasmuch as it contributes to the effective recovery of those fines, is part of the objective of deterrence which is pursued generally by competition law (see, to that effect, Case 41/69 ACF Chemiefarma v Commission [1970] ECR 661, paragraphs 172 and 173; and Case C‐289/04 P Showa Denko v Commission [2006] ECR I‐5859, paragraph 61) and respects the principle of non bis in idem, a fundamental principle of European Union law, also laid down in Article 4 of Protocol No 7 of the ECHR, which precludes penalising more than once, for the same infringement of competition law, the same conduct of the undertaking on the market through the persons which may be held personally liable for it (see, to that effect, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, paragraph 52 above, paragraph 338; Joined Cases T‐305/94, T-306/94, T‐307/94, T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T‐328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission [1999] ECR II‐931, paragraphs 95 to 99; and Joined Cases T‐217/03 and T‐245/03 FNCBV and Others v Commission [2006] ECR II‐4987, paragraph 340). 152 The fact that the personal liabilities incurred by several companies due to the participation of the same undertaking in an infringement is not identical does not prevent them from being fined jointly and severally, since the joint and several liability for payment of a fine covers only the period of the infringement during which they formed an economic unit and thus constituted an undertaking for the purposes of competition law. 153 In that regard, contrary to what the Commission claims in its argument set out in paragraph 121 above, it is not free to determine the sums to be paid jointly and severally. It follows from the principle that penalties must be specific to the offender and to the offence concerned, as described in paragraph 122 above, that each company must be able to discern from the decision imposing a fine on it to be paid jointly and severally with one or more other companies the amount which it is required to bear in relation to the other joint and several debtors, once payment has been made to the Commission. To that end, the Commission must, inter alia, specify the periods during which the companies concerned were jointly liable for the unlawful conduct of the undertakings which participated in the cartel and, where necessary, the degree of liability of those companies for that conduct. 154 Therefore, in the present case, the Commission had to take account of the findings which it made, in recital 468 of the contested decision, regarding the periods of joint responsibility of the various companies belonging to the undertaking VA Tech in order to determine the amounts to be paid jointly and severally by those companies. In so far as possible, those amounts must reflect the weighting of the individual shares of the joint liability of those companies, as identified in that recital. 155 It should be added that, like the concept of ‘undertaking’ for the purposes of competition law, of which it is merely an ipso jure legal effect (see paragraphs 150 and 151 above), the concept of ‘joint and several liability for the payment of fines’ is an autonomous concept which must be interpreted by reference to the objectives and system of competition law of which it forms part and, where necessary, to the general principles deriving from the national legal systems as a whole. In particular, even though the nature of the payment obligation on the companies fined jointly and severally by the Commission as a result of an infringement of Community competition law differs from that of joint debtors of a private‐law obligation, it is appropriate to seek guidance, in particular, in the rules on joint and several obligations. 156 Thus, the decision by which the Commission imposes on several companies the payment of a fine jointly and severally necessarily produces all the effects which are inherent, by force of law, in the legal rules governing the payment of competition law fines, both in relations between creditors and joint and several debtors and in those between joint and several debtors. 157 It is therefore exclusively for the Commission, in exercising its power to impose fines under Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, to determine the respective shares of the various companies of the fines imposed on them jointly and severally, in so far as they formed part of the same undertaking, and that task cannot be left to the national courts, contrary to what the Commission suggested at the hearing. 158 It must be held that, in the absence of a contrary indication in the decision by which the Commission has imposed a fine jointly and severally on several companies for an infringement by an undertaking, that decision attributes that infringement to them in equal measure (see, to that effect, Case C‐196/99 P Aristrain v Commission [2003] ECR I‐11005, paragraphs 100 and 101). Companies on which a fine has been imposed jointly and severally and which incur, unless otherwise specified in the decision imposing the fine, liability in equal measure for the infringement must, in principle, contribute in equal amounts to the payment of the fine imposed on account of that infringement. Consequently, where a company against which the Commission proceeds pays the whole amount of the fine, it may, on the basis of the Commission’s decision, make a claim for recovery against each of the other joint and several debtors in respect of its share. Although the decision imposing a fine on several companies jointly and severally does not make it possible to determine, from the outset, which of those companies will actually be called on to pay the amount of the fine to the Commission, it does not leave any doubt as to the shares of the fine for which they are personally liable, with the result that each of them will be able, where necessary, to bring an action against its joint and several codebtors for repayment of the sums which it might have paid in excess of that share. 159 Therefore, in the absence of any finding in the contested decision that, within the undertaking VA Tech, certain companies are more responsible than others for the participation of that undertaking in the cartel during a given period, it must be assumed that they are all equally liable and, consequently, that the shares of the fine imposed on them jointly and severally are equal. 160 However, it is evident in the present case that the calculation of the individual fines of SEHV and Magrini and the calculation of the amounts which Siemens Österreich, KEG, Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini and Schneider Electric are required to pay jointly and severally, as set out in recitals 505, 509 and 552 of the contested decision, and the result set out in Article 2(j) to (l) of the contested decision, do not take account of the principles referred to above or of the findings in recital 468 of the contested decision. 161 First, the Commission held Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini jointly and severally liable for EUR 17 550 000 of the total fines of EUR 22 050 000 which it imposed on them (recitals 509 and 552 and Article 2(k) and (l)(i) of the contested decision). 162 However, those three companies belonged to the same undertaking only in the period from 1 April 2002 to 11 May 2004, namely for a period of two years and one month. As is apparent from recitals 507 and 509 of the contested decision, the total fine imposed on the undertaking VA Tech was EUR 12 600 000 for the period from 20 September 1998 to 11 May 2004, namely a period of four years and four months and thus more than double the period referred to above. Therefore, even taking account of the fact that the fines imposed on various companies within an undertaking which participated in the cartel do not have to be proportionate to the duration of the infringement (see, in that regard, paragraph 181 above), the sum of EUR 17 550 000, for which the subsidiaries SEHV and Magrini are liable jointly and severally with Reyrolle, manifestly exceeds the sum which, on the basis of the Commission’s own findings in the contested decision, is appropriate to sanction the participation of SEHV and Magrini in the cartel as subsidiaries of the VA Tech Group between 1 April 2002 and 11 May 2004. 163 Second, of the total fine of EUR 22 050 000 imposed on Reyrolle by the Commission, EUR 12 600 000 is to be born jointly and severally by Siemens Österreich and KEG and EUR 17 550 000 jointly and severally by SEHV and Magrini (recitals 509 and 552 and Article 2(l)(i) and (ii) of the contested decision). 164 On the one hand, the sum to be paid by Reyrolle jointly and severally with other companies clearly exceeds the total amount of its fine. Although, as the Commission stated in its answers to the written questions put by the Court, that cannot lead to a situation in which Reyrolle is required to pay a sum greater than EUR 22 050 000, such a calculation of the sums to be paid jointly and severally does not enable the applicants to discern from the contested decision the shares which they will be required to bear when dividing the sums among themselves, once payment has been made to the Commission, contrary to the latter’s obligation set out in paragraph 153 above. On the other hand, it must be noted that, contrary to what the Commission rightly found in recital 468(a) of the contested decision, Reyrolle was not held solely liable for a part of its fine for the period between 1988 and 1998, during which it participated alone in the infringement. 165 Third, it is apparent from the table in recital 509 and from Article 2(l) of the contested decision, that Siemens Österreich and KEG were not held jointly and severally liable for part of the fine imposed on SEHV and Magrini, contrary to what the Commission rightly stated at the end of recital 468(c) of the contested decision, to take account of the period of two years and one month during which those companies belonged to the same undertaking. 166 It must be concluded that, in holding Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini jointly and severally liable for payment of a fine which clearly exceeds their joint liability, in not holding Siemens Österreich and KEG jointly and severally liable for payment of part of the fine imposed on SEHV and Magrini, and in not holding Reyrolle solely liable for a part of the fine imposed on it, the Commission infringed the principle that penalties must be specific to the offender and to the offence, as set out in paragraph 122 above. 167 Consequently, Article 2 of the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it concerns the calculation of the fine imposed on SEHV and Magrini and the amounts to be paid jointly and severally by the applicants. – The failure to take account of the particular circumstances of Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini when applying to them the starting amount calculated for the undertaking VA Tech 168 Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini submit that, given their particular circumstances, the fact that the Commission applied to them the starting amount calculated for the undertaking VA Tech means that they were fined disproportionately in relation to the size of their contribution to the cartel. 169 The argument raised by Reyrolle (see paragraph 109 above) is that the Commission failed to take account, in applying to it the starting amount calculated for the undertaking VA Tech, of its limited capacity to harm competition within the common market, since its business activities were limited to the United Kingdom and Ireland during the period of the GQ Agreement. 170 In that regard, it should be noted that, in the case where a worldwide cartel which, in addition to price fixing, also allocates markets, the Commission may legitimately rely on the global turnover from sales of the product concerned so that the starting amounts reflect the nature of the infringement, its actual impact on the market and the scope of the geographic market, having regard to the considerable disparity in size between the members of the cartel (see, to that effect, Joined Cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T‐244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T‐252/01 Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission [2004] ECR II‐1181, paragraphs 197 and 198, and Case T‐329/01 Archer Daniels Midland v Commission [2006] ECR II‐3255, paragraph 87). 171 In the present case, it should be pointed out, first of all, that the United Kingdom and Ireland, taken together, make up a significant part of the common market. Harm caused to competition on those markets cannot therefore be classed as minor. Secondly, the infringement imputed to the applicants in the contested decision includes precisely the complaint that the undertakings concerned allocated different national markets at the European level, by means of a ‘home countries’ system. Therefore, the fact that, under such an unlawful agreement, Reyrolle limited its business activities within the common market to its domestic markets cannot be regarded as a mitigating circumstance. Thirdly, according to the Commission’s findings, which were not contested by the applicants, the participants to the cartel had themselves taken account of their global turnover when setting the individual quotas within the cartel, quotas which applied both at the European level – outside of ‘home countries’ – and at the global level. It follows that the Commission was also entitled to take account of their global turnover from GIS projects when assessing the specific weight of the various undertakings involved. 172 Consequently, Reyrolle’s argument must be rejected. 173 The argument raised by SEHV and Magrini (see paragraph 115 above) is that the Commission established the starting amount applied to the undertaking Schneider in the light of its shareholding in VAS. Since VA Technologie brought into VAS various business activities which were not related to the cartel, the resultant relationship between the starting amounts of the fine applied to the undertaking VA Tech and to the undertaking Schneider does not correspond to the relationship between the turnover from GIS projects made by the subsidiaries which VA Technologie and Schneider Electric brought into VAS. The result is that the starting amount determined for the undertaking Schneider was too low in relation to the starting amount set for the undertaking VA Tech. 174 SEHV and Magrini claim that the business activities brought into VAS by VA Technologie which are unrelated to the GIS projects cannot justify the imposition on the undertaking VA Tech of a higher fine that that imposed on the undertaking Schneider. SEHV and Magrini consider that the Commission should have divided the starting amount on the basis of the turnover made on GIS projects by the former subsidiaries of VAS or on the basis of their quotas within the cartel, which they calculate, according to the table set out in recital 144 of the contested decision, at 2.79% for Reyrolle and 7.28% for SEHV and Magrini. 175 It should be noted, as regards the starting amount applied to the undertaking Schneider, that that amount was not set, as for the other undertakings, on the basis of the global turnover made in 2003, no doubt because the Commission considered that it was no longer participating in the cartel during that period. As is stated at the end of recital 489 of the contested decision, the starting amount applied to the undertaking Schneider was established at 40% of the starting amount applied to the undertaking VA Tech, given that it held a 40% shareholding in VAS, which grouped together, as of 13 March 2001, all of the business activities concerning GIS of the VA Tech Group and the Schneider Group. The size of that shareholding thus gives an idea of the relative importance of the turnovers of Reyrolle, on the one hand, and of SEHV and Magrini, on the other, when VAS was created. 176 The argument of SEHV and Magrini must be rejected for three reasons. 177 First, the complaint raised in that regard essentially concerns the claim that the Commission disadvantaged VA Technologie, KEG and Reyrolle in relation to Schneider Electric, SEHV and Magrini. However, SEHV and Magrini have no interest in raising that complaint. If the Court were to uphold that complaint and therefore increase the starting amount of the fine in relation to the undertaking Schneider, that would lead to an increase in the share of the fine imposed on them for their participation in the infringement during the period in which they belonged to that undertaking, but without reducing the fine imposed on them for the period in which they belonged to the undertaking VA Tech. SEHV and Magrini thus benefit from an alleged error by the Commission and cannot, on that basis, be permitted to challenge it before the Court. For that reason, the present argument must be rejected as inadmissible. 178 Second, for the sake of completeness, the claim that VA Technologie brought into VAS a significant number of business activities which were not related to GIS projects is not substantiated. In addition, SEHV and Magrini do not even state what those business activities were, or the relative weight which they had in relation to the GIS activities. It is thus necessary to reject that argument also for that reason. 179 Third, the initial individual quotas within the cartel, as referred to in recital 144 of the contested decision and on which SEHV and Magrini base their line of argument, were subsequently amended. Thus, recital 145 of the contested decision contains a table in which it is stated, for an unspecified period, but after Alstom had taken over the GIS activities of AEG in 1996, a quota of 10.94% for the undertaking Schneider and a quota of 10.3% for Reyrolle. Towards the end of the first phase of the applicants’ participation in the cartel, Reyrolle’s weight in relation to that of SEHV and Magrini was therefore greater than the figures given by SEHV and Magrini, which must therefore be rejected in any event as erroneous. – The increase as a result of the duration of the infringement 180 First, Siemens Österreich and KEG claim, as set out in paragraph 111 above, that, in relation to the duration of the respective infringements imputed to them, the fine imposed is twice the fine imposed on Reyrolle, namely EUR 242 307 per month of infringement for Siemens Österreich and KEG, compared with EUR 124 576 per month of infringement for Reyrolle. 181 It should be noted, in that regard, as does the Commission in its defence in Case T‐122/07, that Community law does not require that the fines imposed on various companies within the same undertaking be proportionate to the duration of the participation imputed to each of those companies. In addition, Siemens Österreich and KEG have not invoked such a principle, but merely claimed that there is a principle pursuant to which the fine imposed on parent companies held jointly and severally liable for the infringement committed by their subsidiaries and based on the decisive influence which the former exercise over the commercial conduct of the latter cannot be any heavier than that incurred by those subsidiaries, to then criticise the fact that the fine set in the contested decision was higher, per month of participation, for them than for Reyrolle, in respect of the period during which they controlled the latter. Since the fines imposed on the various companies within the same undertaking do not have to be proportionate to the duration of the participation imputed to each of those companies, such a comparison between the amount in euros, per month of participation in the infringement, applied to two companies accused of participating for different periods of time cannot amount to unequal treatment. 182 Therefore, it does not appear that the Commission’s practice of setting fines in a manner which is not strictly proportionate to the duration goes beyond the limits of its recognised discretion under the case‐law (see, to that effect, Case T‐150/89 Martinelli v Commission [1995] ECR II‐1165, paragraph 59; Case T‐49/95 Van Megen Sports v Commission [1996] ECR II‐1799, paragraph 53; and Case T‐229/94 Deutsche Bahn v Commission [1997] ECR II‐1689, paragraph 127). 183 Second, Siemens Österreich and KEG claimed, in that regard, that there is a contradiction between the operative part of the contested decision and the grounds for that decision. As the Commission also stated, in its defence in Case T‐122/07, it follows implicitly but clearly from the Guidelines that the fines calculated on the basis thereof are not at all proportionate to the duration of the infringements. On the contrary, the fact that, according to the end of Point 1 B of the Guidelines, the basic amount results from the addition of the starting amount, established purely on the basis of the gravity of the infringement, and the increase as a result of duration evidently implies that the amount per month of infringement will be digressive with duration, since the relative weight of the – invariable – starting amount in that sum will diminish in line with the increase for duration. In so far as the Commission stated at numerous intervals, in the contested decision, that it calculated fines in accordance with its Guidelines, as is also consistent with its standard practice, there can be no question, in respect of the digressive nature of the amount of the fine per month, of contradiction or incoherence between the operative part of the contested decision and the grounds raised in support thereof. 184 Consequently, that argument must be rejected. – The ceiling of 10% of turnover 185 As set out in recital 107 above, Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini submit that the contested decision fails to respect the ceiling of 10% of turnover laid down in Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003. 186 In that regard, it should be noted, first of all, that the fact that several companies are held jointly and severally liable for a fine on the ground that they form an undertaking for the purposes of Article 81 EC does not mean, as regards the application of the maximum amount of 10% of turnover laid down by Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, that the obligation of each of them is limited to 10% of the turnover which it achieved during the last business year. According to settled case‐law, the maximum amount of 10% of turnover within the meaning of that provision must be calculated on the basis of the total turnover of all the companies constituting the single economic entity acting as an undertaking for the purposes of Article 81 EC, since only the total turnover of the component companies can constitute an indication of the size and economic power of the undertaking in question (HFB and Others v Commission, paragraph 122 above, paragraphs 528 and 529, and Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission, paragraph 150 above, paragraph 90). 187 Contrary to what the applicants claim, the concept of undertaking, for the purposes of Article 23(2) and (3) of Regulation No 1/2003, is thus not different from the concept of undertaking for the purposes of Article 81(1) EC. Therefore, it is also not necessary, in the case of the joint and several liability of several companies within a group forming an undertaking for the purposes of those provisions, to determine the ceiling in relation to the company with the lowest turnover. 188 The judgment in Aristrain v Commission, paragraph 158 above, referred to by the applicants, is not such as to call that consideration into question. In the case which gave rise to that judgment, the Commission found that two companies belonging to the same group had participated in an infringement, but imposed a fine only on one of them, stating that that fine also took account of the conduct of the other company. Since the Commission did not give any reasons for its choice of addressee of the contested decision and did not, in particular, show that the company on which the fine had been imposed had managerial control over the other, the Court of Justice partially annulled the contested decision for failure to state adequate reasons (Aristrain v Commission, paragraph 158 above, paragraphs 93 to 100). In that judgment, the Court of Justice was thus not opposed to the idea that all the companies making up an undertaking be taken together for the purposes of applying the ceiling of 10% of total turnover of that undertaking but merely noted that the Commission was required to show the existence of factual circumstances justifying the treatment of several companies as an economic unit. 189 In the present case, as noted in paragraph 138 above, it is not disputed that, at the end of the cartel, Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini formed, together with Siemens Österreich and KEG, their respective predecessor companies, one and the same undertaking. Therefore, the Commission was able, in principle, to take the total turnover of that undertaking as a reference for the calculation of the 10% ceiling for each of the fines imposed on the companies which constituted that undertaking. 190 Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini refer, in addition, to the Court’s case‐law, according to which, if an economic unit which participated in an infringement has broken up between the end of the infringement and the date of adoption of the decision sanctioning that infringement, each addressee of the decision is entitled to have the ceiling of 10% of turnover applied individually to it (Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission, paragraph 90 above, paragraph 390). They infer from this that, as a general rule, the ceiling of 10% can be calculated on the basis of the global turnover of an economic entity only if that entity remained identical from the time of the infringement to the date the Commission adopted the decision. Therefore, in their view, the ceiling of 10% must also be calculated separately for each company where the economic entity has grown after the infringement. 191 That argument must be rejected because the economic entity designated as ‘VA Tech’ in the contested decision and comprising, inter alia, Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini, did not grow between the end of the cartel and the contested decision. All of the applicants were part of it on the day the cartel ended, 11 May 2004, and were still part of it on the day the contested decision was adopted, 24 January 2007 – even though some of them changed name or, in the case of VAS, were absorbed by another company. 192 Therefore, the argument that the ceiling of 10% of turnover was exceeded in respect of Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini must be rejected. b) The fifth complaint, alleging that the Commission erroneously held Reyrolle liable in addition to its parent company Arguments of the parties 193 Reyrolle submits that its employees no longer participated, as of 2002, in the project coordination system and that it was concerned by the cartel only as a ‘component of VAS’. The subsidiaries are individually liable for anti‐competitive practices only in so far as they participated personally. By contrast, the subsidiaries cannot be held liable for the conduct of their parent company. Therefore, the applicant cannot have a fine imposed on it in respect of the second phase of infringements, namely the period from 2002 to 2004. 194 The Commission disputes Reyrolle’s arguments. Findings of the Court 195 First, it should be noted that Reyrolle’s present complaint is the result of an overly formalistic understanding of the infringement imputed to it in the contested decision. Participation in cartel meetings is reprehensible only as an external manifestation of the fact that the participants wanted to collude and that they felt bound by the unlawful agreements concluded within the cartel. Reyrolle has not claimed to have distanced itself from those agreements or from the cartel in general, nor that it no longer respected the rules of the cartel and the concrete agreements on GIS projects when conducting its business. Therefore, even supposing that, after the creation of VAS, Reyrolle was no longer represented at meetings within the cartel by its own employees, that does not show that its conduct, as a legal person, did not constitute an infringement of Article 81(1) EC. 196 Second, the fact that a parent company has the conduct of its subsidiary attributed to it for having determined the subisidary’s commercial conduct does not mean that the parent company has to be regarded as having carried out that conduct instead of the subsidiary. In other words, the liability of a parent company for the conduct of its subsidiary in no way exonerates the subsidiary from its own liability as a legal person and the subsidiary thus remains individually liable for the anti‐competitive practices in which it participated. 197 Therefore, the present complaint must be rejected. c) The sixth complaint, based on an infringement of the principle ne bis in idem Arguments of the parties 198 Siemens Österreich and KEG submit that Article 2(l)(ii) of the contested decision infringes the principle ne bis in idem in that it may lead to them being sanctioned twice for the same infringement. It is apparent from recitals 487 and 505 of the contested decision that the Commission intended to impose a fine of EUR 22 050 000 on the undertaking VA Tech. The Commission then arbitrarily divided the fine between the various legal persons constituting that undertaking on the date the infringement was terminated. That division could lead the VA Tech Group and, ultimately, Siemens Österreich and KEG, which are the only companies in the group with sufficient financial resources, to have to pay, for the same infringement, an additional fine of EUR 4 500 000 if Schneider Electric, as it has stated it would, were to refuse to pay the fine imposed on it jointly and severally with SEHV and Magrini. 199 In addition, the unlawful conduct of SEHV and Magrini during the period from 1988 to 2000 would be sanctioned twice, since it would both increase Reyrolle’s liability – whose starting amount takes account of SEHV’s and Magrini’s turnover – and the joint and several liability of SEHV, Magrini and Schneider Electric. 200 The Commission contests the arguments of the parties. Findings of the Court 201 First, it should be noted that it is not in the interests of Siemens Österreich and KEG to raise this complaint since it does not affect them personally. Under Article 2(l) of the contested decision, they are fined only EUR 12 600 000 jointly and severally with Reyrolle. By contrast, they are not held jointly and severally liable for payment of the fine imposed on SEHV and Magrini. Therefore, if Schneider Electric were to request repayment from SEHV and Magrini, that would not increase the amount owed by Siemens Österreich and KEG. It should be added, in so far as the latter claim to be the only companies within the VA Tech Group with sufficient financial resources, that neither the contested decision nor Community law in general provides that, if the addressee of a decision imposing a fine lacks liquidity, its parent company is required to pay the fine instead. 202 Second, as stated in paragraph 167 above, Article 2 of the contested decision must be annulled in so far as concerns the calculation of the fine imposed on SEHV and Magrini and the sums to be paid jointly and severally by the companies belonging to the undertaking VA Tech. Consequently, the present complaint raised by Siemens Österreich and KEG has become obsolete. 203 Third, the fact that the turnover of SEHV and Magrini may be taken into account both for the purposes of determining the starting amount of Reyrolle’s fine, including for the period from 1988 to 2000, during which it did not form part of one and the same undertaking with SEHV and Magrini, and for the purposes of calculating the fine imposed on SEHV and Magrini for the same period, is the inevitable consequence of the fact that, during the period at issue, those companies did not belong to the same undertaking for the purposes of Community competition law. However, that does not constitute a double penalty for the same infringement in respect of either Reyrolle or the undertaking VA Tech, in so far as, for the period from 1988 to 2000, the undertaking VA Tech and the undertaking Schneider are fined separately. 204 Consequently, that complaint must be rejected. d) The seventh complaint, based on the failure to reduce the fine Arguments of the parties 205 Siemens Österreich and KEG argue that Article 2(l)(ii) of the contested decision infringes the rules relating to mitigating circumstances, as they result from the Guidelines, the case‐law of the Courts of the Union, and the Leniency Notice. In particular, they submit that the Commission did not take account of the fact that they voluntarily discontinued their participation in the infringement as of 21 January 2004, before the Commission intervened, that they had ceased all contact contrary to the competition rules with the other members of the cartel when the inspections were carried out, that the undertaking VA Tech played a passive role within the cartel, that they cooperated actively during the administrative procedure and that they always acknowledged the participation of the undertaking VA Tech in the cartel from October 2002 to March 2004. 206 The Commission disputes the arguments of Siemens Österreich and KEG. Findings of the Court – The mitigating circumstances 207 It should be noted that Section 3 of the Guidelines provides for a reduction in the basic amount of the fine for ‘special mitigating circumstances’ such as an exclusively passive or ‘follow-my-leader’ role in the carrying out of the infringement, and termination of the infringement as soon as the Commission intervenes. 208 It should be pointed out that the Guidelines do not set out in mandatory terms the mitigating circumstances that the Commission is required to take into account. Consequently, the Commission retains a measure of discretion in making an overall assessment of the size of any reduction in the fines to reflect mitigating circumstances (see, to that effect, Case T‐50/00 Dalmine v Commission [2004] ECR II‐2395, paragraph 326). 209 In the present case, first, in so far as the applicants claim that they voluntarily discontinued their participation in the infringement as of 21 January 2004, it is sufficient to note that, as is apparent from the recitals referred to in paragraphs 77 to 81 above, the Commission was entitled to find that the applicants had participated in the cartel until 11 May 2004. 210 Second, as regards the ‘termination of the infringement as soon as the Commission intervenes’ in Section 3 of the Guidelines, the complaint raised by Siemens Österreich and KEG can also not succeed. 211 The Commission is under no obligation, in the exercise of its discretion, to reduce a fine because of the termination of a manifest infringement, whether that termination occurred before or after its intervention (Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission, paragraph 90 above, paragraph 292). 212 In the present case, the infringement at issue was undoubtedly a manifest infringement since it related to a secret cartel whose object was price fixing and allocation of markets. That type of cartel is expressly prohibited by Article 81(1)(a) and (c) EC and constitutes a particularly serious infringement, which the Commission rightly found in recital 479 of the contested decision. Therefore, Siemens Österreich and KEG wrongly complain that the Commission failed to reduce their fines for having terminated their participation in that infringement. 213 Even though, in the past, the Commission has regarded voluntary termination of an infringement as a mitigating circumstance, it is entitled, when applying its Guidelines, to take account of the fact that, even though their illegality was established at the inception of Community competition policy, very serious manifest infringements are relatively frequent and, therefore, to take the view that it is appropriate to abandon that generous practice and no longer reward the termination of such an infringement by a reduction of the fine (Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission, paragraph 90 above, paragraph 294 and the case‐law cited). In any event, the Court does not consider it appropriate to review that assessment on the part of the Commission, even in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction. 214 In the light of the above, the fact that the companies which belonged to the undertaking VA Tech terminated their participation in the infringement as soon as the Commission intervened does not constitute a mitigating circumstance. 215 Third, as regards the ‘exclusively passive or “follow-my-leader” role in the infringement’, referred to in Section 3 of the Guidelines, the argument raised by Siemens Österreich and KEG must also be rejected. 216 First of all, Siemens Österreich and KEG argue that they did not participate in the elaboration of anti‐competitive agreements. In that regard, the Commission found, in the contested decision, that Reyrolle, Magrini and Schneider Electric, as the representative of the legal predecessors of SEHV, had participated in the elaboration of the agreements underlying the cartel and were cofounders of it. In that respect, it should be noted that Annex 1 to the GQ Agreement, which contains the list of the founding members of the cartel and their codes, lists, inter alia, numbers ‘13’, ‘26’, and ‘32’, which the Commissions found, without being contradicted by the applicants, to represent Reyrolle, the Schneider Group and Magrini respectively. Since Siemens Österreich and KEG have not disputed, in a substantiated manner, the finding that their subsidiaries participated in the elaboration of the GQ Agreement, that argument must be rejected. 217 Secondly, Siemens Österreich and KEG submit that the undertaking VA Tech was deceived by the other members of the cartel in that it was led to believe, in December 2000, that the cartel had been brought to an end and in that, during the second phase of its participation, the other members debated GIS projects without its knowledge. 218 It is sufficient, in that regard, to find that the fact that the undertaking VA Tech, whose participation in the cartel – an infringement characterised as very serious, as noted in paragraph 212 above – was demonstrated by the Commission to the required legal standard, was deceived by the other participants to that cartel, which thereby attempted to obtain additional advantages to those which they obtained under the cartel, cannot render that undertaking’s conduct less serious. Therefore, such circumstances are not capable of constituting a mitigating circumstance and, in particular, do not show the exclusively passive or ‘follow-my-leader’ role of that undertaking within the cartel. – The application of the Leniency Notice 219 According to the case‐law, the reduction of fines for cooperation on the part of the undertakings participating in infringements of Community competition law is based on the consideration that such cooperation facilitates the Commission’s task of establishing the existence of an infringement and, where relevant, to bring it to an end (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C‐208/02 P and C-213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, ECR I‐5425, paragraph 399; Case T‐311/94 BPB de Eendracht v Commission [1998] ECR II‐1129, paragraph 325; Case T‐338/94 Finnboard v Commission [1998] ECR II‐1617, paragraph 363; and Case T‐347/94 Mayr‐Melnhof v Commission [1998] ECR II‐1751, paragraph 330). 220 As is stated in point 29 of the Leniency Notice, the notice has created legitimate expectations on which undertakings may rely when disclosing the existence of a cartel to the Commission. In view of the legitimate expectation which undertakings intending to cooperate with the Commission are able to derive from the notice, the Commission must therefore adhere to the notice when, for the purpose of determining the fine to be imposed on Siemens Österreich and KEG, it assesses their cooperation (see, to that effect and by analogy, Case T‐26/02 Daiichi Pharmaceutical v Commission [2006] ECR II‐713, paragraph 147 and the case‐law cited). 221 Within the limits laid down by the Leniency Notice, the Commission has a broad discretion in assessing whether the evidence provided by an undertaking represents added value within the meaning of point 22 of that notice and, on that basis, whether it is appropriate to grant a reduction to an undertaking under that notice (see, by analogy, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, paragraph 219 above, paragraphs 393 and 394, and Joined Cases T‐259/02 to T-264/02 and T‐271/02 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich and Others v Commission [2006] ECR II‐5169, paragraph 532). That assessment is the subject of limited review by the Court. 222 It should be noted, in that regard, that Siemens Österreich and KEG have not shown, to the required legal standard, that their contribution represented significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission’s possession, in the sense of point 21 of the Leniency Notice. It is for the applicants to indicate precisely the information provided by them to the Commission and how that information facilitated the Commission’s task of establishing the facts at issue. 223 In the present case, Siemens Österreich and KEG submit that, as regards the period from October 2002 to March 2004, the VA Tech Group drew up lists of GIS projects and meetings showing, in detail, which meetings VAS and its subsidiaries participated in and which GIS projects were actually discussed. That those indications helped the Commission to gather evidence of the infringement committed by the undertaking VA Tech and other undertakings is evidenced by the fact that, in recital 163 of the contested decision for example, the Commission lifted whole segments of the matters disclosed by the VA Tech Group. 224 The Commission, which does not deny having used the information provided by the VA Tech Group, noted, in recitals 539, 541 and 542 of the contested decision, that, all in all, it was already aware of those facts and that the VA Tech Group had thus not provided any evidence facilitating its task of establishing the facts at issue. The Commission also took account of the fact that the VA Tech Group denied certain facts which the Commission regarded as established and that it made contradictory statements, which did not facilitate the Commission’s conclusions. 225 It is apparent, from recital 163 of the contested decision – the only passage in the contested decision, referred to by Siemens Österreich and KEG, in which the Commission based its findings on the information produced by the VA Tech Group – that the claim that the Commission lifted ‘whole segments of the matters disclosed’ by the VA Tech Group is exaggerated. The only instance in which the Commission expressly referred to the declaration made by the VA Tech Group pursuant to the Leniency Notice was in relation to the fact that several GIS project packages in and outside Europe were discussed between October 2002 and February 2004. Even supposing the applicants were justified in claiming that it is because of them that the Commission gained access for the first time to the distinction made, as of 2002, between European project packages, referred to as ‘EP’, and other project packages, referred to as ‘P’, the added value of that information cannot be classed as significant for the purposes of point 21 of the Leniency Notice. 226 Siemens Österreich and KEG have not stated the extent to which the information disputed by the Commission facilitated the latter’s task of proving the facts in question, nor identified any other information among that supplied to the Commission which facilitated its task. 227 It follows that, in the light of the discretion granted to the Commission, under the case‐law cited in paragraph 221 above, it cannot be accused of having unlawfully refused to reduce the fine imposed on Siemens Österreich and KEG. 228 Consequently, that complaint must be rejected. B – The second plea, based on an infringement of substantial procedural requirements and, more specifically, of the applicants’ right to examine the witness against them, resulting from Article 6(3)(d) of the ECHR, and of the right to a fair hearing Arguments of the parties 229 The applicants submit, in essence, that the Commission infringed their right to examine the witness against them, one of the procedural guarantees stemming from Article 6(3)(d) of the ECHR and their right to a fair hearing. In finding that the undertaking VA Tech had resumed its participation in the infringement, through VAS, from 1 April 2002, the Commission relied on the statements of Mr M., ABB’s main witness, without respecting, from the outset, their right to examine or to have examined that witness against them. That procedural guarantee is even more essential as the witness in question has a personal interest in the present case in the applicants being fined heavily, given that the competitor undertaking which he represents is itself exempt from payment of its fine pursuant to the Leniency Notice, and that Article 19 of Regulation No 1/2003 does not, in any case, require him to see the truth. 230 The applicants submit that those principles are applicable to the procedure before the Commission in relation to cartels even though it is not a criminal procedure before a court, since the legal nature of fines for the purposes of Article 23 of Regulation No 1/2003 as sanctions in the broader sense is recognised. In any event, the procedure before the Court cannot remedy that irregularity by hearing that witness. 231 The Commission challenges the applicants’ arguments. Findings of the Court 232 It is settled case‐law that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the Community Courts ensure (Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I‐1759, paragraph 33, and Case C‐299/95 Kremzow [1997] ECR I‐2629, paragraph 14). For that purpose, the Court of Justice and the General Court draw inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international instruments for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they are signatories. In that regard, the ECHR has special significance (Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, paragraph 18, and Kremzow, paragraph 14). Furthermore, Article 6(2) EU states that the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law. 233 It is therefore necessary to examine whether, in the light of those considerations, the Commission failed to observe the rights of the defence, a fundamental principle of the Community legal order (Case 322/81 Nederlandsche Banden‐Industrie‐Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, paragraph 7), by not offering the applicants the possibility of examining the witness Mr M. directly. 234 In that regard, it should be noted that, according to the case‐law, that principle requires that the undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned be afforded the opportunity, from the stage of the administrative procedure, to make known their views on the truth and relevance of the facts, objections and circumstances put forward by the Commission (see Case T‐314/01 Avebe v Commission [2006] ECR II‐3085, paragraph 49 and the case‐law cited). By contrast, that principle does not require that those undertakings be afforded, in the administrative procedure, the opportunity themselves to cross-examine the witnesses heard by the Commission (see, to that effect, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, paragraph 52 above, paragraph 200). 235 Therefore, it is necessary to reject the second plea raised by the applicants. II – The applications for amendment 236 As is apparent from paragraphs 65 to 72 above, Article 1 of the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it finds that the applicants participated in an infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement in the period from 1 April to 30 June 2002. The result is a reduction, for all the applicants, in the duration of the infringement by three months compared with the duration determined in the contested decision. 237 In addition, as is apparent from paragraphs 137 to 167 above, Article 2 of the contested decision must be annulled in so far as concerns the calculation of the fine to be imposed on SEHV and Magrini and in so far as concerns the determination of the amounts to be paid jointly and severally by the applicants. 238 It should be noted, in that regard, that, where the examination of the pleas raised by an undertaking against the legality of a Commission decision imposing on it a fine for infringement of the Community competition rules has revealed an illegality, it is necessary for the Court to consider whether it must, under its unlimited jurisdiction, amend the contested decision (Case T‐59/02 Archer Daniels Midland v Commission [2006] ECR II‐3627, paragraph 443). 239 The applicants have requested the Court to reduce the fines imposed on them to a maximum of EUR 1 980 000 for Siemens Österreich and KEG, EUR 1 100 000 for Reyrolle and Magrini, and EUR 2 750 000 for SEHV. A – The fines imposed on SEHV and Magrini 240 The Court considers that it is necessary to amend the contested decision in so far as it concerns the calculation of the fines imposed on SEHV and Magrini and in so far as it concerns the determination of the amounts to be paid jointly and severally by them and the other companies with which they constituted an undertaking for the purposes of Community competition law during the period of their participation in the cartel. 241 Both the Commission and the applicants have affirmed, in their pleadings and/or at the hearing, that, in the present case, there were several possibilities for calculating the fines. In that regard, account needs to be taken of various considerations. First of all, the liability incurred by a company as a result of its participation in an infringement should in principle lead to a single fine, calculated in relation to the sum of the periods during which it participated in the infringement. Second, the fines imposed on the various companies belonging to the same undertaking throughout the duration of the infringement should be calculated on the basis of the economic power of that undertaking during the last full year of its participation in the infringement, in order to ensure that the fine is sufficiently dissuasive. Third, in the case where, as here, certain companies belonged to two different undertakings successively, for which different starting amounts were also calculated, it is, however, necessary to impose on those companies a fine made up of two separate amounts for each of the periods corresponding to the time they belonged to those two undertakings, in order to determine in an appropriate manner the amounts to be paid jointly and severally by the companies to which the infringement may be imputed. 242 Therefore, a fine needs to be set for SEHV and Magrini made up of two separate amounts for each of the periods of the infringement during which they were controlled by Schneider Electric and by VA Technologie respectively. 243 As regards the period from 1 July 2002 and 11 May 2004, during which SEHV and Magrini were controlled by VA Technologie, in the contested decision the Commission set a starting amount of EUR 9 000 000 for the fine imposed on the undertaking VA Tech. As is apparent from paragraphs 122 to 136 and 203 above, the applicants’ arguments are not such as to call that amount into question. 244 It is apparent from recital 492 of the contested decision that, on account of the duration of the infringement, the Commission increased the starting amounts, on the basis of the Guidelines, by 10% per full year of infringement and 5% for each additional period equal or additional to six months, but less than one year. The starting amount of EUR 9 000 000 of the fine for the undertaking VA Tech must therefore be increased by 15% to take account of the period of one year and ten months between 1 July 2002 and 11 May 2004, which results in a starting amount of EUR 10 350 000 (9 000 000 + 1 350 000) for the undertaking VA Tech which, in the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, corresponds to the amount of the fine. 245 That fine must be paid jointly and severally by Reyrolle, Siemens Österreich and KEG, SEHV and Magrini, which, during that period, formed an undertaking for the purposes of Community competition law. In accordance with the considerations set out in paragraphs 158 and 159 above, as between themselves, the joint and several debtors are each to bear a fifth of the amount of EUR 10 350 000. 246 As regards the fine for the period from 15 April 1988 to 13 December 2000, during which SEHV and Magrini belonged to the Schneider Group, in the contested decision the Commission set a starting amount of EUR 3 600 000 for the undertaking Schneider. As noted in paragraphs 176 to 179 above, the arguments of SEHV and Magrini are not such as to call that amount into question. In accordance with the Guidelines, that starting amount of the fine must be increased by 125% to take account of that period of twelve years and seven months, which results in a basic amount of EUR 8 1000 000 (3 600 000 + 4 500 000) for the undertaking Schneider which, in the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, corresponds to the amount of the fine. 247 That amount must be paid jointly and severally by Schneider Electric, SEHV and Magrini, which, during that period, formed an undertaking for the purposes of Community competition law. In accordance with the principle set out in paragraph 158 above, as between themselves, each of the joint and several debtors is to bear a third of the amount of EUR 8 100 000. 248 In that regard, first, it should be noted that the total amount of the fine imposed on Schneider Electric is unchanged from the one set in the contested decision. In addition, the allocation of the amounts to be paid jointly and severally under that fine is more in Schneider Electric’s favour than the fine determined in the contested decision. In such circumstances, the fact that Schneider Electric has not been heard does not prevent an amendment of the contested decision as indicated in the preceding paragraph. 249 Second, the Court does not consider it appropriate to follow the reasoning suggested by the Commission to justify its choice, in the contested decision, to impose on SEHV and Magrini only the part of the fine of the undertaking Schneider corresponding to the increase on account of the duration of the infringement. 250 Indeed, to order Schneider Electric to pay an amount which SEHV and Magrini would not be required to pay would presuppose that the Commission addresses an additional complaint to it, which either extends beyond the participation of its (former) subsidiaries SEHV and Magrini, or relates to a longer period. 251 However, there is no such an additional complaint in the contested decision. The Commission did state, in paragraph 29 of its rejoinder in Case T‐124/07, that ‘in principle, it is legitimate to impose an individual fine on Schneider Electric for its individual conduct’. However, it has not stated in the contested decision or in its pleadings before the Court what that individual conduct on the part of Schneider Electric consisted of and to what extent such conduct differs from that for which it was held liable for the participation in the cartel of its (former) subsidiaries. In addition, the Commission itself stated, in its replies to the written questions put by the Court, that that reference to ‘individual conduct’ should not be understood in the sense that it accuses Schneider Electric of conduct which goes beyond the facts complained of in respect of SEHV and Magrini. Finally, the Commission stated, in recital 423 of the contested decision, with no reservations, that it intended to hold Schneider Electric, SEHV and Magrini jointly and severally liable for the period from 15 April 1988 to 13 December 2000. 252 It follows that, since Schneider Electric, on the one hand, as a parent company, and SEHV and Magrini, on the other, as subsidiaries, together formed the undertaking Schneider, they must be held liable for the same amount, subject only to any aggravating or mitigating circumstances in relation to just one of the companies. It is established that such circumstances do not exist in the present case, neither in respect of Schneider Electric nor SEHV and Magrini. 253 In its reply to the written questions put by the Court, the Commission also stated that it had limited the joint and several liability of Schneider Electric and of its former subsidiaries to the part of the fine corresponding to the increase on account of the duration of the infringement, in order to prevent SEHV and Magrini from having to pay two starting amounts as a result of their turnover being taken into account to calculate the starting amount of the fine for both the undertaking VA Tech and the undertaking Schneider. The fine imposed on SEHV and Magrini, namely EUR 22 050 000, already includes a starting amount of EUR 9 000 000, which takes account of their turnover, among other things. It would therefore be unfair to make them also jointly and severally liable for the starting amount of the fine of the undertaking Schneider, namely EUR 3 600 000, based on the same turnover. 254 The Court considers that, since Article 2 of the contested decision has been annulled in so far as concerned the calculation of the fines imposed on SEHV and Magrini, it is not necessary to examine the relevance of the reasoning proposed by the Commission. That reasoning concerns the fines imposed in the contested decision, characterised by an approach whereby the amount of the fine imposed on SEHV and Magrini had to be calculated on the basis of a single starting amount for the entire duration of their participation in the cartel, without regard being had to the fact that those two companies belonged to two different undertakings successively. As amended by the Court, the fine for SEHV and Magrini is based on a separate calculation for each of the periods during which they belonged to the undertaking Schneider and the undertaking VA Tech. Accordingly, the starting amounts of the fines are not imposed twice for the same period. 255 In addition, the starting amount of a fine constitutes only a figure in the calculation algorithm applied to determine the basic amount of that fine applicable to an undertaking, and is not, in itself, a detachable part of the fine. On the contrary, the basic amount of the fine must be regarded as an indivisible sum, in the light of the collective liability of the various companies which constitute the undertaking concerned, with the result that the starting amount of that fine cannot, given the joint and several liability, be treated differently from the increase on account of the duration of the infringement – unlike the multipliers applied to take account of aggravating or mitigating circumstances which influence only the fines of companies in respect of which those circumstances arose or to which they may be imputed (see paragraph 252 above). 256 Thus, SEHV, Magrini and Schneider Electric are required to pay jointly and severally the fine of EUR 8 100 000 imposed on them for their participation in the cartel during the period prior to 13 March 2001, during which they belonged to the same undertaking. 257 Therefore, a total fine of EUR 18 450 000 is imposed on SEHV and Magrini. B – The fines imposed on Reyrolle, Siemens Österreich and KEG 258 The Court considers that it is necessary to amend the contested decision in so far as it concerns the calculation of the fines imposed on Siemens Österreich, KEG and Reyrolle and in so far as it concerns the amounts to be paid jointly and severally by them and the other companies with which they constituted an undertaking for the purposes of Community competition law during the period of their participation in the cartel. 259 As is apparent from recitals 506 and 507 of the contested decision, the Commission held Reyrolle liable for an infringement of a duration of 14 years and 9 months and Siemens Österreich and KEG liable for an infringement of a duration of 4 years and 4 months. 260 Therefore, as is apparent from paragraph 72 above, Article 1 of the contested decision must be annulled in so far as the Commission found therein an infringement on the part of the applicants for the period from 1 April to 30 June 2002, the duration of the infringement imputed to them must be reduced by 3 months, bringing it to 14 years and 6 months for Reyrolle and 4 years and 1 month for Siemens Österreich and KEG. 261 The Guidelines provide for an increase of 10% per full year of infringement and 5% for every additional period equal to or greater than six months, but less than one year. Therefore, the reduction of the duration of the infringement by three months for Reyrolle, Siemens Österreich and KEG does not lead to a reduction in the increase made on account of duration which is applied to them. That increase thus remains 145% for Reyrolle and 40% for Siemens Österreich and KEG. It follows that the basic amounts of their fines – which, in the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, correspond to the amounts of their fines – remain unchanged, namely EUR 22 050 000 and EUR 12 600 000 respectively. 262 In accordance with the findings made by the Commission in recital 468 of the contested decision and taking account both of the three month reduction in the duration of the infringement for all the applicants and of the calculation of the amount of the fine for SEHV and Magrini in paragraph 244 above, of the EUR 22 050 000 imposed on Reyrolle, an initial amount of EUR 10 350 000 must be paid jointly and severally by Siemens Österreich, KEG, SEHV and Magrini. As noted in paragraph 245 above, in their relations among themselves, each of the joint and several debtors is to bear a fifth of the amount of EUR 10 350 000. 263 In addition, of the fine of EUR 22 050 000 imposed on Reyrolle, a second amount of EUR 2 250 000 must be paid jointly and severally by Siemens Österreich and KEG. In accordance with the considerations set out in paragraphs 158 and 159 above, each of the joint and several debtors is to bear a third of that amount. 264 Finally, of the fine of EUR 22 050 000 imposed on Reyrolle, that company is to bear only EUR 9 450 000. 265 As for the remainder, the applications for amendment of the contested decision must be dismissed. Costs 266 Pursuant to Article 87(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may order that the costs be shared or that each party bear its own costs where each party succeeds on some and fails on other heads. 267 In Case T‐122/07, since the action has been upheld in part, the Court will make an equitable assessment of the case in holding that the Commission is to pay one tenth of the costs incurred by Siemens Österreich and KEG and one tenth of its own costs. Siemens Österreich and KEG will pay nine tenths of their own costs and nine tenths of the costs incurred by the Commission. 268 In Case T‐123/07, since the action has been upheld in part, the Court will make an equitable assessment of the case in holding that the Commission is to pay one tenth of the costs incurred by Reyrolle and one tenth of its own costs. Reyrolle will pay nine tenths of its own costs and nine tenths of the costs incurred by the Commission. 269 In Case T‐124/07, since the action has been upheld in part, the Court will make an equitable assessment of the case in holding that the Commission is to pay one fifth of the costs incurred by SEHV and Magrini and one fifth of its own costs. SEHV and Magrini will pay four fifths of their own costs and four fifths of the costs incurred by the Commission. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber) hereby: 1. Annuls Article 1(m), (p), (q), (r) and (t) of Commission Decision C(2006) 6762 final of 24 January 2007 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/F/38.899 – Gas insulated switchgear), in so far as the Commission found therein an infringement on the part of Siemens AG Österreich, VA Tech Transmission & Distribution GmbH & Co. KEG, Siemens Transmission & Distribution Ltd, Siemens Transmission & Distribution SA and Nuova Magrini Galileo SpA, for the period from 1 April to 30 June 2002; 2. Annuls Article 2(j), (k) and (l) of Decision C(2006) 6762 final; 3. Imposes the following fines for the infringements found in Article 1(m), (p), (q), (r) and (t) of Decision C(2006) 6762 final: – Siemens Transmission & Distribution SA and Nuova Magrini Galileo, jointly and severally with Schneider Electric SA: EUR 8 100 000; – Siemens Transmission & Distribution Ltd, jointly and severally with Siemens AG Österreich, VA Tech Transmission & Distribution GmbH & Co. KEG, Siemens Transmission & Distribution SA and Nuova Magrini Galileo: EUR 10 350 000; – Siemens Transmission & Distribution Ltd, jointly and severally liable with Siemens AG Österreich and VA Tech Transmission & Distribution GmbH & Co. KEG: EUR 2 250 000; – Siemens Transmission & Distribution Ltd: EUR 9 450 000; 4. Dismisses the remainder of the actions; 5. In Case T‐122/07, orders the European Commission to pay one tenth of the costs incurred by Siemens AG Österreich and VA Tech Transmission & Distribution GmbH & Co. KEG and one tenth of its own costs, and orders Siemens AG Österreich and VA Tech Transmission & Distribution GmbH & Co. KEG to pay nine tenths of their own costs and nine tenths of the costs incurred by the Commission; 6. In Case T‐123/07, orders the Commission to pay one tenth of the costs incurred by Siemens Transmission & Distribution Ltd and one tenth of its own costs, and orders Siemens Transmission & Distribution Ltd to pay nine tenths of their own costs and nine tenths of the costs incurred by the Commission; 7. In Case T‐124/07, orders the Commission to pay one fifth of the costs incurred by Siemens Transmission & Distribution SA and Nuova Magrini Galileo and one fifth of its own costs, and orders Siemens Transmission & Distribution SA and Nuova Magrini Galileo to pay four fifths of their own costs and four fifths of the costs incurred by the Commission. Pelikánová Jürimäe Soldevila Fragoso Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 3 March 2001. [Signatures] Table of contents Background to the dispute I – Applicants and the VA Tech Group II – GIS and the prelitigation procedure III – Contested decision Procedure and forms of order sought by the parties Law I – The actions for annulment A – The first plea, based on an infringement of Article 81 EC, Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement, and certain provisions of Regulation No 1/2003 1. Lack of evidence of the alleged infringement a) Arguments of the parties b) Findings of the Court 2. Errors of assessment in respect of the duration of the alleged infringement a) The date on which the applicants discontinued their participation in the infringement Arguments of the parties Findings of the Court b) The date on which the undertaking VA Tech resumed its participation in the infringement Arguments of the parties Findings of the Court c) The end date of the infringement Arguments of the parties Findings of the Court 3. The part alleging that the alleged infringement was time-barred for the period prior to 16 July 1998 a) Arguments of the parties b) Findings of the Court 4. The part alleging that the fines imposed are excessive a) The first four complaints alleging, in essence, an erroneous application by the Commission of the concept of undertaking for the purposes of Community competition law Arguments of the parties Findings of the Court – The principle that penalties must be specific to the offender and the offence – The various companies to which the conduct of the undertakings which participated in the cartel may be attributed and the application of the rules governing the joint and several liability for payment of fines – The failure to take account of the particular circumstances of Reyrolle, SEHV and Magrini when applying to them the starting amount calculated for the undertaking VA Tech – The increase as a result of the duration of the infringement – The ceiling of 10% of turnover b) The fifth complaint, alleging that the Commission erroneously held Reyrolle liable in addition to its parent company Arguments of the parties Findings of the Court c) The sixth complaint, based on an infringement of the principle ne bis in idem Arguments of the parties Findings of the Court d) The seventh complaint, based on the failure to reduce the fine Arguments of the parties Findings of the Court – The mitigating circumstances – The application of the Leniency Notice B – The second plea, based on an infringement of substantial procedural requirements and, more specifically, of the applicants’ right to examine the witness against them, resulting from Article 6(3)(d) of the ECHR, and of the right to a fair hearing Arguments of the parties Findings of the Court II – The applications for amendment A – The fines imposed on SEHV and Magrini B – The fines imposed on Reyrolle, Siemens Österreich and KEG Costs Language of the case: German.
de	wikipedia	N/A	Das Konsum-Investitions-Problem ist ein Standardproblem der modernen Finanzökonomik. Es stellt die Frage, wie ein risikoscheuer Konsument über seinen Lebenszyklus sein verfügbares Finanz- und Humankapital intertemporal anlegen und wie viel er zu jedem Zeitpunkt konsumieren sollte (d. h. wie hoch seine Sparquote sein sollte und welches Portfolio er für sein Anlagevermögen wählen sollte). Es lässt sich als stochastisches Optimierungsproblem über eine kontinuierliche brownsche Bewegung darstellen und wurde in seiner Grundform 1969 von Robert C. Merton für Stiftungen mit fester sowie mit unendlicher Lebensdauer mithilfe des Lemma von Itō gelöst. Eine zentrale Einsicht von Mertons Modell ist, dass ein Anleger mit Standard-CRRA-Nutzenfunktion „kurzfristig“ anlegt; langfristige Anlage die Risiken nicht senkt. Des Weiteren ergibt sich, dass die Tobin-Separation aufrechterhalten werden kann. Risiko äußert sich im Modell konkret darin, dass die Sparquote und damit das für den Konsum verfügbare Kapital mit dem Kapitalmarkt schwankt: Erzielt der Kapitalmarkt Verluste, muss die Sparquote erhöht werden und umgekehrt. Sie ist nicht mehr nur abstrakt Schwankung der Größe des Vermögens. Das Mertons Modell überwindet damit die Defizite des Kapitalgutpreismodells. Verfeinerungen des Modells berücksichtigen Transaktionskosten, Rentenalterwahl, Insolvenz, menschentypische Lebenszyklen (d. h. stochastische Sterblichkeit) und andere Faktoren. Mertons Modell ist das Standardmodell für rationale, den gesamten Lebenszyklus berücksichtigende Finanzplanung geworden. Quellen Finanzierung
nl	legislation	Belgium	Artikel 1 . Deze wet regelt een aangelegenheid als bedoeld in artikel 78 van de Grondwet. Art. 2 . In artikel 275 6 van het Wetboek van inkomstenbelastingen 1992, laatstelijk gewijzigd bij de wet van 22 december 2009, worden de volgende wijzigingen aangebracht : 1° in het tweede lid worden de woorden " minstens 12 jaar oud zijn en " opgeheven; 2° het derde lid wordt vervangen als volgt : " Voor de toepassing van het tweede lid wordt verstaan onder bedragen besteed aan de opleiding van jonge sportbeoefenaars, de bezoldiging van personen belast met de opleiding, begeleiding of ondersteuning van deze jonge sportbeoefenaars in hun sportbeoefening en de bezoldiging van de jonge sportbeoefenaars. De bezoldiging van jonge sportbeoefenaars omvat de betaalde of toegekende bezoldiging tot maximaal van het achtvoud van het bedrag bedoeld in artikel 2, § 1, van de wet van 24 februari 1978 betreffende de arbeidsovereenkomst voor betaalde sportbeoefenaars en de ermee verband houdende kosten bedoeld in artikel 52, 3°. " Art. 3. Deze wet heeft uitwerking met ingang van 1 juli 2010. Kondigen deze wet af, bevelen dat zij met 's Lands zegel zal worden bekleed en door het Belgisch Staatsblad zal worden bekendgemaakt. Gegeven te Brussel, 28 april 2011. ALBERT Van Koningswege : De Vice-Eerste Minister en Minister van Financiën, D. REYNDERS Met 's Lands zegel gezegeld : De Minister van Justitie, S. DE CLERCK
fr	wikipedia	N/A	L'Open des trois rois 2020 est un tournoi de snooker pro-am comptant pour la saison 2019-2020. L'épreuve s'est tenue du 2 au 5 janvier 2020 à la Patricks Candian Taverne de Rankweil, en Autriche. Elle est organisée par la WPBSA. Déroulement Format Les joueurs ont été répartis en quatorze groupes de quatre joueurs, dans lesquels les deux premiers se qualifient pour les phases finales. Faits marquants Il s'agit de la treizième édition de ce tournoi. Elle a réuni des amateurs et deux joueurs professionnels. Les professionnels s'affrontent en finale, Luca Brecel dominant le Suisse Alexander Ursenbacher sur le score de 5 manches à 2, en réalisant quatre demi-centuries et un century. Il a par ailleurs réalisé le meilleur break du tournoi avec une série de 128 points. Dotation La répartition des prix est la suivante : Vainqueur : Finaliste : Demi-finalistes : Quart de finalistes : de finalistes : Dotation totale : Phases de groupe Sources Les matchs ont été disputés au meilleur des trois manches. Groupe A Mario He 2-0 Sandro Hasenfratz Jenson Schmid 0-2 Pedro Chacon Mario He 2-0 Pedro Chacon Jenson Schmid 1-2 Sandro Hasenfratz Mario He 2-0 Jenson Schmid Pedro Chacon 2-0 Sandro Hasenfratz Groupe B Thomas Janzso 2-0 Patrick Rohner Atmar Abdullah 2-1 Urs Freitag Thomas Janzso 2-0 Urs Freitag Atmar Abdullah 2-1 Patrick Rohner Thomas Janzso 2-0 Atmar Abdullah Urs Freitag 2-1 Patrick Rohner Groupe C Jürgen Kesseler 2-0 Dominik Haug Bernhard Wallner 2-1 Aref Hussaini Jürgen Kesseler 2-1 Aref Hussaini Bernhard Wallner 2-0 Dominik Haug Jürgen Kesseler 2-1 Bernhard Wallner Aref Hussaini 2-0 Dominik Haug Groupe D Hans Nirnberger 2-0 Patrik Schmid Thomas Gsteu 0-2 Umar Ali Shaikh Hans Nirnberger 2-0 Umar Ali Shaikh Thomas Gsteu 2-1 Patrik Schmid Hans Nirnberger 2-0 Thomas Gsteu Umar Ali Shaikh 2-0 Patrik Schmid Groupe E Markuss Pfistermüller 1-2 Omar Alkojah Fidan Qerkinaj 2-1 Robin Otto Markuss Pfistermüller 2-1 Robin Otto Fidan Qerkinaj 0-2 Omar Alkojah Markuss Pfistermüller 2-1 Fidan Qerkinaj Robin Otto 0-2 Omar Alkojah Groupe F Kevin Wegmann 2-0 Alexander Huber Suphi Yalman 2-1 Clausdieter Franschitz Kevin Wegmann 2-0 Clausdieter Franschitz Suphi Yalman 2-0 Alexander Huber Kevin Wegmann 0-2 Suphi Yalman Clausdieter Franschitz 2-1 Alexander Huber Groupe G Richard Wienold 2-0 Jerome Liedtke Uwe Kleinschmidt 0-2 Roger Hohl Richard Wienold 2-0 Roger Hohl Uwe Kleinschmidt 0-2 Jerome Liedtke Richard Wienold 2-0 Uwe Kleinschmidt Roger Hohl 1-2 Jerome Liedtke Groupe H Luca Brecel 2-0 Christopher Jaritz Lorenz Propst 0-2 Günter Kalser Luca Brecel 2-0 Günter Kalser Lorenz Propst 2-0 Christopher Jaritz Luca Brecel 2-0 Lorenz Propst Günter Kalser 2-1 Christopher Jaritz Groupe I Alexander Ursenbacher 2-0 Alexander Trinkl Daniel Schneider 0 -2 Mario Grabner Alexander Ursenbacher 2-1 Mario Grabner Daniel Schneider 0 -2 Alexander Trinkl Alexander Ursenbacher 2-0 Daniel Schneider Mario Grabner 2-1 Alexander Trinkl Groupe J Andreas Ploner 2-0 Jamshid Kharazchi Mike Toth 2-1 Florian Hinterschuster Andreas Ploner 2-1 Florian Hinterschuster Mike Toth 2-0 Jamshid Kharazchi Andreas Ploner 2-0 Mike Toth Florian Hinterschuster 2-0 Jamshid Kharazchi Groupe K Sebastian Hainzl 2-0 Patrik Oberkofler Jürg Alder 0-2 Thomas Brünner Sebastian Hainzl 2-0 Thomas Brünner Jürg Alder 1-2 Patrik Oberkofler Sebastian Hainzl 2-0 Jürg Alder Thomas Brünner 2-0 Patrik Oberkofler Groupe L Paul Schopf 2-0 Rafael Giger Gianmarco Tonini 2-0 Sinan Cetinkaya Paul Schopf 2-0 Sinan Cetinkaya Gianmarco Tonini 2-0 Rafael Giger Paul Schopf 2-0 Gianmarco Tonini Sinan Cetinkaya 2-0 Rafael Giger Groupe M Soner Sari 2-0 Jan Egermann Tiziano Guerra 2-0 Rainer Sikuta Soner Sari 2-0 Rainer Sikuta Tiziano Guerra 1-2 Jan Egermann Soner Sari 2-0 Tiziano Guerra Rainer Sikuta 2-0 Jan Egermann Groupe N Marvin Losi 0-2 Sybren Sokolowski Andreas Hartung 0-2 Alexander Tröster Marvin Losi 2-0 Alexander Tröster Andreas Hartung 0-2 Sybren Sokolowski Marvin Losi 2-0 Andreas Hartung Alexander Tröster 0-2 Sybren Sokolowski Phases finales Source Finale Centuries Total : 5 128, 121, 116 Luca Brecel 120, 113 Alexander Ursenbacher Références Voir aussi Articles connexes Snooker Glossaire du billard Classement mondial de snooker Snooker en 2020 Open des trois rois de snooker
en	caselaw	US	In the United States Court of Federal Claims No. 14-492 T Filed: January 12, 2015 **************************************** * Motion to Dismiss, RCFC 12(b)(1); * 26 U.S.C. § 1346 (United States as * defendant); HARPER INTERNATIONAL CORP., * 26 U.S.C. § 6511 (Limitations on * credit or refund); Plaintiff, * 26 U.S.C. § 6532 (Statute of * Limitations for tax refund claims); v. * 26 U.S.C. § 7422 (Jurisdictional * prerequisites for tax refund THE UNITED STATES, * claims); * 26 C.F.R. § 301.7502-1 (Timely Defendant. * mailing of documents and * payments treated as timely filed * and paying). * **************************************** Michael A. Thompson, Zerbe, Fingeret, Frank & Jadav, P.C., Houston, Texas, Counsel for Plaintiff. Jennifer D. Auchterlonie, United States Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, D.C., Counsel for the Government. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND FINAL ORDER BRADEN, Judge. I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND. 1 Harper International Corp. (“Harper” or “Plaintiff”) is a New York corporation engaged in the design and production of thermal processing solutions and technical services for the production of advanced materials. Compl. ¶¶ 5–8. During the 2005–2009 tax years, Harper “engaged in the development of . . . thermal processing solutions, for which qualified research activities were undertaken.” Compl. ¶ 9. 1 The relevant facts discussed herein were derived from: the June 9, 2014 Complaint (“Compl.”) and Exhibit A attached thereto (“Compl. Ex. A”); an Exhibit to the Government’s August 8, 2014 Motion To Dismiss (“Gov’t Mot. Ex.”); and an Exhibit to the Government’s September 22, 2014 Reply (“Gov’t Reply Ex.”). On unspecified dates, Harper filed amended tax returns for the 2005 and 2006 tax years with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) that claimed $659,800 for qualified research expenses in 2006. Compl. ¶¶ 10–11. Based on the $659,800 in qualified research expenses, Harper claims that it is owed $42,887, as a refund for a research credit, which should be increased to $444,166, “[d]ue to changes in tax regulations and legal precedent.” Compl. ¶ 12; see also Compl. ¶¶ 1, 10. On May 2, 2012, the IRS issued a Notice of Disallowance via certified mail. Gov’t Mot. Ex. 1. The May 2, 2012 Notice stated that, if Harper wanted to contest the tax due, penalties, or other monies, it must file suit either with a United States District Court having venue or with the United States Court of Federal Claims “within 2 years from the mailing date of this letter.” Gov’t Mot. Ex. 1. In June 2012, Harper also received an uncertified note from the IRS, dated June 5, 2012, advising Harper that the IRS found “no basis to change the original determination to sustain the penalties.” Compl. Ex. A. The IRS further advised Harper that “a formal notice of claim disallowance” will be issued and that Harper “will have two years from the date of this formal claim disallowance to bring formal suit.” Compl. Ex. A. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY. On June 9, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the IRS’s disallowance for the tax year ending December 2006 is erroneous and that Plaintiff is entitled to: the full amount of the disallowed research credit for the tax year ending December 2006, in the amount of $444,166; utilize the carry-over general business credit from the 2005 tax year, in the amount of $273,071; the maximum interest under the applicable tax laws; and its costs. Compl. ¶¶ 22–26. On August 8, 2014, the Government filed a Motion To Dismiss, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1) (“Gov’t Mot.”). On September 5, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Response (“Pl. Resp.”). On September 22, 2014, the Government filed a Reply (“Gov’t Reply”). III. DISCUSSION. A. Jurisdiction. Section 1346(a)(1) provides that the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over: Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal- revenue laws[.] 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1); see also N.Y. Life Ins. v. United States, 118 F.3d 1553, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that the United States Court of Federal Claims has “jurisdiction over suits seeking the return of money improperly paid to, exacted or retained by the government”). 2 As a jurisdictional prerequisite, however, the taxpayer must first file a timely claim with the IRS. See 26 U.S.C. § 7422 2; 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a) 3 (setting forth the statute of limitations for tax refund claims). Next, the tax due must be paid in full. See Shore v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that a tax refund claim must be dismissed if the “principal tax deficiency has not been paid in full”). If the IRS denies a refund claim, the taxpayer may timely file a suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims that has jurisdiction to adjudicate tax refund claims. See 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a) 4; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (recognizing the United States Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction to adjudicate civil actions for taxes “erroneously or illegally assessed or collected”). B. Standard Of Review For A Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To RCFC 12(b)(1). A challenge to the United States Court of Federal Claims’ “general power to adjudicate in specific areas of substantive law . . . is properly raised by a [Rule] 12(b)(1) motion.” Palmer v. United States, 168 F.3d 1310, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also RCFC 12(b)(1) (allowing a party to assert, by motion, “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction”). When considering whether to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court is “obligated to 2 Section 7422 of the Internal Revenue Code provides, in relevant part: No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary[.] 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a). 3 Section 6511(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides, in relevant part: Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title in respect of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer, within 2 years from the time the tax was paid. 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a). 4 Section 6532(a) of the Internal Revenue provides, in relevant part: No suit or proceeding under section 7422(a) for the recovery of any internal revenue tax, penalty, or other sum, shall be begun . . . after the expiration of 2 years from the date of mailing by certified mail or registered mail by the Secretary to the taxpayer or a notice of the disallowance of the part of the claim to which the suit or proceeding relates. 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1). 3 assume all factual allegations [of the complaint] to be true and to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor.” Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995). C. The Government’s August 8, 2014 Motion To Dismiss. 1. The Government’s Argument. The Government moves to dismiss the June 9, 2014 Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because it is barred by the two-year period of limitation for commencing tax-refund suits under 26 U.S.C. § 6532. Gov’t Mot. at 1. The Government argues that the statute of limitations expired on May 2, 2014, because the IRS notified Plaintiff by certified mail on May 2, 2012 that its 2006 refund claim was disallowed. Gov’t Mot. at 3. Therefore, the June 9, 2014 Complaint is untimely and must be dismissed. Gov’t Mot. at 3. 2. The Plaintiff’s Response. Plaintiff responds that there is no evidence of the mailing date of the Government’s May 2, 2012 Notice and that the Government “has not shown evidence necessary of when the limitations period began and ended.” Pl. Resp. at 6. Instead, Plaintiff justifiably relied on the IRS’s June 5, 2012 Note that states Plaintiff will be “issued a formal notice of claim disallowance” and “will have two years from the date of this formal claim disallowance to bring formal suit.” Compl. Ex. A. In addition, the accrual date for the statute of limitations “may commence on subsequent communications regarding disallowance when the totality of the factual circumstances show that the taxpayer justifiably relied upon [a] misleading communication by the IRS.” Pl. Resp. at 6; see also Se. Bank of Orlando v. United States, 676 F.2d 660, 664 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (holding that “the time for filing should be extended when the claimant is understandably confused by a second notice of disallowance, and acts reasonably”); Haber v. United States, 831 F.2d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that “taxpayers and the court can and should reasonably view the second disallowance as incorporating a reconsideration of the . . . claim previously rejected”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Miller v. United States, 500 F.2d 1007, 1011 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that, when the taxpayer’s “reliance on the erroneously issued disallowance notice was not unreasonable[,] . . . the government is estopped from raising the earlier deadline as a bar” to an action (citing Beardsley v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 775, 777 (D. Conn. 1954) (holding that statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date of notice of reaffirmance of the disallowance))). In this case, the expiration date of the statute of limitations was June 5, 2014, and Plaintiff timely filed the June 9, 2014 Complaint with the United States Court of Federal Claims by sending it via certified mail on June 4, 2014. Pl. Resp. at 8. Under the “mailbox rule” set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 301.7502-1(c)(2), 5 a document is considered filed on the date that it was 5 26 C.F.R. § 301.7502-1(c)(2) provides: If the document or payment is sent by U.S. registered mail, the date of registration . . . is treated as the postmark date. If the document or payment is sent by U.S. certified mail and the sender’s receipt is postmarked by the postal 4 placed in the mail, as reflected by the postmark. Pl. Resp. at 7–8. Therefore, the court should deny the Government’s Motion To Dismiss. Pl. Resp. at 9. 3. The Government’s Reply. The Government replies that the May 2, 2012 Notice governs because it: was printed on IRS letterhead; contained a certified mail number; is addressed to the taxpayer; identified the tax year at issue; described the subject of the refund claim regarding research activities; and provided the IRS’s denial of that claim. Gov’t Reply at 3. In addition, the IRS included a Declaration of Counsel of Record and a copy of the certified mail receipt, confirming that the Notice was mailed on May 2, 2012 and received by Plaintiff in Lancaster, New York, on May 4, 2014. Gov’t Reply at 4; see also Dkt. No. 8. Therefore, the two-year statute of limitations expired on May 2, 2014. Gov’t Reply at 4. The June 5, 2012 Note was not mailed to Plaintiff via certified or registered mail, and it simply affirmed the assessed penalties set forth in the May 2, 2012 Notice. Gov’t Reply at 5. As such, it was not a formal notice of disallowance. Gov’t Reply at 5. Nevertheless, even if the court measures the two-year limitations period from June 5, 2012, Plaintiff’s June 9, 2014 Complaint is still untimely and must be dismissed, because it was filed more than two years after June 5, 2012. Gov’t Reply at 6. The “mailbox rule” set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 301.7502-1(c)(2) does not apply to any court other than the United States Tax Court. Gov’t Reply at 6. (citing 26 C.F.R. § 301.7502-1(b)(1)(iii) (“The term does not include any document filed in any court other than the Tax Court.”)). The court’s rules previously contained a provision “that would have allowed [P]laintiff to seek a corrective order under this [c]ourt’s decision in Charlson Realty Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 434 (Ct. Cl. 1967).” Gov’t Reply at 7. Former RCFC 3(b)(2)(c): allowed the court to deem a complaint filed on the last date allowed by a statute of limitations, if the plaintiff established the following three elements in its motion for a corrective order: 1) that the complaint was sent by registered or certified mail, properly addressed to the clerk of the court; 2) that the complaint was deposited in the mail sufficiently in advance of the last date allowed for filing to provide for receipt by the clerk on or before such date in the ordinary course of the mail; and 3) that the plaintiff exercised no control over the mailing after it was deposited and before it was delivered to the court. employee to whom the document or payment is presented, the date of the U.S. postmark on the receipt is treated as the postmark date of the document or payment. Accordingly, the risk that the document or payment will not be postmarked on the date that it is deposited in the mail may be eliminated by the use of registered or certified mail. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7502-1(c)(2). 5 Gov’t Reply at 7 (citing Walther v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 74, 76 (2002) (setting forth the three requirements for a corrective order under former RCFC 3(b)(2)(C)). But, this rule is no longer in effect, 6 so Plaintiff may not seek a corrective order. Gov’t Reply at 7. In addition, Plaintiff fails to establish that it sent the June 9, 2014 Complaint “sufficiently in advance of the last date allowed for filing to provide for receipt by the clerk on or before such date in the ordinary course of mail,” because the Complaint was mailed from Houston, Texas on June 4, 2014, one day before the statute of limitations expired. Gov’t Reply at 7–8. In addition, Plaintiff did not provide any evidence that the Complaint should be deemed filed any date earlier than June 9, 2014. Gov’t Reply at 8. Therefore, the June 9, 2014 Complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Gov’t Reply at 8. 4. The Court’s Resolution. Section 6532(a)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that: Any consideration, reconsideration, or action by the Secretary with respect to such claim following the mailing of a notice by certified mail or registered mail of disallowance shall not operate to extend the period within which suit may be begun. 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(4). a. Plaintiff Did Not Reasonably Rely On The Internal Revenue Service’s June 5, 2012 Note. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that Section 6532(a)(4) of the IRS Code “explicitly prohibits equitable considerations based on the actions of the IRS after a notice is mailed.” RHI Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 142 F.3d 1459, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Marcinkowsky v. United States, 206 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that 26 U.S.C. § 6532 contains no equitable exception). Plaintiff cites four cases as support for the proposition that the June 5, 2012 Note extended the statute of limitations period. Pl. Resp. at 6–7. First, in Se. Bank of Orlando, the taxpayers filed a second claim for a refund after the IRS rejected their first claim. See 676 F.2d 660. But, the IRS rejected the second claim, because the second notice should be reasonably viewed as “incorporating a reconsideration of the . . . claim previously rejected”; so that “a formal reconsideration and disallowance of this type begins a new period of limitations for suit.” Id. at 662. In this case, however, the June 5, 2012 Note was not formal and was not a reconsideration of the first notice of disallowance. See Compl. Ex. A (stating the required steps before issuance of a formal notice of claim disallowance). And, at the bottom of the June 5, 2012 Note, the IRS stated that “[Plaintiff] will then be issued a formal notice of claim 6 See RCFC 3(b)(2)(c), United States Court of Federal Claims Rules Committee, Notes (2002 Revision) (stating that “former subdivision (b) [of RCFC 3(b)], which addressed disputes regarding filing dates, was deleted—both in the interest of uniformity and in the belief that it was inappropriate to include a rule of decision as part of a procedural rule”). 6 disallowance” and that “[Plaintiff] will have two years from the date of this formal claim disallowance to bring formal suit.” Compl. Ex. A. Thereafter, the June 5, 2012 Note confirmed the IRS’s “original determination to sustain the penalties” and was not a formal notice of disallowance. Compl. Ex. A. As such, Plaintiff did not reasonably rely on the June 5, 2012 Note. See Henry v. United States, 870 F.2d 634 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that the plaintiff failed to show reasonable reliance when the IRS formally disallowed the plaintiff’s claim after the plaintiff waived the requirement that the IRS send a notice of disallowance). Second, in Haber, IRS personnel orally directed the taxpayer’s accountant to ignore an initial notice of disallowance, but sent a substitute notice to the taxpayer, without referencing the previous notice, to which it was substantially identical. See 831 F.2d at 1051–52. Therefore, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that “[o]n the totality of circumstances . . . [the] taxpayer was entitled to rely on the IRS[’s] oral representation that the notice was withdrawn.” Id. at 1053–54. In contrast, in this case, the IRS did not withdraw the May 2, 2012 Notice. Third, in Miller, the taxpayers waived the notice requirement under 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(3), and the IRS misplaced the waiver form and sent a disallowance notice eighteen months later. See 500 F.2d 1007. According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 26 U.S.C. § 6532 “merely nullifies any informal reconsideration after a formal disallowance notice of waiver.” Id. at 1010. Because both the waiver form and the disallowance notice were equally formal, that appellate court held that the taxpayers’ “reliance on the erroneously issued disallowance notice was not unreasonable” and that the Government was estopped from raising the earlier deadline as a bar to the action. Id. at 1011. Finally, Beardsley concerned a situation when the IRS withdrew the original notice of disallowance, instructed the taxpayers to ignore the notice, and substituted a customary thirty- day notice. See 126 F. Supp. 775. The District Court held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date of notice of reaffirmance of the disallowance. Id. at 777. In this case, the text of the June 5, 2012 Note does reflect an error by the IRS, i.e., the IRS informed Harper that it would receive a formal notice of disallowance in the future, although the IRS had already sent the formal May 2, 2012 Notice to that effect. Compl. Ex. A. This may have confused Plaintiff, who may have been waiting for the forthcoming formal notice before filing the Complaint. But, “even failure to follow an agency practice manual, the provisions of which are not mandated by the Constitution, Federal statute or Federal regulation, has not been held as automatic grounds for estoppel against the government.” Henry v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 795, 800 (1988) (citing Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981)), aff’d, 870 F.2d 634 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that “even if reasonable reliance and the other traditional elements of estoppel had been shown . . . [plaintiff] has failed to show . . . affirmative misconduct[.]”). In sum, although the IRS made a procedural mistake, that fact does not relieve the taxpayer of filing a timely protest. 7 b. Plaintiff Failed To File Suit Before The Expiration Of The Statute Of Limitations. Even if the court measures the two-year limitations period beginning on the date the June 5, 2012 Note was sent, the June 9, 2014 Complaint in this case was filed too late, because the Complaint was filed more than two years after June 5, 2012. Plaintiff argues that under the “mailbox rule” set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 301.7502-1(c)(2), a document is considered filed on the date it was placed in the mail, as reflected by the postmark. Pl. Resp. at 7. The “mailbox rule,” however, “does not include any document filed in any court other than the Tax Court[,]” 26 C.F.R. § 301.7502-1(b)(1)(iii), and under the RCFC 3, “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” As such, this case was filed out of time. Plaintiff’s reliance on Charlson Realty is misplaced. In that case, the plaintiff, a Minnesota corporation, filed two claims for a refund. See 384 F.2d at 438. The District Director of the IRS notified the taxpayer by certified mail that its second claim for refund was disallowed on December 6, 1960. Id. The plaintiff filed suit by mailing its petition via First Class certified mail at the post office in St. Paul, Minnesota, on Friday, November 30, 1962. See id. at 441. The expert postal employees testified that this First Class letter would arrive in Washington, D.C. on December 1, 2, or 3, 1962, and at the court in due course of mails on December 3, 4, or 5, 1962. See id. The mail was stamped December 7, 1962 by the guard of the court at the front door, and the plaintiff’s petition was marked filed on December 7, 1962, one day after the last day of the statute of limitations. See id. at 442. The court held that because the plaintiff “did everything that could be reasonably expected of it in the mailing of its petition to [the] court[,]” the court assumed that the petition was “mailed in plenty of time for it to reach the court in due course of the mails within the limitation period.” Id. at 445. Moreover, this presumption was conclusive, because “it ha[d] not been rebutted by direct, positive, clear and convincing evidence.” Id. In this case, Plaintiff mailed the Complaint from Houston, Texas, on June 4, 2014, one day before the statute of limitations expired. Plaintiff, however, proffered no evidence indicating that it selected next day delivery or overnight delivery. In other words, Plaintiff did not “d[o] everything that could be reasonably expected” to assure the Complaint would reach the court by June 5, 2014. Id. As such, Plaintiff failed to establish that the Complaint should be deemed filed any date earlier than June 9, 2014. IV. CONCLUSION. For these reasons, the Government’s August 8, 2014 Motion To Dismiss is granted. See RCFC 12(b)(1). Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is directed to dismiss the June 9, 2014 Complaint. IT IS SO ORDERED. s/ Susan G. Braden SUSAN G. BRADEN Judge 8
en	caselaw	US	Defendant, Walter W. Compton, was charged in the district court of Bryan county with the crime of assault with intent to kill, was tried and convicted of the crime of assault with a dangerous weapon and his punishment assessed at two years in the penitentiary, and he has appealed. This charge was the outgrowth of a shooting by defendant of Fred Bookout, in Bryan county, on the 29th day of March, 1934. Defendant was not apprehended until the 1st day of April, 1938, and was tried, and convicted as above stated on the 30th day of May, 1940. His appeal was filed in this court on the 29th day of November, 1940, and was submitted on the 27th day of April, 1941. Page 50 In the brief of defendant but two questions are relied upon for reversal of this case. They are: "(1) The lower court committed reversible error in excluding testimony to explain defendant's absence and in instructions pertaining to flight." "(2) By the giving of instruction No. 13, admitting prejudicial evidence and excluding competent evidence and by the asking of improper questions to prejudice the jury on irrelevant matters Walter W. Compton was prevented from having a fair and impartial trial." For consideration of these propositions it is unnecessary to give a detailed statement of the voluminous evidence as revealed by the record. Defendant was charged under Oklahoma Statutes 1931, section 1873, 21 Okla. St. Ann. § 652, which is as follows: "Every person who intentionally and wrongfully shoots, shoots at, or attempts to shoot at another, with any kind of firearm, airgun or other means whatever, with intent to kill any person, or who commits any assault and battery upon another by means of any deadly weapon, or by such other means or force as is likely to produce death or in resisting the execution of any legal process is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding ten years." He was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon as defined by Oklahoma Statutes 1931, section 1870, 21 Okla. St. Ann. § 645, as an included offense. This was proper under the decisions of this court. Castleberry v. State, 26 Okla. Crim. 59,221 P. 1044; De Witt v. State, 58 Okla. Crim. 261, 52 P.2d 88; Ponkilla v. State, 69 Okla. Crim. 31, 99 P.2d 910; Horton v. State, 35 Okla. Crim. 80, 248 P. 878; Wheeler v. State,66 Okla. Crim. 127, 90 P.2d 49; Bayne v. State, 72 Okla. Crim. 52,112 P.2d 1113. The evidence of the state was that defendant shot the prosecuting witness, Fred Bookout, three times with a shotgun; that he was at a distance of between 50 and Page 51 60 yards; that the prosecuting witness did not know that he was being attacked by defendant. He was shot in the back of the neck and side of the face with his back to defendant at the time the shots were fired. Several eyewitnesses testified that defendant was behind a tree with his gun resting against the same at the time the shot was fired. The difficulty was the outgrowth of a fight between the parties just a short time prior to the shooting. Both parties went to their homes and procured guns and returned to the scene of the difficulty. One of defendant's sons had shot the prosecuting witness with a shotgun just prior to the time he was shot by defendant. Under this statement it will be readily observed that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the judgment and sentence. It would have easily justified a sentence under the attempt to kill statute above quoted. After the shooting defendant went to the home of Alvin Willingham and was by him taken in an automobile to the town of Caddo, in Bryan county. He left the county and state and was not apprehended until the 1st day of April, 1938. The first contention is based upon the evidence of the sheriff of Bryan county, Ben Risner, upon cross-examination, and Alvin Willingham, a witness for defendant who testified by deposition, he being the party who took the defendant to Caddo after the difficulty as above stated, and the evidence which defendant offered to show that the prosecuting witness was searching for defendant with a shotgun after he had left and which was excluded by the court. A careful examination of the record discloses that defendant at no time knew of any search for him by the prosecuting witness, nor did he in any way attempt to explain his four-year absence from the state. The evidence simply revealed that defendant went to Page 52 Caddo and on into the oil fields, and that he was at one time seen in Pampa, Tex., in April, 1935, by his own witness Alvin Willingham. He never attempted to explain his flight to Texas. The charge of the court with reference to flight was No. 14, as follows: "Evidence has been introduced relative to the departure of the defendant after the alleged assault had taken place. You are instructed that you must first determine whether or not the actions of the defendant constituted flight. In this connection you are told that one who absents or conceals himself, conscious of his guilt of a crime, can be said to be in flight if the jury believe all these facts. However, a defendant may explain his absence, and if he does so to the satisfaction of the jury, or if the jury have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he was in flight, then the fact of his absence is not a circumstance against him. If the jury believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in flight after the alleged assault took place, then this is a circumstance to be considered by you, with all the other evidence, to aid you in determining the question of his guilt or innocence." This instruction was a very fair one, taking into consideration the evidence in this case, and this applies to the evidence of defendant's witness, Alvin Willingham, who testified that defendant wanted him to bring him to Caddo to see a deputy sheriff, and that when he left him stated that he was going to see a deputy sheriff, but that he did not do so, and that when he waited for ten or twenty minutes for his return, he went away. This evidence, coupled with the fact that defendant did leave the county and state and did not return and give himself up to the officers for a period of four years, and that no explanation of his absence was attempted in his own testimony, was sufficient for the court to present the issue to the jury as a question of fact for their consideration; and certainly the above instruction very fairly presented Page 53 this issue and in no way was prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. The refusal to permit the witness Roy Laughlin to testify that prosecuting witness and his brother were searching for defendant during his absence and that they had a gun was not error. There is nothing in the record to show that this information was ever conveyed to defendant. Counsel for defendant in his brief quotes from 16 Corpus Juris 552 in giving a definition of flight, as follows: "The term signifies, in legal parlance, not merely a leaving, but a leaving or concealment under a consciousness of guilt and for the purpose of evading arrest. Such consciousness and purpose is that which gives to the act of leaving its real incriminating character." See, also, 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 625. The evidence and the record in the instant case brings the defendant clearly within the terms of this definition when it says, "a leaving * * * under a consciousness of guilt and for the purpose of evading arrest." The mere fact that parties may have been searching for him did not justify his fleeing and remaining away, and the fact that the sheriff of Bryan county had a warrant for his arrest and was looking for him was no reason for his absenting himself from the county and from the state. If he had any valid reason it would have been permissible for him to submit such evidence to the jury, but he made no attempt to do so. The mere fact that he was afraid of bodily harm at the hands of the prosecuting witness did not justify his fleeing and remaining away. As a matter of fact, if he had surrendered to the deputy sheriff as he stated he was going to do on the date of the conflict there would have been no opportunity for harm at the hands of the prosecuting witness. Page 54 All through the record in this case there was evidence of the defendant that he intended to and was making preparations to leave on the very day this difficulty arose, and that he intended to go to Ada to try to secure work in the oil fields, this being his occupation. The court at no time denied defendant the right to introduce this evidence and it was for the proper consideration of the jury as the other evidence in the record upon the question of flight, and no doubt was so considered by the jury. Robinson v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. 667,130 P. 121; Jackson v. State, 12 Okla. Crim. 406, 157 P. 945; Colglazier v. State, 23 Okla. Crim. 23, 212 P. 332; Sprouse v. State, 52 Okla. Crim. 184, 3 P.2d 918. The statement in defendant's brief that the question of flight was the only evidence that caused the jury to convict the defendant cannot be harmonized with the record in this case. The evidence of the defendant and that of his family is such that justifies a verdict of guilty in this case, not considering the evidence of several disinterested witnesses. The sons of the defendant were in no immediate danger of the loss of their lives nor of suffering great bodily harm at the hands of the prosecuting witness at the time defendant shot, nor was the prosecuting witness in any way committing any overt act either toward the defendant or his sons or family. We find no error of the court as contended in defendant's first assignment of error. The second contention of defendant is that the court erred in giving instruction No. 13, which was as follows: "You are instructed that if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the complaining witness, Fred Bookout, did not make some overt act or demonstration at the time of the difficulty indicating to the defendant, as a reasonable man, an intention to assault him or his son and do some serious bodily harm Page 55 or kill either of them, then the fact of a previous difficulty is immaterial for any purpose in the case, and should be disregarded by the jury and given no weight." Counsel for defendant contends in his brief that this instruction "is erroneous in its entirety. It did not, nor did any of the other instructions, take into consideration that from the circumstances there existing defendant may have been properly led to have believed that prosecuting witness was about to make an overt act which would have endangered the life of his son." This statement is not the law. No authorities are cited in defendant's brief to substantiate this contention. In Saunders v. State, 4 Okla. Crim. 264, 111 P. 965, 972, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 766, this court said: "The law does not permit one to kill another merely because the other has made threats against him. And unless the deceased at the time of the fatal difficulty, without being willfully provoked thereto by the defendant, and without the defendant having sought the difficulty or having voluntarily entered into it, made some overt act or demonstration indicating to the defendant as a reasonable man an intention to kill him or do him some great bodily injury, then any threats previously made against or communicated to the defendant are immaterial for any purpose in the case; and the jury should be so instructed. We therefore find no error in the instruction given. Morris v. Territory, 1 Okla. Crim. 617, 99 P. 760, 101 P. 111; Reed v. State, 2 Okla. Crim. 589, 103 P. 1042; Wigmore on Evidence, vol. I, §§ 110, 111." See, also, Turner v. State, 4 Okla. Crim. 164, 111 P. 988; Liddell v. State, 18 Okla. Crim. 87, 193 P. 52, 16 A. L. R. 405; Ging v. State, 31 Okla. Crim. 428, 239 P. 685. In People v. Westlake, 62 Cal. 303, the court says: "Past threats or conduct of the deceased, how violent soever, will not excuse a homicide, without sufficient present demonstration to authorize the belief that the deadly *Page 56 purpose then exists, and the fear that it will then be executed." Defendant's own testimony did not show any overt act on the part of the prosecuting witness and his own witness, Alvin Willingham, testified: "Just as soon as Compton came out from the canyon, Bookout broke to run." From the examination of the record in this case we find nothing that deprived this defendant of any substantial right. The instructions of the court as a whole were very fair to the defendant and stated the law as shown by the testimony and issues in this case. The defendant was indeed fortunate that his counsel was able to secure a verdict of only assault with a dangerous weapon and his punishment assessed at two years in the penitentiary. The judgment and sentence of the district court of Bryan county is affirmed. JONES and DOYLE, JJ., concur.
nl	wikipedia	N/A	Little Rock is een plaats (census-designated place) in de Amerikaanse staat Minnesota, en valt bestuurlijk gezien onder Beltrami County. Demografie Bij de volkstelling in 2000 werd het aantal inwoners vastgesteld op 1055. Geografie Volgens het United States Census Bureau beslaat de plaats een oppervlakte van 35,5 km2, waarvan 33,8 km2 land en 1,7 km2 water. Plaatsen in de nabije omgeving De onderstaande figuur toont nabijgelegen plaatsen in een straal van 32 km rond Little Rock. Externe link Plaats in Minnesota
fr	other	N/A	"La garantie" est l'obligation que la loi ou le contrat impose à celui qui transmet la propriété ou la jouissance d'un bien ou d'une créance, de prendre fait et cause pour celui auquel il a transféré ses droits lorsqu'un tiers vient à contester ceux de ce dernier. La procédure par laquelle le "garant" ou "débiteur de la garantie" est assigné en justice par le bénéficiaire de cette protection, se nomme l' "appel en garantie". Si mieux n'aime le garant intervenir volontairement dans la procédure opposant le garanti et le tiers revendiquant, la procédure a lieu par voie d'intervention forcée. Le demandeur en garantie simple, (lorqu'il ne bénéficie pas d'une garantie solidaire ou indivisible) demeure partie principale. La garantie est simple lorsque le demandeur en garantie est lui-même poursuivi comme personnellement obligé : l'appel en garantie simple ne crée pas de lien juridique entre le demandeur à l'action principale et le garant, de sorte que si un véhicule était entaché d'un vice de fabrication d'une pièce du moteur à l'origine de la panne et que la responsabilité de la société est engagée du fait de la vente du produit défectueux, le constructeur doit être appelé en cause, sinon aucune condamnation ne peut être obtenue contre lui. (1ère Chambre civile, 15 mai 2015, pourvoi n°14-11685, aussi 2e Chambre civile 13 mai 2015, pourvoi n°14-13660, BICC n°830 du 1er novembre 2015 et Legifrance) Consulter la note de Madame Laura Weiller, Revue procédures 2015, comm. 227. La garantie, c'est aussi l'obligation légale ou conventionnelle entraînant la responsabilité du vendeur qui a livré une chose dépourvue des qualités essentielles en vue desquelles l'acheteur en a fait l'acquisition. L'action découlant du non-respect de cet engagement est l'action en garantie. La garantie a donc deux faces : la première est la garantie d'éviction, elle est de nature purement juridique, et la seconde, la garantie des vices contre les malfaçons qui est de nature économique. La garantie s'applique également en matière de travaux. S'il résulte de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne que la réparation des dommages causés à une chose destinée à l'usage professionnel et utilisée pour cet usage ne relève pas du champ d'application de la directive 85/ 374/ CEE du Conseil, du 25 juillet 1985, relative au rapprochement des dispositions législatives, réglementaires et administratives des États membres en matière de responsabilité du fait des produits défectueux (arrêt du 4 juin 2009, moteurs Leroy Somer, C-285/ 08), la même directive s'applique, en revanche, au producteur d'un produit affecté d'un défaut, quelle que soit la destination, privée ou professionnelle, de l'usage de ce produit (1ère Chambre civile 11 janvier 2017, pourvoi n°16-11726 BICC n°862 du 15 mai 2017 et Legifrance). . Il incombe au vendeur professionnel de prouver qu'il s'est acquitté de l'obligation de conseil lui imposant de se renseigner sur les besoins de l'acheteur afin d'être en mesure de l'informer, quant à l'adéquation de la chose proposée, à l'utilisation qui en est prévue (Cass. 1ère civ., 28 oct. 2010, n°09-16. 913, BICC n°736 du 15 février 2011, LexisNexis et Legifrance) et il est décidé aussi, en présence d'une clause de non-garantie, que le vendeur qui, ayant connaissance d'un vice lors de la conclusion du contrat, stipule qu'il ne le garantira pas, reste tenu à garantie, nonobstant cette clause (3°chambre civile 16 décembre 2009 pourvoi n°09-10540, BICC n°723 du 1er juin 2010 et Legifrance). Mais la clause excluant la garantie de l'assureur de la copropriété en cas de défaut d'entretien ou de réparation caractérisé et connu de l'assuré ne se référant pas à des critères précis et à des hypothèses limitativement énumérées n'étant pas formelle et limitée et ne peut ainsi recevoir application en raison de son imprécision (3 Chambre civile 26 septembre 2012, pourvoi n°11-19117, BICC n°774 du 15 janvier 20013, Legifrance). Le vice caché, lequel se définit comme un défaut rendant la chose impropre à sa destination, ne donne pas ouverture à une action en responsabilité contractuelle mais à une garantie dont les modalités sont fixées par les articles 1641 et suivants du code civil. Lorsque l'acheteur ne dispose pas des compétences techniques nécessaires pour déceler les vices affectant la chose vendue, le vendeur ne peut opposer à l'acheteur la clause limitative de responsabilité figurant à l'acte de vente. (Chambre commerciale 19 mars 2013, pourvoi n°11-26566, BICC n°7869 du 15 juillet 2013 et Legifrance). Par réfétrence à l'article L. 121-7 du code des assurances, la 2e Chambre civile juge que si le dommage a été causé par un vice caché, la garantie de l'assureur n'est acquise que si le contrat le prévoit d'une manière expresse. (2e Chambre civile, 10 septembre 2015, BI C n°835 du 1er février 2016 et Legiftrance). Le caractère apparent ou caché des désordres s'apprécie en la personne du maître de l'ouvrage constructeur et au jour de la réception, qui correspond pour celui-ci à l'achèvement des travaux (3e Chambre civile 10 novembre 2016, pourvoi n°15-24379, BICC n°859 du 1er avril 2017 et Legifrance). La responsabilité des architectes et des constructeurs à l'égard du maître de l'ouvrage est régie par l'article 1792-3 du code civil. Mais, les désordres qui affectent le revêtement végétal d'une étanchéité, ne compromettant pas la solidité de l'ouvrage et ne le rendent pas impropre à sa destination : ils concernent un élément dissociable de l'immeuble et ne relèvent pas de la garantie de bon fonctionnement. (3e Chambre civile 18 février 2016, pourvoi n°15-10750, BICC n°845 du 1er juillet 2016 et Legifrance). Même dans les rapports entre professionnels, les défauts portant sur l'aspect esthétique de la chose vendue, par exemple sur la teinte, engagent la responsabilité contractuelle de celui qui a l'obligation de livrer la chose conforme à ce qui a fait l'accord des parties (3e Chambre civile 30 juin 2016, pourvoi n° 15-12447 15-22690, BICC n°853 du 15 décembre 2016 et Legifrance). Consulter la note de M. Philippe Malinvaud, Revue de droit immobilier 2016, p. 478. La clause de non garantie est pareillement inapplicable lorsque le vendeur d'un bien immobilier a commis une réticence dolosive en faisant insérer à l'acte la mention d'un état parasitaire négatif alors qu'il se devait de signaler la présence de termites et que le dommage relevait de la seule responsabilité du vendeur (3e chambre civile, 13 janvier 2010, pourvoi n°08-21677, BICC n°724 du 15 juin 20101 et Legifrance). Consulter aussi : 3e Civ., 16 décembre 2009, pourvoi n° 09-10. 540, Bull. 2009, III, n° 288 et la note de M. Xavier Delpech référencée dans la Bibliographie ci-après. Toute clause ayant pour effet de réduire la durée de la garantie de l'assureur à un temps inférieur à la durée de la responsabilité de l'assuré est génératrice d'une obligation sans cause et doit être réputée non écrite. (3e Chambre civile 26 novembre 2015, pourvoi : 14-25761, BICC n°840 du 15 avril 2016 et Legifrance). L'entreprise a t-elle un devoir de conseil lorsqu'elle offre ses services pour réaliser des travaux en assurant à son client qu'en souscrivant le contrat qu'elle lui propose, il allait- pouvoir bénéficier d'un avantage fiscal ce qui diminuerait d'autant le prix de revient de l'installation. Une entreprise a soutenu devant le juge du fond, que le devoir de conseil du professionnel trouvait sa limite dans les connaissances personnelles qu'avait son client. Le juge devait rechercher si son client n'avait pas eu connaissance du mécanisme du crédit d'impôt en question pour en avoir déjà bénéficié lors d'une précédente installation de chauffage. A défaut d'avoir fait une telle recherche, la juridiction n'avait pas donné de base légale à sa décision. La Cour de cassation a répondu à ce moyen en jugeant que l'information donnée par l'entreprise à son client relativement au crédit d'impôt afférent à la réalisation des travaux litigieux, avait déterminé le consentement du client. Faute d'avoir recueilli les renseignements indispensables au calcul exact du crédit d'impôt auquel le client pensait pouvoir bénéficier, l'entreprise avait engagé sa responsabilité (1ère Chambre civile 8 mars 2012, pourvoi n°10-21239, BICC n°764 du 15 juin 2012 et Legifrance). Consulter la note de Madame Chloé Mathonnière référencée dans la Bibliographie ci-après. En vertu de l'Article 1644 du Code civil, l'acheteur a le choix soit, de rendre la chose et de se faire restituer le prix, soit de garder la chose et de se faire rendre une partie du prix, telle qu'il sera arbitré par experts. L'action par laquelle l'acquéreur exerce son droit de conserver la chose tout en sollicitant que le prix soit réévalué pour tenir compte du vice dont elle est entachée ou de ce que du fait de ce vice il en tirera une moindre utilité, se nomme "l'action estimatoire". L'action estimatoire permet de replacer l'acheteur dans la situation où il se serait trouvé si la chose vendue n'avait pas été atteinte de vices. La réduction sera proportionnelle à la moins value de la chose. Il ne s'agit ni d'une action en responsabilité civile, ni d'une action en fixation de dommages-intérêts. Une telle action a pour but un rééquilibrage des prestations. Elle sera égale aux sommes que l'acquéreur devra payer pour remédier au vice dont elle est atteinte. (1ère Chambre civile 16 janvier 1985, pourvoi : n°83-13613, Legifrance). Il convient de noter que l'acheteur d'une chose comportant un vice caché peut refuser la remise en l'état de la chose vendue par le vendeur ou son remplacement. (1ère Chambre civile 11 juin 1980, pourvoi n°79-10581, Legifrance). Consulter la note de M. Hemard référencée dans la Bibliographie ci-après). Jugé enfin que l'action en réparation du préjudice éventuellement subi du fait d'un vice caché n'est pas subordonnée à l'exercice d'une action rédhibitoire ou estimatoire et, par suite, peut être engagée de manière autonome. (1ère Chambre civile 26 septembre 2012, pourvoi n°11-22399, BICC n°774 du 15 janvier 2013 et Legifrance). Mais, si l'acquéreur accepte que le vendeur procède à la remise en état de ce bien ne peut plus ensuite invoquer l'action en garantie dès lors que le vice originaire a disparu mais peut solliciter l'indemnisation du préjudice éventuellement subi du fait de ce vice (chambre commerciale, 1er février 2011, pourvoi n°10-11269, Legifrance). Enfin, si la perte de la chose vendue arrivée par cas fortuit est aux risques de l'acheteur qui en est demeuré propriétaire, elle ne fait pas obstacle à ce que celui-ci obtienne, par la voie de l'action estimatoire, la réduction du prix que justifie la gravité du vice dont cette chose était atteinte (1ère Chambre civile 13 décembre 1996, pourvoi n°94-19176, Legifrance). L'action qui est donnée à l'acheteur par les articles 1641 et suivants du Code civil se prescrit par deux ans. Le délai court de la date de la découverte du vice. Cette découverte peut résulter d'un rapport d'expertise si une expertise s'était avérée nécessaire pour apprécier l'ampleur et le caractère irrémédiable des désordres (Cass. 1ère Ch. civile 4 avril 2006, pourvoi n°03-20379, Legifrance). Selon l'arrêt rendu le 19 octobre 1999 par la Cour de cassation, (Cass, 1ère Ch civile 19 octobre 1999, Dalloz Sirey, n°5, 1er février 2001, pp. 413-415) l'acquéreur agissant en garantie des vices cachés, qui assigne en référé son vendeur dans le bref délai pour voir ordonner une expertise, satisfait aux exigences de la Loi et dès lors que le délai de la prescription est interrompue, c'est la prescription de droit commun qui court à compter de la conclusion de la vente. Consulter sur le site de Legifrance , le texte de l'Ordonnance n° 2005-136 du 17 février 2005 relative à la garantie de la conformité du bien au contrat due par le vendeur au consommateur. A noter cependant que la Cour de cassation (Cass. 3e civ., 17 janv. 2007, pourvoi n° 06-10. 442) a jugé au visa de l'article 1116 du Code civil, que l'acquéreur, même professionnel, n'est pas tenu d'une obligation d'information au profit du vendeur sur la valeur du bien acquis. Cette référence est tirée du site LexisNexis . L' auteur de la note, estime que cet arrêt vient contredire celui rendu par la même juridiction qui avait, il est vrai dans des circonstances différentes (richesse géologique du sous-sol connue de l'acquéreur, dissimulé derrière un prête-nom, non révélée au vendeur, fausse destination de l'immeuble dans le projet d'acte authentique) prononcé la nullité de la vente pour dol (Cass. 3e civ., 15 nov. 2000, Juris-Data n° 2000-006872 ; JCP n°2002, 1618, observations C. Lièvremont). Selon la Cour de cassation, l'information que le vendeur doit à l'acquéreur sur les éléments nécessaires à sa connaissance de la chose et des conditions du contrat, mais ne s'appliquerait pas à l'estimation de sa valeur. A l'obligation générale de garantie peut s'ajouter des garanties spéciales comme la garantie décennale en matière de construction d'immeuble et de travaux. La réception des travaux au sens de l'article 1642-1 du code civil résulte de l'acte passé entre le maître de l'ouvrage et les constructeurs, de sorte que la participation des acquéreurs à cette réception n'a aucun effet juridique (3e Chambre civile 4 novembre 2010, pourvoi n°09-70235, BICC n°737 du 1er mars 2011 et Legifrance). Consulter aussi la note de M. Garcia référencée dans la Bibliographie ci-après. Si le contrat de construction d'une maison individuelle avec fourniture du plan peut être conclu sous la condition suspensive de l'obtention de la garantie de livraison, le délai maximum de réalisation de cette condition suspensive ainsi que la date d'ouverture du chantier, déterminée à partir de ce délai, doivent, à peine de nullité, être précisés par le contrat (3ème Chambre civile 30 mars 2011, pourvois n°10-13457 10-13854, BICC n°746 du 15 juillet 2011 et Legifrance). Consulter la note de Yves-Marie Serinet référencée dans la Bibliographie ci-après. En matière de garantie décennale, le dommage consistant dans la non-conformité de l'ouvrage aux règles parasismiques obligatoires dans la région où se trouve la maison, facteur certain de risque de perte par séisme, compromet sa solidité et la rend impropre à sa destination (3ème Chambre civile 11 mai 2011 pourvoi n°10-11713, BICC n°748 du 1er octobre 2011 et Legifrance). Consulter la note de M. Malinvaud référencée dans la Bibliographie ci-après. Lorsqu'une personne vend après achèvement, un immeuble qu'elle a construit ou fait construire, l'action en garantie décennale n'est pas exclusive de l'action en garantie des vices cachés de droit commun de l'article 1641 du code civil (3°chambre civile, 7 juin 2009, pourvoi n°08-15503, BICC n°713 du 15 décembre 2009 et Legifrance). Voir aussi, 3e Civ., 2 mars 2005, pourvoi n° 03-16. 561, Bull. 2005, III, n° 49 et la note de M. Tournafond référencée dans la Bibliographie ci-après. Les défauts de conformité, même apparents, relèvent du régime de la responsabilité contractuelle et de la prescription de droit commun et la réception des travaux prononcée sans réserve par le vendeur d'un immeuble se trouvant en l'état futur d'achèvement est sans effet sur l'obligation de ce dernier de livrer un ouvrage conforme aux stipulations contractuelles ; de même la participation des acquéreurs à cette réception, n'a aucun effet juridique sur l'étendue de la garantie décennale. (3e Chambre civile 8 septembre 2010, pourvoi n°08-22062, BICC n°733 du 15 décembre 2010 et Legifrance). Consulter la note de M. Olivier Tournafond référencée dans la Bibliographie ci-après. Mais, les défauts d'exécution ne sont couverts par la garantie décennale de l'article 1792 du Code civil qu'à la condition que les dommages aient été constatés au cours de la période de dix ans ayant courru à compter de la réception (3e Chambre civile 20 mai 2015, pourvoi n°14-14773, BCC n°831 du 15 novembre 2015.) Encore faut il que les désordres soient imputables aux travaux réalisés par l'entrepreneur. (3e Chambre civile 20 mai 2015, BICC n°831 du 15 novembre 2015 et Legifrance). Sagissant de la vente d'un appartement en l'état futur d'achèvement, la suspension de la prescription prévue par l'article 2239 du code civil n'est pas applicable au délai de forclusion. Si le juge relève qu'une assignation en référé a interrompu le délai de forclusion et qu'un expert a été désigné, il retient à bon droit que l'acquéreur ne peut pas invoquer la responsabilité contractuelle de droit commun du vendeur d'immeuble à construire qui ne peut être tenu à garantie des vices apparents au-delà des limites résultant des dispositions d'ordre public des articles 1642-1 et 1648 du code civil. (3e Chambre civile 3 juin 2015, pourvoi n°14-14706 et même Chambre même date, pourvoi n°14-15796 BICC n°832 du 1er décembre 2015 et Legifrance). La vente en l'état futur d'achèvement peut être précédée d'un contrat préliminaire par lequel, en contrepartie d'un dépôt de garantie effectué à un compte spécial, le vendeur s'engage à réserver à un acheteur un immeuble ou une partie d'immeuble. Le dépôt de garantie est fait à un compte spécial ouvert au nom du réservataire dans une banque ou un établissement spécialement habilité à cet effet ou chez un notaire. L'absence de remise du dépôt de garantie sur un compte spécial ouvert au nom du réservataire entraîne la nullité du contrat de réservation. (3e Chambre civile 22 septembre 2010 pourvoi n°09-16512, BICC n°734 du 15 janvier 2011 et Legifrance). Consulter la note de Madame Françoise Nési référencée dans la Bibliographie ci-après. Relativement à la compétence pour connaître des recours lorsque le dommage s'est produit en France, la Cour de cassation a jugé qu'ayant constaté que la société réceptrice de la marchandise avait été sollicitée par des voies qu'elle n'avait aucunement tenues pour anormales et que les ventes réalisées, qui portaient sur plus de cent articles, avaient été opérées sans difficulté particulière ni quelconque réticence de la part de cette société dans un laps de temps bref et qu'elles avaient abouti à des livraisons à Paris, où le fait dommageable invoqué s'était produit, la cour d'appel en avait exactement déduit que les juridictions françaises étaient compétentes, mais pour les seuls faits dommageables qui s'étaient produits en France (1ère Civ. - 25 mars 2009, 1ère chambre civile, 25 mars 2009, pourvoi n°08-14119. 25, BICC n°710 du 1er novembre 2009 et Legifrance). Sur la compétence de la juridiction de l'Etat contractant pour les dommages causés dans cet Etat, consulter aussi, : 1ère Civ., 16 juillet 1997, pourvoi n° 95-17. 163, Bull. 1997, I, n°245 ; 1ère Civ., 21 novembre 2006, pourvoi n°04-16. 612, Bull. 2006, I, n° 499). L'ordonnance n° 2006-346 du 23 mars 2006 relative aux sûretés, Contrats et obligations réforme le droit des sûretés. Désormais le sous-titre II du titre II du livre IV comporte un chapitre Ier intitulé : «Des privilèges mobiliers». L'ordonnance a crée sous le nouvel article 2321 du Code civil, "la garantie autonome" qui est l'engagement par lequel le garant s'oblige, en considération d'une obligation souscrite par un tiers, à verser une somme soit à première demande, soit suivant des modalités convenues, et "la propriété retenue à titre de garantie" qui par l'effet d'une clause de réserve de propriété suspend l'effet translatif d'un contrat jusqu'au complet paiement de l'obligation qui en constitue la contrepartie. A défaut de complet paiement à l'échéance, le créancier peut demander la restitution du bien afin de recouvrer le droit d'en disposer. La retenue de garantie peut aussi s'appliquer à un bien immobilier (art. 2373 C. Civ.), il s'agit alors de l'antichrèse. L'Ordonnance n° 2009-112 du 30 janvier 2009 portant diverses mesures relatives à la fiducie a introduit un nouveau Chapitre VIII, « De la propriété cédée à titre de garantie" selon lequel (C. Civil, Art. 2367 et s. et 2488-1 et s. nouveaux) la propriété d'un bien mobilier ou d'un bien immobilier peut être cédée à titre de garantie d'une obligation en vertu d'un contrat de fiducie conclu en application des articles 2011 à 2030 du code civil. A défaut de paiement de la dette garantie et sauf stipulation contraire du contrat de fiducie, le fiduciaire, lorsqu'il est le créancier, acquiert la libre disposition du bien cédé à titre de garantie. Le fiduciaire qui n'est pas le créancier, peut exiger du débiteur la remise du bien, dont il peut alors librement disposer, ou, si la convention le prévoit, la vente du bien et la remise de tout ou partie du prix. Sauf s'il s'agit d'un titre ayant une valeur résultant d'une cotation officielle sur un marché organisé au sens du code monétaire et financier ou si le bien est une somme d'argent, la valeur du bien mobilier ou immobilier est déterminée à dires d' expert désigné, soit à l'amiable, soit par justice. Toute clause contraire est réputée non écrite. Dans la vente, encore qu'il n'ait été fait aucune stipulation sur la garantie, le vendeur est obligé de droit à garantir l'acquéreur de l'éviction qu'il souffre dans la totalité ou partie de l'objet vendu, ou des charges prétendues sur cet objet, et non déclarées lors de la vente. Mais cette garantie qui concerne le trouble provenant d'un tiers qui prétend disposer d'un droit sur la chose vendue, n'est due que si le trouble subi par l'acheteur est un trouble de droit. (3ème Chambre civile, 11 mai 2011, pourvoi n°10-13679, BICC n°748 du 1er octobre 2011 et Legifrance). Consulter la note de M. Paulin référencée dans la Bibliographie ci-après. Dans le domaine du droit de la responsabilité, le bien-fondé de l'appel en garantie du responsable d'un dommage contre un tiers est subordonné à la seule démonstration que celui-ci ait commis une faute ayant contribué à la réalisation du préjudice de la victime. (Chambre commerciale 14 juin 2016, pourvoi n°14-16471 14-29165, BICC n°852 du 1er décembre 2016 et Legifrance). La clause de "garantie du passif" est une convention par laquelle l'acquéreur d'un fonds de commerce ou de droits sociaux (parts ou actions de sociétés) s'engage à payer le montant des dettes de l'entreprise qui seraient nées avant la cession et dont le cessionnaire n'aurait pas été tenu informé par le vendeur. Le mot "garantie" s'emploie également dans le sens général de "sûreté". On dit en effet d'une personne qui s'est porté caution pour une autre, qu'elle garantit le paiement de la dette de la personne cautionnée. On peut également dire que celui, qui a souscrit une obligation solidaire garantit le paiement de la dette. On parle aussi de garantie a l'occasion de l'exécution d'un contrat d'assurance. Les techniques destinées à assurer le règlement d'une dette à terme sont nombreuses. Parmi elles la cession de créance. La cession de créance effectuée à titre de garantie prend fin sans formalité particulière pour les sommes excédant la créance qui reste due à la banque cessionnaire par le cédant. (Chambre commerciale 9 février 2010 pourvoi : 09-10119, BICC n°725 du 1er juillet 2010 et Legifrance). On dit ainsi que l'assureur garantit son assuré contre les conséquence pécuniaire de la survenance d'un événement dommageable entraînant pour la victime un droit à réparation. La "garantie de ressources" est l'assurance donnée à certaines personnes d'obtenir un revenu salarial minimum. A titre d'exemples voir les dispositions prises en faveur des personnes handicapées par la Loi n°75-534 du 30 juin 1975 et les article L351-1 et s. du Code du travail instituant des "revenus de remplacement". La "garantie de paiement des créances de salaire" est l'ensemble des mesures légales et réglementaires prises en vue d'éviter que les salariés d'une entreprise se trouvent privés de moyens d'existence lorsque leur employeur n'est plus en mesure d'en assurer le règlement. (voir les articles L143-6 et s. et L751-15 du Code du travail). Sur la garantie de passif, consulter la rubrique : Plan de redressement. Certains agents immobiliers vont jusqu'à inscrire le mot "garantie" dans leurs baux pour désigner le cautionnement (et non pas la caution) que verse le locataire en entrant dans les lieux. Voir aussi les rubriques : Garantie commerciale notamment sur la garantie décennale, Malfaçon, Rédhibitoire, Vices cachés, Fonds de Garantie Sous-acquéreur. Carrez (Loi -). Textes Code civil, Articles 884, 1440, 1625 et s., 1641 et s., 1693 et s., 1696, 1705, 1721, 1725, 1792 et s., 1797. Code civil, Articles 2321, 2367 et s. 2372-1 à 2372-6, 2488-1. Code de la Construction et de l'Habitat, Articles L222-3, R222-9 et s. Ordonnance n°2005-136 du 17 février 2005 relative à la garantie de la conformité du bien au contrat due par le vendeur au consommateur Décret n°87-1045 du 22 décembre 1987 relatif à la présentation des écrits constatant les contrats de garantie et de service après vente. Ordonnance n°2009-112 du 30 janvier 2009 portant diverses mesures relatives à la fiducie. Décret n°2010-1128 du 27 septembre 2010 relatif aux ventes d'immeubles à construire ou à rénover. Ordonnance n° 2013-890 du 3 octobre 2013 relative à la garantie financière en cas de vente en l'état futur d'achèvement. Décret n°2014-1482 du 9 décembre 2014 relatif aux obligations d'information et de fourniture concernant les pièces détachées indispensables à l'utilisation d'un bien. Décret n° 2015-494 du 29 avril 2015 définissant les conditions dans lesquelles le prêteur et l'assureur délégué s'échangent les informations préalables à la souscription des contrats d'assurance liés à un crédit immobilier. Décret n° 2016-359 du 25 mars 2016 relatif à la garantie financière en cas de vente en l'état futur d'achèvement. Bibliographie Bastin (J.), Le paiement de la dette d'autrui : La caution, la garantie, les fonds de garantie, etc., Paris, LGDJ, 1999. Bidault de l'Isle (M.), Les garanties du crédit à la construction à la copropriété, Paris, Impr. Dorel, date ?. Boituzat (A.), La nature juridique de la notion de garantie pour vices cachés. 1971. Bouloc (B.), observations sous 1ère Civ., 3 mai 2006, Bull. 2006, I, n° 216, p. 190, RTComm., janvier-mars 2007, n° 1, p. 221. (Action estimatoire). Calais-Auloy (J.), Une nouvelle garantie pour l'acheteur : la garantie de conformité, RTC., octobre-décembre 2005, n°4, articles, p. 701-712. 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Revue Lamy droit civil, Exécution forcée du contrat ou dommages-intérêts : la victime peut changer de stratégie en cours de procédure n°60, mai 2009, Actualités, no 3411, p. 13. Serinet (Y-M), Mentions obligatoires et nullité des contrats de promotion immobilière, Semaine juridique, édition générale, n°19, 19 mai 2011, Chronique - Droit des contrats, n° 566, p. 949 à 956, spéc. n°12, p. 954, note à propos de 3e Civ. - 30 mars 2011. Tournafond (O.), Dans les ventes après achèvement, la garantie décennale n'exclut pas la garantie des vices cachés du code civil. Revue de droit immobilier - urbanisme - construction, n°9, septembre 2009, Chroniques, p. 475 à 478, note à propos de 3e Civ. - 17 juin 2009. Tournafond (O.), Présence des acquéreurs à la réception des travaux et étendue de la garantie décennale, Revue de droit, immobilier - urbanisme - construction, n°11, novembre 2010, Chroniques, p. 559-560, note à propos de 3e Civ. 8 septembre 2010. Vlamuyns (D.), La garantie décennale à l'épreuve des tribunaux. Le Moniteur, 4 mai 2007, p. 66-67. Zavaro (M.), L'Assurance et les garanties financières de la construction, Paris, Litec, 1997. Zavaro (M.), Le bon usage par le maître de l'ouvrage des assurances construction, Annales des loyers, juillet 2007, p. 1244-1273. Liste de toutes les définitions
en	caselaw	US	UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-2375 SEBLE HAILE YEMANE, Petitioner, versus ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. (A95-546-583) Submitted: April 11, 2005 Decided: April 25, 2005 Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Seble Haile Yemane, Petitioner Pro Se. George William Maugans, III, Special Assistant United States Attorney, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Baltimore, Maryland, Carol Federighi, Wanda Evans, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). PER CURIAM: Seble Haile Yemane, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denying her motion to reconsider its denial of her motion to reopen. We review the Board’s denial of a motion to reconsider for an abuse of discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2004); Yanez-Popp v. INS, 998 F.2d 231, 234 (4th Cir. 1993). A motion to reconsider asserts that the Board made an error in its earlier decision. The motion must “state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Such motions are especially disfavored “in a deportation proceeding, where, as a general matter, every delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States.” INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992). We have reviewed the administrative record and the Board’s decision and conclude the Board did not abuse its discretion when it found that Yemane failed to establish that the documents she submitted with her motion to reopen were material and previously unavailable. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. - 2 - We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. PETITION DENIED - 3 -
en	caselaw	US	* Rehearing denied April 28, 1933. Plaintiff alleged it was the holder and owner for value before maturity of a certain promissory note executed by defendant, dated September 15, 1928, for the sum of $1,450, payable to any future holder on December 31, 1928, bearing interest at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum from date until paid, and 10 per cent. on the whole as attorney's fees; that the note is identified with an act of mortgage of same date, recorded in the mortgage records of Natchitoches parish, La., wherein the defendant mortgaged, pledged and hypothecated to and in favor of any future holder of the note the following described property to wit: Lot 5 of block 44 and lots 4 and 5 of block 36, with improvements thereon, situated in the village of Marthaville, Natchitoches parish, La. It further alleged that the defendant was president and general manager of the Veal-Winn Company, Limited, a corporation, and owned all of its capital stock with the exception of one or two shares, and was in sole control thereof; that said corporation owed to plaintiff a large sum of money which it was unable to pay, and the defendant, in consideration of the petitioner carrying the account and making further advances to said corporation, agreed to secure in part the debt then due by giving certain personal security, including the note sued on here. In accordance with said agreement the note sued on was given to defendant, and the other securities promised were never delivered. It further alleged that Veal-Winn Company, Limited, had been placed in the hands of a receiver and its assets reduced to cash, and that plaintiff did not receive anything therefrom to place against its account. It prayed for judgment on the note, with interest and attorney's fees, and for recognition of its special mortgage, and that the property described therein be sold as the law directs, and that it be paid by preference and priority over all other persons. The defense set up by defendant is that he gave the note in question to plaintiff for the sole and only purpose of securing further advances of goods, wares, and merchandise to the corporation, Veal-Winn Company, Limited, during the year 1928, and for no other purpose; and that it shipped to plaintiff during the year 1928 a large number of bales of cotton which were more than enough to pay for all advances made during the year 1928; and that the debt for which the note was given as security was thereby settled, annulling and abrogating the note held by plaintiff as security. He further alleged that plaintiff had additional security in a $10,000 life insurance policy on defendant's life, and refuses to return it, and should be ordered to return same to defendant. He prays that plaintiff's demands be rejected at its cost. The lower court sustained the defense set *Page 774 up and rejected the demands of plaintiff, and it has appealed to this court. The facts disclosed by the record do not justify the judgment of the lower court, even though we should accept defendant's version that the note was given as security for advances for 1928 only. The record discloses that during the year 1928 advances were made to Veal-Winn Company, Inc., by plaintiff to the amount of $25,190.97, and during that year plaintiff received on this account 283 bales of cotton, which were sold for $20,493.46, leaving a balance due on 1928 account of $4,697.51. These are the figures testified to by the treasurer of the plaintiff company. The testimony offered by the defendant to offset this is very vague and indefinite. He testified that according to his recollection he shipped 50 bales of cotton on contract and at contract price; and his recollection is that he shipped an additional 275 bales, and that at the price of cotton at the time it was shipped, it would have settled in full the 1928 account. He did not authorize or request the sale of the cotton at the time it was shipped, but left it to the judgment of plaintiff when to sell, as he had done for a number of years previous thereto. He does not give us the price of cotton when it was shipped, the dates of shipment, or the grade of cotton. He is not positive how many bales were shipped, and testifies only, as he puts it, to "my recollection." Such testimony is not sufficient to overcome positive testimony as to the number of bales received by plaintiff from the Veal-Winn Company, Limited. Plaintiff for many years had received cotton from defendant corporation to be applied on account, and the record, we think, discloses that the cotton was sold or held for better price by plaintiff, and its judgment was exercised in this respect, with the full approval of defendant. This being true, it would have been necessary for defendant to have given specific orders to plaintiff to sell his cotton and its refusal shown, before he can complain. Having found that there was a balance due on the 1928 account in a sum exceeding the amount of the note sued on here, it is unnecessary to determine if the note was given for security for the 1927 account also. The evidence in regard to the insurance policy is that plaintiff has paid all premiums paid to date. Defendant has paid nothing on said policy. Although defendant alleged on said policy, there is nothing in the prayer concerning it; neither has there been any reference made to it in brief. We presume it has been abandoned. It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment of the lower court is reversed, and there is now judgment for plaintiff, Ardis Co., and against the defendant, J.I. Winn, in the full sum of $1,450, with interest at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum from February 15, 1928, until paid, and 10 per cent. upon both principal and interest as attorney's fees. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the plaintiff's special mortgage be recognized on lot 5 of block 44, and lots 4 and 5 of block 36, with improvements thereon, situated in the village of Marthaville, Natchitoches parish, La., and that same be seized and sold by the sheriff of Natchitoches parish, La., in accordance with law, and plaintiff be paid the proceeds thereof by preference and priority over all other persons.
de	caselaw	Germany	Tatbestand 1 I. Streitig ist, ob der Kläger und Revisionskläger (Kläger) für die Jahre 2002 und 2003 (Streitjahre) zur Einkommensteuer zu veranlagen ist. 2 Der Kläger reichte seine Einkommensteuererklärung für das Streitjahr 2002 am 30. Dezember 2005 beim Beklagten und Revisionsbeklagten (Finanzamt --FA--) ein. Neben Einkünften aus nichtselbständiger Arbeit erklärte er negative Einkünfte aus Vermietung und Verpachtung aus einer Grundstücksgemeinschaft in Höhe von 3.638 €. Mit Bescheid vom 18. Januar 2006 lehnte das FA die Veranlagung zur Einkommensteuer unter Hinweis auf die in § 46 Abs. 2 Nr. 8 des Einkommensteuergesetzes (EStG a.F.) bestimmte sog. Zweijahresfrist ab. Am 6. Februar 2006 stellte das FA gegenüber dem Kläger anteilige Verluste aus Vermietung und Verpachtung in Höhe von 3.638 € fest. 3 Am 23. März 2006 reichte der Kläger seine Einkommensteuererklärung für das Streitjahr 2003 ein. Neben Einkünften aus nichtselbständiger Arbeit erklärte er Einkünfte aus Gewerbebetrieb in Höhe von 449 €. Mit Bescheid vom 13. Juni 2006 stellte das FA gegenüber dem Kläger anteilige Verluste aus Vermietung und Verpachtung in Höhe von 3.989 € fest. Es lehnte die Veranlagung zur Einkommensteuer 2003 mit Bescheid vom 31. Juli 2006 unter Hinweis auf § 46 Abs. 2 Nrn. 1 und 8 EStG a.F. ab. 4 Der Kläger legte gegen die Bescheide vom 18. Januar und 31. Juli 2006 erfolglos Einspruch ein. 5 Mit Schreiben vom 14. Dezember 2007 stellte der Kläger erneut einen Antrag auf Veranlagung für die Streitjahre. Am 22. Januar 2008 reichte er die Einkommensteuererklärungen nach. Diese entsprachen im Wesentlichen den 2005 bzw. 2006 eingereichten. Das FA lehnte den Antrag erneut ab. Die gegen die Einspruchsentscheidung gerichtete Klage hatte keinen Erfolg. 6 Nach Auffassung des Finanzgerichts (FG) ist der Kläger nicht zur Einkommensteuer zu veranlagen. Gemäß § 46 Abs. 2 Nr. 1 EStG i.d.F. des Jahressteuergesetzes (JStG) 2007 setze eine Pflichtveranlagung voraus, dass die positive Summe der einkommensteuerpflichtigen Einkünfte, die nicht dem Steuerabzug vom Arbeitslohn zu unterwerfen gewesen wären, mehr als 410 € betrage. Das sei hier nicht der Fall. Gemäß § 52 Abs. 55j EStG i.d.F. des JStG 2007 komme die Neufassung des § 46 Abs. 2 Nr. 1 EStG auch bereits in den Streitjahren zur Anwendung. Die rückwirkende Anwendung sei verfassungsrechtlich unbedenklich. 7 Eine sog. Antragsveranlagung gemäß § 46 Abs. 2 Nr. 8 EStG komme nicht in Betracht. Zwar sei aufgrund der Änderung dieser Vorschrift durch das JStG 2008 die Zweijahresfrist entfallen. Die Neuregelung sei jedoch gemäß § 52 Abs. 55j Satz 2 EStG i.d.F. des JStG 2008 für die Veranlagungszeiträume vor 2005 nur in den Fällen anzuwenden, in denen am 28. Dezember 2007 über einen Antrag auf Veranlagung zur Einkommensteuer noch nicht bestandskräftig entschieden worden sei. Davon könne im Streitfall nicht ausgegangen werden. Das FA habe vor diesem Stichtag die Anträge des Klägers auf Veranlagung für die Streitjahre bestandskräftig abgelehnt. Auf die erneut gestellten Anträge vom 14. Dezember 2007 komme es nicht an. 8 § 46 Abs. 2 Nrn. 1 und 8 EStG ständen einer Änderung gemäß § 175 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 1 der Abgabenordnung (AO) entgegen. 9 Mit der Revision rügt der Kläger die Verletzung materiellen Rechts. 10 Der Kläger beantragt sinngemäß, das angefochtene Urteil, die Bescheide vom 18. August 2008 und die Einspruchsentscheidung vom 10. November 2008 aufzuheben und das FA zu verpflichten, ihn für die Veranlagungszeiträume 2002 und 2003 zur Einkommensteuer zu veranlagen. 11 Das FA beantragt, die Revision zurückzuweisen. Entscheidungsgründe 12 II. Die Revision ist unbegründet und daher zurückzuweisen(§ 126 Abs. 2 der Finanzgerichtsordnung --FGO--). Das FG hat zu Recht entschieden, dass der Kläger nicht zur Einkommensteuer zu veranlagen ist. 13 1. Besteht das Einkommen ganz oder teilweise aus Einkünften aus nichtselbständiger Arbeit, von denen ein Steuerabzug vorgenommen worden ist, wird eine Veranlagung nur unter den in § 46 Abs. 2 Nrn. 1 bis 8 EStG genannten Voraussetzungen durchgeführt. Der Steuerpflichtige kann die Veranlagung nach § 46 Abs. 2 Nr. 8 EStG nur beantragen, wenn er nicht bereits nach Abs. 2 Nrn. 1 bis 7 der Vorschrift von Amts wegen zu veranlagen ist (Urteil des Bundesfinanzhofs --BFH-- vom 22. Mai 2006 VI R 15/05, BFHE 214, 149, BStBl II 2006, 912). 14 a) Nach § 46 Abs. 2 Nr. 1 EStG i.d.F. des JStG 2007 ist die Amtsveranlagung nur durchzuführen, wenn, was hier nicht der Fall ist, die positive Summe der einkommensteuerpflichtigen Einkünfte, die nicht dem Steuerabzug vom Arbeitslohn zu unterwerfen waren, vermindert um die darauf entfallenden Beträge nach § 13 Abs. 3 und § 24a EStG, mehr als 410 € beträgt (zur früheren Rechtslage s. BFH-Urteile vom 21. September 2006 VI R 47/05, BFHE 215, 149, BStBl II 2007, 47; VI R 52/04, BFHE 215, 144, BStBl II 2007, 45). § 46 Abs. 2 Nr. 1 EStG i.d.F. des JStG 2007 ist gemäß § 52 Abs. 55j EStG i.d.F. des JStG 2007 auch auf Veranlagungszeiträume vor 2006 anzuwenden. 15 Zur Frage, ob die rückwirkende Anwendung der Neuregelung verfassungsrechtlichen Vorgaben genügt (Schmidt/Kulosa, EStG, 30. Aufl., § 46 Rz 12, m.w.N.), muss der Senat nicht Stellung beziehen. Denn einer Veranlagung von Amts wegen stehen nach Auffassung des Senats bereits die bestandskräftigen Bescheide des FA vom 18. Januar und 31. Juli 2006 entgegen, mit denen das FA jeweils die Durchführung einer Veranlagung abgelehnt hat. 16 b) Gemäß § 46 Abs. 2 Nr. 8 EStG i.d.F. der Streitjahre wird eine Veranlagung durchgeführt, wenn sie beantragt wird. Der Antrag ist gemäß Satz 2 der Regelung bis zum Ablauf des auf den Veranlagungszeitraum folgenden 2. Kalenderjahres zu stellen. Zwar ist § 46 Abs. 2 Nr. 8 EStG wegen der sog. Zweijahresfrist nach Auffassung des Senats mit dem Grundgesetz unvereinbar. Wegen der Bestandskraft der erwähnten Bescheide vom 18. Januar und 31. Juli 2006 kann der Kläger daraus nach Auffassung des Senats jedoch keine Rechte herleiten. 17 c) Eine Veranlagung kommt auch nicht gemäß § 46 Abs. 2 Nr. 8 i.d.F. des JStG 2008 in Betracht. 18 Zwar hat danach der Steuerpflichtige in den Fällen, in denen die Voraussetzungen der Pflichtveranlagung nicht vorliegen, einen Anspruch auf Veranlagung ohne Beachtung einer Antragsfrist. Die Neuregelung ist jedoch gemäß § 52 Abs. 55j Satz 2 EStG i.d.F. des JStG 2008 erstmals für den Veranlagungszeitraum 2005 anzuwenden und in Fällen, in denen am 28. Dezember 2007 über einen Antrag auf Veranlagung zur Einkommensteuer noch nicht bestandskräftig entschieden ist (s. dazu Senatsurteile vom 15. Januar 2009 VI R 23/08, BFH/NV 2009, 755; vom 12. November 2009 VI R 1/09, BFHE 227, 97, BStBl II 2010, 406). 19 Im Streitfall hatte das FA indessen über die Anträge vom 30. Dezember 2005 bzw. 23. März 2006 vor dem genannten Stichtag bestandskräftig entschieden. Darin unterscheidet sich der Streitfall von dem Sachverhalt, der dem Urteil in BFHE 227, 97, BStBl II 2010, 406 zugrunde liegt. Der erneuten Antragstellung vom 14. Dezember 2007 kommt deshalb keine Bedeutung zu. Sie kann den Mangel, dass am 28. Dezember 2007 bestandskräftige Bescheide vorlagen, nicht heilen. 20 2. Eine Veranlagung ist nicht schon aufgrund von § 175 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 1 AO durchzuführen. Zwar ist danach ein Steuerbescheid zu erlassen, soweit ein Grundlagenbescheid, dem Bindungswirkung für diesen Steuerbescheid zukommt, erlassen, aufgehoben oder geändert wird. Nach der Rechtsprechung des BFH soll aber der Erlass eines Feststellungsbescheids gemäß § 175 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 1 AO nicht zu einer Veranlagung von Amts wegen führen und die Bindungswirkung eines Grundlagenbescheids keine Ausweitung der in § 46 Abs. 2 Nrn. 1 bis 8 EStG spezialgesetzlich geregelten Veranlagungstatbestände des EStG zur Folge haben (BFH-Urteil in BFHE 214, 149, BStBl II 2006, 912, m.w.N.)
en	caselaw	US	Filed 4/12/17 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A146680 v. DAVID BECHTOL, JR., (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCR-663130) Defendant and Appellant. In Garcia v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal. 4th 953 (Garcia), the California Supreme Court determined that a criminal defendant could not move to strike a prior conviction, alleged as an enhancement in a pending proceeding, on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel in the earlier case. Appellant David Bechtol, Jr., charged with two alcohol-related driving offenses within 10 years of a prior felony driving under the influence (DUI) conviction, argues Vehicle Code section 414031 permits him to move to strike his earlier felony conviction despite Garcia. We disagree and conclude that section 41403 does not independently authorize such challenges, but simply sets forth the procedural rules to be used for those challenges that are otherwise authorized. BACKGROUND In July 2015, appellant was charged with a DUI committed within 10 years of a prior felony DUI conviction (§§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550.5, subd. (a)), and driving with a blood alcohol content of more than .08 percent within 10 years of a prior felony DUI 1 All undesignated section references are to the Vehicle Code. 1 conviction (§§ 23152, subd. (b), 23550.5, subd. (a)).2 The information alleged appellant had been convicted of a felony DUI in 2006. In August, appellant filed a section 41403 motion to strike his 2006 conviction as constitutionally invalid on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion as unauthorized under section 41403 without making a finding on the merits of appellant’s ineffective assistance claim. Appellant subsequently pled guilty. The trial court granted appellant’s request for a certificate of probable cause on the denial of the section 41403 motion. DISCUSSION Section 41403 sets forth detailed procedural rules for “any proceedings to have a judgment of conviction of a violation of Section 14601, 14601.1, 14601.2, 23152, or 23153, or Section 23103 as specified in Section 23103.5,[3] which was entered in a separate proceeding, declared invalid on constitutional grounds . . . .” (§ 41403, subd. (a).) First, “the defendant shall state in writing and with specificity wherein the defendant was deprived of the defendant’s constitutional rights, which statement shall be filed with the clerk of the court and a copy served on the court that rendered that judgment and on the prosecuting attorney in the present proceedings at least five court days prior to the hearing thereon.” (Ibid.) A hearing shall be held “outside of the presence of the jury.” (§ 41403, subd. (b).) The statute then sets forth in detail the burdens of production and proof: “The prosecution shall initially have the burden of producing evidence of the separate conviction sufficient to justify a finding that the defendant has suffered that separate conviction”; “the defendant then has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s constitutional rights were infringed in the separate proceeding at issue”; “[i]f the defendant bears this burden successfully, the prosecution shall have the right to produce evidence in rebuttal”; and the 2 We omit additional allegations and the underlying facts, which are not relevant to this appeal. 3 The enumerated offenses are for driving with a suspended or revoked license, DUI, and certain reckless driving convictions. 2 court “shall strike from the accusatory pleading any separate conviction found to be constitutionally invalid.” (§ 41403, subd. (b)(1)–(4).)4 “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘We 4 In its entirety, section 41403 is as follows: “(a) In any proceedings to have a judgment of conviction of a violation of Section 14601, 14601.1, 14601.2, 23152, or 23153, or Section 23103 as specified in Section 23103.5, which was entered in a separate proceeding, declared invalid on constitutional grounds, the defendant shall state in writing and with specificity wherein the defendant was deprived of the defendant’s constitutional rights, which statement shall be filed with the clerk of the court and a copy served on the court that rendered that judgment and on the prosecuting attorney in the present proceedings at least five court days prior to the hearing thereon. [¶] (b) Except as provided in subdivision (c), the court shall, prior to the trial of any pending criminal action against the defendant wherein the separate conviction is charged as such, hold a hearing, outside of the presence of the jury, in order to determine the constitutional validity of the charged separate conviction issue. At the hearing the procedure, the burden of proof, and the burden of producing evidence shall be as follows: [¶] (1) The prosecution shall initially have the burden of producing evidence of the separate conviction sufficient to justify a finding that the defendant has suffered that separate conviction. [¶] (2) After the production of evidence required by paragraph (1), the defendant then has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s constitutional rights were infringed in the separate proceeding at issue. If the separate conviction sought to be invalidated is based upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant shall provide the court with evidence of the prior plea, including the court docket, written waivers of constitutional rights executed by the defendant, and transcripts of the relevant court proceedings at the time of the entry of the defendant’s plea. These records shall be provided to the defendant without cost to him or her, when the defendant is represented by the public defender or counsel appointed pursuant to Section 987.2 of the Penal Code. [¶] (3) If the defendant bears this burden successfully, the prosecution shall have the right to produce evidence in rebuttal. [¶] (4) The court shall make a finding on the basis of the evidence thus produced and shall strike from the accusatory pleading any separate conviction found to be constitutionally invalid. [¶] (c) If the defendant fails to comply with the notice requirement of subdivision (a) or fails to produce the evidence required by paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), the court shall hear the motion at the time of sentencing in lieu of continuing the trial, unless good cause is shown for failure to provide notice pursuant to subdivision (a) or produce the evidence required by paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), in which case the court shall grant a continuance of the trial for a reasonable period. The procedure, burden of proof, and burden of producing evidence as provided in subdivision (b) shall apply regardless of when the motion is heard.” 3 begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context, because the language employed in the Legislature’s enactment generally is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.’ [Citations.] The plain meaning controls if there is no ambiguity in the statutory language. [Citation.] If, however, ‘the statutory language may reasonably be given more than one interpretation, “ ‘ “courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 1261, 1265.) As appellant argues, the language of the statute itself does not limit the nature of the constitutional challenges which can be adjudicated by its procedures. However, section 41403’s opening phrase—“In any proceedings to have a judgment of conviction of [certain violations], which was entered in a separate proceeding, declared invalid on constitutional grounds” (italics added)—suggests the authority to bring such challenges derives from elsewhere. (Cf. Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (a) [“A person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint.”].) We find the statutory language ambiguous regarding whether it independently authorizes these challenges, or merely sets forth the procedural framework to be used if they are otherwise authorized.5 The authority to challenge prior convictions in a subsequent prosecution began prior to the enactment of section 41403.6 In People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 204 (Coffey), the defendant moved to strike an allegation that he suffered a prior felony 5 Appellant points to language obligating the trial court to “strike from the accusatory pleading any separate conviction found to be constitutionally invalid.” (§ 41403, subd. (b)(4).) However, this provision appears to simply be part of the procedural framework to be followed in “any proceedings” challenging a prior conviction under this statute, and therefore does not remove the ambiguity. 6 Section 41403 was initially enacted in 1973 as section 23102.2. (Stats. 1973, ch. 1128, § 4, p. 2296.) 4 conviction, arguing the prior conviction was constitutionally invalid because he had not been represented by counsel and had not waived his right to counsel. (Id. at p. 210.) The trial court denied the motion as unauthorized under California law. (Id. at p. 211.) The California Supreme Court reversed, noting “to the extent that statutory machinery relating to penal status or severity of sanction is activated by the presence of prior convictions, it is imperative that the constitutional basis of such convictions be examined if challenged by proper allegations.” (Id. at pp. 214–215.) The court continued: “Though these principles were first given application in a series of cases involving collateral attacks on final judgments [citations], it is clearly in the interest of efficient judicial administration that attacks upon the constitutional basis of prior convictions be disposed of at the earliest possible opportunity, and we are therefore of the view that, if the issue is properly raised at or prior to trial, it must be determined by the trial court.” (Id. at p. 215.) As explained in a subsequent California Supreme Court opinion, “Coffey authorized defendants to institute in their current trial a collateral attack on a prior felony conviction, which previously had been permissible only by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. . . . In today’s parlance, we would characterize the rule as a judicially established rule of criminal procedure.” (People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 424, 430 (Allen).) After establishing this judicial rule of procedure authorizing challenges to a prior conviction in a subsequent prosecution, Coffey proceeded to “delineate the nature of the contemplated hearing . . . for the guidance of courts and counsel who will be called upon to deal with similar matters in the future.” (Coffey, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 217.) The court set forth in detail the mechanics of the hearings: “First, when a defendant, whether by motion to strike the prior conviction or convictions on constitutional grounds, or by denial of such prior conviction or convictions on constitutional grounds at the time of entering his plea to the same, raises the issue for determination, the court shall, prior to trial, hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury in order to determine the constitutional validity of the charged prior or priors in issue. Second, in the course of such hearing the prosecutor shall first have the burden of producing evidence of the prior conviction sufficient to justify a finding that defendant ‘has suffered such previous 5 conviction.’ (Pen. Code, § 1025.) Third, when this prima facie showing has been made, the defendant shall thereupon have the burden of producing evidence that his constitutional right to counsel was infringed in the prior proceeding at issue. Fourth, if defendant bears this burden, the prosecution shall have the right to produce evidence in rebuttal. Fifth, the court shall make a finding on the basis of the evidence thus produced and shall strike from the accusatory pleading any prior conviction found to be constitutionally invalid.” (Id. at pp. 217–218, fn. omitted.) This description of the procedural framework governing constitutional challenges to prior convictions in subsequent prosecutions may sound familiar–it was codified six years later when the Legislature enacted the predecessor to section 41403. Following that enactment, subsequent cases clarified or modified the authority, established in Coffey, to collaterally attack a prior conviction in a subsequent prosecution. In one such case, Garcia, supra, 14 Cal. 4th 953, the defendant sought to challenge, by a pretrial motion to strike, an allegation that he had a prior serious felony conviction for residential burglary on the ground that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at pp. 956–957.) Garcia discussed a United States Supreme Court case holding “a defendant has no right under the federal Constitution to challenge the constitutional validity of a prior conviction in proceedings involving a subsequent offense, except upon the ground of Gideon[7] error.” (Id. at p. 963 [discussing Custis v. United States (1994) 511 U.S. 485].) Garcia continued, “[n]othing in the language of our state Constitution, or in our past decisions construing its provisions, presents a ‘cogent reason’ for us to reach an interpretation of our state constitutional requirements different from that under the federal Constitution.” (Ibid.) This left the question of “whether, as urged by petitioner and amici curiae, the interest of efficient judicial administration, or some other policy consideration, supports a judicially established rule of procedure permitting a defendant who faces greater punishment for a current offense because of a prior conviction to challenge the validity of that prior on the ground that he or she was denied 7 Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335. 6 the effective assistance of counsel in the earlier proceeding.” (Id. at p. 964.) The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative: “the effective administration of criminal justice would not be furthered, but rather would face serious disruption, if—in the course of the proceedings related to a current offense—the trial court were required to entertain and adjudicate an attack on the validity of a challenged prior conviction based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Ibid.)8 Garcia concluded, “a defendant whose sentence for a noncapital offense is subject to enhancement because of a prior conviction may not employ the current prosecution as a forum for challenging the validity of the prior conviction based upon alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in the prior proceeding.” (Id. at p. 966.) Garcia did acknowledge section 41403, although the statute was not at issue in that case. Garcia noted, “the Legislature has not enacted a generally applicable statute authorizing or prescribing the procedure by which an individual may raise a collateral challenge to the constitutional validity of a prior conviction,” adding in a footnote that section 41403 “sets forth a procedure for raising challenges to the constitutional validity of prior convictions based upon specified provisions of the Vehicle Code.” (Garcia, 14 Cal.4th at p. 960 & fn. 2.) Appellant argues Garcia did not interpret section 41403 or state its holding applied to challenges brought under that statute. We agree that the 8 As the Supreme Court explained: While Gideon-type error “generally may be readily determined with minimum disruption of the proceedings involved in the current offense,” ineffective assistance claims “generally cannot be resolved based upon the appellate record—because the record alone will not shed light on the existence or nonexistence of a tactical basis for a defense attorney’s course of conduct—and therefore more appropriately should be resolved on habeas corpus. [Citations.] Such a claim often will necessitate a factual investigation with regard to counsel’s actions, omissions, and strategic decisions, requiring the parties and the court to reconstruct events possibly remote in time, and to scour potentially voluminous records, substantially delaying the proceedings related to the current offense. Conducting evidentiary hearings on these types of claims also would protract substantially the proceedings on the current offense.” (Garcia, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 964–965.) 7 significance of Garcia’s cursory reference to section 41403 is unclear.9 However, we find relevant the Supreme Court’s apparent distinction between statutes “authorizing or prescribing the procedure by which an individual may raise a collateral challenge to the constitutional validity of a prior conviction.” (Garcia, at p. 960, italics added.) We construe this statement as a recognition that a statute could authorize a certain challenge—as Coffey “authorized defendants to institute in their current trial a collateral attack on a prior felony conviction” (Allen, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 430)—or it could prescribe the procedural rules applicable to such a challenge, such as the burdens of proof and production—as Coffey later prescribed “the nature of the contemplated hearing . . . for the guidance of courts and counsel” (Coffey, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 217). (Compare 1 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 799 [defining “authorize” as “To give legal or formal warrant to (a person) to do something; to empower, permit authoritatively”], with 12 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 390 [defining “prescribe” as “To write or lay down as a rule or direction to be followed”].) To determine whether section 41403 authorizes collateral attacks or simply prescribes the procedures to be followed if such attacks are otherwise authorized, we turn to its legislative history. A digest appearing in the Senate Judiciary bill file identified one of the bill’s purposes as to “[a]ccomplish more effective enforcement of drunk driving laws on second and subsequent offenses,” and noted the bill’s proponents contended that “since April 1969, approximately 25,000 prior convictions of drunk driving have been invalidated by the courts in cases where the defendant was before the court on a second or subsequent drunk driving charge.” (Sen. Com on Judiciary, Digest of Sen. Bill No. 9 The People rely on the proposition that “ ‘ “a general provision is controlled by one that is special, the latter being treated as an exception to the former” ’ ” (Miller v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 883, 895), and argue the general provision in section 41403 regarding constitutional challenges is controlled by Garcia’s specific exclusion of ineffective assistance claims. The principle relied on is one used to reconcile conflicting statutes, and does not assist our analysis. 8 1268 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) as introduced, p. 3.)10 An enrolled bill report prepared for the Governor by the California Highway Patrol explained that, while the Legislature had previously imposed increased punishment for repeat DUI offenders, “[t]he courts have . . . on occasion seen fit to temper the law . . . by setting aside or vacating prior judgments and convictions. This was, in some instances, done intentionally to circumvent the jail sentence which would have caused the defendant to lose his job. [¶] This bill, . . . restrict[s] somewhat the judicial discretion in these matters . . . .” (Cal. Highway Patrol, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1268 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 21, 1973, p. 2.)11 This assessment is consistent with a legislative analysis prepared by the Department of Motor Vehicles and found in the Senate Judiciary Committee bill file, which stated the bill’s provisions regarding striking prior convictions “provide[] an urgently needed remedy to problems attending indiscriminate practices which now thwart the intent of existing law.” (Bus. & Transportation Agency, DMV, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1268 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) Jun. 19, 1973.) These analyses indicate a legislative understanding that courts had been striking prior DUI convictions without proper cause to avoid imposing enhanced punishments for repeat offenders. By prescribing clear procedures for “any proceedings” to strike a prior 10 The bill replaced a provision enacted four years after Coffey which provided a “motion to vacate or set aside a prior judgment of conviction of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor made in a pending criminal proceeding in which the defendant is accused of having committed another such offense” shall be in writing and state “with particularity” its grounds, shall be supported by an affidavit from the defendant, and shall be served on the prosecutor before the hearing; and that the hearing shall be continued if the prosecutor shows it necessary to enable the prosecutor to prepare a response. (Stats. 1971, ch. 1371, § 1, p. 2694.) 11 Appellant dismisses the use of an enrolled bill report as a source of legislative history. However, our Supreme Court “ ‘ha[s] routinely found enrolled bill reports, prepared by a responsible agency contemporaneous with passage and before signing, instructive on matters of legislative intent.’ ” (In re Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal. 4th 1206, 1218, fn. 3.) “Although these reports certainly do not take precedence over more direct windows into legislative intent such as committee analyses, and cannot be used to alter the substance of legislation, they may be as here ‘instructive’ in filling out the picture of the Legislature’s purpose.” (Ibid.) 9 conviction on constitutional grounds, the Legislature intended to ensure that such claims were rigorously adjudicated and decided on the merits.12 There is no indication, however, that the Legislature intended the bill to independently authorize such challenges. (See Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1268 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 1973, Summary Dig., pp. 177–178 [bill “[i]mposes specified requirements and provisions re burden of proof with respect to any proceeding to have a prior judgment of conviction of such offenses declared invalid on constitutional grounds”].) Coffey already provided this authority and there is no suggestion of a legislative intent to codify or expand upon it; instead, the bill was intended to ensure that the authority was exercised properly.13 12 This legislative intent is apparent in another amendment enacted by the same bill, adding the following provisions to two DUI statutes: “Except in unusual cases where the interests of justice demand an exception, the court shall not strike a prior conviction of an offense under this section for purposes of sentencing in order to avoid imposing as part of the sentence or term of probation the minimum time in confinement in the county jail and the minimum fine . . . . [¶] When such a prior conviction is stricken by the court for purposes of sentencing, the court shall specify the reason or reasons for such striking order. [¶] On appeal by the people from such an order striking such a prior conviction it shall be conclusively presumed that such order was made only for the reasons specified in such order and such order shall be reversed if there is no substantial basis in the record for any of such reasons.” (Stats. 1973, ch. 1128, §§ 2 & 5, pp. 2295–2296, 2298 [former §§ 23102, subd. (g) & 23105, subd. (h)]; see also Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1268 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 1973, Summary Dig., p. 177.) 13 While the Legislature borrowed heavily from Coffey’s language in enacting section 41403’s procedural rules, we note one difference. Coffey provided the defendant has “the burden of producing evidence that his constitutional right to counsel was infringed in the prior proceeding at issue” (Coffey, 67 Cal.2d at p. 217, italics added); the Legislature changed this to “the burden of producing evidence that his constitutional rights were infringed in the prior proceeding at issue” (Stats. 1973, ch. 1128, § 4, p. 2296, italics added). We do not construe this alteration as evidencing an intent to authorize collateral attacks on all constitutional grounds; instead, it ensures the procedural rules can accommodate any such challenges that are otherwise authorized. For example, when our Supreme Court later held “that a defendant may move to strike a prior conviction on Boykin/Tahl grounds [Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal. 3d 122]” (People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal. 3d 909, 914), the procedural rules of section 41403 could be applied to this newly authorized challenge. 10 In sum, we conclude section 41403 does not authorize defendants to collaterally challenge the enumerated prior convictions in a subsequent prosecution. Instead, it prescribes the procedures to be used for any such challenges that are otherwise authorized. Because the only authority to bring such challenges is the judicial rule established in Coffey, which Garcia held did not extend to challenges based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the procedures set forth in section 41403 may not be used to collaterally attack a prior conviction on ineffective assistance grounds. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. SIMONS, J. We concur. JONES, P.J. BRUINIERS, J. 11 Superior Court of Sonoma County, No. SCR-663130, Hon. Gary A. Medvigy, Judge. Paul F. DeMeester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. Share and Leif M. Dautch, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 12
pt	wikipedia	N/A	O café de la Paix é um famoso café localizado na esquina noroeste do cruzamento do Boulevard des Capucines e a Place de l'Opéra, no 9o arrondissement de Paris, França. Projetado no estilo Napoleão III pelo arquiteto Alfred Armand, que também projetou o histórico Grand-Hôtel no qual o café está localizado, sua decoração interior florida, localização histórica e clientela de alto perfil, todos trouxeram reconhecimento internacional como um local de grande significado cultural. História O Café da Paix foi inaugurado a 30 de junho de 1862. A sua proximidade com a Ópera atraiu a muitos clientes famosos como Piotr Ilich Chaikovski, Jules Massenet, Émile Zola e Guy de Maupassant. Na Belle Époque, entre os clientes do café figuram Sergei Diaghilev, e o Príncipe de Gales e futuro rei do Reino Unido, Eduardo VII. Em 22 de agosto de 1975, foi declarado monumento histórico pelo governo francês. Bibliografia Ayers, Andrew (2004). The Architecture of Paris. Stuttgart; London: Edition Axel Menges. ISBN 978-3-930698-96-7. Auguste Lepage, Lhes Cafés artistiques et littéraires de Paris, Martin Boursin, Paris, 1882, capítulo XXV (« Le Café de la Paix »), pg. 191–198 Ligações externas Página oficial do Café de la Paix (em francês) Cafés de Paris Restaurantes de Paris 9.o arrondissement de Paris
fr	other	N/A	2C_780/2016 06.02.2017 2C_780/2016 Université de Genève, Ecole d'avocature. la République et canton de Genève, Chambre administrative, 1ère section, du 28 juin 2016. X.________, après deux échecs les 7 avril et 12 juin 2014, s'est présentée une troisième fois à l'examen final du brevet d'avocat genevois le 1 er octobre 2014. Elle a échoué en obtenant les notes de 3 sur 6 à l'épreuve écrite et de 2 sur 6 à l'épreuve orale, soit un total de 5 points sur les 8 requis. Par décision du 8 octobre 2014, la Commission d'examens des avocats (ci-après: la Commission) de l'Ecole d'avocature de l'Université de Genève (ci-après: l'Ecole d'avocature) a prononcé l'échec définitif de l'intéressée. Celle-ci a formé opposition contre cette décision le 10 novembre 2014. Le conseil de direction de l'Ecole d'avocature a rejeté l'opposition par décision du 22 juin 2015. X.________ a interjeté recours contre ce prononcé auprès de la Chambre administrative de la Cour de justice de la République et canton de Genève (ci-après: la Cour de justice) le 27 août 2015. Le 1 er février 2016, cette autorité a auditionné les parties. Le 25 avril 2016, elle a entendu la psychothérapeute de l'intéressée. Par arrêt du 28 juin 2016, la Cour de justice a rejeté le recours de X.________. Agissant par la voie du recours en matière de droit public et celle, subsidiaire, du recours constitutionnel, X.________ demande au Tribunal fédéral d'annuler l'arrêt du 28 juin 2016 de la Cour de justice et de l'autoriser à passer une ultime fois l'examen final du brevet d'avocat; subsidiairement de renvoyer la cause à l'autorité précédente pour nouvelle décision au sens des considérants. Elle se plaint de violation de son droit d'être entendue, de violation des garanties de procédure et d'application arbitraire du droit cantonal. La Cour de justice persiste dans les considérants et le dispositif de son arrêt. L'Ecole d'avocature conclut au rejet du recours. Dans des observations finales, X.________ a maintenu ses conclusions. 1.1. En vertu de l'art. 83 let. t LTF, le recours en matière de droit public n'est pas ouvert à l'encontre des décisions sur le résultat d'examens ou d'autres évaluations des capacités, notamment en matière de scolarité obligatoire, de formation ultérieure ou d'exercice d'une profession. Le motif d'irrecevabilité contenu dans cette disposition dépend en principe de la matière et non du grief soulevé (cf. arrêts 2D_1/2015 du 4 mai 2015 consid. 1.1; 2C_422/2013 du 8 juillet 2013 consid 1.1.1). Selon la jurisprudence, les décisions d'exmatriculation d'une université ou d'une haute école ou celles d'élimination d'une faculté ou d'un programme d'études tombent sous le coup de l'art. 83 let. t LTF lorsque la décision d'exmatriculation ou d'élimination est en lien avec une évaluation des capacités de l'étudiant évincé (ATF 136 I 229 consid. 1 p. 231; arrêt 2C_120/2010 du 16 décembre 2010 consid. 1.1, non publié in ATF 137 I 69). Tel n'est pas le cas en l'espèce, puisque l'arrêt contesté porte, au fond, sur la reconnaissance d'une incapacité médicale (préexistante à la session d'examens, mais reconnue postérieurement à celle-ci) de la recourante à effectuer l'examen final du brevet d'avocat genevois (cf. arrêt 2C_1054/2014 du 4 décembre 2014 consid. 4). Partant, la voie du recours en matière de droit public est ouverte. Le recours constitutionnel subsidiaire est par conséquent irrecevable (art. 113 LTF a contrario). 1.2. Au surplus, déposé en temps utile (art. 46 al. 1 let. b et 100 al. 1 LTF) et dans les formes prescrites par la loi (art. 42 LTF), par la destinataire de l'arrêt attaqué qui a un intérêt digne de protection à son annulation ou à sa modification (art. 89 al. 1 LTF), le présent recours, dirigé contre une décision finale (art. 90 LTF) rendue par une autorité cantonale supérieure de dernière instance (art. 86 al. 1 let. d et al. 2 LTF) dans une cause de droit public (art. 82 let. a LTF), est recevable. 2.1. Saisi d'un recours en matière de droit public, le Tribunal fédéral examine librement la violation du droit fédéral (cf. art. 95 let. a et 106 al. 1 LTF). Sauf dans les cas cités expressément à l'art. 95 LTF, le recours devant le Tribunal fédéral ne peut par contre pas être formé pour violation du droit cantonal (ou communal) en tant que tel. En revanche, il est possible de faire valoir que la mauvaise application du droit cantonal ou communal constitue une violation du droit fédéral, en particulier qu'elle est arbitraire au sens de l'art. 9 Cst. ou contraire à d'autres droits constitutionnels. Le Tribunal fédéral n'examine toutefois le moyen tiré de la violation d'une norme de rang constitutionnel que si le grief a été invoqué et motivé de manière précise (art. 106 al. 2 LTF). 2.2. Le Tribunal fédéral statue en principe sur la base des faits établis par l'autorité précédente (art. 105 al. 1 LTF), sous réserve des cas prévus à l'art. 105 al. 2 LTF (ATF 142 I 155 consid. 4.4.3 p. 156 s.). Le recourant ne peut critiquer les constatations de fait ressortant de la décision attaquée que si celles-ci ont été effectuées en violation du droit au sens de l'art. 95 LTF ou de manière manifestement inexacte, c'est-à-dire arbitraire (ATF 136 II 304 consid. 2.4 p. 313 s.), et si la correction du vice est susceptible d'influer sur le sort de la cause (art. 97 al. 1 LTF; ATF 137 III 226 consid. 4.2 p. 233 s.). Conformément à l'art. 106 al. 2 LTF, le recourant doit expliquer de manière circonstanciée en quoi ces conditions seraient réalisées. Les faits et les critiques invoqués de manière appellatoire sont irrecevables (ATF 137 II 353 consid. 5.1 p. 356). Par ailleurs, aucun fait nouveau ni preuve nouvelle ne peut en principe être présenté devant le Tribunal de céans (art. 99 al. 1 LTF). Dans un grief d'ordre formel qu'il convient d'examiner en premier lieu, la recourante, citant l'art. 29 al. 2 Cst., se plaint d'une violation de son droit d'être entendue en ce que la Cour de justice, qui, selon elle, a implicitement reconnu une telle violation par l'autorité de première instance, aurait à tort réparé ce vice. Selon la jurisprudence, la violation du droit d'être entendu peut être réparée, en particulier lorsque la décision entachée est couverte par une nouvelle décision qu'une autorité supérieure - jouissant d'un pouvoir d'examen au moins aussi étendu - a prononcée après avoir donné à la partie lésée la possibilité d'exercer effectivement son droit d'être entendu (ATF 135 I 279 consid. 2.6.1 p. 285; 133 I 201 consid. 2.2 p. 204 s.). Toutefois, la réparation de la violation du droit d'être entendu doit rester l'exception et n'est admissible que dans l'hypothèse d'une atteinte qui n'est pas particulièrement grave aux droits procéduraux de la partie lésée. Si, en revanche, l'atteinte est importante, il n'est en règle générale pas possible de remédier à la violation (cf. ATF 137 I 195 consid. 2.3.2 p. 197 s.; 135 I 279 consid. 2.6.1 p. 285). Cela étant, une réparation de la violation du droit d'être entendu peut également se justifier, même en présence d'un vice grave, lorsque le renvoi constituerait une vaine formalité et aboutirait à un allongement inutile de la procédure (" formalistischer Leerlauf "; cf. ATF 137 I 195 consid. 2.3.2 p. 197 s.; 136 V 117 consid. 4.2.2.2 p. 126 s.; arrêt 1C_446/2016 du 3 janvier 2017 consid. 4.1). En aucun cas, il ne saurait néanmoins être admis que l'autorité parvienne, par le biais d'une violation du droit d'être entendu, à un résultat qu'elle n'aurait jamais obtenu en procédant de manière correcte (cf. ATF 135 I 279 consid. 2.6.1 p. 285 et les références citées). 3.2. Il ressort de l'arrêt entrepris que devant l'Ecole d'avocature, simultanément au dépôt d'un avis de sa psychothérapeute traitante, la recourante a sollicité l'audition de cette spécialiste. Or, l'Ecole d'avocature a statué sans donner suite à cette demande. La Cour de justice a entendu cette psychothérapeute et ainsi considéré que l'éventuelle violation du droit d'être entendu était réparée. Pour la recourante, une telle réparation est contraire au droit fédéral, dès lors que la violation est grave, " l'audition de la thérapeute ayant apporté des éléments d'une indéniable pertinence, s'agissant d'expliquer aussi bien le mécanisme de sabotage inconscient que son intensité jamais vue à travers sa pourtant longue carrière ". 3.3. En l'occurrence, on doit tout d'abord constater que, contrairement à ce qu'affirme la recourante, l'autorité précédente n'a pas implicitement reconnu une violation du droit d'être entendu de la part de l'Ecole d'avocature, mais a laissé la question ouverte en mentionnant que de toute façon l'éventuelle violation pouvait être réparée. Quant à la violation, si elle devait être reconnue, force serait de constater que celle-ci n'est pas grave. La psychothérapeute dont l'audition avait été sollicitée par la recourante avait en effet déjà eu l'occasion de s'exprimer par écrit dans une attestation établie le 20 mars 2015. S'il n'est pas exclu qu'elle ait encore apporté quelques éléments supplémentaires lors de son audition devant la Cour de justice le 25 avril 2016, les observations générales retranscrites par oral étaient déjà connues des autorités. Au demeurant, comme on le verra ci-après (cf. consid. 5.3 i.f. ci-dessous), ce moyen de preuve n'était de toute façon pas déterminant pour statuer sur la cause. Par conséquent, en procédant à l'audition de la psychothérapeute traitante de la recourante, la Cour de justice, s'il devait exister un cas de violation du droit d'être entendu, l'a valablement réparé, bénéficiant du même pouvoir d'examen en fait et en droit que l'Ecole d'avocature. 3.4. Le grief de violation du droit d'être entendu doit ainsi être écarté. Citant l'art. 29 al. 1 Cst. et une application arbitraire du droit cantonal, la recourante se plaint ensuite de ce que l'autorité de première instance n'était pas régulièrement constituée lorsqu'elle a rendu sa décision. 4.1. L'art. 29 al. 1 Cst. prévoit que toute personne a droit, dans une procédure judiciaire ou administrative, à ce que sa cause soit traitée équitablement et jugée dans un délai raisonnable. La jurisprudence a tiré de cette disposition un droit à ce que l'autorité administrative qui statue, le fasse dans une composition correcte et impartiale (ATF 142 I 172 consid. 3.2 p. 173 ss et les références citées). Cette disposition n'exclut pas une certaine liberté dans la composition de l'autorité, par exemple en permettant la participation de suppléants dans le processus décisionnel. Il faut toutefois, lorsque cela est possible, que la composition soit fondée sur des critères objectifs (ATF 142 I 172 consid. 3.2 p. 173 ss et les références citées). La composition de l'autorité est définie selon les règles du droit de procédure ou d'organisation. Celui-ci prévoit généralement des quorum afin d'assurer le fonctionnement des autorités collégiales (ATF 142 I 172 consid. 3.2 p. 173 ss et les références citées). L'autorité est ainsi valablement constituée lorsqu'elle siège dans une composition qui correspond à ce que le droit d'organisation ou de procédure prévoit. Par conséquent, lorsqu'un membre de l'autorité est appelé à se récuser ou ne peut, pour une autre raison, prendre part à la décision, il doit, dans la mesure du possible, être remplacé (ATF 142 I 172 consid. 3.2 p. 173 ss et les références citées). Si l'autorité statue alors qu'elle n'est pas valablement constituée, elle commet un déni de justice formel. Si la composition de l'autorité est prévue par le droit cantonal, le Tribunal fédéral ne revoit l'interprétation et l'application de celui-ci que sous l'angle restreint de l'arbitraire. Sous réserve de motivation suffisante (cf. art. 106 al. 2 LTF), il examine en revanche avec une pleine cognition le point de savoir si la composition correcte de l'autorité administrative, telle que prévue, par le droit cantonal remplit les conditions de l'art. 29 al. 1 Cst. (ATF 142 I 172 consid. 3.2 p. 173 ss et les références citées). Cela signifie que, dans un premier temps, le Tribunal fédéral examinera si l'interprétation et l'application du droit cantonal par le Tribunal cantonal sont ou non arbitraires. Dans une seconde phase, le Tribunal fédéral contrôlera avec une pleine cognition si l'interprétation et l'application du droit cantonal, reconnues non arbitraires, sont compatibles avec la garantie de l'art. 29 al. 1 Cst. (ATF 142 I 172 consid. 3.2 p. 173 ss et les références citées). 4.2. L'art. 33A al. 2 de la loi genevoise du 26 avril 2002 sur la profession d'avocat (LPAv/GE; RSGE E 6 10) prévoit notamment que l'examen final est subi devant une commission d'examens désignée par l'Ecole d'avocature. Pour sa part, l'art. 28 al. 1 du règlement genevois du 7 décembre 2010 d'application de la loi sur la profession d'avocat (RPAv/GE; RSGE E 6 10.01) dispose en particulier que la commission d'examens prévue à l'art. 33A al. 2 LPAv/GE se compose d'au moins 30 membres titulaires nommés tous les quatre ans par le conseil de direction. Aux termes de l'art. 29 RPAv/GE, la commission d'examens est présidée par son président ou un membre désigné par lui. Elle siège valablement lorsque dix membres au moins sont présents (al. 1). La commission d'examens se subdivise en sous-commissions de trois membres pour apprécier l'examen final (al. 3). Il ressort de l'arrêt entrepris que " les membres des sous-commissions chargés d'évaluer l'épreuve écrite et l'épreuve orale d'un candidat ne savent pas, lors du passage de celui-ci, s'il s'agit de sa troisième tentative ou non. Ils en sont toutefois informés par la directrice de [l'Ecole d'avocature] dès la fin de l'examen et la remise des notes. Une fois les notes attribuées par la sous-commission et communiquées au secrétariat, le président de la commission informe les autres membres de l'échec définitif d'un candidat, sans mention particulière concernant ce dernier, en leur impartissant un délai pour demander la convocation d'une séance plénière extraordinaire [...]. Une séance plénière est toutefois automatiquement convoquée en présence d'un cas limite, soit s'il manque un quart de point sur le total minimum à obtenir ". 4.3. En l'occurrence, la recourante se plaint de ce que la Commission ne s'est pas réunie pour statuer sur son cas et, partant, n'a pas statué à au moins dix de ses membres. On constate tout d'abord que rien n'indique que l'appréciation de l'examen final de la recourante n'a pas été effectuée par trois membres d'une sous-commission, comme le prévoit l'art. 29 al. 3 RPAv/GE. La recourante ne semble pas le contester. Elle estime bien plus que la pratique de la Commission constitue une application arbitraire du droit cantonal. Elle ne saurait toutefois être suivie, car en informant la totalité des membres de la Commission et en leur donnant la possibilité de requérir une séance extraordinaire, le président demande en réalité à ceux-ci de se prononcer sur l'issue de l'examen de chaque candidat en situation d'échec définitif. En renonçant à demander une telle séance, les membres se déclarent (tacitement) favorables à la proposition du président (consistant en l'occurrence à valider les deux notes fixées par les sous-commissions). Le RPAv/GE n'exclut aucunement que l'accord soit donné tacitement et par voie de circulation. En ce sens, retenir, comme l'a fait la Cour de justice, que la " pratique ne s'avère aucunement contraire aux dispositions applicables, et aucun élément ne permet de retenir qu'elle aurait des conséquences défavorables sur les candidats concernés ", n'est pas arbitraire. Elle n'est pas non plus constitutive d'inégalité de traitement, dès lors que tous les candidats ayant obtenu moins de 7,75 points sont traités de la même manière (cf. ATF 137 I 167 consid. 3.5 p. 175). 4.4. N'étant pas arbitraire, compte tenu des dispositions légales en cause, de statuer par voie de circulation, respectivement de demander aux membres s'ils s'opposent à la proposition du président, rien n'indique dans le cas d'espèce que le quorum de l'art. 29 al. 1 RPAv/GE n'ai pas été respecté et que le président n'ait pas demandé à au moins dix membres s'ils désiraient convoquer une séance extraordinaire pour parler du cas de la recourante. A teneur du courriel du 2 octobre 2014 (cf. art. 105 al. 2 LTF), on constate au contraire que le président s'est adressé à l'ensemble des membres de la Commission. Partant, le grief de violation de l'art. 29 al. 1 Cst. doit être écarté. Finalement, la recourante invoque une application arbitraire du droit cantonal par la Cour de justice, estimant que celle-ci a faussement appliqué la jurisprudence relative à la prise en compte d'un certificat médical déposé après que l'examen ait été passé. 5.1. Selon la jurisprudence cantonale telle que présentée par l'autorité précédente, un motif d'empêchement ne peut, en principe, être invoqué par le candidat qu'avant ou pendant l'examen. La production ultérieure d'un certificat médical ne peut remettre en cause le résultat obtenu lors d'un examen. Des exceptions à ce principe, permettant de prendre en compte un certificat médical présenté après que l'examen a été passé, ne peuvent être admises que si cinq conditions sont cumulativement remplies. Il faut que la maladie n'apparaisse qu'au moment de l'examen, sans qu'il ait été constaté de symptômes auparavant, le candidat à l'examen acceptant, dans le cas contraire, un risque de se présenter dans un état déficient, ce qui ne saurait justifier après coup l'annulation des résultats d'examens (1); qu'aucun symptôme ne soit visible durant l'examen (2); que le candidat ait consulté un médecin immédiatement après l'examen (3); que le médecin ait immédiatement constaté une maladie grave et soudaine qui, malgré l'absence de symptômes visibles, permette à l'évidence de conclure à l'existence d'un rapport de causalité avec l'échec à l'examen (4); et que l'échec ait une influence sur la réussite ou non de la session d'examens dans son ensemble (5). 5.2. En l'occurrence, il ressort de l'arrêt entrepris que la recourante n'a pas fait part à l'Ecole d'avocature de son état de santé avant le début de l'examen, dont elle a passé toutes les étapes. La recourante ayant produit deux documents médicaux postérieurement à l'examen, c'est donc sans arbitraire que la Cour de justice a appliqué la jurisprudence précitée. La recourante ne le conteste d'ailleurs pas. 5.3. L'autorité précédente a relevé qu'entre la date de l'examen le 1 er octobre 2014 et son opposition le 10 novembre 2014, la recourante ne s'est jamais manifestée. Elle n'a en particulier pas fait mention de son état de santé après avoir reçu les résultats le 8 octobre 2014, ni après avoir consulté son médecin traitant en octobre 2014. Ce n'est que dans son opposition du 10 novembre 2014 que la recourante a allégué avoir souffert pendant l'examen litigieux d'une importante crise d'angoisse et de panique ayant exacerbé ses douleurs dorsales, liées à un accident survenu fin 2013 et dont elle avait connaissance depuis lors. Le certificat médical a été établi le 14 octobre 2014 et n'est que purement anamnestique. Le 27 avril 2015 la recourante a produit une attestation de sa psychothérapeute relative à une affection psychologique. Sur la base de ces faits, c'est sans arbitraire que l'autorité précédente a jugé que les conditions une, trois et quatre de la jurisprudence cantonale précitée n'étaient pas réunies en l'espèce. C'est ainsi de manière pleinement soutenable qu'elle a considéré que la " recourante ne peut en effet pas se prévaloir d'une maladie qui ne serait apparue qu'au moment de l'examen, sans qu'il ait été constaté de symptômes auparavant, ce d'autant qu'elle a accepté le risque de se présenter dans un état déficient ". Il est en effet pour le moins surprenant qu'aucune manifestation de quelques symptômes que ce soit ne soit intervenue durant l'examen, alors que la recourante aurait prétendument ressenti une exacerbation de ses douleurs dorsales " pendant l'examen ". Compte tenu de cette survenance des douleurs " pendant l'examen ", on pouvait en outre attendre de la recourante qu'elle consulte un médecin dans un délai inférieur aux près de deux semaines durant lesquelles elle a patienté. On ajoutera que le résultat est d'autant moins arbitraire que la jurisprudence cantonale exige qu'un médecin constate l'existence d'une maladie. Or, la recourante a uniquement produit un certificat médical se limitant à reprendre ses plaintes subjectives, sans poser de diagnostic, ainsi qu'une attestation de sa psychothérapeute qui n'est pas médecin et qui n'a en conséquence pas non plus posé de diagnostic. Pour cette raison également, l'audition de la psychothérapeute n'était pas déterminante. 5.4. La Cour de justice n'a dès lors pas fait une application arbitraire du droit cantonal en refusant de prendre en compte les documents médicaux produits par la recourante pour lui permettre de se présenter à l'examen final du brevet d'avocat genevois une ultime fois et en confirmant l'échec définitif de la recourante à cet examen. Sur le vu de ce qui précède, le recours doit être rejeté. Succombant, la recourante doit supporter les frais judiciaires (art. 66 al. 1 LTF). Il n'est pas alloué de dépens (art. 68 al. 1 et 3 LTF). Le présent arrêt est communiqué au mandataire de la recourante, à l'Ecole d'avocature de l'Université de Genève, ainsi qu'à la Cour de justice de la République et canton de Genève, Chambre administrative, 1 ère section.
en	caselaw	US	Case 4:21-cr-00009 Document 104-3 Filed on 08/10/21 in TXSD Page 1 of 3 Message From: Permit [permit1@lambdaprime.org] Sent: 12/11/2012 1:31:52 AM To: redfish@lambdaprime.org Subject: RE: Evatt, No change desired. Bob From: Redfish [mailto:redfish@lambdaprime.org] Sent: Monday, December 10, 2012 7:42 AM To: permit1 @lambdaprime.org Subject: RE: Bob, \| do not know your preference regarding Don’s compensation, however the annual payment is structured as a royalty fee paid by Tangarra to Wedge. This is part of the agreement whereby Wedge sold its book of business to Tangarra. If you wish to keep Don’s compensation going, changing the ownership of the fund companies won’t impact on the payment. If not or if you wish to reduce the payment, then \| will talk to Don. Evatt From: Permit [mailto:permit1 @lambdaprime.org] Sent: Sunday, December 09, 2012 9:15 PM To: redfish@lambdaprime.org Subject: RE: Evatt, \| agree. Plus \| think that Don would agree also — as he does not need to have his trusts come to the attention of the house. The only issue is that we have to consider Don’s compensation with regards to these trusts. Bob From: Redfish [mailto:redfish@lambdaprime.org] Sent: Sunday, December 02, 2012 5:53 AM To: permiti @lambdaprime.org Subject: Bob, ET_0000054773 Case 4:21-cr-00009 Document 104-3 Filed on 08/10/21 in TXSD Page 2 of 3 As part of a general clean-up, one area that causes me some concern with FATCA looming is the ownership of the common shares in Edge, Cabot and Point. This would also apply to the new entity, Proventus Constans Limited, should that be incorporated as a fund structure rather than a straight tightly held investment vehicle. The common shares of those there funds are owned by either the Massengill Children’s Trust, the Massengill Grandchildren’s Trust or the Louise C. Massengill Trust. Obviously, in each case we have an U.S. person, albeit deceased, as settlor. in each case, we have U.S. beneficiaries notwithstanding that these are fully discretionary trusts. Legally, our position is clear and clean. However, under FATCA we need to assume that banks will decide to play it safe and report the fact of a U.S. settlor and beneficiaries. Neither the banks nor the House will care much about legal niceties. For the most part, in the now regular due diligence exercises, \| get away with disclosing these trusts as the ultimate beneficial owners. In the case of Point where the most disclosures are required because of the Vista activity, \| arn asked for details of the owners of the common shares even though the substance of the fund links to the AEBCT. To us, it is clear that the ownership of the common shares means little since the value in the fund is linked to the investment shares which are owned by other companies. For Cabot and Edge, all holders of investment shares (with the exception of Lakewood) are companies that are ultimately owned by the new pure charitable trusts. Having the common shares owned by these trusts does not add in any way to the protection of the assets. The use of the trusts was simply an expedient at the time of the creation of the funds. To change to a different ownership structure — and \| recommend a simple purpose trust with the existing trustee and protector — would strip out an unnecessary complication of the U.S. settlor and beneficiaries. \| can’t see any downside. Further, if the funds were subject to a review by the House, they would work backwards to Don through these existing family-connected trusts. in the past year we have cleaned up the investor side of these funds (excepting Point) to put them in purely charitable trusts. i think we should now clean up the common share side. Should you agree and should you think that a purpose trust is the right way to go, \| would propose creating the trusts and then transferring the shares of each underlying company from the existing trust to the new purpose trust. The purpose trust itself would have charitable objects and a beneficiary clause that provides that at the end of its life/purpose, the assets of the trust would be applied to recognized charities. Of course, at the end of the life of the purpose trust there would be no assets, but this is a fudge so that we have a dressed up charitable purpose. The change would be very simple and could all be completed in a few days. i would then contact the banks, Vista etc. to advise that the new ownership. Evatt ET_0000054774 Case 4:21-cr-00009 Document 104-3 Filed on 08/10/21 in TXSD Page 3 of 3 Message From: Permit [permit@proventusconstans.com] Sent: 3/2/2014 3:37:05 PM To: redfish@proventusconstans.com Subject: RE: Don Jones situation as of March 2.doc Evatt, Currently the $200K is a retirement/transition benefit that we voluntarily advanced. The principal service rendered was the Jones family trusts providing “ownership services” for the investment funds that held the assets of Cabot and Edge. As far as \| know none of this was ever committed to writing. There are assets in Wedge — so there is plenty to fund this $200K a year — probably forever. Bob From: Redfish PC [mailto:redfish@proventusconstans.com] Sent: Sunday, March 02, 2014 9:16 AM To: ‘Permit’ Subject: RE: Don Jones situation as of March 2.doc Bob, One matter \| forgot to mention is that Don told me that the payment of $200K would continue for the life of Melissa and then the lives of Kelly and Dru. That creates a whole other set of difficulties. Evatt From: Permit [mailto:permit@proventusconstans.com] Sent: Sunday, March 02, 2014 11:14 AM To: redfish@proventusconstans.com Subject: Don Jones situation as of March 2.doc My understanding - please correct when we talk abou it. Bob ET_0001975780
de	wikipedia	N/A	Dieser Artikel behandelt die grundlegendsten Spielzüge im American Football. Im Englischen spricht man von einem sogenannten Play. Die Bezeichnung wird dabei sowohl für den Vorgang des Spielzugs als auch für den taktisch geplanten Ablauf verwendet. Ablauf Ein Play beginnt stets auf eine der beiden folgenden Weisen: Ein Play von der Line of Scrimmage beginnt, wenn der Ball vom Center an einen Back (in der Regel an den Quarterback) abgegeben wird. Ein Free Kick (ein Kickoff oder ein Free Kick nach einem Safety) findet statt. Ein Play gilt unter anderem als beendet, wenn ein Team einen Score erzielt oder eines der folgenden Ereignisse eintritt: Der Ballträger ist down. Dies ist der Fall, wenn der Spieler den Boden mit einem anderen Körperteil als den Füßen oder den Händen berührt und von einem gegnerischen Spieler berührt wurde. Die Vorwärtsbewegung des Ballträgers wird gestoppt, es kommt zu einem Stillstand und es ist klar, dass er weder weiteren Raumgewinn erzielen kann, noch dass er wie oben beschrieben down gehen wird. Der Ballträger geht out of bounds, berührt also mit irgendeinem Körperteil die Spielfeldmarkierung oder den Bereich außerhalb davon. Der Ballträger kniet nieder oder rutscht mit den Füßen voraus zu Boden. Ein Ball geht nach einem Kickoff, Scrimmage Kick oder Fumble out of bounds. Ein freier Ball kommt am Boden zur Ruhe und wird von keinem Spieler berührt (oft nach einem Punt). Ein Vorwärtspass berührt den Boden oder geht out of bounds, bevor er gefangen wird (incomplete pass). Berührt der Ball den Boden in einer anderen Situation, so gilt dies als Fumble und der Spielzug läuft weiter, bis eines der genannten Kriterien erfüllt ist. Ist ein Spielzug beendet, so wird der Ball an die Startposition des nächsten Spielzuges gelegt. In den ersten drei der oben beschriebenen Fälle ist dies an der Stelle mit dem größten Raumgewinn. Wird der Ballträger durch einen Tackle zurückbewegt oder wird von den Schiedsrichtern aufgrund fehlender Vorwärtsbewegung für down erklärt, so wird der Ball so nah an das gegnerische Tor gelegt, wie der Ballträger an dieses herangekommen war. Läuft er aus eigenem Antrieb nach hinten, so wird der Ball dort platziert, wo er down geht. Im Falle eines incomplete pass startet der nächste Spielzug an derselben Stelle wie der vorherige. Grundsätzliches Die Offense des angreifenden Teams muss mindestens sieben Spieler an der Line of Scrimmage positionieren, die bis zu den Seitenlinien reicht. Die Defense des verteidigenden Teams darf alle Spieler an der Line of Scrimmage positionieren, üblicherweise beschränkt es sich aber auf drei bis acht Spieler. Spielzüge der Offense Sofern nicht anders erwähnt beziehen sich die folgenden Ausführungen auf die Standard-I-Formation, die als einfachste aller Formationen im American Football gilt. Die meisten Taktiken lassen sich aber auch auf viele andere Formationen übertragen. Zudem werden die folgenden Begriffe verwendet: Run Block -- Ein aktives Blocken, bei welchem der Spieler nach vorne tritt und versucht, den Gegner zur Seite zu schieben, um Platz für den Ballträger zu schaffen. Pass Block -- Ein passives Blocken, bei dem der Spieler nach hinten tritt, um eine pocket für den Quarterback zu erschaffen, welche ihm Zeit verschafft, einen Pass zu werfen. Lead Block -- Der Blocker läuft vor dem Ballträger in derselben Route, um den Weg von Defensivspielern zu befreien, die möglicherweise noch nicht geblockt wurden. Pull -- Ein Spieler der Offensive Line tritt nach hinten aus seiner üblichen Position heraus und läuft quer zur Line of Scrimmage, um an einer anderen Stelle zu blocken. Dies kann sowohl in Pass- als auch in Laufspielzügen eingesetzt werden. Pocket -- Der geschützte Bereich um den Quarterback herum, den die Offensive Line erschafft, um dem Quarterback genügend Zeit und freie Sicht für einen Pass zu ermöglichen. Hole -- Eine Lücke in der Offensive Line, durch welche der Ballträger rennen kann. Eine solche Lücke kann durch einen Abstand zwischen den Spielern der Line von Anfang an vorhanden sein, oder aber durch entsprechende Bewegungen beim Blocken geschaffen werden. Laufspielzüge Bei einem Laufspielzug wird der Ball von einem Spieler hinter der Line of Scrimmage entgegengenommen. Dieser Spieler kann derjenige, der den Ball vom Center bekommt (Quarterback), oder ein Spieler, der den Ball per Hand-Off bekommt (Runningback) sein. Plunge / Dive Bei einem Dive (auch Plunge, Slam, Guts oder diverse andere Bezeichnungen) wird der Ball vom Quarterback zu einem Runningback abgegeben, welcher dann durch eine Lücke (hole) in der Offensive Line zu rennen versucht. Die Spieler dieser Line spielen run block, um diese Lücke zu vergrößern, während oft der Fullback vor dem Runningback als Lead Blocker läuft, um ungeblockte Defensivspieler zu blocken. Der Runningback wird in der Regel versuchen, durch die A- oder B-Gap zu laufen, wobei sich Erstere zwischen Center und Guard und die B-Gap zwischen Guard und Tackle befindet. Off Tackle Bei diesem Spielzug läuft der Runningback nicht durch eine Lücke in der Offensive Line, sondern läuft knapp außerhalb am Tackle vorbei. Dies ermöglicht dem Runningback mehr Flexibilität, da er nach dem Passieren der Line of Scrimmage in der Regel mehr Platz zur Verfügung hat. Toss Bei einem Toss Play laufen Halfback und Fullback zu einer vorher ausgewählten Seite und drehen dann in Richtung der gegnerischen Endzone. Dabei wirft der Quarterback einen Pitch zum Halfback, der hinter dem als Lead Blocker fungierenden Fullback läuft. Da der Pitch kein Vorwärtspass ist gilt dieser Spielzug als Laufspielzug. Sweep Bei einem Sweep Play läuft der Fullback zunächst zur Seitenlinie, bevor er in Angriffsrichtung dreht. Dabei bewegen sich Spieler der Offensive Line, meistens einer oder beide Guards, auf diese Seite und schaffen so eine freie Spur für den Runningback. Der Fullback dient dabei im weiteren Verlauf oft als Lead Blocker. Trap Bei einem Trap Play vollführt der Guard auf der entgegengesetzten Seite der Laufrichtung einen Pull und dient als Lead Blocker für den Runningback. Der Fullback übernimmt dann meist die Lücke, die der Guard dabei entstehen lässt und blockt dort. Counter Bei einem Counter Play läuft der Ballträger zunächst ein oder zwei Schritte auf die andere Seite des beabsichtigten Weges und täuscht dadurch eine falsche Laufrichtung an. Dann dreht er und läuft in die geplante Richtung weiter. Die Spieler der Defense beginnen dabei meist zunächst in die falsche Richtung zu laufen, wodurch ein wendiger Runningback einen Zeitvorteil erhält. Bei einem Counter-Spielzug blockt die Offensive Line oft (aber nicht immer) in Richtung des beabsichtigten Laufweges, statt davon weg, um die Täuschung, der Spielzug gehe in die andere Richtung, zu verstärken. Draw Bei einem Draw Play (oder auch Delay) fällt die Offensive Line in Pass Blocking-Position zurück, während der Quarterback ebenfalls einige Schritte nach hinten geht. Dadurch entsteht der Eindruck, dass es sich um einen Passspielzug handelt. Dies sorgt dafür, dass der Bereich um die Line of Scrimmage herum offener wird. Der Quarterback übergibt den Ball dann an den Runningback (oder behält ihn selber), so dass der Ballträger durch die Pass blockenden Spieler laufen kann. Bootleg Der Quarterback spielt einen Fake Hand-Off, täuscht die Ballübergabe zum Runningback also nur an, behält den Ball und läuft damit selbst in die dem Runningback entgegengesetzte Laufrichtung weiter. Das Blocking kann dabei einem Sweep ähneln, weshalb man in diesem Fall auch von einem Quarterback Sweep spricht. Alternativ kann der Spielzug auch ohne zusätzliches Blocken für den Quarterback gespielt werden, in diesem Fall beruht der Erfolg des Spielzuges darauf, dass sich die Defense vom angetäuschten Hand-Off hereinlegen lässt und den Runningback attackiert. Quarterback Sneak Bei einem Quarterback Sneak (kurz QB Sneak) erhält der Quarterback den Snap und läuft mit diesem unmittelbar am Center vorbei nach vorne. Dieser Spielzug ist darauf ausgelegt, nur relativ wenig Raumgewinn zu erzielen und wird daher meist dann angewendet, wenn nur noch etwa ein Yard für ein first down (also vier neue Angriffsversuche) benötigt wird. Die Entscheidung zum QB Sneak erfolgt oft spontan an der Line of Scrimmage durch den Quarterback, falls dieser das Verhalten der Defense kommen sieht und es daher für sinnvoller erachtet. Dabei gibt es zwischen Quarterback und Center meist ein unauffälliges Signal (zum Beispiel Zwicken), so dass diese beiden Spieler dann selbst im eigenen Team die einzigen Spieler sind, die vom Einsatz dieses Spielzuges wissen. End-Around Der Wide Receiver erhält den Ball per Hand-Off direkt vom Quarterback und versucht entweder, selbst Raumgewinn zu erzielen, indem er in Richtung der Line of Scrimmage läuft, oder wirft selbst einen Pass zu einem weiteren Spieler, der berechtigt ist, einen Pass zu fangen (selten). Reverse Dieser Spielzug ähnelt zunächst einem Sweep Play. Bevor der Runningback jedoch über die Line of Scrimmage tritt übergibt er den Ball einem Wide Receiver, der in die entgegengesetzte Richtung läuft. Der Spielzug wird dabei zwar relativ zeitintensiv hinter der Line of Scrimmage, die Idee ist aber, dass die Defense zum Runningback eilte und der Wide Receiver dadurch eine offene Spielhälfte vorfindet und durch seine Geschwindigkeit Raumgewinn erzielen kann. Option Bei einem Option Play nimmt der Quarterback den Ball und läuft zu einer Seite der Offensive Line, wo er auf eine Möglichkeit wartet, mit dem Ball zu laufen. Der Runningback folgt ihm dabei und gibt ihm die Option, gegebenenfalls einen Pitch zu werfen, bevor er getackelt wird. Die Defense wird also gezwungen, entweder den Quarterback zu attackieren, oder den Pitch zu verhindern. Dies gibt der Offense wiederum die Möglichkeit, die beste Wahl zu treffen. Für diesen Spielzug benötigt man jedoch einen schnellen und flexiblen Quarterback, zudem ist er relativ risikoreich, da der Pitch fallen gelassen werden könnte, wodurch der Ball live bleibt (Fumble). Das Option Play trifft man daher meist nur im College Football an, da High-School-Teams nicht die Fähigkeit haben, diesen Spielzug korrekt und sicher auszuführen, während NFL-Teams so gut sind, dass die Defense gut auf den Spielzug reagieren kann. Quarterback Kneel Bei einem quarterback kneel (auch victory formation genannt) kniet der Quarterback direkt mit dem Football in der Hand auf den Boden und beendet direkt den Spielzug. Ziel ist, das Risiko auf einen Fumble zu minimieren. Der Kneel findet meist kurz vor Spielende statt, wenn das angreifende Team vorne liegt und die Spieluhr auslaufen lassen will, denn der Quarterback Kneel gilt als Laufspielzug, bei dem die Uhr nicht anhält. Die Offensive Line wird auf beiden Seiten durch Tight Ends verstärkt, und für den Fall, dass der Quarterback den Football beim Snap verliert, stehen hinter ihm drei Runningbacks, die den Ball entweder selbst aufnehmen bzw. einen Gegner, der den Ball bekommt, sofort tackeln können. Diese Form des Zeitschindens war früher verpönt, ist aber mittlerweile akzeptiert. Passspielzüge Passrouten Im Folgenden findet sich eine Auflistung der gängigen Standardrouten bei Passspielzügen. Fly/Go Die Fly-Route (auch Go- oder Streak-Route) wird insbesondere dann eingesetzt, wenn der Wide Receiver einen Geschwindigkeitsvorteil gegenüber dem Defensivspieler hat. Bei dieser Route versucht der Receiver geradlinig so schnell wie möglich tief in das Feld zu laufen, um dort einen Pass vom Quarterback zu erhalten. Post Bei dieser Route läuft der Receiver zunächst etwa 10–15 Yards geradeaus und dreht dann nach innen ("in Richtung der Goal Posts"), um den Ball bei voller Laufgeschwindigkeit zu fangen. Je nach Play kann die anfängliche Distanz oder der Winkel, um den man sich nach innen dreht, variieren. Flag/Corner Diese Route ist für Spielzüge über weite Distanzen gedacht. Der Receiver läuft dabei eine Distanz von etwa 10–15 Yards geradeaus und dreht sich dann nach außen in Richtung Seitenlinie und Endzone. Out Bei dieser Route läuft der Receiver etwa 7–10 Yards geradeaus und dreht sich dann um 90 Grad, um in Richtung der Seitenlinie nach außen zu laufen. Diese Route kann in der Distanz variiert werden, so kann man zum Beispiel von einem Five and Out oder Fifteen and Out sprechen, um zu verdeutlichen, wie viele Yards der Receiver zunächst geradeaus laufen soll. In/Drag Die In-Route (oder auch Drag-Route) ähnelt der Out-Route, hier dreht sich der Receiver allerdings 90 Grad nach innen und versucht dann den Ball zu fangen. Slant Der Receiver läuft ein oder zwei Schritte nach vorne und dreht sich dann schlagartig auf eine diagonal nach innen führende Richtung, so dass er hinter den Linebackern aber vor den Safeties den Ball fangen kann. Hook/Hitch Der Receiver läuft eine gewisse Anzahl von Yards oder Schritten geradeaus und hält dann an, um sich in Richtung des Quarterbacks zu drehen. Diese Route soll bezwecken, dass der Defensivspieler nicht schnell genug reagieren und der Receiver daher den Ball fangen kann. Flat Diese Route erhält ihren Namen durch das Gebiet, in welchem es stattfindet. Während eines gängigen Spielzuges entsteht dabei ein Gebiet, das relativ offen ist, dieses Gebiet nennt man Flats. Es befindet sich typischerweise von den Hash Marks zu den Seitenlinien und 3–5 Yards nach der Line of Scrimmage (in Richtung der verteidigenden Mannschaft). Die Route selbst kann auf verschiedene Arten und Weisen gelaufen werden. Eine der gängigsten Möglichkeiten, die so genannte Arrow-Route, wird durch einen Receiver ausgeführt, der sich in unmittelbarer Nähe zum Offensive Tackle aufstellt und dann direkt in dieses Gebiet läuft. Bei der so genannten Swing-Route läuft ein Runningback zur Seitenlinie und dann in einer Rolle als Wide Receiver entlang des Spielfeldes. Option Routes Option-Routes ermöglichen eine sehr flexible Spielweise, erfordern aber ein hohes Niveau der Spieler. Der Receiver hat eine primäre Route vorgegeben, aber mehrere Optionen zur Auswahl. Zu Beginn des Spielzuges muss er die Defense richtig einschätzen und so die beste Option wählen. Zum Beispiel könnte die primäre Route ein Slant sein, der Receiver erkennt jedoch, dass dies gedeckt ist und läuft stattdessen eine Out-Route. Für ein erfolgreiches Durchführen von Option-Routes ist es nötig, dass sowohl Receiver als auch Quarterback dieselbe Einschätzung (read) der Defense haben. Screen Pass Ein Screen Pass ist ein komplexer Spielzug, bei dem viele Dinge auf einmal passieren. Er wird vor allem gegen eine sehr aggressive Defense eingesetzt. Bei diesem Passspielzug soll der Eindruck entstehen, dass ein weiter Pass geworfen wird. In Wahrheit erfolgt der Pass jedoch nur knapp hinter die Defensive Linemen, die zum Quarterback gelangen wollen. Genau dies wird ihnen erleichtert, so dass die Linemen zum Quarterback kommen und der freie Raum für den kurzen Pass entsteht. Einige Spieler der Offensive Line können dabei dann dazu dienen, dem Receiver zusätzlich den Weg freizublocken. Die Gefahr eines Screen Pass besteht darin, dass selbst ein Defensive Lineman den Ball relativ einfach abfangen kann. Da dann kaum ein Offensive Lineman zur Verfügung steht droht die Gefahr, dass der Ball sehr weit, möglicherweise bis zum Touchdown, zurückgetragen wird. Auf der anderen Seite kann ein solcher Spielzug aber auch sehr effektiv sein. Der genaue Ablauf eines Screen Pass kann sehr variieren. Erfolgt der Pass zu einem Runningback, so spricht man meist nur von einem Screen. Bei einem Pass zu einem Wide Receiver gibt es verschiedene Typen wie den Bubble Screen, Middle Screen, Slot Screen oder den Slip Screen. Play-Action Fake (Play-Action-Pass) Der Quarterback nimmt den Snap und täuscht den Hand-Off zum Runningback an. Der Quarterback nimmt den Ball dann schnell zu sich und versucht ihn vor den Augen der Defensivspieler zu verstecken. Der Runningback setzt währenddessen seine Bewegung fort und agiert, als würde er mit dem Ball rennen, dabei hält er auch seine Hände so, als ob er einen Ball hätte. In der Hektik des Spielzugs ist es für die Defensivspieler fast unmöglich, zu erkennen, ob er den Ball wirklich hat. Die Offensive Line beginnt erst mit Run Blocking, wechselt dann aber in Pass Blocking, gleichermaßen starten die Wide Receiver damit, zu blocken, beginnen dann aber, ihre Routes zu laufen. Bei einem Play-Action Fake (oft auch nur Play-Action genannt), der im Grunde das Gegenteil eines Draw Plays ist, hofft der Quarterback darauf, dass die Defense denkt, es wird sich um einen Laufspielzug handeln. Der erhoffte Effekt ist, dass das Pass Rushing der Defense verlangsamt wird, was dem Quarterback Zeit verschafft, und dass die Defensive Backs sich dazu entscheiden, beim Blocken des Laufspielzuges zu helfen, statt einen Receiver zu decken. Dadurch hat der Quarterback also die Zeit, einen möglichst freien Receiver anzuspielen. Trick Plays Bei einem Trick Play versucht die Offense die Defense glauben zu lassen, dass es sich um einen anderen Spielzug handelt. Bekannte Beispiele sind ein Half Back Pass (der Halfback bekommt den Ball und wirft ihn zu einem Receiver), der Razzle Dazzle (der Runningback nimmt den Ball und wirft ihn zu einem Receiver) oder der Flea Flicker (der Quarterback übergibt den Ball an einen Runningback, der sich umdreht, einen Pitch zurück zum Quarterback wirft, so dass dieser einen weiten Pass zu einem Receiver spielen kann). Quarterback Spike Wenn die Offense gegen Ende einer Halbzeit in Zeitnot ist, kann sie mit dem Quarterback Spike Zeit sparen. Dabei wirft der Quarterback den Ball unmittelbar nach dem Snap vor sich auf den Boden. Dies gilt als unvollständiger Pass, welcher die Uhr anhält. Spielzüge der Defense Rush Ein Pass Rush, umgangssprachlich auch Pressure („Druck“) genannt, findet statt, wenn die Defense von einem Passspielzug ausgeht. Diese stürmt dann mit einer Kombination von meist drei oder vier Linemen das gegnerische Team, um den Passversuch zu stören. Ein möglicher Ausgang wäre ein Sack, aber das Pass Rushen ist auch daher sinnvoll, da es den Quarterback unter Druck setzt und zu einem frühen oder unpräzisen Wurf zwingt. Auch das Abfangen des Balls wäre ein möglicher Ausgang eines solchen Fehlers seitens des Quarterbacks. Stunt Ein Stunt ist ein Vorgang, durch den Spieler der Offensive Line verwirrt werden sollen. Ein Defensive Lineman läuft dabei eine schräge Route und blockt einen Offensive Lineman, der nicht unmittelbar vor ihm stand. Dies sorgt dafür, dass der geblockte dem Defensivspieler folgt, während dieser nun einen anderen Lineman blockt. Dadurch entsteht eine Lücke, die ein zweiter Defensivspieler nutzen kann, um einen Rush durchzuführen. Blitz Bei einem Blitz führen Defensivspieler, die nicht der Defensive Line angehören, einen Rush durch (Linebacker oder Defensive Backs). Ein Blitz ist also eine Erweiterung des effektiven Konzepts eines Rush. Coverage Für die Spieler der Defense gibt es verschiedene grundsätzliche Möglichkeiten, gegnerische Spieler wie die Wide Receiver zu decken. Man nennt dies einen Coverage. Man-to-Man Beim Man-to-Man-Coverage ist jeder Receiver durch einen Defensive Back oder einen Linebacker gedeckt. Dieses Coverage wird oft während eines Spielzuges gewählt, die einen Blitz involviert, da nicht genügend Defensivspieler zur Verfügung stehen, um ein Zone Coverage durchzuführen. Falls die Defensive Backs überlegen sind, wird dieses Coverage auch in anderen Spielzügen benutzt. Zone Beim Zone-Coverage sind die Defensivspieler (Defensive Backs oder Linebacker) nicht für einen bestimmten Receiver, sondern für ein bestimmtes Gebiet auf dem Feld verantwortlich. Dies ermöglicht es ihnen, während des Deckens den Quarterback zu beobachten und gegebenenfalls sogar einen Ball abzufangen. Aus dieser Art des Coverage resultieren nicht selten Interceptions oder besonders harte Tackles, nachdem der Receiver den Ball gefangen hat. Weblinks Eine Übersicht offensiver Spielzüge (englisch) Eine Übersicht defensiver Spielzüge (englisch)
en	wikipedia	N/A	Pieter Claeissens the Younger (also known as Claes, Claessen, Claeissins, Claeissz) (c. 1535 in Bruges – 1623 in Bruges) was a Flemish painter and cartographer. Life He was the second son of Pieter Claes, the elder, who was also a painter. He became a master of the Guild of St. Luke in Bruges in 1570. He was dean of the Guild in 1587, 1600, and 1606. Pieter Claeissins the Younger succeeded his younger brother Antoon as official painter to Bruges in 1581. He held the post until 1621. His brothers Gillis and Antoon were successful painters, while his brother Ambrosius became a master goldsmith. Work He painted history paintings, allegories and portraits which continued the Bruges style into the second half of the 16th century. He is known to have collaborated with his father in painting the monumental Resurrection in the cathedral in Bruges, completed in 1585. His Allegory of the Peace of the Netherlands in 1577 (Groeningemuseum, Bruges) was painted to mark the inauguration of John of Austria as Governor of the Netherlands. In 1584 he made a map of Ostend and a bird’s-eye View of Bruges to replace the original by Pieter Pourbus of 1566, which had become damaged due to its frequent use. The Church of Our Lady in Bruges holds an altarpiece by Pieter Claeissins the Younger on the Foundation of S Maria Maggiore in Rome. His masterpiece is a triptych In the St. Walburga Church in Bruges, representing Our Lady of the Dry Tree painted in 1606-1608. There is also a triptych, an Ecce Homo, by him in the Bruges cathedral. References External links Flemish history painters Painters from Bruges Year of birth unknown 1612 deaths
en	wikipedia	N/A	Neil James Lumsden (born December 19, 1952) is a Canadian politician and retired professional football player. Lumsden was elected to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario in the 2022 provincial election, and was subsequently appointed as the Minister of Tourism, Culture and Sport in June 2022. Lumsden played his entire professional career in the Canadian Football League, mostly as a fullback and also as a running back for the Toronto Argonauts, Hamilton Tiger-Cats and Edmonton Eskimos from 1976 to 1985. Early life He played high school football at Northern Secondary School and graduated from Crescent School in Toronto. Football career Some of his career highlights include the Vanier Cup with the University of Ottawa Gee-Gees in 1975, being the eastern conference nominee for Most Outstanding Rookie in 1976, losing out to John Sciarra of the BC Lions, and winning three Grey Cup Championships with Edmonton Eskimos from 1980 to 1982, and again being a Grey Cup winner in 1999 as General Manager of the Hamilton Tiger-Cats. In the 1981 Grey Cup game Lumsden with 8 receptions for 91 yards plus a carry for 2 yards was selected as the Outstanding Canadian being awarded with the Dick Suderman Trophy. In ten seasons Lumsden played in 141 regular season games and carried the ball 767 times for 3755 yards and with 36 touchdowns. He also had 180 receptions for 1729 yards and 15 more touchdowns. Several times during his career he was called on to fill in as a placekicker and punter. Post-CFL career Lumsden worked briefly in cycling when he was appointed COO of the Hamilton, Ontario, UCI Road World Championships in 2003. This was only the fourth time the road cycling world championships had taken place outside Europe. Lumsden now heads Drive Marketing, a sports marketing firm and a division of OK&D Marketing Group of Burlington, Ontario. Lumsden acted as Honorary Chairman of the 2008 Desjardins Vanier Cup in Hamilton, Ontario. In 2014, he was inducted into the Canadian Football Hall of Fame. Political career In 2022, he was nominated to run as a candidate for the Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario in the provincial electoral riding of Hamilton East—Stoney Creek. He was then elected to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario in the 2022 provincial election. Personal life His son is Jesse Lumsden was also a CFL football player who played for the Hamilton Tiger-Cats, Edmonton Eskimos, and Calgary Stampeders before retiring in 2011. He is now a member of the Canadian Olympic Bobsled Team. In 2015, he and his daughter, Kristin Lumsden, a makeup artist/skincare specialist living and working in Toronto, competed in the third season of The Amazing Race Canada. In the first six legs, they placed 10th, 6th, 1st, 6th, 7th, and 6th. In the seventh leg, they placed last in 7th place and were eliminated from the show. References 1952 births Living people Canadian football fullbacks Canadian Football Hall of Fame inductees Canadian Football League announcers Canadian Football League Rookie of the Year Award winners Canadian football running backs Canadian television sportscasters Edmonton Elks players Hamilton Tiger-Cats general managers Hamilton Tiger-Cats players Ottawa Gee-Gees football players Politicians from Hamilton, Ontario Politicians from London, Ontario Sportspeople from Hamilton, Ontario Sportspeople from London, Ontario Toronto Argonauts players The Amazing Race Canada contestants University of Ottawa alumni Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario MPPs Canadian sportsperson-politicians
cs	wikipedia	N/A	Neapolská válka byla válečné střetnutí mezi částí vojsk sedmé koalice (především Rakouska) a Neapolským královstvím. Válka začala 15. března 1815, když neapolský král Joachim I. (bývalý Napoleonův maršál Joachim Murat) vyhlásil válku Rakousku a skončila 20. května 1815 kapitulací neapolských vojsk a podpisem smlouvy z Casalanzy. Boje probíhaly v období tzv. Sta dní, kdy se císař Napoleon vrátil z vyhnanství na ostrově Elba a opět dosedl na trůn ve Francii. Ovšem válku probíhající severně od Alp boje v Itálii výrazněji neovlivnily, až na skutečnost, že jimi byly nějaký čas vázány rakouské jednotky v Lombardii, původně určené pro invazi do jižní Francie. Navíc neapolská válka skončila ještě dříve než Napoleon opustil Paříž, aby vytáhl do Belgie a na bojiště u Waterloo. V důsledku porážky byl král Joachim I. nucen emigrovat a na Neapolský trůn se vrátil Bourbon Ferdinand IV., který příští rok spojil, jako Ferdinand I. Neapolsko-Sicilský, Neapol a Sicílii do Království obojí Sicílie. Pozadí Neapolskému království vládl až do roku 1805 Ferdinand IV., který byl, jako Ferdinand III., zároveň králem Sicílie. Přidal se ovšem na stranu III. koalice a po bitvě u Slavkova, která vyústila v Prešpurský mír, byl nucen Neapol odstoupit Francii. Napoleon určil jako neapolského krále svého bratra Josefa, a když se ten stal v roce 1808 králem ve Španělsku, učinil králem svého maršála a švagra Joachima Murata. Král Joachim I. vládl zemi podle Francouzského vzoru a byl dlouhou dobu věrným spojencem císaře. Neapolské jednotky se účastnily většiny tažení Grand Arme a sám král obvykle velel Napoleonovu jezdectvu. Ovšem po katastrofě v bitvě u Lipska, Joachim I. Napoleona opustil, vrátil se do Neapole a navázal kontakt s Rakušany. Za příslib zachování trůnu přešel 11. ledna 1814 na stranu spojenců. Po Napoleonově porážce se 1. října 1814 sešel Vídeňský kongres, aby nově uspořádal poměry v Evropě. Pro krále Joachima se situace na jednáních nevyvíjela dobře. Na jeho straně stálo Rakousko, ale Velká Británie podporovala Ferdinanda IV., který se nikdy nevzdal nároku na neapolský trůn. Situace se ještě zhoršila, když na kongres dorazil francouzský ministr zahraničí Talleyrand, který logicky podporoval nároky Bourbonů spřízněných s Ludvíkem XVIII. Přípravy Joachim I. chápal, že se situace na Vídeňském kongresu pro něj vyvíjí stále hůře. Rostoucí napětí mezi Neapolí a dvorem v Palermu, který soustavně podporoval ozbrojené tlupy v Kalábrii, vnucovalo i umírněným rakouským politikům myšlenku jestli by nebylo lepší vrátit Neapol Ferdinandovi a pro Joachima najít nějaké malé knížectví v Německu. Na to král samozřejmě nebyl ochoten přistoupit a poslední měsíce roku 1814 strávil v horečnaté snaze posílit armádu a navázat kontakt se stoupenci myšlenky sjednocení Itálie na celém poloostrově. Spoléhal především na generály, kteří bojovali pod Napoleonovým velením a nebo přímo pod ním a teď sloužili v armádách různých italských států. Počítal s tím, že pokud vystoupí proti Rakušanům a vyhlásí boj za sjednocení a nezávislost, tak k němu přejdou i se svými jednotkami. Na začátku roku 1815 úspěšně pokračovalo posilování neapolské armády a rostoucí neshody mezi velmocemi na čas odsunuly bezprostřední ohrožení Joachimova trůnu. Potom, ale v prvním březnovém týdnu, přišla zpráva, že Napoleon uprchl z Elby a vylodil se ve Francii. Dokud byl výsledek tohoto podniku nejistý zachovával král opatrnost. Dokonce informoval Londýn a Palermo, že na jeho veskrze mírové politice se tímto nic nemění. Ovšem jak začalo být jasné, že císař v uchopení moci uspěje, pochopil král Joachim, že teď nastala ta pravá chvíle. Poslal svého pobočníka k císaři Napoleonovi s dopisem, ve kterém mu nabízel své služby. Ani nepočkal na odpověď a 15. března 1815 vyhlásil Rakouskému císařství válku. Válka Neapolský postup Král Joachim svěřil království do rukou své ženy Caroliny a ponechal jí asi 10 000 mužů v posádkách pro případ anglo-sicilského výsadku. Potom se odebral do Ancony, kde se soustředily čtyři divize pod velením generálů Carrascosy, Lechiho, d'Ambrosia a Pignatelli di Cerchiara. První ale zahájily postup dvě divize, které měly operovat samostatně západně od Apenin. Veleli jim generálové Livron a Pignatelli di Strongoli a obsahovaly i elitní jednotky královské gardy. Poté, co papež rezolutně odmítl povolit neapolské armádě průchod svým územím, překročily tyto dvě divize hranice papežského státu a obsadily Řím. Papež Pius VII. opustil 22. března věčné město a uprchl do Janova (od 3. ledna 1815 součást Sardinského království). Kardinál Somaglia, který v nepřítomnosti papeže řídil vládu papežského státu, ostře protestoval proti narušení suverenity území Svatého stolce, ale nebylo to nic platné. Neapolské jednotky přešly papežský stát a překročily hranice Toskánského velkovévodství habsburka Ferdinanda III. Toskánského. 7. dubna vytlačily z Florencie posádku podmaršálka Nugenta a hlavní město Toskánska obsadily. Nugent se ovšem v žádném případě necítil poražen. 8. a 10. dubna odrážel neapolce v ústupových bojích a když dostal posily ze severu, zaujal u Pistoii výhodné obranné postavení, ze kterého se už nenechal vytlačit. Mezitím vyrazila z Ancony i hlavní neapolská armáda pod královým velením. 29. března vstoupily jeho jednotky do Rimini. Zde druhého dne pronesl Proklamaci z Riminy, ve které vyzýval všechny italské vlastence, aby se připojili pod jeho prapory a bojovali za sjednocenou a nezávislou Itálii. Stejného dne zaútočila u Ceseny divize generála Carrascosy na rakouský sbor podmaršálka Bianchiho a donutila ho k ústupu až na linii na řece Panaro. To umožnilo neapolské armádě pokračovat v postupu. 1. dubna obsadila Faenzo a 2. dubna Boloňu. 3. dubna zaútočily neapolské síly na Bianchiho u Castelfranca s cílem vynutit si přechod přes Panaro. Rakušané kladli houževnatý odpor, ale mužům generála Filangieriho se podařilo dobýt most v Sant Ambrogiu. Když pak brigáda generála Colletty přešla řeku u Spilamberta a zamířila do rakouského pravého boku, nezbylo Rakušanům než vyklidit pozice a vydat tak neapolcům Modenu, odkud musel uprchnout další habsburk František IV. Modenský. Bitva u Occhiobella Bianchiho sbor zaujal novou obrannou pozici za kanálem Bentivoglio s předmostím na řece Pád u Borgoforte. 5. dubna se velení všech rakouských jednotek v Lombardii ujal generál jezdectva Frimont. Ustavil hlavní štáb v Piacenze a roztáhl svoje jednotky na Pádu, tak aby mohl krýt cestu na Miláno. Mezitím král Joachim rozdělil svoji armádu. Spolu s divizí Carrascosa obsadil Modenu, Reggio a Carpi a zbylé jednotky poslal obsadit Ferraru a zaujmout postavení na Pádu u Occhiobella. Na rozdíl od ostatních měst se ovšem ve Ferrarské citadele opevnila posádka generálmajora Lauera a umíněně se odmítala vzdát. 8. dubna se Joachim rozhodl překročit Pád u Occhiobella. Věděl, že tento úsek brání pouze slabé síly podmaršálka Mohra. Neapolci měli sice převahu v počtech mužů, ale většina jejich dělostřelectva byla vázána obléháním Ferrary. A právě rakouské dělostřelectvo, výhodně postavené u mostu v Occhiobello, rozhodlo o neúspěchu neapolského útoku. Rakušanům se povedlo odrazit několik pokusů o přechod Pádu a večer dokonce, s podporou jednoho dragounského pluku, přešli do protiútoku. Barona Frimonta útok u Occhiobello poněkud překvapil, ale zareagoval rychle. Především dokázal během noci z 8. na 9. dubna posílit jednotky generála Mohra. Správně předpokládal, že se neapolci druhý den pokusí o nový útok. Uvědomoval si ovšem, že jeho strategie musí být mnohem ofenzivnější. Bylo jasné, že posádka ve Ferraře už nedokáže dlouho vzdorovat a je třeba ji vyprostit. Proto dostal podmaršálek Bianchi rozkaz, aby jeho druhý rakouský sbor zahájil následující den protiofenzivu. Část Bianchiho jednotek vyrazila 9. dubna na Carpi bráněné brigádou generála Pepeho a druhá část se pokoušela Carpi obejít a odříznout tak Pepemu ústupovou cestu u Quartirofola (dnes součást Carpi). V době, kdy se dávaly do pohybu Bianchiho jednotky, zahájil král Joachim druhý pokus o překročení Pádu. Ovšem jeho jednotky byly oslabené ztrátami předchozího dne a na druhém břehu je očekávala obrana, ke které už stihly dorazit Frimontem vyslané posily. Stejně jako předešlého dne dokázaly rakouské síly zabránit přechodu řeky a dokonce po celodenních bojích udržely předmostí na jižním břehu Pádu. Rakouský protiútok Bitva u Occhiobella znamenala obrat ve válce. Joachim ztratil strategickou iniciativu a musel zaujmout obranná postavení v okolí Ferrary. Aby toho nebylo málo, Velká Británie vyhlásila Neapoli válku a vyslala svoji flotilu k italským břehům. Generál Carrascosa, který velel jednotkám v okolí Modeny, pochopil z pohybů sboru generála Bianchiho rakouskou past, která hrozila obklíčením divize generála Pepeho v Carpi a rozkázal všem jednotkám stáhnout se na obrannou linii za řekou Panaro. Ale i po Carrascosově ústupu Murat stále zůstával na pozici a pokračoval v obléhání Ferrary. V reakci na to Frimont rozkázal sboru generála Neipperga zaútočit na Muratovo opevněné pravé křídlo. 12. dubna po krvavé bitvě u Casaglia, byly nepolské jednotky z opevněných pozic vytlačeny. I přes tento neúspěch se dařilo neapolcům i nadále obléhat Ferraru. 14. dubna se Bianchi pokusil překročit řeku Panaro, ale byl odražen. Ovšem stejného dne v Toskánsku obě neapolské gardové divize dosti nepochopitelně vyklidily Florencii a to i přesto, že je Nugentovi Rakušané nijak neobtěžovali. Ti pak 15. dubna prázdné město obsadili. Když se to Murat dozvěděl, nezbylo mu než 16. dubna zrušit obléhání Ferrary a začít ustupovat na Boloňu. Když teď byla cesta na Florencii volná, a Itálie se před ním otevírala, vyslal Frimont dva sbory na jih, aby s Neapolským královstvím definitivně skoncovaly. Bianchi byl vyslán po via Florentia k Folignu, čímž by se dostal do neapolského týlu a odřízl by je od ústupových tras, zatímco Neipperg byl vyslán přímo proti Joachimovi, aby ho donutil ustupovat na Anconu. Když se válečná štěstěna obrátila na rakouskou stranu, zavelel Frimont k návratu do Lombardie, aby připravil svoji armádu na invazi do Francie. Tak byla většina rakouských jednotek stažena a zůstaly jenom tři sbory (Bianchiho, Neipperga a Nugentův) o síle asi 35 000 mužů. Král Joachim, který vkládal příliš nadějí do čtyř gardových divizí a věřil, že budou schopny zastavit postup Bianchiho a Nungeta, ustupoval jen zvolna a dokonce se odhodlal k lokálním protiútokům na řekách Ronco a Savio. Každopádně Neippergův předvoj dvakrát dostihl a překvapil ustupující Neapolce u Cesenatica a Pesara. Joachim musel zrychlit svůj ústup a koncem dubna jeho hlavní síly dorazily bezpečně do Ancony, kde se spojily se dvěma gardovými divizemi stahujícími se od Florencie. Bitva u Tolentina Zatím Bianchi rychle postupoval. Do Florencie dorazil 20. dubna, svého cíle Foligno dosáhl 26. dubna a teď ohrožoval Muratovy ústupové linie. Neippergův sbor byl stále na pochodu a 29. dubna jeho předvoj dosáhl Fano. Jelikož byly rakouské síly rozděleny, doufal Joachim, že se mu podaří rychle porazit Bianchiho a potom se obrátí proti Neippergovi. Je to podobná taktika jakou uplatní Napoleon před bitvou u Waterloo. Murat vyslal Carrascostovu divizi na sever zdržovat Neipperga a sám vytáhl s hlavními silami na západ proti Bianchimu. Murat původně plánoval postavit se Bianchimu blízko města Tolentino, ale 29. dubna Bianchiho předvoj úspěšně vyhnala z Tolentina zdejší malou posádku. Bianchi, který dorazil první, tak mohl zformovat svoje jednotky ve výhodných obranných pozicích v kopcích východně od města. Neapolský král rozestavil svoji armádu, momentálně posílenou o většinu jednotek divizí Livorno a Pignatelli Strongolî, na výšinách Monte Milone na půl cesty mezi Macerata a Tolentinem. S Neippergovou armádou pochodující mu do týlu musel Joachim 2. května 1815 přijmout u Tolentina bitvu. Prvního dne bitvy zaútočil na rakouské pravé křídlo, ale byl odražen. 3. května útok obnovil podél velké silnice, zatímco divize Ambrosio a Pignatelli zaútočily z Monte Milone na rakouské levé křídlo. Asi 8 000 Neapolců seřazených do karé, každé po dvou batalionech sestoupily z hory a pod těžkou palbou z děl i pušek postupovali proti nepříteli. Tento útok dopadl na Rakušany seřazené ve dvou řadách a podporovaných jízdou, která se stočila a vpadla Neapolcům do pravého boku. To stačilo na zastavení útoku a když i generál Mohr dokázal na pravém křídle odrazit útok, nařídil generál Bianchi oběma křídelním kolonám aby přešly do protiútoku směrem na Monte Milone. V tu dobu dostal král zprávu, že Neipperg porazil 1. května u Scapezzana Carrascostu a postupuje mu od města Jesi do týla. V tu chvíli pochopil nevyhnutelné a zavelel k ústupu. Bitva výrazně poškodila morálku neapolského vojska a armáda ztratila v bitvě mnoho vyšších důstojníků. Poražená neapolská armáda upadla do naprostého zmatku. 5. května zahájila spojená anglo-rakouská flotila blokádu Ancony, s cílem zajmout tamější posádku. Konec V naprostém zmatku musela hledat neapolská armáda záchranu v ústupu po špatných cestách podél pobřeží Jadranu. Pronásledoval je generál Mohr s částí rakouských sil. 8. května vstoupil do Tronta, devátého okupoval Benedetto, 12. května vyčlenil část svých sil k blokování Pescara a se zbytkem pochodoval na Popoli. Generál Bianchi s hlavní rakouskou armádou, teď tvořenou spojeným prvním i druhým sborem, pokračoval po silnici směrem na Foglio Terni, 9. května byl ve Spoletu, přešel hory mezi Terni a Rieti a 12. května dorazil do L'Aquily. Hrad L'Aquila se vzdal Neippergovu předvoji a Bianchi pokračoval v pochodu na Popoli a Sulmona. Neapolci prošli soutěskami v naprostém zmatku a jejich armáda se různými ztrátami smrskla asi na 15 000 mužů. Mezitím generál Nugent pokračoval ve svém pochodu z Florencie na Řím, kam dorazil 30. dubna. Z Říma pochodoval směrem na Ceprano, v jehož blízkosti musel postoupit drobné srážky s ozbrojenými horaly generála Montigniho. Dál pokračoval po trase Terracina, Fondi a Pontecorvo. 14. května mu u San Germana zastoupil neapolský král cestu s jednotkamy y určenými k vnitřní obraně království. 15. května král Joachim, který měl nad Nugentem dvojnásobnou převahu, zahájil od San Germana útok. Podařilo se mu sice zahnat rakouský předvoj, ale prorazit nepřátelskou sestavu se nezdařilo. Neapolské vojsko, které při útoku utrpělo těžké ztráty, ustoupilo zpět k San Germanu a zaujalo defenzivní postavení. Přispěl k tomu i Bianchiho sbor postupující z tolentinského bojiště do neapolského boku. Blízkost hlavní rakouské armády natolik posílila Nugentovo sebevědomí, že 16. května zahájil vlastní útok. Tisícovka husarů, podporovaná mysliveckými a hraničářskými jednotkami, zaútočila na obranná postavení u San Germano. K boji prakticky nedošlo. Většina Neapolců uprchla ještě dříve než se k nim Rakušané dostali. Se zbytkem armády ustoupil král Joachim na Capuu. Postavení neapolské armády bylo beznadějné. Vojsko sláblo neutuchající dezercí. V Capui už čítalo jen 12 000 unavených, deprimovaných a demoralizovaných mužů. Zprávy říkaly, že anglo-sicilský výsadek je připraven překročit úžinu a pochodovat na Neapol od jihu. Bylo nemožné pokračovat v boji. Král Joachim předal velení generálovi Carrascosovi, pověřil ministra zahraničí hraběte San Gallo, aby začal vyjednávat o příměří a sám odjel do Neapole. Do hlavního města vstoupil doprovázen čtyřmi polskými kopiníky v pět odpoledne 18. května. Ráno 19. května přineslo špatné zprávy od San Galla. Bianchi se odmítl o příměří bavit. Prohlásil, že on je teď pánem Neapolska a že nezná žádného krále Joachima. Je pouze ochoten uzavřít vojenskou dohodu o zastavení palby s generálem Carrascosou, ze které musí být „maršál Murat“ vyloučen. Anglická eskadra ležela na dohled od Neapole a Carolina zabránila bombardování města jen vydáním těch několika ozbrojených lodí, které se plavily pod neapolskou vlajkou. Pevnost Gaeta stále odolávala obléhání. Murat vyhlásil záměr odejít tam a sdílet osud posádky. Byla ovšem otázka, zda Gaeta odolá rakouskému útoku a pokud by i ano, dříve či později se bude muset vzdát. Jeho přátelé mu radili, že nejlepší bude pokusit se uprchnout do Francie. 19. května strávil svůj poslední den v neapolském paláci a připravoval svůj útěk. Nemohl déle čekat, protože lid začínal být neklidný a začínaly se množit zprávy o britském vylodění. Aby se zatajil jeho odchod, bylo rozhodnuto, že Carolina prozatím zůstane v Neapoli a připojí se k němu později ve Francii. Byli přesvědčeni, že jí spojenci zajistí bezpečný a volný průchod. Murat odplul na malém člunu na Korsiku a odtud posléze do Cannes. 20. května neapolská armáda kapitulovala a zástupci Rakouska, Velké Británie a Neapole uzavřeli smlouvu z Casalanzy. Podmínky smlouvy byly k poraženým Neapolcům poměrně mírné. Všichni generálové si ponechali svoje hodnosti a hranice království zůstaly nezměněny. Smlouva pouze požadovala návrat krále Ferdinanda IV. Neapolského a Sicilského na neapolský trůn, propuštění všech válečných zajatců, a to aby všechny neapolské posádky pevností složily zbraně. To se netýkalo Ancony, Pescary a Gaety. Tato tři města byla blokována anglo-rakouskou flotilou a byla mimo kontrolu generála Carrascosy. Všechny tři posádky postupně kapitulovaly, byť se obléhání Gaety protáhlo až do srpna. Po boji Joachim Murat se odmítl vzdát nároku na trůn. Vrátil se z exilu a 8. října 1815 přistál s 28 muži v Pizzo v Kalábrii. Na rozdíl od Napoleona o sedm měsíců dříve se nedočkal vřelého přijetí a byl zajat bourbonskými oddíly. Pět dní po přistání u Pizzo byl v tamějším městském hradě popraven zastřelením. To bylo poslední jednání napoleonských válek. Odkazy Reference Literatura Napoleonské války Války 19. století Války Itálie Války Rakouského císařství Války Spojeného království
es	other	N/A	Decreto 9/2006, de 27 de enero, por el que se crea el Consejo Superior de Estadística de La Rioja y se aprueba el Reglamento que establece su organización, composición y funcionamiento - BOR. Boletín Oficial de La Rioja - Legislación - VLEX 19415026 Decreto 9/2006, de 27 de enero, por el que se crea el Consejo Superior de Estadística de La Rioja y se aprueba el Reglamento que establece su organización, composición y funcionamiento Emisor: Consejeria de Hacienda y Empleo Artículo 1. Creación y naturaleza del Consejo. Artículo 4. Composición del Consejo Superior de Estadística de La Rioja. Artículo 5. Nombramiento, renovación y sustitución de los Consejeros no natos y sus suplentes. Artículo 6. Funcionamiento del Consejo Superior de Estadística de La Rioja. Artículo 7. Adopción de acuerdos. Artículo 8. Tramitación de las peticiones de informe. Artículo 9. Actas. Artículo 10. Funciones del Presidente, Vicepresidentes y Secretario. Artículo 11. Funciones de los Consejeros. Artículo 12. Grupos de trabajo. Artículo 13. Composición y constitución de los grupos de trabajo. Artículo 14. Funciones del Presidente y del Secretario de los grupos de trabajo. Artículo 15. Participación de expertos. El Estatuto de Autonomía de la Rioja en su artículo octavo establece que corresponde a la Comunidad Autónoma de La Rioja la competencia exclusiva en materia de estadística para fines no estatales. La experiencia desarrollada en el ejercicio de las competencias establecidas en el mismo, aconseja que el ordenamiento jurídico de La Rioja acoja y regule el ejercicio de la materia estadística, como instrumento para conocer mejor la realidad demográfica, social, territorial, económica, medioambiental y cultural de nuestra región. La Ley 2/2005, de 1 de marzo, de Estadística de La Rioja dedica el capítulo IV de su título II a la regulación del Consejo Superior de Estadística de La Rioja determinando su naturaleza y competencias, así como su composición y funciones dentro del Sistema Estadístico Regional. El artículo 33 de dicha Ley dispone que su creación debe efectuarse mediante Decreto, y el apartado 2 del artículo 35 determina que su régimen de organización, y funcionamiento se fijará reglamentariamente. En consecuencia es preciso dictar un Decreto que dé cumplimiento a la normativa reseñada. En su virtud, el Consejo de Gobierno, conforme con el Consejo Consultivo de La Rioja, a propuesta del Consejero de Hacienda y Empleo y previa deliberación de sus miembros, en su reunión celebrada el día 27 de enero de 2006, acuerda aprobar el siguiente, Artículo 1 Creación y naturaleza del Consejo. Se crea el Consejo Superior de Estadística de La Rioja como órgano colegiado consultivo y de participación del Sistema Estadístico Regional, donde están representados las organizaciones sindicales y empresariales y otros grupos representativos de la vida social, económica y académica de La Rioja, junto a las Consejerías del Gobierno de La Rioja y a un representante del Instituto Nacional de Estadística, de la Federación Riojana de Municipios y del Ayuntamiento de Logroño. El Consejo Superior de Estadística de La Rioja se integra en la Consejería de Hacienda y Empleo. Artículo 2 Finalidad. El Consejo Superior de Estadística de La Rioja tiene como finalidad promover la adecuación entre las necesidades de información de los usuarios y la producción de estadísticas para un mejor aprovechamiento de los recursos destinados a su elaboración. El Consejo Superior de Estadística de La Rioja desempeñará las siguientes funciones: Informar el Plan Regional de Estadística de La Rioja y los Programas Anuales de Estadística. Presentar recomendaciones sobre la difusión de la estadística regional; sobre las relaciones entre órganos estadísticos e informantes, y sobre la aplicación práctica del secreto estadístico. Emitir informe sobre cualquier otro proyecto o consulta que en materia estadística someta a su consideración el Gobierno de La Rioja. Artículo 4 Composición del Consejo Superior de Estadística de La Rioja. El Consejo Superior de Estadística de La Rioja estará compuesto por los siguientes miembros: El Presidente, que será el titular de la Consejería a la que esté adscrito el Instituto de Estadística de La Rioja. El Vicepresidente primero, que será el titular de la Dirección General a la que esté adscrito el Instituto de Estadística de La Rioja. El Vicepresidente segundo, que será el Director del Instituto de Estadística de La Rioja. El Secretario General Técnico de cada una de las Consejerías o persona en quien delegue. El Consejo, además, estará formado por un máximo de 11 miembros no natos... Decreto 11/2004, de 20 de febrero, por el que se regula el Consejo Regional de Cooperación para el Desarrollo Decreto 49/2006, de 11 de mayo, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de Organización y Funcionamiento del Consejo Cántabro de Estadística. Decreto 18/2007, de 20 de abril, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de creación, organización y funcionamiento del Consejo Riojano de Calidad Agroalim... ORDEN FORAL 923/2009, de 1 de diciembre, del Consejero de Presidencia, Justicia e Interior, por la que se resuelve el VI Premio 'Martín de Azpilicueta', correspondiente al año 2009, para trabajos de estudio e investigación sobre las Administraciones Públicas, el sector público de Navarra y el Derecho Civil Foral Navarro. Decreto Legislativo 1/2004, de 28-12-2004, por el que se aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley de Ordenación del Territorio y de la Actividad Urbanística. DECRETO 253/2008, de 16 de diciembre, por el que se regulan los cursos de formación en bienestar animal. Orden de la Consejería de Educación, Formación y Empleo, de 11 de junio de 2013, por la que se crea la marca distintiva “Empresa Segura de la Región de Murcia”.
en	caselaw	US	97 Okla. Crim. 399 (1953) 264 P.2d 1004 Ex parte HARRELSON. No. A-12020. Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma. December 16, 1953. 400 Harold Witcher, Cordell, for petitioner. Emmett N. Sasseen, County Atty., and Charles Edwards, Asst. County Atty., Cordell, for respondents. JONES, J. This is an original action in habeas corpus instituted by the petitioner William Richard Harrelson for the purpose of securing his release from imprisonment in the county jail of Washita county at Cordell. From the allegations of the petition and the evidence presented before this court, it appears that petitioner is now 17 years of age; that on November 7, 1953, he was arrested in Del Rio, Texas, while driving an automobile allegedly stolen in Washita county; that after questioning by Texas police officers, the petitioner admitted the commission of certain crimes in Oklahoma and the officers of Washita county were notified by the Texas officers that the petitioner was held in custody at Del Rio and had admitted the commission of certain crimes in Oklahoma and had signed a statement waiving extradition and agreeing to return to the State of Oklahoma for trial. The sheriff of Washita county, respondent herein, went to Del Rio, Texas, brought the accused back to Oklahoma and incarcerated him in the county jail where he has since been confined. The accused had no counsel to advise with him in the State of Texas and none in Oklahoma until after he had waived a preliminary examination and had been ordered held for trial in the district court. Counsel who appeared herein was appointed by the district court of Washita county to represent the accused upon his arraignment before the district court. Counsel upon arraignment raised the question that accused had appeared without counsel before the committing magistrate, was wholly inexperienced in court procedure, and was incapable of intelligently waiving a preliminary examination. Thereupon the county attorney moved the court to vacate the proceedings in the district court and send the cause back to the magistrate for a new preliminary examination. The court sustained the motion, the proceedings in the district court were vacated, and the cause remanded 401 to the county court, sitting as a committing magistrate for the purpose of holding a preliminary examination. Two questions are presented to this court for determination: (1) Is the petitioner entitled to his discharge from custody because he did not have counsel to advise with him at the time he waived extradition in the State of Texas? (2) Is he entitled to his absolute discharge from further prosecution because of the failure to provide counsel for him at the time of his preliminary examination? Both of these questions must be answered in the negative. In the case of Adams v. Waters, 94 Okla. Crim. 428, 237 P.2d 914, and in Traxler v. State, 96 Okla. Crim. 231, 251 P.2d 815, this court held that the right to try a person accused of crime who is found within the territorial jurisdiction of the state wherein he is so charged may not be defeated or impaired because of the methods by which his personal presence in the state was secured. The Supreme Court of the United States has also held to this effect. Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192, 27 S. Ct. 111, 51 L. Ed. 148. In accordance with these decisions, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether there was an intelligent waiver by the accused of his right to demand an extradition hearing in the State of Texas before being brought to Oklahoma for trial, as he is now within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Oklahoma within Washita county, where he stands legally charged with the commission of a felony. The second contention likewise must be determined adversely to the petitioner. This court has consistently held that a judgment of conviction of one who did not effectively waive his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is void as having been rendered without jurisdiction, and that where the accused is a minor, inexperienced in court proceedings, and charged with a felony, it is the duty of the court to assign counsel to represent him as a necessary requisite of due process of law. Ex parte Cornell, 87 Okla. Crim. 2, 193 P.2d 904; Ex parte Cook, 84 Okla. Crim. 404, 183 P.2d 595; Ex parte Meadows, 70 Okla. Crim. 304, 106 P.2d 139. In each of those cases, the judgment and sentence was vacated because of the denial of certain of the constitutional rights of the prisoner, and the case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings, as if no arraignment had ever been had of the accused. Applying those principles of law to the facts in the instant case, we find that the district court of Washita county has already given the petitioner all of the relief to which he was entitled because of the lack of counsel to advise with him at his preliminary examination. The district court set aside the proceedings in the district court and remanded the prisoner to jail to await a new preliminary examination before the committing magistrate. If the petitioner had appeared before this court in an original action without having gone before the district court, we would not have granted him his unqualified discharge from prison, which he now seeks, but would have done no more than was done by the district court. It appears to us under any reasonable view of the facts that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on habeas corpus. It is so ordered. POWELL, P.J., and BRETT, J., concur.
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Allan Scott est un scénariste américain né le à Arlington, New Jersey (États-Unis), mort le à Santa Monica, Californie (États-Unis). Il a surtout travaillé avec le réalisateur Mark Sandrich, notamment pour quelques films musicaux des années 1930 et 1940 avec Fred Astaire ou Ginger Rogers. Il fut d'ailleurs nommé aux Oscars pour le scénario de Les Anges de miséricorde. Il est le frère d'Adrian Scott, producteur et scénariste, et le père de l'actrice Pippa Scott. Filmographie Scénariste 1934 : Avec votre permission (By Your Leave) de Lloyd Corrigan 1935 : Village Tale de John Cromwell 1935 : Le Danseur du dessus (Top Hat) de Mark Sandrich 1935 : Je te dresserai (In Person) de William A. Seiter 1936 : En suivant la flotte (Follow the fleet) de Mark Sandrich 1936 : Sur les ailes de la danse (Swing Time) de George Stevens 1937 : Pour un baiser (Quality Street) de George Stevens 1937 : L'Entreprenant Monsieur Petrov (Shall We Dance) de Mark Sandrich 1938 : Quelle joie de vivre (Joy of living) de Tay Garnett 1938 : Amanda (Carefree) de Mark Sandrich 1939 : L'Irrésistible Monsieur Bob (Man about Town) de Mark Sandrich 1939 : Un ange en tournée (5th Avenue Girl) de Gregory La Cava 1940 : Le Lys du ruisseau (Primrose Path) de Gregory La Cava 1940 : Double Chance (Lucky Partners) de Lewis Milestone 1941 : La Folle alouette (Skylark) de Mark Sandrich 1941 : de Lloyd Bacon 1943 : Les Anges de miséricorde (So Proudly We Hail !) de Mark Sandrich 1944 : La Marine en jupons (Here Come the Waves) de Mark Sandrich 1946 : La Mélodie du bonheur (Blue Skies) de Stuart Heisler 1950 : Maman est à la page (Let's Dance) de Norman Z. McLeod 1951 : The Guy Who Came Back de Joseph M. Newman 1952 : The Four Poster d'Irving Reis 1957 : Affaire ultra-secrète (Top Secret Affair) de HC Potter 1959 : Mirage de la vie (Imitation of Life) de Douglas Sirk 1964 : The Confession'' de William Dieterle Liens externes Scénariste américain de cinéma Naissance en mai 1906 Décès en avril 1995 Décès à 88 ans Naissance dans le comté de Hudson Décès à Santa Monica
de	caselaw	Germany	Tenor Der Antrag wird abgelehnt. Der Antragsteller trägt die Kosten des Verfahrens, in dem Gerichtskosten nicht erhoben werden. 1Gründe: 2Der - sinngemäß gestellte - Antrag, 3die aufschiebende Wirkung der Klage gleichen Rubrums 8 K 1257/15.A gegen den Bescheid des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Bundesamt) vom 10. Juli 2015 anzuordnen, 4hat keinen Erfolg. Der zulässige Antrag ist unbegründet. 5Das Verwaltungsgericht kann nach § 80 Abs. 5 VwGO auf Antrag die aufschiebende Wirkung einer Klage anordnen, wenn das Suspensivinteresse des Antragstellers gegenüber dem öffentlichen Vollzugsinteresse überwiegt. Das Gericht trifft dabei eine eigene Ermessensentscheidung, die sich maßgeblich an den Erfolgsaussichten des eingelegten Rechtsbehelfs orientiert. 6Diese Interessenabwägung fällt vorliegend zu Lasten des Antragstellers aus, weil der Bescheid des Bundesamtes vom 10. Juli 2015 rechtmäßig ist und den Antragsteller nicht in seinen Rechten verletzt. 7Die Abschiebungsanordnung findet ihre Rechtsgrundlage in § 34a Abs. 1 2. Alt. AsylVfG. Nach dieser Vorschrift hat das Bundesamt dann eine Abschiebungsanordnung zu erlassen, wenn der Ausländer in einen für die Durchführung des Asylverfahrens zuständigen Staat (§ 27a AsylVfG) abgeschoben werden soll und sobald feststeht, dass die Abschiebung durchgeführt werden kann. 8Diese Voraussetzungen liegen vor. 9Das Bundesamt hat in dem angefochtenen Bescheid (Ziffer 1) den Asylantrag des Antragstellers mit der Begründung gemäß § 27a AsylVfG als unzulässig abgelehnt, dass nach den Rechtsvorschriften der Europäischen Gemeinschaft Rumänien für die Durchführung des Asylverfahrens zuständig sei. Diese Entscheidung ist rechtlich nicht zu beanstanden. 10Die Bestimmung des zuständigen Mitgliedsstaates zur Prüfung des Asylantrags im Sinne des § 27a AsylVfG richtet sich nach der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 604/2013 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 26. Juni 2013 (ABl. Nr. L 180 S. 31) zur Festlegung der Kriterien und Verfahren zur Bestimmung des Mitgliedstaates, der für die Prüfung eines von einem Drittstaatsangehörigen oder Staatenlosen in einem Mitgliedstaat gestellten Antrags auf internationalen Schutzes zuständig ist (Dublin-III-VO). 11In Anwendung der Vorschriften der Dublin-III-VO ist Rumänien für die Prüfung des Asylantrags des Antragstellers zuständig. 12Gemäß Art. 3 Abs. 1 Dublin-III-VO gilt der Grundsatz, dass ein im Hoheitsgebiet der EU-Mitgliedstaaten gestellter Asylantrag nur von einem einzigen Mitgliedstaat geprüft wird. Greifen vorrangige Kriterien zur Bestimmung des zuständigen Mitgliedstaates (Art. 7 bis 15 der Dublin-III-VO) nicht ein, so gilt nach der Generalklausel des Art. 3 Abs. 2 UAbs. 1 Dublin-III-VO der weitere Grundsatz, dass der erste Mitgliedstaat, in dem der Asylantrag gestellt wurde, für dessen Prüfung zuständig ist. 13Vorliegend war für die Prüfung des Asylantrags des Antragstellers nach den Kriterien des Kapitels III der Dublin-III-VO an sich Bulgarien zuständig. Die Zuständigkeit Bulgariens beruhte auf Art. 13 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Dublin-III-VO. Nach dieser Vorschrift ist ein Mitgliedstaat für die Prüfung des Antrags auf internationalen Schutz dann zuständig, wenn auf der Grundlage von Beweismitteln oder Indizien gemäß den beiden in Art. 22 Abs. 3 Dublin-III-VO genannten Verzeichnissen, einschließlich der Daten nach der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 603/2013 festgestellt wird, dass ein Antragsteller aus einem Drittstaat kommend die Land-, See- oder Luftgrenze des Mitgliedstaats illegal überschritten hat. Vorliegend ist der Antragsteller nach seinen eigenen Angaben aus der Türkei (also einem Drittstaat) kommend illegal nach Bulgarien eingereist. 14Die so begründete Zuständigkeit Bulgariens ist jedoch wieder erloschen und wurde durch die Zuständigkeit Rumäniens ersetzt, Art. 17 Abs. 1 UAbs. 1, UAbs. 2 Satz 1 Dublin-III-VO. 15Art. 17 Abs. 1 UAbs. 1 Dublin-III-VO erlaubt es einem Mitgliedstaaten abweichend von Art. 3 Abs. 1 Dublin-III-VO einen bei ihm von einem Drittstaatsangehörigen oder Staatenlosen gestellten Antrag auf internationalen Schutz zu prüfen, auch wenn er nach den in dieser Verordnung festgelegten Kriterien nicht für die Prüfung zuständig ist. Gemäß Art. 17 Abs. 1 UAbs. 2 Satz 1 Dublin-III-VO wird ein Mitgliedstaat, der dies beschließt, dadurch zum zuständigen Mitgliedstaat und übernimmt die mit dieser Zuständigkeit einhergehenden Verpflichtungen. 16Der Antragsteller hat am 19. März 2015 ausweislich der EURODAC-Daten in Rumänien Asyl beantragt. Nach Auskunft der rumänischen Behörden wurde der Antrag am 2. April 2015 abgelehnt. Damit hat Rumänien die Zuständigkeit für die Prüfung des Antrags im Sinne des Art. 17 Dublin-III-VO übernommen. 17Es ist nichts dafür ersichtlich, dass die Zuständigkeit Rumäniens wieder erloschen ist. Entsprechend Art. 18 Abs. 1 d) Dublin-III-VO hat Rumänien auch dem Rückübernahmeersuchen des Bundesamtes zugestimmt. Nach dieser Vorschrift ist der nach der Dublin-III-VO zuständige Mitgliedstaat verpflichtet, einen Drittstaatsangehörigen oder Staatenlosen, dessen Antrag abgelehnt wurde und der in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat einen Antrag gestellt hat oder sich im Hoheitsgebiet eines anderen Mitgliedstaats ohne Aufenthaltstitel aufhält, wieder aufzunehmen. 18Die Entscheidung in Ziffer 1 des Bescheids ist zudem nicht deshalb rechtswidrig, weil es als unmöglich im Sinne des Art. 3 Abs. 2 UAbs. 2 Dublin-III-VO anzusehen wäre, den Antragsteller nach Rumänien zu überstellen. Nach Art. 3 Abs. 2 UAbs. 2 Dublin-III-VO darf keine Überstellung in einen Mitgliedstaat erfolgen, wenn dort das Asylverfahren und die Aufnahmebedingungen systemische Schwachstellen aufweisen, die eine Gefahr der Verletzung des Art. 4 GR-Charta mit sich bringen. 19Systemische Schwachstellen des rumänischen Asylverfahrens und der Aufnahmebedingungen liegen nicht vor. 20Die Vorschrift Art. 3 Abs. 2 UAbs. 2 Dublin-III-VO dient der Umsetzung der Rechtsprechung des EuGH zur Dublin-II-VO. Nach dieser Rechtsprechung steht hinter der Schaffung eines Gemeinsamen Europäischen Asylsystems (vgl. Art. 78 AEUV) das "Prinzip des gegenseitigen Vertrauens". Dieses beruht auf der Annahme, alle daran beteiligten Staaten, ob Mitgliedstaaten oder Drittstaaten, die Grundrechte, einschließlich der Rechte, die ihre Grundlage in der Richtlinie 2011/95/EU, der GFK sowie in der EMRK finden, beachten, und dass die Mitgliedstaaten einander insoweit Vertrauen entgegenbringen dürfen. Es gilt die - allerdings widerlegbare - Vermutung, die Behandlung als schutzberechtigt anerkannter Ausländer stehe in jedem einzelnen Mitgliedstaat in Einklang mit den genannten Rechten. 21Vgl. EuGH, Urteil vom 21. Dezember 2011 - C-411/10 und C-493/19, C-411/10, C-493/10 -, Slg 2011, I-13905 = juris, Rn. 10 ff., 75, 78, 80. 22Eine Widerlegung der Vermutung ist wegen der gewichtigen Zwecke des Gemeinsamen Europäischen Asylsystems an hohe Hürden geknüpft. Nicht jede drohende Grundrechtsverletzung oder geringste Verstöße gegen die Richtlinien 2003/9, 2004/83 oder 2005/85 genügen, um die Überstellung eines Asylbewerbers an den normalerweise zuständigen Mitgliedstaat zu vereiteln. Ist hingegen ernsthaft zu befürchten, dass das Asylverfahren und die Aufnahmebedingungen für Asylbewerber im zuständigen Mitgliedstaat systemische Mängel aufweisen, die eine unmenschliche oder erniedrigende Behandlung der an diesen Mitgliedstaat überstellten Asylbewerber im Sinne von Art. 4 Grundrechte-Charta zur Folge haben, ist eine Überstellung mit dieser Bestimmung unvereinbar. 23Vgl. EuGH, Urteile vom 10. Dezember 2013 - C-394/12 -, NVwZ 2014, 208 = juris, Rn. 60; und vom 21. Dezember 2011 - C-411/10 und C-493/19, C-411/10, C-493/10 -, a.a.O., Rn. 81 ff.; BVerwG, Beschluss vom 19. März 2014 - 10 B 6/14 -, NVwZ 2014, 1039 = juris, Rn. 6. 24Systemische Schwachstellen sind solche, die entweder bereits im Asyl- und Aufnahmeregime selbst angelegt sind und von denen alle Asylbewerber oder bestimmte Gruppen von Asylbewerbern deshalb nicht zufällig und im Einzelfall, sondern vorhersehbar und regelhaft betroffen sind, oder aber tatsächliche Umstände, die dazu führen, dass ein theoretisch sachgerecht konzipiertes und nicht zu beanstandendes Asyl- und Aufnahmesystem - aus welchen Gründen auch immer - faktisch ganz oder in weiten Teilen seine ihm zugedachte Funktion nicht mehr erfüllen kann und weitgehend unwirksam wird. Dabei ist der Begriff der systemischen Schwachstelle nicht in einer engen Weise derart zu verstehen, dass er geeignet sein muss, sich auf eine unüberschaubare Vielzahl von Antragstellern auszuwirken. Vielmehr kann ein systemischer Mangel auch dann vorliegen, wenn er von vornherein lediglich eine geringe Zahl von Asylbewerbern betreffen kann, sofern er sich nur vorhersehbar und regelhaft realisieren wird und nicht gewissermaßen dem Zufall oder einer Verkettung unglücklicher Umstände bzw. Fehlleistungen von in das Verfahren involvierten Akteuren geschuldet ist. 25Vgl. BVerwG, Beschlüsse vom 19. März 2014 - 10 B 6.14 - NVwZ 2014, 1039 = juris, Rn. 9, und vom 6. Juni 2014 - 10 B 35.14 - NVwZ 2014, 1677 = juris, Rn. 5 f.; VGH Baden-Württemberg, Urteil vom 1. April 2015 - A 11 S 106/15 -, juris, Rn. 33; OVG NRW, Urteil vom 7. März 2014 - 1 A 21/12.A -, DVBl 2014, 790 = juris, Rn. 66 ff. 26Soweit systemische Schwachstellen im vorstehenden Sinne festgestellt werden, muss auch der konkrete Schutzsuchende individuell betroffen sein. Es genügt nicht, dass lediglich abstrakt bestimmte strukturelle Schwachstellen festgestellt werden, wenn sich diese nicht auf den konkreten Antragsteller auswirken können. Dabei ist zu berücksichtigen, dass - eine systemische Schwachstelle unterstellt - einer drohenden Verletzung von Art. 4 Grundrechte-Charta im konkreten Einzelfall gegebenenfalls vorrangig dadurch "vorgebeugt" werden kann und auch muss, dass die Bundesrepublik Deutschland die Überstellung im Zusammenwirken mit dem anderen Mitgliedstaat so organisiert, dass eine solche nicht eintreten kann. 27Vgl. EGMR, Urteil vom 4. November 2014 - Nr. 29217/12, Tharakel/Schweiz - juris; BVerfG, Kammerbeschlüsse vom 17. September 2014 - 2 BvR 939/14 und 2 BvR 1795/14 - juris, und vom 17. April 2015 - 2 BvR 602/15 - juris. 28Nach diesen Grundsätzen sind systemische Mängel im rumänischen Asylverfahren nicht festzustellen. 29Vgl. VG Aachen, Beschluss vom 5. März 2015 - 8 L 739/14.A -, juris; VG Düsseldorf, Beschluss vom 6. November 2014 - 17 L 2289/14.A, juris, jeweils für Antragsteller, die in Rumänien bereits einen Schutzstatus erhalten haben; für Asylsuchende ohne Schutzstatus in Rumänien: VG Regensburg, Urteil vom 17. Juni 2015 - RO 4 K 15.50311 -, juris; VG Bayreuth, Beschluss vom 25. August 2014 - B 5 S 14.50047 -, juris; VG Karlsruhe, Beschluss vom 10. Februar 2014 - A 1 K 3800/13 -, AuAS 2014, 127; Schweizer Bundesverwaltungsgericht, Urteil vom 1. Juni 2015, Abteilung V, E-3354/2015; unter Angabe umfangreicher Erkenntnismittel über Rumänien: Österreichisches BVwG, Erkenntnis vom 7. Mai 2015, Geschäftszahl W212 2106560-1; a.A.: VG Köln, Beschluss vom 31. März 2015 - 20 L 211/15.A -, juris; VG Schwerin, Beschluss vom 27. März 2015 - 3 B 236/15 As, juris. 30Im Jahr 2005 hatte die EU-Kommission in einem umfassenden Monitoring-Bericht für die Vorbereitung des EU-Beitritts von Rumänien noch ausgeführt, dass der grundlegende rechtliche Rahmen für das Asylrecht und Aufnahmekapazitäten für Asylsuchende zwar geschaffen worden sei, es aber noch einer weiteren Angleichung der Rechtsvorschriften an die Mindeststandards für die Aufnahme von Asylsuchenden, die Dublin-II-Verordnung sowie an die Konzepte des internationalen und des vorübergehenden Schutzes bedürfe. 31Vgl. EU-Kommission, Rumänien, Umfassender Monitoring-Bericht 2005, S. 83 f. 32Nach dem EU-Beitritt Rumäniens zum 1. Januar 2007 ist die Angleichung der Rechtsvorschriften im Hinblick auf das das nationale Recht überformende Unionsrecht erfolgt. Die Kommission hat die Entwicklung Rumäniens auch nach dem Beitritt weiter überwacht und die Ergebnisse in jährlichen Monitoring-Berichten festgehalten. In dem Zeitraum 2007-2015 ist die Kommission dabei in keiner Form auf noch bestehende Defizite des Asylverfahrens eingegangen. Dies lässt den Schluss zu, dass aus ihrer Sicht systemische Mängel in Rumänien weder hinsichtlich der rechtlichen Regelungen noch des tatsächlichen Vollzugs vorliegen. 33Vgl. VG Düsseldorf, Beschluss vom 6. November 2014 - 17 L 2289/14.A -, a.a.O., Rn. 32 ff.; VG Bayreuth, Beschluss vom 25. August 2014 - B 5 S 14.50047 -, juris, Rn. 28; VG Karlsruhe, Beschluss vom 10. Februar 2014 - A 1 K 3800/13 -, AuAS 2014, 127 = juris, Rn. 10. 34Auch weitere Erkenntnisse lassen den Schluss auf systemische Mängel in Rumänien nicht zu. Die rumänische Regierung arbeitet mit dem Büro des UN-Hochkommissars für Flüchtlinge (UNHCR) und anderen humanitären Organisationen bei der Bereitstellung von Schutz und Hilfe für Flüchtlinge (einschließlich Personen mit subsidiärem Schutz), Asylsuchende, Staatenlose und andere Personen zusammen. Flüchtlinge mit einem Schutztitel erhalten Zugang zum Arbeitsmarkt, trotz Schwierigkeiten können sie Wohnraum erlangen, grundsätzlich stehen anerkannten Schutzberechtigten bei der medizinischen Versorgung dieselben Rechte wie rumänischen Staatsangehörigen zu. Die Aktivitäten des UNHCR lassen keine grundlegenden Verletzungen der GFK oder der EMRK erkennen. 35Vgl. U.S. Department of State, Romania 2014 Human Rights Report, Section 2d). 36Dass nach einigen Berichten die Asylsuchenden und anerkannten Schutzberechtigten zur Verfügung gestellten finanziellen Mittel defizitär sind, 37vgl. U.N., Economic and Social Council, Concluding observations on the combined third to fifth periodic reports of Romania, Section C.12., vom 9. Dezember 2014; ProAsyl, Flüchtlinge im Labyrinth, Die vergebliche Suche nach Schutz im europäischen Dublin-System, S. 22, 2012; als aufklärungsbedürftig angesehen von VG Köln, Beschluss vom 31. März 2015 - 20 L 211/15.A -, juris; VG Schwerin, Beschluss vom 27. März 2015 - 3 B 236/15 As, juris, 38rechtfertigt keine andere Bewertung. 39Zwar geht auch der Einzelrichter davon aus, dass die wirtschaftliche Lage von Flüchtlingen in Rumänien schwierig ist. Es ist aber nicht erkennbar, dass die Lage so defizitär ist, dass ihnen dort im Sinne eines systemischen Mangels eine völlige Aushöhlung des Schutzstatus und mit beachtlicher Wahrscheinlichkeit eine unmenschliche oder erniedrigende Behandlung drohen. 40Vgl. VG Regensburg, Urteil vom 17. Juni 2015 - RO 4 K 15.50311 -, juris, Rn. 30; VG Aachen, Beschluss vom 5. März 2015 - 8 L 739/14.A -, juris, Rn. 29 ff. 41Der von dem VG Köln und des VG Schwerin zur Begründung von konkreten Anhaltspunkten für das Vorliegen systemischer Schwachstellen herangezogene Bericht von ProAsyl, 42vgl. ProAsyl, Flüchtlinge im Labyrinth, Die vergebliche Suche nach Schutz im europäischen Dublin-System, S. 22, 43stammt aus dem Jahr 2012 und ist schon deshalb nicht zur Beurteilung der aktuellen Situation in Rumänien geeignet. Die weiteren vorliegenden Berichte lassen nicht hinreichend deutlich Anhaltspunkte dafür erkennen, dass auf Grund von finanziellen Defiziten grundlegende Menschenrechte verletzt würden, die eine Durchbrechung des System "gegenseitigen Vertrauens" der Dublin-III-VO rechtfertigen würden. 44Der Bericht der US Regierung, 45vgl. U.S. Department of State, Romania 2014 Human Rights Report, Section 2d), 46der - soweit ersichtlich - die aktuellsten Angaben zur Situation in Rumänien enthält, verweist zwar auf die Sorge des UNHCR, dass die finanzielle und materielle Unterstützung von Asylsuchenden, insbesondere von besonders schutzbedürftigen Flüchtlingen, unzureichend sei. Der Bericht führt aber weiter aus, dass sich die Empfangsbedingungen sich in bestimmten Aspekten im Vergleich zu den vorherigen Jahren verbessert hätten. Eine konkrete Gefährdung von grundlegenden Rechten der GFK, der EMRK und der Grundrechte-Charta lässt dies nicht erkennen. Der UNHCR hat auch gerade nicht - anders als zeitweise für Bulgarien - davon abgeraten, Flüchtlinge im Wege des Dublin-Verfahrens nach Rumänien zu überstellen. 47Die drohende Zurückweisung in ein Land, in dem die eigene wirtschaftliche Situation schlechter sein wird als in dem ausweisenden Vertragsstaat reicht nicht aus, um die Schwelle der unmenschlichen Behandlung, wie sie von Art. 3 EMRK verboten wird, zu überschreiten. 48Vgl. EGMR, Entscheidung vom 2. April 2013 - 27725/10 -, juris, Rn. 70. 49Der Antragsteller muss sich deshalb auf den in Rumänien für alle dortigen Staatsangehörigen geltenden Versorgungsstandard verweisen lassen, auch wenn dieser dem Niveau in Deutschland nicht entspricht. 50Vgl. OVG NRW, Urteil vom 7. März 2014 - 1 A 21/12.A -, AuAS 2014, 118 = juris, Rn. 118 ff. (für Italien); VG Düsseldorf, Beschluss vom 6. November 2014 - 17 L 2289/14.A -, a.a.O., Rn. 45. 51Auch der Vortrag des Antragstellers rechtfertigt keine andere Bewertung. Soweit er auf schlechte Zustände in einem Flüchtlingslager verweist, ist schon zu berücksichtigten, dass er sich nach seinem eigenen Vortrag dort nur drei Tage aufgehalten haben will. Ein Zeitraum von drei Tagen lässt aber keine Beurteilung der Tatsachen zu, die systemische - also nicht nur in einem Einzelfall vorliegende - Mängel begründen könnten. 52Die Abschiebung kann ferner auch durchgeführt werden, § 34a Ábs. 1 AsylVfG. Es ist weder etwas dafür vorgetragen noch sonst erkennbar, dass der Abschiebung des Antragstellers zielstaatsbezogene Abschiebungsverbote in Bezug auf Rumänien oder inlandsbezogene Abschiebungshindernisse entgegenstehen, die das Bundesamt im Rahmen des Erlasses einer Abschiebungsanordnung nach § 34a AsylVfG mit zu prüfen hat, und zwar unabhängig davon, ob diese vor oder nach Erlass der Abschiebungsanordnung entstanden sind. 53Vgl. in ständiger Rechtsprechung: OVG NRW, etwa Beschluss vom 30. August 2011 - 18 B 1060 -, juris, Rn. 4; nunmehr auch: BVerfG, Beschluss vom 17. September 2014 - 2 BvR 1795/14 -, juris. 54Die Kostenentscheidung beruht auf § 154 Abs. 1 VwGO, § 83b AsylVfG. 55Der Beschluss ist unanfechtbar, § 80 AsylVfG.
sv	caselaw	EU	6.12.2008 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 313/8 Domstolens dom (fjärde avdelningen) av den 16 oktober 2008 (begäran om förhandsavgörande från Lunds tingsrätt – Sverige) – Svenska staten genom Tillsynsmyndigheten i Konkurser mot Anders Holmqvist (Mål C-310/07) (1) (Tillnärmning av lagstiftning - Skydd för arbetstagarna vid arbetsgivarens insolvens - Direktiv 80/987/EEG - Artikel 8a - Verksamhet i flera medlemsstater) (2008/C 313/12) Rättegångsspråk: svenska Hänskjutande domstol Lunds tingsrätt Parter i målet vid den nationella domstolen Sökande: Svenska staten genom Tillsynsmyndigheten i Konkurser Svarande: Anders Holmqvist Saken Begäran om förhandsavgörande – Lunds tingsrätt – Tolkning av artikel 8a i rådets direktiv 80/987/EEG av den 20 oktober 1980, om tillnärmning av medlemsstaternas lagstiftning om skydd för arbetstagarna vid arbetsgivarens insolvens (EUT L 283, s. 23; svensk specialutgåva, område 5, volym 2, s. 121), i dess lydelse enligt Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2002/74/EG av den 23 september 2002 (EUT L 270, s. 10) – Lönegaranti för en arbetstagare som är anställd av ett vägtransportföretag som har sitt säte och sitt enda driftställe i en medlemsstat och som utför varuleveranser mellan ursprungsmedlemsstaten och andra medlemsstater. Domslut Artikel 8a i rådets direktiv 80/987/EEG av den 20 oktober 1980 om tillnärmning av medlemsstaternas lagstiftning om skydd för arbetstagarna vid arbetsgivarens insolvens, i dess lydelse enligt Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2002/74/EG av den 23 september 2002, ska tolkas så, att det inte är nödvändigt att ett företag som är etablerat i en medlemsstat har en filial eller ett fast driftställe i en annan medlemsstat för att det ska anses vara verksamt på den sistnämnda medlemsstatens territorium. Företaget måste emellertid ha en varaktig ekonomisk närvaro i den medlemsstaten, i form av personella resurser, som gör det möjligt för företaget att bedriva verksamhet där. När det gäller ett transportföretag som är etablerat i en medlemsstat innebär inte den omständigheten, att en arbetstagare, som är anställd i den medlemsstaten av detta företag, levererar varor mellan den medlemsstat i vilken transportföretaget är etablerat och en annan medlemsstat, att detta företag har en varaktig ekonomisk närvaro i en annan medlemsstat. (1) EUT C 211, 8.9.2007.
de	other	N/A	1P.698/2003 (14.01.2004) 1P.698/2003 /mks A.________,Beschwerdeführerin, vertreten durch Fürsprecher Beat Kurt, Untersuchungsrichter 3 des Untersuchungsrichteramtes IV Berner Oberland, Bälliz 64, 3601 Thun, Art. 5 und 9 BV, Art. 17 KV BE (Nichtzulassung als Privatklägerin), Staatsrechtliche Beschwerde gegen den Beschluss der Anklagekammer des Obergerichts des Kantons Bern vom 17. Oktober 2003. Am 7. Januar 2000 wurde in den Büros der Regionalfahndung Berner Oberland auf der Polizeiwache Thun eingebrochen und Bargeld in der Höhe von Fr. 12'190.-- gestohlen. Auf polizeiliche Anzeige hin eröffnete die Untersuchungsrichterin 2 des Untersuchungsrichteramtes IV Berner Oberland am 28. Februar 2000 die Strafverfolgung gegen unbekannte Täterschaft wegen Diebstahls, Hausfriedensbruchs und Sachbeschädigung. Die Ermittlungen blieben ergebnislos. Mit am 23. Mai 2003 der Post übergebenem Schreiben reichte A.________ unter anderem wegen des erwähnten Einbruchdiebstahls Strafanzeige gegen unbekannte Täterschaft ein und erklärte, im Verfahren als Privatklägerin im Straf- und Zivilpunkt auftreten zu wollen. Sie äusserte überdies die Vermutung, der Diebstahl sei von Angehörigen des Polizeikommandos verübt worden und verlangte die Aufklärung des Falles. Mit Verfügung vom 11. September 2003 entschied der zuständige Untersuchungsrichter 3, A.________ nicht als Privatklägerin zuzulassen, da sie nicht unmittelbar in ihren eigenen, rechtlich geschützten Interessen betroffen sei. Gegen diesen Entscheid gelangte A.________ am 26. September 2003 an die Anklagekammer des Bernischen Obergerichtes. Die Anklagekammer wies die Beschwerde mit Beschluss vom 17. Oktober 2003 ab. Mit Eingabe vom 21. November 2003 erhebt A.________ staatsrechtliche Beschwerde und beantragt die Aufhebung des angefochtenen Beschlusses wegen Verletzung von Art. 5 und 9 BV, Art. 17 der Verfassung des Kantons Bern vom 6. Juni 1996 (KV-BE; BSG 101.1) und Art. 47 des Gesetzes über das Strafverfahren vom 15. März 1995 (StrV-BE; BSG 321.1). Gleichzeitig stellt die Beschwerdeführerin Antrag auf Gewährung der unentgeltlichen Prozessführung. Die Anklagekammer des Obergerichtes und der Untersuchungsrichter 3 schliessen auf Abweisung der Beschwerde. Beim angefochtenen Beschluss handelt es sich um einen kantonal letztinstanzlichen Endentscheid, der mit staatsrechtlicher Beschwerde insbesondere wegen Verletzung verfassungsmässiger Rechte angefochten werden kann (Art. 84 Abs. 1 lit. a OG). Nach Art. 90 Abs. 1 lit. b OG muss eine staatsrechtliche Beschwerde die wesentlichen Tatsachen und eine kurz gefasste Darlegung darüber enthalten, welche verfassungsmässigen Rechte inwiefern durch den angefochtenen Entscheid verletzt worden sind. Im staatsrechtlichen Beschwerdeverfahren prüft das Bundesgericht nur klar und detailliert erhobene Rügen (BGE 125 I 71 E. 1c S. 76; 122 I 70 E. 1c S. 73 mit Hinweisen). Diesen Anforderungen genügt die vorliegende Beschwerde nur insoweit, als die Beschwerdeführerin geltend macht, die Auslegung und Anwendung von Art. 47 StrV-BE verstosse gegen Art. 9 BV. Soweit sich die Beschwerdeführerin auf die rechtsstaatlichen Schranken von Art. 5 BV beruft, kommt diesen keine eigenständige Bedeutung zu. Hinsichtlich der gerügten Verletzung von Art. 17 KV-BE kann auf die Beschwerde nicht eingetreten werden: Das Recht auf Einsicht in amtliche Akten bildete nicht Gegenstand des kantonalen Verfahrens, und es ist nicht ersichtlich, inwiefern die umstrittene Nichtzulassung der Beschwerdeführerin als Privatklägerin in den Schutzbereich der erwähnten Bestimmung der Kantonsverfassung fallen könnte. 2.1 Als Privatklägerin oder Privatkläger kann sich am Strafverfahren beteiligen, wer durch eine strafbare Handlung unmittelbar in seinen eigenen rechtlich geschützten Interessen verletzt worden ist. Als in ihren rechtlich geschützten Interessen verletzt gilt auch die zum Strafantrag berechtigte Person (Art. 47 Abs. 1 StrV-BE). 2.2 Die Beschwerdeführerin vermag in keiner Weise aufzuzeigen, inwiefern die Anklagekammer die zitierte Bestimmung willkürlich angewandt haben soll. Durch den Einbruchdiebstahl in den Büros der Regionalfahndung Thun ist die Beschwerdeführerin nicht unmittelbar in einem eigenen, rechtlich geschützten Interesse betroffen. Die vage Vermutung, die Kantonspolizei selber könnte eine strafbare Handlung begangen und damit das in sie gesetzte Vertrauen verletzt haben, vermag mitnichten eine unmittelbare Betroffenheit zu begründen, welche die Stellung als Privatklägerin rechtfertigen könnte. Die Ausführungen im angefochtenen Entscheid halten offensichtlich vor dem Willkürverbot stand. Andererseits lässt sich aus dem verfassungsmässigen Anspruch auf Behandlung nach Treu und Glauben nicht ableiten, die Beschwerdeführerin hätte - ungeachtet des kantonalen Strafverfahrensrechts - unter den gegebenen Umständen als Privatklägerin zugelassen werden müssen. Die Beschwerde ist demzufolge abzuweisen, soweit überhaupt darauf eingetreten werden kann. Da sich die Beschwerde als von vornherein aussichtslos erweist, ist auch das Gesuch um unentgeltliche Rechtspflege abzuweisen (vgl. Art. 152 OG). Bei diesem Verfahrensausgang wird die Beschwerdeführerin kostenpflichtig (vgl. Art. 156 OG). Dieses Urteil wird der Beschwerdeführerin, dem Untersuchungsrichter 3 des Untersuchungsrichteramtes IV Berner Oberland und der Anklagekammer des Obergerichts des Kantons Bern schriftlich mitgeteilt.
en	caselaw	US	Case 3:17-cv-01104-VLB Document 82-94 Filed 05/15/19 Page 1 of 3 Exhibit 94 Case 3:17-cv-01104-VLB Document 82-94 Filed 05/15/19 Page 2 of 3 From: Hungerford, Amy [/O=YALE UNIVERSITY/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDL T)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=AMY.HUNGERFORD] Sent: Monday, July 06, 2015 11: 13:02 AM To: Gendler, Tamar; Bakemeier, Emily CC: Dovidio, John Subject: Re: SPORT review status and Byrne case I think you would have to declare the dept in receivership vis a vis this review if we are to go forward right now. We would have to appoint a committee (I think) entirely outside for SPORT and specify also a process somehow outside of SPORT to carry the case through, since putting anyone on would seem to prejudge who was going to emerge well or badly from the review. Or the case could be prepared by an outside committee, with a process for review in place but also the option that it can be returned to the dept. for a vote if the review is complete and a satisfactory structure in place by that time. As for people, I think it would be possible to do this. We could ask David Quint to chair it, for instance<or even Mary Miller, from afar, given her Spanish chops? Or someone else from Romance languages, and make a committee of three using other literature folks to get the referee list and letters out. But speaking of letters raises the fact that we 1 d have to tell writers that letters will be sent to the FAS Dean 1 s office, not SPORT. Thoughts?? The other option is to extend her clock if the process cannot be started by a certain date (say, the latest date we started cases last year, which was probably about mid-July.) A. On 7/6/15, 10:58 AM, "Gendler, Tamar" <tamar.gendler@yale.edu> wrote: >Where are we on this > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Bakemeier, Emily >> Sent: Thursday, July 02, 2015 7:43 PM >> To: Gendler, Tamar >> Cc: Hungerford, Amy; Dovidio, John >> Subject: Re: SPORT review status and Byrne case >> >> Have we figured out who can actually be on the review committee, even >> sans review? >> >> >> >>>On Jul 2, 2015, at 6:48 PM, Gendler, Tamar <tamar.gendler@yale.edu> >> wrote: >> > >>>This is still a total mess -- what can we do in the meantime? >> > >>>Looping in Emily and Jack for wisdom >> > >> > >>>>>>>>>>>On Jun 29, 2015, at 11:52 AM, "Hungerford, Amy" >> >> <amy.hungerford@yale.edu> wrote: >> >>>>>>>>> BYRNE007650 Case 3:17-cv-01104-VLB Document 82-94 Filed 05/15/19 Page 3 of 3 >>>>>>>>>>>Hi, everyone-just checking in to see whether when we might go >>>>forward with the Byrne case in Span and Port. Is that review in yet? >>>>>>>>>>>A. BYRNE007651
en	caselaw	US	Case 19-07041 Doc 1 Filed 10/18/19 Entered 10/18/19 18:37:34 Desc Main Document Page 1 of 15 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS In re: ) Case No.: 19-71019 ) James M. Ellenberg, ) Chapter 7 ) Debtor. ) Adv. No. ) ) UL LLC, ) COMPLAINT OBJECTING TO ) DISCHARGEABLITY OF A DEBT ) (11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) James M. Ellenberg. ) ) Defendant. ) ) Plaintiff UL LLC (“UL” or “Plaintiff”) hereby alleges: JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. The Court has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 in that it is an adversary proceeding and a core proceeding arising under title 11 of the United States Code and has been referred to this Bankruptcy Court by the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. UL consents to entry of a final order or judgment by the Bankruptcy Court. 2. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a), because this adversary proceeding arises under title 11 of the United States Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et. seq. (the “Bankruptcy Code”) and is filed in the district in which Debtor’s bankruptcy case is pending. 3. On July 16, 2019, Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in this Bankruptcy Court. Case 19-07041 Doc 1 Filed 10/18/19 Entered 10/18/19 18:37:34 Desc Main Document Page 2 of 15 THE PARTIES 4. Plaintiff UL is a Delaware limited liability company located and doing business at 333 Pfingsten Road, Northbrook, Illinois 60062. 5. Defendant James M. Ellenberg (“Debtor”) is the debtor in the above-entitled Chapter 7 case and resides at 3812 Indian Lands Lane, Springfield, Illinois 62711. NATURE OF THIS ACTION 6. This is a proceeding to have the claim of UL held nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Specifically, Debtor willfully and maliciously injured UL by intentionally infringing and counterfeiting UL’s valuable trademarks in violation of the Federal Trademark Act of 1946, also known as the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051. As described below, prior to the automatic stay, UL was prosecuting a civil action against Debtor and Debtor’s company ManSeeManWant LLC (“ManSeeManWant”) in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois (the “Illinois District Court”), in a case captioned UL LLC v. Gangsong Grp. Corp., et al., Case No.: 2:17-cv-08166 (the “Illinois District Court Action”). 7. As provided in further detail below, the Illinois District Court Action originates from a civil action filed by UL in the Central District of California on November 11, 2017 in which UL named Debtor and ManSeeManWant as two of the several defendants. Through a court order, Debtor and ManSeeManWant successfully severed and transferred UL’s claims against them to the Illinois District Court. 8. To date, UL continues to prosecute its claim against ManSeeManWant in the Illinois District Court Action. In conjunction with the initiation of this adversary proceeding, UL will file a motion for stay relief—asking that the Court enter an order allowing UL to continue prosecuting its claim against Debtor in the Illinois District Court Action. 2 Case 19-07041 Doc 1 Filed 10/18/19 Entered 10/18/19 18:37:34 Desc Main Document Page 3 of 15 FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. UL’S VALUABLE RIGHTS 9. Founded in 1894, UL, including its affiliates and predecessors, is one of the oldest certification companies in the United States. UL has tested, inspected, and certified products and developed safety standards for over a century. 10. UL’s services include promulgating safety standards, certifying that representative samples of products satisfy applicable safety standards, and providing follow-up testing and inspection services to confirm that manufacturers are in compliance. 11. UL is a global independent safety science company offering certification, validation, testing, inspection, advising, training, and auditing services for a variety of industries around the globe. 12. UL owns the well-known UL-in-a-circle certification mark and variations thereof (the “UL Certification Marks”). UL also owns the UL Service Mark (the “UL Service Mark” and, collectively, the “UL Marks”). 13. UL has been providing testing reports and certifying products that conform to UL’s Standards for Safety since at least 1906. Since at least 1906, UL, including its affiliates and predecessors, have continuously used the UL Marks in interstate commerce. 14. UL has been testing products and authorizing use of the famous UL Certification Marks on products that conform to UL’s Standards for Safety in interstate commerce in the United States since at least 1937. UL’s authorized customers have been using the UL Certification Marks on products offered for sale and distributed in interstate commerce since 1937. 3 Case 19-07041 Doc 1 Filed 10/18/19 Entered 10/18/19 18:37:34 Desc Main Document Page 4 of 15 15. UL serves all members of the general public, including, but not limited to, consumers, manufacturers, suppliers, retailers, vendors, trade groups, industry associations, regulatory bodies, and governmental entities. 16. UL’s thousands of authorized customers have used UL’s well-known UL Certification Marks on billions of household, consumer, commercial, and industrial products including refrigeration equipment, lighting products, cable, wiring, building materials, life safety vests, batteries and power packs for computers and consumer electronics, traffic signals, sprinklers, cash registers, and many more. 17. Over the past century, UL has used its UL Marks to promote its certification programs through a wide variety of marketing channels and outlets on a national, regional, and local basis, including but not limited to television, radio, consumer and trade newspapers, consumer and trade magazines, industry trade journals, promotional literature, brochures, direct mail, email campaigns, and interactive websites and webpages such as <ul.com>, <safetysmart.com> and the UL Safety at Home page located on <facebook.com>. 18. As a result of UL’s extensive use of the UL Marks to promote its certification programs, including standards development activities, follow-up conformity assessment and inspection services, community involvement, and safety science research, the UL Marks have attained a national and global reputation for technical expertise and integrity, and have become a symbol of trust and objectivity. 19. The UL Marks are well-known and recognized by the general public as well as members of local, state and federal government regulatory bodies and industry trade associations, as marks indicating testing, inspection, validation, certification, training, advising, and auditing services originating with UL. 4 Case 19-07041 Doc 1 Filed 10/18/19 Entered 10/18/19 18:37:34 Desc Main Document Page 5 of 15 20. The UL Service Mark and the UL Certification Marks are renowned among the general public as symbols of UL’s testing, inspection and certification services originating with UL, and have been renowned since long before Debtor began engaging in the conduct alleged in this Complaint. 21. UL has duly and properly registered the UL Service Mark and the UL Certification Marks in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) on the Principal Register. UL owns the following federally registered marks. Copies of some of these registrations, or their corresponding USPTO website pages, are attached as Exhibits A- D. MARK REG. NO. EXHIBIT TYPE 0782589 A Certification Mark 2391140 B Certification Mark UL 4201014 C Service Mark 4,283,962 D Certification Mark 22. The federal trademark registrations referenced above are valid and subsisting, and provide conclusive evidence of the right of UL to use the UL Marks in commerce. 23. UL certifies the products of others in a variety of industries (the “Certification Services”) under its UL Certification Marks (Exhibits A-B, D). The UL Certification Mark is the single most accepted certification mark in the United States, appearing on 22 billion products annually. UL has adopted an enhanced version of its Certification Marks, shown in Exhibit D, to 5 Case 19-07041 Doc 1 Filed 10/18/19 Entered 10/18/19 18:37:34 Desc Main Document Page 6 of 15 deliver greater transparency and inspire buyer confidence at point-of-sale. UL also introduced holographic labels to prevent or deter duplication of its Certification Marks by counterfeiters. Holographic labels provide greater security because it is very difficult for counterfeiters to imitate the unique features. 24. UL offers educational, business advisory, product safety testing, and public safety services (the “UL Services”) under its UL Service Mark. 25. Use and registration of the UL Certification Marks and the UL Service Mark clearly establish that UL has senior trademark rights in its family of UL Certification Marks and UL Service Mark, and consequently there is no question of priority of rights, as such priority clearly belongs to UL. 26. UL’s United States Trademark Registration Nos. 2391140 and 782589 referenced above are incontestable under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b). As such, UL’s incontestable federal trademark registrations confer exclusive use of the UL Certification Marks throughout the United States in connection with the UL Certification Services. 27. UL has extensively used the UL Service Mark and has advertised, promoted, and offered the UL Services under the UL Service Mark in interstate commerce through various channels of trade. As a result, the customers and potential customers of UL, and the public in general have come to know and recognize the UL Service Mark as identifying the UL Services as services of the highest quality offered by UL, and associate the UL Service Mark with the UL Services. UL has thus built up extensive and invaluable goodwill in connection with the sale of its services offered under its UL Service Mark. [Remainder of Page Intentionally Left Blank] 6 Case 19-07041 Doc 1 Filed 10/18/19 Entered 10/18/19 18:37:34 Desc Main Document Page 7 of 15 B. UL’S PRODUCT CERTIFICATION PROCESS 28. Manufacturers may seek UL certification and listing in the UL certification directory by submitting representative product samples for evaluation and/or testing. UL will examine these representative samples to determine whether they comply with the applicable safety, performance or other standards. 29. If the representative samples comply with the applicable standard, and the manufacturer has adequate procedures in place to ensure that its production runs will be consistent with those representative samples, UL may authorize the manufacturer to affix the UL Certification Mark to that product and to advertise the product as being UL Certified. 30. When a manufacturer’s product has been found eligible for UL certification, the product is subject to UL’s follow-up services whereby representatives of UL will make random, unannounced visits to the factory a few times per year to audit the means the manufacturer uses to determine the product’s continued compliance with UL’s requirements (“Follow-Up Services”). The manufacturer’s use of the UL Certification Mark is the manufacturer’s representation that the product is in compliance with UL’s requirements and subject to UL’s Follow-Up Services. C. DEBTOR’S WRONGFUL CONDUCT 31. In the fall of 2015, self-balancing two-wheeled scooters called “hoverboards” became a popular consumer item. In order to meet holiday demand, unscrupulous manufacturers rushed these products to production without sufficient attention to key safety details. 32. By mid to late 2015, there were numerous reports about hoverboards self- combusting and catching on fire. Hoverboards that were exploding and setting on fire became a 7 Case 19-07041 Doc 1 Filed 10/18/19 Entered 10/18/19 18:37:34 Desc Main Document Page 8 of 15 significant safety concern because users were being injured and homes and cars were being damaged as a result of such unsafe hoverboards. 33. On December 15, 2015, the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) opened an investigation into hoverboard safety. The CPSC was prompted to open its investigation because it had received at least 29 reports of personal injuries from hoverboards that required emergency room treatment and 10 other reports of hoverboards catching fire. 34. On information and belief, because these safety issues harmed sales, many unscrupulous manufacturers responded to this negative press by falsely claiming that their hoverboards were “UL Certified.” In 2015, no safety standard for self-balancing scooters existed, and any claim that a hoverboard was “UL Certified” was patently false. 35. In February of 2016, UL released a safety standard, UL 2272 “Outline of Investigation for Electrical Systems for Self-Balancing Scooters,” for self-balancing scooters, and UL has been working with several manufacturers to certify products which meet that standard. UL did not issue its first certification of hoverboards under this standard until on or about May 2016. Unfortunately, there were a number of counterfeiters who insisted on claiming that their product was certified by UL when they were not UL customers and had never asked UL to inspect or certify their product. 36. In this case, Shenzhen Kebe Technology Co. Ltd. (“Kebe”) was the source of the hoverboards bearing the counterfeit UL mark and also sold hoverboards on various websites, claiming UL certification, when they were not certified. 37. Notwithstanding UL’s exclusive rights in and to the UL Certification Marks and the UL Service Mark, and well after UL’s adoption and registration of the UL Certification Marks and the UL Service Mark, Gangsong Group Corporation (“Gangsong”), Flying Medical USA LLC 8 Case 19-07041 Doc 1 Filed 10/18/19 Entered 10/18/19 18:37:34 Desc Main Document Page 9 of 15 (“Flying Medical”), Logistic Public Warehouse (collectively “Santa Fe Springs Defendants”) and Thomas Soon Chiah adopted and began using a mark that is identical to or substantially indistinguishable from the UL Certification Marks (the “Counterfeit Mark”) to suggest falsely that their goods have been certified by UL. During this time, Mr. Chiah was the Chief Executive Officer of Gangsong, Vice President of Sales and Business Development of Flying Medical, and Sales Manager of Logistic Public Warehouse. 38. Specifically, the Santa Fe Spring Defendants and Mr. Chiah used a Counterfeit Mark on hoverboards they sold. The Santa Fe Springs Defendants and Mr. Chiah offered these products for sale at a warehouse located at 10001 Pioneer Boulevard, Santa Fe Springs, California 90670-3221. Representative photos of these products are below: 9 Case 19-07041 Doc 1 Filed 10/18/19 Entered 10/18/19 18:37:34 Desc Main Document Page 10 of 15 Certain of the hoverboards photographed above bear labels with the Counterfeit Mark, representing to customers that such products are certified by UL when they are not certified. 39. On September 18, 2017, a UL representative accompanied a task force from the Los Angeles Sherriff’s Department (“LASD”) as it executed a search warrant at the warehouse located at 10001 Pioneer Boulevard, Santa Fe Springs, California, 90670-3221. A UL representative identified approximately 2,500 hoverboards, some of which were affixed with labels bearing the Counterfeit Mark. The retail value of this quantity of counterfeit goods, if genuine, would be over $580,000. In addition, the UL representative identified 2,325 counterfeit UL holographic labels bearing the Counterfeit Mark at the Santa Fe warehouse. An image of these labels is below: 10 Case 19-07041 Doc 1 Filed 10/18/19 Entered 10/18/19 18:37:34 Desc Main Document Page 11 of 15 40. Debtor is the owner of ManSeeManWant. 41. ManSeeManWant is an Illinois limited liability company, filing number 05321123, doing business at 4055 West Jefferson Street, Springfield, Illinois 62707. 42. On information and belief, Debtor, ManSeeManWant and other yet unknown individuals maintained an interactive website at <https://manseemanwant.com/>. The website offered for sale hoverboards which were marketed falsely as UL Certified to consumers in the United States. (Exhibit E.) Debtor caused ManSeeManWant to falsely advertise and promote these hoverboard products as compliant with UL2272, going so far as to include “UL2272” in the title of the hoverboard ManSeeManWant offered for sale. 43. Debtor obtained these hoverboards from the Santa Fe Springs Defendants and Mr. Chiah. (Exhibit F.) 44. ManSeeManWant also advertised Universal Hoverboard Replacement Battery Packs as being UL Certified when they were not, in fact, UL Certified. 45. Debtor used a Counterfeit Mark that is identical to and confusingly similar to the UL Certification Marks in appearance, sound, meaning, and commercial impression. 11 Case 19-07041 Doc 1 Filed 10/18/19 Entered 10/18/19 18:37:34 Desc Main Document Page 12 of 15 46. Debtor’s use of the Counterfeit Mark traded off the goodwill of the UL Service Mark and was without permission or license from UL. 47. Debtor advertised and sold the hoverboards in commerce using the Counterfeit Mark to falsely suggest the products were certified by UL. 48. Debtor’s products associated with the Counterfeit Mark were never certified by UL to any safety requirements, and as such, may have placed the health and safety of the user at risk. Indeed, consumers purchase these types of high voltage products relying on the representation that the products are certified by UL, particularly given the numerous reports of uncertified hoverboards catching fire. 49. Debtor’s infringement had at all times been knowing and willful. Debtor was on constructive notice of the UL Certification Marks and the UL Service Mark by virtue of their federal registration. Debtor had no permission to use UL’s Marks in the marketing of hoverboard products on ManSeeManWant’s website. 50. Debtor is aware that he never asked UL for permission to use any of the UL marks. Debtor is aware that UL has never authorized Debtor to make any use of the UL Marks. Debtor nevertheless personally and repeatedly used the Counterfeit Mark to advertise and promote his hoverboard products. 51. Debtor knew or had reason to know of the UL Certification Marks and the UL Service Mark at the time Debtor commenced use of the Counterfeit Mark. Upon information and belief, Debtor intentionally adopted and used the Counterfeit Mark so as to create consumer confusion and traffic off of UL’s reputation and goodwill under the UL Certification Marks and UL Service Mark. 12 Case 19-07041 Doc 1 Filed 10/18/19 Entered 10/18/19 18:37:34 Desc Main Document Page 13 of 15 D. THE DISTRICT COURT ACTIONS 52. On November 11, 2017, UL filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) against the Santa Fe Spring Defendants; Mr. Chiah; Shenzhen Kebe Technology Co.; Shenzhen Leidisi Electronics Technology Co., Ltd.; TRC International Corp.; Sum Fortune International Group; Defant USA, LLC; Sun Defang; ManSeeManWant; and Debtor in the United States District Court for the Central District of California (the “California District Court”) (Exhibit G.) The Complaint asserts counts for: (1) Federal Trademark Infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (2) Counterfeiting of a Registered Trademark under 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (3) Federal Unfair Competition and False Designation of Origin and False and Misleading Representations under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (4) Unfair Competition under California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq.; and (5) False Advertising under California Business and Professions Code §§ 17500 et seq. 53. On December 8, 2017, upon the request of UL, the Clerk for the California District Court entered default on Debtor and ManSeeManWant. (Exhibit H.) 54. On February 6, 2019, the California District Court denied UL’s application for default judgment against Debtor and ManSeeManWant and also set aside the entry of default against the two parties. (Exhibit I.) 55. On March 15, 2019, the Court entered an order approving a motion jointly filed by Debtor and ManSeeManWant. (Exhibit J.) The order stated that the claims against Debtor and ManSeeManWant were to be severed and transferred to the Illinois District Court. (Id.) 56. On April 12, 2019, the Clerk for the California District Court submitted a transmittal sheet providing that the claims against Debtor and ManSeeManWant were severed and transferred to the Illinois District Court. (Exhibit K.) 13 Case 19-07041 Doc 1 Filed 10/18/19 Entered 10/18/19 18:37:34 Desc Main Document Page 14 of 15 57. On May 16, 2019, Debtor and ManSeeManWant answered the Complaint in the Illinois District Court. (Exhibit L.) 58. On July 16, 2019, Debtor filed for a petition for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7. See (Exhibit M.) Counsel for Debtor notified the Illinois District Court. (Id.) CLAIM FOR RELIEF 59. UL repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth herein in full. 60. Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(6) provides in pertinent part as follows: (a) A discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt— (6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to the entity or to the property of another entity . . . . 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). 61. UL has suffered irreparable harm as a result of Debtor’s wrongful conduct. 62. Debtor intended to and did cause UL injury from his conduct. 63. Debtor acted willfully in his wrongful conduct and his actions were malicious. 64. Debtor’s debt to UL is nondischargeable as it is a debt for willful and malicious injury caused by Debtor within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(6). 14 Case 19-07041 Doc 1 Filed 10/18/19 Entered 10/18/19 18:37:34 Desc Main Document Page 15 of 15 PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, UL respectfully prays the Court: A. Enter a judgment in favor of UL and against Debtor holding UL’s claim nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6); B. Order Debtor to supply UL with a complete list of the individual or entities to which he caused to be distributed and/or sold products using the Counterfeit Mark; C. Order Debtor to pay to UL both the costs of this action and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred by UL in prosecuting this action, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); and D. Award such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. DATED: October 18, 2019 UL LLC By: /s/ Nancy A. Peterman Nancy A. Peterman (IL ARDC #6208120) Kevin D. Finger (ARDC # 6216060) Danny A. Duerdoth (ARDC # 6323842) Greenberg Traurig, LLP 77 West Wacker Dr., Suite 3100 Chicago, Illinois 60601 Telephone: (312) 456-8400 Emails: Fingerk@gtlaw.com Duerdothd@gtlaw.com – and – Matthew R. Gershman Greenberg Traurig, LLP 1840 Century Park East, Suite 1900 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 586-7700 Emails: Gershmanm@gtlaw.com Attorneys for Creditor UL LLC 15
en	caselaw	US	[Cite as Berea City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2012-Ohio-4605.] Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 98286 BEREA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE vs. CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION, ET AL. DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES [APPEAL BY 14043 BROOKPARK, INC.] JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED Civil Appeal from the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals Case Nos. 2009-A-3433 and 2009-A-3434 BEFORE: Rocco, J., Boyle, P.J., and Sweeney, J. RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 4, 2012 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Charles Gruenspan Charles Gruenspan Co., L.P.A. 601 Commerce Park Square Four 23240 Chagrin Boulevard Cleveland, OH 44122 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES For Berea City School District Board of Education Rita M. Jarrett Kadish, Hinkel & Weibel 1360 East Ninth Street, Suite 400 Cleveland, OH 44114 For Cuyahoga County Board of Revision and Cuyahoga County Fiscal Officer Saundra J. Curtis-Patrick Assistant County Prosecutor 1200 Ontario Street, 8th Floor Cleveland, OH 44113 KENNETH A. ROCCO, J.: {¶1} In this appeal assigned to the accelerated calendar pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 11.1, appellant 14043 Brookpark, Inc. (“the owner”) appeals from a decision by the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”). The BTA permitted appellee Berea City School District Board of Education (“the district”) to voluntarily dismiss its appeal of the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision’s (“the board’s”) 2008 tax valuation of the owner’s property. {¶2} The purpose of an accelerated appeal is to permit this court to render a brief and conclusory opinion. Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn., 11 Ohio App. 3d 158, 463 N.E.2d 655 (1st Dist.1983); App.R. 11(E). {¶3} The owner presents three assignments of error that it argues together in contravention of App.R. 16(A)(7). The owner claims that the BTA acted improperly in: (1) “denying [the owner’s] motion to remove its appeal from the Court of Common Pleas to the [BTA]”; (2) refusing to hear the owner’s appeal of the board’s tax valuation; and (3) dismissing the district’s appeal of the board’s tax valuation over the owner’s objection. {¶4} A review of the record demonstrates none of the owner’s assignments of error has merit. They are, therefore, overruled, and the BTA’s order is affirmed. {¶5} The dates of the parties’ actions in this case are pertinent to the disposition of this appeal. According to the record, in February 2009, the owner filed a complaint with the board against the board’s 2008 taxable valuation of the property. The owner claimed the property’s taxable valuation had decreased due to the state of the economy, and, thus, sought a decrease of the property’s taxable valuation in the amount of $276,920. {¶6} In May 2009, the district filed a counter-complaint. The district wanted the board’s taxable valuation of the property to stand. {¶7} The board scheduled the matter for a hearing in September 2009. Upon considering the evidence offered by the parties, the board decreased the property’s taxable valuation by $141,200, allowing the owner a partial victory. By a letter dated November 4, 2009, the board notified the parties of its decision. {¶8} On November 12, 2009, the district filed a notice of appeal of the board’s decision with the BTA pursuant to R.C. 5715.01.1 On November 19, 2009, the BTA administrator sent a letter to the district’s attorney, acknowledging the appeal and 1R.C. 5715.01 provides in relevant part: An appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may be taken to the board of tax appeals within thirty days after notice of the decision of the county board of revision is mailed * * . Such appeal shall be taken by the filing of a notice of appeal, in person or by certified mail, express mail, or authorized delivery service, with the board of tax appeals and with the county board of revision. * * [T]he date of the United States postmark placed on the sender’s receipt by the postal service or the date of receipt recorded by the authorized delivery service shall be treated as the date of filing. Upon receipt of such notice of appeal such county board of revision shall by certified mail notify all persons thereof who were parties to the proceeding before such county board of revision, and shall file proof of such notice with the board of tax appeals. The county board of revision shall thereupon certify to the board of tax appeals a transcript of the record of the proceedings of the county board of revision pertaining to the original complaint, and all evidence offered in connection therewith. * * * . (Emphasis added.) providing the assigned case number. The letter indicates carbon copies were sent to the county prosecutor, the county auditor, and the owner. {¶9} On December 3, 2009, the owner filed a notice of appeal of the board’s decision in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to R.C. 5717.05.2 On January 5, 2010, the board formally sent notice of the district’s R.C. 5717.01 appeal to the owner. {¶10} On January 14, 2010, the district filed in the common pleas court a motion to dismiss the owner’s appeal, arguing that pursuant to R.C. 5717.01, the BTA had jurisdiction over the matter. On January 22, 2010, the owner filed a motion in the common pleas court, requesting the court simply to “remove” the appeal to the BTA. The court granted the motions on January 29, 2010. 2R.C. 5717.05 provides in relevant part: As an alternative to the appeal provided for in section 5717.01 of the Revised Code, an appeal from the decision of a county board of revision may be taken directly to the court of common pleas of the county by the person in whose name the property is listed or sought to be listed for taxation. The appeal shall be taken by the filing of a notice of appeal with the court and with the board within thirty days after notice of the decision of the board is mailed as provided in section 5715.20 of the Revised Code. The county auditor and all parties to the proceeding before the board, other than the appellant filing the appeal in the court, shall be made appellees, and notice of the appeal shall be served upon them by certified mail unless waived. * * * When the appeal has been perfected by the filing of notice of appeal as required by this section, and an appeal from the same decision of the county board of revision is filed under section 5717.01 of the Revised Code with the board of tax appeals, the forum in which the first notice of appeal is filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal. (Emphasis added.) {¶11} On February 1, 2010, the owner filed a similar motion with the BTA, requesting the BTA to “remove” the owner’s appeal from the common pleas court to the BTA. That same day, the owner filed a request with the BTA to deny the district’s motion should the district file a motion to voluntarily dismiss its appeal. {¶12} On April 12, 2011, the BTA denied the owner’s request for “removal” of the appeal from the common pleas court. On March 12, 2012, the district filed with the BTA a notice of voluntary dismissal of the district’s appeal. On March 27, 2012, the BTA issued a decision that dismissed the district’s appeal. The owner seeks review of the BTA’s orders in this court. {¶13} To repeat, the owner claims that the BTA acted improperly in: (1) “denying [the owner’s] motion to remove its appeal from the Court of Common Pleas to the [BTA]”; (2) refusing to hear the owner’s appeal of the board’s tax valuation; and (3) dismissing the district’s appeal of the board’s tax valuation over the owner’s objection. The owner’s assignments of error are overruled on the authority of Hope v. Highland Cty. Bd. of Revision, 56 Ohio St. 3d 68, 564 N.E.2d 433 (1990), Trebmal Constr. v. Cuy. Cty. Bd. of Revision, 93 Ohio App. 3d 246, 640 N.E.2d 601 (8th Dist.1994), and Meadows Dev., L.L.C. v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St. 3d 349, 2010-Ohio-249, 922 N.E.2d 209. See also 1495 Jaeger, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 132 Ohio St. 3d 222, 2012-Ohio-2680, 970 N.E.2d 949, ¶ 15. {¶14} In Hope, the supreme court stated: Adherence to the provisions of the appellate statutes is essential to confer jurisdiction upon the BTA to hear appeals. American Restaurant & Lunch Co. v. Bowers (1946), 147 Ohio St. 147, 34 Ohio Op. 8, 70 N.E.2d 93. * * * . Failure to comply with the appellate statute is fatal to the appeal. Austin Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1989), 46 Ohio St. 3d 192, 546 N.E.2d 404. See, also, Fineberg v. Kosydar (1975), 44 Ohio St. 2d 1, 73 Ohio Op. 2d 1, 335 N.E.2d 705; and Zephyr Room, Inc. v. Bowers (1955), 164 Ohio St. 287, 58 Ohio Op. 67, 130 N.E.2d 362. (Emphasis added.) {¶15} In Trebmal, this court observed, “To preserve the litigation of taxable values, it was necessary for both [the district] and [the owner] to file their own appeals with the BTA, where its jurisdiction became exclusive.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 253, citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 62 Ohio St. 3d 156, 580 N.E.2d 775 (1991). See also 75 Public Square v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 76 Ohio App.3d 340, 601 N.E.2d 628 (8th Dist.1991) {¶16} Moreover, in Meadows, at ¶ 14, the supreme court reiterated that, being administrative tribunals, boards of tax appeals have inherent authority to reconsider their own decisions because the power to decide in the first instance automatically carries with it the power to reconsider; however, their authority does not extend beyond either the actual institution of an appeal or expiration of the time for appeal. (Emphasis added.) {¶17} Based upon the foregoing, the BTA had jurisdiction in this case only over the district’s appeal. Nothing in the statute prevented the district from dismissing its appeal to the BTA over the objection of the other parties. Ohio Adm.Code 5717-1-17(A). Compare Tower City Props. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 49 Ohio St.3d 67, 70, 551 N.E.2d 122 (prior version of statute prevented unilateral dismissal of court appeal). {¶18} Neither the BTA nor this court has the authority to rewrite statutes. Jefferson Golf & Country Club v. Leonard, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-434, 2011-Ohio-6829, ¶ 29. R.C. 5717.01 contains no time period in which the board must send a formal notice to interested parties that an appeal of the board’s decision has been filed with the BTA.3 Compare Austin Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 46 Ohio St. 3d 192, 546 N.E.2d 404 (1989) (filing of notice of appeal with board is jurisdictional requirement). {¶19} The record of this case reflects the owner received notice of the district’s appeal of the board’s decision through the BTA by way of a carbon copy of the acknowledgment letter the BTA sent to the district. Rather than institute a timely appeal of its own with the BTA, the owner sought to take advantage of the board’s tardiness in providing formal notification to the parties of the district’s appeal, seeking to obtain another tribunal. {¶20} Because the language of R.C. 5717.01 demonstrates the board’s formal notification to parties that an appeal has been filed is not a jurisdictional requirement, the owner’s effort did not, in itself, serve to confer jurisdiction on the BTA over the owner’s R.C. 5717.05 appeal. Trebmal. Simply put, the district acted first to secure its tribunal; the owner did not. 3 This is not to say that this court approves of the board’s tardiness in providing formal notice to the owner of the district’s appeal to the BTA. In light of Ohio Adm.Code 5717-1-09(B), which requires the board to certify the transcript to the BTA within 45 days of the filing of a notice of appeal to the BTA, the formal notification of the appeal should be made to the parties within the same time period. {¶21} Under these circumstances, the BTA did not act in an unreasonable and unlawful manner in either refusing to entertain an appeal by the owner or allowing the district to dismiss its appeal. {¶22} Accordingly, the owner’s assignments of error are overruled. {¶23} The BTA’s decisions are affirmed. It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. _____________________________________ KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR
en	caselaw	US	Case 19-12664-abl Doc 61 Entered 01/30/20 15:21:34 Page 1 of 4 ! "# $%&%'% ()& +,"-. 3 / 3 /0 3 4 .#.+66. 7 3 5 / / /0 1/2/ // 3 2 ! " #$$% & '($ ) #+ / 1 2))8)3 & , "- . / ! 0 1 ", " " 2 0 ! / "- / / ) +/ 34- / /0 1/2/ //3 2 5/ ! - 2 0 /6 , - ! 7- - 0 ) 8 79- $/ ) 8 &9- :3 / 01 " !/ - , 2/ " / " !/ , 2/ - !/ 9, !/ / " , 2/ - 9 ! 1 - - " / !/ Case 19-12664-abl Doc 61 Entered 01/30/20 15:21:34 Page 2 of 4 " 9 " - / ! - / - ! ""-9 - " ) +/ 34 #" !/ ; " </- !/ " 9 - , / 5/ 9 !/ , , !/ #" !/ - " , , / " !/ - 9 !/ , , !/ / ! -/- = - / ! ,/ " ! / 01 - , - " ' - $ 7 1 /! ./- ! - 7/- 0 ) 8 7/9 - $/ - ) 8 &9- :3 / " . / ! 0 @@ > )& ) 8# > )9 2 ?+ 0 7 &>+'?25 Case 19-12664-abl Doc 61 Entered 01/30/20 15:21:34 Page 3 of 4 1 Kathleen A. Leavitt Chapter 13 Trustee 2 201 Las Vegas Blvd. South, Suite 200 Las Vegas NV, 89101 (702) 853-0700 3 4 UNITED STATE BANKRUPTCY COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 7 IN RE: CASE NO: 19-12664-ABL 8 DIVINA AQUINO Chapter 13 Debtor (s) 9 10 I hereby certify that I am an employee of KATHLEEN A. LEAVITT, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Trustee; that I am over the age of 18 years; and that on January 30, 2020, I provided a 11 copy of the Motion to Dismiss and Notice of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss to each of the 12 following by: 13 [X] a. United States mail, via First Class United States Mail, postage fully prepaid. 14 See EXHIBIT A for mailing matrix 15 [X] b.ECF System: 16 /s/ Esther Carr 17 Employee of Kathleen A. Leavitt 18 Chapter 13 Standing Trustee 19 20 21 22 23 24 Case 19-12664-abl Doc 61 Entered 01/30/20 15:21:34 Page 4 of 4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - EXHIBIT A - Mailing Matrix DIVINA AQUINO 9050 W TROPICANA AVE #1136 LAS VEGAS NV 89147 TOYOTA MOTOR CREDIT CORPORATION C/O BECKET & LEE P.O. BOX 3001 MALVERN PA 19355-0701 ISSO AND HUGHES LAW FIRM 2470 ST ROSE PKWY #306F HENDERSON NV 89074 SYNCHRONY BANK C/O PRA RECEIVABLES MANAGEMENT LLC PO BOX 41021 NORFOLK VA 23541