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Can the court decline to enforce a divorce rider? particularly if it is unreasonable

Admittedly due to my own negligence a rider made it into my final divorce agreement that I'm trying to fight. My SO is not allowed in the presence of my children. I agreed to that in the temporary agreement ONLY and it carried over because I didn't speak up. We have an enforcement hearing today and for the following reasons I'm going to argue that it is unreasonable. There is no safety concern for the children. We both live in the same town and can end up at the same store. Our kids are roughly the same age and therefore could end up at the same park/school. The kids are with me 12/14 nights. Is it a possible outcome that the court declines to enforce the motion? or am pretty much going to have to take it now and wait for the modification hearing (still waiting to be scheduled)?

Usually, an attack on the validity or prudence of the underlying order is not a defense to court action to enforce it. Usually, the only exception would be when it was impossible, or practically impossible, to perform the court order for some reason. You could seek to modify the order, but that would be prospective in effect only and usually isn't granted unless there has been a change in circumstances since the original order was entered. You could also bring a motion to set aside judgment (usually this has to be done within six months of entry of an order) on the grounds that this provision was included only due to mistake or irregularities in the process or excusable neglect. But, that only would have only prospective effect.

Are many judges stronger or weaker at some types of cases than others, and do court systems take judicial notice of this?

Admittedly, this exercise was "time" and "space" limited, but I came up with an interesting finding regarding the ratings of New York City judges in the past decade. Most judges received "average" ratings (between 4.0 and 6.0 on a ten point scale) by attorneys. But as my father, a retired Civil Engineering professor would say, "There are two kinds of "B" students. One makes "straight B's." The other kind makes "half A's and half C's." These judges appeared to be mostly in the latter category because (with few exceptions) they would be rated "8" or "9" in some areas of the law, and "1" or "2" in other areas, and that's how they got their "average" ratings. Do court systems track the above in any way and tend to assign judges cases in areas of law where they are strong, and not where they are weak or is it "potluck" whether a client gets a "1" level judge or a "9" level judge in the law relating to their particular case? There may be many other examples but the one I know best was the Quattrone insider trading case . The judge was a celebrated anti-Mob (read: blue collar) jurist. But he did not know that "intent" was an essential element of certain white collar crimes, including Quattrone's. He (wrongly) instructed the jury to ignore Quattrone's intent, and that's why the resulting conviction was overturned on appeal.

Almost all judges are weaker or stronger at some kinds of cases. Most judges have backgrounds either in criminal law, or in personal injury law, or as government litigators, although there are exceptions to the rule. Lawyers with a background primarily in non-criminal legal specialties, in contrast, are usually weaker in the area of criminal law. And, lawyers with a practice general enough to have equal aptitude in all commonly litigated areas of law are usually not prestigious and well connected enough to be appointed to, or elected to, judgeships as the case may be. Even within specialized judgeships, like designated probate judges, some are stronger in protective proceedings, like guardianships, and others are stronger in areas like technical tax oriented trust interpretation and technical probate rules governing the interpretation of wills. Do court systems track the above in any way and tend to assign judges cases in areas of law where they are strong, and not where they are weak or is it "potluck" whether a client gets a "1" level judge or a "9" level judge in the law relating to their particular case? Courts do not track this and for the most part it is "potluck", but some courts have unofficial internal administrative divisions such that, for example, certain judges handle domestic relations cases for a while, while other judges handle criminal cases for a while, and other judges handle ordinary civil cases for a while. Usually, these assignments are rotated from time to time, but these informal internal divisions sometimes reflect the preferences or expertise of the judges. Similarly, on the U.S. Supreme Court, while each justice has an equal vote, Justice Gorsuch, with a background in Indian Law, is more likely to be the author of a majority opinion on Indian law, that Justice Alito, who has no background prior to his U.S. Supreme Court appointment, in that area of law. The law does not take judicial notice of this fact. Indeed, it does the opposite. It conclusively presumes that judges are experts on everything that comes before them, whether this presumption is well founded or not. On questions of law, it doesn't matter, because those questions are reviewed de novo on appeal without any deference to how the issue was resolved in the trial court. But on issues of discretionary determinations, findings of fact, and evidentiary issues, judges are afforded broad discretion and deference, whether or not this deference is well earned in light of their personal experience. Indeed, one of the more common sources of bad judicial determinations which are upheld on appeal is a standard of appellate review for a decision that affords a judge who has no clue in a particular kind of transaction or area of law great deference. For example, I once had a case before a judge with a background as a violent crimes prosecutor who was stunned to learn that stockholders of publicly held companies are owners of the company, and thought that one could determine the fair market value of a company several years in the past, by calling up its accountant without warning and having a five or ten minute conversation with the accountant. A factual determination based upon that approach, as disconnected from reality as it is, would receive great deference on appeal, despite the judge's obvious unfamiliarity with the basics of corporate law and business valuation.

Can adverse possession be used on land that IS registered?

Adverse possession is normally talked about in terms of finding and claiming land for which there is no registered ownership. Around us, a lot of land is listed as registered by the local council including unused/derelict plots. Can adverse possession or something else apply for land which is registered but apparently forgotten? In other words, by the same process of using and tending to the land can an ownership claim become valid? Or, once land is registered is it then non-claimable in perpetuity?

Yes After 10 years the squatter may apply to become the registered owner The current registered owner may oppose the transfer. If they do, they succeed except (complicated reasons). If they don’t oppose or (complicated reasons) the title is transferred. If the title is not transferred and the squatter remains in occupation, they can reapply in 2 years and will be successful. (complicated reasons) are spelled out in the linked article and are quite ... complicated.

Why does airline benefits program advertising not violate truth-in-advertising laws?

Advertising for airline customer loyalty programs frequently offers customers "miles" as a reward. For instance, Delta Airlines claims: Earn up to 50,000 bonus miles with the Delta SkyMiles® American Express Cards. Terms apply. (This example technically only says "up to," but there are others that do not include such a qualifier). Of course, these miles do not correspond to any common usage of the term miles, but rather represent a certain number of loyalty program points, one that would be insufficient to buy any combination of flights that would travel a distance greater than twice the circumference of the earth. On the surface, would seem like a clear example of misleading or false advertising under a number of legal regimes (including the USA): a company redefines a term related to their product (the distance travelled) in such a way as to produce a misleading impression that can result in financial benefit, without noting the redefinition in its advertisement. However, this does not appear to have caused any legal problems for airlines, so that would suggest that such advertising is legal. Why is this?

Airline miles are pegged to the miles you fly For those airlines which still call their points miles (many don’t) you usually earn 1 mile for each full-fare economy nautical mile flown. More for business and first class, less for discount fares. So, no problem. That said, the word is now generic to the extent that any loyalty program could use then without confusion.

Are US federal guidelines and statistics available for sentencing for "possession of a gun by an addict"?

After 04:44 in CNN's June 22, 2023 Was Hunter Biden given a 'sweetheart deal'? Legal expert weighs in , the senior legal analyst for CNN, and former assistant United States Attorney Elie Honig says: If we look at the gun charge here, it is exceedingly rare for somebody to be charged with a federal gun crime and given pretrial diversion , as Hunter Biden has been given, meaning he doesn't even have to plead guilty as long as he behaves himself, the charge will go away. On the other hand, the vast majority of federal gun crimes involve somebody who either use the gun in some sort of violent crime or somebody who is a prior convicted felon. So it's rare to even see anyone prosecuted at all under the law that Hunter Biden was prosecuted for, which is possession of a gun by an addict. Rare or not, are US federal guidelines and statistics available for sentencing for "possession of a gun by an addict"? That would seem to be germane to a discussion of the level of "sweetheartness" associated with this particularly notable and visible case.

I can at least look at the federal sentencing guidelines . From the description of the offense I'm guessing he's charged under 18 USC §922 (g)(3). In the guidelines, this offense would appear to fall under "§2K2.1. Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition; Prohibited Transactions Involving Firearms or Ammunition". The notes here say: For purposes of subsections (a)(4)(B) and (a)(6), "prohibited person" means any person described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) or § 922(n). I therefore believe he meets the criteria of §2K2.1(a)(6) ("if the defendant was a prohibited person at the time the defendant committed the instant offense"), which would mean the base offense level was 14. Then the big question is whether he falls under §2K2.1(b)(2): If the defendant, other than a defendant subject to subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), or (a)(5), possessed all ammunition and firearms solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection, and did not unlawfully discharge or otherwise unlawfully use such firearms or ammunition, decrease the offense level determined above to level 6. I doubt the handgun was for sporting purposes or for collection; it was likely for self-defense. But I also don't think he is accused of unlawfully discharging or using it. I'm not sure exactly how this would be interpreted. If the offense level is 6, a sentence of probation would normally fall within the guidelines. If it was 14 (or even 12 after a possible 2-level decrease for taking responsibility), a sentence of probation would not be within the guidelines. This is, however, a pretrial diversion, not a conviction. I'm not sure how much the ordinary guidelines apply to that, or whether that's normally done for this sort of thing. It's also possible that I'm missing some factor which would change the offense level more.

Can I keep downloaded Google Play musics even after I cancel my monthly subscription

After I cancel my Google Play Music monthly subscription, I wonder if I can keep/listen to previously downloaded music files from Google Play. I take a look at Google Play terms of service section 5 and section 7, but it looks like spaghetti to me.

You cannot access saved content for the simple reason that you are not allowed to save it in the first place: Capturing of Streams . You may not use Google Play or any Content in conjunction with any stream-ripping, stream capture or similar software to record or create a copy of any Content that is presented to you in streaming format.

Gödel's loophole

After WWII before Gödel was about to be interviewed in order to get a US citizenship, he had found a loophole in the US constitution which allowed a fascist regime to legally turn the US into a dictatorship. I tried searching it online and only found that Gödel's loophole is related to article 5 of the US constitution; however, I couldn't find more information about it. So what is Gödel's loophole? Can you explain it to me?

This article lays out what little is known about the putative loophole, thought to depend on problems of "self-reference". (This is because of the nature of Gödel's view on "self-contradiction"). Note that Article V might itself be amendable.

Being convicted in one jurisdiction and serving the sentence in another

After William Boychuk, a Canadian, was convicted of murder in North Carolina, he was allowed to serve his life sentence in Canada. Now the New Zealand mosque terrorist has been sentenced to life without parole (an unprecedented sentence according to the article linked below) and New Zealand's foreign minister Winston Peters says he wants him to serve his sentence in Australia since that's where he's from. The Australian prime minister Scott Morrison said that would not be a normal practice, and NZ prime minister Jacinda Ardern said "[T]here isn't a legal basis for it. It would be a very complex undertaking." How widespread is such a practice? Is this a unique treaty between the U.S. and Canada, or something done everywhere except that it's unheard of in Australia and New Zealand, or something between those extremes? https://www.tvnz.co.nz/content/tvnz/onenews/story/2020/08/27/peters.html?fbclid=IwAR0aV7y1rNit1S5qv0w92EyL1H7P6H3eiaGWiiaAMzbnJBBh6rNA-dUPIJo

It is possible in principle, in the US, under the Bureau of Prison Treaty Transfer program , so that one could serve your time in Australia for example -- but not New Zealand, which isn't part of a bilateral or multilateral treaty with the US: here is the list . Canada and Australia are on the list via the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons . New Zealand is (by choice) not a participant.

Is it legal to pick locks to gain access to an area you're allowed to be in, in Canada?

After a bit of discussion regarding my answer for this question in the Workplace Stackexchange, I got to wondering: Is it legal to pick a lock to gain access to an area you're authorized to enter in Canada, without getting permission to pick the lock? For instance, you're legally allowed to enter your workplace, so would it be legal to pick a lock to gain access to it, rather than using the intended methods of opening the lock? If you're allowed to go there, you wouldn't be committing a crime like Criminal Trespass or Breaking and Entering, right? Are there any other laws that would make this illegal there?

Are you “legally allowed to enter your workplace“? Or are you legally allowed during normal work hours when the premises is open for business? Permission to enter can be conditional and a locked door is generally a big denial of permission. However, let’s assume you have permission to be inside. Do you have permission to break in? That’s a question that will turn on the facts. If the owner says you didn’t have permission then breaking in is a crime.

What are the benefits of a cohabitation contract in US in no-common law marriage state?

After a number of years together, an unmarried couple in a no-common-law-marriage state decide to consolidate households. The apartment renter (say $1000/mo) will move into the other's mortgaged house (say $2000/mo mortgage). They decide 1) to split the savings, which amounts to the rent on the apartment, thus the non-owner will contribute half of that rent ($500) towards the mortgage/taxes/whathaveyou, 2) split the utilities, and 3) the owner will always be 100% sole owner regardless of developments. While the owner doesn't want a contract, the non-owner is willing and thinks a contract is a very good idea for the benefit of the owner. How might a cohabitation contract benefit the non-owner in the event that 1) the relationship ends disagreeably, and 2) the relationship continues but a lawsuit is filed against one or the other by a third party? (Note corresponding financial question here .)

Ownership of real property often carries obligations to local or national bodies, such as property taxes (which are paid to local government). Being an owner of the property puts that obligation on you. Depending on the structure of the tax law, owners may be obligated by proportion (you own x % of the house, you owe x % of the tax) or they may be obligated "jointly and severally" (everybody owes the taxes together, it can be - and sometimes is - taken from the first person the claimant is able to get their legal process hands on). Contractual disavowment of any ownership interest relieves you of that tax obligation, at least.

Using fictitious and forged document in personal injury case

After a slip and fall that required surgery, I retained an attorney and filed a personal injury suit against the corporation. At the time of the injury I filled out an Onsight Incident report. I wrote on the form that I was hurt bad and in a lot of pain. During discovery, we were sent a copy of this Incident Report. The verbiage had been changed to read, "Subject said he had fallen but was okay". My signature on the form was also forged. I brought this to the attention of my attorneys but they said it was not relevant to my case. It seems to me that this is a clear case of Spoliation of Evidence. My attorneys did not want me to bring this up during my deposition and I didn't. I did retain a well respected forgery expert to give me his opinion and he said there is no doubt that my signature was forged and would be happy to testify as to such. Does anyone have any suggestions or feedback on this situation? If so, it would be appreciated. I believe I might want to change attorneys. Thank You

If you employ a professional, it is precisely beacuse he knows more about the area than you do; in this case not how to show the other side are untrustworthy, but specifically how to win this suit. You can (and probably should, assuming you are happy to pay for the time) ask your attorney how and whether he is going to use the evidence of fraud, but that is all. Nobody who is not a specialist in this area and also has read the papers can tell you the reasons for this decision, but every lawyer has encountered clients who disagree with the advice given, usually for insufficient reason. If you lose the case when the evidence of fraud would have meant that you won, you can sue your attorney; but it is not negligent to decide not to use certain facts, much less not to use them in a particular deposition. Changing attorneys is your privilege at any time, but you need to decide why you are doing so. If it is because you disagree with this decision, you are putting your knowledge of the law above your attorney's; is it likely that another lawyer will take the oppsite view? If so, will that attorney be trying his best to win the case, or just to take your fee and do whatever you say?

Is it legal to shine a non-laser light source at an aircraft?

After all the media coverage about people pointing lasers at commercial aircraft, I started to wonder what was so special about lasers. It seems to me that the amount of distraction that could be done with a 5mW laser is significantly less than what could be done with something else. For example, if I bought/borrowed the light beam from the Luxor hotel , put it in my backyard, turned it on, and pointed it at the planes flying out of a major airport, I would expect that pilots might have some more issues with a 4.3 Billion candela beam than with a 5mW laser (right?) However, I can't find any laws against it, so would this be legal? Alternatively, what if I just wanted to swing that beam around in the sky, and it accidentally crossed the path of a plane? Are there different laws regarding unintentionally hitting a plane with something like this?

If I were a federal prosecutor (which I'm emphatically not), I might try to charge you under 18 USC § 32 (a) (5): a) Whoever willfully— [...] (5) interferes with or disables, with intent to endanger the safety of any person or with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, anyone engaged in the authorized operation of such aircraft or any air navigation facility aiding in the navigation of any such aircraft; [...] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both. Since you clearly know, or believe, that this has the potential to interfere with piloting, which would obviously be a serious danger to people on board the aircraft, I'd argue you would be acting with "reckless disregard for the safety of human life." If your conduct results in anybody's death, then life imprisonment and/or the death penalty are also on the table, under 18 USC § 34 .

After being pardoned, can one be forced to testify in civil and criminal cases?

After being pardoned, can one be forced to testify in civil and criminal cases with no protection against self-incrimination? My example is how Trump has pardoned former Arizona sheriff Joe Arpaio ; does Arpaio's protection against self-incrimination disappear if he accepts the pardon for his conviction of a federal crime? Can Arpaio be compelled to testify in cases brought against him, such as federal and state cases that concern his past actions as sheriff? I.e., such as civil or criminal cases concerning Arpaio's department's past treatment of prisoners, instances of racial profiling and immigration-related cases? Can Arpaio be compelled to testify against co-defendants in the same case(s) he was being prosecuted for that were nullified by the pardon? Is there a difference between between civil and criminal cases as to what he can be compelled to do? And a difference between state and federal cases? Can Arpaio decline the pardon in order to protect himself from being forced to testify? And, can Trump preemptively pardon Arpaio, as the pardon states for any other offenses... that might arise, or be charged, in connection... ?

This analysis by UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh concludes that the answer is yes . A person may refuse to testify, even when subpoenaed, on the grounds that the testimony may expose him to criminal liability. But if the prospect of criminal liability disappears — whether because he has been granted adequate immunity by prosecutors, or because he has accepted a presidential pardon — then the privilege against self-incrimination also disappears. Of course, Arpaio could still claim (plausibly, in my opinion) that his testimony would incriminate him as to other crimes with which he has not been charged / convicted / pardoned. (Unless the pardon was so broad as to cover all related federal crimes of which he might have been guilty; I cannot find the exact text of the pardon.) He could also claim that his testimony would incriminate him as to crimes under state law; the President cannot pardon those.

What determines the order in which witnesses testify?

After day 5 of Floyd case, all of the witnesses thus far appear to be from the prosecution. When does the defense call their witnesses? What determines the order in which witnesses appear in court to testify?

The prosecution chooses the order of its witnesses and must present all of its witnesses before the defense presents its witnesses, and the defense chooses the order of its witnesses. The parties can agree, with the judge's permission, to take a witness out of order (usually for the convenience of a witness who has limited availability on a relatively minor issue). But this is done far more often in civil cases than in criminal cases, because the defense wants to preserve its ability to argue that the prosecution failed to present evidence sufficient to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt in its own case, which can be important in an appeal. If a defense witness is taken out of order, something that a defense witness says could inadvertently tip the balance by establishing some minor but mandatory element of some offense that the prosecution failed to include it its "case in chief". For example, maybe the relevant statute requires that the defendant be over the age of eighteen to be guilty of a crime (e.g. statutory rape), and the prosecution forgets to ask a question about the defendant's age in their case in chief, so the prosecution fails to prove that element of the crime. If a defense witness taken out of order says that "I've known the defendant since I went to his fifth birthday party in 1980.", that could be the difference between having the case reversed on appeal and affirming a conviction on that count. So the defense is reluctant to allow its witnesses to be taken out of order. After the prosecution has presented its "case in chief", and the defense has presented its "case in chief", the prosecution may then present rebuttal witnesses to the testimony of the defense witnesses, and often, the defense may then present rebuttal witnesses to the prosecution's rebuttal witnesses. After the prosecution completes its case in chief, the defense has the right, if it wishes to do so, to present no additional evidence whatsoever. In a criminal trial, the prosecution often presents many witnesses and the defense often presents far fewer witnesses, but that is not a hard and fast rule. Often the defense presents very little evidence for reasons similar to its reasons for not wanting to take a defense witness out of order. For example, suppose a prosecution witness on a key point is not very credible. Offering a defense witness on that point who is also not very credible could bolster the jury's opinion of the prosecution witness's credibility, or could simply help to corroborate that "something" definitely happened that was memorable when the crime was allegedly committed, even if their accounts are not identical.

After death what are the requirements of a next of kin?

After death what are the requirements of a next of kin? For example after my parents die can I say "I'm not touching that with a ten foot pole"? (Not that I would.) I live in Indiana.

Nobody is legally required to touch the legal affairs of the deceased. If you have an interest in their affairs (joint ownership of some property), you may have difficulty disposing of your interest other than by abandoning it (unless someone touches it with a 10 foot pole). Their death does not erase your debts. Creditors can sue the deceased and will win a default judgement (defendant failed to show up...), their property can be seized, real estate can be auctioned off for non-payment of property taxes, and so on. At some point, non-physical assets may end up in the state's unclaimed property office until someone claims it. The county coroner will dispose of the unclaimed body.

In California, can landlords take money out of a security deposit for a "cleaning fee"

After doing some cursory research I've read that landlords cannot deduct damages for "normal wear and tear" from their tenants'. Does a "cleaning fee" that was stated in the rental agreement violate this law?

Short Answer Does a "cleaning fee" that was stated in the rental agreement violate this law? This question does not clearly enough describe the term in the rental agreement to provide an accurate answer. A cleaning fee that is taken out of a security deposit in all circumstances, without regard to how clean it is at the termination of the tenancy (if actually enforced), is probably prohibited, although this isn't absolutely clear beyond all question. But, if the rental agreement provides that it is only due when needed because the premises need to be cleaned (or is enforced in that manner even if the lease says otherwise), then the rental agreement would most likely be construed as a reasonable contractual agreement to establish what constitutes "reasonable wear and tear" in advance of an actual dispute over that issue, and to establish in advance what a reasonable cost was for very specific items in advance to provide greater predictability and lower litigation costs to both parties. Also, an upfront cleaning fee collection in all cases that does not come out of a security deposit appears to be permitted. Analysis Several cases address the issue. One holds that the "statutory definition of security does not include legitimate rent and in determining characterization of payment as security or legitimate rent trier of fact must look to various factors including facts and circumstances of each particular case." Granberry v. Islay Investments , 207 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Cal. App. 1984) (note that this is not the same case as the California Supreme Court case involving the same parties cited below by one of the cases quoted). Another recent case holds that an upfront cleaning fee imposed in every case is permitted. Defendants contend that the TIER fee is not an unrefundable security fee prohibited by Civil Code section 1950.5 . Civil Code section 1950.5 now provides in relevant part: “(a) This section applies to security for a rental agreement for residential property that is used as the dwelling of the tenant. “(b) As used in this section, ‘security’ means any payment, fee, deposit or charge, including, but not limited to, an advance payment of rent, used or to be used for any purpose, including, but not limited to, any of the following: “(1) The compensation of a landlord for a tenant's default in the payment of rent. “(2) The repair of damages to the premises, exclusive of ordinary wear and tear, caused by the tenant or by a guest or licensee of the tenant. “(3) The cleaning of the premises upon termination of the tenancy. “(4) To remedy future defaults by the tenant in any obligation under the rental agreement to restore, replace, or return personal property or appurtenances, exclusive of ordinary wear and tear, if the security deposit is authorized to be applied thereto by the rental agreement.” Subdivision (e) provides that “[t]he landlord may claim of the security only those amounts as reasonably necessary for the purposes specified in subdivision (b). The landlord may not assert a claim against the tenant or the security for damages to the premises or any defective conditions that preexisted the tenancy, for ordinary wear and tear or the effects thereof, whether the wear and tear preexisted the tenancy or occurred during the tenancy, or for the cumulative effects of ordinary wear and tear occurring during any one or more tenancies.” When Civil Code section 1950.5 was enacted in 1977, and until a 1986 amendment (Stats.1986, ch. 564, § 1, p.1991), subdivision (e) limited use of a security fee to “such amounts as are reasonably necessary to remedy tenant defaults in the payment of rent, to repair damages to the premises caused by the tenant, exclusive of ordinary wear and tear, or to clean such premises, if necessary, upon termination of the tenancy. ” The $100 TIER fee was collected from every new tenant by Trinity Management Services, Inc. The fee is usually collected when the tenant signs a standard form lease. The lease imposes an obligation to pay the fee before occupying the premises. Upon payment the tenant receives a “Receipt and Agreement for Tenancy Initiation Expense Reimbursement” from the landlord. Unlike the Court of Appeal here and in Parkmerced , we do not find subdivision (e) of Civil Code section 1950.5, which specifies the uses to which a security may be put by a landlord, useful in determining whether the TIER fee is a security. Subdivision (b) (set out, ante ) defines the term and, while it provides that its examples of securities are not exclusive, it supports a conclusion that a security fee paid by a tenant to a landlord is an amount intended to offset expenses incurred by the landlord as a result of tenant conduct during the tenancy. It does not encompass the TIER fee that the trial court included in the restitution order made here. We begin, as we must, with the term “security.” “We interpret statutory language according to its usual and ordinary import, keeping in mind the apparent purpose of the statute. When no ambiguity appears, we give statutory terms their plain meaning. Excluding meanings for the noun “security” that are irrelevant in this context, the term means “something given, deposited, or pledged to make certain the fulfillment of an obligation.” (Webster's 9th New Collegiate Dict. (1989) p. 1062.) Every example of a security given in subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1950.5 is consistent with this ordinary meaning of the word. The parties and the Parkmerced court assume that because the TIER charge is a fee it must be a “security” within the definition of security given in subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1950.5. It is apparent, however, that the Legislature included the terms “payment, fee, deposit or charge” in the definition to ensure that a landlord would not be able to use those or similar terms rather than “security” for a charge and thereby avoid the prohibition of nonrefundable securities and the limits placed on the use of a security by that statute. Application of the principle of ejusdem generis and consideration of the remainder of the statute compels that conclusion. “ Ejusdem generis applies whether specific words follow general words in a statute or vice versa. In either event, the general term or category is ‘restricted to those things that are similar to those which are enumerated specifically.’” The canon presumes that if the Legislature intends a general word to be used in its unrestricted sense, it does not also offer as examples peculiar things or classes of things since those descriptions then would be surplusage. All of the examples of a security set forth in subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1950.5 are charges intended to secure the landlord against future tenant defaults. Subdivision (e) specifies the only uses to which such fees may be put by the landlord, again confirming that the “fee, deposit, or charge” which may be a security within the subdivision (b) definition is one held by the landlord to ensure reimbursement for future tenant defaults. This is confirmed by section 1950.5, subdivision (d), which provides that the landlord holds a security for the tenant, by subdivision (f), which imposes a duty on the landlord to notify a tenant who has vacated the premises of the amount and disposition of the security and to return any remaining portion, and by subdivision (l ), which prohibits a nonrefundable security. Reading the statute as a whole thus confirms that even though a security is not limited to the examples set out in subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1950.5, a security is limited to charges imposed to secure the landlord against future tenant defaults. A fee imposed at the outset of the tenancy to reimburse the landlord for expenses incurred for such purposes as providing application forms, listing, interviewing, screening the applicant, for checking credit references, and for similar purposes is not a security governed by the provisions of that section. Kraus v. Trinity Mgt. Services, Inc . , 999 P.2d 718, 733–35 (Cal. 2000) (some holdings of this case that are not applicable to this issue subsequently superseded by statute) (some citations omitted). This case also notes that from 1977 to 1986, cleaning fees could only be deducted from a security deposit if cleaning was "needed" at the termination of a tenancy. It isn't entirely clear of the "as needed" qualification survived the 1986 amendment and there are fair readings of the statute that go either way. On one hand, the "as needed" language was replaced with more general language that could be taken to mean the same thing as the old language. On the other hand, the removal of the "as needed" language from the statute could be interpreted as changing prior law as to cleaning fees even though the prior law was not changed as to other kinds of damage charges. There is also a relevant unpublished case that that does not establish binding precedent on the issue that strongly implies that automatic deductions from security deposits for cleaning fees at the termination of a lease are prohibited if that lease provision is actually enforced. Jason Reynolds, Brittany Lundquist, and David Pherrin (collectively plaintiffs) filed a class action lawsuit against Shea Properties Management Company, Inc. (Shea). Plaintiffs allege that Shea improperly deducts fees for cleaning and painting from tenants' security deposits after tenants vacate their apartments. Plaintiffs allege that the fees are improper because they are governed by policies requiring that the tenant be charged for (1) all cleaning costs and (2) some or all painting costs depending solely on the duration of the tenancy rather than on an assessment of the actual condition of the paint. Plaintiffs appeal from the denial of their motion for class certification. Plaintiffs contend that common issues predominate with respect to their claims because Shea's policies render the deductions from tenants' security deposits unlawful. But Shea introduced evidence showing, among other things, that Shea did conduct individualized assessments of each unit with respect to both cleaning and painting, that Shea did not charge for all cleaning costs, and that Shea did not charge for painting solely on the basis of the duration of the tenancy. We conclude that plaintiffs have shown no abuse of discretion, and we therefore affirm the order denying class certification. Reynolds v. Shea Properties Mgt. Co., Inc. , B268949, 2017 WL 4769384, at *1 (Cal. App. Oct. 23, 2017) (not published, not citable). This recent case didn't reach this issue on the merits and merely denied class certification of the issue. But, it strongly implied that automatically deducting a cleaning fee from a security deposit was not allowed if it is actually enforced, stating (in this non-precedent creating case) that: To establish liability based on a violation of section 1950.5, plaintiffs must prove that the amount deducted from the tenant's security deposit exceeded the amount reasonably necessary for the specified purposes. ( See Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738 , 744–745.) Whether a deduction for cleaning or painting was excessive under the statute depends on the condition of the unit at the beginning of the tenancy, its condition at the end of the tenancy, the extent of ordinary wear and tear, and the amount of the cleaning or painting fee charged. The condition of the unit at the beginning and end of the tenancy may differ for each unit. The extent of ordinary wear and tear may differ depending on the length of the tenancy. Plaintiffs argue that common questions predominate because Shea's written policies were unlawful and applied to all of Shea's tenants. As regards painting, plaintiffs argue that “Shea's policy applicable to all class members was to charge ‘based on length of residency,’ and to strictly impose its rate schedule based on length of residency whenever an outside vendor was used to paint.... No consideration whatsoever was given to wear and tear by Shea's policies when charging for painting. Shea's tenants are charged out of their security deposit for painting whenever a third party is used, ‘regardless of what that damage is.’ ” Although Shea's written policies provide some support for some of plaintiffs' assertions, the record contains substantial evidence that contradicts all of them. Shea introduced evidence that it did not “strictly impose its rate schedule based on length of residency whenever an outside vendor was used to paint.” Rather, Shea individually assessed the condition of the paint in each unit and, when possible, used its in-house personnel to do touch-up painting, which was usually sufficient to deal with ordinary wear and tear in any tenancy of two years or less (and the schedule itself called for no painting charge after two years); tenants were not charged for painting done by Shea's in-house personnel. When Shea did use an outside vendor, it did not always charge the tenant the full percentage specified in the written policy and sometimes waived the charge altogether. In addition, when Shea did use an outside vendor, it would sometimes contract for a “full paint” but sometimes only for a “partial paint,” depending on the condition of the unit. In sum, the record contains substantial evidence that Shea did not rigidly adhere to a percentage schedule for painting charges based on length of tenancy alone. Because the record contains substantial evidence supporting the negation of all of the factual premises on which plaintiffs' argument is based, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting plaintiffs' position. Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Shea's written policies concerning painting charges do not present a common question as to liability. Insofar as the written policies suggest an unlawful type of uniformity in charging tenants for painting (“strictly ... based on length of residency whenever an outside vendor was used”), the evidence shows that Shea's actual practices did not conform to the policies, were based on individual assessments of each unit, and do not present a common question of liability. Plaintiffs raise a parallel argument concerning cleaning charges: “Shea's policy is to ‘always' charge from the security deposit any time an outside vendor is used.... The schedule charged is a flat rate based solely on size of the unit, i.e., how many bedrooms.... No consideration was given of the condition of the property when the tenant moved, the tenant['s] efforts to clean, how dirty it is, or how long it takes to clean.” The argument is meritless for parallel reasons: Section 1950.5 allows the tenant to be charged for the reasonable cost of restoring the unit to the level of cleanliness it was in at the start of the tenancy. The record contains substantial evidence (and common sense confirms) that tenants rarely leave a unit as clean as they found it. Thus, in the overwhelming majority of cases, section 1950.5 would allow Shea to hire a vendor to restore the unit to its pre-tenancy state of cleanliness, and Shea could lawfully charge the tenant the reasonable cost of doing so. The record contains substantial evidence that in numerous respects Shea's actual practices were not as described by plaintiffs and were more favorable to tenants than section 1950.5 requires. The record contains substantial evidence that Shea individually assessed each unit, did not charge for cleaning by in-house personnel, did not always charge for cleaning by outside vendors, and in particular did not charge as long as the tenant made a reasonable effort to clean. Again, insofar as the written policies suggest an unlawful type of uniformity in charging tenants for cleaning (“ ‘always' charge ... any time an outside vendor is used,” and give “[n]o consideration” to “the tenant['s] efforts to clean”), the evidence shows that Shea's actual practices did not conform to the policies, were based on individual assessments of each unit, and do not present a common question of liability. Reynolds v. Shea Properties Mgt. Co., Inc. , B268949, 2017 WL 4769384, at *5–6 (Cal. App. Oct. 23, 2017) (not published, not citable) (some citations omitted). I could imagine a case addressing this issue in a published decision departing from Reynolds in one of two different ways. On one hand, another court issuing a published decision could rule that a lease with a facially impermissible automatic deduction for cleaning fees from a security deposit language had to be reformed in every case to legally permissible language, even if the lease was not actually enforced as written. On the other hand, another court issuing a published decision could rule that an amount due from every single tenant at the close of a lease, even if it might be called a "cleaning fee", is, in substance, not a cleaning fee after all, and instead is simply additional rent. Moreover, even if calling it a "cleaning fee" was not allowed, the law wouldn't necessarily prohibit the landlord from increasing the rent for a final month by $100 or something like that, if the charge was called rent and was due as part of the final month's rent payment rather than deducted from the security deposit.

How does the FBI seize websites if they cannot use the law?

After doing some research about websites that have been taken down like Silk Road I have been extremely curious about the procedure that the FBI does to take down a website from the Internet. How do they do it if the website is hosted in another country for example? Do they just contact the hosting company and blackmail them? Does the FBI "hack" the websites they cannot seize? My question applies for both Dark Web and Clear Web websites. I understand that is much easier for a government entity to just use the law for their purposes but that's not always possible...

Hacking a website to take it down is not effective; the target can simply regain control of their machine or restart the service somewhere else. The objective of the FBI is to make arrests and obtain convictions, not play whack-a-mole. When the FBI targets a website and its operators there are a number of approaches that it can use, depending on the circumstances. For clear-web sites one simple approach is just to seize the domain name. When you type badsite.com into a web browser a system called DNS looks up the name in a distributed database and from that gets an IP address. The DNS database is managed by a number of national and international authorities , and most national authoritities will cooperate with legal requests from the FBI, possibly routed through INTERPOL or via a Mutual Legal Assistance treaty. Of course there are some countries that won't cooperate, and this on its own doesn't help the FBI to arrest anyone. The FBI can use an IP address to find out where the physical servers are located. If that is in the US then they can simply go and seize those servers as evidence, or use a subpoena . If it is outside the US then its back to INTERPOL or Mutual Legal Assistance. Servers on the "dark net" use TOR to bounce the packets around the Net a few times. This hides the IP addresses of both servers and clients, so the challenge for the FBI is to find out what the IP address of the target machine is. Once they have that they can proceed as normal. Getting the IP address generally means hacking the target machine via TOR, and then finding the IP address once inside. If the DNS and servers are hosted in a country that won't play ball with the FBI, well that is just too bad. The FBI can carry on investigating of course, and if someone running the website ever travels to a country where the FBI can get them arrested then they will do so.

"Guidelines" for juvenile felony in ohio

After finding some things such as this that kind of shows a guideline for sentencing and fines for felonies I was wondering if there was some sort of guidelines that could apply for a minor to commit a felony?

Alright after a lot of searching before hand I finally phrased the search right to find this .. Sorry to sound like I don't google things, but I'd been searching for a while. I do hope this helps others looking for this, as it is tricky to find. "A serious youth offender (SYO) sentence combines a sentence typically given to a juvenile with a sentence that is typically reserved only for adults convicted of a felony or misdemeanor. Several factors are used by the court to determine whether such a sentence is appropriate. These include: Whether the crime was an offense of violence if committed by an adult; Whether the juvenile had a firearm while committing the offense; and Whether the juvenile has a prior conviction for a serious crime." Classes of felonies in Delaware (and generally) Ohio (or non-classed such as murder) Aggravated Murder & Murder If the juvenile is 14-17 years old – mandatory SYO sentence If the juvenile is 10-13 years old – discretionary SYO sentence If the juvenile is under 10 years old – up to 90 days in a detention facility Fine up to $2000 Attempted Aggravated Murder or Attempted Murder If the juvenile is 14-17 years old – mandatory SYO sentence 10-13 years old – discretionary SYO sentence under 10 years old – up to 90 days in a detention facility Maximum $2000 fine 1st Degree Felony 16-17 years old – mandatory SYO sentence if factors are present; discretionary SYO sentence if no factors are present 14-15 years old – discretionary SYO sentence 10-13 years old – discretionary SYO if factors are present under 10 years old – up to 90 days in a detention facility Maximum $1500 fine 2nd Degree Felony 14-17 years old – discretionary SYO sentence 12-13 – discretionary SYO sentence if factors are present under 12 years old – up to 90 days in a detention facility Max Fine: $1000 3rd Degree Felony 16-17 years old – discretionary SYO sentence 14-15 – discretionary SYO sentence if factors are present under 14 years old – up to 90 days in a detention facility Fine up to $750 4th Degree Felony 16-17 years old – discretionary SYO sentence if factors are present under 16 years old – up to 90 days in a detention facility $400 Max fine 5th Degree Felony 16-17 years old – discretionary SYO if factors are present under 16 years old – up to 90 days in a detention facility Max $500 Fine

Am I allowed to use my university's logo?

After graduating from college I am more than relieved to be done. What I am curious about is if it is ok to feature the logo image from my school on social media or perhaps on my personal website legally? I assume that I am not allowed but could probably get away with it, though I don't want to be doing anything that is technically illegal.

Under Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, it is likely legal due to fair use if you are only using the logo for identification purposes. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc., the court ruled that the former Playmate of the Year was permitted to place the Playboy image on her website for self-identification even though she was advertising herself for commercial gain. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Playboy_Enterprises,_Inc._v._Welles

Can I be fined for the intention to commit a traffic violation, after the police prevented me from carrying through?

After having stopped at a red traffic light, seeing the intersection empty, I was about to get on by bike and turn right when a police officer behind me informed me that doing so would mean a €100 fine¹, so I walked around the corner and then got on my bike there. I did not get fined. Which makes me wonder: Can the police officer issue a fine for clearly intending to commit a traffic violation, even if the police officer prevented me from doing so? ¹Although a general "right turn on red allowed for cyclists" has been discussed, such is currently not allowed in Germany.

General Question Having an intention is never enough for punishments (both Strafe and Bußgeld ) of the German state. But having an intention and be right at the start of doing the offense (details are complicated) is sometimes punished as an attempt of the offense ( Versuch ). This is defined in § 13 Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz ( Act on Regulatory Offences ). § 13 OWiG (= §§ 22-24 Strafgesetzbuch ( Criminal Code )) (1) Whoever, in accordance with his understanding of the act, takes a direct step towards the realisation of the factual elements of the offence, shall be deemed to have attempted a regulatory offence. (2) The attempt may be sanctioned only if expressly provided by law. (3) If the perpetrator voluntarily renounces further execution of the act or prevents its completion, he shall not be sanctioned for attempt. If the act will not be completed without the contribution of the abandoning party, his voluntary and earnest efforts to prevent its completion shall be sufficient. (4) If more than one person participates in the act, the one who voluntarily prevents its completion shall not be sanctioned for an attempt. However, his voluntary and earnest efforts to prevent the completion of the act shall suffice if the act is not completed without his contribution or is committed independently of his earlier participation. If you started the offense but stopped, so you don't fulfill offense, you don't get sanctioned, if you stopped voluntarily ( freiwillig ), § 13 III OWiG. (The details are more complicated.) This may be the case in your example, but beeing seen by a police officer is no reason for Freiwilligkeit . So you may have attempted the offence. But an attempted offence gets only sanctioned if this is expressly provided by law, § 13 II OWiG. This is provided for no traffic violation. (But for some of the Straftaten in context of traffic, e.g. § 315b StGB Dangerous disruption of road traffic .) So the answer to your question is a clear: No Specific aspects of your case I have searched the norms for your case, a red light offence for cyclist: § 37 II Nr. 1, Nr. 2, Nr. 6 Straßenverkehrsordnung : the rules for traffic light § 49 III Nr. 2 StVO: declaring violations of § 37 StVO as regulatory offences (legal basis: § 24 I Straßenverkehrsgesetz ) Nr. 132a Anlage 1 Bußgeldkatalog-Verordnung : sets 60 € fine for red ligth violations of cyclists (legal basis: § 1 I BKatV) Nr. 132a Anlage 1 BKatV: sets 100 € fine for red ligth violations of cyclists after at least one second Nr. 3.2.19 Anlage 13 Fahrerlaubnis-Verordnung : sets fine of one point in Fahreignungsregister (driving ability register) for these offences (legal basis: § 40 FeV) In none of these laws a sanction for attempt is defined. I'm not sure what you did after getting of your bike, you migth have violated the red ligth walking. For this you can get a 5 € fine (Nr. 130 Anlage 1 BKatV), strictly speaking not a Bußgeld (fine), but only a Verwarnungsgeld (warning fine). But the competent authority can but doesn't have to sanction the offence, § 47 I OWiG. So the officer just didn't gave you the warning and thought it is OK.

Why is it said that pre-trial procedures are "heavily skewed in favour of a plaintiff" in cases of defamation in Australia?

After losing a defamation lawsuit, ABC (Australia) said in a statement that This case has again starkly demonstrated fundamental problems with Australian defamation law and pre-trial procedures being heavily skewed in favour of a plaintiff. What exactly in the procedure generally favors the plaintiff in defamation cases in Australia?

Because they lost The procedure was espoused by Aesop in The Fox & the Grapes - don't listen to the loser when they complain that the game was rigged. Also, don't complain that "that's not how they do it in England" - how they play they game in other places is irrelevant. The plaintiff sets the terms of the case Defamation is rarely about out and out lies - media organisations are too savey to straight out call someone a kiddie fondler. Instead they present information is such a way that such a conclusion might be imputed. The plaintiff in a defamation case gets to choose the imputations that they want to rely on. In ABC v Wing : Dr Chau alleges the publications, in their natural and ordinary meaning, conveyed the following six imputations: Dr Chau betrayed his country, Australia, in order to serve the interests of a foreign power, China, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) by engaging in espionage on their behalf; Dr Chau is a member of the CCP and of an advisory group to that party, the People’s Political Consultative Conference, and, as such, caries out the work of a secret lobbying arm of the CCP, the United Front Work Department (United Front); Dr Chau donated enormous sums of money to Australian political parties as bribes intended to influence politicians to make decisions to advance the interests of the Republic of China, the Chinese government and the CCP; Dr Chau paid Sheri Yan, whom he knew to be a corrupt espionage agent of the Chinese government, in order to assist him in infiltrating the Australian government on behalf of the CCP; Dr Chau paid a $200,000 bribe to the President of the General Assembly of the United Nations, John Ashe; Dr Chau was knowingly involved in a corrupt scheme to bribe the President of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Dr Chau further alleges the conveyance of a true innuendo to the effect that he broke his pledge of loyalty to Australia as an Australian citizen. In their defence, the respondents alleged that each of the above imputations was substantially true. Further, the respondents sought to allege substantial truth in respect of variants of the applicant’s imputations. Each variant imputation corresponded to those set out above but was prefaced by the words ‘There are reasonable grounds to believe that…’. The trial judge, Rares J, rejected that defence and refused leave to file an amended defence because "there was a substantive distinction between suspicion and fact, rendering each of the respondents’ variant imputations impermissible variants of Chau’s pleaded imputations. His Honour also determined that the proposed particulars of truth in the schedule to the defence and the proposed amended defence did not provide a basis for the inferences alleged to arise therefrom, did not properly particularise allegations of knowledge, failed to comply with the rules of pleading, and could not reasonably support the plea of truth to the applicant’s imputations." All of the trial judge's findings were upheld on appeal at the Full Bech of the Federal Court and the High Court did not give leave to appeal so this is the definitive law in Australia. That is, the imputation that someone is suspected of doing A is different from the one where they did A. Obviously, a publication can convey either or both of those imputations but if they do contain both, the plaintiff gets to decide which one they want to sue over. In their Honours’ view, only a precise analysis of the words used and their context will reveal: …whether a matter is capable of conveying imputations of both suspicion and guilt, or grades of meaning in-between, including whether the suspicion imputation is one of strong suspicion, reasonable suspicion or mere suspicion, or whether it is objective or subjective, active or passive… . So, the preliminary ruling was that they couldn't run a defence that it was true that Dr Chau was suspected of the things they said because his suit was based on the imputation that he did those things. In the immediate sense, the effect of the Full Court’s decision has been to deny the respondents a defence of justification, without which they are left to argue that the imputations pleaded by Wing are not conveyed by the publications, and otherwise rely on a defence of qualified privilege. That is, as they couldn't raise the truth of the suspicion, they had to demonstrate that they did not impute that Dr Chau did these things. And they couldn't. So they lost. As an aside: these allegations and documents supporting some of them have been raised in Parliament both before and after the trial. Parliamentary statements are privileged which means that the parliamentarian who made them cannot be sued for defamation.

Can an HVAC installer's warranty be voided if another company works on the system?

After moving into a new home, I had a licensed HVAC company install a whole house humidifier. A few days later, a guy from the builder's HVAC contractor came out to address an airflow issue. When he saw the humidifier, he told me that because I let another company work on the system, my warranty is now void. He told me I should have known that because the warranty terms are spelled out in a binder full of paperwork the home builder gave me. After searching through the binder, I finally did find that clause, but I wouldn't call it obvious information. I don't remember signing anything saying I agree to the conditions. The papers were simply handed to me when I bought the house. To be clear, the manufacturer's warranty still applies. It's only the installer's warranty on their workmanship that's considered void. Is voiding a warranty like that legal? Would the Magnuson Moss Act protect me? I'm in Idaho, USA.

You can read about Magnuson Moss here , but it only applies to warranties on goods, not services. As you note, the warranty on the unit is still valid. As for agreeing, it is not unusual that a consumer is not aware what all they are agreeing to when they buy a house. One of those myriad signatures that you put on myriad documents was your agreement to contract terms in the pile of papers that you were handed. If you trace through the entire pile of pieces of paper, you should find something saying that you agree to "all of the attached conditions", which is where you are supposed to say "Wait, what conditions?".

Changing tax residency - how does it work?

After my Phd in US, I move back to Syria. Life savings are in my US bank account (Can't trust Syria) Year is 2011 and Syria enters a war. Every single resident of Syria gets OFAC sanctioned. I'm not in Syria, I'm traveling. But my bank has my Syrian address on file. On W8BEN and in bank's own system Would my bank close down my account? Do I say goodbye to my life savings and retirement plan? If I'm also a resident of another country, can I use that? Can I change my address on file as soon as I hear about the sanction? I have a tax ID and all that. Or is it too late?

The U.S. Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) manages about a dozen different sanctions systems, each with their own set of rules, and new sanctions don't necessarily have the same rules as old ones. The legal basis of the various sanctions implicating Syria can be found here . They arise under six statutes, eight executive orders, Part 542 of Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and at least four pending regulations, as well as some UN materials that aren't directly applicable until codified in U.S. laws and regulations. There is a summary here . The core provisions are as follows: Current Syria sanctions (1) block the property and interests in property of the Government of Syria pursuant to E.O. 13582, (2) block the property and interests in property of persons listed in an Annex to, or that are determined by the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the Secretary of State, to meet the criteria described in, E.O. 13338, E.O. 13399, E.O. 13460, E.O. 13572, E.O. 13573, E.O. 13582, or E.O. 13606, (3) prohibit transactions or dealings with foreign persons that are determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to meet the criteria described in E.O. 13608, and (4) prohibit certain transactions with respect to Syria pursuant to E.O. 13582. Under E.O. 13582, all property and interests in property of the Government of Syria, which includes its agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities, which are in the United States or within the possession or control of U.S. persons, are blocked. E.O. 13582 also prohibits the following: • New investment in Syria by a U.S. person, wherever located; • The direct or indirect exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply of any services to Syria from the United States or by a U.S. person, wherever located; • The importation into the United States of petroleum or petroleum products of Syrian origin; • Any transaction or dealing by a U.S. person, wherever located, in or related to petroleum or petroleum products of Syrian origin; and • Any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a U.S. person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited if performed by a U.S. person or within the United States. The names of persons listed in an Annex or designated pursuant to E.O. 13338, E.O. 13399, E.O. 13460, E.O. 13572, E.O. 13573, or E.O. 13582, whose property and interests in property are therefore blocked, are published in the Federal Register and incorporated into OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”) with the identifier “[SYRIA].” The names of persons listed in an Annex or designated pursuant to E.O. 13606, whose property and interests in property are therefore blocked, are published in the Federal Register and incorporated into OFAC’s SDN List with the identifier “[HRIT-SY].” The names of foreign persons identified pursuant to E.O. 13608 are published in the Federal Register and incorporated into OFAC’s SDN List with the identifier “[FSE-SY],” The SDN List is available through the following page on OFAC’s Web site: www.treasury.gov/sdn . Most, but not all, of the sanctions with Syria involve specific named individuals wherever they may be in the world. Also, in general, sanctions are imposed based upon nationality and not based upon residency. The question seems to assume that address on file with the bank is the controlling factor, but this is unlikely. Furthermore, there is a special set of rules that exist specifically to prevent people from circumventing sanctions and you need to be wary of violating those as well when otherwise you might not be subject to the sanctions at all. The rules are highly technical and not easily summarized in a Law.SE answer.

Do parents have access to an adult child's childhood medical records

After my child turns 18, I know I am blocked from seeing any new medical records, unless they give explicit permission. However, does that mean I am blocked from their pediatric medical records? Their pediatric provider sent me their complete vaccination record for our records, but they are now over 18. Is this a violation of HIPAA? I tried reading the rules and regulations, but I couldn't parse out this situation. If it is a violation, can you point at the regulation? If it is a violation, I'd like to inform the provider, so they don't continue this mistake. (To be clear, I have a release, and permission from our adult child, but the provider wouldn't know that.)

Late to the party, but I'll answer anyways. In general, providers have a lot of wiggle room when sharing information with parents, on condition that the patient hasn't explicitly objected despite having opportunity to do so. HIPAA allows the provider to make a judgment call on whether such information can be shared without explicit consent: Quoting Title 45 § 164.510 : (i) Obtains the individual's agreement; (ii) Provides the individual with the opportunity to object to the disclosure, and the individual does not express an objection; or (iii) Reasonably infers from the circumstances, based the exercise of professional judgment, that the individual does not object to the disclosure. HHS does discuss disclosure to family members in their FAQ : A covered entity is permitted to share information with a family member or other person involved in an individual’s care or payment for care as long as the individual does not object. A parent of a child who has just turned 18 is likely still somewhat involved in the child's care, so, absent either an objection or a reason to believe the child would object if asked, sharing is probably not a violation.

After passing security, is it legal to give your boarding pass to someone else?

After passing security, is it legal to give your boarding pass to someone else?

No. It is not legal to give your boarding pass to someone else. It is a non-transferrable document. This is why your boarding pass is checked against your ID at security checkpoints. Your boarding pass indicates the level of security screening you face , which is particular to the individual identified on it. It is also used to make sure that the person identified in a boarding pass and their luggage are on the same flight (also called "positive passenger-bag matching"), to discourage non-suicidal terrorists from inserting bombs onto planes. This is authorized by 49 U.S. Code § 44901 and by related regulations. An airline would be within its rights to insist on ID to confirm the identity of someone holding a boarding pass before boarding and after the security checkpoint, even though this is not common practice to do so on domestic flights (it is common to do so on international flights to facilitate bag matching and to prevent the airline from having to return someone who doesn't have a passport to their point of origin).

Why is it legal to give away for free a physical copy of copyrighted material that you bought, but not a digital copy?

After posting this question , another one, more obvious came to mind. If the "first sale doctrine" is a widespread law, and allows someone to give their whole collection of VHS or DVDs or vinyls for free, then why is this rule not applying when it comes to a digital copy? If the first sale doctrine rule applied, then someone who legally purchased thousands of albums and movies digitally should be able to give these files for free to whoever they want.

A frequent distinction between the two situations is that usually, you buy the actual physical thing (DVD, VHS, CD, book, etc.), but for a purely digital asset, you may be only buying a restricted licence to the asset (on iTunes , for example). In the case where you did buy the digital asset (not simply a restricted licence to it), another difference is that the transfer of a physical item does not implicate the reproduction right 1 that is given exclusively to copyright owners. However, transfer of a digital asset often does implicate that reproduction right. See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc. : It is also undisputed that Capitol did not approve the reproduction or distribution of its copyrighted recordings on ReDigi’s website. Thus, if digital music files are “reproduce[d]” and “distribute[d]” on ReDigi’s website within the meaning of the Copyright Act, Capitol’s copyrights have been infringed. It is a different situation if you transfer the actual medium onto which you downloaded the digital content ( ibid. ): Section 109(a) still protects a lawful owner’s sale of her “particular” phonorecord, be it a computer hard disk, iPod, or other memory device onto which the file was originally downloaded. Notes 1. 17 USC §106 (1) " the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to [...] reproduce the copyrighted work... " This answer assumes US jurisdiction, but Canada's Copyright Act is fairly similar to 17 USC and similar holdings have been made in Canada.

What's the rationale for "joint controller" instead of keeping every entity doing stricly separate?

After reading Case C-40/17 and Case C-210/16 I still cannot figure out why GDPR would require "joint controller" decision. Wouldn't it be much simpler to decide that e.g. in "Fashion ID" case, the Facebook cannot set cookies if Facebook hasn't acquired consent from the end user? That would allow embedding Like buttons on any page at will and Facebook could only track the users that have already given consent for Facebook. Technically facebook would have been able to run their own JavaScript code on the host page so they could have implemented the consent query on any page if they really wanted to set cookies only after getting consent. This would also immediately solve questions such as Who's liable for GDPR compliance when embedding/hosting a self-contained 3rd-party website/service? and Who needs to implement Cookie Consent for embedded content? because in both cases the host that wants to set non-necessary cookies would need to independantly verify they already have been given consent for those cookies. As GDPR doesn't define how such content must be acquired, there could be an UI on the host domain document and then the acquired consent must be explicitly transferred to 3rd party. In practice, the transfer cannot be just "it's okay" but "user has given consent for trackingdomain.com via domain example.com at yyyy-mm-dd with log id abc123ef" because GDPR requires that the user must be able to retract the consent later and entity doing the processing must be able to specify the origin for the consent. Is the current ruling just caused by the interpretation that embedding any content via URL is considered implicit consent for the whole domain? In practice, this would practically prevent 3rd party cookies for any services the user hasn't expicitly visited previously.

The rulings you refer to are not primarily about cookies or consent. They are about pages who use Facebook services, and claim that Facebook would be the sole data controller. As the ECJ has ruled, this is not the case: causing or contributing to Facebook's processing of personal data can establish a joint controller role. Thus, the admin of a Facebook page ends up being co-responsible for the correct use of cookies on that page, and the embedder of a Facebook like button ends up being co-responsible for sending visitor data (such as IP addresses) to Facebook. You are correct that joint controller situations are messy and potentially difficult to navigate. But the “joint controller” concept reflects the reality of the legal situation that more than one person/entity can meet the definition of a “controller” for a particular processing activity. It is possible to avoid joint controller situations, for example when processing activities are structured suitably, or when one party engages the others as data processors. Of course, it would be contrary to Facebook's interests to act as a data processor because FB wants to use the personal data for their own purposes, not solely for the other controller's purposes. Some detailed notes: The Fashion ID case does not involve the setting of cookies, it applies more generally to any personal data a browser might send while making a request. Both of these cases are not about Facebook's responsibilities, but about the responsibilities of data controllers that use Facebook's services. You can't just embed/use third party services and argue that you're not responsible for compliance. GDPR does not require explicit records of consent to be stored. Doing so might even violate the data minimisation principle. The GDPR has the weaker requirement that “the controller shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented to processing of his or her personal data” (Art 7(1)). This could perhaps be demonstrated indirectly, e.g. that it is not possible to trigger the processing activity without giving consent. The controller of a page embedding content does not have influence over the use of cookies by that embedded content and would not typically collect consents for that content. Instead, embedding pages typically collect consent for the loading of third party content, e.g. “click to show content from twitter.com” or a greyed-out Facebook icon with a toggle next to it. This page (about the Fashion ID ruling) has a wonderful example with an embedded YouTube video: Source: https://www.verbraucherzentrale.de/wissen/digitale-welt/datenschutz/eughurteil-likebutton-von-facebook-nur-mit-info-an-nutzer-12029 Translation: The video is currently deactivated to prevent unwanted data transfers to Youtube. To activate, please click the link! This will transmit data, but we can't provide information on their type, scope, and purpose. Link: show video There is no such thing as implicit consent under the GDPR. Consent must be indicated unambiguously. Art 4(11) defines consent as “any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data”. It is quite likely that, were Facebook to set cookies via embedded Like buttons or to use Like buttons to create profiles of users that are not Facebook members, that Facebook would be acting illegally. The lack of suitable consent would be a concern. But that matter was not being litigated in the cited cases.

Has the patent process been patented?

After reading What topics can I ask about here? in Patents SE I've decided this question is off-topic there, so I'll ask here. Has there been an application for a process patent for the patenting process itself? It would probably be beneficial to license it freely, but I'm just curious if such an application has been filed, and if so, if one was granted.

Yes, in a sense. One patent is US 7444589 Automated patent office documentation by AT&T. Another is US 6434580B1 System, method, and recording medium for drafting and preparing patent specifications from NEC. In most locations patents on a business method are not allowed but, although controversial, they are allowed in the U.S. Of course the fundamental requirement for patentablity is to be new. Since patenting itself is very old any patent on the topic would need to cover some narrow aspect, like the AT&T and NEC patents. I do not understand the assumption that such a patent would necessarily be licensed freely.

Is it normal for German Landlords to intercept internet traffic?

After reading https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/136543/landlord-will-be-watching-my-data-traffic-as-mentioned-in-the-lease-agreement I was wondering if this realy is common in germany? From the answer: I would say that the restrictions are pretty standard for Germany. Is it?

In a normal rental property, the tenant is in a contract with the telecommunications provider and landlord has no business listening to the communication. When the landlord does provide internet access for tenants, he/she gets into a complicated legal position. The owner of the internet connection is generally liable for things like copyright violations, hate speech, etc. coming from that connection. This law predates open-access wifi connections and even the internet. Legislation and legal precedent are only slowly catching up with that new reality.

Do cases of Jury Nullification set precedent?

After reading the answers from this question, What is jury nullification? , I was wondering if cases of Jury Nullification would set legal precedent within a given jurisdiction. For example, a legal system with three tiers. a jury-trial found the defendant guilty at the first level, then the case was appealed to the second, where the jury (via nullification) acquitted. Would a similar case brought to the first level have to follow the precedent set by the higher court, or is there judicial discretion available when it comes to case precedent?

"Precedent" refers to a finding of what the law is. A jury only finds facts, and operates (supposedly) within the meaning of the law as already established. All the jury reports is "yes" and "no" to questions of fact (with some reference to existing law): they do not report, at least in any official way "we interpret the law as saying X". So it would be impossible for a jury to "set precedent" in the case law sense. In a notorious case, they might "set precedent" in inspiring other jurors to act similarly, but this is not enforceable precedent in the way that case law precedent is. In the US, if the jury acquits the defendant, that is the end of the matter and there is no re-trial. As for the UK, I am not sure but I think that the prosecution being unhappy with the jury's decision does not create an exception to the double jeopardy rule.

Has The Unlicense any legal value?

After reading this article about public domain my understanding (which is based on not much so there's a lot of chance I'm actually wrong) is that there's no such thing as public domain for copyright-covered work (mostly every work created within the U.S. and most European countries -- as long as the copyright hasn't expired ). Now (again my understanding is quite limited regarding these things), The Unlicense claims to allow the release of copyrighted work in the public domain: In jurisdictions that recognize copyright laws, the author or authors of this software dedicate any and all copyright interest in the software to the public domain. So that would mean that your work, with this license, isn't owned by anyone anymore right? How does that work if your work is something illegal and you "unlicense it"? No one can sue you because it's not yours anymore?

The argument as I understand it is that copyright is a property right (agreed) and that so long as it exists, someone owns that property. I can see some merit in that argument. Following it through to its logical conclusion copyright exists until its statutory term expires at which time it ceases to be property and cannot be owned. At common law, if you abandon property then the property belongs to the first person to claim it. However, there is some doubt in my mind if the quote you use is a statement of abandonment or instead an irrevocable and unconditional licence granted to everybody. It seems clear that the intention is the latter and not the former, particularly when the document is considered as a whole; that is, it is not the expectation of the person making it that the next person to come along can assert ownership of the abandoned property. I do not agree with the arguments advanced that an irrevocable licence can be revoked because there is no contract in the absence of consideration. On that basis, the recipient of any gift could never rest comfortably on its title if the giver could return at any point in the future and reassert their ownership. Once a gift is given then title has passed; even if the title is only to a licence rather than the copyright itself. To be legally effective, the giver must have the intention to make the gift (pretty unassailable here), must deliver the gift to the receiver (posting it on a web site would do that) and the receiver must accept it - technically the gift could be revoked up until the point where any of the beneficiaries (i.e. anyone) downloaded it, after that it would be irrevocable. As to the second part of your question, if it was illegal for the work in question to be created, distributed or possessed as it is, for example, with child abuse material, then releasing it into the "public domain" does not relieve the creator, distributor or receiver of any criminal liability they might have.

Could anyone sue spammers?

After reading this article about the lawyer who sued companies solely because they sent him spam, I was wondering if anyone could follow his steps and do the same thing, and how one would do so. (I am not sure that one should do it, but whether or not anyone could do it would really interest me).

The lawyer referred to in that article is suing in his capacity as the recipient of spam emails under California's anti-spam law. Not every jurisdiction has a law like this. I'm from Australia. In Australia, when we make laws prohibiting something, the law usually appoints a government agency to administer the law and bring prosecutions under it, and fines are paid to the government. In contrast, America has a lot of these laws where affected individuals can sue and collect the fines personally. So under the Californian law, you can get $1,000 per email for particular kinds of spam even if you haven't actually suffered any real damage: California Business and Professions Code s 17529.5(b)(1)(B)(ii). How? You need to work out who sent the spam, get evidence to prove it, and file a claim in a Californian court. Apparently you can sue in small claims court, which saves you on filing fees. It helps if you have many email accounts, because then you will receive many emails and therefore can collect many fines. One of that lawyer's wins was in Balsam v Trancos (2012) in the Californian Court of Appeal. Another example of a judgment discussing the Californian anti-spam law is Bontrager v Showmark Media .

Is forging another's signature prosecutable if forger had permission?

After reading this post , I realized that a significant percentage of my friends and family could go to prison for forgery. Many couples I know sign one another's names all the time, including on the backs of checks. My wife and I have given one another blanket permission to sign for one another, and I know many other people with a similar understanding. In the United States, is it in fact illegal to sign someone else's signature on the back of a check if one has permission to do so? How about signing my wife's signature on our IRS forms?

Take the laws of Washington to be typical. RCW 9A.60.010 defines crucial terms: To "falsely complete" a written instrument means to transform an incomplete written instrument into a complete one by adding or inserting matter, without the authority of anyone entitled to grant it ; and: "Forged instrument" means a written instrument which has been falsely made, completed, or altered Forgery then requires a bad intent: (1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with intent to injure or defraud: where (a) He or she falsely makes, completes, or alters a written instrument or; (b) He or she possesses, utters, offers, disposes of, or puts off as true a written instrument which he or she knows to be forged . In the scenario described, there is no intent to injure of defraud, and furthermore the document is not forged, because a forged document is one made / completed without authorization.

What can a network service disclose to law enforcement if they claim they don't keep any logs?

After reading this question I was wondering about the legal applications of the terms-of-service of Privateinternetaccess.com (PIA): a VPN provider. What's a VPN provider? If you have one, all your internet traffic goes through it. One of the largest claims PIA makes is that it doesn't keep any logs so that theoretically even if a government issues a warrant they would be unable to disclose any information on the activities of its users. According to this article PIA claims "We absolutely do not maintain any VPN logs of any kind." Is it legal not to keep any logs? Did they just "pull a legal fast one" by saying VPN logs so if they were to hand over information about a user they would just say it was from a non-VPN log? From the first linked page: Failure to comply with the present Terms of Service constitutes a material breach of the Agreement, and may result in one or more of these following actions: Issuance of a warning; Immediate, temporary, or permanent revocation of access to Privateinternetaccess.com with no refund; Legal actions against you for reimbursement of any costs incurred via indemnity resulting from a breach; Independent legal action by Privateinternetaccess.com as a result of a breach; or Disclosure of such information to law enforcement authorities as deemed reasonably necessary. When they say "Disclosure of such information," to what information could they refer? They claim they don't keep any information. Is the statement saying, "they will comply with the law, by showing their (empty) logs"?

There is not necessarily a contradiction. Information that they may keep may be: Account information Subscriber information Information on breaches of the Terms of Service or Agreement So yes, they might certainly not keep any logs – although that claim is doubtful, since they almost certainly keep at least error-level logs of their services – but that doesn't mean that they have no information to disclose to law enforcement. It's also questionable what "logs" refers to – would aggregate statistics be considered a log, by law? Would your last known IP address be considered a log, provided they don't keep any other history?

Is borrowing without consent illegal?

After reading this question: Borrow something and return it considered stealing? I got the impression that, other than a bike, if I borrow stuff from random people without their consent and return it later, it's not illegal. Which sounds extremely unrealistic, but not being in the law field and knowing very little of it, I wouldn't doubt. So that is my question: generally speaking (meaning, except when there are specific laws, like the bike laws cited above) is it not illegal to borrow things without consent?

Yes, it's illegal new-south-wales s118 of the Crimes Act says: Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the accused appropriated the property in question to the accused’s own use, or for the accused’s own benefit, or that of another, but intended eventually to restore the same, or in the case of money to return an equivalent amount, such person shall not by reason only thereof be entitled to acquittal. QED

France: is it the same copyright principle?

After reading this: https://www.joelonsoftware.com/2016/12/09/developers-side-projects/ I'm stuck with this: Well… maybe. In the United States, if you hired Sarah as a contractor, she still owns the copyright on that work. That is kind of weird, because you might say, “Well, I paid her for it.” It sounds weird, but it is the default way copyright works. In fact, if you hire a photographer to take pictures for your wedding, you own the copies of the pictures that you get, but the photographer still owns the copyright and has the legal monopoly on making more copies of those pictures. Surprise! Same applies to code. Is it the same copyright principle in France? If I make a big JavaScript "generic" implementation of something that I would like to re-use somewhere else, is it legal for me to do so?

Links are in French. As the author of a work, you would generally hold copyright unless there's a contract otherwise. L113 of the Code de la propriété intellectuelle determines who is the rights holder of a given work and I don't see anything there that changes things for you as a contractor. Even if you assigned some rights to your employer through a contract, France has moral rights which can never be ceded. In fact, even if you were a salaried employee, you still hold the rights by default, unlike the US. There are a few exceptions to that though: software, inseparable joint works , and works where the creative process was purely directed by your superiors .

Is a name of a fictional character, location or universe free to use if it is not trademarked?

After searching on USPTO names of characters fron Dota 2 and Warcraft, I found that most names are not trademarked. Does this means these names are free to use as a software name?

Under US law, trademarks are only protected if they are "used in commerce". In general this means the mark is used to describe or label a product or service, or to advertise it. Note that words and images used in this way may get a degree of trademark protection even if they are not registered. Proof of use in commerce is sufficient to grant this protection. However, the names of characters are not usually used as identifications of a product or service, nor as designations of source. If they are not so used, they do not have trademark protection. If a reasonable person would be led by the use of a character name to incorrectly believe that the product had been authorized, sponsored, or endorsed by the creator of the character or a related entity, then that use might constitute an infringement. But usually this would not be the case. For example, a software company calling itself "SauronWare" and distributing a word processor called "SauronWriter" would probably not infringe on the intelelctual property of the Tolkien Estate. But trademark law can be complex, and a would-be user wouldf be wise to consult a trademark lawyer. Note also that song, book, and story titles, character names, and other short phrases are not subject to copyright protection under US law (see Copyright Office Circular 33.)

How would copyright infringement apply in this case?

After seeing that a lot of manga reader websites are making advertisement money out of other people's copyrighted works, I was wondering how would it be to make a similar site, but where the advertisement income would be sent back to its appropriate owner. The transactions would be stated in a transparent way to show that I am not the one making money off those works. Since I would not be able to get the permission to publish their work, it would be clearly a purposeful copyright infringement. However, if people were to ask for a take down since they are being published elsewhere, I would willingly take them down and leave a link to their site. Now, I have two questions: Would they ask for a take down for any other reason, when various other manga reader websites are making money off them? Considering that myself is not going to be making any money off their work, does this still fall into the category of criminal act? If so, are there more than take down notices that can happen? (C&D? financial punishment? imprisoning?)

Would they ask for a take down for any other reason, when various other manga reader websites are making money off them? Merely looking at the fact that the other sites have not been taken down is not a good metric to decide if you will face an infringement suit for your own site. Consider the following possibilities: The manga on those sites may be published by a different publisher than the manga you want to host, and that publisher of your desired manga is more litigious. The manga publisher may not have been actively pursuing infringement for the last several years, but they may suddenly decide this fiscal year it's a financially good idea to start aggressively pursuing infringement. They will go after the other sites and your site at the same time. Because you plan to give them money, you are actively drawing attention to your infringing site. While they may not find it worth their while to seek out whatever new infringing sites pop up every week, in this case, they don't have to come looking for you. You show up to them , actively telling them that you're infringing their copyright. Of course, they might not care. They might love your idea. Regardless, the legally sound way to do this is to ask for permission before you do it, rather than forgiveness afterward. If you don't, you are certainly vulnerable to a lawsuit (whether or not the publisher will pursue the opportunity to sue you is a question left to the discretion of the publisher). Considering that myself is not going to be making any money off their work, does this still fall into the category of criminal act? If so, are there more than take down notices that can happen? (C&D? financial punishment? imprisoning?) Having your infringing site taken down is the minimum that could happen. If you commit copyright infringement, the copyright holder is fully entitled to file a lawsuit against you at once. It's possible that they could just file a DMCA takedown notice to your ISP to have the content taken down, but they are entitled to sue you for damages as well. Maybe they won't sue you because it's not worth their while. If not: lucky you! So, ask yourself: do you feel lucky? Copyright infringement is typically a civil offense and only punished with fines. It can only qualify as a criminal offense under 17 U.S.C. §506 when the infringement is "willful" and meets one of the following criteria: (A) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain; (B) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000; or (C) by the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial distribution, by making it available on a computer network accessible to members of the public, if such person knew or should have known that the work was intended for commercial distribution. As long as you don't violate any of those conditions, your infringement is not criminal. Condition B seems most likely, if I am reading it correctly: if your site serves a $10 book one hundred times, then you've met the $1000 threshold. The threshold of what makes an infringement "willful" versus "ordinary" is somewhat nebulous; see Wikipedia's article on Criminal Copyright Law in the United States .

Can a Rental Contract Supersede State Law?

After several years of habitability issues (which were eventually fixed after 4 years), our landlord is asking us to sign a settlement agreement that would release them from all liability dating back to the start of our tenancy. I’ve agreed to sign it on the condition that they reimburse us for rent overpaid during those months of hardship, which they’ve not agreed to. I’m considering taking them to small claims, but there’s a clause in our lease claiming a six month statute of limitations on damages (state law is 4 years) and another claiming that tenants can only pursue legal action within 30 days of terminating the lease. I think I’ve got solid ground to take this before a judge, but I’m no lawyer nor can I afford to hire one - any advice you could provide (examples or references would be amazing) would be greatly appreciated.

At the outset, I don't understand why people are voting to close this question. The question presents an interesting issue of contract law. Can a Rental Contract Supersede State Law? No, not in your situation. The doctrine of contra proferentem is decisive, and it favors your position unless you are the party who drafted the lease contract (which is unlikely in a landlord-tenant context). The clause establishing a six-month statute of limitations is in conflict with the tenant's right (per the same contract) " to pursue legal action within 30 days of terminating the lease ". That is, the contract creates an ambiguity. Because the 30-day deadline has not expired --by virtue of your lease not having been terminated yet--, the doctrine of contra proferentem dictates the ambiguity is decided or solved by adopting the option that favors the party who is not the draftsman of the ambiguous contract. There is one note of caution, though. You mention that the statute of limitations in CA is four years, and also that the habitability issues lasted four years. At first glance, the latter suggests that the CA statute of limitations might have expired anyway (depending on the exact dates when your claims --specifically, your losses-- accrued). If that's the case, you need to be careful about what legal theory (or theories) to pursue. Some of these theories could be to proceed on the basis of: Breach of contract by establishing that your losses accrued at the instant(s) the landlord failed to fix the issues; Unjust enrichment accruing at the instant when the landlord refused to reimburse you for rent overpaid (assuming that reimbursement is consistent with the language of the lease); and/or Fraud , if you are able to prove that the landlord intentionally misled you, and that your reasonable reliance on his representation(s) caused you losses. Note that although in California " there is not a standalone cause of action for 'unjust enrichment,' which is synonymous with 'restitution', [...] [unjust enrichment and restitution] describe the theory underlying a claim that a defendant has been unjustly conferred a benefit through mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. [...] The return of that benefit is the remedy typically sought in a quasi-contract cause of action. ", Astiana v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc. , 783 F.2d 753, 762 (2015) . (For further information on the prima facie elements of these claims under California law, search for these terms at leagle.com ) The decision on which theories to pursue depend on additional, specific facts and details which are not reflected in your inquiry.

Do rights come with responsibilities?

After some google research, many ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) points of view that suggest that rights come with responsibilities are related (bottom line) to "community" and/or "feelings". So, if you apply rules in school, condominium... although they tend to mirror the "Rights" that you have, they are more about local rules and the responsibilities related to those rules. So, since I'm not North American but I follow some of those discussions especially in the political context, I tend to favor the short straight answer some people would throw right in the beginning of the discussion: "There is nothing in the Bill saying 'Freedom of speech as long you behave responsibly'". So, in terms of law, how would that proceed? Is there implicit or explicit ways to relate Responsibilities to Rights?

In the US, rights are independent of "responsibilities". But, responsibilities is a very broad concept: some aspects of responsibility are encoded in law, others are not. You have an absolute legal obligation to not murder or steal, as defined by the law. Some people say you have a social responsibility to put others before your own interest: this may be legally true in certain contexts, especially fiduciary contexts where your broker is supposed to make decisions on your behalf that benefit you (regardless of personal effect on the broker). Contracts are another source of obligations – you gain a right (access to someone else's property) in exchange for something, which may include standards of behavior. You thus have a legal obligation on SE to not be hurtful in your postings (enforcement is via suspension, in the worst case). The rights spelled out in the Bill of Rights are about the government – it says what the government may not do, it isn't a source of permission for you to exercise your rights. Generally, the traditional US understanding of "rights" is that they are inherent in people and are not "granted" by the government, so the Bill of Rights is a codification of what that means. Therefore, (morally, intellectually) irresponsible speech is also protected.

Can a business lawfully refuse to serve someone because of allergies?

After some high profile deaths, I’ve noticed more and more restaurants and takeaways in England have signage refusing to serve people with food allergies. Is this legal, or is it disability discrimination? (I’m prompted by England, but very interested to hear answers from many different jurisdictions )

In the UK this is governed by the Equality Act 2010, which prohibits discrimination against disabled persons. Official guidance as to what counts as "disability" can be found here , but the basic definition in the law (as paraphrased here ) is "substantial" and "long term" difficulty in carrying out every-day tasks. ‘substantial’ is more than minor or trivial, eg it takes much longer than it usually would to complete a daily task like getting dressed ‘long-term’ means 12 months or more, eg a breathing condition that develops as a result of a lung infection. Allergies are long-term, so the question is whether a food allergy presents substantial difficulty in carrying out every-day tasks. The kind of every-day tasks that the guidance considers are things like getting dressed, preparing a meal, meeting work deadlines, typing or writing. The guidance does not specifically mention allergies. However the mere existence of an allergy would not create substantial difficulty in carrying out this kind of every-day task. So it would not be considered a disability.

What Is the minimum required for someone to consent to a contract on a website

After some searching i have found that a textbox where the user enters their name along with a check box that verifies that they understand that typing their name above is confirming they agree to the contract. Is this enough in the EU and other non US regions?

It depends. Student lawyers go to multiple lectures to understand contract formation in one part of one state in the EU (England and Wales are part of the United Kingdom, but contract formation is different in Scotland). The law will be different in other parts of the EU. It also depends what the contract is for. As a specific example, that might not be enough to form a contract for the sale of land in E&W (such a contract has to be in writing, and I'm not convinced that filling in a text box would count). Finally, are you sure you want to form the contract then? Most online retailers say that the contract is not formed until they dispatch the goods; until then, the customer order is just an offer to form a contract. That way they can't be sued for specific performance if they turn out to be out of stock - they can just turn down the offer and return the money.

Where can I validate my music compositions?

After somebody creates his/her own new song, where does (s)he need to register/verify to be sure it's not a plagiarism? I'm curious how these things work–who has the power to say a song is a plagiarism of another song or not? Is there any tool to verify this?

Anyone in a country without strong laws against libel can accuse you of plagiarism. If I hear your song on the radio, I'm free to say "it sounds just like xyz written by abc in 1968". But that doesn't mean anything. If Mr. ABC himself thinks "it just sounds like xyz that I wrote in 1968", then he can accuse you of copyright infringement. And take you to court. And a judge or a jury, supported by expert witnesses, would make the decision whether you copied the song or not.

Left item in an Airbnb, host no longer available. Responsibility lies with owner, host or Airbnb?

After staying one night in an Airbnb, my friend realised he left an item in the property (not expensive, cost of around €50). I immediately contacted the Host over Airbnb messaging, she confirmed she had found the item and would post it out to me (I asked how much postage would cost and how to pay her). This was the last time I would hear back from the host. Giving time for the busy postage period over Christmas, I tried to contact the host again around 20 days later but didn't get a reply. After another week, I contacted Airbnb support who said that the host had already responded that she would send the item out in the post. After yet another couple of weeks waiting, I reached out to Airbnb again. This time, I spoke to someone who said they would try to reach out to the host. A couple of days had passed and they got back to me and said they were unable to reach the host and there was nothing they could do and that would be the end of it. Furthermore, they said I couldn't apply for a refund through their resolution centre as 60 days had passed since the trip. I'm wondering from a legal perspective where responsibility lies (mostly as a thought exercise). My friend should have taken his property with him, but presumably the host can't just keep it, especially after reaching out to them? As my contract was with Airbnb and the host works from them, is there any responsibility on their part , e.g. Could I hypothetically open a small claims case against them? Or would any small claims case be directly against the host themselves? Looking for answers based in law or with real world examples. This is in Ireland / EU.

My friend should have taken his property with him, but presumably the host can't just keep it, especially after reaching out to them? Correct. However, the host does not have to do anything to facilitate its return i.e. they don’t have to post it to you. So long as they keep it for your friend to collect and don’t appropriate it for their own use, they are not breaking the law. If they do appropriate it, that is called theft or its tort equivalent, conversion. As my contract was with Airbnb and the host works from them, is there any responsibility on their part, e.g. Could I hypothetically open a small claims case against them? Or would any small claims case be directly against the host themselves? This is not true. You and the host each have a contract with Airbnb for the use of the platform . The contract for the accommodation is between you two and doesn’t involve Airbnb at all. In any event, there is no contractural issue here.

Is storing on EU-based servers sufficient to be GDPR-compliant with regard to the Schrems II arrest if they're controlled by a U.S. company?

After the Schrems II decision, data transfers to US data processors are increasingly risky at best, for example to public cloud providers such as GCP, Azure, and AWS. A very common suggestion is to store your data in EU-based data centers of these cloud providers if your application isn't too latency-sensitive, for example in this answer . I fail to see how this makes a significant difference. All of the major public cloud providers are US companies, and their servers in Europe are still under their control, and so the US government can just as easily demand to hand over data hosted on EU servers as they can on US servers. In a strict sense of the word, data transfer to the US is indeed avoided, as the data physically remains on EU servers. But in a broader sense of the word, and really in the spirit of the Schrems II arrest and GDPR in general, the data is de facto transferred to a US controlled company the moment when it's stored on any GCP, Azure or AWS server, regardless of where that server is located. Thus, I feel as though hosting on EU-based servers of US-based public cloud providers doesn't solve anything at all, and simply provides a false sense of security and compliance. Is this correct, or am I missing something?

The tricky bit from a GDPR standpoint is that the US has a law that says a US-based company must hand over data to US government agencies even if the data is stored outside the US. This is US specific and a case where the US government gives itself jurisdiction outside the US but the EU can't directly do anything against it (outside of international negotiations). As you noticed this means if you store data at a US data processor there is no real difference whether the data is physically stored in the US or the EU. So to avoid transferring EU consumer data to the US several steps are needed. First the servers have to be physically located in the EU and second the company needs to be non-US based, EU based seems the obvious choice. AFAIK constructions of a US-based company creating a fully owned EU-based subsidary are currently used to achieve the second part. Whether this is sufficient may have to be decided in court.

When does new US legislation come into force?

After the US Congress passes a new bill and the president signs it into law, when does this law come into force (become effective and binding)? Does the law need to be oficially published somewhere?

By default a new US Federal law is effective as soon as it is enacted. That is, when the President signs it, when the 10 days for approval expire without the President vetoing it, or on the date when the second of the houses of Congress votes to override a veto. However, in modern usage, many, perhaps most, statutes specify as pone of their provisions an effective date some time after the date of enactment, in some cases several years later. If such a date is specified, that is the legal date. All bills and the actions enacting them are recorded in the Congressional Record , which is a public document, published on a regular basis. They are generally included in the next revision of the USC (united States Code) and the USCA (United States Code, Annotated). But these publications are generally well after the date of enactment. The Thomson Reuters Perspectives: Teaching Legal Research and Writing (winter 2000) “HOW Can I Tell the Effective Date of a Federal Statute?” by Barbara Bintliff says: The generally applicable rule is easy to state: a federal statute usually takes effect on the date of its enactment,3 which is itself determined by when the last step necessary for the statute’s enactment occurred. Most of the time the last step in the enactment process is the president’s signature, and this date, therefore, becomes the date of effectiveness for most federal statutes. However, there are exceptions to the general rule. For instance, sometimes the last step occurs when Congress overrides the president’s veto, or when the bill is allowed to become law without a presidential signature. And sometimes a later date is specified by the terms of the statute itself. The article geos on to say: The date of enactment is most easily located by consulting the parenthetical information provided after every statutory section included in the print and online versions of the United States Code (USC), the United States Code Annotated® (USCA®), and the United States Code Service (USCS).5 The parenthetical is variously called a “source note,” “statutory authority,” “statutory history,” “history,” “source credit,” or “credit.” In the print versions, the parenthetical follows the statutory section with nothing in between the statutory text and the source note. In the primary online versions, it is labeled “credit” (in USCA on Westlaw) or “history” (in USCS on LEXIS-NEXIS). The credit has been included with federal statutes since they were first codified in the Revised Statutes of 1874 and is an official part of the statute. "Enactment of a Law - Learn About the Legislative Process" from Congress.gov describes the procsss also, saying: If the president does approve it, he signs the bill, giving the date, and transmits this information by messenger to the Senate or the House, as the case might be. In the case of revenue and tariff bills, the hour of approval is usually indicated. The enrolled bill is delivered to the archivist of the U.S., who designates it as a public or private law, depending upon its purpose, and gives it a number. Public and private laws are numbered separately and serially. An official copy is sent to Government Printing Office to be used in making the so-called slip law print. ... If a bill which has been vetoed is passed upon reconsideration by the first House by the required two-thirds vote, an endorsement to this effect is made on the back of the bill, and it is then transmitted, together with the accompanying message, to the second House for its action thereon. If likewise reconsidered and passed by that body, a similar endorsement is made thereon. The bill, which has thereby been enacted into law, is not again presented to the president, but is delivered to the Administrator of the General Services Administration for deposit in the Archives, and is printed, together with the attestations of the secretary of the Senate and the clerk of the House of its passage over the president's veto.

Would the UK still have to leave the EU if they changed their mind after invoking Article 50?

After the brexit referendum results came in, there has been a lot of talk about Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union : Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period. [...] It is possible to imagine a scenario where the UK invoke Article 50, but then change their mind and don't want to leave (e.g. because the negotiated deal was not good enough, or because of new elections). It is also reasonable to believe that the EU would be happy to keep the UK. From the news I am given the impression that the UK would have to leave if they invoked Article 50 even if both the EU and the UK agreed that it would be better if they stayed. Is that so?

You often have the situation in legal science and practice that a certain situation is not clearly addressed by the law. In these cases you are left to interpret the law. That means you infer from the cases that are addressed by the law to those that aren't. There is a whole lot of techniques to do that (by the word if the law, by its context, by its history etc.). There is a lot of arguments you can make (e.g. to consider an extreme case that borders to the absurd, called argumentum ad absurdum ). That is what you learn at law school. Everyone can read the law, but to apply it you need a lawyer. Given the sheer amount of ways to make your argument, it is no wonder that lawyers often disagree drastically in their interpretations of the law. So which opinion will prevail here remains to be seen. My personal 2 cents are that since the European treaties are designed to build a stable and lasting Union, most probably the opinion will win that you can cancel the process. But who knows, I could be wrong. UPDATE: Let me elaborate more on the possible opinions on this case and where my opinion comes from: Those opposed to the possibility to cancel could argue that in Article 49 you'll find the rules of admission to the Union and in Article 50 you'll find the rules for leaving the union. So you have clear rules for admission and clear rules for leaving. The absence of rules for cancelling means that this shouldn't be possible. If they would have wanted the possibility, they would have added it. Those on favour of the option to cancel would say that it was merely forgotten when the treaty was drafted (that happens more often than you think). They would argue that nobody expected that a country would actually use the option (at least not anytime soon), so they wouldn't bother too much to consider all the cases. Another argument in this direction is the intent of these regulations. The admission process is to make sure that a country is ready to join the Union, so you need a process to make sure of that. The process to exit the Union was installed because it doesn't make much sense to keep a country that doesn't want to be a member, so give them a way out. Now if a country changes their (collective) minds, would it make sense to not let them? The admission process is unnecessary since as a current member they are clearly ready. And since they don't want to be out anymore, the intent of the exit regulations is not met anymore. So why force them to continue? Now, whatever argument you find more compelling (for me it's the second one), I believe a cancellation would be accepted. Why? The current situation is the Britain wants out and everyone else wants them to stay. If the UK change their minds now, there will be nobody anymore who wants them out. Since you can argue that cancellation is possible, why would anyone take the other side? And even if there would be countries vetoing the cancellation, the case would probably go to the European Court of Justice in Luxemburg. There the UK would argue against the rest that they can stay (sounds absurd, doesn't it?). The Court has a history that in a case of doubt they would tend to take the decision that makes Europe stronger. Since Europe is stronger with the UK, I think chances are good that they would allow to stop the Article 50 process.

Judge to jurors: "I cannot give you a trial transcript; no such transcript exists" So, what is the court recorder doing?

After the closing statements in the Chauvin murder trial, the judge says the following to the jury before they retire to consider their verdict: "You will take with you into the jury room, copies of the instructions that I am reading to you. The lawyers and I have determined that these instructions contain all the laws that are necessary for you to know in order to decide the case. I cannot give you a trial transcript; no such transcript exists. We count on the jury to rely on its collective memory ..." So what was the court recorder doing all this time if no transcript exists? Is it always the case that the jury don't have a transcript? Why don't they - wouldn't it be useful? Afterthought Given the advances of technology, it should be easy these days to produce a printout pretty quickly. Is there a case to made to start doing this even though it might have been impractical in the past?

The court reporter keeps a contemporaneous, verbatim, shorthand record of the proceedings (and often has an audio tape to refer to as well), and the official copies of exhibits admitted into evidence are also maintained by the court. But, the final version of the official transcript takes at least a couple of days per day of testimony the court reporter heard to finalize (and, of course, a court reporter doesn't necessarily work transcribing day after day on one case, the court reporter may have other jobs to take down testimony at the same time that an official transcript based upon testimony that the court reporter previous took down in shorthand is requested, it can often take weeks or months). Sometimes drafts of official transcripts are provided to the testifying persons or counsel for review to catch errors in transcription, before being finalized. I don't know what Minnesota practice is on that fine detail in criminal trial transcripts. The official transcript is used for purposes of appeal (and usually only actually prepared in final form only if there is an appeal) and sometimes for post-trial motions, but is not prepared in time to be available to the jury, and is quite expensive (several hundred U.S. dollars to single digit thousands of U.S. dollars per typical day of testimony). Given the advances of technology, it should be easy these days to produce a printout pretty quickly. Is there a case to made to start doing this even though it might have been impractical in the past? It isn't unheard of (especially in big dollar commercial cases) to have a private court reporter making a working copy of a transcript that is available in real time or by early evening after each day of testimony, but these working copies are not done to the same standards of accuracy as official trial transcripts for purposes of appeal and are done at a high price premium by elite court reporters who can transcribe faster than the average court reporter can.

Under what aspect of International Law could the Allies divide up Germany into Western and Eastern spheres of influence?

After the defeat of Nazi Germany the Allies, in particular, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union at Potsdam came to an agreement concerning the military occupation and reconstruction of Germany, its borders and the entire European theatre of war. France was not considered as an occupying power and was not invited to the conference at Potsdam, a posh suburb of Berlin. It addressed Germany's demilitarisation, reparations, and the prosecution of war criminals. Obviously, Germany was divided into two halves; one under the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, that is East Germany; and one under the Western influence, Western Germany. Q. Under what aspect of international law could the allies accomplish this division? According to Wikipedia, the agreement was not a peace treaty according to international law and was superseded by the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany, signed in 1990.

The short answer is that international law is not binding upon sovereign states unless they choose to be bound, and the Allied Coalition had the real world power to do so.

Was it legal for the US government to torture detainees?

After the events of 9/11 the Bush administration started torturing (by international standards of the word) people suspected of terrorism. For example " enhanced interrogation " was used which included things such as water boarding. It's my understanding this was allowed, because according to lawyers such as John Yoo, the methods that they were using did not fit the definition of what the US considered torture. It has been found the John Yoo's argument was poor but he never faced charges. Did anything illegal happen? Was it illegal for the government to use enhanced interrogator and was it illegal for John Yoo to advise the government it was legal to use such techniques(for example could he be guilty of criminal negligence)?

Torture is defined at 18 USC 2340 , and the law against torture is 18 USC 2340A . It is never illegal to give the government advice, just as it is not illegal to make a ridiculously false claim (there seems to be a popular belief that saying false things is against the law, which is a stunningly ironic belief). The only way to tell if the actions constituted torture would be to file a lawsuit (which would no doubt make its way to SCOTUS). I don't think there is any case law which one could base a prediction on. The answer certainly cannot be found with certainty based on the statutory wording.

Can a White Person sue for Discrimination after being Fired for using the N-Word?

After the landmark Bostock v. Clayton County ruling, I am asking for a friend if he has an action against an employer who fired him for using the N-word on 3 occasions as well as uttering "my melamine-enhanced homie over here". The employee was visibly white, and neither party disputes that black employees regularly use such language and face no disciplinary action as a result. From Bostock: “An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex,” Gorsuch wrote. “Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.” It is obvious that he was fired for actions it would not have questioned (and has not) in members of a different race. Is this not exactly what Title VII forbids?

Bostock is irrelevant. Your friend can sue under Burlington v. News Corp. Burlington answered this exact question ten years ago, using exactly the same, well-established logic used in Bostock. Burlington involved a news anchor (Burlington) who was fired after using the N-word descriptively in a staff meeting. He sued under Title VII. He argued he was being discriminated against on racial grounds, since several Black employees had used the word at work without consequence. The case was tried before a jury in Federal district court. Burlington lost after the jury decided the facts did not support his claim. However, the judge made clear that the actions he alleged would violate Title VII: Historically, African Americans' use of the word has been ironic, satirical, or even affectionate. Too often, however, the word has been used by whites as a tool to belittle, oppress, or dehumanize African Americans. When viewed in its historical context, one can see how people in general, and African Americans in particular, might react differently when a white person uses the word than if an African American uses it. Nevertheless, we are unable to conclude that this is a justifiable reason for permitting the Station to draw race-based distinctions between employees. It is no answer to say that we are interpreting Title VII in accord with prevailing social norms. Title VII was enacted to counter social norms that supported widespread discrimination against African Americans. To conclude that the Station may act in accordance with the social norm that it is permissible for African Americans to use the word but not whites would require a determination that this is a "good" race-based social norm that justifies a departure from the text of Title VII. Neither the text of Title VII, the legislative history, nor the caselaw permits such a departure from Title VII's command that employers refrain from "discriminat[ing] against any individual...because of such individual's race." Added: Why Bostock is Irrelevant for Your Friend’s Case: As you say, if we substitute the word “race” for “sex” in those sentences from Bostock, it seems obvious your friend would have a case under Title VII. This is true, but not because of Bostock. Bostock changed who could claim sex discrimination under Title VII, but nothing else. In particular, it did not change the test used to prove discrimination under Title VII. The sentences you quoted, use the well-established ”but for” test. Here's Gorsuch’s explanation of how the "but for" test works: In the language of law, Title VII’s “because of” test incorporates the “simple” and “traditional” standard of but-for causation. That form of causation is established whenever a particular outcome would not have happened “but for” the purported cause. In other words, a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause. The Bottom Line: Bostock is illustrative, but not dispositive, of your friend's claim.

What happens when a public institution in the US engages in segregation?

After the passage of Civil Rights Act what's the formal process to bring charges against schools, government institutions, or businesses that engage in segregation or other variations of "seperate but equal" policies. Say we were looking at a non-compliant public school during the transition from Jim Crow but under up to date laws, what is the case brought against them and the legal remedy that is pursued. I chose schools as they are also somewhat government institutions, though if there is a significant difference in treatment on public/private then I'd also be interested in hearing how they differ, say how segregation policies would be punished if a city government or mayors office engaged in it vs private restaurant.

For a government agency at the state or local level, the aggrieved party would bring an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 , which allows for relief from anyone who deprives another person "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." If the offending party is a private entity, you would most likely bring an action under 42 U.S.C. 1981 , which provides that all people have the right to do business on the same terms as those afforded to white people.

How could submarine tours (or similar activities) in international waters be regulated?

After the recent Oceangate Titan submersible disaster, much attention has been drawn to the fact that there was no requirement for licensing or certification, due to operating in international waters. It has been said that Oceangate operated in a "regulatory no man's land" and that the results of an investigation may be of limited value, since no government has the jurisdiction to implement practical changes in the rules. I imagine that there are ways to regulate such activities. For instance, countries can make it illegal for a ship offering unlicensed deep-sea exploration tours to dock in its ports. (Of course, this can be circumvented by using a different country as a starting point). Another measure might be to "sanction" a company, i.e. to prohibit the selling of parts or technology to a company offering uncertified ocean tours, which could be effective if most of the world's developed countries were on board. However, I say all this as someone who knows nothing of the relevant laws/treaties/practices. What do experts on this subject think? For example, do you think that the results of an investigation into the Titan disaster could lead to practical changes?

Let's start with the bottom: For example, do you think that the results of an investigation into the Titan disaster could lead to practical changes? Yes, but it will depend on who does the investigation: The police or the responsive maritime safety board (the National Transportation Safety Board in the US). The police can present charges e.g. for negligent manslaughter, but the Transportation Safety Board cannot. Their job is to present ideas on how to improve the security of transportation, not to apportion blame. there was no requirement for licensing or certification, due to operating in international waters. I would contest that. It is true that the open ocean is no-mans-land and you can do whatever you want there, unless it is against international law. And there are international regulations regulating the safety of shipping anywhere on the world. The must important such regulation is called SOLAS ( International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea ). And all vessels need to adhere to it, at least in as far as the rules apply to them. The "flag state" is responsible that any vessel flying its flag are in compliance with these regulations. Honestly, I'm no SOLAS expert, so I don't know what happens if a vessel doesn't comply to it. It is probably true that they won't be allowed to enter or leave a port if the non-compliance in any point is detected. Interesting fact: The first version of the SOLAS convention was established as a result of the Titanic disaster. Yet still people die as a result of her sinking, even 111 years after the fact... The "flag state" is the state whichever flag the vessel flies. In the case of the Titan, this appears to be the US. So the US can indeed enforce the operator is in compliance with any safety regulations. Also, anyone on board a vessel is subject to the jurisdiction of said flag. So on board the Titan (and it's mother ship) the US jurisdiction is applicable. That means that the US police can indeed start an investigation and charge someone for manslaughter. Of course, as always, they can only charge living people. And the heirs of the deceased may sue the operator in the US.

Can California deny concealed carry permit after the recent SCOTUS decision?

After the recent SCOTUS decision regarding concealed carry , can any state, in particular CA, deny a concealed weapon carry permit to its residents, who are not disqualified from gun ownership in any way?

There isn't one simple answer. The case prohibited a showing of a "special need" for a concealed weapon to allow one to have a permit. Many California concealed carry laws have similar requirements. But, California doesn't have just one concealed carry law. There is a default rule that applies in small, rural counties, but most larger cities and counties in California have their own specific concealed carry laws and the precise grounds for denying a concealed carry permit would matter. In all likelihood, many provisions of existing California concealed carry laws would remain grounds to deny permission to concealed carry (e.g. age, history of drug abuse, criminal record, restraining orders in place, etc.), while others provisions would no longer constitute valid grounds for a denial. This particular decision is about denying permits based upon lack of a particularized need for one different from other members of the general public, rather than about any possible reason that the permit applicant could be deemed untrustworthy to have a permit. The decision discusses the idea that it is problematic to have unfettered discretion in issuing permits, but doesn't really base its ultimate conclusion on that ground. So, something like a general residual "good character" requirement, while vague, wouldn't be squarely within the scope of the most recent decision. The case also doesn't itself prohibit (nor does the case law) some reasonable fee for issuance of a concealed carry permit. Thus, the new case does not require uniform law with "constitutional carry" for everyone permitted by federal law to own a gun. But, it does prohibit limitations related to a requirement to show a need to have a concealed carry permit.

How would a company use this result of USA v David Nosal?

After the ruling of USA v David Nosal in the Ninth Circuit Court, a news article "Federal court rules that sharing your Netflix password is a federal crime" indicates that this would give companies additional reason to say that password sharing, breaking ToS, is criminal. While it would be bad publicity for these big media companies (Netflix, HBO), how would a large internet company use the criminal ruling against customers (in the USA) violating the ToS? This is considering beyond specifically closing/canceling the account.

The leverage that a company would have is that if they know of such criminal activity, they can contact the competent federal authorities (or state authorities since there are state analogs of the law), seeking prosecution. That leverage could have deterrent power, if they post warning signs pointing out that computer fraud is a crime punishable by jail time and so on. There is the distinct possibility that such warnings would have the same effect as the FBI copyright warning that you see on movies, that is, people will see but not look. As for the "news article", then claim that the court rules that sharing your Netflix password is a federal crime, but they don't give any evidence of such a ruling. The dissent wanted this to be about password sharing, but a dissent is not what's called a "ruling".

Modify a client file

After the setup of the GDPR law about personnal data security, I have a case I'm not sure about. Test case: I receive an addresses file from a client containing x lines of addresses with personnal data (phone number, address, name,...). I have a treatment to be ran on this file and I see that a data is incorrect (date format for example): - Do I have the right to modify the original file? - Should I ask the client to resend a new file? - Can I change the format of the date if I make a copy of the file before? Not really sure that case is concerned by the GDPR thought...

No issue with how you modify the data. You still need to protect the original and modified data as personal data (though I know that's not your question). And that's also assuming that the modifications you're making aren't reducing the accuracy of the personal data per Article 5... but I'm not sure why you'd want to update the data to be wrong.

StackOverflow logo change vs. user contributions and CC BY-SA 3.0

After the temporary LoveOverflow logo change, there has been a whole lot of fuss about SO and political matters, including a question on MSO claiming that displaying such a logo on a page with user contributions implies a connection between the contributing users and support for same-sex marriages, thus violating the terms of the CC BY-SA 3.0 license under which all user contributions are submitted. Whether or not this is true is heavily debated in the comments of the linked question, but (unsurprisingly) no-one on StackOverflow seems to be a lawyer, so I'm turning to you to ask: Does the recent StackOverflow logo change violate the terms of CC BY-SA 3.0 or not? Or could it be considered a borderline case? And if it does violate the license, would it be enough to include an additional footer notice along the lines of Contributing users are in no way connected to any political view of stack exchange inc or its staff. in order to comply with it?

I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer 1 For the avoidance of doubt, the thrust of this debate is: By placing a logo associated with a certain political movement near my user profile, does StackExchange violate Section 4(c) of the CC BY-SA 3.0 ? Subscriber Content is Content that is contributed by StackExchange users. The relevant sections of CC BY-SA 3.0 (emphasis added) are: c. ... The credit required by this Section 4(c) may be implemented in any reasonable manner; provided, however, that in the case of a Adaptation or Collection, at a minimum such credit will appear, if a credit for all contributing authors of the Adaptation or Collection appears, then as part of these credits and in a manner at least as prominent as the credits for the other contributing authors. For the avoidance of doubt, You may only use the credit required by this Section for the purpose of attribution in the manner set out above and, by exercising Your rights under this License, You may not implicitly or explicitly assert or imply any connection with, sponsorship or endorsement by the Original Author, Licensor and/or Attribution Parties, as appropriate, of You or Your use of the Work, without the separate, express prior written permission of the Original Author, Licensor and/or Attribution Parties. d. Except as otherwise agreed in writing by the Licensor or as may be otherwise permitted by applicable law, if You Reproduce, Distribute or Publicly Perform the Work either by itself or as part of any Adaptations or Collections, You must not distort, mutilate, modify or take other derogatory action in relation to the Work which would be prejudicial to the Original Author's honor or reputation ... Does changing the logo on all pages imply an endorsement of the site/organisation by the user? It is likely, though not definite, that this positioning of the logo will imply that the user endorses the website. However, actions taken by the user - such as creating an account, accepting the Terms, contributing content - are likely to affirm this view. Does changing the logo imply that the site/organisation supports a particular political view? Again, it is likely, not definite, that changing the logo will imply that the site/organisation supports a particular political view. Does changing the logo impute support of a political view to the user? In this case, however, it is highly unlikely that the change of logo would impute to the user support of the political view. In a case such as this, onus of proof is on the plaintiff - were this claim brought in court, it would need to be proven on the balance of probability (or, less likely, on the preponderance of evidence) that a reasonable person would impute support of the marriage equality (and perhaps some other) agenda to the user. Reasonable person does not mean any particular person, nor does it mean, all people. Part of the imputation must come from the purpose that the user subscribes to the site. Perhaps if StackOverflow were a site that promoted marriage equality or judicial activism, this could support an opinion that the user supports this view. However, StackOverflow is about programming, and programming doesn't imply that kind of agenda. Perhaps if the icon had been changed to something that suggested support for object-oriented programming, the icon could be taken to suggest that the user supports this agenda. Neither does the user's content suggest support for this cause - if they constantly made off-hand remarks about it in their posts, then perhaps, again, a reasonable person may make that imputation. In any case, the damages awarded to the user would likely be compensatory rather than punitive - the user would need to therefore demonstrate actual suffering or loss as a result of the change of icon. If there were actual damages or loss, the way in which the user contributed to them - perhaps by posting a thread that would be likely to be inflammatory and attract attention to the user - may reduce an award of damages. In the case of no actual suffering or loss, the user could be awarded nominal damages. Injunctions that could be awarded would need to be proportionate to the breach of license - the court could require references to this user to be anonymised. This is easily done. It is unlikely that the court would require all contribution by the user to be removed - this is unlikely to pass a public interest test. In relation to placing a disclaimer in the footer, US courts have generally accepted disclaimers if they are positioned such that a reasonable user is likely to see it... In the footer? It's not a great place, and easily missed. It could be better than nothing, though, and may help with the likelihood of someone imputing such opinions to a user. Essentially - it's extremely unlikely that a reasonable person would impute support of the marriage equality agenda on a user based on a logo change, because the support is not sufficiently connected to the primary purpose of the site, or the user's activities on the site. Even if the user were successful in showing that this is the likely conclusion of a reasonable person, the remedies available to them would be limited to damages (which limited to actual losses, including suffering), and an injunction (which is likely to be anonymisation). A disclaimer may not, on its own, actually preserve the validity of the license, but it may be useful on determining the likelihood of a reasonable person imputing opinions to a user. 1. This is larger than normal, because I think it is more important than normal.

Under what circumstances are you required to stop and/or answer questions by the police?

After this case of suspected harassment by the police in England in response to refusal to provide a name while walking to catch a train I wondered when you are required to stop, and when you are required to answer questions as a pedestrian. From the linked pages, it would seem the answer is that you are not required to answer any questions. You are required to stop if you are either legally arrested or are going to be searched. To be legally arrested the police must: identify themselves as the police tell you that you’re being arrested tell you what crime they think you’ve committed explain why it’s necessary to arrest you explain to you that you’re not free to leave To detain you for a search the police must tell you: their name and police station what they expect to find, for example drugs the reason they want to search you, for example if it looks like you’re hiding something why they are legally allowed to search you that you can have a record of the search and if this isn’t possible at the time, how you can get a copy From my reading, unless all of one of these sets of actions have been completed, you are allowed to continue about your business as if the police were not there. Is this interpretation correct?

Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force , but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP.

Its Wrong, But Is It Class Action Wrong?

After viewing my receipts I noticed a company is charging it’s customers for extra items I assume by “accident”. When I go back the next day to confront them they apologize and are gracious enough to give a credit for the full ticket price. During one of these returns I watched 5 others that were there for the exact same thing I was and considering it wasn’t the first time for me I assume this must be happening a lot. What I didn’t realize until my third trip is I wasn’t receiving the full amount back I had paid tax on the initial purchases but I was only receiving the price of the item. Technically it wasn’t a return because I hadn’t received the item but I still paid tax on it. Based on the number of people I’ve seen this has happened to I can assume the actual amount people is much larger as I am not their very often and even though the amount is small for each person the sum would probably be much higher for the company. Is this a class action or just wrong.

This is for educational (and fun!) purposes and is not and should not be thought of as legal advice and, if you're planning on doing something with respect to your situation described above, you should seek the counsel of an attorney in your jurisdiction. The question: Well, it's wrong regardless of whether it is a class action lawsuit. Now, it is not a class action because a class action is created by the determination of a judge. So, you need to know if this situation would qualify to become a class action. Certifying the class: The most important part is having the "class" certified. The "class" is the group of people with similar injuries sues the same person or company or several people or companies. Prior to this, a plaintiff must fill out a standard complaint filing and check the appropriate box to indicate the intention to file a class action. State level requirements: Requirements to become certified as a class vary by state. Most states, in general, follow broad requirements which require the plaintiff to prove: the representative plaintiff has suffered the same alleged injuries as the proposed class. The allegations are assumed to be true for the purposes of certification (since the trial has not started) the class can be defined clearly enough to determine who is and is not a member the number of class members makes joining all of them to the lawsuit impractical (40 or more is almost always enough, 21 or less is almost always not enough) a common set of facts or legal interest underlies all of the members’ alleged injuries the representative plaintiff’s claims are so similar to the class members that litigating the representative plaintiff’s case will adequately decide the absent class members’ cases, and a class action is the best and most efficient way of resolving the claims, either for the plaintiffs or for the defendants. Federal level requirements: Similarly, there can be class actions at the federal court level, too. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 covers Class Actions. Rule 23(a) establishes four "threshold requirements" for certification. They all must be met. They are : (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of class members is impracticable (numerosity); (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class (commonality); (3) the claims or defenses of the class representatives are typical of those of the class (typicality); and (4) the class representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy). Additionally, the court then must find that at least one out of three more possible conditions are met. Under Rule 23(b), those requirements are: (1) that prosecution of separate actions risks either inconsistent adjudications which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the defendant or would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of others; (2) that defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class; or (3) that there are common questions of law or fact that predominate over any individual class member’s questions and that a class action is superior to other methods of adjudication. Burden of proof: The burden is wholly on the plaintiff to not only plead each element that must be met, but also to prove those conditions exist. The standard of proof here is a "preponderance of the evidence," which is the one used in civil cases and is less than "beyond a reasonable doubt" required of a criminal case. Misc. items of note: If a class is certified, then one plaintiff participates in the litigation, while the others essentially await adjudication. There are more complexities than appropriate to delve into here. For example, you'll notice there is no number requirement; rather, numerosity with respect to the practicality of joinder of all members of the class. FYI: However , generally, 20 and less is considered "insufficiently numerous," while 40 or more will often "satisfy the numerosity requirement."

Disputing Tenancy Deposit Scheme Adjudication Decisions

After years of complaining about the lack of care the landlord had for the property I was renting from them I finally got served an eviction notice. I moved out, and 2 weeks later because of terms in the tenancy agreement I was still renting the property but there was a water leak from a bathroom pipe. I was issued a demand for £4,500 worth of damage to the property which would partially be covered by the deposit which i refused to pay. I went to my insurance company who told me that they would sort everything out until the landlord claimed that I had deliberately damaged the pipe in the bathroom. At this point the Insurance company offered me only advice but would not handle the case. I raised a dispute with the tenancy deposit scheme in order to recover my deposit giving lots of evidence showing that I had continuously complained about the bathroom the whole of of the time I had been living there, at one point the landlord sent their brother in law to fit a whole new bathroom (poorly I might add) and yet all of this was shot down by the adjudicator with the reason being ... The landlords report states that I damaged the pipe so due to "the balance of probabilities" I was in breach of my tenancy agreement and my full deposit has been awarded to the landlord to cover renovation costs. I am also aware the landlord intends to sue me for the rest of the cost I refused to pay outside of the adjudication process. My understanding (which may be wrong) ... In a civil case the law seems to state that if I am "probably at fault" (in this case, I had a set of keys which appears to be enough to implicate me) then I likely am liable. In a Criminal case it would have to be certain that I did indeed cause the damage and proof to that nature would need to be provided in order for me to be deemed liable. So, my question is ... Given that the landlord claims I "criminally damaged" their property but never provided a single shred of evidence to back this up what can I do to fight this with no help from my insurer? ... or ... Is there some way I can force this in to a criminal court or in the event that this can't be forced that way perhaps force my insurer to step in and help?

Given that the landlord claims I "criminally damaged" their property but never provided a single shred of evidence to back this up what can I do to fight this with no help from my insurer? The only thing you can do is bring a claim in the County Court (assuming you are in England or Wales) against your landlord for recovery of your deposit. Since you agreed to use the deposit scheme's Alternative Dispute Resolution service, and the adjudicator found against you, the landlord will undoubtedly introduce his findings as evidence in his defence. You will have to adduce evidence to the contrary. The standard of proof in a civil case is on the balance of probabilities. Since you are bringing the claim, it will be for you to prove that it's more likely than not that you did not cause the damage yourself. Without seeing the evidence it's impossible to say what your chances of success might be. You should seek legal advice before beginning a claim. Is there some way I can force this in to a criminal court... No, you can't. The only way this could become a criminal matter is if your landlord involves the police. Under the circumstances it seems unlikely that he would do this, and even less likely that the police would consider it anything other than a civil matter. ...or in the event that this can't be forced that way perhaps force my insurer to step in and help? You could raise a formal complaint with your insurer and, if that doesn't give you the result you want, refer the matter to the Financial Ombudsman . You should read their procedures carefully before doing so.

Lawmakers and practicing medicine without a license

Again and again we see lawmakers pass laws (generally in the context of abortion) that direct doctors to provide medically incorrect information or engage in acts which are medically unsound, or to not provide medical information beneficial to the patient. How is this not engaging in the practice of medicine? Why are they not prosecuted for such behavior?

Lawmakers have special rights, known as legislative immunity , which allows them to enact laws. Thus lawmakers are allowed to say what may legally be done by teachers, without being licensed to teach, and they can say what the law is, without being licensed to practice law, moreover they can say what doctors can do without being licensed to practice medicine, what spies can do without having a license to kill, and so on. Indeed, none of the above acts (of passing legislation) would be violations of "unlicensed practice" statutes, even without the concept of legislative immunity. For example, I can tell you about the legal concept of legislative immunity, without that act being "unlicensed practice of law". In general, anyone in the US can freely talk about a topic: what is forbidden is holding oneself out as an X, if one does not have an X license, for legally-restricted profession X. Finally, legislators do not provide any advice at all, instead, they say what the law is. As do appellate justices, in a different manner.

I lent someone money then they moved out of state and stopped communicating. How do I track down this individual for prosecution?

Against my better judgement I tried to help a fellow renter, my housemate, in a time of need. I had him sign a promissory note and lent him $1200 in Virginia. After the deadline passed I followed up in person where he came up with excuses to push it back. I relocated for a new job and over the grace period of a few months I reached out a few times to which he did not respond. Finally, I drafted a letter of intent, which threatened that I would contact collections and pursue him in small claims court. Checking with our then landlord to confirm he would receive the letter I learned that he moved to NYC and failed to mention a forwarding address because he even owed our landlord money . What approach can we take to locate and prosecute this individual without breaking the bank?

Find him yourself Anything else will cost money. As to how, the 21st century has made this much easier. Find his digital footprint and use that to find him. If you don’t know how to do this, hire a private eye. That said, your cheapest option is to forget about the money: odds are you’ll never get it back.

Is this story about US tax office reasonable?

Ages ago I read a nice story that sounds quite reasonable, but might be complete nonsense. Here it goes: A private detective in the USA has lots of lawyers as customers. And they are notoriously bad at paying their bills. As a result, the detective owes money to the IRS. He talks to the IRS on the phone, and explains that he would love to pay his tax bill, but can't because so many of his customers are not paying their bills. The tax officer says "I'll come to your office on Monday morning. Please have your 20 largest unpaid bills ready". Monday morning, the tax officer arrives, takes the first unpaid bill to a lawyer, and calls: "Hi, this is John Smith. I'm informed that you owe private detective X an amount of $Y. Is that true?" Then the story explains (whether true or false I don't know) that in the USA it is quite possible to delay a payment legally, but it is illegal to falsely claim that you don't owe a debt. So when the lawyers office confirms, he says "I'm John Smith from the IRS, and I would ask you to pay the amount you owe to the IRS. Today. " And two hours later, the detectives tax bill is paid. Question 1: Is it indeed illegal to lie about owing money? Question 2: Would a company owing someone money that is past due payment be obliged to send the money to the IRS to pay the person's tax bill, assuming that the tax officer and the person owed state that this should happen? Or is this story not reasonably possible?

There is no general law making it illegal to lie about debts, or anything else. It is illegal to lie to a law enforcement officer in the course of an investigation . (And of course it is illegal to lie in court testimony or when otherwise under oath.) But it is in no way unlawful to decline to answer, unless a proper court order has been obtained, or other lawful means of compelling an answer. I would expect any law office to respond to such a question with something like "Am I/we being investigated? If so, send the appropriate notice and our lawyer will consider what we should tell you. If not, tell us what information you want, and we will consider and provide a written response in due course." If a taxpayer has been found to be delinquent in paying taxes, in some cases a court order may be obtained seizing assets, including unpaid debts. But no IRS agent can make such a claim on the spot, and indeed for a client to make such a payment without such a court order, or the order of an IRS tribunal (or the creditor's written consent) would itself be unlawful and would subject the lawyer to a suit by the PI (Private Investigator). When the lawyer pays a service provider, a 1099 must be filed with the IRS. If the PI is a corporation, a different form is used, but a record of payment is still required. As failure to timely file such a form is a violation of the tax code, an accusation of paying without filing would permit the lawyer to decline to answer under the Fifth amendment. If the lawyer did pay and did file a 1099 or other documentation, the IRS would know what had been payed, and would not need to confront the PI. Also, as the comment by Hilmar points out, a PI would be likely to use the cash accounting method, and so would own no tax on work performed but unpaid (as yet). So unless the IRS agent thinks the PI was paid "off-the books" and is intentionally failing to report the payment, there would be no point to such a question. And if that were he case, the lawyer would be very likely to decline to answer. I find the story quite implausible.

Revoking my right to defend my Intellectual Property by using Let's Encrypt

Agreement : https://letsencrypt.org/documents/LE-SA-v1.1.1-August-1-2016.pdf Section of interest: BY WAY OF FURTHER EXPLANATION REGARDING THE SCOPE OF THE DISCLAIMER, AND WITHOUT WAIVING OR LIMITING THE FOREGOING IN ANY WAY, ISRG DOES NOT MAKE, AND ISRG EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS, ANY WARRANTY REGARDING ITS RIGHT TO USE ANY TECHNOLOGY, INVENTION, TECHNICAL DESIGN, PROCESS, OR BUSINESS METHOD USED IN EITHER ISSUING LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATES OR PROVIDING ANY OF ISRG’S SERVICES. YOU AFFIRMATIVELY AND EXPRESSLY WAIVE THE RIGHT TO HOLD ISRG RESPONSIBLE IN ANY WAY, OR SEEK INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST ISRG, FOR ANY INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INCLUDING PATENT, TRADEMARK, TRADE SECRET, OR COPYRIGHT. It sounds like if I use a Let's Encrypt certificate, then they can steal my Intellectual Property on the site and I have no recourse. Certainly that cannot be true. Can you help me understand how to properly read this section?

First, lets look at the entire section: 4.4 IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITY EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY SET FORTH IN ISRG’S CERTIFICATE POLICY AND CERTIFICATE PRACTICE STATEMENT, LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATES AND SERVICES ARE PROVIDED “AS-IS” AND ISRG DISCLAIMS ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES OF ANY TYPE, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING AND WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF TITLE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, IN CONNECTION WITH ANY ISRG SERVICE OR LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATE. BECAUSE LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATES ARE ISSUED FREE-OF-CHARGE AS A PUBLIC SERVICE, ISRG CANNOT ACCEPT ANY LIABILITY FOR ANY LOSS, HARM, CLAIM, OR ATTORNEY’S FEES IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH CERTIFICATES. ACCORDINGLY, YOU AGREE THAT ISRG WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES, ATTORNEY’S FEES, OR RECOVERY, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER SUCH DAMAGES ARE DIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, PUNITIVE, OR COMPENSATORY, EVEN IF ISRG HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. THIS LIMITATION ON LIABILITY APPLIES IRRESPECTIVE OF THE THEORY OF LIABILITY, I.E., WHETHER THE THEORY OF LIABILITY IS BASED UPON CONTRACT, WARRANTY, INDEMNIFICATION, CONTRIBUTION, TORT, EQUITY, STATUTE OR REGULATION, COMMON LAW, OR ANY OTHER SOURCE OF LAW, STANDARD OF CARE, CATEGORY OF CLAIM, NOTION OF FAULT OR RESPONSIBILITY, OR THEORY OF RECOVERY. THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THIS DISCLAIMER IS INTENDED TO BE CONSTRUED TO THE FULLEST EXTENT ALLOWED BY APPLICABLE LAW. BY WAY OF FURTHER EXPLANATION REGARDING THE SCOPE OF THE DISCLAIMER, AND WITHOUT WAIVING OR LIMITING THE FOREGOING IN ANY WAY, ISRG DOES NOT MAKE, AND ISRG EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS, ANY WARRANTY REGARDING ITS RIGHT TO USE ANY TECHNOLOGY, INVENTION, TECHNICAL DESIGN, PROCESS, OR BUSINESS METHOD USED IN EITHER ISSUING LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATES OR PROVIDING ANY OF ISRG’S SERVICES. YOU AFFIRMATIVELY AND EXPRESSLY WAIVE THE RIGHT TO HOLD ISRG RESPONSIBLE IN ANY WAY, OR SEEK INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST ISRG, FOR ANY INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INCLUDING PATENT, TRADEMARK, TRADE SECRET, OR COPYRIGHT. The first part that you notice is that in the first section is this sentence: LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATES AND SERVICES ARE PROVIDED “AS-IS” AND ISRG DISCLAIMS ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES OF ANY TYPE, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING AND WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF TITLE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, Which basically says that "we won't provide any statement to guarantee that our services/certificates don't infringe on another work, or that they are fit for your particular use". The real point of this indemnification section is in the second paragraph: BECAUSE LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATES ARE ISSUED FREE-OF-CHARGE AS A PUBLIC SERVICE, ISRG CANNOT ACCEPT ANY [...] They are too poor to afford lawyers, so they are saying that you must agree not to sue them if you suffer any damages as a result of using the service/certificates. This is not a license granted by you to steal anything you don't expressly give them license to do so. Let's take an example: Let's Encrypt (LE) gives you (Customer) a certificate. That certificate, knowingly or unknowingly, infringes upon a patent owned by XYZ. XYZ sues LE and the judge orders LE to revoke all certificates using XYZ technology. Your site is now shown as unsafe and your payment process doesn't work. You lose $100k in revenue getting your site back up with another certificate company. According to this agreement, you cannot sue LE for that. XYZ could go even further and sue you, even though you unknowingly had been using that patent. Again you can't turn around and sue LE to recover anything XYZ recovers from you (or even the fees you spend to win). What you are not granting to LE is a right to "steal" any technology on any site/system that the certificate or service is used on. This agreement, in its entirety, is between LE and you for the use of LE services/certificates. Even if LE somehow steals from you, this would not indemnify them for that.

When does a person lose diplomatic status?

Ahmed Ali Muthana, father of Hoda Muthana, "claims" that he was no longer working as a diplomat at the time of his daughter's birth, thereby insisting that his daughter was born a US citizen under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. His statement suggests that he was at one time employed in a diplomatic function (and that assumes that he had diplomatic "papers" because of his employ), how does one lose that status, and is there any action that he is required to take to relinquish that status? Further more, if he failed to take some action to relinquish that status, has he committed some crime?

His statement suggests that he was at one time employed in a diplomatic function (and that assumes that he had diplomatic "papers" because of his employ), how does one lose that status, and is there any action that he is required to take to relinquish that status? Diplomatic personnel with official diplomatic status under the relevant treaties and for purposes of U.S. naturalization laws are credentialed by the U.S. Department of State. When an embassy and consulate wants to bring in a new diplomat, it provides their credentials to the State Department, which must approve the grant of diplomatic status to the person, although this decision is given very broad deference in practice. The State Department could decline to credential someone due to an individualized history of prior misconduct (e.g. a known serial killer or war criminal who escaped prosecution due to diplomatic immunity), because the regime seeking to have the diplomat credentialed is no longer recognized as legitimate by the United States (e.g. the Assad regime of Syria), or because the total number of diplomats is excessive (e.g. if Luxembourg wanted to credential 1000 diplomats in the U.S.). Mostly, however, the credentialing process is important because a diplomat's credentials can be revoked. This is usually done either in response to the individualized conduct of a particular person (for example, the person is discovered to be a spy with a diplomatic cover who is actively stealing key secrets from the United States), or as a symbolic form of sanctions for conduct of the diplomat's country of which the United States does not approve. For example, many countries revoked the credentials of many Russian diplomats after Russia assassinated a former Russian spy in Britain. When a diplomat ends a tour of service in the United States, that diplomat's credentials are supposed to be withdrawn, in part, to prevent the number of credentialed diplomats from their country in the U.S. from being excessive. A credentialed diplomat is not required to be in the U.S. 24/7 while the credentials are in place. But, the country has some mild incentives not to have too many absentee diplomats. (The U.S. State Department could also unilaterally revoke the credentials of a diplomat known to be a long time absentee.) It isn't clear to me in this case, if this individual's credentials had actually been formally withdrawn yet, or if he and his family were in the gap period between terminating his employment in the U.S. with the embassy and formally having his credentials withdrawn by his home country. In the former case, his children born in the U.S. are definitely U.S. citizens pursuant to the 14th Amendment and U.S. citizenship and naturalization laws. In the later case, the rule is less clear and it may be an issue of first impression not resolved by any prior case law regarding an issue that is arguably ambiguous under the statute. Vox has a good description of the underlying facts in the case , in addition to a lot of analysis that I omit from the quoted material below: Hoda Muthana’s father, Ahmed Ali Muthana, came to the US from Yemen in 1990 to serve as a diplomat representing his home country at the United Nations, whose headquarters are located in New York City. However, he lost that job — and thus his diplomatic immunity — as the result of the Yemeni civil war in the mid-1990s. The question is exactly when he lost his diplomatic privileges — and whether that happened before Hoda was born, on October 28, 1994, or after. The US government has told Ahmed Ali Muthana (according to his lawsuit) that its records show he held diplomatic status until February 6, 1995 — that is, until after Hoda’s birth — and therefore that Hoda was born while he was still a diplomat and thus is not a US citizen, but a Yemeni one. Ahmed Ali Muthana, on the other hand, claims in a lawsuit that he surrendered his diplomatic identity card on June 2, 1994 — months before his daughter was born. Legal experts I spoke to said that that wouldn’t necessarily mean he officially lost his diplomatic status on that date, though. Steve Vladeck, a law professor at the University of Texas at Austin, said that under US law, ex-diplomats who are still in the country enjoy some “residual immunity” while they pack their bags and prepare to head back home. But the Muthanas weren’t just wrapping up their affairs before returning to Yemen; they were settling in the country for good. Since the Muthanas credentials with the State Department weren't officially withdrawn until February 5, 1995, after his daughter was born, the question of whether he was a diplomat or not when she was born isn't a cut and dried one. A lot of the argument in the case pertains to how the United States government treated this case before it was at issue when his daughter sought to travel to the United States as would be her right if she was a U.S. citizen. But, ultimately, all of this portion of the factual background is only pertinent to the extent that it sheds light on the official interpretation of the legal issues that the United States understood to be the case before the dispute arose. But, the United States government's interpretation of the law regarding when someone has diplomatic immunity, while it can be considered as persuasive authority, does not determine definitively if the United States government's previous interpretations of this law as applied to this case were legally correct. Either party is free to dispute any previous interpretation given to the law that was not established in a a disputed court case on the merits of the dispute. The facts are also illuminated and complicated by a point made by @user6726 in his answer which points out that UN representatives don't have the full diplomatic immunities enjoyed by other diplomats. Further more, if he failed to take some action to relinquish that status, has he committed some crime? He has not committed a crime. First of all, upon the termination of his diplomatic status, he could have received a tourist visa which is available for several months, as a matter of course, to citizens of many nations who arrive in the U.S. without prior issuance of a visa. Second, even if he and his family are present in the United States without any legal visa or citizenship authorizing them to be present in the United States, this merely means that as a civil (i.e. non-criminal) matter, he and his family may be deported. Overstaying a visa is not a crime. Also, even he had committed a crime because, for example, after his diplomatic status ended he trafficked sex slaves to pimps in the U.S. in a manner that evaded a port of entry after having previously been convicted of the same offense (which would be a felony), this would not prevent his child, born in the United States while he did not have diplomatic credentials from being a U.S. citizen. Birthright citizenship under the 14th Amendment is available even to people who are illegally present in the United States and are deportable and even if that presence arose from a crime. FOOTNOTE ON PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS Naively, this case also seems to raise some interesting issues of civil procedure and subject-matter jurisdiction. Most questions related to immigration and nationalization law are heard in the first instance in Article II (Executive Branch) immigration courts which are administrative law courts, subject to appeal to an appellate Article II administrative law court called the BIA (Board of Immigration Appeals). Appeals from the BIA, in turn, are to the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit, an Article III (Judicial Branch) intermediate appellate court, and then to the U.S. Supreme Court. A handful of questions related to immigration and naturalization law are, or may be, raised in the United States District Courts (an Article III trial court), subject to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit, an Article III (Judicial Branch) intermediate appellate court, and then to the U.S. Supreme Court. (I don't have the technical expertise to quickly and accurately summarize which cases belong in Article II immigration courts and which belong in Article III U.S. District Courts without considerable further research, but this isn't necessary to understand the jurisdictional conundrum posed by this case.) But, court cases in which diplomats are parties are also in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. The pertinent language of Section 2 of Article III of the United States Constitution states: The judicial Power shall extend . . . to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Counsuls . . . In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls . . . the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. But, because the case law has held that this portion of the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court clause vests concurrent rather than exclusive jurisdiction over these cases in the U.S. Supreme Court , this is not the barrier that it would naively seem to be. Therefore, if the case were filed originally in the U.S. Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction, the U.S. Supreme Court could instead transfer the matter to another appropriate federal trial court, or could dismiss the case without prejudice on prudential grounds rather than because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear original proceedings in the case. If this had not been the case, it would have been tricky to resolve in this case, because the crux of the dispute is whether or not the father of the child was a diplomat at the relevant time, which is also the central fact that needs to be determined when one attempts to discern which court has jurisdiction over the case. (Also, had this been an issue, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104 , the evidentiary rules that apply to a preliminary determination regarding whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction are different that the normal evidentiary rules that apply to subsequent reconsiderations of the subject-matter jurisdiction question and the decision on the merits.) Since the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding diplomatic matters is not exclusive, it does not raise complicated issues of subject matter jurisdiction, because both the U.S. Supreme Court and the ordinary trial court in cases like these both have subject matter jurisdiction. There is also no doubt that the questions presented in this case are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts as opposed to state and local courts, unlike most federal questions over which the federal courts and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction. SECOND FOOTNOTE RE POSSIBLE LOSS OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP Another potential issue in this case is whether the daughter took actions that amounted to a voluntary renunciation of her U.S. citizenship in as an adult in connection with her alleged involvement with ISIS and loyalty oaths that may have been taken by her at that time. If she swore an oath of loyalty to ISIS that included an express renunciation of all claims she might have to citizenship in any other country or to any other sovereign, that could operate as a renunciation of her U.S. citizenship even if she was a citizen at birth. So far as I know, the litigation has not yet progressed far enough for this issue to be ripe for consideration yet, because you can't determine if someone has renounced their U.S. citizenship until you figure out if that person was a U.S. citizen in the first place.

Why was Ahok convicted of blasphemy when so many similar cases are around?

Ahok said that people may be lied to by using Al Maidah 51. Why is Ahok in prison? A legal analysis of the decision The court effectively says that Ahok speech implies that the Quran is a tool for lying. The problem is, is there a guarantee that anyone that is using religion isn't lying? To the opposite. We have many cases where people use the religious textbook for many fraudulent aims. Heres an article about a Quran corruption case in Indonesia, called KPK Questions Witness of Quran Procurement Corruption Abu Tours and First travel using Umrah (a Muslim pilgrimage) case, to defraud people. Another Umrah scam Trial starts for alleged 'umrah' fraud case So clearly here, religions have been used for a dishonest purpose. Yet almost 0 Muslims complain about Abu Tour. Many newspapers tell about people using the Quran to commit corruption. No body-mind. We sort of knew it happens. Duh... Yet, when Ahok said that people are using the Quran to lie, somehow it's a big deal. Most politicians lie or mislead. It's politics. C'mon. Why is Ahok case such a big deal from the law perspective?

Because law is not independent of politics - particularly in Indonesia.

If you commit a crime in an airport, are you tried under maritime law?

Airports occupy an interesting legal grounds, wherein they are not technically a part of the country they are in (hence tax-free purchases in duty-free), and yet still must obey some set of laws. By international agreement (though the exact name of the treaty or treaties escape me), any land (or water for that matter) that is not occupied or claimed by some sovereign nation, and is therefore not under the jurisdiction of any sovereign nation — such as space, unclaimed islands and the middle of the Pacific — is under maritime law. Does maritime law therefore apply to crimes committed in airports? Even more interesting, can someone who commits a crime in an airport physically located within a country he or she is not allowed to be in (no visa for example) be removed from that airport (and therefore allowed into the country) to stand trial? Update: After some additional research, it seems international airports, embassies and certain war-risk areas (i.e. the Green Zone in Iraq, also known as the International Zone of Baghdad) contain specified areas defined as international zones . These zones are not so much unclaimed as designated independent of the country they're in largely for purposes of diplomacy. Because of the, ahem, fuzziness of the law governing them, I'd be very much interested in an answer to the question, even if the wording on the question may have been a bit confusing to the first few people to see it.

For purposes of criminal law, in practice, airports in the United States are treated as part of the territory of the state (or district or territory) that they are a part of and of the United States. The scope of maritime criminal jurisdiction is defined at 18 USC 7 . It states: The term “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States”, as used in this title, includes: (1) The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States, or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, when such vessel is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State. (2) Any vessel registered, licensed, or enrolled under the laws of the United States, and being on a voyage upon the waters of any of the Great Lakes, or any of the waters connecting them, or upon the Saint Lawrence River where the same constitutes the International Boundary Line. (3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building. (4) Any island, rock, or key containing deposits of guano, which may, at the discretion of the President, be considered as appertaining to the United States. (5) Any aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the United States, or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States, or any State, Territory, district, or possession thereof, while such aircraft is in flight over the high seas, or over any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State. (6) Any vehicle used or designed for flight or navigation in space and on the registry of the United States pursuant to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, while that vehicle is in flight, which is from the moment when all external doors are closed on Earth following embarkation until the moment when one such door is opened on Earth for disembarkation or in the case of a forced landing, until the competent authorities take over the responsibility for the vehicle and for persons and property aboard. (7) Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense by or against a national of the United States. (8) To the extent permitted by international law, any foreign vessel during a voyage having a scheduled departure from or arrival in the United States with respect to an offense committed by or against a national of the United States. (9) With respect to offenses committed by or against a national of the United States as that term is used in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act— (A) the premises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other United States Government missions or entities in foreign States, including the buildings, parts of buildings, and land appurtenant or ancillary thereto or used for purposes of those missions or entities, irrespective of ownership; and (B) residences in foreign States and the land appurtenant or ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used for purposes of those missions or entities or used by United States personnel assigned to those missions or entities. Nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to supersede any treaty or international agreement with which this paragraph conflicts. This paragraph does not apply with respect to an offense committed by a person described in section 3261(a) of this title. Often, law enforcement at an international airport is provided by a county sheriff or municipal police department in addition to the TSA (including air marshalls) which has narrower jurisdiction, in contrast to places like Indian Reservations and federal parks, which while within a state are outside state and local law enforcement jurisdiction (although the assimilative crimes act applies state law in many such circumstances). They are definitely not subject to maritime jurisdiction in the United States. Duty free status usually arises from a definition particular to tax treaty and not a global sovereignty definition.

How does Akinator not violate copyright law?

Akinator, the app and website, both display images of what I assume is copyrighted material. How do they manage to get around copyright law? Is this considered fair use?

There are several things going on with Akinator and their use of trademarked names and characters. If you look at akinator.com Legal Notices it says: 2 – Copyright – Reproduction rights All the content of this site falls under French and international legislation on copyright and intellectual property. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part of this website, in any form or by any means is strictly prohibited without prior authorisation of the publications director. All products and trademarks mentioned are property of their respective owners. (emphasis mine) The fact that they mention that all trademarks belong to their respective owners is good, but it's a formality. What it appears the site really relies on for use of trademarked characters is what's called Nominative Use, which is a type of "trademark fair use." The product or service cannot be readily identified without using the trademark (e.g. trademark is descriptive of a person, place, or product attribute). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominative_use Akinator has to use the names and trademarks to identify those names and trademarks. Akinator could possibly be sued to establish their type of fair use is not valid in their case, but it's probably not worth it for the companies to pursue. And, most companies would rather people use and see their trademarks in a marketing and money-making fair use sense rather than sue to stop their use. See In the US, when is fair use a defense to copyright infringement? for a full description of Fair Use. Now, when you get to the "answer" part of the game , you will see a "copyright" link. Part of that resulting page says Displayed pictures are accessible from the web. It is Elokence's policy to respond to notices of alleged copyright infringement that comply with applicable international intellectual property law and make the necessary changes. In respect of Elokence's Intellectual Property Policy, Elokence operates a complaints procedure accessible via the form below. So the company has given itself a further bit of protection by only using images on the web they can link to (at least in the web browser game; I don't know about the App), so that means the image is already "out there", uploaded by someone else, and Akinator can claim they didn't upload it. And, further, there is a contact form for trademark holders to send DMCA takedown notices for their work. It's a belt and suspenders approach to the use of trademarks in their game.

Would Al Capone be convicted today?

Al Capone was convicted of failing to file a tax return. According to Wikipedia : Assistant Attorney General Mabel Walker Willebrandt recognized that mob figures publicly led lavish lifestyles yet never filed tax returns , and thus could be convicted of tax evasion without requiring hard evidence to get testimony about their other crimes. These days, if you file late, you get penalized financially, not go to prison. Would Al Capone's crime merit imprisonment today?

He would still be convicted. It remains a crime to not file ( 26 USC § 7203 ), but the failure to file must be "willful," meaning that you knew you had to file and intended not to. One of the ways that the government can demonstrated that the failure was willful is by showing that you had a large amount of income that you were trying to shield from taxation. That was the case with Al Capone, and it's still part of how they do it today. So the IRS might go after an Al Capone criminally for filling late, but it's not as likely to do so in a case where the person is not making a ton of money. Like you said, that taxpayer would probably just get hit with a fine and warning not to make the same mistake again.

How does the mandate to report income from illegal activities in the US jibe with the Fifth Amendment?

Al Capone was famously taken down for tax evasion for not reporting income from his illegal activities. If someone were to report the income from illegal activities like a marijuana dispensary or a bribe, my understanding is that they would be then investigated/prosecuted for their disclosed activities. However, The Fifth Amendment states that: No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,... Since reporting income, even if illegal, is a mandate and the Fifth Amendment protects against someone being held as a witness against themselves, the law seems to be inconsistent. How does the mandate to report income from illegal activities in the US jibe with the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination?

The original 1913 Revenue Act only required the reporting of income from "lawful" sources. In the 1921 Revenue Act the word, "lawful" was removed requiring all income to be reported. [IRS Publication 17] states: Illegal activities. Income from illegal activities, such as money from dealing illegal drugs, must be included in your income on Form 1040, line 21, or on Schedule C or Schedule C-EZ (Form 1040) if from your self-employment activity. In United States v. Sullivan in 1927, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it was constitutional to require that a tax return be filed to report income. If the filer believed information required to be filed would incriminate him then the filer could raise the issue on the form. The filer could not simply refuse to file. Justice Holmes further wrote: It is urged that, if a return were made, the defendant would be entitled to deduct illegal expenses, such as bribery. This by no means follows, but it will be time enough to consider the question when a taxpayer has the temerity to raise it. In Garner v. United States in 1976, the Supreme Court ruled that a filer's income tax return that revealed himself to be a gambler could be used as evidence that the filer violated gambling laws. An article in Forbes describes a taxpayer who filed their returns but refused to answer some questions related to their income, asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege. The IRS attempted to impose a "frivolous return" penalty on the taxpayer for refusing to provide all information. The Tax Court ruled that the taxpayer had a legitimate fear regarding disclosure of information related to failing to file a report of foreign bank and financial accounts. The tax court found the taxpayer had filed the standard return, the return contained sufficient information and that a return doesn't need to be "completely correct" but, rather, "substantially correct." The IRS had claimed that omitting some information because of fear of self-incrimination is frivolous. The Tax Court found that the standard, Notice 2010-33 , doesn't require that "all" information must be provided, simply that substantial information must be provided. As a result, the penalty was removed and the taxpayer's assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege was found not to be "frivolous." As the Tax Court ruling explains, the Fifth Amendment privilege applies to tax returns, provided the taxpayer affirmatively claims the privilege on the return and does so before he files it. In summary, it is still necessary to file a return; a blanket Fifth Amendment claim applying to the entire return is considered frivolous. However, the taxpayer must claim the privilege. Any incriminating information included on the return can be used against the taxpayer.

Can a previously binding precedent be overturned based on its rationale being outdated?

Al loses a case at first instance and appeals to some very high court if not all the way to last resort. The ultimate decision is made based on some rationale that appeals to common sense or general social conditions like an observation of what is socially typical. Or alternatively perhaps it is literally a ruling based on a determination what a “reasonable person” in a given scenario might do. Anyway, this becomes the prevalent legal regime for a certain type of case for 50 years, during which time society and culture progress and develop. 60 years later Bob loses a case on the basis of this precedent from a superior court 50 years ago. Is it generally possible to argue to the court in which Bob finds himself that the rationale for the prevailing regime, laid down 60 years ago, is now outdated and thus inapplicable?

An "outdated rationale" is one factor to be considered when overruling precedent. Yes. Precedent relies on respect for the principle of stare decisis , the idea that courts should stand by what they have already decided, and thus enforce similar outcomes for similarly situated individuals. In the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court has established a test for when to ignore stare decisis and overturn precedent: the quality of the precedent's reasoning the workability of the rule it established the precedent's consistency with other related decisions developments since the decision was handed down; and reliance on the decision Janus v. AFSCME , 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478-79 (2018) . Your question seems to most squarely implicate factor 4, i.e., when the Court decided United States v. Al , the state of the universe required Rule X , but the universe has now changed such that Rule Y makes more sense in United States v. Bob . Establishing that fact alone may not be enough to justify overruling a precedent, but that fact will often also support the other factors, as well. Perhaps the quality of the precedent's reasoning is low because it failed to account for the possibility of the changes Bob is relying on. Perhaps those changes are so prevalant that they have rendered the precedent's rule unworkable. Perhaps the precedent is inconsistent with related decisions that have relied on those changes to establish their rules. An outdated rationale was key to the decision to overrule Quill Many precedents have been overruled based -- at least in part -- on that scenario. Probably the best recent example is South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. , 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) , which overruled Quill Corp. v. North Dakota , 504 U.S. 298 (1992) and Nat. Bellas Hess v. Dept. of Revenue , 386 U.S. 753, 87 S. Ct. 1389 (1967) , which held that states may not impose sales-tax collection obligations on a business based on its sales into the state, unless the business had a "physical presence," such as an office, warehouse, or sales agents, in the state. Bellas Hess reached that decision based in large part on the administrative burdens businesses would encounter in trying to discern the sales tax rates applicable to every sale across the country. Doing so would require the seller to (1) know not only what state all their buyers live in, but also whether they were also subject to sales tax based on the county, city, school district, water district, etc., in which each one lived; and if so (2) determine whether their product was within the definition of a taxable good or service in each of those jurisdictions; and if so (3) calculate tax based on the current rates of each of those jurisdictions; and then (4) comply with each jurisdiction's reporting and recordkeeping requirements. In 1967, there was no practical way for remote sellers to carry on their business without incurring massive compliance costs. But when the Court heard Wayfair 50 years later, the same was no longer true. Although other factors also counseled in favor of setting aside stare decisis , Wayfair focused most of its attention on the technological changes that demanded a new rule, noting that everything had changed since Quill was decided. On one hand, the importance and impact of remote sales had grown wildly: Internet access had grown from 2 percent of America to 89 percent. Remote sales had grown from $180 billion annually to more than half a trillion dollars annually, with Amazon and other e-commerce platforms supplanting Wal-Mart stores and other brick-and-mortar sellers. The loss of tax revenue from remote sales had grown from $3 billion to $33 billion. But while the ease and impact of making remote sales had been increasing, the states had seriously ameliorated the burden of collecting taxes on those sales. Many states had spent the last 15 years on the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement , collaborating to bring uniformity to their sales tax definitions, administration, and collection. And technological developments from companies like Avalara -- subsidized by the states -- had greatly reduced the burden of calculating the tax due on purchases anywhere in the country. Therefore, given "the present realities of the interstate marketplace," the Court concluded that it must overrule its holdings from Quill and Bellas Hess : The real world implementation of Commerce Clause doctrines now makes it manifest that the physical presence rule as defined by Quill must give way to the far-reaching systemic and structural changes in the economy and many other societal dimensions caused by the Cyber Age. Though Quill was wrong on its own terms when it was decided in 1992, since then the Internet revolution has made its earlier error all the more egregious and harmful. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. , 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018) . Other cases Of course, this was not the first or only case to find that the rationale for a precedent was outdated. Others include: “The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.” Obergefell v. Hodges , 576 U.S. 644, 670-71 (2015) , overruling Baker v. Nelson , 409 U.S. 810 (1972) "The deficiencies in Bowers became even more apparent in the years following its announcement. [Bowers relied on the prevalance of similar laws in other states as a basis for upholding Georgia's anti-sodomy law, but] the 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the Bowers decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct. Lawrence v. Texas , 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) , overruling Bowers v. Hardwick , 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) "Experience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson , had revealed its defects, political and social; and the benefits expected to flow from the rule did not accrue." Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938) , overruling Swift v. Tyson , 41 U.S. 1 (1842) . "It is untenable to suggest these days that it would be a special hardship for each and every woman to perform jury service or that society cannot spare any women from their present duties." Taylor v. Louisiana , 419 U.S. 522, 533-35 (1975) , overruling Hoyt v. Florida , 368 U.S. 57 (1961) . " Austin is undermined by experience since its announcement. ... Rapid changes in technology—and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression—counsel against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers. Today, 30–second television ads may be the most effective way to convey a political message. Soon, however, it may be that Internet sources, such as blogs and social networking Web sites, will provide citizens with significant information about political candidates and issues." Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 364-65 (2010) , overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce , 494 U.S. 652, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990) .

SARing received text messages from a lost phone

Al loses his phone and it runs out of battery. He then is sent 10 SMS from various people. He then recovers his phone and switched it on and the messages are all received. Bob loses his phone but never recovers it yet would like to see any messages he may have been sent. As evidenced above and under RIPA 2000, we know that his service provider has been storing all of his received messages even if he never gets back that particular SIM card. Is Bob entitled to access the SMS that were sent to him?

The service provider has no obligation (unless by contract) to keep the content of SMS messages. The service provider may keep content for a few hours or days, for circumstances such as unpowered phones. It will retain the metadata e.g. sender, recipient, date and time, and message type, for a longer period. Bob should be able to obtain the metadata for his outgoing communications via SAR. But before resorting to a SAR, Bob should find out if his provider makes that information available via the customer support or customer account section of its website. Bob will need a court order to obtain the metadata for his incoming communications. The above is true for, at least, Vodafone , O2 , Three and EE , each of which has published material specifically about this topic.

Is it legal to have an abortion in another state or abroad?

Alabama passed new laws recently, making abortion a very limited option. In that context is it legal for a US national who lives in Alabama to have an abortion in another state where it is legal in the circumstances she in in? have an abortion abroad, in circumstances which are illegal in the US? Does the "US national" above matter? In other words: is the specific act of abortion illegal on itself in Alabama (or another state if it matters), just because of the geographic constraints - or is it related to the fact that someone lives in Alabama or, more broadly, is a US citizen (second bullet of my question)? Or, yet phaserly differently: can someone who lives in Alabama just travel to another state and get an abortion, then come back safely (= Alabama law enforcement does not care) or is it still a felony to have an abortion outside of Alabama? Note: Alabama is taken as an example following the recent law changes and their wide broadcasting in France. Any other state with a similar law will do.

Does the "US national" above matter? The nationality of the person is not relevant. Like most criminal statutes, the law applies to acts within the jurisdiction of Alabama, which basically means within the state's territory. The only foreign people who would be immune from that jurisdiction would be diplomats and the like, but such people would not be licensed to practice medicine in Alabama. This brings us to the point in the next paragraph. is it still a felony to have an abortion outside of Alabama? No. It is not even a felony to have an abortion inside Alabama. The law does not criminalize having abortions. It criminalizes performing abortions. See section 5 of the law: Section 5. No woman upon whom an abortion is performed or attempted to be performed shall be criminally or civilly liable. Furthermore, no physician confirming the serious health risk to the child's mother shall be criminally or civilly liable for those actions. To extend your question, let us consider a doctor who is licensed to practice medicine both in Alabama and in some other jurisdiction where abortion is legal. Such a doctor could not be convicted under Alabama law for performing abortions in the other jurisdiction.

Are US Senate impeachment convictions reviewable by the Supreme Court

Alan Dershowwitz argues that a conviction of any President by the US Senate would be unconstitutional under certain circumstances. Please see his book and his television interviews for those certain circumstances that he argues would create a unconstitutional conviction. However the circumstances that he puts forward are not what prompts me to ask the question above. Generally US citizens expect the judiciary to be the arbiter of constitutionality, with the US Supreme Court to be the final arbiter of in the event of an appeal. So, are US Senate impeachment convictions reviewable by the judiciary and or the Supreme Court In the event that the answer to the title question is "yes", have any impeachment convictions been reviewed by the Supreme Court?

The only relevant case heard by SCOTUS is Nixon v. US , 506 U.S. 224, where a federal judge was tried and convicted for actual crimes, but would not resign his position so continued to draw his salary. The key legal question was whether the matter is "justiciable" (meaning, not a political matter but a legal matter). Nixon's argument was that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause, and the court held that the question (more specifically what it means to "try") is nonjusticiable. White & Blackmun, and Souter, wrote concurring opinions (which might be called on in a subsequent impeachment case) that reminds the reader (and future court) what was not part of the holding of the court, and what might therefore allow future impeachment review. White writes The Court is of the view that the Constitution forbids us even to consider his contention. I find no such prohibition and would therefore reach the merits of the claim. I concur in the judgment because the Senate fulfilled its constitutional obligation to "try" petitioner. He observes that the Senate has very wide discretion in specifying impeachment trial procedures and because it is extremely unlikely that the Senate would abuse its discretion and insist on a procedure that could not be deemed a trial by reasonable judges. But, I would prefer not to announce an unreviewable discretion in the Senate to ignore completely the constitutional direction to "try" impeachment cases. When asked at oral argument whether that direction would be satisfied if, after a House vote to impeach, the Senate, without any procedure whatsoever, unanimously found the accused guilty of being "a bad guy," counsel for the United States answered that the Government's theory "leads me to answer that question yes." Tr. of Oral Arg. 51. Especially in light of this advice from the Solicitor General, I would not issue an invitation to the Senate to find an excuse, in the name of other pressing business, to be dismissive of its critical role in the impeachment process. Souter in his opinion states that One can, nevertheless, envision different and unusual circumstances that might justify a more searching review of impeachment proceedings. If the Senate were to act in a manner seriously threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss, or upon a summary determination that an officer of the United States was simply" 'a bad guy,'", judicial interference might well be appropriate. In such circumstances, the Senate's action might be so far beyond the scope of its constitutional authority, and the consequent impact on the Republic so great, as to merit a judicial response despite the prudential concerns that would ordinarily counsel silence. In other words, review of an impeachment is largely but not entirely off the table, at least until SCOTUS declares that impeachments are completely unreviewable, no matter what, period (unlikely to ever happen).

Is a copyright claim diminished by an owner's refusal to publish?

Alan is aware of an obscure old book that is out of print, and republishes it. Brenda Books, Inc. objects and sues Alan since they own the copyright. This is not disputed. Brenda Books' claim is a tremendous amount of money. The book is indeed out of print, and Brenda Books claims the reason it's out of print is the low probable sales don't justify the cost of reprinting it. "We don't cede our interest in the work; it's just not profitable to reprint it." Thus it is a "dog in the manger" scenario (in which the dog beds down in the cows' food trough, neither partaking of the cows' food not allowing the cows to do so either; thus maliciously wasting the valuable resource to no profit for anyone.) Note that this is a not a "Disney Vault" scenario where the definitely-profitable resource is made artificially scarce to increase its value further: this is a book that the conventional publisher doesn't really have a pathway to make money on. But setting aside the social or moral issues... How does the fact of Brenda's unwillingness to print the book, affect the damages? Can Alan diminish damages by showing Brenda Books wasn't doing anything with the work anyway, and thus, doesn't really have any lost profits to claim against Alan?

When you own something, you get to decide what you do with it There is no obligation to make a copyrighted work available and the fact that it isn’t is not a defence to a copyright infringement. Brenda Books is entitled to either damages or an account of profits. Arguably, they have suffered no damage, so Alan’s profits are the better target. In some jurisdictions, such as the United States, statutory damages (a set dollar amount for each infringement) is available even if there are no damages or profits.

Has "deceiving a machine" been prosecuted/defined in practice?

Alaska Statutes - Section 11.46.985 ("Deceiving a machine") states : In a prosecution under this chapter for an offense that requires "deception" as an element, it is not a defense that the defendant deceived or attempted to deceive a machine. For purposes of this section, "machine" includes a vending machine, computer, turnstile, or automated teller machine. Has anybody been prosecuted (and especially, convicted) for a crime under that chapter for an offense requiring "deception" where the "deception" was of a machine?

The reason this section exists is pretty well stated in an English case: Holmes v. Governor of Brixton Prison and Another . In paragraph 12, they discuss the law of theft in England, and note that under the law there as it stood in 2004 (and reaching back to principles of common law, which are often but not always shared with the US), deception required causing someone to believe something. A machine has no mind, cannot think, and can't be made to believe anything -- it sees an input and mechanically performs some response in response to that input. For instance, suppose you were to discover someone's bank account number and printed a check of your own that had that number on it. You then make that check up to look like it's a check from the someone else to you, and deposit it to an ATM; you then withdraw however much is available immediately. In all likelihood, no human will see that check until the victim looks into why they're significantly poorer than they remembered, so no human was deceived. The only things that were possibly deceived were the computers involved in the check-clearing process. But they don't have a mind: as far as they're concerned, they see pixels, pass them through an algorithm, and then send a message to another computer at the bank with certain information (which a human recognizes as an image of a check and an amount of money, but an ATM doesn't know what it means for something to be an image of a check). The machine then mechanically pushes bills out a slot. They don't think the check's real, don't think it's fake, and don't think it's a check: they're just piles of semiconductors and wires acting in accordance with the laws of physics. If you gave a check like this to a check-cashing place, it's clearly theft by deception: you make the human there (falsely) think you have a legitimate check, and they then pay you money based on it. But these days, a lot of this stuff is automated. Alaska's legislature didn't want you to get out of theft by deception charged because something was automated. So, they said that a machine could be deceived. This isn't a crime by itself; you can't be charged with deceiving a machine. You are charged with an offense under the chapter that involves deception. What 11.46.985 does is say you can't argue "this wasn't deception because only the machine was deceived."

Why are people sentenced to prison for terms longer than life?

Albert Morake was sentenced to 1,535 years in prison. How can a person be sentenced to more than 1 life imprisonment?

Just to expand on what others have answered: It's important that each crime is also given its own sentence as it's possible that prisoners can be cleared of crimes if new evidence is found. This could make a significant difference to the amount of time the prisoner is serving. For example if a person was convicted for kidnap, murder, and stealing a car, all adding up to a total of 120 years, but later was found to be a car thief who was in the wrong place at the wrong time, and proven innocent of the kidnap and murder charges, that person would then only face the sentence from the car theft. If one life sentence had been issued for the three crimes, a new sentence would have to be worked out.

A deceased signed a car loan on behalf of a relative with poor credit- what happens?

Albert signed a car loan on behalf of his son, Bob as Bob had poor credit. Bob drove the car and paid the repayments, though was not mentioned on the loan. Albert dies. What rights does the bank have at this point. Can they repossess the car? What are Bob's options if he wants to keep the car? Can he offer to take on the loan? If the bank doesn't want this to happen, can he force them? What is the executor of the estate to do? The executor is concerned that the bank will repossess the car, and then pay the car off with the sale of his fathers house.

When a debtor dies, with the debt outstanding, the debt enters default. The estate has to solve the outstanding debt before paying out any inheritances: The estate can and does pay up. This outstanding debt of the estate is gone, the car is paid off, and enters the estate as a value to be distributed as the will or rules dictate. The estate doesn't pay up, nobody refinances the car. The car is not part of the estate and can't be inherited. The debt is in default, and the car will be repossessed by the bank, together with any other securities for the car. The items/money repossessed leave the estate before any item can be distributed. The estate does not pay up, but one of the inheritors discusses with the bank to refinance the car. The car never enters the estate. The refinancing person now has a contract with the bank about a car loan. The debt leaves the estate by virtue of being no longer in the name of the deceased, its obligation was taken up by the refinancer. It's up to the bank to agree or deny. Many loan contracts contain a clause for the case of debtors dying.

What are the laws for lunch breaks for salaried employees in Alberta, Canada?

Alberta Law: https://www.alberta.ca/hours-work-rest.aspx An employee is entitled to one 30-minute paid or unpaid break after the first 5 hours of work for shifts that are between 5 and 10 hours long. My Contract: The Employee shall be available to provide services no later than 6:00am or the time of day time required to support the technical requirements for that trading period. The Employee is expected to work no less than 8 hours on all business days. Lunch break will be after 11:30 am and further breaks will be taken at the Employee’s discretion. My company says I cannot take a break until after 5.5 hours of work. Is this against the law, or are there different rules for employees who are not paid by the hour?

There is no general exemption from the employment standards for salaried employees. Certain industries have specific exemptions. 2(1) This Act applies to all employers and employees, including the Crown in right of Alberta and its employees, except as otherwise provided in this Part. ( Employment Standards Code ) Your exact situation does matter when the tribunal or courts decide if an agreement or employment contract is enforceable when it does not directly contradict an employment standard. For example, requiring a six-month notice period before an employee can resign is likely not enforceable for minimum wage employees, but for an executive officer it may be reasonable and hold up. Is this against the law Alberta does not require that the break to be within or immediately after the first five hours of work, if you agree to it (including by signing an employment contract). If you do not, then If the employer and the employee cannot agree on a break schedule: The employer must provide at least 30 minutes within or immediately following the first 5 hours of the shift (at a time chosen by the employer) For shifts 10 hours or longer, the employer must provide at least 30 minutes within or immediately following the first 5 hours of the shift (at a time chosen by the employer) and a second break of at least 30 minutes after the first 5 hours of the shift. Unfortunately, in this situation, the employer may terminate you if you do not agree to a schedule convenient to their business (just like they can fire you for refusing overtime). Not agreeing to rest periods however does not constitute a reasonable cause to dismiss an employee for cause. You are still entitled to notice periods and severances depending on your employment history and employment contract. Between 2017 and 2020, an employee was entitled to a 30-minute break within each five hours of work under the legislation passed by the labour-friendly New Democratic government, however, this change was reversed by the United Conservatives in 2020.

In urban areas, U-turns are not permitted on a roadway between intersections and at an alley intersection

Alberta's Driver's Guide says " in urban areas, U-turns are not permitted on a roadway between intersections and at an alley intersection ". What would be the reason or reasons behind the prohibitions? If I have asked the question on the wrong forum, please let me know. Thank you!

The most likely reason is that in the Americas, most cities are built in grids. For the first couple of hundred years of European colonization, grid cities were highly efficient, as it was easy to survey and parcel off property and allowed for movement of pedestrian and equine traffic efficiently in lines (go two blocks up and two blocks right, and you're there). Then, everything changed when the automobile was invented... Most roads were not built with the car in mind and they were a bit faster and less mobile for grid cities. This lead to a situation where many roads in urban cores are more crowded because of cars, but the roads cannot be expanded because the property along them is owned by many different parties, and that's not with historical structures that are protected from being torn down. As such, it may be prudent to add stricter controls to the vehicle flow in cities by limiting the ability to turn around. One of the main disadvantages of grids for automobiles is that there is frequent intersections, which disrupts the flow of traffic because often only one direction can go. Often to ease this, "Right on Red" rules are introduced that allow traffic making right hand turns to do so after stopping for oncoming traffic. This helps reduce the wait for the green light and allows more people to continue on their journey and free up space on that section of a road. Because a U-turn is a wide turn on a left hand turn, it might risk the people who have Right on Red (often times if traffic is only allowed to make left hand turns on a green left hand arrow, the right hand turns are also given a green arrow). U-Turns there for are difficult for Right on Red traffic to predict because there is no way to indicate if a car is making a left or a U. Furthermore, in a grid city, a U-Turn can be achieved by making three lefts and then a right hand turn onto the original road, so it's not much of an inconvenience. This is likely a quirk of Alberta, as the U.S. (where driving rules tend to be similar.) U-turns are typically permitted unless signs specifically disallow it. We do have occasional intersections where signs will indicate a lane can make a U-Turn (these generally have two dedicated left hand turn lanes, with the furthest left turn being a U-turn permitted lane, and all other left turn only lanes not permitting it.).

Turning right from a two-way road onto another two-way road

Alberta's driver's guide says "when turning right from a two-way road onto another two-way road, stay centred in your turning lane, and no more than 1 metre (3 feet) from the curb or edge of the road." However, it then says "If it is safe, complete your turn by turning into the first available traffic lane on the right when there is space to allow you to gently accelerate and change lanes. After you complete the turn, look well ahead along your intended path." Does that mean you don't actually have to stay centred in your original turning lane - you can just turn into the first available traffic lane? Thank you!

I am pretty sure what they mean is "Don't swing wide." That is, cross the lane markings or where the lane marking would be if you went straight across the intersection. Watch vehicles when they turn--a lot of people swing wide (to the left) when turning right. From Connecticut's Driver's Manual (PDF) (emphasis mine): Where there are no signs or lane markings to control turning, you should turn from the lane that is closest to the direction you want to go and turn into the lane closest to the one you came from. This way, you will cross the fewest lanes of traffic. When making turns, go from one lane to the other as directly as possible without crossing lane lines or interfering with traffic. Once you have completed your turn and once it is safe to do so, you can change to another lane if you need to. Remember to always look and signal before changing lanes. • Right turns. On right turns, avoid swinging wide to the left before making the turn . If you swing wide, the driver behind you may think you are changing lanes or going to turn left and may try to pass you on the right. If you swing wide as you complete the turn, drivers who are in the far lane will not expect to see you there.

The difference between the first available exit and any other exit

Alberta's driver's guide says "when you intend to use the first available exit, approach the circle (even though you are already in the circle, intending to exit ...) using the right lane. It also says "when you intend to leave at any other exit, approach the circle (you are already in the circle, but the guide tells you to approach it again ... confusing) using the left lane. My question is: What's the difference between the first available exit and any other exit? I thought if you are in the right lane, you have to stay in that lane when exiting. And if you are in the left lane, you have to stay in that lane when exiting. This is all very confusing to me. Please help and thank you! "Exiting circular intersections Always wait to activate your right turn signal after passing the exit that is before your intended exit. This tells other drivers that you intend to leave the circle at the next exit. When you intend to use the first available exit: • Approach the circle using the right lane. • Use your right signal as you approach. Leave it on until you have exited the circle. • As you approach, scan for pedestrians and cyclists at the crosswalks at the entrance and exits of the circle. • Yield to traffic in the circle. • Exit the circle using the right lane. When you intend to leave at any other exit: • Approach the circle using the left lane. • Activate your left signal to communicate that you do not plan to use the first exit. • As you approach, scan for pedestrians and cyclists at the crosswalks at the entrance and exits of the circle. • Yield to traffic in the circle. • Exit the circle using the left lane."

I think you have understood it correctly. And the diagrams make things clearer as to why, when you are intending to use an exit other than the first exit, it is better to enter the two-lane roundabout via the left lane. The reason is because if you are in the right lane and do not exit, you must be alert to the need to yield to left-lane traffic that might be exiting. Using the left lane when you have planned ahead-of-time that you will not be using the first exit helps avoid a potential yield situation. The guide seems to emphasize that the lane you enter is the lane you should stay in throughout and is the lane you should end up exiting from. This is clear from the diagrams showing that you can exit directly from the left lane (by crossing through the right lane on the way out); it's captioned " Vehicle H must yield to vehicle G ." As far as I can tell, none of that is prescribed by regulation other than the requirement to yield to left-lane traffic. But the material in the guide might inform the standard of care (see also an Alberta example ), and following the guide might be expected as part of a driving test.

What can a lawyer do if the client wants to be acquitted of everything despite serious evidence?

Alex the accused has been charged with a series of crimes. The list of charges is long (beating up his wife, speeding while drunk, trafficking...) and for most crimes, the evidence presented by the state attorney is very strong. Dave the defense attorney, seeing the evidence, suggests his client should follow the "I'm sorry, it will never happen again" strategy to get a small, maybe even suspended sentence. But Alex is very stubborn and sympathizes with the "Reichsbürger"-Movement, so he asks his attorney to plead for innocence, saying that it's his wife, so he can do with her what he wants, and traffic laws, given he is a good driver, won't apply to him etc. Dave is very certain that with this strategy, Alex will not only be convicted and given not only a long prison sentence, but maybe even a long-term preventive detention. What can Dave do to follow the wishes of his client while still representing him as best as he can?

In several civil law systems, including in Switzerland, the involvement of a defence lawyer can be mandatory, even against the will of the accused . If the accused does not appoint a lawyer, a duty lawyer must be appointed by the director of the proceeding (the prosecutor or the judge depending on the stage of the proceedings). The obligation to have a lawyer may extend to important civil cases in some countries before higher courts to avoid wasting judicial resources. In criminal cases, this is also to ensure the accused's rights to a competent, diligent and effective defence. The accused is responsible for the costs of the lawyer, within their financial circumstances and subject to government legal aids, if they are found responsible for procedural costs. All lawyers at bar in a canton are required to accept mandates assigned to them due to obligatory provisions of law, provided that they are competent to do so. This is regulated by art. 130 to 135 of the federal Criminal Procedure Code, in particular, A defence lawyer must be appointed to represent the accused if: a. the period on remand including the period when under arrest has continued for more than 10 days; b. the offence concerned carries a custodial sentence of more than a year or a custodial measure or may result in expulsion from Switzerland; c. the accused is unable to safeguard his or her interests in the proceedings adequately due to his or her physical or mental condition or for other reasons, and his or her statutory representative is unable to do so either; d. the prosecuting lawyer is appearing in person before the court of first instance or the court of appeal; e. accelerated proceedings (Art. 358–362) are being conducted. Essentially, all serious offences are subject to this obligation. Until now this is not a direct answer to the question posed, but it is a factor that shows the relationship between the lawyer and the client is not a simple one. Now going back to your question. In Switzerland, or indeed in most legal systems, the lawyer is to ensure that the accused receives a competent, diligent and effective defense. Indeed, if the public prosecutor or the judge believes or reasonably ought to have believed the defence is clearly incompetent or otherwise negligent in their professional duties, the proceedings must be suspended until a suitable defence is appointed by choice of the accused or by the proceeding director. so he asks his attorney to plead for innocence, saying that it's his wife, so he can do with her what he wants, and traffic laws, given he is a good driver, won't apply to him etc. The lawyer is a professional that must exercise their professional judgement. They are also a 'servant of the law' and a 'collaborator in the administration of justice' and bear responsibility for the correct functioning of the justice system (Federal Court rulings 106 IA 100 , 130 II 270 ). In general, they are not allowed to induce the justice and the authorities in error. Thus, they cannot simply present baseless arguments before the judicial authorities. Dave is very certain that with this strategy, Alex will not only be convicted to a long prison sentence, but maybe even to a long-term preventive detention. What can Dave do to follow the wish of his client while still representing him as best as he can? If the lawyer is convinced that the strategy imposed by the client is clearly contrary to the client's interest, they may decide to withdraw from the mandate, if they can do so without seriously prejudicing the client's interest. This is the case when the accused had chosen their own lawyer, who under contractual law must follow the client's instructions and the recourse to avoid unprofessional conducts is withdrawal. For the duty defence lawyers, the accused cannot waive the right to a defence lawyer, indeed, it is an obligation on the accused, the lawyer and the judicial authority. While the law provides for replacement of the lawyer if the mutual trust between the lawyer and the client is seriously compromised, this is not simply so because the client says so. Loss of confidence on subjective grounds alone does not constitute a reason to change a duty lawyers unless the attitude of the lawyer is seriously prejudicial to the interests of the accused (Federal Court ruling 1B_307/2012 ). For lack of a better analogy, the duty defence lawyer would proceed to represent the interests of the accused as if the accused was mentally deficient or otherwise incompetent (not that the accused is recognized as so with respect to their criminal responsibility, but that the accused is unable, or in this case unwilling, to cooperate fully with the lawyer on their own defence). The duty lawyer can impose their own defence strategy and must do so if they sincerely believe it is in the best interests of their client ( https://www.penalex.ch/faq-avocats/mon-avocat-doffice-peut-il-mimposer-sa-strategie/ ). Of course, the accused still has a right to be directly heard by the court, but such right is not unlimited. They can make their own representations and may note their disagreement with the defence counsel, but the accused does not have the right just ramble for two hours in the court. As it is not an adversarial system, the decision maker will take all circumstances into account and the disagreements between the client and their own counsel (despite being imposed by the law and the state) are not as much of an issue as in an adversarial common law trial. Note that an acquitted accused may still be found responsible for procedural costs (including for any obligatory defence fees) if they had deliberately caused the penal procedure to be opened unlawfully or wrongfully (even if "criminally" not guilty), or that they had deliberately made the proceeding more difficult (e.g. through multiple unjustified requests to change lawyers, or indeed possibly, presenting the arguments of Reichsbürger with insistence). Other consulted references: L'avocat dans la défense pénale : de l'obligation de dire la vérité à un droit de mentir, Flavien Morard https://sui-generis.ch/article/view/sg.53/661

Would a jury have been used in a divorce trial in 1920s England?

Alfred Hitchcock's silent film Easy Virtue opens with a divorce trial, interspersed with flashbacks. The film is set in the 1920s, and the trial is in England. It seems to show a jury meeting and considering the verdict. Is that an accurate depiction of how such a divorce proceeding would have been conducted in that time and place? More generally, are there any common-law countries where a jury is likely to be used in a divorce proceeding? Or any where a jury would have been used in the past? (Or would the particular facts of the story in the movie, such as that her alleged lover left her money in his will, or that he died in a confrontation with her husband, have been a basis to convene a jury, even though a typical divorce in those days wouldn't have used one?)

Short Answer In the 1920s, there was not a right to a trial by jury in a divorce case in England and Wales, but a judge had the authority to order a jury trial in a divorce case, and while this was rare and disfavored, if the judge did so, the jury would have both me and women on it at that time. Or would the particular facts of the story in the movie, such as that her alleged lover left her money in his will, or that he died in a confrontation with her husband, have been a basis to convene a jury, even though a typical divorce in those days wouldn't have used one? This is possible but not decisive. Historically there was a right pre-1883 to have the validity of a Will handled in a trial by jury, but that would not have existed post-1883, and it would be highly unusual to merge a probate case and a divorce case, or a wrongful death case and a divorce case. The most likely time for there to be a jury trial of a divorce in England would be from 1857 to 1883, but the historical evidence isn't decisive from what I have at my disposal in that time period. It could be that the Hitchcock account was based upon accounts of jury trials in divorces from that time period. A more likely scenario is that Hitchcock's script was originally based upon an American jury trial in a divorce, which would have existed in the 1928 when the film was made and in 1925 in New York State where the original stage play debuted, or in the alternative, upon a non-divorce court proceeding in the stage play that it was based upon, related to suicide. This was probably then transplanted to England without legal fact checking (and with a jury) for dramatic effect. Notably, the original stage play which debuted in 1925 in New York City upon which the film was based was only very loosely used as inspiration for the film . The stage play was ambiguous about where the events took place and where the divorce took place. In the original New York City stage production, a New York setting was implied but not stated. In the London stage production that followed not long after the New York City debut, a London setting was probably implied. Neither stage production showed a jury proceeding in the divorce on stage. Long Answer Historically, some common law countries had jury trials on at least whether the marriage could be terminated. According to 56 A.L.R.4th 955 those states included Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Wisconsin. Most of these limit the right to a jury to try issues regarding grounds or entitlement for divorce only. Pennsylvania appears to be such a state. 23 Pennsylvania Statutes § 3322. Colorado appears to have terminated the right to a jury trial when it adopted no fault divorce. Colorado's Dissolution of Marriage Act provides that "All issues raised by these proceedings shall be resolved by the court sitting without a jury." Section 14-10-107(6), Colorado Revised Statutes. Recent case law is in agreement: "All issues raised or presented in a dissolution proceeding are to be resolved by the court in equity sitting without a jury." In re Marriage of Lewis, 66 P.3d 204, 205 (Colo. App. 2003). Georgia, at least, until recently, had quite broad divorce jury trials. Moxley v. Moxley, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 987 (November 28, 2006). Texas has provided jury trial rights most broadly, including even the right to a jury trial on questions regarding child custody. (For citations, see the annotation on the subject at). The reason for the split of authority is that at common law and historically at equity, divorce itself was not available except by legislative special bills particular to a given couple. Most domestic and family property matters were in equity, in which jury trials were not available, but the right to a judicial divorce was a 19th century statutory innovation whose procedure in terms of law or equity had to be determined as a matter of first impression in states where the statute itself did not resolve the question. Divorce as a legal cause of action post-dates the law and equity division that governed the right to a jury trial in other matters in common law countries. Where no fault divorce is the exclusive grounds for divorce and fault was no longer a consideration in resolving substantive matters within a divorce case, jury trials were almost always dispensed with. But, it lingered on in fault based divorce systems, in some cases, even if fault based divorces grew rare. Getting to the point, England adopted fault based judicial divorce by statute in 1857 . Prior to that there were 324 divorces authorized by parliament in English history (from King Henry in 1552, to the second divorce in 1670, to the enactment of the law), only four of which were initiated by women. According to Wikipedia , the highlights of British divorce legislation were as follows: Historically, divorce was not administered as such by the barristers who practised in the common law courts but by the "advocates" and "proctors" who practised civil law from Doctors' Commons, adding to the obscurity of the proceedings. Divorce was de facto restricted to the very wealthy as it demanded either a complex annulment process or a private bill leading to an Act of Parliament, with great costs for either. The latter entailed sometimes lengthy debates about a couple's intimate marital relationship in public in the House of Commons. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 moved litigation from the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts to the civil courts, establishing a model of marriage based on contract rather than sacrament and widening the availability of divorce beyond those who could afford to bring proceedings for annulment or to promote a private Bill. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1923 provided for adultery as sole ground for either husband and wife, not just the husband. Prior to this women had to prove additional fault. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1937 made divorce easier to access, particularly for women, who until then could not get a divorce merely on grounds of adultery, as men could: women needed to show more causes than adultery, such as incest, sodomy, or cruelty. The need for the reforms was illustrated in the best-selling satirical novel Holy Deadlock (1934). The Divorce Reform Act 1969 marked a significant change in that people could end marriages that had "irretrievably broken down" without having to prove fault. They could end marriages after separation of two years, if both parties desired divorce, or five years if only one party desired divorce. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 provided that a marriage had to have lasted for three years before a divorce could be applied for; the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 reduced this period to one year. Either the 1857 Act or the 1923 Act could have been in force in a 1920s setting. Procedurally, the 1857 Act "abolished Ecclesiastical jurisdiction regarding matrimonial matters, and for the first time secular divorces possible (by court order). The Act created a new Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes and gave it jurisdiction to hear and decide civil actions for divorce. Further, it gave rights of audience both to common law barristers and civil law advocates, removing the advocates' previous monopoly in divorce proceedings." The Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes was created by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, which transferred the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts in matters matrimonial to the new court so created. The Judge Ordinary of the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes also presided over the Court of Probate, but the two Courts remained separate entities. On 1 November 1875, under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 and the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875, the Judge Ordinary of the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes was transferred, as its President, to the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice. The High Court of Justice 's jurisdiction over divorce cases has continued thorough the present, with the High Court of Justice now having a Queen's Bench Division, a Chancery Court Division and a Family Court Division. The 1875 Act that created the High Court effectively merged law and equity into a single bureaucratic institution in English law . The High Court of Justice was established in 1875 by the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873. The Act merged eight existing English courts—the Court of Chancery, the Court of Queen's Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, the Court of Exchequer, the High Court of Admiralty, the Court of Probate, the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, and the London Court of Bankruptcy—into a new Supreme Court of Judicature (now known as the Senior Courts of England and Wales). The new Supreme Court was divided into the Court of Appeal, which exercised appellate jurisdiction, and the High Court, which exercised original jurisdiction. Originally, the High Court consisted of five divisions—the King’s Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer, Chancery, and Probate, Divorce and Admiralty divisions. In 1880, the Common Pleas and Exchequer divisions were abolished, leaving three divisions. The Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division was renamed to the Family Division by the Administration of Justice Act 1970, and its jurisdiction reorganised accordingly. In the 1920s divorces would have been heard in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty division of the High Court, with the King's Bench and Chancery divisions co-existing with it, and the Family division not yet in existence. The Kings/Queen's Bench division handled cases arising in "law" rather than "equity". The Chancery division was a court of equity in which jury trials were not used. The primary innovation with regard to jury trials in the High Court came in 1883: Another change was made by the rules of 1883, which was regarded by some common law lawyers as revolutionary. Formerly every issue of fact in a common law action, including the amount of damage, had to be decided by the verdict of a jury. "The effect of the rules of 1883," said Lord Lindley, who was a member of the rule committee, "was to make trial without a jury the normal mode of trial, except where trial with a jury is ordered under rules 6 or 7a, or may be had without an order under rule 2". 7 The effect of the rules may be thus summarised: In the Chancery division no trial by jury unless ordered by the judge. Generally the judge could order trial without a jury of any cause or issue, which before the Judicature Act might have been so tried without consent of parties, or which involves prolonged investigation of documents or accounts, or scientific or local investigation. Either party had a right to a jury in actions of slander, libel, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, seduction or breach of promise of marriage , upon notice without order; or in any other action, by order. Subject as above, actions were to be tried without a jury unless the judge, of his own motion, otherwise orders. As emphasized above, as of 1883, there was a right to a trial by jury in "heart balm actions" but not for a divorce itself, in which case a trial by jury was in the discretion of the court and was disfavored. A seduction action is one brought by a woman induced to have sex before marriage based upon a misrepresentation and would be brought by the father against the man who had sex with her. A breach of promise to marry action was a form of breach of contract lawsuit brought when a formally engaged couple did not marry, and could only be brought by a woman against a man (a woman has a common law right to change her mind about a marriage engagement). So, neither of these actions could have been part of a divorce lawsuit. This Court rule was formalized as a statute in 1933 . The role of civil juries in England and Wales further contracted over time due to case law and other developments, to the point that : "In 1998 less than 1% of civil trials in England and Wales were jury trials and these were principally defamation cases." Women began to serve on juries in England and Wales in 1919 . Scottish jury practice and procedure has always been separate from that of England and Wales.

Use of aliases in contracts between parties

Aliases were used in the infamous hush agreement involving Donald Trump and Stephanie Clifford. The alias for Donald Trump was David Denison and the alias for Stephanie Clifford was Peggy Peterson. Did the document state who the aliases stood for? How could the agreement be enforced as an agreement between Trump and Clifford if it seems the agreement involved neither of them?

A contract is an agreement between 2 or more people - who cares what they call themselves? If someone asserts that the person named in the contract is you and you assert that it isn’t then they would need to provide sufficient evidence to prove it was you on the balance of probabilities. It the contract has your name on it rather than an alias this is obviously easier.

Can victims of defamation get restitution from people who acted on the defamatory statements?

Alice accuses Bob of animal abuse. She uses her moderate social media following to harass Bob and get him fired, by having dozens of people call his job and demand to know why they employ an animal abuser. Bob has not abused any animals, Alice has no evidence, and Bob has proof directly and incontrovertibly contradicting her claims. The trial is a slam-dunk win for Bob. Bob had a well-paying job, Alice is broke, and so could not possibly pay for Bob's lost pay. Can Bob seek remedy from his former employer somehow?

To make headway in a suit against the employer, Bob has to establish that the employer has a duty to not fire him. In the US, firing could be illegal as discriminatory, but being an alleged animal abuser is not a protected class. There are other forms of wrongful termination such as retaliation for a legal action by the employee (reporting a wrong-doing or filing a workman's comp claim). In California, Connecticut, South Carolina, and Louisiana, political expression is a protected activity but otherwise you can be fires for being red in a blue shop. Montana does not adhere to the at-will employment doctrine, so after the probationary period, you can only be fired for good cause which means reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the employer's operation, or other legitimate business reason. The legal use of a lawful product by an individual off the employer's premises during nonworking hours is not a legitimate business reason, unless the employer acts within the provisions of 39-2-313(3) or (4). Elsewhere it reduces to a contractual question. As a tenured professor in the state university system of Ohio, there are specific criteria for firing Bob, which do not include being an actual animal abuser. So Bob might prevail in a lawsuit for damages against the university. But as a programmer working for Microsoft, pursuant to para 2 of the employment contract , Bob can be fired at any time for any reason. As a star player for the Seattle Supersonics ( cough ), there is a specially crafted clause in the contract that only allows termination of the contract before the end of the 5 year term for "egregiously immoral behavior". In that case, Bob would likely prevail in the lawsuit since he did not engage in egregiously immoral behavior, by any reasonable understanding of the expression. Barring such a contract clause, Bob is out of luck in a lawsuit against the employer.

Assault while commiting a felony

Alice and Bob accost Carol as she gets out of her car and steal it. In the process, Carol is struck and injured. The police find and arrest Alice, but Bob evades capture. If Alice is charged with assault (in addition to grand theft), can she defend herself by saying (essentially), " I helped steal the car, but I didn't hit the woman. Bob did."? Or is that claim irrelevant? This happens in the state of Maryland.

Claim is irrelevant. Specific to Maryland Law, Assault occurs when one makes or attempts to make physical contact with another OR intentionally frightens another. Alice saying she helped to steal the car and your definition of the theft as "accosted Carol" implies one of the three forms of Assault took place. Alice just admitted to commiting the crime she thought was wrongly charged to her. The crime she was trying to get out of is called "Assault and Battery" which is where Assault leads to actual injury or physical harm to the victim OR attempts to actually injure or harm another OR puts them in fear of such action. In Maryland Law, the Battery portion almost always is paired with assault while in other states, it might be possible to commit Battery without Assault (though in these states, normally a separate assault charge to Battery is usually added.). As a helpful tip, the two words general break down as follows: Assault: The act of threatening harm or making unwanted non-injurious contact with another person. Battery: Causing Injurious Harm to another person. In Maryland, Alice was rightly charged with assault. Upon capture, Bob will recieve an "Assault and Battery" charge for hitting Carol with the stolen card and may get an addition simple Assault charge for the threats before he drove away.

Driver's liability for friend passenger's losses in an accident

Alice and Bob are friends. One day they decide to go on a road trip in Bob's car. It has started freezing and the road may be icy. Bob drives below the speed limit and applies some extra care that he thinks is adequate, but his experience in driving on icy roads is by no means broad/extensive. In particular, he does not know that bridges freeze first, and signs saying that are missing — they are just not common there. The car enters a bridge, loses control and rolls over. Because the two wear seat belts, the car is rigid and they are very lucky they manage to escape the car — shaken but with only minor or no injures. However, Alice's jacket is damaged. Also she is concerned that she might have been injured, so she visits a doctor for checkup. The doctor finds nothing requiring medical care. The police investigates the incident and issues Written Traffic Warning to Bob, alleging him of Careless Driving . No charges are laid. Alice attempts to claim the costs of the doctor checkup and the jacket. Will she succeed? Jurisdiction: New Zealand, but also interested in any others.

Barring any specific statute the relevant law is the tort of negligence. To succeed Alice must prove Bob: had a duty to Alice, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to Alice, and Alice was, in fact, harmed or damaged. She will probably succeed on 1, 3 and 4 where she will struggle is with 2. It seems that Bob did everything a reasonable person could do to avoid the accident. The only possible hope is that not knowing that bridges freeze first might be something a qualified NZ driver should know and that he breached his duty by not knowing if that is something the judge considers reasonable. The traffic warning is irrelevant and untested (and untestable) hearsay and should be excluded from evidence.

Can someone be liable if they make someone so angry they die?

Alice and Bob are having an argument on the internet about the Charlie and the Chocolate Factory adaptations- specifically which had better oompah loompahs. While Alice prefers the later ones from the Johnny Depp film, Bob very strongly likes the orange ones. The argument becomes extremely heated and a cutting remark from Alice enrages Bob. Unbeknownst to Alice, Bob had a severe heart condition and the rage sends him into cardiac arrest. He dies minutes later. When Mrs. Bob discovers him, she sees the full transcript of the debate. (i.e. for this hypothetical, all relevant facts are known and provable). Could Alice face criminal charges and/or be found liable in a civil case? Juristiction is the US, but they're in different states.

No. There could be a remote possibility if Alice knew of Bob's severe heart condition (but even then, no reasonable person would expect someone to get a heart attack out of disagreement over personal tastes however heated/cutting). But as she does not, no chances. Poor Mr and Mrs Bob.

Does a contract modification need all the elements of a contract?

Alice and Bob have a contract. One day they mutually agree to modify it. Does the modification need to have all the elements of a new contract? In particular, does it need to have a consideration on both sides? Typical scenario is employee's annual pay rise. The employer raises the pay, the employee agrees. But what is his/her new consideration for the employer? Does the absence of one render the pay rise unenforceable? (This question has been inspired by this one ).

In general, yes See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? That said, contracts can contain terms allowing for the terms to be varied - either unilaterally or bilaterally. If so, then a variation that followed this term would be valid without having to meet the requirements. The scope of this term can be as broad (i.e. allowing modification of all terms) or narrow (e.g. only allowing modification of some terms). Sometimes, such a term is so ubiquitous in some industries (e.g. building and construction contracts) that the courts will imply it into the contract as "common industry practice" if it is not explicit. By and large, that is what is going on with employee pay rises - the ability of an employer to offer pay rises without consideration from the employee is so ubiquitous (in all industries) that it can be considered to be implicit in an employment contract. You are quite right that continuing to perform the obligations you already have under a contract is not sufficient (in the legal sense) consideration.

Is taking a screenshot or photograph of e.g. a third person's ebay's account as evidence legal?

Alice and Bob live in a flat together. Bob mentions to Alice, that he is buying and reselling merchandise but not reporting it to the tax office, because he does not want to register a business. One day, Bob leaves the flat but leaves his computer turned on and the door to his room open. Alice looks at the monitor, sees the evidence for tax fraud in the online selling/buying history and decides to take pictures of it to report it to the authorities. Is Alice within legal boundaries?

Don't do it. So clearly tax fraud is bad and the state can prosecute this when tipped off. Alice is also clearly allowed to report the possible tax fraud to authorities and to serve as a witness if necessary. The problem is that Alice can expose herself to various liabilities, and could be sued by Bob or by the state. On what grounds did Alice snoop around in Bob's room? Even if they are roommates, Alice might not have a right to enter the room. Even if she has grounds to enter the room, she might not have permission to trawl through Bob's private stuff. A glance at a computer screen is also quite unlikely to show evidence of tax fraud, as even selling lots of stuff does not imply running a business. 1 On what grounds can Alice collect and share personal data with authorities? There is no constitutional right for snooping and snitching. 2 Alice must instead identify a legal basis for sharing such screenshots or pictures with third parties. Data protection law such as the GDPR does recognize that there might be a legitimate interest, but Alice is unlikely to have such a legitimate interest unless she is personally affected by Bob breaking the law. For example, some people have been sued for overly enthusiastic reports of parking violations. Footnotes: People can sell goods e.g. on eBay without running a business that would have to be registered with the tax office. A business in this context is any regular business-like for-profit activity. Thus, a registration might not be necessary for occasional activity, or if the activity isn't for profit. For example, a person selling their old stuff for less than they bought it for is not acting with a profit motive. Even if there is occasional profit, this can be a privates Veräußerungsgeschäft (private sale). Whether such a sale is taxable depends on the duration between acquisition and sale. If it is taxable, it has to be reported as part of income tax filings. Generally, the profit is free from income tax after one year. VAT is a different matter. Private sales don't involve VAT. When a sole proprietor registers a business, they can elect to ignore VAT until they reach certain turnover or profit limits ( Kleinunternehmerregelung ). This kind of tax fraud is typically not a crime, and more of an administrative offence. Thus, intrusive investigations are not proportional – and even then, they would be up to the state, not to individuals. It is worth noting that Germany has extremely poor whistleblower protections and has failed to implement relevant EU laws.

Is there criminal or civil liability for sabotaging or lying about the use of contraception, which then results in a pregnancy?

Alice and Bob, both unmarried adults, engage in consensual intercourse. Alice lies to Bob about her use of contraception or sabotages Bob's use of contraception, and as a result, Alice becomes pregnant. Alternatively, Bob and Alice, both unmarried adults, engage in consensual intercourse. Bob lies to Alice about his use of contraception or sabotages Alice's use of contraception, and as a result, Alice becomes pregnant. In either case, could there be any criminal or civil liability? I'm not talking about child support or any custody issues. Any jurisdiction.

canada criminal-law These acts could be sexual assault. Pregnancy is irrelevant to the analysis. Deviating from the sexual activity consented to A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Kirkpatrick , 2022 SCC 33 , in the context of a sexual assault charge, held that where birth control measures "change the physical act itself, like condom use" they are part of the "sexual activity in question" that is being consented to. Deviation from that activity is stepping outside of the consent. For the majority, birth control measures can very well change the physical act and can be a condition of a complainant's consent. In Kirkpatrick the issue was condom use, but the language the majority used was "birth control measures." Whether birth control measures are in fact alter the physical act to which consent is granted in particular circumstances depends on the facts of the scenario. See para. 100. What matters is whether the method of birth control changes the physical nature of the act (not whether the purpose was to prevent pregnancy) and whether consent was conditioned on that. So methods like diaphragms, condoms (penile and vaginal variants), and other barrier methods are all probably relevant. Consent vitiated by fraud There is an alternate path to sexual assault: if the consent was vitiated by "deceptions about the conditions or qualities of the physical act." See R. v. Hutchinson , 2014 SCC 19 . Deceptions that deprive a person from the choice not to become pregnant, or exposing a person to an increased risk of becoming pregnant, or exposing a person to a significant risk of bodily harm such as a risk of contracting sexually transmitted diseases can all vitiate consent. This path to sexual assault is not as straightforward as the path described above from Kirkpatrick , as it requires a showing of dishonesty, which can include non‑disclosure of important facts, and a risk of serious bodily harm ( R. v. Cuerrier , [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371 ). At least one court has said this reasoning does not apply when a person falsely represents that they are taking a birth control pill and then gets pregnant ( PP v. DD , 2017 ONCA 180 ). This was in the context of a civil claim for sexual battery, but the court considered the reasoning from Cuerrier and found it was not analogous because the deceit had "no physically injurious consequences" for the plaintiff. The court recognized the consequences of a person having to support a child, but in the context of a wrong based on physical contact, what matters is physical damage. the appellant's alleged damage is principally emotional harm or, in other words, hurt feelings and lost aspirations and/or career opportunities flowing from the birth of his child. His situation, as a man, is quite different from that of the woman. Clearly, there are profound physical and psychological effects on a mother undergoing a pregnancy that do not apply to the father of the child. The appellant was not exposed to any serious transmissible disease or other significant risk of serious bodily harm flowing from the intercourse. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the appellant was willing to assume some risk, albeit small, that pregnancy would result from the several instances of sexual intercourse, a risk present even where the woman is taking contraceptive pills.

What crime could occur while processing non-fungible tokens without copyright?

Alice creates a non-fungible token (NFT) of a digital file that they do not own copyright of. She adds the token to the ethereum blockchain, and creates a transaction that transfers it to a wallet controlled by Bob. Bob does not download the blockchain, but keeps his keys safe. Charlie knows nothing about this exchange, but downloads the blockchain and mines the block that represents the transaction. Dawn also has the blockchain, and downloads the newly mined block and adds it to her copy (as does everyone else in the world with a copy of the blockchain). It seems to me that the NFT is a derivative work of the original file, and therefore if Alice was located in the US she would be breaching copyright in creating the NFT, and in distributing it by adding it to the blockchain. Bob has never seen the NFT and has never created a copy of it, but has the theoretical ability to create transactions involving it that would be recognised as valid by others. Charlie has created a copy of the NFT (by downloading the blockchain) and distributed a derivative (by publishing the mined block) but has no knowledge of any infringing activity. Dawn has created a copy of the NFT. If Alice was in the US, and therefore breaching copyright law in creating the NFT, are Bob, Charlie and/or Dawn either committing any crimes, or exposing themselves to potential civil charges? If Alice was in a jurisdiction which did not recognise the copyright on the original work (perhaps Iran ?) does this change the situation? What about if Charlie is?

NFTs typically link to the file, but do not include it. Thus, no copyright concerns apply. Specifically: NFTs have an opaque identifier that ensures each NFT is unique. You can ascribe any meaning you want to to these identifiers, for example that a particular token identifier represents the Mona Lisa, and that another ID represents this answer. However, the NFT can have associated metadata. This metadata contains a description of the thing represented by the token, e.g. a URL that links to some artwork. For details on the most common NFT systems, see the specifications EIP-721 and EIP-1155 . Of course, the metadata could include copyrighted material, e.g. a poem or a binary encoding of an image. However, it would be very expensive to create such a large token.

Inheritance after name change

Alice creates a will that names her child, Bob, as a beneficiary. Some time later, Bob legally changes their name to Bernice. Assuming the will is not updated, will Bernice still inherit their share of Alice's estate? What does Bernice have to do, if anything, to show they were previously Bob? I'll pick Maryland as an example state, but differing rules in other states would be interesting as well.

A will should clearly identify the person A name is part of identifying someone but I’m sure there are hundreds of thousands of Bobs in the world. Which did Alice mean? So long as there is one and only one beneficiary claiming to be Bob, if they can demonstrate that they are the Bob then they get the cash irrespective of what they go by. If several Bobs present themselves to the executor then that poor bastard has to decide which is the Bob. They can reasonably expect the other Bobs to challenge this in which case the who estate gets eaten away by legal fees and nobody gets anything. Except the lawyers. Well drafted wills use both a name (if known, wills can give bequests to potential people like children you don’t have yet) and a relationship to the testator - “My son Bob”, “My army buddy Bob who I served in Afghanistan with in 2005” etc. This identifies the person unambiguously and doesn’t rely on things that can change. Your daughter Bernice is quite clearly the same person as your child Bob. A really well drafted will should still work even if Bob is dead. This is why Alice should have hired a lawyer.

Is it legal to use a laser to protect privacy vs. CCTV camera?

Alice has a garden that is not overlooked by any windows, but is next door to a commercial car park that has a CCTV camera on a pole within a plastic hemisphere that does not allow an observer to see where the camera is pointing. She would like to sunbathe, but is concerned she will be watched by the CCTV operator. To prevent this she sets up a Class IIIa/3R laser pointer located at her sunbed pointing at the camera. Her assumption is that if the camera is not looking at her it will have no effect, but if it is it will blind but not damage it . What is the legality of Alice's actions? Any jurisdiction would be interesting.

It's illegal to (temporarily) break an item The commercial car park owner may not aim the camera at Alice garden. However, even if it does so, breaking the camera or damaging it is still illegal - as one of the various forms of destruction/damaging of property colloquially called vandalism. Do note that the very article and the clasification of laser OP links to points out that *even a low-powered "pet-safe" IIIb/3R laser leaves out burnt-out pixels with a pinkish surrounding. These might not be enough to prevent identification when not aiming the laser into the camera, but they are damage to the sensor. The very article also describes how the camera damage progresses even after exposure, possibly due to the high power lasers. However, even if no such damage occurs, the owner of the camera is (temporarily) deprived of its legal uses while the laser is pointed on it, which is in many jurisdictions enough to count as theft.

Is it legal to use force against a person who is trying to stop you from rescuing another person?

Alice has been severely injured or is otherwise in danger. Eve wants to help Alice, but Bob is somehow preventing her from getting to Alice. Assume that Bob is not threatening to harm Eve; he is only preventing her from helping Alice. Perhaps Eve needs to walk down a narrow hallway and Bob is blocking it and refusing to move; there is no alternative way to rescue Alice. Is it legal for Eve to use physical force against Bob in order to rescue Alice? Does it matter whether or not Bob is responsible for Alice's injury or endangerment?

germany Bob through his actions is harming Alice. Thus Eve may use the minimum necessary force to help Alice as Nothilfe , which is defined as using §32 StGB (Self protection/Notwehr) and §34 StGB (justifying state of emergency/Rechtfertigender Notstand). As a result, it is allowed to harm someone to the degree of self protection for the benefit of someone else that can't protect themselves - such as Alice. However, the amount of force allowed must be proportional to the harm done to Alice - so Eve may use the least needed amount of force to get Bob from stopping Eve from helping Alice. As an example, Eve might shove Bob out of the way, hit him, or use the threat of serious harm (which is usually illegal!) to deter Bob from getting in the way, but unless Alice is actually at risk of dying from Bob keeping her from applying pressure on a lacerated artery this very moment, she can't shoot at Bob - that would overstep the Notwehr, but might not be punished if the overstepping is for the right reasons defined in §33 StGB. Bob also is liable for not rendering aid, §323c StGB unterlassene Hilfeleistung/Behinderung von hilfeleistenden Personen (Failure to provide assistance/hindering persons providing assistance).

Does one have legal right to access possessions "land locked" in a co-tenant's room?

Alice has possessions in a storage closet that requires traversing roommate Bob's bedroom to access. There was a preexisting oral agreement granting Alice reasonable easement. Bob eventually decides to deny Alice access to this room with posted notice. Obeying this is denying Alice access to her possessions, she now cannot remove them. There is no dispute over ownership of the possessions, both declare them to be Alice's. Q: Can Alice legally disregard this notice despite Bob's intentions? Does doing so constitute invasion of privacy or trespassing? Related questions: How legal is this for Bob to do in the first place? Can Bob do this indefinitely? Can Alice get the law to grant easement if she can't just enter-at-will? Does it matter if there was a preexisting oral agreement granting easement?

My answer would be different if either Alice or Bob was the landlord, or the landlord had a separate agreement with Alice and Bob. If a single lease is written, per the comment, that Alice and Bob are components of "the tenants", and "the tenants" have rented the named premises, then they all have equal rights to occupy the whole premises under the lease. If the landlord is professional I will further presume they all have joint and several liability for the whole rent; it would be inequitable to alienate Alice with joint and several liability from any part of the premises without her consent. If there is a separate roommate agreement that allocates rooms and expected share of rent or controls behaviors, then that is a contract that can form as a meeting of the minds of the roommates where they each trade something of value, such as exclusive use of a room. The narrative suggests an original verbal agreement that Bob would like to change. That's nice but Alice doesn't have to agree; or can agree with other changes of value to her such as the ratio of expected rent reflecting the ratio of use and access to the space Alice would have.

Is a response to a N5B section 21 accelerated claim required to be given on the dedicated form N11B?

Alice has received an accelerated section 21 claim from the court on form N5B, which legally is invalid. There exists a long and quite involved form intended for use in answering N5B accelerated claims, namely form N11B. Alice instead submits her defence to the claim on a simple handwritten and signed letter indicating her case number, and stating the reason why the claim is properly invalid and her desire to plead this in a hearing. What happens with this letter when it is received by the court, as it is not on the intended form, and what happens with the case more generally? Does it get listed for a hearing? Do the contents of her letter reach or get considered by the judge?

Is a response to a N5B section 21 accelerated claim required to be given on the dedicated form N11B? YES . Assuming this refers to an accelerated possession claim on property let on an assured shorthold tenancy in England then Rule 55.14 Civil Procedure Rules applies: A defendant who wishes to – (a) oppose the claim; or (b) seek a postponement of possession in accordance with rule 55.18, must file his defence within 14 days after service of the claim form. (2) The defence should be in the form set out in Practice Direction 55A. Practice Direction 55A , at Rule 1.5, states: [...) The defence must be in form N11, N11B , N11M or N11R, as appropriate. The use of must is well established in British law as meaning a non-optional obligation (unlike should ). It is not, as far as I can see, defined by statute so the courts' convention is to use the normal meaning of the word by reference to the Oxford English Dictionary. The recently revised free online version has limited availability but the previous version merged with Dictionary.com which offers these examples: 1 to be obliged or bound to by an imperative requirement 2 to be under the necessity to; need to The use of must in Rule 1.5, by my reading, trumps the use of should in Rule 55.14 but Alice might be able to argue this apparent contradictory terminology as to why her case for her defence is submitted by letter rather than the prescribed form. What happens with this letter when it is received by the court...what happens with the case more generally? Does it get listed for a hearing? Do the contents of her letter reach or get considered by the judge? All that would be a matter for the court to decide and could go either way: a judge has the inherent power to deal with matters in his own court as he sees fit (within the limits of the law etc).

What intellectual property rights are being surrendered with this contract?

Alice has worked for an quango/academic organisation “The Establishment”, which is part of a larger “Wider Establishment” for some years. She was recently made redundant on pretty good terms and ended her employment on friendly terms with “The Establishment”. There is a bit of work that is in the interests of both Alice and “The Establishment” to complete and publish in a peer reviewed journal. To this end it has been agreed that Alice will have to desk space and high performance computing (HPC) resources to complete and write up this work, while receiving no pay or other compensation, other than the prestige of being author of said paper. As part of this Alice is required to sign a document that contains the following terms: It is important for “The Establishment” as part of “Wider Establishment” to take ownership of all inventions arising from research in its establishments, and Visiting Workers undertaking research in “The Establishment” are therefore required, as set out below, to agree to assign to the “The Establishment” as part of “Wider Establishment” any rights they may have in intellectual property, and material arising from their research in “The Establishment”. If, during the course of your period of work in “The Establishment”, you believe that you may have developed commercially exploitable technology please inform your supervisor, the “The Establishment” Director or local Technology Transfer Office (as applicable). Income to “The Establishment” as part of “Wider Establishment” from licensing of inventions is allocated between inventors, the “The Establishment” budget and central “The Establishment” funds in accordance with the terms of the “The Establishment” Awards to Inventors Scheme. Alice wants to initiate work in a different field as part of a potential startup business as the next stage of her career, with the intention of producing valuable intellectual property. No “The Establishment” resources are used in this work. Skills gained during the years of employment are essential for this work. Alice has the following work pattern: Month 1 Works 9-5 5 days a week in the office Produces copyrighted work A, patent application X during evenings and weekends Month 2 Spends a couple of days in the office setting of big jobs on the HPC which run for a month, at the end of the month spends a couple of days in the office processing results. Submits paper to peer review. Produces copyrighted work B, patent application Y during other days Month 3 Comes in for 1 hour to celebrate papers acceptance at the end of the month Produces copyrighted work C, patent application Z during month Which of these items of intellectual property could be claimed by “The Establishment”?

I think this is the troubling paragraph: If, during the course of your period of work in “The Establishment”, you believe that you may have developed commercially exploitable technology please inform your supervisor, the “The Establishment” Director or local Technology Transfer Office (as applicable). Alice is aware of work that is commercially exploitable in the situation you describe above. No qualifications are given, in this statement, as to when the work is performed or on whose equipment. In my non-lawyer opinion the Establishment would own rights to all work and patent applications mentioned in the scenario above. In fact if all work was begun after month 3, the Establishment might be able to prove that Alice was aware of these projects prior to the celebration, and thus they own a stake in them. So I would either change the agreement and have the results reviewed by Alice's own lawyer; or, forget the paper. It is a lot of work for something that will likely mean nothing to the profitability of these ventures.

After employing the services of an 'architect' then later finding they are not a registered architect, can the contract be cancelled? (UK)

Alice hires Bob to do architectural work and refers to him as an architect once verbally and once in writing. Bob does not correct her. Bob never actually calls himself an architect nor advertises himself as one but does use phrases such as "here is a quote for the architectural work". On the quote Bob writes his name but there is no job title or letters after his name. Alice then discovers Bob is not a registered architect. Can Alice rescind the contract, or is she obligated to pay him?

Employed services of 'architect' but found the person is not an architect, can I cancel contract? (UK) Yes, you are entitled to rescind the contract. In terms of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §153 (US law), your basic assumption was the belief that that person is an architect. That belief is " not accord with the facts ", Id at §151, his silence and inducement in that respect are tantamount to misrepresentation, and at no point did you purport to disregard the possible or actual inaccuracy of that belief, Id at §154. Therefore, the contract is voidable by you. Also under UK law " [t]he normal remedy for misrepresentation is rescission [...] Rescission is prima facie available if "practical justice" can be done ". See Salt v Stratstone Specialist LTD [2015], pars. 24, 30 . He not only knowingly failed to make the pertinent disclaimer or clarification despite your multiple references to him as "architect", but his written --and thus readily provable-- statement " Thank you for inviting me to quote for the architectural work " evidences his willful reinforcement of your belief that he was an architect. That is because an architect is presumed to be the right individual for devising a quote for architectural work. This person's statement and the circumstances you describe fall within scope of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, s.50 (1) (not that subsection (2) is equivalent to the Restatement at §154 and therefore inapplicable to these circumstances). His inability to satisfy your implied requirement that the job be performed by an architect, coupled with other significant flaws you identified, indicates that he cannot comply with the terms of the contract. Accordingly, the situation warrants rescission.