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What makes a car not a “negotiable” chattel?

Another answer contrasts negotiable instruments like currency with the example of a car where a thief of the car doesn’t “own” the car and cannot transfer ownership. What is it about a car that makes it different from the currency?

The question makes more sense if you ask it in the other direction. Everything that is not currency, pretty much, is like the car. Currency is the pretty much singular exception to this rule, by sheer force of laws designed to facilitate free transferability of currency without friction. Currency is special property because it is defined as such. See also this answer .

What is a slip opinion?

Another answer mentions slip opinions being not yet bound into a volume. Who is it that does this binding, which seems to canonise certain decisions in a certain sense, if only by making them more referable and accessible. Who makes these decisions of what decisions are worthy of such binding?

All supreme court decisions are bound. The slip decision merely serves the purpose of making the decision available for reference before the binding has taken place. See https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/21 : “Slip” opinions are the first version of the Court’s opinions posted on this website. A “slip” opinion consists of the majority or principal opinion, any concurring or dissenting opinions written by the Justices, and a prefatory syllabus prepared by the Reporter’s Office that summarizes the decision. The slip opinions collected here are those issued during October Term 2021 (October 4, 2021, through October 2, 2022). These opinions are posted on the website within minutes after the opinions are issued and will remain posted until the opinions for the entire Term are published in the bound volumes of the United States Reports. See also https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/USReports.aspx : The opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States are published officially in a set of case books called the United States Reports. See 28 U. S. C. §411. Bound Volumes: The bound volumes of the U. S. Reports are the final generation of the Court’s opinions. See Information About Opinions. The bound volumes of the U. S. Reports collected here contain the full text, from cover through index, of volumes 502 et seq., including all of the opinions, orders, and other materials issued for the Court’s 1991 Term and subsequent years. Additional volumes will be posted here after they are published. Preliminary Prints: Each bound volume of the U. S. Reports is preceded by “preliminary prints” which are brown, soft-cover “advance pamphlets” that contain the same materials and features of the U. S. Reports. See Information About Opinions. The contents of two or three preliminary prints will eventually be combined into a single bound volume. Thus, the title of each preliminary print includes a part number, e.g., Preliminary Print, Volume 577, Part 1. Prior to publication, all of the materials that go into a preliminary print undergo an extensive editing and indexing process, and permanent page numbers are assigned that will carry over into the bound volume. 28 USC 411: Supreme Court reports; printing, binding, and distribution (a) The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States shall be printed, bound, and distributed in the preliminary prints and bound volumes of the United States Reports as soon as practicable after rendition, to be charged to the proper appropriation for the judiciary. The number and distribution of the copies shall be under the control of the Joint Committee on Printing. (b) Reports printed prior to June 12, 1926, shall not be furnished the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air Force. (c) The Director of the Government Publishing Office, or other printer designated by the Supreme Court of the United States, upon request, shall furnish to the Superintendent of Documents the reports required to be distributed under the provisions of this section.

What is the "fringe on the flag" argument?

Another answer on this question refers to the "fringe on the flag" category of arguments. What is the "fringe on the flag" argument?

See Meads v. Meads , 2012 ABQB 571 , para. 272 OPCA litigants who advance these schemes will often focus on certain aspects of court formalities. Like Mr. Meads, they may scrutinize the court for some hidden indication of its true nature. A strange but common belief is that a flag with yellow or gold thread ‘fringes’ “denotes a military jurisdiction, not common law” . In R. v. J.B.C. Securities Ltd. , 2003 NBCA 53 at para. 2, 261 N.B.R. (2d) 199, Chief Justice Drapeau of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal rejected a motion by Lindsay “... removing the gold‑fringed Canadian flag that has adorned the Court of Appeal’s hearing room for years ...”. This motion, and the argument that “[t]here is no lawful reason for a Canadian flag to be present other than the regular statutory authorized flag” was frivolous and vexatious: para. 9.

What jurisdictions allow civil claims to be served over social media?

Another answer vaguely mentions that "some jurisdictions" even allow process service over social media. This is interesting. What jurisdictions does this include?

No jurisdiction of which I am aware allows for service of process to be made via social media as a matter of course. But some jurisdictions (indeed, almost all U.S. jurisdictions) allow what is called "substituted service" by a means not usually allowed in cases where it would normally not be permitted if service can not be obtained by standard means of personal delivery to the person being served, or personal delivery to someone else authorized by court rule or statute to accept service on behalf of the person being served, that is reasonably calculated to provide actual notice to a defendant. In Colorado, for example, the usual means of making service of process are set forth in Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e), but Colorado Rule of Civl Procedure 4(f) allows a party seeking to serve someone with process who has made duly diligent efforts to do so via the Rule 4(e) methods to instead serve process by a customized means set forth in Rule 4(f) which states: (f) Substituted Service. In the event that a party attempting service of process by personal service under section (e) is unable to accomplish service, and service by publication or mail is not otherwise permitted under section (g), the party may file a motion, supported by an affidavit of the person attempting service, for an order for substituted service. The motion shall state (1) the efforts made to obtain personal service and the reason that personal service could not be obtained, (2) the identity of the person to whom the party wishes to deliver the process, and (3) the address, or last known address of the workplace and residence, if known, of the party upon whom service is to be effected. If the court is satisfied that due diligence has been used to attempt personal service under section (e), that further attempts to obtain service under section (e) would be to no avail, and that the person to whom delivery of the process is appropriate under the circumstances and reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the party upon whom service is to be effective, it shall: (1) authorize delivery to be made to the person deemed appropriate for service, and (2) order the process to be mailed to the address(es) of the party to be served by substituted service, as set forth in the motion, on or before the date of delivery. Service shall be complete on the date of delivery to the person deemed appropriate for service. Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 4(g) provides for service of process by mailing and publication in certain in rem lawsuits (e.g. a quiet title action to determine who owns real property), but "publication" in that rule has a statutorily defined definition of what publications count for service by publication and that excludes social media.

If an officer has a warrant to collect an electronic device, can the owner insist it's turned off first?

Another theoretical question just out of curiosity. Lets say that an officer has gotten a warrant to take/search an individuals laptop in the United States and comes to serve it. At the moment the officer appears to serve the warrant the individual has the laptop on (or in hibernation mode) and with incriminating data being viewed. If the laptop was taken as-is the incriminating data could be viewed when taken out of hibernate mode to be inspected later, but the data could not be retrieved if the computer was turned off completely (he's using an incognito browser or encrypted drive etc to cover his tracks). Does the person being searched have the right to demand the computer be turned off before it is taken on the grounds that the warrant is only for the computer, not for the activity he is currently involved in? Assuming the question is yes then as a follow up question what could the individual do if the computer was not turned off and the state tries to take him to trial using evidence that was only accessible because the device was not deactivated? could he get the evidence dismissed? Would he have to have requested, and been denied, that the computer be deactivated before confiscation for the evidence to be dismissed, or could he retroactively point out it should have been? In short, could I justify police knowing someone is guilty because of content he had viewed in a private browser at the moment the computer was confiscated, but being unable to prosecute because it isn't legally viable?

Does the person being searched have the right to demand the computer be turned off before it is taken on the grounds that the warrant is only for the computer, not for the activity he is currently involved in? No. A warrant will often specify that both information (which they have a reasonable suspicion is on the computer) and the computer itself (as contraband) are in the scope of the warrant. Even if it only specified specific information as the target, they can seize the computer that it may be on. The seizure takes place as-is. You don't get to tidy anything up. Things that the officers see while seizing the device or upon waking it from hibernation mode would be admissible under the "plain view" doctrine (or even just simply within the scope of the warrant, if what is on the screen is the information they're looking for).

Corporate China - evicting onshore management via reproduced chops

Another weird and wonderful story out of corporate China has captured my attention. Relevant excerpt: It’s a situation that’s difficult to picture in much of the capitalist world, with its emphasis on private property rights, contract law and the prerogative of owners to hire and fire. Imagine the CEO of an American corporation who’s just been terminated after a successful takeover leaning back in his chair and saying: “You know what? I’m doing a pretty good job. I think I’ll just stay.” In China, though, it’s far from rare. Essentially, despite having ticked all the relevant boxes in terms of conventional activist investing, the shareholders couldn't achieve their goal of evicting management because management knew how to use their legal representative / chop-holding status to entrench themselves amid the legal process. Things got really slow and ultimately disclosures were not filed in time and the entity in question seems to have been delisted altogether. So, hypothetically, what if the offshore shareholders tried to beat them at their own game. What if they reproduced an exact replica of the chop -- it's a physical object after all. And what's more, all the multinationals operating in China are always complaining about IP theft: "they're taking my manufacturing plant tech, machinery IP, blah blah blah." Well, fight fire with fire: use the lax IP environment to your advantage. They’ve been around for thousands of years but they’re still tripping up foreign investors in China. Company chops are the carved seals that, when used with a red inkpad to stamp documents, confer legitimacy on corporate actions. Investors accustomed to the norms of Western business may think they control the company when they hold a majority of the shares. Nuh-uh. The chops are the keys to the kingdom. He or she who possesses them is the master. Question In this kind of situation, could offshore shareholders improve their legal leverage by simply making their own chop? Note: What I feel this story is misleading on is it might not be about the chops per se, but the legal representative (anybody can "hold" a chop, but only in the hands of the legal rep can it be recognized by the onshore courts). But still I think it's a valid thought experiment that we can explore.

Fraud is illegal in China (just like everywhere else) Using a forged chop is exactly the same as using a forged signature in other jurisdictions. In fact, it's easier to detect because while a person's signature varies each time, the chop does not (save for gradual wear) and the government has a record of the mark each and every chop makes. A person who holds the legitimate chop (noting that there is more than one type but never more than one of each) can bind the company. Worse, without the right seal the company cannot do anything - they can't pay wages, they can't withdraw money, and they can't effectively operate. Now, obviously, there are ways of dealing with a lost or stolen chop: If a seal is lost or stolen, an announcement must be published as quickly as possible in an official journal recognised by the local authorities. This public advertisement makes it possible to request the cancellation of the lost or stolen seal, to have it remade and to register the new seal with the Public Security Bureau. The company can then prove that any documents stamped subsequent to this new registration were stamped using a stolen seal and will thus be able to annul them. The original business licence must be presented in order to officially register the new seal. If the licence has been stolen too, another declaration of theft and a request for a replacement will have to be made, which can take several weeks. However, in the linked article, the chop is neither lost nor stolen. It's not lost because everyone knows who has it and it's not stolen because that person is an agent of the company and the Chinese police (like police in most parts of the world) don't get involved in commercial disputes.

What is the status of 'Good Faith' in Australian contract law?

Answers from other jurisdictions (particularly united-states and europe ) state that there is an implied duty of good faith in contracts. Is this the case in Australia?

Answers from other jurisdictions (particularly united-states and europe) state that there is an implied duty of good faith in contracts. Is this the case in Australia? Yes, the duty of good faith is implied in Australian law. The strawman argument for refuting the covenant of good faith in UK or Australian law entails the mistaken assumption that good faith means something in the sense of " altruism toward the counterparty ". But in reality, under contract law, the notion of good faith is not antithetical to the notion of self-interest . Take a look at one of the links in the answer you posted shortly after posting your own question. The conclusion in that source reflects that the only reason why there is no implied duty of good faith in contracts is that: The fundamental principles which constitute good faith such as cooperation, reasonableness, legitimate interest and proper purpose are already implied in law . Good faith implied as a separate definitive doctrine would only cover the principles already established in law . (emphasis added) Adding a synonym (namely, good faith ) for fundamental principles already implied in law would only be redundant. Furthermore, the excerpt reflects that fundamental principles such as those listed (cooperation, reasonableness, legitimate interest and proper purpose) encompass the entire meaning of good faith . In the author's words, they constitute good faith even if the list given is not exhaustive. For there to be a need or reason to incorporate good faith as a distinct or separate doctrine in contract law, one would need to attach to that term other attributes or principles without rendering it redundant.

What is "profiteering" and is it illegal?

Anther question discusses discrimination and "profiteering". What is profiteering in a legal context as distinct from normal for profit business in a capitalist market society?

UK In england-and-wales , Profiteering or " Price Gouging " don't appear at all in laws. However, there is the Competition Act of 1998 , which bans abusive practices. Of particular interest is this provision : 18 Abuse of dominant position. (1)Subject to section 19, any conduct on the part of one or more undertakings which amounts to the abuse of a dominant position in a market is prohibited if it may affect trade within the United Kingdom. (2)Conduct may, in particular, constitute such an abuse if it consists in— (a)directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; The unfair pricing part would most certainly be triggered by demanding the weight of a roll of toilet paper in sterling silver (227 grams with ~£0.55 per gram, so ~£125), but the law also requires market domination, which is defined as controlling the price of about 40% of the goods in an area. So unless you are dominate the toilet paper market in all of the county or hundreds of miles, you can almost demand whatever you want. US Profiteering can be one of two things in legal circles of the united-states : Price Gauging War Profiteering War Profiteering War Profiteering was part of the title of HR-400 War Profiteering Prevention Act of 2007 , defining the act as: Whoever, in any matter involving a contract with, or the provision of goods or services to, the United States or a provisional authority, in connection with a mission of the United States Government overseas, knowingly— (1) (A) executes or attempts to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud the United States or that authority; or (B) materially overvalues any good or service with the intent to defraud the United States or that authority; Examples from history would be deliberately creating sub-par products that break as soon as they hit combat. In any way, it is just against the US as the state, not any person. Price Gouging In many state laws, Price Gouging is fixed in some way or another. Price Gouging is the term of art used for the act to "take advantage of spikes in demand by charging exorbitant prices for necessities". The term does not apply to normal increases of prices due to shifting economies or dissimilar prices for products. Commonly, many are also restricted to emergency situations such as natural disasters, war, or even covid-19 . Generally, these laws punish people who increase prices in an unreasonable manner but they also don't prescribe what reasonable is. An example of Price Gouging is the salesman, who knowing a hurricane will hit Florida, buys up all generators in Detroit that cost below 2000 USD and gets a truck there to sell them the moment it has passed. Now he sells each generator for 20000 USD, while the normal market price outside of the hit area is just a 10th of that. In addition, have him sell 5-gallon cans of fuel for 500 USD. Both items - equipment to make electricity to fix the homes and fuel - are under Fla. Stat. §501.160 1(a) and the prices are clearly matching 1(b). So our Detroid salesman in Florida is violating the law on Price Gouging. Non-emergency laws? Only very few laws are not concerned with an emergency situation and thus more broad and general. The most likely broadest of them is Mich. Comp. Laws §445.903 (z). It reads: Charging the consumer a price that is grossly in excess of the price at which similar property or services are sold. Here, grossly in excess is the requirement, but also the similarity of the products. So, it does not take dissimilar products into account, especially not if the two items cost you very dissimilar to acquire them. To take a less emergency example, let's say we have a shop. We sell two types of toilet paper: one is 1-ply and costs 10 cents a roll. The other is imported german, extra soft 4-ply with Aloe-Vera and vanilla smell and we demand 5 USD per roll. The price difference is harsh (50 times!) but the two products are not similar, and we can prove that the import paper did cost us something like 4 USD to get to our shop in the first place. Now, one day we just put the 5 USD label from our import paper onto the cheap one for whatever reason. Only now we grossly overprice our cheap toilet paper and violate that provision: we charge 50 times what the item's fair price is. When goods don't appear dissimilar but are A baker might make a pie for 50 USD in basic fixed costs (tools, wages, electricity) to run the shop, and 25 cents per pie in ingredients if he bakes 100 of them. That's 75 USD for 100 pies in costs, or 75 cents a pie. He wants to sell them at 1 USD a piece, that's a 1/3rd markup and a somewhat normal price. The same baker can also bake gluten-free pies. The ingredients cost him 50 cents a pie and the same basic fixed costs to make a batch. But he also has to clean the shop top to bottom for 3 hours before to get any gluten flour out of it, costing him another 100 USD in wages. He also only has a demand for 10 pies, so those pies cost him 160 USD per batch or 16 USD per pie. To make a profit, he sells them at 21,33 USD, which is again a 1/3rd markup. At first glance, a gluten-free pie might appear a very similar product, but it isn't even similar under the Michigan law, because manufacturing costs are disproportional higher for the market. Even if he could sell 100 pies and then made a 100 pie batch, he'd still pay 200 USD for 100 pies, and the fair price for a single pie from a 100-item batch would be 2,66 USD. But from the 10-item batch, it's 21,33 USD. Because the two pies are so dissimilar in manufacturing prices, they can not be used as "similar" under Michigan law. You'd need to compare the price of another gluten-free pie that is baked in similarly small batches in a bakeshop that makes both normal and gluten-free products in the same workshop.

What are the guidelines for compensation value for assault in which there was no physical (nor psychiatric) injury sustained?

Anther recent question was answered with a reference to a textbook which I don't have access to, but it gives examples such as injuries to an elbow. How much are guidelines for general damages in a scenario with no physical or psychiatric injuries sustained but only fear and horror of them in the moment, deliberate intimidation by the perpetrators, and the public humiliation and embarrassment of being publicly assaulted? As well as the (apparently intended) demoralisation and chilling effect of having ones political expressions countered with physical violence? In other words, suppose that the victim did not develop diagnosable PTSD or the like, but simply had a really bad day full of distress and horror. How much are they due to be compensated for this?

You allude to the answer How are general damages for assault calculated? given in response to your previous question. The answer cites the book Judicial College Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases . The answer says "In the case of assault, one might find reference to Chapter 4, which is on psychiatric effects including PTSD..." The book might be available in a library. If you do a web search for "Judicial College Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases Chapter 4", the search results will include links to the purported text of Chapter 4 of that book. The specific numbers might be out-of-date (depending on the age of the edition from which the text is copied) but will remain in these magnitudes or 'ballparks': Less severe - low four figures moderate - four to five figures moderately severe - low to mid five figures severe - mid to high five figures The more severe, the harder to treat and recover, the longer lasting and so on, the higher the damages. There may also be "aggravated damages", depending on the conduct of the defendant. You can google for discussion of or the judgments themselves in real cases where there were awards for "injury to feelings" or "mental distress" to get a sense of what is awarded for what kinds of claims. These seem to range from (mostly) four figures all the way up to (rarely) six figures. Some judgments don't separate the amount of "damages" from the amount of "aggravated damages". So it can be difficult to get a sense of how much aggravating conduct affects compensation. Some websites operated by "claims management companies" and other purported specialists in compensation claims offer "personal injury compensation calculators" in which you input broad features about a claim to see the compensation range the calculator 'thinks' could be awarded, based on the Judicial College compensation guidelines. With the company's assistance, of course. (Interestingly the 2021 Personal Injuries Guidelines for Ireland are freely available from Ireland's Judicial Council's website in pdf format https://judicialcouncil.ie/assets/uploads/documents/Personal%20Injuries%20Guidelines.pdf . This also has a Chapter 4 about psychiatric damage, with similar bands and numbers.)

Would Anthony Huber be considered armed at any point?

Anthony Huber was carrying a skateboard when he encountered Kyle Rittenhouse. When Mr. Huber struck Mr. Rittenhouse with the skateboard, did the status of the skateboard change from simply an object to a weapon? Did Mr. Huber's state change from unarmed to armed in any way that is legally meaningful? Perhaps this is part of a broader conversation about when a given item is considered a weapon or not, and I'd be interested in that, too.

Any object you hold which can cause death can be called a dangerous weapon. As chapter 939 section 22 states. "Dangerous weapon" means any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded; any device designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or great bodily harm; any ligature or other instrumentality used on the throat, neck, nose, or mouth of another person to impede, partially or completely, breathing or circulation of blood; any electric weapon, as defined in s. 941.295(1c) (a); or any other device or instrumentality which, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Skateboards can cause death or great bodily harm , especially when used on the head or neck area. The defense did have a use of force expert who would have argued that use of the skateboard was assault, and would have clarified. The expert, John Black, spent hours outlining the moments that led to Kyle Rittenhouse’s decisions to shoot Joseph Rosenbaum, Anthony Huber and Gaige Grosskreutz, offering a preview of the defense team’s strategy when Rittenhouse’s trial begins next month. Black testified that video shows Rosenbaum chasing Rittenhouse and reaching for the teenager’s gun, Huber attacking Rittenhouse with a skateboard and trying to wrestle away his gun, and Grosskreutz running at him with a pistol in his hand. “A citizen in that position, given those indicators, would it be reasonable for them to believe they were about to be assaulted?” Black said. “I would argue yes.” But his testimony was limited to content on time. so sadly we didn't get to see a professional discussion on the issue. In trial, the defense attorney testified that skateboards could be used to behead people. “Ladies and gentlemen, I would love to be able to hold up that skateboard in front of you as evidence today, because then you could see it,” Mr Richards told the jury. “You could see the weight and the heft of what a skateboard is, and what that skateboard would do if somebody takes it in their hand and swings down on somebody’s shoulder, head, and neck, trying to separate the head from the body.” As Kraus replied in the prosecution rebuttal. "Someone should tell all the parents and grandparents and Santa Claus giving skateboards this Christmas about how they're giving their children a deadly weapon. I guess they should get them an AR-15 instead." Indicating that skateboards were children toys, not weapons. It was as such left up to the jury, with no expert instructions and only prosecution and defense lawyer testimony, whether the skateboard was considered a deadly weapon.

What are the different names of anti-collusion laws?

Anti-collusion laws have different names. For example, they are called "antitrust laws" and "anti-monopoly laws" in China following Nishan (2021) , and "anti-collusion laws" in India following Dasgupta (2019) . What other names have been used for these laws?

You are correct that "antitrust laws" and "anti-monopoly laws" and "anti-collusion laws" are all used. Probably the most common name that you have haven't mentioned is "unfair competition" laws.

Does antitrust law allow for a monopoly that strictly benefits consumers?

Antitrust law has long existed under the premise that more competition is better for the consumer. But what if a monopoly were to eliminate competition, and then use the increase in efficiency of an empty market strictly to benefit consumers? The two most important players in antitrust law globally are almost certainly the United States and the EU, so I'm specifically interested in the laws of both, especially in how they contrast given Europe's stronger stance against anticompetitive activities. Say a company, Supergood Corp., were to intentionally act in such a way as to eliminate competition. Then Supergood hires all workers laid off by the bankrupt competitors, and uses the loss of competition to increase efficiency by cutting advertising (why advertise when you're the only player), consolidating supply chains for faster and cheaper goods, etc. Supergood Corp. then passes all of the savings resulting from its actions on to consumers, lowering prices to minimize profit, and improving both price and quality over conditions before the anticompetitive activities took place. Considering the criteria used to establish violation of antitrust law, is there a way that Supergood Corp. can avoid legal culpability under relevant laws for the above actions?

There is no provision allowing monopolization "for the good of the consumer", regardless of your standards for judging that. The law simply says Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. It is not clear what actually counts as a violation is the law: it's not the fact of being the only game in town, per se , it's what you do that might bring that about, it's doing so through improper means. The Dept. of Justice, which may prosecute a case, has guidance on what the law could mean , in particular, the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident As you describe it, this is a clear violation of the law. "Noble intentions" is not a valid defense to prosecution. However, prosecution is discretionary, so a favorable government could reach an agreement to not prosecute, as was the case with AT&T (before WWI, not the breakup). Further however, under 15 USC 15c a state attorney general can also bring a civil suit against a monopolizer, so you'd have to get a lot of agreement to not take legal action.

Why does antivirus software have permission to scan and inspect third party intellectual property?

Antivirus software works by inspecting the inside of files on a computer. Many of these files are software owned by a third party and governed by their own EULAs, often with specific clauses about inspecting the inside of those files (e.g. reverse engineering). What legal doctrine is used to authorize antivirus software to inspect third party intellectual property?

First, scanning software for viruses or malware is arguably different from reverse engineering. The anti-virus software is not attempting to duplicate the functionality of the scanned software, and it doesn't generate any sort of report on how the scanned software works. Second, it will depend specifically on what terms are stated in the EULA. For example, the license for Microsoft Windows says [you may not] reverse engineer, decompile, or disassemble the software, or attempt to do so, except and only to the extent that the foregoing restriction is (a) permitted by applicable law; Note that there is no prohibition on "inspecting the inside of the files". Anti-viral software may be inspecting the software, but it is not reverse engineering, decompiling, or disassembling it, so it would not be in violation of the license. Finally, while a EULA might try to include some language forbidding examination by anti-virus software, the concept of fair use might provide a defense. In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc a US court ruled that in certain circumstances, reverse engineering might be allowed despite license terms to the contrary under the fair use doctrine.

Unauthorized Business Site License

Any business lawyer? Please answer my question. My house has been used by a previous tenant to obtain a site license from the California Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), to run a substance abuse treatment center. She gave me a 30-day notice to vacate in February this year, had a DHHS person visit my home in April and she was able to renew her license till 2020. She left my home soon after the visit from DHHS and is conducting business elsewhere with the site license obtained on my home. DHHS web site and several other advertisements on-line list my home address as her business site (substace abuse treatment center). Please let me know what are the legal implications of this? Can this person legally allowed to do this? Thank you very much. What are my options as a landlord?

It's hard to say without knowing more facts about the license and facility. Assuming that this is a Substance Use Disorder treatment residential license, the initial license application information is available here . The very first thing they say is that Current providers wishing to relocate, add or delete treatment services, increase/decrease treatment beds or change target population must complete the Supplemental Application DHCS 5255 and that form says, in red, If you are requesting to relocate you must include a letter explaining why you are moving, anticipated move date and the new facility address. So... assuming the person did properly notify DHCS, perhaps there is a lag in updating facility addresses. More likely, the person was evading the requirement for a site inspection (fire safety-related ), and that's against the law. You can certainly report your suspicions to the SUD Compliance Division; I don't think there is a law that punishes you if you don't act on your suspicions, but it could be a nuisance for you if the world incorrectly thinks that your house is a SUD treatment facility.

Anti-Fighting Clauses in a Prenup (MN)

Any ideas for prenup clauses to discourage fighting at a future divorce? I've got so far: Binding mediation & arbitration Fees (attorney, court, etc.) awarded to opposite party for refusing mediation, not participating in mediation, or for disproven or highly unlikely accusations Otherwise each party pays own attorney fees and mediation, arbitration, and court fees are split. Any other ideas?

Any ideas for prenup clauses to discourage fighting at a future divorce? To make this answer self-contained, allow me to restate my comment (especially since it is uncomfortable to some who might seek to have it removed): Don't get entangled with lawyer issues in your prenup. They will find a way to overcome it, drag your court proceedings anyway, and prolong litigation for as long as you have any money left in your bank account. Instead, I strongly encourage you to do research on divorce & custody law, and then enter a prenup with a clause to the effect of barring attorneys altogether if divorce or any dispute arises. See this report and don't become their next target. That being said, now I address your follow up question : Any suggestions on how an average person would do more research? What follows is one sketch on how to get started. In assessing how much this approach makes sense to you, consider two preliminary remarks: I am not knowledgeable of family law. This means that prior to drafting this answer I had (and have) essentially the same starting point you do. What I have is litigation experience and legal research skills, so don't be discouraged or intimidated if you initially think some resources or ideas would not have occurred to you on your own. Sooner or later you would have gotten to these sources as well, and I only intend to obviate the time gaps it may take for an inexperienced person to identify the legal aspects you need to know. With your follow up question in mind, I went to leagle.com , entered " prenuptial agreement " in field " This Exact Phrase ", selected Minnesota in " Search By Court ", and clicked on Search. The search brought 8 results. Only one of the 8 cases was released by the Supreme Court [of Minnesota], McKee-Johnson v. Johnson , 444 N.W.2d 259 (1989) . The other 7 are from the Court of Appeals some of which constitute legal precedent (the rest do not, but one could still gain useful knowledge from there and find additional case law cited therein). I started reading the opinion/precedent McKee-Johnson . There I learned, at the outset, that another term for prenuptial agreement is antenuptial agreement . This is relevant because then I conducted another search, now for " antenuptial agreement ", which brought 58 cases. Many of these are more recent than, although not necessarily in conflict with, the McKee-Johnson decision. My point is that it is in one's best interest to try different search terms. The McKee-Johnson opinion discusses, inter alia , the validity and enforceability of a prenuptial agreement. The opinion makes reference to Minn.Stat. 519.11 . A search for that statute took me to chapters 517-519A of the [current] [Minnesota Statutes] 7 . I am not reading the MN statutes, but you should in order to ensure the terms and circumstances of your prenuptial agreement are compliant with statutory law. The McKee-Johnson opinion ascertains the legislative history & intent of the aforementioned statute, which the lower courts had considered ambiguous. A review of the legislative history led the court to the conclusion that the statute sought to encompass also marital property, not just nonmarital property. See McKee-Johnson at 264-265: We find nothing in the legislative history which indicates that the statute was hostile towards agreements which contained provisions relative to the disposition of marital property. [...] We find nothing in the legislative history which justifies the conclusion that the legislature harbored hostility toward the inclusion of provisions respecting disposition of marital property in pre-marital contracts, or that such provisions are void or unenforceable. To the [265] contrary, the statute recognizes the validity of such a contract so long as it "would be valid and enforceable without regard to this section." Please note that I am not reading the entire opinion, but you are encouraged to do so (since you are the one getting married and also because you might not be familiar with most of the general principles/doctrines involved). This will make you acquainted with concepts of law. If the meaning of a term is unclear to you, you can consult the Black's Law Dictionary or search for case law that uses that term. Although McKee-Johnson nowhere mentions the Restatement (Second) of Contracts , there is an important overlap insofar as a prenuptial agreement is a contract. For instance, McKee-Johnson touches on wife Mary's repeated refusal to obtain legal information separately from husband Lance. These refusals amount to Mary's bearing the risk of a mistake as defined in the Restatement at § 154, which has legal implications regarding the procedural fairness discussed in McKee -Johnson*. Additionally, you might want to visit the court in your location and search for divorce cases. Some of these might have exhibits with the parties' prenuptial agreement. Those documents might give you some ideas on the format and wording of an agreement. However, it is utmost important to ensure you understand the terms of those agreements and that they look acceptable to you if you are considering to adopt them. At first glance, this learning process might seem a titanic task. To a great extent it is. But you have the advantage that you don't have an immediate need for litigation, whence it is safe for you to postpone for now anything that has to do with procedural law (motion practice, admissibility of evidence, and so forth). By contrast, some of us have had to learn both substantive and procedural law at once in order to pursue in court a remedy for the wrongs made to us.

How much effort could have gone into composing the judgement for Meads v. Meads?

Any intelligent/educated guesses by people who perhaps work more or less full time as lawyers as to how much time it would have taken the judge to research and to write up all of the precedents and to address all of the different aspects of the vexatious party's peculiar quirks would be welcome. Alternatively, are there any mechanisms by which one could possibly learn on a less speculative basis, perhaps by a FOIA request or the local equivalent, for the judge's timesheet entries that might have logged his efforts deliberating and working on that case as a government employee? Or simply writing to him on an informal and candid basis inquiring as to how long this impressively comprehensive reference on vexatious litigation tactics took him to produce?

Judges don't have timesheet entries (and are often expressly excluded from FOIA obligations). They get paid salaries and are expected to work hard enough to clear their dockets in reasonable periods of time, however long that takes. If you wanted a more direct evidentiary estimate, you could estimate that a judge and his clerk together probably work 90-120 hours a week, figure out how many trials and hearings of what length were conducted and deduct that time spent on that from the total, and then divide the remaining hours by the number of opinions one can estimate that the judge wrote (or better yet, a reasonable estimate of the number of pages of opinions that one can estimate that the judge wrote). Typically, a lot of the legal research grunt work and more boilerplate parts of an opinion are written by the law clerk under some general instructions from the judge, with the judge writing the more substantive sections personally and heavily (or lightly, depending upon the quality of the law clerk) revising the draft opinion as a whole. The longer the opinion, the more likely it is that a substantial portion of it was written by the law clerk. For similar kinds of legal writing (e.g. appellate briefs and motions for summary judgment and proposed orders or written closing arguments) one to six hours per page from all professionals working on the document would be in the right ballpark. Judicial opinions come with some efficiencies, because once a judge decides a point of law or reaches a factual conclusion it doesn't have to be belabored in the same way that a litigant who isn't sure if their reasoning will be persuasive or not must. But, judicial opinions also typically have to spell out a greater proportion of legal and factual foundation for the end analysis that isn't hotly contested, will summarize all of the material points from the evidence presented in the case, and will frequently also recap in some detail the arguments made by the advocates for both sides of the case before actually engaging with those arguments in an analysis section. On balance, those factors probably pretty much balance out. If the judicial opinion is shorter, elegantly written, contains pithy turns of phrase, and/or contains lots of legal citations or factual analysis not raised by either party, it is probably closer to five or six hours per page or more. If the opinion is longer, has a rote and mechanical feel to it, and has very little factual analysis or references to law not mentioned by the parties, it is probably closer to one hour per page or even less. When some of these factors go one way, and other of these factors go the other way, it is probably in between in terms of hours per page. This said, sometimes it takes a judge a long time to write an opinion, but the end product is very short and elegant. In these situations, often what happened is that the judge and the judge's clerk spent lots and lots of hours writing a long and detailed first draft, then got an insight that provided a much more efficient and succinct way to reach a resolution to the case. In those circumstances, there would be dozens or scores of hours of work that went into the discarded first draft, only to be superseded by a half a dozen or dozen hours devoted to a much shorter final draft. In those cases, the final draft of the opinion might be ten or twenty hours per page or more once you include the time spent on the discarded draft. Of course, another factor is that some judges are just more efficient legal writers than others, and some judges have more familiarity with some areas of law than others. A opinion that might take one judge twenty hours to write might take another judge presiding over the very same case and producing an opinion of the same length and quality a hundred hours to write. The opinion in Meads v. Meads was 176 pages . If I had to make a best guess, I'd estimate that it probably took about 600 hours to write, probably about two-thirds of which was law clerk hours and probably about one-third of which was judge time.

APA vs. tort comparison

Any suggestions on where to find a detailed side-by-side comparison of the Administrative Procedures Act use versus the use of tort law for federal agency cases? Thanks for suggestions. Searching on Scholar and other free law search engines. Expecting to, but not finding any review specific to my request.

There isn't much to compare. The Administrative Procedures Act creates a variety of statutory rights and remedies, primarily in connection with the issuance of regulations and to a lesser extent with the quasi-judicial adjudication of disputes with a governmental agency arising from agency action or a request for agency action. Federal government agencies, except in a narrow class of lawsuits for money damages cases adjudicated by the U.S. Court of Claims (e.g. for automobile accidents involving a federal government agency employee) where sovereign immunity is expressly waived, reverse condemnation actions under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and select constitutional violations in Bivens actions (mostly against federal law enforcement officers), are immune from lawsuits arising on tort theories under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Only one of these remedies - a reverse condemnation action - is allowed as a remedy for agency action also governed by the Administrative Procedures Act, and both are present only in very rare cases where a new regulation or agency action deprives someone of all economic use of their property without just compensation. I suspect that what you are really looking for a different comparison about which there is a moderate sized academic literature that is discussed by economists and in legal theory (especially by tort law scholars). This is the literature comparing two different ways other than criminal law for the government to regulate unlawful conduct by private actors. One way to do that is with "private law" by authorizing someone who is harmed by the unlawful conduct of a private actor to sue the person who engaged in the unlawful conduct in a private tort law lawsuit (a tort is a "civil wrong" that may be remedied in a private lawsuit for money damages). Another way to do that is to create a government agency that has the authority to have a government official enforce statutes or regulations enforcing or implementing statutes by bringing civil lawsuits, either in an administrative tribunal (like the National Labor Relations Board, or the Securities and Exchange Commission or the hybrid case of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission proceedings) subject to eventual Article III federal court review at least on appeal, or in a court. In these enforcement actions, remedies including fines, restitution to victims of the unlawful conduct, and/or injunctive relief. There are many academic discussions comparing the features of these two ways to address wrongful, harmful conduct in violation of the law outside the criminal justice system. But, generally speaking, an administrative agency enforcement mechanism arises from substantive federal regulatory statutes and not from the Administrative Procedures Act which governs primarily the process by which administrative agencies adopt regulations and to a much lesser extent to how administrative tribunals are constituted.

Does Judge R Dearie have to quit the bench to accept a special master job?

Any truth to the assertion that a SENIOR status judge is prevented from taking “outside employment”?

FRCP 53 states the only rule of disqualification for special masters: (a)(2) A master must not have a relationship to the parties, attorneys, action, or court that would require disqualification of a judge under 28 U.S.C. §455, unless the parties, with the court's approval, consent to the appointment after the master discloses any potential grounds for disqualification. The rule also states that A magistrate judge is subject to this rule only when the order referring a matter to the magistrate judge states that the reference is made under this rule meaning that "being a judge" is not a bar to serving as a special master. He is a retired judge, so there is no bar arising from federal court employment ethics rules . Since the DoJ also proposed retired judges for this position, we can be pretty sure that it's legal to appoint a retired judge to be special master.

Can a power of attorney allow you to act "pro se" on behalf of the issuer?

Anyone can represent themselves in a court of law, if he or she doesn't want, or can't afford, a lawyer. On the other hand, only lawyers who have passed the bar in a state are allowed to represent others. Suppose you have an aging parent (or other relative) that is certifiably "incompetent" but has given you the power of attorney. From the sound of it, this means that you would be able to represent this person "pro se" or through other means. Is this true? Or is it a case where "power of attorney" doesn't confer the right to act as a lawyer for someone who is incompetent, even though it sounds like it does (to a layman). Are there at least some forums, such as small claims court, where the "power of attorney" gives you the right to act as someone's "lawyer?"

For most civil matters the answer is "no". Small claims court is special since there are restrictions on using attorneys, and in that context, it depends on the rules. In Indiana , the answer in their manual is no Small Claims Rule 8 allows a person to appear at trial and, if he or she chooses, represent himself or herself and avoid the cost of hiring an attorney. However, a person is allowed to hire an attorney and have the attorney appear with him or her at the trial. A person who has power of attorney for another person may not represent that person in court. "Have the attorney appear with him or her at the trial" is pretty unclear, since it doesn't say whether the attorney can represent them. Rule 8(C)(1) states that "A natural person may appear pro se or by counsel in any small claims proceeding", which clarifies that they don't just mean "have at your side". In Minnesota , the answer is more emphatic "no": A power of attorney does not authorize a nonlawyer to file a claim, appear, or in any other way “represent” a natural person in conciliation court. As for allowing attorneys in small claims court, Attorneys are only allowed to represent parties in conciliation court with permission of the court (emphasis added). The situation in California is somewhat of a hybrid, but as I read it, it means that the incapacitated person is out of luck, which strikes me as surprising. They say Self-representation is usually required. There are, however, several exceptions to this general rule: If the court determines that a party is unable to properly present his or her claim or defense for any reason, the court may allow another individual to assist that party. The individual who helps you can only provide assistance—the individual’s participation in court cannot amount to legal representation, and the person can’t be an attorney. So this is most unlike Indiana is that you can't have an attorney, and all the person can do is "assist". So unless they just waive the rules, this means that if the individual is incapacitated, they cannot have recourse to small claims court.

Which country laws apply to user data? HQ location or Cloud data center location

Anyone here know which country laws apply to user data when a startup based in a different country (ex: UK), than where user data resides (ex: Switzerland) ? Switzerland have better privacy (not perfect) than other countries, So I am deciding to store user data in Switzerland data center, so user data is protected by Swiss laws. But I am not sure which country laws apply to user data? Someone please help. Thanks in advance!

The country where you are, where the user is and where the data is So if you are in the UK, your data is in Switzerland and your user is in China and is an Australian/Thai dual national then potentially the laws of the UK (noting that this is 3 separate jurisdictions), Switzerland (each canton being a separate jurisdiction), China (which I think is only a single jurisdiction), Australia (8 possible jurisdictions) and Thailand (single jurisdiction I think) all potentially apply. Of course, your second user may introduce more jurisdictions. It is certain that all these jurisdictions will impose different, even incompatible, requirements. If this is hard, the governments of those jurisdictions don’t care. You need a lawyer.

What laws govern, empower, or limit indiscriminate accusatory TV Licensing mailings?

Anyone who has lived in the UK knows about postal TV license fee spam. These gaslighting, accusatory and threatening letters seem to verge on extortion, and are regularly received by households who do not watch any TV. What is the worst that can happen due to ignoring these seemingly empty threats, who sends them out, what powers do they have, and is it not illegal for them to send these threatening letters groundlessly?

The law doesn't work like that. You don't need a law to allow you to send someone a letter, just as you don't need a law to allow you to do anything at all. You are free to do anything you like unless there is a law which says you can't do that thing. There is no law which specifically says that TV licensing cannot write to unlicensed properties. More generally, there is Section 1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 which provides at sub-section 1: A person must not pursue a course of conduct — (a) which amounts to harassment of another, and (b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other. Sub-section 3 provides that the above rule is not breached if " in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable. " Section 7 provides that "course of conduct" means there must be at least two occasions of that conduct, and that harassment includes alarm and distress. It is a fast and straightforward matter to notify TV licensing that you don't need a TV Licence. You are free to do that at any point before or after you receive a letter. If you do so, they will stop writing to you for two years. It seems unlikely therefore that a court would make a finding of harassment. It is reasonable conduct for TV Licensing to write to properties which its records show are unlicensed given that they will stop doing so if you ask them to. "What is the worst that can happen due to ignoring these seemingly empty threats?" If you do not do any of the following: Install or use a television receiver. Have in your possession or control a television receiver which you intend to install or use or which you know or believe someone else intends to install or use, then you can safely ignore the letters free of consequence. If you do any of the above then you will commit an offence under Section 363 of the Communications Act 2003 and you can be prosecuted.

How are MIDI files of copyrighted music licensed?

Anyone with a music studio can easily download a .midi file from the internet, and then use it to produce a musical track. A midi file exists online for almost every song in the world, and you can do a song title search along with the keyword midi. It's often an entire arrangement, everything one needs to produce a full blown song, all you need is further programming and studio equipment. One triggers various synthesizers to perform the contents of these .midi files, and it sounds like music. Midi files contain every note that every instrument in the orchestra plays. Is this "art" or merely raw data? If I can obtain this data online, I won't have a lengthy data entry phase or need to do any composing, but it doesn't sound ethical or legal. I'd have to get a license from the publisher to sell this new recording, of course. But what about for using someone else's midi from the internet? How do I handle credit or licensing here?

The midi is an artistic work and protected by copyright just as sheet music or an actual recording would be. It’s possible, even likely, that a midi file running free on the internet is itself an infringing copy. If so, any purported licence is worthless. The onus is on you to validate a clear licensing chain from you back to the copyright holder of both the midi file and the music itself - the midi is a derivative work of the music with its own copyright (assuming it was legally created). The midi file has copyright protection even if the original music has entered the public domain (given the age of the technology, no midi file would have had its copyright expire as yet).

What are the main conditions to have a housing loan in the USA?

Apart from having 1 year of work in the same company and a good credit score... Once that's okay... For example I earn $5000 a month, can I borrow $4500 a month if I want ? Or is there a limit based on a percentage of my net incomes a month ? And is there a limit on the duration of the real estate loan ?

This is more of a bank policy question, but typically they won't loan you more than can be covered by around 30% of your income. In your example, depending on current interest rates and the number of periods in the loan, (i.e. 15 or 30 years) your cap might be a monthly payment of $1500 per month.

Are there any parts of human rights which are not already part of US law?

Apart from healthcare (which is subjective and not a specific right), are there any parts of US law which violate the human rights set out in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights or any of those rights not included in any US state laws?

According to the ACLU , lots Including: life sentences without parole no legal right to sue for being illegally tortured by the US systemic socioeconomic generational inequality corporal punishment lack of legal protection based on gender mass immigration detention mass and racially discriminatory incarceration lack of ratification (along with Somalia) of the UN declaration on the rights of the child lack of protection of voting rights of minorities failure to ratify the UN declaration on the rights of the disabled the only liberal democracy to still have the death penalty To be fair, many other countries have failed on some of these metrics but, as in many things, the US is No 1 among the OECD.

Apart form tax and less regulation what are the benefits of registering a company offshore?

Apart from tax and less regulation what are the benefits of registering a company offshore? I also mean why would one register a company offshore and the incorporate a subsidiary in the country where they operate what are the benefits of such? (Apart from tax and less regulation)

Some reasons for using an offshore jurisdiction, presented hopefully without judgment - Tax As well as lower tax rates, there is the chance of ingenious schemes involving tax reliefs between different jurisdictions - the famous "Double Irish", "Dutch Sandwich", "Single Malt" are examples. Tax can be simpler in some administrative respects. The Isle of Man, for example, wants you to file an annual tax return, and you have to have business accounts, but you don't have to file the accounts or have them audited. And when there are fewer categories of tax to deal with, with simpler rules, the tax return is easier to do. When there are subsidiaries in many countries, having the hub in a low- or zero-tax jurisdiction can reduce the tax paid on complex multinational asset flows. The same applies to a joint venture between independent companies in different countries. This goes by the marketing name of "tax neutrality" (not the same as "tax neutrality" in setting tax policy, confusingly). The theory here is that taxes are still being paid in the appropriate places, when the revenue is generated, but aren't also being incurred artificially by essentially "internal" transfers. Company structure and liability Offshore jurisdictions can be looser on requirements for company formation (e.g. allowing a sole director who is the same person as the sole shareholder, or having no minimum share capital). They may be less strict about background or solvency checks, and can sometimes allow much faster registration, even within minutes. Winding up a company can also be easier. That can have some advantages in the use of special-purpose temporary companies, such as the "limited duration company" that's offered in Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and elsewhere. They may offer novel devices for limiting liability, such as a Guernsey "protected cell company". For example, if you are running a lot of different investment funds with different risk profiles, and one of them crashes into huge liabilities, its creditors might seek recompense from your other, more solvent, funds. But in a PCC model they are isolated: even though each cell is owned and operated by the same people, local law treats their assets as independent. The same applies for something like operating a fleet of vessels where each one can belong to a separate cell. Likewise, insurance regulation may let a company establish a "captive", a special-purpose insurance company set up exclusively for the parent company's needs. This is comparable to self-insurance (a large wealthy organization acting as its own insurer) but has financial and regulatory differences. Privacy In the past, but less so these days, offshore companies could be used to shield the identity of the true owners of some asset. This is still relied upon in many cases, but the tide is against it in terms of international anti-money-laundering and anti-terrorism efforts. So it is harder to hide from a government, even though you can often still hide from an ordinary inquisitive person. Cultural factors Many offshore jurisdictions attempt to provide other aspects of a business-friendly environment, such as promoting access to financial services, legal services, dispute resolution, and so on. The comparative advantage can be large if you're coming from another country with less developed institutions. Sometimes, for a joint venture between companies from different countries, they'll want to pick a neutral third place, and an offshore jurisdiction is a natural choice due to the other factors above.

Apart from trademark protection, what kind of intellectual property protection may logos have according to US law?

Apart from trademark protection, what kind of intellectual property protection may logos have under US law? Could a logo be considered a graphical "work", therefore copyrightable? If it could, how? By measuring the level of creativity used for creating it? For example, how would creativity be measured for a logo created using a slightly modified typeface, as opposed to a logo drawn in an entirely original way? Would the former be copyrightable given that copyright doesn't protect typefaces? Could a logo be considered an industrial design? If it could, would the concept of "author", as in the specially ordered or commissioned designer, even be relevant? Who would own the industrial design rights to the logo then?

Trademark can protect a designed logo as well as a "short phrase" or title, it must be used in commerce and be renewed every 10 years, but if so renewed can continue forever. Copyright cannot protect most "short phrases" or titles, but it can protect an original design, such as a logo. It expires 70 years after the death of the original creator (different for a work for hire, 95 years from the year of its first publication or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first). A design patent can protect an ornamental design that is part of a functional item (such as the shape/design of the CocaCola bottle for instance) And lasts for 14 years from issuance. Many forms of industrial design would find protection here, such as perhaps a drinking glass with a particular shape and ornamentation. So to answer your question: If your logo is an original design used in commerce, and not "just a phrase" in a particular font, then the design can be protected by copyright, and also protected by trademark. If the logo is part of the design of a functional item, you could likely get a design patent, but that would not necessarily be useful, as the design would already be protected by trademark and copyright.

Leak Damage: Can sue for damages covering only damaged floor or floor in the entire property?

Apartment owner B, claims a leak from apartment owner A above, supposedly damaged a very small portion of B's hallway floor. Owner A offered to replace the hallway floor. Instead owner B insists that owner A must replace entire flooring in the entire apartment since B claims the new portion of the floor in the hallway, will not match 100% cosmetically with the rest of the undamaged apartment floor. Can owner B sue for damages to replace all of the flooring in the entire apartment even though only a very small isolated portion was damaged? And if so, what are the chances of B winning? Jurisdiction: US, Florida

Both outcomes are possible. A's insurance company would resist full replacement, so B would probably have to sue and prove that full replacement was necessary. Since the basic idea behind compensation is making the person whole after having been harmed, and what is the harm in a more limited repair job? The jury would contemplate all of the details regarding B's apartment. Then it matters just how crisp the floor was originally, and how aesthetically offensive a mere 99% match would be. It would not hinge solely on B's self-serving statement that he would not accept less than 100% match. But the award would not be limited to "the cheapest possible repair".

Registering a business without actually doing business?

Apologies for the silly question but I don't really have any background in terms of businesses or any legal matters. I am paying for an online service that provides many features, some of which are only available if I verify my account. The verification process though asks for the following fields: Legal Company Name EIN or Registration Number Country of Incorporation State of Incorporation Just to clarify, I am using this online service for personal use but some of the features I am paying for are meant for businesses and I'm actually interested in using them for my personal use. I'm just wondering if it's possible for me to simply register a business based in Calgary without actually doing business just so I could verify my account and use those additional features? I saw this page from the Calgary website (city I reside in) and it seems like the simplest solution for me (home occupation class 1) . No fees involved and no expiry. Although I'm not sure if that's all I need. What's the simplest (and most importantly cheapest) solution for me to do so I can get a business registration number for what I'm trying to achieve? I also found Ownr which let's me pay CAD $49 (one time fee) to register a sole proprietorship which would give me a business registration number but I'm not sure how legitimate they are or if that's really all I need. I would also prefer not to have to pay but $49 is something I would do. I just don't want to spend hundreds or thousands. Can anyone help me figure this out? What are some of the things I need to consider if I'm going to go ahead with registering a business without actually doing business? Any pitfalls? Do I need to worry about filing taxes even if I don't get any revenue/expenses as I won't really be doing any business activities?

Jurisdiction: england-and-wales This could technically amount to fraud as you are misrepresenting yourself as a business in order to gain something you wouldn't have otherwise been able to gain, when in fact the business is a sham. Aside from that, there is no requirement that companies must trade. Companies which do not trade are known as dormant companies and are defined at Section 1169 of the Companies Act 2006 . It is perfectly legitimate to create and own a dormant company for as long as you wish, so long as you comply with annual filing requirements. That includes the duty to file an annual confirmation statement and to file annual (dormant) accounts . I also found Ownr which let's me pay CAD $49 (one time fee) to register a sole proprietorship A sole proprietorship is not a company; it's merely you as an individual operating as a business. As such, it doesn't have a "legal company name", nor a "country of incorporation" or "state of incorporation" since it isn't a corporation. Any pitfalls? Do I need to worry about filing taxes even if I don't get any revenue/expenses as I won't really be doing any business activities? Yes, there is a pitfall. The parties to the contract will be the service provider, and your company. Therefore your premise that there are no " revenue / expenses as I won't really be doing any business activities " is wrong. It will be the company purchasing the services and then reselling them (or gifting them) to you. Accordingly, your company will no longer be dormant and will be subject to the usual accounting and tax rules that apply to trading companies. There are ways around this; for example the company can act as your agent for the purposes of entering into the contract and, provided that you pay for the services from your personal funds, the company may still be able to remain dormant. You would probably also need to inform the service provider of the agency arrangement as undisclosed principals can result in a deemed contract between the service provider and the agent. This scenario is definitely more complicated than merely setting up a company and you should probably seek legal advice.

Legal status of an ongoing situation pending an appeal

Apologies for the title. I could not think of a concise and accurate way to phrase it. I will phrase this question in terms of charitable trusts, but my question is really about the general principle. I am assuming that the particular statutes which apply to the given situation are silent on this issue. Let's say we have a charitable trust. It is determined (by a regulator or a court of first instance) that the trust is invalid. Let's call this point A in time. At point A, it is as if the trust has never existed (which means we have a resulting trust back to the settlor). The trustees appeal. If they lose, then nothing changes - the trust never existed. If they win, then the trust has always existed. Let's call this point B in time. My question is, how do the trustees figure out what their legal duties are between point A and B? What happens if they do something during this time which would be considered a breach of trust if the charitable trust is reinstated? What if they are legally compelled to do so e.g. the beneficiary of the resulting trust asks for his money back. If there is no charitable trust, then the trustees cannot refuse the request. On the other hand, if the charitable trust is reinstated then they have spent charitable funds on a non-charitable purpose. What is the general principle? How should you behave when you are in situation X, but the outcome of an appeal could mean that you are retrospectively in situation Y, and you are faced with a conflicting set of rules for a given action during the interim? Ideally I would like a UK specific answer, but would also welcome more general answers based on common law systems.

Ohwilleke's answer (i.e. 'there isn't a simple answer') covers the general principles clearly. But for your specific situation (England and Wales, appeal to the High Court Chancery Division or Court of Appeal), the answer is "Do nothing irrevocable if possible; if necessary, apply for interim directions to the Court". The Chancery Masters are used to this sort of application, and though somebody will presumably be diappointed by the decision, the trustees have no liability.

Can people (especially LEO) be prosecuted for deliberately helping illegal aliens?

Apologies if the question is somewhat naive. IANAL. As far as I know, illegal immigration (well, technically speaking, "illegal entry" is a crime (misdemeanor or felony depending on particulars). To the best of my understanding, if you help someone to commit a crime, you can be charged and prosecuted (aiding and abetting?). Concealing a crime can be prosecuted (accessory after the fact?). If you deliberately plan to do so in advance, presumably you can be prosecuted for conspiracy. Combining the two points above, can people in general, and especially politicians or LEOs, be charged and prosecuted for intentionally violating immigration policies (e.g. failing to detain someone knowing their illegal status, etc...)? Context for the question: http://fortune.com/2016/11/11/new-york-los-angeles-sanctuary-cities-donald-trump/

I am answering assuming that LEO must mean "Law Enforcement Officer" (the abbreviation is not widely used). can people in general, and especially politicians or LEOs, be charged and prosecuted for intentionally violating immigration policies (e.g. failing to detain someone knowing their illegal status, etc...)? The short answer is no . But, they can be successfully sued for enforcing immigration laws when they do not have the legal authority to do so, and usually, state and local government officials do not have the legal authority to enforce federal immigration laws. (State and local governments are also generally prohibited from enacting state or local laws pertaining to someone's immigration status.) In general, the only people with the authority to detain someone for violating immigration laws are immigration officers employed by the federal government. They have absolute discretion in how they enforce federal immigration laws and are free to systematically or on a case by case basis choose not to enforce those laws, as are the executive branch politicians to whom they report. One of the main reasons that state and local officials cannot enforce immigration laws is that this would interfere with this exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government over immigration and with the absolute discretion of federal officials to decline to enforce the immigration laws or to enforce immigration laws merely on a selective basis. State and local officials have authority in this regard only if they are expressly authorized to do so by law, and then, only if the state or local government chooses to cooperate by allowing their officials to be used for that purpose. Generally speaking, the federal government authorizes state and local jail administrators to detain someone pursuant to an immigration hold if the state and local government authorizes the jail to do so. But, usually state and local officials do not have the authority to arrest someone solely for being in the U.S. without having a valid and current immigration status. This authority is largely reserved to Homeland Security officials, although FBI agents in the Justice Department probably also have this authority. In contrast, generally speaking, someone detained by a state and local law enforcement officer who enforces a federal immigration law, despite not having the legal authority to do so, could prevail in a lawsuit against the state or local law enforcement officer for violating the civil rights of a person detained by someone who had no legal authority to do so. Such suits have prevailed repeatedly in Phoenix, Arizona where a rogue sheriff attempted to enforce federal immigration laws despite not having the legal authority to do so. Thus, the assumption that the kind of actions involved, for example, in "sanctuary city" policies are intentional violations of immigration law is ill-founded (violating a mere "policy" that is not actually a law is by definition never illegal). Generally speaking, there are no immigration laws violated. A "coyote" is intentionally violating an immigration law as is someone sneaking over the border when not legally authorized to do so. Someone who doesn't participate in the act of illegal entry, and who does not violate federal employment laws related to immigration (basically requiring an I-9 to be filled out and filed with the federal government), is violating no law. As a matter of constitutional law, the federal government does not have have the constitutional authority to compel state and local government officials to enforce federal law (although it can authorize and "bribe" state and local governments to do so). Subject to applicable state law, for example, a city government has every right to declare itself a "sanctuary city" and refrain from actively assisting the federal government's enforcement of federal immigration laws. Also, politicians and state and local prosecutors are absolutely immune from legal liability in connection with performance of their official duties, and law enforcement officers have qualified immunity for their acts. In particular, law enforcement and prosecutors have essentially absolute discretion to refrain from choosing to enforce any law, and their politician bosses have broad authority to direct how they will exercise this discretion. For example, in general, even if a prosecutor and law enforcement know to an absolute certainty that someone is a serial killer, and can effortlessly arrest that person without any risk of harm to anyone and at minimal expense, they have no enforceable legal duty under U.S. law to try to arrest that person or prosecute that person for any crime. Failing to enforce a known violation of the law is not a crime (unless the failure to enforce is caused by a bribe). Many millions of people who reside in the United States are deportable but have not committed any crime, so rendering assistance to someone is deportable is not per se assisting someone in the commission of a crime, even after the fact, and indeed, many public officials have a legal duty to aid all "persons" in protecting their legal rights, including people who are deportable.

Is it legal in California to require extra behavior/communication from a single employee?

Apologies if this is not the right forum for this question. Please feel free to close if it should be asked elsewhere. I was recently terminated from employment due to poor performance. About a year ago, my mother passed away, and the psychological trauma was extreme. I already suffer from clinical chronic depression, and this even took a toll on me. For a six-month period, there were several instances where I missed work without notice. Admittedly, I could have communicated an out-of-office status, but my depression seemed to overwhelm me to a point where it was difficult to communicate. Upon a conversation with my manager, I communicated that I understood the need/requirement of communication, and I began seeking intense therapy (both alone and with group support) on Mondays. My employer made accommodations to this and allowed me to work only Tuesday-Thursday. Two months ago, I was asked by my manager when Mondays were going to be available again, and I was told my team/colleagues were feeling a lack of cohesion with the team on my part. I told her I'm still working through this loss and therapy has been immensely helpful, but she pushed the cohesion issue again. I felt guilted/pressured into willfully terminating my Monday therapy. A month ago, I accidentally only requested 2 days of PTO (in our PTO system) for a trip to celebrate my mother's passing. I communicated effectively with the team that I would be gone for three days, and they even marked it appropriately in our team-level capacity sheet. I was confronted two weeks ago by my manager stating that I am not communicating well enough with my team, and that no one was aware of this extra day. To that end, I was given an ultimatum. I was told I had to perform the following tasks every day: An end-of-day status, consisting of what I planned to accomplish today, what I actually accomplished, and plans for the next day Attendance to all scheduled meetings, unless I was sick. In our team chat software (Slack), I must "@here" anytime I was away from the keyboard, or send an e-mail to all team members. @here sends a notification to all team members' screens in case they have the software minimized. Each of these things are not required by any other team member. While I don't mind guided direction to regain team cohesion, these requests--especially the "@here" portion, felt extremely degrading, especially if I just had to use the restroom. Furthermore, throughout these next two weeks, it also felt like a slap in the face when other team members would just send a non-notifying message if they were going to be away or offline. Last week, I @here'd that I was feeling under the weather and would work remotely from home. That afternoon, I was feeling light-headed, and so I communicated that, accidentally without the "@here." I was terminated yesterday explicitly for this. I am in an at-will employment state, so I do understand that employment can be terminated at any time, but I still feel concerned that my reason for termination was that I was not following rules that only I was given as an ultimatum for employment. If it matters, all my team members are of the same role/level as me. Update: Part of my concern is that I was also encouraged to terminate therapy, even with knowledge that I am suffering from a medical condition exacerbated by recent events.

You were on a performance improvement plan, those often require special requirements of the employee. I'm sorry your mother died, but a year seems like a very long time to take, and your company was very kind to give you that long. I am not a lawyer but I sincerely doubt there is anything actionable here.

UK - Responsibility when house is not built to standards

Apologies if this is not the right group. I bought a house last February (new build) and there are a few issues. We sent the list of issues to the builder who is supposed to fix them. One that is really bothering me is a spot light hanging out of the ceiling in the bathroom. I suspect it's a safety issue. After 4 month we are still waiting for it to be fixed. Since things don't seem to be moving I'd like to report the issue to someone, but I don't know who. Is there a body in the UK supposed to enforce the houses are built correctly and issues fixed? Or I'll have to sue the builder directly?

The Department for Communities and Local Government (along with some land-related company) say "if a person carrying out building work contravenes the Building Regulations, the local authority may prosecute them in the Magistrates' Court where an unlimited fine may be imposed (sections 35 and 35A of the Building Act 1984). Prosecution is possible up to two years after the completion of the offending work. This action will usually be taken against the person carrying out the work (builder, installer or main contractor)". The other thing they say is "Alternatively, or in addition, the local authority may serve an enforcement notice on the building owner requiring alteration or removal of work which contravenes the regulations (section 36 of the 1984 Act). If the owner does not comply with the notice the local authority has the power to undertake the work itself and recover the costs of doing so from the owner". So the problem has to be fixed; but the penalties against the builder would be greater. There is a 1 year limit on enforcement against the owner, and if violation was not specifically rejected, a section 36 ("against the owner") enforcement is precluded. What's a little unclear here is why the inspectors did not catch the violation. I assume there is a completion certificate, which came to light with the land search For example, maybe it is not technically a violation. It seems that if you hire a "competent person" (a registered tradesperson), the builder can self-certify that the work was done to standard, but they should have insurance and formal procedures for addressing complaints. Enforcement seems to be in the hands of the local government.

If you are serving a life sentence, die, are legally declared dead, and are brought back to life, are you now free?

Apologies if this is too hypothetical and not allowed. I'm not trained in law, but am curious about the following question: If you are sentenced to 1 life sentence, die, are legally declared dead, and you are brought back to life (not going to address how, but who knows, maybe it's something that could happen in the future), will you now be free, having technically served a life sentence? You were in prison until your death. Would the second interval of life be considered the same life, and so imprisonment should continue, or would it be a second life? I understand that there is probably no precedent for this and so any answer may just be speculation. But if you were the judge, what would your opinion be? As a follow up question, if the answer is that your second life would be free, then what if you have 2 life sentences? Would you serve another life sentence upon your second life? In that case, would the second life sentence be considered served to completion upon your second death, in which case you would be free if you were lucky enough to be revived once more?

If you can be revived, you are not legally dead . To be declared dead you must be in cardio-pulmonary failure and have all attempts at resuscitation cease or be brain dead - no one has ever recovered from these conditions. Notwithstanding, if you are declared legally dead and show up alive, that declaration can be nullified i.e. you were never dead.

What name should I use?

Apologies if this question is not fit for this website. I thought it was the best one to put it. I come from a country (Brazil) where the naming custom is: Given name + Mother's maiden name + Father's name. This is also the custom in Portugal. Not everyone follows it in Brazil though, my family is of immigrant background there and everyone in my family follows the convention Given name + Fathers name only. It is not mandated by law. For instance: Alice Sneijder marries Peter Smith, their son would be Bob Sneijder Smith. Now, I have moved to central Europe, where the custom is only Given name + Father's name. Initially, I just used my full name at all times. However, many times this yields confusion, as they do not know whether it is a middle name or not, if it's from Spanish-speaking countries (where the mother's name is the last and generally not used). My friends from spanish speaking countires also have three names, but normally they use only two (the given and the father's). I would like to know if this is possible. For instance, if I sign a document where my name appearsas only "Bob Smith" and not "Bob Sneijder Smith" is it problematic? Does it lose legal value? I tried removing my mother's maiden name but that is not easy. I am also a citizen of Italy where the convention is also given + father and this is also generating confusion. What are my alternatives? Can I do like my spanish speaking friends and just omit my mother's maiden name? I talk about official things, ex: signing a lease, buying property, signing a job contract, etc... Thanks

Tricky. An airline will usually want to know “your name as written in your passport”. My name is not the name written in my passport, but I tell airlines what will cause the least trouble - the name in my passport. You may or may not be able to change your Brazilian name, according to what your government says. (I found out it is impossible to change the name in my passport to be the same as my name). If you become citizen of another country, their rules apply as well. If you got UK citizenship, you could probably change your British name to James Johnson without problem - which may create more confusion elsewhere. As far as signing is concerned, in most places the fact that you sign is what counts. There may be problems with evidence, but in most places even signing “Mickey Mouse” will be a legally binding signature. You signing with something that could reasonably be taken as your name should be fine legally, but of course may cause confusion.

Do Sunday working hours count towards overtime?

Apologies if this should be in Workforce Exchange... I live and work in Massachusetts, US as a full-time, paid hourly, retail worker. I work Wednesday though Sunday. In Massachusetts, I am entitled to time and a half on Sundays. In the US, I am entitled to time and a half per every hour over forty hours during one week. Here's the rub, I never get overtime because my place of business counts Sunday as overtime. For example, if I work eight hours on Sunday, and then nine hours for each of the next four days, I will have worked forty-four hours. However, because Sunday is considered overtime, I only get eight hours of overtime pay. I am wondering if I should get twelve hours of overtime, eight for working the Sunday, and then the four for going over forty. My Massachusetts source has been: mass.gov... And for the US: dol.gov... The US wording confuses me: Unless specifically exempted, employees covered by the Act must receive overtime pay for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek at a rate not less than time and one-half their regular rates of pay. There is no limit in the Act on the number of hours employees aged 16 and older may work in any workweek. The Act does not require overtime pay for work on Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, or regular days of rest, as such. What does that last sentence mean? Should I be getting paid more than I am?

> What does that last sentence mean? It means that federal law does not provide premium pay on Sundays and Holidays the way MA does. > Should I be getting paid more than I am? No. Check out G.L. c. 151, § 1A : the hours so worked on Sunday or certain holidays shall be excluded from the calculation of overtime pay In other words, take your eight hours on Sunday and subtract that from the total hours for the week. That number minus 40 is how many OT hours you get. This calculation is called crediting - basically the employer credits your time-and-a-half Sunday work against your total hours for the week. Crediting is allowed and it is why you do not get the Sunday pay on top of your overtime. If you want to get in the weeds take a look at Swift v Autozone where the MA Supreme Court describes why crediting is allowed. Also see 29 U.S.C. 207(h)(2) which tells us that extra compensation is creditable..

Is it legal to compel users to share data in order to access more features, when the features being accessed do not require the data being requested?

Apologies in advance if this is not the correct exchange for this question. I am a developer working for a company that owns a healthcare application. They operate exclusively in the EU. As part of the data consent / privacy policy, users can agree to allow the company to collect additional data about their account, in addition to our standard terms. I have been asked to implement a set of new features. Part of this implementation involves making these features inaccessible to users who have not allowed the company to collect additional data. If the user agrees to share this data, they can access the new features. However, these new features do not need to use the additional data in order to work. I am concerned that this is illegal and am hesitant to carry out the project. I have spent some time trying to research this online but have been unable to find clear advice on the legality of leveraging feature access against data consent options. I do not think this is considered best practice, but I am unable to assess if it is illegal, or just a poor decision. Is it legal to compel users to share data in order to access more features, when the features being accessed do not require the data being requested?

Any processing of personal data needs a legal basis, for example necessity for some contract or legitimate interest. If no other legal basis allows the processing, you need to acquire consent. Consent must be freely given . If something is gated behind consent without that consent being really necessary, this might coerce users and they would not be able to consent freely. The GDPR does not have a hard ban on this, but it explicitly calls out that this case must be considered when determining whether consent is valid. So what your company is trying to do is in a dark grey area. Not necessarily wrong, but likely so. Consent could be made free if users have an actual choice. For example, some online newspaper sites had success with a “pay or consent” wall. (Success in the sense that some data protection authorities allowed this). In your case, this could mean that users either consent to extra data collection, or that they buy some reasonably priced premium mode. But none of this is for you to decide. You can voice your doubts that the software would be compliant. You could also ask if the Data Protection Impact Assessment document for this proposed processing is available (creating such an assessment is likely mandatory in this case). But in the end, it is the company's obligation to be compliant, and this responsibility is largely shouldered by the company's data protection officer (to whom you can turn with further questions).

How does a preliminary hearing differ from a full trial?

Apparently "preliminary hearings" are to determine whether or not the defendant should be sent to Superior Court for a "full" trial. (My "source" for this is "Perry Mason.") What exactly is a "preliminary hearing"? Is it a "halfway house" between say, a grand jury indictment and a trial? Or given the sequence of arrest and "preliminary hearing," is it the grand jury indictment process itself?

A "preliminary hearing", of the kind depicted in the Perry Mason novels, is a procedure in California and some other states. It is an alternative to a Grand jury proceeding. It is used to determine whether there is probable cause to put the defendant on trial. Such hearing are mostly rather routine, and rarely reach the level of drama shown in "Perry Mason". But the prosecutor does present witnesses, which the defendant's lawyer can cross-examine. The defendant may, but rarely does, also present witnesses. Note that Mason stories sometimes involved a full trial, not just a preliminary hearing. Gardner, who wrote Perry Mason, was a practicing attorney in CA, and most of the law as he shows it was accurate when he wrote, but he often showed legally possible but highly unlikely events to improve the drama of his stories.

Breach of contract implies bad faith in New York?

Apparently in New York, breach of contract implies bad faith in New York, so there is no necessity in making a separate complaint of bad faith when filing for breach of contract. However, this seems kind of irrational to me because obviously a person can fail to fulfill a contract through no fault of their own due to accident or bad business planning or whatever and none of these ordinary causes for failure to perform involve acting in bad faith. Furthermore, I thought bad faith claims were important because if, for example, a debtor acts in bad faith, then they may not be able to receive protection in bankruptcy for example. What am I missing here?

I belive you have misread the linked article: "A Narrow Lane: Navigating Claims for Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing"/ It says thst all conrtreacts involve a duty of good faith: It is a settled principle of New York law that “all contracts imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the course of performance.” 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co. , 98 N.Y.2d 144, 153 (2002) (collecting cases). Courts have described this covenant as a duty “encompassing any promises which a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would be justified in understanding were included and which are not inconsistent with the contract.” It goes on to say that it is tempting for a plaintiff to include a bad faith claim in any contract dispute: After all, most plaintiffs probably believe that the defendant did not act in good faith and/or that the result was unfair. But it says that courts are reluctant to honor such claims in ordinary contract disputes: ... courts are loath to make rulings that might vary the terms to which the parties agreed. A party’s conduct either breaches the terms of the agreement or it does not; if it does not, that is generally the end of the line for a breach of contract claim. A party seeking to impose an additional duty on the ground that it is “implied” bears a heavy burden . In short, claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing fail far more often than they succeed . This article explores some of the nuances that make such claims particularly thorny . ... “[t]he law encourages ‘efficient breaches’”; that is, breaches committed based on the breaching party’s calculated determination that it “will still profit after compensating the other party for that party’s expectancy interest.” 28A N.Y. Prac. Contract Law § 23.2. Absent a specific provision in the contract that requires good faith, a “bad faith breach” is no different from any other. ... although a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing requires that the parties have a valid contract ..., such a claim will fail if it is based on the same alleged conduct that forms the basis for a cause of action for breach of the contract’s express terms. See Kim v. Francis , 184 A.D.3d 413, 414 (1st Dept. 2020). So the article explicitly says that a claim for breach of contract does not automatically imply a breach of good faith. To the contrary, something more is required.

Standards for convicting a person of being an accomplice to a crime when the crime did not occur

Apparently in the United States one can be convicted of being an "accomplice" to a crime, even if that crime has been proven in a court of law to have not occurred. Is there a legal standard for this, or is it just irrationality? An example of the situation to which I am referring is when multiple people get charged with a crime and one is acquitted, the jury finding that there was no crime, but then other people involved get convicted of being "accomplices" even though the primary defendant was found to be innocent. A specific instance of this was the high profile cases of the State of New Hampshire against Mark Gray and Brenna Cavanaugh. Gray had fired a gun at an intruder after the intruder had fled Gray's house. Gray was charged by police with criminal threatening with a deadly weapon and criminal mischief. Cavanaugh, who lives with Gray, and was with him at the time of the shooting, was charged with being an accomplice to the two charges made against Gray. Gray was acquitted of both charges. Nevertheless, not only was the case against Cavanaugh continued, but she was convicted even though a jury had already decided no crime had occurred by the person she was allegedly abetting. Now, obviously a state legislature could pass a law stating "No person shall be convicted of a being an accomplice to an act which has been previously decided to have not been a criminal act by a court of law." However, it seems idiotic that a legislature should have to pass a law like this. This seems like something that is legal common sense and should be in the purview of the courts. In other words, legislatures should not have to pass laws stating logically obvious legal principles. So, what is going on here? Are courts in the United States just exhibiting incompetence on this subject or is there some legal principle of which I am unaware?

The jury never finds there was “no crime” They either find that the state has proven that this particular defendant committed this particular crime (guilty) or they have not proven it (not guilty). Another jury at another time may find the opposite - this does sometimes happen where a guilty verdict is appealed and the appeals court orders a retrial. For another defendant charged with a different crime (e.g. accessory to the first crime) before another jury, the result of another trial is both irrelevant and inadmissible.

Jurors not allowed to talk to each other during the trial?

Apparently many judges instruct jurors not to discuss the case in progress. What is the rationale for this, other than just yet another tactic to marginalize juries and prevent them from trying cases? A related issue is asking questions. Obviously if the jury wants to ask witnesses questions, they may need to talk among themselves to decide what question to put to the witness, so the instruction would seem to directly conflict with basic juror rights, such as the right to question witnesses.

Overview The rule on whether jurors may discuss a case before closing arguments is almost always a matter of statewide law and not a decision left to a particular judge in a particular case. There is good reason to believe that prohibiting pre-closing deliberation by jurors tends to make ultimate jury verdicts more accurate for reasons discussed below. The question about juror questions seems to be based upon the inaccurate assumption that jury questions are only allowed if collectively approved by the jury. Details The Rationale For Preventing Pre-Deliberation Discussions Among Jurors The Traditional Rule Described Is Not Universal First of all, prohibiting jurors from deliberating or discussing a case prior to the close of evidence and closing arguments is not universal practice. Colorado, for example, is one of the minority of reformist states that allow jurors to deliberate at any time that they are all present together in a case, after the panel is chosen. Arizona was one of the first states to experiment with this innovation. But, there is a rational reason for the older majority rule. Discouraging Pre-Judgment Of The Case This is first, to discourage jurors from reaching conclusions before all of the evidence is in, because people have a natural tendency to place more emphasis on the evidence that they hear first and to jump to conclusions before hearing all of the evidence, such as the defendant's evidence that comes last. Talking to other jurors consolidates and solidifies opinions and that makes it harder to change opinions when new evidence confronts an original opinion. Groups cling more tightly to an initial consensus than individuals. In contrast, individual jurors often change their minds during the course of a trial. Preventing Groupthink Secondly, it is to maximize the independence with which jurors reach their conclusions at the close of evidence. This matters because, empirically, the ultimate decision of a jury panel is overwhelmingly consistent with the initial pre-deliberation inclination of the median juror on the issue of guilt or innocence. The ultimate verdict of a jury is almost completely foreordained by the initial impressions of the jurors when they start their deliberations, even though it doesn't feel like that because jury deliberations cause people who are in the minority in an initial straw poll on the verdict to change their minds based upon what the other jurors have to say about 90% of the time. Twelve Angry Men (a drama and movie in which a holdout juror convinces all of the other jurors to change their mind on their verdict from their first straw poll) is an extremely outlier case that almost never happens in real life, especially in non-death penalty cases. So getting the first straw poll right is much more important than getting deliberations right since those have very predictable results. Deliberations almost never matter unless the jury has a 50-50 split in their initial straw poll and a lot of cases where there is a 50-50 split in the initial straw poll will produce a hung jury. Statistics on jury decisions To put some flesh on the numbers, the best empirical estimates of the overall accuracy of jury panels in making guilt-innocence determinations is about 90%. (Estimates on false convictions range from about 2.3% to 7% for all serious felonies including convictions arising from plea bargains in a 2007 study, a 14% acquittal rate was found in stranger rape cases where DNA evidence can lead to acquittals following jury trials, and roughly 40-47% of death sentences are overturned in the appellate and post-conviction review process.) Note that about 90% of criminal cases, overwhelmingly those with more clear cut guilt, result in plea bargains, so only about 1% of criminal defendants who are convicted are wrongfully convicted as a result of an inaccurate jury verdict. This accuracy rate somewhat underestimates how hard it is to be that accurate. It has been shown statistically (in the same article supporting the majority rule of jury verdict outcomes linked above), that about 68% of cases are pretty much guaranteed to produce convictions regardless of the makeup of the jury or the process used, while about 14% of cases that produce acquittals are sufficiently clear that the makeup of the jury or the process used doesn't matter (in a large, representative Sarasota, Florida sample). Thus, only about 18% of cases presented to juries are actually close cases and on those cases juries get the right result only a little better than 50% of the time. It is reassuring that about 95%+ of cases that are prosecuted have predictable outcomes in the system either through plea bargaining or correct jury verdicts, but not very comforting that about 2%+ of criminal prosecutions, and about one in five criminal jury trials, involve such unclear facts that their outcome at trial is basically a coin flip. In general, as a matter of mathematics, it is universally true (subject to assumptions that are present in this situation) that when something is more than 50% likely to happen in each trial as you would like it to happen, you are more likely to get a good result if you maximize the number of independent determinations that are made. In contrast, if something is less than 50% likely to happen as you would like, you maximize your odds of a desired result with as few independent trials as possible. The leading article explaining this idea is called " How To Gamble If You Must ." In a jury context, in real life, any given independent juror who ends up on a jury poll is more than 50% likely to get the right answer in an initial straw poll the vast majority of the time. So, the more independent jurors you have, the more likely it is that a majority of them will get the right answer. And, the fewer independent jurors you have, the more likely it is that a majority of them will make a mistake. So, by preventing pre-judgment deliberation, you increase the number of independent evaluations of the evidence that are made by the jurors and increase the probability of a correct result on the merits. The Case For The Modern Rule Allowing Pre-Closing Deliberation The counterargument for the modern rule is that an overall mistake on guilt or innocence flows from multiple earlier mistakes in interpreting particular items of evidence, and that the ultimate conclusion flows from a lot of mini-determinations. And, if someone makes a wrong mini-determination early on and can't be swayed from it once deliberations come along, this can lead to the jury being wrongfully hung. In contrast, if jurors deliberate on each item of evidence as it comes along as a complete group, the likelihood of getting any particular sub-issue wrong is minimized , and getting sub-issues right consistently may be more important to reaching a correct decision than maintaining independent points of view throughout the trial. Jury Questions Should Juror Questions Be Allowed? The traditional position is that jurors can't ask questions at all. To the best of my knowledge, juror question asking is a very recent phenomenon (probably late 1980s or later). The modern position, followed in a minority of states, allows jurors to ask questions if they are not objectionable under the rules of evidence that apply to lawyers. Some jurisdictions allow this in both civil and criminal cases, while others allow it only in civil cases. I honestly don't know what the rule in Colorado is on juror questions in criminal cases, because my practice is exclusively non-criminal. The state of the law on jury questioning in criminal cases in the federal courts is summarized in a recent 6th Circuit opinion : Juror questioning, we have explained, “should be a rare practice,” but “the balance of risks to benefits is more likely to weigh in favor of juror questions in complex cases.” The concern about allowing juror questions in criminal cases is that the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is on the prosecution and it can lose simply by failing to meet that burden of proof. An answer to a juror question could provide additional evidence that turns a case where it seems likely that a defendant committed a crime but there has not been proof beyond a reasonable doubt, into one where there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, unfairly and unconstitutionally disfavoring the criminal defendant. In a civil case where the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof makes the balance equal between the parties, and where the focus is more on getting a right result between two people who are equal before the state as opposed to protecting people from state overreach, the same considerations about aiding one side in meeting a burden of proof with jury questions don't apply to the same extent. The argument for the modern position is that psychology research shows that people make more accurate decisions when they can ask questions on points about which they are unclear. The lawyers and judge in the room may think that a point made by a witness was perfectly clear, but some of the jurors may not understand the word that someone used and come to the wrong conclusion. But, lawyers can't clarify the facts so as to assist the jurors in making the right decision if the jurors can't ask questions that illustrate what the jurors aren't understanding of the presentation before them. Deliberation As Related To Juror Questions A related issue is asking questions. Obviously if the jury wants to ask witnesses questions, they may need to talk among themselves to decide what question to put to the witness, so the instruction would seem to directly conflict with basic juror rights, such as the right to question witnesses. In my experience when juror questions are allowed, any juror who wants to ask a question may do so unilaterally without reaching the agreement of the other jurors, on the theory that even one juror who doesn't understand something about the testimony or has unanswered questions when facts are available to them, is one too many. Usually, a few jurors ask lots of questions, and many jurors ask few or no questions. So, it isn't clear how a prohibition on jurors deliberating prior to the close of evidence would change the practice of jurors asking questions. Perhaps there are places where jurors are allowed to ask questions only if they agree on those questions, but I am not aware of any such jurisdiction. In every jurisdiction that I am aware of that allows questions, individual jurors can ask them, and questions are not asked by jurors only if no juror has any questions for a witness. Also, even if jury questions did require the approval of the entire jury, my experience with how juries interact is that most juries would routinely approve almost every question of almost every individual juror anyway, so I don't know that it would make much of a difference.

Company hasn't paid me in weeks. Retaliation Concerns of contacting labor board?

Apparently my company is not doing well financially, and they could not pay me for quite a bit of time now. I would like to let the labor board know so that I can get paid, but I'm worried that the employer can retaliate and fire me for doing that. Is this legal to do in the USA? I did some research and can see that reporting workplace harrassment is protected by laws, but didn't find any mention of reporting to the labor board for failure to pay wages. If it's illegal, I'd like details on what the law name / section is so that I can do research on it. EDIT1: The state is RI and it's not a "famous" company. They have a very large client base but honestly I don't know of many employees at all, and they owe me several thousand dollars. I love working for the company and the work conditions are extremely good (I know that should not affect my ultimate decision here), so I am hesitant to do anything bad against the company. I don't want to give out too much info here in fear that they'll discover this topic and act accordingly, but I hope this is enough info for good responses.

Shorter Answer You are focusing on the trees and missing the forest. Your best first step is to stop working for a place that hasn't paid you in weeks. Indeed, anything you hear from the company about how they are going to fix the situation that is giving you the hope that is making you stay at your job at this point is more likely than not a straight out lie from management. While your options are explored at greater length below, in all likelihood they aren't paying you because they don't have the money to pay you. If that is true, it is probably futile to even bring a lawsuit or have an agency intervene. How can you collect, if they are so broke that they can pay workers whom they'd like to keep for weeks? Longer Answer While in theory, the U.S. Department of Labor can bring suit against an employer that doesn't pay wages, on the theory that this violates the Fair Labor Standards Act minimum wage requirement, often it does not, in part, on the theory that the employer owes you at least the minimum wage, even if the employer hasn't paid it. Also, usually the Department of Labor focuses its efforts on employers with lots of employees who are especially vulnerable and hence unable to look out for themselves, such as non-English speakers or developmentally disabled workers. So this makes it unlikely that they would take your case. A minority of U.S. states have laws on the books that do provide far more effective remedies when wages aren't paid, either through agency action or a private lawsuit. But, without knowing which state you are in, it is impossible to determine if you could benefit from such a law. The default and typical remedy, if you are not paid as agreed, is to bring a private lawsuit for payment of wages against your employer, because typically there is no agency willing to enforce a claim for unpaid wages. Of course, if you have a contract with an arbitration clause with your employer, you must commence a private arbitration instead, and then bring a private lawsuit to enforce the arbitration awards. Quite frankly, in your situation, being fired as retaliation is probably the least of your worries. Most people don't want to work for free and quit their job if their employer stops paying them. Failure to make payroll is usually a strong sign that a company is extremely likely to file for bankruptcy and/or discontinue its operations imminently, often in a matter of days or a few weeks. Very few companies ever recover from that kind of situation. Generally, you are best served by either quitting your job to cut your losses and suing for the wages you are owed, or not quitting and pressuring the employer without filing an agency complaint or lawsuit which could cause an employer to see you as an enemy to avoid paying instead of a friend to prioritize payment to. Quitting is a particularly attractive option in the current strong labor market. Also, threatening to quit if you don't receive at least partial payment immediately and getting the employer to put the balance of its debt to you in writing, effectively confessing its liability, may be a good middle ground. But, it rarely makes sense to file an agency complaint or lawsuit while still working there. The threat of a retaliation lawsuit is not very worrisome to a business that doesn't even have enough cash to make payroll anyway. It can't pay you money it doesn't have whether it owes you $5,000 of back wages or $500,000 of damages in a retaliation lawsuit. Also, while small amounts of unpaid wages are entitled to preferential payment if the company goes bankrupt, the larger the debt that is owed to you for back wages is, the larger the share of that debt that will receive no preference vis-a-vis other creditors in a bankruptcy becomes. So, the bankruptcy code also encourages you to quit and find a new job in order to mitigate your damages when your employer fails to pay you for a sustained period of time.

At what point does a dead person's image enter the public domain?

Apparently the Ronald Reagan Institute claims to own Ronald Reagan's image and claims the ability to prevent the use of his image for commercial gain . I am pretty sure I am allowed to sell pictures of George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and John F. Kennedy for profit. But I can't sell images of Ronald Reagan for profit? At what point does a person's image enter the public domain?

In California, 70 years This is statutorily determined by the Celebrities Rights Act passed in 1985. Before that, such rights were not inheritable following Lugosi v Universal Pictures . California law applies because Reagan was a California resident at the time of his death.

Trade restrictions on open source software

Apparently the US has put Huawei on a trade blacklist that prevents US companies to trade with Huawei. With hardware and proprietary software it is straightforward how this can be executed (don't make any contracts, don't sell stuff/licenses). With OSS this is a lot more complicated since there is no real deal or negotiation between the licensee and the provider of a license. Also, there is not a single copyright holder and copyright matters are often very complicated concerning OSS. So the question is twofold: does the trade blacklist have any effect on OSS and if not, is it at all possible for the US government to limit the trade of OSS?

Publishing source code is protected under the First Amendment . Therefore the US government cannot stop anyone from publishing open source software, and once it is available from a web site it is impossible to stop anyone else getting it. However any kind of support contract ( such as this ) or other commercial arrangement would fall under the definition of "trade" and be banned. Update in response to comments about ITAR. The USA International Traffic in Arms Regulations still cover cryptographic software . However any attempt to prosecute an open source project for publishing cryptographic software would run up against the First Amendment. In 2008 the 9th Circuit found that open source cryptographic software is covered under the First Amendment, and hence the use of ITAR to restrict its publication is unconstitutional. The US government declined to push this case to the Supreme Court, and no other similar cases have arisen since. In the meantime strong open source cryptographic software has been made widely available from within the USA without US government permission (Linus Torvalds is resident in the US). In theory the US government might launch a case against an open source project, win the appeal in another circuit, and hence create a circuit split which the Supreme Court would have to resolve. However they have now had over 10 years to try this, and the longer they wait the less likely such a case is to succeed.

International enforcement of dirty ship "laws"

Apparently there are some "laws" that make it illegal to sail dirty ships in international waters. I read an article giving only the information that "Maritime laws prohibit stained tankers from navigating international waters." with no further information. What "maritime law" is this referring to? How is it enforced? Can random countries just seize vessels in international waters if they decide the vessel is dirty?

This is an incomplete and not fully authoritative answer but it may answer some of your questions. Footnote 85 to a law review Note (i.e. student written law review article) by Maria Efaplomatidis from 2000 lists a number of international treaties that govern pollution from merchant ships. It cites the following treaties as relevant (as of the year 2000, of course): International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47 The Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546, (SOLAS) International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, and the Protocol of 1978 ("MARPOL") International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 ("STCW") Multilateral International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459 ("COLREGS") United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 Agreement for a Cooperative Vessel Traffic Management System for the Juan de Fuca Region, Dec. 19, 1979, 32 U.S.T. 377. I don't have easy direct access to all of those legal sources myself. The article you appear to be referencing, originally from Reuters , discusses oil tankers flying under a Venezuelan flag that were impounded in Caribbean ports, under the admiralty law of those ports, for not paying bills to firms that clean oil waste from the sides of oil tankers, non-payment which is also preventing other ships from getting cleaned. My guess, without reading the relevant treaties, is that consent to jurisdiction by the country under whose flag the ship operates subjects a ship to the treaty. I would also guess that the effect of the treaty as implemented by member states is only to ships that intend to travel to international waters or are coming in from international waters (to leave coastal boats in national waters to local regulation). I suspect that ships in violation are not permitted to leave the ports of a signatory. I doubt that a coast guard or naval ship of a signatory state would impound such a ship while it is actually in international waters, although I have no hard evidence for that assumption.

When does a fan game fall under parody?

Apparently there was a case in 2013 where the fan game My Little Pony: Fighting is Magic got taken down by Hasbro. This makes me wonder, why did it not fall under fair use in terms of Parody? This article by a legal information website says [...] a parody is a literary or artistic work that imitates the characteristic style of an author or a work for comic effect or ridicule. It is regarded as a criticism or comment on the original copyrighted work. In simple terms, it has to convey to the audience some type of message about the original work. This “message” fits can be understood to transform the original work (the work that’s being parodied) because that message is adding something new; it takes all or part of the original work and gives it a different purpose or character. [...] Making a game about characters from this TV show fighting each other, when in the series it's all about loving each other could be seen as criticism or comment on the peacefulness of the original characters. So why doesn't that count as parody? In a related fashion, I'm thinking about a game where giant dynamaxed Pokemon unleash death and destruction onto the world. If PETA's Pokemon clone is parody, wouldn't an overly brutal version of Pokemon be parody as well? I would be creating my own assets. What exactly is and isn't parody?

The details of this specific matter are not clear because it appears that Mane6 relented in response to a cease and desist letter, rather than be dragged through court. Since we are not privy to the letter from Hasbro, the best we can do is guess based on the degrees of freedom that exist under the law. The claim that this game was a "parody" is an affirmative defense that Mane6 would have to raise in response to a copyright infringement claim (we don't know if there were also trademark infringement claims in the letter). Then the jury would look at the arguments of the two sides to determine whether this was really "fair use", performing the "balancing act" to see how much of the original work was copied, how transformative the derived work is, what the effect on market would be. The lines drawn for making these judgments are not bright. A quick scan of a successor product Them's Fightin' Herds suggest that someone thought the artwork was too substantially similar to the Hasbro product, that is, the fighting pony version was judged to not be transformative enough. Since it didn't go to court, we'll never know.

Why are Saudi men forbidden from marrying citizens of Chad, Myanmar, Bangladesh or Pakistan?

Apparently these four countries are singled out in the law. What is specially significant about these four countries in relation to Saudi Arabia and specifically its Marriage laws? The claim is made in a recent answer

According to the Wikipedia article I cited in the original answer, the reasoning for these countries is that Saudi Arabia has a high population of immigrants from those nations and prefers not to allow further immigrants entry through marriage.

Some link building service got an old webpage of mine and is hosting it on another domain

Apparently they got it from archive.org. They made no changes to the page except to throw in some links, fitting them into the context so it will look natural to a crawler. They neglected to remove the visitor counter, that's how I found out. They even left the copyright notice I had on the page. They're using my images, my design, my content, my js, etc. Even though I no longer own the domain of the original site, I seem to be last owner. Can't find out who owns the domain so I guess I would go through the host to get in touch. Wondering if there is any legal remedy for this.

Is there any legal remedy? Yes. What you describe is an open-and-shut case of copyright infringement . The question is how much effort and expense is involved in dealing with this. At the simple end of things, if the webpage host is in the United States, you can send a DMCA takedown notice to get the page removed; at the complex end, if the host is in a country with a lax copyright regime that isn't on good terms with your country (say, you're in the US and the host is in Russia), you may be looking at a decades-long international copyright infringement lawsuit to get the page taken down.

How much names can be reused from another work?

Apparently using only 1-2 names from another work would not be sufficient to cause a work to become derivative, but is there a maximum limit of how many names can be reused?

There are two areas of IP law that might apply here, copyright and trademark law. Of these, copyright law will be more significant and more likely to lead to a possible suit. US Copyright Law Use of Previously Used Names Using the name of a character from an earlier work, even the name of a well known character that is central to the earlier work, does not of itself create copyright infringement. Even the use of a very well-known and distinctive name, such as "Harry Potter" or "Bilbo Baggins" or "Clark Kent" or "James Bond" would not, on its own create a case for infringement. For one thing, names as such are not protected by US copyright at all. The US Copyright Office's Circular 33: "Works Not Protected by Copyright" reads (on pages 2-3): Words and short phrases, such as names, titles, and slogans, are uncopyrightable because they contain an insufficient amount of authorship. The Office will not register individual words or brief combinations of words, even if the word or short phrase is novel, distinctive, or lends itself to a play on words. Examples of names, titles, or short phrases that do not contain a sufficient amount of creativity to support a claim in copyright include: The name of an individual (including pseudonyms, pen names, or stage names) The title or subtitle of a work, such as a book, a song, or a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work The name of a business or organization The name of a band or performing group The name of a product or service A domain name or URL The name of a character Catchwords or catchphrases Mottos, slogans, or other short expression No amount of use of the name or names of fictional characters from other, previously existing works constitutes a copyright infringement, unless there is a substantial similarity beyond the name itself. Derivative Works The use of a character or characters copied from a previous work may make a new work a derivative of the older work. For this to occur, the character(s) must be presented in the newer work with several distinctive elements clearly copied from the older work. These might include the detailed description of the character, the character's turns of speech, the ways in which a character acts, or other elements of similarity. While re-use of the name of the character might contribute to this similarity, it is probably going to be the least important aspect of such a similarity. in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. , 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) Judge Learned Hand explored the question of when a literary work (a play in this case) infringed another with similar plot elements. He wrote ( emphasis mine ): It is of course essential to any protection of literary property, whether at common-law or under the statute, that the right cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations. That has never been the law, but, as soon as literal appropriation ceases to be the test, the whole matter is necessarily at large, so that, as was recently well said by a distinguished judge, the decisions cannot help much in a new case. Fendler v. Morosco , 253 N.Y. 281, 292, 171 N.E. 56. ... When the question is whether the part so taken is "substantial," and therefore not a "fair use" of the copyrighted work; it is the same question as arises in the case of any other copyrighted work. Marks v. Feist , 290 F. 959 (C. C. A. 2); Emerson v. Davies , Fed. Cas. No. 4436, 3 Story, 768, 795-797. But when the plagiarist does not take out a block in situ, but an abstract of the whole, decision is more troublesome. Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended. Holmes v. Hurst , 174 U.S. 82, 86, 19 S. Ct. 606, 43 L. Ed. 904; Guthrie v. Curlett , 36 F.(2d) 694 (C. C. A. 2). Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can. In some cases the question has been treated as though it were analogous to lifting a portion out of the copyrighted work ( Rees v. Melville , MacGillivray's Copyright Cases [1911-1916], 168); but the analogy is not a good one, because, though the skeleton is a part of the body, it pervades and supports the whole. In such cases we are rather concerned with the line between expression and what is expressed . As respects plays, the controversy chiefly centers upon the characters and sequence of incident, these being the substance. ... Nor need we hold that the same may not be true as to the characters, quite independently of the "plot" proper, though, as far as we know, such a case has never arisen. If Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a second comer might so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not be enough that for one of his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the household, or a vain and foppish steward who became amorous of his mistress. These would be no more than Shakespeare's "ideas" in the play, as little capable of monopoly as Einstein's Doctrine of Relativity, or Darwin's theory of the Origin of Species. It follows that the less developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly. Thus only a detailed, distinctive portrayal of a character will constitute the kind of "substantial similarity" that leads to a judgement of copyright infringement. A name alone (or even several names) will not be enough to constitute infringement, even if the second author openly admits to taking the name from a previous work. Fair Use US Copyright Law includes a broad concept of fair use . Fair use is an exception to copyright , and so any use of an existing work that is held to be a fair use is not an infringement. A work that is concernedly a derivative work may be a fair use. For example in Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. , 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) the novel The Wind Done Gone (TWDG) was held to be a faior use of the earlier novel Gone With the Wind (GWTW). TWDG retells the story of GWTW from the point of view of he enslaved black characters. It repeats many scenes and incidents. But the court held that the use of these was "transformative" because of the way in which TWDG commented on GWTW, and was thus fair use. Literary reference, the mention of, or allusion to, a previous work, is a common technique, and is usually considered to be a form of fair use. For example, in Mark Twain's "A Double-Barreled Detective Story" the character of Sherlock Holmes appears, but this was not considered a copyright infringement. In John Myers Meyers's novel Silverlock the title character and his companion Golias find and set off on Huck Finn's raft. In Randall Garrett's "The Ipswich Phile" there is a super-spy character named "Sir James le Lien". (A lien, as many readers of this site will know, is a form of secured debt not unlike a bond. The reference is clear.) Use of names from previous works as a form of literary reference will usually constitute fair use, as it did in all the cited examples. US Trademark Law Trademark law in the US protects a trademark against being used in commerce without permission. It is possible, although a bit unusual, for the name of a fictional character to be protected as a trademark. There are, however, definite limits to the protections offered by trademark law. a protected mark is protected against use by another as a mark , that is a a designation of source, used to identify a brand, make, or type of goods or services offered or advertised for sale or rental. It does not protect agINST use of the mark as a name for the goods or services, not calimimng ownershipm of the mark ( nominative use ). And it does not protect against a use of the mark not in commerce, that is not used to identify any goods or services. Also, in most cases it does not protect against the use of the same mark form goods or servies of a quite different type, where no confusion is likely. Use of a mark as the name of a fictional character within a literary work, not as part of the title of the work, and not in the advertising for that work, would not be "use in commerce" and so would not be trademark infringement, even if the name was protracted as a trademark. Conclusion Use of one or several names of character that had previously appeared in another litary work or works is not likely to constitute copyright or trademark infringement, unless detailed and distinctive aspects of the character, setting, or plot are also copied, or unless the name is used to identify or advertise the work.

How is it legal for the US President's name to appear on aid checks?

Apparently, (soon-former) US President Donald Trump's name appeared on the stimulus checks sent out last year. I guess this is a late question to ask, but - how can this be legal? It makes it appears as though it is a personal gesture by Trump rather than a federal state action, which if anything is credited to the congress. Obviously it has a significant (and perhaps huge) effect on people's personal support for Trump as a candidate if "he sent them checks". Is this kind of practice really not forbidden by some law or election-related regulation?

It is common place for major official actions, not just checks but also, for example, governmental buildings, to note the politicians who implemented law or enacted them at the time. This practice is not forbidden by any law or election-related regulation. There is a strong political norm as a matter of political etiquette that checks from the government be signed by a senior official in the Treasury department or a state and local equivalent, such as the Secretary of Treasury, the Comptroller of the Currency, or the Director of the Internal Revenue Service, rather than the President, Governor, or Mayor. But no one would have legal standing to challenge a violation of this political norm in court, because a person receiving a check naming the President as the signer has not suffered an actual injury.

Motions in Hip Pocket Service?

Apparently, Minnesota and the Dakotas allow "Hip pocket service" , where a case starts by just sending someone a demand letter by what appears to be certified mail. In Minnesota, these cases have no court number and are nowhere docketed, at least until it is filed. This has to happen within a year, so the rules state. Oh, and as icing: that Minnesota rule is from before Minnesota was a state. What institution would adjudicate standard motions like a motion to dismiss on standing grounds, if that case isn't even in the court system yet to be given a judge? Does this setup mean, it is upon the defendant to spend filing fees and put everything on record by filing that someone sent them a suit so a judge can go and dismiss the plaintiff's case, which they didn't even file?!

Does this setup mean, it is upon the defendant to spend filing fees and put everything on record by filing that someone sent them a suit so a judge can go and dismiss the plaintiff's case, which they didn't even file?! Basically yes. After service on a defendant, (1) the defendant invokes the jurisdiction of the court by filing an answer or motion to dismiss, (2) the plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of the court by filing a motion for default judgment, or (3) the parties by express agreement or implication waive the Minn. R. Civ. Pro. 12(a) deadline for a responsive to a complaint. The third case would usually arise either (1) because payment in full or settlement has made the case moot, or (2) because they are negotiating a resolution. The Summons, Return of Service, and Complaint don't have to be filed with the court until one year after service of process on a defendant (unless mutually agreed otherwise) or the claims there were brought or could have been brought in the complaint are dismissed with prejudice. Minn. R. Civ. Pro. 5.04(a). But any responsive pleading such as an answer or motion to dismiss must be served by the defendant within 21 days of service, Minn. R. Civ. Proc. 12(a), and any responsive pleading must be filed with the court. Minn. R. Civ. Pro. 5.4(b). I'm not certain what filing fees apply in cases where an answer or motion to dismiss is filed before the summons and complaint: There is a $75 fee for filing a motion or response to a motion (which is unusual), and a $285 fee for a party's first filing in an ordinary civil action (which is common). Failing to appear in response to a Motion to Dismiss would incur no new filing fees but result in a default judgment against the Plaintiff on the Motion to Dismiss together with a judgment for costs. From the defendant's perspective the fees incurred in this scenario are the same as they would be if the Plaintiff had filed the case in the first place, and the plaintiff will pay the same fees that it would have otherwise if the Plaintiff responds to the Motion to Dismiss. The Defendant filing the Motion to Dismiss is no worse off if the Plaintiff avoids the filing fee in the case by not filing a response to the Motion to Dismiss with the Court, giving the Defendant a default judgment on it (indeed, the Defendant is better off because no fees have to be incurred to write a reply brief regarding their Motion to Dismiss). Presumably, a prevailing motion to dismiss party is entitled, at a minimum, to a judgment for costs against the plaintiff in such a case. The Defendant might even receive an award of attorneys' fees a sanction as well, if the Plaintiff defaults in response to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, if the right conditions are met. Of course, a Plaintiff can't get a court to enter a default judgment without filing the Summons, Return of Service, Complaint, a Motion for Default Judgment, and a Soldier's and Sailor's Relief Act Affidavit with the court. Incidentally, service of a summons by certified mail on an individual is generally only allowed if there is consent prior to suit (e.g. in a contract). See Minn. R. Civ. Proc. 4(a). Analysis and Context A few observations about the Minnesota Rule: Minnesota does not permit a party who can't manage to get a defendant served with process because the defendant can't be located by a process server to preserve their statute of limitations by filing a complaint with the court and then serving the summons and complaint within a reasonable time afterwards, unlike federal court and most state court systems. This has the potential to be quite harsh in effect. Statutes of limitations are automatically tolled pending negotiations up to a year, when there is service of a summons and complaint followed by negotiations rather than a filing of the case with the court. Hip pocket service allows a debt collector to make sort of a "super demand notice" in which non-compliance results in not just a threat to sue in the future but immediate filing of a lawsuit which damages the defendant's credit rating in a public record. This extra nudge on a defendant who is well off enough to care about a credit record can make collection more likely to be successful especially in cases where the defendant has not viable defense to assert in good faith in an answer. Hip pocket service probably slightly reduces the case load of routine default judgment or immediate voluntary dismissal cases. Hip pocket service was probably instituted originally to end the need to have courts issue an alias summons when a defendant couldn't be timely filed back in the days when a summons had a date certain return date and had to be served a certain number of days prior to the return date, rather than requiring a response within certain number of days after service of process is achieved as modern Minn. R. Civ. Pro. 12(a) provides (which was an innovation first widely adopted by states in the 1930s in following the adoption then of the federal rules of civil procedure which used this procedure). The linked article in the question does a good job of explaining the process. The older date certain return date hasn't vanished, however. Colorado, for example, has a hybrid version of this system using the federal response within days of service model for its general jurisdiction district courts, and also allows for hip pocket service but with the requirement that the complaint be filed within 14 days of service. Colo. R. Civ. Pro. 3 . It also allows for fixed return date with hip pocket service for its limited jurisdiction county court civil actions. New York State also has many circumstances with date certain return dates in the form of Order to Show Cause practice that is common there. But, at the linked article notes, post-service out of court process in Minnesota and two other states is much more extensive than in other states.

Is a filing in the public domain?

Apparently, a Comic book shop filed a complaint as a comic book. The third amended complaint in the case has, in part, the style of an illustrated novel. But it is also a court filing. Court Proceedings are a matter of public matter, and open to the public... A graphic novel is clearly a creative work and could have copyright. But this is a court filing. Was it as a result put in the public domain?

Court filings are, in general, matters of public record . This does not automatically put them into the public domain . This will mean that, absent a special order of the court, anyone will be able to read this filing as pert of the court records. Many courts now make all or parts of their records available on the web. But the copyright holders will possibly retain their rights to authorize the making of further copies, and surely retain the right to authorize the making of derivative works, and their other rights that are part of the copyright bundle, such as the rights of public performance. These rights would not be retained if the work had been placed in the public domain.

Does the "Family First Coronavirus Response Act" cover federal employees?

Apparently, a new coronavirus related paid family leave law takes effect on 04/01/2020. I understand that, among commercial companies, it applies only to those under 500 employees (because, of course, companies that can afford lobbying cannot be burdened, but that's unrelated to the question.) The questions I have regarding that law: 1) Does the new extended leave law apply to federal employees? More specifically, my wife works for Veterans' Affairs, and we'd like to figure out whether she qualifies. On one hand, VA has more than 500 employees, but on the other hand, VA is not a commercial company, and I don't see in the reports specifics regarding the government employees. 2) Would a mother of small children qualify for paid family leave to watch them while the schools are closed? This has become quite an issue as soon as the schools closed for the year.

The Department of Labor has a page about the law. Some excerpts (boldface mine): Most employees of the federal government are covered by Title II of the Family and Medical Leave Act, which was not amended by this Act, and are therefore not covered by the expanded family and medical leave provisions of the FFCRA . However, federal employees covered by Title II of the Family and Medical Leave Act are covered by the paid sick leave provision. And as to your Question 2: Generally, the Act provides that employees of covered employers are eligible for: Two weeks (up to 80 hours) of paid sick leave at two-thirds the employee’s regular rate of pay because the employee is unable to work because of a bona fide need to care for an individual subject to quarantine (pursuant to Federal, State, or local government order or advice of a health care provider), or to care for a child (under 18 years of age) whose school or child care provider is closed or unavailable for reasons related to COVID-19 , and/or the employee is experiencing a substantially similar condition as specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation with the Secretaries of the Treasury and Labor; and Up to an additional 10 weeks of paid expanded family and medical leave at two-thirds the employee’s regular rate of pay where an employee, who has been employed for at least 30 calendar days, is unable to work due to a bona fide need for leave to care for a child whose school or child care provider is closed or unavailable for reasons related to COVID-19. (This page was quite easy to find, just by searching Google for the title of the law...)

Is it against the EU freedom of movement for Italy refuse entry to an EU citizen with only an ID card flying from outside the EU/EFTA?

Apparently, as stated in Timatic, a database operated by IATA and used by airlines to establish whether a passenger can enter the destination country, Italy recently introduced a restriction that non-Italian EU/EFTA citizens can only use their national ID cards to enter Italy if having flown from an EU/EFTA country. Italian citizens, meanwhile, can only use their IDs to enter if having flown from an EU/EFTA state, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Tunisia or Turkey. Is this a violation of the EU freedom of movement directive, whereby a verified EU/EFTA national cannot normally be refused entry to any EU/EFTA state, and/or the international policy that a country should never refuse entry to verified citizens of their own? UPDATE : Turns out this alleged quirk was merely misinformation from the Italian government. I learnt of it the hard way, by being denied boarding on a Pegasus flight from Istanbul to Bergamo (despite calling the border police in Bergamo, who sent a clearance message to Pegasus). I then e-mailed my IATA contact and asked him to ask their Italian government sources to re-confirm this restriction. It was found not to exist whereby Timatic was corrected.

You've asked a two part question. [Is this a violation of] the international policy that a country should never refuse entry to verified citizens of their own? In considering that question, the US example may be illuminative. The US requires US citizens to have a "passport book" when flying into the US, even though the US issues "passport cards" that serve as proof of nationality. If you can get to the border and prove your US nationality (by passport card or otherwise), they'll let you in, but airlines won't board you unless you have a passport book. If you don't have a passport book, you're supposed to get to the nearest consulate and apply for a passport before flying to the US. But note that the US obligation to admit its own citizens is principally a feature of US law. CBP does not waive 8 USC 1185 because of some international body; there is no body that enforces international "policies" of this nature. Rather, they do so because they know that the federal courts would require them to admit US citizens based on the right of free movement implicit in US law. If someone were unable to get into their country of citizenship and unable to gain legal residence elsewhere then unless they could remain on the run for the rest of their life they would eventually end up as the subject of negotiation between whatever country is trying to deport them and their country of citizenship. In other words, in the worst case, such people become a bilateral diplomatic matter between two countries. Therefore, any challenge to the restriction would have to go through the Italian or EU legal system. Is this a violation of the EU freedom of movement directive, whereby a verified EU/EFTA national cannot normally be refused entry to any EU/EFTA state? It certainly seems to be, but without a decision from an EU court, we can't be certain. From Article 5 of the freedom of movement directive ( 2004/38/EC ): Article 5 Right of entry 1.   Without prejudice to the provisions on travel documents applicable to national border controls, Member States shall grant Union citizens leave to enter their territory with a valid identity card or passport and shall grant family members who are not nationals of a Member State leave to enter their territory with a valid passport. No entry visa or equivalent formality may be imposed on Union citizens. This doesn't say anything about allowing EU citizens to board aircraft from non-EU destinations without their EU passports. So if Italy makes a rule that EU citizens need a passport to board a flight to Italy from outside the EU and Schengen area, that doesn't seem to violate Article 5 except by implication. It would be for a court to decide whether that implication is in fact present. Because Article 5 doesn't say anything about where the passenger has flown from, we can also consider the case of a dual citizen of an EU member state and a "third country," who might fly to Italy using the third-country passport, and then present a national ID card at the immigration counter. If such a traveler were denied entry, that would appear to violate Article 5. If that traveler's other nationality were one that required a visa in the non-EU passport, the traveler might have a stronger case that Italy's rule infringes on the right of free movement. EU or EFTA citizens could also challenge the restriction more generally as an infringement on the right of free movement that is established in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), even if the directive itself does not prohibit the restriction. For example, one might argue that free movement is restricted because there are countries to which EU citizens can travel with only an ID card, but from which they cannot return to Italy with only that card. In addition, non-Italian EU or EFTA citizens could challenge the more restrictive regime applied to them on the argument that it violates the principle of non-discrimination articulated in Article 9 of the TEU: Article 9 In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.... Furthermore, non-Italians residing in Italy could challenge the more restrictive regime on the basis of Article 24 of the directive: Article 24 Equal treatment 1.  Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in the Treaty and secondary law, all Union citizens residing on the basis of this Directive in the territory of the host Member State shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State within the scope of the Treaty. The benefit of this right shall be extended to family members who are not nationals of a Member State and who have the right of residence or permanent residence.

Is Plummer v State still valid under contemporary law?

Apparently, in Plummer v State back in 1893, the court ruled an individual may act in self-defense against a police officer provided there is unlawful use of force. Note, this does not mean self-defense is acceptable against an unlawful arrest. So, can this still be used as precedent today? Because what I learned from my Criminal Justice education was that a person can only act in self defense if they did not know the officer was an officer or if the officer turned out to be someone impersonating an officer. Unlawful arrest or even misuse of force can only be legally remedied by civil suits not self-defense.

It appears that Plummer v. State is still valid, but only in a very limited fact pattern. It is often quoted on the internet to justify the idea that a person may resist any unlawful arrest with force. That may have been true when Plummer was decided, and it was the clear holding of Bad Elk v. United States , 177 U.S. 529 (1900) But Bad Elk is bad law today -- the wide adoption of the Model Penal Code starting in 1962 removed the right to resist a merely unlawful arrest. The right to use self-defense against excessive force by an officer remains, but is narrowly limited, and courts rarely find such resistance justified. In State v. Mulvihill 57 N.J. 151 (1970) The Supreme Court of New Jersey held: If, in effectuating the arrest or the temporary detention, the officer employs excessive and unnecessary force, the citizen may respond or counter with the use of reasonable force to protect himself, and if in so doing the officer is injured no criminal offense has been committed. However, the Mulvihill court cautioned: State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169 (App. Div. 1965) held that "a private citizen may not use force to resist arrest by one he knows or has good reason to believe is an authorized police officer engaged in the performance of his duties, whether or not the arrest is illegal under the circumstances obtaining." (89 N.J. Super. at 184.) The opinion put to rest the notion that the common law rule existing in some jurisdictions, which permits a citizen to resist, even with reasonable force, an unlawful arrest by a police officer, was applicable in New Jersey. ... Accordingly, in our State when an officer makes an arrest, legal or illegal, it is the duty of the citizen to submit and, in the event the seizure is illegal, to seek recourse in the courts for the invasion of his right of freedom. The Mulvihill court explained the difference in the two csase by saying: Despite his duty to submit quietly without physical resistance to an arrest made by an officer acting in the course of his duty, even though the arrest is illegal, his right to freedom from unreasonable seizure and confinement can be protected, restored and vindicated through legal processes. However, the rule permitting reasonable resistance to excessive force of the officer, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful, is designed to protect a person's bodily integrity and health and so permits resort to self-defense. Simply stated, the law recognizes that liberty can be restored through legal processes but life or limb cannot be repaired in a courtroom. And so it holds that the reason for outlawing resistance to an unlawful arrest and requiring disputes over its legality to be resolved in the courts has no controlling application on the right to resist an officer's excessive force. People v. Curtis , 70 Cal. 2d 347, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 719. The Mulvihill court further warned that: [A citizen] cannot use greater force in protecting himself against the officer's unlawful force than reasonably appears to be necessary. If he employs such greater force, then he becomes the aggressor and forfeits the right to claim self-defense ... Furthermore, if he knows that if he desists from his physically defensive measures and submits to arrest the officer's unlawfully excessive force would cease, the arrestee must desist or lose his privilege of self-defense. The court said that the duty to desist and submit if that would stop the excessive force is analogous to the duty to retreat rather than use force in self defense when this is feasible. The Nolo Press page "Resisting Arrest When Police Use Excessive Force" says: It’s rare that someone being placed under arrest has the right to forcefully resist. But in most states, if the arresting officer uses excessive force that could cause “great bodily harm,” the arrestee has the right to defend him or herself. That’s because most states hold that an officer’s use of excessive force amounts to assault or battery, which a victim has a right to defend against. ... An officer’s use of force is “excessive” if it is likely to result in unjustifiable great bodily harm (serious injury). Most states consider whether a “reasonable person” under the circumstances would have believed that the officer’s use of force was likely to cause great physical harm (including death). If the answer is “yes”—if a reasonable person would have felt it necessary to resist in self-defense, and if that person used a reasonable degree of force when resisting, then the resistance is typically justified. But this is a very high standard to meet, such that courts hardly ever find that an arrestee’s forceful resistance was defensible. This article from policeone.com citing California law, says that forceful resistance to an arrest is almost never justified. It does agree that resistance to excessive force can be used; Section 693 requires that even if the officer were committing a public offense (crime), only that "self-defense" force that is sufficient to prevent the offense may be used. In other words, the subject may only use force to simply stop the assault/battery under color of authority and never any more than that. and says that: It is a rare circumstance when this assault/battery under color of authority actually occurs and an officer is charged, not because of some great law enforcement driven conspiracy but because it rarely happens. In short, Plummer is still valid, but limited to the fact pattern when the person being arrested is actually being subjected to excessive force likely to cause great bodily harm, or death, and only justifies sufficient force to prevent such harm. The lawfulness of the arrest does not matter, it the the danger caused by the excess force that justifies possible resistance. As a practical matter, if resistance is likely to escalate rather than prevent harm, it is highly unwise. When Plummer is cited, often with Bad Elk , to justify resistance to an unlawful arrest because of its unlawfulness, that is no longer valid law and has not been for decades. Note that is a person who is not a law enforcement officer (LEO) but who is pretending to be one, tries to make an "arrest" this would not be an arrest at all, but an assault or an attempted abduction, and the victim would be justified in using reasonable force in self-defense, although not excessive force. This is not the Plummer rule, but the normal law of self-defense. However any arrestee should be careful. Claiming that the arresters are impersonators when they are in fact plainclothes LEOs will not go well. If a reasonable person should have known that they were LEOs, there is no right to resist unless excessive force is used. Note further that if non-LEOs attempt to make a "citizen's arrest", not impersonating officers, the right to self-defence only applies if excessive force is used, or there is a reasonable fear of excessive force likely to cause great bodily harm or death. Basically the Plummer rule still applies. Also, all of this is a matter of state law, and while Plummer should be good law in most if not all states, the exact rule may vary by state. In 2012 a few US states retained the common-law rule that any unlawful arrest justified resistance, according to the Nolo page linked above. That may have changed, or may change when a case arises. The question does not specify a state, and a precise answer depends on the specific state.

Are US courts less likely to enforce the repayment of a loan if it is (ceteris paribus) without interest?

Apparently, in common law, a loan given without an interest being specified/demanded is at procedural disadvantage, in that a court may not recognize it as a contract, the plaintiff having to rely on promissory estoppel instead, in this case, at least according to Investopedia : Promissory Estoppel as a Part of Contract Law Contract law generally requires that a person receive consideration for making a promise or agreement. Legal consideration is a valuable asset that is exchanged between two parties to a contract at the time of a promise or agreement. Ordinarily, some form of consideration, either an exchange of money or a promise to refrain from some action, is required for a contract to be legally enforceable. However, in attempting to ensure justice or fairness, a court may enforce a promise even in the absence of any consideration, provided that the promise was reasonably relied on and that reliance on the promise resulted in a detriment to the promisee. It seems pretty obvious to me that not getting back the money lent is "a detriment to the promisee". Are there quantitative or (lacking those) qualitative (e.g. comparative case) studies whether a zero-interest loan is a true disadvantage in the US court system, regarding repayment, ceteris paribus (i.e. assuming otherwise the same basic conditions are met, e.g. evidence [like witnesses and/or a written note] to prove that the promise to repay was made on a certain date/event or schedule)? Or is the lack of interest [demanded] rather irrelevant in practice, as far as trial outcomes? I'd prefer we limit the discussion to the US, but if clear-enough evidence (one way or the other) is only available from other common-law jurisdictions, I'd accept an answer based on a proxy jurisdiction. I'm not sure if this self-answers my Q (I would like more evidence) but LII Wex says in broad terms that: An agreement made by promissory estoppel will typically have the same binding effects on parties that a valid contract would. (N.B. Another source says that promissory estoppel "was formally “ushered” onto the stage of American contract law in 1932". So I guess evidence has to be after that year...)

I've never seen that principle invoked in U.S. law. There are tax reasons not to make zero interest loans to related parties (unpaid interest at a low market rate is deemed income to the lender for income tax purposes, followed by a gift from the lender to the borrower for gift tax purposes), but no substantive contact law ones in U.S. jurisprudence. Consideration is a greatly degraded doctrine, but normally, the consideration in this transaction in a suit by a lender to enforce the contract would be obvious. The loan is made for the consideration that it must be repaid later. A promise to make an interest free loan in the future might face more consideration problems as a barrier to enforcement by someone seeking to now receive a zero rate interest loan from the person who promised to make one without getting anything in return for that promise. Indeed, there are standard commercial terms for such arrangements that are used routinely, such as "thirty days net" which means paid for with an interest free loan due thirty days after the day of the invoice. Similarly, there are examples of zero interest government bonds. This said, promissory estoppel remains good law and is often pleaded in the alternative with breach of contract in any remotely atypical basically contractual transaction. Promissory estoppel is almost identical to breach of contract but substitutes detrimental reliance on a promise for consideration. Footnote: (N.B. Another source says that promissory estoppel "was formally “ushered” onto the stage of American contract law in 1932". So I guess evidence has to be after that year...) This is probably a reference to the First Restatement of Contracts. Indeed, upon checking it, that is what it says. The First Restatement relied on prior caselaw to make its points, so the statement isn't truly accurate (and the Restatements aren't binding sources of law, there is nothing "formal" about it unlike the adoption of a statute or a precedent setting case decision, the Restatements are just a persuasive source of common law principles), but the First Restatement of Contracts certainly made Promissory Estoppel much more widely known and accepted in U.S. law.

Is it legal for employers to charge for training if you leave too soon?

Apparently, some employers are requiring new employees to sign a contract that says, “We will provide training. You must work here for at least N months. If you leave before that, you will have to pay us back $XXXX for the training. Are these contracts enforceable? Some people claim that they are a form of indentured servitude and that this is illegal in the US.

There is a reason these are commonly called "TRAP"s ( T raining R epayment A greement P rovision). These agreements don't just protect the employer from paying for training that an employee can use elsewhere. These agreements frequently act to "trap" the employee in difficult employment circumstances where the employer can demand long hours and excessive dedication in difficult jobs for little pay, knowing that if the employee tries to leave, they could face a substantial financial burden. These agreements are generally legal, provided they are executed in good faith. However, certain circumstances have been used to void the agreements. In particular: If the cost or value of the the training is vastly overstated, so the training actually provides minimal value to the employee, but has a disproportionately large repayment cost that only benefit the employer. If the term of the agreement is excessively long (typically, more than 1 year). Training is unlikely to be so valuable and specialized that the employee would need years to repay the benefits. (Certain exceptions apply, such as for advanced engineering work or specialized skills like airline pilots) If the "training" doesn't actually have much value; if the training is just company propaganda and policies, rather than job specific skills, repayment costs are unlikely to hold up in a dispute. If the employee already has demonstrated skills before the training, then forcing them into unnecessary training just for a TRAP contract is unlikely to be supported. For example, someone with years of skilled electrical design work probably cannot be forced to repay thousands of dollars of "training" for a few weeks of basic electrical refresher courses. Basically, if the training isn't valuable to the employee and the cost isn't reasonable for the training, the TRAP line can frequently be voided. Yet doing so almost always requires mediation or a suit, which are also expensive, time consuming, and have uncertain outcomes. Its best for a prospective employee to call out a TRAP provision as a red flag before accepting an offer, and avoid it if at all possible unless they truly believe they'll benefit from the training, intend to stay the full term, and understand the employer might use the cost as a way to expect more from them or hold back their professional advancement.

Do I need to worry about inheriting Polish debt from a family member when based in the UK?

Apparently, under Polish law you inherit debt, though you can choose not to accept the inheritance. "Polish inheritance law follows the rule of general succession which means that heirs are liable for the debts of the estate." My family live in the UK. I am British and my wife is Polish born but has lived in the UK since she was 2 years old and only holds a British Passport and is a British citizen. My wife’s parent are also Polish born and live in the UK and are British citizens. My wife’s cousin recently passed away with circa £50k in dept and no assets. He's Polish and lived in Poland. When a family member rejects an inheritance, it is then automatically passed to the next family member in this order. • his spouse and children are the first in line, followed by • grandchildren, followed by • great grandchildren, followed by • parents, followed by • siblings etc. All family members based in Poland will be rejecting the inheritance. They can do this for a sum of circa 50zl but you need a Polish passport and you need to be in Poland to do this via an appointment with the consulate. What this means is my wife and her mother will need to reject the inheritance for the same reasons. But to do this in the UK without a Polish passport required Notary service and quotes are coming in from UK based solicitors at £420 per person. It’s also not clear how far down the family hierarchy this needs to be carried out for. If my children also need to reject, then the price for the family starts to get silly. So my question is, is this really required to reject the inheritance since we are based in the UK. Can Polish authorities / bailiffs really chase us for money oversees? And if not, is this a problem if we visit Poland in the future?

Most civil law jurisdictions, including Poland, have a concept called "universal succession." What this means is that the default rule is that the persons entitled to receive a decedent's property, as established by a notarized will or intestate succession in the absence of a will, collectively receive the property of the decedent subject to the debts of a decedent, with a legal obligation to share the proceeds and obligations between each other as provided by law and the terms of the Will. But, it is possible, instead, to have the estate of a decedent formally administered. In these cases, the assets and liability of a decedent are formally determined and set off against each other. Successors of the decedent (either under a Will or intestate succession) are not subject to the debt's of the decedent if this is done, and instead, receive only the residuary assets of the estate remaining after the assets of the decedent have been used to pay the decedent's debts. This leaves only assets exempt from claims of creditors by statute (which are few) in the case of an insolvent estate, which is in most cases almost equivalent to giving up one's inheritance entirely. In the exception case when an estate is formally administered in this fashion, this is normally done either by non-family executors, in cases where it seems sure that the estate will be insolvent, or by an executor chosen by the successors of the decedent or the Will, in cases where a complicated estate of a decedent is probably solvent, but its solvency is uncertain because it is hard to exactly value some assets and some liabilities, or because there is a likelihood that some unknown assets and/or some unknown liabilities exist. Formal administration of a decedent's estate normally involves a process involving court filings or filings with a notary public that must be followed to affirmative elect to have a decedents estate formally administered. If this process is not followed within the specified time frame, the estate is usually, instead, governed by default process of universal succession. The nitty gritty details of the process are beyond my knowledge, but that is the basic conceptual outline and baseline of how the process of handling decedent's estate is usually managed in civil law countries from which any country specific laws may deviate or further elaborate. There is a summary of the law in Poland here . Basically, it provides that an heir's liability can be limited either by refusing the inheritance altogether or accepting it with the liability amounting to the value of the estate (so called "benefit of inventory"). So, in Poland, to get the benefits of formal administration the heirs need to prepare and file an inventory of the estate within six months of the date of death. They also have six months from the date of death to instead disclaim their inheritance and the obligations that come with it. Under Polish law, the heirs should make declaration on accepting an inheritance or refusing an inheritance within 6 months from the date they became aware of the fact that they are to inherit after the decedent. Where there is no declaration on acceptance or rejection of inheritance within a period of 6 months, this will be considered as the beneficiary accepting the inheritance with the benefit of inventory. That is a good solution as the liability would be limited to the value of the assets of the estate. Therefore, the heir would not have to pay more debts then the inherited value. However, that entails a duty to prepare an inventory list of the estate by the heirs. That is why the refusal of inheritance is also worth considering. . . . Sometimes it is . . . better to take action and refuse the inheritance instead of passively accepting the inheritance with the benefit of inventory and dealing with unpaid debts which were not yours, even if they do not exceed the estate's value. The extent to which a debt arising by universal succession would be honored as a foreign judgment after established in the country where the decedent is domiciled at death is a question that honestly doesn't come up very much. I don't know what preconditions a U.K. court would place on converting that debt to a U.K. money judgment. I suspect that a U.S. court would be quite skeptical of recognizing a foreign judgment arising by universal succession because it would probably not meet the usual requirements of U.S. law for recognition of judgments, such as service of process on the resident judgment debtor, the existing of personal jurisdiction in personam over the resident judgment debtor in the court where the judgment was entered, and the lack of an adequate opportunity to litigate the obligation on the merits that was known to the resident judgment debtor. But, I also wouldn't count on these defenses if I were a U.S. person and would instead seek to hire counsel in Poland to insist that the decedent's estate by having an inventory of the estate prepared and filed in a timely fashion, or by disclaiming the inheritance, based upon an evaluation of the benefits, risks, and administrative costs involved, and thus limiting the U.S. person's liability, unless the decedent's estate was solvent beyond any reasonable doubt. In the U.S., in contrast, heirs or successors of a decedent are never subject to the debts of a decedent except to the extent the obligation arises from their own mismanagement of the administration of the estate, and typically only receive inheritances once all liabilities of the decedent have been adjudicated and paid out of the decedent's assets, making a U.S. probate proceeding, unlike a civil law universal successor proceeding, an in rem proceeding that only adjudicates rights to a specific collection of property and does not create new personal obligations for heirs that can be enforced with money judgments against those heirs.

Use original trial witness testimony against witness in new trial?

Appeal court reversed municipal court judgement and ordered new trial. During the new trial, can I use the officer's testimony from the first trial? The officer's first trial testimony contradicts video from discovery request videos received after the first trial. Is that enough to show the officer is untruthful? If the officer is shown untruthful, does that invalidate all of the officer's testimony?

During the new trial, can I use the officer's testimony from the first trial? That is procedural question and the answer depends on what the jurisdiction allows. The officer's first trial testimony contradicts video from discovery request videos received after the first trial. Is that enough to show the officer is untruthful? Untruthful? No. Has recollections that differ in some ways from a video record? Yes. No one remembers events exactly as they occurred. Everyone misrepresents what was said, the sequence of events and other details. This doesn't make the officer untruthful, just human. If the officer is shown untruthful, does that invalidate all of the officer's testimony? It is for the finder of fact (the jury or judge as applicable) to decide what weight, if any, to give evidence, including the officer's testimony. They may or may not form the opinion that the testimony is untrustworthy and discount it - that's up to them. If the come to the opinion that that the difference between video and testimony is a product of malfeasance rather than error, they are more likely to discount the testimony in total.

Is a Denial of a Motion to Compel Arbitration reviewed de novo by the Appellate Division?

Appeals of an arbitration award are reviewed de novo . Does the same apply to the denial of a Motion to Compel Arbitration? In other words, if the trial court denied a motion to compel arbitration, is the appealing party entitled to ask the Appellate Division to review matters of fact or only matters of law? Assuming it is reviewed de novo , is the appellant specifically required to ask for de novo review or it is done implicitly?

The appellate court reviews based upon the trial court record. To the extent that it turns on questions of law, including interpretations of written documents whose authenticity is not in question, this review is de novo . Likewise, decisions on this issue made on a paper record and argument of counsel, without an evidentiary hearing that resolved material disputes of fact between the parties, are reviewed de novo . So are procedural question, like whether an evidentiary hearing should have been held. But, in cases where there is a mixed issue of fact and law, the appellate court defers to all findings of fact made in the trial court from an evidentiary hearing held in the trial court that are supported by admissible evidence in the trial court record. Since the material facts relating to the enforceability of arbitration are frequently not in dispute in a case like this and arbitration rulings are often made without evidentiary hearings, as for example, in this case and in this case , an appellate court often does engage in de novo review. But, the appellate court is not permitted to re-weigh the credibility of witnesses, for example, in a manner contrary to the trial court's findings of fact supported by admissible evidence in the record, if an evidentiary hearing was held and this was necessary to resolve disputed issues of fact that were material to the question of whether arbitration could be compelled. While what I have said above is somewhat different than the standards, for example, in New Jersey as stated in this document quoted below, this is to some extent a function of the facts of the referenced cases. None of which involve a refusal to compel arbitration following an evidentiary hearing involving disputed findings of fact. Appellate courts "review de novo the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint and compelling arbitration ." Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 131 (2020). See Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020). "Under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7, either party may move to confirm an award within three months of the date of its delivery. Once confirmed, the award is as conclusive as a court judgment. N.J.S.A. 2A:24-10." Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 292 v. Borough of N. Haledon, 158 N.J. 392, 398 (1999). N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 provides a court may vacate an arbitration award for: 1) corruption, fraud or undue means; 2) evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators; 3) misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party; or 4) the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. "Judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass'n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 N.J. 268, 276 (2010)). "To foster finality and 'secure arbitration's speedy and inexpensive nature,' reviewing courts must give arbitration awards 'considerable deference.'" Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201-02 (2013)). "[A]n arbitrator's award resolving a public sector dispute will be accepted so long as the award is 'reasonably debatable.'" Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013)). "An arbitrator's award is not to be cast aside lightly. It is subject to being vacated only when it has been shown that a statutory basis justifies that action." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Kearny PBA Loc. # 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 221 (1979)). Certain statutes, including the Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 to -30, set "strict limits on the appeal of an arbitration award. " Riverside Chiropractic Grp. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 228, 235 (App. Div. 2008). In support of a contrary view that even the findings of fact of the trial court are subject to de novo review are statements like this one (from this case ): The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo . Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., L.L.C. , 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co ., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). But, the cited cases don't mean precisely what they are purported to say in the rare case where the decision rests, for example, on resolved a disputed credibility decision between two witnesses over whether the purported arbitration document is authentic in an evidentiary hearing. Those cases are merely dicta as applied to that fact pattern. The case containing this quote was decided at the trial court level on the pleadings alone without receiving any testimony or documents in an evidentiary hearing (see footnote 1 at page 2). Hirsch was decided in motion practice without an evidentiary hearing ( see page 184) and the case itself says (at page 186): Orders compelling arbitration are deemed final for purposes of appeal. R. 2:2–3(a); GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572, 587, 17 A.3d 177 (2011). We review those legal determinations de novo . See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995) (“A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.”). The decision in Frummer was similarly qualified and also relied upon interpretation of written instruments whose execution was undisputed that was resolved in motion practice without any mention of an evidentiary hearing. The Court in Frummer said at page 13: We review the denial of a request for arbitration de novo . See Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 393 N.J.Super. 560, 572-73, 925 A.2d 22 (App.Div. 2007). "A `trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'" Id. at 573, 925 A.2d 22 (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995)). See also this case stating that: The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo . Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC , 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co ., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). Again, however, I would question whether this holding is dicta because it involves the interpretation of written instruments whose authenticity is in doubt, and not, for example, a dispute over whether the person who signed the documents is the same person who is a party to this litigation and not someone else with a very similar name that was resolved in an evidentiary hearing.

Can application for leave to appeal be determined by the judge whose decision is being appealed?

Appeals to the next level court may first require leave to appeal. Say in New Zealand, where a party wants to appeal a decision of the High Court to the Court of Appeal, they may need to apply to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal . Whether or not leave is required depends on the statute that governs the matter. Moreover, in some circumstances, leave to appeal needs to be applied for to the same level court where the decision to be appealed was made. Section 56(3) of the Senior Courts Act 2016 goes: No appeal, except an appeal under subsection (4), lies from any order or decision of the High Court made on an interlocutory application in respect of any civil proceeding unless leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal is given by the High Court on application made within 20 working days after the date of that order or decision or within any further time that the High Court may allow. (emphasis added) So, say Bob is suing Rob in the High Court. Rob applied for a direction (for example, he wants to join Alice to the case). Bob objected. Judge Judy made an interlocutory order where the direction that Rob sought is granted. Bob is unhappy and wants to appeal to the Court of Appeal. But to do this, Bob first needs to obtain leave from the High Court. If this is declined, then and only then Bob can apply for leave appeal to the Court of Appeal directly (upon the grant of which he can finally file the appeal itself). Now this may create an interesting collision. What if the application for leave to appeal filed in the High Court gets in the hands of the same judge that made the decision that the appeal is against? As per answers to this question , judges will not enjoy if their decisions get overturned. Therefore, they may be personally interested in rejecting the application for leave to appeal, especially if the decision was made publicly available. The High Court has published its Recusal Guidelines here . One possible ground for recusal in this situation goes: 5. Recusal where opinions earlier expressed 5.1 A judge should consider recusing him or herself if the case concerns a matter upon which the judge has made public statements of firm opinion on the issue before the court. 5.2 An expression of opinion in an earlier case or in an earlier stage of a proceeding is not of itself a ground for recusal. So, given that judge Judy's decision has been published, does that hit 5.1 above in a way that 5.2 does not overweight it? Should judge Judy now consider recusing herself from hearing the application for leave to appeal? Can judge Judy not hear the application for leave to appeal for any other reason? This question is not tightly attached to New Zealand — answers re other comparable jurisdictions are welcome.

Yes It's not uncommon. In fact I am aware of at least one case where the trial judge referred it to appeal before he made his decision on the basis that whichever way he decided the law was so unsettled that grounds for appeal would occur. In that case the court of appeal called up the trial judge to sit on the 3 judge appeal a) because he knew the case and b) because you don't get to not make a decision because it's hard sonny-jim.

Is it possible for appellant to examine the written grounds of judgment by the Sessions Court Judge before deciding whether to file an appeal?

Appellant wants to examine the written grounds of judgment by the Sessions Court Judge before deciding whether to file an appeal. Is it possible? It is stated that the Sessions ct judge did not give any reason for his decision. Can appellant file an appeal only on the basis of costs?

Based on the parallel of the English High Court, there may well be no written reasons, if the Judge said something like "This claim, even if I accept everything in the papers, is plainly barred by the relevant Limitation Act. I accordingly dismiss it with costs." That paragraph is 'the judgment', and there will be a recording of it somewhere. You are entitled to a copy if you wish, but you may well have to pay to have it transcribed. (An additional point occurs to me; in some cases where permission to appeal from a lower court is sought, the test is 'in the opinion of a senior judge' or something similar, so "Rejected" is the whole of the decision, and there is no appeal from it. The question is nowhere near clear enough to say whether this applies.) Appeals on the basis of costs only are not automatically barred, but neither are they automatically allowed to proceed. You would be well advised to consult a lawyer since a) appeals are notoriously complex and counter-intuitive and b) the Lord Ordinary thought the case so obvious that it was not worth a written judgment.

What is the significance of dissenting opinions in appellate court decisions?

Appellate courts often hear cases en banc and decide them by simple majority of the judges on the bench. The majority will typically sign a single "per curiam" decision, which constitutes the judicial precedent (and hence law) on the question decided. But judges who disagree with the majority opinion will often author dissenting opinions or statements which are published along with the majority opinion. What significance, if any, do these dissents have for purposes of law? For example, I was just reading a filing with SCOTUS requesting an emergency stay of a Pennsylvanian Supreme Court decision . The filing includes not only the majority state court per curiam in question (ref A1), but also several dissenting statements from that court in that case (ref A5-). Do those have any more weight before the SCOTUS than any other writing or argument that may be filed in support of the appellants' arguments? Or, do dissents have any sort of intermediate authority – less than precedent, but more than any other argument would have solely on its merits – in terms of informing future legal decisions?

The decision of a court consists of several things: The orders made A summary of the evidence The judge's reasoning from the evidence to their conclusions of what the facts of the case are The judge's reasoning from the evidence to their conclusions of what the law applying to those facts is The judge's reasoning from those findings of facts and law to the orders that were made ( ratio decidendi ) Reasoning on how things might have been decided otherwise (or the same way) if the facts or the law were different ( obiter dicta ). We hope that the judge is articulate enough that we can tell which is which. Where there is more than one judge there is more than one opinion. However, there is still ratio decidendi and obiter dicta across all the opinions. Typically, a dissenting judge disagrees with the ratio decidendi in whole or part and his reasoning about that is obiter dicta . The ratio decidendi – "the point in a case that determines the judgement" or "the principle that the case establishes" – creates binding precedent. The obiter dicta creates persuasive precedent. A binding precedent is just that – it binds the decisions of lower ranked courts in the hierarchy. If the facts of the current case match the facts of the precedent then the judge must follow the precedent even if they disagree with it – indeed there are many decisions where the judge expresses their disagreement with the precedent in no uncertain terms. In addition, there can be conflicting precedent, for example, where the High Court of Australia has made a decision on a piece of legislation that conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court of NSW on an essentially similar provision in a different Act. A wise judge in such a situation should do what McDougal J did in Chase Oyster Bar v Hamo Industries [2010] NSWCA 190 and issue orders referring it to a court that can overturn one (or both) of the precedents. A persuasive precedent can influence the decisions of other courts – they are an authority a judge can look to in formulating their reasons but they are free to consider and reject them even if the facts match. Obiter dicta from same level or higher courts in the hierarchy is persuasive precedent as is ratio decidendi and obiter dicta from same level courts and courts in other jurisdictions.

Why did Lord Reid write "we should beware of looking at older authorities through modern spectacles"?

Appellate judges usually aren't stupid or short-sighted. They can foresee that their judgments will become "older authorities" and will be read through "modern spectacles". So what did Lord Reid mean exactly? Public Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (2019 4 edn) . p 317. The Burmah Oil case In March 1942, the British army blew up the installations and oil stocks owned by the Burmah Oil Company at Rangoon in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the advancing Japanese forces. The Burmah Oil Company later sought compensation from the Crown for its losses. In the House of Lords, it was accepted that the actions were done under the royal prerogative and the question was whether compensation had to be paid. The House held by a three- to- two majority that, in the circumstances, compensation was payable. Controversially, the effect of the decision was subsequently retrospectively reversed by the War Damages Act 1965. For now, our interest focuses on Lord Reid’s judgment. Burmah Oil Company v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75, 99–100 Lord Reid It is not easy to discover and decide the law regarding the royal prerogative and the consequences of its exercise. Apart from In re a Petition of Right [[1915] 3 KB 649] and Attorney-General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd. [[1920] AC 508] there have been no cases directly raising the matter for some centuries, and obiter dicta and the views of institutional writers and text writers are not always very helpful. The definition of Dicey [. . .] always quoted with approval [. . .] does not take us very far. It is extremely difficult to be precise because in former times there was seldom a clear- cut view of the constitutional position. I think we should beware of looking at older authorities through modern spectacles . We ought not to ignore the many changes in constitutional law and theory which culminated in the Revolution Settlement of 1688– 89, and there is practically no authority between that date and 1915. I am no historian but I would suppose that Maitland is as good a guide as any. In his Constitutional History he says: ‘I do not wish you to think that a definite theory to the effect that while legislative power resides in king and parliament, the so- called executive power is in the king alone, was a guiding theory of mediaeval politics. On the contrary, the line between what the king could do without a parliament, and what he could only do with the aid of parliament, was only drawn very gradually, and it fluctuated from time to time.’ (p. 196.) [. . .] So it appears to me that we must try to see what the position was after it had become clear that sovereignty resided in the King in Parliament. Any rights thereafter exercised by the King (or the executive) alone must be regarded as a part of sovereignty which Parliament chose to leave in his hands. There is no doubt that control of the armed forces has been left to the prerogative (see Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions subject to the power of Parliament to withhold supply and to refuse to continue legislation essential for the maintenance of a standing army: and so also has the waging of war. But it may be interesting to note in passing the Scottish Act, 1703, c. 5, which provided that ‘no person being King or Queen of Scotland and England shall have the sole power of making war with any prince, potentate or state whatsoever without consent of Parliament [. . .]’ p 318. The reason for leaving the waging of war to the King (or now the executive) is obvious. [. . . although . . . t]here is difficulty in relating the prerogative to modern conditions. In fact no war which has put this country in real peril has been waged in modern times without statutory powers of an emergency character. [. . .] QUESTIONS Why does Lord Reid say that ‘we should beware of looking at older authorities through modern spectacles’?

I would argue that he wrote it in keeping with the saying "say what you mean, and mean what you say." This passage discusses the difficulty of inferring constitutional principles from old authorities that were written during a time when constitutional thinking had not yet arrived at the "modern" position. In this case, he is considering the evolution in the constitution between the 17th and 20th centuries. The opening paragraph of this question considers that someone today might have to apply the same caution when looking at Lord Reid's opinion, but that does not appear to be Lord Reid's concern. He is more concerned with his own viewpoint as he considers authorities from several centuries ago than he is with the implications for future opinions that rely on his own. After all, his main duty is to reach an opinion in the case at hand. Still, one can imagine that Lord Reid would have recognized the possibility, or even the probability, that a 23rd-century judge would need to read 20th-century opinions with similar caution because of future constitutional change.

Is Apple's private relay feature illegal in Colombia and South Africa, and if so, why?

Apple has announced a new browsing feature designed to hide a user's browsing from others. The article linked above said the feature is banned in: China, Saudi Arabia or Belarus, Colombia, Egypt, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Turkmenistan, Uganda and the Philippines. However, I thought section 14 of South Africa's constitution protected the right to privacy. Why is Apple not legally able to offer the new private browsing there?

These rights are not unrestricted s36 says: (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including— (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. South Africa has laws that allow the government to demand private information. Apple publishes a report on this. Whether there is such a prohibition is South Africa is hard to say : Apple could not immediately indicate which regulations in South Africa prevented it from launching Private Relay here.

Is apple airtag tracking illegal?

Apple make a device called an airtag that allows one to remotely monitor the location of the device. This has been used to track people , sometimes without their knowledge or consent. If this was done as part of a criminal scheme then I would presume that the scheme would make it illegal. However it seems that the motivation for these actions is unknown. Is there any law that would make placing an airtag on a car or coat of an individual without their knowledge or consent illegal? Any jurisdiction would be of interest.

It's clearly allowable with a warrant It's OK for police to track someone if they have a warrant. But for the owner, it is also not illegal to throw the device away, as two cases involving Law Enforcement show: Some two years or so ago, Indiana police had a warrant to mount a tracking device on a car. The owner found it and removed it. Police got a warrant and sued the owner for theft. But the Indiana Supreme Court decided: No, that's not theft, and atop that, the warrants for searching for that device are invalid. In a similar case, a woman in Lousiana did find a tracker. Aparently, she watched the device being planted , and when she reported that to the police, they requested the device - which would have got the woman in trouble for being in possession of a device she's not allowed to have, as tracking cars without consent is illegal in Lousiana. Somehow , it ended on a pole across from a school - and they have pretty much nothing to sue for in that case. So, is it legal for laymen? Which brings us to the actual question at hand: Is it illegal to track other cars? It could be even illegal to possess an airtag in lousiana under LA Rev Stat § 14:222.3 (2017) , unless you have a certain exception, like are a police unit investigating or to track your car (see subsection C): (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to possess a cellular tracking device or to use a cellular tracking device for the purpose of collecting, intercepting, accessing, transferring, or forwarding the data transmitted or received by the communications device, or stored on the communications device of another without the consent of a party to the communication and by intentionally deceptive means. Note that Bluetooth is still in the definition of Communications Device in that law, and the phone reading the location data from the apple Airtag together form a pair of CTD and TD: (1) "Cellular tracking device" means a device that transmits or receives radio waves to or from a communications device in a manner that interferes with the normal functioning of the communications device or communications network and that can be used to intercept, collect, access, transfer, or forward the data transmitted or received by the communications device, or stored on the communications device; includes an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) catcher or other cell phone or telephone surveillance or eavesdropping device that mimics a cellular base station and transmits radio waves that cause cell phones or other communications devices in the area to transmit or receive radio waves, electronic data, location data, information used to calculate location, identifying information, communications content, or metadata, or otherwise obtains this information through passive means, such as through the use of a digital analyzer or other passive interception device; and does not include any device used or installed by an electric utility solely to the extent such device is used by that utility to measure electrical usage, to provide services to customers, or to operate the electric grid. (2) "Telecommunications device" means any type of instrument , device, or machine that is capable of transmitting or receiving telephonic, electronic, radio, text, or data communications , including but not limited to a cellular telephone, a text-messaging device, a personal digital assistant, a computer, or any other similar wireless device that is designed to engage in a call or communicate text or data. It does not include citizens band radios, citizens band radio hybrids, commercial two-way radio communication devices, or electronic communication devices with a push-to-talk function. So to track someone else's car? Only if you have the permission of the tracked person under C4, C5, or C12, or are exempt under C6 or C10, or you are the parent of a minor under C7 (which would often include the C4/C5 but overrides consent).

Can companies use user data for App Store marketing screenshots?

Apple's App Store lets you preview features of a published app via screenshots, images, and even videos. In the case of a social media app, those functionalities can only be shown through including pictures, account names and some account data. Is it legal to have in such media, faces and data of actual people subscribed to said social media? Or, should the company ask for permission to each of the accounts that would be shown? UPDATE: The nature of the question is whether using this data, without asking, is legal or not. In the described scenario might not be possible to ask for permission to each user and the only alternative would be to use dummy data. Moreover it is important to note that screenshots are a way of describing what an app does, so the exposed data would not be in a text format like a website but rather in some kind of view only mode (pictures or video)

Depends on the terms and conditions of the social media platform. In order to avoid public controversy, although some may legally have the right to use your content, in practice, most reputable companies would ask for permission first, or create dummy accounts to avoid any legal issues. Facebook will ask for your permission first. We do not share information that personally identifies you (personally identifiable information is information like name or email address that can by itself be used to contact you or identifies who you are) with advertising, measurement or analytics partners unless you give us permission. When you post on Twitter , you retain your rights to the content. However By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). This license authorizes us to make your Content available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. You agree that this license includes the right for Twitter to provide, promote , and improve the Services and to make Content submitted to or through the Services available to other companies, organizations or individuals for the syndication, broadcast, distribution, promotion or publication of such Content on other media and services, subject to our terms and conditions for such Content use. Such additional uses by Twitter, or other companies, organizations or individuals, may be made with no compensation paid to you with respect to the Content that you submit, post, transmit or otherwise make available through the Services. Stack Exchange uses the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported license . This means Stack Exchange has the right to share and adapt user content as long as the content creator is attributed and the derivative content is licensed under the same license. You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. You grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works and store such Subscriber Content and, except as otherwise set forth herein, to allow others to do so in any medium now known or hereinafter developed (“Content License”) in order to provide the Services, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by You.

Is Apple violating any specific rights of mine by preventing me from taking a fair use screenshot?

Apple's Safari web browser prevents you from taking a screenshot of DRM (Digital Rights Management) content, such as Netflix movies, by blacking out that part of screen (when taking screenshot) which has the movie (as seen the the screenshot ). This is done in order to prevent piracy, and I get it. However, my question is if Apple doesn't actually infringe any rights here? Because, for example, can't I opt to take a screenshot of a movie, to use it in a blog post? I believe Apple is infringing some right of the user here.

Apple has no obligation to allow you to make fair-use copies or extracts. You have no affirmative right to make them, even if it is not against the law to do so.

Apple's magnetic charging port has been patented, but why wasn't a search engine?

Apple's magnetic port has been patented , and now no other company can use the same idea to build its charging ports. If this can be achieved for a charging port, I was wondering why a search engine or an e-commerce platform per se can't be patented so that no other competitor would start working on it.

Explanations of Apple's MagSafe patent are here . The USPTO explains what can be patented under U.S. statute (which is generally informative for all member countries of the Patent Cooperation Treaty ): [A]ny person who “invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent,” subject to the conditions and requirements of the law. The word “process” is defined by law as a process, act, or method, and primarily includes industrial or technical processes. The term “machine” used in the statute needs no explanation. The term “manufacture” refers to articles that are made, and includes all manufactured articles. The term “composition of matter” relates to chemical compositions and may include mixtures of ingredients as well as new chemical compounds. These classes of subject matter taken together include practically everything that is made by man and the processes for making the products. Interpretations of the statute by the courts have defined the limits of the field of subject matter that can be patented, thus it has been held that the laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable subject matter. A patent cannot be obtained upon a mere idea or suggestion. The patent is granted upon the new machine, manufacture, etc., as has been said, and not upon the idea or suggestion of the new machine. A complete description of the actual machine or other subject matter for which a patent is sought is required. As noted here : Despite the best efforts of patent offices many patents are granted that may not meet these criteria: that's why a patent can be challenged in court. An invalid patent may stand for many years (or even expire) without ever being reviewed by a court. It is possible to win and enforce a patent that might not withstand a vigorous administrative or legal challenge. In fact, there is a great deal of ongoing rule- and law-making regarding what can be patented . It is possible to patent things that you might consider to cover a "search engine" or "e-commerce platform. For example, Amazon.com famously patented "one-click" ordering in the U.S., but its application with the European Patent Office was refused.

What are the consequences of lying to US immigration authorities?

Application for a US visa now requires information about social media accounts. I know that intentionally omitting this information constitutes misrepresentation, but what are the potential consequences of not disclosing the social media information? Is it just the risk of being denied a visa and deportation?

A sample visa application is provided here . On p. 80, it warns that the submission of an application that contains false or misleading information may result in permanent refusal of a visa or denial of entry, and that all declarations are unsworn declarations made under perjury of penalty, 28 USC 1746 the penalty being specified as a fine and up to 5 years prison in 18 USC 1621 .

If a law is blatantly unconstitutional, is a search warrant based on that law valid?

Applications for search warrants are typically ex parte. In such a proceeding the person who owns the property to be searched and/or seized cannot challenge the unconstitutional laws that form the basis of an affidavit justifying that probable cause exists for a search. Does there exist a basis to challenge the admissibility of evidence obtained following this search? Particularly if such a search is used as pretext to find items that violate laws that are not unconstitutional. Would agents that engage in such a search be able to assert qualified immunity in a 1983 proceeding even though the statute was blatantly unconstitutional?

If it is "sufficiently obvious" that a law is unconstitutional, evidence obtained relying on that law can probably be suppressed. Two important principles help discern the answer to this question: The Constitution prohibits searches that are "unreasonable." The existence of a warrant authorizing a search is strong evidence that a search is reasonable, but the warrant is neither necessary nor sufficient to make a search reasonable. The Exclusionary Rule is designed to do one and only one thing: discourage law enforcement misconduct. Therefore, evidence obtained in reliance on a defective warrant will only be suppressed if it was "objectively unreasonable" for the officer to rely on that warrant. Courts typically find reliance on a warrant to be objectively unreasonable when the warrant was obtained through deception, when it authorizes a search of a person or place with no connection to a crime, or when it fails reasonably describe the person or place to be searched. It is likely also possible to have evidence suppressed because the warrant authorized a search for evidence of the violation of a plainly unconstitutional law. That was the question in Illinois v. Krull , 480 U.S. 340, (1987) , where a defendant was prosecuted based on evidence obtained in reliance on a law that was later ruled unconsitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court held that because the law was unconstitutional, the search relying on it was also unconstitutional, and the evidence obtained thereby must be suppressed. But the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence need not be suppressed because "this defect in the statute was not sufficiently obvious so as to render a police officer's reliance upon the statute objectively unreasonable." This suggests that if a statute's unconstitutionality is sufficiently obvious, that an officer seeking evidence in reliance on it would be objectively unreasonable, and that that evidence would therefore be subject to suppression. I don't know of it ever happening, but it's easy enough to make up ridiculous laws that might satisfy this standard. For instance, if Congress passed a law permitting police to write their own warrants to search any mosque at any time, evidence from that search would likely be suppressed. Or if Congress passed a law prohibiting all black women from criticizing the president, evidence that a defendant had violated that law would likely also be suppressed, even if it had been obtained with an otherwise validly issued warrant. Of course, most laws are not as obviously unconstitutional as those, so a challenge on these grounds will likely revolve around what exactly should have alerted a reasonable officer to the statute's consitutional infirmities. Likewise, an officer executing such a search is exposed to Section 1983 liability for an unreasonable search or seizure if his reliance on the warrant is not objectively reasonable. As always, there will be a question of whether the officer is entitled to qualified immunity, but that question will turn as always on whether his violation of the law was clearly established. If he is searching for evidence of black people voting, qualified immunity is going to be a hard sell. If he's searching for evidence that a defendant violated a law in a gray area, qualified immunity may save him.

How much does civilian-jury cases impact legal precedent?

Apropos of the Kyle Rittenhouse case: In the Rittenhouse case, one of the arguments made by the prosecution (I don't know if it was a "main" argument as I only watched snippets of the proceedings myself, but it was definitely presented by the prosecution) is that Kyle Rittenhouse lost his right to self-defence, or at least that right was impacted, by the fact that he chose to be in a plainly dangerous area (a riot zone) in a provocative manner (with a firearm). Therefore, he did not deserve the right to defend himself from a situation that "he caused" (according to the prosecution). Hypothetically speaking, let's say the civilian jury (whom, to my knowledge, are not law professionals and don't have knowledge of the law beyond what's instructed to them by the judge) agreed with the prosecution in this instance and convicted Rittenhouse based on this notion. The judge, of course, being a trained professional in the law, even if he disagreed with the conviction, would not be able to (to my knowledge) overturn the jury decision and would have to sentence Rittenhouse as guilty. To what degree could this case, decided by non-legal-professionals, be used as legal precedent in future, similar cases? Could it be used in future cases of life-endangerment (where the defendant believed their life to be in danger), providing the accompanying circumstances (dangerous area + provocative appearance) existed? Could it be used in other cases of attempted capital crime (e.g. where an attempted-rape victim defended themselves and caused grave bodily harm, including death, to the attacker), provided existence of the accompanying circumstances?

A jury verdict does not have any effect as legal precedent. Only appellate court opinions (that are not mere de novo bench trials of a court not of record) have effect as legal precedent outside the dealings of the actual parties to the case in future litigation with each other. Even then, an appellate court ruling is binding precedent only over the courts inferior to the appellate court issuing the opinion.

Decency Laws vs. Discrimination Laws

Apropos of this . Brief background: Teacher in Canada transitions from male to female. Teacher purchases extremely oversized prosthetic breasts which they use as part of their gender reassignment, and wear a top over their breastplate which wears tightly around the breastplate and shows the nipples. Parents and (some) news media are outraged. School board claims they can't discipline or reprimand, the teacher in any way, or ask the teacher to change their behaviour, or even institute a general dress code for staff that would cover this situation, due to anti-discrimination statutes. Question: Where is the legal line between what is considered a "decency law" (public indecency, pornography, nudity) and a "discrimination law" (not accepting someone on the basis of discrimination)? Legally speaking, how does it affect the situation if the person in question was primarily associating with minors, in a role of authority? I would assume it is not irrelevant given legal underpinnings of laws such as child pornography and statutory rape.

I think you misunderstand some of the relationships between laws, decisions, and justifications, and you're conflating two separate areas of jurisprudence. The linked real-world example you provide is happening in the employment context, but also in a government context (since it is a public school). But all the examples in your list have nothing to do with employment law and would be purely statutory/regulatory prohibitions. I will attempt to answer broadly enough to cover both domains. Laws and regulations can be challenged as discriminatory The things you have listed under "decency law" would be criminal or regulatory matters. A preliminary question would be whether the laws as written even capture the behaviours you've described. To the extent that they result in discrimination, the laws could be challenged as breaches of s. 15 (right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . There may be other Charter arguments too, if the laws affect expression or life, liberty, or the security of the person. (Public decency / nudity laws are more frequently challenged on grounds of free expression.) Decisions of school boards are subject to the Charter The Charter almost certainly applies to decisions of public school boards and schools. See Elementary Teachers Federation of Ontario v. York Region District School Board , 2022 ONCA 476, paras. 39-41 . These decisions could be challenged by judicial review (i.e. court review of an administrative decision-maker's decisions) and would be analyzed for reasonableness, including whether the decision strikes a proportionate balance between the Charter right and the statutory objectives ( Doré v. Barreau du Québec , 2012 SCC 12 ). Even if there is an infringement, the government gets a chance to justify it If you're looking for some sort of a "line" it is found in the justification or reasonableness analysis . Where a law or regulation is challenged, and if a breach of s. 15 is established, then the onus is on the government to justify the breach as a reasonable limit as allowed by s. 1 of the Charter . This will depend on the importance of the government objective , whether there is a rational connection between the objective and the law, whether the law is minimally impairing, and whether the impact on the claimant is proportional to the salutary effects of the law. When a court reviews an administrative decision for reasonableness, it is "engaged in balancing somewhat different but related considerations, namely, has the decision-maker disproportionately, and therefore unreasonably, limited a Charter right. In both cases, we are looking for whether there is an appropriate balance between rights and objectives, and the purpose of both exercises is to ensure that the rights at issue are not unreasonably limited" (Doré, para. 6). In each of your examples, the judgments would be highly fact-based and it is fruitless to speculate about what the evidence might show. Relevance of association with minors You ask whether it would matter " if the person in question was primarily associating with minors." This likely would not matter if a law was challenged, because such challenges are about the validity of the law , not the factors that might render its applicability to a particular person to be more or less justified. But if the law itself had the purpose of protecting children, or if the law itself was targetted solely at those associating with minors or those in positions of authority over minors, this would be a factor weighing in favour of justification of the infringing law ( Irwin Toy , R. v. Sharpe ). Whether the person in question was primarily associating with minors would matter in the context of an administrative decision, because these decisions are case-specific. Some anti-discrimination statutes provide more protections Ontario's Human Rights Code potentially contains even further protections. Section 5 says that every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of sex, gender identity, gender expression, and other enumerated factors. Section 24 provides for exceptions to that right in educational settings (and some others) where what would otherwise be discrimination is actually a bona fide qualification of the employment and if it cannot be accommodated without undue hardship on the employer. These judgments are also highly fact-based and it would be fruitless to speculate about what the evidence might show.

What does "sever ties with" mean in terms of inheritance?

Apropos of this news article , in which, apparently, Elon Musk's transgender daughter wants to sever ties with her father: Hypothetically speaking, if Elon Musk wrote her out of his will, could she challenge the will and claim part of his estate despite stating that she wants to "sever ties" with him? If, on Elon Musk's death, he does not write her out of his will, could one of Musk's other children challenge the will, claim she severed ties, and distribute her part of the estate to the remaining beneficiaries, leaving her with nothing?

Legally, an announcement by one adult that s/he wants to "sever ties with" another has effectively no meaning. Presumably in the case mentioned the daughter intends to stop interacting with Musk, or significantly limit such interactions. She is free to do so. That has no legal effect on Musk's will. It might cause Musk to change his will, but that is his decision. He is free to leave money, even lots of money, to a person who has "severed ties" with him if he so chooses. So is anyone else. (Of course most people don't have as much to leave as Musk presumably will.) If Musk does choose to leave money to this daughter, her announcement of negative feelings towards Musk would not be grounds to challenge the will or to disinherit the daughter. There are various grounds on which a will may be challenged in US law. Perhaps the most common are undue influence, and lack of the needed mental competence. Announcing an intent to "sever ties" would not be a usual way to obtain undue influence over a person, and nothing in Musk's reported actions shows the kind of lack of mental competence which would render a will void. In short, the only way in which this or any similar announcement might change Musk's will is if it first changes his mind. As for the daughter challenging the will, she would have no more and no less rights to do so than if no announcement had been made. There are various legal grounds on which a will may be challenged, depending on the state. They are all fact-dependent, and can be done only if certain sorts of facts are alleged in the challenge. There is no way to know, now, if any such facts will be true when Musk dies. But the announcemt on its own will not matter.

Arbitration and GDPR

Arbitration allow a both parties to settle the dispute outside the court where the arbitrator would decide the law to b e applied to the dispute?. However, arbitration will not exempt their obligation under the GDPR if the issue is related to GDPR compliance?

Arbitration is a private dispute resolution process For grievances between private parties, they can agree to resolve them through arbitration. For breaches of public law (like GDPR) the state is the one against whom the offence is committed. Arbitration is not available to resolve these matters - resolution is through the courts or administrative tribunals.

Can I scan in pre-1923 photographs from books and upload them to wikipedia without violating copyright?

Arcadia Publishing has the Images of America book series, many of which have pre-1923 photographs. Same thing for Eyewitness Books. For example they have a book on money which has images of coins and currency going back hundreds of years. My question is... could I scan in some of these images from these books and upload them to, say, Wikipedia? In the United States anything published before 1923 is public domain but what exactly does that mean? Like if I want to upload a pre-1923 image from one of these books to Wikipedia do I have to track down the original and upload scan it in myself or can I rely on the scans that other people did?

Date and Place of Publication Matter If the photographs were published in the US prior to 1923 (or indeed now prior to 1927) by a US resident, they are now in the public domain (PD) in the US under US law. Wikipedia will generally accept such photos, and the persons who would otherwise be the copyright holders will not be able to bring an infringement suit in a US court. If the pictures were taken before 1923, but not published until after 1980, they will be under copyright until 70 years after the death of the photographer, or until 2047, whichever is later. If they were taken before 1923, but published after 1927 with a proper copyright notice, and if published in 1963 or before, and their copyright was properly renewed 28 years after publication, the copyright lasts for 95 years after publication. There are various other sets of circumstance that may apply. The famous Cornell chart "Copyright Term and the Public Domain" covers all the relevant cases and spells out in which cases works are in the public domain, or if not, how long the copyright lasts for. If the photograph(s) were first published outside the US, or the photographer was neither a US citizen nor a US resident, then a suit could be filed in the country of origin of the photographs, under the laws of that country. Copyright term varies in different countries, but in most it is calculated from the death of the author (the photographer) varying from 50 years to 100 years after the author's death. 70 years is perhaps the most common term, including most countries in Europe. The Wikimedia Foundation (publisher of Wikipedia) takes the legal position that it is governed only by US law. To the best of my knowledge there has never yet been a successful copyright suit over an image (or text) published on Wikipedia that is PD under US law, but not by the law of its country of origin. So you will see that the date of publication is a key fact, and the place of publication may also be relevant. The copyright page of the book which you are scanning will give the date that book was published, and may well give the dates of publication of images included inn the book, if those are earlier. Under US law, scanning a previously published image will not generally give a new copyright on the image, nor will re-publishing a previously published image. Creating a modified (derivative) version of an image may well give a new copyright on the modified elements, but will not extend the copyright on the original image. (All this is also true for texts.) The age of the subject of a photo (or other image) is not relevant to the duration of the copyright of a new, original image of that subject. The date that the image was created (as opposed to being published) will only rarely be relevant. Money Images of US coins and currency (bills) are a special case. They are considered to be "works of the US Federal Government" and so are not protected by copyright within the US at any time. A new US coin or bill first put out in 1922 would still not be protected within the US. Money of other countries may be protected, or not, depending on the laws of its country of origin. But money issued before 1927 would be PD under US law.

Can gateways be added to public information?

Archive.org is a repository that has millions of papers, books and archives that are in the public domain, and are freely available. No registration whatsoever is needed. Conversely, Academia.edu, is a for-profit company aiming to become a platform for academics. They have collected many works in the public domain, but to access any of them, it is necessary to register, or to "connect" using social media (by which you give consent to share your contacts). This is, in my opinion, nothing more than a facebook-type business model. In fact, their advertisment website says it plainly: Advertise on the largest platform for Academics Target 62 million registered users and over 25 million monthly impressions My question is: is it legal to add a barrier ("free" in money terms, but not in information terms, which has value) to information already in the public domain?

You are framing it wrong. It is not that "they have put a barrier" to public domain information, it is that they have added an additional source of that information. The new source has a barrier, yes, but that does not prevent you from accessing the same information elsewhere. If you own a copy of some public domain data, you are not allowed to prevent other users from accessing other copies (by claiming copyright infringement or the like); you cannot even prevent people from doing copies from the copies you did provide them. But you are not forced to allow other users to access your copy . Consider the logical conclusion if that were the law. The moment that you downloaded some public domain file into your computer, you would be forced to give access to your hard disk from the internet, isn't it? Would you need to leave your home door open if you happened to have a printed copy of the text there? Of course, there is a need to discriminate between "public domain" (without licence) and "not public domain but open licence" (BSD, CC, GPL, etc.). In the later case the licence could be tailored so that the work could appear in archive.org but that it would be illegal to provide it with the business model of Academia.edu 1 . But that would be possible only for works not in the public domain. 1 To be decided by a judge on the basis of the wording of the licence and jurisdiction.

How can a company protect itself against a product possibly causing injury to the consumer?

Arduino (a company that sells educational electrical kits to kids) must have some protection against kids accidentally blowing up electrical circuits (and getting hurt or burned) when first learning to use their products. How does a company like Arduino protect itself against injuries or possible lawsuits? Similarly, how does a company like Nerf protect against kids shooting each other in the eye, causing irreversible eye damage, and parents possibly suing the company? How does Nerf handle these situations? Would an LLC help protect the owners from these possible problems? Thanks for your time.

They purchase liability insurance. Then, if they are found liable, the insurer covers some proportion of the damages that the company is ordered to pay. An LLC will protect the LLC's owners from being held personally liable for the LLC's liabilities, but the LLC is not itself protected from liability.

What Are Mooted Motions

Are "mooted" motion(s) a part of the record for hearing FRCP 12(c) motions? Can a party incorporate their previous motion(s) to dismiss into their current motion to dismiss even though those previous motions have been ruled "moot" because of an amended complaint? If the previous motion(s) were ruled "moot" and never responded to, what would be the purpose of allowing them to be a part of the record for a motion to dismiss on the pleadings aka FRCP 12(c)?

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) states: (c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings. The Court cannot consider moot motions. You need to cut and paste arguments made before the previous motions were mooted into your new motion or response to motion and if you fail to do so, your argument need not be considered. Arguably, you could incorporate the prior motion by reference and make it an exhibit to the new motion, but that would be bad form.

Are the terms "stipulate" and "determine" interchangable in legal texts?

Are "stipulate" and "determine" interchangeable? Can I say, "the Government Regulation is determined by the Presidential Decree", for instance, or simply use "stipulated" instead? I read on the internet that "determine" means ‘to set limits’ while "stipulate" is 'to require (something) as a condition of a contract or agreement', but I don't really get it.

No. Neither colloquially nor in legal speak are they interchangeable. In law, a stipulation is a "formal legal acknowledgement and agreement made between opposing parties prior to a pending hearing or trial." For example, say you and I are litigating over a contract dispute. Sometimes it may be in our interest to stipulate to the fact that there was a valid contract. It increases in efficiency of the court system, saves money and time not arguing over obvious things, and generally just lets the proceedings address the topics required of them. To determine something, conversely, is simply to make a decision or to establish something as fact, often after research or measurements.

Are marketplace lenders subject to fair lending laws?

Are 'marketplace' lenders, such as those using Lending Club or Funding Circle, etc. , subject to fair lending provisions, such as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act or the Fair Lending provisions of the Fair Housing Act? (Though I realized there are probably few mortgages through these sites.) If so, what are the obligations of lenders under the law, and what is the enforcement mechanism for violations?

In the case of the ECOA , yes. The law applies to any person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly participates in a credit decision, including banks, retailers, bankcard companies, finance companies, and credit unions. For example, a 2017 American Bankers Association report at pages 91-92 (internal pages numbers, add 7 for pdf page number) which states: Since marketplace lenders are very much involved in many aspects of the credit transaction, they must structure and operate their lending platforms in compliance with the ECOA and applicable state law counterparts. In addition, the criteria used to determine creditworthiness must not have a disparate impact on the basis of any Prohibited Basis. Notably, the ECOA applies to commercial as well as consumer lending. The Fair Housing Act also applies in mortgage lending with regard to owner occupied residential housing (see also here ). The only meaningful exemption would be for mortgage lending provided by religious organizations to its members only, which does not apply to the situations in the question. But see , Alexander v. AmeriPro Funding, Inc. , No. 15-20710 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, U.S. No. 16-cv-01395 (11/6/2017) (holding that the FHA does not apply to secondary market purchases of mortgage loans which are subject at the underlying loan level to the act). This case is discussed starting at page 18 of the American Bankers Association report linked above (internal page numbering, not pdf page number). For what it is worth, I do not believe that Alexander will be followed by other federal circuits or will remain good law, because it is contrary to a plain reading of the statute and HUD and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") policy (at least prior to the current administration), and because it requires primary lenders to make prohibited distinctions to cull packages of loans for sale to secondary market purchasers.

Are 'no contra proferentem' clauses enforceable?

Are 'no contra proferentem' clauses enforceable? It seems the point they exist is to increase fairness and removing them would inherently make contracts less fair. Also, is there another name from contra proferentem? I seem to recall reading one once, like Equal Interpretation (which stated the most common sense interpretation of the clause would be used, regardless who wrote it), but I may be mistaking.

Yes, no contra preferentem clauses are enforceable. It may make contracts “less fair” but, in general, contracts do not have to be fair.

Under what conditions are 3rd party works automatically subject to the OGL 1.0a?

Are 3rd party creations that are "compatible with" D&D automatically subject to the OGL (OGL 1.0a for the purposes of all references in this question), or can they be published without relying or agreeing to the terms of the OGL? To put it another way, so long as a creator of such content doesn't quote the SRD content provided as part of their work, nor use any of Wizard of the Coast's trademarked names, nor the rules of the game, would the creator have to comply with the OGL? If they used the style WoTC (as set out in the style guide made available by Wizards of the Coast on the dmsguild), and applied it to their original works, would that work now fall under the aegis (or dominion) of the OGL? Is there a test set out to determine if a work is a derivative work (and thus would be covered by the OGL)? For the purposes of this I'm interested in the law of copyright arising from the the EU, US and UK (And the relevant copyright treaties they are party to).

When the 3rd-party agrees to follow the OGL 1.0a Clause 3 states: Offer and Acceptance: By Using the Open Game Content You indicate Your acceptance of the terms of this License. And clause 10 says: Copy of this License: You MUST include a copy of this License with every copy of the Open Game Content You Distribute. So, if you use Open Game Content and include a copy of the licence (or other indication of your intent to be bound) then you are bound by the OGL 1.0a. If you use Open Game Content under fair use/dealing, or illegally, then you are not bound. How much of the Open Game Content is protected by copyright? Some. Game rules are a procedure and procedures are not protected by copyright. However, the particular presentation of those rules by Wizards of the Coast (WotC) is protected by copyright as are any components that are not rules. AFAIK there is no case law on Dungeons & Dragons on where this line is drawn. If your “derivative” work draws only on the rules, then there is no copyright infringement. However, even if it draws on things that are protected by copyright, you might have a fair use defence in the US but you are unlikely to have a fair dealing defence in Commonwealth nations. I can’t help you with civil law jurisdictions. There appears to be a general consensus that most of what the Open Game Content contains is stuff that WotC could not successfully prosecute you for using under copyright or trade mark law. Effectively its a licence to allow you to use what you could use anyway - the only thing you gain is the certainty that WotC won’t sue you irrespective of if that suit might be successful. To put it another way, so long as a creator of such content doesn't quote the SRD content provided as part of their work, nor use any of Wizard of the Coast's trademarked names, nor the rules of the game, would the creator have to comply with the OGL? As stated above, you can quote a lot of the content, just not the stuff that isn’t rules. You can refer to WotC trade marks in a nominative way, just not in a way that suggests that your product is their product. You can quote all the rules of the game if you like. That does’t mean that WotC won’t sue you, it just means they will be unlikely to succeed. If they used the style WoTC (as set out in the style guide made available by Wizards of the Coast on the dmsguild), and applied it to their original works, would that work now fall under the aegis (or dominion) of the OGL? Following a style guide does not infringe anyone’s copyright. You would need to observe the rights that anyone held in fonts and you could not use the style in an attempt to pass your work off as theirs - style can be a form of trade dress which is a type of trademark. Is there a test set out to determine if a work is a derivative work (and thus would be covered by the OGL)? Yes, there most certainly are tests and they vary from country to country. However, as stated above being derivative and following the OGL are two seperate things.

Copyright rules are restricted

Are Copyright rules enforced by the authorities currently only to written documents? Are there any regulations on "mind reading" and producing documents elsewhere? How correctly and usefully are the source and publishing office are connected and handled. Do the rules have country-wise variations?

Are Copyright rules enforced by the authorities currently only to written documents? Copyright is not restricted to written documents. It applies to many kinds of works. In Canada, for example, this includes "literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work" and these include "paintings, drawings, maps, charts, plans, photographs, engravings, sculptures, works of artistic craftsmanship, architectural works." The scope varies from country to country, but for those parties to the Berne Convention, they will cover at least the following: “literary and artistic works” shall include every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, such as books, pamphlets and other writings; lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the same nature; dramatic or dramatico-musical works; choreographic works and entertainments in dumb show; musical compositions with or without words; cinematographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to cinematography; works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography; photographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to photography; works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture or science. But copyright does not apply to things that are not yet works. It does not protect ideas. It only protects particular expressions of ideas. So to the extent that a concept is only in someone's mind, it does not yet have copyright protection. Are there any regulations on "mind reading" and producing documents elsewhere? Copyright gives to the copyright holder an exclusive right to copy. Unauthorized copying of someone else's copyrighted work is infringement. Copying requires access to the source material, whether direct or indirect. If a person A has perceived a work, and person B gets information about that work from person A in order to reproduce the work, the eventual reproduction would still be a potential infringement. This is true no matter how person B gets that information from person A.

IP addresses in criminal cases

Are IP addresses enough to convict someone of criminal activity? So for instance, if someone was using their home WiFi network, which would have one IP address, then they use their mobile network which would have another IP address, would this be all that’s needed to convict someone of criminal activity if there was no proof that it was them that committed it? Or are IP addresses not substantial enough?

It depends. If the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that noone else could use that IP address at that particular time then yes. But can it prove so? Maybe yes. Maybe not. Depends on the results of forensic examination of the device, network traffic, any other corroborating evidence etc.

Are NFL athletes employees of their teams?

Are NFL athletes employees of their teams, or are they contractors? Are their civil protections similar to a normal person working an office job?

NFL players are employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by their union, the NFLPA , part of the AFL-CIO, which indicates specific different civil protections compared to an office job. This is a two-way bargain, not categorically better or worse. On one hand, many office workers receive severance pay at the discretion of the employer; NFL players are entitled to specific dollar amounts based on service (Article 60 in the link above). On the other hand, in the event of a dispute, the union, speaking for employees, has agreed to defined arbitration processes instead of individual members being able to bring a lawsuit against the teams or leagues. This is of note as there was a union lockout in 2011. The union dissolved itself, and 10 players were able to bring a lawsuit against the league to challenge the lockout . Decertifying the NFL Players Association enabled the players to file antitrust litigation against the owners, which they did late Friday, with superstar quarterbacks Tom Brady, Peyton Manning and Drew Brees among the 10 named plaintiffs.

Are terms of service legal contracts?

Are ToS considered contracts in and of themselves, enforceable under contract/civil law? Generally I'm talking about the Common Law systems in the major regions (UK, North America and Oceania). Anything that applies to (majority of) Europe would be fine too.

Providing they meet the basic requirements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? ) then they are binding contracts. Consideration is not an issue: the site provides the content, the user provides eyeballs on it. Consent is the major stumbling block. Online Terms of Service are either presented as browsewrap or clickwrap or sign-up wrap . A browsewrap provides notice of the terms of service but there is no specific user assent to them. A clickwrap requires the user to check a box specifically about agreeing to the terms (with or without user registration). A sign-up wrap presents user registration with a "Sign up" and provides notice to the terms at the point of service but doesn't have a check button specifically for the terms. As an example, Stack Exchange provides two types of wrap. For the casual user, there is a Legal link at the bottom of the page - a browsewrap. If you sign-up, you go to a page that says "By clicking "Sign up", you agree to our terms of service , ..." - a sign-up wrap. Whether a Terms of Service is an enforcable contract depends on whether the user provided notice, whether the user gave consent and whether enforcing the agreement is conscionable. Clickwraps and sign-up wraps have the advantage over browsewraps in the first two of these. Assuming that the contract terms are unremarkable (i.e. they are within the range of "normal" for that type of contract) a clickwrap will normally create an enforcable contract - Forrest v Verizon and Motise v America Online being the relevant case law. Browsewraps are more problematic: Specht v Netscape said no contract but where the browsewrap is shown prominently and repeatedly they can form an enforceable contract - Hubbert v Dell and Cairo v CrossMedia Services . Zaltz v Jdate was a sign-up wrap and did create an enforceable contract. All of these turn on the facts of how the information was was presented to the user. For example, in Meyer v Kalanick the Second Circuit said: Where there is no evidence that the offeree had actual notice of the terms of the agreement, the offeree will still be bound by the agreement if a reasonably prudent user would be on inquiry notice of the terms.[sic] So, in general, Terms of Service are enforcable as a contract if a reasonably prudent user could, on inquiry (e.g. by clicking a link), make themselves aware of the terms. This also explains why skrinkwraps (when software came on actual physical media in a shrink-wrapped box with the terms inside) were not enforcable - a reasonably prudent user could not inform themselves of the terms without unwrapping a product they didn't yet own.

Can an employer apply one-off pay cuts via forced contributions?

Are US employers allowed to unilaterally cut the pay for an employee, specific team or all employees through a one-off measure? Are forced contributions to charity, pay reductions during an economic crisis, fines for not meeting performance goals, and others legally above board? From my limited understanding of US labor law, an employer is free to reduce pay going forward for any reason that isn't covered by specific anti-discrimination laws. And as a company-wide measure applied to future pay this also doesn't seem like it could be construed as an illegal deduction. But I'm not finding a straight answer. This question was inspired by this question about an employer reducing pay to buy the CEO's book and this off-site article about an employer fining people for being late. Can an employer apply what are effectively one-off pay cuts through enforced contributions, fines or other measures?

Can an employer apply one-off pay cuts via forced contributions? No. This type of issues pertains to state law, and many (if not all) jurisdictions in the U.S. have statutes prohibiting forced deductions that are neither ordered by court, nor pursuant to bargaining agreements, nor as required or expressly permitted by law . See, for instance, MCL 408.477 and .478 . The case of the CEO's book sounds in clear violation of MCL 408.477(2) since the user who asked on Workplace SE mentions that the employees did not consent to that deduction. Even if an employee consents to the deduction, it is important to discern between (1) his altruistic consent, and (2) his concession for the sake of continuation of employment. Unless the consent is altruistic, the clause(s) allowing for the deduction might be rendered null and enforceable by virtue of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 178(1) in relation to the aforementioned statutes. Any form of deductions as a permissible sanction (as fining when the employee gets late to work) would have to be provided in the agreement between employer and employee. Otherwise it is unlawful.

Research of US public corporations: disclosing amounts paid to buy other companies or other assets

Are US public stock traded corporations, like Intel or Google, forced by law to disclose how much they paid for buying companies and other assets? How and who is allowed to access this information, if at all? I know the accounts have to be audited and published to stockholders. However, what does the law say about the amount of detail here? Do stockholders get a total amount or an itemized list of amounts paid for buying companies, patents, real estate, and other assets? Could they mud the picture using a proxy company for buying assets?

In general, no Think about it; Google probably has a fleet of several thousand cars - these are all "other assets". It would be impractical (and uncompetitive) for them to disclose each and every transaction involving their motor vehicle fleet. Purchases of real property and public companies are a matter of public record (in most places), so these are disclosed. Assets like private companies, "businesses", plant, equipment, motor vehicles, stationary etc. are private matters between the buyer and the seller. The buyer or the seller can of course disclose this information if they want subject to any NDA. Records of these transactions must be kept for accounting and taxation purposes and the consolidated accounts of a public company are a matter of public record. Line item detail like "Purchase ABC Corporation - $562,000,000" and "Purchase Pens - $7.60" do not make it that far.

Are Wagner militants considered combatants under the IHL?

Are Wagner militants fighting in Ukraine considered combatants under the international humanitarian law? Here's what the OSCE has to say Members of private military and security companies such as the “Wagner group” only fall under the very restrictive definition of mercenaries if they are both not Russian nationals and are not part of the Russian armed forces. If participating in the IAC against Ukraine, they may even be considered as members of an armed group under a command responsible to Russia and they are therefore POWs if they fall into the power of Ukraine. Otherwise they would be protected civilians (who may as such be punished for any direct participation in hostilities). So a Russian passport automatically makes a Wagner militants a combatant, doesn't it? Even if they are not incorporated into the Russian armed forces? Why? And what do they mean by the following they may even be considered as members of an armed group under a command responsible to Russia Regular Ukrainian servicemen can't prove or disprove their reported link to Russia's General Staff on the spot. How are they supposed to treat Wagner militants?

The relevant conventions tried to discourage the traditional mercenary business model, but they also try to avoid loopholes in their rules. Under command by and authorized by Russia? Yes. Wearing clothing/insignia recognizable at a distance? I don't know, but a big Z would be enough. Carrying arms openly? I presume so. There is no requirement that armed forces use only their own nationals (see the French Foreign Legion). While Russia tries to deny being "at war," under international law it is, and residents of the unoccupied part of Russia may rally around the flag. We don't know what will happen after the war. There is the precedent of the SS, which was declared a criminal organization at Nuremberg (that is, membership was considered evidence of complicity in their crimes).

In Washington state must a doctor report things that happened in the past?

Are Washington state's mandated reporting requirements triggered if a doctor discovers that their adult patient had been abused in the past? What if there are no longer any 'protected populations' at risk (no children, no vulnerable adults/elderly,...)? What if the patient talks exclusively in hypothetical terms?

RCW Chapter 26.44 covers abuse of children, and RCW 26.44.030 1(a) states the duty to report: the reporter "has reasonable cause to believe that a child has suffered abuse or neglect" – the law doesn't say "a child is currently suffering abuse", it say "has suffered". But then: subsection (2) says: The reporting requirement of subsection (1) of this section does not apply to the discovery of abuse or neglect that occurred during childhood if it is discovered after the child has become an adult. However, if there is reasonable cause to believe other children are or may be at risk of abuse or neglect by the accused, the reporting requirement of subsection (1) of this section does apply. So, no, unless it is reasonable to believe that the abuse is ongoing, in which case, yes. It's not really possible to judge the status of a "hypothetical", because some hypotheticals are hypotheticals, and others are real, so it would depend on the totality of evidence that would support that conclusion.

Whiteboards availability in High courts and Supreme courts of USA and UK

Are Whiteboards available separately for the two lawyers in High courts and Supreme courts of USA and UK to explain their cases? If No, Do you recommend to have Whiteboards in the courts?

US Supreme Court No Briefs According to the Supreme Court's rules, the petitioner has a certain amount of time to write a brief, not to exceed 50 pages, putting forth his/her legal case concerning the issue on which the Court granted review. After the petitioner's brief has been filed, the other party, known as the respondent, is given a certain amount of time to file a respondent's brief. This brief is also not to exceed 50 pages. After the initial petitions have been filed, the petitioner and respondent are permitted to file briefs of a shorter length that respond to the other party's respective position. If not directly involved in the case, the U.S. Government, represented by the Solicitor General, can file a brief on behalf of the government. With the permission of the Court, groups that do not have a direct stake in the outcome of the case, but are nevertheless interested in it, may file what is known as an amicus curiae (Latin for "friend of the court") brief providing their own arguments and recommendations for how the case should be decided. Oral arguments Each case is allotted an hour for arguments. During this time, lawyers for each party have a half hour to make their best legal case to the Justices. Most of this time, however, is spent answering the Justices' questions. The Justices tend to view oral arguments not as a forum for the lawyers to rehash the merits of the case as found in their briefs, but for answering any questions that the Justices may have developed while reading their briefs. No room for whiteboards. UK Supreme Court No Application An appellant needs to provide four copies of the application for permission to appeal; the order appealed against and the order refusing permission to appeal to the Supreme Court; the official transcript of the judgment of the court appealed from; the orders made by all other courts in the proceedings; the transcript of the final judgments of all other courts in the proceedings; and a document which sets out the history of the proceedings. Documents ... the documents which are needed for an appeal hearing. These are a statement of facts and issues - this document has to be agreed by all the parties to the appeal; the appendix - this includes the documents listed at paragraph 8 above together with other documents which are necessary for understanding the legal issues and the > arguments in the appeal; and the appellant's case and the respondent's case - these are the statements of the parties' arguments in the appeal: their 'skeleton argument'. At least two weeks before the hearing date, the appellant must file core volumes which include the notice of appeal or re-sealed application for permission to appeal; statement of facts and issues; the appellant's and respondent's cases; Part I of the appendix; and an index to the volumes of authorities. Hearing At the hearing, the appellant will have the opportunity to state his arguments first. The respondent to the appeal will then make his submissions and the appellant has a right of 'reply'. No room for whiteboards here either. General Even in a trial court, there will be no whiteboards. Cases are not made up spontaneously like a brainstorming session. For any significant criminal or civil litigation, both sides will have provided large numbers of highly detailed documents (which term includes non-written things like video, audio, and physical evidence), which will have been argued over and agreed upon long before any hearing. Should issues arise during a hearing, the parties will be given time to make further submissions. No one's using a whiteboard Summary offences and small-value civil claims dealt with in the lower courts are a bit of a sausage factory, with a magistrate dealing with 40 or more matters in a day. That's about 10-12 minutes each. No one's using whiteboards here either.

Is it possible to find all U.S. federal laws digitized and online?

Are all of the federal laws in the United States digitized and available to the public through some free ".gov" website? Is it possible to download them all into, say, PDF?

See http://uscode.house.gov/download/download.shtml to start. But what exactly do you mean by a "law"? Lots falls under that term: do you include case law? SCOTUS decisions? Administrative policies? Read earlier Law SE question Naive approach to aggregating all US Federal Laws?

Are all statutory instruments in the UK subordinate to an Act of Parliament?

Are all statutory instruments in the United Kingdom subordinate to an Act passed by Parliament? If so, is the intention that the thrust of law is democratically accountable, but for expediency the details can be passed with less democratic oversight? IIUC EU directives are often implemented using statutory instruments and the “negative resolution procedure”, but these are presumably subordinate to an Act passed in 1973(?) when we acceded to the EC?

Not necessarily. Executive power of the government can be executed either under an Act that specifically grants that power to them or through the exercise of a power that they have through historical common law. However, over the last century, many (but not all) of those common law powers have been codified by an Act of Parliament which usually abolishes the common law power.

Are properties like APKMirror or APKPure legal?

Are app stores that host free yet copyrighted APKs without the author's explicit permission legal? Examples include APKMirror and APKPure.

It is legal to have a website that distributes software, for money or for free. However, such a website might bear some liability for copyright infringement, if a user uploads protected material without the permission of the copyright owner. This was the case with Grokster , which was found to have induced copyright infringement, and subsequently had to pay $50 million. There is a provision in US copyright law, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act , which sets forth conditions whereby a website can protect themselves from such liability. There are particular steps that have to be taken to officially complain and correctly respond to a complaint. If a pirate uploads someone's software without permission and the software owner learns about it, the owner can follow the takedown notice rules and the website operator should remove the offending material. If they do not remove it, they may be found liable for contributory infringement. The pirate could file a counter-notice (which could result in a perjury conviction, since the pirate knows they do not have permission). Once the notice and counter-notice have been filed and the parties notified, the other has 10 days to sue (you put the material back up if no lawsuit files within that period). The Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act is Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) , and is probably beter known under that name.

Are attorneys legally or ethically bound to share evidence in civil cases before complaints are filed?

Are attorneys legally or ethically bound to share evidence or discovery materials in civil matters before actual complaints are filed? Let's say Person A (a non-public figure) suspects Person B (a non-public figure) of a civil tort, such as defamation. Person A gets Lawyer A to send a cease and desist letter to Person B. Person B shows the letter to their Lawyer (B). Lawyer B asks Person B if they have indeed defamed Person A. Person B says they have and outlines the incidents. Lawyer B determines there is enough evidence that the defamation did damage the reputation of Person A and more than likely resulted in monetarily loses in business for Person A. Is Lawyer B obligated in any legal or ethical sense to inform Lawyer A of what Person B said before a complaint is filed? Or only after a complaint is filed? And only when discovery takes place? Or would Lawyer B inform Lawyer A out of common and/or professional courtesy?

england-and-wales There are two issues here: B's "confession" to their lawyer would fall within the definition of legal professional privilege, specifically litigation privilege : Litigation privilege protects communications between lawyers or their clients and any third party for the purpose of obtaining advice or information in connection with existing or reasonably contemplated litigation . So unless B gives their permission, this cannot be disclosed. A party's duty for disclosure, under Part 31 Civil Procedure Rules, begins once proceedings have started by a claim being issued under Rule 7.2(1) unless Rule 31.16 applies as section 33 Supreme Court Act 1981 1 permits disclosure before proceedings have started. So unless A makes, and is successful with, a section 33 application there is no legal obligation on B for disclosure that is not protected by legal professionalprivilege. 1 Defamation is dealt with as a "media and communications claim" under Rule 53.1(3) in the High Court so the other method of pre-proceedings disclosure at section 52 County Courts Act 1984 does not apply here. Although tagged united-states , I have answered as per the Help Centre : " we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag] "

What powers do civil courts have to probe the finances of a defeated defendant refusing to pay compensation or even claiming destitution?

Are bailiffs ever used to enforce civil damages judgments as they are for fines and evictions? If a defendant wishes to get out of paying the compensation ordered due, how hard is it for then to weasel lie or avoid their way out of doing so? In matters of welfare tax or social housing frauds, statutes specifically give powers to DWP HMRC or local authorities to access one's bank accounts in investigations. What about in evasion of civil judgments? I've been told that simply by claiming destitution one can easily get out of a judgement of £10000 by agreeing to a payment plan of £100/month and then in 5 months' time, just say you can't pay again and just make it so much effort for the plaintiff to bother chasing up and arguing at every step that it isn't worth it. Is that true?

These powers Find out what the debtor can afford to pay Send bailiffs to collect payment Get money deducted from wages Freeze assets or money in an account Charge the debtor’s land or property Of course, one of the things a plaintiff should do before commencing legal action is to make sure the defendant isn’t “judgement proof” i.e. doesn’t have the money (or insurance) to pay if you win.

Do US or Australia have laws that prevent insurance companies from racking up too much margin?

Are claim ration in US or Australia much higher and if so, what laws differences cause it. What are the typical claim ratio of insurance companies in US, Australia, and Indonesia? https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/042315/what-difference-between-loss-ratio-and-combined-ratio.asp Claim ratios are the ratio between reimbursement and premium. Say I buy insurance. From a gambler points of view, I want to know how much, on average, I will be reimbursed compared to how much money I pay. For example, if I pay $1000k for life insurance, I want to know that on average, I will get $900. The amount I get if I die may be $1m., But the chance that I will die is 0.09 percent, for example, I will on average, collect $900 out of my $1k premium. Of course, on average I lose. But because I am risk avert it's still worth it. However, given that I don't lose a lot and I want security, I am okay with that. Of course, if the loss ratio is very low, it's stupid to buy insurance. If premium fees are very clear and insurance companies compete with one another, I would expect the loss ratio to be very high. If premium fees are unclear and customers insurance companies avoid competition, I would expect the loss ratio to be very low. Most extra money goes to marketing and profit. Do US and Australian companies have much higher claim ratio? Can we know? What sort of laws on western countries that ensure that that differs from those in Indonesia. I asked a friend of mine in some group and an Australian told me this An established, mature insurance company in Australia (and most western countries I would think) will expect, in the long term, to pay out more money in claims than they receive in premiums. They make their money by investing the premiums during the time interval between receiving the premiums and paying out claims. Insurance companies live or die on their funds management. That's not due to any legislative requirement. It's a competitive business. If their prices aren't competitive, they won't get any customers. It seems that in Australia, buying insurance may be "worth it" In Indonesia, insurance agents are told that it is unethical to compete on price. Also, companies can increase fees through various tricks or scam. One such trick is by using a combination of not writing fees clearly, combining investment with insurance, and simply having huge fees. For example, someone may pay $10k premium believing that most or all money is "invested". The company can obfuscate contracts that make it very difficult for customers to see the fees. Agents can lie to customers claiming that all money are invested. Basically, it's like Sim Lim scam, but much more obfuscated. https://www.asiaone.com/singapore/sim-lim-scams-student-reduced-tears-after-being-charged-1k-iphone-warranty One agent told me that there is no way a customer can know about those fees unless the agents tell and most agents simply don't tell. Latter, even though the insurance benefit only worth $500, the customer can end up paying $5k in fees. Because the insurance and investment is joined, the customers do not know about it till it's very late. Also, it's very difficult to compare prices among different companies. So why Australian or us companies do not just pull the same trick? Why do they bother competing? In general, I think buying insurance in western country may be worth it but buying insurance in Indonesia may not be. I think the claim ratio, that is, ratio between reimbursement in western countries is high and the reimbursement ratio in Indonesia is low. Am I correct? If I am correct, or not, why? Update: I just found out that life insurance premium in Singapore is 1/10th the price in Indonesia, for the same amount. This is what I am talking about. I am very sure that mortality rate in Indonesia, while higher than in Singapore, isn't really 10 times more. So insurance in Indonesia is simply very inefficient

You can’t “mislead or deceive” in “trade or commerce” in Australia It is flat out against the law to mislead or deceive - you can’t lie, you can’t conceal salient facts, you can’t tell half truths, you can’t even tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth if that could be misleading. The fines are huge (for example ), plus the contracts are unenforceable, plus the reputational damage is extreme. The types of practice that you describe would result in orders to return the premiums, plus fines plus probably revocation of the licence to be an insurer in Australia if they were systemic. This is particularly true of insurance companies - the legislation that applies to them is enumerated here .

Are community college instructors and students liable to the same anti-discrimination, Title IX laws as universities in the United States of America?

Are community college instructors and students in America subject to the same anti-discrimination, Title IX,non-sexual abuse, anti-hate-crime, identity, LGBTQ rights gender-abuse laws as universities in the United States of America? If an instructor were to bias treat students, discriminate based on the student's age, background, educational history, gender, sex can the victim sue the community college, the local government, and the instructor with the instructor having the status as an sole proprietor civil court? Are community colleges so cheap or just a little off bankruptcy, that individual instructor so penniless that there exists no injunctive relief or money-compensation available/worthy of the time to sue them minus lawyer fees making the whole legal action a waste of time?

Title IX Applies. So does Title VI The US Department of Justice (DoJ) has issued a Title IX Legal Manual . This reads in the section Scope of Coverage : Title IX prohibits, with certain exceptions, any entity that receives "federal financial assistance" from discriminating against individuals on the basis of sex in education programs or activities. The clearest example of federal financial assistance is the award or grant of money. However, federal financial assistance may also be in nonmonetary form. See United States Dept of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans , 477 U.S. 597, 607 n.11 (1986). Much the same is true of Title VI of the Civil Rights act of 1964. The term "federal financial assistance" is interpreted quite broadly, and most, perhaps all, community colleges will be within the scope of Title IX and Title VI. Federal Anti-discrimination Law Nolo's page lists several laws (all should spply to any community college) and their scope, including: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e and following) prohibits employers from discriminating against applicants and employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin (including membership in a Native American tribe). It also prohibits employers from retaliating against an applicant or employee who asserts his or her rights under the law. Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII to make it illegal for employers to discriminate on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 USC 621-634). Americans With Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. 12101-12213). Equal Pay Act (29 U.S.C. 206(d)) Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) (8 U.S.C. 1324). IRCA prohibits employers from discriminating against applicants and employees on the basis of their citizenship or national origin. IRCA's prohibition on discrimination applies to all terms, conditions, and privileges of employment, including hiring, firing, compensation, benefits, job assignments, promotions, and discipline. Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Section 1981) Although the law's original purpose was to protect African Americans, courts have interpreted it to protect people of all races from discrimination and harassment. Section 1981 has also been interpreted to prohibit discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, if the discrimination is racial in character. Section 1981 protects all private employees and all employees of state and local governments. It also protects independent contractors from discrimination by hiring firms and protects partners in a partnership from discrimination. It does not apply to federal employees, however. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (42 U.S.C. 2000ff and following).

Are companies allowed to file consumer complaints to the Federal Communications Commission?

Are companies allowed to file consumer complaints to the Federal Communications Commission? May a company complain to the FCC that their business phone provider won't give them the information needed to port a number or they're overcharged for internet?

There is no legal significance to their use of the word "consumer" rather than "customer" or "purchaser", and nothing on their website suggests a limit on who can file a complaint. Indeed, the complaint form asks for "Company Name (if applicable)". There are no subject-matter restrictions on complaints though it is pointless to complain about something that isn't about a violation of FCC regulations. It is pointless to complain about internet service rates, because the FCC does not regulate those rates. I cannot determine if there is any FCC requirement that a provider must tell you how to port your number from one provider to another. However, you could file a complains, which the provider must reply to, and they would tell you something like "We don't provide that information". You could then escalate the matter to the status of a formal complaint (which costs money), and eventually you might get a full formal explanation that they are not required to tell you how to do it (unless they are required to, then they presumably will have told you before you got to this stage). The FCC guide on porting numbers does not indicate whether the provider has to explain to you how to do it, but their guide is a good starting point.

Can a company print the wrong Net. Weight on a product?

Are companies allowed to use old packaging (900g) on their new product which is (650g)? Here's the story. The product is a pita bread. My dad started buying this brand since it weighs more and costs less only to find out after weighing that the product uses the wrong package. I called them and they said: "Yeah we had some of the old packages so we used that, what's the big deal?" Is this allowed in Ontario?

I don't know the regime in Canada, but I'd bet that it's not that different from the United States, where this would almost certainly violate a variety of laws. Most likely it would lead to liability under a consumer-protection laws forbidding deceptive sales practices. It's not really any different than selling someone a dozen eggs and then giving them eight eggs.