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de	caselaw	Germany	Tenor Der Beklagte wird unter teilweiser Aufhebung des Bescheides der Leiterin der Justizvollzugsanstalt N. vom 1. 12. 2009 und des Widerspruchsbescheides des Leiters der Justizvollzugsanstalt Köln vom 23. 2. 2010 verpflichtet, dem Kläger 3.493,93 Euro zu zahlen. Im Übrigen wird die Klage abgewiesen.Die Kosten des Verfahrens tragen der Kläger zu zwei Fünfteln und der Beklagte zu drei Fünfteln.Das Urteil ist wegen der Kosten vorläufig vollstreckbar. Der Kläger und der Beklagte dürfen die Vollstreckung in Höhe des jeweiligen Vollstreckungsbetrages abwenden, wenn nicht der jeweilige Vollstreckungsschuldner vor der Vollstreckung Sicherheit in beizutreibender Höhe leistet. 1Tatbestand2Der Kläger trat am 00.00.0000 in die mittlere Laufbahn des nordrhein-westfälischen Vollzugsdienstes ein. Er war zuletzt als Dienststellenleiter der Zweigstelle Coesfeld der Justizvollzugsanstalt N. tätig. Er ist zuletzt zum Justizvollzugsamtsinspektor (Besoldungsgruppe A 9) befördert worden. Sein letztes Bruttogehalt im aktiven Dienst betrug 3.111, 46 Euro.3Der Kläger war vom 31. 3. bis 31. 5. 2009 dienstunfähig erkrankt. Mit Wirkung ab dem 1. 6. 2009 ist er in den Ruhestand versetzt worden. Im Urlaubsjahr 2008 hatte er 4 Tage und im Urlaubsjahr 2009 keinen Tag Erholungsurlaub angetreten.4Mit Schreiben vom 15. 5. 2009 beantragte er eine finanzielle Abgeltung der nicht angetretenen Erholungsurlaubstage. Zur Begründung verwies er im Wesentlichen auf die Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes.5Die Leiterin der Justizvollzugsanstalt N. lehnte den Antrag mit Bescheid vom 1. 12. 2009 ab und führte aus, eine Abgeltung von Erholungsurlaub sei im Beamtenrecht nicht vorgesehen.6Gegen den Bescheid erhob der Kläger Widerspruch und machte geltend: Die Richtlinie 2003/88/EG sei auch auf Beamte anwendbar.7Der Leiter der Justizvollzugsanstalt L. wies den Widerspruch mit Widerspruchsbescheid vom 23. 2. 2010 zurück. Er vertiefte die Ausführungen in dem Bescheid vom 1. 12. 2009 und führte weiter aus: Die Richtlinie 2003/88/EG sei auf Beamte nicht anwendbar.8Der Kläger hat am 24. 3. 2010 Klage erhoben und macht geltend: Der Anspruch auf finanzielle Abgeltung seines nicht angetretenen Erholungsurlaubs ergebe sich unmittelbar aus der Richtlinie 2003/88/EG. Für 2008 und 2009 seien ihm insgesamt 39 Urlaubstage abzugelten.9Der Kläger beantragt,10den Beklagten unter Aufhebung des Bescheides der Leiterin der Justizvollzugsanstalt N. vom 1.12.2009 und des Widerspruchsbescheides des Leiters der Justizvollzugsanstalt L. vom 23.2.2010 zu verpflichten, ihm, dem Kläger, 6.067,35 Euro zu zahlen.11Der Beklagte beantragt,12die Klage abzuweisen.13Er vertieft die Ausführungen in den angefochtenen Bescheiden.14Wegen der weiteren Einzelheiten des Sachverhalts und des Vorbringens der Beteiligten im Übrigen wird auf den Inhalt der Gerichtsakte und der beigezogenen Verwaltungsvorgänge Bezug genommen.15Entscheidungsgründe16Die Klage ist als Verpflichtungsklage im Sinne des § 42 Abs. 1 VwGO zulässig, aber nur teilweise begründet. Der Kläger hat gegen die Beklagte einen Anspruch auf Zahlung von 3.493,93 Euro; insoweit sind der Bescheid der Leiterin der Justizvollzugsanstalt N. vom 1.12.2009 und der Widerspruchsbescheid des damaligen Leiters der Justizvollzugsanstalt L. vom 23.2.2010 rechtswidrig und verletzen den Kläger in seinen Rechten (§ 113 Abs. 5 Satz 1 VwGO). Im Übrigen sind die angefochtenen Bescheide rechtmäßig, weil dem Kläger ein über 3.493,93 Euro hinausgehender Zahlungsanspruch nicht zusteht.17Anspruchsgrundlage für den Anspruch des Klägers auf Abgeltung seines krankheitsbedingt nicht genommenen Erholungsurlaubs in den Jahren 2008 und 2009 ist Art. 7 Abs. 2 der Richtlinie 2003/88/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 4. 11. 2003 über bestimmte Aspekte der Arbeitszeitgestaltung, Abl. L 299/9, (im Folgenden: RL). Danach darf der bezahlte Mindesturlaub, wie er durch Art. 7 Abs. 1 RL gewährleistet ist, außer bei Beendigung des Arbeitsverhältnisses nicht durch eine finanzielle Vergütung ersetzt werden.18Art. 7 Abs. 2 RL gilt unmittelbar, weil es eine Anspruchsgrundlage für den geltend gemachten Anspruch des Klägers im nationalen Recht nicht gibt. Dementsprechend gibt es auch keine nationalen günstigeren Vorschriften, die der Anwendbarkeit des Art. 7 Abs. 2 RL entgegenstünden. Außerdem ist in der Rechtsprechung geklärt, dass Art. 7 Abs. 2 RL nicht nur für Arbeitnehmer, sondern auch für Beamte gilt.19Vgl. zur Anwendbarkeit und den Voraussetzungen des Art. 7 Abs. 2 RL: EuGH, Urteil vom 3.5.2012 – C-337/10 -, juris = NVwZ 2012, 688; OVG NRW, Beschluss vom 11.10.2012 – 1 A 2076/12 -, Urteil vom 22.8.2012 – 1 A 2122/10 -, und Beschlüsse vom 23.7.2012 – 6 A 193/11 -, und 24. 7. 2012 – 6 A 1738/10 -, jeweils abrufbar im Internet unter www.nrwe.de.; VG Münster, Urteil vom 25.9.2012 – 4 K 182/09 -.20Die Voraussetzungen des Art. 7 Abs. 2 RL liegen hier in Bezug auf den vom Kläger in 2008 und 2009 nicht in Anspruch genommenen Erholungsurlaub teilweise vor.21Der Abgeltungsanspruch nach Art. 7 Abs. 2 RL umfasst denjenigen Mindesturlaub, den der Arbeitnehmer oder Beamte nicht nehmen konnte, weil er während des gesamten Bezugszeitraums und/oder Übertragungszeitraums oder eines Teils davon krankgeschrieben war. Entscheidendes Kriterium für den Abgeltungsanspruch ist demnach, dass der Arbeitnehmer oder Beamte den Mindesturlaub infolge einer Erkrankung, also aus von seinem Willen unabhängigen Gründen nicht nehmen konnte. Diese Voraussetzung ist hier erfüllt. Der Kläger war ab dem 31. 3. 2009 dienstunfähig erkrankt und ist – ohne die Dienstfähigkeit zurückerlangt zu haben – mit Wirkung ab dem 1. 6. 2009 in den Ruhestand versetzt worden. Auch der Beklagte hat nicht in Abrede gestellt, dass die Erkrankung des Klägers kausal dafür war, dass er den ihm noch zustehenden Erholungsurlaub nicht vor der Zurruhesetzung in Anspruch nehmen konnte.22Damit hat der Kläger einen Anspruch auf finanzielle Abgeltung von 24,33 Urlaubstagen.23Für 2008 sind dem Kläger 16 Tage Erholungsurlaub abzugelten. Auf den Mindestjahresurlaub von 20 Tagen nach Art. 7 Abs. 1 RL sind 4 Urlaubstage anzurechnen, die er 2008 erhalten hat. Denn nach dem unwidersprochen gebliebenen Vortrag des Beklagten hatte der Kläger in 2008 insgesamt 26 Tage Urlaub nicht beantragt, also von den ihm zustehenden 30 Urlaubstagen (§ 5 Abs. 2 der für das Urlaubsjahr 2008 noch maßgeblichen Erholungsurlaubsverordnung NRW – EUV) 4 Urlaubstage tatsächlich angetreten.24Für 2009 sind dem Kläger, der mit Wirkung ab dem 1. 6. 2009 in den vorzeitigen Ruhestand versetzt worden ist und in 2009 keinen Urlaubstag angetreten hat, (20 Tage Mindesturlaub : 12 Monate x 5 Monate) 8,33 Urlaubstage finanziell abzugelten. Da sich der (gemeinschaftsrechtliche) Mindesturlaub von vier Wochen auf das Urlaubsjahr bezieht, ist er bei unterjähriger Beendigung der Dienstzeit der Berechnung des Abgeltungsanspruchs anteilig zu Grunde zu legen. Eine Auf- oder Abrundung von Bruchteilen eines Urlaubstages kommt in Ermangelung einer dies im vorliegenden Zusammenhang anordnenden Bestimmung des Gemeinschaftsrechts nicht in Betracht.25OVG NRW, Urteil vom 22.8.2012 – 1 A 2122/10 -, nrwe, Rdn. 39 ff., m. w. N.26Der abzugeltende Mindesturlaub des Klägers für 2008 und 2009 war bei Eintritt in den vorzeitigen Ruhestand auch noch nicht verfallen. Nach der seinerzeit noch geltenden Regelung in § 8 Abs. 2 Satz 1 EUV wäre der Jahresurlaub des Klägers aus 2008 erst mit Ablauf des Monats September 2009 und der anteilige Jahresurlaub für 2009 mit Ablauf des Monats September 2010 verfallen. Der Kläger war aber bereits mit Wirkung ab dem 1. 6. 2009 in den Ruhestand versetzt worden und hatte die finanzielle Abgeltung des nicht angetretenen Urlaubs bereits im Mai 2009 beantragt. Es kommt deshalb nicht darauf an, dass die Regelung in § 8 Abs. 2 S. 1 EUV nicht mit europarechtlichen Vorgaben in Einklang steht,27EuGH, Urteil vom 3.5.2012 – C-337/10 -, juris = NVwZ 2012, 688,28und ob stattdessen eine Verfallszeit von (längstens) 18 Monaten zugrundezulegen ist.29So OVG NRW, Urteil vom 22.8.2012 – 1 A 2122/10 -, nrwe, Rdn. 48.30Bei der Berechnung der Höhe des Abgeltungsanspruchs ist das Bruttogehalt des Klägers im letzten Monat vor Eintritt in den vorzeitigen Ruhestand zugrundezulegen. Es wird mit 3 multipliziert (Quartalsbetrachtung). Das Ergebnis ist durch 13 (Wochenzahl des Quartals) zu dividieren. Dieses Ergebnis ist wiederum durch 5 (Arbeits-/Urlaubstage je Woche) zu dividieren. Das sich daraus ergebende Ergebnis ist schließlich mit der Anzahl der abzugeltenden Urlaubstage zu multiplizieren.31OVG NRW, Urteil vom 22. 8. 2012 – 1 A 2122/10 -, nrwe, Rdn. 53 bis 58.32Daraus ergibt sich ein Anspruch des Klägers auf Zahlung von (3.111,46 Euro x 3 : 13 : 5 x 24,33 =) 3.493,93 Euro.33Die Kostentscheidung beruht auf § 155 Abs. 1 Satz 1 VwGO und entspricht dem Verhältnis des jeweiligen Obsiegens und Unterliegens.34Der Ausspruch über die vorläufige Vollstreckbarkeit der Kostenentscheidung beruht auf § 167 Abs. 1 und Abs. 2 VwGO i. V. m. §§ 708 Nr. 11, 711, 713 ZPO.
en	caselaw	US	705 N.W.2d 746 (2005) Kelci STRINGER, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Korey Stringer, and as Trustee for the Heirs and Next-of-Kin of Korey Stringer, and Kodie Stringer, a Minor, through his Parent and Natural Guardian, Kelci Stringer, and Cathy Reed-Stringer and James Stringer, Appellants, v. MINNESOTA VIKINGS FOOTBALL CLUB, LLC, and Fred Zamberletti and Chuck Barta and Paul Osterman, Respondents, and Dennis Green and Michael Tice, and W. David Knowles, M.D., and Mankato Clinic, Ltd., and Sheldon Burns, M.D., and David Fischer, M.D., and Orthopaedic Consultants, P.A., and Edina Family Physicians, a professional association, and John Does 6 through 30, Natural Persons or Entities Whose Names or Identities are Unknown to Plaintiff, Defendants. Nos. A03-1635, A04-205. Supreme Court of Minnesota. November 17, 2005. 747 Stanley Chesley, Paul DeMarco, Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley Co., LPA, Cincinnati, OH, Eric J. Magnuson, Diane B. Bratvold, Rider Bennett, LLP, Richard 748 G. Hunegs, Randal W. LeNeave, Hunegs, Stone, LeNeave, Kvas & Thornton, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, Kenneth R. White, Kevin O'Connor Green, P.A., Mankato, MN, for Appellants. James A. O'Neal, Bruce G. Jones, Amy R. Freestone, Faegre & Benson, LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent. Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc. OPINION ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice. Korey Stringer, a highly respected member of the Minnesota Vikings football team, died of heat stroke after the second day of practice at the 2001 Vikings training camp. Kelci Stringer, Korey Stringer's wife, as trustee and personal representative of the estate of Korey Stringer, brought a wrongful death action against the respondents in Hennepin County District Court.[1] The respondents moved for summary judgment. The court granted respondents' motion and dismissed the action against them. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, we must determine whether Kelci Stringer can show the existence of genuine issues of material fact that Vikings' employees Paul Osterman and Fred Zamberletti are not immune from coemployee liability. To make this determination, we must address the interaction between common law tort liability and the workers' compensation system, which has restricted coemployee liability in negligence actions. As part of our analysis, we must determine whether our prior case law on coemployee immunity is applicable to the facts of this case when determining whether Osterman and Zamberletti owed Korey Stringer a personal duty and, if there was a duty, whether Osterman and Zamberletti were grossly negligent in performing that duty. We conclude that the personal duty test is applicable, but that Osterman and Zamberletti did not owe Korey Stringer a personal duty. Therefore, the district court did not err when it granted summary judgment. We affirm, but on grounds different from those articulated by the court of appeals. On August 1, 2001, Korey Stringer, 27, a Pro Bowl offensive tackle for the Minnesota Vikings, died of complications from heat stroke. Stringer collapsed after the morning practice on the second day of training camp in Mankato, Minnesota. His core body temperature, when first measured at Immanuel St. Joseph's Hospital in Mankato, was 108.8 degrees F. First Day of 2001 Training Camp Stringer reported to the Vikings training camp on Sunday, July 29, 2001. At a team meeting that evening, head athletic trainer Charles Barta[2] briefly spoke to the team members about heat and making sure they drank plenty of fluids. The 749 players did not receive any written instructions about guarding against heat-related illnesses. The chain of events leading to Korey Stringer's death appears to start on the first day of practice, July 30, 2001. July 30 was a day of high heat and humidity with a heat index of at least 109 during the afternoon practice. On that first day, there was a morning and an afternoon practice where the players did not wear their full gear. Before the morning practice, Stringer told Barta that he had an upset stomach. Barta listened to Stringer's self-diagnosis that he was "jumpy" and gave him some Tums, an antacid. Before the afternoon practice, Barta gave Stringer some Gatorade with an electrolyte supplement because Barta knew that Stringer had suffered from "heat-related problems" in previous training camps. As the result of heat-related illness, Stringer had received fluids intravenously at least once at a previous training camp. About 45 minutes into the afternoon practice, Stringer vomited twice. Vikings offensive line coach Mike Tice told Stringer to leave the practice and called Barta over to look at Stringer. Barta again listened to Stringer's self-diagnosis that he was feeling anxious and brought him to the on-field trailer after Stringer vomited a third time. Barta stated in his deposition that he told Stringer to consume some liquids, but he did not monitor whether Stringer drank anything. Already inside the trailer were Fred Zamberletti, coordinator of medical services for the Vikings; Paul Osterman, an assistant trainer[3]; and another Vikings team member. Barta told Zamberletti that Stringer had been vomiting and that he brought him to the trailer to "cool down" and "take it easy." Barta then left the trailer to go back to the practice. Zamberletti stated that he observed Stringer and did not believe that he was in a lot of distress because he was sitting upright at the edge of the examination table. Dr. W. David Knowles, a Mankato physician who provided medical services for the Vikings, arrived soon after and examined the other Vikings team member, but he did not examine Stringer. Osterman, Zamberletti, and Barta all testified that Stringer was frustrated that he was taken out of the Monday afternoon practice. Stringer left the trailer that afternoon without anyone examining him. Dr. Knowles' report for July 30 stated that Stringer "had an episode of heat exhaustion during afternoon training camp. He recovered without incident following rest and hydration." Athletic intern D.J. Kearney said Barta instructed him to bring some Gatorade to Stringer's dormitory room that evening. The following morning, July 31, Barta asked Stringer how he felt and checked Stringer's weight on the weight chart[4]. Barta said that Stringer 750 replied that he had an upset stomach, but that he felt okay. No other monitoring of Stringer was done.[5] Second Day of Practice July 31, the second day of practice, was also a day of high heat and humidity. The morning practice began at approximately 8:45 a.m. with the players wearing full gear. The heat index was already almost 90 when the morning practice began.[6] Sometime during the morning practice, Stringer vomited again, but he continued to participate in the practice. A photographer noticed that Stringer appeared to be struggling during the practice and was drenched with sweat.[7] At about 10:30 a.m., Stringer turned an ankle, which Barta taped. Stringer then returned to practice. Witness testimony indicates that during practice, Stringer either fell to his knees or to the ground more than once, getting up by himself each time. Shortly after the main morning practice ended at approximately 11:15 a.m., Stringer dropped to his knees, fell to his right side, and then threw his hands over his head and lay on his back. Osterman and Kearney heard another Vikings player call "Trainer." Osterman was the only athletic trainer remaining on the field at that time. Barta had given Osterman a cell phone and told him to call Zamberletti "if anything comes up." Barta also gave Osterman a list of phone numbers, which included Dr. Knowles' number and an ambulance service. In his deposition, Osterman initially stated that he "saw Korey getting up from the ground after kneeling on one knee." Osterman later stated that Stringer was lying flat on his back when he first arrived and that he did not know how long Stringer had been lying there. Kearney also confirmed that he had initially seen Stringer lying flat on his back. The photographer, who had previously observed Stringer, also saw Stringer lying on the football field and estimated that he was lying there for about five minutes. Although two other witnesses said that Stringer had been moaning or groaning for several minutes, Osterman said that he had not heard him. Osterman testified that he asked Stringer how he was doing, but Stringer ignored him, and again got up without any assistance. Stringer went to the "big bag," hit it one time, and then headed toward the trailer. Stringer was sweating, but Osterman did not remember any details about what Stringer was wearing or how sweaty he was. Inside the Trailer Osterman said that even though he thought Stringer was "doing fine," he brought Stringer to the air-conditioned trailer as a "preventive" measure. Osterman testified that Stringer "jogged" to the trailer, but a Vikings teammate stated that Stringer only jogged a couple of steps and then walked to the trailer. According to Osterman, about five minutes passed between the time he saw Stringer lying on 751 the ground and the time they entered the trailer. Estimates are that Stringer and Osterman entered the trailer at about 11:20 a.m. Osterman's testimony was that when Stringer was inside the trailer, he "jumped up" on one of the tables. Osterman said he asked Stringer how he was. It appears from the record that Stringer did not respond to Osterman's question. About five minutes later, Kearney also entered the trailer with some water for Stringer even though, according to Barta, Gatorade and ice bags were already inside the trailer. Kearney left soon thereafter. No one else was in the trailer. Stringer drank "one or two sips" of the water. Osterman said that he determined that Stringer's skin was "cool and moist"[8] and he then "just kind of let him relax" for between five and ten minutes. After this time had passed, Stringer got off the table and moved to the floor. He asked Osterman to remove his shoes and socks and cut the tape from his ankles. Osterman did so and said that Stringer thanked him, but Osterman did not recall Stringer saying anything else the rest of the time while in the trailer and he did not ask Stringer any other questions. Osterman also said that Stringer drank some more sips of water, but he did not know how much. A bit later, Stringer moved back to the table and began humming and "bopping his head back and forth." He continued this behavior for another ten minutes or more. Osterman then called the athletic training room to have someone come with a golf cart to pick up Stringer. Osterman said that he waited to call the training room because "they're pretty busy after practice and, * * there really wouldn't have been anyone around to come out before that" and because he did not think this was an emergency. Stringer got off the table and lay down on the floor again. Osterman applied at least one ice towel to Stringer's forehead, but Stringer pushed it away and Osterman did not reapply it. The golf cart came about five to ten minutes after Osterman placed the call to the training room. When the golf cart arrived, Osterman and Kearney tried to get Stringer up, but he was unresponsive. Osterman testified that he instructed Kearney to get him some ice towels and to get Zamberletti. Kearney stated that he "knew there was something not right about the situation" because Stringer was not responding and appeared to be having difficulty moving. Kearney and Osterman rolled Stringer on to his side. Osterman said, "I was kind of confused because that was the first sign that something was going wrong." Osterman also said that this was the first time he checked any of Stringer's vital signs, such as his pulse. Osterman said Stringer's breathing was "normal"; his pulse was steady but slow, but he did not count the beats per minute. He did not have a thermometer and did not think to check Stringer's temperature. He also did not take Stringer's blood pressure. He applied two ice towels to Stringer. Neither Osterman nor Kearney called an ambulance up to this point. 752 Zamberletti arrived with Kearney after about three to five minutes. According to Osterman, Stringer's breathing became shallower and quicker as Zamberletti arrived. Kearney also stated that Stringer's breathing had changed since the time he left to get Zamberletti. Stringer was also groaning, which, to Kearney, sounded involuntary. Osterman did not say anything to Zamberletti and testified that as soon as he entered the trailer, Zamberletti said, "[Stringer's] hyperventilating." Zamberletti did not ask for any history about Stringer's condition, but he instructed Kearney to put a Ziploc bag over Stringer's mouth because of his belief that Stringer was hyperventilating. Kearney stated that he held the bag over Stringer's mouth and nose for about one to one and one-half minutes. Kearney also stated that he did not believe Stringer's breathing improved as a result of using the bag. After trying the Ziploc bag treatment, Zamberletti took Stringer's pulse and testified that it "was real rapid," but he did not count the beats per minute. Zamberletti testified that he then instructed Osterman to leave the trailer and to call for a van. Osterman did so and when he came back inside the trailer, Zamberletti told him to call Dr. Knowles.[9] Osterman was unable to reach Knowles so he called his nurse, who said that she would page Knowles. Knowles called back about three or four minutes later and Zamberletti left the trailer to speak with him. According to Zamberletti, after his conversation with Knowles, Zamberletti instructed Osterman to call Gold Cross ambulance.[10] During this time, Kearney, on his own, replaced one ice towel that was behind Stringer's neck and another on his chest. Kearney also monitored Stringer's airway to make sure he was breathing and heard "a lot of fluid or saliva." He said that Stringer's skin was "cool and moist." Zamberletti also testified that when he returned to the trailer, he monitored Stringer's airway, breathing, and circulation. Zamberletti testified that at that time he did not think Stringer's condition was heat-related. Instead, he said, "I thought there was a possibility [Stringer] could have just fainted. I thought that he could have had the possibility of a seizure, which would havecould have been done by an insect bite or some medication that he had taken or something." Hospitalization and Death The ambulance was dispatched at 12:00 noon and arrived at the football field at 12:08 p.m. The paramedics put Stringer on a backboard and briefly examined him. Zamberletti said that the paramedics did not ask him any questions. Zamberletti rode in the ambulance with Stringer to the hospital. Zamberletti observed the paramedics taking Stringer's blood pressure and pulse and he assisted them with suctioning saliva from Stringer's mouth. Neither Zamberletti nor the paramedics took any action to cool Stringer when he was in 753 the ambulance. Shortly before reaching the hospital, Stringer began vomiting a large amount of clear fluid. The ambulance arrived at Immanuel St. Joseph's Hospital at 12:24 p.m. On admission, Stringer was unconscious, his pulse was 148 beats per minute, and his blood pressure could not be determined. When hospital personnel took Stringer's temperature at 12:35 p.m., the reading was 108.8 degrees F. The hospital packed bags of ice around Stringer, inserted intravenous lines for rapid infusion of saline, and attempted other methods to assist in cooling. As Stringer's condition continued to worsen, hospital personnel attempted infusions of plasma, dialysis, and drug treatments. CPR was started at about 1:20 a.m. on August 1, but was finally discontinued after about 30 minutes. Korey Stringer died from heat stroke at 1:50 a.m. on August 1, 2001. Cause of Action Kelci Stringer, Korey Stringer's wife and personal representative of his estate, filed a wrongful death action in Hennepin County District Court asserting 13 separate counts. Count I included Osterman and Zamberletti and asserted they each had a personal duty to protect and care for Korey Stringer's health and that they were grossly negligent in carrying out their personal duty. The court determined that Osterman and Zamberletti did not owe Korey Stringer a personal duty and that they were not grossly negligent and granted Osterman's and Zamberletti's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the counts against them. Kelci Stringer appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that although Osterman and Zamberletti owed Korey Stringer a personal duty, their actions were not grossly negligent as a matter of law. Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, LLC, 686 N.W.2d 545, 551-52 (Minn.App.2004). The court determined that Osterman and Zamberletti owed Korey Stringer a personal duty because they were both directly engaged in Stringer's care and treatment and their actions did not involve general workplace safety. Id. at 550-51. The court analogized the situation to circumstances when an ordinary person takes charge of or controls circumstances, thereby creating an affirmative duty to provide care. Id. at 551.[11] Though finding a personal duty, the court of appeals did not conclude that Osterman's or Zamberletti's actions were grossly negligent because the two men had taken some actions to care for Stringer. Id. at 552. The court said, "[r]espondents' actions may reflect poor judgment or lack of reasonable care, but there is no basis to conclude that respondents disregarded the risk to Stringer altogether in a manner `equivalent to a willful and intentional wrong.'" Id. Kelci Stringer petitioned for review on the issue of whether Osterman and Zamberletti were grossly negligent. Osterman and Zamberletti sought cross-review of the issue of whether they owed Korey Stringer a personal duty. We granted both requests for review. I. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Odenthal v. Minn. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Minn. 754 2002); Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. We review de novo whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law. Meintsma v. Loram Maint. of Way, Inc., 684 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Minn.2004). We do not weigh facts or determine the credibility of affidavits and other evidence. DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 70 (Minn.1997). The nonmoving party must do more than rest on averments or denials of the adverse party's pleading. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.05; see also DLH, Inc., 566 N.W.2d at 71. The moving party has the burden to show the absence of an issue of material fact. Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 609 N.W.2d 868, 874 (Minn.2000). Workers' Compensation Background To provide the necessary context to our analysis, we begin with a brief summary of Minnesota's workers' compensation system. This system is based on a compromise between employees and employers and involves "a mutual renunciation of common law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike." Minn. Stat. § 176.001 (2004); see also Foley v. Honeywell, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Minn.1992). Under the workers' compensation statutory scheme, the employer "is liable to pay compensation in every case of personal injury or death of an employee arising out of and in the course of employment without regard to the question of negligence." Minn.Stat. § 176.021, subd. 1 (2004). The employer's liability to pay compensation "is exclusive and in the place of any other liability." Minn.Stat. § 176.031 (2004). Under this scheme, an employee is precluded from bringing a tort action for damages against the employer.[12] But an injured employee or the employee's personal representative may, under certain limited circumstances, bring an action in tort against a coemployee for the latter's gross negligence. Wicken v. Morris, 527 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Minn.1995). Minnesota Statutes § 176.061, subd. 5(c) (2004), specifically provides: A coemployee working for the same employer is not liable for a personal injury incurred by another employee unless the injury resulted from the gross negligence of the coemployee or was intentionally inflicted by the coemployee. The term "coemployee" includes a "corporate officer, general supervisor, or foreman." Dawley v. Thisius, 304 Minn. 453, 455, 231 N.W.2d 555, 557 (1975). In Wicken, we stated that, to establish a gross negligence claim against a coemployee, the injured employee must show: 1. the coemployee had a personal duty toward the employee, the breach of which resulted in the employee's injury, and that the activity causing the injury was not part of the coemployee's general administrative responsibilities; and 2. the injury arose from gross negligence on the part of the coemployee. Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98. The first prong of the test we adopted in Wicken was first articulated in Dawley, a 1975 case that involved a wrongful death action against a company's general manager. 304 Minn. at 455, 231 N.W.2d at 557. The second prong of the test is based on a 1979 amendment to the workers' compensation statute. The 1979 amendment added language to Minn.Stat. § 176.061, subd. 5(c), and bars coemployee liability except where the coemployee has been grossly 755 negligent or has committed an intentional tort. Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 31, 1979 Minn. Laws 1256, 1272. Before the 1979 amendment, the Workers' Compensation Act did not specifically include a provision for coemployee immunity. See Minn.Stat. § 176.061 (1978). In enacting coemployee immunity in 1979, the legislature adopted the rationale of the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Study Commission, which was concerned that allowing an employee to sue a coemployee for simple negligence "tends to shift tort liability from employer to fellow employee in a manner never intended by the workers' compensation system." Jay Y. BenAnav, Workers' Compensation Amendments of the 1979 Minnesota Legislature, 6 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 743, 764 (1980) (quoting Minnesota Workers' Compensation Study Commission, A Report to the Minnesota Legislature and Governor, 41 (1979)). As the Study Commission language demonstrates, the purpose of the 1979 amendment was to allow only a narrow window for coemployee liability.[13] Personal Duty Requirement With the foregoing background, the next step in our analysis is to determine whether the district court erred when it granted summary judgment for the respondents on the issue of whether the respondents owed Korey Stringer a personal duty. The presence of a duty is a question of law that we review de novo. Wong v. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 576 N.W.2d 742, 745 (Minn.1998). In Dawley, we adopted the requirement of a personal duty to overcome coemployee immunity in the context of a wrongful death action against the company's general manager. Dawley was a worker at a sheet metal company who died after he fell into a tank filled with a caustic detergent solution. 304 Minn. at 454, 231 N.W.2d at 556. The plaintiff in Dawley, the deceased worker's estate, sued the company's general manager asserting that the manager had "general overall responsibility for the day-to-day operation" of the company. Id. at 454, 231 N.W.2d at 556-57. We determined that the plaintiff's allegation that the supervisor had a general duty to provide a safe place to work was insufficient to show that the supervisor owed a personal duty to the deceased worker. Id. at 456, 231 N.W.2d at 558. We then stated that a coemployee will have no personal liability "because of his general administrative responsibility for some function of his employment without more." Id. at 456, 231 N.W.2d at 557. A critical concept underlying our holding in Dawley was the preservation of the compromise struck in the workers' compensation statute balancing certain, but limited, benefits provided to employees injured in the course of their employment 756 with the limitations on the ability of workers to recover damages in tort actions. See id. at 455-56, 231 N.W.2d at 557. We explained that the duty to provide employees with a safe workplace is a nondelegable duty held by the employer. Id. at 456, 231 N.W.2d at 558. Therefore, we concluded that the manager was immune from being sued personally for failing to provide a safe workplace because providing a safe workplace was the employer's duty and the workers' compensation statute precludes an action against the employer for an alleged breach of its duty. Id. at 456, 231 N.W.2d at 558. In other words, when the alleged breach of duty falls within the workers' compensation compromise between employers and employees, the coemployee should not be held liable. To create personal liability for the coemployee, we require that "[t]he acts of negligence for which a co-employee may be held liable must be acts constituting direct negligence toward the plaintiff, tortious acts in which he participated, or which he specifically directed others to do." Id. at 456, 231 N.W.2d at 557. In Wicken, we applied Dawley and required that for a coemployee to be liable for his or her acts of negligence to a coemployee, he or she must breach a duty based on personal fault, which is something different from the coemployee's "general administrative responsibility for some function of his employment." Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98. Like Dawley, Wicken also involved an action against a company manager for acts that had not been directed at any specific employee. We concluded that a manager, who made false statements in applying for a DNR permit in order to burn explosive material, did not owe a personal duty to the workers who were killed by a resulting explosion. We said that the permit application did not create a personal duty because it was not directed toward the injured employees, but "was an administrative activity required as an integral part of [the coemployee manager's] employment obligations." Id. at 99. We also stated, "[t]o hold otherwise, permitting co-employee liability when harm results however indirectly from the carrying out of administrative obligations incident to work responsibilities would eviscerate the fundamental purpose of the workers' compensation laws." Id. The Dawley and Wicken holdings are a bit difficult to apply to the facts before us because the two earlier cases do not address the situation where the coemployee's responsibilities involve direct contact with a coemployee, as is the situation here. In both Dawley and Wicken, the defendants held managerial positions and their acts had broad impact within the company. Because the facts of Dawley and Wicken involved duties not directed toward a specific person, we did not discuss whether "general administrative responsibility" meant only duties of general impact on all employees or whether it also includes carrying out work duties, regardless of whether the work duties involve direct contact with a coemployee, as the respondents contend. Nor did we discuss specifically whether the personal duty requirement applied only to managers, supervisors, or officers. Here, the parties do not dispute that coemployeesOsterman and Zamberlettitook direct action toward Korey Stringer; but they disagree on whether the coemployees' direct action was sufficient to create a personal duty. Kelci Stringer contends that Osterman's and Zamberletti's direct actions toward Korey Stringer created a personal duty owed to him. She argues that Dawley and Wicken distinguish between "actions taken by an employee that have broad and general impact on all fellow employees" (general administrative responsibilities) and "direct, personal actions that a particular employee takes with respect to a particular co-employee." According to Kelci Stringer, 757 the latter are personal duties and the former are not. In this case, Kelci Stringer asserts that general administrative responsibilities would have included procuring enough fluids for the team, staying abreast of weather forecasts, or making sure that trainers and interns had the proper equipment. The respondents argue that an administrative responsibility is any task performed in the scope of one's employment and that performance of such a task cannot create a personal duty. They assert that administrative responsibilities are those duties carried out by employeesand Osterman and Zamberletti were only carrying out their required work duties when they attempted to help Korey Stringer. Respondents assert that Kelci Stringer's argument that direct contact with the injured employee creates a personal duty would serve to protect those who devise policy, but would leave defenseless those who carry it out. They further claim that the standard of personal duty asserted by Kelci Stringer would thwart the goals of the workers' compensation system and significantly expand coemployee liability. They contend that a personal duty arises only when the coemployee departs from his or her employment responsibilities and voluntarily assumes additional duties that put another employee at risk. We conclude that neither Kelci Stringer nor the respondents have articulated the correct test for overcoming coemployee immunity. Rather, each has articulated only a portion of the test. Our holdings in Dawley and Wicken are clear that direct action toward the injured employee is required before a personal duty is created. Dawley, 304 Minn. at 456, 231 N.W.2d at 557 ("[t]he acts of negligence for which a co-employee may be held liable must be acts constituting direct negligence toward the plaintiff, tortious acts in which he participated, or which he specifically directed others to do"); Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98-99. But direct contact alone is insufficient; the employee whose job involves direct contact with others should not bear inordinate risk for coemployee liability for the simple fact of his chosen employment or assigned duties. Therefore, we also stated "personal liability * * * will not be imposed on a co-employee because of his general administrative responsibility for some function of his employment without more." Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98. Our holdings in Dawley and Wicken have in essence created a two-prong test which must be met before a coemployee has undertaken a personal duty to a coemployee. To have a personal duty to the injured employee, the coemployee must have (1) taken direct action toward or have directed another to have taken direct action toward the injured employee, Dawley, 304 Minn. at 456, 231 N.W.2d at 557, and (2) acted outside the course and scope of employment, see Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98. This personal duty applies to all coemployees and we do not distinguish between managers, supervisors, or officers and other coemployees in the requirement of a personal duty. We see no reason to treat them separately.[14]See 758 Gunnett v. Girardier Bldg. and Realty Co., 70 S.W.3d 632, 638 (Mo.Ct.App.2002). We did not use the specific phrase "course and scope of employment" in either Dawley or Wicken; therefore, it is important at this point in our analysis that we elaborate on why we conclude that a personal duty necessarily contemplates that the coemployee must have acted outside of his or her course and scope of employment. In Wicken, we said a coemployee does not owe a personal duty based on a "general administrative responsibility for some function of his employment without more." Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98. We also stated that the DNR permit application in Wicken "was an administrative activity required as an integral part of [the manager's] employment obligations." Id. at 99. "Scope of employment" is defined as "the field of action in which a servant is authorized to act in the master-servant relationship." Black's Law Dictionary 1374 (8th ed.2004). "Course of employment" refers to "[e]vents that occur or circumstances that exist as a part of one's employment; esp., the time during which an employee furthers an employer's goals through employer-mandated directives." Id. at 378. Under the workers' compensation system, we have said that course of employment refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the incident causing the injury. Gibberd by Gibberd v. Control Data Corp., 424 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Minn. 1988). We conclude that, while we did not use the specific phrase, "course and scope of employment" under the facts of either Dawley or Wicken, we articulated essentially the same concept when we spoke of the coemployee's "administrative activity required as an integral part of * * employment obligations" or "administrative obligations incident to work responsibilities," Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99, and the "general administrative responsibility for some function of * * * employment," Dawley, 304 Minn. at 456, 231 N.W.2d at 557. We discussed the specific term "administrative" in Dawley and Wicken because the facts of both of those cases involved administrative responsibilities of coemployee managers. But our stated concerns in Wicken included that the coemployee not be held personally liable for decisions he was required and authorized to make as part of his job and that we "[maintain] the integrity of the compromise between employers and employees" under workers' compensation. Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99. Thus, the relevant issue is not whether the personal duty requires us to explain the meaning of the term "administrative," but rather whether any articulation of what constitutes a personal duty would upset the purposes of the workers' compensation system to fairly and fully compensate the meritorious injury claim. See Dawley, 304 Minn. at 455-56, 231 N.W.2d at 557; Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99; see also Franke v. Fabcon, Inc., 509 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Minn.1993). Acting within the course and scope of employment is what brings the coemployee within the protection of the workers' compensation system. We acknowledge the concerns raised by the dissent. We share some of these concerns and have considered them carefully; but we conclude that the dissent's analysis ultimately fails because it does not sufficiently answer the question on personal duty that is before us in light of our case law and the purposes of the workers' compensation scheme. When the dissent asserts that a course and scope of employment test is an incorrect reading of personal duty, it relies significantly on 759 Behr v. Soth, 170 Minn. 278, 212 N.W. 461 (1927), a pre-1979 legislative amendment case that does not discuss personal duty. In Behr, we held that coemployees are included among third parties for purposes of tort liability under the workers' compensation scheme. Id. at 283, 212 N.W. at 463. And we determined that the fire chief defendant was acting within the course and scope of his employment when he drove his personal vehicle to a fire rather than going to the fire in a city-owned vehicle. Id. at 281-82, 212 N.W. at 462-63. The issue in Behr, however, was whether the plaintiff, a coemployee/common enterpriser, was precluded from seeking damages from the defendant because he had already elected to receive workers' compensation benefits. Id. at 286-87, 212 N.W. at 463. Under the statute then in effect, the plaintiff could either seek compensation from his employer or pursue the coemployee/common enterpriser in tort. Id. at 284, 212 N.W. at 463. The dissent's assertion that Behr rejected a course and scope of employment test for personal duty is far too broad a reading for a case that discusses neither personal duty nor whether the defendant could have been liable under the facts of that case. Reliance by the dissent on the tangential analysis in Behr cannot overcome the fact that we adopted the concept of a personal duty in a subsequent case, Dawley, and then rearticulated that concept in Wicken, and those two cases are the cases on which our analysis must be based.[15] Moreover, when the legislature passed the 1979 amendments to add a gross negligence requirement, it was silent as to Dawley's requirement that a coemployee have a personal duty to an injured coemployee to be liable for tort damages. The dissent concedes that the legislature was silent and acknowledges that the personal duty requirement is applicable here. Given that the legislature took no action to 760 alter the standard we set forth in Dawley and rearticulated in Wicken, our case law provides that the legislature's silence expressed its concurrence in Dawley's and Wicken's holdings. See Robinson v. Lamott, 289 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Minn.1979); Minn.Stat. § 645.17(4) (2004) (stating that "[w]hen a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language"). In our analysis, we are striving to be true to our precedent and to our rules of construction when we apply Dawley and Wicken to the facts of this case. The dissent's analysis strays from this objective. For example, the dissent asserts that key language in Dawley and Wickenthat a coemployee is not liable for a "general administrative responsibility for some function of his employment"is not relevant here; but when it adopts this approach, it overlooks key concerns from these two cases that a coemployee not be held personally liable for required and authorized decisions and that we maintain the workers' compensation compromise. See Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99. Finally, the dissent's test, which only requires a direct act toward the injured employee for coemployee liability, fails because it would serve to protect coemployee managers with duties of general impact on a company while increasing the vulnerability of employees whose duties include direct contact with their coemployees. We conclude that adopting a course and scope of employment prong is compatible with the purposes of the workers' compensation system. See Minn.Stat. §§ 176.001; 176.021, subd. 1; see also Franke, 509 N.W.2d at 376 (stating that "[w]orkers' compensation * * * is social legislation, providing a measure of security to workers injured on the job, with the burden of that expense considered a proportionate part of the expense of production."). While other jurisdictions have not framed coemployee immunity in terms of a personal duty, we conclude that requiring a showing that the coemployee has acted outside of the course and scope of employment before liability will be imposed is the better approach. Moreover, our approach aligns with holdings on coemployee immunity from certain other jurisdictions that have specifically addressed this issue. See, e.g., Meade v. Ries, 642 N.W.2d 237 (Iowa 2002); Brooks v. Carter, 102 Ill.App.3d 635, 58 Ill. Dec. 534, 430 N.E.2d 566 (1981); Jackson v. Hutchinson, 453 S.W.2d 269 (Ky.Ct.App. 1970); Daus v. Marble, 270 N.J.Super. 241, 636 A.2d 1091 (App.Div.1994). When determining coemployee immunity, we conclude that course and scope of employment should have the same meaning as the course and scope of employment test used to determine whether an employee qualifies for workers' compensation benefits. We note that applying the same test to both the determination of qualification for benefits and coemployee immunity allows for greater uniformity in the application of the workers' compensation statute. Larson refers to using the workers' compensation benefit test as "more satisfactory" than using the scope of employment test used to determine vicarious liability under respondeat superior. 6 Arthur Larson and Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 111.03(3), at 111-15 (2003). Did Osterman and Zamberletti owe Korey Stringer a Personal Duty? We must now apply the two-prong personal duty test to determine whether Osterman and Zamberletti (1) took direct action toward or directed another to take direct action toward Stringer and (2) acted outside the course and scope of their employment. Application of this test will enable us to determine whether summary 761 judgment on the personal duty allegation in Count I of the complaint was appropriate. There is no dispute that the first prong of the personal duty test has been met; the parties do not disagree that Osterman and Zamberletti both took direct action toward Stringer. Thus, the focus of our analysis is on the second prong of the test. Under the second prong of the test, Osterman and Zamberletti must have been acting within their authorized course and scope of employment to not owe a personal duty to Korey Stringer. When an employee engages in acts exceeding his authorization, including the violation of an instruction or a rule, he is acting outside the course and scope of his employment. Bartley v. C-H Riding Stables, Inc., 296 Minn. 115, 117, 206 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1973) (denying workers' compensation benefits to employee thrown from a horse he was instructed not to ride); see also Lange v. Mpls.-St. Paul Metro. Airports Comm'n, 257 Minn. 54, 57, 99 N.W.2d 915, 918 (1959). In Lange, we distinguished between the performance of authorized acts in a prohibited manner and the performance of prohibited acts. Id. at 57, 99 N.W.2d at 918. We explained that the performance of prohibited acts is outside the scope of employment and does not come within the protection of the statute. Id. at 57, 99 N.W.2d at 918. We have held that an activity not explicitly within the employee's defined duties can nevertheless be related to the employee's duties if the work is in "furtherance of the employer's business." Ramczik v. Winona Mach. & Foundry Co., 174 Minn. 156, 158, 218 N.W. 545, 545 (1928).[16] An employer may also extend the scope of employment by directing or requesting an employee to perform some act outside the usual scope of employment. Weidenbach v. Miller, 237 Minn. 278, 292, 55 N.W.2d 289, 296 (1952). The rule that a person's scope and course of employment can be extended also may apply to rescue activities, where the scope and course of an employee's employment may be impliedly extended in an emergency to include the performance of any act designed to save life or property in which the employer has an interest. 2 Larson, § 28.01(1), at 28-2; Carey v. Stadther, 300 Minn. 88, 95-96, 219 N.W.2d 76, 80 (1974) (reversing a denial of benefits to a widow of a sales employee who died attempting a rescue where the employer had actively encouraged its employees to perform acts of community service in order to enhance sales). But not every act which might benefit the employer is in the course and scope of employment. 2 Larson, § 27.01(3), at 27-6. And not every rescue is in the course and scope of employment. Weidenbach, 237 Minn. at 279-81, 293, 55 N.W.2d at 289-90, 297 (upholding a denial of benefits to dependents of a deceased worker who attempted to rescue a person who had fallen through the ice because there was no express direction by his employer to help the person in peril). In this case, Osterman and Zamberletti were employed by the Vikings to provide 762 some level of care for the Vikings' players and the record demonstrates that their actions toward Stringer occurred within work-related limits of time and place. Further, while we would prefer that the record contain more specific information regarding Osterman's and Zamberletti's duties and responsibilities,[17] we conclude that the record does contain sufficient information to enable us to determine their specific duties with coinciding expectations, responsibilities, and authorization. Thus, on the record before us, we are able to determine whether Osterman and Zamberletti acted within the course and scope of their employment and whether their actions were in furtherance of the interests of the Vikings' organization. The record provides information about Osterman's degree program to become an athletic trainer, including training he received on recognizing the signs and symptoms of heat emergencies. The job description for Zamberletti as Coordinator of Sports Medicine includes the following as Zamberletti's job duties for the period from January 1999 through January 15, 2002: on-field rehabilitation of players classified physically unable to play and conditioning of developmental and injured reserved players. The record indicates that Zamberletti has been certified as an athletic trainer since 1970 and has been employed with the Vikings since 1961. We also note that the Vikings' Athletic Training Intern Handbook states, "Realize your limitationsnever make an assessment. All assessments on players will be done by Chuck [Barta], Fred [Zamberletti], or Dr. Fischer." Here, Osterman's and Zamberletti's obligations to Stringer directly resulted from their employment by the Vikings and the Vikings' efforts to provide a safe workplace for their players. The record shows that the purpose for employing trainers was to protect the health and safety of the players. The Vikings required at least one trainer to remain on the field until the last player finished with practice. While on the field, the trainers' duties included monitoring practice, providing players with water, and evaluating and treating player injuries. Osterman's and Zamberletti's actions with respect to Stringer conformed with these duties. Osterman testified that while he thought Stringer was "doing fine," he did take Stringer to the air-conditioned trailer as a "preventive" measure. While in retrospect we may want or expect that Osterman and Zamberletti would have responded to Stringer's condition differently, they nonetheless were acting within their scope of employment, and any duty they had toward Stringer did not exist absent their employment status. We recognize that any time medical attention or care is involved, a great deal of trust is placed in the discretion of the caregiver. Caregivers must not exceed the level of care they are trained and authorized to provide. Those who provide health care services must realize their limitations and those who provide health care services must not make decisions or take actions they are not qualified to make. But we also want those who provide health care services to be able to perform their duties and respond to emergencies without unduly worrying about being subject to personal liability for their acts. We also acknowledge that in this context the course and scope of employment may be difficult to ascertain, especially when employees 763 such as Osterman and Zamberletti have the authority to exercise discretion in making assessments. In such situations, an appropriate baseline of job duties, expectations, and authorizations is necessary for a court to determine if an employee exceeded the course and scope of his employment. We conclude that such a baseline exists in the record before us. Accordingly, based on all of the foregoing, we conclude that summary judgment on the issue of whether Osterman and Zamberletti had a personal duty to Korey Stringer was appropriate and therefore we hold that the district court did not err when it granted summary judgment for the respondents. II. Having decided that the district court properly granted summary judgment for the respondents under the personal duty requirement, we need not address whether the district court properly granted summary judgment for the respondents based on gross negligence; therefore, we decline to address this issue. Affirmed. PAGE, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. HANSON, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. First, I disagree with the conclusion of the majority on the "personal duty" prong of Wicken v. Morris, 527 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Minn.1995). I would conclude that the evidence establishes as a matter of law that Paul Osterman and Fred Zamberletti owed a personal duty to Korey Stringer. As foundation for that conclusion, I would hold that, under our precedent interpreting Minnesota's law of "personal duty" and absent directions to the contrary from the legislature, the plaintiff need not prove that the coemployee was acting outside the course and scope of his employment, but only that the coemployee's acts were taken directly toward the injured employee and were not general actions taken in the performance of the employer's nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace. Second, I would reach the gross negligence prong of Wicken. On that prong, I would conclude that Stringer has presented sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact and that summary judgment was inappropriate. A. Personal Duty 1. Policy Considerations I find that there are competing public policy concerns relating to the scope of coemployee liability. This suggests that any further restrictions on coemployee liability should be addressed by the legislature, not by this court. On the one hand, I share the concerns expressed by the majority that unlimited coemployee liability might intrude on the compromise reached in the workers' compensation laws between employer and employees, and could erode the benefit of the immunity from tort liability that is provided to employers. The policy arguments in favor of narrowing, or even eliminating, the window for coemployee liability include these: coemployees could risk serious personal liability on a daily basis; the employer may be required to provide a defense to the coemployee, thereby diminishing the benefit of the employer's immunity; the employer may see increases in liability insurance premiums; and coemployee liability might provide the employer with a subrogation claim against the coemployee, shifting the burden for compensating workplace injuries from the employer to the employee. See, e.g., McCluskey v. Thompson, 363 So. 2d 256, 259 (Miss.1978) (observing that permitting plaintiff to recover "would effectively transfer the ultimate burden of providing compensation 764 from the industry, where it belongs, to fellow servants, where it does not belong."); 6 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 111.03[2] (2004); William E. Hanna, Coemployee Immunity: What Does It Take to Plead "Something More?," 53 J. Mo. Bar 77, 82 (March/April 1997). But there are competing concerns with restricting coemployee liability. The policy arguments against narrowing or eliminating coemployee liability are these: the injured employee is entitled to be fully compensated for his injuries by all but the employer; the coemployee tortfeasor should not be relieved of the consequences of his wrongdoing; extending immunity to the coemployee would encourage fellow employees to neglect their duties; and the coemployee, who was not part of the workers' compensation compromise, did not provide any quid pro quo to support the abrogation of the injured employee's right to sue at common law. See, e.g., Grantham v. Denke, 359 So. 2d 785, 787 (Ala. 1978) (observing that the "quid pro quo is solely between employer and employee"); Rehn v. Bingaman, 151 Neb. 196, 36 N.W.2d 856, 859 (1949); and Larson, § 111.02[2]. Because the workers' compensation laws are a creature of the legislature, which has regularly refined the elements of the compromise since the original enactment in 1913, I believe that we should look to the legislature to determine the scope of coemployee tort liability and decline any attempt to imply legislative intent from these competing policy concerns. 2. Legislative Action This reluctance to imply legislative intent where none has been expressed is reinforced by the legal presumption that statutes should not be construed as abrogating common law rights unless they do so expressly. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn.2000) (declining to construe legislative intent to abrogate common law in absence of clear purpose to do so). Therefore, we need to consider whether Minnesota's workers' compensation laws expressly eliminate or restrict coemployee liability. Minnesota Statutes § 176.031 (2004) provides immunity from tort liability to employers as follows: The liability of an employer prescribed by this chapter is exclusive and in the place of any other liability to such employee, personal representative, surviving spouse, parent, any child, dependent, next of kin, or other person entitled to recover damages on account of such injury or death. From its inception, that immunity has been understood to apply only to the employer and not coemployees. See, e.g., Behr v. Soth, 170 Minn. 278, 283, 212 N.W. 461, 463 (1927). No one argues to the contrary here. By contrast, when other states have extended workers' compensation immunity to coemployees, they have done so expressly. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-501(b) (2005) (stating that "no employer, or other employee of such employer, shall be liable for any injury for which compensation is recoverable under the workers compensation act"); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-8 (2005) (stating that "[i]f an injury or death is compensable under this article, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person injured or killed, except for intentional wrong"); N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 29, subd. 6 (2005) (workers' compensation "shall be the exclusive remedy to an employee * * * when such employee is injured or killed by the negligence or wrong of another in the same employ"); 765 see also Ind.Code § 23-3-2-13 (2004) (injured employee "may commence legal proceedings" as long as alleged wrongdoer is "some other person than the employer and not in the same employ").[1] The failure of the Minnesota legislature to amend section 176.031 to similarly extend the employer's immunity to coemployees demonstrates the absence of any intent to abrogate common law coemployee liability. To the contrary, Minnesota's workers' compensation laws expressly preserve coemployee liability. Minnesota Statutes § 176.061 (2004) preserves the liability of a "third party" to injured employees. It provides, as relevant here: Subd. 5. Cumulative remedies. If an injury or death for which benefits are payable is caused under circumstances which created a legal liability for damages on the part of a party other than the employer, * * [and] the party other than the employer is not then insured or self-insured as provided by this chapter, legal proceedings may be taken by the employee or the employee's dependents * * * against the other party to recover damages, notwithstanding the payment of benefits by the employer or the special compensation fund or their liability to pay benefits. (Emphasis added). Again, from the inception of the third party liability provision, a "third party" has been held to include coemployees. Behr, 170 Minn. at 283, 212 N.W. at 463. And, prior to the 1979 amendments to the third-party liability provisions, coemployee liability was based on ordinary negligence. Id. In 1979, section 176.061 was amended to add the following restriction of third-party liability for a coemployee: A coemployee working for the same employer is not liable for a personal injury incurred by another employee unless the injury resulted from the gross negligence of the coemployee or was intentionally inflicted by the coemployee. Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 31 (extra session 1979), 1979 Minn. Laws 1256, 1272 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 176.061, subd. 5(c) (2004)). This amendment confirms that a "third party" includes a coemployee and that coemployees are not covered by the employer's immunity from tort liability. Otherwise this amendment would have no purpose. Thus, if we look solely to legislative action to determine the scope of coemployee liability, we would conclude that there is no immunity and the only restriction is the heightened standard of gross negligence. The statute makes no mention of personal duty. 3. Case Law The concept of personal duty originated with this court and not the legislature. But, because the legislature has apparently acquiesced in this court's recognition of a personal-duty restriction by implication, neither codifying nor eliminating it, I agree that the personal-duty prong of coemployee liability is applicable. The relevant question concerns the scope of that prong. For the reasons discussed above, I would read the judicially implied personal-duty prong narrowly, limiting our prior cases to their facts. I read the majority opinion to expand the personal-duty prong, 766 and quite broadly, when it adds the requirement that the coemployee's acts must be outside the course and scope of employment. Such a requirement is not supported by any legislative action; is not required by prior case law; it would create immunity for coemployees that is virtually coextensive with that of employers, which the statute does not do; and it would be difficult to apply. To conclude that the legislature acquiesced in the court's engrafting of a scope of employment requirement to the personal duty prong is to assume that the legislature could divine what this court might think in 2005 when these unusual facts were presentedthe court has never before used the words "scope of employment" in describing the personal duty prong. Some state legislatures have expressly restricted coemployee liability, as the majority proposes, to acts outside of the course and scope of employment. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 85.20 (2005) (stating that workers' compensation remedy is exclusive right when injury caused by coemployee "arises out of and in the course of such employment and is not caused by the [coemployee's] gross negligence amounting to such lack of care as to amount to wanton neglect for the safety of another"); Ohio Rev.Code. Ann. § 4123.741 (2005) (stating that no employee may be held liable for injury "received or contracted by any other employee of such employer in the course of and arising out of the latter employee's employment"). The Minnesota Legislature has not followed the lead of these states. This legislative inaction can only be interpreted as a rejection of this type of restriction. Our case law likewise does not support this expansion of the personal-duty prong. In fact, our decision in Behr is directly contrary to any restriction based on the course and scope of employment. 170 Minn. at 283, 212 N.W. at 463. Although the statutory framework of third party liability that was before this court in Behr is considerably different from that presented today, two aspects of Behr remain fully applicable: (1) Behr viewed a "third party" to include coemployees and (2) Behr determined that the fact that the coemployee was acting within the course and scope of his employment did not limit the coemployee's liability. Behr, 170 Minn. at 281-83, 212 N.W. at 462-63. In Behr, we specifically rejected the argument that the coemployee fire chief was acting outside the scope of his employment (which would have taken the case completely outside the workers' compensation laws) when his car collided with a fire truck, injuring the plaintiff fireman. Id. Yet, we concluded that the fire chief was a "party other than the employer" who had legal liability for any negligence in causing the plaintiff's injuries. Id., 170 Minn. at 283, 212 N.W. at 463. This holding is significant because, years later, when we first mentioned "personal duty" in Dawley v. Thisius, we grounded our recognition of the right to sue a coemployee for negligence on what the majority now calls a "tangential analysis" in Behr. Dawley, 304 Minn. 453, 456, 231 N.W.2d 555, 557 (1975). Then, when we went on to consider how coemployee liability is affected "by the policy behind the [workers'] compensation statute," we implied a much narrower restriction than that proposed by the majoritythat the act of the coemployee must constitute "direct negligence toward the plaintiff." Id. at 455-56, 231 N.W.2d at 557. And, in this context, our further statementthat coemployees' liability will not be imposed "because of his general administrative responsibility for some function of his employment", see id. at 456, 231 N.W.2d at 557cannot reasonably be read not to incorporate any course and scope of employment standard, which had been rejected in Behr, but only to 767 emphasize that the negligence must be direct, not indirect or vicarious. This was necessary in Dawley because the claim was made against a manager for negligence in the performance of certain general, administrative functions. The discussion of administration is not relevant here because these coemployees were not managers and were not performing administrative functions. Limiting Dawley to its facts, where the claim was based solely on the failure of a supervising coemployee to provide a safe place to work, the "personal duty" rule that emerges is that liability must be based on a coemployee's direct acts toward the injured employee and not on general actions taken in performance of the employer's nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace.[2] When we revisited coemployee liability in Wicken v. Morris, 527 N.W.2d 95, 98-99 (Minn.1995), we did not expand on Dawley, but merely identified the personal-duty test of Dawley as one prong of liability, the other being the legislature's intervening enactment of the gross negligence prong. As to personal duty, we repeated the words of Dawley, adding only that the duty may include acts of omission as well as commission"The personal duty to coemployees contemplated in Dawley is no different than the duty any individual owes another arising from normal daily social contactthe duty to refrain from conduct that might reasonably be foreseen to cause injury to another." Id. at 98. And, as in Dawley, our ultimate decision in Wicken was that a supervisory coemployee could not be held liable for breach of the employer's nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace. Id. at 98-99. The majority's restriction of coemployee liability to acts outside the course and scope of employment would have the effect, perhaps unintended, of providing immunity to coemployees that is essentially coextensive with that of the employer. Generally, an employer's respondeat superior liability turns on whether the employee was acting within the scope of his employment. See, e.g., Hagen v. Burmeister & Assocs., 633 N.W.2d 497, 504 (Minn. 2001) (observing that "we will not impose [respondeat superior] liability unless there is some connection between the tort and the business"). Thus, the immunity given to employers essentially applies to acts of its employees performed within the cause and scope of their employment. Had the legislature intended to provide such broad and equivalent immunity to coemployees, it presumably would have done so directly by amending section 176.031 to extend the employer's immunity to its employees. Finally, I doubt that a scope of employment test is workable in a case such as this where the coemployee's job is to provide care directly to employees. Accordingly, I would decline to broaden the test as the majority proposes and, instead, read narrowly the test already announced in Dawley and Wicken. Given this narrower test for personal duty, I would agree with the court of appeals that the undisputed facts show Osterman and Zamberletti had a personal duty toward Korey Stringer. Stringer v. 768 Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC, 686 N.W.2d 545, 551 (Minn.App.2004). B. Gross Negligence The concept of gross negligence, as used in other contexts, has often been referred to as a range of conduct, from great negligence to the absence of scant care. See, e.g., State v. Bolsinger, 221 Minn. 154, 158-60, 21 N.W.2d 480, 485 (1946); State v. Al-Naseer, 690 N.W.2d 744, 752 (Minn.2005). But I would conclude that one end of that rangethe "want of even scant care"is not applicable to coemployee liability because of its incompatibility with the personal-duty prong for that liability. We have no cases establishing the standard for gross negligence for coemployee liability under the workers' compensation laws. The cases that describe gross negligence as a range that includes the want of scant care arise in contexts not particularly relevant to coemployee liability. See, e.g., Al-Naseer, 690 N.W.2d at 752 (discussing gross negligence in the context of the crime of vehicular homicide); State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 478 (Minn. 1999) (examining gross negligence in criminal vehicular homicide context); Bolsinger, 221 Minn. 154, 159, 21 N.W.2d 480, 485 (1946) (defining gross negligence in criminal context). What is unique about coemployee liability, as discussed above, is that we do not even reach the gross negligence question unless a personal duty has been establishedsome act of direct negligence toward the injured employee. When the personal-duty prong is coupled with the gross-negligence prong, the notion of scant care appears to have no place. As applied to the claims before us, Stringer alleges 25 acts of commission and omission that amount to gross negligence and she supports those allegations with expert affidavits. The use of a scant-care standard would focus not on those acts where the care was negligently performed or was negligently not performed, but on what other care was given. The fact that a caregiver performed some acts that were not themselves negligent (i.e. bringing Korey Stringer to the air conditioned trailer for evaluation, offering water) should not be considered to excuse the negligent performance or failure to perform the other acts that are alleged to have been required by due care. Accordingly, I would describe the gross negligence standard for coemployee liability in terms of what it isnegligence of a high degree, great negligence, more than ordinary negligence but less than wanton and willful conductand not in terms of what it is notthe provision of scant care. And under that standard, Stringer has presented sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact that the conduct of Osterman and Zamberletti was grossly negligent. Accordingly, summary judgment should be reversed and the matter remanded for trial. MEYER, Justice (dissenting). I join in the dissent of Justice Hanson. NOTES [1] Kelci Stringer brought the suit against the Minnesota Vikings, several Vikings employees, and several Vikings physicians. The district court dismissed the counts against most of the defendants. In this appeal, only the Minnesota Vikings Football Club, LLC; Fred Zamberletti, coordinator of medical services; Charles (Chuck) Barta, head athletic trainer; and Paul Osterman, assistant athletic trainer, remain as respondents and, of these, Kelci Stringer states that she now presents only one claim of gross negligence against Zamberletti and Osterman. [2] Following briefing, but before the scheduling of oral argument, respondent Chuck Barta submitted a motion requesting his dismissal from this appeal on the ground that Stringer had raised no issue as to Barta that could possibly result in reversal of the court of appeals' decision affirming summary judgment in Barta's favor. Stringer opposed the motion and we deferred action on the motion until this case was resolved. In light of the decision reached in this case, we deny Barta's motion on the ground that it is now moot. [3] At the time of Korey Stringer's death, Osterman was not certified or registered as an athletic trainer although he had completed a 4-year degree program, testing, and other requirements for certification and registration. Paul Osterman was certified as an athletic trainer on August 31, 2001, and registered with the Minnesota Board of Medical Practice as of January 12, 2002. [4] Team members were instructed to weigh themselves in the morning before practice and in the afternoon after practice. No monitoring was done to ensure that they weighed themselves as requested or that they weighed themselves out of their uniforms. Stringer's weight chart showed that his weights during the camp were as follows: July 30 a.m.336 pounds; July 30 p.m.330 pounds; July 31 a.m.332 pounds. Barta said that he considered Stringer's two-pound weight gain overnight to be acceptable for Stringer to practice. [5] The Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (MDLI) inspected the Mankato training facility and the Vikings' safety provisions that were in place on July 30 and 31, 2001. The MDLI concluded that "no provisions of the Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health Act or its standards were violated by the Vikings during July 30 and 31, 2001." The MDLI did nevertheless make some recommendations to the Vikings "for reducing and monitoring the effects of heat and humidity on players." [6] Respondents acknowledge that a total of 11 Vikings players were treated for heat-related illnesses on July 31, 2001. [7] Included in the record are articles written about heat stroke. According to one article, heat exhaustion is associated with heavy sweating. Another article, written by one of the respondents' experts, states that vomiting can be an early warning sign of impending heat stroke. [8] According to Osterman, it was important that Korey Stringer's skin was cool and moist because from his training he learned that a person who was suffering from heat stroke would have hot and dry skin. We note from information in the record, however, that chills and moist skin can be a symptom of heat exhaustion. Dizziness, weakness, and vomiting can also be warning signs of impending heat stroke. Moreover, while hot and dry skin can be a symptom of heat stroke, it is not the only symptom. Other symptoms can include fever, confusion, rapid and shallow breathing, an abnormally fast heart rate, vomiting, seizures, and unconsciousness. [9] Osterman's testimony differs from Zamberletti's on the timing of the phone calls and Osterman's leaving the trailer. According to Zamberletti, Osterman was inside the trailer during the treatment with the Ziploc bag. Zamberletti also testified that he told Osterman to call for the van before he told him to call Knowles. Osterman, however, testified that Zamberletti told him to leave in order to call Knowles before Kearney performed the Ziploc bag treatment. [10] Osterman's and Zamberletti's testimony differs on which of them had the idea for Osterman to call an ambulance. Osterman said that he first thought to call an ambulance before Knowles called back, but Zamberletti stated that he told Osterman to call an ambulance after Zamberletti returned to the trailer after speaking with Knowles. [11] The court of appeals also held that Barta did not owe Korey Stringer a personal duty based on the court's conclusion that Barta's actions "arose out of his employer's nondelegable duty to ensure safe work conditions." 686 N.W.2d at 551. [12] There is one exception to an employer's immunity from tort actions under workers' compensation, which allows the employee to sue his or her employer if the employer has willfully assaulted and injured the employee (the "intentional injury exception"). Gunderson v. Harrington, 632 N.W.2d 695, 702-03 (Minn.2001). [13] An employer who pays workers' compensation benefits to an employee injured by a third party's negligence, including the gross negligence of coemployee tortfeasor, is ordinarily entitled to bring a subrogation action against the third party and seek reimbursement for those payments. Minn.Stat. § 176.061, subd 5(a) (2004). The employer may join in a tort action brought by the employee or may bring a separate action. Id. "To the extent that coemployees are liable on the same basis as any other third persons, it follows logically that the employer can exercise subrogation rights against its own tortfeasor employee." 6 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 111.02, at 111-4 (2003). Workers' compensation was intended to keep the burden of loss on industry as a cost of production rather than on employees. Arens v. Hanecy, 269 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Minn.1978) (citing Eichholz v. Shaft, 166 Minn. 339, 342, 208 N.W. 18, 19 (1926)). But allowing the employer subrogation rights against the coemployee tortfeasor has the tendency to shift that burden to the coemployee. To minimize this burden shifting, the window of coemployee liability should be narrow. Subrogation rights are not at issue in the case before us. [14] We recognize that the personal duty concept arose in the context of actions against a coemployee supervisor or officer. To incur tort liability, the supervisor or officer had to be acting as a coemployee and not in his or her capacity as a corporate officer or supervisor while acting on behalf of the employer. See Gerger v. Campbell, 98 Wis. 2d 282, 297 N.W.2d 183, 186 (1980) ("Only if it can be said that by [the officer's or supervisory employee's] conduct he has changed his status from that of a supervisor to that of a co-employee will an action for common law tort lie."). We note that we are not the only jurisdiction to eliminate the distinction between supervisory and managerial employees and other coemployees when determining personal duty. See Gunnett, 70 S.W.3d at 638 (defining coemployee to include a corporate officer, a supervisor, as well as a coworker in the context of the coemployee personal duty). [15] We also note that, in Minnesota, permitting suit against a coemployee/common enterpriser had more to do with the restoration of the employee's common-law action than with holding the coemployee accountable and discouraging neglect of duties. Before 1913, an employee had a common-law tort action against a third party who was not his own employer. But the Workers' Compensation Act, as enacted in 1913, took that action away, providing instead an election of remedies between recovery from the employer or recovery from the third party who was also subject to the Act and limiting damages to the amount fixed by the Act. O'Malley v. Ulland Bros., 549 N.W.2d 889, 893 (Minn.1996). By amendment in 1923, the legislature restored that common law action, in part, by limiting the election of remedies provision to situations in which the employer and third party, also subject to the Act, were engaged in a common enterprise. Id.; Act of April 16, 1923, ch. 279, § 1, 1923 Minn. Laws 373, 374-75 (currently codified at Minn.Stat. § 176.061, subds. 1-4). We have held that the election of remedies provision applies to suits against coemployees. Peterson v. Kludt, 317 N.W.2d 43, 49 (Minn.1982) (holding, in pre-1979 amendment case, that the election of remedies provision applies to suits against coemployees); Behr v. Soth, 170 Minn. 278, 286, 212 N.W. 461, 464 (1927) (holding that injured employee could seek compensation from the employer or from coemployee/common enterpriser but not both). It is true that in 1937 the legislature abrogated the rights of employers and employees to elect not to be bound by the Act and mandated insurance coverage for employers. Act of March 12, 1937, ch. 64, 1937 Minn. Laws 109, 111. But the legislature did not alter the basic compromise between employees and employers which contemplated, according to Behr, an election of remedies and limited recovery against common enterprisers, including coemployees. Given that the intent of the coemployee immunity provision of 1979 was to limit coemployee liability, it is doubtful that the legislature intended any expansion of that liability by the placement of the immunity provision at the end of the cumulative remedies section, which ordinarily has application when the election of remedies provisions do not apply. [16] In Ramczik, we concluded that a worker who was employed to unload scrap iron from train cars was entitled to workers' compensation benefits when he was injured while helping his coworkers lift a heavy object in the company's foundry. Ramczik, 174 Minn. at 157-58, 218 N.W. at 545. Although the injured worker would not have been required to help with lifting in the foundry, we concluded that his attempt to help was incidental to and arising out of his employment because he was still on the employer's premises and the work was in furtherance of the employer's business. Id. at 158, 218 N.W. at 545. We note that the additional work the injured worker undertook outside the specific scope of his employment was the same type of work for which he was employed, but in a different location in the company. [17] We acknowledge that the record provides a limited description of Osterman's and Zamberletti's specific duties and responsibilities and what the Vikings' organization expected of them, especially what the Vikings expected of Osterman as a new athletic trainer and of Zamberletti as the coordinator of medical service. In the future, we prefer that the record be more fully developed on such issues. [1] Alabama is among states that have struggled with the question of whether coemployee immunity violates state constitutional guarantees that injured persons have a due process right to a legal remedy against their wrongdoers. See Grantham v. Denke, 359 So.2d at 789 (holding that workers' compensation law that bars negligence actions for damages by coemployee violated state constitution), overruled by Reed v. Brunson, 527 So. 2d 102, 117 (Ala.1988) (holding immunity law not unconstitutional "insofar as it abolishes suits against co-employees for negligence or wantonness"). [2] Although not binding on us, the court of appeals has interpreted Dawley in this manner. Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC, 686 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Minn.App.2004). The court of appeals observed that "Dawley and Wicken have been consistently interpreted to provide immunity from negligence actions * * pursuant to the employer's nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace." Id. (citing Buck v. Freeman, 619 N.W.2d 793, 795-96 (Minn.App.2000), review denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001); Wood v. Korn, 503 N.W.2d 523, 525 (Minn.App.1993), review denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 1993)).
pt	other	N/A	DJDF 13/11/2018 - Pg. 599 \| Diário de Justiça do Distrito Federal \| Diários Jusbrasil Página 599 do Diário de Justiça do Distrito Federal (DJDF) de 13 de Novembro de 2018 Nao Consta Advogado. ÓRGÃO: SEGUNDA TURMA CRIMINAL CLASSE: MANDADO DE SEGURANÇA CRIMINAL (1710) No PROCESSO: 0717058-76.2018.8.07.0000 IMPETRANTE: JEOVANY LEITE DOS SANTOS RELATOR: DESEMBARGADOR SILVANIO BARBOSA DOS SANTOS Vistos etc. 1. Cuida-se de pedido formulado pelo impetrante (ID 6162776) para que seja declarada sem efeitos a certidão que o intimou para pagar as custas finais do presente feito (ID 6154615). Argumentou que o pedido de concessão da gratuidade da justiça foi feito na petição inicial do mandado de segurança, não havendo indeferimento expresso, razão pela qual deve se entender pela sua concessão tácita, isentandoo, portanto, do referido pagamento. Decido. O novo Código de Processo Civil, em seu artigo 99, ?caput?, prevê a possibilidade do pedido dos benefícios da justiça gratuita em qualquer fase processual. Não obstante, a redação do § 2o estabelece: ?Art. 99. (...) § 2o O juiz somente poderá indeferir o pedido se houver nos autos elementos que evidenciem a falta dos pressupostos legais para a concessão de gratuidade, devendo, antes de indeferir o pedido, determinar à parte a comprovação do preenchimento dos referidos pressupostos? (grifos nossos). Este dispositivo, hoje, consagra a tese, que já vinha sendo construída pela jurisprudência, de que a declaração de necessidade de concessão de gratuidade de justiça goza de presunção relativa de veracidade, admitindo a prova em contrário. Nesse sentido, é a jurisprudência deste egrégio TJDFT: A concessão da assistência gratuita à pessoa natural, consoante o novo ordenamento processual, exige, tão somente, a declaração de hipossuficiência, cuja veracidade é presumida. Apenas na hipótese de existir elementos que permitam afastar essa presunção, caberia ao magistrado indeferir o benefício. (Acórdão n.1104598, 07160518320178070000, Relator: LUÍS GUSTAVO B. DE OLIVEIRA, 4a Turma Cível, Data de Julgamento: 20/06/2018, Publicado no DJE: 26/06/2018). Com o advento do novo Código de Processo Civil, consolidou-se o entendimento jurisprudencial segundo o qual se presume como verdadeira a alegação de hipossuficiência deduzida por pessoa natural (art. 99, § 3o, CPC/2015). Contudo, a declaração feita por aquele que afirma ser contemplado com o benefício da assistência judiciária gratuita possui presunção juris tantum, permitindo a impugnação da contraparte mediante a comprovação da inexistência dos requisitos essenciais à concessão da benesse. Sob essa moldura, é ônus do impugnante demonstrar, de maneira inequívoca, que a situação econômico-financeira do requerente lhe permite arcar com as despesas processuais, nos termos do art. 100, do digesto processual em vigor. In casu, ausente a comprovação de que a agravante possui condições de suportar os encargos processuais, o deferimento dos benefícios da gratuidade de justiça é medida que se impõe. (Acórdão n.1100613, 07065437920188070000, Relator: CARMELITA BRASIL 2a Turma Cível, Data de Julgamento: 01/06/2018, Publicado no DJE: 07/06/2018). 1. O regramento atinente à gratuidade de justiça restou sensivelmente modificado pelo Novo Código de Processo Civil, o qual estabelece em seu o art. 99 que a presunção de veracidade, firmada pela declaração do próprio postulante, pessoa natural, só pode ser afastada com base em elementos concretos que demonstrem a ausência dos requisitos legais, entendimento, inclusive, que já era dominante na doutrina e na jurisprudência. (Acórdão n.1099969, 07042434720188070000, Relator: GISLENE PINHEIRO 7a Turma Cível, Data de Julgamento: 30/05/2018, Publicado no DJE: 04/06/2018). No caso concreto, o impetrante pleiteou os benefícios da justiça gratuita na inicial (ID 5555626), apresentando declaração de hipossuficiência (ID 5556565), documento que possui presunção ?iuris tantum? de veracidade, conforme antes explicitado. No mais, tal pleito não foi apreciado nos autos, o que, nos termos da jurisprudência, gera a concessão tácita do benefício. Neste sentido, o entendimento do colendo Superior Tribunal de Justiça: PROCESSUAL CIVIL. AGRAVO REGIMENTAL NOS EMBARGOS DE DECLARAÇÃO NOS EMBARGOS DE DIVERGÊNCIA EM RECURSO ESPECIAL. PEDIDO DE JUSTIÇA GRATUITA. OMISSÃO DO JUDICIÁRIO. PRESUNÇÃO DE DEFERIMENTO. 1. A Corte Especial no julgamento dos EAREsp 440.971/RS, DJe de 17/03/2016, firmou o entendimento de que a ausência de indeferimento expresso do pedido de assistência judiciária gratuita formulado enseja a presunção da concessão do benefício em favor da parte que o pleiteou, quando acompanhado da declaração de hipossuficiência, só podendo ser afastada por decisão judicial fundamentada, quando impugnada pela parte contrária, ou quando o julgador buscar no processo informações que desqualifiquem referida declaração. 2. No caso, a parte agravante formulou pedido de concessão dos benefícios da assistência judiciária gratuita na petição inicial e, em nenhum momento tal requerimento fora expressamente indeferido, de maneira que, o feito prosseguiu regularmente. Nesse contexto, impõe-se presumir a concessão tácita da benesse, nos moldes do que firmou a Corte Especial, repelindo-se, assim, a pena de deserção imposta aos embargos de divergência. 3. Agravo regimental provido para afastar a pena de deserção dos presentes embargos de divergência. (AgRg nos EDcl nos EREsp 1445382/CE, Rel. Ministro BENEDITO GONÇALVES, CORTE ESPECIAL, julgado em 20/04/2016, DJe 29/04/2016). (Grifos nossos). ISTO POSTO, defiro os benefícios da justiça gratuita e declaro sem efeitos a intimação e a cobrança das custas finais ao impetrante. 2. Publique-se. Intime-se. Cumpra-se. Brasília, 12 de novembro de 2018. SILVANIO BARBOSA DOS SANTOS - Relator N. 0713758-09.2018.8.07.0000 - REVISÃO CRIMINAL - A: JORGE PEREIRA DE SOUZA. Adv (s).: DF10737 - NORBERTO SOARES NETO, DF4353600A - ANA FLAVIA DE MACEDO RODRIGUES. R: MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO DO DISTRITO FEDERAL E DOS TERRITÓRIOS. Adv (s).: Nao Consta Advogado. REVISÃO CRIMINAL. HOMICÍDIOS CONSUMADO E TENTADO. TRIBUNAL DO JÚRI. FALTA DE PEDIDO DE INSTAURAÇÃO DE INCIDENTE DE DEPENDÊNCIA TOXICOLÓGICA DO RÉU. ALEGAÇÃO DE AUSÊNCIA DE DEFESA. INOCORRÊNCIA. AUSÊNCIA DE DETERMINAÇÃO DE INSTAURAÇÃO DO INCIDENTE PELO JUÍZ PRESIDENTE DO JÚRI, DE OFÍCIO. INEXITÊNCIA DE OBRIGATORIEDADE. PEDIDO DE NULIDADE PROCESSUAL. IMPROCEDÊNCIA. REVISÃO CRIMINAL JULGADA IMPROCEDENTE. 1. A ação revisional é viável nas hipóteses elencadas no artigo 621 do Código de Processo Penal: I - quando a sentença condenatória for contrária ao texto expresso da lei penal ou à evidência dos autos; II - quando a sentença condenatória se fundar em depoimentos, exames ou documentos comprovadamente falsos e III - quando, após a sentença, se descobrirem novas provas de inocência do condenado ou de circunstância que determine ou autorize diminuição especial da pena. 2. Não demonstrada qualquer deficiência da atuação da defesa do requerente durante o curso da ação penal originária apta a nulificar o processo, pois através de seu patrono constituído à época, o requerente respondeu a todos os chamados processuais, apresentando respostas e recursos adequados, aduzindo teses absolutórias e desclassificatórias que julgava cabíveis. 3. Na espécie, não houve demonstração de error in judicando ou procedendo por parte do Juiz Presidente do Tribunal do Júri, pois diante das provas apresentadas, não tinha obrigação de instaurar, de ofício, incidente de dependência toxicológica, vez que o réu, em seus interrogatórios, assumiu a prática dos crimes e narrou sua dinâmica em detalhes, demonstrando ter consciência da ilicitude de sua conduta e poder de autodeterminarse, apesar de estar sob efeito de entorpecentes no momento dos fatos. 4. Demonstrado que o requerente, na realidade, pretende rediscutir matéria já apreciada, sem, contudo, trazer aos autos fato novo que tenha o condão de alterar o julgado ou de clarificar injustiça e eventual erro de julgamento, a improcedência do pedido revisional é medida que se impõe. 5. Revisional admitida. Pedido improcedente. N. 0714626-84.2018.8.07.0000 - CONFLITO DE JURISDIÇÃO - A. Adv (s).: . R. Adv (s).: . T. Adv (s).: . T. Adv (s).: . CONFLITO NEGATIVO DE JURISDIÇÃO. SERVIR OU FORNECER BEBIDA ALCOÓLICA À CRIANÇA. APARENTE CONFLITO DE NORMAS ENTRE O ARTIGO 63, INCISO I, DA LCP E ARTIGO 243 DO ECA INEXISTENTE. CRIME PRATICADO NA VIGÊNCIA DA LEI 13.106/2015, QUE ALTEROU O ART. 243 DO ECA E REVOGOU O INCISO I DO ARTIGO 63 DA LCP. 1. Não há se falar em conflito aparente de normas, ou, ainda, em incompatibilidade entre o artigo 63, inciso I, da LCP (invocado pelo Juízo suscitado para declinar da competência para o Juízo suscitante) e o artigo 243 do ECA (mencionado pelo Juízo suscitante para sustentar a sua incompetência para processar e julgar o presente feito), uma vez que aquela foi expressamente revogada por esta. 2. Na espécie, restou demonstrado que os fatos, objetos de apuração, ocorreram quando já estava em vigor o art. 243 do Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente, com a nova redação dada pela Lei no 13.106, de 17 de março de 2015, que revogou o inciso I do art. 63 da Lei das Contravenções Penais, não havendo, portanto, que se falar em conflito aparente de normas. 3. Sendo a pena do crime previsto no artigo 243 do ECA de detenção de 2 (dois) a 4 (quatro) anos e multa, portanto, não se amoldando no conceito de infração penal de menor potencial ofensivo, previsto no artigo 61 da Lei no 9.099/95, tem-se que a competência para processar e julgar o processo em questão é do Juízo suscitado. 4. Conflito de jurisdição conhecido para declarar competente o Juízo suscitado, qual seja, o Juízo da Vara Criminal de Sobradinho. Andamento do Processo n. 0713758-09.2018.8.07.0000 - Revisão Criminal - 13/11/2018 do TJDF Andamento do Processo n. 0714626-84.2018.8.07.0000 - Conflito de Jurisdição - 13/11/2018 do TJDF
pt	wikipedia	N/A	A Batalha de Seelow (em alemão: Schlacht um die "Seelower Höhen") foi um combate que fez parte da Ofensiva de Seelow-Berlim (16 de abril - 2 de maio de 1945); foi um dos últimos grandes ataques contra posições fortificadas da Segunda Guerra. Foram exatos três dias de luta continua, de 16 até 19 de abril de 1945. Mais de um milhão de soldados soviéticos (com o apoio de 78 556 soldados poloneses), comandados pelo Marechal Gueorgui Júkov, atacaram repetidamente a região chamada de "Portão de Berlim". Cerca de 110 mil soldados alemães do 9o Exército, comandados pelo General Theodor Busse, estavam na defesa da região. Esta batalha é lembrada como parte da Batalha de Oder-Neisse. Seelower Höhen foi o local onde a luta foi mais árdua e sangrenta, mas foi apenas um dos vários locais as margens dos rios Oder e Neisse a serem atacados pelos russos. A Batalha de Oder-Neisse foi apenas o começo da luta por Berlim. O resultado desta batalha foi o cerco completo do 9o Exército que desenrolaria na batalha de Halbe. Ligações externas Batalhas e operações da Segunda Guerra Mundial em 1945 1945 na Alemanha Batalha de Berlim no:Slaget om Berlin#Slaget ved Seelowhøydene
da	wikipedia	N/A	Mario Cantone (født 9. december 1959) er en amerikansk komiker, forfatter, skuespiller og sanger, med adskillige optrædener på Comedy Central, herunder Chappelle's Show. Han spillede også Anthony Marentino i Sex and the City. Hans stil er tempofyldt og energisk, og meget af hans humor kommer fra hans efterligninger af forskellige karakterer lige fra hans familiemedlemmer til berømtheder til stereotyper. Eksterne henvisninger Italiensk-amerikanere Skuespillere fra Massachusetts Standupkomikere fra USA Personer fra Boston
en	caselaw	US	Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 1 of 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Criminal Action No. 93-97-2 (BAH) ERIC A. HICKS, Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Having served approximately 340 months of a life sentence of imprisonment, defendant Eric A. Hicks now seeks compassionate release “to reduce his risk of dying from Covid-19” at Federal Correctional Institute Schuylkill (“FCI Schuylkill”), where he is currently incarcerated, and “to recognize his substantial and commendable work towards rehabilitation while imprisoned.” Def.’s Emergency Mot. Compassionate Release Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 5, ECF No. 732. Defendant was sentenced, in 1994, to life in prison after a jury found him guilty of drug trafficking and racketeering conspiracy offenses, stemming from his leadership of the “First Street Crew,” which, from early 1988 until the arrest of defendant and other members approximately five years later, “sold crack cocaine and engaged in ‘violent activities’” in Washington, D.C. United States v. White (“White II”), 413 F. Supp. 3d 15, 18 (D.D.C. 2019), rev’d, 984 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. White (“White I”), 116 F.3d 903, 909–11 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). The government opposes defendant’s early release. Gov’t’s Opp’n Def.’s Emergency Mot. Compassionate Release (“Gov’t’s Opp’n”) at 1, ECF No. 737. For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s motion is denied.1 1 This case was reassigned to the undersigned Chief Judge in December 2016. Min. Entry (Dec. 8, 2016); see Local Crim. R. 57.14(d). 1 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 2 of 24 I. BACKGROUND Starting in early 1988, for approximately five years until his arrest, defendant was a member of the “First Street Crew,” a street gang that “sold ‘large amounts of crack’ in the area of First and Thomas Streets, N.W.” in Washington, D.C. White II, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 19 (quoting White I, 116 F.3d at 909). He “eventually ‘took charge when . . . [his co-defendant] White was out of the neighborhood, i.e., in prison.’” Id. (omission in original) (quoting White I, 116 F.3d at 909). “The First Street Crew’s ‘drug operation’ involved ‘violent activities,’ including the murder and intimidation of witnesses against them.” Id. (quoting White I, 116 F.3d at 909). In March 1993, defendant, along with four co-defendants, was charged in a 26-count indictment with, inter alia, “conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, RICO conspiracy, and numerous individual counts of drug distribution.” White I, 116 F.3d at 909–10; see also Indictment (Retyped) (Jan. 28, 1994) at 2–36, ECF No. 228. At the conclusion of a three-month jury trial, in February 1994, defendant was found guilty of (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii), 846 (1993) (Count 1); (2) Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (“RICO”) conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1993) (Count 5); (3) distribution of, or unlawful possession with intent to distribute, on different dates, a detectable amount of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (1993) (Counts 8 and 10); and (4) unlawful distribution of, or unlawful possession with intent to distribute, five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii) (1993) (Count 11). See Judgment & Commitment Order at 1, ECF No. 301. 2 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 3 of 24 The presiding Judge sentenced Hicks to life in prison, highlighting his “very large distribution of . . . twenty-one kilos” of crack cocaine and the Crew’s “intimidation or worse of witnesses.” Sentencing Tr. (May 11, 1994) (“May 11 Sentencing Tr.”) at 93:1–2, 12–13, ECF No. 354; see also id. at 132:8–12. In assessing the then-mandatory applicable sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines Manual, the court calculated that defendant’s base offense level of 42 was enhanced by ten levels for possession of a weapon, his leadership role in the First Street Crew, id. at 132:8–133:3, obstruction of justice for “brib[ing]” a First Street Crew member “not to give information up to the grand jury” investigating defendant for murder, Sentencing Tr. (May 9, 1994) at 84:6–7, ECF No. 353; see also id. at 84:3–85:1; May 11 Sentencing Tr. at 133:1–3, and fleeing from law enforcement in a high-speed car chase that led to crashes with four vehicles, resulting in a total offense level of 52, May 11 Sentencing Tr. at 133:4–6; see Presentence Report (“PSR”) ¶¶ 71, 90, ECF No. 713. This total offense level was reduced to the maximum level of 43 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5A, comment (n.2.). May 11 Sentencing Tr. at 133:7–8; PSR ¶ 94. Defendant’s criminal history category was III, “based on a prior conviction for stealing a car and the fact that he was charged in this federal criminal case while on probation in an unrelated D.C. Superior Court case.” White II, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 25 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). His total offense level of 43, combined with his criminal history category of III, resulted in a mandatory sentencing range under the Guidelines of life imprisonment. May 11 Sentencing Tr. at 133:8–17; PSR ¶ 117. Defendant was accordingly sentenced to concurrent terms of life in prison on the two conspiracy convictions and terms of years on the remaining counts, followed by concurrent terms of five years of supervised release on each count. Judgment & Commitment Order at 1–3. He pursued a direct appeal and collateral motions attacking his conviction and sentence, none of 3 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 4 of 24 which were successful. See White II, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 25–26. In 2019, defendant filed a motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018 (“First Step Act”), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. See Def.’s Mot. Appointment of Counsel & Reduction of Sentence, ECF No. 684; Def.’s Emergency Suppl. Mot. Reduce Sentence Pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018, ECF No. 688. That motion was denied, except that defendant’s sentence for his conviction on one of the drug distribution charges was reduced to time served. White II, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 52–53. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded. United States v. White (“White III”), 984 F.3d 76, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Defendant’s renewed motion for reduction in sentence under the First Step Act is currently pending, with briefing under the schedule proposed by the parties to be completed by June 11, 2021. See Def.’s Suppl. Mot. Imposition of Reduced Sentence Under Section 404 of the First Step Act, ECF No. 731; Min. Order (Mar. 4, 2021); Min. Order (Apr. 26, 2021). Due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, on January 14, 2021, defendant submitted a request for consideration of compassionate release to the warden of his facility. Def.’s Mot., Ex. 13, Letter from Joanna Munson Perales, Att’y, Off. of Fed. Pub. Defender, D.C., to Warden, FCI Schuylkill (Jan. 14, 2021) (“Warden Request”) at 1–2, ECF No. 732-2. That request was denied on February 8, 2021. Id., Ex. 13, Letter from Scott Finley, Warden, FCI Schuylkill, to Joanna Munson Perales, Att’y, Off. of Fed. Pub. Defender, D.C. (Feb. 8, 2021) (“Warden Denial”) at 3– 4, ECF No. 732-2.2 On February 16, 2021, defendant tested positive for COVID-19. Def.’s Mot. at 19; Gov’t’s Opp’n at 5; see also Def.’s Mot., Ex. 11, Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) Medical Records (“Medical Records”) at 3–4, ECF No. 734. About six weeks later, on March 29, 2021, 2 Defendant also requested that the warden “consider him for home confinement under the CARES Act,” Warden Request at 1, which request was denied, Warden Denial at 4. He does not seek placement to home confinement in the pending motion. See Def.’s Mot. 4 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 5 of 24 simultaneous with the submission of his renewed motion for reduction in sentence under the First Step Act, defendant filed the pending Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release. Def.’s Mot. The following day, he received his first dose of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine. Gov’t’s Opp’n, Ex. 1, BOP Health Services Immunizations (“Vaccination Record”), ECF No. 737-1. Under applicable guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), he will receive his second dose within three to six weeks of the first dose, or by May 11, 2021. Id. at 14. The parties completed their briefing on the pending compassionate-release motion on April 20, 2021. See Def.’s Reply Supp. Compassionate Release (“Def.’s Reply”), ECF No. 738. The motion is now ripe for review. II. LEGAL STANDARD “Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to ‘modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed;’ but the rule of finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions.” Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)). As originally enacted, one such exception, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), empowered the BOP Director to “petition the court for a reduction in sentence,” S. Rep. No. 98-223, at 118 (1983), and gave courts the authority to grant those petitions if, “after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable,” Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1837, they “found that the reduction was justified by ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons,’” S. Rep. No. 98-223, at 118. The First Step Act expanded the exception in § 3582(c)(1)(A) to authorize a defendant directly to file a motion for such compassionate release with the district court after he exhausts any “administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a [compassionate-release] 5 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 6 of 24 motion” on his behalf or he waits at least “30 days” after he delivers his request for compassionate release to “the warden of [his] facility.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In resolving motions for compassionate release, the court may reduce a term of imprisonment only “after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable,” id., and upon making two findings: first, that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction,” id. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i);3 and, second, “that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,” id. § 3582(c)(1)(A).4 III. DISCUSSION Defendant contends that both (1) the risks associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, in combination with his medical condition of obesity, and (2) the combined effect of changes in the legal landscape since his 1994 sentencing, his relative youth at the time of the offenses, and his rehabilitation while imprisoned, establish “extraordinary and compelling reasons” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Def.’s Mot. at 23–34; Def.’s Reply at 7–25. The government counters that neither set of circumstances justifies defendant’s early release. Gov’t’s Opp’n at 11–20, 21–23.5 Consideration of each of the two proffered “extraordinary and compelling reasons” follows review of the applicability of the Sentencing Commission’s policy 3 Though not relevant to the instant motion, the court may also reduce a prisoner’s sentence if he is “at least 70 years of age” and “has served at least 30 years in prison,” when BOP has determined “that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under [18 U.S.C. §] 3142(g).” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). 4 The Sentencing Commission is tasked, in its organic statute, with promulgating general policy statements regarding “the sentence modification provisions set forth in section[] . . . 3582(c) of title 18,” 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C), and “describ[ing] what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples,” id. § 994(t). 5 The parties do not dispute that defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). See Def.’s Mot. at 23; Gov’t’s Opp’n at 10 n.1. 6 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 7 of 24 statement at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, defining “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that warrant a reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), to defendant’s motion. A. Applicability of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 At the outset, the parties dispute the weight owed to the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 states that, “[u]pon motion of the Director of the [BOP] under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A),” a reduction of a term of imprisonment may be warranted, “after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, when the court makes three determinations: (1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction,” or the defendant meets certain age and minimum incarceration period criteria, id. § 1B1.13(1)(A)–(B); (2) the defendant poses no “danger to the safety of any other person or to the community,” id. § 1B1.13(2); and (3) “the reduction is consistent with [the] policy statement,” id. § 1B1.13(3). The commentary to this policy statement describes four “circumstances” that satisfy “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant[ing] the reduction,” id., § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)–(D), including “[o]ther [r]easons” found by the BOP Director to present an extraordinary and compelling reason “other than, or in combination with,” the reasons specified in the policy statement, id. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(D).6 This Court has recognized elsewhere that the current global pandemic may, in some circumstances, “‘present[] such an other reason.’” United States v. Tobias, Crim. A. No. 19-143 6 The other three “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances described in the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 are not invoked and have no relevance here. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)–(C) (describing defendant who “is suffering from a terminal illness” or has chronic and “substantially diminishe[d] . . . ability . . . to provide self-care” within the prison environment; who is at least 65 years old, with “a serious deterioration in physical or mental health,” after serving at least 10 years or 75 percent of the prison term, “whichever is less;” or for whom “[f]amily [c]ircumstances” involve “[t]he death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s minor child or minor children” or “the incapacitation of the defendant’s spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner”). 7 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 8 of 24 (BAH), 2020 WL 4673414, at 4 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Morris, Crim. A. No. 12-154 (BAH), 2020 WL 2735651, at 7 (D.D.C. May 24, 2020)). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 was last substantively amended by the Commission on November 1, 2016 and therefore has not been updated since the enactment of the First Step Act, due to the lack of a voting quorum on the U.S. Sentencing Commission. See U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 2020 Annual Report and Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics (“2020 Annual Report”) 2 (2020), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports- and-sourcebooks/2020/2020-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf. Consequently, this policy statement is framed to provide guidance in resolving a “motion of the Director of [BOP] under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A),” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, but makes no reference to a motion filed directly by a defendant. As a result of the Commission’s inability to conform U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to reflect this new avenue to compassionate release and to accommodate the more expansive view of compassionate release adopted in the First Step Act, defendant argues, the policy statement is “outdated,” Def.’s Mot. at 21, and “courts now have nearly unfettered discretion to determine what constitutes extraordinary and compelling circumstances,” id. at 22; see also Def.’s Reply at 1–3. The government counters that “[i]n light of the statutory command that any sentence reduction be ‘consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,’ the policy statement should apply to motions filed by defendants as well.” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 10 n.2 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). Relying on the statutory direction in the First Step Act that compassionate-release motions be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), this Court has treated U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as binding in the compassionate-release context, see, e.g., United States v. Goldberg, Crim. A. No. 12-180 (BAH), 8 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 9 of 24 2020 WL 1853298, at 4 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2020). The D.C. Circuit has not yet decided the question, but every circuit to have done so has concluded that the current version of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 does not apply to motions initiated by defendants and thus this policy statement’s definition of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” does not bind district courts resolving compassionate-release motions brought directly by defendants.7 Focusing on the word “applicable” in the recently amended § 3582(c)(1)(A), these circuits have determined, “[t]here is as of now no ‘applicable’ policy statement governing compassionate-release motions filed by defendants . . . , and as a result, district courts are ‘empowered . . . to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release that a defendant might raise.’” United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 284 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 230 (2d Cir. 2020)). To the extent any binding limit remains on the exercise of district court discretion to undo a final judgment imposing a term of imprisonment, some courts have cited only the limit imposed by the Sentencing Commission’s organic statute, which states that “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t); see, e.g., Brooker, 976 F.3d at 237–38. Nonetheless, at least one circuit has cautioned that, though it is no longer binding, “[t]he substantive aspects of the Sentencing Commission’s analysis in § 1B1.13 and its Application Notes provide a working definition of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’” and that “a judge who strikes off on a different path risks an appellate holding that judicial discretion has been abused.” United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 2020); cf. United States v. Aruda, 7 See United States v. Aruda, No. 20-10245, 2021 WL 1307884, at 3–4 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 2021); United States v. Shkambi, No. 20-40543, 2021 WL 1291609, at 3–4 (5th Cir. Apr. 7, 2021); United States v. Maumau, No. 20-4056, 2021 WL 1217855, at 10–12 (10th Cir. Apr. 1, 2021); United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1048–50 (10th Cir. 2021); United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 280–84 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180–81 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1108–11 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 235–36 (2d Cir. 2020). 9 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 10 of 24 No. 20-10245, 2021 WL 1307884, at 4 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 2021) (“The Sentencing Commission’s statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 may inform a district court’s discretion for § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by a defendant[.]”). Moreover, Congress’s continuing mandate, even after the First Step Act, that any reduction in sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A) be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission” provides a strong textual indication that, when it granted defendants the ability to file directly motions for compassionate release, Congress expected that courts’ evaluation of those motions would be guided by the Sentencing Commission’s analysis of relevant issues rather than a court-by-court, discretionary interpretation of the phrase “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” The Sentencing Commission’s current inability to update its previously applicable policy statements to align with the new procedural pathways to compassionate release created by the First Step Act and the Act’s general policy in favor of expanding the availability of compassionate release is no reason to disregard completely the Commission’s decades of expertise in assessing the substantive contours of the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that might justify release in favor of unbounded judicial discretion.8 Thus, like other courts to have recognized that “relying on the established standards is preferable to conducting an unmoored inquiry into what qualifies as ‘extraordinary and compelling,’” United States v. Shepard, Crim. A. No. 07-85 (RDM), 2021 WL 848720, at 4 (D.D.C. Mar. 4, 2021), even if U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is not binding, this policy guidance is highly 8 It bears noting that the Supreme Court has determined that, for sentence-modification proceedings pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), allowing for the reduction of a sentence when the relevant Guidelines range “has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission,” “after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a)” and “if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,” the Guidelines remain binding even after the transition to an advisory Guidelines regime. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828–30 (2010). Though the availability of relief under § 3582(c)(2), unlike compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A), turns on a subsequent revision to the applicable Guidelines range, the mandatory deference owed to the Guidelines in this analogous context counsels in favor of looking to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 for guidance in resolving motions for compassionate release. 10 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 11 of 24 persuasive authority in resolving motions for compassionate release, see, e.g., United States v. Minicone, No. 5:89-CR-173, 2021 WL 732253, at 2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2021) (noting that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13’s “outdated guidance documents remain ‘helpful in defining a vague standard’” (quoting United States v. Ebbers, 432 F. Supp. 3d 421, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)). The “extraordinary and compelling reasons” suggested by defendant to justify his release pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A) are considered against this backdrop. B. Defendant Has Not Shown Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons Warranting Compassionate Release Defendant offers two potential “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for his release. He points, first, to his high vulnerability to serious illness or death from COVID-19 due to his medical condition of obesity, Def.’s Mot. at 32; see also id. at 23–32; Def.’s Reply at 7–17, and second, to the combination of “significant changes in the law” since his 1994 sentencing, his age of 17 to 22 years at the time of his offenses, and his rehabilitation during his imprisonment, Def.’s Mot. at 34; see also id. at 32–34, 37–55; Def.’s Reply at 17–25. The government opposes defendant’s early release, arguing that “defendant has received his first dose of the COVID-19 vaccination” and recovered from a mild COVID-19 infection, and therefore cannot rely on the combination of his medical conditions and the ongoing pandemic to establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for release, Gov’t’s Opp’n at 9; see also id. at 9–20, and that changes in the relevant law do not justify his release, id. at 21–23. Each of the suggested extraordinary and compelling reasons for release is examined in turn. 1. Defendant’s Medical Condition and Risks Associated with COVID-19 Are Not an Extraordinary and Compelling Reason Defendant first contends that the prevalence of COVID-19 at FCI Schuylkill, “‘coupled with the established fact that [he] has certain preexisting medical conditions that put him at a higher risk of being harmed if he contracts Covid-19, qualifies as an extraordinary and 11 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 12 of 24 compelling reason’ and warrants a reduction of his sentence.” Def.’s Mot. at 23 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 464 F. Supp. 3d 22, 27 (D.D.C. 2020)); see also id. at 23–32; Def.’s Reply at 7–17. As support, he cites his documented medical condition of obesity. Def.’s Mot. at 3; see also Medical Records at 25. The government acknowledges that defendant’s “documented obesity” is a condition that “could place him at an increased risk of negative consequences from COVID-19,” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 15, but argues that because “BOP has already vaccinated defendant with the first dose of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine,” id. at 16; see also Vaccination Record, and will soon administer his second dose, “[d]efendant’s COVID-19 risk is significantly mitigated,” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 17.9 Though, as the government concedes, defendant’s medical condition in combination with the ongoing pandemic might otherwise demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons, the fact that he has already received his first dose of the COVID-19 vaccine and will soon receive his second dose substantially diminishes his risks from potential exposure to COVID-19. The Food and Drug Administration reports that the Pfizer vaccine administered to defendant “was 95% effective in preventing COVID-19 disease among . . . clinical trial participants.”10 That 9 Defendant further contends that his “age, race, and gender” place him at increased risk for complications from COVID-19 and support a finding that the threat of COVID-19 justifies his early release. Def.’s Mot. at 32; see also id. at 30–32. As the government points out, current CDC guidance indicates that, while the risk for severe illness from COVID-19 increases with age, “‘[t]he greatest risk for severe illness . . . is among those 85 or older.’” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 16 (quoting CDC, Older Adults: At Greater Risk of Requiring Hospitalization or Dying if Diagnosed with COVID-19 (last updated Apr. 16, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra- precautions/older-adults.html). Though defendant, at 51 years of age, see Medical Records at 2, is at higher risk for severe illness than a younger person, he is not considered to be in a high-risk age category. Likewise, although, as defendant notes, “‘[l]ong-standing systemic health and social inequities have put many people from racial and ethnic minority groups at increased risk of getting sick and dying from COVID-19,’” Def.’s Mot. at 30 (alteration in original) (quoting CDC, Health Equity Considerations & Racial & Ethnic Minority Groups (last updated Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/race-ethnicity.html), and some evidence suggests that men may be more likely than women to suffer the most severe effects of COVID-19, see id. at 31–32, defendant’s vaccination and natural immunity triggered by his mild COVID case mitigates such enhanced risk of severe illness from these factors. 10 Press Release, Food & Drug Administration, FDA Takes Key Action in Fight Against COVID-19 by Issuing Emergency Use Authorization for First COVID-19 Vaccine (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news- events/press-announcements/fda-takes-key-action-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-first- covid-19. 12 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 13 of 24 defendant will soon complete both doses of this highly effective vaccine undercuts his claim that he must be released to reduce his risk of infection with COVID-19. See, e.g., Shepard, 2021 WL 848720, at 5 (“Given that [the defendant] received his first dose of the vaccine about two weeks ago (and, presumably, will receive his second dose in the near future), he cannot show that he needs to be released from prison to protect him from risks associated with COVID-19.”); United States v. Wakefield, Crim. Case No. 1:19-cr-00095-MR-WCM, 2021 WL 640690, at 3 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 18, 2021) (“Because he has already contracted the virus and recovered without complication, and because he is in the process of being vaccinated, the Defendant cannot meet his burden of establishing that his COVID-19 risk is an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release.”); Gov’t’s Opp’n at 17–18, 18 n.5 (collecting cases). In addition, as of this writing, BOP has fully vaccinated 93 staff members and 520 of the 1,048 inmates at FCI Schuylkill, for an overall vaccination rate of nearly fifty percent among inmates. See BOP, COVID-19 Vaccine Implementation (last updated Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/; BOP, FCI Schuylkill (last visited Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/sch/. This overall increase in immune protection at the facility where defendant is housed further reduces his risk of reinfection and accompanying complications from COVID-19. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, Case No. 1:19-cr-347 (TNM), 2021 WL 1299439, at 2 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2021) (holding that “statistics” on the number of inmates and staff members at defendant’s facility who “ha[d] received both doses of the COVID-19 vaccine . . . undermine[d] [his] claims” for compassionate release); United States v. Piles, Crim. A. No. 19-292-5 (JDB), 2021 WL 1198019, at 3 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2021) (“The Court is hopeful that the risk of reinfection will continue to decrease, as [defendant’s facility] has begun vaccinating inmates and staff.”); United States v. Fields, Crim. No. 19-0048 (PLF), 2021 13 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 14 of 24 WL 780738, at 4 (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2021) (finding that defendant’s “circumstances lack the extraordinary and compelling character required under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)” in part because of “BOP’s plan to vaccinate inmates” at his facility). The government also notes that defendant “has recovered from a . . . COVID-19 infection” diagnosed in February 2021, further “minimiz[ing] his risk of contracting it again.” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 19.11 The CDC currently believes that “[c]ases of reinfection with COVID- 19 . . . remain rare,” CDC, Reinfection (last updated Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/ coronavirus/2019-ncov/your-health/reinfection.html, and evidence suggests that this natural immunity from the virus lasts for at least several months, see, e.g., Dr. Francis Collins, Study of Healthcare Workers Shows COVID-19 Immunity Lasts Many Months, Nat’l Insts. Health Director’s Blog (Dec. 8, 2020), https://directorsblog.nih.gov/2020/12/08/study-of-healthcare- workers-shows-covid-19-immunity-lasts-many-months/ (describing research finding that “acquired immunity from an initial COVID-19 infection offers protection against reinfection for six months or maybe longer”). Defendant was infected just two months ago, see Medical Records at 2–4, and therefore will likely remain protected from reinfection until he is fully vaccinated. Defendant nonetheless asserts, citing to scientific and popular sources, testimony from medical experts, and BOP press releases reporting the deaths of individuals in BOP custody after reinfection, that he remains at high risk from his exposure to COVID-19 despite his earlier 11 The parties dispute the severity of defendant’s COVID-19 infection. The government submits that he suffered “a largely asymptomatic infection,” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 19; see also id. at 13–14, a characterization supported by defendant’s medical records, see Medical Records at 2–4, while defendant states that “he experienced severe fatigue, chills, extreme constipation, vomiting, and fever,” Def.’s Mot. at 36; see also id., Ex. 9, Letter from Eric Hicks to Joanna Perales (Feb. 25, 2021), ECF No. 732-2, and continues to show some symptoms “including ‘constant dry cough, fatigue, and loss of appetite,’” id. at 37 (quoting id., Ex. 1, Hicks Email to the Court (Mar. 17, 2021) (“2021 Hicks Email”) at 5, ECF No. 732-2). For present purposes, this contradiction need not be resolved, as either an asymptomatic or a more serious bout of COVID-19 likely confers some immunity against reinfection. 14 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 15 of 24 infection and vaccination. In support of this claim, he points to the emergence of COVID-19 variants that may be resistant to the antibodies produced by currently available vaccines, questions in the scientific community about the effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccines among individuals who are considered medically obese and individuals in high-spread, congregate settings like prisons, and uncertainty about the duration of natural immunity. See Def.’s Mot. at 10–17, 25–28; Def.’s Reply at 3–17. Without wholly dismissing any remaining possibility of reinfection, the lingering risk COVID-19 poses to defendant does not establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for release, in light of the recency of defendant’s initial infection and the fact that, as the government puts it, by being vaccinated, defendant “is already receiving the most beneficial treatment currently available to prevent COVID-19 infection, inside or outside of the BOP.” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 19; cf. United States v. King, Crim. A. No. 18-318 (JDB), 2021 WL 880029, at 4 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2021) (finding that a defendant “just barely[] established extraordinary and compelling reasons” in light of “his medical conditions, the threat of emerging variants [and] the risk of reinfection,” among other factors, where he had yet to be vaccinated and ten months had passed “since his last infection”). 2. Changes in the Legal Landscape and Defendant’s Rehabilitation While Imprisoned Are Not an Extraordinary and Compelling Reason Defendant next argues that, beyond his health and the associated risks presented by the pandemic, “significant changes in the law” governing his sentencing, his relative youth at the time of the offenses for which he was convicted, and his record of rehabilitation while incarcerated together constitute an independent extraordinary and compelling reason for release. Def.’s Mot. at 34; see also id. at 37–58; Def.’s Reply at 17–25. Plainly, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 does not include such considerations in its enumeration of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying early release. Nevertheless, defendant observes that, in the wake of the growing 15 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 16 of 24 consensus in other circuits that this policy statement does not constrain a district court evaluating a motion for a compassionate release, a number of courts have weighed similar factors in their decisions to grant release. Def.’s Mot. at 32; Def.’s Reply at 17–19; see also, e.g., McCoy, 981 F.3d at 286 (affirming district court’s consideration of “the extent of the disparity between the defendants’ sentences and those provided for under the First Step Act,” “the defendants’ relative youth . . . at the time of their offenses,” the substantial time served by defendants, and defendants’ “substantial steps towards rehabilitation”); United States v. Price, Crim. No. 07- 0152-06 (ESH), 2020 WL 5909789, at 4 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2020) (finding that “changes to the law . . . can present an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce a defendant’s sentence, even in the absence of serious health issues”); United States v. Vigneau, 473 F. Supp. 3d 31, 36– 39 (D.R.I. 2020) (similar); Def.’s Mot. at 5, 32–33; Def.’s Reply at 18–19 (collecting cases).12 12 Notably, only two of the cases cited by defendant in support of this theory determined that some combination of changes in the law, a defendant’s age at the time of the offense, and rehabilitation standing alone constituted an “extraordinary and compelling reason” justifying compassionate release. See McCoy, 981 F.3d at 286; Vigneau, 473 F. Supp. 3d at 36–39, 39 n.8. The overwhelming majority of the remaining cases based their decision in favor of release at least in part on the defendant’s advanced age or medical conditions and are distinguishable on that ground. See Price, 2020 WL 5909789, at 6 (noting that defendant’s age and medical conditions put him “at greater risk from the COVID-19 pandemic than a younger and healthier inmate”); United States v. Mack, Case No. 2:98-cr-162, 2021 WL 1099595, at 4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 2021) (considering, among other factors, “defendant’s health concerns”); United States v. Parker, 461 F. Supp. 3d 966, 980 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (finding that defendant’s “serious” medical conditions, “in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic, present ‘extraordinary and compelling’ circumstances” before turning to consideration of changes in applicable sentencing law); United States v. Vargas, No. 88-CR-325 (VEC), 2020 WL 6886646, at 8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020) (finding extraordinary and compelling defendant’s “rehabilitation in conjunction with his unduly harsh sentence, his medical issues and heightened risk of severe illness or death due to the COVID-19 pandemic”); United States v. Jones, 482 F. Supp. 3d 969, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (granting compassionate release after “consider[ing] the significant changes in law since [defendant]’s sentencing” and his “heightened risk of complications from COVID-19”); Order at 3, United States v. Smith, Case No. 14-cr-189 (TSC) (D.D.C. May 14, 2020), ECF No. 76 (finding that in addition to changes in the law, the defendant’s “age, health, and the COVID-19 pandemic all weigh in favor of a sentence reduction”); Order at 6–7, United States v. Morefield, No. 2:13-cr-2113-SAB-1 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 19, 2021), ECF No. 321 (similar); Def.’s Mot. at 5 (collecting additional cases and noting that each “granted compassionate release to individuals with extraordinary and compelling health conditions” in light of “significant changes in the law” and “their exceptional accomplishments and prison records”). In the one outlying case, the government conceded that “there [we]re sufficient reasons supporting [the defendant]’s request for immediate release” and disputed only the court’s “authority to determine if extraordinary and compelling reasons justify early release . . . in light of the First Step Act’s amendment of § 3582(c)(1).” United States v. Perez, Case No. 88-10094-1-JTM, 2020 WL 1180719, at 2–3 (D. Kan. Mar. 11, 2020). 16 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 17 of 24 Some courts may be construing the First Step Act’s compassionate-release amendment as a broad invitation for wholesale revisiting of otherwise-final sentences for any reason that appears to be justified to the presiding Judge, as defendant urges, but this is not the approach that this Court will adopt. A determination that the factors suggested by defendant qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason for release would undermine the limits on the availability of sentence-reduction proceedings based on changes in the law established in section 404 of the First Step Act. That section restricts such proceedings to cases involving “covered offense[s],” First Step Act § 404(b), defined as those offenses “the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,” id. § 404(a), and further confines them to cases in which (1) the original sentence was not “previously imposed or previously reduced” pursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“Fair Sentencing Act”), Pub. L. No. 111- 220, 124 Stat. 2372, and (2) a previous motion for reduction in sentence under the First Step Act was not “denied after a complete review of the motion on the merits,” First Step Act § 404(c). To treat changes in the law and related mitigating factors as an extraordinary and compelling reason would effectively override these statutory limitations with a definitional sleight-of-hand by allowing any defendant sentenced under any subsequently amended statute to seek early release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act, and thus to avoid the threshold requirements set forth in section 404. Such a result stands in tension with Congress’s intent, made plain in section 404, to cabin the availability of sentence-reduction proceedings premised on shifts in the legal landscape to only those defendants sentenced under statutes later revised by the Fair Sentencing Act. The factors suggested by defendant therefore do not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. Even if they qualified as 17 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 18 of 24 extraordinary and compelling reasons, as explained below, these factors would not warrant compassionate release in defendant’s case. As to shifts in the controlling law, defendant contends that the transition from mandatory to advisory Guidelines introduced by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and the statutory reduction of “the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger increased penalties in the drug statutes” in the Fair Sentencing Act, Def.’s Mot. at 38; see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2010), made retroactively applicable to defendant in section 404 of the First Step Act, “underscore that the amount of time he has so far served is sufficient but not greater than necessary to fulfill the purposes of sentencing,” Def.’s Mot. at 38. Of the five counts of which defendant was convicted, his sentence has already been reduced to time served on Count 11, see White II, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 52, and defendant does not contend that the statutory penalties applicable to him have changed with respect to Counts 8 and 10, see Def.’s Mot. at 38. He argues principally that the relevant statutory penalties for Counts 1 and 5, the two conspiracy charges carrying a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, have been reduced. Id. This assertion appears to be based on the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion, in reviewing this Court’s disposition of defendant’s initial First Step Act motion, that when considering a sentence reduction under section 404(b) of the First Step Act, “the court must use the revised penalty range now applicable to the drug amount in the original statute of conviction.” White III, 984 F.3d at 86. Defendant was “convicted of a conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii) (1993). Id.; see also id. at 83. That statute imposed a penalty range of “not . . . less than 10 years or more than life” imprisonment, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1993), for individuals convicted of a violation involving “50 grams or more of a mixture or substance . . . which contains cocaine base,” id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), which 18 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 19 of 24 range carried over to Count 1 against defendant, see id. § 846, and enhanced his maximum penalty under Count 5 to life imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(d), 1963(a) (1993). After the Fair Sentencing Act, however, the penalty range for offenses under § 841 involving 50 grams or more of crack is five to forty years imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). As a result, if defendant were sentenced for the offenses as charged today, he would be subject to the five-to- forty-years imprisonment range for Count 1, see id. § 846, and to a maximum term of imprisonment of twenty years for Count 5, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(d), 1963(a). As noted, the presiding Judge found more than twenty-one kilograms—21,000 grams—of crack cocaine attributable to the First Street Crew conspiracy. May 11 Sentencing Tr. at 93:1–2, 132:8–12; see also White II, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 22, 24.13 Even after the Fair Sentencing Act, the statutory range for violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841 involving this amount of crack cocaine remains “a term of imprisonment” of “not . . . less than 10 years or more than life.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A); see also id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (applying this penalty to individuals convicted of a violation involving “280 grams or more of a mixture or substance . . . which contains cocaine base”). Thus, while the statutory ranges for the offenses of which defendant was convicted have changed if assessed by reference to the penalty range applicable to the drug amount in the original statute of conviction, they remain unaltered if assessed by reference to the drug amount actually attributed to defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a); 21 U.S.C. § 846. Though the Circuit has directed that the drug amount of the original statute of conviction be used to resolve motions under section 404(b) of the First Step Act, see White III, 984 F.3d at 86, it has not held that this 13 While the jury in defendant’s trial made no specific findings as to the quantity of crack cocaine attributable to the conspiracy, see Trial Tr. (Jan. 28, 1994) at 30:4–9, 45:7–15, ECF No. 320; Verdict Form (Mar. 2, 1994), ECF No. 238, the D.C. Circuit has clarified that “[t]he court may consider both judge-found and jury-found drug quantities” in resolving defendant’s renewed motion for reduction in sentence under the First Step Act, White III, 984 F.3d at 88. 19 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 20 of 24 requirement extends to consideration of changes in statutory penalties as a factor supporting compassionate release. The question of how to calculate defendant’s statutory range for purposes of the instant motion need not be resolved, however, to conclude that the continued availability of life imprisonment to penalize conspiracies involving the quantity of crack cocaine for which the sentencing Judge found defendant accountable weighs against a determination that the law has changed so dramatically, and renders defendant’s sentence so unjust, as to supply an extraordinary and compelling reason for release.14 Defendant further speculates, based on the presiding Judge’s criticisms of the then- mandatory Guidelines regime during his sentencing hearing, that the Judge “would have varied below the range” given the opportunity, Def.’s Mot. at 40; see also id. at 39–41, but this theory is nothing more wishful thinking that is undermined by the Judge’s remarks specific to defendant. As to defendant, the Judge determined that a life sentence was warranted “because if witnesses can be intimidated, injured or killed, all the crime bills Congress may pass will be just illusions, limited in practical effect,” May 11 Sentencing Tr. at 93:23–25, and cabined his generalized frustration with the mandatory Guidelines as applied to low-level drug offenders, stating that “[his] reasoning[] [was] not applicable to major drug dealers” such as defendant, id. at 92:3–4. In further support of his argument that the sentencing Judge would have varied in his case, defendant relies on statistics about crack cocaine sentences imposed under the advisory Guidelines regime, indicating that in recent years more defendants convicted of crack-related offenses were sentenced outside the applicable Guidelines range than within it. Def.’s Mot. at 40. As the government points out, however, these statistics do not capture the particular 14 Indeed, calculated by reference to the judge-found drug quantities allocated to the First Street Crew, defendant’s advisory Guidelines range of life imprisonment “would remain unchanged.” White II, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 51. 20 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 21 of 24 circumstances of defendant’s offense conduct that resulted in a Guidelines range of life imprisonment. See Gov’t’s Opp’n at 22; supra Part I (describing enhancements applied to defendant’s offense level under the Guidelines). For example, defendant contends that “in fiscal year 2020, only 37.7 percent of crack cocaine sentences were within the advisory Guidelines range, while . . . 43.0 percent[] varied from that range,” Def.’s Mot. at 40 (citing 2020 Annual Report, supra, at tbl. D-14), but this statistic reflects sentences imposed on all defendants convicted of any crack-related offense. Offenders similarly situated to defendant make up only a tiny fraction of that group. To take just two of the enhancements applied to calculate defendant’s Guidelines range, of all defendants sentenced for a crack-related offense in fiscal year 2020, under 40 percent received an enhancement for possession of a weapon, see 2020 Annual Report, supra, at tbl. D-8, and only 5.6 percent received an aggravating-role enhancement, id. at tbl. D-9. Though defendant counters that “[t]he percentages of defendants who receive each enhancement say[] nothing about whether a court ultimately sentenced those defendants within the range recommended by the advisory guidelines,” Def.’s Reply at 21, the statistics do suggest that the severity of defendant’s underlying offense conduct differs substantially from that of the typical crack offender. Comparisons to the rate of variance in sentences imposed with respect to all crack offenders are therefore not particularly helpful to determining whether defendant would have received a variance below the Guidelines range were he sentenced today. Defendant next contends that his “relative youth of 17 to 22 years old at the time of the offenses is an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence . . . because of changes in our understanding of the maturation process of young men well into their mid-to-late twenties and their capacity for transformational rehabilitation, mitigating factors [defendant] was barred from relying upon to receive a sentence below the mandatory Guidelines range in 1994.” Def.’s 21 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 22 of 24 Mot. at 34; see also id. at 46–49. He cites to a number of scientific and popular sources in support of this argument, see id. at 46–49, but as legal authority, relies primarily on decisions of the Supreme Court recognizing the reduced responsibility and potential for rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, see id. at 46–47 (citing Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005)). Defendant, however, was not a juvenile when most of the offense conduct occurred. He was twenty-two years old when he was arrested and twenty-four years old at the time of sentencing. Def.’s Mot. at 9, 46. Though his age at the time of the offenses might properly be considered as a potential mitigating factor in assessment of the § 3553(a) factors, it does not present an extraordinary and compelling reason to grant compassionate release. Finally, defendant proffers that “the significant and inspirational advances [he] has made in his mindset and his selfless acts towards others . . . are extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release.” Def.’s Mot. at 34; see also id. at 49–58; Def.’s Reply at 22–25. To make this argument, defendant references the substantial and admirable steps he has taken while incarcerated to obtain his paralegal certificate with an A+ average, see id., Ex. 7, Letter & Diploma from School of Paralegal Studies (“Paralegal Diploma”), ECF No. 732-2; to participate in additional academic and vocational programs, including a commercial driver’s license course, see id., Ex. 8, BOP Summary Reentry Plan & Progress Report (Mar. 18, 2021) (“Progress Report”) at 1–2, ECF No. 732-2; and to serve as a tutor and mentor to other inmates, see id. at 50–51. According to his case manager at FCI Schuylkill, defendant “maintains a positive rapport with staff and inmates alike” and “achieves good work performance evaluations.” Progress Report at 3. He has had no disciplinary reports since 2009, see Def.’s Mot., Ex. 8, Inmate Discipline Data (Dec. 29, 2020), at 10, ECF No. 732-2, and “was approved for transfer to a Low 22 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 23 of 24 security institution,” although the transfer was put on hold due to COVID-19, Progress Report at 3. During the pandemic, he has “volunteered to work as a[n] . . . orderly.” Def.’s Mot. at 51. Defendant even started an organization with other inmates called Project D.A.D. (“Donate-A- Dollar”) that raises money from inmates and donates it to community organizations “to illustrate to the people in the community that [the inmates] care about the problems that they endure and were committed to helping however [they] could.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 6, Email from Eric A. Hicks to Joanna Perales (Apr. 12, 2019, 5:51 PM), ECF No. 732-2.15 Beyond these accomplishments, defendant expresses genuine remorse for his actions. He describes himself as a person “who is striving to make amends to those who were hurt by his poor judgment and . . . who sincerely cares about paying his debt to society,” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 1, Hicks Letter to the Court (Mar. 4, 2019) at 2, ECF No. 732-2, and states that his “continued mission” is “to make amends for [his] actions as a young man,” a mission he characterizes as “a lifelong commitment . . . and the most sincere way that I know to apologize to everyone who was affected by my actions,” 2021 Hicks Email at 1. He also enjoys significant support from his wife, children, family, and friends, many of whom submitted letters in support of his release, remarking on the important role he plays in their lives and their willingness to facilitate his reentry into the community in whatever way possible. Id., Ex. 2, Letters from Debra M. Hicks (wife); Ex. 3, Letters from Bernard Payton & Kavon Rayford (son and stepson); Ex. 4, Letters from Dan R. Hutchinson, Jr., Evonne Natasha Hicks, Sandra Beatty, & Tracy Beatty (friend, sisters, and aunt); Ex. 5, Letters from Sean Scott, Juan C. Luna, & Joseph Arnold (individuals 15 The government characterizes defendant’s conduct while incarcerated as “good (though not exemplary),” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 22, and contends that many of defendant’s “educational courses . . . were initiated in the wake of his First Step Act motion,” implying that the government believes defendant only undertook these efforts to bolster his motion, id. at 23. In fact, defendant earned his paralegal certificate in 2002, more than fifteen years before the First Step Act was passed in 2018, see Paralegal Diploma, and completed additional academic programs in 2003, 2007, and 2012, see Progress Report at 1–2. In short, the Court recognizes that defendant has made impressive strides for which he deserves credit. 23 Case 1:93-cr-00097-BAH Document 741 Filed 04/27/21 Page 24 of 24 tutored or mentored by defendant while incarcerated); Ex. 10, Letters from Demetria Atkinson & Ernest Smith (family friends expressing willingness to facilitate defendant’s participation in reentry programs and employment opportunities), ECF No. 732-2. As defendant acknowledges, however, his rehabilitation alone, though commendable, cannot be considered as an extraordinary and compelling reason for release, 28 U.S.C. § 994(t); see Def.’s Mot. at 22; supra Part III.A, and thus the conclusion that defendant has not established any other extraordinary and compelling reason forecloses a finding that his progress while incarcerated is sufficient to justify release. Defendant has therefore failed to establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. In the absence of this showing, defendant does not satisfy the threshold requirement for release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and the § 3553(a) factors need not be addressed. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, defendant has not demonstrated that a reduction in his sentence comports with the requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Accordingly, his Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release must be denied. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered contemporaneously. Date: April 27, 2021 __________________________ BERYL A. HOWELL Chief Judge 24
en	wikipedia	N/A	George Everett Faulkner (January 31, 1855 – May 2, 1931) was a Canadian businessman, accountant and politician from the province of Nova Scotia. He served as a member of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly, including as Speaker of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly and a member of cabinet in the George Henry Murray government. Early life Faulkner was born January 31, 1855, in Folly Village, Glenholme, Nova Scotia to Thomas Faulkner and Arabella Morrison. Faulkner began working for the Dun, Wiman and Company in 1876, and started his own business Faulkner and Company in the 1890s. Political life Faulkner served as an alderman on Halifax Council from 1896–1901. Faulkner was elected as a Liberal to the Nova Scotia House of Assembly in the district of Halifax in the 1906 Nova Scotia general election. Faulkner served as Speaker of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly from February 24, 1910 to May 15, 1911 after Speaker Edward Matthew Farrell was appointed to the Senate. Faulkner was reelected to the Assembly in the 1911 and 1916 general elections. After the 1911 election, he was named minister without portfolio in the George Henry Murray government. In the run up to the 1920 Nova Scotia general election, Faulkner failed to gain the nomination of the Liberal Party for Halifax, finishing 7 out of 8 on the party ballot, ending his political career. Historian Barry Cahill was unable to find a definitive reason for Faulkner's failure to gain the nomination, but noted his popularity was likely diminished from his support of Robert Borden's Unionist government, and his opposition to Irish Home Rule movement, which was popular in the province. Later life After politics, Faulkner returned to his business. His health began to fail due to heart disease, and he died on May 2, 1931, at the age of 76. References External links Nova Scotia Liberal Party MLAs Members of the Executive Council of Nova Scotia Speakers of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly Businesspeople from Nova Scotia Nova Scotia municipal councillors People from Colchester County 1855 births 1931 deaths
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Antony Poilleux né en 1795 à Beauvais et mort en 1866 est un littérateur français du . Il est connu pour avoir publié un ouvrage sur le duché de Valois en 1842. Biographie Il embrasse d’abord une carrière de journaliste, puis se spécialise dans l’écriture de textes historiques. On a de lui Le duché de Valois pendant les , publié en 1842, puis en 1843. Il écrit par la suite plusieurs livres historiques et rédige l’histoire de Gandelu. Œuvre Le Duché de Valois pendant les quinzième et seizième siècles, chez Lamy, 1842, , 480 pages ; Éléments de la grammaire latine, à l’usage des colléges (par Lhommond). Nouvelle édition considérablement augmentée publiée sous le nom « Un professeur de l’Université », Paris, 1847 ; Bibliographie Félix Bourquelot, La littérature française contemporaine, 1827-1849, continuation de la France littéraire, chez Delaroque ainé, t. 6, Paris, 1857, , « Poilleux (Antony) », ; Bibliographie de la France : ou Journal général de l’imprimerie et de la librairie - 1843 (30) Son travail sur le duché de Valois a été repris par plusieurs auteurs, y compris par nos contemporains. Références Liens externes Naissance en 1795 Décès en 1866 Écrivain français du XIXe siècle Historien français du XIXe siècle Famille Poilleux
de	legislation	Germany	(1) Vor der erstmaligen Erbringung einer nur vorübergehenden und gelegentlichen Dienstleistung im Inland, welche den Zugang zu dem Gesetz unterliegenden Stoffen oder Gegenständen erfordert, überprüft die zuständige Behörde, ob ein wesentlicher Unterschied zwischen der Qualifikation der nach § 13a der Gewerbeordnung Anzeige erstattenden Person und den geforderten Kenntnissen besteht, wenn unter Berücksichtigung der konkret beabsichtigten Tätigkeit bei unzureichender Qualifikation eine schwere Gefahr für die Gesundheit oder Sicherheit der Dienstleistungsempfänger oder Dritter bestünde. Im Fall des §13a Absatz 3 der Gewerbeordnung unterrichtet die zuständige Behörde die Anzeige erstattende Person über ihr Wahlrecht nach § 40 Absatz 2 und 3. § 40 Absatz 4 Satz 2 und 3 finden Anwendung. (2) Von dem Erfordernis einer Begleitung der Stoffe nach § 13 Absatz 2 des Gesetzes ist befreit, wer seinen Wohnsitz oder ständigen Aufenthaltsort in einem anderen EU-Mitgliedstaat, einem EWR-Vertragsstaat oder der Schweiz hat und mit dem Verbringen eine Person beauftragt, die nach den Gesetzen dieses Mitgliedstaates befugt ist, die Stoffe in der vorgesehenen Art und Weise zu verbringen, sofern die Befugnis einer Berechtigung zum Verbringen nach § 15 Absatz 6 Satz 3 des Gesetzes gleichwertig ist. Die zum Verbringen berechtigenden Erlaubnisse oder sonstigen Bescheinigungen anderer Mitgliedstaaten werden im Bundesanzeiger bekannt gemacht.
en	wikipedia	N/A	Inés Camelo Arredondo (March 20, 1928 in Culiacán, Sinaloa – November 2, 1989 in Mexico City) was a Mexican writer. In 1947 she enrolled in the department of Philosophy at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. In 1958 she married the writer Tomás Segovia. She won the Xavier Villaurrutia Award in 1979 for her novel Río subterráneo . Biography Inés Camelo Arredondo was born to a middle-class family that grew poor later on; her father, Mario Camelo y Vega, was a liberal doctor, and Arredondo was the oldest of nine. She passed a large part of her childhood in the sugar plantation called "Eldorado" of her maternal grandfather Francisco Arredondo. Between 1936 and 1944 she studied at the Colegio Montferrant in Culiacán, a school run by Spanish nuns. From 1945 to 1946 she studied at the Colegio Aquiles Serdán in Guadalajara. In 1947 she enrolled in the National Autonomous University of Mexico in Mexico City, for a degree in philosophy. However, she underwent a spiritual crisis as a result of reading Friedrich Nietzsche and Søren Kierkegaard, and due to the skeptical and atheist environment that surrounded her. She became suicidal, at which point her doctor advised her to change her area of study. So, in 1948 she began studying Hispanic Literature. She finished her studies in 1950 with a thesis on "Political and social ideas and feelings in Mexican theater, 1900–1950" ("Sentimientos e ideas políticas y sociales en el Teatro Mexicano de 1900 a 1950"). Between 1950 and 1952 she studied drama, and in 1953 she took a Library Science course. During her studies she came to know many people who had been exiled during the Spanish Civil War. The republicans were, for her, a strong counterpoint to the strong nationalist tendencies in Mexico at the time. During this period, she also discovered French existentialism, surrealism, the Generation of 27, and the writing of Juan Rulfo and Juan José Arreola. She lived with classmates Rosario Castellanos, Jaime Sabines and Rubén Bonifaz Nuño, and her teachers included Julio Torri, Francisco Monterde and Carlos Pellicer. In 1958, she married writer Tomás Segovia, who she shared many interests with. After the birth of their first daughter, Inés, her second child, José, was stillborn, leading to another spiritual crisis. Between 1952 and 1955 she worked in the National Library; later, she took the position of Emilio Carballido in the School of Fine Arts for Theater. She collaborated on the drafting of the Dictionary of Latin American Literature edited by UNESCO, and between 1959–1961 she edited the Dictionary of Mexican History and Biographies. She also wrote for radio and television shows and worked as a translator. Her translation work led to the idea for her first original work, "El membrillo" (published in 1957 in the university magazine). From that point on, she did not stop writing. She gave birth to two more children, Ana and Francisco Segovia, and worked with her husband on the Mexican Literature Review, although her name did not appear on it until she separated from him. Elena Poniatowska said that she was something of a muse, the only woman in her generation, and that Huberto Batis and Juan García Ponce were her "admirers" (Poniatowska 1994: 2). Several of her stories were published in the Review. In 1961 she received a scholarship from the Mexican Center for Writers and in 1962 she received another one from the Fairfield Foundation in New York. Despite their marital troubles, she and her husband decided to wipe the slate clean and move to Montevideo (Uruguay), where she worked in the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). However, in 1962 they separated, and Inés returned to Mexico. Their divorce became official in 1965. As a divorced mother, she held the following positions to support her children: Member of the editing committee for the Mexican Literature Review until its end in 1965 Investigator in the Coordination of the Humanities (1965-1975) Invited to conferences at Indiana University and Purdue University in 1966 Professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), teaching courses on the Golden Age and literature (1965-1968) Critic in the review section of "México en la cultura", supplement to the magazine Siempre! (1965-1967) Collaborator in the University Radio of UNAM (1965-1970) Collaborator in the Dictionary of Mexican Writers in the Center for Literary Studies at UNAM (1967) Professor in the School of Theater in the National Institute of Fine Arts (1965-1967) Editor in the Department of Information and Press, UNAM (1965-1968) Co-wrote the feature-length film Mariana with Juan García Ponce (1967) Professor of History of Theater in the Iberoamerican University (1970) Researcher in the Center for Historical Studies of Mexico, CONDUMEX (1966-1973) En 1965 she published her first book of short stories, La Señal (The Signal). From this point on, the short story was her preferred style; Only Opus 123 (1983) could be considered a short novel. Perhaps as a result of her excessive workload or her psychological conflicts she began to have issues with her spinal column. She underwent five operations and spent many years in a wheelchair. During this period, Elena Poniatowska described her as "A bedridden women with an indomitable spirit". In 1972 she remarried with the surgeon Carlos Ruiz Sánchez. She picked up her literary studies again, and wrote her masters thesis on the Mexican poet and essayist, Jorge Cuesta. In 1980 she finished her studies with an honorable mention. In 1979 she published her second book, Río subterráneo (Underground River), which won the Xavier Villaurrutia Award and critical praise. In 1979 the US Library of Congress in Washington, DC made recordings of three of her stories for the series Voz Viva de México (Live voice of Mexico). In 1983 the editorial Oasis publish Opus 123, and one year later her children's story Historia Verdadera de una Princesa (True Story of a Princess) was published. In 1988, her final book of short stories, Los espejos (The Mirrors) was published. In the same year she edited her Obras Completas (Complete Works) with the publisher Siglo XXI. Around her 60th birthday she received several prizes and honors, the most important being an honorary degree from the Autonomous University of Sinaloa on May 27, 1988. In November 1988, a festival dedicated to her was organized in Culiacán. She spent the last years of her life confined to her bed and on November 2, 1989, she died in her apartment in Mexico City. Literary works About her works and contexts Inés Arrendondo's work was a turning point for Mexican literature, especially that written by women due to the taboo topics she embarked on in her many works. Her main focus was family and partner relationships. Her stories questioned roles and the status quo. Not only did she expand on eroticism, madness, death, perversion, love, passion, voyeurism, loss of innocence, infidelity and betrayal, but she also denounced hidden secrets in Mexican families, such as sexual abuse, the abuse between parents to their children, authoritarianism, machismo, abortion, incest and bullying. Her work as a literary critic and essay writer is reflected and captured in a series of texts published by different magazines and cultural supplements of Mexico throughout her time, in which she left her footprint as an intellectual reader and cultural promoter. Today all these texts can be found under the book titled Ensayos, written by Ines Arredondo and published in 2012. In the book she emphasizes her autobiography and the extensive study she conducted on Jorge Cuesta, An original investigation that she analyzed for the first time in Mexico, on one of the main examples of the Contemporáneos (Contemporary) group. Arredondo like many others of her time, was a loyal followers of his works. Arredondo was part of the Half Century Generation, a decade that consists of the forties to the mid-fifties. This time period became definitive for many Mexican artists of all sorts. Arredondo was also baptized as a member of the Casa del Lago (The Lake House Group), of “La Revista Mexicana de Literatura” ( The Mexican Literature Magazine). The members of The Lake House Group not only developed a creative play, they also did critical work with different artistic approaches such as theater, cinema, painting, music, poetry, novels, tales and essays, while also working with topics that were once censored in Mexico. During Arredondo's lifetime she received four official recognitions from the Mexican government and from the Autonomous University of Sinaloa (Universidad Autónoma de Sinaloa or (UAS). Arredondo received the medal “Fray Bernardo de Balbuena” granted for the first time in the history of Sinaloa in November 1986. An honorary ceremony was held in Culiacan, Mexico in recognition of Arredonodo's literary merits in March 1987. An honorary doctorate was given to her by the UAS in May 1988. There was also a second tribute made for her for her quality literary work during the cultural festival of Sinaloa in 1988. [open translation from the website "Enciclopedia de la literatura en México" On El río subterráneo: Winning the “El Premio Villaurrutia” (1970), The book “Río subterráneo” published in 1979 is the second book out of her three storybooks. The book translates to “the underground river” and the title of the book suggests its contents, which is the hidden actions of men and women. The book takes up various concerns and thematics of “La Señal” (another book written by Arredondo) like the filtration of evil, the lack of love, the passion, the triangulation of desire and perversion. Most of her characters are involved in ill-fated searches for the Absolute through both excessively passionate and sadomasochistic relationships. (Open translation from) Anthologies Obras Completas, Mexico: Siglo XXI/DICOFUR, 1988. Cuentos completos. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2011. Books of short stories La señal. México: Era, 1965 (Colección Alacena). Río subterráneo. México: Joaquín Mortiz, 1979 (Col. Nueva Narrativa Hispánica). , Los Espejos. México: Joaquín Mortiz/Planeta, 1988 (Serie del Volador). Novels Opus 123. México: Oasis, 1983 (Los Libros del Fakir, 23) Essays Acercamiento a Jorge Cuesta. México: SEP/Diana, 1982. Ensayos. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2012. , Children's books Historia Verdadera de una Princesa. Cuento para niños. México: CIDCLI/ Secretaría de Educación Pública 1984 (Reloj de Cuentos). English translations The Underground River and Other Stories. Trans. Cynthia Steele. Lincoln/London: University of Nebraska Press, 1996. Margarita Vargas and Juan Bruce Novoa. “The Shunammite.” By Inés Arredondo. Mundus Artium (1985): 36–45. Margarita Vargas and Juan Bruce Novoa. “Mariana.” By Inés Arredondo. Fiction (1981): 156–64. German translations "Die Sunemiterin", traducción por Barbara Kinter, en: Alcántara, Marco (ed.): Frauen in Lateinamerika 2. Erzählungen und Berichte. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1986, pp. 80–91 (dtv, 10522). "Sommer", traducción por Erna Pfeiffer, en: Pfeiffer, Erna (ed.): AMORica Latina, Viena: Wiener Frauenverlag, 1991, pp. 55–64. References 1928 births 1989 deaths Writers from Sinaloa People from Culiacán
en	wikipedia	N/A	Tarbet (Scottish Gaelic, An Tairbeart) is a hamlet in Sutherland, on the west coast of Scotland. It is the nearest port of contact to the Scottish Wildlife Trust's national nature reserve of Handa Island, and a small ferry operates between the two. The few buildings include the Shorehouse seafood restaurant, which Rick Stein once visited and gave a good review to, partly because it had taken him so long to reach it. Like neighbouring Handa, Tarbet hosts a good wildlife population, including the true wild form of the rock pigeon, which lives on the cliffs that surround the hamlet. Ravens and buzzards fly over the area and unlikely populations of house sparrows, robins and pied wagtails live near the restaurant. Because it is the only settlement for a large distance around, many power lines bring electricity to it. Populated places in Sutherland
en	contracts	US	As filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 18, 2017 Securities Act File No. 333-183173 Investment Company Act File No. 811-22733 United States Securities and Exchange Commission Washington, D.C. 20549 FORM N-1A Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 x Pre-Effective Amendment No. ̈ Post-Effective Amendment No. 15 x and/or Registration Statement Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 x Amendment No. 18 x John Hancock Exchange-Traded Fund Trust (Exact Name of Registrant as Specified in its Charter) 601 Congress Street Boston, MA 02210-2805 (Address of Principal Executive Offices) Registrant’s Telephone Number, including area code: (617)663-3000 Name and address of agent for service: Kinga Kapuscinski, Esq. Nicholas J. Kolokithas, Esq. John Hancock Advisers, LLC 601 Congress Street Boston, MA 02210-2805 Copy to: Christopher P. Harvey, Esq.
en	caselaw	US	This proceeding in mandamus was brought by Robert J. Riley for the purpose of testing the validity of the appointment by the Board of Commissioners of Ohio County of Carl B. Galbraith to succeed the petitioner as one of the four commissioners of accounts in and for Page 546 Ohio County. The necessary formal parties respondent including the Board of Commissioners, its members and clerk, as well as the Clerk of the County Court of Ohio County, all appeared. However, the controverted questions are raised by Galbraith's demurrer to the petition and his answer, the allegations of which seem not to raise a material issue of fact, so that the conclusion at which we have arrived consists entirely of a question of law reached by considering the uncontradicted allegations of the respondent's answer. Since the matter is determinable only by considering constitutional and statutory provisions which are peculiarly applicable to Ohio County and upon which the order of the Board of Commissioners under attack, entered upon the tenth day of February, 1943, depends, it is necessary to state chronologically the provisions in question. Under the provisions of the Constitution adopted in the year 1872, the county courts of this State then functioning, were continued, but the Legislature was vested with power "with the assent" of a majority of the voters in the counties affected, to "reform, modify, or alter" the county organizations by creating another court, "other tribunals" exercising police and fiscal powers or with probate powers and civil jurisdiction in general, the tribunals created by enactment to be either "separate or combined". Pursuant to the power thus conferred upon it the Legislature created for Ohio County a Board of Commissioners with power to administer the police and fiscal affairs of that county, and also created a County Court to be presided over by a single judge to be elected and to have jurisdiction in law and equity and to exercise "probate jurisdiction" with the power to appoint fiduciaries. In 1880 the Constitution was altered so that the Legislature was deprived of its power to re-form county courts in general, the changed provisions transferring to county clerks the exercise of powers and discharge of duties theretofore required of tribunals established for judicial Page 547 purposes under Section Thirty-four of Article Eight of the Constitution of Eighteen Hundred and Seventy-two, expressly including matters of probate. However, the provision conferring probate jurisdiction upon county clerks was made subject to the clause "until otherwise provided by law". See Article 8, Section 24, Constitution of West Virginia. In 1931 the provisions of what in 1933 became Code, 44-3-1, were amended so as to vest in county courts the power to appoint commissioners of accounts, except that in counties where separate tribunals administered police and fiscal affairs the officer known as the county clerk was accorded that power. On January 19, 1939, the County Clerk of Ohio County removed Carl B. Galbraith as commissioner of accounts, and in his place appointed Robert J. Riley. On March 10, 1939, the Legislature reenacted with material alterations Code, 44-3-1, so that in counties where there existed separate tribunals exercising police and fiscal powers, being the Board of Commissioners in Ohio County, the power to appoint commissioners of account was conferred upon those tribunals. On February 10, 1943, the Ohio County Board of Commissioners removed the petitioner and appointed the respondent. The position of the petitioner is that the office of commissioner of accounts functions as an integral part of the probate power, and that since the County Clerk of Ohio County is by the Constitution vested with exclusive probate jurisdiction, commissioners of account are an essential part of a constitutional office, and that consequently the act of 1939, by the terms of which the county clerk was deprived of the appointive power and that power was conferred upon the Board of Commissioners, is ineffective because it encroaches upon constitutional powers and is therefore unconstitutional. The respondent replies by saying that in Ohio County the office of a commissioner of accounts in all matters of probate Page 548 is subordinate in all respects to the final decision of the county clerk, and that consequently the creation of that office by the Legislature does not affect the constitutional function of the county clerk in any way. In addition to this primary question there are a number of minor questions raised, including the relator's contention that since commissioners of accounts are required by statute to report to the court by which they were appointed, if the act of 1939 is held valid, Galbraith will be required to report in probate matters to the Board of Commissioners, which exercises no probate functions, and the other three commissioners of accounts of Ohio County will be required to report in probate matters to the county clerk, who did, in fact, appoint them to their offices. Respondent takes the position that the meaning of the statute requiring commissioners of accounts to report to the courts appointing them is confined to the current assignment, and means only that their reports shall go to the same tribunal from which the business in hand originated, and, therefore, that all commissioners of accounts in Ohio County will continue reporting to the county clerk who refers probate matters to them. We are under the impression that a part of the confusion which exists in this matter owes its origin to the period when county courts possessed general civil jurisdiction, both at law and in chancery, and to the period when they exercised concurrent jurisdiction in probate matters with the circuit courts. Then there were no commissioners of account, courts of chancery, including then the county courts, were thought to possess inherent power to appoint commissioners in chancery. This the county court did in probate matters until, in the confused legislative period that followed the formation of West Virginia, the Legislature undertook to prohibit their appointment. Then followed the Code of 1879, Chapter 22, conferring upon all courts of record, expressly including county courts, power from time to time to appoint commissioners for executing their orders and decrees, and Page 549 for settling accounts of fiduciaries. This provision seems to have been the origin of the office of what is now known as commissioner of accounts and the transposition of its status and function seems to have gradually developed until the time when our county courts were deprived of their general civil jurisdiction and were no longer courts of chancery. Section 6 of Chapter 68 of the Acts of 1882 expressly provides for the appointment of commissioners of accounts by the county court. It will be observed that at that time the County Clerk of Ohio County under the Constitution of 1880 was vested with probate jurisdiction and that its Board of Commissioners under the same provision was looking after its police and fiscal matters, both to continue until otherwise provided by law. Speaking strictly, Ohio County had no county court. From the above it will be noted that the office of commissioner of accounts owes its origin to legislation and that fact, coupled with the fact that in controverted matters referred to commissioners of accounts, they are required to take proof and report their findings of fact and law, subject to exception, to the body having power to confirm or reject, makes it rather difficult to reach the conclusion that they are performing, even in part, a delegated constitutional function. Speaking generally, that theory, it seems to us, would endanger the very existence of a great number of helpful agencies which are not vested with authority and yet contribute vitally to its expeditious exercise. Based upon what has been said, we are of the opinion that a commissioner of accounts in Ohio County is entirely a legislative officer having no judicial powers in matters of probate and that, consequently, the Legislature may provide his appointment, qualification and tenure. We do not believe it follows from what has been said that a commissioner of accounts in Ohio County is required to report in fiduciary matters to the Board of Commissioners. On the contrary, we believe that it is *Page 550 a time-honored precept that commissioners of all kinds shall be required to report to that body of which they are acting as an adjunctive, as distinguished from integral, part. We therefore believe that the commissioners of accounts in Ohio County should report to, and settle their accounts with, the County Clerk of that county who acts as the Ohio County Court of Probate. Peremptory writ denied.
pt	other	N/A	Valor do salário mínimo por decreto: atuação da AGU na ADI no 4568 - Jus.com.br \| Jus Navigandi ADI no 4568: a atuação da AGU na defesa da Lei no 12.382/2011. Divulgação do valor do salário mínimo por Decreto do Poder Executivo ADI no 4568: a atuação da AGU na defesa da Lei no 12.382/2011. Divulgação do valor do salário mínimo por Decreto do Poder Executivo A fixação do salário mínimo em condições que atendam à população brasileira é uma política pública institucionalizada na Constituição Federal, que em seu artigo 7o, IV assim dispõe: Vê-se que o dispositivo normatiza a fixação do salário mínimo por meio de lei, razão pela qual a lei n. 12.382/2011, que criou a política de valorização do salário mínimo de longo prazo, entre os anos de 2012 e 2015, foi contestada via Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade, tombada sob o n. 4568[1], eis que em seu artigo 3o há a previsão de que o estabelecimento do salário mínimo se dará via Decreto do Poder Executivo, senão observe-se: Parágrafo único. O decreto do Poder Executivo a que se refere o caput divulgará a cada ano os valores mensal, diário e horário do salário mínimo decorrentes do disposto neste artigo, correspondendo o valor diário a um trinta avos e o valor horário a um duzentos e vinte avos do valor mensal. (grifo nosso) Referida ADI, proposta pelo Partido Popular Socialista – PPS, Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira – PSDB e Democratas – DEM, tem por escopo a declaração de inconstitucionalidade do dispositivo acima reproduzido ao fundamento de que ao se autorizar a fixação de reajustes e aumentos do salário mínimo por meio de decreto estar-se-ia violando o art. 7o, IV da Constituição, antes transcrito. Nesse sentido, aduzem os requerentes que somente por meio de delegação legislativa, nos termos do art. 68 e seus §§ da Constituição Federal[2], é que se poderia conferir ao Poder Executivo a atribuição de majoração do salário mínimo. A Advocacia-Geral da União[3], por sua vez, seja assessorando a Presidente da República na elaboração das suas informações ao Supremo Tribunal Federal, seja atuando na forma prevista pelo art. 103, § 3o da Constituição, bem como da Lei n. 9.868/99, posicionou-se pela constitucionalidade do dispositivo desafiado, consignando, para tanto, os argumentos que seguem. Sustentou-se que foi a própria lei n. 12.382/2011 em seu artigo 2o[4] que fixou os índices de atualização e cálculo do valor do salário mínimo entre os anos de 2012 e 2015, de modo que o termo “estabelecidos” tem o significado prático de “divulgados” ou “declarados”, já que a fórmula de cálculo do seu valor já restou consignada em lei, tal qual previsto pelo texto constitucional, não havendo, deste modo, qualquer supressão de competência do legislativo ou ofensa a dispositivos da Lei Fundamental. Muito pelo contrário, ao editar decreto que se limite a declarar o novo valor do salário mínimo, observados os critérios legais para a sua definição entre os anos de 2012 a 2015, o Poder Executivo exercerá tão somente função regulamentar plenamente vinculada. Não é a toa que o artigo 3o da lei n. 12.382/2011 traz, ao final, a expressão “nos termos desta Lei” (Manifestação da AGU, p. 06 e Informações do Presidente da República, p.05-06). Tal fato restou explicitado na manifestação da AGU (p. 07), que citou inclusive trecho do parecer produzido pela Comissão de Constituição, Justiça e Cidadania do Senado[5], assim versado: O decreto que for editado anualmente estabelecendo o valor do salário mínimo é um ato totalmente vinculado, sem qualquer espaço para a discricionariedade. Apenas aplicará variáveis objetivamente determinadas ao valor do salário mínimo para explicar o que foi fixado em lei pelo Congresso Nacional. Essa foi a tese levantada e defendida com sucesso pela Advocacia-Geral da União, ao sustentar a constitucionalidade do artigo 3o da lei n. 12.382/2011. Observe-se o seguinte trecho das informações elaboradas pela Advocacia-Geral da União e adotadas pela Presidente da República (p. 05-06) na referida ADI, verbis: Dessa forma, foram fixados em lei o valor do salário mínimo de 2011 e a base para ser usada no reajuste anual até 2015. O Congresso Nacional apenas se absteve de declarar desde já o valor do salário mínimo pelos próximos anos porque não são conhecidos ainda o Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidos – INPC e o valor do Produto Interno Bruto – PIB para a correção dos anos de 2012 a 2015. Tais índices somente poderão ser conhecidos no futuro, quando serão calculados pelo Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística – IBGE. O objetivo do legislador foi aproximar o valor real do salário mínimo da previsão constitucional do inciso IV do artigo 7o, tido como norma programática. Esse empenho de aumento real do salário se revela na nova lei, que previu que, no esforço de garantir o poder aquisitivo do trabalhador, serão aplicados índices que reflitam a variação do INPC, calculado pelo IBGE, acumulados no ano que anteceda o reajuste. Há também previsão para o aumento do valor real mediante a utilização de percentuais de crescimento do PIB, de forma que a riqueza nacional reflita na composição dos valores do salário mínimo. Os decretos presidenciais mencionados no artigo 3o da lei apenas declararão o valor do salário mínimo nos próximos anos, calculados com os parâmetros já estabelecidos na lei. Assim, tem-se que o salário mínimo não será fixado por decreto, mas sim pela própria lei. Em não sendo permitido ao Poder Executivo qualquer sorte de inovação primária no ordenamento jurídico, mas exclusivamente a aplicação de indicadores econômicos que serão futuramente definidos pelo IBGE, a atividade por si desenvolvida no caso em tela está circunscrita ao âmbito da função regulamentar, cujo exercício é típico da Administração (Manifestação da AGU, p. 08-09). Isso é fato, uma vez que a Presidente da República não possui outra escolha senão submeter-se à dúplice vinculação especificada na lei, qual seja: o PIB e o valor do INPC, que são divulgados pelo IBGE. Desse modo, a política púbica de valorização do salário mínimo de longo prazo, prevista constitucionalmente, não poderá ser contingenciada por discussões políticas circunstanciais e até eleitorais. Noutro turno, a AGU também combateu o argumento de que o teor da norma declinada no art. 3o da lei n. 12.382/2011 teria a natureza de delegação legislativa imprópria, violando, deste modo, o preceito constitucional do art. 68 da nossa Lei Fundamental. Com efeito, a Advocacia-Geral da União sustentou que ao passo que a lei combatida trouxe tanto os elementos essenciais para a determinação do valor do salário mínimo entre os anos de 2012 e 2015, como também todas as definições necessárias à sua plena execução, não haveria razão para se sustentar a tese da ocorrência de uma autorização legislativa que implicasse em uma abdicação de competência do Congresso Nacional em favor do Executivo Federal (Manifestação da AGU, p. 9). Nesse sentido, lembrou-se que essa mesma técnica legislativa fora utilizada no Projeto de Lei n. 7.749/2010 enviado pela Presidência do STF ao Congresso Nacional em 12 de agosto de 2010, que dispunha sobre as atualizações pré-fixadas dos subsídios dos Ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal para os exercícios de 2012 a 2015, conforme disposto no art. 48, XV, da Constituição (Manifestação da AGU, p. 10-11). Ademais, citou-se precedente análogo veiculado no julgamento da ADI/MC n. 1287, Relator Ministro Sydney Sanches, onde o STF, analisando Medida Cautelar, emitiu juízo provisório de constitucionalidade sobre lei paranaense (Lei n. 6.615/1994) que determinava a atualização das rubricas orçamentárias do Estado mediante índices que deveriam ser publicados via decreto do Poder Executivo, ainda que previamente fixados pelo Poder Legislativo (Manifestação da AGU, p. 11-12). Por fim, registrou-se que tanto não há delegação de competência para o Executivo que se o Legislativo não mais concordar com os critérios legais fixados pelo diploma combatido, basta que o revogue e aprove outro em seu lugar. Assim, a AGU concluiu sua manifestação (p. 14) no seguinte sentido: Conclui-se, assim, que a Lei no 12.382/11 não atenta contra a reserva legal inscrita no artigo 7o, inciso IV, da Constituição, pois, ao atribuir ao Poder Executivo o encargo de estabelecer os reajustes e aumentos do salário mínimo, o artigo 3o desse diploma legal foi explícito em determinar a observância da fórmula fixada nos §§ e incisos do seu artigo 2o, que impõe a aplicação cumulativa dos índices de variação do INPC e do PIB para a determinação dos novos valores a serem estipulados. Não existe, outrossim, qualquer espécie de usurpação da função precípua do Legislativo por decorrência do artigo 3o da Lei no 12.382/11, uma vez que referido Poder pode, a qualquer momento, rever a decisão consubstanciada no artigo sob invectiva a respeito da política de valorização do salário mínimo, bastando, para tanto, que aprove nova norma disciplinando a matéria. Desse modo, constata-se a compatibilidade do artigo 3o da Lei no 12.382/11 com os postulados contidos na Carta da República, especialmente com aqueles suscitados pelos requerentes como parâmetros de controle de constitucionalidade. A relatora da ADI no Supremo Tribunal Federal, Ministra Cármen Lúcia, aponta de forma precisa o cerne da discussão travada, verbis: (...) O ponto discutido na presente ação é se a norma do art. 3o da Lei n. 12.382/2011 contém determinação para se fixar o salário mínimo por decreto, a cada ano, de 2012 a 2015 (tese dos Autores da presente ação) ou mera indicação do quantum devido como salário mínimo a cada ano (até 2015), segundo o valor fixado naquele diploma legal. Dito de outra forma: os Autores argumentam que o que se contém na lei é delegação para que a Presidente da República fixe o valor do salário mínimo. O que o Congresso Nacional e a Presidente informam, secundados pela Advocacia Geral da União e pela Procuradoria Geral da República, é que o valor já foi fixado pela Lei, cabendo à Chefe do Poder Executivo, por decreto, apenas atualizar e divulgar o valor segundo os parâmetros indicadores legalmente estatuídos. Para os Autores, a divulgação do novo quantum, a cada ano, por decreto desobedeceria o comando constitucional relativo ao tipo legislativo a se adotar para tal procedimento, enquanto para os Requeridos a Constituição teria sido observada, pois o valor foi fixado pela Lei, cabendo ao Poder Executivo tão somente a quantificação do reajustamento anual do valor e o aumento, quando for o caso, pela apuração, aritmética, do quantum devido pela aplicação àquele valor dos índices definidos pelo Congresso Nacional (art. 2o da Lei n. 12.382/11). 5. A norma constitucional tida pelos Autores como contrariada refere-se à exigência de lei para o estabelecimento do valor do salário mínimo. O que se há de levar em conta para a sua interpretação é, portanto, a definição constitucional de fixação e de valor.[6] Em seu voto, vê-se claramente que a Ministra acatou a argumentação despendida pela AGU, seja assessorando a Presidente da República, seja atuando em nome próprio como curadora da Constitucionalidade das Leis. Tanto que, de início, analisando o teor da epígrafe da Lei (“dispõe sobre o valor de salário mínimo em 2011 e a sua política de valorização de longo prazo”) afirma que o escopo da lei não é somente traduzir em reais o valor do salário mínimo para o ano de 2011, mas também dispor acerca de como seria valorizado, ou seja quantificado em reais, o valor do salário mínimo que prevalecerá entre os anos de 2012 e 2015 (Inteiro Teor, p. 09). Assim atuando, afirma a relatora, o Congresso Nacional, no exercício de sua competência típica, estabeleceu que o valor do salário mínimo para os anos de 2012 a 2015 seria o valor do salário mínimo de 2011 com os reajustes necessários à preservação do seu poder aquisitivo, para tanto haveria de corresponder à variação do Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor - INPC, calculado e divulgado pelo IBGE, acumulada nos doze meses anteriores ao mês do reajuste, consoante disposto pelo § 1o do art. 2o da Lei n. 12.382/11. “Com tal estatuição”, prosseguiu a relatora, “o legislador retirou do Presidente da República qualquer discricionariedade quanto à fórmula para apuração do quantum a ser adotado segundo o valor legalmente fixado ou sequer quanto à possibilidade de revisão ou forma de compensação de eventuais resíduos” (Inteiro Teor, p. 11). Quanto à alegação declinada pelos autores da ADI n. 4568 de que teria havido uma delegação de atribuições imprópria do Poder Legislativo para o Executivo, em malferimento ao art. 68 da Constituição, já que tal se pefectibilizaria mediante lei ordinária e não mediante lei delegada, a Ministra Cármen Lúcia a afasta sob três argumentos diversos: a) O primeiro, repetindo o que já dissera anteriormente, de que o Executivo não fixa os critérios para o cálculo do salário mínimo, mas só o declara, tratando-se de ato vinculado e não passível de alteração discricionária por parte daquele Poder; b) O segundo aduz que ainda que delegação houvesse, e para se superar essa mácula legislativa se afastasse da lei a previsão quanto à “decretação do salário mínimo” pelo Poder Executivo, tal providência não teria o condão de alterar a realidade fática imposta pela lei. Vale dizer, com a previsão ou não do decreto pelo Poder Executivo, os valores do salário mínimo para os anos de 2012 a 2015 não sofreriam qualquer modificação quantitativa por força dessa providência, já que os critérios objetivos de aferição do seu montante permaneceriam inalterados; e c) O terceiro, por fim, supera a questão da pseudo-delegação ante o simples fato de que a lei combatida emanou do Congresso Nacional, podendo ser por esse mesmo Congresso revogada, sem qualquer interferência do Poder Executivo. Por esses fundamentos[7], a Ministra Cármen Lúcia julgou improcedente o pedido formulado na ADI n. 4568 e declarou constitucionais os dispositivos questionados. Insta observar que o Ministro Luis Fux, acompanhando na integralidade o voto da Ministra Cármen Lúcia, destaca a tese da AGU ao afirmar que o papel do Poder Executivo é diminuto no que concerne à fixação do salário mínimo, já que a ele caberá tão só a edição de um decreto que aplicará de modo absolutamente vinculado à lei os critérios previamente desenhados pelo legislador[8]. De igual modo, o Ministro Ricardo Lewandowski, destaca a argumentação da AGU a fim de se posicionar acompanhando a Ministra Cármen Lúcia. Assim afirma, in litteris: Senhor Presidente, também julgo improcedente a ação, baseado nos excelentes argumentos veiculados pela ilustre Relatora e pelos Ministros que me precederam. No entanto, chamou a minha atenção, de modo especial, um argumento veiculado pelo eminente Advogado-Geral da União, Luís Inácio Adams, segundo o qual o ato a que se refere o artigo 3o da Lei 3.382[9], que está sendo impugnado nessa ação direta de inconstitucionalidade, tem uma natureza meramente administrativa. Ele é um ato de caráter declaratório, não tem natureza constitutiva, não cria direito novo. O Chefe do Executivo periodicamente constatará qual foi o INPC do ano anterior e também fará os cálculos do crescimento do PIB, para o efeito exatamente pretendido na lei do aumento real que se quer dar ao salário mínimo, e simplesmente divulgará o resultado dessa equação. Portanto, não se trata de nenhuma burla ao comando constitucional que exige uma lei para fixar o salário mínimo; não há, então, nenhuma inconstitucionalidade a ser apontada a meu ver por este Egrégio Plenário. Acompanho a Relatora, julgando também improcedente a ação.[10] Adotando esses fundamentos, o STF, por maioria de votos, julgou improcedente a ADI e declarou constitucionais os dispositivos legais atacados[11]. [1] STF, ADI n. 4568, Relatora Ministra Cármen Lúcia. Disponível em http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=TP&docID=1870956. Acesso: 11 mar. 2012. [2] “Art. 68. As leis delegadas serão elaboradas pelo Presidente da República, que deverá solicitar a delegação ao Congresso Nacional. § 3o - Se a resolução determinar a apreciação do projeto pelo Congresso Nacional, este a fará em votação única, vedada qualquer emenda.” [3]http://redir.stf.jus.br/estfvisualizadorpub/jsp/consultarprocessoeletronico/ConsultarProcessoEletronico.jsf?seqobjetoincidente=4039049. Acesso 12 mar. 2012. [4] Art. 2o Ficam estabelecidas as diretrizes para a política de valorização do salário mínimo a vigorar entre 2012 e 2015, inclusive, a serem aplicadas em 1o de janeiro do respectivo ano. [5] Disponível em http://legis.senado.gov.br/mate-pdf/87000.pdf. Consulta em 12 mar. 2012. [6] Vide nota 302, p. 08-09 do inteiro teor do Acórdão. [7] Percebe-se que a grande maioria dos argumentos deduzidos no voto da Ministra Relatora encontram-se consignados na manifestação da AGU, o que reforça a tese de sua atuação contenciosa influenciou de forma decisiva a adoção da política pública de valorização de longo prazo do salário mínimo. [8] “Dentro desse sistema teleologicamente orientado a assegurar a efetividade do artigo 7o, IV, da Constituição, o papel a ser desempenhado pelo Chefe do Poder Executivo, como foi destacado aqui pela Advocacia- Geral da União, esse papel é, na realidade, bastante diminuto. Cabe a ele, pela edição de decreto, apenas estabelecer os reajustes e aumentos fixados na forma da lei que serão estabelecidos, então, dessa forma pouco ingerente, pelo Poder Executivo. Em outras palavras, o decreto do Poder Executivo apenas aplicará de modo absolutamente vinculado à lei os critérios já previamente delineados pelo legislador.” (Inteiro Teor, p. 17) [9] Erro de digitação constante do original disponibilizado na internet. A lei é a de n. 12.382. [10] Inteiro Teor, p. 38. [11]“EMENTA: CONSTITUCIONAL. VALOR DO SALÁRIO MÍNIMO. ART. 3. DA LEI N. 12.382, de 25.2.2011. VALOR NOMINAL A SER ANUNCIADO E DIVULGADO POR DECRETO PRESIDENCIAL. DECRETO MERAMENTE DECLARATÓRIO DE VALOR A SER REAJUSTADO E AUMENTADO SEGUNDO ÍNDICES LEGALMENTE ESTABELECIDOS. OBSERVÂNCIA DO INC. IV DO ART. 7. DA CONSTITUIÇÃO DO BRASIL. AÇÃO JULGADA IMPROCEDENTE. 1. A exigência constitucional de lei formal para fixação do valor do salário mínimo está atendida pela Lei n. 12.382/2011. 2. A utilização de decreto presidencial, definida pela Lei n. 12.382/2011 como instrumento de anunciação e divulgação do valor nominal do salário mínimo de 2012 a 2015, não desobedece o comando constitucional posto no inc. IV do art. 7o. da Constituição do Brasil. A Lei n. 12.382/2011 definiu o valor do salário mínimo e sua política de afirmação de novos valores nominais para o período indicado (arts. 1o. e 2o.). Cabe ao Presidente da República, exclusivamente, aplicar os índices definidos legalmente para reajuste e aumento e divulgá-los por meio de decreto, pelo que não há inovação da ordem jurídica nem nova fixação de valor. 3. Ação julgada improcedente.” AMORIM, Filipo Bruno Silva. ADI no 4568: a atuação da AGU na defesa da Lei no 12.382/2011. Divulgação do valor do salário mínimo por Decreto do Poder Executivo. Revista Jus Navigandi, ISSN 1518-4862, Teresina, ano 17, n. 3409, 31 out. 2012. Disponível em: <https://jus.com.br/artigos/22896>. Acesso em: 24 maio 2018.
pt	other	N/A	Debates Parlamentares - Diário 058, p. 45 (2011-01-05) Página Inicial 3a República Assembleia da República Série II-A XI Legislatura Sessão Legislativa 02 Número 058 2011-01-05 Página 45 45 \| II Série A - Número: 058 \| 5 de Janeiro de 2011 a) Infracção financeira, punível com multa de valor igual ao previsto nos n.os 2, 4 e 5 do artigo 65.o da Lei n.o 98/97, de 26 de Agosto, alterada pela Lei n.o 35/2007, de 13 de Agosto, pela qual são responsáveis os dirigentes dos serviços em causa; b) Fundamento de recusa dos pedidos de requisição de fundos, de libertação de créditos, de autorização de pagamentos e de transferências relativamente ao orçamento em execução, enquanto permanecer a situação de atraso. Artigo 79.o [»] Artigo 82.o [»] 1- [»] 2- No âmbito da estabilidade orçamental, o presente título destina-se a cumprir as obrigações decorrentes do artigo 126.o do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia e do Pacto de Estabilidade e Crescimento, até à plena realização deste, e concretiza o disposto na parte final do n.o 7 do artigo 2.o, no n.o 2 do artigo 4.o e na alínea b) do artigo 17.o. Artigo 88.o [»] 1- Para assegurar o estrito cumprimento dos princípios da estabilidade orçamental e da solidariedade recíproca, decorrentes do artigo 126.o do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia e do Pacto de Estabilidade e Crescimento, a lei do Orçamento pode determinar transferências do Orçamento do Estado de montante inferior àquele que resultaria das leis financeiras especialmente aplicáveis a cada subsector, sem prejuízo dos compromissos assumidos pelo Estado no âmbito do sistema de solidariedade e de segurança social. 2- [»] Artigo 91.o [»] 1- [»] 2- Sempre que se verifique qualquer circunstância que envolva o perigo de ocorrência, no orçamento de qualquer dos organismos que integram o sector público administrativo, de uma situação orçamental incompatível com o cumprimento das medidas de estabilidade a que se refere o artigo 86.o, o respectivo organismo deve remeter imediatamente ao Ministério das Finanças uma informação pormenorizada e justificada acerca do ocorrido, identificando as receitas e despesas que as originaram, e uma proposta de regularização da situação verificada. 3- [»] Artigo 92.o [»]
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Quorum Business Park est une zone d'activité située à North Tyneside dans l’Angleterre du Nord-Est. Le site est localisé à 7 km de Newcastle et est étendu sur environ 9 hectares. Ses 6500 employés proviennent de 65 pays. Histoire En 2009-2010 des entreprises ont commencé à arriver bénéficiant de soutiens, notamment du fonds d’investissement du Nord-Est ainsi que le programme d’innovation pour les PME de cette région. Le parc a reçu deux récompenses : en 2011 le RICS Award et en 2013, la récompense de business du Nord Est dans la catégorie responsabilité des entreprises et environnement. En 2019, Shelborn rachète la moitié du Quorum Business Park pour 40 millions de livres. Au cours de l’année 2020, le prix de l’acquisition de propriété est remportée par Shelborn pour son achat. Environnement Les bâtiments du parc d’activités ont le classement excellent ou très bon sur la notation BREEAM. Les bureaux disposent de l’air conditionnée, de cuisines et de douches, la notation EPC, « Environmental Power Concepts » est C. Entreprises présentes En 2017 parmi les entreprises présentes on trouve : Balfour Beatty Cofely Convergys Greggs HM Revenue and Customs Sitel Group Tesco Bank Verisure rejoint le site en 2021-2022. Références Liens externes Site officiel Entreprise ayant son siège en Angleterre Newcastle upon Tyne
de	wikipedia	N/A	Polycystin-1 (PKD-1) ist ein Glykoprotein, das im Körper vieler Wirbeltiere vom PKD1-Gen kodiert wird. Es spielt eine wichtige Rolle beim Krankheitsbild Zystenniere. Aufbau Polycystin-1 besteht aus 4303 Aminosäuren und hat eine Molekülmasse von etwa 460 kDa. Sein Aufbau lässt sich in drei Bereiche untergliedern: eine extrazelluläre N-terminale Region elf transmembranöse Domänen ein cytoplasmischer C-Terminus Die extrazelluläre Region besteht aus über 2500 Aminosäuren. Die bilden sich wiederholende Leucin-reiche Einheiten, einen Bereich aus C-Type Lecitin, 16 Immunoglobulin-ähnliche sich ebenfalls wiederholende Bereiche und vier Typ III Fibronectin-verwandte Domänen. Funktion Polycystin-1 spielt bei dem Aufbau der Nierenkanälchen (tubuli) eine wichtige Rolle. Mutationen im PKD1-Gen, das Polycystin-1 kodiert, stehen in unmittelbarer Verbindung zur autosomal-dominanten Zystenniere (ADPKD), der häufigsten lebensbedrohlichen Erbkrankheit beim Menschen. In 85 % aller ADPKD-Erkrankungen ist eine Mutation in PKD1 die Ursache. Bei den restlichen 15 % ist PKD2, das Polycystin-2 kodiert, der Ausgangspunkt für die ADPKD. Polycystin 1 ist multifunktional und die meisten Funktionen des Glycoproteins im Organismus sind noch unbekannt. Es spielt unter anderem bei der Reifung von Epithelzellen und bei der Aufrechterhaltung der renalen epithelialen Differenzierung eine wichtige Rolle; ebenso bei der Organisation der Struktur der Nephrone im frühen fetalen Stadium. Auch ist eine Beteiligung an Zell-Zell- und Zell-Matrix-Interaktionen nachgewiesen. Polyzystin-1 enthält zwei leucin-reiche Wiederholungseinheiten (Leucine-Rich Repeats, LRR), die von zwei cystein-reichen Bereichen flankiert werden. LRRs finden sich bei Proteinen, die an Protein-Protein-Interaktionen beteiligten. Polyzystin-1 erhält nur wenige LRRs. Zusammen mit anderen Proteinen bildet es eine hufeisenförmige Struktur um RNase A zu binden. Die LRRs des Polyzystin-1 modulieren des Weiteren die Bindung an Kollagen I, Fibronektin und Laminin. Die LRRs haben offensichtlich im Fall der Bindung an Laminin eine proliferationshemmende Wirkung, was wiederum Fehllokalisationen von Membranproteinen und Veränderungen der extrazellulären Matrix bewirken kann. Zusammen mit Polycystin-2 bewirkt Polycystin-1 die Produktion von calciumpermeablen, nicht selektiven Kationenkanälen. Zusammen spielen beide Proteine eine wichtige Rolle in der Wachstumsregulation. Polycystin-2 ist dabei ein wichtiger Cofaktor. Diese Interaktion erklärt auch, warum die Mutationen eines der beiden Gene (PKD1 oder PKD2) zum PKD-Phänotyp führen können. Polycystin-1, beziehungsweise PKD1, wird in einer Reihe unterschiedlicher Gewebe exprimiert. Abgesehen von den bei einer ADPKD betroffenen Organen Nieren und Leber findet sich Polycystin auch in den folgenden Organen: Duodenum, Herz, Nebenniere, Lunge, Hoden und Thymus. Der Gehalt ist in der Großhirnrinde dreimal höher als in der Niere. In polyzystischen Nieren ist der Gehalt an Polycystin entsprechender mRNA zweimal höher als in normalen Nieren. Genetik siehe Hauptartikel: PKD1 Polycystin-1 wird beim Menschen vom PKD1-Gen (polycystic kidney disease 1 (autosomal dominant)) auf Chromosom 16 Genlocus p13.3 kodiert. Einzelnachweise Literatur P. D. Wilson: Polycystin: new aspects of structure, function, and regulation. In: J. Am. Soc. Nephrol. 12, 2001, S. 834–845. PMID 11274246 A. Boletta A und G. G. Germino: Role of polycystins in renal tubulogenesis. In: Trends Cell Biol 13, 2004, S. 484–492. PMID 12946628 T. Weimbs: Regulation of mTOR by polycystin-1: is polycystic kidney disease a case of futile repair? In: Cell Cycle 5, 2007, S. 2425–2429. PMID 17102641 A. C. M. Ong u. a.: Coordinate Expression of the Autosomal Dominant Polycystic Kidney Disease Proteins, Polycystin-2 And Polycystin-1, in Normal and Cystic Tissue. In: Am J Pathol 154, 1999, S. 1721–1729. PMID 10362797 Membrankanal Nephrologie Codiert auf Chromosom 16 (Mensch)
en	caselaw	US	This action was brought to set aside certain conveyances of real estate executed by the insolvent defendant, H. C. Lentz, to his wife, Mary A. Lentz, on the ground that they were made in fraud of creditors. On 7 May, 1904, defendant H. C. Lentz, as principal, with H. T. Graeber, J. L. Rendleman, J. M. Eddleman, W. G. Patterson, J. C. Lingle, F. E. Corriher, J. L. Holshouser, and G. A. Ramseur, as sureties, executed a note to the Davis Wiley Bank of Salisbury, N.C. in the sum of $2,000, for value received. H. C. Lentz failing to pay said note, action was commenced by the bank, summons served 2 February, 1907, and judgment rendered in favor of the bank against Lentz and his sureties at May Term, 1907, of Rowan Superior Court. Execution was issued 6 July, 1907, against H. C. Lentz, and returned nulla bona. (68) On 6 November, 1907, the bank, for value and without recourse, assigned said judgment, on the record, to one J. M. Eddleman as trustee for the sureties, who had paid the indebtedness. Defendant H. C. Lentz, having also been sued by the First National Bank of Salisbury, 31 January, 1907, on a note for $5,000, upon which judgment was obtained, executed the deeds for all his real estate to his wife, the feme defendant, Mary A. Lentz, dated 2 February, 1907, and on the same day executed a bill of sale to one Fesperman for a certain stock of goods, including all his personal property. The deeds to Mary A. Lentz and the bill of sale to Fesperman were recorded the day of their execution. The wife, Mary A. Lentz, grantee, had no separate estate, and no money or property of any kind except what her husband, defendant H. C. Lentz, gave her, and when the deeds were made to her she knew of the existence of the note to the bank, and that it had not been paid. The $1,229 note alleged to have been executed to her by her husband, which was a part of the consideration for the deeds, was given for stock in the J. A. Rose Company, which her husband had theretofore bought and paid for, and the certificate of stock was made to her without consideration. The $1,000 mortgage, which it is alleged she assumed, and upon which it is alleged she paid $750, the proceeds from the sale of a house and lot in China Grove, was a valid encumbrance, but the $750 was indirectly paid by the husband, H. C. Lentz, who had bought and paid for the house and lot at China Grove, and had the title made to her, without consideration. The jury returned the following verdict: 1. Did the defendant H. C. Lentz execute and deliver the deeds mentioned in the complaint with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors, as alleged in the complaint? Answer: Yes. Page 57 2. If so, did the defendant Mrs. Mary A. Lentz have knowledge of and participate in such fraudulent intent? Answer: Yes. There was no objection to the issues by either party. Judgment, declaring the deeds void, was entered upon the verdict, and defendants appealed. The defendants demurred ore tenus to the complaint, upon the ground that the complaint did not state a good cause of action, plaintiffs having failed to allege therein that the judgment against H. C. Lentz and his sureties had been paid by the latter and assigned to a trustee for them. The pleading, it is true, was not drawn with that regard for technical precision and accuracy which even the liberal provisions of The Code require. It must not be supposed that because pleadings are now under The Code construed favorably to the pleader, to effectuate the main purpose of having cases tried upon their real merits, that it permits the pleader to disregard the ordinary and familiar rule requiring pleadings to be so drawn as to present clearly the issues in the case. The Code provides that the cause of action shall be plainly and concisely stated, but this does not mean that essential fullness of statement shall be sacrificed to conciseness, but that all the facts going to make up the cause of action must be stated as plainly and concisely as is consistent with perfect accuracy, and that no material allegation should be omitted. Blackmore v.Winders, 144 N.C. 212; Bank v. Duffy, 156 N.C. 83. Looseness in pleading and inadequacy of allegation are as much condemned by the present code of procedure as they were under the former strict and exacting system of the common law. It is from and fiction that have been abolished, but the essential principles of good pleading have been retained. The defendant's demurrer comes too late. They passed the defective pleading by themselves answering to the merits, and thereby waived the defect, which is not a fatal one, but can be cured by amendment. It is the defective statement of a good cause of action, and not the statement of a defective cause. When the defect appears in the cause of action itself, no amendment can cure it, for it has no existence in fact; it is otherwise where the defect is merely in the statement, for in such a case it can be removed by amendment, and the cause of action will thus be perfected.Garrett v. Trotter, 65 N.C. 430; Warner v. R. R., 94 N.C. 251; Johnsonv. Finch, 93 N.C. 205; McElwee v. Blackwell, 94 N.C. 261, and casessupra. Page 58 (70) While the complaint does not allege, as good pleading perhaps required, that the sureties had paid the judgment, it does state that the judgment had been assigned "for value and without recourse" to a trustee for the sureties, which subrogated them in law and equity to the rights of the creditor, or plaintiff in the judgment, to whom they had advanced the consideration for the use and benefit of the debtor, H. C. Lentz, one of the defendants. In any view of the complaint and the proceedings below, the demurrer oretenus was properly overruled; but before final judgment is entered in the case the complaint should be amended by inserting the omitted allegation as to the payment by the sureties. The sureties should also be made parties, as plaintiffs, in their own right, and not merely as beneficiaries under the assignment of the judgment to the trustee, as they are the real parties in interest within the meaning of The Code, the trustee merely holding the naked legal title for them, and not being beneficially interested in the recovery. They are certainly proper parties, in a case like this one, notwithstanding Revisal, sec. 404, and it is best that they should be brought in by amendment, and joined as parties with the trustee. It is contended by the defendants that the sureties satisfied the judgment by the payment, but this is not so, as it appears that it was assigned to a trustee for their benefit, if that was necessary, and the fact that he may be one of the sureties, which does not clearly appear, can make no difference, as he holds, at least, for the other sureties under the assignment, if, as to himself, the judgment is canceled by the payment of his share. Besides, the sureties can maintain the action upon the implied promise of their principal, H. C. Lentz, to reimburse them for the money paid on the judgment to his use, and a fresh judgment against him is not necessary for the purpose, as we have recently held in Silk Co. v. SpinningCo., 154 N.C. 421. See, also, Bank v. Harris, 84 N.C. 206; Mebane v.Layton, 86 N.C. 574; McLendon v. Commissioners, 71 N.C. 38. (71) As to the rights and remedies of sureties, under such circumstances, the following authorities may further be consulted: 27 A. E. Enc. (2 Ed.), 213; Stearns on Suretyship, 470, 474, 478; Brandt on Suretyship and Guaranty (3 Ed.), secs. 342, 343, and 346;Leightbown v. McMyn, L. R., 33 Ch. Div., 575; Gerber v. Shrak,72 Ind. 553; Neal v. Nash, 23 Ohio St. 483; Benne v. Schnecke,100 Mo., 250; Bragg v. Patterson, 85 Ala. 233; Harris v. Frank, 29 Kansas, 200. We do not see how the defendants are now interested in the question as to the sureties' rights under the judgment. The proceeds of the property fraudulently conveyed must be applied to the payment of H. C. Page 59 Lentz's creditors, and the right of the sureties to the lien of the judgment is not, at present, involved. Having disposed of these preliminary matters, we will now proceed to consider the remaining question, as to the fraud. It seems to us, after carefully reading the evidence, that there is plenary proof of the intent in the mind of H. C. Lentz to defeat his creditors, when he made the conveyances to his wife and Fesperman. He was utterly and hopelessly insolvent at the time. The circumstances, not disputed, tend to show his unlawful purpose to divest himself of his property and put it away so that it could not be reached by his creditors, who were justly entitled to have it applied to the payment of their debts. Not only this, but he declared his dishonest purpose to the witness J. L. Holshouser on the very eve of his impending financial disaster, telling him that he intended to save himself, and advising Holshouser to do the same. Thefeme defendant objected to this testimony, but it was competent, as to his intent, but not binding upon her or affecting her interest in the property, unless she participated in the fraud or accepted the deed with knowledge of it. As to H. C. Lentz, the proof discloses a bald and transparent fraud. Did she avail herself of it with such notice? This is really the only practical question in the case. It would seem that the fraud was so palpable — so visible to the naked eye — if she had notice of the circumstances, which appears more than probable, that she could not have overlooked it, or misunderstood the true nature of the transaction. She knew that he was insolvent, or should have known it, which is the same in law; that her husband was heavily involved and was transferring all he had to her without any adequate consideration, (72) and upon the sole pretense of benefiting her, without any regard for the just rights of his creditors. She had paid nothing for the property, real or personal, that he had given her, but was really, and to all intents and purposes, a mere volunteer. Such a transaction should not be allowed to stand in the way of creditors so as to defeat their rights. The presiding judge stated the case with unusual clearness and with impartiality, and most favorably for the defendant, in his charge to the jury, following closely the decisions of this Court upon the subject, as we understand and interpret them. He instructed them substantially that, notwithstanding all the suspicious circumstances relied on to condemn the transfer of the property, if they found that the feme defendant paid value for the property, it would shift the burden to the plaintiffs, and require of them to prove that there was an actual intent on the part of H. C. Lentz to defraud, and, moreover, that the feme defendant either participated in the fraudulent alienation of her husband's property or Page 60 took the deeds from him with actual notice of his covinous purpose. He even told the jury that if, before her husband became insolvent, he had transferred to her the stock in the Rouse Company, it was a valid gift, and should be treated by them as her property, in passing upon the question as to the consideration for the conveyances, she having testified that her husband had transferred the stock to her as a gift, and afterwards had bought it back, giving her his note for $1,229 for it, and that this debt of his to her, and a previous mortgage on the land, which she assumed, constituted the consideration of the deed to her for the property. There was ample evidence that the feme defendant was fully cognizant of the wrongful intent of her husband in making the transfers to her. It was all done at a time when he was being hotly pursued by his creditors, and it had every appearance of an effort, on his part, to better prepare himself for the race he was running with his creditors "to save himself" and to outstrip them. No one could hardly fail to discover his motive. In order to sustain the charge of the court, it is only necessary that we should refer to what is said by Justice Avery in the learned and valuable opinion he delivered for the Court in Peeler v. Peeler, 109 (73) N.C. 628, as follows: "Where an insolvent husband has conveyed land to his wife, and a preexisting creditor brings an action to impeach the deed for fraud, the onus is upon her to show that a consideration actually passed in the shape of money paid, something of value delivered, or the discharge of a debt due from the husband to her. Brown v.Mitchell, 102 N.C. 373; Bump. Fraud. Con., pp. 6, 318; Stephenson v.Felton, 106 N.C. 120; Osborne v. Wilkes, 108 N.C. 669; Woodruff v.Bowles, 104 N.C. 213; Bigelow on Frauds, 136. To this extent she is required to assume a burden not placed upon other grantees. Helms v.Green, 105 N.C. 257. When she offers testimony sufficient to satisfy the jury of the existence, validity, and discharge of such previous debt by the conveyance, or shows in some other way that the deed was founded upon a valuable consideration, the burden shifts again and rests upon the plaintiff to show, to the satisfaction of the jury, the fraud which he has alleged as the ground of the relief demanded. Brown v. Mitchell,supra; McLeod v. Bullard, 84 N.C. 515. But if, after turning the laboring oar over to the creditor, the jury are satisfied, upon a review of the testimony, that the husband executed the deed to her to hinder, delay, or defeat a creditor in the collection of his debt, and that she participated in his purpose, or knew of his intent at the time, though the consideration may have been a valid preexisting debt to her, it is their duty to find that the conveyance was made to defraud creditors. In the last clause of the statute (Code, sec. 1545; 13 Eliz., ch. 5, sec. 2) it is Page 61 provided that as against a person whose debt, etc., `shall or might be in any wise disturbed, hindered, delayed, or defrauded' by the covinous and fraudulent practices previously mentioned in the same section, viz., by conveyances executed `with the purpose and intent to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors,' such a conveyance shall be void." If there was the least departure by the learned trial judge from this statement of the law, it was decidedly in favor of the feme defendant, and, therefore, she cannot complain; but we think the law was given to the jury with perfect accuracy.Redmond v. Chandley, 119 N.C. 575; Graeber v. Sides, 151 N.C. 596;Crockett v. Bray, 151 N.C. 615. Speaking for himself, and not in the least committing the Court to his view, the writer of this opinion thinks that the law is not, and should not be, so favorable to the married woman as stated by (74) this Court in the cases cited. Our statute, Revisal, sec. 764, requires the purchaser of property, where the fraud of the vendor is shown, to take the burden and prove that he (or she) acquired it for value, or upon good consideration, and without notice of the fraud.Cox v. Wall, 132 N.C. 734; Pell's Revisal, sec. 964, and notes. But this Court seems to have made an exception to that statutory rule, in the case of the wife taking a conveyance from her husband, though there would seem to be no real and convincing reason for it. The presumption, it seems, should be stronger against her than it is when the conveyance is made to one not so closely connected with the vendor, or sustaining such an intimate and confidential relation towards him, for, in the case of husband and wife, with his strong influence over her, there is a greater temptation to commit fraud, and a better opportunity afforded for its consummation. The position of the feme defendant would not be improved, but made worse, should the law be thus declared. She would have to take all, instead of only a part of the burden to rebut the presumption against her. But the law, as it now stands, is more favorable to her, as we have shown, and we follow the decisions. The jury have found that fact against the defendants, upon evidence which fully warrants the verdict, and under instructions wholly free from error. It is competent to prove by O. D. Davis that the sureties had paid the judgment of the Davis Wiley Bank against H. C. Lentz. He knew the facts, as its cashier and receiving teller, and why should he not be permitted to speak of it? The evidence as to the bill of sale to Fesperman was also competent, as showing a contemporary transaction, indicating the fraudulent purpose of Lentz and the preparation he was making at the time to put away his property in order to defeat his creditors. It was but forging one of the links in the chain of Page 62 circumstances going to establish the essential fact of intent. It can make no difference that the conveyance was made to a third party, for still it bears upon the issue as to the covinous purpose. Brink v. Black,77 N.C. 59. The evidence as to a fraudulent intent usually is permitted to take a wide range, as it may be inferred from many circumstances, (75) each one by itself being apparently of small importance, but together producing an absolute conviction. The court might, in this case, have gone further than it did in the judgment, and ordered a sale of the land for the payment of the judgment debt evidenced by it, but there was no request for it to do so, and we merely refer to it for the purpose of calling attention to the advisability of deciding all controversies, relating to the same subject-matter, in one action, as contemplated by The Code. No error. Cited: Shuford v. Cook, 169 N.C. 54.
en	contracts	US	EXHIBIT 31.1 CERTIFICATIONS I, James J. O’Brien, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Ashland Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles; c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the Audit Committee of the registrant’s Board of Directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. Date:February 2, 2011 /s/ James J. O’Brien James J. O’Brien Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)
en	caselaw	US	194 U.S. 451 (1904) DAVIS v. MILLS. No. 235. Supreme Court of United States. Argued April 19, 1904. Decided May 16, 1904. CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. 453 Mr. John A. Shelton, with whom Mr. T.J. Walsh was on the brief, for Davis. Mr. William Waldo Hyde, with whom Mr. Charles E. Perkins was on the brief, for Mills. MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. The general theory on which an action is maintained upon a cause which accrued in another jurisdiction is that the liability is an obligation, which, having been attached to the person by the law then having that person within its power, will be 454 treated by other countries as accompanying the person when brought before their courts. But as the source of the obligation is the foreign law, the defendant, generally speaking, is entitled to the benefit of whatever conditions and limitations the foreign law creates. Slater v. Mexican National Railroad, 194 U.S. 120. It is true that this general proposition is qualified by the fact that the ordinary limitations of actions are treated as laws of procedure and as belonging to the lex fori, as affecting the remedy only and not the right. But in cases where it has been possible to escape from that qualification by a reasonable distinction courts have been willing to treat limitations of time as standing like other limitations and cutting down the defendant's liability wherever he is sued. The common case is where a statute creates a new liability and in the same section or in the same act limits the time within which it can be enforced, whether using words of condition or not. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199. But the fact that the limitation is contained in the same section or the same statute is material only as bearing on construction. It is merely a ground for saying that the limitation goes to the right created and accompanies the obligation everywhere. The same conclusion would be reached if the limitation was in a different statute, provided it was directed to the newly created liability so specifically as to warrant saying that it qualified the right. If, then, the only question were one of construction and as to liabilities subsequently incurred, it would be a comparatively easy matter to say that section 554 of the Montana Code of Civil Procedure qualifies the liability imposed upon directors by section 451 of the Civil Code, and creates a condition to the corresponding right of action against them, which goes with it into any jurisdiction where the action may be brought. But the question certified raises greater difficulties both as to construction and as to power. We have first to consider whether section 554 purports to qualify, or to impose a condition upon, liabilities already incurred under the earlier act taken up into section 451. In doing so we assume that the 455 word "directors" in the later act means the same as "trustees" in the earlier one. The contrary was not suggested. At the argument we were pressed with section 3455 of the Code of Civil Procedure: "No action or proceeding commenced before this Code takes effect, and no right accrued, is affected by its provisions." But the trouble made by this is more seeming than real. The following section deals specifically with limitations, and must be taken to override a merely general precaution against the disturbance of vested rights. By § 3456: "When a limitation or period of time prescribed in any existing statute for acquiring a right or barring a remedy, or for any other purpose, has begun to run before this Code goes into effect, and the same or any limitation is prescribed in this Code, the time which has already run shall be deemed part of the time prescribed as such limitation by this Code." The language clearly imports that the limitations in the Code are to apply to existing obligations upon which the previous limitation already had begun to run. The result is that § 554 purports to substitute a three years' limitation for the one year previously in force, assuming that the previous one year limitation applied to this case, as under the decisions it did. State Savings Bank v. Johnson, 18 Montana, 440; Park Bank v. Remsen, 158 U.S. 337, 342. But if § 554 purported to make this substitution, it purported to introduce important changes. It lengthened the time on the one hand, but it took away the exception in case of absence from the State on the other. This last is disputed, but it seems to us a part of the meaning of the words "This title does not affect actions against directors," etc. The section as to absence from the State is a part of the title, and whatever necessary exceptions may be made from the generality of the words quoted, this is not one of them. A further difference is that, while there might be difficulties in construing the general limitation upon actions for penalties as going to the right, this section is so specific that it hardly can mean anything else. We express no opinion as to the earlier act, but we think that this § 554 so definitely deals 456 with the liability sought to be enforced that upon the principles heretofore established it must be taken to affect its substance so far as it can, although passed at a different time from the statute by which that liability first was created. We do not go beyond the case before us. Different considerations might apply to the ordinary statutes as to stockholders. We express no opinion with regard to that. We come then to the question of power. It is said that a statute of limitations cannot take away an existing right but only remedies, and therefore that, whatever the effect of § 554 on subsequently accruing liabilities, it cannot bar the plaintiff in this suit. Before considering this it is to be observed in the first place that, so far as the State of Montana was concerned, the only practical difference made by the statute was to take away the allowance for absence from the State while giving over a year for the prosecution of the action within it. The cause of action accrued on September 22, 1893, and the new statute went into effect on July 1, 1895, so that the plaintiffs had at least until September 22, 1896, in which to sue there. As to action within the State, it could not be contended that the change took away constitutional rights. It did not shorten liability unreasonably. Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U.S. 245. The only way in which it could be made out that the attempt to take away a remedy outside the State after the same lapse of time was unconstitutional is through the theoretical proposition which we have stated. It is said that remedies outside the State can be affected only by destroying the right, and that no statute of limitations can do that. It is quite incredible that such an unsubstantial distinction should find a place in constitutional law. Prescription which applies to easement the analogy of the statute of limitations unquestionably vests a title. There is no such thing as a merely possessory easement. A disseisor of a dominant estate may get an easement which already is attached to it, but the easement is attached to the land by title or not at all. Again, as to land the distinction amounts to nothing, because to deny *457 all remedy, direct or indirect, within the State is practically to deny the right. "The lapse of time limited by such statutes not only bars the remedy, but it extinguishes the right, and vests a perfect title in the adverse holder." Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599, 605. So far as we have observed, the cases which have had occasion to deal with the matter generally hold that the title to chattels, even, passes where the statute has run. Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 623; Chapin v. Freeland, 142 Massachusetts, 383, 386. Property is protected because such protection answers a demand of human nature, and therefore takes the place of a fight. But that demand is not founded more certainly by creation or discovery than it is by the lapse of time, which gradually shapes the mind to expect and demand the continuance of what it actually and long has enjoyed, even if without right, and dissociates it from a like demand of even a right which long has been denied. Dunbar v. Boston & Providence Railroad, 181 Massachusetts, 383, 385. Constitutions are intended to preserve practical and substantial rights, not to maintain theories. It is pretty safe to assume that when the law may deprive a man of all the benefits of what once was his, it may deprive him of technical title as well. That it may do so is shown sufficiently by the cases which we have cited and many others. In the case at bar the question comes up in the most attenuated form. The law is dealing not with tangible property, but with a cause of action of its own creation. The essential feature of that cause of action is that it is one in the jurisdiction which created it; that it is one elsewhere is a more or less accidental incident. If the laws of Montana can set the limitation to the domestic suit, it is the least possible stretch to say that they may set it also to a foreign action, even if to that extent an existing right is cut down. We can see no constitutional obstacle in the way, and we are of opinion that they have purported to do it and have done it. The question is answered in the affirmative, and it will be so certified.
en	other	N/A	Model Id 83291 Maytag Washing Machine Model A612 Parts Live Chat 1-800-269-2609\| En Español\| Available 7 days a week RepairClinic.com LogoFast ShippingMy OrdersLoginOrder HistoryMy Model NumbersCart (0) Shop PartsRepair HelpSEARCHA612Clear AllMaytag Washing Machine Model A612 Parts123...6>> Looking for parts for your Maytag Washing Machine? RepairClinic.com has the appliance parts, lawn equipment parts and heating/cooling parts you need! A portion of your search was successful, but model id 83291 did not match anything.Repair Help for Maytag Washing Machine A612Return Policy:365 Days.Period.® Enter Model Number HereSEARCHShop By Category:Appliance Parts›DryerRefrigeratorRange/Stove/OvenWashing MachineDishwasherBath FanCarpet CleanerDehumidifierFreezerGarbage DisposerHot Water DispenserIce MachineMicrowaveOven + MicrowaveRange Vent HoodTrash CompactorVacuum CleanerWasher/Dryer ComboWater Filtration SystemShow All...Lawn Equipment›Lawn MowerSmall EngineSnowblowerString TrimmerChainsawEdgerGeneratorHedge TrimmerLeaf BlowerLog SplitterPole PrunerPressure WasherTillerWood ChipperShow All...HVAC›Air ConditionerFurnaceHumidifierHeat PumpWater HeaterAir HandlerCentral Air ConditionerPackaged Unit/RTUUnit HeaterShow All...Power Tools›Circular SawDrillDriverGrinderJig SawMiter SawNailer & StaplerPaint SprayerPlaner & JoinerReciprocating SawShow All...Refine Selection Here:Product Type›Washing MachineBrand›Maytag PartsModel Number›A612Clearance Parts›Clearance PartsCommon Problems›Washer fills slowlyWasher is making loud noiseWasher leaking waterWasher overflowingWasher stops mid cycleWasher vibrating or shakingWasher won't agitateWasher won't drainWasher won't spinWasher won't spin or agitateWasher won't start Part Category›PumpKnob, Dial & ButtonFastenerSwitchLatchGasket & SealValve & FloatHose, Tube & FittingAgitatorMotorCircuit Board & TimerSuspension & Shock AbsorptionBeltDrum & TubSpringSee All...AdhesiveAgitatorAxle, Roller, Shaft, WheelBearingBeltBracket & FlangeCap, Lid & CoverCapacitorCircuit Board & TimerCleaner & DeodorizerDispenserDoorDrum & TubFastenerFilterGasket & SealHingeHose, Tube & FittingKnob, Dial & ButtonLatchLeg, Foot & CasterLubricantManuals, Care Guides & LiteratureMiscellaneousMotorPanelPower CordPulleyPumpSpringSuspension & Shock AbsorptionSwitchToolTransmission, Brake & ClutchValve & FloatWire, Receptacle & Wire ConnectorSee Less...Part Title›ActuatorAdhesiveAgitator AssemblyAxleBase AssemblyBearingBelt KitBleach DispenserBoltBracketBrake AssemblyBrake Removal ToolCapCapacitorClamp KitCleanerClipCollarControl PanelCoverDetergent DispenserDispenserDiverter valveDoor StopDoor SwitchDrain HoseDrain PipeDrain PumpDrive MotorDrive PulleyDrive ShaftFabric Softener DispenserFastenerFill HoseFill TubeFilterFront PanelGasketGearHeat ShieldHose ClampHose ConnectorHose WasherHousingInjector TubeInlet HoseInner TubKnobKnob DialLeveling LegLeveling Leg PadLeverLidLid HingeLock WasherMotor Mount Spring KitMotor PulleyMotor SwitchMounting BracketMounting ClipMulti ScrewdriverNozzleNutO-RingOuter TubPinPlatePower CordPressure SwitchRepair ManualRetainerRust RemoverScreen FilterScrewSealSeal KitSet ScrewShaftShieldSiphon BreakSnap Retaining RingSnubber PadSpacerSpanner NutSpanner WrenchSpringSpring ClipStart CapacitorStart SwitchStop LugStrain ReliefStrainerSuspension SpringSwitchTemperature SwitchTerminalTimerTimer KnobTimer MotorTransmissionTransmission Case GasketTransmission OilTub BearingTub SealTub SupportTubeValveWasherWater DeflectorWater InjectorWater Inlet ValveWireSee All...Maytag Washing Machine CleanerRepairClinic Item # 1373065Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineAffreshTM Washing machine cleaner. This cleaner removes and prevents odor-causing residue in all brands of washers. To use, add one tablet to washer with no clothes and select hot water. - Septic safe - More effective than bleach. - Three tablets per package.OEM Part - Manufacturer #W10135699Affresh® Dishwasher Cleaner is specially formulated to help remove limescale and mineral build-up.Hazardous Material – Special Shipping Required$8.50Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Spanner WrenchRepairClinic Item # 1021707Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineSpanner nut wrench for many Whirlpool, Kenmore, General Electric & Maytag inner tub lock nutsAftermarket (Non-OEM) Part - Manufacturer #TB123A$16.20Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine AdhesiveRepairClinic Item # 4369899Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineWhite silicone adhesive caulkOEM Part - Manufacturer #W10841140Hazardous Material – Special Shipping Required$10.15Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Belt KitRepairClinic Item # 402507Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineWasher belt kit for Maytag models. If the washer does not agitate, spin, or drain then one of the belts could be worn and require replacement.OEM Part - Manufacturer #12112425$24.58Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Door SwitchRepairClinic Item # 4273196Grid is 1 inch squareWatch Video:Skill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineDryer door/washer lid switch kitOEM Part - Manufacturer #W10820036$19.10Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Fill HoseRepairClinic Item # 3400Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing Machine5-foot-long rubber fill hose for washing machines. Used for hot or cold water.OEM Part - Manufacturer #WP89503Over time, rubber hoses dry out and become susceptible to leaks or bursts. Replace fill hoses every 5 years to reduce the risk of hose failure.$8.05Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Tub SealRepairClinic Item # 1478842Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineWashing machine tub seal repair kit. This kit is for Maytag two belt washers. If the washing machine is leaking water from above the transmission this seal is likely damaged or worn out.OEM Part - Manufacturer #6-2095720Recommend also ordering the Related Items: Tub Bearing and the Tool: Spanner Wrench$52.29Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine ScrewRepairClinic Item # 597369Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineScrew 8 X 1/2OEM Part - Manufacturer #WP489355$2.15Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Leveling LegRepairClinic Item # 832599Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineAdjustable leveling leg with stop-nutOEM Part - Manufacturer #22003428$7.80Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Tub BearingRepairClinic Item # 1472880Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineWashing machine tub bearing repair kit. The tub bearing is mounted in the middle of the outer tub of the washing machine. The tub bearing helps to keep the inner tub spinning smoothly. If the tub bearing is defective, it may lock up and prevent the washer from spinning.OEM Part - Manufacturer #6-2040130The tub bearing and tub seal should be replaced together.$45.69Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Water Inlet ValveRepairClinic Item # 3440Grid is 1 inch squareWatch Video:Skill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineWashing machine water inlet valve top-loading unit, valve has multi-mount bracket & outlet adaptorOEM Part - Manufacturer #205613$38.90Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Drain PumpRepairClinic Item # 1480330Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineMaytag two belt washing machine drain pump. If the washer does not drain then the pump could be clogged or defective.OEM Part - Manufacturer #WP6-2022030Consider replacing the belts while you have the washer apart.$70.02Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Injector TubeRepairClinic Item # 400646Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineInjector tube and nozzle kit for the water inlet valve on a washer.OEM Part - Manufacturer #12001677$15.28Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Leveling LegRepairClinic Item # 2789Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineLeveling feetOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP210684$9.90Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Inlet HoseRepairClinic Item # 435666Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineInjector hose kit with air gap assembly. Top mounting style injector sleeve.OEM Part - Manufacturer #WP206680Common cause for leak at top left corner of outer tub.$36.55Quantity:Out of StockClick for Expected Ship Date ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Lid HingeRepairClinic Item # 3317Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineLid hinge ballOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP211726$4.65Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Hose ClampRepairClinic Item # 657359Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineHose clampOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP596669$2.15Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Drain HoseRepairClinic Item # 1450Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineTub to pump drain hoseOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP213045$19.20Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Snubber PadRepairClinic Item # 1282Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineDamper pad kit for base support with lubricant, also order RCC #1243096, rubber adhesiveOEM Part - Manufacturer #203956Hazardous Material – Special Shipping RequiredRequired with this product:High Temperature Adhesive #1243096$36.65Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Spring ClipRepairClinic Item # 1603Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineFront cover top retaining spring clipOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP22001650$4.50Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine ScrewRepairClinic Item # 739047Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineScrew, 10-24 3/8OEM Part - Manufacturer #WP90767$4.95Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Door StopRepairClinic Item # 1285Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineLid bumperOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP212716$4.65Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Screen FilterRepairClinic Item # 745872Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineInlet screen, water valveOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP96160$6.90Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Drain PipeRepairClinic Item # 436287Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineSiphon break elbow kit with clampOEM Part - Manufacturer #208847$18.45Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Brake Removal ToolRepairClinic Item # 347232Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineBrake removal tool for Maytag two-belt top-loading washers.OEM Part - Manufacturer #038315$58.50Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine ScrewRepairClinic Item # 2311090Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineScrewOEM Part - Manufacturer #WPW10346892$4.65Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Hose ClampRepairClinic Item # 470837Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineHose clampOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP285655$4.65Quantity:Out of StockClick for Expected Ship Date ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Siphon BreakRepairClinic Item # 1390Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineSiphon break connector with clampOEM Part - Manufacturer #206638$27.15Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Drain HoseRepairClinic Item # 824653Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineDrain hose (corrugated), black, 90 inches longOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP22003410$19.15Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine BearingRepairClinic Item # 893728Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineBreak bearing above brake assembly. Maytag two belt washer.OEM Part - Manufacturer #WP22003441$13.90Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine BearingRepairClinic Item # 433316Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineBrake rotor bearingOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP200835$17.85Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine TerminalRepairClinic Item # 463170Grid is 1 inch squareThis part fits your Washing MachineSpade terminalOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP248562$4.65Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Brake AssemblyRepairClinic Item # 1472923Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineBrake assembly Maytag 2 belt washerOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP6-2011900$68.95Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Injector TubeRepairClinic Item # 444984Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineInjector tube for water inlet system on Maytag 2 belt washersOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP216201Common cause for leak at top left corner of outer tub.$12.00Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Seal KitRepairClinic Item # 436000Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineTransmission bottom lip seal kit, instructions includedOEM Part - Manufacturer #207843$10.50Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Water InjectorRepairClinic Item # 441033Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineInjector tube sleeve bracket. Bottom mounting style.OEM Part - Manufacturer #WP215447$4.65Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine TubeRepairClinic Item # 454382Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineWashing machine air tube for tub fill volumeOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP22001619$26.30Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine ScrewRepairClinic Item # 1187259Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineScrewOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP67006380$2.15Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine TransmissionRepairClinic Item # 4378142Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineTransmission kit with seal and mounting stem- ShallOEM Part - Manufacturer #W10841093Oversize Part – Special Shipping Required$269.45Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Motor PulleyRepairClinic Item # 1480328Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineMotor pulleyOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP6-2008160$26.92Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine BoltRepairClinic Item # 1378511Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineOuter tub bolt and gasket assembly, shortOEM Part - Manufacturer #W10175939$2.15Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Tub SealRepairClinic Item # 2068Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineUpper outer tub ring sealOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP211232$23.15Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Hose WasherRepairClinic Item # 1239256Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineGasket, water inlet hoseOEM Part - Manufacturer #WPY013783$4.65Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Inlet HoseRepairClinic Item # 1798Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineInjector hoseOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP213013$17.75Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine TransmissionRepairClinic Item # 1480334Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineWashing machine Orbital transmission kit for deep tub models.OEM Part - Manufacturer #6-2097750Consider replacing the washers belts while you have it apart.Special Shipping Required$296.30Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Fill HoseRepairClinic Item # 709916Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing Machine6 Foot fill hose, one straight & one elbow, requires 2 washersOEM Part - Manufacturer #WP76314Replace inlet hoses after 5 years of use to reduce the risk of hose failure.$22.15Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Drive MotorRepairClinic Item # 1066793Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineTwo speed motor kit with wiring jumperOEM Part - Manufacturer #12002353Oversize Part – Special Shipping Required$176.50Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Hose WasherRepairClinic Item # 400407Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineHose washer and filter for washer inlet hoseOEM Part - Manufacturer #12001413$4.65Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine SpringRepairClinic Item # 434716Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineSpring kit, motor slide-plateOEM Part - Manufacturer #202718$4.65Quantity:Out of StockClick for Expected Ship Date ›Add to Cart365 Day Return PolicyMaytag Washing Machine Motor Mount Spring KitRepairClinic Item # 2791Grid is 1 inch squareSkill Level:Skill LevelThis part fits your Washing MachineWashing machine motor slide-plate repair kitOEM Part - Manufacturer #205000Hazardous Material – Special Shipping Required$25.76Order now and this item will ship out tomorrowQuantity:In Stock ›Add to Cart365 Day Return Policy123...6>>
hu	wikipedia	N/A	Jordán Adél (Budapest, 1980. szeptember 14. –) magyar színésznő, a Budapesti Katona József Színház tagja. Édesapja Jordán Tamás a Nemzet színésze és Kossuth-díjas színművész, édesanyja Lázár Kati Kossuth-díjas színésznő. Életútja Szülei Lázár Kati és Jordán Tamás. A Színház- és Filmművészeti Egyetemen Máté Gábor tanítványa volt. A diploma átvétele után, 2003-ban az Egri Gárdonyi Géza Színház szerződtette. 2006-ban került a Katona József Színház társulatába. Magánélete Gyermekkora óta az I. kerületi Tabán lakója. Öt évig élt együtt Fenyő Iván színésszel. Férje Keresztes Tamás színművész volt. 2020 januárjában bejelentették szakításukat. Fiuk, Andor 2010. november 6-án született. 2021 augusztusában bejelentette, hogy párkapcsolatban él Székely Kriszta színházrendezővel. Szerepei Színház Film Ez van, Azarel /rövidfilm/ (1995) Közel a szerelemhez (1999) uristen@menny.hu /rövidfilm/ (2000) Csocsó, avagy éljen május elseje! (2001) Jött egy busz... (2003) – Zsuzsi Csak szex és más semmi (2005) – Saci Ulricht /Rövidfilm/ (2006) – Adél Oldalbordák /rövidfilm/ (2006) Jumurdzsák gyűrűje /videójáték/ (2006) – Sárosi Juli S.O.S. szerelem! (2007) – A miniszter szeretője 9 és 1/2 randi (2008) – Merci Kolorádó Kid (2010) – Csóka Joli Aglaja (2012) – Mary Mistral Én is téged, nagyon /rövidfilm/ (2012) – Ibolya Nagyanyám köldöke /rövidfilm/ (2013) – Nagymama, Anya, Feleség Isteni műszak (2013) – Mrs. Steiner lánya Három nagymamám volt /rövidfilm/ (2013) – Narrátor Megdönteni Hajnal Tímeát (2014) – Virág Kőmajmok háza (2014) – Marcsi néni Dumapárbaj (2015) – Barbi Hamlet 360 (2017) Tóth János /tévésorozat/ 14 epizód (2017–2018) – Léna Róma bukása /Rövidfilm/ (2018) – Anya (hang) Nyitva (2018) – Eszter Csak színház és más semmi (2019) Akik maradtak (2019) – Klára anyja Mellékhatás (2020) – Dalma Díjai, elismerései Vastaps-díj - Különdíj (2007) Máthé Erzsi-díj (2007) POSZT, a MASZK Országos Színészegyesület díja - A legjobb női alakítás (2007) Junior Prima díj (2008) Vastaps-díj - legjobb női alakítás (Barbárok, A hős és a csokoládékatona) (2009) Bezerédj-díj (2012) Legjobb mellékszereplő, Vidor fesztivál (A nyaralás), megosztva: Pálos Hannával (2013) Vastaps Alapítvány Díj: Legjobb női epizódszereplő (Sirály) (2016) Színikritkusok díja: Legjobb női mellékszereplő (Ascher Tamás Háromszéken) (2019) Kép és hang Önbizalom növelő tréning Betelefonálós játék Jegyzetek Kapcsolódó fejezetek: Források A budapesti Katona József Színház hivatalos honlapja Adatlapja a Katona József Színház honlapján Vászonra vele További információk RTL Klub: Kismama interjú Magyar színésznők 1980-ban született személyek Máthé Erzsi-díjasok Junior Prima díjasok Élő személyek Bezerédj-díjasok Magyar LMBT színészek
sv	legislation	EU	15.10.2005 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning L 271/7 KOMMISSIONENS FÖRORDNING (EG) nr 1682/2005 av den 14 oktober 2005 om fastställande av högsta stödbelopp för grädde, smör och koncentrerat smör för den 172:a särskilda anbudsinfordran som utförs inom ramen för den stående anbudsinfordran som avses i förordning (EG) nr 2571/97 EUROPEISKA GEMENSKAPERNAS KOMMISSION HAR ANTAGIT DENNA FÖRORDNING med beaktande av Fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen, med beaktande av rådets förordning (EG) nr 1255/1999 av den 17 maj 1999 om den gemensamma organisationen av marknaden för mjölk och mjölkprodukter (1), särskilt artikel 10 i denna, och av följande skäl: (1) I enlighet med kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 2571/97 av den 15 december 1997 om försäljningen av smör till sänkta priser och beviljandet av stöd för grädde, smör och koncentrerat smör avsett att användas i framställningen av konditorivaror, glass och andra livsmedel (2) använder interventionsorganen sig av anbudsinfordran för försäljning av vissa kvantiteter interventionssmör som de innehar och beviljande av stöd för grädde, smör och koncentrerat smör. I artikel 18 i den förordningen fastställs att det med hänsyn till de anbud som inlämnas för varje enskild anbudsinfordran skall bestämmas ett lägsta försäljningspris för smör och ett högsta stödbelopp för grädde, smör och koncentrerat smör som kan varieras enligt det avsedda användningsområdet, fetthalten i smöret och iblandningsförfarandet, eller också skall det fattas beslut om att inget kontrakt skall tilldelas med avseende på en anbudsinfordran. Förädlingssäkerhetens eller -säkerheternas belopp bör bestämmas i enlighet med detta. (2) De åtgärder som föreskrivs i denna förordning är förenliga med yttrandet från Förvaltningskommittén för mjölk och mjölkprodukter. HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE. Artikel 1 För den 172:a särskilda anbudsinfordran inom ramen för den stående anbudsinfordran som avses i förordning (EG) nr 2571/97, skall det högsta stödbeloppet och beloppen på säkerheterna för förädling fastställas enligt tabellen i bilagan. Artikel 2 Denna förordning träder i kraft den 15 oktober 2005. Denna förordning är till alla delar bindande och direkt tillämplig i alla medlemsstater. Utfärdad i Bryssel den 14 oktober 2005. På kommissionens vägnar Mariann FISCHER BOEL Ledamot av kommissionen (1) EGT L 160, 26.6.1999, s. 48. Förordningen senast ändrad genom kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 186/2004 (EUT L 29, 3.2.2004, s. 6). (2) EGT L 350, 20.12.1997, s. 3. Förordningen senast ändrad genom förordning (EG) nr 2250/2004 (EUT L 381, 28.12.2004, s. 25). BILAGA till kommissionens förordning av den 14 oktober 2005 om fastställande av högsta stödbelopp för grädde, smör och koncentrerat smör för den 172:a enskilda anbudsinfordran som utförs inom ramen för den stående anbudsinfordran som avses i förordning (EG) nr 2571/97 (EUR/100 kg) Formel A B Iblandningsförfarande Med spårämnen Utan spårämnen Med spårämnen Utan spårämnen Högsta stödbelopp Smör ≥ 82 % 39 35 39 35 Smör < 82 % 37 34,1 — 34 Koncentrerat smör 46,5 42,6 46,5 42 Grädde — — 19 15 Förädlingssäkerhet Smör 43 — 43 — Koncentrerat smör 51 — 51 — Grädde — — 21 —
de	other	N/A	SR 725.116.22 Verordnung vom 29. Juni 2011 über die Verwendung der zweckgebundenen Mineralölsteuer für Massnahmen im Luftverkehr (MinLV) Verordnung über die Verwendung der zweckgebundenen Mineralölsteuer für Massnahmen im Luftverkehr (MinLV) vom 29. Juni 2011 (Stand am 1. Januar 2016) gestützt auf die Artikel 37a Absatz 2, 37b Absatz 3 und 37c Absatz 2 des Bundesgesetzes vom 22. März 19851 über die Verwendung der zweckgebundenen Mineralölsteuer (MinVG), 1 Diese Verordnung regelt die Gewährung von Beiträgen an die Massnahmen nach Artikel 37a Absatz 1 MinVG. 2 Die Artikel 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Absätze 1, 3 und 4 gelten nicht für: die Beiträge an Ausbildungen nach der Verordnung vom 1. Juli 20152 über die Finanzhilfen für Ausbildungen im Bereich der Luftfahrt (VFAL); die Beiträge des Bundes für die An- und Abflugsicherung auf Regionalflugplätzen nach den Artikeln 29 und 30 der Verordnung vom 18. Dezember 19953 über den Flugsicherungsdienst. 1 Fassung gemäss Ziff. I der V vom 18. Nov. 2015, in Kraft seit 1. Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 4941). 2 SR 748.03 3 SR 748.132.1 Art. 2 Anwendbarkeit des Subventionsgesetzes 2. Abschnitt: Verteilschlüssel und Höhe der Beiträge Art. 3 Verteilschlüssel 1 Der Zeitraum zur Einhaltung des Verteilschlüssels nach Artikel 37a MinVG beträgt 12 Jahre.1 2 Das Bundesamt für Zivilluftfahrt (BAZL) kann vom Verteilschlüssel vorübergehend abweichen: zur Unterstützung von wichtigen, insbesondere rechtlichen und technologischen, Entwicklungen innerhalb der drei Aufgabenbereiche; bei ausserordentlichen Ereignissen, die sofortige Sicherheits- und Umweltschutzmassnahmen im Bereich der Luftfahrt nötig machen. 3 Wird vom Verteilschlüssel abgewichen, so muss sichergestellt werden, dass der Verteilschlüssel über den Zeitraum nach Absatz 1 eingehalten wird. Art. 4 Grundanforderungen an Massnahmen 1 Das BAZL kann Beiträge nur für zweckmässige und wirksame Massnahmen nach den Artikeln 37d–37f MinVG gewähren. 2 Es gewährt die Beiträge aufgrund eines Mehrjahresprogramms. 3 Die Massnahmen nach den Artikeln 37d–37f MinVG müssen ihre Wirkung oder ihren Nutzen in der Schweiz erzielen. Art. 5 Mehrjahresprogramm 1 Das Eidgenössische Departement für Umwelt, Verkehr, Energie und Kommunikation legt im Einvernehmen mit dem Eidgenössischen Finanzdepartement und nach Anhörung der interessierten Kreise das Mehrjahresprogramm fest. Dieses enthält eine mittelfristige Finanzplanung und legt die Schwerpunkte nach Artikel 37a Absatz 3 MinVG fest. 2 Das Mehrjahresprogramm legt für die Bemessung der Beiträge an Massnahmen nach den Artikeln 37d, 37e und 37f Buchstaben b–e MinVG Höchstsätze zwischen 40 und 80 Prozent der anrechenbaren Kosten fest, soweit der Höchstsatz nach Artikel 4 Absatz 1 VFAL1 auf die Beiträge nach Artikel 37f Buchstabe e MinVG nicht anwendbar ist.2 3 Die Dauer eines Mehrjahresprogramms beträgt vier Jahre. 1 SR 748.03 2 Fassung gemäss Ziff. I der V vom 18. Nov. 2015, in Kraft seit 1. Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 4941). 1 Nicht als Kosten einer Massnahme anrechenbar sind insbesondere: Gebühren und andere Abgaben an Behörden; Kosten der Beschaffung und Verzinsung von Kapital. 2 Der Gesuchsteller muss die Kosten belegen. Fallen für wiederkehrende Massnahmen jeweils ungefähr gleich hohe Kosten an, so können die anrechenbaren Kosten aufgrund von Erfahrungswerten bestimmt werden. Art. 7 Bemessung der Beiträge 1 Die Höhe der einzelnen Beiträge bemisst sich nach: dem Nutzen der Massnahme in Bezug auf das Ziel des betreffenden Massnahmenbereichs; der wirtschaftlichen Leistungsfähigkeit des Gesuchstellers; dem Eigeninteresse des Gesuchstellers. 2 Beiträge werden jeweils für ein Kalenderjahr gewährt. 3 Für Massnahmen, deren Dauer über ein Kalenderjahr hinausgeht, werden für jedes Kalenderjahr Teilbeträge festgesetzt. Art. 81Beitragsgesuch 1 Das Beitragsgesuch ist mittels eines Gesuchsformulars beim BAZL einzureichen. Das BAZL stellt das Gesuchsformular zur Verfügung. 2 Das Beitragsgesuch muss die folgenden Angaben enthalten: a. Name und Adresse oder Firmenbezeichnung und Sitz des Gesuchstellers; b. Angaben zur wirtschaftlichen Leistungsfähigkeit des Gesuchstellers; c. Beschreibung der Massnahme und deren Wirksamkeit; d. Beschreibung des Eigeninteresses des Gesuchstellers in Bezug auf die Umsetzung der Massnahme; e. Höhe des beantragten Beitrags; f. detaillierte Zusammenstellung der Kosten; g. Nachweis der Eigenleistungen und Fremdleistungen; h. weitere Finanzierungsquellen sowie Leistungen Dritter; i. Beginn und Abschluss der Massnahme; j. bei Gesuchstellern, die ihren Sitz oder Wohnsitz im Ausland haben: eine dem schweizerischen Handelsregisterauszug gleichwertige Urkunde; k. bei Vereinen, die nicht im Handelsregister eingetragen sind: die Beilage der Statuten; l. Auszug aus dem Betreibungsregister; m. Unterschrift des Gesuchstellers. 3 Das BAZL kann weitere Unterlagen anfordern. 4 Das Gesuch ist spätestens am 30. November für das nachfolgende Jahr einzureichen. Sind Beiträge für mehrjährige Massnahmen nach Artikel 7 Absatz 3 bereits festgelegt, so müssen sie nicht jährlich beantragt werden. 5 Wird eine Massnahme, für die bereits ein Beitrag beantragt oder zugesprochen wurde, wesentlich geändert, so sind die Änderungen dem BAZL mitzuteilen. Art. 9 Prioritätenordnung 1 Übersteigt der Gesamtbetrag der Gesuche, die die Anforderungen nach den Artikeln 4 und 8 erfüllen, die für ein Kalenderjahr verfügbaren Mittel, so erstellt das BAZL gestützt auf das Mehrjahresprogramm eine Prioritätenordnung. 2 Es gibt die Prioritätenordnung den interessierten Kreisen bekannt. Art. 10 Beitragszusicherung 1 Das BAZL entscheidet mit Verfügung über das Gesuch. 2 Übersteigt der beantragte Beitrag fünf Millionen Franken, so entscheidet es im Einvernehmen mit der Eidgenössischen Finanzverwaltung.1 3 Die Verfügung bezeichnet: die Massnahme; die anrechenbaren Kosten; den zugesicherten Betrag oder, bei Teilzahlungen über mehrere Kalenderjahre, die Teilbeträge und den Gesamtbetrag; die für die Auszahlung des Beitrags geltenden Bedingungen und Auflagen, insbesondere die Fristen für den Beginn der Durchführung und den Abschluss der Massnahme; den Zeitpunkt, in dem der Beitrag zur Auszahlung fällig wird. 4 Wird mit der Durchführung der Massnahme nicht innerhalb der in der Zusicherungsverfügung festgelegten Frist begonnen und ist ein fristgerechter Abschluss nicht mehr möglich, so widerruft das BAZL die Zusicherung des Beitrags.3 3 Fassung gemäss Ziff. I der V vom 18. Nov. 2015, in Kraft seit 1. Jan. 2016 (AS 2015 4941). 1 Das BAZL veranlasst die Auszahlung der Beiträge. 2 Für Massnahmen, deren Dauer über ein Kalenderjahr hinausgeht, wird jedes Jahr der entsprechende Teilbetrag ausbezahlt. 1 Die Änderung kann unter AS 2011 3473 konsultiert werden. 1 Am 1. Januar 2012 beginnt der erste Zeitraum zur Einhaltung des Verteilschlüssels (Art. 3). 2 Das Eidgenössische Departement für Umwelt, Verkehr, Energie und Kommunikation kann im Einvernehmen mit dem Eidgenössischen Finanzdepartement die Dauer des bei Inkrafttreten der Änderung vom 18. November 2015 laufenden Mehrjahresprogramms auf höchstens sechs Jahre verlängern.
pl	wikipedia	N/A	Ryan Randle (ur. 21 kwietnia 1981 w Duncanville) – amerykański koszykarz, występujący na pozycjach skrzydłowego oraz środkowego. W 2003 roku został wybrany w drafcie do USBL przez zespół Texas Rim Rockers z numerem 67, w VIII rundzie. W latach 2004–2005 reprezentował Cleveland Cavaliers w trzech letnich ligach NBA. 19 września 2006 roku został wybrany w III rundzie draftu – Expansion NBA Development League Draft przez zespół Anaheim Arsenal. Osiągnięcia College Mistrz NCAA (2002) Wicemistrz NJCAA (2001) Mistrz Maryland JUCO (2000) 2-krotny uczestnik rozgrywek Sweet Sixteen turnieju NCAA (2002, 2003) Zaliczony od składów: NCAA All-Atlantic Coast Conference Third Team (2003) NJCAA All-Maryland JC Athletic Conference (2001) Drużynowe Mistrz Cypru (2007) Wicemistrz Polski (2004) Zdobywca pucharu: Polski (2004, 2005) Cypru (2008) Indywidualne Uczestnik: meczu gwiazd Polska - Gwiazdy PLK (2004) meczu gwiazd PLK (2005) meczu gwiazd Eurochallenge (2008) konkursu wsadów PLK (2004) Lider PLK w skuteczności rzutów z gry (2004) Zwycięzca konkursu wsadów podczas meczu gwiazd EuroChallenge (2007) Przypisy Bibliografia Linki zewnętrzne Profil na plk.pl Statystyki z Europy na basketball-reference.com Statystyki z D-League na basketball-reference.com Statystyki akademickie sports-reference.com Profil na espn.go.com Profil na draftexpress.com Profil na pzkosz.pl Profil na foxsports.com Profil na fibaeurope.com Profil na bgbasket.com Profil na plkhistory.ugu.pl Amerykańscy koszykarze Koszykarze Śląska Wrocław Koszykarze Fayetteville Patriots Koszykarze AEL Limassol Urodzeni w 1981
es	wikipedia	N/A	Marshall es una ciudad ubicada en el Área censal de Wade Hampton en el estado estadounidense de Alaska. En el Censo de 2010 tenía una población de 414 habitantes y una densidad poblacional de 34,86 personas por km2. Geografía Marshall se encuentra en las coordenadas . Según la Oficina del Censo de los Estados Unidos, Marshall tiene una superficie total de 11.88 km2, de la cual 11.87 km2 corresponden a tierra firme y (0.09%) 0.01 km2 es agua. Demografía Según el censo de 2010, había 414 personas residiendo en Marshall. La densidad de población era de 34,86 hab./km2. De los 414 habitantes, Marshall estaba compuesto por el 2.66% blancos, el 0% eran afroamericanos, el 94.69% eran amerindios, el 0.24% eran asiáticos, el 0% eran isleños del Pacífico, el 0% eran de otras razas y el 2.42% pertenecían a dos o más razas. Del total de la población el 0.24% eran hispanos o latinos de cualquier raza. Localidades adyacentes El siguiente diagrama muestra a las localidades más próximas a Marshall. Referencias Enlaces externos Ciudades de Alaska Localidades del Área censal de Wade Hampton
hu	wikipedia	N/A	A Naughty Dog, Inc. egy amerikai videójáték fejlesztő cég, melynek székhelye a kaliforniai Santa Monicában található. A vállalatot 1986-ban alapította Andy Gavin és Jason Rubin független fejlesztőként, a Sony Computer Entertainment 2001-ben felvásárolta a céget. Gavin és Rubin, olyan viszonylag sikeresebbnek mondható játékoknál működött közre, mint a Rings of Power Sega Genesisre vagy a Way of the Warrior 3DO-ra. Az utóbbinak köszönhetően aláírták Universal Interactive Studios szerződését, amely három játékot és a cég bővítését eredményezte. Mark Cerny, a Sonic the Hedgehog 2 producere meggyőzte a Naughty Dog vezetőit, hogy az új erőforrásaikat egy szereplő alapú platformjáték létrehozására összpontosítsák, amely teljes mértékben kiaknázná az új rendszer 3D képességeit. Ez végül a Crash Bandicoot 1996. augusztus 31-i megjelenését eredményezte a PlayStation játékpalettáján. A Naughty Dog három Crash Bandicoot folytatást készített el az elkövetkezendő néhány évben. 2001 januárjában bejelentésre került, hogy a Sony fel fogja vásárolni a Naughty Dogot. A Crash Team Racing fejlesztésének befejeztével a vállalat belefogott a Jak and Daxter sorozat készítésébe PlayStation 2 játékkonzolra. 2004-ben a Naughty Dog stúdió elnöke és társalapítója Jason Rubin kilépett a cégből, hogy az Iron and the Maiden című projektjén dolgozhasson. A belsős játékfejlesztési csapatukon kívül a Naughty Dog ad otthont az ICE Teamnek, a Sony World Wide Studios egyik központi technológiai részlegének. A cég első PlayStation 3 címe, az Uncharted: Drake’s Fortune 2007-ben jelent meg, a folytatása, az Uncharted 2: Among Thieves 2009-ben, míg a harmadik rész, az Uncharted 3: Drake’s Deception 2011-ben. Történelme Alapítás Jason Rubin és Andy Gavin középiskolás diákok, akiknek volt némi tapasztalata a Lisp és a C++ programozási nyelvekkel, társultak és 1986-ban megalapították a Jam Software játékfejlesztő céget. Rubin és Gavin úgy döntött, hogy az Apple II számítógépre fogják elkészíteni első videójátékukat, ami egy síelős játék lett volna. A játék fejlesztése alatt Gavin véletlenül felülírta a játék egyetlen példányát bootleg játékokkal. Rubin ekkor egy új síelős játékban kezdett Ski Crazed néven (eredetileg Ski Stud). Mivel a játék lassan futott, ezért Gavin újraprogramozta, hogy nagyobb sebesség mellett fusson. A játékot később a Baudville adta ki, ami 250 amerikai dollárért vette meg a játékot a Jam Softwaretől. Rubin és Gavin ekkor az Apple IIGS-re készített el egy grafikus kalandjátékot Dream Zone címen, amely 1988-ban jelent meg, majd átportolták Atari ST és Amiga rendszerekre, valamint személyi számítógépekre. Naughty Dog 1989-ben Rubin és Gavin újabb játékot készített el Keef the Thief néven, melyet az Electronic Arts adott ki Apple IIGS-re, Amigára és személyi számítógépekre. A friss indulás és a Baudville közötti kapcsolat feloszlatása érdekében Rubin és Gavin átnevezte a Jam Softwaret Naughty Dogra. A kilencvenes évek elején a Naughty Dog elkészítette a Rings of Powert, melyet az Electronic Arts adott ki Mega Drivera 1991-ben. Akkoriban Rubin és Gavin egyetemre járt és a cég a csőd szélén járt. Rubin és Gavin (néhány barátjával) elkészítette a Way of the Warriort 3DO Interactive Multiplayer rendszerre, amit megmutattak a Universal Interactive Studios (a mára már megszűnt Vivendi Games) fejének, Mark Cernynek. Cerny elégedett volt a Way of the Warriorral és egy szerződést ajánlott a Naughty Dognak, hogy létrehozzanak három újabb játékot a Universal Interactive Studios felügyelete alatt. Rubin és Gavin felvetette egy háromdimenziós akció-platformjáték ötletét. Mivel a játékosnak folyamatosan a szereplő hátsó felét kellett néznie, ezért a játék kódneve „Sonic’s Ass Game” volt. A játék fejlesztése 1994-ben indult, amikor a Naughty Dog kibővítette az alkalmazottainak számát és egy „Goal Oriented Object LISP” nevű fejlesztési eszközbe fektette a pénzt. Charles Zembillas és Joe Pearson karikaturistákat kérték fel a játék szereplőinek megalkotására, melynek eredményeként megszületett a játék főszereplője, Crash Bandicoot. Tizennégy hónap fejlesztés után a játékot megmutatták a Sony Computer Entertainmentnek, ami elvállalta annak forgalmazását. A Crash Bandicootot a először az E3 rendezvényen mutatták be és a PlayStation konzol egyik legsikeresebb videójátéka lett a maga több, mint 6,8 millió eladott példányával. Kapcsolatok Insomniac Mivel egyazon épületben dolgozott a két cég a Universal Interactive Studiosnál, ezért a Naughty Dogot és az Insomniac Gamest szoros kapcsolat fűzi egymáshoz. Mark Cerny producer mindkét cégnél dolgozott. Hasonló típusú játékokat készítettek; a kilencvenes évek végén a Naughty Dog Crash Bandicoot sorozata és az Insomniac Spyro the Dragon sorozata eredetileg mind kitalált világban játszódó platformjáték volt a PlayStation konzolra. A PlayStation 2 megjelenésével a két sorozat a Universal (jelenleg az Activision) kezében maradt, és a két fejlesztő folytatta a barátságos versengést miután elkészítették új franchiseaikat (Jak and Daxter és Ratchet & Clank). A PlayStation 3 megjelenésével mindkét fejlesztő nézőpontot váltott; a Naughty Dog az Uncharted akció-kaland sorozatával, míg az Insomniac Resistance sci-fi first-person shooter sorozatával, bár az utóbbi továbbra is folytatta a Ratchet and Clank sorozatát. A Naughty Dog és az Insomniac is azt állítja, hogy nem terveznek közös játékot, annak ellenére sem, hogy az Activisionnél vannak mind a Crash Bandicoot és mind a Spyro the Dragon sorozat szereplőinek kiadási jogai. Ugyan több crossover játék is megjelent, amelyben mindkét sorozat szereplői megjelennek, míg a Sony PlayStation Move Heroes PlayStation 3-as játékában szerepelnek a Jak and Daxter és a Ratchet and Clank szereplői, valamint a Sucker Punch Sly Cooper játékának karakterei is. Sem a Naughty Dognak sem az Insomniac sem volt semmi beleszólása ezen játékokba. Ready at Dawn 2003-ban Didier Malenfant kilépett a Naughty Dogból, hogy megalapítsa saját fejlesztő stúdióját, a Ready at Dawnt a Blizzard Entertainment több korábbi tagjával. Az első projektjük a Daxter volt PlayStation Portablere, melyet pozitív fogadtatásban részesítettek. Egyéb vállalatok Az Uncharted sorozat stáblistáján látható az SCE Japan, a Sony Santa Monica, a Guerrilla Games, a Sucker Punch Productions, a Media Molecule, a Zipper Interactive, a Bungie és az Incognito Games is. Az Insomniac azt állította, hogy a Sony belső fejlesztő stúdiói technológiai részleteket és ötleteket szoktak megosztani egymás között. Játékai JAM Software-ként Naughty Dogként Források További információk A Naughty Dog weboldala Az Amerikai Egyesült Államok videójáték-fejlesztő cégei
en	wikipedia	N/A	Interstate 78 (I-78) is an east–west route stretching from Union Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, to New York City. In New Jersey, I-78 is called the Phillipsburg–Newark Expressway and the Newark Bay–Hudson County Extension of the New Jersey Turnpike. The highway runs for in the northern part of the state of New Jersey from the I-78 Toll Bridge over the Delaware River at the Pennsylvania state line in Phillipsburg, Warren County, east to the Holland Tunnel under the Hudson River at the New York state line in Jersey City, Hudson County. The Phillipsburg–Newark Expressway portion of I-78, formally called the Lightning Division Memorial Highway, runs from the Phillipsburg area east across rural areas of western New Jersey before entering suburban areas in Somerset County. The road crosses the Watchung Mountains, widening into a local–express lane configuration at Route 24 as it continues through urban areas to Newark. Here, I-78 intersects the mainline of the New Jersey Turnpike (I-95) and becomes the Newark Bay Extension, crossing the Newark Bay Bridge and continuing to Jersey City. The route, along with Route 139, follows a one-way pair of surface streets to the Holland Tunnel. In 1927, Route 11 was legislated as a high-speed bypass of US Route 22 (US 22) between Whitehouse and Warren Township but was never built. The earliest parts of I-78 to be built were the Holland Tunnel in 1927 and the Newark Bay Extension. With the creation of the Interstate Highway System in the 1950s, a highway was planned along US 22 through northern New Jersey, becoming I-78 in 1958. The highway between Phillipsburg and Newark was built in various stages from the 1960s to 1989, with the final segment opening at the I-78 Toll Bridge. The section of highway through the Watchung Mountains and across Newark garnered opposition from environmentalists and residents who were worried about the effects of the highway. In addition, there was opposition to building I-78 through Phillipsburg, which resulted in the alignment to the south of the Lehigh Valley. In the 2000s, I-78 was completely rebuilt between Route 24 and the Garden State Parkway. In addition, missing movements between the parkway and I-78 were completed in 2010. Route description Warren and Hunterdon counties I-78 enters New Jersey from Pennsylvania on the I-78 Toll Bridge over the Delaware River and the Belvidere and Delaware River Railway, heading into Phillipsburg, Warren County. The highway heads south into agricultural areas as a six-lane freeway that is maintained by the Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission (DRJTBC), entering Pohatcong Township a short distance after the river. The freeway makes a turn to the east as it briefly passes through a corner of Alpha before coming back into Pohatcong Township. Bypassing the center of Alpha to the south, I-78 passes under Norfolk Southern Railway's Lehigh Line and has two more segments that enter the Alpha borough limits before coming to an interchange with US 22 and the western terminus of Route 173. At this point, US 22 forms a concurrency with I-78 and the road comes into Greenwich Township. At this point, the New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) takes over maintenance of the road. I-78/US 22 continue east through Greenwich Township, coming to a westbound exit and eastbound entrance with County Route 637 (CR 637). The road turns southeast and has an eastbound exit and westbound entrance with CR 632 in Franklin Township. Within the ramps for this interchange, there are weigh stations in both directions. A short distance after this interchange, I-78/US 22 crosses the Musconetcong River into Bloomsbury, Hunterdon County. In Bloomsbury, the road has an interchange with Route 173. After this interchange, the freeway enters Bethlehem Township, with Route 173 closely running to the north of I-78/ US22. The road comes to a bridge over Norfolk Southern Railway's Central Running Track line and has rest areas in both directions before it passes over Norfolk Southern Railway's Lehigh Line and turns southeast to cross Musconetcong Mountain. As the freeway crosses Jugtown Mountain, there is an automatic deicing spray, the first such to be installed in New Jersey. The freeway turns east again and enters Union Township, coming to an interchange with CR 614 and Route 173. From here, I-78/US 22 continue east directly to the south of Route 173, coming to another interchange with that route as well as CR 625. Entering more commercial areas, Route 173 merges onto I-78/US 22 at exit 13. At exit 15, the highway interchanges with CR 513, and Route 173 splits from I-78/US 22 by heading north on CR 513. At this point, the freeway enters Franklin Township briefly at exit 15 and then enters Clinton where it crosses the South Branch Raritan River. I-78/US 22 turns northeast and leaves Clinton for Clinton Township, where it has an eastbound exit and westbound entrance for Route 173 that also provides access to Route 31. Immediately after is the interchange with Route 31. At the next interchange near the community of Annandale, US 22 splits from I-78 onto a four-lane surface highway, heading closely to the south of that route. Immediately after the split, I-78 passes over NJ Transit's Raritan Valley Line and runs through rural areas with increasing suburban development. The freeway runs through Lebanon, where an exit for CR 639 provides access to the town and the Round Valley Recreation Area. After running through Clinton Township again and into Readington Township, US 22 turns southeast while I-78 continues a due east course. In Tewksbury Township, there is an interchange with CR 523 that also provides access to CR 517. After this exit, the highway crosses back into Readington Township. Somerset and Union counties After crossing the Lamington River, I-78 comes into Bedminster, Somerset County, continuing east through more woods and farms with some suburban residential areas. Upon entering Somerset County, there is an exit for CR 665 (signed as CR 523 Spur). The next interchange, exit 29, is called the Vincent R. Kramer Interchange. It is at I-287, which serves as a bypass around New York City. At this point, I-78 carries four eastbound lanes and three westbound lanes as the median widens. The road enters wooded suburban areas and crosses Second Watchung Mountain, running through a corner of Bridgewater Township, where there is a westbound scenic overlook, before coming into Bernards Township. The eastbound direction narrows back to three lanes before the interchange with CR 525, at which point the freeway crosses into Warren Township. The road heads east along the southern bank of the Dead River, coming to exit 36 for CR 651. I-78 heads farther south of the Dead River as it comes to the CR 531 interchange. Past CR 531, the highway turns to the northeast and comes to an interchange with Drift Road/Dale Road that provides access to US 22. At this point, I-78 runs across Second Watchung Mountain again. The freeway crosses Green Brook into Berkeley Heights, Union County, reaching exits for CR 655 and CR 640. The latter is an eastbound exit and entrance that also provides access to parallel CR 527. At this point, I-78 runs between Second Watchung Mountain to the northwest and the Watchung Reservation to the southeast. Along the reservation border, the road passes under Nikesite Road before coming into Summit, where there is an overpass that serves as a wildlife crossing. There is an eastbound exit and westbound entrance with CR 527 as it heads away from the Watchung Reservation and into more suburban surroundings. It briefly forming the border between Summit to the northwest and Mountainside to the southeast before coming into Springfield Township. The freeway passes near First Watchung Mountain before coming to the Route 24 interchange, where suburban development becomes more dense. At Route 24, I-78 divides into local–express lanes, with three express and three local lanes eastbound and two express and three local lanes westbound. In this section of the highway, most access is via the local lanes, though the next exit for Route 124 includes a direct westbound onramp to the express lanes. Before Route 124, I-78 briefly runs east through Millburn in Essex County and Springfield Township again before entering Union Township at the interchange. Past Route 124, I-78 carries a 3-2-2-3–lane configuration and comes to partial interchanges with CR 630 and CR 633. The next interchange along the highway provides access to the Garden State Parkway along the border of Union Township and Hillside. The road turns northeast again into Hillside, heading into more urbanized settings. In Hillside, I-78 passes under Conrail Shared Assets Operations's Irvington Industrial Track line and has an eastbound exit and westbound entrance to Winans Avenue. Essex and Hudson counties I-78 briefly passes through a corner of Irvington in Essex County before continuing into Newark. Upon entering Newark, the road has an interchange serving CR 602 and Wainwright Street. Following this, the freeway passes near urban neighborhoods before coming to exit 56. This large semi-directional T interchange was originally meant to serve the unbuilt Route 75, which would have connected to I-280. The large flyover ramps constructed were converted to exit ramps to Irvine Turner Boulevard with full access to the local and express lanes. Past this, the roadway passes over Conrail Shared Assets Operations's Lehigh Line (which also carries NJ Transit's Raritan Valley Line), Route 27, and Amtrak's Northeast Corridor. The final interchange on the free part of I-78 is the massive complex to the north of the Newark Liberty International Airport, called the Newark Airport Interchange, with ramps to and from US 1/9, US 22, Route 21, and many local roads. Several ramps provide access to the express lanes. Just to the east, the local and express lanes rejoin at the toll gate for the New Jersey Turnpike, at which point I-78 becomes maintained by the New Jersey Turnpike Authority, following the Newark Bay Extension of the New Jersey Turnpike. An interchange just beyond the toll booth provides full access to I-95, the mainline of the New Jersey Turnpike. I-78 here becomes a four-lane highway, heading over the New Jersey Turnpike and Conrail Shared Assets Operations's Chemical Coast Secondary and Corbin Street Lead lines before passing by the Port Newark–Elizabeth Marine Terminal. I-78 crosses the Newark Bay on the Newark Bay Bridge into Bayonne, Hudson County. As it enters Jersey City, exit 14A, numbered as part of the New Jersey Turnpike, provides access to Route 440. Within this interchange, the road passes over Conrail Shared Assets Operations's Bayonne Industrial Track and Greenville Industrial Track lines. From here, the freeway turns northeast on an elevated alignment and passes industrial areas of Jersey City, with Conrail Shared Assets Operations's National Docks Branch line parallel to the northwest. The next interchange, exit 14B, is for Bayview Avenue and provides access to Liberty State Park. After this interchange, I-78 comes to exit 14C, the number given to the toll plaza at the end of the turnpike extension. After the toll plaza, there is an exit for a park and ride lot at the Liberty State Park station along NJ Transit's Hudson–Bergen Light Rail line. Continuing north, the road passes over the Hudson–Bergen Light Rail line before there is an exit for Columbus Drive and Montgomery Street. Past this interchange, the highway crosses PATH's Newark–World Trade Center line. I-78 heads down to surface level and passes over Conrail Shared Assets Operations's National Docks Branch line twice before it merges with the Route 139 freeway. From here, I-78 and Route 139 pass through business areas as a one-way pair that follows six-lane 12th Street eastbound and six-lane 14th Street westbound. This segment of the route is under the jurisdiction of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) and is also known as Boyle Plaza. It runs on surface streets with traffic lights, an example of a non–limited-access section of Interstate Highway. The first intersection is with Jersey Avenue, which heads to Downtown Jersey City and Hoboken. It intersects with the one-way northbound CR 633 (Erie Street) next before crossing one-way southbound CR 635 (Grove Street). After Grove Street, the road crosses CR 637 (Luis Muñoz Marín Boulevard) near Newport Centre just to the south. Past this intersection, the eastbound direction comes to the toll plaza for the Holland Tunnel. From here, the concurrency enters the Holland Tunnel under the Hudson River, which carries two lanes in each direction. Route 139 ends at the New Jersey–New York state line within the tunnel and I-78 continues into the New York City borough of Manhattan. History The oldest section of I-78, the Holland Tunnel, was established in September 1927. The tunnel predated the Interstate Highway System, as a commuter route linking Jersey City and Manhattan. Six months after it was opened, 3.66 million passengers had used the tunnel. In 1927, Route 11 had been legislated as a high-speed bypass of US 22, running from Route 28 in Whitehouse east to Route 29 in Warren Township, roughly following the alignment of present-day I-78; it was never built. The Newark Bay Extension of the New Jersey Turnpike was the first limited-access section of I-78 to be built in the state of New Jersey. The long expressway was opened in 1956 to provide access from the New Jersey Turnpike mainline to the Holland Tunnel. At this time, the Interstate Highway System was established and a route was planned to run east–west from the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, area to New York City, running across the northern part of New Jersey from Phillipsburg to Jersey City along the US 22 corridor. This freeway was originally planned as FAI Corridor 102 and I-80 before it became I-78 in 1958. The part of I-78 between exit 3 and exit 13 opened in the 1960s; this segment runs concurrent with US 22 with the old alignment of US 22 becoming Route 173. In building the road between CR 614 and exit 13, the eastbound lanes of US 22 became westbound I-78 and the westbound lanes of US 22 became the Route 173 frontage road. By 1969, I-78 had also been completed between exit 13 and CR 525. In July 1963, New Jersey Governor Richard J. Hughes approved a plan to build I-78 through the city of Newark at a cost of $205 million (equivalent to $ in ). This plan had been opposed by several communities along the route. The section of I-78 between Route 24 and the New Jersey Turnpike was completed in the mid-1970s. Along this stretch, exit 56 was to connect to the proposed Route 75 freeway, which was never built. The section of freeway between CR 525 and Drift Road (exit 41) in Watchung was completed in 1974. The section from Drift Road to Route 24 (exit 48) in Springfield Township was delayed because of environmental impacts to the Watchung Reservation. In order to mitigate opposition to the original plan, that was shifted closer to the northern edge of the Reservation, which required extensive cuts into the Second Watchung Mountain. Extra land was added to the Nikesite Road overpass and a separate elevated wildlife crossing was built to allow for animal migration. The road was also designed to use a narrower right-of-way with no median strip and just a Jersey barrier dividing the highway, to minimize the amount of rock to be removed. This stretch of I-78 opened in 1986. A section of I-78 in Newark was closed off in August 1989 when a debris pile under a bridge caught fire and damaged the elevated highway. The road was opened nine days after the fire occurred. The westernmost section of I-78 in New Jersey opened in November 1989 after a more northerly alignment along present day US 22 through Phillipsburg was rejected due to community opposition. This led to I-78 being rerouted to the south of the Lehigh Valley in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The additional length of roadway that resulted from this rerouting is the reason exit numbers 3 through 52 (which were assigned before this westernmost section opened) are mismatched by approximately when compared to their corresponding milemarker. I-78, like many other highways in New Jersey, once had solar powered emergency callboxes every , however, with the advent of cellphones, the usage of these callboxes became extremely limited. To save on maintenance costs, the NJDOT removed these call boxes in 2005. In 2006–2007 the highway between Route 24 (exit 48) and the Garden State Parkway (exit 52) was rebuilt. This included redecking of bridge decks and covering the deteriorated concrete pavement with an asphalt overlay. Exit 52 was reconstructed due to missing ramps from the Garden State Parkway and I-78 since the I-278 connection was canceled. Construction began in June 2008, with the ramp from the northbound Garden State Parkway to westbound I-78 being completed in September 2009. The connection between the southbound Garden State Parkway and eastbound I-78 was completed in December 2010. In 2012–2013, the deteriorating concrete surface of I-78 between the Garden State Parkway (exit 52) and US 1/9 and US 22 (exit 57) was resurfaced with an asphalt overlay; this had been the last section of I-78 within New Jersey that was still concrete. Exit list See also References External links I-78 in New Jersey Exits Photos of Interstate 78 at New Jersey Roads Speed Limits for New Jersey State Roads: Interstate 78 A history of the building of I-78 in NJ I-78 (Greater New York Roads) New Jersey 78 Transportation in Warren County, New Jersey Transportation in Hunterdon County, New Jersey Transportation in Somerset County, New Jersey Transportation in Union County, New Jersey Transportation in Essex County, New Jersey Transportation in Hudson County, New Jersey New Jersey Turnpike Holland Tunnel
es	caselaw	EU	21.12.2002 ES Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas C 323/27 Recurso interpuesto el 8 de noviembre de 2002 contra la La parte demandante solicita al Tribunal de Justicia que: República Portuguesa por la Comisión de las Comunida- des Europeas 1. declare que, al no haber adoptado las medidas necesarias (Asunto C-393/02) para asegurar, respecto al vertedero de La Bañeza, León, la aplicación de los artículos 4, 9 y 13 de la Directiva 75/ (2002/C 323/39) 442/CEE (1) del Consejo, de 15 de julio de 1975, relativa a los residuos, modificada por la Directiva 91/156/CEE (2) del Consejo, de 18 de marzo, el Reino de España ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud En el Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas se ha de la citada Directiva; presentado el 8 de noviembre de 2002 un recurso contra la República Portuguesa formulado por la Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas, representada por la Sra. C. Tufvesson 2. condene en costas al Reino de España. y el Sr. M. França, en calidad de agentes, que designa domicilio en Luxemburgo. La parte demandante solicita al Tribunal de Justicia que: — Declare que la República Portuguesa ha incumplido las Motivos y principales alegaciones: obligaciones que le incumben en virtud de la Directiva 1999/42/CE ( 1) del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 7 de junio de 1999, por la que se establece un mecanismo — Violación del artículo 9 de la directiva 75/442/CEE: de reconocimiento de títulos respecto de las actividades Aunque las autoridades españolas en respuesta a la carta profesionales a que se refieren las Directivas de liberaliza- de emplazamiento y al dictamen motivado, respectiva- ción y de medidas transitorias, al no haber adoptado las mente, sostuvieron que el vertedero de La Bañeza estaba disposiciones legales, reglamentarias y administrativas autorizado en los años 79/80 y que cumplía los requisitos necesarias para dar cumplimiento a lo dispuesto en dicha establecidos, estas autoridades no han transmitido nunca Directiva o, en cualquier caso, al no haberlas comunicado copia de la citada autorización. Consiguientemente, la a la Comisión. Comisión considera que, en ausencia de notificación de dicha información, la autorización no existe o, en caso de — Condene en costas a la República Portuguesa. que existiera, que la misma no debe ser conforme con las prescripciones exigidas por el artículo 9 de la directiva 75/442/CEE. Motivos y principales alegaciones Por otra parte, la obligación de obtener una autorización termina únicamente con el cierre definitivo o sellado del El plazo para la adaptación del Derecho interno a la Directiva vertedero, y en la fecha final del plazo concedido por el expiró el 31 de julio de 2001. dictamen motivado el vertedero de La Bañeza seguía abierto, a la espera de la construcción del Centro de ( 1) DO L 201 de 31.7.1999, p. 77. Tratamiento de Residuos de San Román de la Vega. — Violación del artículo 4 de la directiva 75/442/CEE: Si bien las autoridades españolas afirman haber realizado diferentes obras de acondicionamiento para «mejorar» las deficientes condiciones del vertedero en causa, éste sigue Recurso interpuesto el 11 de noviembre de 2002 contra en funcionamiento y su deficiente situación sigue persis- el Reino de España por la Comisión de las Comunidades tiendo en la actualidad, entrañando una paulatina degra- Europeas dación del medio ambiente y ocasionando serios proble- mas a la población que vive en su entorno. (Asunto C-398/02) (2002/C 323/40) — Violación del artículo 13 de la directiva 75/442/CEE: Aunque, en virtud del artículo 14 de la directiva 1999/ 31/CE ( 3), el Anexo II de dicha directiva no sea inmediata- mente aplicable a los vertederos existentes, su contenido En el Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas se ha sirve para comprender la naturaleza de las inspecciones presentado el 11 de noviembre de 2002 un recurso contra el periódicas a las que hace referencia el artículo 13 de la Reino de España formulado por la Comisión de las Comunida- directiva 75/442/CEE. Las autoridades españolas no han des Europeas, representada por los Sres. G. Valero Jordana y respondido a la solicitud de transmitir una información M. Konstantinidis, que designa como domicilio en Luxem- detallada sobre las inspecciones efectuadas ni aportado burgo. pruebas al respecto, hasta el punto de que en su respuesta ---pagebreak--- C 323/28 ES Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas 21.12.2002 al dictamen motivado no hacen referencia alguna a esta las autoridades francesas están obligadas a adoptar un procedi- cuestión. miento de reconocimiento mutuo de los títulos obtenidos en otros Estados miembros, como exigen estas dos Directivas. ( 1) D0 L 194 de 25.7.75, p. 39, EEE: capítulo 15, tomo 1, p. 129. ( 2) DO L 78 de 26.3.91, p. 32. El mecanismo de asimilación organizado por los Decretos sin ( 3) DO L 182 de 16.7.1999, p. 1. tener en cuenta lo dispuesto en la Directivas 89/48 y 92/81 se basa únicamente en el examen de los títulos presentados por los candidatos y no prevé el cómputo de la experiencia eventualmente adquirida en el ejercicio de la profesión para compensar una eventual diferencia en la duración o el contenido de la formación sancionada con estos títulos. Ahora Recurso interpuesto el 12 de noviembre de 2002 contra bien, os Estados miembros están obligados a tener en cuenta la República Francesa por la Comisión de las Comunidades la experiencia profesional eventual del candidato a efectos de Europeas la asimilación del título obtenido en otro Estado miembro y el acceso a la profesión regulada de que se trate. (Asunto C-402/02) (1 ) Directiva 89/48/CEE del Consejo, de 21 de diciembre de 1988, (2002/C 323/41) relativa a un sistema general de reconocimiento de los títulos de enseñanza superior que sancionan formaciones profesionales de una duración mínima de tres años (DO L 019, p. 16). En el Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas se ha (2 ) Directiva 92/51/CEE del Consejo, de 18 de junio de 1992, relativa presentado el 12 de noviembre de 2002 un recurso contra a un segundo sistema general de reconocimiento de formaciones profesionales, que completa la Directiva 89/48/CEE (DO L 209, República Francesa formulado por la Comisión de las Comuni- p. 25). dades Europeas, representada por la Sra. M. Patakia y el Sr. D. Martin, en calidad de agentes, que designa domicilio en Luxemburgo. La Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas solicita al Tribunal de Justicia que: — Declare que República Francesa ha incumplido las obliga- Recurso interpuesto el 12 de noviembre de 2002 contra ciones que le incumben en virtud de las Directivas 89/48/ el Reino Unido por la Comisión de las Comunidades CEE (1) y 92//51/CEE (2) y del artículo 39 CE, al no Europeas adoptar un procedimiento de reconocimiento mutuo de títulos, a efectos del acceso a la profesión de educador (Asunto C-405/02) especializado en la función pública hospitalaria, por una parte, y en la función pública territorial, por otra parte, y al mantener una normativa nacional y una práctica de la (2002/C 323/42) comisión de asimilación de títulos que no tiene en cuenta la experiencia profesional de los trabajadores migrantes. — Condene en costas a República Francesa. En el Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas se ha presentado el 12 de noviembre de 2002 un recurso contra el Reino Unido formulado por la Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas, representada por las Sras. Maria Patakia y Karen Motivos y principales alegaciones Banks, en calidad de agentes, que designa domicilio en Luxemburgo. A efectos de las Directivas 89/48/CEE y 92/51/CEE se considera que una profesión está regulada en un Estado miembro cuando está autorizada en él y el acceso a ella o su ejercicio se La demandante solicita al Tribunal de Justicia que: reserva a las personas que cumplan los requisitos legales que determinan, directa o indirectamente, el régimen de esta 1. Declare que el Reino Unido ha incumplido las obligacio- profesión. A este respecto carece de pertinencia el hecho de nes que le incumben en virtud de la Directiva 1999/42/ que el acceso a una profesión similar en el sector privado o CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 7 de junio asociativo no esté supeditado al mismo requisito. Asimismo, de 1999, por la que se establece un mecanismo de la afirmación hecha por las autoridades francesa en su reconocimiento de títulos respecto de las actividades respuesta al dictamen motivado, en el sentido de que una profesionales a que se refieren las Directivas de liberaliza- profesión únicamente está «regulada» si está sometida a un ción y de medidas transitorias ( 1), al no adoptar las requisito de titulación que se desprenda de una disposición disposiciones legales, reglamentarias y administrativas general de carácter legislativo es jurídicamente erróneo. Puesto necesarias para atenerse a dicha Directiva, o, en todo que las Directivas 86/48 y 92/51 se aplican en materia de caso, al no haberlas comunicado a la Comisión. acceso a la profesión regulada de educador especializado en la función pública hospitalaria y en la función pública territorial, 2. Condene en costas al Reino Unido.
en	wikipedia	N/A	The Building at 399 West Fullerton Parkway is a historic apartment building at 399 West Fullerton Parkway in the Lincoln Park neighborhood of Chicago, Illinois. Built in 1926, the seventeen-story building was developed and marketed as luxury cooperative apartments for Chicago's affluent residents. Cooperative apartments, in which residents were part owners of the building and controlled its management and who could buy units, became popular with Chicago's upper class in the 1920s due in part to successful marketing by developers. The apartments at 399 West Fullerton offered an attractive location with lakeside views and modern amenities, including parking space and chauffeur service for the increasingly popular automobile. Architects McNally and Quinn designed the French Renaissance Revival building; their design includes a brick exterior with classically ornamented stone on the first three stories, decorative balustrades and window surrounds on the upper floors, and two small, steep hip roofs atop the projected sections of the facade. The building was added to the National Register of Historic Places on May 22, 2007. References Residential buildings on the National Register of Historic Places in Chicago Apartment buildings in Chicago Renaissance Revival architecture in Illinois Residential buildings completed in 1926
sv	wikipedia	N/A	Sorgskogssångare (Geothlypis philadelphia) är en nordamerikansk fågel i familjen skogssångare inom ordningen tättingar. Vintertid flyttar den till södra Centralamerika och nordvästligaste Sydamerika. Kännetecken Utseende Sorgskogssångaren är en 13–15 cm skogssångare med relativt lång kropp och kort stjärt. I fjäderdräkten är den olivgrön ovan, gul under och med grå huva. Den är mycket lik västligare släktingen gråhuvad skogssångare (G. tolmiei), men denna är något mindre och mer långstjärtad och har framför allt en tydlig, bruten vit ögonring. De blekaste individerna har till skillnad från sorgskogssångaren helt grå huva och vitaktig strupe, ej brutet bröstband och gul strupe. Läten Sången är djup och fyllig och återges i engelsk litteratur som "churree churree churree turi turi", medan lätet beskrivs som ett "pwich", i flykten ett ljust "svit". Utbredning och systematik Sorgskogssångaren häckar i sydöstra Kanada och nordöstra USA och övervintrar från Nicaragua till nordvästra Sydamerika. Tillfälligt har den påträffats på Grönland. Den behandlas som monotypisk, det vill säga att den inte delas in i några underarter. Släktestillhörighet Tidigare placerades arten i släktet Oporornis, men DNA-studier visar att arterna i släktet inte är varandras närmaste släktingar. Sorgskogssångaren står närmare gulhakarna i Geothlypis än typarten för Opororonis, connecticutskogssångare och förs numera allmänt dit. Levnadssätt Sorgskogssångaren häckar i tät undervegetation som al och björnbärssnår i skogsgläntor, vanligen i fuktiga områden. Där ses den hoppa på marken (liknande connecticutskogssångaren går) efter insekter och andra leddjur, framför allt spindlar. Fågeln häckar från maj till början av september, men huvudsakligen slutet av juni till augusti. Status och hot Arten har ett stort utbredningsområde och en stor population, men tros minska i antal, dock inte tillräckligt kraftigt för att anses vara hotad. Utifrån dessa kriterier kategoriserar internationella naturvårdsunionen IUCN arten som livskraftig (LC). Beståndet uppskattas bestå av 14 miljoner vuxna individer. Namn Det vetenskapliga artnamnet philadelphia syftar på staden med samma namn varifrån typexemplaret insamlades under flyttningen. Referenser Externa länkar Läten på xeno-canto.org Skogssångare Fåglar i nearktiska regionen Fåglar i neotropiska regionen
en	caselaw	US	MEMO ENDORSED 5/18/21 May 14, 2021 Via ECF and Email Hon. Andrew L. Carter, Jr. United States District Court Judge Southern District of New York 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007 Re: United States v. Jose Escobar, 19-cr-828 (ALC) Your Honor: I am CJA counsel to Jose Escobar. I write, with no objection from the government, to request a 60-day adjournment of Mr. Escobar’s sentencing, currently scheduled for June 3, 2021. This is the defendant’s second request for an adjournment of his sentencing. The Court-appointed mitigation specialist is still waiting for important school records from the NYC Department of Education. He has followed-up and has been told they are in process. We believe these records are critical for a complete and accurate presentation of Mr. Escobar’s history. As noted, the government has no objection. Thus, we respectfully request for an adjourn date of 60-days. I thank the Court for its attention to this matter. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Dawn M. Cardi The application is GRANTED. Sentencing adjourned cc: All Parties (via ECF) to 8/5/21 at 2:00 p.m. So Ordered. 5/18/21
it	other	N/A	Impugnabilità di un licenziamento collettivo avvenuto in forma scritta, ma senza preavviso \| aDomandaRisponde.it Mar, 11/24/2009 - 13:10 — Redazione Parere di carattere Fiscale La risposta viene inviata via e-mail, su carta intestata (ad esempio dallo studio di commercialisti che risponde) e firmata. Quindi utilizzabile a tutti gli effetti come un parere scritto da un qualsiasi Commercialista "in persona". Dopo l’esame con le organizzazioni sindacali, una ditta – a causa di una crisi aziendale – è giunta a un accordo di licenziamento di 60 persone sottoscritto solo da alcuni sindacati. La ditta non ha accettato nell’accordo con due dei tre sindacati di richiedere alcun intervento d’integrazione salariale. La comunicazione ai singoli lavoratori è stata effettuata per iscritto, ma senza rispetto del preavviso. È possibile impugnare i licenziamenti, con un procedimento ex art. 700 c.p.c.? Qualora sia dichiarato nullo il licenziamento, è invalidato anche l’accordo sottoscritto dai sindacati? La materia dei licenziamenti collettivi ha ricevuto un’organica disciplina grazie alla l. 223/1991 e s.m.i. Tale legge ha recepito la direttiva comunitaria 129 del 1975, modificata dalla successiva direttiva comunitaria 56 del 1992, recepita a sua volta dal d.lgs. 151/1997. Queste direttive sono state poi successivamente abrogate dalla 59 del 1998 concernente il riavvicinamento delle legislazioni degli Stati membri in materia di licenziamenti collettivi. Il successivo d.lgs. 110/2004 ha poi dato completa attuazione alla direttiva comunitaria 59 del 1998, estendendo gli obblighi di informazione e consultazione previsti dalla legge in commento anche nei confronti dei datori di lavoro non imprenditori. La l. 223/1991 prevede due fattispecie di licenziamento collettivo. La prima è disciplinata dall’art. 24, comma 1, rubricato “norme in materia di riduzione del personale”, che riguarda l’ipotesi del licenziamento attuato ab origine dall’imprenditore che non abbia fatto ricorso al trattamento straordinario di integrazione salariale prima di procedere alla procedura di licenziamento collettivo. A tale fattispecie si affianca un’altra ipotesi di licenziamento collettivo prevista dall’art. 4, comma 1, della l. 223/1991 per le sole imprese ammesse al trattamento straordinario d’integrazione salariale, qualora nel corso di attuazione del programma di ristrutturazione, riorganizzazione o conversione l’imprenditore non ritenga di essere in grado di garantire il reimpiego di tutti i lavoratori sospesi. In altre parole, si tratta del licenziamento collettivo attivato dall’imprenditore qualora l’eccedenza del personale sospeso non sia riassorbibile mediante il ricorso a strumenti alternativi al licenziamento. Entrambe le due ipotesi di licenziamento collettivo seguono l’identica procedura disciplinata dall’art. 4, commi 2-12, della l. 223/1991. L’art. 24 della l. 223/1991 si applica alle imprese che hanno alle proprie dipendenze più di quindici lavoratori, indipendentemente dal settore di appartenenza. Di contro, l’art. 4 della medesima legge trova applicazione alle sole imprese ammesse al trattamento straordinario di integrazione salariale. La differenza tra imprese che rientrano nel campo di applicazione della disciplina d’intervento straordinario d’integrazione salariale e quelle che non vi rientrano determina tra l’altro, ai fini della procedura di licenziamento collettivo, l’obbligo delle imprese che beneficiano di tale trattamento di integrazione salariale di versare all’apertura della procedura di mobilità il cosiddetto contributo d’ingresso. È pacifico che la disciplina dei licenziamenti collettivi si applichi agli operai, agli impiegati e ai quadri: l’art. 4, comma 9, della stessa legge dispone che, esaurita la procedura o raggiunto l’accordo sindacale, il datore di lavoro ha la facoltà di collocare in mobilità le citate categorie di dipendenti. Vi sono peraltro dubbi interpretativi circa la possibile applicazione della normativa anche ai dirigenti e ai funzionari. Sotto il profilo causale, l’art. 24 della stessa legge definisce come collettivo il licenziamento “conseguente a una riduzione o trasformazione di attività o di lavoro”. Inoltre, la disciplina del licenziamento collettivo si applica anche alle ipotesi di cessazione dell’attività dell’impresa. La giurisprudenza sviluppatasi a seguito dell’introduzione della l. 223/1991 ha superato il precedente indirizzo giurisprudenziale che riteneva esservi una differenza ontologica fra il licenziamento collettivo e quello individuale sul presupposto che il primo derivasse esclusivamente da una contrazione non temporanea dell’attività produttiva dell’impresa che comportasse la soppressione di elementi materiali dell’organizzazione. In altre parole, erano esclusi dai licenziamenti collettivi quelli derivanti dalla riduzione o dalla trasformazione dell’attività di lavoro, compresi i cosiddetti licenziamenti tecnologici, nonché quelli derivanti dalla cessazione di attività. A seguito del nuovo impianto normativo si è venuto a modificare il precedente indirizzo giurisprudenziale. Il consolidato orientamento della Suprema Corte oggi ritiene che “nel nuovo assetto normativo conseguente all’entrata in vigore della l. 223/991 i licenziamenti collettivi si differenziano dai licenziamenti individuali plurimi per giustificato motivo oggettivo non più dal punto di vista ontologico o qualitativo – poiché entrambi tali tipi di licenziamento sono caratterizzati dal necessario collegamento a motivi non inerenti la persona del lavoratore”. Logica conseguenza di tale principio è che in presenza dei presupposti numerico-temporali, una volta accertato che la risoluzione del rapporto non è collegata a motivi inerenti la persona del lavoratore deve senz’altro applicarsi la disci-plina di cui alla l. 223/1991. È considerato licenziamento collettivo la riduzione o trasformazione di attività o di lavoro determinata “da una riduzione delle richieste di beni e servizi offerti sul mercato, da una situazione di crisi o da una modifica dell’organizzazione produttiva che comportino soppressione di uffici, reparti, lavorazioni o anche soltanto contrazione della forza lavoro” (Cass., 11465/1997). La l. 223/1991 prevede che – prima che possano essere intimati i licenziamenti collettivi ritenuti necessari – l’imprenditore deve esperire una procedura a carattere consultivo cosiddetta di mobilità. Tale procedura è disciplinata dall’art. 4, commi 2-12, nonché 15-bis, ed è unica per entrambe le fattispecie di licenziamento collettivo previste dagli artt. 4 e 24 della l. 223/1991. Infatti, l’art. 24 richiama espressamente l’applicazione dei sopra citati commi dell’art. 4. In linea generale, questa procedura si suddivide in due fasi: la prima di consultazione in sede sindacale e la successiva ed eventuale in sede amministrativa presso i competenti uffici. La prima fase deve essere esperita entro il termine di 45 giorni dalla data di ricevimento della comunicazione di avvio trasmessa dal datore di lavoro ai destinatari previsti ex lege (art. 4, comma 6). La seconda eventuale fase ha una durata massima di 30 giorni a partire dal ricevimento da parte dell’ufficio competente dell’esito della consultazione tenutasi in sede sindacale (art. 4, comma 7). Tali termini sono ridotti a metà se il licenziamento collettivo coinvolge un numero di lavoratori inferiore a dieci (art, 4, comma 8). In relazione a tali termini si osserva che la legge stabilisce solo un termine massimo ma non fornisce alcuna indicazione di un termine minimo al raggiungimento del quale scatta la facoltà dell’imprenditore di procedere ai licenziamenti. La Suprema Corte, tuttavia, ha precisato che “va dichiarata l’inefficacia dei licenziamenti collettivi intimati in un momento antecedente all’esaurimento della procedura di mobilità prevista dai commi 6, 7 e 8 dell’art. 4 della l. 223/1991 o al raggiungimento, in seno a detta procedura, di un accordo sindacale” (Cass., 10576/2001). Ovvia conseguenza di questo principio è che, in assenza di un accordo sindacale, i licenziamenti devono essere intimati soltanto a seguito dell’esaurimento di tutta la procedura (45 più 30 giorni). Sotto un altro profilo, la Corte di legittimità ha affermato che i termini indicati dall’art. 4 non sono posti a tutela dei lavoratori bensì del datore di lavoro a garanzia che la procedura non sia procrastinata oltre il tempo ritenuto dal legislatore congruo per la ricerca di ogni possibile superamento della situazione determinante la necessità di riduzione del personale. Questo orientamento si pone in linea con quanto già affermato in precedenza dalla giurisprudenza di merito che aveva ritenuto la natura ordinatoria di tali termini, sì che il superamento della durata massima consentita dalla legge non comporta la violazione della procedura di mobilità (Pret. Torino, 5 gennaio 1993). Per quanto concerne la consultazione in sede sindacale, la procedura ha inizio con l’invio di un’apposita comunicazione scritta, che deve avere determinati contenuti previsti dall’art. 4, comma 2, della l. 223/1991, alle rappresentanze sindacali aziendali costituite ai sensi dell’art. 19 della l. 300/1970, nonché alle rispettive associazioni di categoria (ovvero alle associazioni nell’ambito delle quali tali rappresentanze sono state costituite). In assenza delle predette rappresentanze, la comunicazione deve essere inviata alle associazioni aderenti alle confederazioni più rappresentative sul piano nazionale (art. 4, comma 2). La disposizione legislativa precisa, inoltre, che la comunicazione d’avvio della procedura può essere effettuata anche per il tramite dell’associazione datoriale alla quale l’impresa aderisce o conferisce mandato. Con “esame congiunto” s’intende una comunicazione che deve essere trasmessa anche all’organo amministrativo competente in materia di procedure di consultazione nell’ambito di operazioni di riduzioni di personale. In relazione a ciò, la l. 469/1997 – in materia di “conferimento alle regioni e ali enti locali di funzioni e compiti in materia di mercato del lavoro” – ha attribuito alla Regione la competenza a promuovere “l’esame congiunto previsto nelle procedure relative agli interventi di integrazione salariale straordinaria nonché quello previsto per la dichiarazione di mobilità del personale” (art. 2). Volgendo ora lo sguardo alla comunicazione alle associazioni sindacali dai lavoratori, l’interpretazione letterale dell’art. 4, comma 2, della l. 223/1991 induce ragionevolmente a ritenere che in presenza di Rappresentanze sindacali aziendali (RSA) o Rappresentanze sindacali unitarie (RSU) la comunicazione vada inoltrata alle sole associazioni sindacali territoriali nel cui ambito le RSA/RSU siano state costituite ai sensi dell’art. 19 dello Statuto dei lavoratori e non anche alle associazioni di categoria aderenti alle confederazioni più rappresentative sul piano nazionale. Nell’ipotesi in cui l’impresa abbia fruito del periodo di cassa integrazione straordinaria, l’art. 4, comma 15, prevede che sia competente l’Ufficio regionale del lavoro se la mobilità riguarda più province e il ministero del Lavoro se la procedura di mobilità riguarda più regioni. La comunicazione d’avvio della procedura deve contenere quanto previsto dall’art. 4, comma 3, come modificato dal d.lgs. 151/1997. Qualora non sia raggiunto l’accordo sindacale, decorso il termine di 45 giorni, il datore di lavoro deve comunicare all’Ufficio il risultato della consultazione e i motivi del suo eventuale esito negativo. Raggiunto l’accordo sindacale o esaurita la procedura, il datore di lavoro ha la facoltà di collocare in mobilità gli impiegati, gli operai e i quadri eccedenti, comunicando per iscritto a ciascuno di essi il recesso nel rispetto dei termini di preavviso (art. 4, comma 9). La forma scritta del licenziamento è prescritta a pena dell’inefficienza del licenziamento medesimo (art. 4, comma 12). La comunicazione di recesso deve contenere unicamente la notizia del licenziamento senza alcuna necessità di motivazione, poiché la tutela dei lavoratori è affidata alla dettagliata regolamentazione della procedura di mobilità (Cass., 5719/1999). Pertanto, il lavoratore non è destinatario delle informazioni previste dalla procedura di mobilità e nemmeno di quelle riguardanti i criteri di scelta applicati (Cass., 2711/2000). Contestualmente alla comunicazione di recesso a ciascun lavoratore coinvolto nella procedura di licenziamento collettivo, l’imprenditore è tenuti altresì a comunicare per iscritto all’Ufficio del lavoro competente – nonché alle associazioni di categoria di cui all’art. 4, comma 2, della l. 223/1991 – l’elenco dei lavoratori collocati in mobilità, con l’indicazione per ciascun soggetto di alcuni dati. A differenza dei licenziamenti individuali, per i quali la verifica della legittimità del recesso è attribuita al giudice sulla base dei motivi posti a fondamento del recesso, nei licenziamenti collettivi il controllo di legittimità del recesso è collegato al rispetto degli adempimenti formali degli atti della procedura, con la conseguenza che l’inosservanza delle prescrizioni procedurali rende inefficace il recesso intimato (App. Milano, 12 aprile 2001). Quanto alla cosiddetta contestualità, essa non può dirsi soddisfatta se la comunicazione avviene con un ritardo di circa due mesi, con la conseguenza che i licenziamenti devono ritenersi inefficaci (App. Milano, 12 aprile 2001). Ai sensi dell’art. 5 della l. 223/1991, l’individuazione dei lavoratori da collocare in mobilità deve avvenire, in relazione alle esigenze tecnico-produttive e organizzative del complesso aziendale, nel rispetto dei criteri eventualmente previsti dai contratti collettivi stipulati con i sindacati individuati quali destinatari della comunicazione di avvio della procedura di mobilità (art. 4, comma 2). In mancanza di tali contratti, l’individuazione dei lavoratori da collocare in mobilità deve avvenire nel rispetto dei seguenti criteri in concorso tra loro: carichi di famiglia, anzianità, ed esigenze tecnico-produttive e organizzative. Il recesso intimato all’esito della procedura di mobilità senza la forma scritta o in violazione delle procedure previste è colpito dall’inefficacia (rectius, nullità) ex art. 5, comma 3. Le Sezioni Unite della Suprema Corte ritengono che al vizio procedurale possa essere dato rimedio mediante il compimento dell’atto mancante o la rinnovazione dell’atto viziato (Cass., SS.UU., 302/2000, 419/2000 e 5942/2004), purché nell’immediatezza del licenziamento o comunque nell’ambito temporale della procedura di mobilità e non dopo la chiusura della procedura. Infine, il collocamento in mobilità non può essere disposto in epoca antecedente il raggiungimento dell’accordo sindacale o l’espletamento di tutte le fasi della procedura, pena l’inefficacia del licenziamento (Cass., 10576/2001). Il licenziamento può essere impugnato dal lavoratore nel termine di 60 giorni dal ricevimento della comunicazione di recesso con qualsiasi atto scritto anche extragiudiziale. L’art. 5, comma 3, recita che l’inefficacia del recesso comporta l’applicazione dell’art. 18 dello Statuto dei lavoratori, ovvero la reintegrazione del dipendente licenziato nel posto di lavoro precedentemente ricoperto. In conclusione, è possibile impugnare il mancato preavviso. La comunicazione del licenziamento deve essere effettuata dopo che sia stato raggiunto l’accordo sindacale o dopo che sia stata esaurita la procedura. Se non vi è stato accordo sindacale, vi deve essere stato accordo in sede amministrativa: in caso contrario non vi è neppure cassa integrazioni guadagni straordinaria (CIGS). PER RICEVERE GRATIS VIA EMAIL IL DOCUMENTO IN PDF DI QUESTA RISPOSTA INVIARE UNA EMAIL CON IL TITOLO DELL' ARTICOLO A info@adomandarisponde.it . tag: consulenza fiscale parere licenziamento diritti impugnazione preavviso consulenza legge comunicazione licenziamento risposta domanda informazione azienda lavoro
de	other	N/A	mietrechtsinfo.de / Schönheitsreparaturen BGH – Kombination von Quotenabgeltungsklausel und Schönheitsreparaturen Zur Frage, ob Quotenabgeltungsklauseln sowie Klauseln über die Abwälzung von Schönheitsreparaturen bei unrenoviert oder renovierungsbedürftig überlassener Wohnung der Inhaltskontrolle nach § 307 Abs. 1 BGB standhalten. BGH, Beschluss vom 22.01.2104 – VIII ZR 352/12 – in WuM 2014, 135 Nach diesem Hinweisbeschluss des BGH ist damit zu rechnen, dass die Kombination von Quotenklausel und normaler (auch wirksamer) Schönheitsreparaturenklausel demnächst „gekippt“ wird. Vermieter sollten dringend Ihre Vertragsformulare überprüfen und entsprechend anpassen. Gespeichert unter Einzug Auszug, Schönheitsreparaturen \| Permalink \| Kommentare (0) » BGH – Ersatzansprüche wegen irrtümlich ausgeführter Schönheitsreparaturen BGH, Urteil vom 04.05.2011 -VIII ZR 195/10- in WuM 2011, 363 Gespeichert unter Schönheitsreparaturen \| Permalink \| Kommentare (0) » Nutzungsausfall bei verweigerter Rücknahme Bei verspäteter Rückgabe der Mietwohnung ist eine Vorenthaltung der Mietsache zu verneinen, wenn der Mieter die Wohnung zurückgibt, ohne die ihm obliegenden Schönheitsreparaturen auszuführen, oder nur deshalb noch den Besitz an der ansonsten bereits geräumten Wohnung behält, um auf Wunsch des Vermieters Mängelbeseitigungsarbeiten durchzuführen. Die Beurteilung, ob ein Mietausfallschaden wegen Vorenthaltung der Mietsache gegeben ist, ist Aufgabe des Tatrichters. Feste Regeln hierzu lassen sich nicht aufstellen, da Vieles von den Umständen des jeweiligen Einzelfalls abhängt. Die Frage nach den zur Bejahung einer Schadenswahrscheinlichkeit erforderlichen Anknüpfungstatsachen hängt mithin in erster Linie von der dem Tatrichter obliegenden Würdigung der Umstände des Einzelfalls ab und ist einer verallgemeinernden, die Revisionszulassung rechtfertigenden Betrachtungsweise nicht zugänglich. Es ist nicht zu beanstanden, wenn der Tatrichter eine Schadenswahrscheinlichkeit deswegen verneint, weil der klagende Vermieter lediglich zwei Mietinteressenten benannt hat, ohne angeben zu können, ab wann diese die Wohnung überhaupt hätten anmieten wollen, und weil der Wohnungsmarkt in der fraglichen Gemeinde nicht derart angespannt sei, dass allein schon aus dem Angebot der Wohnung auf dem Markt auf deren umgehende Weitervermietung hätte geschlossen werden können. Die Revision vor dem BGH wurde zurückgenommen. BGH, Beschluss vom 13.07.2010 -VIII ZR 326/09- in GE 2010, 1265; WuM 2010, 632 BGH – „Auf eigene Kosten“ als Fachhandwerkerklausel Eine in Formularmietverträgen über Wohnraum enthaltene Klausel, wonach es dem Mieter obliegt, die Schönheitsreparaturen „ausführen zu lassen“, benachteiligt den Mieter unangemessen und ist deshalb unwirksam, wenn sie bei kundenfeindlichster Auslegung dem Mieter dadurch die Möglichkeit der kostensparenden Eigenleistung nimmt, dass sie als Fachhandwerkerklausel verstanden werden kann. BGH, Urteil vom 09.06.2010 -VIII ZR 294/09- in WuM 2010, 476
en	other	N/A	Jimmy Polston's web site - Welcome! > Site Navigation > Home Page \| Part 1 - Stereo Scary-O \| Part 2 - Plates & Brackets \| Part 3 – Cable Tips More About Stereo Scary-O A Fool Mounts A Power Supply Cables Don't Really Matter—well, not all that much but what do I know? 2016 Savannah St. Patrick's Celebration March 17th, Thursday -- 2:30PM - 5:30PM March 19th, Saturday -- 1:30PM - 3:30PM Downtown City Market, Savannah, Georgia. The Yuengling Stage on Jefferson Street. Savannah St. Patrick's Celebration Control Zone Map Redbreast Tournament Stoke's Bluff Bounty Hunter to perform 8PM - 11PM Info on Bounty Hunter's band web site. Hope to see you there. Always a blast! www.bilcoamps.com www.BountyHunterReunion.com Life Success for Musicians "Doing Music & Nothing Else - The Music Business Seminar" by Peter C. Knickels, Music Business Seminars, Ltd. I'm very fortunate that a lot of different kinds of people often express how much they enjoy how I play the guitar. I love that they appreciate sharing a musical journey with our band and with me personally through the years. Charleston is a guitar kinda town; so is the musically-rich South Carolina Lowcountry and Savannah Georgia as well. They love heart-felt improvisation within a solid awareness of song structure and a sense of adventure in their own way, same as how they love musical mojo in New Orleans; only the beats, the voodoo, and the cuisine are different. On the lighter side of things, I would be remiss if I did not say, "Don't inject the pot. Not. Even. Once." Lighten up people! About the digital image at the top of this web page: The photo montage at the header is made from photographs of some of my guitar gear. All of these montage elements are from my creative works. A digital photo overlay of an acrylic-on- canvas-paper / brush / toothbrush / drybrush painting, titled "Cargo Jet 3", blended-layer in on top of the photo composite adds the coloring to the amplifiers and guitarist equipment. The "No Fuzz Boxes Allowed On Premises" signage is a joke about a former cafe owner with a serious problem who used to have musicians perform there. Signage graphic created in Adobe Illustrator. Digital images captured on a Nikon D90 DSLR camera fitted with a Tamron 17-50mm 2.8 lens, shot in Camera RAW format; post-processed on Adobe ACR and Photoshop Extended. I still use Adobe Creative Suite CS4. I stood in front of a 3x5-foot silk panel as a background. My camera was mounted on an Induro tripod / ball head, and timer activated. The guitar is my goldtop 1979 Gibson Les Paul Deluxe Pro. This guitar weighs 11 lbs. I had it re-fretted in 2002 by Mike Fisher of Slidell, Louisiana, guitar tech for Brian Stoltz of The Funky Meters. Welcome to this introduction to an excerpt from my Pedalboard Diaries journal. I call it The Mad Jap's Stereo Scary-o Guitar Rig. Glad you could make it! This first writing is about a guitar stage rig project which began approximately fifteen years ago. That's when I first plugged my trusty guitar into an unassuming but classy little oxblood amplifier at a music store where I worked as a guitar instructor... and then promptly traded a whole bunch of guitar gear for this little Teutonic tube transducer: a late 1990s Hughes & Kettner Edition Tube 20-watt combo amp with a 12-inch speaker. That amp—let's refer to it the same as my gear tech at Bilco calls it, "The Beast"—has seen awesome times jamming in the New Orleans area. One club owner would literally call me for his "guitar mercenary" work whenever a "situation" arose at one of his open jams. This amp, an old Les Paul with P90s, and little else other than his "favorite left hand north of Lake Ponchartrain", got the job done. I had no band politics to get in the way of helping out my friend. After The Beast was blown up by a delay pedal overload mishap at a Bounty Hunter rehearsal, I bought a used Hughes & Kettner Edition Tube 20th Anniversary model from a popular auction web site to fill in for it while other amp techs tried in vain to repair it—(they demanded to be paid anyway). The 20th Anniversary lost a tube during the first set of its third gig. I wound up gigging through a hybrid Randall that guitarist friend Billy Sargent (of Music Co-op and a former fellow staff guitar instructor at Bay Street Music in Beaufort, South Carolina) had been kind enough to sell me at a good price as a backup amplifier. My RG526 metal band required more umph than the little Randall could deliver. I went big in the amp department. Pedalboards were built, stolen--as were my two big amp heads--, and replaced piece-by-piece whilst in the middle of gig season. The little duo of German H&Ks sat patiently. Other amps came and stole their due attention. Eventually, other musical group side projects (Moist Executive, The Ebolans) took my guitar rigs into totally different directions. I evolved more and more as a musician. In the background, a fabled master tech at Bilco Amps took on the task of bringing my two Hughes & Kettners back to life, as did medical doctors with my trying to get my busted ticker in somewhat of a working order. In time, they all succeeded. We're hearing the wonderful sounds in my head that I'd abandoned some years ago. Technology has caught up with us. Fortunately, I had some funds saved up for just such an occasion. Aged, scarred, and knowing; we're back. As I write this to you, our band Bounty Hunter is preparing for our fifth invitational to perform for the people gathered in Downtown City Market in Savannah, Georgia for its annual St. Patrick's Celebration for two wonderful afternoons. More of Ronnie Able's vintage bass guitars are returning to the stage. Brian Canaday has a killer green-black-fade drum set for these shows. Ray Tomasino's high-tech guitar rig just may go stereo this year. That may be because my entire stage rig has now become more full-stereo than my previous amp. Bounty Hunter is going to rock Savannah! My rig? The Beast is the Master Amp; the 20th Anniversary is its stereo Slave Amp. Pushing this pair of amps are two brand-new pedalboards filled with the sounds and the show in my head. But it's not just the amps, pedalboards, and hands. —Jimmy "The Mad Jap" Polston. March 9, 2016 Bounty Hunter Show Dates and Times Location: Downtown City Market, Savannah, Georgia Event Stage: The Yuengling Stage, Jefferson Street The Details - Chapter 1. Go to The Mad Jap's Stereo Scary-O St. Patrick's Guitar Rig, March 2016 A short article on theft recovery measures, which I touched upon in Lowcountry Underground Magazine, but will update on this web site with new information. * Anyone want to buy an (8) PAR38 aluminum fixtures, (2) DMX dimmer packs, and (1) DMX foot-controller stage lighting setup? Don't tell me your band can't afford lights. I bought this lighting gear with my pay from a couple of months of weekend nightclub gigs. They look a heckuva lot better than bare bulbs on the floor. Local pickup only, please. No; I'm not interested in selling my LED stage lighting at fire sale prices. Home Page \| Part 1 - Stereo Scary-O \| Part 2 - Plates & Brackets \| Part 3 – Cable Tips All content on this web site © Copyright 2016 James D. Polston. All Rights Reserved.
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Philomène Ferrer Galceran (Móra d'Ebre, - Valls, ) est une religieuse espagnole de l'ordre des Minimes initiatrice du premier temple expiatoire dédié au Sacré-Cœur de Jésus et reconnue vénérable par l'Église catholique. Biographie Elle naît à Móra d'Ebre en 1841, fille du sculpteur Feliu Ferrer et Josefa Galceran, ils auront dix enfants dont cinq mourront dans diverses épidémies de choléra. Philomène reçoit une éducation profondément catholique, l'un de ses frères, , sera sculpteur comme son père, un autre deviendra prêtre, et une de ses sœurs sera religieuse. Elle passe une partie de son enfance malade. Vers treize ans, elle a une extase lors de sa première communion où le mystère de l'Immaculée Conception lui est révélé, sous cette expérience, elle prononce un vœu de virginité. Elle manifeste alors son désir de se consacrer à Dieu dans un couvent dédié à l'Immaculée Conception mais ses parents s'opposent fortement à cette vocation à cause de la mauvaise santé de leur fille. Malgré ses difficultés, elle entre au monastère de l'Immaculée Conception de Valls le à 19 ans prenant le nom de Philomène de sainte Colombe. Bientôt, la communauté des sœurs la décrit comme un modèle de vertu ; elle occupe les postes de professeur de chant, d'aide lingère, d'économe et de deuxième infirmière. Elle déclare recevoir des confidentes du Sacré-Cœur et particulièrement la demande de fondation d'un monastère de minimes à Móra d'Ebre avec un temple expiatoire dédié au Sacré-Cœur de Jésus. Elle écrit à l'évêque de Tortosa et au prieur de Móra d'Ebre pour y collaborer. Elle œuvre beaucoup à la diffusion de cette dévotion, en particulier dans la communauté elle-même et parmi les prêtres, auxquels elle conseille fortement de se consacrer au Cœur Divin. Elle s'offre comme victime pour l'Église, pour le pape et le respect fidèle de la règle de la communauté elle-même. Elle décède le à l'âge de 27 ans. À sa mort, elle jouit d'une grande renommée de sainteté à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur du couvent de Valls. En 1972, les restes de Philomène sont transférés du cimetière municipal de Valls à l'église du monastère où ils sont actuellement conservés. La fondation du couvent de Móra d'Ebre est réalisée 26 ans après la mort de Philomène comme elle l'aurait prédit. Sa sœur, Manuela, également religieuse, poursuit la fondation principalement financée par des dons populaires. La première pierre est posée le et le monastère inauguré le lorsque sept religieuses y entre. Le , le temple annexe est inauguré, le premier temple expiatoire de toute l'Espagne. La cause de la béatification de Philomène est introduite en 1880 et le procès envoyé à Rome en 1887. Le pape Léon XIII la proclame vénérable le . Le , Jean-Paul II promulgue un décret d'approbation des vertus héroïques de sœur Philomène poursuivant son procès de béatification. Notes et références Voir aussi Bibliographie . . . . . Vénérable catholique espagnol Naissance en avril 1841 Naissance dans la province de Tarragone Décès en août 1868 Décès à 27 ans Décès à Valls
en	caselaw	US	Case 4:19-cv-00158-AW-MJF Document 40 Filed 08/22/19 Page 1 of 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION CLEONDENISE BODERICK, Individually, and on behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Case No.: 4:19cv158-AW/MJF GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY, CLASS REPRESENTATION Defendant. PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Plaintiff, CLEONDENISE BODERICK (“Boderick”), individually, and on behalf of all those similarly situated, files this First Amended Class Action Complaint against Defendant, GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY (“GEICO”), and alleges as follows: Introduction 1. GEICO insures all its Florida individual automobile insurance policyholders using the identical Form A-30FL (03-11) policy form (the “Policy”). The Collision and Comprehensive coverages of the Policy, on their face, and as amended to conform with Fla. Stat. § 626.9743(5) (if necessary), allow Travelers to adjust and settle a first-party motor vehicle total loss via a cash payment based upon the actual cost to purchase a comparable motor vehicle. 2. GEICO purports to adjust and settle the total loss claims of all its Florida policyholders in this manner, but it does not do so in reality, thereby breaching the Policy as to all of them. Boderick v. GEICO Page 1 of 15 - First Amended Complaint Case 4:19-cv-00158-AW-MJF Document 40 Filed 08/22/19 Page 2 of 15 3. GEICO breaches the Policy and violates Florida law by failing to include in its cash payments the minimum $83.25 in fees charged by the State of Florida in connection with the transfer of title and license to a new vehicle and the dealer/administrative/document fees for the costs and profit to the dealer for items such as inspecting, cleaning and adjusting vehicles and preparing documents related to the sale, which fees are required to be disclosed by Fla. Stat. §§ 501.976(11) and 520.02(2) and Fla. Admin. Code § 69V-50.001 and are charged by every used car dealer in Florida (the “dealer fees”). Those fees constitute part of the “actual cost to purchase a comparable motor vehicle” under § 626.9743(5)(a), just like sales tax, and fall within the Policy’s definition of “actual cash value,” so they must be paid pursuant to the Policy and § 626.9743(5). GEICO’s failure to pay these fees additionally damages by hundreds of dollars all its Florida policyholders who suffer total losses. 4. On behalf of herself and a class of similarly situated Florida GEICO automobile insurance policyholders, Boderick brings causes of action for breach of contract to recover the damages they suffered as a result of GEICO’s refusal to pay dealer fees and title/license fees. 5. In conjunction with these breach of contract causes of action, Boderick seeks to recover the reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs required to prosecute them. Jurisdiction, Parties, Venue 6. This is an action asserting class claims for declaratory relief and damages pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1) and/or (3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 7. This Court has jurisdiction following removal by GEICO under 28 U.S.C. §1446(d) as the parties are diverse from different states and the amount in controversy is greated than $75,000.00. Boderick v. GEICO Page 2 of 15 - First Amended Complaint Case 4:19-cv-00158-AW-MJF Document 40 Filed 08/22/19 Page 3 of 15 8. Plaintiff, Cleondenise Boderick, is and at all material times has been, a resident of Florida and insured by GEICO. 9. GEICO is a Maryland corporation with its principal place of business in Maryland registered to do and doing business in Florida as a Foreign Profit Corporation. At all times material hereto, GEICO was in the business of selling automobile insurance and adjusting and settling automobile insurance claims, including the sale of Collision and Comprehensive coverages and adjustment and settlement of first-party total loss claims under those coverages. 10. Venue is proper as the case was originally filed in Leon County, Florida, because GEICO is a Foreign Profit Corporation, and it has offices for the transaction of, and agents transacting, its customary business in Leon County. 11. All conditions precedent to the maintenance of this action have occurred, have been performed, have been waived, or GEICO is estopped from asserting them Factual Allegations Common to Boderick and the Class 12. GEICO insures all its Florida individual automobile insurance policyholders using the identical Form A-30FL (03-11) (the “Policy”), and it has done so since August 2011. The Policy provides, in pertinent part, as follows: SECTION III - PHYSICAL DAMAGE COVERAGES Your Protection for Loss or Damage to Your Car DEFINITIONS The definitions of the terms auto business, farm auto, non-owned auto, private passenger auto, relative, temporary substitute auto, utility auto, you, your, and war under Section I apply to Section III also. Under this Section, the following special definitions apply: 1. Actual cash value is the replacement cost of the auto or property less depreciation or betterment. Boderick v. GEICO Page 3 of 15 - First Amended Complaint Case 4:19-cv-00158-AW-MJF Document 40 Filed 08/22/19 Page 4 of 15 2. Betterment is improvement of the auto or property to a value greater than its pre-loss condition. 3. Collision means loss caused by upset of the covered auto or its collision with another object, including an attached vehicle. 4. Comprehensive means loss caused other than by collision and includes the following causes: (a) Missiles: (b) Falling objects; (c) Fire; (d) Lightning; (e) Theft; (f) Larceny; (g) Explosion; (h) Earthquake; (i) Windstorm; (j) Hail; (k) Water; (l) Flood; (m) Malicious mischief; (n) Vandalism; (o) Riot; (p) Civil commotion; or (q) Colliding with a bird or animal. 6. Depreciation means a decease or loss in value to the auto or property because of use, disuse, physical wear and tear, age, outdatedness, or other causes. 8. Loss means direct and accidental loss of or damage to: (a) An owned or non-owned auto, including its equipment; or (b) Other property insured under this section. ... LOSSES WE WILL PAY Comprehensive (Excluding Collision) 1. We will pay for each loss, less the applicable deductible, caused other than by collision to the owned or non-owned auto. ... Collision Boderick v. GEICO Page 4 of 15 - First Amended Complaint Case 4:19-cv-00158-AW-MJF Document 40 Filed 08/22/19 Page 5 of 15 1. We will pay for collision loss to the owned auto for the amount of each loss less the applicable deductible and to the non-owned auto for the amount of each loss less the applicable deductible when driven by you or a relative. ... LIMIT OF LIABILITY The limit of our liability for loss: 1. Is the actual cash value of the property at the time of the loss; ... 5. For custom parts or equipment is limited to the actual cash value of the custom parts or equipment, not to exceed the actual cash value of the vehicle. Actual cash value or betterment of property will be determined at the time of the loss and will include an adjustment for depreciation/betterment and for the physical condition of the property. ... SECTION V- GENERAL CONDITIONS These conditions apply to all coverages in this Policy ... 17. TERMS OF POLICY CONFORMED TO STATUTES Any terms of this policy in conflict with the statutes of Florida are amended to conform to those statutes. 13. Pursuant to the Limits of Liability for the Collison and Comprehensive coverages of the Policy and Fla. Stat. § 319.30, GEICO has the right when presented with a claim for damages to a vehicle where the cost to repair would be greater than its actual cash value minus its salvage value to declare the vehicle a total loss and pay the lesser actual cash value. Of course, when a vehicle is stolen, it is a total loss, and GEICO must pay the actual cash value. Boderick v. GEICO Page 5 of 15 - First Amended Complaint Case 4:19-cv-00158-AW-MJF Document 40 Filed 08/22/19 Page 6 of 15 14. When GEICO declares a vehicle a total loss, it must pay its insured the vehicle’s actual cash value as defined in and pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 626.9743, because to the extent that the Policy on its face is in any way inconsistent with that statute, its own terms and Florida law compel that it be reformed to conform to the statute. Thus, if GEICO elects to pay a cash settlement, as it uniformly does, it must pay “the actual cost to purchase a comparable motor vehicle, including sales tax... .” Fla. Sta. § 626.9743(5)(a)(2)(a). This cash settlement is almost always paid before a policyholder purchases a replacement vehicle and its amount is independent of what the policyholder ends up spending, if anything. In fact, the policyholder may simply keep the cash settlement and never replace the total loss vehicle. 15. In Florida, the “actual cost to purchase a comparable vehicle” and its “retail cost” necessarily include numerous fees and taxes, including title transfer service fee of $2.50 and a $1.00 air pollution control fee (see Fla. Stat. §§ 319.32(1), 319.32(2)(a), 320.0609(2)(a), 320.04(1)(a) and 320.03(6)) (“title fees”). In the State of Florida, used motor vehicle dealers uniformly collect these amounts in connection with the sale, registration and titling of a used motor vehicle (see Fla. Stat. §§319.23(6)(a), 320.02(5)(a), and Rules 12A-1.077(8), Florida Administrative Code). 16. In addition, the “actual cost to purchase a comparable vehicle” and its “retail cost” includes dealer fees, because no used car dealer in the State of Florida will sell a vehicle without charging such dealer fees. Thus, the Policy as conformed to Fla. Stat. § 626.9743(5)(a) requires those fees to be paid upfront as part of the cash settlement. Likewise, the plain language of the Policy requires payment of these fees because it provides that “[a]ctual cash value is the replacement cost of the auto or property less depreciation or betterment,” and replacement cost Boderick v. GEICO Page 6 of 15 - First Amended Complaint Case 4:19-cv-00158-AW-MJF Document 40 Filed 08/22/19 Page 7 of 15 includes all the costs of replacement, including these fees. Nevertheless, Geico uniformly refuses to pay title fees and dealer fees. Factual Allegations as to GEICO’s Treatment of Boderick 17. On or about December 4, 2018, Boderick’s vehicle (“Covered Vehicle”), a 2016 Hyundai Elantra, was involved in motor vehicle accident which rendered the vehicle a total loss. At that time, Boderick was a contracting party and named insured under the Policy issued by GEICO, which was in full force and effect. 18. On or about December 6, 2018, Boderick made a total loss claim with GEICO for payment on her Covered Vehicle. On December 6, 2018, GEICO affirmed Collision coverage for the Covered Vehicle as a total loss. 19. On December 6, 2018, under a cover letter of that date, GEICO sent Boderick a report claiming an “Adjusted Vehicle Value” of the Covered Vehicle of $10,187.00. This value represented a “Base Vehicle Value” of $9,631.00. Neither the cover letter nor the report contained an adjustment for or offered to pay title fees or dealer fees, specifically GEICO did not offer to pay the required $2.50 title transfer service fee, or the $1.00 air pollution control fee. A redacted copy of the December 6, 2018 cover letter and enclosed report is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 20. On January 25, 2019, on behalf of herself and all similarly situated GEICO Florida private automobile policyholders, Boderick served GEICO with a letter giving GEICO 30 days to, among other items not relevant to this litigation: (a) pay her title fees, and (b) pay her dealer fees. GEICO did not respond to that letter. A true and correct copy of the January 25, 2019 letter is attached hereto as Exhibit B. Boderick v. GEICO Page 7 of 15 - First Amended Complaint Case 4:19-cv-00158-AW-MJF Document 40 Filed 08/22/19 Page 8 of 15 Class Action Allegations 21. Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1) and/or (3), she brings Counts I and II for breach of contract on her own behalf and on behalf of the Class defined below. 22. The Class consists of and is defined as all individuals who: (a) on or after March 8, 2014; (b) are or were covered by a GEICO Florida personal automobile insurance policy; (c) made a claim under the Collision or Comprehensive coverage of that policy for damage or loss to a covered vehicle which GEICO accepted and treated as a total loss claim; and (d) GEICO paid the claim or offered to pay the claim (which offer remains unaccepted) on a cash settlement basis without offering to pay the title fees and/or dealer fees (hereafter the “Class”). The class period will be from March 8, 2014, to the date of class certification (hereinafter the “Class Period”). 23. Boderick reserves the right to amend the Class and/or add sub-class definitions as discovery proceeds and to conform to the evidence. 24. While the exact number of Class members is unknown at this time, Boderick submits, based upon his counsel’s representation of automobile accident victims in Florida, that there are at least a thousand GEICO policyholders spread throughout the State of Florida who are potential Class members in this action. Accordingly, separate joinder of all Class members would be impracticable. 25. This action poses questions of law and fact that are common to and affect the rights of all members of the Class. Such questions of law and fact common to the Class include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether GEICO’s refusal to pay dealer fees breaches the Policy and violates Florida law? Boderick v. GEICO Page 8 of 15 - First Amended Complaint Case 4:19-cv-00158-AW-MJF Document 40 Filed 08/22/19 Page 9 of 15 b. Whether GEICO’s refusal to pay title fees breaches the Policy and violates Florida law? c. Whether Boderick and the other Class members were damaged in the amount of the dealer fees GEICO refused to pay? d. Whether Boderick and the other Class members were damaged in the amount of the title fees GEICO refused to pay? e. Whether Boderick and the other Class members are entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in connection with the successful prosecution of their declaratory judgment and/or breach of contract causes of action? 26. Boderick’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class, because they all arise out of the exact same policies and practices of GEICO and under the exact same theories of law. 27. Boderick will adequately represent the Class, because she and the undersigned counsel she has retained have no conflicts of interest with the other Class members, she is ready, willing and able to represent the Class, and the undersigned retained attorneys are very experienced class action practitioners with extensive experience in prosecuting class actions against automobile insurers. 28. Boderick’s and the Class’s breach of contract causes of action may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1) because the prosecution of separate claims by individual Class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications concerning individual members of the Class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for GEICO. For example, the court in one case might rule that GEICO must pay dealer fees while another might rule that it does not have to do so. GEICO would be left in an untenable legal Boderick v. GEICO Page 9 of 15 - First Amended Complaint Case 4:19-cv-00158-AW-MJF Document 40 Filed 08/22/19 Page 10 of 15 limbo in such an event, because Florida law requires it to treat all insureds the same under similar circumstances. 29. Boderick’s breach of contract causes of action may also be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), because the questions of law or fact common to Boderick and the Class predominate over any questions of law or fact affecting only individual Class members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. As demonstrated by paragraph 25 above, all the questions necessary for resolution of GEICO’s liability to Boderick and the Class are common. 30. More specifically, a reasonable assumption for a cash settlement is that each Class member will necessarily incur a $2.50 title transfer service fee, and a $1.00 air pollution control fee, making all Class members entitled to recover the exact same $3.50 for GEICO’s refusal to pay title fees. Boderick can also provide evidence of the average dealer fee in Florida, which amount can be awarded to every Class member for GEICO’s refusal to pay dealer fees. 31. A class action is superior because the amounts recoverable by individual Class members are not sufficient to justify individual suits against a large corporation like GEICO which can be expected to vigorously defend every such suit as a matter of precedent. For that reason, Class members do not have a real interest in individually controlling their separate claims. Further, the overwhelming majority of Class members do not even know they have such claims to sue over. This is demonstrated by the fact that there do not appear be any pending individual suits against GEICO in Florida over these issues. Simply put, there are no alternatives to a class action to resolve this controversy. 32. Even if individual suits were feasible and likely to be filed, it would be highly inefficient, and a waste of the parties’ and the court system’s resources to repeatedly adjudicate Boderick v. GEICO Page 10 of 15 - First Amended Complaint Case 4:19-cv-00158-AW-MJF Document 40 Filed 08/22/19 Page 11 of 15 the same factual and legal issues. Plus, it could result in undesirable inconsistent adjudications as set forth above. Thus, it is highly desirable to concentrate the litigation in this forum, which is well equipped to resolve the controversy for all Class members and GEICO. 33. There are no unusual difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of this case as a class action. Florida law applies to all Class members’ claims, and the legal issues are simple matters of statutory and contractual interpretation. All Class members are readily ascertainable from GEICO’s records, including physical addresses and email addresses (in most cases), making the provision of notice routine. And, as previously explained, damages are easily and readily calculable for each Class member. Count I Class Action for Breach of Contract for Title Fees 34. Boderick and the Class re-allege and incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1-33 above. 35. The Policy constituted binding contacts between GEICO and Boderick and the other Class members. By its own terms and Florida law, to the extent the Policy’s express terms regarding the adjustment and settlement of first-party motor vehicle total losses on the basis of actual cash value vary from the provisions of Fla. Stat. § 626.9743(5)(a), it is deemed reformed to conform with that statute. 36. As explained above, by refusing to pay Boderick and the Class the title fees they would presumptively incur, $3.50, GEICO breached the Policy. Such breach proximately injured South and each Class member in that amount. Boderick v. GEICO Page 11 of 15 - First Amended Complaint Case 4:19-cv-00158-AW-MJF Document 40 Filed 08/22/19 Page 12 of 15 37. Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 627.428, Boderick and the Class are entitled to recover their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this cause of action. Count II Class Action for Breach of Contract for Dealer Fees 38. Boderick and the Class re-allege and incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1-33 above. 39. The Policy constituted binding contacts between GEICO and Boderick and the other Class members. By its own terms and Florida law, to the extent the Policy’s express terms regarding the adjustment and settlement of first-party motor vehicle total losses on the basis of actual cash value vary from the provisions of Fla. Stat. § 626.9743(5)(a), it is deemed reformed to conform with that statute. 40. As explained above, by refusing to pay Boderick and the Class the dealer fees they would presumptively incur, GEICO breached the Policy. Such breach proximately injured Boderick and each Class member in the amount of the average dealer fee in Florida. 41. Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 627.428, Boderick and the Class are entitled to recover their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this cause of action. REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Cleondenise Boderick and the Class respectfully request the Court to award the following relief against GEICO: a. Issue an order certifying that this action is properly maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(b)(1) and/or (3) and appointing Boderick to represent the Class defined herein; Boderick v. GEICO Page 12 of 15 - First Amended Complaint Case 4:19-cv-00158-AW-MJF Document 40 Filed 08/22/19 Page 13 of 15 b. Issue an order appointing the undersigned law firms as class counsel; c. Grant a judgment pursuant to Count I against GEICO awarding Boderick and the other members of the Class damages for breach of contract as set forth above; d. Grant a judgment pursuant to Count II against GEICO awarding Boderick and the other members of the Class damages for breach of contract as set forth above; e. Grant a judgment against GEICO pursuant to any one or more of the Counts awarding Boderick and the Class their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 627.428; f. Grant a judgment pursuant to Counts I and II against GEICO awarding Boderick and the Class pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the maximum rates permissible at law or in equity; and g. Grant a judgment against GEICO awarding Boderick and the Class all such other and further relief, general or special, legal or equitable, to which they may be justly entitled. Demand for Jury Trial Boderick and the Class hereby demand a trial by jury on all the issues so triable. Respectfully submitted, CRAIG E. ROTHBURD, P.A. /s/ Craig E. Rothburd CRAIG E. ROTHBURD - FBN: 0049182 Boderick v. GEICO Page 13 of 15 - First Amended Complaint Case 4:19-cv-00158-AW-MJF Document 40 Filed 08/22/19 Page 14 of 15 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY on this 22nd day of August 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court by using this Court’s CM/ECF system that will send a notice of electronic filing to: Attorney for Defendant – GEICO John P. Marino - jmarino@sgrlaw.com Lindsey R. Trowell - ltrowell@sgrlaw.com Kristen L. Wenger - kwenger@sgrlaw.com SMITH GAMBRELL & RUSSELL, LLP 50 North Laura Street, Suite 2600 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 (904) 598-6100 (904) 598-6204 - Fax Dan R. Goldfine - dgoldfine@lrrc.com Ian Fischer - ifischer@lrrc.com LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE 201 East Washington Street, Suite 1200 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 (602) 262-5311 (602) 262-5747 - Fax Brian Blakley - bblakely@lrrc.com LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE 3993 Howard Hughes Pkwy., Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 (702) 949-8200 (702) 949-8298 - Fax /s/ Craig E. Rothburd Craig E. Rothburd, Esquire FBN 49182 Email: crothburd@e-rlaw.com CRAIG E. ROTHBURD, P.A. 320 W. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 700 Tampa, FL 33606 Telephone: (813) 251-8800 crothburd@e-rlaw.com mropp@e-rlaw.com CERPA File No. 6721 Boderick v. GEICO Page 14 of 15 - First Amended Complaint Case 4:19-cv-00158-AW-MJF Document 40 Filed 08/22/19 Page 15 of 15 and Scott R. Jeeves, Esquire FBN 0905630 THE JEEVES LAW GROUP, P.A. 954 First Avenue North St. Petersburg, FL 33705 Telephone: (727) 894-2929 sjeeves@jeeveslawgroup.com khill@jeeveslawgroup.com lawclerk@jeeveslawgroup.com rmandel@jeevesmandellawgroup.com and Casim Adam Neff, Esquire FBN 94030 Neff Insurance Law, PLLC P.O. Box 15063 St. Petersburg, FL 33733-5063 Telephone: (727) 342-0617 cneff@neffinsurancelaw.com and Edward H. Zebersky, Esq. FBN 0908370 Mark S. Fistos, Esq. FBN 909191 ZEBERSKY PAYNE, LLP 110 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 210 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 Telephone: (954) 989-6333 ezebersky@zpllp.com; mfistos@zpllp.com; ndiaz@zpllp.com and Alec H. Schultz, Esq. FBN 35022 Carly A. Kligler, Esq. FBN 83990 LEÓN COSGROVE, LLP 255 Alhambra Circle, Suite 800 Coral Gables, FL 33134 Telephone: (305) 740-1975 ashultz@leoncosgrove.com; ckligler@leoncosgrove.com ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF CLEONDENISE BODERICK AND THE CLASS Boderick v. GEICO Page 15 of 15 - First Amended Complaint
it	wikipedia	N/A	Araneus tambopata è un ragno appartenente alla famiglia Araneidae. Distribuzione L'olotipo femminile è stato rinvenuto in una località del Perù centrorientale: nella riserva naturale di Zona Reserva Tambopata, nella regione di Madre de Dios. Tassonomia Non sono stati esaminati esemplari di questa specie dal 1991 Attualmente, a dicembre 2013, non sono note sottospecie Note Bibliografia Levi, H.W., 1991a - The Neotropical and Mexican species of the orb-weaver genera Araneus, Dubiepeira, and Aculepeira (Araneae: Araneidae). Bull. Mus. comp. Zool. Harv. vol.152, pp. 167–315. (pag.222) Articolo su BHL URL consultato il 15 febbraio 2014 Altri progetti Collegamenti esterni Araneus Taxa classificati da Herbert Walter Levi
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Sker est une localité du Cameroun située dans le département du Logone-et-Chari et la Région de l'Extrême-Nord, à proximité de la frontière avec le Tchad. Elle fait partie de la commune de Zina. Notes et références Liens externes Zina, sur le site Communes et villes unies du Cameroun (CVUC) Plan communal de développement de Zina, 2011, 189 p., à télécharger [1] Village dans la région de l'Extrême-Nord
de	wikipedia	N/A	Das Druck- und Verlagshaus CW Niemeyer wurde 1797 gegründet und hat seinen Sitz in Hameln in Niedersachsen. Anfänge Nach Stationen in Helmstedt (1656–1677) und Bevern (1678–1680) hatte ab 1681 Johann Heitmüller in Hameln eine Weile gedruckt. 1719 kam der Buchdrucker Johann Hartwig Hillermann nach Hameln. Auch die Druckerei von Johann Georg Christoph Herrnkind, der bereits in Höxter, Holzminden und Pyrmont druckte, bestand nicht lange. Der Versuch des Einbeckers Christian Leberecht Wittig († 4. Juli 1820), der sich 1799 in Hannover etabliert hatte, zwei Jahre später nach Hameln zu ziehen, scheiterte. Bis dahin waren Drucksachen vorwiegend in Hannover und der Universitätsstadt Rinteln angefertigt worden. Die Vorfahren von Carl Wilhelm Hahn († 1818) waren Geistliche und Buchdrucker in Römhild. Hahn war Pächter der Culemannschen Druckerei in Königslutter und etablierte sich infolge napoleonischer Wirren 1806 in Hameln, wo er das Haus Osterstraße 19 erwarb. Nach Schleifung der Festung Hameln waren seine anfangs zwei Pressen bald nicht mehr ausgelastet. Unter seiner Witwe, Joh. Doroth. Henr. Hahn, geb. Gerloff († 1824), die die Druckerei kaufte, lebte das Geschäft wieder auf. Sie hatte vier Töchter und einen jungen Sohn. Nach Erkrankung ihres aus Polle stammenden Schwiegersohns Georg Friedrich Buttenbaum (1795–1834) führte ihre älteste Tochter, Louise Friedrike Buttenbaum (1793–1849) nach Auszahlung ihres in Emden etablierten Bruders die Druckerei fort. Ihre älteste Tochter Theodore hat mit acht Jahren Schriftsetzen und mit zehn Korrekturlesen gelernt. Für Pastor Schläger druckten sie ab 1823 die Hamelschen Anzeigen, zwei Jahre später auch die gemeinnützigen Blätter und für Sertürner die Annalen für das Universal-System der Elemente. Für die Hahnsche Hofbuchhandlung in Hannover kamen Verlagsartikel hinzu. Mangels Auslastung der Presse werden auch Drucksachen wie Frachtbriefe, Ausfuhrzertifikate, Zahlungsbefehle, Infanterie-Instruktionen, Theater-Programme, Etiketten, Urlaubspässe, Konfirmandenzettel, Haushaltspläne für den Magistrat, ein Produkten-Etat der Messinghütte Reher, Bandgedichte und vieles mehr gedruckt. 1843 heiratete Theodore (* 14. September 1822) den Kaufmann Carl Wilhelm Niemeyer (1820–1874) aus einer Hülptingsener Bauernfamilie, nach dem die Druckerei fortan benannt ist. 1848 erhielt er die Genehmigung, die Deister- und Weserzeitung herauszugeben, die ab 4. Juli 1848 erschien, ab 1884 täglich. Neuzeit Von Beginn an wurden neben Heimatzeitungen und allgemeinbildenden Zeitschriften auch Bücher gedruckt und verlegt. 1956 mit einer schöngeistigen Produktion beginnend, sieht der Verlag seine Aufgabe heute insbesondere in der Dokumentation von Landschaft, Kultur und Geschichte des Weserraumes. Seit 1963 ist der Verlag auch Inhaber des 1894 gegründeten, renommierten hannoverschen Verlages Adolf Sponholtz, dessen Produktion hauptsächlich auf der Herausgabe von Hermann-Löns-Titeln und Hannover-Bildbänden basiert. Schwerpunkte des Programms sind die Regionalliteratur, Kunstbildbände und in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Landesamt für Denkmalpflege die Herausgabe zahlreicher Dokumentationen zum Thema Denkmalpflege in Niedersachsen. 2010 wurde mit der Herausgabe der Reihe WeserberglandKRIMI begonnen, die eine größere Leserschaft fand. Die Krimis sind entweder in einer bestimmten Region Deutschlands beheimatet oder lassen ihre Ermittler im gesamten deutschen Sprachraum agieren. Inzwischen sind rund 115 Titel erhältlich, die auf der Frankfurter Frankfurter und der Leipziger Buchmesse präsentiert werden. Seit 1997 ist der Verlag eine eigenständige GmbH und firmiert als CW Niemeyer Buchverlage GmbH. Der Verlag ist Mitglied im Börsenverein des Deutschen Buchhandels. Literatur Weblinks CW Niemeyer Buchverlage im Katalog der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Offizielle Website Einzelnachweise Niemeyer Niemeyer Unternehmen (Hameln) Gegründet 1797 Verlag (Niedersachsen) Mitglied des Börsenvereins des Deutschen Buchhandels
sv	wikipedia	N/A	Abūyesān (persiska: Abavīsān, ابویسان) är en ort i Iran. Den ligger i provinsen Khorasan, i den nordöstra delen av landet, km öster om huvudstaden Teheran. Abūyesān ligger meter över havet och antalet invånare är . Terrängen runt Abūyesān är platt söderut, men norrut är den kuperad. Den högsta punkten i närheten är meter över havet, km söder om Abūyesān. Runt Abūyesān är det ganska glesbefolkat, med invånare per kvadratkilometer. Närmaste större samhälle är Dastūrān, km söder om Abūyesān. Trakten runt Abūyesān består till största delen av jordbruksmark. Ett kallt stäppklimat råder i trakten. Årsmedeltemperaturen i trakten är °C. Den varmaste månaden är juli, då medeltemperaturen är °C, och den kallaste är januari, med °C. Genomsnittlig årsnederbörd är millimeter. Den regnigaste månaden är mars, med i genomsnitt mm nederbörd, och den torraste är juli, med mm nederbörd. Kommentarer Källor Orter i Khorasan
de	wikipedia	N/A	Die Hoechster-Farben-Straße ist eine wichtige Verbindungsstraße im Westen Frankfurts zwischen den Stadtteilen Höchst und Sindlingen. Sie ist nach den Farbmitteln benannt, die der ehemaligen Hoechst AG zu ihrem Weltruf verhalfen. Häufig wird auch fälschlicherweise die Schreibweise „Höchster Farbenstraße“ verwendet. Geschichte Lange bevor das Werksgelände der Farbwerke Hoechst existierte, führte die Landstraße nach Mainz südlich der Hoechster-Farben-Straße von Höchst nach Sindlingen. Mit der Erschließung des Gebietes durch die Industrieanlagen verlor diese Straße ihre ländliche Prägung und wurde nach dem Mitbegründer der Hoechst AG, Adolf von Brüning, Brüningstraße benannt. Der westliche Teil bekam den Namen Farbenstraße. Nördlich der heutigen Hoechster-Farben-Straße wurde bereits 1839 die Bahntrasse der Taunus-Eisenbahn (Höchst–Kastel) angelegt. In den 1950ern entschloss sich die Hoechst AG dazu, das Werksgelände für den öffentlichen Verkehr zu schließen. Dadurch war eine neue Streckenführung von Höchst nach Sindlingen nötig. Entlang der nördlichen Werksmauer führte zunächst ein Fußweg mit dem Namen An der Chinesischen Mauer. Ihn zu verbessern, hatte sich Frankfurt bereits im Einigungsvertrag mit der Stadt Höchst vom 19. Januar 1928 verpflichtet. Nun sollte die Straße An der Chinesischen Mauer zur „Neuen Farbenstraße“ ausgebaut werden. Jeweils ein Kreisel wurde in Höchst (Leunaknoten) und Sindlingen angelegt. 1954 konnte die Straße dann freigegeben werden. Verlauf Die Straße verläuft weitgehend parallel zur Taunus-Eisenbahn im Nordwesten und dem Industriepark Höchst im Südosten. Am Bahnhof Frankfurt-Sindlingen knickt sie nach Süden ab und endet dann an einer Anschlussstelle der Bundesstraße 40. Der Sindlinger Kreisel teilt die Straße in zwei unterschiedliche Abschnitte. Leunaknoten – Pfaffenwiese Die Hoechster-Farben-Straße beginnt am so genannten Leunaknoten in Höchst und setzt dort die Adolf-Haeuser-Straße fort, während sie den Straßenzug Liederbacher Straße/Leunastraße kreuzt. Unter dem Knotenpunkt fließt der Liederbach. Die Straße bildet in diesem Abschnitt die Stadtteilgrenze Höchst (Süden) und Unterliederbach (Norden). Nach knapp einem Kilometer folgt die Brücke der Pfaffenwiese, die die Taunus-Eisenbahn und Main-Lahn-Bahn Richtung Zeilsheim überquert. Pfaffenwiese – Sindlinger Kreisel Nach weiteren 500 Metern in Höhe des Gleisdreiecks der beiden Bahnstrecken führt die Straße unter einer Eisenbahnbrücke, die die Main-Lahn-Bahn mit dem Werksinternen Eisenbahnnetz verbindet, hindurch. In einer scharfen Linkskurve erreicht die Hoechster-Farben-Straße den südlichen Teil von Sindlingen und den dortigen Kreisel. Hier kreuzt die Sindlinger Bahnstraße den Straßenverlauf. Westlicher Abschnitt Unter nordwestlicher Umfahrung von Sindlingen-Süd folgen die Abzweigungen Straße zur Internationalen Schule in die Ferdinand-Hofmann-Siedlung, Westenbergerstraße zum südlichen Ortskern Sindlingens und Im Hofheimer Grund nach Hattersheim. Im letzten Abschnitt der Straße verläuft dazu parallel die Wendeschleife der Stadtbuslinien 54 und M55. Bauwerke Die Hoechster-Farben-Straße hat nur fünf Hausnummern (2, 4, 5, 15 und 27), die sich alle im Stadtteil Sindlingen befinden. Trotzdem ist sie weitgehend bebaut. Das markanteste Bauwerk im östlichen Abschnitt ist die Werksmauer des Industrieparks Höchst, die über 2 km entlang der Straße verläuft. Sie wird im Volksmund als „Chinesische Mauer“ bezeichnet. Des Weiteren befinden sich die Bahnhöfe Farbwerke und Sindlingen an der Straße, wobei letzterer nicht von dort aus zugänglich ist. In Sindlingen befindet sich das Tor West des Industrieparks, das in Tieflage nur durch eine eigene Zufahrtsstraße und einen Fußgängertunnel unterhalb der Hoechster-Farben-Straße erreichbar ist. Im Stadtteil liegen außerdem zwei Tankstellen, und das Feuerwehrhaus der Freiwilligen Feuerwehr Sindlingen. Die Hermann-Brill-Siedlung und der Sportplatz von Viktoria Sindlingen liegen ebenfalls in unmittelbarer Nähe der Straße. Verkehr Die Hoechster-Farben-Straße ist vierstreifig ausgebaut und Teil zweier Landesstraßen. Über den östlichen Abschnitt verläuft die L3006, während der westliche Abschnitt Teil der L3265 ist. Sie wird ab Leunaknoten von den Omnibuslinien 54 bis zum Sindlinger Kreisel und 53 bis zur Pfaffenwiese befahren. Auf der Straße ist größtenteils ein Tempolimit von 60 km/h vorgeschrieben. Wegen des großzügigen Ausbauzustands wird dieses Limit aber häufig überschritten, was vor allem im Bereich der engen Kurve in Sindlingen schon häufig zu schweren Unfällen führte. Quellen Weblinks Landesstraße in Hessen Straße in Frankfurt am Main Verkehrsbauwerk in Frankfurt-Höchst Frankfurt-Sindlingen Frankfurt-Zeilsheim Straße in Europa
es	wikipedia	N/A	Saiyuki Reload (en japonés Gensomaden Saiyuki Reload) es un popular manga y anime japonés basado en la conocida leyenda del viaje hacia el oeste (Xī Yóu Jì) protagonizada por el rey mono Sun Wukong. La autora de la obra original es la mangaka Kazuya Minekura. Saiyuki Reload es la segunda adaptación al anime, que estuvo a cargo del Estudio Pierrot en el año 2003 - 2004, y el título de la segunda parte del manga, que está todavía sin acabar. Argumento En Tôgenkyô (Shangri-La en la traducción), conviven pacíficamente los Youkai (demonios) y los seres humanos. Sin embargo, poco tiempo atrás, una onda de energía negativa se extendió por todo el mundo, haciendo que los yokâis perdieran el control, atacando a todos los humanos. La divinidad Kanzeon Bosatsu sospecha que este suceso puede tener relación con los intentos de resucitar a Gyûmaô, un gran yokâi que fue encerrado hace quinientos años. Para comprobarlo, Kanzeon Bosatsu envía al monje humano Genjyo Sanzo junto con sus tres compañeros yokâis Son Goku, Cho Hakkai y Sha Gojyo partir hacia el Oeste, para encontrar dicha respuesta. Personajes Genjo Sanzo: Es un monje budista que, al tener el denominativo de "Sanzo", implica que es un monje de alto rango. Presenta un fuerte carácter nada adecuado para la profesión que ejerce. Suele amenazar a sus compañeros con matarles si se interponen en sus decisiones o le molestan. Es ateo, y tiene como armas una pistola y un sutra, con el cual puede realizar múltiples hechizos. Son Goku: Es un mono nacido de una roca, debido a las auras de la tierra. Tiene siempre ganas de comer. Su arma es una vara llamada Nyojibô. Es un yokâi, pero con apariencia humana debido al dispositivo que controla su fuerza que, cuando la pierde, se convierte en Seiten-taisei Son Goku, perdiendo todo control de sí mismo. Cho Hakkai: Antiguamente conocido como Cho Gono, es un humano que se transformó en yokâi al aniquilar 1000 demonios. Es tranquilo, tiene un carácter un tanto confuso, ya que a sus compañeros les cuesta distinguir las cosas que dice en serio o en tono bromista. Tiene un pequeño dragón volador llamada Hakuryu/Hakuryuu, que se puede transformar en un vehículo, el cual usan para dirigirse al oeste. Su técnica de lucha es el ki. Sha Gojyo:Es el hijo de un yokâi y una humana, prohibido según las leyes de Togenkyo, por lo que es conocido como el chico tabú. De carácter mujeriego y bromista, le gusta fastidiar a Goku. El arma que usa es una especie de bastón metálico que finaliza en una media luna. Kinkaku: Ginkgaku: Kami Sama: Manga Hay que decir que hay un desajuste entre el manga y el anime porque Kinkaku, Gingaku y Kami Sama no aparecen en el Saiyuki Reload sino en Gensoumaden Saiyuki (la primera parte). No hay nada especial que subrayar en este segunda anime y manga sino que 3 de los 4 personajes principales cambian vestidos, lo que fue muy comentado por los fanes japoneses. Referencias Site officiel (jap) Anime de 2003 Manga de 2005 Series de televisión de TV Tokyo
en	caselaw	US	Ezra Shahmoon and Lydia Shahmoon, Petitioners, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, RespondentShahmoon v. CommissionerDocket No. 19134United States Tax Court13 T.C. 705; 1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 47; November 2, 1949, Promulgated 1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 47">47 Decision will be entered for the respondent. Deduction -- Depreciation -- Basis -- War Loss. -- An adjustment of the basis for depreciation of property on account of a war loss in 1941 is mandatory under section 127 (a) (2), I. R. C., and no deduction for depreciation of the property is allowable thereafter unless and until the basis of the property is restored through recoveries at or after the end of the war. Abraham Albert Andriesse, 12 T.C. 907, followed. Max Schiller, C. P. A., for the petitioners.Sheldon V. Ekman, Esq., for the respondent. Murdock, Judge. MURDOCK 13 T.C. 705">705 The Commissioner determined a deficiency of $ 9,344.38 in the income tax of the petitioners for 1944. The issue for decision is whether1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 47">48 the Commissioner erred in disallowing a deduction of $ 20,000 claimed as depreciation on buildings in Shanghai, China, owned by the taxpayer. The explanation given by the Commissioner in disallowing the deduction is as follows:Depreciation claimed on buildings in Shanghai disallowed. Basis of property for depreciation purposes, and equity of rate used not substantiated. Furthermore, it is considered that the taxpayer has been automatically divested of title to this property in a prior year by virtue of Section 127 (a) (2) of the I. R. C. (War Loss Provisions).FINDINGS OF FACT.The petitioners are husband and wife, residing in New Rochelle, New York. They filed their return for 1944 with the collector of internal revenue for the third district of New York. The husband will be referred to hereinafter as the petitioner.The petitioner was born in Iraq in 1897 and was a citizen of that country until March 4, 1946, when he became a citizen of the United States through naturalization. He was a resident of the United States at all times material hereto.The petitioner acquired vacant land at Dalny and Ward Roads in Shanghai, China, during 1924. About 198 buildings, shops, and houses1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 47">49 were erected on the property in 1925. The cost to the petitioner of the depreciable improvements, stated in American currency, was about $ 188,750. These depreciable properties, constructed of brick exterior and wood interior, except for cement fireproofed kitchens, had useful lives of about 40 years, beginning in 1925.The petitioner acquired land and buildings at Yates Road in Shanghai, China, in 1928. There were about 160 shops and houses on the property. The portion of the cost allocable to the depreciable 13 T.C. 705">706 improvements, stated in United States currency, was about $ 285,000. These buildings, constructed of brick exterior and stucco facing were about 10 years old in 1928 and had a future useful life of about 30 years.The petitioner received rents from the properties prior to the Japanese invasion of Shanghai on December 8, 1941. Thereafter and during the taxable year the petitioner received no rents from the properties, which had been taken over by the Japanese invading forces. The properties were not destroyed during the war. The petitioner again obtained possession of the properties in 1945 and began to receive some rents from them.OPINION.The respondent contends1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 47">50 in his brief that the petitioner has failed to show ownership of the properties, but that question is not fairly or properly in issue. Furthermore, the evidence shows that the petitioner was the owner of the properties, as the respondent must have concluded in determining the deficiencies.The evidence in regard to the cost of the properties and their probable useful lives is not as clear, complete, or convincing as it might be, but findings have been made as favorable to the petitioner as the evidence permits.One of the contentions made by the respondent is that the petitioner may not take depreciation on his Shanghai properties for 1944 in view of the fact that his entire basis for those properties was deductible as a loss in 1941 under section 127 (a) (2), and thereafter he had no basis for depreciation. The petitioner concedes the correctness of this contention if he had no election under section 127 (a) (2). The scheme of Congress in enacting section 127 was to make sure that a taxpayer would have a deductible loss when war was declared or the enemy invaded a country in which the taxpayer owned property and thereafter the property would, if recovered, come into income and1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 47">51 acquire a new basis, but only to the extent that the original loss deduction had had tax benefits. This Court, in another case which is not distinguishable in principle from this one, held that the word "deemed," as used in section 127 (a) (2), created a conclusive presumption of loss on the date war with the enemy country was declared by the United States, and Congress did not intend to permit a taxpayer an election to claim the loss under section 23 (e) (3) in later years when actual destruction or seizure occurred. Abraham Albert Andriesse, 12 T.C. 907. The only difference between that case and the present case is that the present petitioner is claiming a right to a deduction for depreciation under section 23 (l) instead of loss under section 23 (e) (3). This difference does not distinguish 13 T.C. 705">707 the Andriesse case as an authority for the purpose of this case. The basis for depreciation is the same as the basis for gain or loss. Secs. 23 (n), 114 (a), 113 (b). Each is reduced or wiped out by a deduction for loss. The war loss under section 127 (a) (2) wipes out that basis. A taxpayer has no election under section 127 (a) (2), which1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 47">*52 allows him to deduct his basis for the property as a loss at the time of the declaration of war, and, having been allowed to recover his basis in that way, he can not recover it later, either as a loss or through depreciation. Other possible grounds for the Commissioner's determination do not need to be discussed.Decision will be entered for the respondent.
en	caselaw	US	211 F.2d 400 101 U.S.P.Q. 97 FISCHER & PORTER CO.v.BROOKS ROTAMETER CO. No. 11012. United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit. Argued Feb. 16, 1954.Decided April 7, 1954. Leonard L. Kalish, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant. Ralph L. Chappell, New York City (J. Edward Shinn, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee. Before MARIS, KALODNER and STALEY, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. 1 This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment for the defendant entered by the district court n.o.v. in an action for damages for infringement of plaintiff's Fischer patent No. 2,441,350 for a rotameter and metering tube therefor. The case was tried to a jury to which three issues only were submitted, all other issues being reserved by stipulation of the parties for the court. The three issues submitted to the jury were whether the patent involved invention, whether Fischer was the first and original inventor and the amount of damages, in the event of a verdict for plaintiff. The jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $14,177.36. 2 Thereafter the district court, upon motion of the defendant, entered the judgment in its favor from which the present appeal was taken. The court did so pursuant to its conclusion that the evidence, taken in its most favorable light for the plaintiff, failed to support a finding of invention and that in any event the claims of the patent were invalid for want of definiteness. These conclusions are set forth in a comprehensive opinion filed by Chief Judge Kirkpatrick, 107 F. Supp. 1010. We find ourselves in complete accord with his reasoning and conclusions and need add nothing thereto. They fully support the judgment appealed from. 3 The plaintiff urges that the district court erred in denying its subsequent motion for reargument or a new trial, in support of which it offered 25 documents as additional evidence which it alleged contradicted certain of the defendant's evidence. The judgment n.o.v. was entered because of the insufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence, however. Moreover the documents did not in any event qualify as after discovered evidence. We find no error in the denial of the motion. 4 The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Leclercville est une municipalité d'environ 450 habitants dans la municipalité régionale de comté de Lotbinière au Québec, située dans la région administrative de Chaudière-Appalaches. Cette municipalité, constituée le , a une superficie d'environ km et elle est la municipalité la moins densément peuplée dans Lotbinière avec une densité d'environ habitants/km. Les personnes de cette municipalité sont des Leclercvillois et des Leclercvilloises. Géographie Municipalités limitrophes Toponymie Leclercville fut ainsi nommé en l'honneur de Pierre Leclerc qui a donné le terrain sur lequel ont été érigés l'église et le presbytère. Histoire Leclercville fut créé en 1863. En 1863 elle se sépare de Lotbinière. Démographie Administration Les élections municipales se font en bloc pour le maire et les six conseillers. Circonscriptions électorales provinciales et fédérales Leclercville fait partie de la circonscription électorale fédérale de Lévis—Lotbinière et fait partie de la circonscription électorale provinciale de Lotbinière-Frontenac. Infrastructures Économie Transport Les routes 132 et 226 traversent cette municipalité. Éducation Leclercville contient une école primaire : L'École de la Falaise. Les écoles secondaires les plus près sont : L'École secondaire Pamphile-Le May à Sainte-Croix et l'École secondaire Les Seigneuries à Saint-Pierre-les-Becquets. L'école primaire et l'école secondaire de Sainte-Croix font partie du Centre de services scolaire des Navigateurs. L'école secondaire de Saint-Pierre-les-Becquets fait partie du Centre de services scolaire de la Riveraine. Santé Médias Journal municipal L'Écho des falaises est un journal municipal mensuel de Leclercville. Culture et loisirs Patrimoine L'église de Sainte-Emmélie est érigée en 1863. Elle est conçue par l'architecte et sculpteur Zéphirin Perrault. Elle est nommée en l'honneur de l'épouse de saint Basile l'Ancien, sainte Emmélie, et porte l'ancien nom de la municipalité. Elle conserve un fauteuil de l'orateur de l'Assemblée nationale du Québec donné par le député Joseph-Napoléon Francoeur. Sa hiérarchisation régionale permet de la qualifier d'exceptionnelle. Elle est citée comme immeuble patrimonial en 2014. Également cité comme immeuble patrimonial en 2014, un presbytère lui est adjacent. Un cimetière complète le noyau paroissial. Un calvaire s'y trouve. Située à proximité, l'école de la Falaise est aussi citée. Le moulin du Portage est construit en 1816. Sur le plan du patrimoine agricole, une écurie et un hangar ont été bâtis dans la seconde moitié du . Personnalités Gilles Lemay, un évêque Galerie d'images Notes et références Annexes Articles connexes Rivière du Chêne, un cours d'eau Rivière Henri, un cours d'eau Rivière Huron, un cours d'eau municipalité régionale de comté, une MRC Liens externes La mémoire du Québec Municipalité en Chaudière-Appalaches Municipalité dans Lotbinière
en	other	N/A	[USC03] 15 USC 2615: Penalties << Previous TITLE 15 / CHAPTER 53 / SUBCHAPTER I / § 2615 Next >> 15 USC 2615: Penalties Text contains those laws in effect on December 17, 2017 ( Pub. L. 94–469, title I, §16, Oct. 11, 1976, 90 Stat. 2037 ; renumbered title I, Pub. L. 99–519, §3(c)(1), Oct. 22, 1986, 100 Stat. 2989 ; amended Pub. L. 102–550, title X, §1021(b)(5), Oct. 28, 1992, 106 Stat. 3923 ; Pub. L. 114–182, title I, §12, June 22, 2016, 130 Stat. 492 .) 2016-Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 114–182, §12(1), substituted "$37,500" for "$25,000". 1992-Subsecs. (a)(1), (2)(A), (b). Pub. L. 102–550 substituted "section 2614 or 2689 of this title" for "section 2614 of this title" wherever appearing.
nl	legislation	EU	Avis juridique important \| 31995H0377 95/377/EG: Aanbeveling van de Commissie van 13 september 1995 betreffende de inachtneming van de statistische nomenclatuur van de economische activiteiten in de Europese Gemeenschap bij de onderverdeling van de netto- omzet naar categorieën bedrijfsactiviteiten Publicatieblad Nr. L 225 van 22/09/1995 blz. 0018 - 0020 AANBEVELING VAN DE COMMISSIE van 13 september 1995 betreffende de inachtneming van de statistische nomenclatuur van de economische activiteiten in de Europese Gemeenschap bij de onderverdeling van de netto-omzet naar categorieën bedrijfsactiviteiten (Voor de EER relevante tekst) (95/377/EG)DE COMMISSIE VAN DE EUROPESE GEMEENSCHAPPEN, Gelet op het Verdrag tot oprichting van de Europese Gemeenschap, Gelet op de Vierde Richtlijn 78/660/EEG van de Raad van 25 juli 1978 (1) betreffende de jaarrekening van bepaalde vennootschapsvormen, inzonderheid op artikel 43, lid 1, onder 8), Overwegende dat het met het oog op de werking van de interne markt noodzakelijk is dat op het gebied van de economische informatie normen worden toegepast, zodat ondernemingen, financiële instellingen en administratieve diensten over betrouwbare en vergelijkbare statistische gegevens kunnen beschikken; dat ondernemingen dergelijke gegevens vooral ook behoeven om hun prestaties te meten, hun concurrentievermogen te evalueren en hun positie ten opzichte van de concurrentie te bepalen; Overwegende dat de behoefte aan internationaal vergelijkbare economische informatie de Lid-Staten en de Europese instellingen heeft aangespoord gemeenschappelijke nomenclaturen in te voeren, opdat de inhoud van vooral de activiteiten- en produktencategorieën door alle Lid-Staten op gelijke wijze wordt geïnterpreteerd en coherentie met de internationale classificaties van de Verenigde Naties wordt gewaarborgd; dat hiertoe bij verordening een statistische nomenclatuur van de economische activiteiten in de Europese Gemeenschap, NACE Rev. 1 (2), is vastgesteld, die door de diensten van de Commissie voor alle naar economische activiteit ingedeelde statistieken wordt gebruikt en die ook door de Lid-Staten rechtstreeks of via een hiervan afgeleide nationale nomenclatuur wordt toegepast; Overwegende dat in de Vierde Richtlijn 78/660/EEG is vastgelegd dat cooerdinatiemaatregelen moeten worden genomen die van toepassing zijn op de nationale bepalingen betreffende de jaarrekening van bepaalde vennootschapsvormen en dat de jaarrekening een getrouw beeld moet geven van het vermogen, de financiële positie en het resultaat van de vennootschap; dat hiertoe wordt vastgesteld welke gegevens de toelichting ten minste moet bevatten en dat in dit verband in artikel 43, lid 1, onder 8), is bepaald dat zij gegevens over de netto-omzet, gesplitst naar categorieën bedrijfsactiviteiten, omvat; Overwegende dat uit hoofde van de in Richtlijn 78/660/EEG vastgelegde vrijstellingen niet alle vennootschappen in de Lid-Staten verplicht zijn deze informatie te verstrekken, zodat deze dan op basis van vrijwilligheid wordt gegeven; Overwegende dat het wenselijk is dat voor de vennootschappen die deze informatie vrijwillig verstrekken criteria worden vastgesteld waardoor de gepubliceerde informatie zowel binnen een Lid-Staat als tussen verschillende Lid-Staten van de Europese Unie vergelijkbaar is; Overwegende: - dat het op elkaar afstemmen van het boekhoudkundig en statistisch taalgebruik kan bijdragen tot een verbetering van de vergelijkbaarheid en kwaliteit van de economische informatie; - dat het algemeen gebruik van de NACE Rev. 1 bij de onderverdeling van de netto-omzet naar categorieën bedrijfsactiviteiten overeenkomstig artikel 43, lid 1, onder 8), van Richtlijn 78/660/EEG deze onderlinge afstemming ten goede zou komen, daar hierdoor aan genoemde bepaling een minimale inhoud wordt gegeven; dat gebruik van de NACE Rev. 1 door de grotere coherentie tussen het economisch en boekhoudkundig taalgebruik talrijke voordelen biedt, inzonderheid: 1. vermindering van de belasting die voor de vennootschappen uit de verzameling van statistische gegevens voortvloeit door het gebruik van een gemeenschappelijk basis; 2. betere overeenstemming tussen de bij de ondernemingen verzamelde informatie en de statistische economische informatie die weer naar de gebruikers van economische informatie terugstroomt; - dat het dus uiterst wenselijk is om dit doel (deze doelstellingen) te bereiken zonder dat aan de vennootschappen nieuwe verplichtingen worden opgelegd; Overwegende dat in overeenstemming met het subsidiariteitsbeginsel de opstelling van gemeenschappelijke statistische en boekhoudkundige normen voor de produktie van geharmoniseerde resultaten alleen op communautair niveau op doeltreffende wijze kan worden uitgevoerd en dat de toepassing hiervan in elke Lid-Staat zal plaatsvinden; Overwegende dat de Commissie het gezien deze situatie noodzakelijk acht de Lid-Staten aan te bevelen een maatregel te bevorderen die tot een verbetering van de doorzichtigheid en de werking van de interne markt leidt; dat een meerderheid van de leden van het Contactcomité, dat krachtens artikel 52 van de Vierde Richtlijn van de Raad werd opgericht en dat met name tot taak heeft een geharmoniseerde toepassing van de richtlijn te bevorderen door regelmatig overleg over met name de concrete problemen die zich bij de toepassing daarvan voordoen, zich heeft uitgesproken voor het voorstel van de Commissie betreffende de vrijwillige toepassing door de vennootschappen van de NACE Rev. 1 voor de onderverdeling van de netto-omzet naar categorieën bedrijfsactiviteiten, BEVEELT DE LID-STATEN AAN: - alle vennootschappen die, krachtens artikel 43, lid 1, onder 8), van Richtlijn 78/660/EEG een onderverdeling van hun netto-omzet naar categorieën bedrijfsactiviteiten maken, te stimuleren om hiervoor de categorieën van de NACE Rev. 1 te gebruiken; - de vennootschappen die zich op de statistische nomenclatuur baseren, aan te sporen om bij het gebruik van de NACE Rev. 1 de in de bijlage van deze aanbeveling opgenomen voorwaarden toe te passen. Gedaan te Brussel, 13 september 1995. Voor de Commissie Mario MONTI Lid van de Commissie BIJLAGE Gebruik van de NACE Rev.1 als referentienomenclatuur voor de onderverdeling van de omzet naar activiteit Vergelijkbare gegevens over de omzet naar categorieën bedrijfsactiviteiten kunnen op de volgende wijze worden verkregen: - de ondernemingen gebruiken voor de boekhoudkundige onderverdeling van de door hen afgezette goederen en verleende diensten een classificatieschema dat is aangepast aan hun behoeften op het gebied van het intern beheer; - daarbij is het wenselijk dat zij hun classificatieschema voor de onderverdeling naar categorieën bedrijfsactiviteiten aansluiten op de statistische nomenclatuur van de economische activiteiten in de Europese Gemeenschap, NACE Rev.1, of op de nationale versie van deze nomenclatuur (1). 1. Mate van overeenstemming De interne classificatie stemt met de Europese statistische nomenclatuur overeen, als: - haar rubrieken gelijk zijn aan die (afdelingen, groepen of klassen) van de NACE Rev.1 (2) (3); - haar rubrieken een onderverdeling zijn van die van de NACE Rev.1, zodat een aantal van deze rubrieken samen overeenkomen met de rubrieken van NACE Rev.1. 2. Gewenste niveau De NACE Rev.1 kent verscheidene niveaus, namelijk afdelingen, groepen en klassen. Daar de NACE Rev.1 tot en met het niveau van de klassen, d.w.z. het niveau met vier cijfers, voor alle Lid-Staten gelijk is, is het wenselijk dat de verstrekte informatie gebaseerd is op dit niveau dat als het meest adequaat wordt beschouwd. Bovendien wordt op basis van dit niveau de hoofdactiviteit bepaald en de samenhang tussen de Lid-Staten gewaarborgd. 3. Bijzondere gevallen en uitzonderingen 3.1 Het is mogelijk dat bepaalde vennootschappen menen dat een onderverdeling van hun omzet op basis van het niveau van vier vijfers van de NACE Rev.1 voor hen te gedetailleerd en nadelig is. In dat geval is het toegestaan de splitsing van de omzet naar activiteit te baseren op het niveau met drie cijfers (groepen) of zelfs twee cijfers (afdelingen) van de NACE Rev.1. 3.2 In enkele gevallen waarin sprake is van een gedeeltelijke overeenstemming tussen de interne classificatie en de statistische nomenclatuur, kunnen de omzetcijfers niet in een enkele klasse, groep of afdeling van de NACE Rev.1 worden ingedeeld of zou een dergelijke indeling kosten meebrengen die in geen verhouding tot het nut van de verstrekte informatie staan. In dat geval kan de informatie worden ondergebracht in een post "Niet nader gesplitste omzet". 4. Opmerking Met het oog op de onderverdeling van de omzet naar categorieën bedrijfsactiviteiten is het wenselijk dat de vennootschappen hun zuiver commerciële activiteiten (handel) (4) scheiden van hun produktieactiviteiten (verkoop van door de onderneming geproduceerde goederen en diensten).
da	caselaw	EU	Vigtig juridisk meddelelse \| 61986C0160 Forslag til afgørelse fra generaladvokat Sir Gordon Slynn fremsat den 19. marts 1987. - MINISTERE PUBLIC MOD JACQUES VERBRUGGE. - ANMODNING OM PRAEJUDICIEL AFGOERELSE INDGIVET AF TRIBUNAL DE POLICE DE REIMS. - FASTE PRISER FOR BOEGER. - SAG 160/86. Samling af Afgørelser 1987 side 01783 Generaladvokatens forslag til afgørelse ++++ Hoeje Domstol . Jacques Verbrugge er direktoer for supermarkedet "Continent" i Reims . Han er tiltalt for at have solgt boeger til en lavere pris end tilladt efter fransk lovgivning, nemlig lov nr . 81-766 af 10 . august 1981, som aendret ved lov nr . 85-500 af 13 . maj 1985 og gennemfoerelsesanordning nr . 85-556 af 29 . maj 1985 . Ifoelge denne lovgivning er det med visse undtagelser forbudt at saelge boeger, som inden for de foregaaende to aar er udgivet eller indfoert i Frankrig, med rabatter paa over 5% af den af forlaeggeren eller importoeren fastsatte pris, medmindre der er tale om boeger indfoert fra et andet EF-land, efter at de er udgivet dér, eller efter at de er udgivet i Frankrig og herfra udfoert til et andet EF-land . Der er i den foreliggende sag enighed om de faktiske omstaendigheder . Da Verbrugge paa grund af konkurrence fra andre boghandlere, som tilsyneladende solgte til lavere priser end de ved lov fastsatte, gav han sine kunder valget mellem den i loven fastsatte pris og den anbefalede salgspris med 20% rabat . Selv om der ikke i den foreliggende sag foreligger bevis for et reelt salg, er det klart, at mange, om ikke alle, kunder ville foretraekke den lave pris . Tribunal de police de Reims, som behandler straffesagen, har forelagt foelgende spoergsmaal for Domstolen : "Er de faellesskabsretlige principper om lighed og om forbud mod forskelsbehandling, som er fastlagt i EOEF-traktaten, til hinder for, at en af Faellesskabets medlemsstater ved lov eller forvaltningsforskrift indfoerer en dobbelt prisordning i bogsektoren for identiske eller lignende varer, navnlig naar der, for saa vidt angaar boeger, er tale dels om en prisbindingsordning ( med mulighed for hoejst 5% rabat ) for boeger, som udgives og saelges i den paagaeldende stat, og som ikke i noget salgsled har passeret landegraenser inden for Faellesskabet, dels om en ordning med fri prisdannelse for boeger udgivet i Frankrig og genindfoert fra en anden medlemsstat?" Det problem, der skal tages stilling til i den foreliggende sag, er i store traek det samme som i sag 355/85, ( Driancourt mod Cognet, dom af 23 . oktober 1986, Sml . s . 3231 ). Verbrugge har gjort gaeldende, at den franske lovgivning indebaerer en forskelsbehandling af boghandlere, der saelger boeger udgivet i Frankrig, som aldrig har forladt Frankrig, i forhold til boghandlere, der saelger indfoerte boeger, eller boeger udgivet i Frankrig, som genindfoeres efter forudgaaende eksport . Ifoelge Verbrugge foerer loven til ophaevelse af priskonkurrencen i detailleddet og til forskelsbehandling . Som jeg ser det, gaar Verbrugge' s argumenter snarere paa en kritik af fransk lovgivning som saadan end paa spoergsmaalet om, hvorvidt den er forenelig med faellesskabsretten . De argumenter, som vedroerer sidstnaevnte spoergsmaal, er indgaaende behandlet i Domstolens dom i Cognet-sagen og er ligeledes taget i betragtning i sag 168/86, ( Rousseau mod anklagemyndigheden, dom af 25 . februar 1987, Sml . s . 0000 ). Hverken de skriftlige indlaeg eller de mundtlige indlaeg, vi har hoert i dag, indeholder efter min opfattelse momenter, som boer foranledige Domstolen til at aendre det standpunkt, den indtog i Cognet - og Rousseau-sagerne . Der er under sagens behandling henvist til artikel 3, litra f ), skoent den ikke direkte er naevnt i spoergsmaalet . Som allerede naevnt i Cognet-sagen mener jeg ikke, at denne bestemmelse i sig selv kan paaberaabes i en sag mellem en medlemsstat og en indenlandsk erhvervsdrivende . ( Jfr . ligeledes sag 229/83, Leclerc, Sml . 1985, s . 1 ). Af de i Cognet-dommen anfoerte grunde boer det af tribunal de police de Reims forelagte spoergsmaal derfor besvares saaledes : Hverken EOEF-traktatens artikel 7 eller andre af EOEF-traktatens bestemmelser eller principper finder anvendelse paa en forskelsbehandling, som rammer enhver detailhandler i henhold til en lovgivning, hvorefter forlaeggeren eller importoeren af en bog fastsaetter detailsalgsprisen, og hvorefter der er fri prisdannelse for boeger udgivet og trykt i den paagaeldende medlemsstat, naar de genindfoeres efter forudgaaende eksport til en anden medlemsstat, mens den af forlaeggeren fastsatte salgspris er bindende, naar der er tale om boeger, som i forbindelse med deres afsaetning ikke har overskredet nogen graense inden for Faellesskabet . De af Kommissionen afholdte omkostninger kan ikke godtgoeres . Det tilkommer den nationale ret, som har forelagt det praejudicielle spoergsmaal, at traeffe afgoerelse om de af Verbrugge afholdte omkostninger . (*) Oversat fra engelsk .
sk	wikipedia	N/A	Havran () je jedna z najznámejších básní Edgara Allana Poea. Po prvýkrát bola uverejnená 29. januára 1845 v novinách New York Evening Mirror. Opisuje mysterióznu polnočnú návštevu havrana u psychicky zmučeného muža, ktorý stratil svoju lásku Lenoru. Muž kladie vo svojom psychickom rozpoložení havranovi rozličné otázky, na ktoré havran odpovedá jediným naučeným slovom: Nevermore (dosl. Nikdy viac). Báseň býva považovaná za obraz psychického utrpenia, viny a pocitu bezvýchodiskovosti. Havran je jednou z najznámejších básní americkej literatúry. Medzi jej charakteristické rysy patrí zvuková bohatosť až muzikálnosť (porov. havranom neustále opakované Nevermore), jazyková štylizácia a nadprirodzená atmosféra plná symbolov. Z týchto dôvodov sa báseň považuje za jeden z najväčších prekladateľských orieškov. Najznámejší preklad Havrana do slovenčiny pochádza od Vladimíra Roya. Okrem neho báseň preložili aj napr. Karol Strmeň, Valentín Beniak, Jozef Urban, Ľubomír Feldek a Jana Kantorová-Báliková. Úryvok Otvoril som prudko oblok, a len čo som cúvol o krok, starobylý havran vkročil do izby sťa zjavenie, neobzrel sa vľavo, vpravo, obišiel ma nevšímavo, iba múdro kýval hlavou, vzlietol k buste pri stene, k bielej Palladinej buste nad dverami pri stene, sadol si, a iné nie. Ubolenú predstavivosť tešila tá čierna bytosť, správala sa veľmi vážne, dôstojne a honosne. Vravím: "Hoci rozčuchraný, no ste bez bázne a hany, pochmúrny a starodávny ako v tajuplnom sne. Prezraďte mi, veličenstvo, ako vaše meno znie!" Havran kráka: "Veru nie." (prel. Jana Kantorová-Báliková) Literatúra Edgar Allan Poe. Havran. Petrus, 2000. (Zbierka deviatich slovenských prekladov Havrana) Diela Edgara Allana Poea Básne
pt	wikipedia	N/A	Cyclothone livida é uma espécie de peixe pertencente à família Gonostomatidae. A autoridade científica da espécie é Brauer, tendo sido descrita no ano de 1902. Portugal Encontra-se presente em Portugal, onde é uma espécie nativa. Descrição Trata-se de uma espécie marinha. Atinge os 3,59 cm de comprimento padrão nos indivíduos do sexo masculino, 5 cm de comprimento padrão nos indivíduos do sexo feminino. Referências Cyclothone livida - Froese, R. and D. Pauly. Editors. 2014. FishBase. World Wide Web electronic publication. www.fishbase.org, (11/2014) Ligações externas Cyclothone livida - Biodiversity Heritage Library - Bibliografia Cyclothone livida - NCBI Taxonomy Database Cyclothone livida - Global Biodiversity Information Facility Cyclothone livida'' - Encyclopedia of Life Peixes de Portugal livida Peixes descritos em 1902
cs	caselaw	EU	Rozsudek Soudu (pátého senátu) ze dne 10. září 2009 – Banco Comercial dos Açores v. Komise (Věc T-75/03) „Státní podpory – Daňová opatření přijatá regionálním nebo místním územně správním celkem – Snížení sazeb daně z příjmu fyzických a právnických osob s bydlištěm nebo sídlem pro daňové účely na Azorách – Rozhodnutí, které prohlašuje režim podpor za částečně neslučitelný se společným trhem a nařizuje vrácení vyplacených podpor – Žaloba na neplatnost – Osobní dotčení – Přípustnost – Pojem státní podpory – Selektivní charakter – Narušení hospodářské soutěže – Ovlivnění obchodu mezi členskými státy – Rovné zacházení – Legitimní očekávání – Právní jistota“ 1. Žaloba na neplatnost – Fyzické nebo právnické osoby – Akty týkající se jich bezprostředně a osobně – Rozhodnutí Komise, jímž se zakazuje režim podpor v určitém odvětví – Žaloba podniku, který byl příjemcem individuální podpory přiznané na základě tohoto režimu a která má být vrácena – Přípustnost (Článek 230 čtvrtý pododstavec ES) (viz body 38–47) 2. Podpory poskytované státy – Pojem – Selektivní charakter opatření – Finanční opatření přijaté entitou působící pod úrovní státu – Snížená daňová sazba ve srovnání se státní sazbou – Kritéria posouzení (Článek 87 odst. 1 ES) (viz body 74–75) 3. Podpory poskytované státy – Ovlivnění obchodu mezi členskými státy – Narušení hospodářské soutěže – Kritéria posouzení (Článek 87 odst. 1 ES) (viz body 86–87) 4. Podpory poskytované státy – Zákaz – Výjimky – Posuzovací pravomoc Komise – Soudní přezkum – Meze (Článek 87 odst. 3 ES) (viz bod 100) 5. Podpory poskytované státy – Rozhodnutí Komise – Rozlišení dvou odvětví na základě dokumentů předložených dotčeným členským státem – Porušení zásady rovného zacházení – Neexistence [Článek 87 odst. 3 písm. a) ES] (viz body 111–116) 6. Podpory poskytované státy – Navrácení protiprávní podpory – Podpora poskytnutá v rozporu s pravidly postupu podle čl. 88 odst. 3 ES – Případné legitimní očekávání příjemců – Právní jistota – Ochrana – Podmínky a omezení (Článek 88 odst. 3 ES) (viz body 124–126) Předmět Návrh na zrušení závěrečné části článku 1, jakož i článků 2, 3 a 4 rozhodnutí Komise 2003/442/ES ze dne 11. prosince 2002, které se týká části režimu přizpůsobujícího vnitrostátní daňovou soustavu specifickým podmínkám Autonomního regionu Azory, která se týká snížení sazeb daně z příjmu (Úř. věst. 2003, L 150, s. 52) Výrok 1) Žaloba se zamítá. 2) Banco Comercial dos Açores, SA ponese vlastní náklady řízení a nahradí náklady řízení vynaložené Komisí Evropských společenství. 3) Banco Espírito Santo dos Açores, SA ponese vlastní náklady řízení.
en	wikipedia	N/A	Blockbuster is a 2018 French comedy film about a man trying to win back his superhero-loving girlfriend after she dumps him over a video he made to amuse his ailing dad. The film was released worldwide on 24 January 2018 by Netflix although departed in January 2021. Cast Syrus Shahidi as Jéremy Charlotte Gabris as Lola Tom Hygreck as Mathias Gunther Love as Mickael (as Sylvain Quimène) Laura Boujenah as Sarah Foëd Amara as Sam Lionel Abelanski as Simon Production The film was originally getting off the ground thanks to the crowdfunding platform KissKissBankBank before Netflix stepped in. References External links 2018 films Films about comics French comedy films French-language Netflix original films 2010s French films
hu	other	N/A	Galamus - Bírósági vezetők az ország és az EU nyilvánosságához fordultak Bírósági vezetők az ország és az EU nyilvánosságához fordultak 2011. április 15. péntek, 07:58 A Magyar Köztársaság Legfelsőbb Bíróságának teljes ülése, az OIT elnöke, valamint az ítélőtáblák és a megyei bíróságok elnökei által az ország és az Európai Unió nyilvánosságához intézett közleménye, Budapest, 2011. április 14., csütörtök Ennek alapján megszűnik a lehetőség arra, hogy egy bíró, amennyiben egészsége, képességei engedik, 70 éves koráig ítélkezhessen, noha ennek gyökerei a bírói hatalomról szóló 1869:IV. törvénycikkhez nyúlnak vissza és számos európai ország jogrendszere ma is hasonló rendelkezést tartalmaz. A módosító javaslat értelmében 2012. január 1-jén nyolc évvel rövidül a nyugdíjkorhatár, amelynek következtében 228 hatvankettedik életévét betöltött bíró – köztük 121 igazgatási és szakmai vezető – szolgálati viszonya szűnik meg minden átmenet nélkül. 2012. december 31-ig pedig további 46 bírónak ér véget a pályafutása. E döntés következményeként jelentősen romlani fognak az időszerűségi mutatók (mintegy 40 000 ügyben új bírót kell kijelölni, ami akár több éves késedelmet okoz több tízezer ügyfélnek), illetve komoly fennakadások lesznek a bíróságok működésében, hiszen a távozó bírók tömeges utánpótlása rendkívüli nehézségeket okoz. A magasan kvalifikált, több évtizedes tapasztalattal és gyakorlattal rendelkező, többségében a jogorvoslati hierarchia csúcsán álló bírók valódi indok nélküli, kényszerű nyugdíjazásának tovagyűrűző hatása – az egyelőre kiszámíthatatlan következmények mellett – alapvetően fogja megrendíteni a bíróságok működőképességét. Ráadásul méltánytalan és megalázó azokra az érintettekre nézve, akik a Magyar Köztársaság és az igazság szolgálatára esküdtek és a bírói szolgálatra tették fel az életüket. Akik nem írták alá a közleményt A Bács-Kiskun Megyei Bíróság, a Békés Megyei Bíróság, a Pest Megyei Bíróság vezetője. A Vas Megyei Bíróságnak, valamint a Fővárosi Bíróságnak jelenleg nincs elnöke. Az MTI kérdésére Kovács András, a Pest Megyei Bíróság elnöke csütörtök este azt mondta: a megyei bíróság vezetésének egyöntetű véleménye az, hogy nem indokolt most, a végszavazás előtt a nyilvánossághoz fordulni. Egyrészt azért, mert április 7-én – a parlamenti vita elősegítése érdekében – a többi bírósággal együtt eljuttatták kifejezetten szakmai álláspontjukat ez ügyben a törvényhozóknak, másrészt nem szeretnék átlépni a politikai felé vezető vékony határt. Egyébként a tervezett szabály a Pest Megyei Bíróság bíráit nemigen érinti. Bicskei Ferenc, a Bács-Kiskun Megyei Bíróság elnöke nem akarta kommentálni, miért nem írta alá a közleményt. Közölte: a hatályos jogszabályok szerint Magyarországon a nyugdíjkorhatár – a kivételektől eltekintve – 65 év. Egyébként a megyében nem okoz megoldhatatlan problémát a változtatás, mert öt bíró töltötte be a 62. évét, de közülük is egy jövőre 70 éves lesz, egy pedig már korábban kérte a felmentését. „Azt tudom, hogy a többi megyében sokkal komolyabb gondot okozhat a bírákra vonatkozó nyugdíjkorhatár csökkentése” – mondta Bicskei Ferenc. Átmenetileg a bajai bíróságon okozhat gondot a változtatás, mert a megyében ténylegesen érintett három bíróból kettő a bajai bíróság polgári ügyszakán dolgozik, ezek a változások Bács-Kiskun megyében a bíróságok munkájában nem okoznának fennakadást. Pozsonyi János, a Vas Megyei Bíróság elnökhelyettese azt mondta: valóban nem írta alá a nyilatkozatot, ám döntésének indokait nem kívánja nyilvánosságra hozni. Az elnökhelyettes Laky Ferenc elnök március 18-án bekövetkezett halála óta irányítja teljes jogkörben a megyei bíróság munkáját.
en	caselaw	US	253 A.2d 155 (1969) STATE HIGHWAY BOARD v. Mae SHEPARD et al. No. 38-68. Supreme Court of Vermont. Washington. April 1, 1969. 156 James M. Jeffords, Atty. Gen., Louis P. Peck and Robert C. Schwartz, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State Highway Board. Peter Forbes Langrock, and Mark L. Sperry, Middlebury, for defendants. Before HOLDEN, C. J., SHANGRAW, BARNEY and KEYSER, JJ., and DALEY, C. Supr. J. KEYSER, Justice. The State Highway Board brought its petition under 19 V.S.A. § 224 for a determination of necessity for the acquisition of certain lands in the town of Moretown in connection with its highway project on State Route 100 B designated as Moretown S 0167(6). The lands to be taken include the property of James G. and Barbara B. Buckley, appellants herein. The court authorized by statute to hear such 157 cases determined on its findings that necessity of the state required the taking of the lands described in the petition. Issuance of a judgment order followed from which said Buckleys appealed. The appellants raise three questions which are grounded on the following rulings of the court: 1. Denial of the right of appellants to propound interrogatories under 12 V.S.A. § 1231. 2. Refusal to grant a continuance of the hearing. 3. Exclusion of evidence to show the feasibility of improving Route 100 as an alternate project to that proposed in the petition on Route 100 B. The proposed project is for the improvement of a 1.439 mile segment of the state highway known as Route 100 B. It is to be constructed to a safe speed of fifty miles per hour. This project is the southerly extension of two previous projects on Route 100 B which have already been completed and is a part of an overall plan for the highway. The north end of Route 100 B begins at its intersection with U. S. Route 2 in the village of Middlesex and extends southerly to join State Route 100 in Waitsfield which runs southerly from U. S. 2 in Waterbury. Both Routes, 100 B and 100, are accessible from Interstate Highway 89. Route 100 B is one of the access highways to the ski areas which increases the traffic count to 1630 vehicles a day in the winter. In 1966 the average daily traffic count was 775 vehicles per day. The appellants claim the court erred in denying them the right to propound interrogatries to the highway board. This right is controlled by 12 V.S.A. 1231 as follows: "Any party to any action pending in a county court, court of chancery or municipal court may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes. * * " In Walker v. Walker, 124 Vt. 176, 177, 200 A.2d 271, we held that under 12 V.S.A. § 1231 the taking of depositions in civil cases is expressly limited to causes pending in county court, court of chancery or municipal (now district) court, unless the parties stipulate otherwise, and no other can qualify. Futhermore, no right to take depositions existed at common law. Reed v. Allen, 121 Vt. 202, 206, 153 A.2d 74, 73 A.L.R. 2d 1161. In support of their claim of the right to propound interrogatories to the highway board, the appellants argue that the court authorized in 19 V.S.A. § 227 to hear such cases is a county court within the meaning of 12 V.S.A. § 1231. When the highway board desires to take land or any rights therein for the purpose of a project similar to the one involved in this case, it is required to make a survey of the land to be taken or affected. 19 V.S.A. § 223. Upon completion of such survey the highway board presents its petition to a superior judge setting forth what lands or rights are proposed to be taken, describing them, and annex a copy of the survey to the petition. The petition also must contain a request that the judge fix a time and place when he, or some other superior judge, will hear all parties concerned and determine whether such taking is necessary. 19 V.S.A. § 224. The superior judge then must fix a time for hearing and if he is unable to hear the petition at the time set, the chief superior judge assigns another superior judge to hear the cause. 19 V.S.A. § 225. That part of 19 V.S.A. § 227 relating to the hearing reads: "(a) At the time and place appointed for the hearing, the court, consisting of 158 the superior judge signing the order or such other superior judge as may be assigned and at least one of the two assistant judges of the county in which the hearing is held shall hear all persons interested and wishing to be heard. If any person owning or having an interest in the land to be taken or affected appears and objects to the necessity of taking the land included within the survey or any part thereof, then the court shall require the state highway board to proceed with the introduction of evidence of the necessity of such taking. * * " There is no reference in the foregoing statutes to the county court or that such court shall take any part in the proceedings to determine necessity. The statutes specifically provide for a special tribunal to hear, determine and order necessity. The language used by the legislature is clear and positive as to its intent to create such tribunal. Under the condemnation law before its revision in 1957, the question of necessity was determined by commissioners appointed by the court. Under the new law this function of the commissioners was committed directly to a court constituted as set forth in 19 V.S.A. § 227. The questions of necessity and damages to the land owner are separate and distinct hearings, the latter only being for resolution in county court. State Highway Board v. Loomis, 122 Vt. 125, 130, 165 A.2d 572. While the special tribunal is a court, the proceeding is not subject to the procedural devices permitted in a civil action in county court. Although the appellants argue to the contrary, litigation in an adversary sense is not involved in a necessity hearing. The proceedings are in rem. City of Winooski v. State Highway Board, 124 Vt. 496, 498, 207 A.2d 255. Such proceedings raise a public rather than a private issue between the highway board and land owners. The board's decision on the question of necessity is essentially administrative, not judicial, its final adjudication being "reserved to the special statutory tribunal." State Highway Board v. Coburn, 125 Vt. 513, 519, 219 A.2d 582, 587. The ruling of the court below denying the right to appellants to propound interrogatories is without error. The appellants next claim that the court committed error in refusing to grant its motion for a continuance. The court ruled on the motion both as a matter of discretion and a matter of law. The petition was served on the appellants June 18, 1968. The attorney for the appellants entered his appearance and filed an answer on July 19th. The interrogatories filed on July 15th were received by the state on July 16th. On the same day the state filed its motion objecting thereto. Appellants' motion for a continuance was filed July 18th, the basis of which was that the highway board had indicated that it needed more time to answer the interrogatories. On July 22nd, the date fixed by the superior judge for hearing the case, the court sustained the objection to the interrogatories and denied the appellants' motion for a continuance. Their attorney then moved orally for a continuance. The appellants state in their brief the reason was "so that at the least the defendant could have more time to prepare, such time to include at least an opportunity for counsel to confer with the highway department, and for counsel to digest any information made available." The correctness of the courts ruling on the first motion for continuance is not denied but is as to the oral motion. The appellants argue that the denial of its motion for more time to prepare denies their constitutional right of time to prepare their 159 case and that the action of the court was an abuse of its discretion. The appellants contend that they had a bona fide defense to the necessity claim of the state. Briefly, this was that the improvement should be on Route 100 and Route 100 B left as it is. The appellants had thirty-three days (33) from the date of service to the date of hearing within which to prepare their case and any defense they had to the question of necessity. This gave them ample time to confer with the highway department and prepare for hearing. Moreover, knowledge of the proposed project was available to the appellants even before the land to be taken was surveyed and the petition brought. Section 222(a) and (c) of 19 V.S.A. makes it mandatory that before arriving at its judgment concerning a highway project, the board conduct a public hearing after giving publicity to the proposed project and a notice of at least thirty days to all persons affected. The purpose of this hearing is to give persons interested the opportunity to make suggestions and recommendations and to inform the highway board of objections to the project. State Highway Board v. Coburn, supra, at 519, 219 A.2d 582. The record does not show whether the appellants attended the public hearing held on the project in question or that they took any action after the proposed project came to their knowledge. In any event, this court, nothing appearing to the contrary, will presume that public officers have properly discharged the duties of their office and have faithfully performed those matters with which they are charged. State Highway Board v. Coburn, supra, at 517, 219 A.2d 582. We can only conclude from the record that the board held such hearing and gave due notice to the appellants. Attendance at that public hearing would have granted the very right to the appellants which they now complain was denied them by the court. The record fails to show that appellants have established the required essentials of the test that the court abused its discretion in overruling the request for a continuance. John v. Fernandez, 124 Vt. 346, 348-349, 205 A.2d 552. Moreover, the denial of appellants' request for a continuance was correct as a matter of law. The appellants claim the court erroneously excluded evidence of the feasible alternate route to the Route 100 B improvement. In making their offer appellants said: "Now we are trying to find out whether it would be more feasible to improve Route #100 and draw off the traffic that goes up #100 B and leave it the way it is, or whether #100 B is sufficiently developed now so to handle the traffic that comes up to the interstate. We would like to go into the nature of Route #100." The appellants argue that since each highway (100 and 100B) come to nearly the same point, it is unnecessary to improve both into "superhighways." The appellants state in their brief that they are arguing for the right to offer evidence upon the overall plan of the state for the highways in Moretown, Waterbury, Montpelier area as a whole, so as to show that certian major improvements are necessary, but some are not, and exclusion of evidence of this issue was error. The statutes grant no such right either to the appellants or to the courts of this state. The appellants misconstrue, or misunderstand, the statutes referred to supra which define the duties of the state highway board and the authority of the court in such cases. The legislature has vested a broad discretion in the highway board in its selection of a route to be followed where alternate routes are available. State Highway Board v. Coburn, supra, at 517, 219 A.2d 582. In State Highway Board v. Loomis, supra, (1960) at pages 130, 131, 165 A.2d 572, Justice Barney discussed the authority of the court under the highway condemnation *160 law as it existed prior to and after it was revised by the new law passed by the legislature in 1957. He wrote at page 131, 165 A.2d at page 576: "Under the present legislation the court's authority operates not on the projected line or location of the highway itself but only on the land taking proposed." Again at page 132, 165 A.2d at page 576 he said: "This evidences an intent by the Legislature to limit the duty of the court hearing the petition to a determination of whether or not the test of necessity is met on the line and for the taking proposed by the highway board, with the power to modify or alter having reference to the extent of land taking required under the petition." Thus, the court distinctly was without any authority to consider Route 100 as a feasible alternate Route to 100 B. The court properly denied as a matter of law the appellants' motion for a continuance so that they could develop their proposed defense. Likewise, it properly excluded appellants' offered evidence relating to such defense. The highway condemnation statutes on which the Loomis, case, supra, rests clearly foreclosed the appellants from raising the defense attempted. The finding of necessity is well supported by the evidence and the judgment order is without error. Judgment affirmed.
hu	wikipedia	N/A	A japán agyvelőgyulladás elleni védőoltás olyan vakcina, amely védelmet nyújt a japán agyvelőgyulladás ellen. Az oltóanyag 90% feletti hatékonyságú. Nem ismert pontosan, hogy milyen hosszú ideig tart a hatása, de a tapasztalatok azt mutatják, hogy hatékonysága idővel csökken. A vakcinát vagy izomba, vagy a bőr alá fecskendezik. Azokban az országokban, ahol a betegség problémát jelent, ajánlott a vakcinát az oltási rend részévé tenni. Az oltóanyag fajtájától függetlenül egy vagy két adagban adják be. Emlékeztető oltásra általában nincs szükség ott sem, ahol a betegség gyakori. AIDS-szel fertőzöttek és terhes nők esetében inaktivált vírusokat tartalmazó oltóanyagot kell beadni. Javasolt a betegséggel fertőzött területre utazó és ott a szabadban tartózkodni kívánó turisták beoltása. Az oltóanyag viszonylag biztonságos. Az oltás helyén fájdalom vagy bőrpír jelentkezhet. 2015-ben 15 különféle vakcina volt kapható, melyek között vannak rekombináns DNS-technológián alapulók, illetve gyengített vagy inaktív vírusokat tartalmazók egyaránt. A japán agyvelőgyulladás elleni védőoltást az 1930-as években kezdték el alkalmazni. Az oltóanyag szerepel az Egészségügyi Világszervezet alapvető gyógyszereket tartalmazó listáján, amely az egészségügyi alapellátásban szükséges legfontosabb gyógyszereket sorolja fel. Jegyzetek Fordítás Védőoltások
en	caselaw	US	20-01187-jlg Doc 1-57 Filed 06/20/20 Case 1:19-cv-09319-AKH DocumentEntered 06/20/20 5 Filed 20:19:48 10/17/19 Page 1 Doc5 of 2 Notice Pg 1 of 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK In the Matter of the Application of Orly Genger, as DOCKET NO. 19-cv-9319 to Remove Dalia Genger as Trustee of The Orly Genger 1993 Trust Established on Dec. 13, 1993 by Arie Genger, grantor.____________________ Orly Genger, beneficiary of The Orly Genger 1993 Trust, N.Y. County Surrogate Court Index No. 2008-0017 Petitioner, v. Dalia Genger, as trustee of The Orly Genger 1993 Trust, and The Sagi Genger 1993 Trust, Respondents. ______________________________________________ RESPONDENT’S STATEMENT PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 9027(E)(3) 1. Respondent, Dalia Genger (“Dalia”), by her counsel, in opposition to the Notice of Removal filed by the Bankruptcy Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of Orly Genger, dated October 8, 2019, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9027(e)(3), hereby states that she does not consent to removal to this Court, and does not consent to the entry of final orders or judgment by this Court. 2. Further, Dalia does not consent to the proposed (also by the Bankruptcy Trustee) transfer of this case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, nor to the entry of final orders or judgment by such court. 3. In 2008, Orly Genger commenced the underlying proceeding against Dalia for, inter alia, removal of Dalia as Trustee of the Orly Genger 1993 Trust and breach of fiduciary duty. 4. In June 2019, Dalia resigned as Trustee of the Trust, and substituted Michael Oldner as the new Trustee. 20-01187-jlg Doc 1-57 Filed 06/20/20 Case 1:19-cv-09319-AKH DocumentEntered 06/20/20 5 Filed 20:19:48 10/17/19 Page 2 Doc5 of 2 Notice Pg 2 of 3 5. As there may be a dispute over the validity of her resignation and the appointment of the substituted Trustee, see ECF Doc. No. 1, Notice of Removal, dated October 9, 2019, fn. 1, Dalia is filing this statement of no consent protectively, in order to preserve the objections of the Trustee to the removal of the underlying proceeding. 6. And to the extent that this Court or the Surrogate’s Court considers Dalia or her counsel as still representing the ‘office of the trustee’ (collectively “Office”) of the Orly Trust, the Office, in opposition to the Notice of Removal filed by the Bankruptcy Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of respondent Orly Genger, dated October 9, 2019, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9027(e)(3), does not consent to removal to this Court, and does not consent to the entry of final orders or judgment by this Court and does not consent to the proposed (also by the Bankruptcy Trustee) transfer of this case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, nor to the entry of final orders or judgment by such court. 7. Neither Dalia nor the Office is waiving any rights by filing this Rule 9027(e)(3) statement, including but not limited to the right to seek abstention, remand, withdrawal of the reference, or any other claim, right, or action. Dated: New City, New York October 15, 2019 _________/s/___________________ Judith Bachman, Esq. THE BACHMAN LAW FIRM PLLC Attorneys for Respondent, Dalia Genger 365 S. Main Street, 2nd Floor New City, New York 10956 (845) 639-3210 20-01187-jlg Doc 1-57 Filed 06/20/20 Case 1:19-cv-09319-AKH Document Entered 06/20/20 5-1 Filed 20:19:48 10/17/19 Page 1Doc5 of 1 Notice Pg 3 of 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that on October 16, 2019, the foregoing document was served upon each of the counsel to the parties to the New York Surrogate’s Court action, at the last known address set forth below, by (i) depositing one (1) true and correct copy of the same, enclosed in a postpaid, properly addressed wrapper, in an official depository of the United States Postal Service within New York State and (ii) via e-filing the foregoing document with this Court. Andrew R. Kurland, Esq. Michael Paul Bowen, Esq. Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP Counsel to the Bankruptcy Trustee 1633 Broadway New York, New York 10019 Spencer L. Schneider, Esq. Counsel to Michael Oldner 39 Broadway, 32nd Floor New York, New York 10006 John Dellaportas, Esq. Emmet Marvin & Martin LLP Counsel to Sagi Genger 1993 Trust & Sagi Genger 120 Broadway, 32nd Floor New York, New York 10271 Steven Riker, Esq. Law Office of Steven Riker Guardian Ad Litem One Grand Central Place, 46th Floor New York, New York 10165 __________/s/______________________ Judith Bachman, Esq.
de	wikipedia	N/A	Mattia ben Cheresch (Mattja ben Cheresch oder auch Charasch; * in Judäa) war ein jüdischer Gelehrter des Altertums; er wirkte im zweiten nachchristlichen Jahrhundert und zählt zu den späten Tannaiten der sogenannten zweiten Generation. Er war Schüler des Elieser ben Hyrkanos und lehrte in Rom, wo er eine Schule gründete, unmittelbar vor dem hadrianischen Krieg. Sein in den Sprüchen der Väter (IV., 5) überlieferter Wahlspruch lautet: „Komme jedermann mit einem Gruß zuvor. Sei lieber der Schwanz des Löwen als das Haupt des Fuchses.“ Literatur Zacharias Frankel: Hodegetica, Leipzig 1859 Bacher: Die Agada der Tannaiten, 1884 ff. Samuel Atlas: Artikel Mattia ben Cheresch, in: Jüdisches Lexikon, Berlin 1927 (Band III.) Strack/Stemberger: Einleitung in Talmud und Midrasch, 7. Auflage, Beck, München 1982 Tannait Geboren im 1. oder 2. Jahrhundert Gestorben im 2. Jahrhundert Mann
en	caselaw	US	600 F. Supp. 73 (1984) Albert BUTTS v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION and LaSalle University. Civ. A. No. 84-5763. United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania. December 5, 1984. 74 Gregory T. Magarity, Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff. Howard D. Scher, Patrick T. Ryan, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, Philadelphia, Pa., for LaSalle University. David Bruton, John Chesney, Drinker, Biddle & Reath, Philadelphia, Pa., for National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER FULLAM, District Judge. Plaintiff Albert Butts is six-feet-nineinches tall, weighs 215 pounds, and has been a prominent member of LaSalle University's basketball team for three years. Now a senior, he would like very much to continue playing basketball for LaSalle this year, and entertains well-founded expectations of ultimate selection in an early round of the NBA draft. Unfortunately, he has been declared ineligible to compete this year, by virtue of NCAA by-law 5-1-(d)-(3), which requires that each year of precollegiate basketball competition after age 20 be counted against collegiate eligibility. Under NCAA rules, each participant has a maximum of four years collegiate eligibility, over a five-year period. After obtaining his high school diploma from Frederick Military Academy in Virginia, and after reaching age 20, Mr. Butts remained at Frederick for an additional year pursuing post-graduate studies so as to improve his academic skills sufficiently to gain entrance to LaSalle; and he played basketball for Frederick during that post-graduate year. In this action, plaintiff challenges the validity of by-law 5-1-(d)-(3) on constitutional and statutory grounds, and seeks a preliminary injunction against its enforcement by NCAA and LaSalle. Although named as a defendant, LaSalle University agrees with plaintiff and, by cross-claim, also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the NCAA. Because of the need for a very prompt decision (the basketball season is now under way), my conclusions will be set forth in summary form. Essentially, plaintiff contends that the by-law is invalid because it discriminates on the basis of age, because it discriminates on the basis of race, and because its adoption and promulgation were such that, as to plaintiff, its enforcement would violate due process of law. Virtually every contention advanced by plaintiff in this action has been considered, and firmly rejected, by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Spath v. NCAA, 728 F.2d 25 (1984). In the face of this precedent, plaintiff's burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits is indeed a heavy one. The First Circuit's opinion is persuasive, and I have no reason to suppose that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit would reach a different conclusion. There is one issue presented (somewhat belatedly, in the course of the hearings; the issue was not asserted in plaintiff's Complaint or Motion for Preliminary Injunction) in the present case which was not addressed by the Spath court, namely, racial discrimination in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. Plaintiff has presented 75 Bureau of Census statistics showing that the number of blacks still in high school at age 20 is some 4 times higher than the number of whites in that category. Thus, it is argued, the by-law undoubtedly has a greater adverse impact upon black athletes than upon whites. The defendant argues that, before this inference of adverse impact can properly be drawn, some additional refinement of the data is necessary: the statistics do not reveal information about the actual "pool" of would-be college athletes, but merely about the high school population as a whole. There is, however, evidence to the effect that an NCAA by-law relating to academic standards (the 2.0 grade-point average requirement for admission) does have an adverse impact upon black would be college athletes. And it is reasonable to draw the inference that persons who have trouble meeting the 2.0 academic standard are likely to remain in high school longer than persons of higher academic standard. In short, there is every reason to believe that the actual "pool" of applicants for college athletic programs contains a much higher percentage of blacks over the age of 20 than whites of that age. For purposes of preliminary injunctive relief, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has shown a strong likelihood of establishing that the by-law in question does have racially disparate impact. That is, for present purposes, I conclude that plaintiff has made out a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Under that statute, proof of disparate impact suffices to make out a prima facie case; it is not necessary to prove actual racial animus. Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S. Ct. 3221, p. 3223 n. 2, 77 L. Ed. 2d 866 (1983). But making out a prima facie case is only the beginning of the battle. The defendant NCAA has advanced facially legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the by-lawreasons which the First Circuit found obviously valid in Spath, supra, and which the D.C. Circuit in Howard v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 222 (D.C.Cir.1975) conceded "may be substantial" and plaintiff therefore bears the burden of proving that the reasons advanced are merely pretextual. NCAA asserts that the by-law is designed and intended to promote equality of competition among its members at each level so as to prevent college athletics and access to athletic scholarships from being dominated by more mature, older, more experienced players, and to discourage high school students from delaying their entrance into college in order to develop and mature their athletic skills. These are legitimate, and plainly not insubstantial, justifications for the rule. It is not enough for plaintiff to show that the by-law does not necessarily achieve its objectives in every instance, or in every sport. Plaintiff points out that there is no age limit to participation in college athletics. Plaintiff also challenges the validity of the underlying assumption of the by-law, namely, that participating in pre-college athletic competition beyond age 20 actually does enhance athletic skills. Even if I were to agree with all of plaintiff's arguments, however, the fact remains that I am not empowered to second-guess the wisdom of the rule or the merits of the judgments it represents. The issue before me is whether plaintiff has shown a reasonable likelihood of being able to establish that the rule is a mere pretext for racial discrimination. Much as I sympathize with plaintiff's predicament, I cannot, in all honesty, reach that conclusion. Nor has plaintiff established a likelihood of success in showing that some other, less intrusive, rule would accomplish the stated objects of the present rule. It simply cannot be stated that there is no rational connection between a combination of age and competitive experience, on the one hand, and enhanced ability to compete, on the other. I am likewise unable to conclude that plaintiff has established a substantial likelihood of success on his age-discrimination claims. Although that statute expressly requires exhaustion of administrative *76 remedies before resort to a federal court, I shall assume, without deciding, that there may be a jurisdictional basis for a grant of preliminary injunctive relief to preclude irreparable harm which might be incurred before an administrative resolution can be obtained. Whether this would require an extraordinarily strong likelihood of success on the merits is perhaps arguable. Whatever the standard, I do not believe plaintiff has met it in this case. It is not plaintiff's age alone that results in his ineligibility under the by-law, it is the fact that, after age 20, he competed in high school basketball. As I understand the pertinent HEW regulations, it is probable that this does not amount to age-discrimination under the statute. Plainly, the maturity and level of athletic skill of the athlete are relevant considerations in determining eligibility; in this context, age is simply a shorthand approximation of physical maturity. Accordingly, I have reluctantly concluded that plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief must be denied. This conclusion renders moot LaSalle's application for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to another NCAA by-law, 10-(b), which purports to enable the NCAA to discipline a college for permitting an ineligible player to participate, even pursuant to a grant of an injunction by a court. I do agree with LaSalle that the validity of this by-law is dubious indeed, at least in any case in which the NCAA itself was a party to the litigation, and subject to the court's injunctive order. I need not, however, address that issue at this time. I wish to make very clear that the sole basis for denial of injunctive relief in this case is my conclusion that the plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits. There can be little doubt that plaintiff, LaSalle, and, at least to some extent, Big Five basketball in Philadelphia, will suffer irreparable harm from enforcement of the NCAA by-law. I am likewise convinced that the harm which would flow from granting injunctive relief would be much less than the harm which will result from denying injunctive relief, and that there are no substantial public policy considerations which weigh in the balance. In short, I am not exercising discretion on the basis of the facts, but I am expressing, essentially, a pure conclusion of law.
en	caselaw	US	FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit February 3, 2017 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 14-2223 v. (D.C. No. 1:13-CR-03901-MCA-1) (D.N.M.) KELVIN L. DICKERSON, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, HOLMES, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. Defendant-Appellant Kelvin Dickerson appeals from the district court’s written judgment sentencing him to 121 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release, and ordering him to pay restitution in the amount of $9,798.60. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, with the exception of Mr. Dickerson’s challenge regarding the restitution amount specified in the written judgment, we affirm Mr. Dickerson’s sentence. As to that restitution * This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. amount, we reverse and remand with instructions for the district court to enter an amended judgment ordering restitution in the amount of $8,424.60. I During the summer of 2013, Mr. Dickerson robbed seven individuals as they attempted to make deposits for their employers at banks throughout Albuquerque, New Mexico. Applying various amounts of force, Mr. Dickerson obtained money from the possession of each victim and fled the scene in a car driven by his co-defendant, Dominique Dickens. Police apprehended Mr. Dickerson after his seventh robbery, on September 5, 2013. The grand jury returned an eight-count indictment, charging Mr. Dickerson with one count of conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Count 1), two counts of robbery in violation of § 1951(a) (Counts 2 and 5), and five counts of robbery and aiding and abetting (Counts 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1951(a). Mr. Dickerson pleaded guilty to all eight counts. The presentence investigation report (“PSR”) calculated a recommended sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”) of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment and recommended restitution in the amount of $8,424.60, based on its calculation of actual loss to the 2 individual victims and the employers whose deposits were stolen. 1 To calculate the recommended Guidelines range, the PSR created seven sentencing groups. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 (“All counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into a single Group.”). The PSR created seven sentencing groups based on Dickerson’s charges. Group 1 consisted of Count 1 (conspiracy to commit robbery) and Count 2 (robbery). The remaining six counts were grouped individually—that is, Count 3 became Group 2, Count 4 became Group 3, and so on. The PSR then calculated the combined offense level for the sentencing groups pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. The combined offense level is determined by calculating the adjusted offense level for each group and “taking the offense level applicable to the Group with the highest offense level and increasing that offense level by the amount indicated in [§ 3D1.4].” See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. The PSR assigned each sentencing group a base offense level of twenty, which is the base offense level for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1. The PSR then applied various sentencing enhancements to each sentencing group, 2 and identified Group 5 as having the highest adjusted offense level at 1 The U.S. Probation Office appears to have applied the 2013 version of the Guidelines. The parties do not challenge this decision on appeal. Therefore, we reference that version of the Guidelines herein. 2 More specifically, the PSR applied the following enhancements to each group: Group 1 received two levels for property stolen from a financial institution pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(1) and two levels for threat of death pursuant 3 thirty. The PSR then increased that offense level—i.e., thirty—by five levels based on the adjusted offense levels of the other six groups pursuant to § 3D1.4, totaling a combined offense level of thirty-five. Finally, the PSR subtracted three levels from the combined offense level for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1, for a total offense level of thirty-two. Based on the total offense level of thirty-two, and a criminal history category of III, the PSR calculated a Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing, the district court “adopt[ed] the proposed findings set forth in the [PSR] with the exception [of the] two-level enhancement for threat of death” that the PSR had applied to Groups 1, 2, and 3. R., Vol. III, at 11 (Sentencing Hr’g Tr., dated Dec. 9, 2014). The court then stated that the Guidelines range was 121 to 151 months’ imprisonment. The court pronounced a sentence of 121 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release, and to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F); Group 2 received two levels for property stolen from a financial institution, two levels for threat of death, two levels for bodily injury pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(A), two levels for physical restraint of victim pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), and one level for loss exceeding $10,000; Group 3 received two levels for property stolen from a financial institution, two levels for threat of death, and two levels for physical restraint of victim; Group 4 received three levels for brandishing a dangerous weapon pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) and two levels for physical restraint of victim; Group 5 received two levels for property stolen from a financial institution, four levels for use of a dangerous weapon pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D), two levels for bodily injury, and two levels for physical restraint of victim; Group 6 received four levels for use of a dangerous weapon, two levels for bodily injury, and two levels for physical restraint of victim; and Group 7 received four levels for use of a dangerous weapon, two levels for bodily injury, and two levels for physical restraint of victim. 4 ordered Mr. Dickerson to pay restitution in the amount of $8,424.60. The district court entered a written judgment against Mr. Dickerson on December 15, 2014. The written judgment differed from the sentence pronounced from the bench, however, in one material respect: it ordered restitution in the amount of $9,798.60, rather than $8,424.60. The remainder of the judgment reflected the terms orally pronounced at the sentencing hearing: i.e, 121 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Mr. Dickerson filed a timely appeal, challenging the amount of the written restitution order, and the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his prison sentence. II Mr. Dickerson first challenges the restitution amount ordered in the written judgment. At the sentencing hearing, the district court ordered Mr. Dickerson to pay $8,424.60 in restitution, but in its written judgment the district court ordered Mr. Dickerson to pay restitution in the amount of $9,798.60. On appeal, the government concedes that the amount of restitution ordered at the sentencing hearing—that is, $8,424.60—controls. We agree. See United States v. Barwig, 568 F.3d 852, 855 (10th Cir. 2012) (“It is undisputed that ‘an oral pronouncement of sentence from the bench controls over . . . written language.’” (quoting United States v. Marquez, 337 F.3d 1203, 1207 n.1 (10th Cir. 2003))); accord United States v. Ullman, 788 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, we reverse 5 and remand to the district court with instructions to enter an amended judgment reflecting the restitution amount pronounced at the sentencing hearing—that is, $8,424.60. III Mr. Dickerson challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the district court’s 121-month prison sentence. We reject these challenges. A “Reasonableness review is a two-step process comprising a procedural and a substantive component.” United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884, 895 (10th Cir. 2008). “We ‘must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error . . . .’ If the district court’s decision is ‘procedurally sound,’ we ‘then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed.’” United States v. Lucero, 747 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). Procedural reasonableness concerns “the manner in which the sentence was calculated.” United States v. Sanchez-Leon, 764 F.3d 1248, 1261 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Masek, 588 F.3d 1283, 1290 (10th Cir. 2009)). “Procedural error includes ‘failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any 6 deviation from the Guidelines range.’” Id. (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). Where a defendant preserves his or her procedural challenge in the trial court, we generally review the procedural reasonableness of that defendant’s sentence using the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review, “under which we review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions regarding the guidelines and review its factual findings for clear error,” United States v. Gantt, 679 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original); accord Lucero, 747 F.3d at 1246. “The party challenging the sentence ‘bears the initial burden of showing that the district court’ erred.’” Sanchez-Leon, 764 F.3d at 1261 (quoting Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992)). “If we find a procedural error, ‘resentencing is required only if the error was not harmless.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Cerno, 529 F.3d 926, 939 (10th Cir. 2008)). Substantive reasonableness, on the other hand, concerns “whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Alapizco-Valenzuela, 546 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2008)). We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness under the abuse-of-discretion standard and give “substantial deference to district courts.” United States v. Sayad, 589 F.3d 1110, 1116 (10th Cir. 2009). 7 B We first turn to Mr. Dickerson’s procedural challenges to his prison sentence. He argues that the district court erred in applying “four types of sentencing enhancements and [in calculating] restitution” because the relevant evidence in the record is unreliable and, even if reliable, it is insufficient to support the enhancements and restitution amounts. Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 18. Additionally, he argues that the district court failed to make findings as to disputed issues of fact and erred in relying on these disputed facts to increase his sentence. 1 We first address Mr. Dickerson’s challenge to the reliability of the evidence in the record to support the sentencing enhancements and restitution amount. Mr. Dickerson argues that the only evidence in the record that supports his enhancements was “hearsay information, most of which was taken from police reports.” Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 19. He complains that the “probation officer apparently conducted no in-person interviews and consequently did not observe the demeanor of any victim or any other person involved in this case,” and that “[n]o medical reports substantiated the claimed injuries and no business reports substantiated the claimed loss amounts.” Id. at 20. a Where an evidentiary reliability argument is properly preserved for our 8 consideration, “[w]e review for clear error a district court’s assessment of the reliability of evidence supporting a sentencing enhancement.” United States v. Martinez, 824 F.3d 1256, 1261 (10th Cir. 2016); see Martinez-Jimenez, 464 F.3d 1205, 1209–10 (10th Cir. 2006) (“We . . . conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the evidence establishing [the defendant’s] prior conviction was sufficiently reliable.”). Although Mr. Dickerson objected to the accuracy of certain facts contained in the PSR and noted that these “objections remain” at the sentencing hearing, R., Vol. III, at 2, he never made a specific hearsay challenge to the district court’s reliance on the evidence contained in the PSR. Accordingly, we deem his hearsay-reliability challenge forfeited and subject, at most, to rigorous plain-error review. See, e.g., Gantt, 679 F.3d at 1246 (“If, however, Defendant did not preserve the procedural challenge below, we review only for plain error.”); United States v. Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d 894, 899 (10th Cir. 2008) (“As a general rule, when a defendant fails to preserve an objection to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, we review only for plain error.”). However, because Mr. Dickerson does not even attempt to make a hearsay-reliability argument under the plain-error standard, we may decline to consider the argument at all and treat it as effectively waived. See, e.g., Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he failure to . . . argue for plain error and its application on appeal . . . surely marks the end of the road for an argument for reversal not first presented to the district court.”). 9 b Even were we to give Mr. Dickerson the benefit of plain-error review, his hearsay-reliability argument would fail. “We find plain error only when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) which affects substantial rights, and (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2007); accord United States v. Pursley, 577 F.3d 1204, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009). Mr. Dickerson bears the burden to establish each of these factors. See United States v. Crowe, 735 F.3d 1229, 1242 (10th Cir. 2013) (“The plain error standard presents a heavy burden for an appellant, one which is not often satisfied.” (quoting Romero, 491 F.3d at 1178)); see also United States v. Kieffer, 681 F.3d 1143, 1172 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Both parties agree Defendant did not object to this condition of supervised release before the district court, so he has the burden of establishing plain error.”). Mr. Dickerson “cannot establish that such [alleged hearsay-reliability] error is plain—that is, obvious and clear.” United States v. Wardell, 591 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Duran, 133 F.3d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir. 1998) (“An error . . . is ‘plain’ if it is obvious or clear, i.e., if it [is] contrary to well-settled law.”). In other words, even if the district court erred in relying on unreliable hearsay in imposing the challenged sentencing enhancements and the restitution amount, we cannot conclude that any such error is clear or obvious. 10 “[S]entencing courts have broad discretion to consider various kinds of information.” United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151 (1997) (per curiam) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661). “District courts are not strictly bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence at sentencing hearings.” United States v. Ruby, 706 F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 2013); see U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, cmt. (“In determining the relevant facts, sentencing judges are not restricted to information that would be admissible at trial.” (citation omitted)). “[H]earsay statements may be considered at sentencing if they bear some minimal indicia of reliability.” Ruby, 706 F.3d at 1229 (quoting United States v. Damato, 672 F.3d 832, 847 (10th Cir. 2012)). “This reliability floor is a requirement of due process” and “[c]orroborating evidence is often key to determining whether a statement is sufficiently reliable.” Id. The evidence available to the district court in this case did not clearly or obviously lack the requisite minimal indicia of reliability to support the sentencing enhancements. The district court relied on information set forth in the PSR and “derived from investigative reports prepared by the Albuquerque Police Department.” See R., Vol. II, at 4 (further noting that the investigative reports are “contained in the discovery material provided by the United States Attorney’s Office.”). In Ruby, we found no plain error where a district court similarly relied on statements contained in a Petition and Violation Report that were derived from police reports. 706 F.3d at 1229; see also United States v. McBrayer, 546 F. 11 App’x 803, 805 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Of course, the district court could consider the police reports during sentencing, as hearsay evidence may be considered if it bears a minimal indicia of reliability.”); United States v. West, 2000 WL 807283, at 4 (10th Cir. June 23, 2000) (unpublished table decision) (affirming application of sentencing enhancement where district court relied on police report to justify enhancement). On appeal, Mr. Dickerson relies chiefly on United States v. Fennell, 65 F.3d 812 (10th Cir. 1995). There the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of an automatic machine gun, and the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that he had fired his machine gun at his girlfriend, an act which qualified him for a four-level enhancement under the Guidelines. Id. at 813. The only record evidence supporting the enhancement—that is, the only evidence that he fired the machine gun at his girlfriend—was the defendant’s girlfriend’s unsworn telephone account to a testifying probation officer. Id. Finding this hearsay evidence unreliable, we reversed the enhancement. Id. at 814. We emphasized that the testifying officer had no opportunity to observe the demeanor of the girlfriend and that “no other evidence . . . corroborate[d] the account given the preparing officer.” Id. at 813. Moreover, we explained that “[t]he government did not bother to file the arrest report or even to summarize its contents”; therefore, we were “unable to determine if the girlfriend’s contemporaneous statements to the state police support[ed] the story given the 12 preparing officer.” Id. at 813 n.2. We also noted that Oklahoma authorities had initially charged the defendant with a misdemeanor, rather than a felony. Id. “We took this as evidence that felonious intent to injure was lacking—meaning that [the defendant] hadn’t tried to shoot his girlfriend with the machine gun.” Martinez, 824 F.3d at 1262 (discussing Fennell, 65 F.3d at 813). We thus concluded that the initial misdemeanor charge “tend[ed] to undermine, rather than buttress, confidence in the girlfriend’s hearsay statements.” Fennell, 65 F.3d at 813. Here, the evidence in the record was more reliable than that available to support the enhancement in Fennell. The PSR at least summarized the contents of the police reports, as well as the video recordings of the robberies, and the government disclosed the police reports during discovery. Moreover, Mr. Dickerson points to no significant inconsistencies among the contents of the police reports, the video recordings, and the PSR, whereas in Fennell, the initial misdemeanor charge tended to contradict the girlfriend’s statements. To be sure, the probation officer in this case conducted a phone interview of one victim, known as H.G., 3 about a year after the robbery. H.G. gave an 3 Throughout this proceeding—commencing with the indictment—the government has identified the individual victims of Mr. Dickerson’s offenses by their initials, cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2) (noting that “[a] crime victim” has “[t]he right to treated . . . with respect for the victim’s . . . privacy”); Mr. Dickerson and the PSR have adhered to this practice. And so do we. 13 unsworn account of her injuries, which the probation officer summarized in the PSR. Mr. Dickerson likens H.G.’s statements to the girlfriend’s statements in Fennell, which we deemed unreliable. In Fennell, however, we noted that the girlfriend may have had a reason to lie based on her previous relationship with the defendant. Here, Mr. Dickerson has made no assertion that H.G. had a dishonest motive, and no such motive is apparent to us. In fact, the PSR indicates that H.G. is not seeking restitution or other compensation from Mr. Dickerson, so H.G. would not personally benefit from exaggerating her injuries to the probation officer. Moreover, nothing in the record, including her initial statements to the police, undermines the statements H.G. made over the phone. And Mr. Dickerson has made no arguments to this effect. In sum, we conclude that, even assuming that the district court erred in considering unreliable hearsay in imposing its sentencing enhancements and determining the restitution amount—which seems doubtful in light of the foregoing analysis—Mr. Dickerson has not demonstrated that any such error is clear or obvious. Accordingly, he has not carried his burden under the rigorous plain-error standard. 2 We now turn to Mr. Dickerson’s argument that the record contained insufficient evidence to support various sentencing enhancements and the restitution amount. Specifically, Mr. Dickerson contends that the record 14 contained insufficient evidence to support the restitution order and the imposition of enhancements for bodily injury, physical restraint, brandishing a dangerous weapon, use of a dangerous weapon, and loss exceeding $10,000. A district court’s factual findings supporting sentencing enhancements and restitution amounts are reviewed for clear error. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia-Canales, 467 F.3d 1280, 1283 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e review the district court’s factual finding of bodily injury for clear error.”); United States v. Burt, 134 F.3d 997, 999 (10th Cir. 1998) (“We begin with the first prong of the [Guidelines] section 3B1.3 inquiry: whether Defendant possessed special skills within the meaning of the guideline. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error . . . .”); see also United States v. Aranda-Flores, 450 F.3d 1141, 1144 (10th Cir. 2006) (“We review for clear error the district court’s factual findings regarding sentencing and review de novo its legal interpretation of the sentencing guidelines.”). As explained below, we conclude that the district court did not err in applying the disputed sentencing enhancements and calculating the restitution amount, based on the evidence in the record. a We first address Mr. Dickerson’s challenge to the dangerous-weapon enhancements applied to Groups 4, 5, 6, and 7. The district court added three levels to Group 4 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) (punishing the brandishing or possession of a dangerous weapon), based on the PSR’s finding 15 that Mr. Dickerson shoved a “hard object in [M.P.S.’s] stomach in a manner that created the impression that the object was a dangerous weapon.” R., Vol. II, at 17. And the court added four levels to Groups 5, 6, and 7 under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) (punishing the use of a dangerous weapon other than simply brandishing or possessing it), for using a taser to accomplish the robberies of H.G., D.G., and J.H., respectively. Mr. Dickerson contests whether, on this record, a “hard object” or taser constitutes a “dangerous weapon.” Specifically, the Guidelines provide: “if a dangerous weapon was otherwise used, increase by 4 levels; . . . if a dangerous weapon was brandished, or possessed, increase by 3 levels.” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D), (E). The Guidelines define “dangerous weapon” as: (i) an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury, or (ii) an object that is not an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury but (I) closely resembles such an instrument; or (II) the defendant used the object in a manner that created the impression that the object was such an instrument . . . . U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(D). After the briefs were filed in this case, our circuit determined that a taser is a dangerous weapon as a matter of law in United States v. Quiver, 805 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2015). Specifically, we held that “a Taser—even in drive-stun mode—is a dangerous weapon.” Id. at 1272. We reasoned that “[i]n either drive-stun or probe mode, a Taser is ‘capable of inflicting . . . serious bodily 16 injury,’ which is defined as ‘injury involving extreme physical pain or the protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation.’” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(D), (L)). In light of Quiver, we reject Mr. Dickerson’s challenge to the four-level dangerous-weapon enhancements applied to Groups 5, 6, and 7. At oral argument, Mr. Dickerson conceded as much—specifically, he acknowledged that our decision in Quiver killed his challenges to the four-level dangerous-weapon enhancements applied to Groups 5, 6, and 7. However, he insists that the three-level dangerous-weapon enhancement applied to Group 4 should be reversed. See Oral Arg. at 6:21–6:25. In explaining the application of the enhancement to Group 4, the PSR stated that “Mr. Dickerson placed a hard object in the victim’s stomach in a manner that created the impression that the object was a dangerous weapon. Therefore a 3 level enhancement is warranted.” R., Vol. II, at 17. Mr. Dickerson objected to this enhancement in the district court, arguing that “[a]n unidentified hard object . . . is not a dangerous weapon.” R., Vol. I, at 35 (Def.’s Sentencing Mem., filed Oct. 26, 2014). But, as stated above, the Guidelines define “dangerous weapon” as, inter alia, “an object that . . . the defendant . . . in a manner that created the impression that the object was [an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury].” U.S.S.G. § 17 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(D). Thus, a hard object does not have to be a dangerous weapon for this enhancement to apply; rather, an object need only be “used . . . in a manner that created the impression that the object was a dangerous weapon.” Id. Here, Mr. Dickerson’s altercation with M.P.S. could certainly give the impression that he was committing the quintessential “stick ‘em up” robbery; that is, by shoving a hard object into M.P.S.’s stomach and demanding money, Mr. Dickerson created the impression that the object was a dangerous weapon that he would use to inflict serious bodily injury if M.P.S. refused to comply with his demand. Mr. Dickerson’s briefing offers no legal authority or arguments to the contrary. We therefore find no clear error in the district court’s application of the three-level dangerous-weapon enhancement to Group 4. b Next, Mr. Dickerson challenges the application of the two-level enhancement for bodily injury pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(A) to Groups 2, 5, 6, and 7. According to the Guidelines, bodily injury is “any significant injury; e.g., an injury that is painful and obvious, or is a type for which medical attention ordinarily would be sought.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(B). “To be ‘significant’ an injury need not interfere completely with the injured person’s life but cannot be wholly trivial and, while it need not last for months or years, must last for some meaningful period.” United States v. Brown, 200 F.3d 700, 709 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Perkins, 123 F.3d 1324, 1326 (10th Cir. 1997)); 18 accord Mejia-Canales, 467 F.3d at 1282. “Visible injuries such as bumps, bruises, and redness or swelling are sufficient to constitute ‘bodily injury.’” Brown, 200 F.3d at 709 (finding bodily injury where “victim sustained bleeding and a severe headache from the ‘half a dozen’ blows he received, as well as swelling, bruises, cuts and lumps on his face”); see Perkins, 132 F.3d at 1326 (affirming the application of the bodily-injury enhancement where the victim sustained a small laceration and bruising, and suffered neck and shoulder pain causing him to seek chiropractic treatment). In determining whether bodily injury occurred for purposes of the two-level enhancement, the focus of the inquiry is on the victim’s injury, not on the defendant’s conduct. United States v. Egbert, 562 F.3d 1092, 1102 (10th Cir. 2009). Mr. Dickerson’s challenges rely heavily on our decision in Mejia-Canales, supra. There, we reversed a bodily-injury enhancement where the victim sustained “a minor head injury and a small oral cut.” Mejia-Canales, 467 F.3d at 1283–84. We noted that the head injury was not “necessarily painful or obvious,” as it “consisted only of a red mark—without any reported swelling, bleeding, or bruising,” and “the record . . . contain[ed] no evidence regarding the painfulness or duration of this injury.” Id. As for the oral laceration, the district court took judicial notice of the fact that “oral injuries do not heal quickly,” but we disagreed, noting that some oral injuries are “lasting and some fleeting, some painful and some scarcely so.” Id. at 1284. We disapproved of the district 19 court’s reliance on the PSR’s “cursory description of a ‘small laceration’ and two photographs of the officer’s mouth, which [were] of such poor quality that they could lend no support to a . . . finding” of bodily injury. Id. at 1285. In sum, we held that the red mark and oral laceration did not rise to the level of bodily injuries under the Guidelines: In every reported case where a “bodily injury” enhancement has been upheld against a challenge based on the significance of the injury or the sufficiency of the evidence presented, the record before the district court demonstrated injuries that were more severe than those here, were painful and lasting, or were of a type for which medical treatment would ordinarily be sought. Id. at 1282 (collecting cases). In Mr. Dickerson’s view, the injuries in this case are similar to the red mark and oral cut in Mejia-Canales. We disagree. It was not clear error for the district court to conclude that the injuries here were more significant than those in Mejia-Canales, and sufficient for the bodily-injury enhancement. Mr. Dickerson first challenges the application of the bodily-injury enhancement to Group 2, which corresponds to the robbery of victim C.P. According to the PSR, Mr. Dickerson threw C.P. to the ground in an apparent headlock, and pinned her down with his knees on her back. The police officer who responded to the crime scene observed that C.P. had several scratches and redness that resulted from her being shoved to the ground. We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that these 20 injuries are sufficient to constitute bodily injury for purposes of the two-level enhancement. First, the injury manifested itself as scratches and redness and we have explicitly stated that “[v]isible injuries such as . . . redness” and presumably scratches “are sufficient to constitute ‘bodily injury.’” Brown, 200 F.3d at 709. Second, the PSR states that the officers observed the scratches and redness on C.P.’s person which suggests that the injury was obvious, an element of the Guidelines’ definition of bodily injury that was lacking in the injuries in Mejia-Canales. It is not clear error for the district court to conclude that visible scratches, which break the skin, are more significant than the red mark left on the victim in Mejia-Canales. Moreover, there is no indication in the record that the district court rested its bodily-injury finding on the erroneous notion that all scratches constitute bodily injury under the Guidelines. In Mejia-Canales, the district court took judicial notice that all injuries to the mouth are lasting, and we found clearly erroneous its finding of bodily injury on that basis, because not all oral injuries will constitute bodily injury. Here, the district court’s finding relates only to the particular scratches and redness suffered by C.P., and we cannot say that this finding is clearly erroneous based on the record. Mr. Dickerson next challenges the application of the bodily-injury enhancement to Group 5, which corresponds to the robbery of victim H.G. The robbery of H.G. presents an even stronger case for bodily injury. H.G. told the responding officer that she had red cuts on her chest after Mr. Dickerson tased 21 and punched her. In a phone interview one year later, H.G. recounted the attack to the probation officer and stated that she sustained marks on her neck from the taser that were sore for a month and experienced two weeks of soreness in her chest from being punched. The evidence thus supports the district court’s finding that the injuries were visible (red cuts) and lasting (neck soreness for a month and chest soreness for two weeks). Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in applying the bodily-injury enhancement to Group 5. Mr. Dickerson also contests the application of the bodily-injury enhancement to Group 6, which corresponds to the robbery of D.G. Like H.G., D.G. also sustained cuts from being tased by Mr. Dickerson. The responding officer observed two cuts on D.G.’s arm where he was tased. According to the PSR, the video recording from the bank corroborates the use of the taser and D.G.’s reaction of “jumping [while] clutching his chest.” R., Vol. II, at 9. There was no follow-up interview with D.G. and there is nothing in the record that explicitly addresses the length of D.G.’s injuries. Nonetheless, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in finding that D.G.’s injuries constitute bodily injury. The two cuts on D.G.’s wrist were visible injuries, obvious to the responding officers. Moreover, we consider relevant the video evidence of D.G. jumping and clutching his chest in response to the taser. Although we have no evidence that the taser caused D.G. lasting pain, it would not be clearly erroneous for the district court to infer that the injury 22 to D.G. was painful based on his reaction to the taser in the video recording. Focusing only on D.G.’s reaction to the pain of the taser, not Mr. Dickerson’s act of tasing D.G., we conclude that the evidence supports a finding that D.G. suffered a “painful and obvious” injury sufficient for bodily injury. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(B). The district court could reasonably find that such a physical response, in conjunction with visible cuts, rises to the level of bodily injury under the Guidelines. Finally, Mr. Dickerson challenges the application of the bodily-injury enhancement to Group 7, which corresponds to the robbery of J.H. J.H. told responding officers that he sustained a seven-centimeter red mark on his upper chest where Mr. Dickerson grabbed him and ripped his shirt during the attack. Mr. Dickerson then tased J.H. and struck him several times. In Mejia-Canales, we held that a “red mark—without any reported swelling, bleeding, or bruising . . . is not, in and of itself, necessarily painful or obvious” and held that the district court committed clear error when it applied the bodily injury enhancement based on such a red mark. Id. at 1283. However, in Brown, 200 F.3d at 709, we noted that “[v]isible injuries such as . . . redness . . . are sufficient to constitute ‘bodily injury.’” Here, J.H. experienced more than a mere red mark; J.H. also experienced the shock of a taser. Focusing only on the victim’s injury, it would not have been clearly erroneous to infer that a victim who experienced the shock of a taser 23 sustained a painful injury and that the red mark is some additional evidence of an obvious injury. We therefore conclude that the district court’s finding that J.H. suffered bodily injury is “plausible in light of the record.” See United States v. Uscanga-Mora, 562 F.3d 1289, 1296 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Spears, 197 F.3d 465, 469 (10th Cir. 1999)). In sum, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in applying the bodily-injury enhancement. c We next turn to Mr. Dickerson’s argument that the district court erred in applying the U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement for physical restraint of the victim to Group 2, which corresponds to the robbery of victim C.P. Under § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) a two-level enhancement applies “if any person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape.” The Guidelines define “physically restrained” as “the forcible restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up.” 4 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(K). “‘[R]estraint’ . . . mean[s] the defendant’s conduct must hold the victim 4 “By use of the words ‘such as,’ it is apparent that ‘being tied, bound, or locked up’ are listed by way of example rather than limitation.” United States v. Roberts, 898 F.2d 1465, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Stokley, 881 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1989)); accord United States v. Harris, 271 F. App’x 723, 726 (10th Cir. 2008). 24 back from some action, procedure, or course, prevent the victim from doing something, or otherwise keep the victim within bounds or under control.” United States v. Checora, 175 F.3d 782, 791 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that physical restraint occurred where defendant “tackled [victim] to the ground to prevent his escape”). “The fact [that] the restraint of [the victim] was brief does not” foreclose a finding of physical restraint. Id. “[T]he ‘Guidelines do not distinguish between long- and short-term restraint, and neither will we.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Foppe, 993 F.2d 1444, 1452 (9th Cir. 1993)). The district court adopted the PSR’s recommendation to apply a two-level enhancement for physical restraint of victim C.P. The PSR stated that C.P. told the responding officers that Mr. Dickerson “pinned” her “to the ground . . . with his knees in her back and demanded she give him the money.” R., Vol. II, at 5. C.P. complied and Mr. Dickerson fled the scene. Id. According to the PSR, the video recordings corroborated C.P.’s story that Mr. Dickerson threw her to the ground “in what appears to be a headlock. As C.P. hits the ground, [Mr. Dickerson] stands up on top of her and violently rips the cash bag from her possession.” Id. at 6. According to Mr. Dickerson he “did not pin C.P. on the ground”; rather, “they both fell to the ground after a brief scuffle as he tried to take the money from her.” Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 27. In Mr. Dickerson’s view, this does not rise to the level of physical restraint. But even Mr. Dickerson’s version of the 25 facts—under which he and C.P. fell to the ground in a struggle for possession of the money—could be construed as Mr. Dickerson “hold[ing] the victim back from some action,” whether it be escape or maintaining possession of the money, and “keep[ing] the victim . . . under [his] control” to effectuate the robbery. See Checora, 175 F.3d at 791. And, Mr. Dickerson cites no legal authority to the contrary. His challenge focuses solely on his disagreement with the PSR’s characterization of his physical altercation with C.P. Even if we assume that his characterization is plausible, the PSR’s certainly is as well. And, “[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). Therefore, the district court’s endorsement of the PSR’s view in applying the physical-restraint enhancement cannot be deemed clearly erroneous. d We next turn to Mr. Dickerson’s claim that the district court erred in applying the enhancement for loss exceeding $10,000 under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(7) to Group 2, which corresponds to the robbery of victim C.P. The PSR states that when Mr. Dickerson robbed C.P., he escaped with $3,662.60 in cash and $35,885.49 in checks. According to the PSR, “the bulk of [One Main Financial’s] loss was in the form of checks or money orders, which their customers either stopped payment on or reissued.” R., Vol. II, at 11. As a result, the actual loss to One Main Financial for the purposes of restitution, which One 26 Main Financial opted not to pursue, would be the value of the cash—that is, $3,662.60. Mr. Dickerson argues that the sentencing enhancement should not apply because the actual loss to One Main Financial was only $3,662.60, an amount that is well below $10,000. In Mr. Dickerson’s view, the relevant total for purposes of this enhancement is the actual loss to the victim and, because One Main Financial’s customers stopped payment on or reissued the stolen checks or money orders, the value of the checks and money orders cannot count towards the “loss” for the sentencing enhancement. The Guidelines define “loss” as “the value of the property taken, damaged, or destroyed.” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 cmt. n.3. This definition—“the value of the property taken”—begs the question: at what point in time do we calculate the value of the loss? When Mr. Dickerson approached C.P., C.P. possessed cash and checks worth $39,548.09 to One Main Financial. When Mr. Dickerson took possession of C.P.’s money bag, he escaped with the entire sum of money. At some point in the future, the stolen checks and money orders in Mr. Dickerson’s possession became virtually worthless because customers stopped payment on them. The question, then, is whether we calculate “the value of the property” taken at the time of dispossession or after customers have canceled the checks and money orders. Other circuits have held that for purposes of determining the amount of the 27 loss under § 2B3.1(b)(7), the Guidelines do not limit “loss” to permanent deprivation of property. See United States v. McCarty, 35 F.3d 1349, 1361 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the relevant amount is the amount taken, not the amount taken less the amount recovered); United States v. Napier, 21 F.3d 354, 355 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the relevant amount was the amount taken prior to apprehension of the defendant); United States v. Cruz-Santiago, 12 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that the loss calculation under § 2B3.1(b)(7) is not limited to permanent deprivations); United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 105 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the amount of loss is calculated irrespective of whether the property is immediately thereafter recovered). Guided by the reasoning of these cases from our sister circuits, we hold that the relevant value of the loss for purposes of the § 2B3.1(b)(7) enhancement is the value of the stolen property at the time of dispossession. To hold otherwise would allow Mr. Dickerson to benefit from the fact that One Main Financial was able to mitigate its losses. The victim’s ultimate actual loss resulting from the robbery is a question for restitution, not for this sentencing enhancement. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in applying the sentencing enhancement for loss exceeding $10,000 under § 2B3.1(b)(7). e Finally, we turn to Mr. Dickerson’s claim that the record contains insufficient evidence to support the district court’s calculation of actual loss for 28 purposes of restitution in the amount of $8,424.60. The PSR recommended a restitution amount of $8,424.60. The amount included losses sustained by three businesses—Loan Max ($3,931), Church’s Chicken ($2,347.60), Sonic ($2,091)—and victim J.H. ($55). The district court adopted the PSR’s findings and, pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”), see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A, ordered restitution in the amount of $8,424.60—the sum of the aforementioned losses. Mr. Dickerson now argues that the government failed to prove the amounts of actual loss sustained by Loan Max, Church’s Chicken, and Sonic. i We first address the parties’ dispute as to which standard of review applies to each of the components of the restitution amount. “We review the district court’s application of the MVRA de novo, review its factual findings for clear error, and review the amount of the restitution awarded for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008). Where a defendant fails to challenge a restitution amount in the district court, “our review is for plain error.” United States v. Burns, 800 F.3d 1258, 1261 (10th Cir. 2015). Mr. Dickerson concedes that he failed to object in the district court to the PSR’s calculation of Sonic’s actual loss and thus that issue is subject to plain-error review. The parties dispute which standard of review applies to the restitution amounts for Loan Max and Church’s Chicken. 29 Mr. Dickerson argues that he preserved his challenges to the restitution amounts for Loan Max and Church’s Chicken in his sentencing memorandum by objecting to paragraphs 43 and 45 of the PSR. The relevant portion of his sentencing memorandum states: Paragraph 43 - The loss amount of $3,931.00 in this paragraph differs from the loss of $3,700 which was reported to the police as reflected in Paragraph 15. Paragraph 45 - The loss amount of $2,347.60 listed in this paragraph differs from the loss amount $2,310 which was reported to the police as reflected in paragraph 17. R., Vol. I, at 34. The government argues that plain-error review applies to all three restitution amounts because Mr. Dickerson failed to object to paragraph 202 of the PSR, in which the probation officer computed the total amount of restitution as $8,424.60. The government maintains that Mr. Dickerson’s “objection to the amount of loss sustained by Loan Max and Church’s Chicken was not a challenge to restitution, but rather a challenge to adjustments under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(7).” Id. at 30–31. We need not resolve the parties’ dispute. Mr. Dickerson makes essentially the same, overarching argument regarding all three restitution amounts. And, as we explain below, his argument fails as to all three under the more rigorous clear- error—as opposed to plain-error—standard. Consequently, for simplicity’s sake, we review the district court’s calculation of the actual losses suffered by Loan 30 Max, Church’s Chicken, and Sonic for clear error and ultimately reject Mr. Dickerson’s challenges. ii The MVRA provides that the district “court shall order . . . that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1). “[A]n order of restitution imposed pursuant to the MVRA must be based on the ‘full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court . . . .’” United States v. Ferdman, 779 F.3d 1129, 1132 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A)). “[T]he MVRA does not require a court to calculate a victim’s actual loss with ‘exact’ precision.” Id. But, “the MVRA undoubtedly ‘require[s] some precision when calculating restitution. Speculation and rough justice are not permitted.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Anderson, 741 F.3d 938, 954 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added)). “The burden of demonstrating the amount of loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense shall be on . . . the Government.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e). The PSR must contain “information sufficient for the court to exercise its discretion in fashioning a restitution order. The report shall include, to the extent practicable, a complete accounting of the losses to each victim . . . .” Id. § 3664(a). “Any dispute as to the proper amount . . . of restitution shall be resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence.” Id. § 3664(e). “A district court 31 ‘may resolve restitution uncertainties with a view towards achieving fairness to the victim so long as it still makes a reasonable determination of appropriate restitution rooted in a calculation of actual loss.’” Ferdman, 779 F.3d at 1133 (alteration omitted) (quoting Gallant, 537 F.3d at 1252). iii We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in adopting the PSR’s calculation of actual loss amounts for Loan Max, Church’s Chicken, or Sonic. The PSR included estimates of the losses as reported by the individual victims of the crime to the responding officers. The probation officer then conducted follow-up interviews with each victim employer business to confirm the restitution amounts. Mr. Dickerson objected that the victims’ loss estimates made to the responding officers immediately after the robbery differed from the amounts that the businesses provided in the follow-up interviews with the probation officer. The probation officer responded to Mr. Dickerson’s objections in the addendum to the PSR, explaining that any discrepancy was a result of the fact that the victim gave an approximation at the scene of the crime and that the businesses were later able to provide a more accurate accounting of actual loss. On appeal, Mr. Dickerson essentially makes the same argument for all three restitution amounts. He argues that we must reverse the district court’s order because the “PSR supplied no supporting documentation for the recommended restitution amounts and did not identify any individual supplying information on 32 loss amounts or explain how those loss amounts were determined.” Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 37. But the caselaw Mr. Dickerson relies on to make this argument is inapplicable here. Mr. Dickerson chiefly relies on Ferdman, a case in which this court reversed a restitution award because insufficient evidence was submitted to the district court. 779 F.3d at 1141. The defendant in Ferdman illegally procured cellular telephones from Sprint stores. Id. at 1131. The district court ordered the defendant to pay Sprint $48,715.59 in restitution based entirely on an “unverified or unsworn . . . letter” that Sprint’s regional manager of investigation submitted to the probation office. Id. at 1133. The letter “purport[ed] to list the amount of the phone losses Sprint sustained” during the relevant period. Id. It explained that “[t]he phone losses are the retail unsubsidized price of these phones,” and included estimates for investigative and shipping costs that allegedly flowed from the defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1134. On appeal, we vacated the restitution order for lack of evidence. Id. at 1141. We held that where a district court relies on “lost sales and accompanying profits to calculate the amount of the victim’s actual loss under the MVRA . . . . in the case of fungible or readily replaceable goods . . . the Government must present more than a claim that but for a defendant’s theft, the victim may have made additional sales[;] . . . the Government must present at least some evidence . . . from which the court could reasonably infer lost sales.” Id. Moreover, we also found that Sprint’s estimates 33 for shipping and investigative costs were insufficient to support a restitution order. Id. at 1140. But the facts in this case are different from those in Ferdman. First, it is easier to calculate the loss for the things that Dickerson stole—cash and checks—than for fungible assets like cell phones. To calculate the loss of fungible assets, we usually need to consider lost sales and profits. But to calculate the loss of cash and checks, we can simply add up the total amount stolen. Second, there was more evidence supporting the restitution award in this case than there was in Ferdman. The responding officers received estimates from the individual victims at the time of the robberies, and the probation officer verified similar totals with the victim employer businesses when preparing the PSR. And third, the district court’s restitution calculation was not based on “estimates” from the victims regarding any vague expenses such as “shipping” or “investigative” costs as in Ferdman. Here, the total restitution amount was based only on the value of the cash and checks taken from the victims. Mr. Dickerson also relies on United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 1998). There the defendant stole guns from a store and the district court ordered restitution in the amount of $1,209.98 “to cover the cost of both guns stolen from the sporting goods store.” Id. at 1057. We reversed the district court’s restitution order because the government failed to “present evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution.” Id. We explained that 34 “[a] restitution order entered without proof of loss is clearly erroneous.” Id. Mr. Dickerson argues that Smith requires us to reverse the restitution order here because the government presented no evidence in support of the restitution order at sentencing. But Mr. Dickerson ignores other differences between this case and Smith. The stolen property in Smith—like the stolen property in Ferdman—was a fungible asset; here, the stolen goods were cash and checks. And, as we pointed out above, it is simpler to calculate the face value of cash and checks than to calculate the value of fungible assets. Moreover, the law does not require the government to make a showing at the restitution hearing where the facts underlying the restitution amounts are undisputed. See Tindall, 519 F.3d at 1061–62 (holding that a sentencing court may “‘accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding of fact.’” (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A))). Mr. Dickerson’s only objection in the district court related to the minor discrepancies between the victims’ initial approximations and later clarifications of loss. Mr. Dickerson never pointed to evidence contradicting the actual loss amounts listed in the PSR. We therefore conclude that the present record contains sufficient, undisputed evidence of the actual losses underlying the total restitution amount. In sum, Mr. Dickerson fails to show that the district court’s factual findings in support of its restitution award were clearly erroneous, or that the court abused its discretion in setting the restitution amount at $8,424.60. 35 3 We next turn to Mr. Dickerson’s third procedural challenge. He argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to make the factual findings necessary for his sentence or responsive to his objections. Specifically, Mr. Dickerson argues that remand is necessary because the district court failed to “find a single fact pertaining to Mr. Dickerson or the offenses for which he was sentenced.” Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 42. He claims that his “objections to the PSR clearly triggered the court’s fact finding obligation under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.” Id. at 45. We disagree. Rule 32(i)(3)(A) “allows the sentencing court to ‘accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding of fact.’” Tindall, 519 F.3d at 1061–62 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A)). “But the court ‘must—for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter—rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(i)(3)(B)). “We review de novo the district court’s compliance with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” United States v. Cereceres-Zavala, 499 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2007). “[T]o invoke the district court’s Rule 32 fact-finding obligation, the defendant is required to make specific allegations of factual inaccuracy.” Id. at 1215–16 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Delma, 456 F.3d 1246, 1253 (10th 36 Cir. 2006)). “[A] defendant’s attempt to controvert legal determinations—or even ultimate factual conclusions—drawn in a PSR ‘does not implicate’ the district court’s fact-finding obligations under Rule 32.” Id. at 1214 (quoting United States v. Tovar, 27 F.3d 497, 500 (10th Cir 1994)). “Arguments that ‘challenge[] the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts and not the facts themselves’ do not trigger any obligation on the part of the district court to make specific findings.” Rodriguez-Delma, 456 F.3d at 1253 (quoting United States v. Windle, 74 F.3d 997, 1002 (10th Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Pena-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d 1108, 1118–19 (10th Cir. 2008) (Ebel, J., concurring) (“Although [the defendant] clearly challenged the application of two guidelines offense-level enhancements . . . he never disputed any of the historical facts contained in the [PSR] . . . . Therefore, Rule 32(i)(3)(B)’s requirement that the district court resolve factual disputes concerning historical facts was never triggered.”). On appeal, Mr. Dickerson does not identify any specific, contested facts that the district court failed to address and that should have triggered a Rule 32 hearing. Rather, Mr. Dickerson only generally refers to the contested sentencing enhancements and the total restitution amount. He argues: [T]he district judge adopted the PSR findings and imposed the bodily injury enhancements, the enhancement for physical restraint of victim C.P., the dangerous weapon enchantments, the enhancement for loss above $10,000 and the restitution orders-all without acknowledging Mr. Dickerson’s numerous objections and 37 without making any findings or comments about them. There is no indication in the record that the district court considered the facts underlying the enhancements or the objections Mr. Dickerson raised. Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 47. To achieve reversal on appeal, Mr. Dickerson needed to point us to the “specific allegations of factual inaccuracy” that he made in the district court that would have triggered the “district court’s Rule 32 fact-finding obligation.” Cereceres-Zavala, 499 F.3d at 1215–16 (quoting Rodriguez-Delma, 456 F.3d at 1253). But Mr. Dickerson has not carried his burden. We therefore reject Mr. Dickerson’s Rule 32 challenge. 4 Finally, we turn to Mr. Dickerson’s argument that “[t]he record does not support the conclusion that the district court appropriately considered the statutory factors in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a).” 5 Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 53. He argues that “the record is insufficient to permit this Court to properly” review the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. Id. Indeed, the failure of a district court to consider a § 3553(a) sentencing factor is reversible procedural error. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. However, Mr. Dickerson must direct this court to 5 Mr. Dickerson includes this argument in his substantive-reasonableness challenge. However, a district court’s failure to consider a sentencing factor set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) is a procedural error. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (classifying as a procedural error a district court’s “fail[ure] to consider the § 3553(a) factors”). Therefore, we address his challenge within our discussion of procedural reasonableness. 38 at least one sentencing factor that, if considered by the district court, would have altered the district court’s calculation of his sentence. Because he fails to do so, Mr. Dickerson gives us no basis on which to reverse the district court. In sum, we conclude that Mr. Dickerson has not identified a significant procedural error worthy of reversal on appeal. C Now that we have assured ourselves that the district court’s sentence is procedurally reasonable, we turn to Mr. Dickerson’s substantive challenges. Specifically, Mr. Dickerson argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because (1) the procedural defects in his sentence implicate its substantive reasonableness, and (2) the court-found facts more than doubled his Guidelines range. Concluding that Mr. Dickerson has identified no substantive error, we affirm the district court’s sentence. 1 As we mentioned supra, our “[r]eview for substantive reasonableness focuses on ‘whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).’” Friedman, 554 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Alapizco-Valenzuela, 546 F.3d at 1215). The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed—(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 39 promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for—(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines . . . (5) any pertinent policy statement[;] . . . (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “When reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness, this court employs the abuse-of-discretion standard, a standard requiring ‘substantial deference to district courts.’” Friedman, 554 F.3d at 1307 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Sells, 541 F.3d 1227, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008)). “A district court abuses its discretion when it renders a judgment that is ‘arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.’” United States v. Munoz-Nava, 524 F.3d 1137, 1146 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Byrne, 171 F.3d 1231, 1235–36 (10th Cir. 2008)). “That we might reasonably have concluded a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Friedman, 554 F.3d at 1307–08 (alterations omitted) (quoting Munoz-Nava, 524 F.3d at 1146). Ordinarily, “if a sentence falls within the correct Guidelines range, we 40 presume it is reasonable.” United States v. Delgado-Montoya, --- F. App’x ----, 2016 WL 6211800, at 6 (10th Cir. Oct. 25, 2016); see United States v. Craig, 808 F.3d 1249, 1263 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting that “we presume Defendant's within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable”); see also United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006) (“If . . . the district court properly considers the relevant Guidelines range and sentences the defendant within that range, the sentence is presumptively reasonable. The defendant may rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the other sentencing factors laid out in § 3553(a).”). 2 At the outset, we address and reject Mr. Dickerson’s contention that we should eschew the presumption of reasonableness on this record. It would ordinarily apply because the district court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence on Mr. Dickerson. See, e.g., Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055. Specifically, the district court calculated a Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months and imposed a sentence within that range—121 months. Mr. Dickerson contends that we “cannot apply the presumption of reasonableness that is accorded to a properly calculated guideline sentence because [we] cannot determine, in light of the inadequate record, that Mr. Dickerson’s sentence was properly calculated.” Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 53. He adds that “[t]he court arrived at the guideline range by applying enhancements 41 unsupported by the evidence.” Id. In other words, Mr. Dickerson asserts that we cannot apply a presumption of reasonableness because (1) his sentence may have been improperly calculated, and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the sentencing enhancements imposed by the district court. We are unpersuaded. First, in arguing against the presumption, Mr. Dickerson alleges only procedural defects with his sentence. See Sanchez-Leon, 764 F.3d at 1261 (“Our review of procedural reasonableness ‘focuses on the manner in which the sentence was calculated.’” (quoting Masek, 588 F.3d at 1290)). But we considered and rejected those defects supra. Second, Mr. Dickerson offers no legal support for the proposition that procedural errors have any bearing on whether we may properly apply a presumption of reasonableness at the substantive-reasonableness stage of our review. Indeed, such a proposition would be at odds with our reasonableness framework. We consider substantive reasonableness only after we have addressed and rejected challenges to procedural reasonableness. See Lucero, 747 F.3d at 1246 (“We ‘must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error . . . .’ If the district court’s decision is ‘procedurally sound,’ we ‘then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51)). If the alleged procedural errors Mr. Dickerson identifies as the basis for his anti-presumption argument were in fact significant errors (i.e., non-harmless errors), we would have reversed on procedural grounds, without reaching the substantive- 42 reasonableness question presently before us. See, e.g., Sanchez-Leon, 764 F.3d at 1261 (“If we find a procedural error, ‘resentencing is required only if the error was not harmless.’ (quoting Cerno, 529 F.3d at 939)); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054–55 (10th Cir. 2006) (“A different approach, however, is warranted when the district court errs in applying the Guidelines. . . . In that situation, we must remand—without reaching the question of [substantive] reasonableness—unless the error is harmless.” (citations omitted)). Thus, consistent with our precedent, we apply the presumption of reasonableness to Mr. Dickerson’s within-Guidelines sentence. 3 The onus is on Mr. Dickerson to “rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the other sentencing factors laid out in § 3553(a).” Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055. Mr. Dickerson has made no attempt to carry this burden. He has not identified a single § 3553(a) factor that, if properly considered in his case, would merit a lower sentence than the district court imposed on him. Mr. Dickerson argues only that “[t]he record does not support the conclusion that the district court appropriately considered the statutory factors in § 3553(a).” Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 53. But Mr. Dickerson’s brief leaves to the imagination which § 3553(a) factors were not considered, how this is evident from the district court’s sentence, and which specific factors would have merited a lower sentence. These questions are essential to our substantive review and 43 without answers to them from Mr. Dickerson, we have no basis on which to reverse the district court. Instead of making a substantive-reasonableness argument based on the § 3553(a) factors, Mr. Dickerson argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because (1) it has procedural defects, and (2) because court-found facts significantly increased his sentence. Concluding that neither argument is a basis for finding his sentence substantively unreasonable, we reject Mr. Dickerson’s substantive challenge. a Mr. Dickerson first argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because of its “serious procedural defects.” Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 52. Specifically, he argues that his sentence was “substantively unreasonable because the district court imposed . . . numerous enhancements that substantially increased Mr. Dickerson’s sentence without sufficient evidence or essential findings.” Id. Moreover, he seems to argue that the district court failed to explain the reasons for its sentence. But these are squarely procedural arguments. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (categorizing as procedural errors “improperly calculating[] the Guidelines range” and “failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.”). And Mr. Dickerson has identified no legal authority for the proposition that procedural error is a basis for finding a sentence substantively unreasonable. We again emphasize our process 44 for analyzing reasonableness. We “first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error” that independently warrants reversal. Id. If there was no procedural error, we “then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed.” Id. If Mr. Dickerson’s sentence was procedurally unreasonable, we would not have reached the substantive-reasonableness inquiry. Moreover, Mr. Dickerson argues that “the record is insufficient to permit this Court to properly conduct substantive review at all.” Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 53. He adds that the “district court did not see or hear any evidence, did not make any credibility determinations, and did not acquire ‘full knowledge’ of the pertinent facts.” Id. at 54 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). However, the record—no matter how inadequate—does not excuse Mr. Dickerson’s failure to make a substantive-reasonableness argument. Put simply, Mr. Dickerson’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the record misapprehends his burden on appeal. No matter what the district court has said, or failed to say, he must point us to at least one § 3553(a) factor that would have counseled in favor a lower sentence. b Finally, Mr. Dickerson argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because court-found facts more than doubled his Guidelines range. According to Mr. Dickerson, the facts underlying the disputed sentencing enhancements needed to be either admitted by him or submitted to a jury to 45 satisfy the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that any fact increasing a sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury), and Alleyne v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2163–64 (2013) (holding that any fact increasing a mandatory-minimum sentence must be submitted to the jury). He therefore argues that we must find his sentence substantively unreasonable. Mr. Dickerson’s reliance on Apprendi and Alleyne is misplaced. He was not subject to a mandatory-minimum sentence nor sentenced beyond the statutory maximum for his robbery-related convictions. The statutory maximum for Mr. Dickerson’s offenses is twenty years (240 months), see 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and the district court sentenced Mr. Dickerson to 121 months, well beneath the statutory maximum. And there is no mandatory-minimum sentence prescribed for his offense. The court’s factual findings simply provided a basis for the court’s calculation of Mr. Dickerson’s Guidelines sentence, including his sentencing enhancements. Accordingly, Apprendi and Alleyne are inapposite. See, e.g., United States v. Zar, 790 F.3d 1036, 1054–55 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The defendants’ reliance on Apprendi and Alleyne is misplaced as none of the defendants were subject to mandatory minimum sentences or sentenced beyond the statutory maximums for their convictions.”); United States v. Cassius, 777 F.3d 1093, 1097 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[N]othing in the record indicates the district court increased Defendant’s statutory sentencing range or otherwise altered his legally prescribed 46 punishment; rather, by all indications the court used its larger drug quantity finding solely as a sentencing factor to help determine Defendant’s sentence within the prescribed statutory range. We find no error in this procedure under Alleyne.” (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2909 (2015); United States v. Fredette, 315 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Apprendi does not apply to sentencing factors that increase a defendant's guideline range but do not increase the statutory maximum.”) In sum, Mr. Dickerson’s failure to argue that his sentence was substantively unreasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors is fatal to his substantive challenge. He has given us no reason to bypass the “due deference” we give to “the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a)” factors justify the sentence imposed. See Friedman, 554 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Munoz-Nova, 524 F.3d at 1146). IV With the exception of Mr. Dickerson’s challenge regarding the restitution amount specified in the written judgment, we AFFIRM Mr. Dickerson’s sentence. As to that restitution amount, we REVERSE and REMAND with instructions for 47 the district court to enter an amended judgment ordering restitution in the amount of $8,424.60. Entered for the Court JEROME A. HOLMES Circuit Judge 48
en	wikipedia	N/A	David Steele Bohigian is an American businessman and government official who served as the acting president of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the former development finance institution of the United States government. Bohigian previously served as the corporation's executive vice president. He was confirmed by the Senate by voice vote in August 2017 under the Donald Trump administration. He also served as Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Market Access and Compliance under President George W. Bush. Bohigian is also an investor, venture capitalist, and has graduated from law school. Education Bohigian graduated with a bachelor’s degree in journalism from Washington and Lee University in 1992 and a Juris Doctor degree from Washington University School of Law in St. Louis in 1995. Career After graduating, Bohigian served as a director and equity partner at venture capital firm Jefferson Partners from October 1995 to June 1999. In 1999, Bohigian co-founded and served as a managing director at VenCatalyst, a venture capital firm focused on technology companies. In 2000, VenCatalyst was acquired by Internet business incubator Idealab. Bohigian would go on to serve as a managing director at Idealab after the acquisition. As part of Idealab, Bohigian also served in executive roles for their portfolio companies. After his stint working for the Bush administration’s Commerce Department, Bohigian founded private equity firm E2 Capital Partners in 2009, which focused on energy efficiency projects. In 2010, Bohigian joined Bridgewater Associates’ core management team. He served as part of Bridgewater’s staff until 2013, when he founded and became managing director of the financial advisory firm and impact investment fund Pluribus Ventures. Bohigian is also a member of institutions such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Eagle Scouts of America, and the Missouri Bar Association. Government career Bohigian began his career in government by working for Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich in 1995 as an intern and staff assistant. In 2002, George W. Bush’s administration offered Bohigian a position in the Commerce Department. He held several positions in the Department of Commerce, including Director of Policy and Strategic Planning from 2002 to 2005 and Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Market Access and Compliance from 2005 to 2009. In September 2008, Bohigian led a clean energy and environment trade mission to China and India as a representative of the Bush administration. Bohigian also served as the Commerce Department’s representative in the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). In late 2016, Bohigian was appointed to the Donald Trump administration’s Commerce Department transition team. In February 2017, he served as a special adviser to the United States Department of the Treasury. In June 2017, President Trump announced his intent to nominate Bohigian as Executive Vice President of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). In August 2017, he was confirmed by the Senate to his position in the OPIC. Bohigian eventually assumed the role of acting president and CEO of the OPIC in March 2019. During his time in the OPIC, Bohigian helped implement the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act (BUILD Act), pitched the Blue Dot Network infrastructure program, approved more than $6 billion in investment worldwide, and helped launch the 2X Africa initiative for women’s empowerment alongside Advisor to the President Ivanka Trump. He also helped oversee the OPIC’s conversion into the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. In late 2019, Bohigian left his position as acting president. In 2019, President Trump nominated Bohigian as a member of the President’s Commission on White House Fellowships. He currently serves as a Commissioner of the White House Fellows Foundation. References 21st-century American businesspeople Date of birth missing (living people) George W. Bush administration personnel Living people Overseas Private Investment Corporation officials Place of birth missing (living people) Trump administration personnel United States Department of Commerce officials United States Department of the Treasury officials Year of birth missing (living people) Washington University School of Law alumni
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Amy Sequenzia est une femme américaine autiste non-verbale, polyhandicapée. Militante pour les droits des personnes handicapées, les droits civils et les droits de l'Homme, elle a également de l'épilepsie, une infirmité motrice cérébrale, de la dyspraxie et de l'insomnie. Sequenzia assure la co-direction de l'ouvrage , consacré à la communication améliorée et alternative. Elle est une fréquente contributrice de l' et d'Ollibean.com. Elle est également membre des conseils d'administration de l'Autistic Self Advocacy Network et de la . Elle écrit de la poésie. Elle a participé à plusieurs conférences aux États-Unis et dans d'autres pays, dont "" (À la reconquête de notre corps et de nos esprit) à l'Université Ryerson à Toronto. . Droits des personnes handicapées et militantisme dans l'autisme Sequenzia est impliquée dans les mouvements de la neurodiversité et des droits de la personne autiste. Elle critique le modèle médical de l'autisme. Sequenzia s'oppose aux tentatives de guérir l'autisme, estimant que l'autisme est une partie inséparable de la personne et de sa personnalité. Elle est en faveur de toute méthode choisie par une personne handicapée pour sa communication et utilise elle-même en particulier la communication facilitée. Elle soutient la recherche pour guérir l'épilepsie. Sequenzia n'utilise pas l'expression « avec autisme » (destinée à mettre le diagnostic en second : ). Elle s'est exprimée contre l'utilisation de la notion d'autisme de bas niveau ou déficient. Sequenzia estime que juger des personnes sur ce qu'elles "ne peuvent pas faire" pousse les autres à juger les personnes autistes de façon inéquitable et préjudiciable. Notes Références Poétesse américaine du XXIe siècle Militante américaine Blogueuse américaine Autiste Autisme aux États-Unis Militant pour les droits des personnes autistes Date de naissance non renseignée (XXe siècle)
sv	caselaw	EU	FÖRSLAG TILL AVGÖRANDE AV GENERALADVOKATL.A. GEELHOEDföredraget den 27 november 2003(1) Mål C-381/01 Europeiska gemenskapernas kommission mot Republiken Italien Mål C-495/01Europeiska gemenskapernas kommission mot Republiken Finland Mål C-144/02Europeiska gemenskapernas kommission mot Förbundsrepubliken Tyskland Mål C-463/02 Europeiska gemenskapernas kommission mot Konungariket Sverige Åsidosättande av artikel 11 i sjätte direktivet (77/388/EEG) – Underlåtenhet att ta ut mervärdesskatt på subventioner som utbetalats med stöd av rådets förordning nr 603/95 om den gemensamma marknaden för torkat foder – Begreppet 'subventioner som är direkt kopplade till priset' I – Inledning 1. I de förevarande fyra målen, som jag skall behandla gemensamt, har Europeiska gemenskapernas kommission yrkat att domstolen skall fastställa att Republiken Italien (mål C-381/01), Republiken Finland (C-495/01), Förbundsrepubliken Tyskland (mål C-144/02) och Konungariket Sverige (mål C‐463/02) inte har uppfyllt sina skyldigheter enligt artikel 11 i rådets sjätte direktiv 77/388/EEG av den 17 maj 1977 om harmonisering av medlemsstaternas lagstiftning rörande omsättningsskatter – Gemensamt system för mervärdesskatt: enhetlig beräkningsgrund (nedan kallat sjätte direktivet) (2) . Ett stöd utbetalas för hetluftstorkat och soltorkat foder till förädlingsföretag med stöd av rådets förordning (EG) nr 603/95 av den 21 februari 1995 om den gemensamma marknaden för torkat foder (3) . Samtliga av de fyra målen rör frågan huruvida stödet för hetluftstorkat och soltorkat foder är belagt med mervärdesskatt. II – Faktiska omständigheter och förfarande 2. I november 1998 skickade kommissionen en formell underrättelse till Republiken Italien, Förbundsrepubliken Tyskland, Republiken Finland och Konungariket Sverige, där den gjorde gällande att det stred mot artikel 11 A.1 a i sjätte direktivet att underlåta att ta ut mervärdesskatt på sådana stödbelopp som utbetalas med stöd av förordning nr 603/95. I skrivelsen anmodade kommissionen medlemsstaterna att inkomma med yttranden inom två månader. Medlemsstaterna invände mot kommissionens ståndpunkt. Under månaderna juli, augusti och september 1999 skickade kommissionen motiverade yttranden till medlemsstaterna där den uppmanade dessa att vidta nödvändiga åtgärder inom två månader efter det att delgivning skett. 3. Den 4 oktober 2001, den 21 december 2001, den 17 april 2002 respektive den 23 december 2002 väckte kommissionen talan vid Europeiska gemenskapernas domstol med stöd av artikel 226 andra stycket EG mot Republiken Italien, Republiken Finland, Förbundsrepubliken Tyskland och Konungariket Sverige. Kommissionen har yrkat att domstolen skall fastställa att Republiken Italien, Republiken Finland, Förbundsrepubliken Tyskland och Konungariket Sverige har åsidosatt de skyldigheter som följer av artikel 11 i sjätte direktivet genom att underlåta att ta ut mervärdesskatt på sådana stödbelopp som beviljas med stöd av förordning nr 603/95, och att dessa medlemsstater skall förpliktas att ersätta rättegångskostnaderna. (4) De berörda medlemsstaterna har yrkat att talan skall ogillas och att kommissionen skall förpliktas att ersätta rättegångskostnaderna. III – Tillämpliga bestämmelser A – Bestämmelserna om beviljande av stöd till sektorn för torkat foder och hur dessa har tillämpats i det förflutna 4. Den 22 maj 1978 antog Europeiska gemenskapernas råd förordning (EEG) nr 1117/78 (5) . I denna förordning, samt i förordningarna (EEG) nr 1417/78 (6) av den 19 juni 1978 och (EEG) nr 1528/78 av den 30 juni 1978 (7) , som båda grundar sig på denna, föreskrivs stöd för torkat foder som har odlats inom gemenskapen. 5. Det framgår av skälen i förordning nr 1117/78 att produktionen inom gemenskapen av torkat foder på den tiden var avsevärt mycket mindre än avsättningsmöjligheterna, särskilt beträffande djurfoder. För att gynna produktionen inrättades ett system med stöd till producenterna, som kompletterades med ett system med tilläggsstöd som syftade till att se till att producenterna åtminstone kunde avsätta sin produktion till ett i förväg fastställt orienteringspris. Detta tilläggsstöd motsvarade en viss procent av skillnaden mellan priset på världsmarknaden och orienteringspriset. Detta reglerades genom artiklarna 3, 4 och 5 i förordning nr 1117/78. 6. Den förutsägbara konsekvensen av det obegränsade produktionsstödet var en överproduktion av torkat (grön)foder inom gemenskapen. Därför anpassades år 1995 regleringen av marknaden för torkat foder genom förordning nr 603/95 och förordning (EG) nr 785/95 (8) . Syftet med dessa förordningar var att stödet till produktionen av torkat foder i fortsättningen skulle begränsas till att avse en viss maximal kvantitet som anges i förordning nr 603/95. Tilläggsstödet avskaffades helt. (9) I den ovannämnda förordningen görs även en åtskillnad mellan soltorkat och hetluftstorkat foder. Eftersom förädlingskostnaderna är lägre för soltorkat än för hetluftstorkat foder är det stöd som utgår för den första gruppen av produkter avsevärt lägre än den som betalas för den andra gruppen produkter. 7. I artiklarna 4 och 5 i förordning nr 603/95 föreskrivs en mekanism för att begränsa den subventionerade produktionen av torkat foder. Mekanismen har följande kännetecken: – För varje regleringsår skall det upprättas maximala garanterade kvantiteter (MGK) för soltorkat och hetluftstorkat foder. – MGK fördelas därefter mellan medlemsstaterna som ger rätt till stöd för nationella garanterade kvantiteter (NGK). – Om under ett regleringsår stöd begärs för en större kvantitet än MGK skall det stöd som skall utbetalas beräknas enligt följande: – För de fem första procenten överstigande MGK skall stödet minska i alla medlemsstater med ett procenttal som proportionellt motsvarar överskridandet. – För överskridande med mer än fem procent skall ytterligare minskningar göras i de medlemsstater i vilka produktionen överstiger NGK, höjda med fem procent i proportion till överskridandet. 8. Dessa korrigeringar skall leda till att de totala utgifterna inte blir högre än de skulle ha varit om MGK inte hade överskridits. 9. Enligt artikel 9 i förordning nr 603/95 skall stödet beviljas sådana förädlingsföretag som bedriver någon av de verksamheter som anges nedan: a) företag som ingått avtal med producenter av foder som skall torkas, b) företag som förädlar sin egen produktion eller, i fråga om producentgrupper, sina medlemmars produktion, c) och företag som fått leveranser av fysiska eller juridiska personer med vissa garantier som skall fastställas, och som har slutit avtal med producenter av foder som skall torkas. 10. Det framgår av förordning nr 603/95 att stödet i vissa fall endast får beviljas om avtal har slutits mellan producenter och förädlingsföretag. (10) Syftet med detta är att främja en jämn tillförsel av grönfoder till förädlingsföretagen och att också producenterna skall kunna dra nytta av stödsystemet. 11. För det fall förädlingsföretaget bedriver verksamhet av typen a är företaget skyldigt att till producenterna utge det stödbelopp som företaget har erhållit för den enligt avtalet förädlade kvantiteten. (11) Det anges inte närmare i förordning nr 603/95 på vilket sätt stödet skall överföras till producenterna. När det är fråga om verksamhet b är förädlingsföretaget och producenten en och samma aktör och kan inte skiljas från varandra. När förädlingsföretaget utövar verksamhet c går det utbetalade stödet till förädlingsföretaget självt. 12. Innan stödet kan beviljas måste det torkade fodret ha lämnat företaget (artikel 8 i förordning nr 603/95). I artikel 3.1 i förordning nr 785/95 anges närmare när foder skall anses ha lämnat ett företag. (12) I artikel 3.2 i förordning nr 785/95 anges vidare att torkat foder som har lämnat ett förädlingsföretag inte får återinföras vare sig till det företagets eller till annat företags område eller till någon lagringsplats. B – Innehållet i sjätte direktivet och särskilt dess artikel 11 A.1 a samt bakgrunden till antagandet av detta 13. Den princip som mervärdesskatten vilar på formuleras i artikel 2 i första direktivet (13) enligt följande: ”Principen om det gemensamma systemet för mervärdesskatt innebär tillämpning på varor och tjänster av en allmän skatt på konsumtion som är exakt proportionell mot priset på varorna och tjänsterna, oavsett antalet transaktioner som äger rum under produktions- och distributionsprocessen före det led där skatt tas ut. På varje transaktion skall mervärdesskatt, beräknad på varornas eller tjänsternas pris enligt den skattesats som är tillämplig på sådana varor eller tjänster, tas ut efter avdrag av det mervärdesskattebelopp som burits direkt av de olika kostnadskomponenterna.” 14. Avdragsmetoden syftar till att garantera skatteneutraliteten, som är mervärdesskattens kärna, genom att den skatt som slutkonsumenten skall betala alltid är densamma oavsett antalet led i produktionskedjan för den ifrågavarande produkten. 15. Enligt artikel 2 i sjätte direktivet (14) skall mervärdesskatt betalas för leverans av varor eller tillhandahållande av tjänster som sker mot vederlag inom landets territorium av en skattskyldig person i denna egenskap. Enligt artikel 4.1 skall varje person som självständigt bedriver någon form av ekonomisk verksamhet betraktas som skattskyldig, oberoende av syfte eller resultat. 16. I artikel 11 A.1 a i sjätte direktivet fastställs underlaget för mervärdesbeskattning inom landets territorium på följande sätt: ”När det gäller annat tillhandahållande av varor och andra tjänster än som avses i punkterna b, c och d nedan: Allt som utgör det vederlag som leverantören har erhållit eller kommer att erhålla från kunden eller en tredje part för dessa inköp, inklusive subventioner som är direkt kopplade till priset på leveransen. ...” 17. Det framgår av tidigare tillämpningar av sjätte direktivet att tolkningen av begreppet ”subventioner som är direkt kopplade till priset på leveransen” har vållat gemenskapslagstiftaren huvudbry. 18. I kommissionens första rapport av den 14 september 1983 om det gemensamma mervärdesskattesystemet noterades det följande: (15) ”I artikel 11 A.1 a i direktivet anges att subventioner som en skattskyldig person erhåller ’som är direkt kopplade till priset’ på leveranser som den personen utför, skall inkluderas i beskattningsunderlaget i de priser som betalas av tredje man. Även om det är relativt lätt att omedelbart avgöra att subventioner är ’direkt kopplade till priset’ när deras belopp antingen fastställs med utgångspunkt i de levererade varornas eller tjänsternas försäljningspris, i förhållande till sålda kvantiteter eller i förhållande till kostnaden för varor eller tjänster som allmänheten erbjuds kostnadsfritt, är det extremt svårt att avgöra detta när det rör sig om andra slags subventioner, såsom stöd vid underskott eller driftstöd, vilka utbetalas i syfte att förbättra ett företags ekonomiska ställning och som beviljas utan särskild hänvisning till något pris. Det förhållandet att det inte finns någon avgörande skillnad mellan dessa två slags subventioner (subventioner ’som är direkt kopplade till priset’ syftar också vanligtvis till att förbättra ett företags ställning), och det faktum att en medlemsstat kan omvandla en subvention av det första slaget till en subvention av det andra slaget, belyser hur bräcklig en distinktion blir som enbart bygger på formella grunder (det sätt på vilket subventionen beviljas), och därmed direktivets brister i detta avseende.” 19. I kommissionens andra rapport om det gemensamma mervärdesskattesystemets funktion (16) hävdade kommissionen att uttrycket subventioner ”som är direkt kopplade till priset” endast skall tolkas strikt och bokstavligt och att subventionen sålunda endast skall inräknas i beskattningsunderlaget om följande tre villkor är uppfyllda: a) subventionen måste utgöra vederlaget eller en del av vederlaget, b) subventionen måste utbetalas till leverantören eller tillhandahållaren av tjänster, c) subventionen måste utbetalas av en tredje part. 20. Slutligen skall följande utgångspunkter beaktas vid tolkningen av sjätte direktivet, vilket också framgår av domstolens rättspraxis. För det första skall de begrepp som rör omfattningen av mervärdesskattens tillämpningsområde ges en vid tolkning, i motsats till bestämmelserna om skattebefrielse som skall tolkas restriktivt. För det andra måste bestämmelserna tolkas strikt för att främja likabehandlingen i skatterättsligt hänseende. Det gör det möjligt att motverka snedvridning av konkurrensen. För det tredje måste principen om skatteneutralitet has i åtanke. Gemenskapslagstiftarens syfte med denna princip är att garantera en fullständigt neutral beskattning av samtliga ekonomiska verksamheter, oberoende av verksamheternas syfte och resultat, förutsatt att dessa verksamheter i sig är föremål för mervärdesbeskattning. För övrigt utgör dessa två principer, likabehandling i skatterättsligt hänseende och skatteneutralitet, jämförbara begrepp, men de används i olika sammanhang. Det första begreppet används i ett mellanstatligt sammanhang och det andra begreppet rör inhemska angelägenheter. IV – Parternas synpunkter A – Kommissionens anmärkningar 21. Enligt kommissionens uppfattning är ett av de viktigaste kännetecknen för det stöd som ges till förädlingsföretag att det är baserat på den producerade kvantiteten torkat foder. 22. Kommissionen har därefter hänvisat till de olika sätt som förädlingsföretagen kan bedriva sin verksamhet på (se punkt 9). 23. Företag som utan vederlag förädlar sin egen produktion eller, i fråga om producentgrupper, sina medlemmars produktion, utför enligt kommissionen inga skattepliktiga transaktioner i den mening som avses i artikel 2 i sjätte direktivet. Kommissionen har därmed dragit slutsatsen att dessa transaktioner inte omfattas av mervärdesskattens tillämpningsområde och inte skall beskattas. 24. Att köpa upp foder från producenter och sälja det vidare till tredje man efter förädling skall enligt kommissionen däremot betraktas som att tillhandahålla varor i den mening som avses i sjätte direktivet. Att förädla en produkt åt producenterna som lämnas tillbaka till producenterna i form av en förädlad produkt, utan att någon överlåtelse av produkten har ägt rum, skall betraktas som att tillhandahålla en tjänst. Eftersom förädlingsföretag bedriver en ekonomisk verksamhet är de skattskyldiga, och därmed skall transaktioner av typen a och c som sådana mervärdesbeskattas. 25. Den väsentliga fråga som följaktligen uppstår är huruvida också det stöd som beviljas enligt förordning nr 603/95 skall mervärdesbeskattas. 26. Enligt kommissionen måste tre villkor vara uppfyllda för att en subvention skall vara skattepliktig: a) Subventionen skall utbetalas till den som tillhandahåller varor eller tjänster. b) Subventionen skall utbetalas av en tredje man, det vill säga av en annan än den som tillhandahåller varorna eller tjänsterna. c) Subventionen skall vara direkt kopplad till priset på varan eller tjänsten. Kommissionen anser att dessa tre villkor är uppfyllda. 27. Vad gäller villkoret att subventionen skall utbetalas till den som tillhandahåller varorna eller tjänsterna konstaterar kommissionen att förädlingsföretaget både är den som tillhandahåller varorna eller tjänsterna och den som är mottagare av subventionen. Detta kan enligt kommissionen utläsas av artikel 9 första meningen i förordning nr 603/95: ”Det stöd som avses i artikel 3 skall endast utgå till ... förädlingsföretag ... ” 28. Som svar på medlemsstaternas påpekanden att stödet också kommer producenterna till godo har kommissionen gått in på den för kommissionen grundläggande skillnaden mellan en stödmottagare i juridisk mening och den ekonomiska betydelse som stödet kan få. Den beviljade subventionen kan få kompletterande ekonomiska effekter inom ramen för produktionscykeln, antingen för producenterna av grönfoder eller för köparna av torkat foder. För det fall förädlingsföretagen har ingått specialavtal om förädling av foder levererat av producenterna, kräver gemenskapslagstiftaren att förädlingsföretaget skall överföra det erhållna stödet till producenterna. Möjligheten att en subvention också kan komma andra företag till godo och förädlingsföretagets skyldighet att föra över stödet till andra aktörer ändrar enligt kommissionen inte den omständigheten att förädlingsföretaget är den som är stödmottagare. I ekonomiskt hänseende är gruppen av stödmottagare visserligen större, men juridiskt sett är det endast förädlingsföretagen, i egenskap av leverantörer av varor (och tillhandahållare av tjänster) som är mottagare av subventionen. 29. Innan någon subvention kan beviljas måste villkoret att produkterna skall ha lämnat förädlingsföretaget vara uppfyllt (artikel 8 i förordning nr 603/95). Med anledning av medlemsstaternas yttranden har kommissionen bekräftat att begreppet ”lämna förädlingsföretaget” inte överensstämmer med leveransen av en vara i den mening som avses i artikel 2 i sjätte direktivet. I praktiken sammanfaller dock de två begreppen. Subventionen kan således betraktas som ett vederlag för ett tillhandahållande av varor eller tjänster och är därmed skattepliktig. 30. Den tyska regeringen har påpekat att det följer av artikel 3.1 a i förordning nr 785/95 att ett lagringsutrymme för torkat foder kan vara beläget utanför förädlingsföretagets område, vilket medför att den tidpunkt då en vara ”lämnar förädlingsföretaget” inte kan likställas med tidpunkten för leveransen av en vara. Som svar på detta påpekande har kommissionen framhållit att det avgörande kriteriet för att subventionen för torkat foder skall vara skattepliktig är att dessa produkter slutligen blir sålda. Lagringen är sålunda endast en etapp som föregår försäljningen av det torkade fodret. 31. Det andra villkoret är att subventionen måste utbetalas av en tredje man, det vill säga av en annan än den som tillhandahåller varorna eller tjänsterna. Enligt kommissionen är även detta villkor uppfyllt. Den behöriga myndigheten som delar ut subventionen är en annan aktör än den som tillhandahåller varorna eller tjänsterna. 32. Det tredje villkoret innebär att stödet ingår i beskattningsunderlaget enligt artikel 11 A.1 a i sjätte direktivet för det fall det föreligger en direkt koppling mellan subventionen och priset för en vara eller en tjänst. Denna koppling måste vara noggrant kvantifierad eller kvantifierbar, och innebära att stödet delas ut om och i den mån varan eller tjänsten säljs på marknaden. I så fall rör det sig om en subvention som är direkt kopplad till priset. 33. Under det muntliga förfarandet vid domstolen har kommissionen förklarat att förädlingsföretagen i det förevarande fallet tack vare subventionen har möjlighet att omsätta det torkade fodret på marknaden till världsmarknadspriset. Utan stödet skulle priset vara högre, på grund av förädlingsföretagens höga produktionskostnader. Stödbeloppet utgör sålunda en beståndsdel i priset. Detta stämmer överens med syftet med artikel 11 A.1 a i sjätte direktivet, nämligen att subventionen skall vara skattepliktig såsom en del av det vederlag som har erhållits vid försäljningen av varan eller utförandet av tjänsten. 34. Kommissionen har gjort gällande att, även om det inte är möjligt att för varje enskild försäljning fastställa vilket som är det subventionsbelopp som ingår i vederlaget, beskattningsunderlaget är en följd av de erhållna vederlagen och det sammanlagda mottagna stödet för leveransen av torkat foder eller för torkningen av grönfoder. 35. Kommissionen har vidare gjort gällande att det enligt dess mening inte är av betydelse att stödbeloppen för leverans av torkat foder och för torkning av grönfoder är lika stora. I båda fallen är det samma ekonomiska målsättning som eftersträvas, nämligen att säkerställa en tillräcklig produktion av torkat foder inom gemenskapen och detta till ett godtagbart pris för köparna av fodret. Det är sålunda logiskt att stödet i båda fallen uppgår till samma belopp och att det beskattas. 36. Inte heller innebär bestämmelserna för att korrigera stödbeloppet vid överskridande av MGK någon ändring av den omständigheten att det föreligger en direkt koppling mellan stödet och priset. (17) Stödet syftar till att stödja produktionen av torkat foder. Den omständigheten att detta endast sker i begränsad utsträckning, genom att hänsyn tas till den föreskrivna volymen, utesluter inte att stödet har en direkt inverkan på priset. 37. Inte heller är det av betydelse att utbetalningen av subventionen inte utgör någon del av det försäljningsavtal avseende torkat foder som har ingåtts mellan ett förädlingsföretag och en köpare. Statliga subventioner betalas ut genom ett offentligrättsligt förfarande av en behörig myndighet till en stödmottagare. Subventionerna ingår på grund av sin speciella karaktär inte i de privaträttsliga försäljningsvillkoren mellan parterna. 38. Resonemanget ovan bekräftar således kommissionens uppfattning att det föreligger en direkt relation mellan subventionen och priset. Därmed skall subventionen inräknas i beskattningsunderlaget. Kommissionen anser att denna uppfattning bekräftas i domen i målet Office des produits wallons. (18) B – Yttranden från medlemsstaterna 39. Medlemsstaterna har invänt mot kommissionens uppfattning att förädlingsföretaget skall betraktas som den enda stödmottagaren. Av artikel 1.2 i förordning nr 603/95 följer att, i de fall det föreligger ett avtal som är ett specialavtal för förädling av foder levererat av producenterna, förädlingsföretaget är skyldigt att till producenterna utbetala det stöd som företaget har erhållit för den enligt avtalet förädlade kvantiteten. Enligt denna bestämmelse skall sålunda även producenterna betraktas som mottagare av det beviljade beloppet. Till skillnad från vad kommissionen påstått är förädlingsföretaget inte den enda stödmottagaren i juridisk mening. 40. I artikel 9 i förordning nr 603/95 föreskrivs visserligen att det ifrågavarande stödet endast betalas ut till företag som förädlar foder. Denna bestämmelse syftar dock endast till att förenkla de administrativa åtgärderna. Förädlingsföretaget fungerar som en mellanhand och har inte rätt att behålla stödet om företaget förädlar foder för producenternas räkning. 41. Enligt medlemsstaterna är det viktigt att veta vem som är mottagare av stödet, eftersom detta är av betydelse för besvarandet av frågan huruvida det föreligger en direkt koppling mellan subventionen och varans pris. (19) 42. Medlemsstaterna har gjort gällande att förordning nr 603/95 inte innehåller en enda antydning om att stödet måste komma köparen av det torkade fodret till godo genom ett lägre pris. (20) Sålunda har stödet ingen effekt på priset på torkat foder. Effekten uppkommer på ett tidigare stadium, och gör att producenterna av färskt foder kan begära ett högre pris för sitt foder. I de fall det föreligger ett specialavtal för förädling av foder levererat av producenterna, är det endast producenterna som direkt drar nytta av stödet. I ett sådant fall kan förädlingsföretagen inte beakta det erhållna (och därefter vidarebefordrade) stödet vid fastställandet av priset för torkningen av grönfodret. Subventionen syftar således till att sänka produktionskostnaderna. 43. Medlemsstaterna har anfört ytterligare skäl till varför det enligt dem saknas en koppling mellan subventionen och försäljningspriset på torkat foder. – För att rätt till stöd skall föreligga krävs att fodret har lämnat förädlingsföretaget och att ett antal kvalitetskrav är uppfyllda. Beviljandet av stöd är inte beroende av huruvida en skattepliktig transaktion genomförs (leveransen av det torkade fodret till en köpare). – Gemenskapens avsikt med subventionen är att förse förädlingsföretagen med en jämn försörjning och säkerställa producenternas inkomster, och inte att säkerställa leveransen av torkat foder till ett acceptabelt pris för köparna av detta foder. – Stödet beräknas utifrån den kvantitet torkat foder som har lämnat företaget. Det pris som förädlingsföretaget erhåller för det torkade fodret varierar beroende på marknadspriset, men stödet förblir oförändrat. – Stödbeloppet för leverans av torkat foder och stödbeloppet för förädling av grönfoder är identiska, trots att kostnaderna för dessa verksamheter skiljer sig åt. – I förordning nr 603/95 föreskrivs ett tak för den subvention som kan erhållas. Enligt medlemsstaterna innebär en sådan maximisubvention att det inte föreligger någon direkt koppling mellan subventionen och priset, eftersom det definitiva stödbelopp som skall utgå inte går att fastställa vid den tidpunkt då skattskyldigheten inträder. (21) 44. Den finska regeringen har under det muntliga förfarandet redogjort för varför den anser att det inte föreligger någon direkt koppling mellan subventionen och priset. Liksom kommissionen har den finska regeringen hänvisat till den omständigheten att förädlingsföretagen tack vare subventionen kan avsätta det torkade fodret på marknaden till världsmarknadspriset. Om de finska förädlingsföretagen inte erhöll något bidrag och därmed tillämpade högre priser på grund av att produktionskostnaderna var högre, skulle köparna av foder i stället börja köpa från de konkurrenter som kan hålla världsmarknadspriset. Förädlingsföretagen kan sålunda inte sätta ett högre pris. Eftersom förädlingsföretagen oberoende av om bidrag erhållits säljer sitt foder till ett och samma pris kan det endast föreligga ett indirekt samband mellan varans pris och subventionen. Subventionen har ingen faktisk inverkan på marknadspriset utan kompenserar endast producenterna för de höga produktionskostnaderna. V – Bedömning A – Allmänt 45. Min utgångspunkt är att beskattning av subventioner, även med beaktande av bakgrunden till lagstiftningen, utgör ett undantag. 46. Endast för det fall en subvention är ”direkt kopplad till priset på leveransen” skall den ingå i beskattningsunderlaget enligt artikel 11 A.1 a i sjätte direktivet. Alla övriga subventioner är uteslutna från beskattningsunderlaget och är i denna egenskap inte skattepliktiga med stöd av artikel 11 A.1 a i sjätte direktivet. I annat fall skulle andra former av subventioner såsom investeringssubventioner och driftssubventioner mervärdesbeskattas vilket inte skulle vara i enlighet med systemet. 47. Det framgår av det som jag skall belysa nedan att det i detta fall är uteslutet att artikel 11 A.1 a i sjätte direktivet skulle syfta till att ta ut mervärdesskatt på den subvention som betalas ut till förmån för fodersektorn. Det finns två skäl till att subventionen inte är skattepliktig. För det första därför att en beskattning av ifrågavarande subvention skulle innebära att neutraliteten hos mervärdesskattesystemet inte garanteras. För det andra saknas den nödvändiga kopplingen mellan subventionen och försäljningspriset. 48. För övrigt är argumenten för att beskatta en subvention inte starka ur funktionell synvinkel, eftersom det innebär att staten med den ena handen tar tillbaka en viss andel av det den har delat ut med den andra handen. (22) Detta kan endast vara motiverat om en underlåtelse att ta ut mervärdesskatt skulle leda till ett otillfredsställande resultat. Ett sådant otillfredsställande resultat kan vara att en obeskattad subvention, som direkt och i sin helhet påverkar transaktionspriset så att detta sänks, får som konsekvens att skatteintäkterna blir lägre. Eftersom en subvention som bevisligen påverkar leveranspriset leder till att priset på varan sänks, kan minskningen av skatteintäkterna kompenseras genom att subventionen beskattas. Genom att belägga den utbetalade subventionen med mervärdesskatt ligger skatteintäkterna kvar på samma nivå som om ingen subvention hade utbetalats. B – Inledande kommentar 49. I allmänhet är det inte logiskt att belägga en subvention med mervärdesskatt om slutkonsumenten och stödmottagaren inte är samma aktör. Eftersom det är en konsumtionsskatt som har skapats med hjälp av det gemensamma systemet för mervärdesskatt är en skattskyldig förpliktad att ta ut och betala in skatt på mervärdet av en vara eller tjänst som denne har tillhandahållit. Detta värde är ett subjektivt värde eftersom beskattningsunderlaget för varor och tjänster utgörs av det faktiskt mottagna vederlaget, och inte av ett värde som uppskattas på grundval av objektiva kriterier. Detta har fastslagits av domstolen i domen i målet Coöperatieve Aardappelenbewaarplaats. (23) 50. Om en skattskyldig erhåller en subvention som är direkt kopplad till priset på leveransen skall han betala skatt på denna enligt artikel 11 A.1 a i sjätte direktivet. I punkt 14 har jag förklarat att principen bakom det gemensamma systemet för mervärdesskatt är att skatten först i slutet av kedjan verkligen träffar slutkonsumenten. Således måste den skattskyldige som har betalat in skatt på den subvention han har erhållit kunna övervältra denna skatt på slutkonsumenten. 51. I en rad avgöranden, varav det första var domen i målet Rompelman (24) , har domstolen förklarat att syftet med avdragsssystemet är att säkerställa att den mervärdesskatt som näringsidkaren skall betala eller har betalat inom ramen för all sin ekonomiska verksamhet inte till någon del belastar honom själv. Med tanke på att det är inom ramen för en ekonomisk verksamhet som subventionen erhålls, skyldigheten att erlägga mervärdesskatt uppkommer och skatten betalas, måste mervärdesskatten kunna övervältras på slutkonsumenten. Endast på så sätt kan principen om mervärdesskattens fullständiga neutralitet förbli orubbad. 52. För det fall mervärdesskatt betalas på en erhållen subvention leder dock tillämpningen av denna princip till att slutkonsumenten får betala skatt på det konkreta, subjektiva värdet av det faktiskt erhållna vederlaget, det vill säga på det konkreta värdet, som bestäms bland annat med hänsyn till subventionens prispressande effekt, samt dessutom skatt på subventionen. Genom att subventionens värde beläggs med en skatt kompenseras visserligen den omständigheten att skattemyndigheterna går miste om skatt på grund av att det konkreta, subjektiva värdet av det erhållna vederlaget påverkas negativt av subventionen. Å andra sidan innebär detta en avvikelse från den grundsats som uttrycktes i domen i målet Coöperatieve Aardappelenbewaarplaats (25) , nämligen att beskattningsunderlaget för mervärdesskatt skall bestämmas av det konkreta, faktiskt erhållna vederlaget. 53. Mot denna bakgrund skall bestämmelsen i artikel 11 A.1 a i sjätte direktivet förstås som ett undantag från de allmänna principerna i det gemensamma systemet för mervärdesskatt. Detta undantag skall tolkas och tillämpas restriktivt och strikt. 54. En restriktiv tolkning innebär att undantaget endast kan tillämpas på subventioner som direkt påverkar priset på leveransen. Domstolen har lämnat vissa anvisningar härom i domen i målet Office des produits wallons (26) , som diskuteras mer ingående i punkterna 71–76 nedan. 55. En strikt tolkning innebär att skatt endast kan tas ut på utbetalade subventioner i den utsträckning de påverkar priset på leveransen. Om en prissänkande subvention skulle beskattas i sin helhet, trots att subventionen endast till viss del påverkar det pris som slutkonsumenten får betala, leder detta nämligen till att den berörda skattemyndigheten erhåller ett större belopp i mervärdesskatt än den har förlorat genom subventionen. En sådan överkompensation strider mot undantagsbestämmelsen i artikel 11 A.1 a i sjätte direktivet, vilken inte syftar till mer än en kompensation för den skatt som faktiskt gått förlorad på grund av subventionen. 56. Det skulle också innebära att den skattskyldige överbeskattas eftersom han i så fall måste betala mervärdesskatt på det högre vederlaget – om subventionen endast till viss del påverkar slutpriset – och på subventionen som beskattas i sin helhet. I så fall skulle han bli skyldig att erlägga en större summa i mervärdesskatt än om någon subvention aldrig hade beviljats. 57. För att se till att mervärdesbeskattningen även fortsättningsvis kommer att fungera enligt systemet, inklusive det begränsade undantaget som föreskrivs i artikel 11 A.1 a i sjätte direktivet, krävs det således att det för tillämpningen av mervärdesskatt på subventioner görs en grundlig undersökning av huruvida dessa påverkar priset i slutkonsumentledet och, om så är fallet, i vilken utsträckning. Med andra ord måste den berörda skattemyndigheten kunna visa att den genom att bevilja en subvention förlorar skatteintäkter och i så fall kunna visa omfattningen av de förlorade skatteintäkterna. C – Mervärdesskattesystemets neutralitet 58. Stöd beviljas för produktion av torkat foder som i enlighet med artikel 9 i förordning nr 603/95 har anknytning till förädling av grönfoder till torkat foder. Såsom kort anges i punkt 9 ovan kan subventionen beviljas i tre olika typer av situationer: – om det föreligger en integrerad produktion där förädlaren förädlar sin egen produktion eller sina medlemmars, – om förädlaren agerar som entreprenör och förädlar (torkar) producentens foder för dennes räkning och därefter lämnar tillbaka detta till producenten, – om förädlaren köper upp foder från producenterna, förädlar det för egen räkning och säljer det vidare. 59. Kommissionen utgår i den första av dessa tre situationer från att ingen mervärdesskatt kan tas ut, eftersom förädlingen av grönfodret inte utgör någon självständig ekonomisk verksamhet. Inom en integrerad produktionsenhet äger inga sådana varu- eller tjänsteleveranser rum som kan beläggas med mervärdesskatt. Därför går det i den situationen inte att ta ut mervärdesskatt med hänvisning till att det föreligger förädling av grönfoder till torkat foder. Svarandena skriver under på denna slutsats, och det gör även jag. Eftersom inga varor levereras och inga tjänster tillhandahålls kan ingen mervärdesskatt tas ut. 60. Beträffande den andra situationen råder delade meningar. Enligt kommissionen betalas subventionen ut till förädlingsföretaget för att främja utförandet av en tjänst för producentens räkning. Kommissionen anser att förädlingsföretaget är den som juridiskt sett är att anse som mottagare av subventionen och att bestämmelsen i förordning nr 603/95 om att subventionen skall vidarebefordras till producenten endast beskriver vilka ekonomiska effekter en subvention kan ha inom en produktionskedja. Det är enligt kommissionen således fråga om ett tillhandahållande av en tjänst till förmån för producenten och den subvention som utbetalas för detta ändamål skall därmed beskattas. 61. Härmed skapar kommissionen emellertid en juridisk fiktion som består i att subventionen skulle ha betalats ut till förädlingsföretaget för att stimulera tillhandahållandet av en tjänst, nämligen förädlingen. Detta är dock de facto inte fallet. 62. Subventionen beviljas för torkat foder som har lämnat förädlingsföretagen och uppfyller vissa kvalitetskrav. (27) Samtidigt föreskriver gemenskapslagstiftaren i artikel 11.2 i förordningen att förädlingsföretaget är skyldigt att till producenterna utbetala det stöd som det erhåller för de förädlade kvantiteterna inom ramen för avtalet. Att det i själva förordningen uttryckligen anges att producenterna är mottagare av stödet visar att förädlingsföretaget inte självt kan vara stödmottagaren. Förädlingsföretaget fungerar endast som en mellanhand som lämnar vidare subventionen till producenten. Detta bekräftas av bestämmelsen om att det är först när fodret har lämnat förädlingsföretaget som det kan bli föremål för stöd. Vidare anges det inte på något ställe i förordningen att subventionen skall utbetalas för tillhandahållande av tjänsten förädling av grönfoder. Subventionen betalas nämligen ut, såsom framgår av det ovan sagda, till förmån för producenten och för att sänka dennes produktionskostnader. Det saknas således helt stöd i förordning nr 603/95 för kommissionens juridiska fiktion, och den kan sålunda inte godtas. 63. Här vill jag tillägga att kommissionen själv i sin tredje rapport om det gemensamma mervärdesskattesystemets funktion (28) har betonat att det bland annat krävs att subventionen betalas ut till leverantören eller tjänstetillhandahållaren för att subventionen skall ingå i beskattningsunderlaget. I förevarande fall tillfaller subventionen den ursprungliga producenten och inte förädlingsföretaget, enligt vad som föreskrivs i förordning nr 603/95. För övrigt betalas inte subventionen ut till den subventionerade producenten för att denne skall leverera en bestämd vara eller utföra en bestämd tjänst, utan den betalas ut efter att en tjänst har utförts till förmån för den subventionerade producenten för att sänka dennes produktionskostnader. 64. Gemenskapslagstiftaren hade kunnat välja att betala ut en subvention till förädlingsföretaget för förädlingen av foder. I så fall borde subventionen i sin helhet ha kommit förädlingsföretaget till godo. Av inledningen till förordning nr 1117/78 framgår dock att gemenskapslagstiftaren uttryckligen har valt att betala ut subventionen till producenterna för att främja produktionen av grönfoder. 65. Kommissionen kan därmed inte med fog göra gällande att subventionen betalas ut till förädlingsföretaget för att stimulera förädlingen av foder. Även av detta skäl är kommissionens påstående att subventionen skulle kunna beskattas hos förädlingsföretaget ohållbart. 66. Vad slutligen beträffar den tredje situationen, skulle subventionen kunna vara skattepliktig med stöd av artikel 11 A.1 a i sjätte direktivet. I detta fall förädlar förädlingsföretaget det grönfoder som det har köpt upp från producenterna och säljer det därefter vidare som torkat foder till tredje man som betalar ett visst pris för detta. Därutöver erhåller förädlingsföretaget en subvention som eventuellt kan resultera i ett lägre leveranspris vid omsättningen. 67. Härvid skall det genast noteras att det är mycket osannolikt att subventionen kommer att resultera i ett lägre pris vid avsättningen av det torkade fodret. I praktiken borde subventionen framför allt resultera i ett högre inköpspris på fodret hos den ursprungliga producenten. Om förädlaren inte i avsevärd utsträckning skulle vidareförmedla den subvention han har erhållit genom att betala ett högre pris till de ursprungliga producenterna, skulle dessa kunna välja att låta en tillfälligt inhyrd entreprenör torka deras produkter, för att på så sätt själva kunna beviljas subventionen direkt. För övrigt följer det av innebörden av det system som föreskrivs i förordning nr 603/95 att förordningen syftar till att främja produktionen av torkat foder, oberoende av hur produktionskedjan är organiserad. 68. Om kommissionens resonemang skulle tillämpas på systemet i förordning nr 603/95 skulle detta följaktligen leda till det oacceptabla resultatet att subventionerna inte beskattas i den ena av situationerna, men beskattas i de båda andra situationerna, beroende på hur tillverkningskedjan är organiserad, trots att syftet med förordningen i samtliga situationer är detsamma, nämligen att stimulera produktionen av foder genom ett finansiellt stöd till produktionsprocessen. Dessutom är det i den andra situationen omöjligt att ta ut någon mervärdesskatt, såsom jag har påpekat ovan, med hänsyn till den ställning som förädlaren innehar faktiskt och juridiskt. Endast i den tredje situationen är det tänkbart att subventionen kan beskattas, men det förutsätter att subventionen påverkar försäljningspriset. Jag har redan påpekat att en sådan konsekvens är mycket osannolik och den som påstår motsatsen förbiser att den subvention som har beviljats förädlaren inte syftar till att underlätta avsättningen av den förädlade produkten genom ett lägre försäljningspris, men däremot till att möjliggöra för förädlaren att betala ett högre inköpspris till den ursprungliga producenten. 69. Om kommissionens resonemang prövas mot bakgrund av det gemensamma systemet för mervärdesskatt blir resultatet inte mindre oacceptabelt. Eftersom resonemanget innebär att stödet till produktionen av torkat foder beskattas på olika sätt beroende på var i produktionskedjan förädlingen sker, strider det mot neutralitetsprincipen, som är systemets kärnbegrepp och som betyder att den totala mervärdesskatten som skall betalas i slutkonsumentledet skall vara densamma oberoende av antalet led i produktionskedjan. Redan av dessa skäl skall kommissionens yrkanden ogillas. D – Den nödvändiga kopplingen mellan en subvention och en varas försäljningspris 70. Det följer av kommissionens andra rapport om det gemensamma mervärdesskattesystemets funktion (29) att subventionen måste utgöra ett vederlag eller en del av ett vederlag. I domen i målet Office des produits wallons (30) har domstolen emellertid gjort en vidare tolkning av begreppet ”subventioner som är direkt kopplade till priset på leveransen”. 71. Denna dom handlade om huruvida den subvention som regionen Vallonien betalat ut till ASBL Office des produits wallons för marknadsföringen och försäljningen av vallonska produkter skulle beläggas med mervärdesskatt. Mer exakt rörde det sig om frågan huruvida mervärdesskatt skall tas ut på driftssubventioner som inte direkt har utbetalats för tillhandahållandet av varor eller tjänster, men som kan leda till att varorna och tjänsterna kan tillhandahållas till ett lägre pris. Domstolen lämnade vissa anvisningar för besvarandet av denna fråga. 72. För det första måste subventionen särskilt ha betalats ut till det subventionerade organet för att det skall leverera en bestämd vara eller tillhandahålla en bestämd tjänst. Endast i det fallet kan subventionen anses utgöra ett vederlag för leverans av en vara eller tillhandahållande av en tjänst och därmed vara skattepliktig. (31) 73. För det andra skall priset på varan eller tjänsten i princip fastställas senast vid skattskyldighetens inträde. 74. För det tredje skall det konstateras att ett åtagande att utbetala subventionen som gjorts av den som beviljar subventionen medför en rätt för stödmottagaren att motta subventionen när denne har genomfört en skattepliktig transaktion. Denna koppling mellan subventionen och priset skall framgå på ett otvetydigt sätt efter en analys i det enskilda fallet av de omständigheter som ligger till grund för utbetalningen av detta vederlag. Det är däremot inte nödvändigt att priset på varan eller tjänsten – eller en del av priset – är ett fastställt pris. Det räcker att priset kan fastställas. 75. Denna vidare tolkning som domstolen har gjort innebär att subventionen måste resultera i en sänkning av priset. Domstolen har konstaterat följande: ”Det är nämligen nödvändigt att det pris som skall betalas av köparen eller tjänstemottagaren fastställs på ett sådant sätt att det minskar i proportion till den subvention som beviljats säljaren av varan eller tjänsteleverantören. Subventionen utgör därmed en omständighet som kan ligga till grund för att fastställa det pris som de sistnämnda kräver.” (32) 76. Såsom framgår av min inledande kommentar anser jag att räckvidden av begreppet ”subventioner som är direkt kopplade till priset på leveransen” skall tolkas så, att skatt endast kan tas ut på utbetalade subventioner i den utsträckning de påverkar priset på leveransen. Det krävs enligt det begränsade undantag som föreskrivs i artikel 11 A.1 a i sjätte direktivet, att det för tillämpningen av mervärdesskatt på subventioner görs en grundlig undersökning av huruvida dessa påverkar priset i slutkonsumentledet, och om så är fallet, i vilken utsträckning. 77. Av de förordningar som beskrivs i punkterna 4–12 går det att sluta sig till att det beviljas ett stöd för att främja produktionen av grönfoder. Subventionen till fodersektorn kan kvalificeras som en produktionssubvention. Till skillnad från en prissubvention syftar en produktionssubvention inte till att direkt inverka på försäljningspriset. (33) Subventionen betalas ut i förhållande till kvantiteten förädlat foder och inte som ett bidrag till priset på prestationen. Visserligen är subventionen begränsad till en viss producerad kvantitet, men det hindrar inte att den syftar till att fortlöpande främja produktionen av foder inom gemenskapen, genom att sänka producenternas produktionskostnader. 78. Det framgår av de rättsliga bestämmelser som beskrivs i punkterna 4–12 i förevarande förslag avseende stöd till produktionen av torkat foder, att produktionen av dessa grödor inom gemenskapen inte kunde möta efterfrågan, på grund av att produktionskostnaderna inom gemenskapen var alltför höga för att produkterna skulle kunna erbjudas till de rådande marknadspriserna. 79. Genom att subventionen ledde till sänkta produktionskostnader blev det möjligt för producenterna inom gemenskapen att med lönsamhet producera till gällande (världs)marknadspriser. Detta bekräftas också av gemenskapens grönfoderproduktions snabbt växande marknadsandel på den gemensamma marknaden. Den här utvecklingen fick gemenskapslagstiftaren att till och med begränsa den subventionerade produktionen till en viss kvantitet för att undvika en överproduktion. 80. Detta visar att subventionen har haft konsekvenser för den inom gemenskapen producerade kvantiteten men inte direkt påverkat marknadspriserna. Detta hänger också samman med foder(världs)marknadens natur, då denna marknad liksom många andra jordbruksproduktmarknader kännetecknas av många små leverantörer. Dessa leverantörer saknar förmåga att påverka de berörda produktmarknaderna genom sina enskilda beteenden på marknaden. Enskilda producenter som erhåller en subvention kommer inte att kunna övervältra denna på slutkonsumenterna. De betraktar det rådande marknadspriset som ett faktum. Det är till detta pris som de måste leverera, oavsett om de blivit subventionerade eller inte. 81. Subventionen kan endast ha en indirekt effekt på försäljningspriserna. Om den totala subventionerade produktionen av foder blev så omfattande att det medförde en betydande förändring av förhållandet mellan utbud och efterfrågan på världsmarknaden, skulle priset som gällde på den marknaden kunna pressas. Jag anser att en sådan effekt är högst osannolik, och dessutom på intet sätt avgörande för bedömningen av kommissionens yrkanden. Subventionen kommer nämligen aldrig att fullt ut påverka försäljningspriset. Dessutom har man just försökt att förekomma denna effekt, som för övrigt skulle ha lett till ett för gemenskapens producenter ännu mindre gynnsamt förhållande mellan produktionskostnader och försäljningspriser, genom att begränsa subventionen till en viss maximikvantitet. 82. Detta bekräftas vidare av utformningen av begränsningsmekanismen i förordning nr 603/95. Härav följer att producenterna erhåller ett förskott under regleringsåret, trots att den slutgiltiga avräkningen äger rum först efter regleringsårets slut. Den osäkerhet som detta innebär gör det på förhand osannolikt att producenterna, även om de skulle kunna, skulle låta produktionssubventionen avspegla sig direkt i försäljningspriserna. 83. Kommissionen har i sina yttranden också hävdat att försäljningspriset på det torkade fodret visar att det är en direkt följd av det utbetalade stödet, eftersom förädlingsföretagen tack vara subventionen har möjlighet att avsätta torkat foder på marknaden till världsmarknadspriset. Kommissionen har anfört att priset skulle ligga på en högre nivå utan detta stöd, med hänsyn till förädlingsföretagens höga produktionskostnader. 84. Av det ovan anförda följer att kommissionens påstående är ohållbart. Mekanismen i förordning nr 603/95 syftar inte till att påverka priset på foder, utan till att påverka producenternas produktionskostnader, så att dessa kan producera till marknadspriset. Subventionen ledde till en ökning av den inom gemenskapen producerade kvantiteten som kan avsättas till det rådande marknadspriset. Om subventionen hade uteblivit skulle detta således inte ha resulterat i högre marknadspriser, utan till en minskning av den kvantitet foder som produceras inom gemenskapen. De behov som då eventuellt skulle kunna uppstå skulle, såsom var fallet före år 1978, kunna tillfredsställas av producenter från tredje land som kan producera till världsmarknadspriset. 85. Sammanfattningsvis lyckas kommissionen med sitt resonemang inte påvisa ens en antydan till ett direkt orsakssamband mellan produktionssubventionen och de slutliga försäljningspriserna på det torkade fodret. Det krav som formuleras ovan i punkterna 55–57 att det måste visas i vilken utsträckning subventionen påverkar priset för slutkonsumenten för att artikel 11 A.1 a i sjätte direktivet skall bli tillämplig tar kommissionen inte ens upp. 86. Även av dessa skäl skall kommissionens yrkanden avslås. VI – Förslag till avgörande 87. Mot bakgrund av det ovan anförda föreslår jag att domstolen skall a) ogilla talan mot Republiken Italien (mål C-381/01), Republiken Finland (C‐495/01), Förbundsrepubliken Tyskland (mål C-144/02) och Konungariket Sverige (mål C-463/01), b) förplikta kommissionen att ersätta rättegångskostnaderna med stöd av artikel 69.2 i rättegångsreglerna, c) och med stöd av artikel 69.4 i rättegångsreglerna förplikta Republiken Finland, Konungariket Sverige och Förbundsrepubliken Tyskland att bära de kostnader de har haft i egenskap av intervenienter. 1 – Originalspråk: nederländska. 2 – EGT L 145, s. 1; svensk specialutgåva, område 9, volym 1, s. 28. 3 – EGT L 63, s. 1. 4 – Republiken Italien stöds av Konungariket Sverige och Republiken Finland. Republiken Finland stöds av Förbundsrepubliken Tyskland och Konungariket Sverige. Förbundsrepubliken Tyskland stöds av Konungariket Sverige och Republiken Finland. Konungariket Sverige stöds av Republiken Finland. 5 – Rådets förordning (EEG) nr 1117/78 av den 22 maj 1978 om den gemensamma organisationen av marknaden för torkat foder (EGT L 142, s. 1; svensk specialutgåva, område 3, volym 9, s. 246), ändrad genom förordning nr 3496/93 (EGT L 319, s. 17; svensk specialutgåva, område 3, volym 54, s. 62). 6 – Rådets förordning (EEG) nr 1417/78 av den 19 juni 1978 om stödsystemet för torkat foder (EGT L 171, s. 1; svensk specialutgåva, område 3, volym 10, s. 25), ändrad genom förordning (EEG) nr 1110/89 (EGT L 18, s. 1; svensk specialutgåva, område 3, volym 29, s. 19). 7 – Kommissionens förordning (EEG) nr 1528/78 av den 30 juni 1978 om tillämpningsföreskrifter för stödsystemet för torkat foder (EGT L 179, s. 10; svensk specialutgåva, område 3, volym 10, s. 39). 8 – Kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 785/95 av den 6 april 1995 om tillämpningsföreskrifter för rådets förordning (EG) nr 603/95 om den gemensamma marknaden för torkat foder (EGT L 79, s. 5). 9 – I artikel 4 i förordning nr 603/95 anges de maximala kvantiteterna beträffande vilka stöd kan beviljas för torkat foder. Artikeln har ändrats genom rådets förordning (EG) nr 1347/95 av den 9 juni 1995 om ändring av förordning (EG) nr 603/95 om den gemensamma marknaden för torkat foder (EGT L 131, s. 1). Bestämmelsen lyder enligt följande: ”För varje regleringsår skall det upprättas en maximal garanterad kvantitet (MGK) på 4 412 400 ton dehydratiserat foder för vilken ... stöd ... kan beviljas” (punkt 1). ”3. För varje regleringsår skall det upprättas en maximal garanterad kvantitet på 443 500 ton soltorkat foder för vilken ... stöd ... kan beviljas” (punkt 3). 10 – För att ha rätt till stöd krävs att förädlingsföretagen har köpt fodret från producenter, producentgrupper eller köpare som blivit godkända av de behöriga myndigheterna i medlemsstaten. 11 – Artikel 11.2 i förordning nr 603/95 har följande lydelse: ”I de fall de avtal, som avses i artikel 9 c första strecksatsen är specialavtal för förädling av foder levererat av producenterna, skall de minst innehålla upplysningar om den areal vars skörd skall levereras samt en klausul som föreskriver förädlingsföretagens skyldigheter att till producenterna utbetala stödet enligt artikel 3 som de erhåller för de förädlade kvantiteterna inom ramen för avtalen.” 12 – ”Enligt denna förordning skall de varor som avses i artikel 2.1, för att beviljas stöd enligt artikel 3 i förordning (EG) nr 603/95, anses ha lämnat förädlingsföretaget då: a) de lämnar i oförändrat skick – förädlingsföretagets område, – ett lagringsutrym[m]e utanför detta område som ger tillräcklig garanti vad gäller kontroll av det lagrade fodret och som har godkänts i förväg av den behöriga myndigheten, och förutsatt att fodret inte kan lagras innanför området, – vilken som helst lagringsplats som uppfyller villkoren i andra strecksatsen när det gäller mobil torkutrustning, utrustning med vilken dehydratisering utförs och när det dehydratiserade fodret lagras av den person som har dehydratiserat det, eller b) det lämnar ett område eller lagringsplats enligt a i form av en blandning och blandningen gjorts inom förädlingsföretaget med andra råvaror än enligt artikel 1 i förordning (EG) nr 603/95 och råvaror som används till bindemedel, för att tillverka foderblandningar för djur, och håller en sund och god marknadsmässig kvalitet när det lämnar förädlingsföretaget som svarar mot kraven för att släppas ut på fodermarknaden och har följande egenskaper: ... ” 13 – Rådets första direktiv 67/227/EEG av den 11 april 1967 om harmonisering av medlemsstaternas lagstiftning om omsättningsskatter (EGT P 71, s. 1301; svensk specialutgåva, område 9, volym 1, s. 3) (nedan kallat första direktivet). 14 – Om inte något annat anges är de bestämmelser som det nedan hänvisas till hämtade från sjätte direktivet. 15 – Kommissionens första rapport till rådet om det gemensamma mervärdesskattesystemets funktion, upprättad enligt artikel 34 i sjätte direktivet (77/388/EEG) av den 17 maj 1977, KOM(83) 426 slutlig, 14 september 1983, s. 37. 16 – Kommissionens andra rapport till rådet om det gemensamma mervärdesskattesystemets funktion, upprättad enligt artikel 34 i sjätte direktivet (77/388/EEG) av den 17 maj 1977, KOM(88) 799 slutlig, 20 december 1988, s. 26. 17 – Det framgår av tredje skälet i förordning nr 603/95 att syftet med bestämmelserna är att begränsa gemenskapens produktion av torkat foder. 18 – Domstolens dom av den 22 november 2001 i mål C-184/00, Office des produits wallons (REG 2001, s. I-9115). 19 – Se även domen i målet Office des produits wallons (ovan fotnot 18), punkt 14: ”Det ankommer sålunda på den hänskjutande domstolen att fastställa en direkt koppling mellan subventionen och den ifrågavarande varan eller tjänsten. I detta avseende är det inledningsvis nödvändigt att kontrollera att köparen av varan eller mottagaren av tjänsten erhåller en fördel till följd av den subvention som beviljats subventionsmottagaren. Det är nämligen nödvändigt att det pris som skall betalas av köparen eller tjänstemottagaren fastställs på ett sådant sätt att det minskar i proportion till den subvention som beviljats säljaren av varan eller tjänsteleverantören. Subventionen utgör därmed en omständighet som kan ligga till grund för att fastställa det pris som de sistnämnda kräver.” 20 – Se även elfte och tolfte skälet i förordning nr 603/95 där följande anges: ”För att främja en jämn tillförsel av grönfoder till förädlingsföretag och för att producenterna skall kunna dra nytta av stödsystemet bör stödet i vissa fall beviljas på villkor att avtal sluts mellan producenter och förädlingsföretag. Avtalen bör, å ena sidan, främja regelbunden tillförsel till förädlingsföretagen och, å andra sidan, möjliggöra för producenterna att dra nytta av stödet. För detta ändamål är det lämpligt att avtalen innehåller vissa upplysningar.” 21 – Medlemsstaterna anser att denna uppfattning bekräftas i domen i målet Office des produits wallons (ovan fotnot 18), punkt 13. 22 – Se även generaladvokaten Jacobs förslag till avgörande av den 25 september 1997 inför domstolens dom av den 18 december 1997 i mål C-384/95, Landboden-Agrardienste (REG 1997, s. I-7387), punkterna 12–13. 23 – Dom av den 5 februari 1981 i mål 154/80, Coöperatieve Aardappelenbewaarplaats (REG 1981, s. 445; svensk specialutgåva, volym 6, s. 23). I denna dom handlade det om medlemmar av en kooperation som drev ett potatislager mot en årlig lageravgift som togs ut av dess medlemmar. Ett år beslöt föreningen att inte ta ut någon lageravgift eftersom kooperationen till följd av en gynnsam transaktion med fast egendom förfogade över tillräckliga finansiella medel. Eftersom ingen lageravgift togs ut, minskade värdet på andelarna i kooperationen, varigenom också andelsinnehavarnas förmögenhetsställning förändrades. Frågan var om minskningen av värdet av de andelar som innehades av medlemmarna i kooperationen kunde betraktas som ett motvärde i den mening som avses i artikel 8 i andra direktivet som ersättning för tjänsten (lagringen av potatis). Enligt domstolen var så inte fallet, eftersom det för denna förvaringstjänst inte erhölls något vederlag i form av en faktiskt utbetalad penningsumma. 24 – Se bland annat dom av den 14 februari 1985 i mål 268/83, Rompelman (REG 1985, s. 655, svensk specialutgåva, volym 8, s. 83), punkt 19, av den 15 januari 1998 i mål C-37/95, Ghent Coal Terminal (REG 1998, s. I-1), punkt 15, av den 21 mars 2000 i de förenade målen C‐110/98–C-147/98, Gabalfrisa m.fl. (REG 2000, s. I-1577), punkt 44, och av den 8 juni 2000 i mål C-98/98, Midland Bank (REG 2000, s. I-4177), punkt 19. 25 – Se ovan fotnot 23. 26 – Se ovan fotnot 18. 27 – Artikel 8 i förordning nr 603/95. 28 – Se ovan fotnot 16. 29 – Se ovan fotnot 16. 30 – Se ovan fotnot 18. 31 – Här skall påpekas att de transaktioner som åsyftas i artikel 11 A.1 a i sjätte direktivet inte är transaktioner som genomförs till förmån för de myndigheter som beviljar subventionerna. Artikel 11 A.1 a i sjätte direktivet rör nämligen situationer där det finns tre parter; myndigheten som beviljar subventionen, den aktör som beviljas subventionen och köparen av varan eller tjänsten som levereras eller utförs av den subventionerade enheten. 32 – ”Det ankommer sålunda på den hänskjutande domstolen att fastställa en direkt koppling mellan subventionen och den ifrågavarande varan eller tjänsten. I detta avseende är det inledningsvis nödvändigt att kontrollera att köparen av varan eller mottagaren av tjänsten erhåller en fördel till följd av den subvention som beviljats subventionsmottagaren. Det är nämligen nödvändigt att det pris som skall betalas av köparen eller tjänstemottagaren fastställs på ett sådant sätt att det minskar i proportion till den subvention som beviljats säljaren av varan eller tjänsteleverantören. Subventionen utgör därmed en omständighet som kan ligga till grund för att fastställa det pris som de sistnämnda kräver. Den nationella domstolen skall undersöka huruvida den omständigheten att en subvention utbetalas till en säljare eller en tjänsteleverantör objektivt kan medföra att denne kan sälja eller tillhandahålla varan eller tjänsten till ett pris som understiger det som han skulle ha krävt i avsaknad av en subvention.” 33 – Det finns ett flertal andra former av subventioner såsom driftssubventioner, inkomstsubventioner och investeringssubventioner. Ett exempel på en inkomstsubvention kan hämtas från den tidigare gällande förordningen nr 1117/78. Enligt denna förordning beviljades dessutom ett tilläggsstöd för att kompensera produktionskostnaderna och gynna konkurrensställningen i förhållande till tredje land. Detta stöd upphävdes genom de nya förordningarna nr 603/95 och nr 785/95. Stödet motsvarade en viss procentuell del av skillnaden mellan priset på världsmarknaden för torkat foder och det orienteringspris som skulle fastställas. Samtliga dessa subventioner har som gemensam nämnare att de inte har någon direkt koppling till en varas pris.
de	other	N/A	§ 38 TabStG, Übergangsvorschriften \| Gesetze auf anwalt24.de § 38 TabStG, Übergangsvorschriften Suche Tabaksteuergesetz (TabStG) Bundesrecht...§ 38 TabStG, Übergangsvorschriften § 38 TabStG, Übergangsvorschriften § 38 TabStGTabaksteuergesetz (TabStG)BundesrechtAbschnitt 8 – SchlussbestimmungenTitel: Tabaksteuergesetz (TabStG)Normgeber: BundAmtliche Abkürzung: TabStGGliederungs-Nr.: 612-1-8Normtyp: Gesetz(1) Für Beförderungen unter Steueraussetzung, die vor dem 1. Januar 2011 begonnen worden sind, gilt dieses Gesetz in der bis zum 31. März 2010 geltenden Fassung bis zum 31. Dezember 2010 fort, es sei denn, die Beförderungen sind mit elektronischem Verwaltungsdokument nach Artikel 21 der Systemrichtlinie eröffnet worden.(2) Die vor dem 1. April 2010 erteilten Erlaubnisse und Zulassungen gelten widerruflich bis zum 31. Dezember 2010 fort.(3) Steuerzeichen zur Versteuerung nach § 2 in der nach Inkrafttreten einer Änderung des Steuertarifs geltenden Fassung (neue Steuerzeichen) können zwei Monate vor Inkrafttreten der Änderung bezogen werden.(4) Die Tabaksteuer, die durch Verwendung von neuen Steuerzeichen nach Absatz 3 entrichtet wird, entsteht in der nach dem Inkrafttreten der Änderung des Steuertarifs (§ 2) geltenden Höhe.(5) Kleinverkaufspackungen mit 17 oder 18 Stück Zigaretten und Kleinverkaufspackungen mit weniger als 30 Gramm Feinschnitt können entgegen § 25 Absatz 2 noch bis zum 31. Dezember 2009 im Steuergebiet zum Verbrauch abgegeben werden. § 37 TabStG, Schwarzhandel mit Zigaretten
de	other	N/A	11.09.2012, Autor: Herr Guido Lenné / Lesedauer ca. 1 Min. (2821 mal gelesen) Mehrere Oberlandesgerichte haben entschieden, dass die Berechnung von Kreditbearbeitungsgebühren aufgrund einer Klausel in Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen (AGB) unzulässig ist. Die Kreditbearbeitung ist nämlich keine Leistung für den Kunden, sondern erfolgt im Eigenteresse der Bank. Was das konkret für den Erstattungsanspruch gegen die Bank heißt, ist noch sehr umstritten: Weitere Rechtstipps (138) Achtung PayPal-Nutzer: neue Betrugsmasche im Internet Betriebsschließung unter Corona: Versicherer verklagen – wie stehen die Chancen? VG Düsseldorf zum Online-Casinoverbot: immer bessere Chancen für Spieler Widerruf Kreditvertrag? Fehlende Pflichtangaben machen es möglich Betriebsschließungsversicherung: LG Mannheim sieht Leistungsverweigerung kritisch Zahlen oder nicht zahlen? 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Vergleich bei Musterfeststellungsklage Ändert sich durch Corona das Umgangsrecht? Zu welchen Maßnahmen ist der Arbeitgeber in der Corona-Krise berechtigt? Notfall-Kinderzuschlag (KiZ) - Hilfe für Familien in der Corona-Krise Aktuelles Urteil des EuGH zum „Kaskadenverweis“ in Darlehensverträgen Bundesverwaltungsgericht: Online-Sportwetten nicht legal Corona-Krise: Kündigung durch Arbeitgeber – was ist zu beachten? Maredo und Vapiano pleite? Wir helfen Gläubigern. Aufhebungsverträge: Arbeitnehmer trotz Corona nicht zum Abschluss verpflichtet Corona-Krise: Kurzarbeitergeld bei Arbeitsausfall in Unternehmen Ahndung von Verstößen gegen Quarantäne, Kontaktverbot oder Ausgangssperre wegen Coronavirus Corona-Krise: Maßnahmen zur Liquiditätssicherung Corona-Krise: KfW-Fördermittel beantragen Corona: Insolvenzen erwartet – was dann? 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Musterklage: Verhandlungen zwischen Verbraucherzentrale und VW gescheitert Thomas Cook-Insolvenz: Geschädigte erhalten erste Zahlungen Negativzins trifft jetzt auch den Verbraucher Urteil gegen PayPal: Mitwirkungsverbot gemäß § 4 Abs. 1 S. 2 GlüStV Thomas Cook: Bundesregierung hilft Geschädigten mit Steuergeldern P&R: erste Forderungsprüfungen im Insolvenzverfahren Musterklage gegen Erzgebirgssparkasse Warnsignale erkennen: Autohäuser kurz vor Insolvenz Anlagebetrug & Insolvenz: die PIM Gold P&R-Insolvenz: Altanleger sollen Geld zurückzahlen Thomas Cook-Insolvenz: kurzfristig noch Geld retten VW-Skandal: auch Softwareupdate mit illegaler Abschalteinrichtung VW-Abgasskandal: Ausstieg aus der Musterklage? P&R: Strafprozess gegen Roth geplatzt Ex-Audi-Chef im Abgasskandal angeklagt Betrugsmasche über PayPal Zahlungsdienstleister und das Online-Glücksspiel Pech für Griechenland-Gläubiger: EZB haftet nicht Krankheitsbedingte Kündigung: So ist die Rechtslage BGH: Kündigung von Sparverträgen durch Sparkassen nach 15 Jahren erlaubt BGH-Beschluss zu Bearbeitungsgebühren in Unternehmerkreditverträgen Online-Casinos können sich in Deutschland nicht auf Dienstleistungsfreiheit berufen Anscheinsbeweis beim Auffahrunfall erneut gestärkt Illegales Online-Glücksspiel: automatisiertes Verfahren keine Ausrede für Banken Extrem langwierig: Musterfeststellungsklage gegen VW BGH-Beschluss zum Abgasskandal stärkt Rechte von VW-Kunden Illegales Online-Glücksspiel: wie Sie sich Ihr Geld zurückholen BGH-Verhandlungstermin VW: Ersatzlieferung auch bei Modellwechsel eines Neufahrzeugs? Stellenabbau Bayer: 12.000 Stellen werden gestrichen Zahlen per Smartphone - Risiken für Verbraucher BGH-Termin im VW-Abgasskandal aufgehoben Chancen von P&R-Anlegern auf Rückzahlungen gestiegen Januar 2019: BGH entscheidet erstmals im VW-Abgasskandal P&R Container: erste Gläubigerversammlung in München Die Restschuldversicherung: wirklich sinnvoll? Guido Lenné im WDR Fernsehen: Bausparkassen kündigen Altverträge Guido Lenné in der ARD: PayPal-Zahlungen für Online-Glücksspiel Versteckte Gefahren: das Smartphone als neue Geldbörse Betriebsrente bei zehn Pensionskassen mit 130.000 Betroffenen stark gefährdet P&R Container: Insolvenzverfahren eröffnet Podcast: Das VW-Skandal-Update - Ansprüche gegen VW geltend machen Was Anleger über die P&R-Insolvenz wissen müssen Laut BGH unwirksam - Preisklauseln für Zinscap-Prämie bzw. Zinssicherungsgebühr VW-Abgasskandal: Schon geklagt? Unternehmerkredite: Bearbeitungsgebühren und Einmalzahlungen laut BGH unzulässig Swap-Geschäfte: BGH bestätigt Aufklärungspflicht Anleger der EN Storage GmbH sollten jetzt handeln LG Düsseldorf untersagt irreführende Werbung für kostenloses Girokonto Die Bank als Spielcasino: Swap-Geschäfte Das "ewige Widerrufsrecht" – gibt es das noch? Berufskleidung: Wann gehört das Umziehen zur Arbeitszeit? BGH verneint Störerhaftung für passwortgesichertes WLAN Erst Ausgesperrt dann Abgezockt: Über den Umgang mit Schlüsseldiensten Keine Vorfälligkeitsentschädigung bei Kündigung wegen Zahlungsverzugs Erste Banken nehmen kein Münzgeld mehr an Bundesgerichtshof zur Rechtzeitigkeit der Mietzahlung Unfall beim Hoteltransfer: Reiseveranstalter ist in der Pflicht BGH: Klausel zu Vorfälligkeitsentschädigung unwirksam Die Targobank und der Individualbeitrag Verhaftung bei Marketing Terminal - Betrug durch Schneeballsystem? BGH entscheidet für unsere Mandanten – Kreditbearbeitungsgebühr unzulässig Abmahnung der Bunkering Logistic Inc. wegen EnEV-Umsetzung Vorsicht: Falle in der betrieblichen Altersversorgung Widerrufsbelehrungen in Immobilienkrediten oft falsch Was ist ein partiarisches Darlehen? Neues in den Santander-Prozessen Vorsicht: Finanzierungslücken drohen bei Verknüpfung von Festdarlehen mit Lebensversicherung Santander erklärt Anerkenntnis und muss Kredit-Bearbeitungsgebühren erstatten Kredit-Bearbeitungsgebühren zurückholen ist einfacher als Sie denken. Auch Santander muss Bearbeitungsgebühren in Darlehensverträgen erstatten Klauseln in Versicherungsverträgen unwirksam – Nachzahlung von Versicherung fordern Hürden für Stornoabwehrmaßnahmen - gute Nachrichten für Versicherungsvertreter Erfolg bei Klage gegen Nissan-Bank wegen Bearbeitungsgebühren Anerkenntnis im Prozess: Bearbeitungsgebühren sind zu erstatten Verhaltensregeln für die Hausdurchsuchung Durchsuchung droht – was nun? Sparkasse fürchtet Bundesgerichtshof - Bearbeitungsgebühren in Darlehen unzulässig Tierhalterhaftpflicht-Versicherung bei Tod oder Verkauf des Tieres BGH hebt Freispruch eines Proberichters auf Vorsicht vor Abzocke durch Tuning Clubs (im Internet und) auf Tuning-Messen! Griechenland-Krise trifft Anleger Probleme mit falschen Schufa-Einträgen Bearbeitungsgebühren in Kreditverträgen unzulässig Ärger mit der Ratenschutzversicherung Argentinien-Anleihen geplatzt: Auch Ende 2009 verjähren wieder Ansprüche 1597302597015 05.09.2017, Autor Sabine Burges (86 mal gelesen) 28.11.2013, Autor Michael Eisner (827 mal gelesen) 17.05.2019, Autor Guido Lenné (66 mal gelesen)
en	wikipedia	N/A	Cher Antoine ou l'Amour raté is a play in four acts by French dramatist Jean Anouilh. It was written and first produced in Paris in 1969 in a production that was co-directed by the author. Synopsis The play takes place in Bavaria in 1913. Antoine was a famous playwright and director, who died in his castle in Bavaria where he had retired. (He killed himself accidentally while cleaning his gun.) The important people in his life, including his ex-wives, all came to the castle for a reading of his last will and testament. They were all trapped by an avalanche, and had to stay in the castle until the road would be cleared. Antoine had organized this gathering in detail, and had even written a play about it. Original cast Jacques François: Antoine Claude Nicot: Cravatar Hubert Deschamps: Marcellin Pierre Bertin: hare foot Joseph Falcucci: Alexandre Francine Bergé: Estelle Françoise Rosay: Carlotta Nelly Benedetti: Valérie Uta Taeger: Anemone Madeleine Ozeray: Gabrielle Édith Scob: Maria Madeleine Suffel: Frida Roland Pietri: The German notary The actors, played by different characters Alexis, mute character, played by Alexander A small German valet, mute character The consul of France, invisible character Film adaptation The 2012 film, You Ain't Seen Nothin' Yet!, directed by Alain Resnais, is a loose adaptation of Dear Antoine, or the Love that Failed. Resnais and Anouilh had worked together on a number of plays. References Plays by Jean Anouilh 1969 plays
de	other	N/A	Rehbock ciervo Reh Rehgeweih roebuck roe-deer chevreuil Horn Geweih abnorm \| eBay Details over Rehbock ciervo Reh Rehgeweih roebuck roe-deer chevreuil Horn Geweih abnorm Rehbock ciervo Reh Rehgeweih roebuck roe-deer chevreuil Horn Geweih abnorm trophaeenweissmann (448 ) 223491870264 nnamßieW akirE 13 eßartsdlawhcräL uaniarG 19428 :noofeleT35218-12880 :liam-Eed.enilno-t@nnamssiew-neeahportdgaj Lärchwaldstraße 31 DE 309686003 Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen der Firma Trophäen Weißmann, Inhaberin Frau Erika Weißmann, Unterer Dorfplatz 1, 82491 Grainau für die Verkaufstätigkeit auf der Handelsplattform eBay Vorbemerkung zum Vertragsschluss bei eBay allgemein § 1 Geltungsbereich / Grundlagen des Vertrages § 2 Zustandekommen des Vertrages § 3 Preise / Versankosten / Rücksendekosten / Gefahrenübergang / Eigentumsvorbehalt § 4 Gewährleistung § 5 Widerrufsrecht für Verbraucher § 6 Zahlungsbedingungen § 7 Haftungsbeschränkung § 8 Erfüllungsort, Gerichtsstand Vorbemerkung zum Vertragsschluss allgemein Das Zustandekommen eines Vertrages zwischen der Firma Trophäen Weißmann, Inhaberin Frau Erika Weißmann und dem Käufer bzw. dem Höchstbietenden zum Zeitpunkt der Auktionszeit entnehmen Sie bitte im Detail den Regelungen unter § 2 dieser Bedingungen bzw. den §§ 9 bis 11 der eBay - AGB. Einen entsprechenden Link zu den Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen der Handelsplattform eBay finden Sie am Ende jeder eBay Seite. Grundsätzlich wird der Vertragstext nach erfolgtem Vertragsschluss als Webseite bei der Handelsplattform eBay für einen Zeitraum von 90 Tagen gespeichert und kann vom Käufer unter Eingabe der jeweiligen Artikelnummer auch nachträglich eingesehen werden. eBay ermöglicht es auch, Eingabefehler vor der endgültigen Abgabe eines Angebots durch Überprüfung des Angebots auf einer gesonderten Internetseite von eBay zu erkennen und gegebenenfalls nach Benutzung der „Zurück“-Schaltfläche in Ihrem Internet Browser den Inhalt der vorherigen Seite zu korrigieren. Im Übrigen gelten folgende Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen wie folgt § 1 Geltungsbereich / Grundlagen des Vertrages (1) Vertragspartner des Kunden ist die Firma Trophäen Weißmann, eBay Verkäufername „trophaeenweissmann“ Inhaber: Frau Erika Weißmann, Unterer Dorfplatz 1, 82491 Grainau, Tel.: 088 21 - 812 53 - E-Mail-Adresse: jagdtrophaeen-weissmann@t-online.de (nachfolgend „Verkäufer“ genannt) (2) Für die Geschäftsbeziehung zwischen dem Verkäufer und dem Kunden (nachfolgend „Kunde“ oder „eBay-Nutzer“) gelten ausschließlich die nachfolgenden Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen und werden mit der Bestellung ausdrücklich anerkannt. Abweichende Bedingungen des Kunden werden nicht anerkannt, es sei denn, der Verkäufer stimmt ihrer Geltung ausdrücklich zu. (3) Diese AGB enthalten teilweise unterschiedliche Regelungen für Verbraucher und Unternehmer: der Kunde ist Verbraucher (§13 BGB), soweit der Zweck der bestellten Lieferungen und Leistungen nicht seiner gewerblichen oder selbständigen beruflichen Tätigkeit zugerechnet werden kann. Dagegen ist Unternehmer (§14 BGB) jede natürliche oder juristische Person oder rechtsfähige Personengesellschaft, die beim Abschluss des Vertrags in Ausübung ihrer gewerblichen oder selbständigen beruflichen Tätigkeit handelt. (4) Sämtliche Kommunikation im Zusammenhang mit dem Vertrag und diesbezüglich relevanten Erklärungen erfolgen in deutscher Sprache. Diese AGB sind in deutscher Sprache verfasst und können von dem Kunden in seinen Arbeitsspeicher geladen werden. Über die Druckfunktion können die AGB auch vom Kunden ausgedruckt werden. Auf Wunsch können diese AGB unter der Tel.: 0 88 21 – 8 12 53 bzw. der E-Mail: jagdtrophaeen-weissmann@t-online.de in digitaler oder schriftlicher Form angefordert werden. Diese AGB werden dem Kunden auch mit der Eingangsbestätigung bezüglich seiner Bestellung übersandt. § 2 Zustandekommen des Vertrages (1) Angebote von Waren bei eBay, welche entweder durch Höchstgebot bei einer Auktion gekauft, oder zu einem Festpreis („Sofort-Kaufen-Option“) gekauft werden können gelten als verbindliches, aber nur befristetes Angebot des eBay-Onlineshops zum Vertragsschluss über diese Ware. Dieses Angebot richtet sich an den registrierten eBay-Nutzer, der während der Laufzeit der online Auktion das höchste Gebot abgibt und gegebenenfalls zusätzlich festgelegte Bedingungen erfüllt. Ein derart erfolgtes verbindliches Angebot des Verkäufers kann während der individuell bestimmten Laufzeit der „online-Aktion“ angenommen werden, wobei diese Annahme ausschließlich über die der Handelsplattform von eBay zur Verfügung stehenden Bietfunktion erfolgen kann. (2) Der Käufer kann über den eBay-Shop des Verkäufers angebotene Ware sofort kaufen oder auf diese Ware im Rahmen einer Auktion bieten. Auktionsangebote können auch mit der Option „Sofort-Kaufen“ verbunden sein. Die im eBay-Shop des Verkäufers im Angebotsformat „Sofort-Kaufen“ angebotene Ware und Auktionen dieser Waren sind auch auf den allgemeinen eBay-Websites sichtbar. Dies gilt nicht für Artikel des Verkäufers, welche von ihm ausschließlich als Shop-Artikel vorgesehen sind. (3) Bei Festpreisartikeln, bei denen der Verkäufer die Option „sofortige Bezahlung“ ausgewählt hat, nimmt der Käufer das Angebot an, indem er den Button „Sofort-Kaufen“ anklickt und den unmittelbar nachfolgenden Zahlungsvorgang abschließt. Der Käufer kann Angebote für mehrere Artikel auch dadurch annehmen, dass er die Artikel in den Warenkorb (sofern verfügbar) legt und den unmittelbar nachfolgenden Zahlungsvorgang abschließt. (4) Bei einer Auktion kommt ein wirksamer Kaufvertrag mit demjenigen Käufer zustande, der innerhalb des Angebotszeitraums das höchste Gebot abgeben hat, es sei denn, ein im Zusammenhang mit dem Angebot hinterlegte Mindestpreis (so genannter „Reserve Preis“) wurde nicht erreicht. Die Höhe des Kaufpreises richtet sich nach diesem Höchstgebot. Das Gebot des eBay-Nutzers erlischt, wenn ein anderer eBay-Nutzer während der Laufzeit der Auktion ein höheres Gebot abgibt. Die Laufzeit der Auktion bemisst sich stets nach der offiziellen eBay-Zeit. (5) Ist ein Auktionsangebot zusätzlich mit der Option Sofort-Kaufen versehen, kommt ein wirksamer Kaufvertrag über den Erwerb des Artikels unabhängig vom Ablauf der Angebotszeit und ohne Durchführung einer Auktion bereits dann zum Sofort-Kaufen-Preis (Festpreis) zustande, wenn ein Käufer diese Option ausübt. Die Option kann vom Käufer jedoch nur so lange ausgeübt werden, solange noch kein Gebot auf den Artikel abgegeben oder ein ggf. vom Verkäufer festgelegter Mindestpreis noch nicht erreicht wurde. Ist im Zusammenhang mit dem Angebot ein Mindestpreis (so genannter „Reserve Preis“) hinterlegt, bleibt der Vertragsschluss abweichend davon auch noch nach Abgabe eines Gebots für die Auktion möglich, bis der Mindestpreis erreicht oder überschritten wurde. (6) Sofern der Verkäufer sein Angebot mit einer Preisvorschlag-Funktion versieht, können Käufer und Verkäufer den Preis für diesen Artikel aushandeln. In der Abgabe des Preisvorschlages durch den Käufer ist dann das verbindliche Angebot und in dem Einverständnis des Verkäufers mit dem Preisvorschlag die verbindliche Annahme des Verkäufers zu sehen. (7) Zur konkreten Abgabe seiner Vertragserklärung muss der eBay-Nutzer auf der Artikelseite den Button „Bieten“, „Sofort-Kaufen“ oder „Preis-vorschlagen“ per Mausklick in seinem Internetbrowser betätigen. Sofern „Bieten“ oder „Preis vorschlagen“ angeklickt werden, öffnet sich eine Folgeseite, in der der Biet-bzw. Vorschlag-Preis eingetragen werden muss. Durch Anklicken der Schaltfläche „Weiter“ bzw. unmittelbar bei betätigen der Schaltfläche „Sofort-Kaufen“ öffnet sich eine Internetseite, in welche die wesentlichen Artikelangaben einschließlich anfallender Kosten nochmals zusammengefasst sind. Bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt kann der eBay-Nutzer seine Eingaben korrigieren bzw. von der Vertragserklärung Abstand nehmen. Eine verbindliche Erklärung zur Ausübung der Annahme des Verkaufsangebotes wird erst durch anschließende Betätigung der Schaltfläche „Gebot bestätigen“, „Kaufen“ oder „Preisvorschlag bestätigen“ abgegeben. (8) Automatisiert über das eBay System übersendet der Verkäufer nach Vertragsschluss dem Käufer eine Bestätigung und Angaben zur Kaufabwicklung. § 3 Preise / Versandkosten / Rücksendekosten / Gefahrenübergang / Eigentumsvorbehalt (1) Die genannten Preise der einzelnen Produkte verstehen sich ab dem Sitz des Verkäufers inklusive Mehrwertsteuer ohne Kosten für Verpackung und Versand. (2) Für Verpackung und Versand der Lieferung (Versandkosten) werden die Kosten gesondert berechnet. Je nach Bestimmungsort der Lieferung führt dies zu Kosten in unterschiedlicher Höhe. Die Höhe der jeweiligen Verpackung- und Versandkosten finden Sie entweder auf der „mich-Seite“ oder diese sind unter dem Register „Versandbedingungen“ in der Auktion zu finden. (3) Zahlungsbedingungen finden Sie unter § 6 dieser AGB. (4) Rücksendekosten Der Kunde trägt die unmittelbaren Kosten der Rücksendung. Es wird insoweit auch auf § 5 (Widerrufsbelehrung) verwiesen. (5) Soweit Sie als Kunde Verbraucher (§13 BGB) sind, geht die Gefahr des zufälligen Untergangs und der zufälligen Verschlechterung der verkauften Sache während der Versendung erst mit der Übergabe der Ware an den Kunden über, unabhängig davon, ob die Versendung versichert oder unversichert erfolgt. Sind Sie als Kunde kein Verbraucher, sondern Unternehmer (§14 BGB) erfolgt die Lieferung und Versendung auf Ihre Gefahr. (6) Eigentumsvorbehalt: Die Ware bleibt bis zur vollständigen Zahlung des Kaufpreises Eigentum des Verkäufers. § 4 Gewährleistung (1) Es gelten die gesetzlichen Vorschriften. (2) Soweit Sie als Kunde nicht Verbraucher, sondern Unternehmer sind (§14 BGB), gilt abweichend bzw. ergänzend zu Ziff. 1 das Folgende: a. Als Beschaffenheit der Ware gelten nur die eigenen Angaben des Verkäufers und die Produktbeschreibung des Herstellers als vereinbart, nicht jedoch sonstige Werbung, öffentliche Anpreisungen und Äußerungen des Herstellers. b. Ein unwesentlicher Mangel begründet grundsätzlich keine Mängelansprüche. c. Sie sind verpflichtet, die Ware unverzüglich und mit der gebotenen Sorgfalt auf Qualitäts- und Mengenabweichungen zu untersuchen und offensichtliche Mängel binnen 7 Tagen ab Empfang der Ware dem Verkäufer schriftlich anzuzeigen, zur Fristwahrung reicht die rechtzeitige Absendung. Dies gilt auch für später festgestellte verdeckte Mängel ab Entdeckung. d. Bei Verletzung der Untersuchungs- und Rügepflicht ist die Geltendmachung der Gewährleistungsansprüche ausgeschlossen. e. Bei Mängeln leistet der Verkäufer nach seiner Wahl Gewähr durch Nachbesserung oder Ersatzlieferung. Schlägt die Mangelbeseitigung zweimal fehl, können Sie nach Ihrer Wahl Minderung verlangen oder vom Vertrag zurücktreten. f. Die Gewährleistungsfrist beträgt ein Jahr ab Ablieferung der Ware. § 5 Widerrufsrecht für Verbraucher Sind Sie als Kunde Verbraucher (Verbraucher ist jede natürliche Person, die ein Rechtsgeschäft zu einem Zwecke abschließt, der weder ihrer gewerblichen noch selbständigen beruflichen Tätigkeit zugerechnet werden kann (§ 13 BGB)) steht Ihnen ein Widerrufsrecht nach folgender Maßgabe zu: Widerrufsbelehrung Widerrufsrecht Sie haben das Recht, binnen vierzehn Tagen ohne Angabe von Gründen diesen Vertrag zu widerrufen. Die Widerrufsfrist beträgt vierzehn Tage ab dem Tag • an dem Sie oder ein von Ihnen benannter Dritter, der nicht der Beförderer ist, die Waren in Besitz genommen haben bzw. hat, wenn Sie eine Ware oder mehrere Waren im Rahmen einer einheitlichen Bestellung bestellt haben und die Ware bzw. Waren einheitlich geliefert wird bzw. werden; • an dem Sie oder ein von Ihnen benannter Dritter, der nicht der Beförderer ist, die letzte Ware in Besitz genommen haben bzw. hat, wenn Sie mehrere Waren im Rahmen einer einheitlichen Bestellung bestellt haben und die Waren getrennt geliefert werden; Sofern mehrere der vorstehenden genannten Alternativen zutreffend sein sollten, beginnt die Widerrufsfrist erst zu laufen, wenn Sie oder ein von Ihnen benannter Dritter, der nicht Beförderer ist, die letzte Ware oder die letzte Teilsendung bzw. das letzte Stück in Besitz genommen haben bzw. hat. Um Ihr Widerrufsrecht auszuüben, müssen Sie uns, die Firma Trophäen Weißmann, eBay Verkäufername „trophaeenweissmann“ Inhaber: Frau Erika Weißmann, Unterer Dorfplatz 1, 82491 Grainau Tel.: 088 21 - 812 53 - E-Mail-Adresse: jagdtrophaeen-weissmann@t-online.de mittels einer eindeutigen Erklärung (z.B. ein mit der Post versandter Brief, Telefax oder E-Mail) über Ihren Entschluss, diesen Vertrag zu widerrufen, informieren. Sie können dafür das beigefügte Muster-Widerrufsformular verwenden, das jedoch nicht vorgeschrieben ist. Zur Wahrung der Widerrufsfrist reicht es aus, dass Sie die Mitteilung über die Ausübung des Widerrufsrechts vor Ablauf der Widerrufsfrist absenden. Folgen des Widerrufs Wenn Sie diesen Vertrag widerrufen, haben wir Ihnen alle Zahlungen, die wir von Ihnen erhalten haben, einschließlich der Lieferkosten (mit Ausnahme der zusätzlichen Kosten, die sich daraus ergeben, dass Sie eine andere Art der Lieferung als die von uns angebotene, günstigste Standardlieferung gewählt haben), unverzüglich und spätestens binnen vierzehn Tagen ab dem Tag zurückzuzahlen, an dem die Mitteilung über Ihren Widerruf dieses Vertrags bei uns eingegangen ist. Für diese Rückzahlung verwenden wir dasselbe Zahlungsmittel, das Sie bei der ursprünglichen Transaktion eingesetzt haben, es sei denn, mit Ihnen wurde ausdrücklich etwas anderes vereinbart; in keinem Fall werden Ihnen wegen dieser Rückzahlung Entgelte berechnet. Wir können die Rückzahlung verweigern, bis wir die Waren wieder zurückerhalten haben oder bis Sie den Nachweis erbracht haben, dass Sie die Waren zurückgesandt haben, je nachdem, welches der frühere Zeitpunkt ist. Sie haben die Waren unverzüglich und in jedem Fall spätestens binnen vierzehn Tagen ab dem Tag, an dem Sie uns über den Widerruf dieses Vertrags unterrichten, an uns zurückzusenden oder zu übergeben. Die Frist ist gewahrt, wenn Sie die Waren vor Ablauf der Frist von vierzehn Tagen absenden. Sie tragen die unmittelbaren Kosten der Rücksendung der Waren. Sie müssen für einen etwaigen Wertverlust der Waren nur aufkommen, wenn dieser Wertverlust auf einen zur Prüfung der Beschaffenheit, Eigenschaften und Funktionsweise der Waren nicht notwendigen Umgang mit ihnen zurückzuführen ist. Ausschluss bzw. vorzeitiges Erlöschen des Widerrufsrechts Das Widerrufsrecht besteht nicht bei Verträgen • zur Lieferung von Waren, die nicht vorgefertigt sind und für deren Herstellung eine individuelle Auswahl oder Bestimmung durch den Verbraucher maßgeblich ist oder die eindeutig auf die persönlichen Bedürfnisse des Verbrauchers zugeschnitten sind; • zur Lieferung von Waren, die schnell verderben können oder deren Verfallsdatum schnell überschritten würde; • zur Lieferung alkoholischer Getränke, deren Preis bei Vertragsschluss vereinbart wurde, die aber frühestens 30 Tage nach Vertragsschluss geliefert werden können und deren aktueller Wert von Schwankungen auf dem Markt abhängt, auf die der Unternehmer keinen Einfluss hat; • zur Lieferung von Zeitungen, Zeitschriften oder Illustrierten mit Ausnahme von Abonnement-Verträgen. Das Widerrufsrecht erlischt vorzeitig bei Verträgen • zur Lieferung versiegelter Waren, die aus Gründen des Gesundheitsschutzes oder der Hygiene nicht zur Rückgabe geeignet sind, wenn ihre Versiegelung nach der Lieferung entfernt wurde; • zur Lieferung von Waren, wenn diese nach der Lieferung auf Grund ihrer Beschaffenheit untrennbar mit anderen Gütern vermischt wurden; • zur Lieferung von Ton- oder Videoaufnahmen oder Computersoftware in einer versiegelten Packung, wenn die Versiegelung nach der Lieferung entfernt wurde.“ Ende der Widerrufsbelehrung § 6 Zahlungsbedingungen (1) Für Kunden im Inland erfolgt die Zahlung per Vorkasse (bar / per Überweisung). (2) Preise auf der Rechnung sind stets Endkundenpreise inklusive Mehrwertsteuer. Die Möglichkeit zum Skontoabzug besteht nicht. (3) Bei Zahlungsverzug ist der Kunde, der Verbraucher ist (§ 13 BGB), verpflichtet, Verzugszinsen in Höhe von 5 % über dem Basiszinssatz (§ 247 BGB) an den Verkäufer zu bezahlen (ist der Kunde Unternehmer (§ 14 BGB) betragen die Verzugszinsen 9 % über dem Basiszinssatz (§ 247 BGB)). § 7 Haftungsbeschränkung (1) Der Verkäufer haftet uneingeschränkt für Schäden aus der Verletzung des Lebens, des Körpers oder der Gesundheit, soweit er einen Mangel arglistig verschweigt oder eine Garantie für die Beschaffenheit des Kaufgegenstandes übernommen hat, in allen Fällen des Vorsatzes und grober Fahrlässigkeit, bei Schäden nach dem Produkthaftungsgesetz oder soweit ansonsten zwingend gesetzlich vorgeschrieben. (2) Sofern wesentliche Pflichten aus dem Vertrag betroffen sind, deren Verletzung die Erreichung des Vertragszweckes gefährdet, ist die Haftung des Verkäufers bei leichter Fahrlässigkeit auf den vertragstypischen, vorhersehbaren Schaden beschränkt. (3) Bei der Verletzung unwesentlicher Vertragspflichten ist die Haftung bei leicht fahrlässigen Pflichtverletzungen ausgeschlossen. § 8 Erfüllungsort, Gerichtsstand (1) Die Vertragssprache ist Deutsch. (2) Die Beziehungen zwischen den Vertragsparteien regeln sich ausschließlich nach dem in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland geltenden Recht. Die Anwendung des einheitlichen Gesetzes über den internationalen Kauf beweglicher Sachen sowie des Gesetzes über den Abschluss von internationalen Kaufverträgen über bewegliche Sachen ist ausgeschlossen. Bei Verbrauchern gilt diese Rechtswahl nur, soweit hierdurch der durch zwingende Bestimmungen des Rechts des Staates des gewöhnlichen Aufenthaltes des Verbrauchers gewährte Schutz nicht entzogen wird (Günstigkeitsprinzip). (3) Sofern es sich beim Kunden um einen Kaufmann, eine juristische Person des öffentlichen Rechts oder um ein öffentlich-rechtliches Sondervermögen handelt, ist Gerichtsstand für alle Streitigkeiten aus Vertragsverhältnissen zwischen dem Kunden und dem Verkäufer der Sitz des Verkäufers. Dasselbe gilt, wenn der Kunde keinen allgemeinen Gerichtsstand in Deutschland oder der EU hat oder der Wohnsitz oder gewöhnliche Aufenthalt im Zeitpunkt der Klageerhebung nicht bekannt ist. Die Befugnis, auch das Gericht an einem anderen gesetzlichen Gerichtsstand anzurufen, bleibt hiervon unberührt. § 9 Hinweis auf Online-Streitbeilegung / Informationen nach § 36 Verbraucherstreitbelegungsgesetz ( VSBG) (1) Die Europäische Kommission stellt eine Plattform für die außergerichtliche Online-Streitbeilegung (OS-Plattform) bereit, aufrufbar unter http://ec.europa.eu/odr (2) Information nach § 36 Verbraucherstreitbelegungsgesetz (VSBG): Wir nehmen an Streitbeilegungsverfahren vor einer Verbraucherschlichtungsstelle nicht teil. Eine gesetzliche Verpflichtung hierzu besteht nicht. Muster-Widerrufsformular (Wenn Sie den Vertrag widerrufen wollen, dann füllen Sie bitte dieses Formular aus und senden Sie es zurück.) An Firma Trophäen Weißmann, eBay Verkäufername „trophaeenweissmann“ Inhaber: Frau Erika Weißmann, Unterer Dorfplatz 1, 82491 Grainau, E-Mail-Adresse: jagdtrophaeen-weissmann@t-online.de Hiermit widerrufe(n) ich/wir () den von mir/uns () abgeschlossenen Vertrag über den Kauf der folgenden Waren () /die Erbringung der folgenden Dienstleistungen () _________________________________ Bestellt am () / erhalten am () ________________________________ Name des/der Verbraucher(s) __________________________________ Anschrift des/der Verbraucher(s) _____________________________________________________________________ Unterschrift des/der Verbraucher(s) (nur bei Mitteilung auf Papier) ___________________ Datum ------------------------------------------------------------ (*) Unzutreffendes streichen. Objectlocatie: Grainau, Duitsland Rehbock ciervo Reh Rehgeweih roebuck roe-deer chevreuil... Rehbock ciervo Reh Rehgeweih roebuck roe-deer chevreuil...
en	caselaw	US	916 F.2d 528 23 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 1517, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,652In re AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY GROUP, INC., aHawaii corporation, Debtor.Thomas E. HAYES, Trustee, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.PALM SEEDLINGS PARTNERS-A, a Hawaii limited partnership;Grant-Buskett Management Corporation, individually and asgeneral partner of the partnership; Robert B. Grant; RuthM. Jasper, Trustee for the Ruth M. Jasper Revocable LivingTrust; Florine A. Katz; Edwin Y.W. Fong; Nancy Foos;Jerome O.C.C. Leong; Joseph C.C. Leong; Lon D. Pierce;George A. Reich; John F. Smith; Myron F. Tethal; MarianF. Townsend; Nancy R. Weisner; and James W. Winters,individually and as limited partners of said partnership,Defendants-Appellants. No. 89-15416. United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted July 17, 1990.Decided Oct. 9, 1990.As Amended Dec. 5, 1990. 1 Fred Paul Benco and Darryl Miyahira, Honolulu, Hawaii, for defendants-appellants. 2 Simon Klevansky and Elizabeth A. Kane, Gelber and Gelber, Honolulu, Hawaii, for plaintiff-appellee. 3 Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii. 4 Before ALARCON and POOLE, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAMS,* District Judge. SPENCER WILLIAMS, District Judge: 5 The appellee, Thomas E. Hayes, is the bankruptcy trustee for the debtor Agricultural Research and Technology Group, Inc. ("Agretech"). He instituted this action against Palm Seedlings Partners-A ("Palm Seedlings-A"), its general partner Grant-Buskett Management Corporation ("Grant"), and its limited partners to avoid certain transfers from Agretech to Palm Seedlings-A, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 544(b), Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 651C-4 and its common-law equivalent. We affirm. PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN DISTRICT COURT 6 Creditors of Agretech filed a petition for its involuntary bankruptcy on September 26, 1986. The trustee of Agretech commenced this action on June 30, 1987, to avoid certain transfers from Agretech to Palm Seedlings Partners-A. In this action, the trustee sought recovery of funds from the following defendants-appellants: 1) Palm Seedlings-A; 2) Grant; and 3) from the limited partners of Palm Seedlings-A, for the amount of monies distributed respectively to each. 7 The district court found that Agretech transferred monies in fraud of its creditors to Palm Seedlings-A by means of a "Ponzi" scheme. A Ponzi scheme is an arrangement whereby an enterprise makes payments to investors from the proceeds of a later investment rather than from profits of the underlying business venture, as the investors expected. The fraud consists of transferring proceeds received from the new investors to previous investors, thereby giving other investors the impression that a legitimate profit making business opportunity exists, where in fact no such opportunity exists. See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 44 S. Ct. 424, 68 L. Ed. 873 (1924). 8 The district court further found that Palm Seedlings-A was a transferee in bad faith. Accordingly, the district court avoided all transfers and ruled that the trustee could recover all monies from Palm Seedlings-A, and its general and limited partners. Because the district court determined that the transfer of funds from Agretech to Palm Seedlings-A greatly exceeded any value transferred from Palm Seedlings-A to Agretech, the district court alternatively ruled that the trustee could at least avoid and recover all transfers to the extent of the excess even if Palm Seedlings-A was not a transferee in bad faith. 9 Judgment was entered in favor of the trustee on September 15, 1988 for the full amount of all transfers and for prejudgment interest from the date the complaint was filed. The district court reserved for later determination whether prejudgment interest could be awarded from the date of the fraudulent transactions. Defendants moved for a reconsideration of the court's order granting plaintiff partial summary judgment. 10 After further briefing, the district court awarded prejudgment interest to the time of the transfers in question. A supplemental final judgment was entered on January 5, 1989, to reflect the additional prejudgment interest. The district court denied defendant's motion for reconsideration on February 22, 1989. 11 Judgment was entered pursuant to certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Therefore, the judgments entered did not dispose of all claims. Defendants appealed from the final partial judgment, supplemental final partial judgment, and the orders denying reconsideration of final partial judgment and supplemental final partial judgment on March 22, 1989 and March 30, 1989, within the thirty day time limit prescribed by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2107. FACTS 12 Agretech was a Hawaii corporation engaged in the business of producing, cultivating and marketing tropical foliage plants. Its operation in this case, which appears to, but may not reflect its overall scheme, was to accept and cultivate seeds from investors. The investors guaranteed a certain germination rate, and made a cash advance to Agretech to cover its cultivation costs. In turn, Agretech agreed to purchase the germinated seeds (seedlings) from the investor at a predetermined time for a predetermined amount. The amount, which guaranteed the investor substantial return on his investment, was greatly in excess of the costs of production, and had no apparent realistic connection with the marketability or market value of the seedlings. 13 Agency and Purchase Agreement With Palm Seedlings-A 14 On October 6, 1983, Agretech and Palm Seedlings-A agreed that Agretech would accept delivery in Honolulu of 8,000,000 "chamaedorea seifrizzi" (palm) seeds purchased by Palm Seedlings-A. Palm Seedlings-A paid $56,000.00 to a third-party seed broker for the seedlings. In return for Agretech's promise to cultivate and market the seedlings, Palm Seedlings-A agreed to advance Agretech $40,000.00 for anticipated cultivation expenses. The parties further agreed that Agretech would re-purchase the seedlings from Palm Seedlings-A for $225,000.00 fourteen months later. 15 The agreement was modified by an "Addendum" dated October 28, 1983, whereby Palm Seedlings-A was to purchase additional seedlings. Accordingly, the purchase price was increased to $229,000.00. Palm Seedlings-A also agreed to purchase additional seedlings if the germination rate fell below 65%, so that Agretech would be assured of a 65% germination rate with respect to the original quantity of seedlings purchased. First Transfer 16 In November of 1983, only one-half of the expected amount of seedlings arrived in Honolulu. Palm Seedlings-A transferred its outstanding credit balance with the seed broker to Agretech. However, Agretech was unable to obtain equivalent seeds from another source. 17 The parties eventually agreed to apply the remaining credit balance with the original seed broker to another shipment of seeds from that broker. The next shipment from the seed broker was expected on May 1, 1984. In view of these new circumstances, the parties decided that Agretech would purchase one-half of the seedlings in December of 1984, and the other half in June of 1985. 18 Not only did the first shipment of seeds arrive late, but they were damaged in transit as well. In January of 1984, Agretech informed Grant that only 4% of the seeds from the first shipment had germinated at Agretech's facility at Waiahole. Eight months after planting, Robert Grant, an officer of Grant, inspected these seeds and found that the germination rate was approximately 2.6%. 19 Despite the low germination rate, Grant demanded that Agretech fulfill its obligation to pay the first purchase price of $114,750.00 on December 15, 1984, as previously agreed. Grant informed Agretech that Grant was soliciting some Palm Seedlings-A limited partners to invest in another partnership, and that "timely payment to Palms [Seedlings]-A will help us to expedite the complete funding of Palms-E. Your cooperation will be much appreciated." Agretech paid the purchase price to Grant, although the value of the seedlings at the time approximately totalled only $5,200.00. 20 At the time of the first payment, Agretech had just received $5,000,000.00 in funds from another investor. Grant distributed Agretech's first payment to Palm Seedlings-A. Palm Seedlings-A, in turn, distributed the transfer to its limited partners. Second Transfer 21 Agretech made payment to Palm Seedlings-A for the first shipment on December 17, 1984, one day before the arrival of the second shipment. The second shipment of seedlings arrived December 18, 1984, seven months after the expected delivery date of May 1, 1984. Some time after December 19, 1984, Agretech planted these seeds at its Waimanalo facility. 22 Upon an inspection of these seedlings on March 20, 1985, Robert Grant observed that "very few" seeds had sprouted. Notwithstanding this low germination rate, Grant demanded that Agretech transfer the second payment on June 1, 1985, as agreed. As was the case with the first transfer, Grant explained to Agretech that Grant wanted to syndicate another partnership, and that "timely payment of the final installment to Palms [Seedlings]-A will help us to expedite the complete funding of Palms-F." 23 Unlike the first transfer, however, Grant explicitly acknowledged to its limited partners that "funds expected by them [Agretech] to be available for purchase of the Seifrizii seedlings owned by Palms-A have not come in as rapidly as they projected ..." Eight days after this letter, Grant remitted to Agretech a check for $114,750.00 on behalf of Palm Seedlings-F. However, Grant syndicated Palms Seedlings-F for the purchase of kentia, not seifrizzi, palms. 24 On the same day Agretech deposited this check into its bank account, it wrote a check on that same account for $114,750.00 in full satisfaction of the second payment. Once again, Palm Seedlings-A distributed this amount to its partners. Subsequent to the transfers in question, Richard Garcia, a former president of Agretech, plead guilty to a Ponzi scheme for the years 1985 and 1986, and acknowledged a similar pattern of transfers for the three preceding years. DISCUSSION I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW A. Appellate Review 25 This court reviews a district court's rulings on summary judgment motions de novo. T.W. Electrical Service, Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Association, 809 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.1987). However, a district court's ruling on a motion for reconsideration is reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard. McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir.1987). Similarly, a district court's award of prejudgment interest is reviewed to determine whether the district court abused its discretion. Western Pacific Fisheries, Inc. v. S.S. President Grant, 730 F.2d 1280, 1289 (9th Cir.1984). B. Summary Judgment Standards 26 The party moving for summary judgment bears "the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion ..." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The moving party must point out why no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. In meeting this burden, the moving party need not negate the opponent's claim. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. 27 Once the moving party meets this burden, the non-moving party must designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. In cases where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial with respect to a material fact, the party opposing the motion is required "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. A mere scintilla of evidence is not sufficient to withstand the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). 28 The question is therefore whether a reasonable jury could find that the party which bears the evidentiary burden at trial with respect to a claim or defense proved its case "by the quality and quantity of evidence required by the governing law ..." Id. at 254, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. All reasonable inferences from the evidence are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. However, the non-moving party must come forward with more persuasive evidence than necessary if the factual context makes the non-moving party's claim implausible. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); California Architectural Building Products, Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1987). 29 II. PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO LIMITED PARTNERSHIP A. Standards for Fraudulent Conveyances 30 Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 544(b), the bankruptcy trustee "may avoid any transfer ... that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim ..." Section 550 of 11 U.S.C. further provides that the trustee may recover from the transferees or subsequent transferees all monies transferred in violation of applicable law. In seeking recovery of such monies, the trustee stands in the overshoes of the debtor corporation's unsecured creditors. Schneider v. O'Neal, 243 F.2d 914 (8th Cir.1957). 31 There are two overlapping bodies of law applicable to this case which permit the trustee to recover a fraudulent conveyance. The Statute of 13 Elizabeth I (1570) is the basis of common-law fraudulent conveyances, and forms part of the common law of Hawaii. Achiles v. Cajigal, 39 Haw. 493 (1952). This common law was incorporated into sections 4(a)(1) and 8 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("Uniform Act"). See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985). 32 Before the second transfer was effected, Hawaii adopted the Uniform Act on June 4, 1985, as Haw.Rev.Stat. Secs. 651C-1 et seq. Because the transfers in question occurred more than one year previous to the filing of the bankruptcy petition on September 26, 1986, the analogous Bankruptcy Code sections do not apply. See 11 U.S.C. Sec. 548. Although the Uniform Act and the common law thus provide the substantive law in this case, cases construing the Bankruptcy Code counterparts are persuasive authority due to the similarity of the laws in this area. 1. Two Theories of Recovery 33 The Uniform Act as adopted by Hawaii provides as follows: 34 (a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (1) With actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or (2) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor: (A) Was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or (B) Intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they became due. 35 Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 651C-4(a); see also 11 U.S.C. Sec. 548(a). Thus, there are two possible theories of recovery under applicable state law: 1) actual intent to defraud; and 2) reasonably equivalent value. Although Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 651C-4(a)(1) requires a showing of actual intent, a successful trustee under this provision can avoid a transaction even if the debtor corporation was not insolvent at the time of the transaction. 36 As one court noted, "[a] court may make a finding of fraudulent intent under section 548(a)(1) [actual intent to defraud] on the basis of circumstantial evidence; direct proof ... will rarely be available." In re Roco Corp., 701 F.2d 978, 984 (1st Cir.1983). For example, the debtor's actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud its creditors may be inferred from the mere existence of a Ponzi scheme. Conroy v. Schott, 363 F.2d 90, 92 (6th Cir.1966); In re Independent Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 860 (D.Utah 1987). Another court found that knowledge that a transaction will operate to the detriment of creditors is sufficient for actual intent. In re American Properties, Inc., 14 B.R. 637, 643 (D.Kan.1981). 37 The second theory, Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 651C-4(a)(2), dispenses with the requirement of intent. Rather, any transfer whereby the transferee gives less than "reasonably equivalent value" in exchange for the transfer from the debtor corporation and has the effect of reducing the debtor corporation's assets by a certain sum may also be avoided. As adopted by Hawaii, a person gives "value" in exchange for a transfer or obligation if: 38 property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied, but value does not include an unperformed promise made otherwise than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish support to the debtor or another person. 39 Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 651C-3(a). 40 However, Hawaii's adoption of the Uniform Act provides for an "out" to certain transferees who wish to recover the value of property they gave the debtor. Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 651C-8(a) permits transferees who received the transfer in good faith and gave reasonably equivalent value to recover any value they exchanged in a transaction avoided under Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 651C-4(a)(1). Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 651C-8(d) permits transferees who received a transfer in good faith to recover any value they gave in a transaction avoided under Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 651C-4(a)(2). See also 11 U.S.C. Sec. 548(c). 2. Good Faith 41 Even if the transferee gave reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer avoided on either of the alternate theories, the transferee may not recover such value if the exchange was not in good faith because good faith is "indispensable" for the transferee who would recover any value given pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 548(c), the equivalent of Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 651C-8. See In re Candor Diamond Corp., 76 B.R. 342, 351 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1987); Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 37 S. Ct. 130, 61 L. Ed. 419 (1917); In re Roco Corp., supra, 701 F.2d at 984 (1st Cir.1983); In re Health Gourmet, Inc., 29 B.R. 673, 677 (Bankr.D.Mass.1983). Palm Seedlings-A's reliance on cases which purportedly contravene this proposition is misplaced. In In re Baker & Getty, 88 B.R. 792 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1988), the trustee did not even contest the issue of good faith. In re Independent Clearing House Co., supra, is also distinguishable because the bankruptcy court erroneously failed to make a finding with respect to good faith. 42 The appellants bear the burden of proof in establishing that Palm Seedlings-A received the transfer in good faith. In re Candor Diamond Corp., 76 B.R. at 351, citing In re Health Gourmet, 29 B.R. at 677; L. King, 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, Sec. 548.10 at 548.108 (15th Ed.Supp.1982). No party in this matter, however, has fully briefed this court on what exactly constitutes "good faith." One court has remarked that a lack of good faith is demonstrated by a transferee who knows that a debtor is operating a Ponzi scheme. In re Independent Clearing House, 77 B.R. at 861. 43 An early case cited by the trustee in this case held that a transferee's 44 knowledge or actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put him, as a prudent man, upon inquiry as to whether his brother intended to delay or defraud his creditors ... should be deemed to have notice ... as would invalidate the sale as to him. 45 Shauer v. Alterton, 151 U.S. 607, 621, 14 S. Ct. 442, 446, 38 L. Ed. 286 (1894). See also Harrell v. Beall, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 590, 21 L. Ed. 692 (1873). These pronouncements indicate that courts look to what the transferee objectively "knew or should have known" in questions of good faith, rather than examining what the transferee actually knew from a subjective standpoint. Therefore, appellants' reference to the subjective assertions of good faith in the Grant affidavit are of no moment. 46 At least one court has held that if the circumstances would place a reasonable person on inquiry of a debtor's fraudulent purpose, and a diligent inquiry would have discovered the fraudulent purpose, then the transfer is fraudulent. In re Polar Chips Int'l., Inc., 18 B.R. 480 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1982). Courts have been candid in acknowledging that good faith "is not susceptible of precise definition." In re Roco Corp., 701 F.2d at 984. Notwithstanding the lack of a precise definition, the facts of this case reveal that Palm Seedlings-A has not met its burden of establishing good faith. B. Alleged Fraudulent Transfers 1. First Transfer Actual Intent 47 As previously noted, the mere existence of a Ponzi scheme, which could be established by circumstantial evidence, has been found to fulfill the requirement of actual intent on the part of the debtor. Appellee convincingly argues that Agretech could not possibly have made the first payment from the sale of the seeds of the first shipment and that the money for this payment is traceable to $5,000,000.00 in new investments. Distributing funds to earlier investors from the receipt of monies from later investors is the hallmark of Ponzi schemes. 48 Moreover, Agretech should have known that transferring funds to earlier investors from later investors and not from the proceeds of the underlying business would ultimately operate to the detriment of its creditors. One court has found this fact sufficient to show actual intent. See In re American Properties, Inc., supra. In rebuttal, appellants refer to the purchase of $263,000.00 worth of seifrizzi seeds at Agretech's Waimanalo facility by a Mr. Liljedahl as evidence against the existence of a Ponzi scheme. 49 However, the chronology of the first payment and Mr. Liljedahl's alleged purchase undermines appellants' contentions in this regard. By affidavit, appellants can only show that Mr. Liljedahl made the last payment on his purchase on December 31, 1984. Appellants do not state when Mr. Liljedahl actually concluded the agreement embodying the purchase. 50 In contrast, appellee has demonstrated that the seeds at the Waimanole facility were not received by Agretech until December 18, 1984. Because Agretech made the first payment on December 17, 1984, Mr. Liljedahl's purchase of the Waimanole seeds which he "personally observed" could not have possibly contributed to the first payment because the Waimanole seeds arrived after the first payment. Mr. Liljedahl's affidavit clearly noted that he bought the Waimanole seeds "which were then in AGRETECH's possession" and not the Waiahole seeds, which were the only seeds planted before the first payment. 51 Appellants cannot successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment on the basis of the general allegation that Mr. Liljedahl purchased certain seeds when unrebutted specific facts refute that allegation. An examination of Mr. Liljedahl's affidavit does not reveal any indication that the "seeds/seedlings" which he purchased in December at Agretech's Waimanalo facility were the second shipment of seeds which originally belonged to Palm Seedlings-A. Indeed, appellee has brought forward evidence which indicated that at least two other partnerships invested in Agretech before this time for the cultivation of seifrizzi seeds. 52 The vagueness of Mr. Liljedahl's affidavit contravenes the Celotex requirement that the non-moving party adduce specific facts in order to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Mr. Liljedahl's use of the term "seeds/seedlings" highlights this vagueness and reinforces the implausibility of Mr. Liljedahl's purchase of seeds/seedlings which had been planted no more than two weeks before the purchase. Mr. Liljedahl could not have purchased in December seedlings planted at the Waimanalo facility that same month by Palm Seedlings-A because such seeds require six to seven months in order to germinate. 53 Appellee also points to other facts which would circumstantially support the existence of a Ponzi scheme. First, Grant's demand for payment explicitly stated that the payment would induce other investors to transfer funds into new partnerships Grant was syndicating. Second, Grant exchanged seedlings of little value in return for over $100,000.00 under the first payment. 54 This evidence is very damaging to appellants' case. The gross disparity between the value exchanged and the accompanying explanation that the payment would induce investment is probably the most direct evidence of a Ponzi scheme obtainable absent an admission. Appellants have failed to directly rebut the significance of the explanation regarding new investment. 55 Instead, appellants challenge the notion that Grant did not give reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer. While reasonably equivalent value more properly belongs to the analysis of the second theory of avoidance, evidence pertaining to reasonably equivalent value is germane to a finding of actual intent. A determination that Agretech did not receive reasonably equivalent value is probative, circumstantial evidence tending to prove that Agretech actually intended to defraud its creditors. 56 Appellants point to a shipping bond, an insurance policy and the seed broker's contractual guarantee of the first shipment as evidence of reasonably equivalent value. Due to Grant's assignment of the contractual guarantee and a $40,000.00 bond with respect to the first shipment, appellants argue that there exists a material issue of genuine fact as to whether reasonably equivalent value was given. Appellants further note that Grant purchased a property insurance policy, naming an Agretech subsidiary, "The Plant Jungle," as the insured. 57 With regard to the insurance policy, appellants have not explained the relation between that particular subsidiary of Agretech and the transfers at issue here. While it is not implausible that this policy was purchased in connection with the transfers in question, appellants have simply made the bald allegation that the insurance policy constituted value. In their pleadings, appellants did not mention that the subsidiary was in any way connected with Palm Seedlings-A's purchase of seeds on behalf of Agretech. 58 With regard to the bond and the seed broker's contractual guarantee of the first shipment, there is no indication in the record that this value was ever transferred to Agretech. The document to which appellants cite merely indicates that Grant assigned to Agretech the "partnership [Palm Seedlings-A] credit balance with Encinitas Foliage [the seed broker]," and makes no mention of the assignment of any bond or guarantee. Moreover, assurances for safe delivery of the seeds could hardly convert a transfer of approximately $5,000.00 worth of seeds into the reasonably equivalent value of the $229,000.00 purchase price for those seeds. 59 It is also appellants' position that Agretech was obligated by contract to make the transfers at issue. Furthermore, appellants cite In re United Energy Corporation, 102 B.R. 757 (9th Cir. BAP 1989) for the proposition that payments on antecedent debts constitute valid consideration. Apparently, appellants contend that the transfers were made for reasonably equivalent value because the transfers constituted payment on the antecedent debt which Agretech owed to Grant under the contract due to Grant's previous transfer of seeds and money to Agretech. 60 Appellant's argument fails in the first instance because it ignores the nature of the contract between the parties. Although appellants have attached the Grant affidavit in which Mr. Grant states in a conclusionary fashion that Agretech's obligation to transfer was "irrevocable," appellants ignore a plain reading of the contract language which provided that Palm Seedlings A would guarantee a certain germination rate. Appellants interpret the contract to mean that Agretech was unconditionally obligated to pay the sums in questions regardless of whether it ever received anything of value. 61 Under Hawaii law, the legal effect to be given a contract is a question of law for the court. Hanagami v. China Airlines, Ltd., 67 Haw. 357, 688 P.2d 1139 (1984). Hawaii law also provides that courts may consider evidence outside of the contract if there is "any doubt or controversy as to the meaning of the language embodying their [the parties'] bargain." Hokama v. Relinc Corp., 57 Haw. 470, 559 P.2d 279 (1977). It is unclear from the record below whether this issue was raised before the district court. 62 Even assuming appellants raised this particular issue below, however, we reject appellants' interpretation of the contract. We review a district court's interpretation of a contract de novo if the district court did not go beyond the four corners of the document. L.K. Comstock & Co. v. United Eng. & Constructors, 880 F.2d 219, 221 (9th Cir.1989). If the court drew upon extrinsic evidence in interpreting a contract, we will not reverse a court's factual findings as to the extrinsic evidence unless clearly erroneous. Culinary and Serv. Employees Union, AFL-CIO Local 555 v. Hawaii Employee Benefit Admin., Inc., 688 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir.1982). 63 Because there is no indication that the district court made factual findings as to any extrinsic evidence, we will interpret the contract de novo. Paragraph four of the Addendum to the Agency and Purchase Agreement simply provided that "[t]he purchase price of the Plants as per paragraph 5 of the Agency and Purchase Agreement, shall be increased from $225,000 to $229,000." In paragraph five of the Addendum, Palm Seedlings-A agreed that "[i]n the event the germination test result is not 65 percent, such deficiency shall be filled by Partnership purchasing additional seeds." 64 Making all reasonable inferences in favor of appellants, we will assume that there is some ambiguity on the face of the contract language and we will consider the extrinsic evidence of the Grant affidavit. The Grant affidavit simply states without more that Agretech's obligation to make the payments was "irrevocable." This general conclusion is of no help in interpreting any conceivable ambiguity in the contract language because it does not set forth any specific facts as to why Agretech would agree to pay over large sums of money even if it received in exchange absolutely nothing of value. 65 Indeed, there is every indication that Agretech's payment was conditioned on Palm Seedlings-A's fulfillment of its obligation to ensure a certain germination rate. Paragraph four makes no mention of an unconditional obligation on the part of Agretech, whereas paragraph five immediately follows the provision pertaining to the purchase price and unequivocally states that any germination deficiency "shall be filled" by Palm Seedlings-A. Thus, we conclude that the Addendum conditioned Agretech's payment on Palm Seedlings-A's performance under paragraph five and did not unconditionally require Agretech to make the payments, as appellants contend. 66 We also find that In re United Energy Corporation, 102 B.R. 757 (Bankr. 9th Cir.1989) does not aid appellants' assertions that the transfers were for reasonably equivalent value. United Energy is distinguishable because the issue before that court concerned payment of an antecedent debt under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 548(a)(2), the equivalent of Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 651C-4(a)(2). The present issue, in contrast, concerns the avoidance of fraudulent transfers under Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 651C-4(a)(1), the equivalent of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 548(a)(1), where the entire transfer may be avoided, even if reasonably equivalent value was given, so long as the transferor actually intended to hinder, delay or defraud its creditors and the transferee accepted the transfer without good faith. See In re Independent Clearing House, 77 B.R. at 859. Reasonably Equivalent Value 67 Because we conclude that the district court was correct in finding that appellants failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Agretech's actual intent to defraud its creditors by transferring the sums in question, we need not reach the alternative basis for avoidance under Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 651C-4(a)(2) and its common-law equivalent. Thus, the next issue to be decided is whether or not the district court erred in alternatively ruling that appellants must return all sums transferred to them because they were transferees in bad faith. For the following reasons, we find that appellants were not transferees in good faith. Good Faith 68 As previously discussed, Haw.Rev.Stat. Secs. 651C-4(a)(1) and its common-law counterpart permit the trustee to recover the full amount transferred. However, if the transferee received the transfer in good faith, it may recover any value given in exchange for the transfer under Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 651C-8(a) and the common law. Although questions of good faith may generally be difficult to establish on summary judgment, it is important to bear in mind that appellants carry the burden of demonstrating their objective good faith at trial. 69 The trustee asserts that Grant received the transfers in bad faith on two grounds: 1) the value received by Grant was grossly in excess of the value Grant exchanged for the transfer; and 2) in its demand for these transfers, Grant affirmatively stated the transfers would induce new investment. The first fact is highly probative of bad faith because Agretech's willingness to accept virtually no value in exchange for its transfer of significant sums of money should have put Grant on notice of a fraudulent scheme. A diligent inquiry, as required by such notice, certainly would have led one to conclude that a business venture cannot long remain solvent where the enterprise certainly could not sell ungerminated (worthless) seeds in order to finance the transfer payments. 70 Indeed, Grant's statement regarding new investment, coupled with the disproportionate exchange of value, is a strong indication that Grant not only knew of the fraud, but was an active participant in it as well. It is significant that Grant did not phrase its demand for payment in terms of contractual obligations, but rather in terms of new investment opportunities which would accrue to Grant should the transfer be made. One wonders why possible benefits to Grant would provide any incentive to Agretech to effect the transfers unless Agretech also had an interest in inducing new investments as part of the overall Ponzi scheme. 71 Appellants' failure to account for Grant's damaging statements reinforces the implausibility of Grant's good faith under the circumstances. Nevertheless, appellants maintain that a genuine issue of fact exists with respect to Grant's good faith. To support this contention, appellants note that Grant had sought guarantees of delivery and germination of the first shipment. 72 The shipment guarantees secured by Grant are probative of Grant's concern that the seeds germinate and do not bear on Grant's good faith after the seeds failed to germinate. The record does not indicate that Grant made use of these guarantees after both shipments of seed failed to germinate as expected. Rather, it is clear that Grant did not hesitate to seek the payment transfers from Agretech in spite of the germination failure. 73 Second, appellants aver that Grant was obligated as general partner by fiduciary duties to enforce Grant's rights under the contract and seek the payment. We previously rejected this reasoning because appellants failed to establish that the contract unconditionally obligated Agretech to effect the transfers. Finally, appellants would find evidence of good faith in Grant's inspection of Agretech facilities, financial records and the absence of law suits against Agretech. 74 The absence of law suits against a company and indications of business growth do not vitiate the existence of a successful Ponzi scheme, but rather support the existence. Although appellants aver that Grant inspected Agretech's financial records, appellants do not explain what basis in those records Grant found for the solvency of Agretech. In fact, the appellee has brought forward specific evidence which indicates that although Agretech received only $1.7 million in commercial plant sales, it paid out approximately $11.5 million to investors and accumulated investments of approximately $38 million during the course of the enterprise. 75 A view of appellants' evidence through the "prism of the substantive evidentiary burden" appellants bear at trial, as required by the Court in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, reveals that the appellants cannot establish a genuine issue of material fact as to Grant's good-faith receipt of the transfers in question. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S. Ct. at 2513. The evidence which Grant presented did not rise to the level of facts specific enough to contradict the evidence set forth by appellee. Therefore, the district court properly held that Grant acted in bad faith as the transferee of the funds. 2. Second Transfer 76 The analysis of the second transfer is virtually identical to the analysis of the first transfer. The only difference between the two is Grant's candid admission with respect to the second transfer that "funds expected by them [Agretech] to be available for purchase of the Seifrizzi seedlings owned by Palms-A have not come in as rapidly as they projected ..." Apparently, Mr. Liljedahl's alleged purchase of seed/seedlings the previous December did not aid Agretech in meeting the second payment. 77 Despite Grant's acknowledgement that Agretech could not make the payments, Grant demanded timely payment of the second transfer. Grant's insistence on this second payment in view of Agretech's imminent insolvency is further support of Grant's bad faith. Likewise, Agretech's willingness to make this payment buttresses appellee's contentions that Agretech actually intended to defraud, delay or hinder its creditors by transferring the monies. 78 III. PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO LIMITED PARTNERS 79 The monies which Palm Seedlings-A allegedly received as a fraudulent conveyance was transferred to its limited partners in respect to their capital contributions. The district court awarded judgment against the limited partners of Palm Seedlings-A to the extent of the distributions they received. The appellee does not contend that the limited partners received those distributions in bad faith. 80 Rather, the appellee asserts that 11 U.S.C. Sec. 550(a)(1) and (2) of the Bankruptcy Code and Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 651C-8 permit the trustee to recover the fraudulently conveyed funds from the initial transferee and any subsequent trustee. In rebuttal, the appellants first contend that the distributions were for "value." This argument rests on the exception contained in 11 U.S.C. Sec. 550(b) and Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 651C-8(b)(2) where good-faith transfers for value are not voidable. 81 Under Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 651C-3, value is property or the securing or satisfaction of debt. Under the Bankruptcy Code, limited partnership interests are classified as "equity security." 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(15). The partnership distributions here were not for value because Palms Seedlings-A made the distributions on account of the partnership interests and not on account of debt or property transferred to the partnership in exchange for the distribution. 82 Furthermore, comment 2 to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act states that value is to be determined in light of the act's purpose, in order to protect the creditors. Any consideration not involving utility for the creditors does not comport with the statutory definition. Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act Sec. 3, comment 2, 7A U.L.A. 639, 651 (1985). Thus, distributions to limited partners is not value because any other definition would not further protection of creditors. 83 Second, the limited partners argue that requiring the limited partners to return their distribution is not permitted by Hawaii's limited partnership law. However, Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 425-37 provides that:[w]hen a contributor has rightfully received the return in whole or in part of the capital of the contributor's contribution, the contributor is nevertheless liable to the partnership for any sum, not in excess of the return with interest, necessary to discharge its liability to all creditors who extended credit or whose claims arose before the return. 84 On the basis of this section, appellee argues that the limited partners are liable for any distribution they received because the return of the distribution is necessary to protect creditors such as the bankruptcy trustee. The premise of appellee's contention is that the distributions at issue here constituted "the return ... of the contributor's contribution ..." 85 One could argue that because the distribution to the limited partners was entirely traceable to partnership profits and not to the limited partners' capital, the distribution to the limited partners on the basis of this statute is not subject to the claims of partnership creditors. Appellee has not cited any persuasive authority to support its blanket proposition that all distributions to limited partners amount to the return of contributed capital. Because appellants failed to present this argument, however, they are therefore deemed to have waived the issue. 86 The limited partners instead maintain that the language of Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 425-37 does not require that they return the distribution because the trustee is not a creditor within the meaning of the statute and because the trustee's claim in the form of a judgment did not arise until after the distribution. Appellants have failed to cite any authority which would exclude the trustee from the definition of a creditor. Because the trustee stands in the overshoes of the debtor's creditors, his claim does involve ordinary business creditors whose claims arose before the distribution. III. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST A. Palm Seedlings-A 87 Hawaii law regarding prejudgment interest is applicable via 11 U.S.C. Sec. 544(b). The district court awarded prejudgment interest on funds transferred to Palm Seedlings-A from the date of the transfer rather than from the date the complaint was filed. Although there is no Hawaii law directly on point, Hawaii law pertaining to conversion, for example, permits prejudgment interest to be awarded from the date of the conversion. Lucas v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 51 Haw. 346, 348, 461 P.2d 140 (1969). 88 Citing In re Independent Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 875-76 (D.Utah 1987), In re Express Liquors, Inc., 65 B.R. 952, 962 (D.Md.1986) and In re Republic Financial Corp., 75 B.R. 840 (D.Okla.1987), appellants maintain that prejudgment interest may only be awarded from the date the adversarial proceeding for recovery of monies was initiated. None of the cited authorities are persuasive. For example, the court in In re Independent Clearing House merely confirmed that interest could be awarded from the date the complaint was filed and did not hold that prejudgment interest must be awarded no earlier than that date. 89 In re Express Liquors is distinguishable because it addressed the issue of postjudgment interest. In re Republic Financial involved a proceeding under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 547, whereas the trustee below and on this appeal premised its recovery under 11 U.S.C. Secs. 544, 548 and 550. Analogous fraudulent conveyance actions under the Bankruptcy Code have upheld prejudgment interest from the time of transfer where fraud was involved. In re Independent Clearing House Co., 41 B.R. 985, 1015-16 (Bankr.1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 77 B.R. 843 (D.Utah 1987), citing Jackson v. Star Sprinkler Corp., 575 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir.1978). 90 Because the district court found that fraud was involved in the partnership's receipt of the transfer, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest from the date of transfer. Appellants' contentions that this was an abuse of discretion because the case was dismissed on summary judgment and not at trial and that the trustee did not ask for interest in the complaint are not well taken. The trustee did ask for interest, and appellants cited no authorities which distinguish between summary judgment and trial for purposes of awarding interest. B. Limited Partners of Palm Seedlings-A 91 Appellants also dispute the award of any prejudgment interest on distributions made to the limited partners. Because the limited partners received the monies in good faith, appellants argue that they should not be required to return the funds with interest. This argument fails because Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 425-37 specifically provides that limited partners required to return sums under that section are liable for the interest thereon. This is a sensible result because the limited partners enjoyed the benefit of the transferred funds, even though they must later return the distributions in order to protect the creditors of the partnership. See Kittredge v. Langley, 252 N.Y. 405, 169 N.E. 626, 631 (1930). IV. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 92 Motions for reconsideration may properly be denied where the motion fails to state new law or facts. MGIC Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir.1986). In arguing that the district court abused its discretion in denying its motion for reconsideration, appellants contend that the district court failed to consider the newly discovered Memorandum of Plea Agreement of Richard Garcia, who was the former president of Agretech, and the recently issued opinion in In re Baker & Getty Financial Services, Inc., 88 B.R. 792 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1988). Neither of these grounds would have warranted granting the motion for reconsideration. 93 According to appellants, the Plea Agreement established that no Ponzi scheme existed until 1985, because Mr. Garcia plead guilty to participation in a Ponzi scheme only for 1985 and 1986. However, upon closer examination, the Plea Agreement demonstrates, if anything, the existence of a Ponzi scheme at least as early as 1982. Mr. Garcia admitted to repaying earlier investors with the proceeds of new investors' funds, and attached a schedule indicating the fraudulent receipts and disbursements began in 1982. 94 In re Baker & Getty added nothing to appellants' contentions before the district court. Although the In re Baker & Getty court only allowed the trustee to recover funds transferred in excess of the value received by the debtor corporation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 548(a)(2), that case did not involve intent to defraud under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 548(a)(1) or bad faith, as was the case in this matter before the district judge. For the above reasons, the final partial judgment and supplemental final partial judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 95 AFFIRMED. * The Honorable Spencer Williams, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation
en	wikipedia	N/A	Special figures were a component of figure skating in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Like compulsory figures, special figures involved tracing patterns on the ice with the blade of one ice skate. This required the skater to display significant balance and control while skating on one foot. While compulsory figures were standard patterns derived from the figure 8, the special figures were elaborate patterns of the skaters' own invention. These designs included rosettes, stars, crosses, and other elaborate curlicues. The building blocks for special figures included not only the elements of the standard compulsory figures, but shapes known as beaks, spectacles, and cross-cuts. Tracing of elaborate patterns on the ice was a characteristic of the American and British schools of figure skating. By the early 20th century, this had been largely displaced by the "International Style" of free skating which utilized the entire ice surface and featured more athletic movements set to music. Special figures was an event in the 1908 Summer Olympic Games. Nikolai Panin of Russia won the event. Nikolai Panin held a gold medal in this special figures skating and was unbeaten through 1952 when the Olympic Committee removed the event due to the fact this was considered too difficult to perform. One challenger of Nikolai Panin saw the complex geometric pattern he had performed and instead of trying to recreate it he forfeited. See also Special figures by Panin Figure skating at the 1908 Summer Olympics References The Official Book of Figure Skating. . Irving Brokaw: The Art of Skating. American Sports Publishing Co., 1928. Benjamin Wright: Skating in America. United States Figure Skating Association, 1996. Figure skating elements
el	legislation	EU	Avis juridique important \| 31987R2046 Κανονισμός (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 2046/87 της Επιτροπής της 10ης Ιουλίου 1987 για τροποποίηση του κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 1948/85 σχετικά με τις λεπτομέρειες εφαρμογής για τη μεταφορά αποκορυφωμένου γάλακτος σε σκόνη στον ελληνικό οργανισμό παρέμβασης από τους οργανισμούς παράμβασης των άλλων κρατών μελών Επίσημη Εφημερίδα αριθ. L 192 της 11/07/1987 σ. 0018 - 0018 ***** ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΣ (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 2046/87 ΤΗΣ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗΣ της 10ης Ιουλίου 1987 για τροποποίηση του κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 1948/85 σχετικά με τις λεπτομέρειες εφαρμογής για τη μεταφορά αποκορυφωμένου γάλακτος σε σκόνη στον ελληνικό οργανισμό παρέμβασης από τους οργανισμούς παράμβασης των άλλων κρατών μελών Η ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ ΤΩΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΩΝ ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΤΩΝ, Έχοντας υπόψη: τη συνθήκη για την ίδρυση της Ευρωπαϊκής Οικονομικής Κοινότητας, τον κανονισμό (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 804/68 του Συμβουλίου της 27ης Ιουνίου 1968 περί κοινής οργανώσεως της αγοράς στον τομέα του γάλακτος και των γαλακτοκομικών προϊόντων (1), όπως τροποποιήθηκε τελευταία από τον κανονισμό (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 773/87 (2), και ιδίως το άρθρο 7 παράγραφος 5, Εκτιμώντας: ότι το άρθρο 1 παράγραφος 2 του κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 1322/85 του Συμβουλίου της 23ης Μαΐου 1985 για τη μεταφορά αποκορυφωμένου γάλακτος σε σκόνη στον ελληνικό οργανισμό παρέμβασης από τους οργανισμούς παρέμβασης άλλων κρατών μελών (3), όπως τροποποιήθηκε από τον κανονισμό (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 1247/87 (4), προβλέπει ότι η σκόνη πρέπει να πωληθεί για τη διατροφή των ζώων στην Ελλάδα· ότι το άρθρο 4 του κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 1948/85 της Επιτροπής (5), όπως τροποποιήθηκε από τον κανονισμό (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 1545/87 (6), προβλέπει τη σύσταση εγγύησης που εξασφαλίζει τη χρησιμοποίηση του αποκορυφωμένου γάλακτος σε σκόνη στην ελληνική επικράτεια, στα πλαίσια των πωλήσεων βάσει του κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 2213/76 της Επιτροπής (7)· ότι παράλληλη διάταξη στα πλαίσια των πωλήσεων βάσει των κανονισμών της Επιτροπής (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 368/77 (8) και (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 443/77 (9) δεν προβλέπεται επί του παρόντος· ότι θα πρέπει να προστεθεί μια τέτοια διάταξη· ότι τα μέτρα που προβλέπονται στον παρόντα κανονισμό είναι σύμφωνα με τη γνώμη της Επιτροπής Διαχειρίσεως Γάλακτος και Γαλακτοκομικών Προϊόντων, ΕΞΕΔΩΣΕ ΤΟΝ ΠΑΡΟΝΤΑ ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟ: Άρθρο 1 Στο άρθρο 4 του κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 1948/85, το ακόλουθο εδάφιο παρεμβάλλεται μετά το δεύτερο εδάφιο: «Στα πλαίσια του παρόντος κανονισμού, η εγγύηση μεταποίησης που προβλεπεται στο άρθρο 11 παράγραφος 2 του κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 368/77 και στο άρθρο 5 παράγραφος 2 στοιχείο β) του κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 443/77 προορίζεται να εξασφαλίσει την εκτέλεση των πρωτογενών απαιτήσεων όσον αφορά: - τη χρησιμοποίηση του αποκορυφομένου γάλακτος σε σκόνη στην ελληνική επικράτεια και - την τήρηση των υποχρεώσεων που αναφέρονται στο άρθρο 6 του κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 368/77 και στο άρθρο 3 του κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 443/77.» Άρθρο 2 Ο παρών κανονισμός αρχίζει να ισχύει την ημέρα της δημοσίευσής του στην Επίσημη Εφημερίδα των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων. Ο παρών κανονισμός είναι δεσμευτικός ως προς όλα τα μέρη του και ισχύει άμεσα σε κάθε κράτος μέλος. Βρυξέλλες, 10 Ιουλίου 1987. Για την Επιτροπή Frans ANDRIESSEN Αντιπρόεδρος (1) ΕΕ αριθ. L 148 της 28. 6. 1968, σ. 13. (2) ΕΕ αριθ. L 78 της 20. 3. 1987, σ. 1. (3) ΕΕ αριθ. L 137 της 27. 5. 1985, σ. 44. (4) ΕΕ αριθ. L 118 της 6. 5. 1987, σ. 2. (5) ΕΕ αριθ. L 183 της 16. 7. 1985, σ. 6. (6) ΕΕ αριθ. L 144 της 4. 6. 1987, σ. 9. (7) ΕΕ αριθ. L 249 της 11. 9. 1976, σ. 6. (8) ΕΕ αριθ. L 52 της 24. 2. 1977, σ. 19. (9) ΕΕ αριθ. L 58 της 3. 3. 1977, σ. 16.
et	wikipedia	N/A	Laidma on eesti perekonnanimi. Nimede eestistamisel määrati Laidma uueks perekonnanimeks isikutele, kelle perekonnanimi oli Bergmann, Glükk, Jaga, Juhkam, Koikson, Kulka, Laksberg, Lazarus, Leimann, Leppikov, Liipa, Lombach, Lombak, Lonkovits, Lossmaa, Malleus, Ohman, Peemann, Pikberg ja Toomson. Hans Laidma palvel kanti Laidma perekonnanimede kaitseregistrisse nr. 289 all. 2017. aasta 1. jaanuari seisuga on perekonnanimi Laidma Eestis 33 mehel ja 48 naisel. Perekonnanimede kaitseregistri nimed Eestistamisel antud perekonnanimed
de	wikipedia	N/A	Die Hallegg, auch Haileke, Hallegger, Hallecker waren ein altes Kärntner Adelsgeschlecht, welches 1765 in den Freiherrenstand erhoben wurde. Geschichte Die Hallegg waren eines der ältesten Kärntner Adelsfamilien, die ab 1198 auf Schloss Hallegg unweit von Klagenfurt nachweisbar sind. Als erste Familienmitglieder werden Otto I. von Hallegg (genannt 1210 und 1249) sowie 1213 die Ministerialen Gerhardus und Albertus de Haileke (von Hallegg) genannt. Die Gebrüder Heidenreich und Albrecht von Hallegg ließen Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts die erste Klagenfurter Stadtbefestigung erbauen, welche aber anlässlich der Stadterweiterung im 16. Jahrhundert teilweise abgetragen wurde. Otto II. von Hallegg war von 1390 oder 1492 bis 1410 der erste Vicedom des Herzogtum Kärnten. Christoph Hallecker (Von Hallegg) wurde 1410/11 als Burggraf auf Sommeregg genannt. Sein Sohn Jörg von Hallegg war Landesverweser des Herzogtums Kärnten sowie Burggraf von Sommeregg, welches 1442 auf Andreas von Graben, dem Gatten seiner Tochter Barbara, überging. Magdalena von Hallegg war zwischen 1481 und 1495 Äbtissin des Nonnenklosters Stift St. Georgen am Längsee in Kärnten. Dionis von Hallegg war 1532 im Aufgebot des Kärntner Adels gegen die Türken, welche in die benachbarte Steiermark eingefallen sind. Sein Sohn Veit von Hallegg war Feldoberst an der Windischen und Kroatischen Grenze resp. kaiserlicher Hauptmann an der Grenze zu Slawonien und wurde durch Kaiser Rudolf II. zum Eques auratus geschlagen. Veits Sohn Adam von Hallegg war 1601 bei der durch Erzherzog Ferdinand unternommenen Belagerung von Kanizsa als Volontair anwesend. Er musste aber aufgrund seines evangelischen Bekenntnisses das Land verlassen, wo er 1630 in Regensburg verstarb. 1603 kam er mit einer Reihe Kärntner Exulanten ins damals protestantische Heideck, ein Amt des Herzogtums Pfalz-Neuburg. Er erwarb die dort gelegene Hofmark Schloss Kreuth und nahm Umbaumaßnahmen vor. Von einem erhaltenen Kapitell des 1932 eingestürzten gewölbten Stalles erfahren wir die Jahreszahl 1608. 1621 erwarb er das Kirchstuhlrecht in der Stadtpfarrkirche. Drei Jahre später verkaufte er Kreuth an den im Nachbarort residieren jüngeren Bruder des Landesherren, Pfalzgraf Johann Friedrich von Pfalz-Hilpoltstein. Johann Maximilian Friedrich von Hallegg war k. k. Landrat in Kärnten und wurde 1765 (siehe Gotha) in den Freiherrenstand erhoben. Als letztes werden die Gebrüder Johann von Hallegg (* 1792), kaiserlicher Oberst, der unverheiratet blieb und Maximilian von Hallegg (* 1796), gleichfalls kaiserlicher Oberst, welcher an der Theresianische Militärakademie lehrte, und seinen Ruhestand in Wien verlebte, genannt. Verwandtschaftsverhältnisse Die Hallegger war unter anderem mit den Dietrichstein, Rogendorf, Guttenstein, Graben, Welzer, Ernau, Neuhaus, Herberstein, Thannhausen und Kellersperg durch Heirat verbunden. Besitz Die Hallegg besaßen bis 1433 das namensgebende Schloss und die Herrschaft Hallegg unweit von Klagenfurt, in der Stadt bewohnten sie einen befestigten Ansitz in der damaligen Wienergasse. Ihr weiterer Besitz umfasste unter anderem die Herrschaft Ratzenegg sowie den Seidlhof. Wappen Blasonierung: von Silber und Rot einmal geteilt und zweimal gespalten. Das obere Feld ist abwechselnd in Silber und Rot, das untere entgegengesetzt tingiert. Auf dem Schild zwei (bzw. drei) offene gekrönte Helme, der eine mit zwei von Rot und Silber quadrierten Büffelhörner, der andere (bzw. die beiden äußeren) mit einem Adlerflügel. Die Helmdecken sind rot-silber. Literatur Gothaisches genealogisches Taschenbuch der freiherrlichen Häuser, Band 2, s. 178/79 Gotha online Neues Allgemeines Deutsches Adels-Lexicon: Graffen – Kalau v. Kalheim, Band 4, S. 169 Google Buch von Hönisch, Die Freiherren von Hallegg, in Carinthia I -76, 1886, S. 146–150 online Einzelnachweise Kärntner Adelsgeschlecht Österreichisches Adelsgeschlecht Klagenfurt am Wörthersee
pt	caselaw	EU	13.2.2010 PT Jornal Oficial da União Europeia C 37/44 Recurso interposto em 3 de Dezembro de 2009 — Espanha/Comissão (Processo T-491/09) 2010/C 37/62 Língua do processo: espanhol Partes Recorrente: Reino de Espanha (Representante: M. Muñoz Pérez) Recorrida: Comissão Europeia Pedidos do recorrente — Declaração da nulidade da Decisão 2009/721/CE da Comissão, de 24 de Setembro de 2009, que exclui do financiamento comunitário determinadas despesas efectuadas pelos Estados-Membros a título do Fundo Europeu de Orientação e de Garantia Agrícola (FEOGA), secção Garantia, do Fundo Europeu Agrícola de Garantia (FEAGA) e do Fundo Europeu Agrícola de Desenvolvimento Rural (FEADER), na parte que é objecto do presente recurso; e — condenação da instituição recorrida nas despesas. Fundamentos e principais argumentos O recorrente apresente os seguintes fundamentos de recurso: 1. Violação, no que respeita à correcção financeira correspondente às ajudas à produção de azeite, do artigo 7.o, n.o 4, do Regulamento n.o 1258/1999 (1) e do artigo 31.o, n.o 1, do Regulamento n.o 1290/2005 (2), porquanto a decisão impugnada os aplica a uma situação em que não o devia fazer, dada a insuficiência das alegadas irregularidades invocadas pela Comissão para justificar a correcção financeira decidida. 2. Inexistência, no que toca à correcção financeira relativa às ajudas aos prémios por ovinos e caprinos, das irregularidades imputadas pela Comissão, o que implica que a decisão impugnada violou o artigo 7.o, n.o 4, do Regulamento n.o 1258/1999 e o artigo 31.o, n.o 1, do Regulamento n.o 1290/2005, ao aplicá-los a uma situação em que não devia fazê-lo. A este respeito, o recorrente defende que os controlos no terreno foram efectuados durante o período de retenção, em conformidade com o artigo 24.o, n.o 2 do Regulamento n.o 2419/2001 (3), e que os problemas alegados pela Comissão relativos aos livros de registos das explorações e a falta de observações dos inspectores relativamente aos registos não actualizados, não afectam a determinação do número de animais elegíveis da exploração ao longo de todo o período de retenção. (1) Regulamento (CE) n.o 1258/1999 do Conselho de 17 de Maio de 1999 relativo ao financiamento da política agrícola comum (JO 160, p. 103). (2) Regulamento (CE) n.o 1290/2005 do Conselho, de 21 de Junho de 2005, relativo ao financiamento da política agrícola comum (JO L 209, p. 1). (3) Regulamento (CE) n.o 2419/2001 da Comissão, de 11 de Dezembro de 2001, que estabelece normas de execução do sistema integrado de gestão e de controlo relativo a determinados regimes de ajudas comunitárias, estabelecido pelo Regulamento (CEE) n.o 3508/92 (JO L 327, p. 11).
de	wikipedia	N/A	Wilfried Fricke (* 6. November 1943; † 24. März 2013) war ein deutscher Fußballspieler. Der Verteidiger kam in der Saison 1965/66 bei Hannover 96 zu zwei Einsätzen in der Fußball-Bundesliga. Er gewann zweimal in Folge die Deutsche Amateurmeisterschaft 1964 und 1965. Karriere Als A-Jugendlicher debütierte Fricke am 31. März 1962 bei einer 0:1-Niederlage als linker Verteidiger in der DFB-Jugendauswahl. Er nahm mit der DFB-Auswahl im April am UEFA-Juniorenturnier in Rumänien teil, wo er neben Mitspielern wie Sepp Maier, Rolf Kahn, Wolfgang Weber, Reinhard Libuda, Wolfgang Overath und Horst Wild in den Spielen gegen Portugal (1:1) und Rumänien (0:3) im damaligen WM-System jeweils als linker Verteidiger zum Einsatz kam. In den Folgejahren erzielte Fricke Erfolge im Vereinsfußball, mit Hannover 96 gewann er zweimal in Folge die Deutsche Amateurmeisterschaft 1964 und 1965. Fricke gehörte auch dem 96er-Team an, das am 2. Juli 1966 in Herford das dritte Endspiel in Folge um die Amateurmeisterschaft bestritt, aber mit 1:5 – dreifacher Torschütze Carsten Baumann – gegen die Amateure von Werder Bremen verlor. Das Amateurteam von Hannover wurde in diesen Jahren von Trainer Hannes Kirk betreut. In der Saison 1965/66 kam Fricke zu seinem Debüt in der Bundesliga. Er absolvierte zwei Spiele zum Ende der Saison, nachdem Trainer Helmut Kronsbein, durch Kirk als Verantwortlicher an der Seitenlinie ersetzt wurde. Er debütierte in der Bundesliga am 30. April 1966 beim Heimspiel gegen den FC Schalke 04 (0:3). Sein zweites und letztes Bundesligaspiel absolvierte er am 21. Mai 1966 bei einem 4:2-Heimerfolg gegen den VfB Stuttgart. In beiden Spielen bildete er vor Torhüter Horst Podlasly mit Bernd Kettler das Verteidigerpaar der „Roten“. Über den weiteren Weg des Fußballers und Menschen Wilfried Fricke ergibt sich aus der vorliegenden Literatur nichts weiteres. Er starb am 24. März 2013. Literatur Notbremse, Hardy Grüne: Die Roten. Die Geschichte von Hannover 96. Verlag Die Werkstatt. Göttingen 2006. ISBN 978-3-89533-537-2. Christian Karn, Reinhard Rehberg: Spielerlexikon 1963–1994. Agon Sportverlag. Kassel 2012. ISBN 978-3-89784-214-4. S. 141. Weblinks Einzelnachweise Fußballspieler (Hannover 96) Deutscher Geboren 1943 Gestorben 2013 Mann
en	wikipedia	N/A	Pernitz is a town in the district of Wiener Neustadt-Land in the Austrian state of Lower Austria. History The origin of the name Pernitz is the Slavic word perenica, which refers to a stream on which charcoal is used. The Slavic settlement was preceded by a Celtic settlement. The name was first mentioned in 1165 in the Falkensteiner Codex. Since the 17th century Pernitz experienced growth, interrupted by the plague in 1679, and the Second Turkish Siege in 1683. In 1828, a road was built to the Triesting valley. It was connected by railway to Leobersdorf and Gutenstein in 1877. Pernitz received water in 1904 and electricity in 1908. It became a market town in 1961. Population References Cities and towns in Wiener Neustadt-Land District
de	legislation	EU	10.12.2004 DE Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 365/7 VERORDNUNG (EG) Nr. 2100/2004 DER KOMMISSION vom 9. Dezember 2004 zur Festsetzung der Ausfuhrerstattungen für Weißzucker und Rohzucker in unverändertem Zustand DIE KOMMISSION DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN — gestützt auf den Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, gestützt auf die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1260/2001 des Rates vom 19. Juni 2001 über die gemeinsame Marktorganisation für Zucker (1), insbesondere auf Artikel 27 Absatz 5 Unterabsatz 2, in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe: (1) Nach Artikel 27 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1260/2001 kann der Unterschied zwischen den Notierungen oder Preisen auf dem Weltmarkt der in Artikel 1 Absatz 1 Buchstabe a der angeführten Verordnung genannten Erzeugnisse und den Preisen dieser Erzeugnisse in der Gemeinschaft durch eine Erstattung bei der Ausfuhr ausgeglichen werden. (2) Gemäß der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1260/2001 sind die Erstattungen für den nicht denaturierten und in unverändertem Zustand ausgeführten Weißzucker und Rohzucker unter Berücksichtigung der Lage auf dem Markt der Gemeinschaft und auf dem Weltzuckermarkt und insbesondere der in Artikel 28 der angeführten Verordnung genannten Preise und Kostenelemente festzusetzen. Nach demselben Artikel sind zugleich die wirtschaftlichen Aspekte der beabsichtigten Ausfuhr zu berücksichtigen. (3) Für Rohzucker ist die Erstattung für die Standardqualität festzusetzen. Diese ist in Anhang I Punkt II der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1260/2001 festgelegt worden. Diese Erstattung ist im Übrigen gemäß Artikel 28 Absatz 4 der genannten Verordnung festzusetzen. Kandiszucker wurde in der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2135/95 der Kommission vom 7. September 1995 mit Durchführungsvorschriften für die Gewährung von Ausfuhrerstattungen im Zuckersektor (2) definiert. Die so berechnete Erstattung muss bei aromatisiertem oder gefärbtem Zucker für dessen Saccharosegehalt gelten und somit für 1 v. H. dieses Gehalts festgesetzt werden. (4) In besonderen Fällen kann der Erstattungsbetrag durch Rechtsakte anderer Art festgesetzt werden. (5) Die Erstattung wird alle zwei Wochen festgesetzt. Sie kann zwischenzeitlich geändert werden. (6) Nach Artikel 27 Absatz 5 Unterabsatz 1 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1260/2001 können die Lage auf dem Weltmarkt oder die besonderen Erfordernisse bestimmter Märkte es notwendig machen, die Erstattung für die in Artikel 1 derselben Verordnung genannten Erzeugnisse je nach Zielbestimmung unterschiedlich festzusetzen. (7) Der erhebliche und rasche Anstieg der präferenziellen Zuckereinfuhren aus den Ländern des Westbalkans seit Beginn 2001 sowie der Zuckerausfuhren der Gemeinschaft nach diesen Ländern scheint in hohem Maße künstlich zu sein. (8) Um jeglichen Missbrauch bei der Wiedereinfuhr von Zuckererzeugnissen, für die eine Ausfuhrerstattung gewährt wurde, in die Gemeinschaft zu vermeiden, empfiehlt es sich, für die Länder des Westbalkans keine Erstattung für die unter diese Verordnung fallenden Erzeugnisse festzusetzen. (9) Aufgrund dieser Faktoren und der aktuellen Marktsituation im Zuckersektor, insbesondere der Notierungen und Preise für Zucker in der Gemeinschaft und auf dem Weltmarkt, sind angemessene Erstattungsbeträge festzusetzen. (10) Die in dieser Verordnung vorgesehenen Maßnahmen entsprechen der Stellungnahme des Verwaltungsausschusses für Zucker — HAT FOLGENDE VERORDNUNG ERLASSEN: Artikel 1 Die Erstattungen bei der Ausfuhr in unverändertem Zustand der in Artikel 1 Absatz 1 Buchstabe a der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1260/2001 genannten und nicht denaturierten Erzeugnisse werden wie im Anhang angegeben festgesetzt. Artikel 2 Diese Verordnung tritt am 10. Dezember 2004 in Kraft. Diese Verordnung ist in allen ihren Teilen verbindlich und gilt unmittelbar in jedem Mitgliedstaat. Brüssel, den 9. Dezember 2004 Für die Kommission Mariann FISCHER BOEL Mitglied der Kommission (1) ABl. L 178 vom 30.6.2001, S. 1. Verordnung zuletzt geändert durch die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 39/2004 der Kommission (ABl. L 6 vom 10.1.2004, S. 16). (2) ABl. L 214 vom 8.9.1995, S. 16. ANHANG AUSFUHRERSTATTUNGEN FÜR WEISSZUCKER UND ROHZUCKER IN UNVERÄNDERTEM ZUSTAND, ANWENDBAR AB 10. DEZEMBER 2004 Erzeugniscode Bestimmung Maßeinheit Betrag der Erstattung 1701 11 90 9100 S00 EUR/100 kg 38,87 (1) 1701 11 90 9910 S00 EUR/100 kg 39,01 (1) 1701 12 90 9100 S00 EUR/100 kg 38,87 (1) 1701 12 90 9910 S00 EUR/100 kg 39,01 (1) 1701 91 00 9000 S00 EUR/1 % Saccharose × 100 kg Reingewicht 0,4226 1701 99 10 9100 S00 EUR/100 kg 42,26 1701 99 10 9910 S00 EUR/100 kg 42,41 1701 99 10 9950 S00 EUR/100 kg 42,41 1701 99 90 9100 S00 EUR/1 % Saccharose × 100 kg Reingewicht 0,4226 NB: Die Erzeugniscodes sowie die Bestimmungscodes Serie „A“ sind in der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 3846/87 der Kommission (ABl. L 366 vom 24.12.1987, S. 1) festgelegt. Die Zahlencodes für das Bestimmungsland/-gebiet sind in der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2081/2003 der Kommission (ABl. L 313 vom 28.11.2003, S. 11) festgelegt. Die übrigen Bestimmungen sind folgendermaßen festgelegt: S00 : Alle Bestimmungen (Drittländer, sonstige Gebiete, Bevorratung und einer Ausfuhr aus der Gemeinschaft gleichgestellte Bestimmungen) mit Ausnahme von Albanien, Kroatien, Bosnien und Herzegowina, Serbien und Montenegro (einschließlich des Kosovo im Sinne der Resolution 1244 des UN-Sicherheitsrates vom 10. Juni 1999), sowie der Ehemaligen Jugoslawischen Republik Mazedonien, außer bei Zucker, der den Erzeugnissen gemäß Artikel 1 Absatz 2 Buchstabe b) der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2201/96 des Rates (ABl. L 297 vom 21.11.1996, S. 29) zugesetzt worden ist. (1) Dieser Betrag gilt für Rohzucker mit einem Rendementwert von 92 %. Wenn der Rendementwert des ausgeführten Rohzuckers von 92 % abweicht, wird der anwendbare Erstattungsbetrag gemäß den Bestimmungen von Artikel 28 Absatz 4 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1260/2001 errechnet.
en	wikipedia	N/A	Kobi Yakob Arad (Hebrew: קובי ארד‎; born: October 2, 1981) is an Israeli-born American jazz pianist, composer, and music producer. He is known for being the pianist, vocalist, and bandleader of the Kobi Arad Band. He has won a Hollywood Music in Media (HMMA) Award and an Independent Music Award, both for his work as a solo artist and as part of the Kobi Arad Band. He has collaborated with artists such as Stevie Wonder, Cindy and Carlos Santana, Jack DeJohnette, and Roy Ayers. Early life and education Arad was born on October 2, 1981 and raised in Haifa, Israel. He earned his bachelor's degree at Tel Aviv University and became the first musician to earn a doctorate in contemporary improvisation and third stream from the New England Conservatory of Music. Career While living in Israel, Arad participated as a keyboardist in a trio with Asaf Sirkis and Gabriel Mayer in the 1990s. Arad also collaborated with Stevie Wonder and his manager Stephanie Andrews at the Berklee Performance Center in 2005. Arad released his album Sparks of Understanding in 2009, which featured an appearance from drummer Bob Moses. Arad collaborated with recording engineer Robert Margouleff on The Experience Project in 2015. In 2015, he also released the albums Webern Re-Visioned, which consisted of re-imaginings of works by Anton Webern, and Superflow, which is a collaboration with Roy Ayers, featuring bassist Jonathan Levy. He also recorded Ellington Upside Down, a Duke Ellington tribute CD, with the Kobi Arad Band. The album’s mashup of “Take the ‘A’ Train” and “It Ain’t Mean a Thing” was nominated for Best Jazz Instrumental at the 17th Independent Music Awards (2019). Arad’s album Segments went on to win Best Jazz Instrumental in the album category at the same event. At the 2021 Hollywood Music in Media (HMMA) Awards, Arad won the Independent Music Artist award in Best Jazz for his performance of “Bemsha Swing” by Thelonious Monk. Discography (selected) Albums Sparks of Understanding (2009) Ancient Novice (2009) Inner Hymns (2012) The Experience Project (2015) Webern Re-Visioned (2015) Superflow (2015) Cubism - Hyper-Dimensional Jazz (2016) Flux - A Song Cycle for Solo Fender Rhodes (2017) Ellington Upside Down (2017) Segments (2018) Intonations (2019) Sketches of Monk (2020) References 1981 births Living people American jazz pianists American people of Israeli descent Jewish American musicians Jewish jazz musicians Jazz arrangers Jazz bandleaders American jazz composers American jazz keyboardists Israeli jazz pianists Israeli Jews
cs	wikipedia	N/A	Jan Šebestík (* 9. ledna 1931, Uherské Hradiště) je československý filozof vědy. Život V letech 1950-1954 studoval filozofii a literární vědu v Bratislavě na Univerzitě Komenského. V letech 1954-1956 pracoval jako asistent na Filozofickém ústavu Slovenské Akademie věd. V roce 1956 emigroval do Německa. Od roku 1957 má trvalý pobyt ve Francii, kde dosud žije. Studoval na Sorbonně v Paříži filozofii, dějiny vědy, matematiku a fyziku. V roce 1959 získal licenci z filozofie a od 1963 se stal vědeckým pracovníkem Národního střediska vědeckého výzkumu na Ústavu pro dějiny vědy a techniky (C.N.R.S). Naposledy zde vykonával funkci ředitel výzkumu. V roce 1974 získal ve Francii státní doktorát za práci Bolzanovo dílo logické a matematické (vyšlo přepracováno roku 1992). Současně učil na různých univerzitách (Paříž IV, Paříž XII, Paříž I, jeden rok na univerzitě Laval v Quebeku, tři roky na univerzitě v Tunisu), studijní pobyty na Claremont Graduate School v Kalifornii, několikrát na kalifornské univerzitě v Berkeley, na univerzitě v Hongkongu, Praze a j. Oblasti vědecké práce dějiny logiky a matematiky, především dílu B. Bolzana filozofie ve střední Evropě dějiny technologie (vědy o technických procesech) od 17. do 19. století. Ocenění Sartonova medaile (Univerzita Gent 1990) Cena Jeana Cavaillèse za knihu Logique et mathématique chez Bernard Bolzano (1995) Zlatá medaile Slovenské akademie věd za celoživotní dílo (2018) Externí odkazy Osobní stránky profesora Jana Šebestíka Životopis Narození 1931 Čeští filozofové Slovenští filozofové Žijící lidé Muži Narození v Uherském Hradišti
it	legislation	EU	N. L 150/42 Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee 22. 6. 93 REGOLAMENTO (CEE) N. 1523/93 DELLA COMMISSIONE del 21 giugno 1993 recante modifica del regolamento (CEE) n. 846/93 che istituisce una tassa di compensazione all'importazione di mele originarie del Cile \ LA COMMISSIONE DELLE COMUNITÀ EUROPEE, regolamento citato è modificata ; che, sulla base di tali visto il Trattato che istituisce la Comunità economica condizioni, occorre modificare la tassa di compensazione per l'importazione di mele originarie del Cile, europea, visto il regolamento (CEE) n. 1035/72 del Consiglio, del 18 maggio 1972, relativo all'organizzazione comune dei HA ADOTTATO IL PRESENTE REGOLAMENTO : mercati nel settore degli ortofrutticoli ('), modificato da ultimo dal regolamento (CEE) n. 638/93 (2), in particolare l'articolo 27, paragrafo 2, secondo comma, Articolo 1 considerando che il regolamento (CEE) n. 846/93 della L'importo di 9,38 ecu che figura nell'articolo 1 del regola Commissione (3), modificato da ultimo dal regolamento mento (CEE) n. 846/93 è sostituito dall'importo di 15,65 (CEE) n. 1467/93 (4), ha istituito una tassa di compensa ECU. zione all'importazione di mele originarie del Cile ; considerando che l'articolo 26, paragrafo 1 del regola Articolo 2 mento (CEE) n. 1035/72 ha stabilito le condizioni nelle quali una tassa istituita in applicazione dell'articolo 25 del Il presente regolamento entra in vigore il 22 giugno 1993. Il presente regolamento è obbligatorio in tutti i suoi elementi e direttamente applicabile in ciascuno degli Stati membri. Fatto a Bruxelles, il 21 giugno 1993 . Per la Commissione René STEICHEN Membro della Commissione (') GU n. L 118 del 20 . 5. 1972, pag. 1 . 0 GU n. L 69 del 20. 3. 1993, pag. 7. (3) GU n. L 88 dell'8. 4. 1993, pag. 30. ìj GU n. L 144 del 16. 6. 1993, pag. 11 .
fr	legislation	EU	Avis juridique important \| 31990R0842 Règlement (CEE) n° 842/90 de la Commission du 30 mars 1990 portant rétablissement de la perception des droits de douane applicables aux costumes, complets et ensembles, de la catégorie de produits n° 16 (numéro d'ordre 40.0160), originaires de Thaïlande, et aux costumes-tailleurs et ensembles de la catégorie de produits n° 74 (numéro d'ordre 40.0740) originaires de Thaïlande, bénéficiaire des préférences tarifaires prévues par le règlement (CEE) n° 3897/89 du Conseil Journal officiel n° L 088 du 03/04/1990 p. 0023 - 0024 *****RÈGLEMENT (CEE) No 842/90 DE LA COMMISSION du 30 mars 1990 portant rétablissement de la perception des droits de douane aplicables aux costumes, complets et ensembles, de la catégorie de produits no 16 (numéro d'ordre 40.0160), originaires de Thaïlande, et aux costumes-tailleurs et ensembles de la catégorie de produits no 74 (numéro d'ordre 40.0740) originaires de Thaïlande, bénéficiaire des préférences tarifaires prévues par le règlement (CEE) no 3897/89 du Conseil LA COMMISSION DES COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPÉENNES, vu le traité instituant la Communauté économique européenne, vu le règlement (CEE) no 3897/89 du Conseil, du 18 décembre 1989, portant application de préférences tarifaires généralisées pour l'année 1990 aux produits textiles originaires de pays en voie de développement (1), et notamment son article 12, considérant que, en vertu de l'article 10 du règlement (CEE) no 3897/89, le bénéfice du régime tarifaire préférentiel est accordé, pour chaque catégorie de produits faisant l'objet dans les annexes I et II de plafonds individuels, dans la limite des volumes fixés respectivement dans les colonnes 8 de l'annexe I et 7 de l'annexe II, en regard de certains ou de chacun des pays ou territoires d'origine dont il est question dans la colonne 5 desdites annexes; que, aux termes de l'article 11 dudit règlement, la perception des droits de douane peut être rétablie à tout moment à l'importation des produits en cause dès que lesdits plafonds individuels sont atteints au niveau de la Communauté; considérant que, pour les costumes, complets et ensembles de la catégorie de produits no 16 (numéro d'ordre 40.0160) et les costumes-tailleurs et ensembles de la catégorie de produits no 74 (numéro d'ordre 40.0740) originaires de Thaïlande, le plafond s'établit respectivement 94 000 et 64 000 pièces; que, le 19 mars 1990, les importations desdits produits dans la Communauté, originaires de Thaïlande, bénéficiaire des préférences tarifaires ont atteint par imputation le plafond en question; considérant qu'il est indiqué de rétablir les droits de douane pour les produits en cause, à l'égard de la Thaïlande, A ARRÊTÉ LE PRÉSENT RÈGLEMENT: Article premier À partir du 6 avril 1990, la perception des droits de douane, suspendue en vertu du règlement (CEE) no 3897/89, est rétablie à l'importation dans la Communauté des produits suivants, originaires de Thaïlande: 1.2.3.4 // // // // // Numéro d'ordre // Catégorie (Unités) // Code NC // Désignation des marchandises // // // // // // // // // 40.0160 // 16 (1 000 pièces) // 6203 11 00 6203 12 00 6203 19 10 6203 19 30 6203 21 00 6203 22 90 6203 23 90 6203 29 19 // Costumes, complets et ensembles, autres que de bonneterie, pour hommes et garçonnets, de laine, de coton ou de fibres synthétiques ou artificielles à l'exception des vêtements de ski // 40.0740 // 74 (1 000 pièces) // 6104 11 00 6104 12 00 6104 13 00 ex 6104 19 00 6104 21 00 6104 22 00 6104 23 00 ex 6104 29 00 // Costumes-tailleurs et ensembles, en bonneterie, pour femmes ou fillettes, de laine, de coton ou de fibres synthétiques ou artificielles, à l'exception des vêtements de ski // // // // Article 2 Le présent règlement entre en vigueur le troisième jour suivant celui de sa publication au Journal officiel des Communautés européennes. Le présent règlement est obligatoire dans tous ses éléments et directement applicable dans tout État membre. Fait à Bruxelles, le 30 mars 1990. Par la Commission Christiane SCRIVENER Membre de la Commission (1) JO no L 383 du 30. 12. 1989, p. 45.
en	wikipedia	N/A	Shane Victor (born 29 December 1988) is a South African sprinter who specializes in the 400 metres. He won a silver medal in the 4 × 400 m relay at the 2011 World Championships in Athletics in Daegu. At the 2012 Summer Olympics, Victor was part of the South African team in the 4x400 metres relay race. In the first semifinal, Ofentse Mogawane fell and dislocated his shoulder when he collided with Kenya's Vincent Kiilu, resulting in South Africa's withdrawal from the race. South Africa was passed into the final on appeal to the IAAF, due to interference from the Kenyan athlete who downed Mogawane. They were assigned the 9th lane and finished in 8th place with their season's best time of 3:03.46. References External links 1988 births Living people South African male sprinters World Athletics Championships medalists Universiade medalists in athletics (track and field) Universiade bronze medalists for South Africa Medalists at the 2011 Summer Universiade
ro	legislation	Romania	ACORD din 25 septembrie 2006 privind amendarea Acordului central european de comerţ liber) Publicat în MONITORUL OFICIAL nr. 1.056 din 30 decembrie 2006 ------- Notă ... ) Traducere Republica Bulgaria, Republica Croaţia, Republica Macedonia şi România, denumite în cele ce urmează părţi, reafirmând contribuţia importantă a Acordului central european de comerţ liber la întărirea relaţiilor economice şi comerciale dintre părţi, recunoscând contribuţia Acordului central european de comerţ liber la îmbunătăţirea pregătirii părţilor pentru a deveni membre ale Uniunii Europene, luând în considerare apropiata aderare a Republicii Bulgaria şi a României la Uniunea Europeană, ferm convinse de necesitatea amendării Acordului central european de comerţ liber în vederea asigurării continuităţii funcţionării sale, au convenit următoarele: Articolul 1 Articolul 42 al Acordului central european de comerţ liber va avea următorul conţinut: "ARTICOLUL 42 Depozitarul Guvernul Republicii Bulgaria, în calitate de depozitar, va notifica tuturor statelor membre care au semnat acest acord cu privire la depozitarea oricărui instrument de ratificare intrarea în vigoare a acestui acord şi orice alt document sau notificare privind acest acord sau valabilitatea sa. La 1 ianuarie 2007 Guvernul Republicii Croaţia va prelua obligaţiile de depozitar al acestui acord." Articolul 2 Prezentul acord va constitui parte integrantă a Acordului central european de comerţ liber. Articolul 3 Prezentul acord va intra în vigoare la data primirii de către depozitar a ultimei notificări a părţilor la Acordul central european de comerţ liber privind îndeplinirea procedurilor necesare în acest scop, dar nu mai târziu de data de 1 ianuarie 2007. Depozitarul va notifica tuturor părţilor îndeplinirea procedurilor necesare pentru intrarea în vigoare a prezentului acord. Drept care subsemnaţii plenipotenţiari, fiind deplin autorizaţi în acest scop, au semnat prezentul acord. Semnat la Bucureşti la 25 septembrie 2006, într-un singur exemplar original în limba engleză, care va fi depus la Guvernul Republicii Bulgaria, care va transmite copii autentificate ale prezentului acord tuturor părţilor la Acordul central european de comerţ liber. Pentru Republica Bulgaria, Konstantin Andreev, ambasador extraordinar şi plenipotenţiar al Republicii Bulgaria la Bucureşti Pentru Republica Croaţia, Ivica Masstruko, ambasador extraordinar şi plenipotenţiar al Republicii Croaţia la Bucureşti Pentru Republica Macedonia, Tihomir Ilievski, ambasador extraordinar şi plenipotenţiar al Republicii Macedonia la Bucureşti Pentru România, Iuliu Winkler, ministru delegat pentru comerţ ----
pl	other	N/A	Nowelizacja ustawy Prawo zamówień publicznych - ABC - Infor.pl PORTAL INFOR.PLKsiegowość firmSektor publicznyKsiegowość budżetowaBiznesKadryPrawoBiura rachunkoweSklep \| IFK \| IRB \| INFORLEX \| GAZETA PRAWNA \| INFORORGANIZER \| APLIKACJA MOBILNA \| SKLEPSzukajSzukajRachunkowośćRACHUNKOWOŚĆZasady ogólneKsięgi rachunkoweEwidencja księgowaSprawozdawczośćAmortyzacjaRachunkowość budżetowaRachunkowość rolniczaRachunkowość organizacji non-profitInwentaryzacjaAngielski dla księgowychPodatkiPODATKIVAT i akcyzaPITCITPCCPostępowanie podatkowe i KKSInne podatki i opłatyInterpretacje podatkowe i orzecznictwoPodatki na wsiVATKosztyUlgiRyczałtUrząd SkarbowyKPiRPodatki osobisteOrdynacja podatkowaPodatek od sprzedaży detalicznejPodatek od instytucji finansowychZUS i kadryZUS I KADRYSkładkiUrlopyWynagrodzeniaZatrudnianie i zwalnianieUmowy zleceniaInneObrót gospodarczyOBRÓT GOSPODARCZYDziałalność gospodarczaSpółkiFundacje, stowarzyszeniaZamówienia publiczneFinanse i inwestycjeWindykacjaCłoInneVademecum księgowegoVADEMECUM KSIĘGOWEGOStandardy rachunkowościKsięgowi i rewidenciDoskonalenie zawoduPisma Ministra FinansówBiura rachunkoweForumPrenumerata 2017VAT 2017Aplikacja WideoakademiaSklepNarzędzia:KalkulatoryWskaźniki i stawkiTerminarzFormularze PITDrukiDziennik ustawAkty prawne ujednoliconeNewsletterreklamaJesteś tutaj: STRONA GŁÓWNA > Księgowość > ABC > Nowelizacja ustawy Prawo zamówień publicznychNowelizacja ustawy Prawo zamówień publicznychW dniu 22 grudnia 2009 r. weszła w życie ustawa z dnia 5 listopada 2009 r. o zmianie ustawy – Prawo zamówień publicznych oraz ustawy o kosztach sądowych w sprawach cywilnych (Dz. U. z 2009 r. nr 206, poz. 1591). Powyższa nowelizacja wprowadza dość istotne zmiany w ustawie z dnia 29 stycznia 2004 r. Prawo zamówień publicznych (Dz. U. z 2004 r. nr 19, poz. 177 z późn. zm.) (dalej „pzp”). Kancelaria Prawna M. Szulikowski i Partnerzy poniżej przedstawia uwagi na temat powyższej nowelizacji.Umowy zlecenia i inne umowy cywilnoprawne od 1 stycznia 2017 r. (książka)Podatkowa Księga Przychodów i Rozchodów 2017Odwrotne obciążenie 2017 – usługi budowlane i towary Poradnik Gazety Prawnej 2/17 (książka)VAT zwolnienia i stawki Instrukcje, jak ustalić należny podatekJednolity Plik Kontrolny - Ewidencja VAT od 1 stycznia 2017Kodeks pracy 2017 Praktyczny komentarz z przykładami (książka)Wersja PREMIUM Przewodnik po zmianach w VAT i Akcyzie 2016/2017Wersja PREMIUM Przewodnik po zmianach przepisów 2016/2017VAT 2017. KomentarzZmianie uległy przepisy dotyczące warunków jakie powinien spełnić wykonawca, aby mógł ubiegać się o udzielenie zamówienia publicznego (art. 22). Ustawodawca sformułował ogólne zasady określania przez zamawiającego opisu sposobu spełniania warunków o których mowa w zmienionym art. 22 pzp (zasada dostosowania do przedmiotu zamówienia), oraz wskazał, w jaki sposób opis taki powinien być publikowany (ogłoszenie o zamówieniu, zaproszenie do negocjacji). Ustawodawca posłużył się dość ogólnymi sformułowaniami (klauzulami generalnymi), jeśli chodzi o zakreślenie zamawiającym granic dopuszczalnego opisu sposobu spełnienia powyższych warunków, co może potencjalnie prowadzić do nadużywania przez zamawiających omawianego przepisu w celu nadmiernego ograniczania kręgu wykonawców w danym postępowaniu. Niepokoić może także wykreślenie przepisu zakazującego wprost określania warunków udziału w postępowaniu w sposób utrudniający uczciwą konkurencję. W powyższym zakresie nadal obowiązuje jednak ogólna zasada z art. 7 ust. 1 pzp, nakazująca przestrzeganie zasad uczciwej konkurencji.Oprócz powyższego, dopuszczono zastrzeżenie w ogłoszeniu o zamówieniu, że o udzielenie zamówienia będą mogli ubiegać się tylko wykonawcy zatrudniający odpowiednią liczbę osób niepełnosprawnych (ponad 50 % zatrudnionych pracowników). Powyższy przepis stanowi wdrożenie art. 19 Dyrektywy 2004/18/WE Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady z dnia 31 marca 2004 r. w sprawie koordynacji procedur udzielania zamówień publicznych na roboty budowlane, dostawy i usługi (dalej „Dyrektywa klasyczna”).reklamareklama Zmianie uległy także przepisy zawierające katalog przesłanek wykluczenia wykonawcy z postępowania. Co ciekawe, jako jedną z przyczyn wykluczenia wykonawcy z postępowania, wprowadzono brak wykazania przez wykonawcę spełniania warunków udziału w postępowaniu. Powyższe ma istotne znaczenie w kontekście nowych przepisów nakładających na wykonawcę obowiązek udowodnienia, na żądanie zamawiającego, we wskazanym przez zamawiającego zakresie, jeszcze przed terminem składania wniosków o dopuszczenie do udziału w postępowaniu lub terminem składania ofert, że wykonawca spełnia warunki udziału w postępowaniu, oraz że nie zachodzą w stosunku do niego przesłanki wykluczenia z postępowania. Zgodnie z uzasadnieniem do projektu nowelizacji, intencją przy wprowadzeniu powyższych przepisów było doprecyzowanie momentu, na który wykonawca powinien wykazać spełnianie warunków udziału w postępowaniu, oraz umożliwienie mu wykazania spełniania tych warunków w dogodny, elastyczny sposób, co miało zmierzać do poprawy konkurencyjności postępowań o udzielenie zamówienia publicznego. Powyższe ma wynikać z dopuszczenia możliwości powołania się na pisemne zobowiązania podmiotów trzecich, które udostępnią wykonawcy zasoby niezbędne do wykonania zamówienia, oraz z umożliwienia w uzasadnionych przypadkach, powołania się na inne dokumenty niż dotyczące sytuacji finansowej i ekonomicznej, w celu wykazania spełniania konkretnego, opisanego przez zamawiającego warunku udziału w postępowaniu. Omawiane rozwiązanie, zdaniem ustawodawcy ma stanowić wdrożenie art. 47 ust. 2, art. 47 ust. 4 oraz art. 48 ust. 2 Dyrektywy klasycznej.Można jednak mieć wątpliwości, czy sposób regulacji przyjęty przez ustawodawcę odzwierciedla istotę powyższych przepisów prawa wspólnotowego, które mają na celu ochronę wykonawców i doprecyzowanie w ich interesie sposobów dokumentowania spełniania warunków udziału w postępowaniu, podczas gdy nowe przepisy pzp pozostawiają duży zakres uznania po stronie zamawiającego i mogą w praktyce prowadzić do odwrotnego rezultatu. W nowym stanie prawnym, wykonawca będzie zobowiązany udowodnić spełnianie warunków udziału w postępowaniu stosownie do opisu sformułowanego na podstawie dość ogólnych zasad przez zamawiającego, jeśli zaś nie udokumentuje spełniania tych warunków, będzie to stanowiło przesłankę wykluczenia go z postępowania (zmieniony art. 24 ust. 2 pkt 4) pzp). Dotychczas, przesłanką wykluczenia z postępowania mogło być tylko niezłożenie w ogóle dokumentów potwierdzających spełnianie warunków udziału w postępowaniu lub złożenie dokumentów zawierających błędy, z zastrzeżeniem obowiązku po stronie zamawiającego wezwania wykonawcy który nie złożył dokumentów lub złożył dokumenty zawierające błędy, do ich złożenia w wyznaczonym terminie (art. 26 ust. 3 pzp). Z powyższej różnicy pomiędzy dotychczasowym a nowym stanem prawnym należy naszym zdaniem wnosić, że przy ocenie, czy wykonawca podlega wykluczeniu, zamawiający będzie obecnie w większym stopniu merytorycznie badał spełnianie przez wykonawcę warunków udziału w postępowaniu, a nie tylko formalnie sprawdzał złożenie odpowiednich dokumentów. Powyższe da zatem zamawiającym potencjalną możliwość większego ingerowania w grono wykonawców, którzy ostatecznie będą mogli uzyskać zamówienie publiczne. KalkulatoryKalkulator odsetek od zaległościKalkulator brutto/nettoKalkulator wynagrodzeńzobacz wszystkie »Wskaźniki i stawkiPodróże służbowe w krajuRyczałty samochodoweOdsetki ustawowezobacz wszystkie »Akty prawneUstawa o VATOrdynacja podatkowaUstawa o rachunkowościZobacz wszystkie »Aktywne formularzeFormularze podatkoweFormularze z rachunkowościFormularze VATzobacz wszystkie »POLECANEJednolity Plik Kontrolny – Ewidencja VATPrzewodnik po zmianach 2017Monitor Księgowego z dodatkamiKasy fiskalne 2017 – zwolnieniaZmiany w rozliczaniu VAT usług budowlanych od 2017 r.Podatki i opłaty lokalne w 2017 roku – stawki maksymalneKasy fiskalne od 2017 r. – zwolnienia z obowiązku ewidencjiJak wypełnić zgłoszenie SD-Z2Przewodnik po zmianach przepisów 2016/2017 WYWIADYNowe sankcje VAT zagrożeniem dla uczciwych podatników?Doradca podatkowy musi rozumieć biznes swojego klientaSztuczne działania podatników zostaną wyeliminowaneAudyt musi wsłuchiwać się w potrzeby firmyZawód księgowego wymaga podwyższania kwalifikacjiBiegły rewident partnerem i doradcą przedsiębiorcyKlauzula przeciwko unikaniu opodatkowania w polskim prawie podatkowymJak przygotować się na Jednolity Plik Kontrolny (JPK)Głównym problemem podatków dochodowych jest ... ich istnieniePełnokrwista postać księgowego, czyli wiedza, praktyka i etykaCo trzeba zmienić w polskim systemie podatkowym – rozmowa z profesorem Witoldem Modzelewskim15 proc. CIT narusza zasadę równościKsięgowy to za mało, potrzebny jest prawnik i doradca podatkowyNie ma ujemnych skutków deregulacjiZwalczanie unikania opodatkowania w PolscereklamaOstatnio na forumKto i kiedy może rozliczyć się wspólnie z dzieckiemkoleżanka - dziś, 18:05Proszę o pomoc! RZiS, wniosek o dofinansowanieGość_Katarzyna25 - dziś, 17:43zwolnienie od psychiatry a wypowiedzenieGość_do oszołomów - dziś, 17:37zwolnienie lekarskie a czas pracyKraktax - dziś, 15:33wycena aktywówGość_Kasia - dziś, 13:45Bezpłatne szkolenie dot. odwrotnego vatuGość_Karol - dziś, 12:59Odwrotne obciążenie w branży budowlanejGość_Karol - dziś, 12:55Jednolity Plik KontolnyJPK_VAT, ewidencja VAT – wyjaśnienia Ministerstwa FinansówJak przesyłać JPK_VAT od 2017 r.Raportowanie JPK – wymagania i karyPierwsze JPK_VAT małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw do 25 lutego 2017 r.JPK a status przedsiębiorcyFaktury zakupu nie będą przekazywane w formacie JPKAplikacja do wysyłania plików JPK do systemu Ministerstwa FinansówJednolity Plik Kontrolny – pierwsze doświadczenia podatnikówNikt nie będzie ukarany za niewykonanie obowiązku przekazania ewidencji dla potrzeb VATMałe firmy bez obowiązku podpisywania plików JPK kwalifikowanym podpisem elektronicznymCheck–lista JPK – co sprawdzić przed wysłaniemEksperci portalu infor.plKamil JaroszEkspert z zakresu marketingu i PRZostań ekspertem portalu Infor.pl »SKLEP.INFOR.PLPublikacje na czasieCentralizacja VAT - wdrożenie, rozliczanie, ewidencja (książka)W publikacji podpowiadamy, jakie procedury wewnętrzne wdrożyć w jednostce, aby móc prawidłowo rozliczać VAT.
en	contracts	US	Exhibit 10.22 Kinetic Concepts, Inc. Compensation Policy for Outside Directors Adopted December 4, 2007 Purpose:The purpose of the Kinetic Concepts, Inc. Compensation Policy for Outside Directors (the "Policy") is to establish the compensation for Outside Directors, as defined herein, in a manner that aligns their interests with those of the shareholders of Kinetic Concepts, Inc. (the "Company") and is competitive with comparable companies.Directors who are not Outside Directors will notbe compensated pursuant to the Policy. Effective Date:The Policy was approved by the Board of Directors of the Company (the "Board") on December 4, 2007 and will become effective commencing for the 2008 calendar year, and, at that time, will replace any other policies previously in effect for this purpose.The Policy will remain in effect until amended or terminated by the Board. Components:Outside Directors' compensation will consist of the components described below. Annual Retainer: Anannual retainer in the amount of $45,000 will be paid in cash increments of $11,250 within 10 days following each regularly-scheduled quarterly Board meeting. Additional Retainer for Chairperson and Committee Chairpersons: An additional amount will be paid annually within 10 days following each annual meeting of shareholders in cash to the following Outside Directors as follows: Chairperson of the Board $35,000 Chairperson of the Audit Committee $20,000 Chairperson of the Compensation Committee $20,000 Chairperson of all other committees $10,000 Payment for Meetings: Meeting Fee:Each Outside Director will be paid a cash fee of $1,500 for each Board meeting he or she attends in person or by telephone, other than a regularly-scheduled quarterly Board meeting, and for each committee meeting he or she attends in person or by telephone, regardless of whether such committee meeting is scheduled in conjunction with a regularly-scheduled quarterly Board meeting; provided, that an Outside Director may only be paid for a maximum of four meetings on any given day. Annual Stock Option Grant: On the date of each annual meeting of shareholders, commencing with the 2008 annual meeting of shareholders, each Outside Director (other than the Chairperson of the Board) will automatically receive a grant of nonqualified stock options to purchase that number of shares of Company common stock with a Black-Scholes calculation value approximately equal to $100,000 ($200,000 for the Chairperson of the Board) and a per share exercise price equal to the fair market value of the Company common stock as of the date of such annual meeting. The actual number of shares subject to the option shall conclusively be determined by the CFO and set forth in the stock option award agreement. The term of the options will be seven years and the options will vest at a rate of 1/12th of the grant at every three-month anniversary of the date of grant, over a period of three years.If an Outside Director's service with the Board terminates by reason of the Outside Director’s death or disability the unvested portion of the options will vest in full and the options must be exercised within one year following the date of termination.If an Outside Director's service with the Board terminates by reason of the Outside Director’s failure to be renominated or reelected to the Board, then the unvested portion of the options will be forfeited at the time of termination, and the vested portion of the options must be exercised within one year following the date termination.In the event of termination for any other reason, the unvested portion of the options will be forfeited at the time of termination, and the vested portion of the options must be exercised within three months of termination.These and the remaining terms of the option grant will be governed by, but shall not supersede, the terms of the applicable plan and award agreement pursuant to which it is granted. Initial Stock Option Grant: If an Outside Director first becomes an Outside Director at any time other than at an annual meeting of shareholders, such director shall receive the annual stock option grant described above that an Outside Director is entitled to receive at the annual meeting of shareholders.However, with the unanimous approval of the Board, an initial grant (or grants) to an Outside Director may differ from the initial grant described herein. Annual Restricted Stock Award: At each annual meeting of shareholders, commencing with the 2008 annual meeting of shareholders, each Outside Director (other than the Chairperson of the Board) will automatically receive a grant of restricted shares of common stock of Company ("Restricted Shares") approximately equal in value to $100,000 ($200,000 for the Chairperson of the Board) as of the date of grant. The actual number of Restricted Shares shall be determined by the CFO and set forth in the Restricted Shares award agreement. The Restricted Shares granted will vest in full on the third anniversary of the date of the grant (the “Vesting Date”), provided that the Outside Director has served continuously from the date of grant until the Vesting Date.If an Outside Director's service with the Board terminates by reason of the Outside Director’s death, disability or failure to be renominated or reelected to the Board, then any unvested Restricted Shares will become vested at the rate of one-third of the Restricted Shares vesting for each full year the Outside Director served on the Board after the date of grant.These and the remaining terms of the Restricted Shares will be governed by the terms of the applicable plan and award agreement. Stock Ownership Requirement: In accepting these awards stock options and Restricted Shares, each Outside Director agrees not to sell any shares of Company stock (including shares acquired as a result of the exercise of a stock option) granted hereunder (except to pay the exercise price of stock options granted hereunder or taxes generated as a result of equity grants under the Policy) until such time as his or her ownership of shares of Company stock equals or exceeds five times the then Annual Retainer, as conclusively determined by the CFO.This stock ownership requirement may be waived by the Board, in its sole and absolute discretion, at any time, and from time to time.In addition, this requirement shall terminate with respect to an Outside Director when such director ceases to serve on the Board. Director’s and Officer’s Insurance:The Company will provide D&O insurance in the amount of $35,000,000 for the Outside Directors, unless such insurance is not available on commercially reasonable terms. Status as Outside Director: For purposes of the Policy, an Outside Director is any director:(i)who is not employed by the Company, and (ii) who satisfies such other criteria for Outside Directors as established from time to time by the Board. For purposes of the Policy, annual compensation and equity grants will be based on the date the Outside Director is elected to the Board or, in the case of existing Board members, the date on which the Policy is approved by the Board and becomes effective.In the case of an existing Board member who becomes an Outside Director as a result of a change in status, the grants will be as of the date the director's status changes to Outside Director. Amendment or Termination of the Policy:The Board reserves the right to amend or terminate the Policy at any time or waive any of the provisions generally or specifically.
da	wikipedia	N/A	Österreichischer Alpenverein (ÖAV - frem til 2014: Oesterreichischer Alpenverein, OeAV) er den største interesseorganisation for bjergbestigning i Østrig. Hovedsædet er i Innsbruck. Organisation Sektioner ÖAV er i indelt i 197 sektioner. Sektionerne er uafhængige klubber, som i visse tilfælde er opstået uden for Alpenverein. "Arbejdsområdet" for en sektion indeholder infrastruktur, såsom veje og hytter. Indsatsområderne er forskellige for de enkelte sektioner, idet de i høj grad er geografisk betingede. Der findes også akademiske sektioner i Wien, Innsbruck og Graz, som opstod af studentersammenslutninger, samt sektioner i udlandet ("Section Britannia", "Sektion Flandern"). Visse indenlandske sektioner har også lokale grupper i udlandet. "Sektion Weitwanderer" arbejder interregionalt med fjernvandreveje. Publikationer ÖAV publicerer kort, vandreguides og undervisningsmateriale samt et medlemsblad "Bergauf", der udkommer fem gange årligt. Hytter og stier ÖAV driver 232 hytter, såkaldte Alpenvereinshütten (pr. 31. december 2017). Med omkring 13.000 sovepladser, om sommeren cirka 1550 arbejdspladser, og hvert år omkring en million besøgende, er ÖAV Østrigs største virksomhed, hvad angår drift af overnatningssteder. Hytter er forpagtet med oftest langvarige kontrakter, hvor forpagteren sikrer, at alle hyttens faciliteter fungerer som de skal. Ejendomme samt natur- og miljøbeskyttelse Alpenverein besidder omkring 400 km2 land. Landområderne er opkøbt siden begyndelsen af det 20. århundrede (for at danne naturbeskyttelsesområder), ligesom foreningen har modtaget områder som donationer. Derfor er ÖAV også blandt de største jordejere i Østrig. En stor del af disse jordområder, omkring 330 km2, er beliggende i Hohe Tauern nationalpark, Østrigs første af slagsen, hvor ÖAV har den største andel af området, og parken ville ikke eksistere i dag, hvis Alpenverein ikke havde lagt en stor indsats i at få nationalparken oprettet. Nogle af de mest prominente bjerge i Østrig, Großglockner og Großvenediger findes her, tillige med Krimmlervandfaldene.. I 1988 opkøbte man 8 kvadratkilometer ved Hochalmspitze, hvor ÖAV på den måde fik forhindret, at området blev forvandlet til gletsjer-skiområde. Området er i dag også en del af nationalparken. Historie Österreichischer Alpenverein blev grundlagt 1862 som den første bjergstigningssammenslutning på det europæiske fastland, og er dermed verdens næstældste efter den britiske "Alpine Club". Den blev grundlagt med indsats fra studenterne Paul Grohmann, Johann August Edmund Mojsisovics von Mojsvár og Guido von Sommaruga, samt flere i startfasen. Den 19. november 1862 fandt den stiftende generalforsamling sted i det østrigske videnskabsakademi under ledelse af Eduard Fenzl, som også blev valgt til første bestyrelse. Fra 1873 til 1938 blev der dannet mere end 400 sektioner i Tyskland, Østrig og (efter første verdenskrig) i Tjekkoslovakiet under navnet DuOeAV. I 1891 oprettede man også en tjeneste for gletschermålinger.I år 1914 havde DuOeAV allerede mere end 100.000 medlemmer. Mellemkrigstiden I mellemkrigstiden fik Alpenverein nazistiske og antisemitiske tendenser, hvilket man ikke er så stolt af den dag i dag. I nogle sektioner benyttede man allerede i begyndelsen af det 20. århundrede en såkaldt arierparagraf, der fastlagde, at der kun kunne optages medlemmer med såkaldt "arisk" afstamning, og i 1907, hhv. 1910 forbød den Akademiske Sektion Wien og Sektion München, at jøder kunne blive medlemmer, andre sektioner fulgte efter. I 1921 blev den nationalsocialistiske Eduard Pichl formand for Sektion Østrig af DuÖAV og begyndte at håndhæve antisemitisme. I samme år blev Sektion Donauland grundlagt, hvor mange ekskluderede jødiske klatrere samlet sig. I 1924 blev denne sektion udelukket fra paraplyforeningen, og 98 af de 110 østrigske sektioner indførte formelt arierparagraffen. Jøderne måtte således hverken blive medlem eller benytte Alpenvereinshütten. 1938-1945 Efter Anschluss i marts 1938 blev alle bjergbestigningsforeninger samlet, og i maj 1938 fik navnet Deutscher Alpenverein (DAV). Frem til krigens afslutning blev det anset som et fagforbund under Reichsbund für Leibesübungen i NSDAP. Formanden på det tidspunkt var den tidligere østrigske kansler Arthur Seyß-Inquart, en overbevist nationalsocialist og antisemit. Efterkrigstiden I 1945 blev Oesterreichische Alpenverein (OeAV) dannet fra grunden igen. Indtil gendannelsen af den tyske Deutscher Alpenverein (DAV) i 1952 forvaltede OeAV tyske aktiver og jordområder, samt hytterne. Referencer Eksterne henvisninger Organisationens hjemmeside Etableret i 1862 Bjergbestigning Sport i Østrig Alperne
de	caselaw	EU	C 146/4 DE Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union 21.6.2003 URTEIL DES GERICHTSHOFES URTEIL DES GERICHTSHOFES (Sechste Kammer) (Fünfte Kammer) vom 3. April 2003 vom 8. Mai 2003 in der Rechtssache C-269/00 (Vorabentscheidungsersu- in der Rechtssache C-144/00 (Vorabentscheidungsersu- chen des Bundesfinanzhofs): Wolfgang Seeling gegen chen des Bundesgerichtshofs): Matthias Hoffmann ( 1) Finanzamt Starnberg ( 1) (Mehrwertsteuer — Sechste Richtlinie — Steuerbefreiung (Sechste Mehrwertsteuerrichtlinie — Artikel 6 Absatz 2 bestimmter dem Gemeinwohl dienender Tätigkeiten — Ein- Unterabsatz 1 Buchstabe a) und Artikel 13 Teil B Buchsta- richtung — Begriff — Leistungen, die von einer natürlichen be b) — Verwendung einer Wohnung in einem insgesamt Personen erbracht werden — Kulturelle Dienstleistungen dem Unternehmen zugeordneten Gebäude für den privaten eines Solisten) Bedarf des Steuerpflichtigen — Keine Gleichstellung einer solchen Verwendung mit der Vermietung und Verpachtung von Grundstücken) (2003/C 146/05) (2003/C 146/06) (Verfahrenssprache: Deutsch) (Verfahrenssprache: Deutsch) In der Rechtssache C-144/00 betreffend ein dem Gerichtshof nach Artikel 234 EG vom deutschen Bundesgerichtshof in In der Rechtssache C-269/00 betreffend ein dem Gerichtshof dem bei diesem anhängigen Strafverfahren gegen Matthias nach Artikel 234 EG vom deutschen Bundesfinanzhof in dem Hoffmann vorgelegtes Ersuchen um Vorabentscheidung über bei diesem anhängigen Rechtsstreit Wolfgang Seeling gegen die Auslegung von Artikel 13 Teil A Absatz 1 Buchstabe n) Finanzamt Starnberg vorgelegtes Ersuchen um Vorabentschei- der Sechsten Richtlinie 77/388/EWG des Rates vom 17. Mai dung über die Auslegung von Artikel 6 Absatz 2 Unterabsatz 1 1977 zur Harmonisierung der Rechtsvorschriften der Mitglied- Buchstabe a), Artikel 13 Teil B Buchstabe b) und Artikel 17 staaten über die Umsatzsteuer — Gemeinsames Mehrwertsteu- Absatz 2 Buchstabe a) der Sechsten Richtlinie 77/388/EWG ersystem: einheitliche steuerpflichtige Bemessungsgrundlage des Rates vom 17. Mai 1977 zur Harmonisierung der Rechts- (ABl. L 145, S. 1) hat der Gerichtshof (Sechste Kammer) vorschriften der Mitgliedstaaten über die Umsatzsteuern — unter Mitwirkung des Kammerpräsidenten J.-P. Puissochet Gemeinsames Mehrwertsteuersystem: einheitliche steuerpflich- (Berichterstatter), der Richter R. Schintgen und V. Skouris, der tige Bemessungsgrundlage (ABl. L 145, S. 1) hat der Gerichts- Richterin F. Macken sowie des Richters J. N. Cunha Rodrigues hof (Fünfte Kammer) unter Mitwirkung des Kammerpräsiden- — Generalanwalt: L. A. Geelhoed; Kanzler: H. A. Rühl, ten M. Wathelet sowie der Richter C. W. A. Timmermans, Hauptverwaltungsrat — am 3. April 2003 ein Urteil mit D. A. O. Edward, P. Jann und S. von Bahr (Berichterstatter) — folgendem Tenor erlassen: Generalanwalt: F. G. Jacobs; Kanzler: H. A. Rühl, Hauptverwal- tungsrat — am 8. Mai 2003 ein Urteil mit folgendem Tenor erlassen: 1. Artikel 13 Teil A Absatz 1 Buchstabe n) der Sechsten Richtlinie 77/388/EWG des Rates vom 17. Mai 1977 zur Harmonisierung der Rechtsvorschriften der Mitgliedstaaten über Die Artikel 6 Absatz 2 Unterabsatz 1 Buchstabe a) und 13 Teil B die Umsatzsteuern — Gemeinsames Mehrwertsteuersystem: Buchstabe b) der Sechsten Richtlinie 77/388/EWG des Rates vom einheitliche steuerpflichtige Bemessungsgrundlage ist dahin 17. Mai 1977 zur Harmonisierung der Rechtsvorschriften der auszulegen, dass der Begriff der „anderen ... anerkannten Mitgliedstaaten über die Umsatzsteuern — Gemeinsames Mehr- Einrichtungen“ als Einzelkünstler auftretende Solisten nicht wertsteuersystem: einheitliche steuerpflichtige Bemessungsgrundlage ausschließt. sind so auszulegen, dass sie nationalen Rechtsvorschriften entge- genstehen, wonach die Verwendung eines Teils eines insgesamt dem 2. Aus der Überschrift des Artikels 13 Teil A dieser Richtlinie als Unternehmen zugeordneten Betriebsgebäudes für den privaten Bedarf des Steuerpflichtigen als eine — als Vermietung oder Verpachtung solcher ergeben sich keine Einschränkungen der Möglichkeiten der Steuerbefreiung nach dieser Bestimmung. eines Grundstücks im Sinne des Artikels 13 Teil B Buchstabe b) — steuerfreie Dienstleistung behandelt wird. ( 1) ABl. C 176 vom 24.6.2000. (1 ) ABl. C 259 vom 9.9.2000.
sk	caselaw	EU	22.9.2014 SK Úradný vestník Európskej únie C 329/2 Návrh na začatie prejudiciálneho konania, ktorý podal Tribunalul Satu Mare (Rumunsko) 25. júna 2014 – Sergiu Lucian Băbăşan/Inspectoratul Judeţean de Poliţie Satu Mare (Vec C-305/14) 2014/C 329/02 Jazyk konania: rumunčina Vnútroštátny súd, ktorý podal návrh na začatie prejudiciálneho konania Tribunalul Satu Mare Účastníci konania pred vnútroštátnym súdom Žalobca: Sergiu Lucian Băbăşan Žalovaný: Inspectoratul Judeţean de Poliţie Satu Mare Prejudiciálne otázky 1. Uplatňujú sa ustanovenia článku 6 ods. 1 Zmluvy o Európskej únii v spojení s článkom 11 ods. 1 a článkom 12 ods. 1 Charty základných práv Európskej únie priamo na území Rumunska, pokiaľ ide o občanov Únie, alebo nie? 2. Majú sa ustanovenia článku 6 ods. 1 Zmluvy o Európskej únii v spojení s článkom 11 ods. 1 a článkom 12 ods. 1 Charty základných práv Európskej únie vykladať v tom zmysle, že nebránia tomu, aby boli občania Únie povinní podrobiť sa zákonným ustanoveniam vnútroštátneho práva členských štátov, ako sú kogentné normy rumunského zákona č. 60/1991 a to článok 12 ods. 1 v spojení so sankciami stanovenými v článku 26 ods. 1 písm. a) tohto zákona, ktoré sa týkajú organizovania a konania verejných zhromaždení?
de	caselaw	Switzerland	Urteil vom 24. Januar 2019 Es wirken mit: Vizepräsidentin Weber-Probst Gerichtsschreiber Schmidhauser In Sachen A._ Beschwerdeführer gegen Ausgleichskasse Verom Beschwerdegegnerin betreffend Verzugszins der AHV-Beiträge (Einspracheentscheid vom 24. Juli 2018) zieht das Versicherungsgericht in Erwägung: I. 1. 1.1 Der 1943 geborene A._ (im Folgenden: Beschwerdeführer) ist der Ausgleichskasse Verom (im Folgenden: Beschwerdegegnerin) zur Beitragserfüllung als Selbstständigerwerbender angeschlossen. Nach Erhalt der Steuermeldung vom 23. Februar 2018 erliess die Beschwerdegegnerin gleichentags eine Beitragsverfügung, worin sie die persönlichen Beiträge des Beschwerdeführers für die Beitragsperiode vom 1. Januar bis 31. Dezember 2013 aufgrund eines Erwerbseinkommens von CHF 43'093.00 bzw. eines beitragspflichtigen Einkommens von (gerundet) CHF 27'000.00 festsetzte, was zu einer Beitragsforderung von CHF 1'972.20 führte (persönliche Beiträge von CHF 1'544.40, Verwaltungskosten von CHF 76.80 und FAK-Beiträge SO [SE] von CHF 351.00). Gleichzeitig erhob die Beschwerdegegnerin auf dem Saldo der noch offenen Beiträge von CHF 948.60 (Beitragsforderung von CHF 1'972.20 abzüglich bereits fakturierte Beiträge von CHF 1'023.60) für den Zeitraum vom 1. Januar 2015 bis 23. Februar 2018 Verzugszinsen (Zinssatz von 5 %) in Höhe von CHF 149.25 (Akten der Ausgleichskasse [AK-Nr.] 1). 1.2 Mit vorgängigen mündlichen sowie schriftlichen Eingaben vom 4. und 7. April, 30. Mai und 15. Juni 2018 erhob der Beschwerdeführer Einsprache gegen die vorerwähnte Beitragsverfügung. Darin machte er im Wesentlichen geltend, er habe am 9. Januar 2013 eine Aufforderung zur Bezahlung von Akontobeiträgen auf einem Erwerbseinkommen von CHF 46'892.00 und am 12. März 2013 eine solche auf einem Erwerbseinkommen von CHF 32’000.00 erhalten. Er habe jedoch nie eine Anpassung der Beiträge an das veränderte Einkommen verlangt. Die Steuerverwaltung des Kantons Solothurn habe der Beschwerdegegnerin am 23. April 2015 die Angaben für das Jahr 2013 übermittelt. Die Beitragsforderung von CHF 948.60 sei mittlerweile bezahlt worden. Von der Erhebung von Verzugszinsen sei jedoch abzusehen (Beschwerdebeilagen [BB] Nr. 6, 8, 10 und 11). 1.3 Mit Einspracheentscheid vom 24. Juli 2018 wurde die Einsprache des Beschwerdeführers vollumfänglich abgewiesen. Zur Begründung wurde im Wesentlichen dargelegt, die Anpassung der Akontobeiträge 2013 vom 12. März 2013 sei aufgrund des zuvor durch die zuständige Steuerbehörde des Kantons Solothurn mitgeteilten definitiven Einkommens im Jahr 2011 erfolgt. Der Beschwerdeführer sei verpflichtet gewesen, das den Akontobeiträgen zu Grunde liegende Einkommen zu kontrollieren; allenfalls hätte er eine Beratung beiziehen können. Der Jahresverdienst (bzw. der genaue Reingewinn) des Jahres 2013 sei mit Steuermeldung vom 23. Februar 2018 in Höhe von CHF 43'093.00 gemeldet worden. Die Festsetzung der Beiträge aus selbstständiger Erwerbstätigkeit für das Jahr 2013 sei gesetzmässig erfolgt (Aktenseiten [A.S.] 1 ff.). 2. 2.1 Mit – unter Berücksichtigung der Gerichtsferien – fristgerechter Beschwerde vom 31. August 2018 stellt der Beschwerdeführer folgendes Rechtsbegehren (A.S. 4 f.): Aufgrund dieses Sachverhalts bitte ich, auf eine Verzugszins-Forderung zu verzichten 2.2 In ihrer Beschwerdeantwort vom 2. Oktober 2018 beantragt die Beschwerdegegnerin die vollumfängliche Abweisung der Beschwerde (A.S. 7 ff.). 2.3 Mit Replik vom 11. Oktober 2018 hält der Beschwerdeführer an seinem gestellten Rechtsbegehren fest (A.S. 12 f.). 2.4 Auch in ihrer Duplik vom 30. Oktober 2018 beantragt die Beschwerdegegnerin sinngemäss die Abweisung der Beschwerde, wobei sie auf eine weitere Stellungnahme verzichtet (A.S. 16). II. 1. 1.1 Die Sachurteilsvoraussetzungen (Einhaltung von Frist und Form, örtliche und sachliche Zuständigkeit des angerufenen Gerichts) sind erfüllt. Auf die Beschwerde ist einzutreten. 1.2 Im vorliegenden Fall ist ausschliesslich die Erhebung von Verzugszinsen auf persönlichen Beiträgen des Beschwerdeführers aus seiner selbstständigen Erwerbstätigkeit für das Jahr 2013 in Höhe von CHF 149.25 strittig, womit der Streitwert unter CHF 30‘000.00 liegt und die Angelegenheit deshalb von der Vizepräsidentin des Versicherungsgerichts als Einzelrichterin zu beurteilen ist (§ 54bis Abs. 1 lit. a des [kantonalen] Gesetzes über die Gerichtsorganisation [GO; BGS 125.12] in der seit 1. März 2015 geltenden, vorliegend anwendbaren Fassung). 2. 2.1 Nach Art. 26 Abs. 1 Satz 1 des Bundesgesetzes über den Allgemeinen Teil des Sozialversicherungsrechts (ATSG, SR 830.1) sind für fällige Beitragsforderungen und Beitragsrückerstattungsansprüche Verzugs- und Vergütungszinsen zu leisten. Verzugszinsen zu entrichten haben nach Art. 41bis Abs. 1 lit. f der Verordnung über die Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung (AHVV; SR 831.101) u.a. Selbstständigerwerbende auf auszugleichenden persönlichen Beiträgen, falls die Akontobeiträge mindestens 25 % unter den tatsächlich geschuldeten Beiträgen liegen und nicht bis zum 1. Januar nach Ablauf des dem Beitragsjahr folgenden Kalenderjahres entrichtet werden, ab dem 1. Januar nach Ablauf des dem Beitragsjahr folgenden Kalenderjahres. Gemäss Art. 41bis Abs. 2 AHVV endet der Zinsenlauf mit der vollständigen Bezahlung der Beiträge, mit Einreichung der ordnungsgemässen Abrechnung oder bei deren Fehlen mit der Rechnungsstellung. Bei Beitragsnachforderungen endet der Zinsenlauf mit der Rechnungsstellung, sofern die Beiträge innert Frist bezahlt werden. Laut Art. 42 Abs. 2 AHVV beträgt der Verzugszinssatz 5 % im Jahr, wobei die Zinsen tageweise berechnet und ganze Monate zu 30 Tagen gerechnet werden (Art. 42 Abs. 3 AHVV). 2.2 Dem Verzugszins kommt die Funktion eines Vorteilsausgleichs wegen verspäteter Zahlung der Hauptschuld zu. Die Verzugszinsen bezwecken unbekümmert um den tatsächlichen Nutzen und Schaden, den Zinsverlust des Gläubigers und den Zinsgewinn des Schuldners in pauschalierter Form auszugleichen. Hingegen weist der Verzugszins nicht pönalen Charakter auf und ist unabhängig von einem Verschulden am Verzug geschuldet. Für die Verzugszinspflicht im Beitragsbereich ist nicht massgebend, ob den Beitragspflichtigen, die Ausgleichskasse oder eine andere Amtsstelle ein Verschulden an der Verzögerung der Beitragsfestsetzung oder –zahlung trifft (BGE 139 V 297 E. 3.3.2.2 S. 305, 134 V 202 E. 3.3.1 S. 206, je mit Hinweisen). 2.3 Gemäss Art. 24 Abs. 1 AHVV haben die Beitragspflichtigen im laufenden Beitragsjahr periodisch Akontobeiträge zu leisten. Die Ausgleichskassen bestimmen die Akontobeiträge auf Grund des voraussichtlichen Einkommens des Beitragsjahres. Sie können dabei vom Einkommen ausgehen, das der letzten Beitragsverfügung zu Grunde lag, es sei denn der Beitragspflichtige mache glaubhaft, dieses entspreche offensichtlich nicht dem voraussichtlichen Einkommen (Art. 24 Abs. 2 AHVV). Zeigt sich während oder nach Ablauf des Beitragsjahres, dass das Einkommen wesentlich vom voraussichtlichen Einkommen abweicht, so passen die Ausgleichskassen die Akontobeiträge an (Art. 24 Abs. 3 AHVV). Die Beitragspflichtigen haben den Ausgleichskassen die für die Festsetzung der Akontobeiträge erforderlichen Auskünfte zu erteilen, Unterlagen auf Verlangen einzureichen und wesentliche Abweichungen vom voraussichtlichen Einkommen zu melden (Art. 24 Abs. 4 und Art. 209 Abs. 2 AHVV). Die Ausgleichskassen setzen die für das Beitragsjahr geschuldeten Beiträge in einer Verfügung fest und nehmen den Ausgleich mit den geleisteten Akontobeiträgen vor (Art. 25 Abs. 1 AHVV; Rz. 1145 der Wegleitung des Bundesamtes für Sozialversicherungen [BSV] über die Beiträge der Selbstständigerwerbenden und Nichterwerbstätigen in der AHV, IV und EO [WSN]). 2.4 Zeigt sich während oder nach Ablauf des Beitragsjahres, dass das erzielte Einkommen wesentlich vom voraussichtlichen Einkommen abweicht, so passen die Ausgleichskassen die Akontobeiträge an (Art. 24 Abs. 3 AHVV). Sie passen sie unverzüglich an, wenn aus der letzten Steuerveranlagung hervorgeht, dass das erzielte Einkommen im Verhältnis zum ursprünglich angenommenen wesentlich zu- oder abgenommen hat und mithin die derzeit bezahlten Akontobeiträge zu hoch oder zu tief sind (WSN, Rz. 1153). Die Beitragspflichtigen haben ihrer Ausgleichskasse die wesentliche Abweichung während oder nach Ablauf des Beitragsjahres zu melden und glaubhaft zu machen (z.B. nach Vorliegen des Geschäftsabschlusses; Art. 24 Abs. 4 AHVV; WSN, Rz. 1154). Als wesentlich gilt eine Abweichung des erzielten vom voraussichtlichen Jahreseinkommen von mindestens 25 % (WSN, Rz. 1155). Um Missverständnisse und Unstimmigkeiten zu vermeiden, haben die Ausgleichskassen die Selbstständigerwerbenden in geeigneter Weise (beispielsweise mit einem entsprechenden Hinweis auf den Beitragsrechnungen) darauf aufmerksam zu machen, dass wesentliche Abweichungen vom voraussichtlichen Einkommen gemeldet werden müssen und dass andernfalls nach Art. 41bis Abs. 1 lit. f AHVV Verzugszinsen anfallen können (WSN, Rz. 1156). 2.5 Der Datenaustausch zwischen den Ausgleichskassen und den Steuerbehörden (Bestellungen und Steuermeldungen) erfolgt ausschliesslich elektronisch (WSN, Rz. 1208). Die Daten werden einheitlich über die elektronische Datenaustauschplattform (DAP) basierend auf Sedex ausgetauscht (WSN, Rz. 1209). Die Ausgleichskassen haben für jede ihnen angeschlossene selbstständigerwerbende Person eine Steuermeldung zu bestellen (WSN, Rz. 1211). Die Angaben der Steuerbehörden sind für die Ausgleichskassen verbindlich (Art. 23 Abs. 4 AHVV; WSN, Rz. 1230 Satz 1 und 1232). 3. Im vorliegenden Fall ergibt sich aus den ins Recht gelegten Akten folgender Sachverhalt: 3.1 Die Beschwerdegegnerin teilte dem Beschwerdeführer mit Schreiben vom 9. Januar 2013 mit, er habe für das Jahr 2013 Akontobeiträge (Persönliche Beiträge Selbstständigerwerbende) auf dem Erwerbseinkommen von CHF 46'892.00 bzw. – nach Abzug des Rentnerfreibetrages im Jahr 2013 von CHF 16'800.00 sowie des Zinsabzugs auf dem Eigenkapital per 31. Dezember 2013 von CHF 440.00 – auf dem beitragspflichtigen Einkommen von (gerundet) CHF 29'600.00 in Höhe von insgesamt CHF 2'157.00 (Persönlicher Beitrag von CHF 1'729.20, FAK SO [SE] von CHF 384.60 und Verwaltungskosten von CHF 43.20) zu bezahlen. Auf der Rückseite dieses Schreibens wurde darauf hingewiesen, die Beiträge setze man – mangels Vorliegen einer Steuerveranlagung – vorläufig anhand der zur Verfügung stehenden Angaben, d.h. in der Regel anhand der vorangehenden Periode, durch Kasseneinschätzung oder gestützt auf die Selbstdeklaration des Beitragspflichtigen fest. Eine wesentliche Veränderung des Einkommens aus selbstständiger Erwerbstätigkeit müsse der Ausgleichskasse innerhalb von 12 Monaten nach Ablauf des Beitragsjahres schriftlich gemeldet werden. Dadurch lasse sich eine allfällige Verzinsung der Differenz zwischen Akontobeiträgen und tatsächlich geschuldeten Beiträgen vermeiden (BB 2; AK-Nr. 2). 3.2 Mit Verfügung vom 12. März 2013 setzte die Beschwerdegegnerin die Beiträge des Beschwerdeführers aus selbstständiger Erwerbstätigkeit für das Jahr 2011 aufgrund eines von der zuständigen Steuerbehörde für die direkte Bundessteuer gemeldeten Einkommens aus selbstständiger Erwerbstätigkeit von CHF 32'343.00 bzw. – nach Abzug des Rentnerfreibetrages im Jahr 2011 von CHF 16'800.00, nach Aufrechnung der persönlichen Beiträge von CHF 856.55 und nach Vornahme eines Zinsabzugs auf dem Eigenkapital per 31. Dezember 2011 von CHF 20.00 – auf dem beitragspflichtigen Einkommen von (gerundet) CHF 16'300.00 fest. Dies ergab eine Beitragsforderung von insgesamt CHF 892.80 (Persönlicher Beitrag von CHF 850.80 und Verwaltungskosten von CHF 42.00) bzw. – nach der bereits für diese Beitragsperiode erfolgter Fakturierung von Beiträgen in Höhe von CHF 2'254.80 - ein Saldo zu Gunsten des Beschwerdeführers von CHF 1'362.00 (AK-Nr. 2). 3.3 Mit gleichentags verfasstem Schreiben vom 12. März 2013 wurde dem Beschwerdeführer mitgeteilt, das vorerwähnte Schreiben vom 9. Januar 2013 betreffend Akontobeiträge 2013 (E. II. 3.1 hiervor) werde ersetzt und die Akontobeiträge müssten nun – unter Vorbehalt der definitiven Steuerveranlagung - auf einem Erwerbseinkommen im Jahr 2013 von nurmehr CHF 32'000.00 bzw. einem beitragspflichtigen Einkommen von (gerundet) CHF 15'100.00 festgesetzt werden; dies ergab zu entrichtende Akontobeiträge von CHF 1'023.60 (Persönlicher Beitrag von CHF 788.40, FAK SO [SE] von CHF 196.20 und Verwaltungskosten von CHF 39.00). Gemäss der Differenzabrechnung auf der Rückseite dieses Schreibens resultierte dabei ein Saldo zu Gunsten des Beschwerdeführers von CHF 188.90. Im Weiteren wurde erneut darauf hingewiesen, die Beiträge würden vorläufig anhand der zur Verfügung stehenden Angaben festgesetzt, da noch keine Steuerveranlagung vorliege. Der Beschwerdeführer habe eine wesentliche Veränderung des Einkommens aus selbstständiger Erwerbstätigkeit der Beschwerdegegnerin innerhalb von 12 Monaten nach Ablauf des Beitragsjahres schriftlich zu melden. Dadurch lasse sich eine allfällige Verzinsung der Differenz zwischen Akontobeiträgen und tatsächlich geschuldeten Beiträgen vermeiden (BB 3; AK-Nr. 2). 3.4 Am 19. Februar 2014 verlangte die Beschwerdegegnerin bei der Steuerverwaltung des Kantons Solothurn auf elektronischem Weg den Beschwerdeführer betreffende AHV-Steuermeldungen (Sedex; AK-Nr. 3; vgl. E. II. 2.5 hiervor). Da die Aussage des Beschwerdeführers, wonach die kantonale Steuerbehörde Solothurn die AHV-Meldung 2013 per 23. April 2015 auf elektronischem Weg habe zukommen lassen, von der Beschwerdegegnerin nicht bestätigt werden konnte, erfolgte hierzu am 16. August 2018 ein interner Datenabgleich der «IT» der Beschwerdegegnerin. Aufgrund dieses Datenabgleichs konnte ein Eingang der AHV-Meldung 2013 am 23. April 2015 bei der Beschwerdegegnerin definitiv ausgeschlossen werden (vgl. AK-Nr. 4 und BB 14). 3.5 Mangels feststellbaren Erhalts der AHV-Meldung 2013 mahnte die Beschwerdegegnerin die Steuerbehörde am 8. Februar 2018 (AK-Nr. 5). Am 23. Februar 2018 meldete die Steuerbehörde des Kantons Solothurn der Beschwerdegegnerin das Einkommen des Beschwerdeführers aus seiner selbstständigen Erwerbstätigkeit in Höhe von CHF 43'093.00 (AK-Nr. 6). 3.6 Am 23. Februar 2018 erliess die Beschwerdegegnerin auf dem im Jahr 2013 erzielten Einkommen von CHF 43'093.00 bzw. einem beitragspflichtigen Einkommen von (gerundet) CHF 27'000.00 die definitive Beitragsverfügung und setzte die Beiträge auf CHF 1'972.20 fest, woraus sich gemäss der Differenzabrechnung ein Saldo zu Gunsten der Beschwerdegegnerin von CHF 948.60 (Jahresbetrag von CHF 1'972.20 abzüglich bereits fakturierter Betrag von CHF 1'023.60). Gleichzeitig wurden auf dem Saldo aller zinspflichtiger Beiträge von CHF 948.60 Verzugszinsen für den Zeitraum vom 1. Januar 2015 bis 23. Februar 2018 in Höhe von CHF 149.25 (Zinssatz von 5 %) in Rechnung gestellt. Zur Begründung gab die Beschwerdegegnerin an, sie habe von der zuständigen Steuerbehörde für die direkte Bundessteuer die AHV-Steuermeldung erhalten. Diese sei für die Ausgleichskasse verbindlich (BB 5). 3.7 Die Beschwerdegegnerin teilte dem Beschwerdeführer auf dessen Eingaben vom 4. und 7. April 2018 (BB 6 und 8) hin mit Schreiben vom 16. Mai 2018 mit, die Verfügung betreffend Beiträge für das Jahr 2011 sei ihm am 12. März 2013 mit einem Einkommen in Höhe von CHF 32'343.00 eröffnet worden. Dieses sei dann als neue Grundlage für die Akontoanpassung 2013 herangezogen worden. Auf eine Mitteilung, wonach diese Neueinschätzung nicht dem voraussichtlichen Einkommen entspreche, habe der Beschwerdeführer verzichtet. Insofern sei seine Aussage, er habe keine Anpassung des Einkommens verlangt, richtig. Sein Versäumnis habe aber dazu geführt, dass nun Verzugszinsen zu erheben seien. Eine rechtzeitige Anpassung hätte eine Verzugszinsberechnung verhindert. Davon unabhängig sei der Zeitpunkt der Lieferung der definitiven Einkommenszahlen durch die Steuerbehörde. Wenn eine Meldung der Steuerbehörde verspätet zugehe, könne dies nicht der Ausgleichskasse als Versäumnis angerechnet werden. Diese habe fristgerecht am 23. Februar 2018 die definitive Beitragsverfügung 2013 erlassen (BB 9). 4. 4.1 Die Beschwerdegegnerin wies die Einsprache des Beschwerdeführers mit vorliegend angefochtenen Einspracheentscheid vom 24. Juli 2018 im Wesentlichen mit der Begründung ab, die Anpassung der Akontobeiträge für das Jahr 2013 vom 12. März 2013 sei gestützt auf das von der Steuerbehörde gemeldete Einkommen für das Jahr 2011 erfolgt. Der Beschwerdeführer sei verpflichtet gewesen, das den Akontobeiträgen zu Grunde liegende Einkommen zu kontrollieren. Allenfalls hätte er eine kompetente Beratung beiziehen können. Eine rechtzeitige Mitteilung der Einkommenshöhe im Jahr 2013 wäre nicht mit viel Aufwand verbunden gewesen. Der Jahresverdienst bzw. Reingewinn im Jahr 2013 von CHF 43'093.00 sei von der Steuerverwaltung des Kantons Solothurn am 23. Februar 2018 gemeldet worden. Dieses Einkommen sei auf erneute Anfrage hin vom zuständigen Sachbearbeiter der Steuerbehörde bestätigt worden. Im Weiteren habe die Wiederaufrechnung der in Abzug gebrachten persönlichen Beiträge durch die Ausgleichskasse zu erfolgen (A.S. 1 ff.). Der Beschwerdeführer macht demgegenüber geltend, seine Beschwerde betreffe nicht die Beitragszahlung für das Jahr 2013, sondern die Erhebung von Verzugszinsen. Die Beitragsverfügung für die Beiträge 2013 sei erst am 23. Februar 2018 erstellt worden. Auf seine Anfrage bei der Beschwerdegegnerin hin habe er die Antwort erhalten, dass die erforderlichen Angaben der Steuerbehörde erst nach Verlangen vom 8. Februar 2018 eingegangen seien. Seine Recherchen hätten indessen ergeben, dass die Einkommensangaben vom Steueramt Solothurn bereits am 23. April 2015 übermittelt worden seien. Die Beschwerdegegnerin wolle diese jedoch nicht erhalten haben. Sie habe angegeben, die Einkommensmeldung am 4. März 2016 verlangt zu haben; die Steuerverwaltung finde jedoch keine solche Anfrage. Erst das Verlangen der Steuermeldung vom 8. Februar 2018 sei dokumentiert; auf diese Eingabe hin sei die Steuermeldung 2013 zugestellt worden. Im Weiteren wird vom Beschwerdeführer beanstandet, es seien ihm am 9. Januar und 12. März 2013 zwei Schreiben betreffend Akontobeiträge für das Jahr 2013 auf Einkommen von CHF 46'892.00 und CHF 32'000.00 zugegangen. Diese Einkommenskorrektur sei nicht von ihm verlangt worden. Er wisse nicht, weshalb man diese vorgenommen habe. Dem Vorwurf, er hätte die Einkommensänderungen rechtzeitig melden müssen, sei entgegenzuhalten, dass man zu Beginn des Jahres nicht wissen könne, wieviel man Ende Jahr verdient habe. Ausserdem habe er aus gesundheitlichen Gründen die Beschwerdegegnerin nicht kontrollieren können. Es sei interessant, dass in den Jahren nach 2013 Abrechnungen erstellt worden seien und er zu viel bezahlte Akontobeiträge zurückerhalten habe. Deshalb sei die Erklärung, nach nochmaliger Prüfung sei kein Eingang der fraglichen Steuermeldung feststellbar, nicht sehr glaubwürdig. Wären die Bearbeitung dieser Angelegenheit und der Erlass der Verfügung rechtzeitig erfolgt, hätte man sich den ganzen Aufwand, den Ärger und die Kosten sparen können. Die Beiträge für das Jahr 2013 seien bezahlt worden, nicht jedoch der Verzugszins (A.S. 4 ff.). Mit Replik vom 11. Oktober 2018 hält der Beschwerdeführer an seinem Begehren, es sie auf eine Verzugszinsforderung zu verzichten, fest (A.S. 12 f.). 4.2 Zunächst ist festzustellen, dass die Festsetzung der Beiträge des Beschwerdeführers aus seiner selbstständigen Erwerbstätigkeit für das Jahr 2013 im vorliegenden Beschwerdeverfahren nicht mehr strittig ist. Sowohl die von ihm im Einspracheverfahren beanstandete Differenz bei der Verbuchung seiner bereits erfolgten Akontozahlungen als auch die bei der Beitragsfestsetzung vorzunehmende Aufrechnung der persönlichen Beiträge (vgl. Art. 9 Abs. 4 des Bundesgesetzes über die Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung [AHVG; SR 831.10]) wurden von der Beschwerdegegnerin hinreichend erläutert (vgl. BB 7 und 9, A.S. 3) und die entsprechend Belege eingereicht (vgl. Kontoauszug vom 5. April 2018, AK-Nr. 7). Der Beschwerdeführer erklärte denn auch mit Eingaben vom 7. April (BB 8), 30. Mai (BB 10) und 15. Juni 2018 (BB 11), das im Jahr 2013 erzielte Erwerbseinkommen sei korrekt und die noch offenen Beiträge gemäss Beitragsverfügung vom 23. Februar 2018 von CHF 948.60 seien von ihm bezahlt worden. Dementsprechend weist er in seiner vorliegend zu beurteilenden Beschwerde darauf hin, diese betreffe nicht die Beitragszahlung für das Jahr 2013, sondern ausschliesslich den gleichzeitig festgesetzten Verzugszins von CHF 149.25 (A.S. 4). Demnach ist zu prüfen, ob sich dieser als gesetzeskonform erweist. 4.3 Der Auffassung des Beschwerdeführers, die Beitragsverfügung 2013 (AK-Nr. 5) sei von der Beschwerdegegnerin erst am 23. Februar 2018 erlassen worden, was diese zu verantworten habe, da die Einkommensangaben für das Jahr 2013 von der Steuerbehörde bereits am 23. April 2015 übermittelt worden seien, und demzufolge sei auf eine Verzugszinsforderung zu verzichten, kann nicht gefolgt werden. Wie (unter E. II. 2.2 hiervor) erwähnt, kommt dem Verzugszins ausschliesslich die Funktion eines Vorteilsausgleichs wegen verspäteter Zahlung der Hauptschuld zu. Die Verzugszinsen bezwecken unbekümmert um den tatsächlichen Nutzen und Schaden, den Zinsverlust des Gläubigers und den Zinsgewinn des Schuldners in pauschalierter Form auszugleichen. Der Verzugszins weist keinen pönalen Charakter auf und ist unabhängig von einem Verschulden am Verzug geschuldet. Demnach ist unerheblich, ob den Beitragspflichtigen oder die Ausgleichskasse ein Verschulden an der Verzögerung der Beitragsfestsetzung oder –zahlung trifft. Im Lichte dieser Rechtsprechung ist der vom Beschwerdeführer vorgebrachte Einwand unerheblich. Nachdem die Verzugszinspflicht auch besteht, wenn der Verzug einem Verschulden der Beschwerdegegnerin zuzuschreiben wäre, hat die Zinspflicht erst recht zu gelten, wenn ein Versäumnis einer anderen Amtsstelle, namentlich des Steueramts, vorliegen sollte (vgl. BGE 139 V 297 E. 3.3.2.2 S. 305 und 134 V 202 E. 3.3 S. 206, je mit Hinweisen). Es ist somit für die Verzugszinspflicht des Beschwerdeführers nicht relevant, dass der zuständige Sachbearbeiter des Steueramts Solothurn dem Beschwerdeführer gemäss seinen Angaben bestätigte, die AHV-Meldung betreffend Einkommen aus seiner selbstständigen Erwerbstätigkeit sei der Beschwerdegegnerin bereits am 23. April 2015 übermittelt worden. Ebenso wenig ist massgebend, dass der zuständige Sachbearbeiter der Beschwerdegegnerin dem Beschwerdeführer bestätigt haben soll, die AHV-Meldung sei am 4. März 2016 bei der Steuerbehörde reklamiert worden. Diese (unbelegten) Behauptungen des Beschwerdeführers vermögen an der bestehenden Verzugszinspflicht des Beschwerdeführers nichts zu ändern. 4.4 Im Weiteren ist – angesichts der vom Beschwerdeführer vorgebrachten Einwände – lediglich ergänzend festzuhalten, dass die Beschwerdegegnerin aufgrund der Abklärungen ihrer IT-Spezialisten keinen Eingang der von der kantonalen Steuerbehörde am 23. April 2015 angeblich übermittelten Steuermeldung 2013 feststellen konnte. Gemäss ihren nachvollziehbaren Ausführungen erfolgte am 19. Februar 2014 die elektronische Bestellung (Sedex) der AHV-Meldung 2013 bei der zuständigen Steuerbehörde des Kantons Solothurn (AK-Nr. 3; vgl. E. II. 2.5 hiervor). Aufgrund des von den IT-Spezialisten durchgeführten internen Datenabgleichs vom 16. August 2018 ist ein Eingang einer AHV-Meldung 2013 am 23. April 2015 definitiv auszuschliessen, zumal die Beschwerdegegnerin darauf hinweist, Einträge auf diesem Auszug seien nicht manipulierbar und könnten daher von ihr nicht ausgetragen werden (vgl. Beschwerdeantwort, A.S. 8). Den vorliegenden Unterlagen (Auszug/Zusammenfassung und detaillierte Steuermeldungen) können nur die Zustellungen der den Beschwerdeführer betreffenden Steuermeldungen für die Jahre 2012 vom 3. April 2014 (Einkommen von CHF 77'163.00), für das Jahr 2014 vom 3. März 2016 (Einkommen von CHF 15'627.00) und für das Jahr 2015 vom 2. März 2017 (Einkommen von CHF 13'522.00) entnommen werden (vgl. AK-Nr. 4). Mangels feststellbaren Erhalts der AHV-Meldung für das Jahr 2013 wurde am 8. Februar 2018 die Zustellung der AHV-Meldung bei der Steuerbehörde gemahnt (AK-Nr. 5). Am 23. Februar 2018 stellte dann die Steuerbehörde die detaillierte AHV-Meldung für das Jahr 2013 (Einkommen von CHF 43’093.00) der Beschwerdegegnerin zu (AK-Nr. 6). Diese wurde gleichentags verarbeitet und die entsprechende Beitragsforderung dem Beschwerdeführer zugestellt (Verfügung vom 23. Februar 2018, AK-Nr. 1). Die Beschwerdegegnerin teilte dem Beschwerdeführer auf dessen Eingaben vom 8. und 14. August 2018 (BB 12 und 13) hin am 17. August 2018 noch mit, wie bereits kommuniziert sei nach mehrfacher Prüfung durch ihre IT-Spezialisten kein Eingang der von der kantonalen Steuerbehörde Solothurn angeblich am 23. April 2015 übermittelten Steuermeldung 2013 feststellbar. Die Steuerbehörde gehe alleine «aufgrund eines gesetzten Hakens in einem Prüfkästchen davon aus, dass der elektronische Meldeversand stattgefunden habe. Aus Erfahrung mit anderen kantonalen Steuerbehörden seien hier jedoch häufiger Fehlfunktionen möglich, sodass der Versand keinesfalls als belegt gelten könne» (BB 14). Diese Darstellung der Beschwerdegegnerin erscheint angesichts der durchgeführten mehrmaligen Abklärungen durch ihre IT-Spezialisten als plausibel und nachvollziehbar, zumal der Beschwerdeführer seine Behauptung nicht belegen kann. Auch die stets erneuerte Darstellung des Beschwerdeführers, das Ausbleiben der AHV-Meldung für das Jahr 2013 sei von der Beschwerdegegnerin am 4. März 2016 bei der Steuerbehörde reklamiert worden, bleibt unbelegt und ist anzuzweifeln, weist doch der Beschwerdeführer selber darauf hin, die Steuerbehörde finde keine solche Anfrage (vgl. BB 6, 8, 10, 11 und 12, A.S. 4 und 12). Dass die Beitragsfestsetzung für das Jahr 2017 (der Beschwerdeführer erzielte seit 2 Jahren kein Einkommen mehr über dem Rentenfreibetrag von CHF 16’800.00 pro Jahr) aufgrund der vorgenommenen Differenzabrechnung ein Saldo zu Gunsten des Beschwerdeführers ergab (vgl. Schreiben der Beschwerdegegnerin vom 2. März 2017, BB 4), vermag die Abklärungsergebnisse der Beschwerdegegnerin nicht in Frage zu stellen. Wie oben (unter E. II. 4.3 hiervor erwähnt), sind die vom Beschwerdeführer wiederholt erhobenen Einwände jedoch nicht relevant, da es für die ihm obliegende Verzugszinspflicht ohne Belang ist, ob die Beschwerdegegnerin oder die Steuerbehörde ein Verschulden trifft. 4.5 Ferner ist darauf hinzuweisen, dass die Beitragspflichtigen den Ausgleichskassen nach Art. 24 Abs. 4 AHVV die für die Festsetzung der Akontobeiträge erforderlichen Auskünfte zu erteilen, Unterlagen auf Verlangen einzureichen und wesentliche Abweichungen vom voraussichtlichen Einkommen zu melden haben. Damit hat es die beitragspflichtige Person in der Hand, Verzugszinsen gemäss Art. 41bis lit. f AHVV zu vermeiden, indem die Ausgleichskasse dank rechtzeitiger Meldung des höheren Erwerbseinkommens die Akontobeiträge heraufsetzt, womit diese weniger als 25 % unter den tatsächlich geschuldeten Beiträgen liegen. Die (rückwirkende) Verzugszinspflicht nach Massgabe von Art. 41bis lit. f AHVV setzt somit nur ein, wenn die beitragspflichtige Person es versäumt, der Verwaltung das höhere Einkommen rechtzeitig zu melden (BGE 134 V 202 E. 3.4 S. 206 f.; vgl. E. II. 2.3 und 2.4 hiervor). Wie die Beschwerdegegnerin zu Recht darauf hinweist, erfolgte die Anpassung bzw. Reduktion der Akontobeiträge für das Jahr 2013 (Einkommen von nurmehr CHF 32’000.00) vom 12. März 2013 (BB 3) – nachdem die Akontobeiträge für dieses Jahr gemäss Schreiben vom 9. Januar 2013 zunächst noch aufgrund der Berechnungsgrundlagen des Vorjahres (Einkommen von CHF 46'892.00) festgesetzt worden waren (BB 2) – gestützt auf das zuvor durch die Steuerbehörde für die direkte Bundessteuer mitgeteilte (verbindliche) Einkommen im Jahr 2011 von CHF 32'343.00 (AK-Nr. 2). Dieses Vorgehen ist korrekt, da die Ausgleichskassen die Akontobeiträge gemäss Art. 24 Abs. 3 AHVV anzupassen haben, wenn sich während oder nach Ablauf des Beitragsjahres zeigt, dass das Einkommen wesentlich vom voraussichtlichen Einkommen abweicht (WSN, Rz. 1153; vgl. E. II. 2.3 und 2.4 hiervor). Das angepasste Einkommen von CHF 32'000.00 weicht vom voraussichtlichen Einkommen von CHF 46'892.00 gemäss dem Schreiben vom 9. Januar 2013 um rund 30 % ab, weshalb es sich um eine wesentliche Abweichung handelt (WSN, Rz. 1155; vgl. E. II. 2.4 hiervor). Die Beschwerdegegnerin war demnach verpflichtet, die Akontobeiträge für das Jahr 2013 auf CHF 32'000.00 zu reduzieren. Ein einsprechendes Verlangen des Beschwerdeführers war hierfür nicht erforderlich. Der Beschwerdeführer versäumte es dann spätestens nach Vorliegen des Geschäftsabschlusses 2013, gegenüber der Beschwerdegegnerin glaubhaft zu machen, dieses Einkommen entspreche offensichtlich nicht seinem voraussichtlichen Einkommen in diesem Jahr (vgl. Art. 24 Abs. 2 AHVV). Es wäre ihm offen gestanden, dies rechtzeitig zu tun, nachdem er von der Beschwerdegegnerin mit Schreiben vom 9. Januar und 12. März 2013 ausdrücklich (mit Fettschrift) darauf aufmerksam gemacht worden war, er habe eine wesentliche Veränderung des Einkommens aus selbstständiger Erwerbstätigkeit der Ausgleichskasse innerhalb von 12 Monaten nach Ablauf des Beitragsjahres schriftlich zu melden, wodurch sich eine allfällige Verzinsung der Differenz zwischen Akontobeiträgen unter tatsächlich geschuldeten Beiträgen vermeiden lasse (BB 2 und 3). Hinweise, dass der Beschwerdeführer aufgrund der von ihm erwähnten gesundheitlichen Probleme oder seines Alters von einer rechtzeitigen Meldung abgehalten worden wäre, sind nicht ersichtlich. Sein Einwand, er habe aus gesundheitlichen Gründen die Arbeit der Beschwerdegegnerin nicht kontrollieren können, geht fehl. Seine Verpflichtung bestand lediglich darin, eine regelmässige Kontrolle seines erheblich schwankenden Einkommens durchzuführen und rechtzeitig eine Meldung der wesentlichen Einkommensänderung an die Beschwerdegegnerin vorzunehmen. Dies hätte genügt, um die vorliegend strittige Verzugszinsforderung der Beschwerdegegnerin zu vermeiden. 5. Nach dem Gesagten ist die Beitragsverfügung der Beschwerdegegnerin für das Jahr 2013 vom 23. Februar 2018, worin gestützt auf ein von der Steuerbehörde gemeldetes Einkommen aus selbstständiger Erwerbstätigkeit von CHF 43'093.00 bzw. ein beitragspflichtiges Einkommen von (gerundet) CHF 27'000.00 neben der definitiven Beitragsforderung in Höhe von insgesamt CHF 1'972.20 auch Verzugszinsen von CHF 149.25 festgesetzt wurden, nicht zu beanstanden. Es bestehen keine Anhaltspunkte, dass der Zinsenlauf (vom 1. Januar 2015 bis 23. Februar 2018) oder der Zinssatz (5 %) nicht korrekt festgesetzt worden wären (vgl. Art. 41bis Abs. 1 lit. f und Art. 42 Abs. 2 und 3 AHVV). Dies wird vom Beschwerdeführer denn auch nicht geltend gemacht. Ob die öffentliche Hand in den fraglichen Jahren (2015 bis 2018) in der Lage gewesen wäre, mit der geschuldeten Summe einen entsprechenden Ertrag zu erwirtschaften, ist unerheblich, da der Verzugszins nicht exakt den der Verwaltung durch den Verzug der beitragspflichtigen Person entstandenen Schaden auszugleichen hat (BGE 134 V 202 E. 3.3.1 und 3.5 S. 206 f.). Die gegen den vorliegend angefochtenen, die Verfügung vom 23. Februar 2018 bestätigenden Einspracheentscheid vom 24. Juli 2018 gerichtete Beschwerde ist abzuweisen. 6. 6.1 Ausgangsgemäss steht dem Beschwerdeführer keine Parteientschädigung zu Lasten der Beschwerdegegnerin zu (Art. 61 lit. g ATSG). 6.2 Grundsätzlich ist das Verfahren kostenlos (Art. 61 lit. a ATSG). Von diesem Grundsatz abzuweichen besteht im vorliegenden Fall kein Anlass. Demnach wird erkannt: 1. Die Beschwerde wird abgewiesen. 2. Es wird keine Parteientschädigung zugesprochen. 3. Es werden keine Verfahrenskosten erhoben. Rechtsmittel Gegen diesen Entscheid kann innert 30 Tagen seit der Mitteilung beim Bundesgericht Beschwerde in öffentlich-rechtlichen Angelegenheiten eingereicht werden (Adresse: Bundesgericht, Schweizerhofquai 6, 6004 Luzern). Die Frist beginnt am Tag nach dem Empfang des Urteils zu laufen und wird durch rechtzeitige Aufgabe bei der Post gewahrt. Die Frist ist nicht erstreckbar (vgl. Art. 39 ff., 82 ff. und 90 ff. des Bundesgerichtsgesetzes, BGG). Bei Vor- und Zwischenentscheiden (dazu gehört auch die Rückweisung zu weiteren Abklärungen) sind die zusätzlichen Voraussetzungen nach Art. 92 oder 93 BGG zu beachten. Versicherungsgericht des Kantons Solothurn Die Vizepräsidentin Der Gerichtsschreiber Weber-Probst Schmidhauser
de	wikipedia	N/A	Tianhe bezeichnet: Tianhe (天河区), Stadtbezirk der Stadt Guangzhou in der chinesischen Provinz Guangdong Tianhe (Chaohu) (天河街道), Straßenviertel der Stadt Chaohu in der chinesischen Provinz Anhui Tianhe (Huancui) (田和街道), Straßenviertel im Stadtbezirk Huancui in der chinesischen Provinz Shandong Tianhe (Huangpi) (天河街道), Straßenviertel im Stadtbezirk Huangpi in der chinesischen Provinz Hubei Tianhe (Ji’an) (天河街道), Straßenviertel im Kreis Ji’an in der chinesischen Provinz Jiangxi Tianhe (Longwan) (天河街道), Straßenviertel im Stadtbezirk Longwan in der chinesischen Provinz Zhejiang Tianhe (Luocheng) (天河街道), Straßenviertel im Autonomen Kreis Luocheng im chinesischen Autonomen Gebiet Guangxi Tianhe (Kaizhou) (天和镇), Großgemeinde im Stadtbezirk Kaizhou in der chinesischen Stadt Chongqing die Supercomputer Tianhe-1A bzw. Tianhe-2 ein Raumstationmodul, siehe Kernmodul Tianhe
fi	wikipedia	N/A	Jalkapallon alle 16-vuotiaiden Euroopan-mestaruuskilpailut 1982 järjestettiin Italiassa Falconara Marittiman ja Senigallian kaupungeissa 5.–7. toukokuuta. Kyseessä oli ensimmäinen Euroopan jalkapalloliiton UEFA:n alle 16-vuotiaiden EM-turnaus. Lopputurnaukseen osallistui neljä maata, jotka olivat päässeet mukaan kaksiosaisen karsinnan kautta. Turnauksessa pelattiin vain välierät sekä pronssi- ja loppuottelut. Välierät Pronssiottelu Loppuottelu Suomen joukkue Mika Malinen (mv) Asko Ristimäki (mv) Jouni Alen Olli-Pekka Heinonen Miika Juntunen Ismo Lius Mika Muhonen Thomas Nordström Petri Ojala Tuomo Pasanen Anssi Salmi Mika Sankala Petter Setälä Kari Skants Jouni Taskinen Kai Tohka Lähteet Euroopan jalkapalloliitto UEFA RSSSF, European U-16 Championship 1982 Alle 16-vuotiaiden Euroopan-mestaruuskilpailut 1982 Alle 16-vuotiaiden Euroopan-mestaruuskilpailut
pl	other	N/A	Ustawa z dnia 16 kwietnia 2004 r. o ochronie przyrody 1 - PDF Download "Ustawa z dnia 16 kwietnia 2004 r. o ochronie przyrody 1" 1 UWAGA: Jedyne źródło prawa na terenie RP stanowią akty ogłaszane i wydawane w Dzienniku Ustaw i Monitorze Polskim. Niniejsza ujednolicona wersja tekstu ustawy została opracowana przez PTOP Salamandra i moŝe być traktowana jedynie jako materiał informacyjny i pomocniczy. Towarzystwo nie odpowiada za skutki działań podjętych w oparciu o to opracowanie. Dokładamy wszelkich starań, aby zamieszczany na naszej stronie internetowej ujednolicony tekst ustawy o ochronie przyrody był zawsze aktualny i poprawny. W przypadku dostrzeŝenia jakiegokolwiek błędu, prosimy o jego zgłoszenie.) Dz.U. z 2004 r. Nr 92, poz. 880, z 2005 r. Nr 113, poz. 954, Nr 130, poz. 1087, z 2007 r. Nr 75, poz. 493, Nr 176, poz. 1238, Nr 181, poz. 1286, z 2008 r. Nr 154, poz. 958, Nr 199, poz. 1227, Nr 201, poz. 1237, z 2009 r. Nr 18, poz. 97, Nr 92, poz Ustawa z dnia 16 kwietnia 2004 r. o ochronie przyrody 1 Rozdział 1 Przepisy ogólne Art. 1. Ustawa określa cele, zasady i formy ochrony przyrody Ŝywej i nieoŝywionej oraz krajobrazu. Art Ochrona przyrody, w rozumieniu ustawy, polega na zachowaniu, zrównowaŝonym uŝytkowaniu oraz odnawianiu zasobów, tworów i składników przyrody: 1) dziko występujących roślin, zwierząt i grzybów; 2) roślin, zwierząt i grzybów objętych ochroną gatunkową; 3) zwierząt prowadzących wędrowny tryb Ŝycia; 4) siedlisk przyrodniczych; 5) siedlisk zagroŝonych wyginięciem, rzadkich i chronionych gatunków roślin, zwierząt i grzybów; 6) tworów przyrody Ŝywej i nieoŝywionej oraz kopalnych szczątków roślin i zwierząt; 7) krajobrazu; 8) zieleni w miastach i wsiach; 9) zadrzewień. 2. Celem ochrony przyrody jest: 1 Niniejsza ustawa dokonuje w zakresie swojej regulacji wdroŝenia następujących dyrektyw Wspólnot Europejskich: 1) dyrektywy Rady 79/409/EWG z dnia 2 kwietnia 1979 r. w sprawie ochrony dzikiego ptactwa (Dz.Urz. WE L 103 z , str. 1, z późn. zm.; Dz.Urz. UE Polskie wydanie specjalne, rozdz. 15, t. 1, str. 98, z późn. zm.), 2) dyrektywy Rady 92/43/EWG z dnia 21 maja 1992 r. w sprawie ochrony siedlisk przyrodniczych oraz dzikiej fauny i flory (Dz.Urz. WE L 206 z , str. 7, z późn. zm.; Dz.Urz. UE Polskie wydanie specjalne, rozdz. 15, t. 2, str. 102, z późn. zm.), 3) dyrektywy Rady 1999/22/WE z dnia 29 marca 1999 r. dotyczącej trzymania dzikich zwierząt w ogrodach zoologicznych (Dz.Urz. WE L 94 z , str. 24; Dz.Urz. UE Polskie wydanie specjalne, rozdz. 15, t. 4, str. 140). 2 1) utrzymanie procesów ekologicznych i stabilności ekosystemów; 2) zachowanie róŝnorodności biologicznej; 3) zachowanie dziedzictwa geologicznego i paleontologicznego; 4) zapewnienie ciągłości istnienia gatunków roślin, zwierząt i grzybów, wraz z ich siedliskami, przez ich utrzymywanie lub przywracanie do właściwego stanu ochrony; 5) ochrona walorów krajobrazowych, zieleni w miastach i wsiach oraz zadrzewień; 6) utrzymywanie lub przywracanie do właściwego stanu ochrony siedlisk przyrodniczych, a takŝe pozostałych zasobów, tworów i składników przyrody; 7) kształtowanie właściwych postaw człowieka wobec przyrody przez edukację, informowanie i promocję w dziedzinie ochrony przyrody. Art. 3. Cele ochrony przyrody są realizowane przez: 1) uwzględnianie wymagań ochrony przyrody w polityce ekologicznej państwa, programach ochrony środowiska przyjmowanych przez organy jednostek samorządu terytorialnego, koncepcji przestrzennego zagospodarowania kraju, strategiach rozwoju województw, planach zagospodarowania przestrzennego województw, strategiach rozwoju gmin, studiach uwarunkowań i kierunków zagospodarowania przestrzennego gmin, miejscowych planach zagospodarowania przestrzennego i planach zagospodarowania przestrzennego morskich wód wewnętrznych, morza terytorialnego i wyłącznej strefy ekonomicznej oraz w działalności gospodarczej i inwestycyjnej; 2) obejmowanie zasobów, tworów i składników przyrody formami ochrony przyrody; 3) opracowywanie i realizację ustaleń planów ochrony dla obszarów podlegających ochronie prawnej, programów ochrony gatunków, siedlisk i szlaków migracji gatunków chronionych; 4) realizację krajowej strategii ochrony i zrównowaŝonego uŝytkowania róŝnorodności biologicznej wraz z programem działań; 5) prowadzenie działalności edukacyjnej, informacyjnej i promocyjnej w dziedzinie ochrony przyrody; 6) prowadzenie badań naukowych nad problemami związanymi z ochroną przyrody. Art Obowiązkiem organów administracji publicznej, osób prawnych i innych jednostek organizacyjnych oraz osób fizycznych jest dbałość o przyrodę będącą dziedzictwem i bogactwem narodowym. 2. Organy administracji publicznej są obowiązane do zapewnienia warunków prawnych, organizacyjnych i finansowych dla ochrony przyrody. 3. Obowiązkiem organów administracji publicznej, instytucji naukowych i oświatowych, a takŝe publicznych środków masowego przekazu jest prowadzenie działalności edukacyjnej, informacyjnej i promocyjnej w dziedzinie ochrony przyrody. Art. 4a. Ilekroć w niniejszej ustawie mowa jest o Wspólnocie rozumie się przez to Wspólnoty Europejskie. 3 Art. 5. UŜyte w ustawie określenia oznaczają: 1) gatunek zarówno gatunek w znaczeniu biologicznym, jak i kaŝdą niŝszą od gatunku biologicznego jednostkę systematyczną, populację, a takŝe mieszańce tego gatunku w pierwszym lub drugim pokoleniu, z wyjątkiem form, ras i odmian udomowionych, hodowlanych lub uprawnych; 1a) gatunek będący przedmiotem zainteresowania Wspólnoty gatunek roślin lub zwierząt, który na terytorium państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej jest: a) zagroŝony, z wyjątkiem gatunków, których naturalny zasięg na tym terytorium jest zasięgiem krańcowym i które nie są zagroŝone lub podatne na zagroŝenie w zachodnim regionie palearktycznym, lub b) podatny na zagroŝenie, czyli mogący w najbliŝszej przyszłości zostać zakwalifikowanym do kategorii gatunków zagroŝonych, jeśli czynniki będące przyczyną zagroŝenia będą na niego nadal oddziaływać, lub c) rzadki, czyli o niewielkiej populacji, który nie jest obecnie zagroŝony ani podatny na zagroŝenie, ale podlega ryzyku zagroŝenia ze względu na występowanie w obrębie ograniczonych obszarów geograficznych albo znaczne rozproszenie na większym obszarze, lub d) endemiczny i wymagający specjalnej uwagi ze względu na szczególny charakter jego siedliska lub potencjalne oddziaływanie jego eksploatacji na te siedliska lub potencjalne oddziaływanie jego eksploatacji na stan jego ochrony; 1b) gatunek o znaczeniu priorytetowym gatunek zagroŝony, w odniesieniu do którego Wspólnota ponosi szczególną odpowiedzialność z powodu wielkości jego naturalnego zasięgu mieszczącego się na terytorium państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej; 1c) gatunek obcy gatunek występujący poza swoim naturalnym zasięgiem w postaci osobników lub zdolnych do przeŝycia: gamet, zarodników, nasion, jaj lub części osobników, dzięki którym mogą one rozmnaŝać się; 1d) integralność obszaru Natura 2000 spójność czynników strukturalnych i funkcjonalnych warunkujących zrównowaŝone trwanie populacji gatunków i siedlisk przyrodniczych, dla ochrony których zaprojektowano lub wyznaczono obszar Natura 2000; 2) korytarz ekologiczny obszar umoŝliwiający migrację roślin, zwierząt lub grzybów; 2a) krzyŝowanie zwierząt kojarzenie osobników genetycznie odmiennych, w tym osobników róŝnych gatunków; 2b) obszar Natura 2000 obszar specjalnej ochrony ptaków, specjalny obszar ochrony siedlisk lub obszar mający znaczenie dla Wspólnoty, utworzony w celu ochrony populacji dziko występujących ptaków lub siedlisk przyrodniczych lub gatunków będących przedmiotem zainteresowania Wspólnoty; 2c) obszar mający znaczenie dla Wspólnoty projektowany specjalny obszar ochrony siedlisk, zatwierdzony przez Komisję Europejską w drodze decyzji, który w regionie biogeograficznym, do którego naleŝy, w znaczący sposób przyczynia się do zachowania lub odtworzenia stanu właściwej ochrony siedliska przyrodniczego lub gatunku będącego przedmiotem zainteresowania Wspólnoty, a takŝe moŝe znacząco przyczynić się do spójności sieci obszarów Natura 2000 i zachowania róŝnorodności biologicznej w obrębie danego regionu biogeograficznego; w przypadku gatunków zwierząt występujących na 4 duŝych obszarach obszarem mającym znaczenie dla Wspólnoty jest obszar w obrębie naturalnego zasięgu takich gatunków, charakteryzujący się fizycznymi lub biologicznymi czynnikami istotnymi dla ich Ŝycia lub rozmnaŝania; 2d) obszar morski polski obszar morski w rozumieniu ustawy z dnia 21 marca 1991 r. o obszarach morskich Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i administracji morskiej (Dz.U. z 2003 r. Nr 153, poz. 1502, z późn. zm. 2 ); 3) obszar specjalnej ochrony ptaków obszar wyznaczony, zgodnie z przepisami prawa Unii Europejskiej, do ochrony populacji dziko występujących ptaków jednego lub wielu gatunków, w którego granicach ptaki mają korzystne warunki bytowania w ciągu całego Ŝycia, w dowolnym jego okresie albo stadium rozwoju; 4) ochrona częściowa ochronę gatunków roślin, zwierząt i grzybów dopuszczającą moŝliwość redukcji liczebności populacji oraz pozyskiwania osobników tych gatunków lub ich części; 5) ochrona czynna stosowanie, w razie potrzeby, zabiegów ochronnych w celu przywrócenia naturalnego stanu ekosystemów i składników przyrody lub zachowania siedlisk przyrodniczych oraz siedlisk roślin, zwierząt lub grzybów; 6) ochrona ex situ ochronę gatunków roślin, zwierząt i grzybów poza miejscem ich naturalnego występowania oraz ochronę skał, skamieniałości i minerałów w miejscach ich przechowywania; 7) ochrona in situ ochronę gatunków roślin, zwierząt i grzybów, a takŝe elementów przyrody nieoŝywionej, w miejscach ich naturalnego występowania; 8) ochrona krajobrazowa zachowanie cech charakterystycznych danego krajobrazu; 9) ochrona ścisła całkowite i trwałe zaniechanie bezpośredniej ingerencji człowieka w stan ekosystemów, tworów i składników przyrody oraz w przebieg procesów przyrodniczych na obszarach objętych ochroną, a w przypadku gatunków całoroczną ochronę naleŝących do nich osobników i stadiów ich rozwoju; 10) ogród botaniczny urządzony i zagospodarowany teren wraz z infrastrukturą techniczną i budynkami funkcjonalnie z nim związanymi, będący miejscem ochrony ex situ, uprawy roślin róŝnych stref klimatycznych i siedlisk, uprawy roślin określonego gatunku oraz prowadzenia badań naukowych i edukacji; 11) ogród zoologiczny urządzony i zagospodarowany teren wraz z infrastrukturą techniczną i budynkami funkcjonalnie z nim związanymi, gdzie są przetrzymywane oraz eksponowane publicznie przez co najmniej 7 dni w roku, Ŝywe zwierzęta gatunków dziko występujących, z wyjątkiem: a) cyrków, b) sklepów ze zwierzętami, c) miejsc, w których eksponowanych jest publicznie nie więcej niŝ 15 gatunków tych zwierząt i łącznie nie więcej niŝ 50 okazów gadów, ptaków i ssaków; 11a) okaz gatunku roślinę, zwierzę lub grzyb z danego gatunku, Ŝywe lub martwe, kaŝdą ich część, formę rozwojową, jajo lub wydmuszkę, a takŝe produkt pochodny równieŝ zawarty 2 Zmiany tekstu jednolitego wymienionej ustawy zostały ogłoszone w Dz.U. z 2003 r. Nr 170, poz. 1652, z 2004 r. Nr 6, poz. 41, Nr 93, poz. 895, Nr 273, poz. 2703, z 2005 r. Nr 203, poz. 1683, z 2006 r. Nr 220, poz. 1600, Nr 249, poz. 1834, z 2007 r. Nr 21, poz. 125 oraz z 2008 r. Nr 171, poz 5 w innych towarach oraz towary, które zgodnie z dołączonym dokumentem, opakowaniem, oznakowaniem lub etykietą, lub jeŝeli wynika to z jakichkolwiek innych okoliczności, mają zawierać lub zawierają części lub produkty pochodne z roślin, zwierząt, lub grzybów z danego gatunku; 12) ostoja miejsce o warunkach sprzyjających egzystencji roślin, zwierząt lub grzybów zagroŝonych wyginięciem lub rzadkich gatunków; 13) ośrodek rehabilitacji zwierząt miejsce, w którym jest prowadzone leczenie i rehabilitacja zwierząt dziko występujących, wymagających okresowej opieki człowieka w celu przywrócenia ich do środowiska przyrodniczego; 14) otulina strefę ochronną graniczącą z formą ochrony przyrody i wyznaczoną indywidualnie dla formy ochrony przyrody w celu zabezpieczenia przed zagroŝeniami zewnętrznymi wynikającymi z działalności człowieka; 15) pozyskiwanie: a) zbiór roślin lub grzybów gatunków chronionych lub ich części ze stanowisk naturalnych do celów gospodarczych, b) chwytanie, łowienie lub zbieranie zwierząt gatunków chronionych lub ich części i produktów pochodnych do celów gospodarczych; c) (uchylona); 16) róŝnorodność biologiczna zróŝnicowanie Ŝywych organizmów występujących w ekosystemach, w obrębie gatunku i między gatunkami, oraz zróŝnicowanie ekosystemów; 17) siedlisko przyrodnicze obszar lądowy lub wodny, naturalny, półnaturalny lub antropogeniczny, wyodrębniony w oparciu o cechy geograficzne, abiotyczne i biotyczne; 17a) siedlisko przyrodnicze będące przedmiotem zainteresowania Wspólnoty siedlisko przyrodnicze, które na terytorium państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej: a) jest zagroŝone zanikiem w swoim naturalnym zasięgu lub b) ma niewielki zasięg naturalny w wyniku regresji lub z powodu ograniczonego obszaru występowania wynikającego z jego wewnętrznych, przyrodniczych właściwości, lub c) stanowi reprezentatywny przykład typowych cech regionu biogeograficznego występującego w państwach członkowskich Unii Europejskiej; 17b) siedlisko przyrodnicze o znaczeniu priorytetowym siedlisko przyrodnicze zagroŝone zanikiem na terytorium państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej, za którego ochronę Wspólnota ponosi szczególną odpowiedzialność z powodu wielkości jego naturalnego zasięgu mieszczącego się na terytorium tych państw; 18) siedlisko roślin, siedlisko zwierząt lub siedlisko grzybów obszar występowania roślin, zwierząt lub grzybów w ciągu całego Ŝycia lub dowolnym stadium ich rozwoju; 19) specjalny obszar ochrony siedlisk obszar wyznaczony, zgodnie z przepisami prawa Unii Europejskiej, w celu trwałej ochrony siedlisk przyrodniczych lub populacji zagroŝonych wyginięciem gatunków roślin lub zwierząt lub w celu odtworzenia właściwego stanu ochrony siedlisk przyrodniczych lub właściwego stanu ochrony tych gatunków; 20) środowisko przyrodnicze krajobraz wraz z tworami przyrody nieoŝywionej oraz naturalnymi i przekształconymi siedliskami przyrodniczymi z występującymi na nich roślinami, zwierzętami i grzybami; 6 21) tereny zieleni tereny wraz z infrastrukturą techniczną i budynkami funkcjonalnie z nimi związanymi, pokryte roślinnością, znajdujące się w granicach wsi o zwartej zabudowie lub miast, pełniące funkcje estetyczne, rekreacyjne, zdrowotne lub osłonowe, a w szczególności parki, zieleńce, promenady, bulwary, ogrody botaniczne, zoologiczne, jordanowskie i zabytkowe oraz cmentarze, a takŝe zieleń towarzyszącą ulicom, placom, zabytkowym fortyfikacjom, budynkom, składowiskom, lotniskom oraz obiektom kolejowym i przemysłowym; 22) udostępnianie umoŝliwianie fotografowania lub filmowania w celach zarobkowych oraz korzystania z zasobów, tworów i składników przyrody w celach naukowych, edukacyjnych, turystycznych, rekreacyjnych i sportowych; 23) walory krajobrazowe wartości ekologiczne, estetyczne lub kulturowe obszaru oraz związane z nim rzeźbę terenu, twory i składniki przyrody, ukształtowane przez siły przyrody lub działalność człowieka; 24) właściwy stan ochrony gatunku sumę oddziaływań na gatunek, mogącą w dającej się przewidzieć przyszłości wpływać na rozmieszczenie i liczebność jego populacji na terenie kraju lub państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej lub naturalnego zasięgu tego gatunku, przy której dane o dynamice liczebności populacji tego gatunku wskazują, Ŝe gatunek jest trwałym składnikiem właściwego dla niego siedliska, naturalny zasięg gatunku nie zmniejsza się ani nie ulegnie zmniejszeniu w dającej się przewidzieć przyszłości oraz odpowiednio duŝe siedlisko dla utrzymania się populacji tego gatunku istnieje i prawdopodobnie nadal będzie istniało; 25) właściwy stan ochrony siedliska przyrodniczego sumę oddziaływań na siedlisko przyrodnicze i jego typowe gatunki, mogącą w dającej się przewidzieć przyszłości wpływać na naturalne rozmieszczenie, strukturę, funkcje lub przeŝycie jego typowych gatunków na terenie kraju lub państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej lub naturalnego zasięgu tego siedliska, przy której naturalny zasięg siedliska przyrodniczego i obszary zajęte przez to siedlisko w obrębie jego zasięgu nie zmieniają się lub zwiększają się, struktura i funkcje, które są konieczne do długotrwałego utrzymania się siedliska, istnieją i prawdopodobnie nadal będą istniały oraz typowe dla tego siedliska gatunki znajdują się we właściwym stanie ochrony; 26) wstęp do parku narodowego albo rezerwatu przyrody wejście lub wjazd na obszar objęty ochroną ścisłą lub czynną w celu naukowym, edukacyjnym, turystycznym lub rekreacyjnym; 27) zadrzewienie drzewa i krzewy w granicach pasa drogowego, pojedyncze drzewa lub krzewy albo ich skupiska niebędące lasem w rozumieniu art. 3 ustawy z dnia 28 września 1991 r. o lasach (Dz.U. z 2000 r. Nr 56, poz. 679, z późn. zm. 3 ), wraz z terenem, na którym występują, i pozostałymi składnikami szaty roślinnej tego terenu, spełniające cele ochronne, produkcyjne lub społeczno-kulturowe; 28) zagroŝenie wewnętrzne czynnik mogący wywołać niekorzystne zmiany cech fizycznych, chemicznych lub biologicznych zasobów, tworów i składników chronionej przyrody, walorów krajobrazowych oraz przebiegu procesów przyrodniczych, wynikający z przyczyn 3 Zmiany tekstu jednolitego wymienionej ustawy zostały ogłoszone w Dz.U. z 2000 r. Nr 86, poz. 958 i Nr 120, poz. 1268, z 2001 r. Nr 110, poz i Nr 145, poz. 1623, z 2002 r. Nr 25, poz. 253, Nr 113, poz. 984 i Nr 200, poz oraz z 2003 r. Nr 80, poz. 717 i poz. 721, Nr 162, poz. 1568, Nr 203, poz i Nr 229, poz 7 naturalnych lub z działalności człowieka w granicach obszarów lub obiektów podlegających ochronie prawnej; 29) zagroŝenie zewnętrzne czynnik mogący wywołać niekorzystne zmiany cech fizycznych, chemicznych lub biologicznych zasobów, tworów i składników chronionej przyrody, walorów krajobrazowych oraz przebiegu procesów przyrodniczych, wynikający z przyczyn naturalnych lub z działalności człowieka, mający swoje źródło poza granicami obszarów lub obiektów podlegających ochronie prawnej. Rozdział 2 Formy ochrony przyrody Art Formami ochrony przyrody są: 1) parki narodowe; 2) rezerwaty przyrody; 3) parki krajobrazowe; 4) obszary chronionego krajobrazu; 5) obszary Natura 2000; 6) pomniki przyrody; 7) stanowiska dokumentacyjne; 8) uŝytki ekologiczne; 9) zespoły przyrodniczo-krajobrazowe; 10) ochrona gatunkowa roślin, zwierząt i grzybów. 2. W drodze porozumienia z sąsiednimi państwami mogą być wyznaczane przygraniczne obszary cenne pod względem przyrodniczym w celu ich wspólnej ochrony. Art Utworzenie lub powiększenie obszaru parku narodowego lub rezerwatu przyrody jest celem publicznym w rozumieniu ustawy z dnia 21 sierpnia 1997 r. o gospodarce nieruchomościami (Dz.U. z 2000 r. Nr 46, poz. 543, z późn. zm. 4 ). 2. Utworzenie lub powiększenie obszaru parku narodowego lub rezerwatu przyrody obejmujące obszary, które stanowią nieruchomości niebędące własnością Skarbu Państwa, następuje za zgodą właściciela, a w razie braku jego zgody w trybie wywłaszczenia określonym w ustawie z dnia 21 sierpnia 1997 r. o gospodarce nieruchomościami. Art Park narodowy obejmuje obszar wyróŝniający się szczególnymi wartościami przyrodniczymi, naukowymi, społecznymi, kulturowymi i edukacyjnymi, o powierzchni nie mniejszej niŝ ha, na którym ochronie podlega cała przyroda oraz walory krajobrazowe. 4 Zmiany wymienionej ustawy zostały ogłoszone w Dz.U. z 2001 r. Nr 129, poz i Nr 154, poz. 1800, z 2002 r. Nr 25, poz. 253, Nr 74, poz. 676, Nr 113, poz. 984, Nr 126, poz. 1070, Nr 130, poz. 1112, Nr 153, poz. 1271, Nr 200, poz i Nr 240, poz. 2058, z 2003 r. Nr 1, poz. 15, Nr 80, poz. 717, 720 i 721, Nr 96, poz. 874, Nr 124, poz. 1152, Nr 162, poz. 1568, Nr 203, poz i Nr 217, poz oraz z 2004 r. Nr 6, poz. 39 i Nr 19, poz. 177. 8 2. Park narodowy tworzy się w celu zachowania róŝnorodności biologicznej, zasobów, tworów i składników przyrody nieoŝywionej i walorów krajobrazowych, przywrócenia właściwego stanu zasobów i składników przyrody oraz odtworzenia zniekształconych siedlisk przyrodniczych, siedlisk roślin, siedlisk zwierząt lub siedlisk grzybów. 3. Park narodowy jest państwową jednostką budŝetową w rozumieniu przepisów o finansach publicznych. 4. Minister właściwy do spraw środowiska, w drodze zarządzenia, nadaje parkowi narodowemu statut określający jego strukturę organizacyjną. Art Nadzór nad parkami narodowymi sprawuje minister właściwy do spraw środowiska. 2. Nadzór, o którym mowa w ust. 1, obejmuje: 1) zatwierdzanie planów finansowych oraz sporządzanie sprawozdań zbiorczych z działalności parków narodowych; 2) zatwierdzanie rocznych zadań rzeczowych wynikających z planu ochrony lub zadań ochronnych; 3) koordynowanie działalności naukowej i edukacyjnej; 4) kontrolę funkcjonowania parków narodowych; 5) funkcjonowanie SłuŜb Parków Narodowych. Art Utworzenie parku narodowego, zmiana jego granic lub likwidacja następuje w drodze rozporządzenia Rady Ministrów, które określa jego nazwę, obszar, przebieg granicy, otulinę i nieruchomości Skarbu Państwa nieprzechodzące w trwały zarząd parku narodowego. Rada Ministrów, wydając rozporządzenie, kieruje się rzeczywistym stanem wartości przyrodniczych obszaru. Likwidacja lub zmniejszenie obszaru parku narodowego następuje wyłącznie w razie bezpowrotnej utraty wartości przyrodniczych i kulturowych jego obszaru. 2. Utworzenie parku narodowego, zmiana jego granic lub likwidacja moŝe nastąpić po uzgodnieniu z właściwymi miejscowo organami uchwałodawczymi jednostek samorządu terytorialnego, na których obszarze działania planuje się powyŝsze zmiany, oraz po zaopiniowaniu, w terminie 30 dni od dnia przedłoŝenia tych zmian, przez zainteresowane organizacje pozarządowe. NiezłoŜenie opinii w przewidzianym terminie uznaje się za brak uwag. 3. Nieruchomości Skarbu Państwa połoŝone w granicach parku narodowego i słuŝące realizacji jego celów zostają oddane w trwały zarząd parku narodowego, na zasadach określonych w rozdziale 5 działu II ustawy z dnia 21 sierpnia 1997 r. o gospodarce nieruchomościami. 4. Administrowanie obszarami morskimi połoŝonymi w granicach parku narodowego odbywa się na podstawie działu III ustawy z dnia 21 marca 1991 r. o obszarach morskich Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i administracji morskiej (Dz.U. z 2003 r. Nr 153, poz. 1502, z późn. zm. 5 ). 5. Parkowi narodowemu przysługuje prawo pierwokupu nieruchomości połoŝonej w granicach parku narodowego na rzecz Skarbu Państwa. 5 Zmiany tekstu jednolitego wymienionej ustawy zostały ogłoszone w Dz.U. z 2003 r. Nr 170, poz oraz z 2004 r. Nr 6, poz. 41. 9 6. Projekty studiów uwarunkowań i kierunków zagospodarowania przestrzennego gmin, miejscowych planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego, planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego województw oraz planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego morskich wód wewnętrznych, morza terytorialnego i wyłącznej strefy ekonomicznej w części dotyczącej parku narodowego i jego otuliny wymagają uzgodnienia z dyrektorem parku narodowego w zakresie ustaleń tych planów, mogących mieć negatywny wpływ na ochronę przyrody parku narodowego. 7. Projekty planów urządzenia lasu, uproszczonych planów urządzenia lasu i zadania z zakresu gospodarki leśnej, o których mowa w art. 19 ust. 3 i 4 ustawy z dnia 28 września 1991 r. o lasach, w części dotyczącej otuliny parku narodowego wymagają uzgodnienia z dyrektorem parku narodowego w zakresie ustaleń tych planów lub zadań, mogących mieć negatywny wpływ na ochronę przyrody parku narodowego. 8. Projekty uproszczonych planów urządzenia lasu lub zadania z zakresu gospodarki leśnej, o których mowa w art. 19 ust. 3 i 4 ustawy z dnia 28 września 1991 r. o lasach, w granicach parku narodowego wymagają uzgodnienia z dyrektorem parku narodowego w zakresie ustaleń tych planów lub zadań, mogących mieć negatywny wpływ na ochronę przyrody parku narodowego. Art Na obszarach graniczących z parkiem narodowym wyznacza się otulinę parku narodowego. 2. W otulinie moŝe być utworzona strefa ochronna zwierząt łownych ze względu na potrzebę ochrony zwierząt w parku narodowym. 3. Strefa ochronna zwierząt łownych nie podlega włączeniu w granice obwodów łowieckich. 4. Minister właściwy do spraw środowiska ustanawia, w drodze rozporządzenia, strefę ochronną zwierząt łownych, określając obszary wchodzące w jej skład oraz kryteria i sposoby utrzymania właściwej liczebności i struktury populacji poszczególnych gatunków zwierząt łownych, kierując się potrzebą: 1) ochrony gatunków zwierząt łownych w parkach narodowych; 2) tworzenia strefy bezpieczeństwa dla gatunków zwierząt łownych wychodzących na Ŝerowiska poza obszar parku narodowego; 3) utrzymywania właściwej liczebności i struktury populacji poszczególnych gatunków zwierząt łownych na obszarze parku narodowego w celu zachowania równowagi przyrodniczej. 5. Ochrona zwierząt łownych w strefie ochronnej zwierząt łownych naleŝy do zadań dyrektora parku narodowego. Art Obszar parku narodowego jest udostępniany w celach naukowych, edukacyjnych, kulturowych, turystycznych, rekreacyjnych i sportowych w sposób, który nie wpłynie negatywnie na przyrodę w parku narodowym. 2. W planie ochrony parku narodowego, a do czasu jego sporządzenia w zadaniach ochronnych ustala się miejsca, które mogą być udostępniane, oraz maksymalną liczbę osób mogących przebywać jednocześnie w tych miejscach. 3. Za wstęp do parku narodowego lub na niektóre jego obszary oraz za udostępnianie parku narodowego lub niektórych jego obszarów mogą być pobierane opłaty. 4. Wysokość opłat, o których mowa w ust. 3, ustala dyrektor parku narodowego. 10 5. Opłata za jednorazowy wstęp do parku nie moŝe przekraczać kwoty 6 zł waloryzowanej o prognozowany średnioroczny wskaźnik cen towarów i usług konsumpcyjnych ogółem, przyjęty w ustawie budŝetowej. 6. Opłaty, o których mowa w ust. 3, uiszcza się w formie wykupu biletu wstępu jednorazowego lub wstępu wielokrotnego w miejscach pobierania opłat lub wnosi się na rachunek bankowy parku narodowego. 7. Opłat za wstęp do parku narodowego lub na niektóre jego obszary nie pobiera się od: 1) dzieci w wieku do 7 lat; 2) osób, które posiadają zezwolenie dyrektora parku narodowego na prowadzenie badań naukowych w zakresie ochrony przyrody; 3) uczniów szkół i studentów odbywających zajęcia dydaktyczne w parku narodowym w zakresie uzgodnionym z dyrektorem parku narodowego; 4) mieszkańców gmin połoŝonych w granicach parku narodowego i gmin graniczących z parkiem narodowym; 5) osób udających się do wyznaczonych w parku narodowym plaŝ; 6) osób udających się do miejsc kultu religijnego. 8. Opłatę za wstęp do parku narodowego lub na niektóre jego obszary w wysokości 50% stawki opłaty ustalonej przez dyrektora parku narodowego pobiera się od: 1) uczniów szkół i studentów; 2) emerytów i rencistów; 3) osób niepełnosprawnych; 4) Ŝołnierzy słuŝby czynnej. 9. Opłaty, o których mowa w ust. 3, są przychodami gospodarstw pomocniczych przy parkach narodowych w rozumieniu art. 20 ustawy z dnia 28 listopada 1998 r. o finansach publicznych (Dz.U. z 2003 r. Nr 15, poz. 148, z późn. zm. 6 ) i są przeznaczone na tworzenie i utrzymanie infrastruktury turystycznej i edukacyjnej parku narodowego oraz na ochronę przyrody. Opłaty pobierane za wstęp do parku narodowego, w wysokości 15% wpływów za kaŝdy kwartał, przeznacza się na dofinansowanie działalności ratowniczej specjalistycznych organizacji ratowniczych Górskiego Ochotniczego Pogotowia Ratunkowego oraz Tatrzańskiego Ochotniczego Pogotowia Ratunkowego, działających na terenie danego parku narodowego. 10. Minister właściwy do spraw środowiska, uwzględniając zróŝnicowanie walorów przyrodniczych i krajobrazowych parków narodowych, nasilenie ruchu turystycznego i jego oddziaływanie na przyrodę parków narodowych, określi, w drodze rozporządzenia, parki narodowe lub niektóre ich obszary, gdzie za wstęp pobiera się opłaty. Art Rezerwat przyrody obejmuje obszary zachowane w stanie naturalnym lub mało zmienionym, ekosystemy, ostoje i siedliska przyrodnicze, a takŝe siedliska roślin, siedliska zwierząt i siedliska grzybów oraz twory i składniki przyrody nieoŝywionej, wyróŝniające się szczególnymi wartościami przyrodniczymi, naukowymi, kulturowymi lub walorami krajobrazowymi. 6 Zmiany tekstu jednolitego wymienionej ustawy zostały ogłoszone w Dz.U. z 2003 r. Nr 45, poz. 391, Nr 65, poz. 594, Nr 96, poz. 874, Nr 166, poz i Nr 189, poz oraz z 2004 r. Nr 19, poz. 177. 11 2. Na obszarach graniczących z rezerwatem przyrody moŝe być wyznaczona otulina. 3. Uznanie za rezerwat przyrody obszarów, o których mowa w ust. 1, następuje w drodze aktu prawa miejscowego w formie zarządzenia regionalnego dyrektora ochrony środowiska, które określa jego nazwę, połoŝenie lub przebieg granicy i otulinę, jeŝeli została wyznaczona, cele ochrony oraz rodzaj, typ i podtyp rezerwatu przyrody, a takŝe sprawującego nadzór nad rezerwatem. Regionalny dyrektor ochrony środowiska, w drodze aktu prawa miejscowego w formie zarządzenia, po zasięgnięciu opinii regionalnej rady ochrony przyrody, moŝe zwiększyć obszar rezerwatu przyrody, zmienić cele ochrony, a w razie bezpowrotnej utraty wartości przyrodniczych, dla których rezerwat został powołany zmniejszyć obszar rezerwatu przyrody albo zlikwidować rezerwat przyrody. 3a. Projekty studiów uwarunkowań i kierunków zagospodarowania przestrzennego gmin, miejscowych planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego, planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego województw oraz planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego morskich wód wewnętrznych, morza terytorialnego i wyłącznej strefy ekonomicznej, w części dotyczącej rezerwatu przyrody i jego otuliny, wymagają uzgodnienia z regionalnym dyrektorem ochrony środowiska w zakresie ustaleń tych planów, mogących mieć negatywny wpływ na cele ochrony rezerwatu przyrody. 3b. Projekty planów urządzenia lasu, uproszczonych planów urządzenia lasu i zadania z zakresu gospodarki leśnej, o których mowa w art. 19 ust. 3 i 4 ustawy z dnia 28 września 1991 r. o lasach, w części dotyczącej otuliny rezerwatu przyrody wymagają uzgodnienia z regionalnym dyrektorem ochrony środowiska w zakresie ustaleń tych planów lub zadań, mogących mieć negatywny wpływ na ochronę przyrody rezerwatu przyrody. 4. Regionalny dyrektor ochrony środowiska, w drodze aktu prawa miejscowego w formie zarządzenia, moŝe wprowadzić opłaty za wstęp na obszar rezerwatu przyrody, kierując się potrzebą ochrony przyrody. 5. Regionalny dyrektor ochrony środowiska ustala stawki opłat, o których mowa w ust. 4, przy czym opłata za jednorazowy wstęp do rezerwatu nie moŝe przekraczać kwoty 6 zł waloryzowanej o prognozowany średnioroczny wskaźnik cen towarów i usług konsumpcyjnych ogółem, przyjęty w ustawie budŝetowej. 6. Opłaty, o których mowa w ust. 4, są przeznaczane na ochronę przyrody. Art. 14. Minister właściwy do spraw środowiska określi, w drodze rozporządzenia, rodzaje, typy i podtypy rezerwatów przyrody, kierując się potrzebą zapewnienia na obszarach cennych przyrodniczo, zróŝnicowanych pod względem wartości przyrodniczych, ochrony rezerwatowej oraz wytypowania reprezentatywnej liczby rezerwatów przyrody ze względu na dominujący przedmiot ochrony i główny typ ekosystemu. Art W parkach narodowych oraz w rezerwatach przyrody zabrania się: 1) budowy lub rozbudowy obiektów budowlanych i urządzeń technicznych, z wyjątkiem obiektów i urządzeń słuŝących celom parku narodowego albo rezerwatu przyrody; 2) (uchylony); 3) chwytania lub zabijania dziko występujących zwierząt, zbierania lub niszczenia jaj, postaci młodocianych i form rozwojowych zwierząt, umyślnego płoszenia zwierząt kręgowych, 12 zbierania poroŝy, niszczenia nor, gniazd, legowisk i innych schronień zwierząt oraz ich miejsc rozrodu; 4) polowania, z wyjątkiem obszarów wyznaczonych w planie ochrony lub zadaniach ochronnych ustanowionych dla rezerwatu przyrody; 5) pozyskiwania, niszczenia lub umyślnego uszkadzania roślin oraz grzybów; 6) uŝytkowania, niszczenia, umyślnego uszkadzania, zanieczyszczania i dokonywania zmian obiektów przyrodniczych, obszarów oraz zasobów, tworów i składników przyrody; 7) zmiany stosunków wodnych, regulacji rzek i potoków, jeŝeli zmiany te nie słuŝą ochronie przyrody; 8) pozyskiwania skał, w tym torfu, oraz skamieniałości, w tym kopalnych szczątków roślin i zwierząt, minerałów i bursztynu; 9) niszczenia gleby lub zmiany przeznaczenia i uŝytkowania gruntów; 10) palenia ognisk i wyrobów tytoniowych oraz uŝywania źródeł światła o otwartym płomieniu, z wyjątkiem miejsc wyznaczonych przez dyrektora parku narodowego, a w rezerwacie przyrody przez regionalnego dyrektora ochrony środowiska; 11) prowadzenia działalności wytwórczej, handlowej i rolniczej, z wyjątkiem miejsc wyznaczonych w planie ochrony; 12) stosowania chemicznych i biologicznych środków ochrony roślin i nawozów; 13) zbioru dziko występujących roślin i grzybów oraz ich części, z wyjątkiem miejsc wyznaczonych przez dyrektora parku narodowego, a w rezerwacie przyrody przez regionalnego dyrektora ochrony środowiska; 14) połowu ryb i innych organizmów wodnych, z wyjątkiem miejsc wyznaczonych w planie ochrony lub zadaniach ochronnych; 15) ruchu pieszego, rowerowego, narciarskiego i jazdy konnej wierzchem, z wyjątkiem szlaków i tras narciarskich wyznaczonych przez dyrektora parku narodowego, a w rezerwacie przyrody przez regionalnego dyrektora ochrony środowiska; 16) wprowadzania psów na obszary objęte ochroną ścisłą i czynną, z wyjątkiem miejsc wyznaczonych w planie ochrony oraz psów pasterskich wprowadzanych na obszary objęte ochroną czynną, na których plan ochrony albo zadania ochronne dopuszczają wypas; 17) wspinaczki, eksploracji jaskiń lub zbiorników wodnych, z wyjątkiem miejsc wyznaczonych przez dyrektora parku narodowego, a w rezerwacie przyrody przez regionalnego dyrektora ochrony środowiska; 18) ruchu pojazdów poza drogami publicznymi oraz poza drogami połoŝonymi na nieruchomościach będących w trwałym zarządzie parku narodowego, wskazanymi przez dyrektora parku narodowego, a w rezerwacie przyrody przez regionalnego dyrektora ochrony środowiska; 19) umieszczania tablic, napisów, ogłoszeń reklamowych i innych znaków niezwiązanych z ochroną przyrody, udostępnianiem parku albo rezerwatu przyrody, edukacją ekologiczną, z wyjątkiem znaków drogowych i innych znaków związanych z ochroną bezpieczeństwa i porządku powszechnego; 20) zakłócania ciszy; 21) uŝywania łodzi motorowych i innego sprzętu motorowego, uprawiania sportów wodnych i motorowych, pływania i Ŝeglowania, z wyjątkiem akwenów lub szlaków wyznaczonych 13 przez dyrektora parku narodowego, a w rezerwacie przyrody przez regionalnego dyrektora ochrony środowiska; 22) wykonywania prac ziemnych trwale zniekształcających rzeźbę terenu; 23) biwakowania, z wyjątkiem miejsc wyznaczonych przez dyrektora parku narodowego, a w rezerwacie przyrody przez regionalnego dyrektora ochrony środowiska; 24) prowadzenia badań naukowych w parku narodowym bez zgody dyrektora parku, a w rezerwacie przyrody bez zgody regionalnego dyrektora ochrony środowiska; 25) wprowadzania gatunków roślin, zwierząt lub grzybów, bez zgody ministra właściwego do spraw środowiska; 26) wprowadzania organizmów genetycznie zmodyfikowanych; 27) organizacji imprez rekreacyjno-sportowych w parku narodowym bez zgody dyrektora parku narodowego, a w rezerwacie przyrody bez zgody regionalnego dyrektora ochrony środowiska. 2. Zakazy, o których mowa w ust. 1, nie dotyczą: 1) wykonywania zadań wynikających z planu ochrony lub zadań ochronnych; 2) (uchylony); 3) prowadzenia akcji ratowniczej oraz działań związanych z bezpieczeństwem powszechnym; 4) wykonywania zadań z zakresu obronności kraju w przypadku zagroŝenia bezpieczeństwa państwa; 5) obszarów objętych ochroną krajobrazową w trakcie ich gospodarczego wykorzystywania przez jednostki organizacyjne, osoby prawne lub fizyczne oraz wykonywania prawa własności, zgodnie z przepisami Kodeksu cywilnego. 3. Minister właściwy do spraw środowiska, po zasięgnięciu opinii dyrektora parku narodowego, moŝe zezwolić na obszarze parku narodowego na odstępstwa od zakazów, o których mowa w ust. 1, jeŝeli jest to uzasadnione: 1) potrzebą ochrony przyrody, wykonywaniem badań naukowych, celami edukacyjnymi, kulturowymi, turystycznymi, rekreacyjnymi lub sportowymi lub celami kultu religijnego i nie spowoduje to negatywnego oddziaływania na przyrodę parku narodowego lub 2) potrzebą realizacji inwestycji liniowych celu publicznego, w przypadku braku rozwiązań alternatywnych i po zagwarantowaniu kompensacji przyrodniczej w rozumieniu art. 3 pkt 8 ustawy z dnia 27 kwietnia 2001 r. Prawo ochrony środowiska (Dz. U. z 2008 r. Nr 25, poz. 150, z późn. zm. 7 ). 4. Generalny Dyrektor Ochrony Środowiska, po zasięgnięciu opinii regionalnego dyrektora ochrony środowiska, moŝe zezwolić na obszarze rezerwatu przyrody na odstępstwa od zakazów, o których mowa w ust. 1, jeŝeli jest to uzasadnione potrzebą: 1) ochrony przyrody lub 2) realizacji inwestycji liniowych celu publicznego, w przypadku braku rozwiązań alternatywnych i po zagwarantowaniu kompensacji przyrodniczej w rozumieniu art. 3 pkt 8 ustawy z dnia 27 kwietnia 2001 r. Prawo ochrony środowiska. 7 Zmiany tekstu jednolitego wymienionej ustawy zostały ogłoszone w Dz. U. z 2008 r. Nr 111, poz. 708, Nr 138, poz. 865, Nr 154, poz. 958, Nr 171, poz i Nr 199, poz 14 5. Regionalny dyrektor ochrony środowiska moŝe zezwolić na obszarze rezerwatu przyrody na odstępstwa od zakazów, o których mowa w ust. 1, jeŝeli jest to uzasadnione wykonywaniem badań naukowych lub celami edukacyjnymi, kulturowymi, turystycznymi, rekreacyjnymi lub sportowymi lub celami kultu religijnego i nie spowoduje to negatywnego oddziaływania na cele ochrony przyrody rezerwatu przyrody. Art Park krajobrazowy obejmuje obszar chroniony ze względu na wartości przyrodnicze, historyczne i kulturowe oraz walory krajobrazowe w celu zachowania, popularyzacji tych wartości w warunkach zrównowaŝonego rozwoju. 2. Na obszarach graniczących z parkiem krajobrazowym moŝe być wyznaczona otulina. 3. Utworzenie parku krajobrazowego lub powiększenie jego obszaru następuje w drodze uchwały sejmiku województwa, która określa jego nazwę, obszar, przebieg granicy i otulinę, jeŝeli została wyznaczona, szczególne cele ochrony oraz zakazy właściwe dla danego parku krajobrazowego lub jego części, wybrane spośród zakazów, o których mowa w art. 17 ust. 1, wynikające z potrzeb jego ochrony. Likwidacja lub zmniejszenie obszaru parku krajobrazowego następuje w drodze uchwały sejmiku województwa, po uzgodnieniu z właściwymi miejscowo radami gmin, z powodu bezpowrotnej utraty wartości przyrodniczych, historycznych i kulturowych oraz walorów krajobrazowych na obszarach projektowanych do wyłączenia spod ochrony. 4. Projekt uchwały sejmiku województwa w sprawie utworzenia, zmiany granic lub likwidacji parku krajobrazowego wymaga uzgodnienia z właściwą miejscowo radą gminy oraz właściwym regionalnym dyrektorem ochrony środowiska. 5. Statut parku krajobrazowego lub zespołu parków krajobrazowych określający strukturę organizacyjną parku lub zespołu parków nadaje sejmik województwa w drodze uchwały. 6. Grunty rolne i leśne oraz inne nieruchomości znajdujące się w granicach parku krajobrazowego pozostawia się w gospodarczym wykorzystaniu. 7. Projekty studiów uwarunkowań i kierunków zagospodarowania przestrzennego gmin, miejscowych planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego, planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego województw oraz planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego morskich wód wewnętrznych, morza terytorialnego i wyłącznej strefy ekonomicznej w części dotyczącej parku krajobrazowego i jego otuliny, wymagają uzgodnienia z właściwym miejscowo regionalnym dyrektorem ochrony środowiska w zakresie ustaleń tych planów, mogących mieć negatywny wpływ na ochronę przyrody parku krajobrazowego. Art W parku krajobrazowym mogą być wprowadzone następujące zakazy: 1) realizacji przedsięwzięć mogących znacząco oddziaływać na środowisko w rozumieniu przepisów ustawy z dnia 3 października 2008 r. o udostępnianiu informacji o środowisku i jego ochronie, udziale społeczeństwa w ochronie środowiska oraz o ocenach oddziaływania na środowisko (Dz. U. Nr 199, poz. 1227); 2) umyślnego zabijania dziko występujących zwierząt, niszczenia ich nor, legowisk, innych schronień i miejsc rozrodu oraz tarlisk i złoŝonej ikry, z wyjątkiem amatorskiego połowu ryb oraz wykonywania czynności w ramach racjonalnej gospodarki rolnej, leśnej, rybackiej i łowieckiej; 15 3) likwidowania i niszczenia zadrzewień śródpolnych, przydroŝnych i nadwodnych, jeŝeli nie wynikają z potrzeby ochrony przeciwpowodziowej lub zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa ruchu drogowego lub wodnego lub budowy, odbudowy, utrzymania, remontów lub naprawy urządzeń wodnych; 4) pozyskiwania do celów gospodarczych skał, w tym torfu, oraz skamieniałości, w tym kopalnych szczątków roślin i zwierząt, a takŝe minerałów i bursztynu; 5) wykonywania prac ziemnych trwale zniekształcających rzeźbę terenu, z wyjątkiem prac związanych z zabezpieczeniem przeciwsztormowym, przeciwpowodziowym lub przeciwosuwiskowym lub budową, odbudową, utrzymaniem, remontem lub naprawą urządzeń wodnych; 6) dokonywania zmian stosunków wodnych, jeŝeli zmiany te nie słuŝą ochronie przyrody lub racjonalnej gospodarce rolnej, leśnej, wodnej lub rybackiej; 7) budowania nowych obiektów budowlanych w pasie szerokości 100 m od linii brzegów rzek, jezior i innych zbiorników wodnych, z wyjątkiem obiektów słuŝących turystyce wodnej, gospodarce wodnej lub rybackiej; 8) lokalizowania obiektów budowlanych w pasie szerokości 200 m od krawędzi brzegów klifowych oraz w pasie technicznym brzegu morskiego; 9) likwidowania, zasypywania i przekształcania zbiorników wodnych, starorzeczy oraz obszarów wodno-błotnych; 10) wylewania gnojowicy, z wyjątkiem nawoŝenia własnych gruntów rolnych; 11) prowadzenia chowu i hodowli zwierząt metodą bezściółkową; 12) utrzymywania otwartych rowów ściekowych i zbiorników ściekowych; 13) organizowania rajdów motorowych i samochodowych; 14) uŝywania łodzi motorowych i innego sprzętu motorowego na otwartych zbiornikach wodnych. 2. Zakazy, o których mowa w ust. 1, nie dotyczą: 1) wykonywania zadań wynikających z planu ochrony; 2) wykonywania zadań na rzecz obronności kraju i bezpieczeństwa państwa; 3) prowadzenia akcji ratowniczej oraz działań związanych z bezpieczeństwem powszechnym; 4) realizacji inwestycji celu publicznego w rozumieniu art. 2 pkt 5 ustawy z dnia 27 marca 2003 r. o planowaniu i zagospodarowaniu przestrzennym (Dz.U. Nr 80, poz. 717 oraz z 2004 r. Nr 6, poz. 41), zwanej dalej inwestycją celu publicznego. 3. Zakaz, o którym mowa w ust. 1 pkt 1, nie dotyczy realizacji przedsięwzięć mogących znacząco oddziaływać na środowisko, dla których sporządzenie raportu o oddziaływaniu na środowisko nie jest obowiązkowe i przeprowadzona procedura oceny oddziaływania na środowisko wykazała brak niekorzystnego wpływu na przyrodę parku krajobrazowego. 4. Zakaz, o którym mowa w ust. 1 pkt 14, nie dotyczy statków jednostek ratowniczych, jednostek organizacyjnych właściciela wód lub urządzeń wodnych zlokalizowanych na wodach, inspektorów Ŝeglugi śródlądowej, Państwowej i Społecznej StraŜy Rybackiej, promów w ciągu dróg publicznych, prowadzenia racjonalnej gospodarki rybackiej oraz wykonywania zadań z zakresu ochrony przyrody przez SłuŜbę Parku Krajobrazowego. 16 Art Dla parków narodowych, rezerwatów przyrody i parków krajobrazowych sporządza się i realizuje plan ochrony. 2. Plan ochrony, o którym mowa w ust. 1, ustanawia się w terminie 5 lat od dnia utworzenia parku narodowego, uznania obszaru za rezerwat przyrody albo utworzenia parku krajobrazowego. Art Projekt planu ochrony sporządza dla: 1) parku narodowego dyrektor parku narodowego; 2) rezerwatu przyrody regionalny dyrektor ochrony środowiska lub po uzgodnieniu z tym organem zarządzający rezerwatem albo sprawujący nadzór nad rezerwatem; 3) parku krajobrazowego dyrektor parku krajobrazowego lub dyrektor zespołu parków krajobrazowych. 1a. Sporządzający projekt planu ochrony, o którym mowa w ust. 1, zapewnia moŝliwość udziału społeczeństwa, na zasadach i w trybie określonych w ustawie z dnia 3 października 2008 r. o udostępnianiu informacji o środowisku i jego ochronie, udziale społeczeństwa w ochronie środowiska oraz o ocenach oddziaływania na środowisko, w postępowaniu, którego przedmiotem jest sporządzenie projektu. 2. Projekt planu ochrony, o którym mowa w ust. 1, wymaga zaopiniowania przez właściwe miejscowo rady gmin. 3. Przepisy ust. 1a i 2 stosuje się odpowiednio w przypadku dokonywania zmiany planu ochrony. 4. (uchylony). 5. Minister właściwy do spraw środowiska ustanawia, w drodze rozporządzenia, plan ochrony dla parku narodowego w terminie 6 miesięcy od dnia otrzymania projektu planu lub odmawia jego ustanowienia, jeŝeli projekt planu jest niezgodny z celami ochrony przyrody, uwzględniając konieczność dostosowania działań ochronnych do celów ochrony parku narodowego. Plan ochrony moŝe być zmieniony, jeŝeli wynika to z potrzeb ochrony przyrody. 6. Regionalny dyrektor ochrony środowiska ustanawia, w drodze aktu prawa miejscowego w formie zarządzenia, plan ochrony dla rezerwatu przyrody w terminie 6 miesięcy od dnia otrzymania projektu planu. Plan ochrony moŝe być zmieniony, jeŝeli wynika to z potrzeb ochrony przyrody. 6a. Sejmik województwa ustanawia, w drodze uchwały, plan ochrony dla parku krajobrazowego w terminie 6 miesięcy od dnia otrzymania projektu planu albo odmawia jego ustanowienia, jeŝeli projekt planu jest niezgodny z celami ochrony przyrody. Plan ochrony moŝe być zmieniony, jeŝeli wynika to z potrzeb ochrony przyrody. 6b. Projekt uchwały, o której mowa w ust. 6a, wymaga uzgodnienia z właściwym regionalnym dyrektorem ochrony środowiska. 7. Plan ochrony dla rezerwatu przyrody połoŝonego na terenie więcej niŝ jednego województwa ustanawiają wspólnie, w drodze aktu prawa miejscowego w formie zarządzenia, regionalni dyrektorzy ochrony środowiska, na których obszarze działania znajdują się części tego rezerwatu. 17 8. Plan ochrony dla parku krajobrazowego połoŝonego na terenie kilku województw ustanawia sejmik województwa właściwy ze względu na siedzibę dyrekcji parku, w porozumieniu z pozostałymi sejmikami województw. Art Plan ochrony dla parku narodowego, rezerwatu przyrody oraz parku krajobrazowego sporządza się na okres 20 lat, z uwzględnieniem: 1) charakterystyki i oceny stanu przyrody; 2) identyfikacji i oceny istniejących oraz potencjalnych zagroŝeń wewnętrznych i zewnętrznych; 3) charakterystyki i oceny uwarunkowań społecznych i gospodarczych; 4) analizy skuteczności dotychczasowych sposobów ochrony; 5) charakterystyki i oceny stanu zagospodarowania przestrzennego. 2. Prace przy sporządzaniu planów ochrony, o których mowa w ust. 1, polegają na: 1) ocenie stanu zasobów, tworów i składników przyrody, walorów krajobrazowych, wartości kulturowych oraz istniejących i potencjalnych zagroŝeń wewnętrznych i zewnętrznych, która moŝe być wykonana w formie szczegółowych opisów; 2) opracowaniu koncepcji ochrony zasobów, tworów i składników przyrody oraz wartości kulturowych, a takŝe eliminacji lub ograniczania istniejących i potencjalnych zagroŝeń wewnętrznych i zewnętrznych; 3) wskazaniu zadań ochronnych, z podaniem rodzaju, zakresu i lokalizacji. 3. Plan ochrony dla parku narodowego oraz rezerwatu przyrody zawiera: 1) cele ochrony przyrody oraz wskazanie przyrodniczych i społecznych uwarunkowań ich realizacji; 2) identyfikację oraz określenie sposobów eliminacji lub ograniczania istniejących i potencjalnych zagroŝeń wewnętrznych i zewnętrznych oraz ich skutków; 3) wskazanie obszarów ochrony ścisłej, czynnej i krajobrazowej; 4) określenie działań ochronnych na obszarach ochrony ścisłej, czynnej i krajobrazowej, z podaniem rodzaju, zakresu i lokalizacji tych działań; 5) wskazanie obszarów i miejsc udostępnianych dla celów naukowych, edukacyjnych, turystycznych, rekreacyjnych, sportowych, amatorskiego połowu ryb i rybactwa oraz określenie sposobów ich udostępniania; 6) wskazanie miejsc, w których moŝe być prowadzona działalność wytwórcza, handlowa i rolnicza; 7) ustalenia do studiów uwarunkowań i kierunków zagospodarowania przestrzennego gmin, miejscowych planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego, planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego województw oraz planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego morskich wód wewnętrznych, morza terytorialnego i wyłącznej strefy ekonomicznej dotyczące eliminacji lub ograniczenia zagroŝeń wewnętrznych lub zewnętrznych. 4. Plan ochrony dla parku krajobrazowego zawiera: 1) cele ochrony przyrody oraz przyrodnicze, społeczne i gospodarcze uwarunkowania ich realizacji; 18 2) identyfikację oraz określenie sposobów eliminacji lub ograniczania istniejących i potencjalnych zagroŝeń wewnętrznych i zewnętrznych oraz ich skutków; 3) wskazanie obszarów realizacji działań ochronnych; 4) określenie zakresu prac związanych z ochroną przyrody i kształtowaniem krajobrazu; 5) wskazanie obszarów udostępnianych dla celów naukowych, edukacyjnych, turystycznych, rekreacyjnych, amatorskiego połowu ryb i dla innych form gospodarowania oraz określenie sposobów korzystania z tych obszarów; 6) ustalenia do studiów uwarunkowań i kierunków zagospodarowania przestrzennego gmin, miejscowych planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego, planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego województw oraz planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego morskich wód wewnętrznych, morza terytorialnego i wyłącznej strefy ekonomicznej dotyczące eliminacji lub ograniczenia zagroŝeń wewnętrznych lub zewnętrznych. 5. Plany ochrony dla parku narodowego, rezerwatu przyrody lub parku krajobrazowego w części pokrywającej się z obszarem Natura 2000 powinny uwzględniać zakres planu zadań ochronnych dla obszaru Natura 2000, o którym mowa w art. 28, albo zakres planu ochrony dla obszaru Natura 2000, o którym mowa w art. 29. Art. 21. Minister właściwy do spraw środowiska określi dla parku narodowego, rezerwatu przyrody, parku krajobrazowego, w drodze rozporządzenia: 1) tryb sporządzania projektu planu ochrony, 2) zakres prac na potrzeby sporządzenia projektu planu ochrony, 3) tryb dokonywania zmian w planie ochrony, 4) zakres i sposoby ochrony zasobów, tworów i składników przyrody kierując się potrzebą ochrony zasobów, tworów i składników przyrody Ŝywej i nieoŝywionej w parkach narodowych, rezerwatach przyrody oraz parkach krajobrazowych, z uwzględnieniem moŝliwości technicznych, organizacyjnych i finansowych oraz poziomu wiedzy i nauki w zakresie ochrony przyrody. Art Dla parku narodowego lub rezerwatu przyrody, do czasu ustanowienia planu ochrony, sprawujący nadzór sporządza projekt zadań ochronnych. 2. Zadania ochronne, o których mowa w ust. 1, ustanawia, w drodze zarządzenia: 1) minister właściwy do spraw środowiska dla parku narodowego; 2) regionalny dyrektor ochrony środowiska dla rezerwatu przyrody. 3. Zadania ochronne, o których mowa w ust. 1, uwzględniają: 1) identyfikację i ocenę istniejących i potencjalnych zagroŝeń wewnętrznych i zewnętrznych oraz sposoby eliminacji lub ograniczania tych zagroŝeń i ich skutków; 2) opis sposobów ochrony czynnej ekosystemów, z podaniem rodzaju, rozmiaru i lokalizacji poszczególnych zadań; 3) opis sposobów czynnej ochrony gatunków roślin, zwierząt lub grzybów; 4) wskazanie obszarów objętych ochroną ścisłą, czynną oraz krajobrazową. 19 4. Zadania ochronne, o których mowa w ust. 1, mogą być ustanawiane na rok lub równocześnie na kolejne lata, nie dłuŝej jednak niŝ na 5 lat. Art Obszar chronionego krajobrazu obejmuje tereny chronione ze względu na wyróŝniający się krajobraz o zróŝnicowanych ekosystemach, wartościowe ze względu na moŝliwość zaspokajania potrzeb związanych z turystyką i wypoczynkiem lub pełnioną funkcją korytarzy ekologicznych. 2. Wyznaczenie obszaru chronionego krajobrazu następuje w drodze uchwały sejmiku województwa, która określa jego nazwę, połoŝenie, obszar, sprawującego nadzór, ustalenia dotyczące czynnej ochrony ekosystemów oraz zakazy właściwe dla danego obszaru chronionego krajobrazu lub jego części, wybrane spośród zakazów wymienionych w art. 24 ust. 1, wynikające z potrzeb jego ochrony. Likwidacja lub zmiana granic obszaru chronionego krajobrazu następuje w drodze uchwały sejmiku województwa, po zaopiniowaniu przez właściwe miejscowo rady gmin, z powodu bezpowrotnej utraty wyróŝniającego się krajobrazu o zróŝnicowanych ekosystemach i moŝliwości zaspokajania potrzeb związanych z turystyką i wypoczynkiem. 3. Projekty uchwał sejmiku województwa, o których mowa w ust. 2, wymagają uzgodnienia z właściwym regionalnym dyrektorem ochrony środowiska. 4. (uchylony). 5. Projekty studiów uwarunkowań i kierunków zagospodarowania przestrzennego gmin, miejscowych planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego, planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego województw i planów zagospodarowania przestrzennego morskich wód wewnętrznych, morza terytorialnego i wyłącznej strefy ekonomicznej, w części dotyczącej obszaru chronionego krajobrazu, wymagają uzgodnienia z właściwym regionalnym dyrektorem ochrony środowiska w zakresie ustaleń tych planów, mogących mieć negatywny wpływ na ochronę przyrody obszaru chronionego krajobrazu. Art Na obszarze chronionego krajobrazu mogą być wprowadzone następujące zakazy: 1) zabijania dziko występujących zwierząt, niszczenia ich nor, legowisk, innych schronień i miejsc rozrodu oraz tarlisk, złoŝonej ikry, z wyjątkiem amatorskiego połowu ryb oraz wykonywania czynności związanych z racjonalną gospodarką rolną, leśną, rybacką i łowiecką; 2) realizacji przedsięwzięć mogących znacząco oddziaływać na środowisko w rozumieniu przepisów ustawy z dnia 3 października 2008 r. o udostępnianiu informacji o środowisku i jego ochronie, udziale społeczeństwa w ochronie środowiska oraz o ocenach oddziaływania na środowisko; 3) likwidowania i niszczenia zadrzewień śródpolnych, przydroŝnych i nadwodnych, jeŝeli nie wynikają one z potrzeby ochrony przeciwpowodziowej i zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa ruchu drogowego lub wodnego lub budowy, odbudowy, utrzymania, remontów lub naprawy urządzeń wodnych; 4) wydobywania do celów gospodarczych skał, w tym torfu, oraz skamieniałości, w tym kopalnych szczątków roślin i zwierząt, a takŝe minerałów i bursztynu; 5) wykonywania prac ziemnych trwale zniekształcających rzeźbę terenu, z wyjątkiem prac związanych z zabezpieczeniem przeciwsztormowym, przeciwpowodziowym lub 20 przeciwosuwiskowym lub utrzymaniem, budową, odbudową, naprawą lub remontem urządzeń wodnych; 6) dokonywania zmian stosunków wodnych, jeŝeli słuŝą innym celom niŝ ochrona przyrody lub zrównowaŝone wykorzystanie uŝytków rolnych i leśnych oraz racjonalna gospodarka wodna lub rybacka; 7) likwidowania naturalnych zbiorników wodnych, starorzeczy i obszarów wodno-błotnych; 8) lokalizowania obiektów budowlanych w pasie szerokości 100 m od linii brzegów rzek, jezior i innych zbiorników wodnych, z wyjątkiem urządzeń wodnych oraz obiektów słuŝących prowadzeniu racjonalnej gospodarki rolnej, leśnej lub rybackiej; 9) lokalizowania obiektów budowlanych w pasie szerokości 200 m od linii brzegów klifowych oraz w pasie technicznym brzegu morskiego. 2. Zakazy, o których mowa w ust. 1, nie dotyczą: 1) wykonywania zadań na rzecz obronności kraju i bezpieczeństwa państwa; 2) prowadzenia akcji ratowniczej oraz działań związanych z bezpieczeństwem powszechnym; 3) realizacji inwestycji celu publicznego. 3. Zakaz, o którym mowa w ust. 1 pkt 2, nie dotyczy realizacji przedsięwzięć mogących znacząco oddziaływać na środowisko, dla których przeprowadzona ocena oddziaływania na środowisko wykazała brak znacząco negatywnego wpływu na ochronę przyrody obszaru chronionego krajobrazu. Art Sieć obszarów Natura 2000 obejmuje: 1) obszary specjalnej ochrony ptaków; 2) specjalne obszary ochrony siedlisk; 3) obszary mające znaczenie dla Wspólnoty. 2. Obszar Natura 2000 moŝe obejmować część lub całość obszarów i obiektów objętych formami ochrony przyrody, o których mowa w art. 6 ust 1 pkt 1-4 i 6-9. Art. 26. Minister właściwy do spraw środowiska określi, w drodze rozporządzenia, typy siedlisk przyrodniczych oraz gatunki będące przedmiotem zainteresowania Wspólnoty, w tym siedliska przyrodnicze i gatunki o znaczeniu priorytetowym, oraz wymagające ochrony w formie wyznaczenia obszarów Natura 2000, a takŝe kryteria wyboru obszarów kwalifikujących się do uznania za obszary mające znaczenie dla Wspólnoty i wyznaczenia jako specjalne obszary ochrony siedlisk oraz obszarów kwalifikujących się do wyznaczenia jako obszary specjalnej ochrony ptaków, mając na uwadze zachowanie poszczególnych cennych lub zagroŝonych składników róŝnorodności biologicznej, na podstawie których jest wyznaczana sieć obszarów Natura Art Generalny Dyrektor Ochrony Środowiska opracowuje projekt listy obszarów Natura 2000, zgodnie z przepisami prawa Unii Europejskiej. 2. Projekt, o którym mowa w ust. 1, wymaga zasięgnięcia opinii właściwych miejscowo rad gmin. NiezłoŜenie opinii w terminie 30 dni od dnia otrzymania projektu uznaje się za brak uwag. Kancelaria Sejmu s. 1/148 Dz.U. 2004 Nr 92 poz. 880 USTAWA z dnia 16 kwietnia 2004 r. Opracowano na podstawie: t.j. Dz. U. z 2015 r. poz. 1651. o ochronie przyrody 1) Rozdział 1 Przepisy ogólne Art. 1. Warszawa, dnia 23 grudnia 2016 r. Poz z dnia 14 grudnia 2016 r. w sprawie ogłoszenia jednolitego tekstu ustawy o ochronie przyrody DZIENNIK USTAW RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ Warszawa, dnia 23 grudnia 2016 r. Poz. 2134 OBWIESZCZENIE MARSZAŁKA SEJMU RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ z dnia 14 grudnia 2016 r. w sprawie ogłoszenia jednolitego tekstu DZIENNIK USTAW RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ Warszawa, dnia 20 października 2015 r. Poz. 1651 OBWIESZCZENIE MARSZAŁKA SEJMU RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ z dnia 21 września 2015 r. w sprawie ogłoszenia jednolitego
fr	wikipedia	N/A	'Kaiserin Auguste Viktoria' est un cultivar de rosier obtenu en 1890 par le rosiériste allemand Peter Lambert et mis au commerce en 1891. Il rend hommage à l'impératrice Augusta-Victoria (1858-1921), épouse de Guillaume II et grande amatrice de roses. Ce cultivar est issu de 'Perle des Jardins' x 'Belle Lyonnaise', ou selon d'autres sources de 'Coquette de Lyon' x 'Lady Mary Fitzwilliam'. On peut l'admirer notamment en Allemagne à l'Europa-Rosarium de Sangerhausen où se trouve un buste de sa dédicataire. Description Il s'agit d'un rosier hybride de thé au feuillage vert sombre et aux grandes folioles qui s'élève à 150 cm environ. Il présente de grandes fleurs très doubles en coupe globuleuse. Ses pétales se terminent en pointes enroulés. Les fleurs fleurissent en bouquets et exhalent un agréable parfum. Elles sont d'un joli blanc ivoire dont le cœur est légèrement nuancé de jaune. La floraison est remontante. Ce rosier est fort vigoureux. Sa zone de rusticité est de 6b à 9b. Il résiste donc bien au froid (-20°). Il est classé par le Journal des roses en 1896 comme l'une des meilleures variétés des vingt dernières années. Descendance 'Kaiserin Auguste Viktoria' a donné naissance à une mutation grimpante, 'Kaiserin Auguste Viktoria climbing', mise au commerce en 1897 par l'obtenteur irlandais Alexander Dickson II. Par croisement avec Rosa foetida var. bicolor Willmott, elle a donné naissance à 'Paula Clegg' (Kiese, 1912) de couleur rouge. Par croisement avec Rosa wichuraiana, elle a donné naissance à 'Mary Lovett' (van Fleet, 1915) de couleur blanche. Notes et références Bibliographie François Joyaux, Nouvelle Encyclopédie des roses anciennes, Ulmer, 2005, page 241 Voir aussi Cultivars de roses portant des noms de célébrités Hybride de thé Cultivar de rosier
en	caselaw	US	Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County. Plaintiff-appellant, Coulter Pontiac, Inc., a franchised dealer of defendant-appellee, Pontiac Motor Division, General Motors Corporation, filed a complaint on May 20, 1981, for injunction and relief to prevent appellee from terminating the dealer franchise agreement which was entered into on May 16, 1979. The underlying reason that appellee notified appellant on February 20, 1981 of its intention to discontinue servicing appellant was because of a total change in stock ownership, which allegedly violated the terms of the franchise agreement. Appellant cites various health and financial reasons that necessitated the change in stock ownership. In response, appellee cites Subsections A(2)(a) and (e), Article IV of the dealer agreement, which state as grounds for termination: "(a) The removal, resignation, withdrawal or elimination from Dealer for any reason of any Dealer Operator or Dealer Owner. "* * * "(e) Any change in the management of Dealer, as set forth in the Management and Ownership Addendum, without the prior written approval of Pontiac." A temporary restraining order was issued on May 20, 1981 by the court of common pleas, the day the complaint was filed, pending further hearing. On June 9, 1981, appellee filed a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order on the grounds the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, and also filed that day a motion to dismiss the complaint. Although the trial court was faced with determination of a motion to dismiss, the factual framework to be determined was in existence, by virtue of the pleadings and exhibits, attached thereto along with the contract in existence between the parties. Upon hearing, the trial court dissolved the temporary restraining order and dismissed the complaint on June 16, 1981. Appellant sets forth two assignments of error, which state: "1. The Court of Common Pleas erred in denying plaintiff-appellant's right to injunction pending a hearing on the merits and granting defendant's motion to dismiss, by failing to recognize that Ohio Revised Code 4517.54 and 4517.55, does [sic] have retroactive application. "2. Even if Section 4517.54 is held by this court not to be retrospective, the lower court will still be incorrect in granting defendant's motion to dismiss, as plaintiff's complaint was legally sufficient to state a cause of action." Central to the determination of this appeal is the issue of the application of Page 170 R.C. 4517.54. The pertinent parts of that section are: "(A) Notwithstanding the terms, provisions, or conditions of an existing franchise, no franchisor shall terminate or fail to continue or renew a franchise except for good cause. " * * "(C) A franchisee receiving written notice from a franchisor proposing to terminate, discontinue, or not renew a franchise may seek a preliminary and permanent injunction in the common pleas court in the county in which the franchisee's dealership is located against the termination, discontinuance, or nonrenewal of such franchise without good cause." Once R.C. 4517.54 was enacted, prior Revised Code sections applicable to franchise terminations were either amended and renumbered or repealed. These sections were numbered R.C. 1333.71 to 1333.82 inclusive, and were in effect at the time that the dealership agreement had been entered into. R.C. 1333.72 stated: "Notwithstanding the terms, provisions, or conditions of any agreement or franchise, no manufacturer engaged in the sale and distribution of motor vehicles, * * , shall: " * * "(B) Prevent a dealer from changing administrative or executive management other than the principal officer or operator of a dealer if the franchise was granted in reliance upon the personal ability of such person;" (Emphasis added.) The remaining paragraphs permitted transfer of stock as long as there was no change in control of the franchise. Appellant's first assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in failing to apply R.C. 4517.54 and 4517.55 retroactively. The second assignment of error charges that, if R.C. 4517.54 is not retroactive, the trial court should have allowed appellant to amend its complaint to allege a claim under former R.C. 1333.73 and 1333.74, which were in effect and did in fact govern appellant's contract with appellee. The new dealer statute, which did not become effective until March 14, 1980, replaced an earlier "Dealers Act" which had been in effect since 1971. The earlier Act, which was the one in effect at the time appellant entered into the dealership agreement now at issue, imposed much narrower limitations on the rights of franchisors and, unlike the newer statute, did not grant to franchisees the right to compel franchisors to continue the franchise. We find that the trial court did not err in determining that R.C. 4517.54 and 4517.55 do not have retroactive application.Clifford Jacobs Motors, Inc., v. Chrysler Corp. (S.D. Ohio 1973),357 F. Supp. 564, held that that Act did not govern contracts which had been executed prior to the effective date of the statute. In rendering this decision, the court relied principally upon the statutorily mandated rule of construction in Ohio (R.C.1.48), that: " `A statute is presumed to be prospective in operation unless expressly made retrospective.' " Clifford Jacobs Motors, supra, at 571. Its analysis of the Act failed to reveal any express provision which established a legislative intent to make the statute retrospective: "In the absence of any express provision in Section[s] 1333.73 and 1333.74 indicating that the legislature intended these statutes to be retrospective, and in the absence of Ohio decisions on this matter, we think that due regard for the statutory presumption requires us to find that Sections 1333.73 and 1333.74 are prospective in operation and are not therefore applicable in this case." Clifford Jacobs Motors, supra, at 572. The reasoning of Clifford Jacobs Motors was applied again more recently to a similar provision in an analogous Ohio law. ExcelloWine Co. v. Monsieur Henri Wines, Ltd. (S.D. Ohio 1979), Page 171 474 F. Supp. 203, held that the "just cause" standard of the Ohio Alcoholic Beverages Franchise Act, R.C. 1333.82 et seq., could not be retroactively applied to a pre-existing oral franchise. R.C. 1.58 also prohibits modification of pre-existing contractural rights: "(A) The reenactment, amendment, or repeal of a statute does not, * * "(1) Affect the prior operation of the statute or any prior action taken thereunder; "(2) Affect any * * * right * * * or liability previously acquired, accrued, accorded, or incurred thereunder;" Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution explicitly states: "The general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws or laws impairing the obligation of contracts; * * ." Arguably, if the legislature intended to make the new statute retroactive, it had no power to do so. Other courts have found that franchise statutes similar to that in Ohio cannot apply to pre-existing contracts. Yamaha PartsDistrib., Inc. v. Ehrman (Fla. 1975), 316 So. 2d 557. Appellant argues that the word "existing" in R.C. 4517.54 evidences legislative intent that the new dealers' act be applied retroactively. Second, appellant claims that R.C. 4517.54 should be applied retroactively because it is remedial. In Witt v. Union Oil Co. of Cal. (1979), 99 Cal. App. 3d 435,160 Cal. Rptr. 285, the statute at issue was a California Franchise Act which was similar in design to the Ohio Auto Dealers Act and to various other state franchise statutes. By language almost identical to R.C. 4517.54, the California Franchise Act stated that: " ` * * no franchisor shall terminate, cancel or refuse to renew any existing franchise without good cause.' "99 Cal.App.3d at 438. Plaintiff in Witt had entered into his franchise agreement more than two years before the California statute was enacted but, like appellant here, Witt argued that the California statute applied retroactively to his agreement, based on the word "existing" in the same context as found in Ohio. The California Court of Appeals rejected Witt's argument: "His interpretation of section 20999.1 would engraft on the lease a continuing term that could never be terminated except for one or more of the `good cause' conditions enumerated in the section. * * * Such a drastic amendment to existing leases and franchise contracts was not intended by the Legislature."99 Cal.App.3d at 438. Appellant asserts that R.C. 4517.54 and 4517.55 should be applied retroactively because they are remedial, or procedural, rather than statutes that create new rights or take away vested rights. The question of whether a statute is remedial or procedural as opposed to substantive many times is a mixed and difficult question. We do not find that the statutes involved herein are remedial or procedural. The provisions at issue are intended to add the substantive requirement in franchise contracts, covered by the Act, that grounds for termination be limited to those specific reasons set forth by statute. That the statutes are substantive is reflected in the decisions in Ohio and elsewhere. The major and substantive change accomplished by the new dealer statutes is the provision which now requires that franchise contracts made after the statutory effective date can be terminated only upon the grounds defined by statute. Thus, R.C. 4517.54 and 4517.55 cannot be described as remedial or procedural. They are substantive statutes. For the foregoing reasons we overrule appellant's first assignment of error. Under appellant's second assignment of error, it argues that if the court finds that R.C. 4517.54 has no retroactive application, then under the notice pleading rules, its complaint should be held to be legally sufficient and allow for amendment *Page 172 invoking the remedy and injunction relief provided for under R.C.1333.73 and 1333.74. As to appellant's request for leave to amend its complaint, there was no such request made at the trial court level and the record does not indicate any action by the trial court that we can consider as reversible error. Such claim on appeal cannot be made unless such action was taken in the lower court. Furthermore, the factual questions were determined by the trial court. These entered the case as indicated at the beginning of this opinion by exhibits and pleadings. We cannot, therefore, consider appellant's second assignment of error and overrule same. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Judgment affirmed. LYNCH, P.J., and O'NEILL, J., concur.
it	wikipedia	N/A	La cimice rosso nera (Pyrrhocoris apterus ), o insetto carabiniere o cimice carabiniere, è un insetto eterottero appartenente alla famiglia Pyrrhocoridae. Descrizione Questo insetto di forma ovale e piana è particolarmente riconoscibile dal suo colore rosso acceso e dalle forme geometriche nere distribuite sul suo corpo. Quest'ultime sono condizionate da fattori abiotici come per esempio la temperatura. La testa e le zampe dell'animale sono nere, il pronoto è rosso con una grande macchia nera, lo scutello è nero e le ali sono rosse con tre macchie nere ciascuna. Questi colori sgargianti e queste forme particolari servono a scoraggiare i suoi predatori. Questa strategia di difesa è chiamata aposematismo. Un altro meccanismo di difesa adottato dalle larve è quello di emanare uno sgradevole odore grazie a tre ghiandole situate sul lato dorsale dell'addome. Questa strategia viene usata per comunicare e per cacciare. La lunghezza di questo animale varia dagli 8 ai 12 millimetri e una differenza morfologica tra i maschi e le femmine è poco visibile. Le ali e le elitre possono andare incontro ad uno sviluppo totale o parziale. Solamente lo sviluppo totale permette all'animale di volare. Distribuzione e habitat Pyrrhocoris apterus è una specie molto diffusa in tutta Europa, in parte dell'America e dell'Asia. Possiamo incontrare questo insetto nelle zone temperate e mediterranee, ma non in alta montagna. Biologia In primavera questa specie ha l'abitudine di formare grandi gruppi (dalle decine alle centinaia di individui) ai piedi di tronchi d'albero soleggiati. Durante la stagione invernale, possono sopravvivere nascondendosi in rifugi naturali, come ad esempio sotto le foglie morte, nelle fessure dei tronchi d'albero o sotto i sassi. Questo è possibile poiché le cimicette rallentano il loro metabolismo come in una sorta di ibernazione. Alimentazione Grazie al rostro la cimice rosso nera si ciba principalmente di linfa e di semi di piante. Le sue preferite sono le Malvaceae e i tigli, ma non disdegnano i noccioli, le querce, gli oleandri e gli ibiscus. Questi insetti non rappresentano nessuna minaccia per le piante, in quanto non recano alcun danno. Può anche nutrirsi di altri animali (zoofago) e di carogne (necrofago); infatti, può succhiare l'emolinfa di queste ultime. Riproduzione A inizio primavera, la femmina copula a tandem con più partner maschi immagazzinandone lo sperma. Questo può portare ad una competizione tra gli spermatozoi raccolti. Per questo motivo il maschio allunga il tempo di copulazione con la femmina che può variare dalle 12 ore ai 7 giorni. In questo modo il maschio si assicura che nella spermateca della femmina il suo sperma sia presente in maniera predominante. Dopo l'accoppiamento, la femmina cerca un posto umido e protetto per deporre circa 12-60 uova che appaiono di colore nero e sono lunghe circa 1 mm. Le neanidi che nasceranno, assomiglieranno morfologicamente agli adulti, ma saranno tutte rosse con un'unica macchia nera vicino alla testa. Le larve diventeranno adulte all'inizio dell'inverno dopo aver attraversato 5 diversi stadi dove avverrà una progressiva sclerificazione e pigmentazione dei tegumenti. Studiando la spermatogenesi della cimicetta rossa nel 1891, il biologo Hermann Henking scoprì che durante la meiosi un elemento non si divideva come tutte le coppie dei cromosomi omologhi, ma veniva trasmesso direttamente alla cellula figlia. H.Henking decise di chiamare questo elemento X. Negli anni successivi, altri studiosi riuscirono a determinare che l'elemento X non era altro che un cromosoma. I maschi della specie Pyrrhocoris apterus producono due tipi diversi di spermatozoi: alcuni contengono il cromosoma X e altri no. Dalla fusione di un uovo e di uno spermatozoo può nascere un individuo con un numero di cromosoma pari (femmine) o dispari (maschi). Questo insetto è stato fondamentale per la scoperta dei cromosomi che determinano il sesso in tutte le specie viventi. Allevamento Essendo la cimicetta rosso nera un animale inoffensivo e inodore, è molto semplice da allevare in terrari e da osservare durante il corso della sua vita. Particolarità È molto facile confondere la cimicetta rosso nera con due specie molto simili ma non-relazionate. La prima è la Corizus hyoscyami (LINNEUS 1758), mentre la seconda è la Scantius aegyptius (LINNEUS 1758). A differenza della Pyrrhocoris apterus, la Corizus hyoscyami possiede solamente una macchia nera sulle elitre, mentre la Scantius aegyptius ha un'unica macchia nera sferica, nettamente più piccola sulle elitre. In un esperimento avvenuto in laboratorio è stato possibile indurre la cimicetta rosso nera a produrre delle molecole antibatteriche contro alcuni batteri gram-positivi e gram-negativi. La carta utilizzata da alcuni quotidiani americani come il New York Times, il Wall Street Journal, il Boston Globe, il Science e il Scientific America mostra la presenza di sostanze paragonabili all'ormone giovanile delle cimicette rosso nere. Note Altri progetti Collegamenti esterni Pyrrhocoroidea
en	caselaw	US	544 Pa. 158 (1996) 675 A.2d 268 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Daniel Michael SARANCHAK, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted October 25, 1995. Decided April 24, 1996. 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 Kent D. Watkins, St. Clair, for Appellant. Claude A.L. Shields, Pottsville, Robert A. Graci, Attorney General's Office, Harrisburg, for Appellee. Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and NEWMAN, JJ. OPINION OF THE COURT CASTILLE, Justice. Appellant pled guilty generally to two separate murders. Following a degree of guilt hearing, the trial court found appellant guilty of first degree murder in both charges.[1] Following a non-jury trial on the other charges filed against appellant, appellant was convicted of burglary,[2] robbery[3] and 166 conspiracy.[4] At the penalty hearing, a jury was empaneled and it determined that two aggravating circumstances existed on each count of murder beyond a reasonable doubt: that the murders were committed during the perpetration of a felony (robbery)[5] and that appellant had been convicted of another murder, committed either before or at the time of the offenses at issue.[6] No mitigating circumstances were found. As required by statute in such circumstances, the jury set the penalty at death.[7]See, Commonwealth v. Basemore, 525 Pa. 512, 582 A.2d 861 (1990)(the jury found one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances and thus, was required to impose the death sentence). On September 15, 1994, the court imposed the jury's sentence of death for both first degree murder convictions and further sentenced appellant to serve consecutively the maximum allowable prison sentences on the three remaining felonies. This direct appeal followed. I. Sufficiency of the Evidence Although appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his first degree murder convictions, we are required in all cases where the death penalty has been imposed, to independently undertake a review of the sufficiency of the evidence, even where a plea of guilty has been entered.[8]Commonwealth v, Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 26, 454 A.2d 937, 942 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S. Ct. 2444, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1327 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1236, 104 S. Ct. 31, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1452 (1983). When reviewing a sufficiency of 167 the evidence claim, an appellate court, viewing all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, must determine whether the evidence was sufficient to enable the fact finder to find that all of the elements of the offenses were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Burgos, 530 Pa. 473, 476, 610 A.2d 11, 13 (1992). Viewing the evidence presented in the trial court below in its proper light, we find that the evidence amply supports the convictions of first degree murder. The following facts form the basis for appellant's convictions: on October 16, 1993, appellant's 78 year-old uncle, and 87 year-old grandmother were found dead in their residence located in the village of Cumbola, Pennsylvania. Their bodies were discovered after appellant's uncle had not shown up for work and his employer went to the home to see if anything was wrong. The employer entered the home through the basement door, discovered the uncle's dead body and summoned the police. When the police arrived at the home, they found appellant's grandmother with a single gunshot wound in the forehead in the upstairs bedroom. Appellant's uncle was found shot to death lying on a couch in the basement. During the subsequent investigation, the police spoke to appellant's mother who informed the police that all she knew was that the night before, appellant had taken his brother's firearm and had gone to the area in Cumbola village known as Five Points to go "shooting."[9] After obtaining this information, the police went to appellant's apartment and transported him to the police station for questioning. 168 At the police station, appellant was advised of his Miranda rights.[10] Appellant indicated that he understood his rights and that he waived those rights. He then gave a verbal statement to the police in which he indicated that on the night of the murders he was at a bar with another male, Roy Miles, and that after a few beers, he and Miles left the bar and traveled to his brother's house to pick up his brother's .22 caliber rifle. He and Miles then went to his grandmother's house where he shot his uncle. Appellant refused to give the police any information regarding the shooting of his grandmother. After his statement, the police arrested appellant for the murder of his grandmother and uncle. Appellant's co-conspirator, Miles, testified at the degree of guilt hearing that while at a bar, he and appellant were drinking and they ran out of money.[11] Appellant told Miles that he knew where they could obtain more money, but that they might have to kill someone to get it. Miles agreed to this proposition and both individuals left the bar and went to appellant's house and retrieved the rifle. The two men then drove to appellant's grandmother's house several miles away. Once they arrived at the house, Miles accompanied appellant, who was armed with the rifle, down into the basement of the house where appellant's uncle was sleeping. Appellant then fired a single shot into his uncle's head killing him instantly. He then told Miles to search his uncle's pockets and take his uncle's wallet which contained a sum of cash. Thereafter, the two men went upstairs to the grandmother's bedroom. As appellant's grandmother was speaking to him, he shot her in the forehead one time killing her instantly as well. The two men then left the house and returned to the bar in Pottsville.[12] 169 A social worker who had interviewed appellant at prison testified at the degree of guilt hearing that appellant told her that he and Miles had gone to his grandmother's house to get money, that he had retrieved a rifle to take with him, that he shot his uncle and that they took money from his dead uncle's pockets. She further testified that although appellant refused to give any specific details regarding his grandmother's murder, appellant slipped more than once and stated that he killed "them" and not just "him." Additional testimony at the degree of guilt hearing included that of a police lieutenant who testified that the shell casings found near both deceased's bodies had been fired from appellant's rifle. Autopsy reports were also admitted which corroborated that both victims died as a result of gunshot wounds to the head fired from the rifle possessed by appellant. In first degree murder cases, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant acted with a specific intent to kill, that a human being was unlawfully killed, that the person accused did the killing, and that the killing was done with deliberation. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 528 Pa. 546, 550, 599 A.2d 624, 626 (1991).[13] Appellant's statements to the police and the social worker, combined with the corroborating testimony of his co-conspirator, Miles, and other evidence clearly showed that appellant, with premeditation, planned to kill, and did kill, two human beings in order to steal money from them. As such, the evidence sufficiently demonstrates that the killings here were done with premeditation, deliberation and in cold blood. Therefore, the evidence sufficiently supports appellant's two first degree murder convictions. II. Improper Exclusion of Prospective Jurors Turning to the issues appellant expressly raises herein, his first claim is that the trial court erroneously excluded for 170 cause six prospective jurors on the basis that each would be unable to impose the death penalty. Appellant claims that they should not have been excused for cause because they did not have sufficient reservations about their ability to impose the death penalty in order to warrant their exclusion. We do not agree. It is well settled that a prospective juror may be excluded for cause when his views on capital punishment are such as would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath." Commonwealth v. Holland, 518 Pa. 405, 410, 543 A.2d 1068, 1073 (1988). Furthermore, absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause, based upon prospective juror's answers and demeanor during voir dire will not be disturbed on appeal. Commonwealth v. AbuJamal, 521 Pa. 188, 193, 555 A.2d 846, 851 (1989). Here, the voir dire transcript demonstrates that the six individuals in question took the following positions when asked about their ability to impose the death penalty: Potential Jurors: Juror # 1 Question: "So you are saying you would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty?" Answer: Yes. Juror # 2 Question: "Do you have a fixed opinion against the death penalty?" Answer: "Yes, I think I do." Question: "Would you say then that you would vote automatically against the imposition of the death penalty?" Answer: "The way I feel right now, yes, I would. I'd be against the death penalty." Juror # 3 Question: "Are you saying that you would listen to this and whatever you heard when you went back to that room you would automatically vote against the death penalty?" Answer: "Yes." Juror # 4 Question: "You said it would be hard. Could you explain that?" Answer: "I guess I . . . . don't think I can make that decision." Question: "You don't believe that 171 you could make the decision itself? Is that the problem?" Answer: "No, I think it would bother me." Juror # 5 Question: "Have you as a result of anything that you read or anything that you have heard, formed an opinion concerning which punishment the defendant should receive?" Answer: "Not what I read; but of a matter of conscience, I would not be able to condemn a man to death." Juror # 6 Question: "And, assume that the evidence so requires it, would you be able to return a verdict of the death penalty?" Answer: "I don't think so." Question: "Well, could you vote for the death penalty?" Answer: "I don't think so." (N.T. 9/12/94 pp. 55, 68, 94, 160, 222 and 239). The record reveals an ample basis for the trial court's findings that the six individuals in question would have been, as a result of their preconceived beliefs or attitudes, "substantially impaired" in the performance of their duties as jurors. Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in excluding these jurors. Thus, appellant's claim is meritless. III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Appellant next broadly asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his request for appointment of new appellate counsel to review the record to attempt to ascertain if there were any viable issues of ineffectiveness of trial counsel such as to warrant a new trial or sentencing hearing. A review of the record fails to demonstrate that appellant made such a request to the court for new counsel and appellant fails to indicate when or how he petitioned the court for new appellate counsel. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the trial court ever ruled upon such a motion. In fact, the record indicates only that appellant's counsel filed a motion to allow him to continue to represent appellant in forma pauperis, that the trial court granted the motion, and that appellant's trial counsel continued to represent him on appeal. It is appellant's responsibility to ensure that any relevant related matter be filed or made part of the original record. Commonwealth v. Ahearn, 543 Pa. 174, 670 A.2d 133 (1996); 172 see also, Pa. R.A.P. §§ 1911, 1923. To the extent that the record is deficient to review appellant's claim, appellant has the opportunity to request that the omission be corrected by the trial court. Pa. R.A.P. § 1926. Because the record in this case is devoid of any ruling by the trial court on a motion for new appellate counsel, this Court can only assume that no such ruling occurred or that appellant failed to correct the apparent omission in the record of any such request for counsel and the trial court's ruling thereon. Assuming that the latter instance is the case, we will not review a claim where the record fails to demonstrate or support the allegation of error. Hence, this claim is without merit.[14] IV. Admission of Photograph Next, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in allowing evidence at the penalty hearing (over defense counsel's objection) of a black and white photograph of appellant's grandmother after she had been shot on the grounds that the photograph was not relevant and was prejudicial. In the alternative, appellant argues that even if the photograph was relevant, the trial court still erred in admitting the photograph since its relevance was outweighed by its prejudicial nature. The admissibility of photographs depicting a crime scene is within the sound discretion of the trial court and only an abuse of that discretion will constitute reversible error. 173 Commonwealth v. Buehl, 510 Pa. 363, 366, 508 A.2d 1167 (1986). A photograph of a murder victim in a homicide trial is not inflammatory per se. Whether the photographs are admissible depends on a two step analysis. First, the court must decide whether a photograph is inflammatory in nature. If the photograph is deemed inflammatory, the court must then apply a balancing test of whether the photograph is of such essential evidentiary value that its need outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the minds and passions of the jury. See, Commonwealth v. Marshall, 537 Pa. 336, 341, 643 A.2d 1070, 1075 (1994). Further, this Court has stated that a capital sentencing hearing is not a sanitized proceeding limited only to evidence of aggravating circumstances. Commonwealth v. Marshall, supra, 537 Pa. at 340, 643 A.2d at 1074 (1994). Rather, the jury must be informed of the history and natural development of the events and offenses with which appellant has been convicted, so that the jury can truly understand the nature of the offenses and appellant's character. Commonwealth v. Young, 536 Pa. 57, 64, 637 A.2d 1313, 1320 (1993). For the jury to properly perform its function, it must be made aware of the facts of the crime for which appellant is being sentenced and the extent to which those crimes properly support the existence of aggravating circumstances. Commonwealth v. Stevens, 543 Pa. 204, 212-13, 670 A.2d 623, 627 (1996). Here, the black and white photograph was offered during the testimony of one of the police officers to demonstrate his description of the crime scene and the condition in which appellant's grandmother was found, that is sitting upright in her bed after she had been shot. The 87 year-old victim had often slept sitting up due to breathing difficulties and the photograph enabled the jury to visualize how appellant murdered his unsuspecting grandmother with one shot directly in the forehead after he had entered her bedroom. It is also relevant to demonstrate appellant's intent to kill by the single gunshot to the forehead and his malice aforethought. 174 Commonwealth v. Chester, Commonwealth v. Laird, 526 Pa. 578, 585, 587 A.2d 1367, 1374 (1991)(color photograph depicting a close view of the corpse was admitted to prove intent to kill in a first degree murder case). Hence, under these circumstances the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the single black and white photograph to be admitted in the sentencing phase. See, Commonwealth v. Buehl, 510 Pa. 363, 508 A.2d 1167 (1986)(black and white photographs admitted at trial were relevant as they depicted the victims as they were found and demonstrated the position of appellant when the fatal shots were fired); Commonwealth v. Rush, 538 Pa. 104, 646 A.2d 557 (1994)(photographs of the murdered victim's body provided the jury with evidence of the assailant's intent). Accordingly, no relief on this claim is warranted. V. Improper Jury Instruction Appellant next asserts that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the court's instructions to the jury regarding mitigating circumstances was confusing and misleading to the jury. Specifically, appellant challenges the following instruction: The Sentencing Code of Pennsylvania defines aggravating and mitigating circumstances. They are things that make a first degree murder case more or less terrible. (N.T. 9/15/94 p. 166). A jury charge by the trial court shall be evaluated on the basis of the entire charge and not on separate, discrete portions of the charge. See, Commonwealth v. Wortham, 471 Pa. 243, 369 A.2d 1287 (1977)(appellate evaluation of the charge must be based on an examination of it as a whole to determine whether it was favorable or not). Furthermore, in order for a new sentencing hearing to be warranted, the instruction must have caused some articulable prejudice. Commonwealth v. May, 540 Pa. 237, 252, 656 A.2d 1335, 1343 (1995). The trial court is free to use its own form of expression in order to explain to the jury often-difficult legal concepts. The only issue is whether the area covered by the instruction adequately, clearly and accurately presents the 175 issue to the jury. Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 528 Pa. 57, 595 A.2d 28 (1991)(the trial judge has broad discretion in phrasing points for charge and is not bound to give instructions in the form requested); see also, Commonwealth v. Smith, 511 Pa. 343, 513 A.2d 1371 (1986). Appellant claims that the charge regarding mitigating circumstances improperly informed the jurors that mitigating circumstances were only those that made the murders themselves less terrible, and that the instructions failed to inform the jury that appellant's character could be considered to support a finding of mitigating circumstances. Appellant claims that as a result of these faulty instructions, the jury was precluded from finding any mitigating circumstances. This claim is baseless. At the outset we note that appellant selectively omitted the remainder of the trial court's instructions given regarding mitigating circumstances which provided: [I]f you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, that the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired or . . . any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense, . . . then you will have found mitigating circumstances. (N.T. 9/15/94 p. 171-172). Clearly, this instruction did instruct the jury that it could consider appellant's character as mitigating evidence. Further, evaluating the charge as a whole, this Court finds that the jury was appropriately informed that in order to find mitigating circumstances the jury must determine that evidence existed showing appellant's character was impaired in some way so as to diminish his capacity to appreciate his criminal behavior.[15] Moreover, this instruction is in conformity with the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury 176 Instructions and specifically addresses the constitutional requirements outlined in Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 110 S. Ct. 1078, 108 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1990)(the jury must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence and the types of mitigating evidence must not be unduly limited). Thus, appellant's argument is meritless. VI. Appeal of Discretionary Aspects of Sentence Finally, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing appellant outside the sentencing guidelines on his convictions for robbery, burglary and conspiracy.[16] Appellant does not dispute that the sentences imposed were legislatively permitted;[17] rather, appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of the sentences imposed. Such appeals are governed by Pa. R.A.P. § 2119(f) which states that an appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence in a criminal matter must set forth in his brief a concise statement of reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal, and that such a statement shall immediately precede the argument on the merits with respect to the discretionary aspects of the sentence. Pa. R.A.P. § 2119(f). This procedural requirement allows the court to determine if an appellant has demonstrated a "substantial question" which is necessary to invoke appellate review. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b). 177 The procedural rule, Pa. R.A.P. § 2119(f) is designed to enhance the functioning of appellate review process. Commonwealth v. Gambal, 522 Pa. 280, 283, 561 A.2d 710, 713 (1989). The legislature has provided 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721, a thorough, though not exhaustive, outline of considerations to focus the court's deliberations in imposing an appropriate sentence. Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 511, 522 A.2d 17, 20 (1987). To demonstrate that a substantial sentencing question exists, a party must articulate reasons why a particular sentence raises doubts that the trial court did not properly consider these general guidelines provided by the legislature. Id. In the instant case, appellant has failed to provide the required prefatory Tuladziecki statement of reasons relied upon for appeal. Appellant has not only failed to comply with this procedural requirement, but he has also failed to articulate how his legal sentences present this Court with a substantial question regarding his sentences. Thus, this issue warrants no further review by this Court.[18] VII. Proportionality Review Finally, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(h)(3)(i), we have reviewed the sentences of death and the record below and have determined that appellant fails to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under the three criteria set forth under 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(h)(3). Specifically, we find that: (i) his sentences were not the product of passion, prejudice or any other 178 arbitrary factors; (ii) the evidence supported the finding of at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d) for each murder; and (iii) the sentences of death for each murder were not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the circumstances of the crime and the character and record of the defendant. Upon reviewing the record below, it is evident that the verdict was not the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factors. Rather, it is clear that the jury's verdict was based upon appellant's cold blooded murder of two elderly, defenseless relatives for nothing more than drinking money for himself and his cohort, Miles. With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d), we find that sufficient evidence existed to support each of the two aggravating circumstances found by the jury on both murder counts (namely, that the murder was committed during the perpetration of a felony, robbery, and that appellant was convicted of another murder committed before or at the time of the offense).[19] The evidence of appellant's first degree murder convictions for both murders provides sufficient support for the jury's finding of an aggravating circumstance that appellant had been convicted of another murder committed at or before the time of the offense. See, Commonwealth v. Crawley, 514 Pa. 539, 526 A.2d 334 (1987)(evidence was sufficient to support same aggravating circumstances where appellant was convicted of murdering three victims during the course of a robbery). Where there are no mitigating factors found and there is a finding of at least one aggravating circumstance, the sentencing court has no discretion but to impose the death penalty. Commonwealth v. Smith, 511 Pa. 343, 358-59, 513 A.2d 1371, 1378 (1986), citing, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). With respect to the final factor we are required to consider, in accordance with Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. at 63, 454 A.2d at 961, this Court has conducted an *179 independent evaluation of all of the death penalty cases decided since September 13, 1978, in order to determine whether appellant's two capital sentences were disproportional to the sentences imposed in similar cases taking into consideration both the circumstances of the offense and the character and the record of the defendant. See, Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428, 443-445, 475 A.2d 700, 707-709 (1984); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 541 Pa. 188, 662 A.2d 610, 613 (1995).[20] Our review reveals that where, as here, there are no mitigating circumstances present and the Commonwealth has proven that the defendant committed the killing during the perpetration of a felony and had been convicted of another murder at the time of the killing, the defendant has been sentenced to death in essentially every instance. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Zook, 532 Pa. 79, 615 A.2d 1 (1992); Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 528 Pa. 57, 595 A.2d 28 (1991); Commonwealth v. Crawley, 514 Pa. 539, 526 A.2d 334 (1987); See, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv)(the verdict must be sentence of death if the trier of fact finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances.) Therefore, we conclude that the sentence of death imposed upon appellant is not excessive or disproportionate to the sentence imposed in similar cases. For the foregoing reasons, we uphold the convictions and affirm the judgment of sentence of death.[21] NOTES [1] 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a). [2] 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a). [3] 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701. [4] 18 Pa.C.S. § 903. [5] 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(6). [6] 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(d)(11). [7] See, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) the verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one specified aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances. [8] Although appellant chose not to in his case, generally a defendant who is convicted of first degree murder by virtue of a guilty plea to murder, may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the first degree conviction. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 442 Pa. 512, 276 A.2d 537 (1971). [9] Several police detectives testified at the degree of guilt hearing that immediately after securing the crime scene, they canvassed the neighborhood and questioned neighbors. Based upon the information they obtained, the police contacted appellant's mother and she informed the police where appellant was currently residing. Based on the mother's statement that appellant had taken a firearm and was in the area of Cumbola on the night of the murders, the police secured a search warrant for appellant's apartment where they confiscated a .22 caliber rifle whose bullets were later determined through ballistic tests to match bullets recovered from the victims' bodies. [10] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). [11] Miles pleaded guilty to burglary, theft, receiving stolen property, robbery, aggravated assault, conspiracy and third degree murder for the killings. He has been sentenced to 9 to 20 years in prison. [12] Numerous other Commonwealth witnesses testified that appellant and Miles had been in the bar the night after the murders occurred and that both men were carrying large sums of money. [13] 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502. Murder. (a) Murder of the first degree. A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional killing. "Intentional killing." Killing by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. [14] In any event, whether a petition for change of court-appointed counsel should be granted is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Williams, 514 Pa. 62, 65, 522 A.2d 1058, 1061 (1987). Furthermore, 42 Pa. R.Crim.P. § 316(c) provides that a motion for change of counsel by a defendant to whom counsel has been assigned, shall not be granted except for substantial reasons. In view of appellant's total failure to demonstrate any violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel in the context of the circumstances of this case, his failure to state any specific claim of arguable merit, and his failure to support his claim by appropriate references to the record or by citations to legal authority, the trial court's refusal of the request was not an abuse of discretion. See, Commonwealth v. Moore, 534 Pa. 527, 633 A.2d 1119 (1993)(appellant's claims of ineffective representation by counsel were completely lacking in substance and thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to remover appointed counsel). [15] A review of the record indicates that the mitigating circumstances appellant presented to the jury included only evidence that appellant used alcohol/drugs immediately prior to the offense and/or that he had a history of alcohol/drug abuse. See, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e). [16] The trial court imposed the following sentences be served consecutively to one another and consecutive to the two death sentences: 10 20 years for robbery; 10 20 years for burglary; and 5-10 years for conspiracy. See, 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103. In support of the sentences imposed, the judge stated that appellant's two first degree murder convictions, the gruesome nature of appellant's brutal murder of his own elderly relatives, and the attendant circumstances provided ample justification for sentencing appellant outside the recommended guidelines. Absent an abuse of discretion, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge in sentencing matters. Commonwealth v. Ward, 524 Pa. 48, 568 A.2d 1242 (1990)(since there was no mandatory sentence to be imposed for the offenses appellant had committed, the trial court had the discretion to impose a sentence outside the guidelines as long as it was within the statutorily permitted ranges). [17] It is well-established that a sentencing court can impose a sentence that is the maximum period authorized by the statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9756(a). [18] Although this Court is permitted to overlook a party's failure to provide a prefatory statement when the Commonwealth fails to object to the omission, it should only do so in situations where the substantial question presented is evident from appellant's brief. Commonwealth v. Gambal, supra, 522 Pa. at 283, 561 A.2d at 713 (1989). Appellant's boilerplate assertion that he should be resentenced simply because the trial court sentenced him outside the Sentencing Guidelines without more does not present a substantial question. Id. A court has no duty to impose a sentence considered appropriate under the Sentencing Guidelines. Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 516 Pa. 365, 532 A.2d 775 (1987). The guidelines are not mandatory; rather, they must only be considered. Id. Appellant must, at a minimum, explain specifically why he thinks his sentences were improper. This he does not do. [19] 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(6)(ii). [20] Our proportionality review was aided, in part, by the sentencing data compiled and monitored by the Administrative Offices of Pennsylvania Courts (AOPC). [21] The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court is directed to transmit to the governor's office, within 90 days, the full and complete record in this matter. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(i).
pt	caselaw	EU	Avis juridique important \| 61996B0075 Despacho do presidente do Tribunal de Primeira Instância de 26 de Agosto de 1996. - Söktas Pamuk Ve Tarim Ürünlerini Degerlendirme Ticaret Ve Sanayii AS (Söktas) contra Comissão das Comunidades Europeias. - Aviso de início de um processo antidumping - Processo de medidas provisórias - Pedido de suspensão de execução - Inadmissibilidade. - Processo T-75/96 R. Colectânea da Jurisprudência 1996 página II-00859 SumárioPartesFundamentação jurídica do acórdãoParte decisória Palavras-chave ++++Processo de medidas provisórias ° Condições de admissibilidade ° Admissibilidade do recurso principal ° Irrelevância ° Limites ° Recurso principal destinado à anulação de uma decisão da Comissão que dá início a um processo antidumping ° Inadmissibilidade (Tratado CE, artigo 185. ; Regulamento de Processo do Tribunal de Primeira Instância, artigo 104. , n. 1) Sumário A admissibilidade do recurso principal não deve, em princípio, ser apreciada no âmbito de um processo de medidas provisórias, sob pena de se antecipar a decisão do Tribunal no processo principal. A apreciação dessa questão deve ser reservada para o processo principal, a não ser na hipótese de, à primeira vista, o recurso ser manifestamente inadmissível. É esse o caso de um recurso de anulação de uma decisão que dá início a um processo antidumping. Com efeito, tal decisão constitui, prima facie, uma medida preparatória, sem efeitos jurídicos, uma vez que não é susceptível de afectar imediatamente e de modo irreversível a situação jurídica das empresas em causa, não as obriga de modo algum a modificar as suas práticas comerciais ou a cooperar no inquérito, o qual pode aliás ser encerrado sem a instituição de medidas de defesa. Face a tal decisão, os direitos da defesa encontram-se suficientemente protegidos pela possibilidade de contestar a sua legalidade no âmbito de um recurso eventualmente dirigido contra a decisão final. Sendo conexo com um recurso principal, prima facie, inadmissível, o pedido de suspensão da execução de uma decisão da Comissão de dar início a um processo antidumping deve ser considerado improcedente. Partes No processo T-75/96 R, Soekta Pamuk Ve Tar m UEruenlerini De erlendirme Ticaret Ve Sanayi A , sociedade de direito turco, estabelecida em Soeke/Ayd n (Turquia), representada por Izzet M. Sinan, barrister, do foro de Inglaterra e do País de Gales, mandatado por Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Bruxelas, com domicílio escolhido no Luxemburgo no escritório dos advogados Arendt & Medernach, 8-10, rue Mathias Hardt, requerente, contra Comissão das Comunidades Europeias, representada por Nicholas Kahn e Dimitris Triantafyllou, membros do Serviço Jurídico, na qualidade de agentes, com domicílio escolhido no Luxemburgo no gabinete de Carlos Gómez de la Cruz, membro do Serviço Jurídico, Centre Wagner, Kirchberg, requerida, que tem por objecto um pedido de suspensão de execução do aviso de início de um processo antidumping relativo às importações de tecidos de algodão não branqueado originários da República Popular da China, do Egipto, da Índia, da Indonésia, do Paquistão e da Turquia (JO 1996, C 50, p. 3), O PRESIDENTE DO TRIBUNAL DE PRIMEIRA INSTÂNCIA DAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEIAS profere o presente Despacho Fundamentação jurídica do acórdão Matéria de facto e tramitação processual 1 Na sequência de uma denúncia, segundo a qual as importações de tecidos de algodão não branqueado lisos, originários da República Popular da China, do Egipto, da Índia, da Indonésia, do Paquistão e da Turquia, seriam objecto de práticas de dumping e causariam assim um prejuízo importante à indústria comunitária, apresentada pelo Comité das Indústrias de Algodão e Fibras Afins da União Europeia (Eurocoton) junto da Comissão, esta deu início a um inquérito, em conformidade com o disposto no artigo 5. do Regulamento (CE) n. 3283/94 do Conselho, de 22 de Dezembro de 1994, relativo à defesa contra as importações objecto de dumping de países não membros da Comunidade Europeia (JO L 349, p. 1, a seguir "Regulamento n. 3283/94"). 2 O aviso de início de um processo antidumping relativo às importações de tecidos de algodão não branqueado, originários da República Popular da China, do Egipto, da Índia, da Indonésia, do Paquistão e da Turquia, foi publicado no Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias, de 21 de Fevereiro de 1996 (JO C 50, p. 3). 3 Através de petição apresentada na Secretaria do Tribunal de Primeira Instância em 20 de Maio de 1996, a sociedade Soekta Pamuk Ve Tar m UEruenlerini De erlendirme Ticaret Ve Sanayi A , que fabrica, nomeadamente, os tipos de tecidos de algodão que se presumem ser objecto de dumping e os exporta para a Comunidade, interpôs, nos termos do artigo 173. , quarto parágrafo, e do artigo 178. do Tratado CE, um recurso de anulação da "decisão" de início de um processo antidumping relativo às importações de tecidos de algodão não branqueado, originários da República Popular da China, do Egipto, da Índia, da Indonésia, do Paquistão e da Turquia, anunciada no aviso de 21 de Fevereiro de 1996, já referido, e pediu a condenação da Comissão na reparação dos danos pretensamente causados à requerente pela medida impugnada. 4 Por acto separado registado na Secretaria do Tribunal no mesmo dia, a requerente apresentou igualmente, nos termos do artigo 185. do Tratado CE, um pedido de suspensão de execução da "decisão impugnada, na medida em que a mesma diz respeito à requerente e à Turquia em geral". A Comissão apresentou observações escritas por articulado apresentado na Secretaria do Tribunal em 11 de Junho de 1996. Em 30 de Julho de 1996, produziu um certo número de documentos a pedido do Tribunal. Atendendo aos elementos dos autos, este último considerou que dispunha de todos os elementos necessários para decidir do presente pedido de medidas provisórias, sem que fosse útil ouvir, previamente, as partes em alegações. Questão de direito 5 Por força das disposições conjugadas dos artigos 185. e 186. do Tratado e do artigo 4. da Decisão 88/591/CECA, CEE, Euratom do Conselho, de 24 de Outubro de 1988, que institui o Tribunal de Primeira Instância das Comunidades Europeias (JO L 319, p. 1), na redacção dada pela Decisão 93/350/Euratom/CECA/CEE do Conselho, de 8 de Junho de 1993 (JO L 144, p. 21), e pela Decisão 94/149/CECA/CE do Conselho, de 7 de Março de 1994 (JO L 66, p. 29), o Tribunal pode, se considerar que as circunstâncias o exigem, ordenar a suspensão da execução do acto impugnado ou as medidas provisórias necessárias. 6 O artigo 104. , n. 1, do Regulamento de Processo do Tribunal de Primeira Instância precisa que o pedido de suspensão de execução só é admissível se o requerente tiver impugnado o acto em questão perante o Tribunal. O n. 2 do mesmo artigo prevê que os pedidos relativos a medidas provisórias devem especificar as razões da urgência, bem como os fundamentos de facto e de direito que, à primeira vista, justificam a adopção da medida provisória requerida. As medidas requeridas devem ter carácter provisório no sentido de que não devem prejudicar a decisão quanto ao mérito (v. despacho do presidente do Tribunal de Primeira Instância de 3 de Junho de 1996, Bayer/Comissão, T-41/96 R, Colect., p. II-0000, n. 13). Quanto à pretensa inadmissibilidade manifesta do recurso principal Argumentos das partes 7 A Comissão invoca a inadmissibilidade manifesta do recurso principal interposto contra o início de um processo antidumping. Alega, em primeiro lugar, que tal medida constitui um acto preparatório não susceptível de modificar de maneira caracterizada, imediata e irreversível a situação jurídica da requerente. Assim, não há que proceder ao exame do presente pedido de medidas provisórias. 8 Em especial, a Comissão rejeita o argumento da requerente segundo o qual as condições, a que o artigo 47. do Protocolo Adicional ao Acordo que cria uma Associação entre a Comunidade Económica Europeia e a Turquia (JO 1972, L 293, p. 3; EE 11 F1 p. 215, a seguir "artigo 47. do protocolo adicional" ou "artigo 47. ") subordina a adopção de medidas antidumping, não se encontrariam reunidas no caso de figura. Mesmo pressupondo que seja estabelecida, o que a Comissão contesta, esta circunstância invocada pela requerente não teria qualquer incidência na natureza do acto impugnado. Além disso, as autoridades turcas não teriam pretendido, nas cartas que dirigiram à Comissão, no que diz respeito ao processo antidumping em causa, que o seu início infringia os direitos conferidos à Turquia ao abrigo do artigo 47. 9 Em segundo lugar, a Comissão alega que, de qualquer modo, o acto impugnado não diz directa e individualmente respeito à requerente. O aviso de início do processo antidumping indica apenas o produto e os países em causa. Não visa determinadas empresas exportadoras ou importadoras em especial. O seu número e identidade não estariam determinados nem seriam verificáveis, no momento do início do processo, contrariamente ao critério definido pelo Tribunal de Justiça no seu acórdão de 1 de Julho de 1965, Toepfer e Getreide-Import/Comissão (106/63 e 107/63, Colect. 1965-1968, p. 119). Além disso, embora procurando obter a suspensão do processo antidumping no que diz respeito "à Turquia em geral", a requerente não pretenderia de modo algum que todas as exportações de produtos abrangidos por este processo, a partir da Turquia, são efectuadas por ela. 10 No seu pedido de medidas provisórias, a requerente sugere, por seu turno, que o recurso principal é admissível. Remete para a argumentação desenvolvida na petição do recurso principal. No caso de figura, a "decisão" de iniciar um processo antidumping com base no artigo 5. do Regulamento n. 3283/94 produz efeitos jurídicos no que lhe diz respeito na medida em que a mesma ignora a tramitação prevista pelo artigo 47. do protocolo adicional e cria a base jurídica para a instituição de direitos antidumping provisórios. Ora, a requerente não estaria exposta a tal risco financeiro se o processo previsto pelo artigo 47. , a fim de resolver amigavelmente este tipo de litígios, tivesse sido seguido. Com efeito, em aplicação deste artigo, a Comissão devia ter apresentado um pedido junto do Conselho de Associação e esperar que este adoptasse uma decisão no prazo de três meses ou se abstivesse totalmente de agir, antes de poder instituir medidas de protecção unilaterais. A decisão impugnada constituiria, assim, o ponto de partida de um processo, sem o qual não poderia ser tomada qualquer decisão afectando negativamente os interesses das partes em causa. Sob este aspecto, produziria efeitos similares aos de uma decisão de início do processo previsto no artigo 93. , n. 2, do Tratado CE, em matéria de auxílios de Estado. 11 Em apoio da sua tese, a requerente explica que o artigo 47. , n. 1, prevê que a Turquia e a Comunidade devem resolver os problemas suscitados em matéria de dumping num quadro institucional misto. Cabe ao Conselho de Associação apreciar se existem ou não práticas de dumping. O Conselho de Associação substitui assim a Comissão e dirige directamente recomendações ao autor ou aos autores das práticas em causa, a fim de pôr termo às mesmas. 12 O artigo 47. prevê unicamente, no seu n. 2, primeiro parágrafo, a possibilidade de uma "parte lesada" agir unilateralmente, quando, depois de ter regularmente submetido o assunto à apreciação do Conselho de Associação, este não tomar qualquer decisão no prazo de três meses, ou fizer recomendações, nos termos do artigo 47. , n. 1, sem qualquer seguimento. 13 Por fim, o artigo 47. , n. 2, segundo parágrafo, permite unicamente instituir, desde que o Conselho de Associação tenha sido previamente informado, medidas de protecção provisórias com uma duração máxima de três meses a contar da apresentação do pedido ou da data em que a parte lesada tomou medidas de protecção unilaterais na sequência da ineficácia das recomendações do Conselho de Associação. 14 No caso de figura, a Comissão teria ignorado as disposições do artigo 47. , n. 1, ao não apresentar um pedido prévio ao Conselho de Associação. A informação deste último, após o início do processo, não é conforme às referidas disposições do artigo 47. Na ocorrência, resulta da acta da reunião do Comité misto da União aduaneira UE-Turquia de 19 de Fevereiro de 1996 (anexo 8 à petição) que a Turquia não subscreve a interpretação do artigo 47. seguida pela Comissão. 15 Neste contexto, o Conselho de Associação teria sido privado da possibilidade de agir, de modo a evitar a acção contenciosa. Apenas pode suspender a medida relativa à instituição de um direito provisório, por força do artigo 47. , n. 3, na pendência do envio das recomendações previstas no n. 1 deste mesmo artigo. Todavia, tal decisão seria altamente improvável, na medida em que a própria Comunidade, representada pela Comissão, seria convidada a dar o seu acordo sobre a decisão de suspensão, no seio do Conselho de Associação. Apreciação do Tribunal 16 Segundo jurisprudência bem assente, o problema da admissibilidade do recurso principal não deve, em princípio, ser apreciado no âmbito de um processo de medidas provisórias, sob pena de se antecipar a decisão do Tribunal no processo principal. A apreciação dessa questão deve ser reservada para o processo principal, a não ser na hipótese de, à primeira vista, o recurso ser manifestamente inadmissível (v. despacho do presidente do Tribunal de Primeira Instância de 22 de Dezembro de 1995, Danielsson e o./Comissão, T-219/95 R, Colect., p. II-3051, n. 58). 17 No presente caso, cabe assim ao Tribunal verificar, em primeiro lugar, se, como é defendido pela Comissão, o pedido principal, destinado à anulação da "decisão" desta instituição de dar início a um processo antidumping relativo às importações de tecidos de algodão não branqueado, originários da República Popular da China, do Egipto, da Índia, da Indonésia, do Paquistão e da Turquia, deve ser considerado, prima facie, manifestamente inadmissível. 18 Convém, em especial, examinar se as condições de admissibilidade deste pedido de anulação, relativas à natureza do acto impugnado, se encontram, prima facie, preenchidas. 19 Segundo jurisprudência bem assente, constituem decisões susceptíveis de recurso de anulação, na acepção do artigo 173. , as medidas que produzam efeitos jurídicos obrigatórios de natureza a afectar os interesses da parte recorrente, ao modificarem de forma caracterizada a sua situação jurídica. Quando se trata de actos ou decisões cuja elaboração se efectua em várias fases, só são, em princípio, actos impugnáveis as medidas que fixam definitivamente a posição da instituição no termo do processo, com exclusão das medidas intermédias cujo objectivo é preparar a decisão final (v., nomeadamente, acórdão do Tribunal de Justiça de 11 de Novembro de 1981, IBM/Comissão, 60/81, Recueil, p. 2639, n.os 8 a 12, e despacho do Tribunal de Primeira Instância de 14 de Março de 1996, Dysan Magnetics e Review Magnetics/Comissão, T-134/95, Colect., p. II-0000, n. 20). 20 No caso vertente, cabe ao Tribunal apreciar se o acto impugnado se afigura, prima facie, susceptível de produzir, por si, efeitos jurídicos que possam afectar os interesses da requerente ou se, pelo contrário, mais não constitui que uma medida preparatória cuja ilegalidade pode ser suscitada no âmbito de um recurso interposto contra a decisão final. 21 A este respeito, a tese defendida pela requerente, segundo a qual o início de um processo antidumping, ao abrigo do artigo 5. do Regulamento n. 3283/94, produziria consequências irreversíveis, na medida em que teria por efeito afastar o processo de resolução amigável dos litígios previsto pelo artigo 47. do protocolo adicional, expondo assim a interessada ao risco de imposição de direitos antidumping provisórios, não parece dever ser seguida. 22 Com efeito, não se afigura, nesta fase, que o início de um processo antidumping ao abrigo do artigo 5. do Regulamento n. 3283/94 tenha por efeito privar a requerente da possibilidade de uma resolução do litígio em conformidade com as modalidades definidas pelo artigo 47. do protocolo adicional. 23 A análise sumária das disposições do artigo 47. demonstra que o mesmo não tem por objecto afastar a aplicação, nomeadamente, dos instrumentos de defesa comercial comunitária, mas sim completar as modalidades da sua execução. A este respeito, resulta, à primeira vista, deste artigo que o mesmo não subordina o início, pela Comunidade, de um processo antidumping a qualquer condição específica, exceptuada a informação do Conselho de Associação. É apenas numa fase ulterior do processo que o artigo 47. subordina a acção da Comunidade a certas condições suplementares. Com efeito, embora autorizando, no seu n. 1, o Conselho de Associação a dirigir recomendações ao autor da prática de dumping, quando verifique, a pedido da parte no tratado de associação pretensamente lesada, que tais práticas são exercidas nas relações entre a Comunidade e a Turquia, o artigo 47. exige unicamente, no seu n. 2, primeiro parágrafo, que esta parte pretensamente lesada ° na ocorrência a Comunidade ° recorra ao Conselho de Associação quando pretende impor uma medida de defesa comercial, que só pode ser tomada se, no prazo de três meses a contar da apresentação do pedido, aquele não tiver dirigido qualquer recomendação às empresas em questão a fim de pôr termo às práticas de dumping em causa, ou se, não obstante as suas recomendações, essas práticas prosseguirem. Por outro lado, o artigo 47. autoriza expressamente, no seu n. 2, segundo parágrafo, a imposição, a título cautelar, de direitos antidumping provisórios, durante um período limitado, por uma das partes no tratado de associação, depois de ter informado o Conselho de Associação desse facto. 24 Esta interpretação do artigo 47. parece corroborada pela secção III, consagrada aos instrumentos de defesa comercial, do capítulo IV da Decisão n. 1/95 do Conselho de Associação CE-Turquia, de 22 de Dezembro de 1995, relativa à execução da fase final da União aduaneira (JO 1996, L 35, p. 1). À primeira vista, resulta expressamente dos artigos 44. a 46. dessa secção que qualquer uma das partes no tratado de associação continua a ser competente para aplicar os seus próprios instrumentos de defesa comercial, sem prejuízo do respeito das modalidades de aplicação definidas pelas referidas disposições do artigo 47. do protocolo adicional. 25 Ora, no caso de figura, a Comissão informou o Conselho de Associação, por carta de 18 de Janeiro de 1996, junta aos autos a pedido do Tribunal, da denúncia que lhe fora apresentada por Eurocoton, em 8 de Janeiro de 1996. Além disso, o Conselho de Associação foi informado, em conformidade com o artigo 47. , pela carta da Comissão de 23 de Fevereiro de 1996 ° contendo uma cópia não confidencial da denúncia °, igualmente apresentada por esta instituição a pedido do Tribunal, do início do processo antidumping, cujo aviso tinha sido publicado em 21 de Fevereiro de 1996 no Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias. O processo seguido afigura-se assim plenamente conforme às disposições do artigo 47. Na ocorrência, o início de um processo antidumping ao abrigo do Regulamento n. 3283/94 parece, à primeira vista, destinar-se a permitir à Comissão realizar as investigações necessárias a fim de poder decidir ulteriormente, com base nas mesmas, ou encerrar o processo, ou, pelo contrário, prossegui-lo adoptando medidas provisórias e propondo ao Conselho a adopção de medidas definitivas, seguindo as modalidades definidas pelo artigo 47. 26 Nestas circunstâncias, o acto impugnado, que se situa numa fase precoce do processo, não parece susceptível de constituir obstáculo, sendo caso disso, a uma eventual intervenção do Conselho de Associação, em conformidade com o disposto no artigo 47. do protocolo adicional, nomeadamente na hipótese de a Comissão pretender adoptar medidas provisórias ou de propor ao Conselho a adopção de medidas definitivas. 27 Daqui resulta que a argumentação da requerente, segundo a qual o aviso de início do processo antidumping em causa teria como efeito excluir a intervenção do Conselho de Associação nas condições previstas pelo artigo 47. , é, à primeira vista, desprovida de fundamento. 28 Além disso, e de qualquer modo, importa recordar que, diferentemente de uma decisão de início do processo previsto pelo artigo 93. , n. 2, do Tratado em matéria de auxílios de Estado, com a qual a requerente faz a comparação, o início de um processo antidumping não é susceptível de afectar imediatamente e de modo irreversível a situação jurídica das empresas em causa. Com efeito, tal processo não conduz automaticamente à imposição de direitos antidumping e pode ser encerrado sem instituição de medidas, como previsto no artigo 9. do Regulamento n. 3283/94. Por outro lado, as empresas abrangidas por um inquérito antidumping não são de modo algum obrigadas a modificar as suas práticas comerciais na sequência do início do processo e não podem ser obrigadas a cooperar no inquérito (v. despacho Dysan Magnetics e Review Magnetics, já referido, n.os 22 a 28). 29 Nestas condições, e de qualquer modo, o início do processo antidumping em causa, no caso de figura, constitui, prima facie, uma medida preparatória, cuja eventual ilegalidade pode ser suscitada no quadro de um recurso interposto, se for caso disso, contra a decisão final, garantindo assim uma protecção satisfatória à requerente. 30 O acto impugnado não constitui, portanto, prima facie, uma decisão na acepção do artigo 173. do Tratado, contra a qual seja possível interpor um recurso de anulação. O pedido principal destinado à anulação deste acto afigura-se, assim, neste estádio, manifestamente inadmissível, sem que seja necessário examinar se o acto impugnado diz directa e individualmente respeito à requerente. 31 No que se refere, em segundo lugar, ao pedido principal destinado à reparação do prejuízo pretensamente causado à requerente pelo início de um processo antidumping, basta verificar que, segundo jurisprudência bem assente, este pedido é, prima facie, manifestamente inadmissível, porque o acto pretensamente irregular, que estaria na origem do prejuízo alegado, não produz quaisquer efeitos jurídicos, tal como resulta do conjunto das considerações que precedem (v., nomeadamente, despacho do Tribunal de Justiça de 4 de Outubro de 1991, Bosman/Comissão, C-117/91, Colect., p. I-4873, n. 20). Além disso, e de qualquer modo, este pedido é, prima facie, manifestamente inadmissível, na medida em que a requerente não fornece qualquer indicação quanto à natureza e à extensão do prejuízo que lhe teria sido ou que lhe seria ocasionado pelo início do processo antidumping em causa. 32 Daqui resulta que o presente pedido de medidas provisórias deve ser indeferido. Parte decisória Pelos fundamentos expostos, O PRESIDENTE DO TRIBUNAL DE PRIMEIRA INSTÂNCIA decide: 1) O pedido de medidas provisórias é indeferido. 2) Reserva-se para final a decisão quanto às despesas. Proferido no Luxemburgo, em 26 de Agosto de 1996.
pt	wikipedia	N/A	Coleophora melanograpta é uma espécie de mariposa do gênero Coleophora pertencente à família Coleophoridae. Bibliografia Australian Biological Resources Study (ABRS) (2008): Australian Faunal Directory — Coleophoridae. Pitkin, Brian & Jenkins, Paul (2004): Butterflies and Moths of the World, Generic Names and their Type-species — Coleophora. Savela, Markku (2010): Markku Savela's Lepidoptera and some other life forms — Coleophoridae. Tree of Life Web Project (ToL) (2009): Coleophoridae. Ligações externas Natural History Museum Coleophoridae Coleophora
pt	wikipedia	N/A	Caneluda do Catolé é um tipo de galináceos domésticos (Gallus Domesticus) surgida no Brasil no estado da Bahia. História A raça descende de tipos de galinha que foram levadas pelos portugueses para o Brasil ao longo da história. Caracterização do tipo racial A Caneluda do Catolé é um tipo de galinha que foi identificada na Bahia. Por ser um animal que demonstra ter características raciais próprias, os estudos para melhor definição do tipo se encontram em desenvolvimento, desconhecendo-se, atualmente, sua população, características genéticas e qualidades produtivas com exatidão. Valor genético A conservação destes animais permite identificar a composição de seus genes e seu uso naquelas características consideradas vantajosas, aprimorando os próprios animais, outras raças ou a criação de novas raças adaptadas a diferentes finalidades ou biomas. Outras raças brasileiras de galinha Aves do Brasil Raças de galinhas Raças de galinhas nativas do Brasil
de	caselaw	Switzerland	{"","Endentscheid U r t e i l v o m 1 6 . O k t o b e r 2 0 2 0 Besetzung Richterin Roswitha Petry (Vorsitz), Richterin Contessina Theis, Richter William Waeber, Gerichtsschreiberin Sarah Diack. Parteien A._, geboren am (...), Guinea, vertreten durch Eva Gammenthaler, Solidaritätsnetz Bern, (...), Beschwerdeführer, gegen Staatssekretariat für Migration (SEM), Quellenweg 6, 3003 Bern, Vorinstanz. Gegenstand Asyl und Wegweisung; Verfügung des SEM vom 14. Februar 2018 / N (...). B u n d e s v e rw a l t u ng s g e r i ch t T r i b u n a l ad m i n i s t r a t i f f éd é r a l T r i b u n a l e am m in i s t r a t i vo f e d e r a l e T r i b u n a l ad m i n i s t r a t i v fe d e r a l Abteilung V E-1705/2018 E-1705/2018 Seite 2","Sachverhalt: A. Der Beschwerdeführer, ein der Ethnie der B._ angehöriger guinei- scher Staatsangehöriger, verliess sein Heimatland gemäss eigenen Anga- ben im (...) des Jahres 2015 und gelangte auf dem Landweg über Mali, Algerien, Marokko, Spanien und Frankreich bis in die Schweiz, wo er am (...) 2015 einreiste und gleichentags im ehemaligen Empfangs- und Ver- fahrenszentrum (EVZ) Vallorbe um Asyl nachsuchte. B. Am 15. Dezember 2015 wurde der Beschwerdeführer zu seiner Person, dem Reiseweg sowie summarisch zu seinen Gesuchsgründen befragt (Be- fragung zur Person [BzP; nachstehend: Erstbefragung]). C. Aufgrund seiner als wahrscheinlich erachteten Minderjährigkeit wurde ihm eine Vertrauensperson der Berner Rechtsberatungsstelle für Menschen in Not zur Seite gestellt und am 11. April 2016 von der Kindes- und Erwach- senenschutzbehörde (KESB) C._ eine Vertretungsbeistandschaft angeordnet. D. Am 6. Oktober 2016 fand eine ausführliche Anhörung zu den Fluchtgrün- den durch das SEM statt. Der Beschwerdeführer trug dabei vor, er sei in D._, Guinea, gebo- ren, wo er mit seinen Eltern und seiner jüngeren Schwester gelebt habe, bis er zum Zwecke des Schulbesuchs nach Conakry umgezogen sei. Dort habe er fortan bei seiner Cousine und deren Ehemann gewohnt. In deren Wohnquartier hätten die ethnischen E._ und F._ die Mehr- heit gebildet, wobei die B._ von den E._ stets terrorisiert worden seien; manchmal habe es organsierte ethnische Kämpfe gegeben. Dabei hätten die E._ die Häuser der B._ mit Steinen bewor- fen beziehungsweise seien auch Steine gegen das Haus seiner Cousine geworfen worden. Als Sympathisant der Partei G._ habe er regel- mässig an den politisch motivierten Märschen beziehungsweise Streiks teilgenommen, die beinahe jeden Montag stattgefunden hätten. Er habe dabei die Hemden der Partei getragen und Transparente gehalten. Es habe beinahe bei jedem Streik beziehungsweise Marsch Vorfälle gegeben, wo- bei entweder Steine geworfen worden seien und/oder Beamte manchmal Tränengas und echte Munition eingesetzt hätten. Einmal sei er dabei mit E-1705/2018 Seite 3 einem Stein am Kopf verletzt und einmal bei einem Generalstreik vom Mi- litär respektive bei einem Marsch von einem Polizisten festgenommen wor- den. Auch der Ehemann seiner Cousine sei einmal mit einer Machete be- ziehungsweise einem Stein verletzt worden. Eines Tages hätten die E._ auf der Strasse Autoreifen angezündet und den heissen Gummi mit einem Stock über seinen Arm tropfen lassen; er habe davon immer noch eine Narbe. Nach diesem Vorfall habe seine Cousine ihn dazu ge- drängt, Conakry zu seinem eigenen Schutz zu verlassen. Er sei dann zu- nächst zu seinen Eltern ins Dorf zurückgekehrt. Diese hätten ihm die Aus- reise finanziert. Mit dem Geld sei er bis nach Mali gereist, wo er eine Zeit lang als Gepäckträger gearbeitet habe, um für seine Weiterreise nach Al- gerien zu sparen. Auch in Algerien habe er gearbeitet, bis er sich die Reise nach Marokko habe leisten können. Von Marokko aus sei er dann über Spanien und Frankreich bis in die Schweiz gelangt. E. Am 16. November 2017 teilte das SEM dem Beschwerdeführer mit, dass sich „Sabou Guinée“, eine guineische Nichtregierungsorganisation (NGO) zum Schutze von Kindern, bereit erklärt habe, ihn nach seiner Rückkehr zu betreuen, und gewährte ihm Gelegenheit, sich zum beigelegten Abklä- rungsbericht zu äussern. F. Der Beschwerdeführer nahm nach erstreckter Frist mit Eingabe vom 14. Dezember 2017 sein rechtliches Gehör wahr. G. Mit Schreiben vom 18. Januar 2018 teilte die damalige Rechtsvertreterin dem SEM mit, dass es beim Beschwerdeführer über den Jahreswechsel zu einer psychischen Krise gekommen sei, welche eine notfallmässige Be- handlung des kinder- und jugendpsychiatrischen Dienstes in seinem Wohnkanton notwendig gemacht habe. H. Am 2. Februar 2018 reichten die H._ SEM einen Arztbericht, datie- rend vom (...), ein. E-1705/2018 Seite 4 I. Mit Verfügung vom 14. Februar 2018 – eröffnet am 15. Februar 2018 – verneinte das SEM die Flüchtlingseigenschaft des Beschwerdeführers, lehnte sein Asylgesuch ab, verfügte die Wegweisung aus der Schweiz und ordnete den Vollzug an. J. Der Beschwerdeführer focht diese Verfügung mit Eingabe seiner neu man- datierten Rechtsvertreterin vom 19. März 2018 beim Bundesverwaltungs- gericht an. Er beantragte dabei die Aufhebung der angefochtenen Verfü- gung und die Asylgewährung, eventualiter die Aufhebung der angefochte- nen Verfügung und die Anweisung der Vorinstanz, die Asylrelevanz zu überprüfen, subeventualiter die Anordnung der vorläufigen Aufnahme in- folge Unzulässigkeit und Unzumutbarkeit des Wegweisungsvollzugs, sub- subeventualiter die Anweisung der Vorinstanz, weitere Abklärungen zum familiären Hintergrund des Beschwerdeführers zu treffen und betreffend Zulässigkeit und Zumutbarkeit einen neuen Entscheid zu fällen. In formel- ler Hinsicht ersuchte er um Gewährung der unentgeltlichen Prozessfüh- rung. Der Beschwerde wurden der Arztbericht vom (...) (siehe oben Bst. H), Fo- tos seiner Narbe am Arm und seiner Eltern sowie verschiedene Online- Berichte über die aktuelle Lage in Guinea beigelegt. K. Mit Eingabe vom 4. April 2018 reichte der Beschwerdeführer eine Erklärung zum Mandatswechsel sowie eine Fürsorgebestätigung zu den Akten. L. Mit Verfügung vom 10. April 2018 hiess die damals zuständige Instrukti- onsrichterin das Gesuch um unentgeltliche Prozessführung gemäss Art. 65 Abs. 1 VwVG gut und verzichtete auf die Erhebung eines Kosten- vorschusses. M. Am 4. April 2019 gelangte der Migrationsdienst des Kantons I._ an das Bundesverwaltungsgericht unter Beilage eines den Beschwerdeführer betreffenden Anzeigerapports der Regionalpolizei J._, datierend vom (...), und eines «Ausschlussberichts» von K._, Co-Geschäfts- leiterin des L._, datierend vom (...). Der Migrationsdienst äusserte E-1705/2018 Seite 5 darin die Bitte um eine zeitnahe Bearbeitung der Beschwerde, da der Be- schwerdeführer durch negatives Verhalten auffalle. N. Mit Eingabe vom 15. April 2019 reichte der Beschwerdeführer einen aktu- ellen Arztbericht von M._, Oberarzt der H._, kinder- und ju- gendpsychiatrischer Dienst N._, datierend vom (...), ins Recht. Gleichzeitig verwies er mit entsprechenden Internetausdrucken auf die ak- tuellen Entwicklungen in Guinea. O. Mit Verfügung vom 11. Dezember 2019 lud die neu zuständige Instrukti- onsrichterin die Vorinstanz zur Vernehmlassung ein. Diese wurde am 17. Dezember 2019 eingereicht. P. Der Beschwerdeführer replizierte mit Eingabe vom 7. Januar 2020. Der Replikeingabe wurde ein Online-Artikel von Amnesty International vom 13. November 2019 («Guinea: Appaling human rights ‘red flags` ahead of presidential election») beigelegt. Q. Auf die Begründung der vorinstanzlichen Verfügung, der Beschwerdeein- gabe, Vernehmlassung und Replikschrift wird – soweit für den Entscheid wesentlich – in den nachstehenden Erwägungen eingegangen.","Bundesverwaltungsgericht zieht in Erwägung: 1. 1.1 Am 1. März 2019 ist die Teilrevision des AsylG vom 26. Juni 1998 (AS 2016 3101; SR 142.31) in Kraft getreten. Für das vorliegende Verfah- ren gilt das bisherige Recht (vgl. Abs. 1 der Übergangsbestimmungen zur Änderung des AsylG vom 25. September 2015). 1.2 Gemäss Art. 31 VGG beurteilt das Bundesverwaltungsgericht Be- schwerden gegen Verfügungen nach Art. 5 VwVG. Das SEM gehört zu den Behörden nach Art. 33 VGG und ist daher eine Vorinstanz des Bundesver- waltungsgerichts. Eine das Sachgebiet betreffende Ausnahme im Sinne von Art. 32 VGG liegt nicht vor. Das Bundesverwaltungsgericht ist daher E-1705/2018 Seite 6 zuständig für die Beurteilung der vorliegenden Beschwerde und entschei- det auf dem Gebiet des Asyls endgültig, ausser bei Vorliegen eines Auslie- ferungsersuchens des Staates, vor welchem die Beschwerde führende Person Schutz sucht (Art. 105 AsylG; Art. 83 Bst. d Ziff. 1 BGG). Eine sol- che Ausnahme im Sinne von Art. 83 Bst. d Ziff. 1 BGG liegt nicht vor, wes- halb das Bundesverwaltungsgericht vorliegend endgültig entscheidet. 1.3 Die Beschwerde ist frist- und formgerecht eingereicht. Der Beschwer- deführer hat am Verfahren vor der Vorinstanz teilgenommen, ist durch die angefochtene Verfügung besonders berührt und hat ein schutzwürdiges In- teresse an deren Aufhebung beziehungsweise Änderung. Er ist daher zur Einreichung der Beschwerde legitimiert (Art. 105 und aArt. 108 Abs. 1 AsylG; Art. 48 Abs. 1 sowie Art. 52 Abs. 1 VwVG). Auf die Beschwerde ist einzutreten. 1.4 Das Verfahren richtet sich nach dem VwVG, dem VGG und dem BGG, soweit das AsylG nichts anderes bestimmt (Art. 37 VGG und Art. 6 AsylG). 1.5 Die Kognition des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts und die zulässigen Rü- gen richten sich im Asylbereich nach Art. 106 Abs. 1 AsylG, im Bereich des Ausländerrechts nach Art. 49 VwVG (vgl. BVGE 2014/26 E. 5). 2. 2.1 Gemäss Art. 2 Abs. 1 AsylG gewährt die Schweiz Flüchtlingen grund- sätzlich Asyl. Flüchtlinge sind Personen, die in ihrem Heimatstaat oder im Land, in dem sie zuletzt wohnten, wegen ihrer Rasse, Religion, Nationali- tät, Zugehörigkeit zu einer bestimmten sozialen Gruppe oder wegen ihrer politischen Anschauungen ernsthaften Nachteilen ausgesetzt sind oder be- gründete Furcht haben, solchen Nachteilen ausgesetzt zu werden (Art. 3 Abs. 1 AsylG). Als ernsthafte Nachteile gelten namentlich die Gefährdung des Leibes, des Lebens oder der Freiheit sowie Massnahmen, die einen unerträglichen psychischen Druck bewirken (Art. 3 Abs. 2 AsylG). 2.2 Wer um Asyl nachsucht, muss die Flüchtlingseigenschaft nachweisen oder zumindest glaubhaft machen. Diese ist glaubhaft gemacht, wenn die Behörde ihr Vorhandensein mit überwiegender Wahrscheinlichkeit für ge- geben hält. Unglaubhaft sind insbesondere Vorbringen, die in wesentlichen Punkten zu wenig begründet oder in sich widersprüchlich sind, den Tatsa- chen nicht entsprechen oder massgeblich auf gefälschte oder verfälschte Beweismittel abgestützt werden (Art. 7 AsylG). E-1705/2018 Seite 7 2.3 Gemäss Rechtsprechung des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts beinhaltet die Glaubhaftigkeitsprüfung eine Gesamtbeurteilung aller Elemente (Über- einstimmung bezüglich des wesentlichen Sachverhaltes, Substanziiertheit und Plausibilität der Angaben, persönliche Glaubwürdigkeit), die für oder gegen die gesuchstellende Person sprechen, wobei die Sachverhaltsdar- stellung nur glaubhaft sein kann, wenn die positiven Elemente überwiegen (vgl. dazu BVGE 2015/3 E. 6.5.1 m.w.H). Klärend sei hier auf die internati- onal empfohlenen Kriterien des UNHCR zur Glaubhaftigkeitsprüfung ver- wiesen, welche die in Art. 7 Abs. 3 AsylG festgeschriebenen Kriterien prä- zisieren. Die Vorbringen der asylsuchenden Person sollten auf Folgendes überprüft werden: a) Hinlänglichkeit und Spezifizierung der Details; b) In- nerer Zusammenhang beziehungsweise Kohärenz; c) die Übereinstim- mung mit Informationen anderer Familienmitglieder oder Zeugen; d) Kohä- renz mit Country of Origin Information (COI) und e) Plausibilität (vgl. dazu BEYOND PROOF, Credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems, UNHCR / European Refugee Fund of the European Commission [Hrsg.], Brüssel 2013, S. 49). 3. 3.1 Das SEM führte zur Begründung seines abweisenden Entscheids den Asylpunkt betreffend aus, die Ausführungen des Beschwerdeführers be- züglich der persönlichen Angriffe durch die E._ würden keinerlei Detailreichtum aufweisen. Es fehlten individualisierte Aussagen, welche seine persönliche Betroffenheit oder ein persönlich gefärbtes Reaktions- muster zum Ausdruck bringen würden. Die Antwort auf die Frage, was ge- nau passiert sei, als die E._ ihn mit dem brennenden Autoreifen verletzt hätten, wirke insgesamt stereotyp und weise keinerlei erlebnisnahe Schilderungen auf. Auch seien seine Antworten bezüglich des Bewerfens seines Hauses mit Steinen, auch auf Nachfrage hin, durchgehend dürftig und oberflächlich geblieben. Abgesehen von seinen vagen Angaben zu den Übergriffen durch die E._ habe er an der Erstbefragung nicht erwähnt, dass er mit einem brennenden Autoreifen verletzt worden sei. Dies sei nicht nachvollziehbar, stehe dieses Vorbringen doch im Zusam- menhang mit seiner Ausreise. Es könne ihm nicht geglaubt werden, dass er selbst Erlebtes wiedergegeben habe. Vielmehr müsse davon ausgegan- gen werden, dass er sich bei den Übergriffen durch die E._ auf ei- nen konstruierten Sachverhalt beziehe. Auch bezüglich der Übergriffe durch die Behörden habe er widersprüchliche Angaben gemacht: Bei der Erstbefragung habe er ausgeführt, einmal anlässlich eines Generalstreiks vom Militär festgenommen und geschlagen worden zu sein. Bei der Anhö- rung habe er den Vorfall indessen nicht mehr erwähnt und sogar die Frage http://links.weblaw.ch/BVGE-2015/3 E-1705/2018 Seite 8 verneint, ob es noch weitere Zwischenfälle gegeben habe, bei denen er persönlich betroffen gewesen sei. Selbst die Frage, ob es zu Zwischenfäl- len mit den Behörden gekommen sei, habe er verneint. Zudem habe er sich widersprochen, als er an der Erstbefragung erklärt habe, bei einem Generalstreik festgenommen worden zu sein, an der Anhörung indessen angegeben habe, anlässlich einer Marschteilnahme inhaftiert worden zu sein. Diese widersprüchlichen Aussagen habe er nicht aufzulösen ver- mocht. Im Weiteren habe er an der Erstbefragung geltend gemacht, der Ehemann seiner Cousine sei bei einem der angestifteten Kämpfe mit den E._ mit einer Machete schwer verletzt worden, an der Anhörung hingegen behauptet, der Ehemann seiner Cousine sei anlässlich eines Marsches mit Steinen beworfen worden. Insgesamt hielten seine Vorbrin- gen betreffend die Übergriffe durch die E._ und die Behörden den Anforderungen an die Glaubhaftigkeit gemäss Art. 7 AsylG nicht stand, wo- mit die Prüfung der Asylrelevanz entfalle. 3.2 In seiner Beschwerdeschrift führt der Beschwerdeführer den Asylpunkt und die Flüchtlingseigenschaft betreffend Wiederholungen, Präzisierungen und Ergänzungen seiner Asylvorbringen an. Er führt zunächst die an den Befragungen geschilderten Ereignisse detaillierter aus (Beschwerdeschrift S: 2 bis 4) und hält sodann den vorinstanzlichen Erwägungen im Wesent- lichen entgegen, dass er in objektiver Weise befürchte, im Falle einer Rück- kehr erneut Opfer asylrelevanter ethnischer Gewalthandlungen zu werden. Die Verfolgungssituation erscheine durchaus zielgerichtet, weil er als jun- ger Mann der Ethnie der B._ diesen Gewalthandlungen ausgesetzt sei und zudem durchaus auch persönlich erkannt werden könne. Zumin- dest aber sei nicht anzuzweifeln, dass er Opfer der allgemeinen Gewalt gegen seine Volksgruppe geworden sei. Seine Vorbringen seien von der Vorinstanz zu Unrecht nicht auf ihre Asylrelevanz hin überprüft worden, was nachzuholen sei. Die Angriffe auf das Haus seines «Onkels» (Anmer- kung des Gerichts: gemeint ist wohl das Haus seiner Cousine beziehungs- weise deren Ehemann) seien von ihm als eine Art Normalität beschrieben worden. Wann immer es zu Auseinandersetzungen gekommen sei, hätten die Bewohner des Quartiers die Häuser der B._ mit Steinen ange- griffen. Dabei seien ihm Unterscheidungen zwischen Marsch, Demonstra- tion und Generalstreik nicht geläufig. Es handle sich dabei immer um Ver- sammlungen von Menschen im öffentlichen Raum, die dem Ziel eines po- litischen Wandels und politischen Protestes dienten. Entgegen der Auffas- sung der Vorinstanz habe sich die Lage nicht beruhigt, was zahlreiche Be- richte bestätigen würden. Die Vorinstanz habe sich auf Ereignisse berufen, die zum Zeitpunkt des Entscheides mehr als zwei Jahre zurückgelegen E-1705/2018 Seite 9 hätten. Da die Vorinstanz die aktuelle Lage in Guinea mit keinem Wort be- achtet habe, sei der Entscheid nicht sachgerecht. 4. Zunächst ist zu prüfen, ob die Vorinstanz die Aussagen des Beschwerde- führers zu Recht als unglaubhaft befunden hat. 4.1 Da die Vorinstanz die Unglaubhaftigkeit der Vorbringen mit deren feh- lender Plausibilität begründet, ohne sich jedoch zur damaligen Lage in Gui- nea zu äussern, rechtfertigt sich an dieser Stelle eine Skizzierung der dor- tigen Situation bis zum Zeitpunkt der Ausreise des Beschwerdeführers. 4.1.1 Am 7. November 2010 wurde nach 30 Jahren der Militärdiktatur zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte Guineas ein Präsident vom Volk gewählt: Al- pha Condé, der sein Amt am 3. Dezember 2010 antrat (vgl. Urteil des BVGer E-4727/2008 vom 15. Juni 2012 E. 6.2.1 m.w.H.). Im Vorfeld seiner 2015 erfolgten Wiederwahl prägten gewaltsame Ausschreitungen den gui- neischen Alltag. Hintergrund der politischen Spannungen bildete die Tatsa- che, dass die B._ – obwohl sie eine der grössten ethnischen Grup- pen in Guinea bilden – bisher nie den Präsidenten des Landes stellten, weshalb sich viele B._ marginalisiert fühlen. Ethnizität war seit jeher ein wichtiger politischer Faktor in Guinea, was auch immer wieder zu Span- nungen und Kämpfen zwischen ethnischen Gruppierungen führte. Viele B._ sehen sich bei Demonstrationen systematisch verfolgt durch die Staatsmacht und sind der Ansicht, dass die Regierung und Alpha Condé ihre eigene ethnische Gruppierung – die E._ – bei der Rek- rutierung für den Staatsdienst bevorzugen (Landinfo, «O._). Ge- mäss dem Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada machen die B._ den grössten Teil der Opfer und Inhaftierten bei Demonstrati- onsveranstaltungen aus (P._). Andere sind indessen der Auffas- sung, die B._ ihrerseits würden Demonstrationen dazu missbrau- chen, um gewalttätige Ausschreitungen zu provozieren. Gewaltsames Vor- gehen gegen politische Demonstranten in Guinea sind seit langem bekannt (vgl. Landinfo a.a.O.). Inzwischen hat die guineische Justiz zwar gewisse Fortschritte in der Strafverfolgung der Beteiligten am Massaker im Jahr 2009 (wobei Sicherheitskräfte für zahlreiche Vergewaltigungen und die Tö- tung von rund 150 Zivilisten verantwortlich gemacht wurden) erzielt, indes- sen sind andere staatlich finanzierte Gewalttaten an der Bevölkerung noch immer straflos geblieben (vgl. Human Rights Watch [HRW] World Report 2019 – Guinea [nachstehend: HRW 2019], < https://www.hrw.org/world-re- port/2019/country-chapters/guinea >, abgerufen am 24.09.2020). https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/guinea https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/guinea E-1705/2018 Seite 10 4.1.2 Aufgrund des Vorangehenden wirken die Vorbringen des Beschwer- deführers mit der Situation vor Ort durchaus kohärent und somit auch grundsätzlich plausibel. Der Beschwerdeführer hat diesbezüglich entgegen der vorinstanzlichen Auffassung Details vorgetragen, die über das Niveau stereotyper Aussagen hinausgehen. So schilderte er lebensnah, wie er sich gerade auf dem Weg zur Schule befunden habe, als die E._ die Autoreifen in Brand gesteckt hätten, und führte dabei durchaus nach- vollziehbar die Motivation der Tat der E._ aus. Angesichts der allgemeinen Situation in Guinea zum damaligen Zeitpunkt und mit Blick auf das in öffentlich zugänglichen Quellen zur Verfügung ste- henden Bildmaterial zu den Protesten in Guinea (vgl. Q._) erscheint es durchaus plausibel, dass der Beschwerdeführer unter den von ihm ge- schilderten Umständen am Arm verletzt wurde. Die vorinstanzliche Auffas- sung, dass seine diesbezüglichen Ausführungen stereotyp und konstruiert wirkten, teilt das Gericht nicht. Die Tatsache alleine, dass der Beschwerde- führer diesen Vorfall anlässlich der summarischen Erstbefragung nicht äus- serte, reicht nicht aus, um ihn als unglaubhaft zu werten. Die diesbezügli- che Argumentation der Vorinstanz überzeugt nicht, insbesondere auch deshalb, weil die offene Narbe beziehungsweise die Verletzung und die entsprechenden Fotos in der vorinstanzlichen Verfügung weder erwähnt noch gewürdigt wurden. Dessen ungeachtet kann mit Blick auf die (dama- lige) Minderjährigkeit des Beschwerdeführers an den Befragungen bei der Beurteilung der Glaubhaftigkeit nicht der gleiche Massstab angewendet werden wie bei einem Erwachsenen. Ob eine Aussage genügend individu- alisiert ausgefallen ist, um als glaubhaft zu gelten, ist vielmehr stets im Kontext des gesamten Aussageverhaltens zu beurteilen. Diesbezüglich fällt auf, dass der Beschwerdeführer während der gesamten Anhörung stets sehr knappe Aussagen gemacht hat, was bei einem unbegleiteten Minderjährigen von 14 beziehungsweise 15 Jahren nicht unüblich ist und daher nicht grundsätzlich als Indiz für die Unglaubwürdigkeit seiner Vor- bringen gelten kann. 4.1.3 Es kann somit festgehalten werden, dass die Aussagen des Be- schwerdeführers mit den relevanten Hintergrundinformationen (COI) über- einstimmen und sich als kohärent erweisen. Die geschilderten Übergriffe der E._ sowohl auf die B._ generell als auch auf ihn indivi- duell sind demnach als glaubhaft gemacht zu qualifizieren. 4.2 E-1705/2018 Seite 11 4.2.1 Die vom Beschwerdeführer geltend gemachte, individuelle Fest- nahme durch das Militär beziehungsweise die Polizei wirkt indessen in der Tat konstruiert. Bei den diesbezüglichen Schilderungen fällt auf, dass sie in ihrer Substanz deutlich detailärmer ausfallen als die übrigen Elemente seiner Vorbringen. An der Anhörung auf die angebliche Festnahme ange- sprochen, erwidert der Beschwerdeführer, so viel erlebt zu haben, dass er sich nicht an alles erinnern könne (vgl. A13/14 F85 und F 105), was nicht zu überzeugen vermag. Die geltend gemachte persönliche Festnahme kann ihm daher nicht geglaubt werden. Ebenso wenig wirken die durch den Mann seiner Cousine erlittenen Verletzungen glaubhaft, wobei an dieser Stelle zur Vermeidung von Wiederholungen auf die zutreffenden Erwägun- gen der Vorinstanz verwiesen wird (vgl. dazu oben E. 3.1 in fine). Auch auf Beschwerdeebene gelingt es dem Beschwerdeführer nicht, diese Ein- schätzung in Frage zu stellen. 4.2.2 Wesentliche Widersprüche können zwar dazu führen, dass der in- nere Zusammenhang beziehungsweise die innere Kohärenz der entspre- chenden Aussagen zu verneinen ist. Aus der Unglaubhaftigkeit der geltend gemachten Festnahme kann indessen nicht automatisch geschlossen wer- den, dass der gesamte Sachverhalt konstruiert ist. Vielmehr sind die Asyl- vorbringen stets aufgrund einer sorgfältigen Abwägung zwischen den glaubhaften und den unglaubhaften Elementen zu beurteilen, und somit nicht nur dann als glaubhaft zu betrachten, wenn die Aussagen völlig wi- derspruchsfrei sind (vgl. zum Ganzen BVGE 2015/3 E. 6.5.1 m.w.H.). Die von der Vorinstanz hervorgehobenen Ausführungen des Beschwerdefüh- rers, wonach er unglaubwürdig wirke, weil er einmal von einem Marsch und einmal von Generalstreik gesprochen habe, sind nicht stichhaltig, zumal er dazu in plausibler Weise erklärt, dass für ihn «Marsch» und «General- streik» dasselbe sei. Da aufgrund des Vorangegangen jedoch feststeht, dass die Festnahme nicht glaubhaft dargelegt wurde, ist auf diesen Punkt nicht weiter einzugehen. 4.3 Zusammenfassend ist festzuhalten, dass der Beschwerdeführer die vorgetragenen Übergriffe auf die B._ als auch die persönlichen Angriffe auf ihn – eine Kopfverletzung durch einen Steinwurf und eine mit brennendem Gummi verursachte Verletzung am Arm – glaubhaft dargelegt hat. Indessen vermochte er die geltend gemachte Festnahme nicht überzeugend darzulegen. 5. E-1705/2018 Seite 12 5.1 Demnach ist zu prüfen, ob die als glaubhaft erachteten Vorbringen des Beschwerdeführers Asylrelevanz entfalten. Da es dem Beschwerdeführer nicht gelingt, überzeugend darzulegen, in- wiefern er von den guineischen Sicherheitskräften als ‒ zumindest poten- zieller ‒ Regimegegner identifiziert und registriert worden sein soll, ist eine solche individuelle Verfolgung zu verneinen. Es wird zwar als glaubhaft er- achtet, dass er jeweils an Protesten anwesend und dabei auch zweimal verletzt worden war, indessen ist anhand der Akten nicht zu erkennen, dass er persönlich behelligt wurde, zumal er keinen direkten Behördenkontakt glaubhaft machen konnte. 5.2 Am ethnischen Charakter der Spannungen in Guinea besteht kein Zweifel (vgl. E. 4.1.2). Indessen ist zur sinngemäss geltend gemachten Kollektivverfolgung der B._ festzuhalten, dass zwar das ganze Land von Demonstrationen betroffen ist, sich die oben geschilderten Ereig- nisse in dieser Form aber nach wie vor insbesondere auf die Hauptstadt Conakry konzentrieren, somit nicht von einem landesweiten Phänomen ge- sprochen werden kann. Das (für Überlegungen im Zusammenhang mit ei- ner Kollektivverfolgung erforderliche) Kriterium der genügenden Verfol- gungsdichte ist somit von Vorneherein nicht erfüllt, weshalb sich weitere Erörterungen erübrigen (vgl. zum Ganzen BVGE 2011/16 E. 5.2). Somit kann weder von einer Kollektivverfolgung im Fluchtzeitpunkt ausgegangen werden, noch ist eine solche bei einer Rückkehr zum heutigen Zeitpunkt gegeben. 5.3 Dem Beschwerdeführer ist es somit insgesamt nicht gelungen, eine flüchtlingsrelevante Verfolgungssituation nachzuweisen oder als überwie- gend wahrscheinlich darzulegen, womit die vorinstanzliche Verfügung be- züglich Verneinung der Flüchtlingseigenschaft und Ablehnung des Asylge- suchs zu bestätigen ist. 6. 6.1 Lehnt das Staatssekretariat das Asylgesuch ab oder tritt es darauf nicht ein, so verfügt es in der Regel die Wegweisung aus der Schweiz und ordnet den Vollzug an; es berücksichtigt dabei den Grundsatz der Einheit der Fa- milie (Art. 44 AsylG). 6.2 Der Beschwerdeführer verfügt weder über eine ausländerrechtliche Aufenthaltsbewilligung noch über einen Anspruch auf Erteilung einer sol- chen. Die Wegweisung wurde demnach zu Recht angeordnet (Art. 44 AsylG; vgl. BVGE 2013/37 E. 4.4; 2009/50 E. 9, je m.w.H.). E-1705/2018 Seite 13 7. Am 1. Januar 2019 wurde das Ausländergesetz vom 16. Dezember 2005 (AuG, SR 142.20) teilrevidiert (AS 2018 3171) und in Ausländer- und Integ- rationsgesetz (AIG) umbenannt. Der vorliegend anzuwendende Gesetzes- artikel (Art. 83 Abs. 1–4) ist unverändert vom AuG ins AIG übernommen worden. 8. Ist der Vollzug der Wegweisung nicht zulässig, nicht zumutbar oder nicht möglich, so regelt das Staatssekretariat das Anwesenheitsverhältnis nach den gesetzlichen Bestimmungen über die vorläufige Aufnahme (Art. 44 AsylG; Art. 83 Abs. 1 AIG). Beim Geltendmachen von Wegweisungsvollzugshindernissen gilt gemäss Praxis des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts der gleiche Beweisstandard wie bei der Prüfung der Flüchtlingseigenschaft; das heisst, sie sind zu beweisen, wenn der strikte Beweis möglich ist, und andernfalls wenigstens glaubhaft zu machen (vgl. BVGE 2011/24 E. 10.2 m.w.H.). 9. 9.1 Der Vollzug ist nicht zulässig, wenn völkerrechtliche Verpflichtungen der Schweiz einer Weiterreise der ausländischen Person in den Heimat-, Herkunfts- oder einen Drittstaat entgegenstehen (Art. 83 Abs. 3 AIG). So darf keine Person in irgendeiner Form zur Ausreise in ein Land gezwungen werden, in dem ihr Leib, ihr Leben oder ihre Freiheit aus einem Grund nach Art. 3 Abs. 1 AsylG gefährdet ist oder in dem sie Gefahr läuft, zur Ausreise in ein solches Land gezwungen zu werden (Art. 5 Abs. 1 AsylG; vgl. ebenso Art. 33 Abs. 1 des Abkommens vom 28. Juli 1951 über die Rechtsstellung der Flüchtlinge [FK, SR 0.142.30]). Gemäss Art. 25 Abs. 3 BV, Art. 3 des Übereinkommens vom 10. Dezember 1984 gegen Folter und andere grau- same, unmenschliche oder erniedrigende Behandlung oder Strafe (FoK, SR 0.105) und der Praxis zu Art. 3 EMRK darf niemand der Folter oder unmenschlicher oder erniedrigender Strafe oder Behandlung unterworfen werden. 9.2 Die Vorinstanz wies in ihrer Verfügung zutreffend darauf hin, dass das Prinzip des flüchtlingsrechtlichen Non-Refoulement nur Personen schützt, die die Flüchtlingseigenschaft erfüllen. Da es dem Beschwerdeführer nicht gelungen ist, eine asylrechtlich erhebliche Gefährdung nachzuweisen oder glaubhaft zu machen, kann der in Art. 5 AsylG verankerte Grundsatz der Nichtrückschiebung im vorliegenden Verfahren keine Anwendung finden. E-1705/2018 Seite 14 Eine Rückkehr des Beschwerdeführers nach Guinea ist demnach unter dem Aspekt von Art. 5 AsylG rechtmässig. Sodann ergeben sich weder aus den Aussagen des Beschwerdeführers noch aus den Akten Anhaltspunkte dafür, dass er für den Fall einer Aus- schaffung in den Heimatstaat dort mit beachtlicher Wahrscheinlichkeit ei- ner nach Art. 3 EMRK oder Art. 1 FoK verbotenen Strafe oder Behandlung ausgesetzt wäre. Weder die allgemeine Menschenrechtslage noch der Umstand, dass der Beschwerdeführer ethnischer B._ ist, lassen den Wegweisungsvollzug zum heutigen Zeitpunkt als unzulässig erschei- nen (vgl. dazu das Urteil des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts D-2777/2019 vom 19. Juni 2019 E. 8.2). 9.3 Nach dem Gesagten ist der Vollzug der Wegweisung sowohl im Sinne der asyl- als auch der völkerrechtlichen Bestimmungen zulässig. 10. 10.1 Gemäss Art. 83 Abs. 4 AIG kann der Vollzug für ausländische Perso- nen unzumutbar sein, wenn sie im Heimat- oder Herkunftsstaat aufgrund von Situationen wie Krieg, Bürgerkrieg, allgemeiner Gewalt und medizini- scher Notlage konkret gefährdet sind. Wird eine konkrete Gefährdung fest- gestellt, ist – unter Vorbehalt von Art. 83 Abs. 7 AIG – die vorläufige Auf- nahme zu gewähren. 10.2 10.2.1 Das SEM bejahte die objektive Zumutbarkeit des Wegweisungsvoll- zugs. Wenn auch künftig vereinzelte gewaltsame Zusammenstösse nicht ausgeschlossen werden könnten, herrsche in Guinea keine Situation von Krieg, Bürgerkrieg oder allgemeiner Gewalt im Sinne von Art. 83 Abs. 4 AIG. 10.2.2 Guinea ist nach wie vor von politischen und ethnischen Spannun- gen geprägt. Seit April 2019 kam es immer wieder zu Massenprotesten und gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzungen mit zahlreichen Todesopfern in Zu- sammenhang mit einem umstrittenen Verfassungsreferendum, welches dem amtierenden Präsidenten Alpha Condé eine dritte Amtszeit ermöglicht (vgl. News aus dem Ausland [Nau.ch], Guinea: Zusammenstösse wegen dritter Amtszeit von Alpha Conde, 1. Mai 2019, < https:// www.nau.ch/news/ausland/guinea-zusammenstosse-wegen-dritter-amts- zeit-von-alpha-conde-65516311 >, Verfassungsreferendum in Guinea von E-1705/2018 Seite 15 tödlicher Gewalt überschattet, 22. März 2020, https://www.nau.ch/politik/in- ternational/verfassungsreferendum-in-guinea-von-todlicher-gewalt-uber- schattet-65682698 >, abgerufen am 24.09.2020). 10.2.3 Trotz der volatilen Lage und auch unter Berücksichtigung der neue- ren politischen Entwicklungen ist nicht davon auszugehen, dass alle gui- neischen Staatsangehörigen in ihrem Heimatland im Sinne von Art. 83 Abs. 4 AIG konkret gefährdet sind. Das Bundesverwaltungsgericht hat auch in neueren Entscheiden bestätigt, dass in Guinea keine Situation von Krieg, Bürgerkrieg oder allgemeiner Gewalt herrscht (vgl. Urteile des BVGer E-158/2020 vom 13. Juli 2020 E.8.5.2.1; D-1233/2020 vom 15. April 2020 E. 6.5.2; E-1193/2020 vom 17. März 2020 E. 8.4.2; E-281/2020 vom 26. Februar 2020 E. 10.1.1; E-2710/2018 vom 4. Dezember 2019 E. 6.2; E-6969/2017 vom 15. November 2019 E. 4.3). Der Wegweisungsvollzug nach Guinea erweist sich daher grundsätzlich als zumutbar. 10.3 10.3.1 Die individuelle Zumutbarkeit betreffend stellte die Vorinstanz fest, beim vom Beschwerdeführer geltend gemachten Unfalltod seiner Eltern im November 2017 handle es sich um eine blosse Behauptung, die nicht be- legt sei. Zudem müsse, selbst wenn sich dieser tragische Vorfall ereignet haben sollte, davon ausgegangen werden, dass seine jüngere Schwester Aufnahme bei Familienangehörigen gefunden habe. Der Beschwerdefüh- rer habe erklärt, dass sowohl eine Cousine als auch ein Onkel und dessen Familie in Conakry lebten. Somit könne davon ausgegangen werden, dass er im Heimatland über ein tragfähiges Beziehungsnetz verfüge. Auch aus medizinischer Sicht erweise sich der Wegweisungsvollzug als zumutbar. Gemäss ärztlichem Bericht vom (...) leide er an einer akuten Belastungs- störung, verbunden mit Angstzuständen und einer depressiven Verstim- mung. Diesbezüglich falle auf, dass er sich erstmals im (...) in ärztliche Behandlung gegeben habe, gerade nachdem ihm das rechtliche Gehör zum Resultat der Korrespondenz mit „Sabou Guinée“ sowie Akteneinsicht gewährt worden sei. Es sei deshalb nicht auszuschliessen, dass die Ursa- che für die diagnostizierten psychischen Probleme die drohende Wegwei- sung nach Guinea sei. Psychische Probleme würden jedoch kein Wegwei- sungsvollzugshindernis bilden. Gemäss ärztlichem Bericht benötige er kei- nerlei Medikamente, jedoch eine psychiatrische und psychologische Be- treuung. Eine solche Behandlung sei auch in Guinea gewährleistet. Für eine allfällige Weiterführung der Behandlung würde die staatliche Einrich- tung CHU Donka in Conakry zur Verfügung stehen. Somit erweise sich E-1705/2018 Seite 16 auch aus individuellen Gründen ein Wegweisungsvollzug des Beschwer- deführers als zumutbar. 10.3.2 Der Beschwerdeführer stellte sich auf Beschwerdeebene auf den Standpunkt, er könne wegen seiner psychischen Erkrankung nicht nach Guinea zurückkehren. Dem ersten Arztbericht (Untersuchung vom [...]) zu- folge sei er suizidal und es drohe ihm ein schwere Depression. Er verfüge über kein Netzwerk, keine Eltern und keine Freunde. Nach zwei Notfallge- sprächen habe er stabilisiert werden können. In seiner Eingabe vom 15. April 2019 führte er aus, dem neueren Arztbericht vom (...) sei zu ent- nehmen, dass er sich in einer «schweren altersbedingten existentiellen Krise» befinde, wobei die «jugendpsychiatrische Situation prekär» sei. Ei- nen Spitalaufenthalt habe er aber bisher trotz mehrfachen Anratens abge- lehnt. 10.3.3 In ihrer Vernehmlassung hielt die Vorinstanz betreffend den mit Be- schwerdeergänzung eingereichten ärztlichen Bericht vom (...) fest, dass es sich beim Beschwerdeführer nicht um einen medizinischen Notfall handle. Suizidalität stelle gemäss konstanter Praxis des SEM und des BVGer für sich alleine die Vollziehbarkeit der Wegweisung nicht in Frage, solange konkrete Massnahmen zur Verhütung der Umsetzung getroffen würden. Es sei Sache der Vollzugsbehörden, der gesundheitlichen Situa- tion der betroffenen Person bei der Ausgestaltung der Vollzugsmodalitäten gebührend Rechnung zu tragen. 10.3.4 In seiner Replikschrift monierte der Beschwerdeführer, die Vorinstanz habe sich nicht ernsthaft mit seinem Gesundheitszustand aus- einandergesetzt. Er befinde sich seit seinem vierzehnten Lebensjahr in der Schweiz und aus dem Umstand, dass er aufgrund der langen Verfahrens- dauer mittlerweile volljährig geworden sei, dürfe ihm kein Nachteil erwach- sen. Er leide an einer schweren depressiven Verstimmung, sei psychisch erschöpft und befinde sich in einer schweren, existenziellen Krise. Gemäss den Ärzten habe eine Ausschaffung schwerwiegende bis lebensgefährliche Folgen, zumal er über kein familiäres oder anderes Netz verfüge, auf wel- ches er in Guinea zurückgreifen könne. E-1705/2018 Seite 17 10.4 10.4.1 Vorab ist festzuhalten, dass sich aufgrund der eingetretenen Voll- jährigkeit des Beschwerdeführers inhaltliche Ausführungen zum Kindes- wohl im Urteilszeitpunkt erübrigen. Die entsprechenden Rügen des Be- schwerdeführers greifen nicht, da sich eine volljährige Person nicht mehr auf die Normen der Kinderrechtskonvention berufen kann. Aus dem glei- chen Grund erübrigen sich – entgegen der Auffassung des Beschwerde- führers – weitere Ausführungen zur NGO Sabou Guinée, die sich aus- schliesslich um Minderjährige kümmert. 10.4.2 Gemäss Rechtsprechung bewirkt der Umstand, dass die Behand- lungsmöglichkeiten im Herkunftsland nicht dem medizinischen Standard in der Schweiz entsprechen, allein noch nicht die Unzumutbarkeit des Voll- zugs. Von einer solchen ist erst dann auszugehen, wenn die ungenügende Möglichkeit der Weiterbehandlung eine drastische und lebensbedrohende Verschlechterung des Gesundheitszustandes nach sich zieht beziehungs- weise – nach präzisierender Rechtsprechung des EGMR – infolge fehlen- den Zugangs zu einer medizinischen Behandlung intensives Leiden oder eine erhebliche Kürzung der Lebenserwartung droht (vgl. BVGE 2011/9 E. 7 m.w.H.; EGMR, Paposhvili gegen Belgien, Urteil vom 13. Dezember 2016, Beschwerde-Nr. 41738/10, § 183). Dies ist vorliegend zu überprüfen. 10.4.3 Die Vorinstanz hat Informationen über die medizinischen Behand- lungsmöglichkeiten in Guinea eingeholt. Dem entsprechenden Dokument lässt sich entnehmen, dass sowohl die Therapieangebote als auch die Er- hältlichkeit von notwendigen Medikamenten in Guinea nicht beurteilt wer- den können (vgl. A26/3). Das vom SEM empfohlene CHU Donka ist das grösste Spital in Guinea und beschäftigt 5 von insgesamt 11 Psychiatern im ganzen Land; die dortige Abteilung ist offenbar die einzige Einrichtung in Guinea, die auf die Behandlung von psychischen Krankheiten speziali- siert ist (R._). Aus den vorhandenen medizinischen Akten geht nicht hervor, dass der Be- schwerdeführer einer (engmaschigen) Therapie bedarf. Auch sind seit dem letzten Arztbericht vom (...) keinerlei weitere medizinische Akten einge- reicht worden, womit davon auszugehen ist, dass sich die gesundheitliche Situation des Beschwerdeführers stabilisiert hat. Da aufgrund der Akten- lage somit nicht angenommen werden kann, dass er einer dringenden psy- chotherapeutischen oder psychiatrischen Massnahme bedarf, ohne die er in eine lebensgefährdende Lage geraten würde, stellt der Gesundheitszu- E-1705/2018 Seite 18 stand des Beschwerdeführers im Lichte der Rechtsprechung kein Wegwei- sungsvollzugshindernis dar. Betreffend seine mit Arztzeugnis vom (...) do- kumentierte Suizidalität ist in Übereinstimmung mit der Vorinstanz festzu- halten, dass – im Falle, dass eine solche (wieder) eintritt – diesem Umstand bei den Vollzugsmodalitäten Rechnung zu tragen sein wird. 10.4.4 Im Übrigen handelt es sich beim Beschwerdeführer um einen voll- jährigen, jungen Mann, der den Grossteil seines Lebens in Guinea ver- bracht hat, dort sozialisiert wurde und bis ins 14. Lebensjahr die Schule besuchte. Das Bundesverwaltungsgericht verkennt nicht, dass die Lebens- bedingungen für den Beschwerdeführer in Guinea schwierig gewesen sein mögen, indessen ist davon auszugehen, dass er in der Lage ist, sich in seinem Heimatland wieder zu integrieren. Aufgrund der Akten kann ihm zwar entgegen der vorinstanzlichen Ansicht durchaus geglaubt werden kann, dass er seine Eltern auf tragische Weise verloren hat, zumal der Tod seiner Eltern auch im Arztbericht als für seinen psychischen Zusammen- bruch kausal erläutert wird (vgl. oben E. 10.3.2). Seinen Ausführungen ge- mäss leben indessen sowohl seine jüngere Schwester als auch seine Cou- sine in Conakry, bei der er vor seiner Ausreise gewohnt hat. Zudem hat die Cousine seine Eltern finanziell unterstützt (vgl. A13 F16 f.). Somit steht ihm die Möglichkeit offen, bei seiner Rückkehr wenigstens zu Beginn wieder bei seiner Cousine zu wohnen und von ihr finanziell unterstützt zu werden. Zwar bringt er auf Beschwerdeebene vor, diese habe Conakry inzwischen verlassen, was jedoch unbelegt bleibt. Dessen ungeachtet ist anzuneh- men, dass die Cousine ihn auch von Marokko aus finanziell unterstützen kann. Ferner ist davon auszugehen, dass zumindest sein «Onkel» noch in Guinea wohnt, sich auch seine Schwester noch in Conakry befindet und somit ein Beziehungsnetz vorhanden ist. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist die Annahme gerechtfertigt, ihm werde eine Reintegration und das Anknüpfen an bestehende respektive das Schliessen neuer Beziehungen in der Hei- mat gelingen. Es liegen somit keine Hinweise vor, dass der Beschwerde- führer bei einer Rückkehr in eine Notlage geraten würde, zumal ihm auch die Möglichkeit offensteht, in der Schweiz finanzielle Rückkehrhilfe zu be- antragen. 10.4.5 Der Beschwerdeführer hat zudem nicht nachweisen können, dass er sich trotz seines bereits mehrjährigen Aufenthalts in der Schweiz über- mässig integriert hätte, was gegebenenfalls einer gesonderten Betrach- tung bedürfen würde. Im Gegenteil fiel er den Behörden wiederholt negativ auf. So wurde er aufgrund übermässiger Absenzen aus der Schule ausge- E-1705/2018 Seite 19 schlossen und musste sein Wohnheim verlassen, weil er eine Sozialarbei- terin bedroht hatte (vgl. A35). Der im Bericht des Wohnheims aufgeführte Verdacht auf Drogenhandel kann aufgrund der Akten indes nicht bestätigt werden. Integrationsüberlegungen stehen einem Wegweisungsvollzug je- denfalls in casu nicht entgegen. 10.4.6 Nach dem Gesagten erweist sich der Vollzug der Wegweisung so- wohl in genereller als auch in individueller Hinsicht als zumutbar. 10.5 Schliesslich obliegt es dem Beschwerdeführer, sich bei der zuständi- gen Vertretung des Heimatstaates die für eine Rückkehr notwendigen Rei- sedokumente zu beschaffen (vgl. Art. 8 Abs. 4 AsylG und dazu auch BVGE 2008/34 E. 12), weshalb der Vollzug der Wegweisung auch als möglich zu bezeichnen ist (Art. 83 Abs. 2 AIG). 10.6 Zusammenfassend hat die Vorinstanz den Wegweisungsvollzug zu Recht als zulässig, zumutbar und möglich bezeichnet. Eine Anordnung der vorläufigen Aufnahme fällt somit ausser Betracht (Art. 83 Abs. 1–4 AIG). 11. Aus diesen Erwägungen ergibt sich, dass die angefochtene Verfügung Bundesrecht nicht verletzt, den rechtserheblichen Sachverhalt richtig so- wie vollständig feststellt (Art. 106 Abs. 1 AsylG) und – soweit diesbezüglich überprüfbar – angemessen ist. Die Beschwerde ist abzuweisen. 12. Bei diesem Ausgang des Verfahrens wären die Kosten dem Beschwerde- führer aufzuerlegen (Art. 63 Abs. 1 VwVG). Aufgrund der Gewährung der unentgeltlichen Prozessführung ist jedoch auf die Erhebung von Verfah- renskosten zu verzichten. (Dispositiv nächste Seite) E-1705/2018 Seite 20","Demnach erkennt das Bundesverwaltungsgericht: 1. Die Beschwerde wird abgewiesen. 2. Es werden keine Verfahrenskosten erhoben. 3. Dieses Urteil geht an den Beschwerdeführer, das SEM und die zustän- dige kantonale Behörde. Die vorsitzende Richterin: Die Gerichtsschreiberin: Roswitha Petry Sarah Diack Versand:",""}
fr	caselaw	Switzerland	Bundesgericht Tribunal fédéral Tribunale federale Tribunal federal {T 0/2} 6B_819/2008 ajp Arrêt du 26 décembre 2008 Cour de droit pénal Composition MM. les Juges Schneider, Président, Ferrari et Mathys. Greffier: M. Vallat. Parties X._, recourant, représenté par Me Fabien Mingard, avocat, contre Ministère public du canton de Vaud, rue de l'Université 24, 1005 Lausanne, intimé. Objet Infraction à la Loi fédérale sur le séjour et l'établissement des étrangers, recours contre l'arrêt du Tribunal cantonal du canton de Vaud, Cour de cassation pénale, du 11 avril 2008. Faits: A. Par jugement du 8 février 2008, le Tribunal de police de l'arrondissement de Lausanne a constaté que X._ s'était rendu coupable d'infraction à la Loi fédérale sur le séjour et l'établissement des étrangers et l'a condamné à la peine de quatre mois de privation de liberté, avec suite de frais. B. Saisie d'un recours en réforme et en nullité, la Cour de cassation pénale du Tribunal cantonal vaudois l'a rejeté par arrêt du 11 avril 2008. Cet arrêt repose en substance sur les faits suivants. B.a X._ est né le 1er janvier 1984 en Côte d'Ivoire, son pays d'origine. En juin 2003, il a déposé une demande d'asile en Suisse, laquelle a été rejetée par décision du 24 octobre 2003, définitive et exécutoire dès le 27 novembre 2003. Le renvoi de Suisse de X._ a été prononcé. Il n'a cependant jamais quitté la Suisse depuis lors, n'ayant aucun désir de retourner en Côte d'Ivoire, où, selon lui, la situation politique est instable et conduit ses ressortissants à vivre dans la crainte perpétuelle d'une arrestation arbitraire. L'intéressé n'est au bénéfice d'aucun titre de séjour valable et n'a aucune ressource. Il vit grâce à l'aide d'urgence accordée de quinzaine en quinzaine par le Service de la population. Il a expliqué vivre momentanément chez un ami à Yverdon-les-Bains. Son casier judiciaire comprend quatre inscriptions, pour des condamnations entre le mois d'avril 2004 et janvier 2006, principalement pour infractions à la LStup et à la LSEE. Entre le 26 janvier 2006, date de sa dernière condamnation, et le 28 septembre 2007, X._ a continué de séjourner en Suisse sans aucune autorisation. B.b En bref, la cour cantonale, examinant le grief de nullité soulevé par le recourant selon lequel il n'avait pas été valablement inculpé, a jugé que le recours en nullité fondé sur l'art. 411 let. g CPP/VD était irrecevable en tant qu'il avait trait à des irrégularités de procédure antérieures à l'ordonnance de clôture d'enquête. Le défaut d'inculpation ne constituait pas une violation d'une règle essentielle de la procédure au stade du jugement, mais uniquement à l'étape antérieure. Il aurait ainsi incombé au recourant de faire valoir ce moyen en exerçant un éventuel recours contre l'ordonnance de renvoi. B.c Examinant ensuite les conclusions en réforme du recourant, la cour cantonale a estimé que l'aide d'urgence accordée pour des raisons humanitaires n'influençait en rien le statut en Suisse du recourant, si bien que son séjour demeurait illicite. L'aide humanitaire dont il bénéficiait ne s'opposait donc pas à sa condamnation. Quant à la peine, la situation financière du recourant ne permettait pas le prononcé d'une peine pécuniaire. Son statut en Suisse ne permettait pas d'atteindre le but de resocialisation assigné au travail d'intérêt général, qui aurait en outre achoppé sur des problèmes pratiques au stade de l'exécution en raison de sa situation précaire. Le pronostic relatif au sursis était défavorable, en raison de cinq condamnations précédentes dont trois pour infraction à la LSEE et de l'intention manifestée de rester en Suisse et de prolonger son comportement illicite. Un sursis partiel n'entrait pas non plus en ligne de compte eu égard à la durée de la peine. Le prononcé d'une courte peine privative de liberté était donc justifié. C. X._ forme un recours en matière pénale contre cet arrêt. Il conclut principalement à son annulation et au renvoi de la cause à l'autorité cantonale afin qu'elle rende une nouvelle décision, et, à titre subsidiaire, à sa réforme en ce sens qu'une peine pécuniaire de 120 jours-amende, à un franc l'un, lui soit infligée. Il requiert en outre d'être mis au bénéfice de l'assistance judiciaire et que l'effet suspensif soit restitué. Le Ministère public et la Cour cantonale ont renoncé à déposer des observations. Considérant en droit: 1. A titre principal, le recourant reproche à la cour cantonale d'avoir arbitrairement appliqué le droit cantonal. Il soutient, en résumé, n'avoir jamais été valablement inculpé, cet acte de procédure lui ayant été signifié non par le juge d'instruction, qui serait seul compétent pour y procéder en application des règles cantonales de procédure, mais par un greffier. Ce vice, qui serait essentiel, aurait dû conduire la cour cantonale à annuler le jugement de première instance en application de l'art. 411 let. g CPP/VD et non à déclarer le grief irrecevable. 1.1 Une décision est arbitraire lorsqu'elle est manifestement insoutenable, méconnaît gravement une norme ou un principe juridique clair et indiscuté, ou encore heurte de manière choquante le sentiment de la justice et de l'équité. Il ne suffit pas que sa motivation soit insoutenable; encore faut-il que la décision apparaisse arbitraire dans son résultat. A cet égard, le Tribunal fédéral ne s'écarte de la solution retenue que si celle-ci apparaît insoutenable, en contradiction manifeste avec la situation effective, adoptée sans motif objectif ou en violation d'un droit certain. Il n'y a pas arbitraire du seul fait qu'une autre solution paraît également concevable voire même préférable (ATF 134 I 140 consid. 5.4 et les arrêts cités, p. 148, 129 I 8 consid. 2.1 p. 9). 1.2 Conformément à l'art. 411 al. 1 CPP/VD, le recours en nullité prévu à l'article 410 est ouvert en raison d'irrégularités de procédure postérieures à l'arrêt ou à l'ordonnance de renvoi. La lettre g de cette disposition consacre un tel cas de nullité s'il y a eu violation d'une règle essentielle de procédure non mentionnée aux lettres a à f de cette disposition et que cette violation a été de nature à influer sur la décision attaquée. En l'espèce, la cour cantonale a rejeté le moyen de nullité comme mal fondé. On comprend cependant à la lecture des considérants de la cour cantonale qu'elle a jugé le recours en nullité fondé sur l'art. 411 let. g CPP/VD irrecevable en tant que le recourant invoquait une irrégularité de procédure antérieure à l'ordonnance de clôture d'enquête. L'arrêt entrepris précise en effet que le défaut d'inculpation ne constituait pas une violation d'une règle essentielle de la procédure au stade du jugement, mais uniquement au stade de l'ordonnance de clôture d'enquête. Il appartenait ainsi au recourant, selon la cour cantonale, de faire valoir ce moyen en exerçant un éventuel recours contre l'ordonnance de renvoi, ce qu'il n'avait pas fait. Il ne pouvait dès lors plus s'en prévaloir à posteriori (arrêt entrepris, consid. II.1, p. 4). 1.3 Le recourant objecte qu'il ne pouvait pas recourir contre l'ordonnance de clôture d'enquête du 25 juillet 2007, dès lors qu'il s'agissait d'une ordonnance de condamnation qui avait été transformée en ordonnance de renvoi ensuite de son opposition. 1.3.1 Il ressort des pièces du dossier et du jugement de première instance que le recourant a fait l'objet d'une ordonnance de condamnation le 25 juillet 2007 dans l'enquête PE07.002674-CMI. Cette ordonnance portait sur une infraction à la LSEE reprochée au recourant pour la période du 26 janvier 2006 au 6 juin 2007. Le recourant y a fait opposition le 7 août 2007. Il a, ensuite, fait l'objet d'une ordonnance de renvoi le 5 novembre 2007 dans l'enquête PE07.015994-CMI. Cette ordonnance portait sur la même infraction pour la période du 7 juin au 28 septembre 2007. Lors de l'audience du 8 février 2008, le recourant a indiqué maintenir son opposition à l'ordonnance de condamnation du 25 juillet 2007 et le Tribunal d'arrondissement a joint les causes avant d'instruire et de juger. 1.3.2 Il s'ensuit que le recourant ne démontre pas en quoi il n'aurait pas été en mesure de faire valoir son défaut d'inculpation par la voie d'un recours dirigé contre l'ordonnance de renvoi du 5 novembre 2007, qui était ouvert en application de l'art. 294 let. f CPP/VD. On ne voit dès lors pas en quoi la cour cantonale aurait appliqué arbitrairement le droit cantonal de procédure en déclarant irrecevable son recours dirigé contre le jugement de première instance, en ce qui concerne sa condamnation pour être demeuré illégalement en Suisse du 7 juin au 28 septembre 2007. Le grief est infondé dans cette mesure. 1.3.3 L'ordonnance de condamnation du 25 juillet 2007 est devenue de lege ordonnance de renvoi ensuite de l'opposition formée par le recourant (cf. art. 270 al. 1er CPP/VD). Selon la jurisprudence cantonale, le recours pour violation d'une règle essentielle de la procédure dirigé contre une ordonnance de condamnation à laquelle le condamné fait simultanément opposition est rendu sans objet par cette dernière parce que le renvoi consécutif à l'opposition permet à l'intéressé de faire valoir ses moyens devant le tribunal de police (BOVAY ET AL., Procédure pénale vaudoise, 3e éd. 2008, art. 294, n. 10.3.3). On ne saurait donc faire grief au recourant de n'avoir pas formé de recours déjà au stade de l'ordonnance de clôture d'enquête à laquelle il s'est opposé. Le recourant précise toutefois dans ses écritures ne pas soutenir que le chef d'accusation retenu par le tribunal de première instance embrasserait des faits sur lesquels il n'aurait jamais été entendu ou qu'il n'aurait pas été en mesure de requérir des mesures d'instruction nécessaires ou utiles en raison des circonstances dans lesquelles son inculpation lui a été signifiée. En d'autres termes, le recourant soutient que le vice affectant l'inculpation justifierait l'annulation du jugement de première instance indépendamment de toute conséquence pratique sur l'exercice de ses droits. Or, l'art. 411 CPP/VD distingue des causes absolues et des causes relatives de nullité, ces dernières étant définies comme celles qui ont été de nature à influer sur le jugement (BOVAY ET AL. , op. cit., art. 411, n. 1.2), catégorie à laquelle ressortissent les irrégularités visées par l'art. 411 let. g CPP/VD invoqué par le recourant dans son recours cantonal. Dans la mesure où elle se résume à soutenir que « le défaut d'inculpation (valable) continue de constituer une violation d'une règle essentielle de la procédure au stade du jugement », l'argumentation du recourant, qui ne tente pas d'établir quelle influence l'irrégularité aurait eu sur le jugement de première instance, ne démontre pas que l'entrée en matière sur son grief aurait pu conduire à l'annulation du jugement de première instance. Il n'explique donc pas en quoi l'arrêt cantonal serait arbitraire dans son résultat. Le grief est donc infondé également en ce qui concerne les faits visés dans l'ordonnance de condamnation du 25 juillet 2007. 1.4 Pour le surplus, le recourant n'invoque expressément la violation d'aucune autre garantie constitutionnelle ou conventionnelle, d'aucune garantie de nature formelle en particulier, si bien qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'examiner la question sous cet angle (art. 106 al. 2 LTF). 2. Le recourant conteste ensuite sa condamnation à une courte peine privative de liberté. 2.1 Selon la cour cantonale, eu égard à la date à laquelle les faits sont survenus et à celle où ils ont été jugés, trois règles fixant la peine étaient susceptibles d'entrer en ligne de compte. Dans sa teneur en vigueur jusqu'au 31 décembre 2006, l'art. 23 al. 1 LSEE permettait de sanctionner celui qui entre ou réside en Suisse illégalement de l'emprisonnement jusqu'à six mois, peine à laquelle pouvait s'ajouter une amende de 1000 francs au plus, cependant que les cas de peu de gravité pouvaient être sanctionnés d'une amende seulement. Dans la teneur modifiée de cette disposition en vigueur dès le 1er janvier 2007, cette infraction était sanctionnée d'une peine pécuniaire de 180 jours-amende au plus. Enfin, selon l'art. 115 al. 1 de la nouvelle loi fédérale sur les étrangers du 16 décembre 2005, en vigueur depuis le 1er janvier 2008, quiconque séjourne illégalement en Suisse, notamment après l'expiration de la durée du séjour non soumis à autorisation ou du séjour autorisé est puni d'une peine privative de liberté d'un an au plus ou d'une peine pécuniaire. De ces trois règles, celle en vigueur du 1er janvier au 31 décembre 2007 était la plus favorable, dès lors qu'elle prévoyait exclusivement une peine maximale de 180 jours, contre une peine de 180 jours pouvant être combinée avec une amende pour la loi la plus ancienne et une peine allant jusqu'à un an pour la loi actuelle. 2.2 Le recourant ne conteste pas le choix de la règle effectué par la cour cantonale conformément à l'art. 2 al. 2 CP. Il soutient en revanche que, l'art. 23 LSEE, dans sa teneur en vigueur du 1er janvier au 31 décembre 2007 ne permettrait pas le prononcé d'une peine privative de liberté. Ce grief est fondé. Dans un arrêt récent, la cour de céans a, en effet déjà eu l'occasion de constater que faute d'une base légale explicite, l'art. 23 al. 1 LSEE dans sa version en vigueur du 1er janvier au 31 décembre 2007 ne permettait pas de prononcer une condamnation à une peine privative de liberté (ATF 134 IV 60 consid. 8.4, p. 81). Il s'ensuit que l'arrêt cantonal, qui viole le droit fédéral sur ce point doit être annulé et la cause renvoyée à la cour cantonale afin qu'elle fixe à nouveau la peine. Ce faisant, la cour cantonale devra encore tenir compte des éléments suivants. 2.3 En ce qui concerne le choix de la sanction, il convient de relever, tout d'abord que selon les constatations de fait de l'arrêt entrepris, la demande d'asile en Suisse du recourant a été rejetée par décision définitive et exécutoire dès le 27 novembre 2003 et son renvoi a été prononcé (arrêt entrepris, consid. B.1, p. 2). Il s'ensuit que le prononcé d'un travail d'intérêt général n'entre pas en considération, cette sanction apparaissant d'emblée inadaptée (cf. ATF 134 IV 60 consid. 3.3, 97 consid. 6.3.3.4, p. 110), sans qu'il soit nécessaire d'examiner plus avant le point de savoir si l'art. 23 al. 1 LSEE constitue une base légale suffisamment explicite au prononcé d'une telle sanction. Quant à la quotité de la sanction, le Tribunal fédéral a, dans un arrêt récent, jugé que la peine infligée en application de l'art. 23 al. 1 LSEE devait tenir compte de précédentes condamnations déjà infligées à raison du même séjour illicite ininterrompu pour des périodes antérieures, de sorte que l'ensemble des peines cumulées n'excède pas la peine maximale prévue par la loi (arrêt du 4 novembre 2008 X c. Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons Schaffhausen, 6B_114/2008 destiné à la publication aux ATF). Enfin, selon la jurisprudence - à laquelle on renvoie en ce qui concerne les modalités générales de la fixation de la peine pécuniaire - les aides sociales constituent des revenus qui doivent être pris en considération lors de la fixation du montant du jour-amende. Même si le montant de ce revenu peut apparaître insuffisant pour garantir le minimum vital du droit des poursuites, cette circonstance ne s'oppose pas encore au prononcé d'une peine pécuniaire, mais doit être prise en considération en procédant, en tant que de besoin, à des abattements du revenu net déterminant (ATF 134 IV 60 consid. 5, p. 65 ss; v. aussi arrêt 6B_541/2007, consid. 6). 3. Le recours est admis. Le recourant qui obtient gain de cause peut prétendre une indemnité de dépens (art. 68 al. 1 LTF), si bien que sa demande d'assistance judiciaire est sans objet (art. 64 al. 2 LTF). Il n'y a pas lieu de prélever des frais (art. 66 al. 4 LTF). La requête de restitution de l'effet suspensif est sans objet. Par ces motifs, le Tribunal fédéral prononce: 1. Le recours est admis. L'arrêt cantonal est annulé en tant qu'il confirme la condamnation du recourant à une peine privative de liberté et la cause renvoyée à l'autorité cantonale afin qu'elle complète l'instruction et rende une nouvelle décision au sens des considérants qui précèdent. 2. Le canton de Vaud versera au conseil du recourant une indemnité de 2'500 francs à titre de dépens. 3. La requête d'assistance judiciaire est sans objet. 4. Il n'est pas prélevé de frais. 5. Le présent arrêt est communiqué aux parties et au Tribunal cantonal du canton de Vaud, Cour de cassation pénale. Lausanne, le 26 décembre 2008 Au nom de la Cour de droit pénal du Tribunal fédéral suisse Le Président: Le Greffier: Schneider Vallat